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Diplomacy
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Press statement on the occasion of the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron

by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Press statement on the occasion of the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron Full statement to the press by the President of the Republic, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, following the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron in Brasília (DF), on March 28, 2024 It is a great joy to reciprocate the hospitality with which my delegation and I were received in Paris when I participated in the Summit for a 'New Global Financial Pact' last June. Over the past three days, we have carried out an extensive agenda that included stops in Belém, home to COP30; Itaguaí, where we have Prosub; and now Brasília, for a State visit. This true marathon gives a sense of the breadth of the cooperation and friendship ties between France and Brazil. Among traditional powers, none are closer to Brazil than France. And among emerging powers, you tell me if any are closer to France than Brazil. In today's highly complex international landscape, the dialogue between our nations serves as a vital bridge connecting the Global South to the developed world, fostering efforts to overcome structural inequalities and achieve a more sustainable planet. Brazil and France are committed to collaborating in advancing a shared global vision through democratic dialogue. A vision grounded in the priority of production over unproductive finance, solidarity over selfishness, democracy over totalitarianism, and sustainability over predatory exploitation. President Macron was able to personally witness that our commitment to the environment is not merely rhetorical. In the past year, we have reduced illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 50%, and we aim to eliminate it entirely by 2030. As a symbol of the revitalization of our partnership, today we embraced a New Action Plan, broadening our collaboration into new arenas. These include financing the ecological and energy transition, advancing in bioeconomy, agriculture, public administration, digital issues, artificial intelligence, and reinforcing human rights and gender equality on our bilateral agenda. This range of topics is reflected in the more than 20 agreements we celebrate today. We discussed the success of the Brazil-France Economic Forum, held yesterday in São Paulo, which had not convened presentially since 2019. We explored ways to expand and diversify trade, which reached 8.4 billion dollars last year and has the potential to grow even further. France is the third-largest investor in Brazil, with a strong presence in sectors such as hospitality, energy, defense, and high technology, which generate employment and income in our country. I presented to President Macron the new investment opportunities in infrastructure and sustainability facilitated by the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento - PAC) and the Neoindustrialization Program. I presented our commitment to combating inequalities as the cornerstone of Brazil's G20 Presidency. Within this context, we are launching a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty. As we mark the 80th anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions this year, President Macron and I concur on the imperative for the G20 to send a clear message advocating for global governance reform and the reinforcement of multilateralism. We also agree that it is time for the super-rich to pay their fair share of taxes, in line with the proposal for fair and progressive international taxation that Brazil advocates within the G20. As strategic partners, we exchanged views on the major dilemmas facing humanity. Across the globe, democracy is under the shadow of extremism. The denial of politics and the dissemination of "hate speech" are growing and concerning. For this reason, Brazil joined, in 2023, the French initiative Partnership for Information and Democracy and will continue to work to promote and protect the circulation of reliable information. It is time to promote a truly multilateral debate on the governance of artificial intelligence. It is unacceptable for a new divide to emerge, segregating wealthy nations, possessors of this technology, from developing countries where basic internet access remains precarious. I reiterated to President Macron Brazil's unwavering belief in dialogue and the defense of peace. My administration will continue working diligently to ensure that Latin America and the Caribbean remain a conflict-free zone, where dialogue and international law prevail. The Security Council's paralysis in response to the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza is both alarming and inexplicable. The arguments questioning the obligation to comply with the recent ceasefire directive in Gaza during the month of Ramadan once again undermine the authority of the Council. Discussing a world governed by rules that are not collectively agreed upon signifies a regression of centuries, reverting back to the law of the jungle. Brazil categorically condemns all forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. We cannot permit religious intolerance to gain ground among us. Jews, Muslims, and Christians have always lived in perfect harmony in Brazil, contributing to the construction of the modern nation we see today. Dear friend Macron, the Strategic Partnership with France embodies our joint endeavor to modernize and invigorate our economies, prioritizing sustainability and upholding human rights. I am convinced that, even after three intense days, there is still much work ahead of us. The future holds countless possibilities for our countries to cooperate, develop, and create together I look forward to seeing you again soon at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Thank you very much.

Diplomacy
Paris, France, 25-04-2024 : Visit of the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, for a major speech on Europe at the Sorbonne.

Macron’s Battle for his European Legacy

by Jacob Ross

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Emmanuel Macron’s second Sorbonne speech showed that the French leader wants to shape a European legacy that will outlast his presidency. In doing so, he also highlighted the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship. In the end, it was a typical speech by French President Emmanuel Macron that members of the government and MPs, journalists and students heard on Thursday morning at the Sorbonne in Paris. It was too long, as the president himself admitted after about an hour. It was also too complicated, many listeners agreed: for almost seven years, translators, analysts, and often Macron’s own advisors have struggled with the metaphors and the convoluted three, four or five-point plans expounded by the president, who has been frequently accused in France of no longer being able to reach his fellow citizens. And yet it was a speech that no other current top politician in Europe would likely be capable of delivering. An emotional speech, sometimes angry and disappointed, then confident again, at times even rousing. A courageous speech, with a firework of analyses and proposals that addressed many pressing issues for the future of the EU. In between defense policy, the green and digital transformations of the economy and international trade policy, the protection of borders and asylum policy, and the threats to the liberal democracies of the West, one central concern dominated this long speech: the sovereignty of the European Union—an echo of his first Sorbonne speech of 2017, which has remained the obsession of the youngest and most pro-European president in French history. Disappointments in Defense Policy Right from the start, Macron measured himself against his own promises, particularly in security and defense policy, where strengthening the EU’s sovereignty is most urgently needed. In 2017, he proposed an EU intervention force, a defense budget, a doctrine for the armed forces, and the promotion of a strategic culture. Global political developments have since proved him right; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has left Germany and other countries “bare” in terms of security policy since 2022. However, the EU has still not implemented Macron's proposals and so the security of 450 million EU citizens could once again depend on a few thousand voters in US swing states in the November presidential election there. If Macron is to be believed, however, there have been successes since 2017 that need to be built on after the forthcoming European Parliament elections this June. In terms of security policy, he included the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which 13 EU member states have joined since 2017. The initiative only delivered a real operational impact in the form of the Takuba special forces mission, which fought terrorist groups in the Sahel from 2020 under French leadership. Berlin refused to take part in Takuba and it ended after a few months. The mission was also unable to prevent the EU from being ousted by Russia and other states in the Sahel and suffering a massive loss of influence. If Takuba is presented as a success, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is in bad shape. Achievements to Be Built on in Future By contrast, the initiative to strengthen European sovereignty in economic policy, which Macron predictably emphasized in his speech, was truly successful from a French perspective. The fact that the German government agreed to take on joint EU debt in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is seen across party lines in Paris as the president's biggest European policy victory since 2017. Macron recalled that the then finance minister and current German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, even spoke of a “Hamiltonion moment” in an interview, alluding to a permanent joint EU budget. For Macron, this remains the prerequisite for genuine EU sovereignty and therefore a goal for the remaining three years of his presidency.
 

France is confident that it will be able to persuade the German government to take this step in the coming years. In his speech, Macron referred several times to a recently published report by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, which contains proposals for strengthening the EU single market and for joint investments and is likely to influence the agenda of the next European Commission. While Macron was giving his Europe speech, journalists in Brussels were speculating about the French president's support for Mario Draghi, another former Italian head of government who has ambitions for the commission presidency. The current president, Ursula Von der Leyen, who is German, was not mentioned at all in the speech. Draghi will also present recommendations for increasing EU competitiveness—very much in line with Macron. Signals to the German Partner Joint debt issuance will inevitably lead to renewed conflict between Germany and France in the coming months. Perhaps that is why Macron praised the relationship with Germany so frequently, emphasizing the value of the Aachen Treaty signed in 2019, cooperation during the pandemic and two joint arms projects that have recently made progress. Nevertheless, the French president could not resist a few digs. He emphasized the importance of nuclear power for the EU’s energy supply, praised French initiatives to form a “nuclear alliance” at the EU level, and called for the expansion of the “Europe of the atom.” More surprising than this old conflict was his allusion to the cannabis legalization introduced by Germany’s coalition government. He said some partners believed that the liberalization of drug policy was right, while he believed it to be wrong. Instead, the authority of the state should be strengthened. Fault Lines in the Franco-German Relationship Beyond these policy issues, the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship also became evident in the second Sorbonne speech: Macron repeatedly emphasized the danger of the EU becoming a “vassal” of the United States, losing its independent voice in the world, and degenerating into a “corner of the West.” Macron said the era of free trade and globalization was coming to an end and he referred to the triad of European dependencies often cited in France these days, most of which are particularly aimed at Berlin: Russian gas, Chinese export markets, and US security guarantees. Both the US and China were increasingly ignoring international rules that only the EU abided by, he claimed. The EU was acting “naively,” endangering the competitiveness of its industries and risking being responsible for its own failure in the process. The palpable fear of decline that ran through Macron’s speech did not only refer to the economy. The old fear of the Europeans, especially the French, of being culturally dominated by the US also flared up in many places. The multilingualism of Europe's youth, which Macron had invoked in 2017, is in a bad way. Despite Brexit, English dominates the EU institutions in Brussels. This is unlikely to change in the future, on the contrary. Thanks to Netflix and TikTok, young people all over Europe speak the same language. The EU, Macron said, barely controlled this digital space anymore and produced no content. Even worse than the withering of multilingualism was the fact that the EU no longer offered any positive narratives. For observers of French politics, this clearly echoed Macron’s concerns about opinion polls ahead of the European elections. His party alliance is lagging far behind the far-right Rassemblement National party, whose 28-year-old leading candidate Jordan Bardella is particularly popular with first-time voters and on social media. Macron’s second Sorbonne speech was therefore also intended to boost the campaign of his party’s leading candidate in the European elections, Valérie Hayer. However, Macron confined himself to a few allusions, probably also because he is for the first time being perceived as a burden for his party’s chances in the election campaign. Departure from Macron While preparing his speech, Macron must have thought back more than once to his first Sorbonne speech in 2017. The new speech heralds the beginning of his farewell as president of France. He has around three years left to turn the optimistic promises made at the beginning of his first term into a European policy legacy that will outlast his presidency. At the end of his speech, Macron quoted Hannah Arendt: “The only way to influence the future” was to “make promises and keep them.” Macron has promised a lot since 2017. No matter what else one might think of him: he is a visionary, the likes of whom has not been seen in the German chancellery for many years. Perhaps that is why the great European, the former German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, who died in December, wanted Macron to give a speech in recognition of his life's work. However, Macron still owes the EU the second part of Arendt's quote—the fulfillment of promises—in many areas. He knows that. And so, in parts of his speech, he came across as a driven man, one who is running out of time. This was also evident in another quote that Macron placed at the end of his speech, which raises the biggest question of all, the answer to which is anything but certain in France: Referring to Ernest Renan’s famous lecture, also delivered at the Sorbonne, in 1882, entitled: “What is a nation?” Macron called for the EU to ask itself the same essential question. If he succeeds in providing this impetus over the next three years, the EU would once again have something to offer, including to the young listeners of his speech. And Macron would have kept his big promise on European policy.


Energy & Economics
Export in Chains

Export bans and inter-state tensions: The need for a revised WTO export bans framework to address worrying state behaviour at the peak of the pandemic

by Dr. Seebal Aboudounya

Please note that this article is only available in English. Abstract: During the peak of the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, some states imposed export bans on medical goods to prevent their exportation during the emergency situation brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the manner in which this policy was applied caused much discontent especially between neighbouring countries and allies, particularly due to the confiscation of pre-ordered goods destined for countries also experiencing a crisis situation. This paper analyses the rise of inter-state tensions due to export bans at the peak of the pandemic and calls for the need to revise the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) export bans framework which currently contains a number of gaps exacerbating the problem and leaving a legal gap. The paper discusses those gaps in the WTO’s legal framework and highlights the areas in need of revision to avoid repeating the troubles of the past pandemic. Introduction Faced with political pressure and an extraordinary situation during the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, some countries resorted to the use of export bans as a tool to ensure that they have enough medical supplies for their population. However, their use of export bans also involved the confiscation of medical goods destined for delivery to their neighbours and allies. Such behaviour provoked discontent among those states expecting the delivery of their ordered medical supplies which were urgently needed as the death-toll from Covid-19 was sharply rising. This article starts by explaining the instances where confiscations using export bans occurred, namely between the United States and Germany, the US and Barbados as well as France and the United Kingdom. The paper also discusses the ‘near misses’ involving some European states where the export bans were initially used to confiscate the goods of other European countries, but then those goods were ultimately allowed to be delivered abroad to their delivery location. The discussion then shifts to the international legal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) governing the use of export bans and then shows how this legal framework is flawed in certain areas as it contains some gaps that may be exploited for conducting unconstrained confiscation operations. An overview of existing studies on export bans then reveals that this policy is already harmful in several ways (Evenett 2020a; Bown 2020; Barichello 2020). The article then ends with a concluding discussion emphasising how export bans are particularly harmful when used in relation to pre-ordered goods and reiterating the need for a revised WTO legal framework on export bans. Incidents of confiscations using export bans The three incidents below all occurred during the peak of the covid pandemic in 2020 when countries faced life and death situations. The three cases also involved the use of export bans to justify the confiscation of medical goods pre-ordered by other states. US vs Germany This incident occurred on 3rd April 2020 involving the United States and Germany (Crump 2020). This particular event captured a lot of media attention and included the release of high-level statements from both sides, with accusations of “modern piracy” being directed towards the US (BBC 2020a). The main issue here was that approximately 200,000 N95 masks that Germany had ordered for its police force were diverted to the United States (Selinger 2020). The masks shipment dispatched from China from an American company was diverted to the US during a transfer between planes in Thailand (Selinger 2020). Germany stated that the masks were confiscated in Bangkok by American officials and that those masks were ordered from a US producer (Crump 2020; DW 2020). The next day, the US company 3M denied Germany’s claims and told a German news agency that it did not have any paperwork regarding a shipment for Germany (DW 2020). However, Germany had made it clear on 3rd April that it had ordered and paid for those urgently needed masks from a US company (Berlin 2020). In fact, Germany referred to earlier accusations made by French officials against the US for buying France’s masks in China and added that “the U.S. administration has obliged the American conglomerate 3M by law to supply the U.S. with as many N95 respiratory masks as possible, such as those used in hospitals” and that “the group also manufactures in China” (Berlin 2020a). Significantly, the media was already reporting how the American company 3M “has been prohibited from exporting its medical products to other countries under a Korean-War-era law invoked by President Donald Trump” (BBC 2020a). The BBC (2020a) added that “on Friday [3rd April], Mr Trump said he was using the Defence Production Act (DPA) to demand that US firms provide more medical supplies to meet domestic demand”. Zooming in on Trump’s official statements during the Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing reveals significant information when he stated that:  I’m also signing a directive invoking the Defense Production Act to prohibit export of scarce health and medical supplies by unscrupulous actors and profiteers. The security and Secretary — the Secretary of Homeland Security will work with FEMA to prevent the export of N95 respirators, surgical masks, gloves, and other personal protective equipment. We need these items immediately for domestic use. We have to have them. […] We’ve already leveraged the DPA to stop the hoarding and price gouging of crucial supplies. Under that authority, this week, the Department of Health and Human Services, working with the Department of Justice, took custody of nearly 200,000 N95 respirators, 130,000 surgical masks, 600,000 gloves, as well as bottles — many, many, many bottles — and disinfectant sprays that were being hoarded (Whitehouse 2020, emphasis added).  Trump’s statements are important because they include the significant number of 200,000. Although Trump did not specify where those 200,000 N95 were confiscated from, the number remains important (BBC 2020a); it is the same number of masks that Germany reported. More importantly, the official statement also supports the fact that the DPA was used as a tool for confiscating goods. Trump’s statements describe these good as being ‘hoarded’ prior to their confiscation, however, the statements from Germany’s side indicate that those masks were intended for the German people. As significant as Trump’s statements were the ones made by Berlin’s Interior Senator who blamed the US for the confiscation of the N95 masks (DW 2020). In fact, he stated that:  We consider this an act of modern piracy. This is not how you deal with transatlantic partners. Even in times of global crisis, there should be no wild west methods. I urge the federal government to urge the United States to comply with international rules (Berlin 2020b; BBC 2020a).  As such, this incident saw direct statements from the German side, indicating that Germany saw the US’ behavior as deviating from international rules. Yet despite Trump’s statements in the press briefing, he directly addressed the German incident, denying the claims by saying that “there has been no act of piracy” (Crump 2020). Similarly, the spokeswoman for the American embassy in Bangkok denied that the US had knowledge of the mask shipment bound for Germany (Tanakasempipat 2020). Despite the US’ constant denial of state involvement, it remains a fact that an order of 200,000 masks destined for Germany was never delivered. Moreover, at no point did the developments mention non-state entities, but rather, the discourse had remained solely at the inter-state level and the main issue for discussion was the US’ use of the Defence Production Act to secure vital medical goods. US vs Barbados On the 5th of April, Barbados was brought into the picture when 20 ventilators donated to Barbados by a Philanthropist where “barred from exportation” by the US government (Barbados Today 2020). Moreover, as stated by the Barbadian Health and Wellness minister, these ventilators were already “paid for” (Barbados Today 2020). In explaining this incident, the Health minister clarified that “it has to do with export restrictions being placed on certain items” (Connell 2020). Thus, the Barbados incident was another instance where export bans were used as the justification for confiscating important medical supplies that were destined for another country. As for the US’ response to this incident, The Miami Herald wrote that a State department spokesperson’s email response “seemed to suggest that some previous media reports about seized medical exports may not be accurate” (Charles 2020). However, given that this is an incident relating to a Caribbean Island whose relations with the US are far from hostile, it is unlikely that this confiscation incident was characterised by significant inaccuracies. France vs UK Another instance of confiscation via export bans was reported during the pandemic, but this time, the location was Europe. The incident happened in March 2020 and had the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) as the victim and France as the accused. France’s actions were reported by Euronews when it stated that:  France has forced a face mask manufacturer to cancel a major UK order as the coronavirus-inspired scramble for protective gear intensifies. The National Health Service ordered millions of masks from Valmy SAS near Lyon earlier this year as COVID-19 threatened. But amid a global shortage, France earlier this week ordered the requisition of all protective masks made in the country (Euronews 2020). France’s export ban placed the company in an uncomfortable situation as it was prohibited from fulfilling the NHS’ order. Indeed, the company director commented that "the requisition does not allow any wiggle room for us to deliver to the NHS, but it is complicated because the NHS was the first client to order and uses our masks all year long” (Euronews 2020). It is important to note that four months later, the Guardian revealed that Valmy had a contract with the NHS that was signed in 2017 where this company “was required to deliver almost 7m FFP3 respirator masks to the UK at 17p per mask in a pandemic situation as soon as the order was activated” (Davies and Garside 2020). The NHS did indeed activate the contract in early February, however, the French “sweeping requisition decree” ultimately meant that France seized the masks within its borders (Davies and Garside 2020). Near misses: tensions in Europe The incidents below can be described as “near misses" as the accused states initially confiscated other state’s products, but eventually gave them back to their neighbours. The cases here are particularly useful for showing how the misuse of export bans has the potential to harm diplomatic relations between neighbouring states and allies, especially when the ban is placed over other states’ pre-ordered goods. Germany vs neighbours One of such instances occurred between Germany and Switzerland, but this time Germany was the accused. The incident was reported on the 9th of March 2020 and caused a strain in Germany’s relationship with Switzerland during the pandemic. The “diplomatic spat” started a week after the German government banned exports on most protective medical goods (Dahinten and Wabl 2020). Switzerland was particularly angered when 240,000 masks travelling to it were blocked from crossing the German border to enter Switzerland (Dahinten and Wabl 2020). Switzerland then called the German ambassador for “an emergency meeting” regarding this issue amid a very tense situation, especially when it hardly manufactures protective equipment itself (The Local 2020). Eventually after a call was scheduled between the leaders of both countries, Germany modified the ban on the 12th of March, adding exemptions and then removed it completely the following week (Hall et al. 2020). Germany’s diplomatic relations were equally weakening with another neighbour, but this time, the neighbour was a European Union (EU) member. The point of conflict was of course the export ban on protective equipment. The Austrian Economy minister commented on this ban by stating that:  It can’t be that Germany is holding back products for Austria just because they happen to be stored in a German location […] these products are for the Austrian market, and unilateral moves by Germany are just causing problems in other countries (Dahinten and Wabl 2020).  Such statements indicate that placing export bans on other states’ goods seriously angers the importing states as such bans make them feel that their interests are being completely ignored by their counterparts. France vs neighbours France also got a share of the criticism in March when it seized the supplies of the Swedish company Mölnlycke located in France after announcing an export ban on masks and other medical goods (AP 2020; Marlowe 2020). The conflict erupted between France and Sweden when the French ban was placed over Mölnlycke’s Lyon Warehouse that is responsible for distributing personal protective equipment to Southern Europe as well as Belgium and the Netherlands (Marlowe 2020). Significantly, the seized stock was composed of 6 million masks, all of which “had been contracted for”, including a million masks each to Italy and Spain (Marlowe 2020). Eventually, France allowed the shipments to go to Italy and Spain despite initial reluctance to do so (AP 2020). However, the easing of the situation was mainly due to the “crucial efforts” of Sweden’s prime minister who was thanked by Mölnlycke on the 4th of April for his role in the removal of the French export ban on the Lyon Warehouse (Mölnlycke 2020). It is important to note that this instance also made its way to the European Parliament on the 3rd of April where the French export ban was questioned and criticised as “yet another demonstration of the lack of European solidarity” (EP 2020). Thus, this specific incident resonated across the whole of Europe, and not in a positive way. Export bans: the GATT framework The international law on export bans falls under the competence of the WTO, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 which itself is mainly composed of the 1947 GATT agreement (GATT 1994). Significantly, article XI of the agreement titled ‘General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions’ prohibits the use of export bans when it states that:  No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party (GATT 1994).  However, the agreement leaves out certain exemptions where this prohibition does not apply, the relevant one here being “export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party” where the GATT clearly states that “the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extent to” it (GATT 1994, XI, 2(a)). The emphasis on the temporary application of such measures is important and is further clarified in the WTO’s timely report on “export prohibition and restrictions” issued at the peak of the Covid pandemic where it explained that:  The reference to a measure that is "temporarily applied" indicates that the carve-out applies to measures applied for a limited time, taken to bridge a "passing need". In turn, "critical shortage" refers to deficiencies in quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or a turning point (WTO 2020, annex 1).  Of relevance to the export bans legal framework is also Article XX of the GATT (1994) titled “General Exceptions” that states how:  Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures […] (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  Thus, here the GATT agreement allows countries to use export bans when it is necessary to protect lives. The WTO’s report confirms the relevance of this exception to the Covid-19 situation when it explains that:  In the context of COVID-19, Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 could be used to justify a ban or quantitative restriction on the exportation of goods, so long as such a measure would be necessary and effective in contributing to protecting the health of that country's citizens (WTO 2020, Annex 1).  Thus, in terms of international law, countries are allowed to make use of export bans when faced with exceptional circumstances. During the Covid pandemic, the WTO member states did indeed make use of the exceptions and exemptions codified in the GATT agreement while informing the WTO of their new policies (Pauwelyn 2020, 107). However, when life is back to normal, their use remains illegal. Thus, overall, the export bans legal situation can be described as residing in a ‘legal grey zone’ whereby their use, though normally prohibited, can be justified and permitted in serious situations requiring them (Pelc 2020, 349). Nonetheless, it is important to note that the international legal framework here does not provide clarification for situations where the export ban exemption is placed on pre-ordered or pre-paid-for goods supposed to go to other countries. Indeed, the current legal framework suffers from a number of ambiguities as explained below. The first ambiguity relates to the term “destined goods.” When prohibiting export bans, article XI speaks of “export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party”. Thus, clearly, countries cannot put their hands on goods going to other countries for this would be illegal. However, the carve-out intended to “prevent or relieve critical shortages” is not detailed enough as to clarify if this also applies to goods “destined” for other countries (GATT, article XI, 2(a)). Even if the “destined” statement is applied to the exemption, the ambiguity remains. Much of the ambiguity rests on how to interpret the term “destined” from the export prohibition paragraph: is the term “destined” applied here generally whereby a company in Country X is an exporter and thus it’s goods will naturally be “destined” for other countries, or does the term imply goods that are ready-to-travel to other countries who have already placed an order or paid for goods? Clearly, it’s the second interpretation when applied as an exemption that has been the cause of conflict between the states in the previous section. However, regardless of which interpretation is intended in the GATT, instances where countries confiscate orders destined for other countries is seen as politically and morally unacceptable by the latter; “modern piracy” was how Germany described it. Thus, whatever the world leaders had in mind when they agreed to this exemption, clearly it now needs a lot of clarification. Secondly, there is ambiguity over the situation regarding donated goods. This is an important question especially given the Barbados case. Here the goods sold in country X were already bought in Country X (from a philanthropist in Country X) to be sent to country Y. Thus, a transaction had already taken place and the goods now belong to the philanthropist who is kindly giving this order to Country Y. Does an export ban apply to this situation? Logically, there is little to no justification for its application in this scenario, but the GATT agreement still needs to confirm this. Thirdly, there is ambiguity over the situation of “guest” companies. Given the globalised world we live in, does this exemption apply to international companies geographically located in country X? This was the main cause of tension between Sweden and France when France imposed the export ban over the Swedish company’s Warehouse. A logical consideration of this situation would lead to a ‘no’ answer to this question, but it is also acknowledged that the company may be subject to the geographical jurisdiction and the laws of the country that it is located in. Thus, it is important that the relationship between the host country and the foreign company is clarified when it comes to export prohibitions. Fourthly, there is ambiguity over the timeline of enforcing an export ban policy. The Covid crisis saw quick decisions being taken and implemented. This was particularly the case with export bans and was to the detriment of the importing states. In the case of the US-Germany incident, the confiscation of the masks on their way to Germany occurred hours before the US president announced invoking the defence production Act. In fact, the US policy on export restrictions became official on the 7th of April after the Federal Emergency Management Agency published it (Bown 2020). Significantly, FEMA stated that “this rule is effective from April 7, 2020 until August 10, 2020” (FEMA 2020). Thus, the obvious question arises: on what basis were the masks going to Germany confiscated? Similarly, on what basis were the ventilators destined for Barbados blocked by the US on the 5th of April? If the WTO steps in to advise on the implementation of such export bans, the situation would be greatly improved. Finally, there is ambiguity over the extent to which one country may enforce its policy, particularly in other countries. The US-Germany case was sensationalised by an “international hunt” for masks in Bangkok; thus, here the US officials imposed the export ban on an American company in a foreign country outside their national jurisdiction. However, the question remains, is this permissible under the GATT? The GATT articles did not go that far, but it is important that the international legal framework answers this question. Overall, several unanswered questions resulting from the brevity of the GATT’s article on export bans require answers. Filling in those gaps in the GATT would greatly improve the legal framework on export bans and ease tensions between member states. The next section takes a closer look at export bans, particularly their discussion in the literature and their unwelcome effects. The effects of export bans The academic literature on export bans mainly focuses on their effects, either on several states or on specific case-studies. Prior to Covid-19, a number of studies were mainly concerned with the effects of export bans following the food price crisis in 2007-2008 when countries made use of export restrictions on agricultural commodities in an attempt to stabilise domestic markets (e.g. Liefert, Westcott, and Wainio 2012; Dorosh and Rashid 2013; Timmer 2010). However, following the coronavirus pandemic, some studies have focused on their use on medical goods and agricultural goods as well as on their effects (Koppenberg et al. 2020; Pelc 2020; Evenett 2020b). Nevertheless, what unites almost all the studies on export restrictions is that they mainly agree that such bans do more harm than good. The recent studies on export bans are important because they demonstrate how this policy results in negative effects. For example, Simon Evenett (2020a, 831) in his recent work argues that “export bans on masks, for example, erode the capability of trading partners to cope with the spread of COVID-19. Rather than beggar-thy-neighbour, export bans on medical supplies effectively sicken-thy-neighbour”. He further analyses the effect of the export ban from the perspective of the developing countries cut-off from receiving advanced medical equipment such as ventilators, and explains that whenever this policy is implemented, “a significant share of the world’s population” is prevented from accessing this vital equipment (Evenett 2020a, 832). Evenett (2020a, 833) therefore recommends that governments consider other alternatives to export bans that “do not impede foreign purchases”. Significantly, Evenett also discusses the effect of the export curbs on the exporting country itself and argues that this policy is counter-productive:  Whatever temporary gain there is in limiting shipments abroad, the loss of future export sales will discourage local firms from ramping up production and investing in new capacity, which is exactly what the WHO has called for. In practical terms, during a pandemic this mean that an export ban “secures” certain, currently available medical supplies at the expense of more locally produced supplies in the future (Evenett 2020a, 832).  Internationally, export bans have also been shown to have severe effects on several countries at once. Chad Bown’s (2020, 43) work on the Covid pandemic demonstrates how “taking supplies off the global market can lead to higher world prices and reduced quantities, harming hospital workers in need in other countries”. He also cautions that their use during the pandemic may invoke a “multiplier effect”, similar to the one observed during the sharp price increases of agricultural goods in the 2000s when “one country’s export restriction led to additional global shortages, further increasing world prices, putting pressure on other countries to impose even more export restrictions” (Bown, 2020, 44). Richard Barichello’s (2020, 223) study on Covid-19 and the agricultural sector also highlights the negative effect of export bans while observing how some countries have already imposed export restrictions on staple goods such as rice and cereal products during the pandemic. Barichello acknowledges that such export bans could have a positive effect on countries such as Canada if a consequence of such a ban increases the price of a commodity that it exports. However, he also explains the gravity of the adoption of export bans during current times when he writes that:  The distributional effects of adding export restrictions will, like the COVID-19 crisis itself, fall most heavily on the poor in importing countries by reducing trade, raising food prices, and reducing food security in all but the export countries of that commodity (Barichello 2020, 223). Export bans have also been shown to have “intangible” negative effects that are also significant. Hoekman, Firoini and Yildirim’s (2020) study focuses on export bans from an “international cooperation” perspective and emphasises the foreign policy damages resulting from export bans. The authors write that “in the case of the EU, the immediate policy responses of some member states may have damaged the European project by eroding trust among European partners” (Hoekman, Firoini and Yildirim 2020, 78). Simon Evenett (2020b, 54) adds that export restrictions are a “gift to those economic nationalists abroad that want to unwind or shorten international supply chains”; such nationalists can then claim that relying on the foreign market is unreliable. It is significant that the WTO itself discusses a similar point in its Covid-19 report on export restrictions when it lists the following as part of the “other possible consequences” of export bans:  An erosion of confidence in the multilateral trading system, in particular if restrictions negatively impact the most vulnerable, especially least-developed countries, whose healthcare systems are already strained. It would be difficult for importing members to trust a system that fails to produce tangible benefits in times of crisis and may lead to general calls to ensure that production of medical and other products only take place at the national level (WTO 2020, 9).  The WTO (2020, 9) also highlights how from a health-perspective, export bans may ultimately weaken the fight against the coronavirus when it states how: “given its global nature, if some countries are not able to combat the disease, this coronavirus, or mutated strains of it, will inevitably recirculate and contaminate the populations of all countries, including those imposing the export restrictions”. Thus, an export ban on medical goods is not the soundest policy to implemented during a pandemic. Effects of export ban confiscations & concluding thoughts It is important to consider the consequences of using export bans specifically as a confiscation technique. The points raised above are still of high relevance. However, there are three main disadvantages that are particularly prominent when countries place export bans on other states’ goods. Firstly, enforcing this policy on the goods of other states creates severe tensions between countries at different levels. The first one is at the diplomatic level whereby the officials of country Y express their discontent to officials of country X. Such tensions then easily transmit to other places. Indeed, at the citizenry level, these tensions take the foreground as the citizens in country Y read the news and frown at what their neighbouring states are doing to them in times of need. Thus, the misuse of export bans can be seen as a threat to diplomacy, international trade, and to the principles of establishing friendly relations between states and peoples. Secondly, shortages and stress are another effect of this policy when enforced on other states’ goods. When countries place orders, it is usually because they have a need for those orders. When those orders are then confiscated, those expecting the orders are left empty-handed and in a stressful situation. The stress is generated after the realisation that their plans for fighting the virus have been compromised; orders placed months or weeks ago will now not reach their borders despite those orders being just hours away from arrival. In the above cases, the German police and the NHS had to deal with the unpleasant news that their mask orders will not arrive. Such export bans create a difficult situation for the importing nations and for their institutions, as they then try to seek alternative suppliers at a very short notice. Finally, the implementation of this policy on other states’ orders sends worrying empirical signals. Scholars of IR when they first learn about international politics naturally ask whether the world we live in is a very “realist” world characterised by “survival of the fittest” instinct, or whether it is a world that accommodates international law and inter-state cooperation, despite anarchy. This is the essence of the classical debate between Realists and neo-Liberal Institutionalists (Mearsheimer 1994; Walt, 1997; Ikenberry 2011; Martin 1992). It is reassuring that in the previous discussion, the WTO still had a role to play. The European Commission also tried to solve the disputes arising between its members over the export bans (EC 2020). However, despite those interventions, it was clear that the cause of the problem was the unilateral export ban policy that was quickly being implemented at the discretion of the member states over what was destined for other states. As such, there is an urgent need for the WTO to revise its export ban legal framework to prevent the above scenarios from ever repeating in the future. 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Defense & Security
Australian flag and South Korean flag

Press Conference, Melbourne. Australia-Republic of Korea 2+2 Foreign And Defence Ministers’ Meeting

by Richard Marles , Cho Tae-Yul , Penny Wong

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Joint transcript with: The Hon Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Subjects: Australia-Republic of Korea 2+2 Foreign And Defence Ministers’ Meeting; AUKUS Pillar Two; Hanwha bid for Austal; foreign interference; Korean peninsula security. 01 May 2024 Deputy Prime Minister, Richard Marles: Well, welcome everyone. Today, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and I have had the pleasure of being able to welcome Minister Cho and Minister Shin, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister of South Korea to a 2+2 with Australia. In December of 2022, the Republic of Korea released its Indo-Pacific Strategy. And it described an assessment of the region and a response to it, which represented Korea looking to take its place in the region and the world. That is remarkably similar to the assessment that we made a few months later in the Defence Strategic Review. And it speaks to the fact that both Korea and Australia have a close strategic alignment and a shared vision about our place in the region and the world. And what was immediately obvious from that moment was the opportunity to take the relationship between our two countries to the next level. And today's 2+2 is very much an expression of that. We are seeing increased engagement between our two countries across the board. We are certainly seeing that in the realm of defence. Last year, Korea had its largest participation in Exercise Talisman Sabre, which is our major bilateral defence exercise. This year, we will see more Korean engagement in Exercise Pitch Black, Exercise Kakadu, Exercise Southern Jackaroo and we are very appreciative of Korea’s participation in those exercises, as we are in the way in which Korea and Australia are working together to uphold the rules-based order within our region and in fact, within the world. Both countries, as we've discussed today, are playing our part in supporting Ukraine in its resistance of the appalling aggression that is being forced upon it by Russia. We are working very closely together within our region to uphold the global rules-based order here as well, and that's seen in a greater engagement that both of us are doing with the countries of the Pacific and the countries of southeast Asia. We are particularly aware of the efforts that have been put in place for Korea to build its relationship with Japan and we see this as a very, very positive step forward in the strategic landscape of the region, and represents a huge opportunity for Australia to engage with both Korea and Japan. Finally, in respect of defence industry, we are seeing a blossoming of the relationship between our two countries in respect of defence industry. Yesterday, Minister Shin and I visited Hanwha's facility in Geelong, which is building for the Australian Army both the Huntsman and the Redback, which will be very central to our capabilities for the Army. But we're also very hopeful that these platforms represent an opportunity for greater industrial activity there, where we can see export to the world. Across the board, this is a relationship which is going to a new place, a place which is much deeper and much closer and we are very, very grateful for the presence of Minister Cho and Minister Shin in Australia today and we've really enjoyed the meeting that we've had this morning. Republic of Korea Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cho Tae-Yul: [spoken in Korean] Good afternoon, ladies and gentleman. I am Cho Tae-Yul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. I am grateful for the successful organisation of the sixth Republic of Korea-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Minister’s Meeting and I extend my deepest thanks to Mr Richard Marles and Ms Penny Wong for the warm welcome toward our delegations. It is with great pleasure that I make my first visit as Minister of Foreign Affairs to Australia to, our esteemed regional partner. Together with Mr Shin Won-sik, Minister of National Defense. During the first day of our visit on the 29th of April we paid tribute to the enduring legacy of 17,000 Australian veterans at the Australian National Museum Korean War Memorial in Canberra, commemorating their profound sacrifices for peace. The sacrifices of Australian veterans have laid a solid foundation for the prosperity of our relationship and on behalf of the Korean Government and people, I’d like to express heartfelt gratidude to the Australian veterans for their unwavering dedication. Today’s meeting holds significant importance as it is the first gathering of its kind following the installation of our current governments and Korea’s announcement of our Indo-Pacific Strategy. This occasion is further distinguished by its location in Melbourne, a symbol of our robust cooperation in defence industry. The Ministers of the two countries engaged in extensive discussions aimed at deepening strategic cooperation and communication, reinforcing our shared vision at both regional and global levels. Both parties recognise each other as pivotal partners in the realisation of our respective Indo-Pacific strategies, and as likeminded nations agreed to enhance our cooperation at bilateral, unilateral and multilateral levels. We acknowledge the remarkable progress in our bilateral cooperation with national defence and defence industries, highlighted by the signing of a contract for the delivery of Redback IFVs and the participation of Korean military personnel in Exercise Talisman Sabre and we said that we will be strengthening our cooperation into the future. In the realms of cyber and maritime security, we agreed to collaborate in blocking North Korea’s access to funding for illicit nuclear and missile developments, and to thwart illegal activities such as arms trading between Russia and North Korea. Our Australian counterparts have expressed their steadfast support for enhancing the human rights of North Koreans and for our policies aimed at reunification. Furthermore, we resolved to continue our close collaboration with ASEAN and the Pacific regions which hold great significance for both our countries. We will also expand our cooperative efforts for comprehensive security in cyber and maritime security, as well as economic security and climate change. I am confident today’s meeting will mark a significant milestone in strengthening our partnership built on the shared foundations of liberal democracy and mutual trust, and will further our commitment to a rules-based regional and global order. Foreign Minister, Senator Penny Wong: Thank you very much. Can I first express my deep appreciation to Minister Cho and Defense Minister Shin for their travel to Australia for this Foreign and Defence Ministers’ 2+2 meeting. We appreciate you coming to Australia and we have deeply enjoyed the dialogue this morning. This is the first 2+2 for us Ministers. We recognise that this dialogue is a cornerstone of our comprehensive strategic partnership with Korea. Can I start by appreciating the Minister's acknowledgement of the role that Australia and Australian veterans have played in this bilateral relationship. We thank you for honouring those Australians who have served. It is a testament to the historic strength of our relationship. But more importantly, today, what we focus on is the increasing strategic and economic convergence that exists between our two nations. And the focus of our meeting was how to translate that convergence that the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Cho have articulated, how we translate that convergence into tangible and practical actions in southeast Asia, in the Pacific and more broadly in terms of our cooperation in in the Indo-Pacific. We are very interested not only in increasing our cooperation and our engagement in defence industries, but also in increasing our collaboration diplomatically and economically. I make note, as Foreign Minister Cho did, of our collective condemnation of North Korea's continue provocative, destabilising activities and we will continue to work together to ensure that this risk and threat to our collective security continues to be met in solidarity between our countries and other countries of the world. As you will see from the joint statement when it is released, discussed a range of other matters, including the Middle East, where we shared our perspectives. I thank, again, my counterpart, the Foreign Minister for his engagement. We were an early call for him and we appreciate it. And we appreciate the efforts that the Ministers have made in coming to Australia for this very important 2+2. Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense, Shin Won-Sik: [spoken in Korean] Good afternoon, I am Shin Won-sik, Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea. First of all, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Mr Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister and Ms Penny Wong, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the warm reception of our delegations. We are externally grateful for the noble sacrifices made by the 17,000 Australians during the Korean War who fought for freedom and peace in our country. On behalf of our people, thank you. During the ROK-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Meeting we engaged in extensive discussions on a range of issues concerning the Korean peninsula, Indo-Pacific region and boarder global foreign affairs and defence matters and reaffirmed our commitment to further develop our bilateral future oriented relationships. Firstly, we agreed to continue enhancing our mutual and beneficial partnership in defence industry. It is with great pleasure that I know a Korean company was selected in Australia’s next generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle project, valued at $250 million USD. This follows the successful collaboration on the self-propelled artillery project in 2021. Yesterday, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Marles, and I visited the construction site of a Korean company in Geelong where we witnessed firsthand our flourishing bilateral cooperation in the defence industry. This collaboration is set to not only modernise Australia’s military capabilities, but also stimulate the local economy and strengthen the strategic solidarity between our nations. Secondly, we agreed to enhance our joint military training to improve interoperability and foster conditions for regional peace and stability. Last year, a significant contingent of Korean armed forces participated in Exercise Talisman Sabre, yielding fruitful outcomes. This year, the Australian military took part in Korea’s Freedom Shield exercises, as a member of United Nations command, enhancing its capabilities for joint operations. We are committed to continuing these joint exercises in various forms and further elevating the level of cooperation between our armed forces. Thirdly, recognising the importance of building trust in our national defence and defence industry partnership, we agreed to expand human exchanges among defence related organisations. Republic of Korea and Australia, as key strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region, share profound strategic views and interests. We will build on the achievements of today’s meeting and collaborate earnestly for the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula, Indo-Pacific region and the international community as a whole. Speaker: Questions? Journalist: South Korean Minister for National Defence, Shin Won-sik, there's been speculation about countries like South Korea joining the AUKUS Defence technology. Did you discuss this today? And does South Korea believe that it could engage in useful cooperation under Pillar Two of AUKUS? And Minister Marles, Hanwha has made a bid for Austal. Was this big discussion discussed in your meetings over recent days? And would such a bid likely be permitted under the new foreign investment framework being unveiled by the government today? Defence Minister Shin: [spoken in Korean] The Korean government, to enhance the regional peace, we support the AUKUS Pillar Two activities, and we do welcome that AUKUS members are considering Korea as the AUKUS Pillar Two partner. Korea's defence science and technology capabilities will contribute to the peace and stability of the development of AUKUS Pillar Two and the regional peace. And during today's meeting, we also discussed the possibility of partnering with AUKUS Pillar Two. Thank you. Deputy Prime Minister Marles: So, perhaps I might address both issues in relation to AUKUS Pillar Two. And we did discuss this both yesterday and today. AUKUS, as you know, is a technology-sharing agreement. It's not a security alliance. And Korea is obviously a country with deeply impressive technology, where we do have shared values, where we have strategic alignment, where we engage closely together. We already engage closely together in relation to technology. So, as AUKUS Pillar Two develops, I think there will be opportunities in the future, and we're seeing that play out in relation to Japan as well and we talked about that. In respect of Austal. Look, ultimately, this is a matter for Austal. They are a private company. From the government's perspective, we don't have any concern about Hanwha moving in this direction. We have identified Austal as a strategic shipbuilder for Australia in WA. Wherever Austal goes, whatever it does, there will obviously need to be security arrangements put in place in respect of sensitive technologies and intellectual property that would have to be managed no matter what the future of Austal. And were there anything that were to transpire in relation to Hanwa that would need to be managed in that context as well. But fundamentally, this is a matter for Austal as a private company. Journalist: And to Foreign Minister Wong. Australian officials have confirmed that India’s government was behind the nest of spies the Director General of Security described in 2021. Should Australians in the diaspora community be concerned about Indian government surveillance? And what message does the Australian government have to the Indian government about the acceptability of these activities and to Foreign Affairs Minister Cho Tae-Yul, the ABC has today reported South Korea is one of the friendly countries with a good relationship with Australia, which nonetheless engages in espionage here. Has there ever been a point of tension between the two countries, or are there clear shared understandings about the operation of intelligence agents in both countries? Foreign Minister Wong: Well, you would be unsurprised to hear me respond that we don't comment on intelligence matters. But at a level of principle about the democracy, I think you would have heard me and other Ministers on many occasions assert the importance of our democratic principles, assert the importance of ensuring that we maintain the resilience of our democracy, including in the face of any suggestion of foreign interference, and we have laws to deal with that. And to continue to say that we deeply value the multicultural fabric of the Australian community. It is a strength and we welcome people's continued engagement in our democracy. Foreign Minister Cho: [spoken in Korean] In regards to your question, I haven't heard anything and I am not sure against which context you are asking this question, so I have nothing to answer to that question. Journalist: Thank you. Minister Cho, you've both spoken today about the tensions across the Korean peninsula. These aren't always discussed when we're talking about issues like defence arrangements in the Pacific and the AUKUS deal as such. Why do you believe that close-knit ties with Australia in defence and these types of engagement is something that does have an impact on that relationship? Foreign Minister Cho: [spoken in Korean] Korea's security focuses on the North Korea's threat, but it's not the only focus. But as you can see, there's huge geopolitical changes taking place and the security in the Indo-Pacific region is closely linked to the security of other regions of the globe. So, we live in such a geopolitical era and Russia and North Korea are cooperating in the Ukraine war. And it shows that the Indo-Pacific region’s security is closely linked to the security of Europe as well. So, Korea's security is closely linked with Australia's security, and that's the world we live in. So, against the context of Indo-Pacific region and from the regional point of view, Australia and Korea share a lot of values and it's very good, not only in terms of economy, but also in security for our two countries to cooperate. So, in that context, we discussed the security partnerships between our two countries. Foreign Minister Wong: I might just add to that, if I may, Richard, that I think history shows us that what happens in the Korean peninsula matters to the security and stability of our region. We have no doubt that North Korea's destabilising, provocative, escalatory actions are contrary, are a threat to international peace and security, as well as to the peace and security of the ROK. We see it as very important that the international community exert and assert as much pressure as possible on the DPRK, including in relation to the regime of sanctions. And as Foreign Minister Cho has said, the actions of Russia in undermining that - those sanctions, in undermining the isolation of the DPRK, in participating in the provision of materiel, in contravention of UN resolutions and sanctions, is destabilising and undermines peace and security for the whole of the globe. And so I think it is important for us to continue not only to express solidarity with the Republic of Korea in the face of this aggression but also to call out Russia's behaviour as irresponsible and destabilising. Journalist: And Minister Wong, you touched on the reports of espionage before - Foreign Minister Wong: No, I was asked about them and I said we don't comment on intelligence matters. Journalist: Sure, I understand that that's the general principle on these matters, but given Australia's close-knit ties with India in the situation of the Quad, as a general principle, could I ask you, do you believe Australia would feel empowered enough to be forthright in raising concerns of these nations with the Indian government if they did it right? Foreign Minister Wong: Well, again, say we don't comment on intelligence matters, but as a matter of general principles, Australia remains consistent to our interests and to our values in all of our engagements. Speaker: Great. Thank you very much.

Diplomacy
Ecuador - Mexico flags

Mexico-Ecuador: Coordinates of a diplomatic crisis foretold

by Rafael Velazquez Flores

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President López Obrador's announcement of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Ecuador marks a turning point in Mexico's foreign policy. Since 1979, the country had not interrupted such a relationship with another nation. In recent years, breaking relations had not been a common practice by Mexico. In the 19th century, Benito Juárez suspended ties with countries that recognized Maximilian's Empire. In the 20th century, the government severed links with the Soviet Union in 1930 for promoting communist ideology; with Spain in 1936 during its Civil War; with the United Kingdom in 1938 after the oil expropriation; with Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor; with Guatemala in 1958 after Guatemalan planes fired on Mexican vessels in the Pacific; in 1974 with Chile after the coup against Salvador Allende, and in 1979 with Nicaragua due to the Somoza dictatorship. But in the last 45 years, the country had not resorted to this practice. The recent announcement was somewhat surprising because Mexico is known for projecting friendly relations with Latin America and is recognized for its defense of peace. Additionally, President López Obrador had proposed to have friendly relations with Latin American countries and adhere to the principle of Non-Intervention. Prior to the rupture with Ecuador, Mexico had been involved in some diplomatic crises with certain Latin American countries. During Vicente Fox's presidency, Mexico expelled the Cuban ambassador in 2004, and later a similar incident occurred with Venezuela, but ties were not broken. In both cases, the level of interaction shifted from Ambassador to Chargé d'affaires. In the current administration, Bolivia and Peru had declared Mexican ambassadors ‘personas non gratas’ and they were recalled. Moreover, Peru announced the same status against President López Obrador. However, in both cases, there was no outright rupture of relations. On the other hand, Mexico has been a generous actor in granting diplomatic asylum to political refugees. For example, the country hosted Leon Trotsky in the 1930s and a significant number of Spaniards fleeing the civil war in that nation. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico received hundreds of asylum seekers from South America after military coups in those countries. Even López Obrador granted this status to Evo Morales and offered it to Pedro Castillo, former presidents of Bolivia and Peru respectively. Partly, the origin of the diplomatic crisis between Ecuador and Mexico stemmed from Mexico hosting Jorge Glas, former vice president of Ecuador, accused of corruption, since December 2023. Since the beginning of 2024, the Ecuadorian government requested Mexico to extradite Glas to serve his sentence as he had already been convicted. When the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused and López Obrador criticized Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa's government, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared Mexican Ambassador Raquel Serur ‘persona non grata’. In response, the Mexican government granted political asylum to Jorge Glas. Fearing a possible escape, the Ecuadorian government decided to forcibly enter the Mexican embassy in Quito to arrest Glas. The incident constituted a flagrant violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which states in Article 22 that "the premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them without the consent of the head of the mission." The incident set a negative precedent in inter-American interactions. In response to this action, President López Obrador decided to sever diplomatic relations with Ecuador. The measure represented a milestone in Mexico's foreign policy, but it was consistent with Ecuador's actions. Although Mexico had other options, severing diplomatic relations was the appropriate decision given the gravity of the situation. The possible alternatives the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) had—without the need to completely sever ties—were: 1) sending a protest note to the Ecuadorian government; 2) recalling the Ecuadorian ambassador to Mexico; 3) presenting the case to the Organization of American States (OAS); 4) suing Ecuador to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of the UN; 5) breaking diplomatic relations but maintaining consular relations. The first option was too soft from a foreign policy standpoint and might have been ineffective. The second was feasible but not highly impactful. The third is appropriate because the OAS serves to resolve differences among its members. The fourth is the best alternative without the need to sever diplomatic relations. The fifth option could be feasible to avoid leaving the Mexican community in Ecuador unprotected and to not affect the economic and tourism relationship between the two countries. Specifically, a suitable decision was to combine some of the mentioned alternatives; for example: presenting the case to the OAS, suing Ecuador in the ICJ, and maintaining consular relations. However, severance was the decision made due to the gravity of the situation. But it's also important to consider the domestic context. In part, AMLO made that decision for domestic political reasons. Defending sovereignty strengthens his popular support base. His followers see him as the president who defends the nation's sovereignty. Additionally, the measure aids MORENA and Claudia Sheinbaum's electoral campaign by bolstering Mexico's position abroad and domestically. For example, there was broad consensus among the Mexican public. Even the opposition candidate, Xóchitl Gálvez, supported the decision. Moreover, the majority of Latin American nations condemned the act and showed solidarity with Mexico. The UN, OAS, and European Union also condemned the violation of international law. Additionally, the United States and Canada expressed displeasure with Ecuador's action. Not all public opinion supported López Obrador's decision. Some criticized Mexico for granting political asylum to a criminal. Similarly, there was an opinion that AMLO's statements – criticizing the Ecuadorian government – constituted a violation of the principle of Non-Intervention and were the cause of the diplomatic crisis between the two countries. In other words, from this perspective, Mexico also bore responsibility for the conflict escalating to the severance of diplomatic relations. Indeed, the Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum of 1954 establishes that a government cannot grant political asylum to a person with a criminal conviction. However, the same instrument states that "it is up to the granting State to qualify the nature of the offense or the reasons for persecution." In other words, Mexico was applying this criterion and decided to grant asylum to Glas. Therefore, there is a divergence on this point. For Ecuador, Mexico could not grant asylum because Glas was a convicted criminal. However, for Mexico, Glas is a politically persecuted individual and, therefore, has the right to asylum. The most appropriate course would have been for Ecuador not to invade the embassy, not to grant Glas safe passage, and to present the case to the ICJ for this body to decide whether he was a criminal or a politically persecuted individual. What factors explain the escalation of the crisis between these two countries—the embassy assault and the rupture of relations? Understanding these decisions requires first knowing the context in Ecuador. Firstly, Daniel Noboa is a young president with little political experience. He is a right-wing businessman who came to power when the previous president established the "cross death," a mechanism that allows for the removal of the Ecuadorian president and the dissolution of the National Assembly. In this context, Noboa is filling the remainder of the former president's term and must leave office in 2025 to call for new elections. Additionally, in recent months, Ecuador experienced a period of intense insecurity when some inmates took over prisons and held the guards as hostages. Drug trafficking, linked to Mexican cartels, has increased in the country. Last year, a presidential candidate was even assassinated. Faced with this situation, President Noboa needed strong actions to consolidate his power and gain legitimacy. However, some groups within Ecuador have criticized the invasion of the Mexican embassy and are calling for his resignation due to his inability to govern. The opposition party criticizes the foreign minister for her lack of diplomatic experience and the minister in charge of the operation, who is of Mexican origin. Both the president and the foreign minister have justified the action based on the possibility of Glas's escape; the consideration that he was a convicted criminal and that the asylum request was illegal; and the defense of Ecuador's dignity. On the other hand, in Mexico, President López Obrador has developed an inconsistent foreign policy towards Latin America. If governments are aligned with his ideology, then there is an amicable treatment. But if they are opposed to his way of thinking, then he criticizes those governments, which constitutes a violation of the principle of Non-Intervention in the internal affairs of another country. In other words, the president applies principles in a discretionary manner. Furthermore, the president has appointed ambassadors in Latin America without diplomatic experience, which contributes to generating conflict in some cases. AMLO's often improvised statements do not contribute to maintaining stable relations with right-wing governments in Latin America. In this administration, three ambassadors were declared ‘personas non gratas’, which represents a failure in the foreign policy strategy. The consequences of the diplomatic relations rupture are broad and negative. For instance, nationals of each country will lack diplomatic protection. In the near future, obtaining visas for travel and trade between both countries may become difficult. Ecuador was exploring the possibility of joining the Pacific Alliance. With what happened, that option is now canceled. Therefore, strengthening Latin American integration may encounter obstacles. The embassy invasion and the diplomatic relations rupture can affect inter-American relations and generate polarization in the region. Cooperation for combating drug trafficking between Mexico and Ecuador may likely halt. Potential joint solutions to Latin American migration to the United States may face obstacles if the incident creates divisions. Ecuador's prestige in the region may be affected by the clear violation of international law. Perhaps not all countries will support Mexico, but they will defend the principle of embassy inviolability. In summary, both parties contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Both Ecuador and Mexico made wrong decisions. However, nothing justifies a country storming an embassy and violating one of the most respected principles of international law. Therefore, Mexico's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Ecuador is justified by the gravity of what happened.

Diplomacy
Israel-Palestine conflict in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Political Insights (6): Determinants of the Egyptian Stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli Aggression on Gaza Strip

by ‘Atef al-Joulani

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском An opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), published on 20/3/2024, revealed that only 12% of Palestinians were satisfied with Egypt’s stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood. The survey results suggest that Egypt’s handling of the situation has weakened its role in the Palestine issue and negatively impacted its image, status and regional role. Determinants of the Egyptian Official Position The Egyptian stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by various determinants and influencing factors, foremost among them: 1. The desire to uphold Egypt’s pivotal role in the Palestine issue was driven by its significance in bolstering Egypt’s regional standing and fostering ties with the US. Throughout recent decades, Egypt has aimed to monopolize influence in Palestinian affairs, thwarting the rise of Arab or regional competitors. This ambition extends particularly to managing mediation efforts between Palestinian resistance and Israel, as well as facilitating Palestinian reconciliation. 2. The Camp David Accords have yielded significant benefits, fostering advanced political, economic and security relations with Israel. These ties have notably strengthened during the tenure of Egyptian President ‘Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 3. The security concern revolves around the potential escalation of sympathetic popular movements for Palestinian resistance, in Egypt and the wider Arab region. There’s apprehension about reigniting the Arab Spring and revitalizing the Arab street, fueled by the profound inspiration from Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the belief in altering the status quo by countering the Zionist project. This sentiment is further compounded by escalating anger over Israeli atrocities in Gaza Strip (GS) and a growing discontent with Arab regimes, either due to perceived neglect of their duty towards Palestine or internal governance failures. 4. Concerns about the significant political and security impact of a potential large-scale displacement of Palestinians from GS to Egyptian territory, which could drag Egypt into conflict with Israel, jeopardize the Camp David Accords, and disrupt the stability of Egyptian-Israeli relations. 5. Ideological reservations within the Egyptian government regarding the Islamic orientation of the Palestinian resistance, particularly amid strained relations with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (MB) movement and broader skepticism towards Islamic movements in the region. There’s a perception that Egyptian and many Arab officials are hesitant about the victory of the Palestinian resistance in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, fearing potential destabilizing effects on Egypt’s internal dynamics and the broader Islamic movement presence in the region. 6. The Egyptian official stance in the Palestinian landscape is characterized by strong alignment with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its political objectives. Egypt maintains cautious and unfavorable relations with Hamas, showing reservations towards its resistance efforts and its inclination to maintain an independent stance and political autonomy in managing relations with Egypt and other Arab and regional entities. 7. The Egyptian economy has been grappling with a deteriorating economic crisis, marked by the sharp depreciation of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar. This situation prompted urgent foreign intervention to stabilize the economy. Notably, on 23/2/2023, Egypt signed a $35 billion deal with the UAE for the Ras al-Hekma development project. Further assistance came from the European Union, which announced a substantial financial support package for Egypt worth €7.4 billion for 20242027, including $2 billion in emergency funding slated for disbursement in 2024. 8. The geopolitical determinant lies in Egypt’s control over the Rafah crossing, the sole land access point for GS to the outside world. This control has served as a potent pressure tool on both Gaza’s resistance factions and its populace, contributing to the tightening of the GS siege since 2007. During Operation al-Aqsa Flood, this control exacerbated accusations against Egypt, alleging complicity in the siege, exacerbating suffering and scarcity, while Israeli aggression targets the GS population and resistance. Facets of Egypt’s Official Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood By observing Egypt’s actions in handling Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the following facets emerge: 1. Politically, Egypt adhered to the resolutions set forth in the joint Arab and Islamic summit held in Riyadh on 11/11/2023, advocating for an end to Israeli aggression against GS and the facilitation of aid entry, although without specified follow-up mechanisms for implementation. 2. Egypt enforced the closure of the Rafah crossing and aligned with Israel’s stance opposing aid flow to GS, despite the crossing being under Egyptian-Palestinian jurisdiction, and the Israeli side has no authority over it. This marked a direct challenge to Egyptian sovereignty, as practical control over the crossing shifted to Israel, granting it sole authority over individual movement and aid entry. Egypt is increasingly apprehensive about the US decision to establish a seaport for Gaza aid, fearing it may diminish Egypt’s influence and control over aid entry via the Rafah crossing. 3. Egyptian authorities pressured Palestinian resistance movements to concede on prisoner exchange deals with Israel, pushing for exclusive Egyptian mediation while attempting to sideline competing mediation efforts, especially the Qatari mediation. Despite Egypt’s desire to monopolize the mediation, Qatar successfully entered the fray, becoming a favored mediator by the United States. 4. Egypt has actively opposed Israeli plans to displace GS residents to Egyptian territory, reinforcing security measures at the Rafah crossing. Diaa Rashwan, the chairperson of the Egyptian State Information Service stated, on 16/2/2024, that such displacement constitutes “a direct threat to Egyptian sovereignty and national security.” 5. During the initial days, Egyptian authorities permitted certain popular events condemning the Israeli war on GS. However, they subsequently enforced stringent measures to curb public protests sympathetic to the Palestinians, leading to a noticeable silence on the Egyptian streets. This repression contrasts with past instances where the Egyptian public reacted to lesser events in Palestinian affairs. Conclusion Operation al-Aqsa Flood’s political and field developments have cast a negative impact on Egypt’s role in the Palestine issue and its regional standing. Accusations have surfaced regarding Egypt’s cooperation with Israel in tightening the GS siege. There’s little indication of a significant shift in Egypt’s stance or political strategies regarding the ongoing war. Politically, Egypt is likely to maintain its adherence to the established official Arab and Islamic stance, over which it holds significant influence in shaping. It’s anticipated that Egypt will persist with its current policies regarding the closure of the Rafah crossing and tying aid entry to Israeli approval. Regarding its engagement with Palestinian resistance groups, particularly with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Egyptian authorities are expected to maintain a cautious and conservative stance. There’s little anticipation for a positive shift in Egypt’s position regarding permitting pro-resistance public events or condemning Israeli aggression against GS.

Defense & Security
The flag of Russia painted on a wall. Military cooperation between Russia and North Korea

Russia and North Korea: Current State and Prospects of Relations

by Konstantin Asmolov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea, or the DPRK, which has been under discussion since January 2024, could not only be perceived as a reciprocal visit after the North Korean leader’s visit to the Russian Far East in the fall of 2023 but also as an extremely important step in bolstering relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. Vladimir Putin visited North Korea in 2020, and along with the inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in 2000, this was a landmark event that allowed the DPRK to overcome its foreign policy isolation and Russia to embark on its “pivot to the East.” One could say that the Russian president’s visit to a country, which the Collective West had brandished as a “pariah” state, was a demonstration of Moscow’s reluctance to join the collective condemnation of the Pyongyang regime. Russian-North Korean relations have seen both ups and downs due to Russia’s view on the DPRK’s aspiration to join the nuclear club. On the one hand, Moscow understands Pyongyang’s position, but on the other hand, it does not accept it because it would destroy the existing world order built on the authority of the UN and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moscow has rather tried to play by the established international rules, and although Russian and U.S. diplomats could argue at length about the extent of sanctions following another nuclear test or missile launch, the idea that every step by the DPRK toward becoming a nuclear power would generate opposition was never questioned. However, since the late 2000s and even more so since the early 2010s, the world has been moving towards a new model of the world order, or rather, it has been a gradual transformation of the old one. The confrontation between the “Collective West” and the “Global South” intensified; the UN and other structures began to turn into a system of justifying double standards, losing the role of an impartial arbiter; and war began making its comeback to politics. In this precarious environment, we see the malfunction of the accepted mechanisms and, although the contours of the new world order have not yet been defined, many elements of the traditional structure of global security are losing their significance. The common political, economic and information space is giving way to the era of blocs, which, due to the competition in the Russia-China-U.S. triangle, inevitably affect Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, the “Asian NATO,” which was being formed after the trilateral summit in Camp David, seeks to justify its existence by a hypothetical alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang or Pyongyang and Beijing, positioned as an alliance of authoritarian regimes threatening democracy and democratic values. Meanwhile, this cooperation is unproven, to put it mildly, and it is based on innuendos or facts that at best (highly likely) can be regarded as circumstantial rather than direct evidence. Note that the intensification of speculations about some secret arms deals between Moscow and Pyongyang did not begin on the eve of Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia. This narrative has been on since June-August 2023, against the backdrop of the apparent failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which had suffocated from a shortage of ammunition, among other reasons. This is why the campaign could be viewed as putting pressure on Seoul to reconsider its policy on the supply of ammunition and lethal weapons to Ukraine. In this context, one of the options for further unfolding of events is the so-called “self-fulfilling prophecy” coming true, when cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang may become a response to the actions of their adversaries within the framework of the “security dilemma.” North Korean statements in late 2023 and early 2024 about a radical change in inter-Korean policy and rejection of the unification paradigm caused a stir in expert circles and were even positioned as preparations for a forceful solution to the inter-Korean problem, even though it was more like a model of “non-peaceful coexistence” – something similar to the Soviet-American confrontation in the Cold War era. Meanwhile, South Korean President Yun Seok-yol’s speech in honor of the March First Movement for Independence in 2024, where he actually declared that the liberation of Korea would be fully accomplished only after the elimination of the DPRK, which should take place with the help of the international community, went virtually unnoticed, although in terms of inflaming regional tensions this was a much more serious step. As a result, a more substantial revision of Moscow’s policy toward Pyongyang is expected from the Russian president’s visit to North Korea. The most radical forecasts concern the legitimization of military or military-technological cooperation and, more importantly, Russia’s withdrawal from the regime of international sanctions against the DPRK. As preliminary steps in this direction, Western experts refer to Russia’s position in the UN Security Council, where it first blocked the attempts of the United States and its satellites to further increase sanctions pressure on Pyongyang, and then, using its veto, paralyzed the official group of experts that formally monitored the sanctions regime and its violations that, in fact, proved to be nothing else than another instrument of pressure and name-calling. In this context, Russia’s withdrawal from the sanction regime seems logical, but Moscow is now seriously weighing the risks. On one side of the scale is the benefit of expanding cooperation with the DPRK, as many of its areas are currently blocked by sanctions. On the other is restrictions through the UN, since a situation when a permanent member of the Security Council, which voted in favor of sanctions, openly violates the relevant resolution, will clearly become a reason for a new round of pressure. The arguments that Russia as an aggressor should be expelled from the UN or deprived of its veto power periodically leak into the public domain, and these will have to be reckoned with. That is why Russia’s position currently boils down to the fact that it is against new sanctions, but intends to comply with the old ones, although proceeding from the principle of “what is not forbidden is allowed.” Therefore, when speaking about further expansion of cooperation between the two nations, it is necessary to divide this cooperation into several levels of involvement, the depth of each to depend on a whole set of factors. First of all, the level of confrontation between Russia and the Collective West, the regional situation in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, and, to a much lesser extent, on the military and political situation on Russia’s borders. It is not quite likely that Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un sign a number of documents “on the transition to the next level” straight off. Rather, this will be a matter of developing a road map, where a system of cooperation will be worked out in advance, depending on the further development of the situation, with preliminary preparations being made first. The first level of cooperation involves advances in existing areas for collaboration – their intensification is already clearly visible from the increased contacts between the two states in certain areas. First of all, this is the search for ways of economic cooperation that would not violate sanctions or exploit the “gray zones,” at best, to avoid direct accusations. Such work is carried out, including through an intergovernmental commission. The intensification of economic ties, which Western experts pass off as the consequences of the “arms deal,” indirectly proves this, since we are talking about the movement of ships with unknown cargo on board. Second, it is the further development of transportation and communication infrastructure: we can expect not only the construction of a cross-border road bridge and the emergence of a regular railroad service, but also the arrival of Russian cellular communications in the DPRK or the connection of certain segments of the DPRK to the Russian Internet. It is not a question of replacing the existing intranet with something more, but those who have the right or ability to go online will do better. At the same time, cooperation of hacker groups or the training of North Korean specialists in such things will not be possible at the current level of cooperation, but only at the next level, where both countries will be galvanized by a common threat. Third, there are prospects for cooperation in technology. Yet, so far, we’ve been talking not so much about transferring offensive military technologies to the North, but rather about North Korean satellites being launched on Russian carrier rockets, for example, or Russian computing power helping calculate the processes by which a nuclear test will be dictated only by political rather than technological necessity. Fourth, there are prospects for cooperation in tourism, which does not fall under sanctions, given that the DPRK has been investing in attempts to create appropriate infrastructure organized according to European standards. The first group of tourists has already started visiting the DPRK, and if the “first pancake” is not a blob, more tourists will flock to the DPRK from Russia than even from China, as the Chinese have not been visiting Pyongyang too eagerly, despite the fact that the tourist cluster in Wonsan and the modernized cluster in the Kumgang Mountains were originally intended for them. Finally, cooperation in education, healthcare, sports, and culture is very important. Contacts at the level of ministers or their deputies are the clearest sign of diplomatic activity intensification in the spring of 2024. In the future, it may even be a question of saturating North Korean medical centers with Russian equipment or opening a branch of a Russian hospital in Pyongyang with Russian medical staff and modern equipment, designed not only for Russians or other foreigners, but also for the local population. The next level of engagement implies that Moscow and Pyongyang may enter into covert cooperation that violates the sanctions regime but does not directly disregard the UN resolution. Here, it is primarily a matter of using North Korean labor, which has earned a good reputation for its combination of value for money, the lack of criminal inclinations, and relative invisibility not only in Russia’s Far East. Some Russian officials have already announced their desire to import North Korean construction workers, so some Western experts have already accused the countries of organizing such cooperation under the guise of importing students, for example, who, according to Russian law, have the right to work part-time. Other potential areas of cooperation include increased supplies of energy or prohibited dual-use goods that would nevertheless be used for peaceful purposes. In essence, everything that the Western media and biased experts have long accused Moscow and Pyongyang of doing would finally become a reality at this stage. The next level of engagement implies that Russia may bluntly despise the sanctions regime in favor of a full-scale cooperation with the North, including in the military-technical domain. In particular, North Korean construction workers may openly travel to Russia’s Far East under this arrangement. As for military-technical cooperation, Russian carriers will then start launching satellites for dual or military purposes, plus Moscow may start transferring something useful to Pyongyang – more likely elements of technology rather than military equipment. In the extreme case, we could talk about single samples as prototypes for subsequent localization. The same may apply to the transfer of North Korean technologies to Russia, not so much as direct supplies of weapons or armaments, but rather as the creation of opportunities for screwdriver assembly or other options of creating equipment clones. Theoretically, it is possible that the DPRK, while rearming its military units and switching from old to new equipment – for example, from 152 mm caliber to 155 mm caliber – will be dropping “obsolete ammunition” to Russia. However, such options look highly unlikely, because the possibility of an inter-Korean conflict is not going anywhere, and the experience of the North Korean Defense Forces shows how quickly peacetime ammunition stocks are depleted in the event of their use by the standards of a full-scale military conflict rather than a local skirmish. The final level of cooperation, where all restrictions are lifted, can only be possible in case of extreme necessity, as the author believes, because it is associated with too high a level of associated risks. Thus, despite the fact that some representatives of Russia’s patriotic camp would like to take literally the statement that “Russia and the DPRK are in the same trench,” any option of internationalization of the conflict on the Russian side, in the author’s opinion, is not worth the consequences. First, it opens the door for similar actions on either side, which is fraught with volunteers from NATO appearing in sufficient numbers. Second, this would cause logistical and communication problems. Third, a significant part of the Russian mass consciousness will perceive such a step as a weakness of the Kremlin, failing to complete the SMO without external assistance. That is why the author believes that the consequences of the Russian president’s visit to the DPRK are unlikely to have a quick and direct impact on the course of the special military operation. Moreover, in any case, the implementation of the summit decisions will take some time, and the more extensive they are, the more time will be needed to put them into practice. And given the international situation, it will be difficult to separate the long-term consequences of the summit from the reaction to a possible change in the current situation. Anyway, when Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea takes place, this will be a landmark demonstration of the new level of relations between the two nations and Moscow’s diplomatic support for Pyongyang. Specific agreements may well be classified as secret, which is why “Scheherazade stops the allowed speeches,” preferring to deal with the analysis of events that have already taken place.

Diplomacy
Former President Rouhani in meeting with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro

Iran's shadow in South America: the foreign policy of the ayatollahs' regime in the region

by María Gabriela Fajardo Mejía , Mario Marín Pereira Garmendia

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The events in the Middle East have the international community on alert. Iran understood the April 1st attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus as a blow to its own territory and a violation of its sovereignty. After several days of threats, on April 13th and for five hours, Iran used 300 projectiles (170 drones, more than 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles) to attack Israeli territory, 99% of which were intercepted. These movements in the geopolitical scenario can be felt in geographically distant regions such as Latin America. To interpret this new scenario, it is necessary to understand how Iran is currently positioned in this region. Its approach to the region is focused on creating ties with states that may be ideologically sympathetic. This is demonstrated by the relationship with Cuba since the end of the first Gulf War, the close relationship with Venezuela, the closeness with Daniel Ortega’s dictatorship in Nicaragua and with Bolivia since the mandate of Evo Morales. Iran has seen the leftward shifts in Latin America as an opportunity to acquire new trading partners, increase its influence in the region and carve out an increasingly important space in the US backyard. Current Iranian Minister of Defense, Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, stressed that “South American countries have a special place in Iran’s foreign and defense policy because they are located in a very sensitive area”. In this sense, we can highlight two key countries: Bolivia and Venezuela. Bolivia, Argentina, and the Triple Frontier Bolivia represents the greatest Iranian foreign policy success in Latin America. Diplomatic relations between these two states date back to 2007. With less than twenty years of friendship, the two signed in July 2023 a memorandum of bilateral cooperation in terms of security and defense that may pose a threat to the stability in the region. The agreement is aimed at assisting Bolivia in its fight against drug trafficking and supporting the state in monitoring its borders. The agreement includes the sale of material and training of military personnel. However, the details of the agreement were not disclosed because they are protected by a confidentiality clause. The Bolivian Minister of Defense, Edmundo Novillo, described Iran as a scientific, technological, security and defense example “for nations that want to be free”, despite the current international sanctions. The agreement entails benefits for both parties. Bolivia will receive weapons, will improve its cyber-operations capabilities and training of military forces’ personnel. On the other hand, Iran will have access to Bolivia’s natural resources, including lithium and gas. It would also be strategically positioned in the heart of South America, where its proxy, Hezbollah, has activities in the Triple Frontier (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) and a relationship with the various cartels operating in the region, according to a report by the Wilson Center. This same report notes that the area of the Triple Frontier has for decades been the center of Iranian and Hezbollah activity in Latin America, taking advantage of the large Lebanese and Shiite diaspora communities. According to the late Argentinian special prosecutor Alberto Nisman, Hezbollah established its presence in Latin America in the mid-1980s, starting in the Triple Frontier area, a relatively lawless region. Argentina and the AMIA case Two days before the Iranian attack on Israel, the Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation of Argentina, the highest criminal court in the country, condemned Iran for the 1992 attacks in Argentina against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and in 1994 against the Israelite Mutual Association of Argentina (AMIA, in Spanish). This ruling proves that the attacks, carried out by the terrorist group Hezbollah, were committed at the behest of the government of that theocracy. After the trial in absentia, it was ratified that those attacks constitute a crime against humanity. This implies that the crimes committed are considered imprescriptible, and the verdict describes Iran as a terrorist state. A series of events has resulted in three decades of impunity. The scandals that led to the imprisonment of the judge and prosecutors in the case, the issuance of Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) red notices against five former Iranian officials and the investigation against two former presidents, Carlos Menem (1989-99) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-15), torpedoed the process. These events, along with the death under strange circumstances of the special prosecutor for the AMIA case, Alberto Nisman, hours before presenting key evidence to the Congress in 2015, explained the delay in the sentencing against Iran. Brazil and the Operation Trapiche In November 2023, the Brazilian Federal Police in collaboration with the Mossad and the FBI carried out Operation Trapiche, which led to the apprehension of three Brazilian nationals. An international arrest warrant was also issued for Mohamad Khir Abdulmajid (Syrian) and Haissam Houssim Diab (Lebanese), accused of recruiting for Hezbollah in Brazil for terrorist purposes. Operation Trapiche was carried out as part of the fight against electronic cigarette smuggling in the Triple Frontier area. The profits from this fraudulent trade were destined to finance illicit activities of the Commercial Affairs Component of Hezbollah’s External Security Organization. Following the events in the Middle East over the last two weeks and Argentina’s full support for Israel, Argentinian Security Minister, Patricia Bullrich, has expressed her concern about the security on the border with Bolivia and has denounced the presence of 700 Iranian members of the Quds forces, a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard., in this country. Bullrich believes that Argentina could be subject to retaliation by Iran. The causes of this fear include the recent ruling condemning Iran as a terrorist state for the AMIA case and the announcement by the president, Javier Milei, of the decision to move the Argentinian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Not to mention the purchase of 26 supersonic F16 aircraft from Denmark, as well as the request to NATO to add Argentina as a “global partner of the organization”. Venezuela Bilateral relations between Venezuela and Iran have been fortified through a series of agreements implemented in recent years in response to the economic sanctions faced by both states. During the visit of Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, to Caracas in June 2023, 25 economic agreements worth approximately US $3,000 million were signed. Details were not disclosed. A year earlier, in June 2022, a cooperation agreement was established for the next 20 years covering science, technology, agriculture, oil and gas, petrochemicals, tourism and culture. In the same year, Iran signed a contract for 110 million euros to repair and reactivate the El Palito refinery, located in the state of Carabobo, which has a production capacity of 146,000 barrels per day. Thus, despite the tough economic sanctions, the operation of “extraterritorial refineries” increases Venezuela’s dependence (also under economic sanctions) on Iranian crude and oil expertise. Regarding the arms sector, while the cooperation memorandum with Bolivia was being signed, an Iranian cargo ship allegedly arrived at Venezuelan shores to deliver vehicles to the Maduro regime. A few days later, Iranian fast attack vessels and anti-ship missiles were exhibited during the bicentennial celebrations of the Venezuelan Navy. Thus, Iran has made possible that Venezuela becomes the first Latin American country to have access to this technology. On the eve of the Venezuelan presidential elections scheduled for July, the Iranian regime has supported the persecution and disqualification of opponents of the Maduro regime to the detriment of the Barbados Agreement. Indeed, it is in Iran’s interest to maintain the status quo in Venezuela, whose regime publicly supports terrorist groups linked to the Ayatollah’s regime. In short, Iran’s interest in maintaining and establishing close cooperative relations in Latin America seek to create ties of dependence with nations sympathetic to the regime. While the international community is on alert for the situation in the Middle East, Iran, which has been gaining ground in the region through alliances with those governments where the influence of the United States is not desired, is closely watching the stance taken by Latin American countries.

Diplomacy
Narendra Modi Prime Minister of India during a roadshow ahead of the Lok Sabha election 2024 in Guwahati India on Tuesday April 16, 2024.

India 2024: anatomy of an election

by Julio Sotes

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Last March 16th, the Election Commission of India informed the public media about the schedule for the upcoming legislative elections in the country for the period 2024-2029. However, this announcement does not mark the beginning of the Indian electoral process, as since 2023, different national political parties had been shaping their candidates and, in some cases, initiating their political campaigns in preparation for the elections. The schedule, announced by the electoral authority, is divided into seven phases, and will be extended from April 19th, 2024, until June 1st of the same year, with vote counting taking place on June 4th. India’s independence from the British Colonial Empire in 1947 marked the beginning of a profound process of political, economic, and social transformations that determined the life of the society and the surrounding countries. The founding fathers of the country, not without setbacks, promoted the drafting and subsequent approval of a constitution that recognized the secular character of the country, reinforcing the idea of a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multi-religious India. Additionally, in the text, the foundations of the country's political system were declared, and consequently, its electoral system. India’s political and electoral system: General aspects India is a federal parliamentary democratic republic, so its political system is a combination of the parliamentary and presidential systems with a greater emphasis on the parliamentary system, where the President is the head of state, and the Prime Minister is the head of government. The President is elected by an Electoral College composed of members of Parliament and cannot act without the approval of the Council of Ministers, who are chosen by the Prime Minister. This is why the Prime Minister is more important than the President. The Indian Parliament is bicameral, meaning it consists of the ‘Lok Sabha’ (House of the People or Lower House) and the ‘Rajya Sabha’ (Council of States or Upper House). The ‘Rajya Sabha’ comprises 238 members, representing the States and the Union Territories, and 12 members designated by the President. Candidates are elected by the Legislative Assembly of the States and Union Territories through the single transferable vote system via proportional representation. On the other hand, the Members of Parliament of the ‘Lok Sabha’ are elected every five years directly by the electorate; the Prime Minister is typically the leader of the party with the most seats in the ‘Lok Sabha’. The party which has the majority of the 543 seats in the Lower House of Parliament can form a government and appoint a Prime Minister from among its winning candidates. In case that no party holds a simple majority, different parties form coalitions until they acquire the necessary number of seats to elect a Prime Minister. [1] While some alliances are formed before elections, many alliances are negotiated after results are announced and may even change during a government's term. The legal framework to conduct elections specifies that the supervision, direction, control, preparations, and behavior of the elections shall be established in the Election Commission, independently of the incumbent government (Article 324). The Election Commission also establishes the principle of adult suffrage (Article 326) and makes a general stipulation regarding the reservation of seats for backward castes, tribes, and the so-called Anglo-Indians (Articles 330-333). A person is qualified to be a candidate for election if they are over 25 years old for the ‘Lok Sabha’ and 30 for the ‘Rajya Sabha’, in addition to being a voter in a parliamentary constituency (Times of India, 2024b). The seats are distributed among the states in proportion to their population: more people mean more seats. Approximately 25% of the seats are constitutionally reserved for members from two disadvantaged communities: the Scheduled Castes (SC), also known as Dalits, and the Scheduled Tribes (ST), which represent India’s tribal populations or Adivasis. Eighty-four seats are reserved for SC candidates, and forty-seven seats are reserved for ST candidates (Times of India, 2024a). In these electoral constituencies, only candidates from the protected groups can participate in the elections, although all eligible adults can cast their votes. Although the Indian Parliament recently passed a new measure to reserve one-third of legislative seats for women, the implementation of this law has been postponed until after 2024. 2014 and 2019 general elections in India. A comparative analysis India’s unique characteristics make any political process there highly complex. The extensive geographical dimension, the contrasts between different climates and terrains, the remote nature of settlements, especially in mountainous regions, and the challenge posed by large, overpopulated cities, make election, whether state or general, become an event of immense proportions. In fact, general elections in India are considered the largest political, democratic, and logistical exercise in the world. In the electoral process of 2014, according to the numbers published by the Pew Research Center, there were 788 million voters, including nearly 150 million who would have been eligible to vote for the first time. In a survey conducted by the same Center between December 2013 and January 2014, the Indian public, by a three-to-one margin, preferred the BJP over the then-ruling INC. Additionally, 60% of the respondents stated they had a very favorable opinion of Modi, while only 23% held the same opinion about Rahul Gandhi, the INC candidate (Stokes, 2014). From April 7th to May 12th, 2014, the Sixteenth General Elections were held in India, they were divided into ten stages across the country's 35 states and Union Territories. Voting took place for representatives from 543 constituencies, with 412 for the general population (General), 84 for the Scheduled Castes, and 47 for the Scheduled Tribes. The total number of candidates for these constituencies was 8,251, of which 7,577 were men, 668 were women, and 6 were "others". The average number of candidates per constituency was 15. There were 927,553 polling stations distributed across the country. The electoral roll consisted of 834,082,814 citizens, with 553,020,648 voters participating, reaching an effective electoral participation rate of 66.30% (Moreno Hernández, 2015). The BJP campaign, which presented Narendra Modi for the first time as its strongest candidate for Prime Minister of the country, was characterized by building an image around Modi as the "development man" — the man who would facilitate comprehensive development in India, having successfully implemented his governance model for over 10 years as Chief Minister in Gujarat. The campaign capitalized on popular discontent and sought to focus its message on the upper and middle classes, as well as the youth, through a developmental discourse that extensively utilized information technologies such as social media and unprecedented media bombardment in India at that time. Modi personally addressed over 400 rallies in a span of 7 months, traveling more than 300,000 kilometers to participate in nearly 200 campaign events, while the holographic projections of his figure and broadcasts of his speeches reached nearly all Indian constituencies (Muralidharan, 2014), effectively transforming the parliamentary campaign into what resembled a presidential-style elections. On May 16th, 2014, the total vote count was conducted. The results showed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the BJP, as the clear winner, securing most of the constituencies, specifically 336 out of 543, which represents 61.8% of the total seats. It is noteworthy that the BJP alone won 282 seats, accounting for 31.34% of the total votes, meaning that out of the 834,082,814 citizens eligible to vote, only 171,660,230 decided to cast their ballots in favor of the BJP. However, the indisputable victory of the right-wing requires a deeper analysis, as the outcome in 2014 does not compare to the 1984 elections when the Congress Party won 414 seats. This highlights the need for caution when referring to the "orange wave" as a pan-Indian phenomenon (Moreno Hernández, 2015). Voter turnout in Indian elections tends to be high: the parliamentary elections of 2019 saw a 67% turnout of the total eligible population. Votes are cast electronically in over a million polling stations, requiring around 15 million employees during voting. To reach all possible voters in villages and isolated islands in the Himalayas, electoral officials travel by any means available, including trains, helicopters, horses, and boats. In 2019, the elections took place in seven phases between April 11th and May 19th, with all votes being counted on May 23rd. Typically, the first phase of elections is held in a specific set of geographic regions, and subsequent phases gradually move across the country to cover other regions. Without primary elections, party leaders have complete control over the nomination of their candidates. If candidates fail to secure the party endorsement, they may run as independents, putting them at a disadvantage compared to party-backed candidates. Out of 543 Members of Parliament elected in 2019, only four were independent candidates (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). While they are considered the elections with the highest number of voters in the world, due to being the most populous country globally, this exercise is also considered one of the most expensive. According to studies, in the 2019 elections, political parties spent over $7 billion. Specifically, parties and candidates spent approximately $8.7 billion to attract more than 900 million eligible voters (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). Regarding the total number of candidates fielded and the electoral roll, in 2019, 8,054 candidates representing 673 parties contested the elections to have the opportunity to become Members of Parliament. Nearly 615 million people (67.4% of Indians) voted in 2019: this was the highest voter turnout recorded. For the first time in history, the persistent gender gap between male and female participation disappeared. In these elections, the ‘Bharatiya Janata Party’ (BJP), in power since 2014, increased its strength by 21 seats to 303 in the ‘Lok Sabha’, securing 38.55% of the votes cast. The number of seats won by its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) also rose to 350, but fell short of a two-thirds majority, and its percentage of votes increased to 45%. In monetary terms, the BJP received over 73% of the declared donations from India's largest political parties in 2017-2018 and over 94.5% of the electoral bonds, totaling at least £19 million. Overall, it is estimated that all political parties spent a total of over £6.7 billion, more than three times the cost of the United States presidential elections in 2016 (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). Mistakes made by the principal opposition party, the Indian National Congress (INC), led to it winning only 52 seats out of 545, just eight more than in the 2014 elections. This was a result of differences among political leaders within the organization, a complacent approach to its program in the elections, betting on its voters repeating the trend of rejecting the incumbent government, and a refusal to accept pre-electoral alliances with regional parties in key States (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). India’s 2024 General election: approximations On March 16th, 2024, the Election Commission of India publicly announced the schedule for the ‘Lok Sabha’ elections to appoint the 543 seats. This schedule will be implemented nationwide in seven phases, from April 19th to June 1st, with the vote count taking place on June 4th, including assembly elections, by-polls, and general elections. The current government’s term ends on June 16th, 2024 (Hindustan Times, 2024a). Additionally, the data provided reveals that in this political process, the electoral roll amounts to a total of 968.8 million voters, of which 497 million are men and 471 million are women. It was also reported that 18.4 million voters fall in the age group of 18 to 19 years, 26.3 million are new voters, and 48,044 are senior citizens.  Source: The Times of India Similarly, according to the mandate of the Supreme Court of India, data related to electoral bonds issued to each contesting party between April 12th, 2019, and January 11th, 2024, were published. The figures revealed that the largest recipient of donations was the BJP, and the largest national donor was the company Future Gaming and Hotel Services. This company accounted for bonds worth 1,365 million rupees distributed among several parties. The second-largest donor was Megha Engineering and Infrastructure Limited (MEIL) with 966 million rupees, of which 60.5% went to the BJP. In financial terms, the BJP received a total of 6,061 million rupees, with MEIL being its largest donor, followed by Qwik Supply Chain and Vedanta. For the INC, the largest donor was Vedanta with 125 million rupees, followed by Western UP Power Transmission Company Limited and MJK Enterprise, amounting to a total of 1,422 million rupees (Hindustan Times, 2024b). Currently, in India, there are two main coalitions competing in the 2024 general elections: the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), both of which include several parties. The NDA, led by the BJP, is a coalition of right-wing conservative parties formally established in 1998 to counter the then-dominant INC. Prominent parties in the alliance include the National People's Party (NPP), Shiv Sena, Janata Dal, Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), Janata Dal, Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party (RLJP), and the currently dominant Bharatiya Janata Party since 2014. The candidate for prime minister is the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has stated the intention of securing over 400 seats for the NDA in these elections (Mint, 2024). The INDIA bloc was formed in 2023 by 26 opposition parties. It is currently led by the president of the INC, Mallikarjun Kharge, who is also the leader of the opposition in the Upper House of the Parliament. Other parties comprising the bloc include the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), Aam Aadmi Party, Samajwadi Party, Shiv Sena (Uddhav Balasaheb Thackeray), Communist Party of India (Marxist), and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (WION, 2024).  Source: Hindustan Times On Friday, April 5th, the INC released its manifesto, this time focusing on equity, youth, women, farmers, workers, the Constitution, the economy, federalism, national security, and the environment. Its 2019 counterpart, mainly focused on the economy and livelihoods, also committing to cover government contracts and eliminate regulations to start a business. It also promised a budget for farmers and pledged to make the non-payment of agricultural loans a civil crime (Hindustan Times, 2024c). On the other hand, for the 2019 general elections, the BJP's electoral manifesto (Sankalp Patra) addressed issues related to nationalism, agriculture, infrastructure, governance, and zero tolerance towards terrorism. Similarly, commitments to amending the citizenship law to protect religious minorities from neighboring countries and the revocation of Article 370 of the Constitution addressing the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir and its change to a semi-autonomous position were fulfilled during the party's and Modi's mandate over the last 5 years. In the 2019 manifesto, the BJP also promised a pension scheme for all small and marginalized farmers in the country, a macroeconomic stability, as well as job generation and gender equality (Hindustan Times, 2024c) Final Considerations The main surveys point to the BJP with Modi at the helm as the primary winning force in the elections. While the intention of both his party and the alliance he leads to conquer more than 400 seats is somewhat ambitious and hasn't been achieved since 1984 when the INC won 144 seats, the NDA is poised as the clear winner in these elections. On the other hand, India is divided by rivalries, political defections, and ideological clashes. "Analysts say that discussions about the allocation of seats within the alliance have cooled off, partly due to the demands of the Congress Party to field its own candidates in most seats, even in states where it is weak" (Agrawal and Anand, 2024). The truth is that the 2024 elections in India are shaping up as an exercise where the BJP and its coalition appear as clear winners. At the same time, it is very challenging for opposition leaders and parties to confront Modi, who after 10 years of national governance and 13 years of state administration, has demonstrated mostly successful implementation of his governance model. The INC and INDIA start from a very disadvantaged position when facing an overwhelming media machinery, a government that promotes laws to silence opposition, thus playing on favorable ground. Additionally, it's worth noting the growing popularity of the Prime Minister, who ranks as one of the most popular leaders worldwide with a 78% national approval rating. In a politically and religiously polarized India, where the government has been promoting an economic, social, and religious agenda aligned with the leading party for the past 10 years, and with a powerful technological and media mechanism, it is unthinkable to imagine that Modi will not secure his third consecutive term at the helm of the country. References Agrawal, Aditi y Anand, Utkarsh (2024). Electoral bonds: Donor-party link public after SC push. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/poll-bonds-donor-party-link-public-after-sc-push-101711046938707.html Mint (2024). BJP’s first list of candidates for Lok Sabha elections 2024 to be out today. https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/lok-sabha-elections-2024-bjp-first-list-to-be-out-today-11709377057949.html Rai, Indrajeet (2024). How BJP’s strenghts and weakness match up with Congress’s. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lok-sabha-elections-2024-pm-modi-rahul-gandhi-bjp-congress-how-bjps-strengths-and-weakness-match-up-with-congresss/articleshow/108614186.cms?utm_source=wa_channel&utm_medium=notification#google_vignette Times of India (2024b). Congress releases fourth list of 46 candidates for Lok Sabha polls. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/congress-releases-fourth-list-of-46-candidates-for-lok-sabha-polls/articleshow/108737876.cms?utm_source=wa_channel&utm_medium=notification Wion (2024). Lok Sabha Elections 2024: List of parties competing in the upcoming polls. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/lok-sabha-elections-2024-list-of-parties-competing-in-the-upcoming-polls-700851/amp Moreno Hernández, Dulce J. (2015). De Gujarat a India: Análisis de la trayectoria política y candidatura a Primer Ministro de Narendra Modi. Tesis de Maestría en Estudios de Asia y áfrica, Centro de Estudios de Asia y África, Colegio de México. https://repositorio.colmex.mx/concern/theses/wd375w520?f%5Bcenter_sim%5D%5B%5D=Centro+de+Estudios+de+Asia+y+%C3%81frica&f%5Bdirector_sim%5D%5B%5D=Banerjee-Dube%2C+Ishita&f%5Blanguage_sim%5D%5B%5D=espa%C3%B1ol&f%5Bmember_of_collections_ssim%5D%5B%5D=Producci%C3%B3n+Institucional&locale=en&per_page=100&view=list Stokes, Bruce (2014). Indians’ support for Modi, BJP shows an itch for change. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2014/02/27/indians-support-for-modi-bjp-shows-an-itch-for-change/ Molina Medina, Norbert y Duarte Peña, Juan J. (2015). Narendra Modi y la India de hoy (Primera Parte). Universidad de Los Andes, Centro de Estudios de África, Asia y Diásporas Latinoamericanas y Caribeñas “José Manuel Briceño Monzillo”. Muralidharan, Sukumar (2014). Modi, media and the feel-good effect. Himal Southasian. https://www.himalmag.com/comment/modi-media-and-the-feel-good-effect Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul (2019). Modi’s return as prime minister of ‘New India’. International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/05/modi-return-new-india/ Hindustan Times (2024a). Lok Sabha Election 2024 Highlights: Polls begin on April 19, results on June 4; MCC kicks in. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/lok-sabha-election-2024-date-live-election-commission-esi-voting-result-date-time-schedule-announcement-today-march-16-101710550714891.html?utm_source=whatsapp&utm_medium=whatsappChannel Times of India (2024a). Lok Sabha elections: BJP releases fifth list of candidates, fields Kangana Ranaut, Naveen Jindal. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lok-sabha-elections-bjp-releases-fifth-list-of-candidates-fields-kangana-ranaut-from-mandi/articleshow/108753780.cms?utm_source=wa_channel&utm_medium=notification Hindustan Times (2024b). BJP’s 5th candidates list for Lok Sabha election: Kangana Ranaut from Mandi, Arun Govil from Meerut. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kangana-ranaut-bjps-candidate-from-mandi-arun-govil-from-meerut-101711294635407.html?utm_source=whatsapp&utm_medium=whatsappChannel Hindustan Times (2024c). In 2019, Congress’s manifesto primarily focused on economy, livelihoods. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/in-2019-congress-s-manifesto-primarily-focussed-on-economy-livelihoods-101712316094820.html [1] An important feature of the process of electing the Prime Minister of India is that all candidates must be a member of the ‘Lok Sabha’ or ‘Rajya Sabha’, which means the candidate must contest elections to secure a seat representing a particular locality.

Diplomacy
Yeouido, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul, South Korea - July 18, 2021: National Assembly building

Parliamentary elections in the Republic of Korea and their possible impacts

by Ruvislei González Sáez

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction The recent parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Korea on April 10th, 2024, with the purpose of forming the XXII Legislature of the National Assembly, have had a significant political significance almost halfway through the current president’s term, Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party (PPP). Since the beginning of his presidency in 2022, most of the Parliament was dominated by the liberal Democratic Party (DPK), which had won the previous elections of this type in 2020 amid the impact of Covid-19. To understand the political system of the Republic of Korea, it is necessary to know that, during the period of authoritarian government in the 20th century, politics were controlled by a single dominant party, although others formally existed. Since the democratization stage, there has been a marked bipartisanship that has dominated the political landscape. This process has been characterized by the alternation between government and opposition. Initially, the evolution of these two parties has not been under the same name, as they have changed frequently, so they are commonly known as conservatives (identified by the red color) and progressives (identified with the blue color). The change of political branding has accompanied the process of merging political organizations, both before and after elections. These organizations continue to be largely led and centered around the figures of the leaders, showing a high level of factionalism and personalism. Although formally the Republic of Korea presents a multi-party system, it has been de facto a two-party system, characterized by a low level of institutionalization. Its key characteristics are deeply rooted in regionalism and ideology, with generation, class and gender associated with these. Meaning that, traditionally the western part of the country has had a more progressive tendency, while the eastern part has been more conservative, and in 2024 this was no exception (figure 1). The DPK is currently identified as the first and the PPP as the second, respectively; it should be added that in terms of gender, women generally identify more with the DPK, while young men with the PPP. Figure 1: Partisan delimitation by color after vote counting for the 22nd National Assembly elections.     Source: Naver (2024) Year 2022 marked the first time that 18-year-olds were eligible to vote in presidential elections and participate in local elections. Both the former People’s Party, and the PPP saw these young voters as a key demographic group. As the PPP consolidated support among young male votes with the rise of Lee Jun-seok and his claim of reverse discrimination, the DPK intensified its efforts to attract young female voters (Kim, 2022). While the country’s politics are dominated by two main parties, which have changed names at certain times, there is also a group of parties with lesser proportional representation or even none in the National Assembly. The major political forces currently are the DPK and the PPP, although others include the Green-Justice Party (center-left position, supporting dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), New Future (centrist reformist), New Reform Party (conservative), Rebuilding Korea Party (centrism, liberalism, and reformism), Liberal Unification Party (far-right), among others. In total, there are more than 15 minor right-wing parties, around seven that are centrist, and about five that are progressive. There are also others that are focused on a single issue, such as the Women’s Party, and some that have attempted to register without success, like the Nuclear Nation Party, with a fascist conception. [1] For the 2024 parliamentary elections, the Electoral Advisory Committee, composed of 33 experts from various fields including media, academia, legal circles, public relations, and civic groups, was tasked with ensuring fair election management and advancing the electoral system. In a meeting in February 2024, the council promoted new measures to enhance public confidence in electoral management. It was decided to respond to illegal acts such as videos created by artificial intelligence, as had previously occurred against the country’s president, and to improve the objectivity and reliability of electoral opinion polls. Measures were taken, including the addition of verification procedures in the vote counting process; changing the notation format, such as from serial numbers on postal ballots to 1-dimensional barcodes; and managing surveys and vote counting, with constant dissemination of videos from cameras in storage locations, such as advance ballot boxes, to determine the transparency and reliability of the electoral management through the establishment of a plan to improve procedures (National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea, 2024). Parliamentary elections 2024, results and impacts While the National Assembly was controlled by the DPK in May 2022 when conservative President Yoon came to power, the PPP’s efforts were focused on gaining control of the legislature in the recent April 2024 elections. Unfortunately for the latter, the results have once again been dominant for the DPK. The general elections on April 10 saw the highest turnout of the country in 32 years, following a historic peak in early voting, as announced by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The total turnout reached 67%, representing an increase of 0.8% compared to the general elections of 2020, which recorded a turnout of 66.2% (see figure 2). Out of 44.88 million eligible voters, approximately 29.66 million people cast their votes in 14,259 polling stations to elect 300 lawmakers for the 22nd National Assembly. (…) Voters cast two votes, one for the 254 single-member constituencies and another for the remaining 46 proportional representation seats. A total of 21 parties contested the elections based on districts, while 38 political parties competed for proportional representation (Jung, 2024). Figure 2: Voting trends in the different elections from 2016 to 2024 in the Republic of Korea.     Source: National Election Commission The main opposition party, the DPK, is poised to achieve a decisive victory in the general elections, with the broader liberal opposition bloc expected to secure up to 200 seats in the 300-member National Assembly. This projection deals a significant blow to President Yoon Suk-yeol. Exit polls conducted by the nation’s top three broadcasters KBS, MBC, and SBS indicated that the DPK was projected to secure between 178 to 197 seats when combining electoral victories with proportional representation seats obtained by its satellite party, the United Democratic Party. This outcome will solidify the DPK’s participation in the current Assembly controlled by the opposition for the next four years. Meanwhile, the ruling PPP was projected to secure between 85 to 105 seats, including those obtained through proportional representation from its satellite party, the People's Party (Lee, 2024). The results were fairly accurate, with almost all votes counted, as the DPK won 161 out of 254 directly contested seats, while the PPP only secured 90 seats (Lee C., 2024). The Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), a progressive-leaning party led by former Justice Minister Cho Kuk, was on track to secure between 12 to 14 seats, marking a notable debut in its first elections since its launch in March. The party chose not to field candidates in the constituencies but focused solely on proportional representation seats. Among other minor parties, the New Reform Party, led by former PPP leader Lee Jun-seok, was projected to secure one to four seats. The New Future Party, headed by former DPK leader Lee Nak-yon, was expected to secure up to two seats (Lee, 2024). The emergence of the RKP is related to internal divisions within the DPK following the conclusion of President Moon Jae-in’s presidency (DPK), which intensified after the 2022 presidential elections when supporters and opponents of Moon divided. Its leader, former Justice Minister Cho Kuk and a supporter of Moon, who emerged as a political phenomenon, is expected to represent a new threat to the administration of Yoon Suk-yeol, as the party made it clear during the electoral campaign that its goal is to punish the “autocratic” administration that, it claims, is controlled by former prosecutors, including Yoon (Nam, 2024). If the final election results, which will be confirmed in the early hours of July 11th (night of July 10th Cuba time), fall within the range of the exit polls, the RKP will be the third largest political party in South Korea, after the main opposition DPK and the ruling PPP. Cho, who served as the Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs and Minister of Justice during the previous administration of Moon Jae-in, is widely described as one of Yoon’s main antagonists for the presidency. He has been under scrutiny for years over allegations that he and his wife fabricated academic documents to get their daughter admitted to medical school. Yoon, who was the prosecutor general at the time (2020), insisted on investigating Cho, leveraging those actions to rise in politics among conservatives and eventually be elected president. (…) Cho lost his job as a professor at Seoul National University, his wife went to prison, and their daughter lost her medical license. Under the Yoon administration, the Cho family has literally lost everything, and this background has transformed him into a political champion who has lost everything and is standing against the administration (Nam, 2024). As of 2 am on April 11th in South Korea (1 pm on April 10th, Cuba time), the count stood at 92.95%, with the DPK (더불어민주당) accumulating 158 elected seats out of the 254 seats for single-member constituencies; the PPP (국민의힘), 93, while the New Future Party (새로운미래), New Reform Party (개혁신당), and the Progressive Party (진보당) has each obtained one seat up to that point (see figure 1). Lee Jun-seok, candidate of the New Reform Party, was elected as a member of the National Assembly after 13 years of entering politics. He was the leader of the PPP (the youngest in the party’s modern political history) at the time of the 2022 presidential elections and contributed to President Yoon’s landslide victory. In late 2023, he split from the party and formed a new one after a long-standing feud with the majority faction of the PPP, composed of loyalists to President Yoon Suk-yeol. Lee is considered by the DPK as a leader who could lead the development of far-right populism and is followed by young men who are negative towards feminism. Political figures like former Foreign Minister Park Jin, who resigned from his position to run in the elections, lost with 46.3% against his DPK rival who obtained 53.8%, causing further negative impacts on President Yoon's presidency (박기호, 2024). Even though he loses the majority, it is important for President Yoon to have key figures from his party in the National Assembly. Currently, he is facing internal political challenges regarding the rejection of increases in medical school admissions, questions about his wife's corruption issues, among other elements. The president's popularity level ranges between 34-40% in recent times, so such a setback will affect him for the remainder of his term. These election results could lead Han Dong-hoon, interim leader of the ruling PPP, former prosecutor, and close to the president, to diminish his prominence and wait for the local elections in 2026. The results of the DPK, combined with the satellite parties that support it in the National Assembly, could lead to a series of future conflicts with the executive, making it difficult for Yoon and the PPP to govern freely. The DPK has several contradictions with the PPP from domestic policy to foreign policy. Particularly on foreign policy issues, they are more inclined to improve relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), strengthen ties with China, and not overly reinforce links with the United States. On issues with Japan, they oppose the current policy of rapprochement and maintain firm stances on unresolved historical issues. Regarding China, there have been some recent signs of change with the idea of holding a trilateral summit between South Korea, China, and Japan at the end of May. Final considerations The results of the parliamentary elections in favor of the DPK and against the PPP will complicate the mandate of the current President Yoon Suk-yeol, especially on many domestic policy issues, with three years remaining in his term. In this scenario, the DPK, from the opposition, would have the ability to unilaterally enact contentious bills, neutralizing the power of the presidential veto. In an even worse scenario, which remains plausible, they might attempt to pass a bill to impeach the president. In recent months, they have already tried to take actions, including those related to corruption allegations against the president's wife, involving a gift from the "Dior" brand. So far, President Yoon Suk-yeol has been able to navigate some executive actions through presidential decrees to fulfill several of his political promises without going through parliament. Additionally, he has unilaterally vetoed some bills passed by the DPK. However, several of Yoon's key initiatives, including the abolition of the income tax on investments and the relaxation of the inheritance tax, have remained pending due to the need for law revisions. Losing his party in the elections further complicates the power of veto, as once the president vetoes a bill, it returns to the legislature for a second vote, and to be approved again, it requires the support of more than half of all legislators and approval by two-thirds of those present. During the 2024-2026 period, there could be a political stalemate that not only increases the contradictions between the president and the National Assembly dominated by the DPK, but also within his own party. Escalation of the situation in the Korean peninsula could be a factor that also puts pressure on the DKP-led legislature regarding the executive. REFERENCES Jung Da-hyun (2024). Voter turnout hits 32-year high at 67%. Disponible en: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/04/356_372452.html. Kim Kaitlyn (2022). Evolution of South Korean Party Politics. Disponible en: https://keia.org/the-peninsula/evolution-of-south-korean-party-politics/. Lee Hyo-jin (2024). DPK poised to clinch landslide victory in general elections. Disponible en: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/04/356_372455.html. Nam hyung woo (2024). Disgraced ex-Minister Cho Kuk returns as political phenom. Recuperado en: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/04/356_372449.html National Election Commission of Republic of Korea (2024). NEC Holds the 22nd National Assembly Election Advisory Committee. Disponible en Naver (2024). 제22대 국회의원선거 경기 성남시분당구갑 개표. Disponible en: https://search.naver.com/search.naver?where=nexearch&sm=tab_etc&query=%EC%A0%9C22%EB%8C%80+%EA%B5%AD%ED%9A%8C%EC%9D%98%EC%9B%90%EC%84%A0%EA%B1%B0+%EA%B2%BD%EA%B8%B0+%EC%84%B1%EB%82%A8%EC%8B%9C%EB%B6%84%EB%8B%B9%EA%B5%AC%EA%B0%91+%EA%B0%9C%ED%91%9C. Swissinf (2024). Cierran los centros de votación en Corea del Sur sin incidentes de importancia. Disponible en: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/cierran-los-centros-de-votaci%C3%B3n-en-corea-del-sur-sin-incidentes-de-importancia/75462528. 박기호 (2024). 서울 민주 34곳·국힘 14곳 앞서…양천갑·도봉갑·영등포을·마포갑 접전. Disponible en: https://n.news.naver.com/article/421/0007473672?type=journalists. [1] Un partido hitleriano que ha presentado su intento de registro por séptima vez. Ver en Comisión Electoral Nacional: https://www.nec.go.kr/site/nec/ex/bbs/View.do?cbIdx=1086&bcIdx=189796.