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Defense & Security
Buenos Aires, Argentina, Feb 16, 2024: People protesting in front of the obelisk, downtown, with posters in the colors of the Palestinian flag forming the text Free Palestine.

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Yarmouk Universi

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction In 2010, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was established and ratified in 2011, with membership expanding to 33 countries. According to the organization’s statements, its aims include “deepening the integration of Latin American countries, promoting international peace, and respecting human rights.” Additionally, there is an implicit ambition among several members to reduce the political and economic influence of the US in the region, as suggested by the context of some of the organization’s statements.[2] With a total population of about 635 million people, covering an area of about 22 million km², and accounting for 17% of the United Nations (UN) voting power, their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis for 2023 is approximately $12.8 trillion, equivalent to 7.8% of the world’s GDP. However, four of the 33 countries contribute more than $9.6 trillion, or about 75% of the GDP. These four countries also comprise 68% of the total population of the regional group, as shown in the following table:[3]   CELAC’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood The Latin American and Caribbean region has the highest percentage of leftist political regimes in the world. Among the 19 most significant countries in the region, 12 are now run by left-wing governments, accounting for 63% of the total. These leftist-led countries represent 92% of the region’s people and 90% of its GDP.[4] This demographic and economic dominance is clearly reflected in CELAC’s stance on two interconnected issues: the position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood, marked by varying degrees of rejection of Israeli policy, and a relative independence from US influence in the region. First: CELAC’s Stance as a Political Bloc on Operation al-Aqsa Flood[5] At the eighth CELAC summit, held in March 2024 in Kingstown, the capital of St.Vincent and the Grenadines, a lack of consensus emerged among the members regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Despite the compromise language in the conference statement, 27 countries endorsed it while 6 countries opposed it.[6] The resolution included the following points:[7] a. Condemning the killing of civilians on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides and emphasizing the need to protect civilians in accordance with international law.b. Supporting the UN General Assembly call for a ceasefire.c. Demanding the immediate and unconditional release of hostages.d. Urging the delivery of humanitarian aid to the affected areas in the Gaza Strip (GS).e. Calling for a peaceful solution based on the two-state solution. Second: Stances of the Central States within CELAC[8] Countries with left-leaning governments are often the most vocal in supporting the Palestine issue, as reflected in their leaders’ statements. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro slammed “the international position regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza,” and pointed out that “international justice exists only to protect the interests of American, European, and Western imperialism, in order to conceal the massacres committed against Palestinian families.” Brazilian President Lula da Silva aligned with this view, calling on “the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to set aside their differences and put an end to the genocide in Gaza.” He reiterated his call for an immediate ceasefire, as outlined in the CELAC statement from the 8th Congress. Additionally, he noted Brazil’s efforts to support UN Security Council resolutions aimed at halting the fighting in GS, which were vetoed by the US. Colombian President Gustavo Petro criticized both the United States and Europe for supporting “Israel in committing genocide against the Palestinians,” with similar sentiments expressed by Nicaragua. Generally, the positions of CELAC countries, particularly the major powers, can be categorized into three distinct stances, as illustrated in the table below:[9]   1. Countries closest to the Israeli position: This group varies in their level of support for Israel, as illustrated by the following indicators: a. The Salvadoran stance is notably one of the most vehement against the Palestinians, despite President Nayib Bukele being a Christian of Palestinian descent who calls for the “demise of the Palestinian resistance.” This position aligns closely with that of Paraguay, one of the few countries to label the Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” and announce plans to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Paraguay’s stance on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is marked by a consistent lack of condemnation at the UN and frequent abstentions from voting on resolutions that support Palestinian rights. b. The Jewish minority in Argentina plays a significant role in influencing the government. With a population of between 300–400 thousand, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. The attacks on Jewish institutions in Argentina during 1992–1994, which were linked to Iran—a key supporter of Palestinian resistance—also influenced the government’s stance, despite opposition from the pro-Palestinian Worker’s Left Front – Unity party. c. Guatemala, with a population of about 18 million, was the first Latin American country to move its embassy to Jerusalem. It is also one of the centers of gravity for Anglican Christianity, which tends to be more sympathetic to Zionism. 2. Countries that have adopted a middle ground, attempting to balance support for and opposition to both sides of the conflict: a. Both Mexico and Brazil criticized the attack on Israel on 7/10/2023, but strongly condemned the Israeli response. b. In the diplomacy of Brazil and Mexico, a role reversal was observed. The presidencies of both countries adopted more articulate positions than their foreign ministries, where traditional diplomatic language prevailed. c. Mexico has not severed ties with Israel; however, its representatives at the UN have sharply criticized the Israeli government. d. Ecuador can be included in this group due to its effort to mediate peace between the Palestinian resistance and Israel by sending Ecuadorian Vice President Verónica Abad in October 2023. Additionally, Ecuador has backed Palestine’s bid for full membership in both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, though it has explicitly condemned the resistance attack that occurred in October 2023. 3. Countries that support Palestinian rights are typically left-leaning and their policies often exhibit the following characteristics: a. Nicaragua unequivocally supported the Palestinian position and even received some Palestinian leaders after the war. b. Colombia has taken a definitive stance in strong support of Palestine. It is one of the most vocal critics of Israeli policies, culminating in its decision to sever diplomatic ties with Israel. Colombian President Gustavo Petro has sharply condemned Israeli actions in Gaza, labeling them as “genocide.” It is important to note that Colombia’s position is significant given its historical and strategic ties with Israel. Although Colombia relies on Israeli military equipment for combating armed opposition and drug trafficking groups, and there has been a free trade agreement between the two countries since 2020, as well as various agreements since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957, trade data shows a 53% decline in trade between Israel and Colombia following the recent conflict, compared to 2022. c. The Cuban and Venezuelan position was a continuation of their traditional support for the Palestinian right, and Cuba justified the Palestinian attack on 7/10/2023 as a reaction to 75 years of oppression of the Palestinians. d. Bolivia did not condemn the Palestinian attack in October, instead focusing its statements on de-escalating the conflict between the two sides. However, the lack of Israeli response to its calls led Bolivia to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Additionally, Bolivia supported South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and endorsed a case before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Colombia and Belize have also cut ties with Israel. Notably, during the last week of June 2024, Bolivia experienced a failed coup attempt, raising suspicions that the US and Israel may have been involved as retaliation for Bolivia’s clear stance on the Gaza war.[10] e. The significant presence of the Palestinian community in Chile, the largest in Latin America with nearly half a million having Palestinian roots, has notably influenced Chilean politics. This influence is reflected in the Chilean Senate’s Human Rights Commission decision to ban companies from importing goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. A US State Department official characterized this decision as one that unfairly singles out Israel.[11] f. Honduras has exhibited a decrease in its support for Israel following Israeli attacks on civilians, leading the government to summon the Israeli ambassador to protest these actions. In 2021, Honduras was one of the first countries to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, joining Guatemala and Paraguay, which had made similar moves in 2018. However, Guatemala reversed its decision and returned its embassy to Tel Aviv shortly thereafter. The shift in Honduras’ stance can be attributed to the change in leadership from a right-wing to a left-wing administration after Xiomara Castro assumed the presidency in 2022. g. Since the beginning of the war, Latin American countries’ positions in support of Palestine have evolved at the diplomatic level in particular, and have begun cutting ties and recalling ambassadors from Israel, which was initiated by Chile, Colombia, and Honduras, while Bolivia and Belize cut diplomatic ties with Israel completely. Bolivia was one of the five countries that referred the situation in GS to the ICC for investigation in November 2023. In the referral, Bolivia cites evidence of crimes against Palestinians including murder, torture, inhumane treatment, persecution, apartheid, forced displacement, and the destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage. Mexico and Chile did the same in January 2024, whereas Brazil’s and Colombia’s foreign ministries issued statements supporting South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICJ. The Brazilian position has been the leading one, which has strained relations between Brazil and Israel despite efforts by the Brazilian Israelite Confederation (CONIB) to mend fences. However, the Brazilian president’s remarks that “what is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people hasn’t happened at any other moment in history” except one: “When Hitler decided to kill the Jews,”[12] combined with the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s endorsement of European countries’ recognition of Palestine as a state and support for a two-state solution, have solidified Brazil’s stance against Israeli policies. CELAC’s Vote at the UN A review of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions reveals that the countries most resistant to supporting resolutions favoring Palestinian demands are Guatemala, Paraguay and Argentina, followed by Haiti, Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador. These countries often either oppose or abstain from voting. Argentina, with a population of nearly 46 million, is the most significant ally of Israeli policy. This is followed by Guatemala with about 18 million people, Paraguay with around 7 million, Panama with 4.5 million and Uruguay, with approximately 3.5 million people. Argentina ranks third among CELAC countries in terms of GDP and fourth in terms of population. Argentina’s stance on Palestinian rights reflects the political shift introduced by President Javier Milei, who aims to align Argentina more closely with the Western capitalist bloc through his foreign policy.[13] Argentina did not support the General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire in December 2023 and opposed the resolution to grant Palestine full membership in the UN. The Argentine position can be attributed to the following reasons:[14] a. President Javier Milei’s religious inclination towards Judaism was evident in his prayers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in 2021, accompanied by Rabbi Shimon Axel Wahnish, who was later appointed as Argentine ambassador to Israel. Although the Argentine president is a Catholic Christian, some sources suggest he is considering converting to Judaism. However, other sources claim that President Milei’s display of Jewish faith is a way to express repentance and counter accusations that he concealed his support for a Nazi sympathizer. b. The Argentine president’s intention to strengthen ties with the Jewish minority in Argentina, as previously mentioned, faced opposition from nearly four thousand Argentine Jewish intellectuals, who voiced concern over Milei’s “political use of Judaism.” This concern was highlighted when he became one of the first world leaders to visit Israel after the war erupted, offering high praise for Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies and pledging to move Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Interestingly, the Argentine president demonstrated a clear bias towards Israel when he cut his state visit to Denmark short, following the Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024, which was in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. President Meli then convened a crisis committee alongside the Israeli ambassador to Argentina and his security minister, who began criticizing the positions of other Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Chile, describing them as “Islamic hotbeds” and accusing them of hosting Hezbollah elements. He also criticized the defense agreement Iran concluded with Bolivia in July 2023. c. Milei, a university economics professor, bases his economic ideology on far-right principles and anti-leftist Peronism in Argentina, making him the most eager to strengthen the relationship with the US and, consequently, with Israel. d. It is noted that trade relations between Israel and Argentina are escalating significantly. Israeli exports to Argentina increased annually by 15.2% from 2017 to the end of 2022, reaching $156 million in 2022. Similarly, Argentine exports to Israel increased annually by 25.2%, reaching $200 million in 2022. Third: Trends in Public Opinion in CELAC Countries Quantitative studies on access to information and data from various sources show that Latin American countries lead the world in relying on social media for obtaining and sharing information. This trend has influenced Israel’s public image in the region.[15] Public opinion polls in Latin America reveal that approval of the way US President Joe Biden’s is dealing with the GS war is modest. A survey of six major Latin American countries showed the following results:[16]   The approval rate with Biden’s GS war policy in six countries is notably low, at around 26%. In contrast, the same survey indicates that the disapproval in these countries is more than double the approval rate, reaching approximately 57%. Meanwhile, the people of CELAC countries expressed their solidarity with Palestine after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This solidarity was evident in demonstrations involving former presidents, civil society organizations, popular sectors, football associations, artists and universities, particularly in Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina, etc. Conclusion The “instability” in political orientations towards international issues is a key feature of Latin American countries’ policies, largely due to the frequent shifts in political regimes and the consequent changes. In analyzing the positions of Latin American countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict, four factors seem to be the most significant in shaping this relationship:[17] 1. The political shifts between leftist and rightist regimes, whether due to coups or presidential elections, often characterize these countries as “unstable.” This is particularly evident in major countries within this group, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia. This instability is reflected in their stances on the Arab-Israeli conflict: leftist regimes typically support Palestine, while rightist ones back Israel. 2. The positions of these countries on Israel are notably influenced by US policies. Some countries align with the US stance to avoid potential pressure, a pattern observable since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. 3. A growing trend among Catholic Christians toward Anglicanism, which shares a closer religious alignment with the Israeli position. 4. Israeli presence in the technological sector of the Latin American economy is significant. In major Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, more than 450 Israeli companies are active in this industry. The data we have discussed highlight the need for resistance forces to recognize the significance of this region in the following ways: 1. Despite a noticeable division among Latin American countries in their responses to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath, the balance of support leans considerably toward the resistance. This is due to the increasing leftist inclination in the region, particularly in its major countries. Demonstrations in support of Palestine have occurred in Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Peru and Chile. 2. Cutting ties with Israel, recalling ambassadors, or participating in cases against it in the ICJ and the ICC by Latin American countries is perhaps the most significant in terms of political impact. This development requires follow-up, including providing these countries with relevant information and support to reinforce this trend. 3. Despite their Anglican background, public opinion trends in these countries reveal a strong sympathy for Palestinian suffering, which is more than twice as significant as the sympathy for Israel. This is evident from the approval rates toward President Biden’s pro-Israel policies. These findings suggest the need for engaging with leftist forces in the region based on shared libertarian values. 4. Comparing the trade between Latin American and Israel, which was $6 billion in 2022, to the trade with Arab countries, the trade volume with the Gulf countries alone is more than three times greater than that with Israel. However, the political influence of these trade relations with the Arab world remains relatively modest.[18] 5. Arab and Palestinian diplomacy should focus on four Latin American countries-Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia—due to their significant political, economic and demographic influence in the international arena. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals. [2] CELAC/ Zone of Peace: “A key step to countering the globalization of militarism” – UN Expert, site of The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3/2/2014, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2014/02/celac-zone-peace-key-step-countering-globalization-militarism-un-expert [3] World Economic Outlook Database: October 2023, site of International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October/weo-report?c=311,213,314,313,316,339,218,223,228,233,238,321,243,248,253,328,258,336,2; GDP, PPP (current international $) – Latin America & Caribbean, site of World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=ZJ; and List of Latin American and Caribbean countries by GDP (PPP), site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_American_and_Caribbean_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)#cite_note-1 [4] Latin America’s left-wing experiment is a warning to the world, site of The Economist newspaper, 18/5/2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/05/18/latin-americas-left-wing-experiment-is-a-warning-to-the-world [5] For a historical overview of Israel’s relations with Latin America, see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Academic Paper: Israeli Relations with Latin America, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/4/2021, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2021/04/05/academic-paper-israeli-relations-with-latin-america/ [6] Estimates vary, but the number of signatories is likely to be 27, see CELAC member states divided over Israel-Gaza war stance, site of SEARCHLIGHT, 5/3/2024, https://www.searchlight.vc/front-page/2024/03/05/celac-member-states-divided-israel-gaza-war-stance; and Brazil, 23 other Celac countries call for immediate ceasefire in Gaza, site of Agencia Brasil, 4/3/2024, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2024-03/brazil-23-other-celac-countries-call-immediate-ceasefire-gaza [7] CELAC summit fails to take unanimous position on Gaza, site of iWitness News, 2/3/2024, https://www.iwnsvg.com/2024/03/02/celac-summit-fails-to-take-unanimous-position-on-gaza [8] Latin American peace, anti-imperialism, and Gaza at the heart of CELAC, site of Al Mayadeen English, 1/3/2024, https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/latin-american-peace–anti-imperialism–and-gaza-at-the-hear; Oliver Stuenkel, The Israel-Hamas War Is Inflaming Polarization in Latin America, site of Americas Quarterly (AQ), 16/11/2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-israel-hamas-war-is-inflaming-polarization-in-latin-america; Ecuador VP says she will go to Israel amid spat with president, Reuters News Agency, 28/11/2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ecuador-vp-says-she-will-go-israel-amid-spat-with-president-2023-11-28; and At CELAC, Lula extols the potential of Latin Americans and Caribbeans as an integrated bloc, site of Planalto, 5/3/2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/03/at-celac-lula-extols-the-potential-of-latin-americans-and-caribbeans-as-an-integrated-bloc [9] For detailed information on the positions of CELAC countries, either individually or as a bloc, please refer to the following references, see Rogelio Núñez Castellano and Carlos Malamud, Latin America and the Gaza crisis, site of The Elcano Royal Institute, 24/11/2023, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-and-the-gaza-crisis; Enrique Reina (@EnriqueReinaHN), site of X (Twitter), 3/11/2023, 10:01, https://x.com/EnriqueReinaHN/status/1720531624289575107; Brazil’s president withdraws his country’s ambassador to Israel after criticizing the war in Gaza, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-israel-ambassador-withdrawn-af9d295d989a86c4fcd8ca4531350f42; Colombia breaks diplomatic ties with Israel but its military relies on key Israeli-built equipment, AP, 3/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/colombia-israel-diplomatic-ties-military-equipment-0c04009ccfc6110e20ee358403509500; President Milei’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension in Argentina and beyond, AP, 3/6/2024, https://apnews.com/article/milei-judaism-hezbollah-israel-hamas-war-netanyahu-d8831369a6bc8a96205d4080d2b2045b; Argentina demands that Bolivia explain its new defense agreement with Iran, AP, 25/7/2023, https://apnews.com/article/argentina-bolivia-iran-defense-mou-2cb8c5917fdb6d3e01af4c67af969797; Israel/ Argentina, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg; Latin America divided and nuanced on Israel-Hamas conflict, site of Buenos Aires Times, 1/11/2023, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/latin-america-divided-and-nuanced-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict.phtml; Marta Tawil Kuri, Perspectives from the Global South: Latin America’s Fragmented Approach to Palestine, site of Arab reform initiative (ARI), 15/12/2023, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/perspectives-from-the-global-south-latin-americas-fragmented-approach-to-palestine; IntelBrief: Leaders in Latin America Speak Loudly on Gaza, site of The Soufan Center (TSC), 1/3/2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-1; Honduran president in Israel for opening of Jerusalem embassy, site of i24NEWS, 24/6/2021, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/1624517565-honduran-president-in-israel-for-opening-of-jerusalem-embassy; Angeline Montoya, In Honduras, the mixed track record of President Xiomara Castro, site of Le Monde, 10/2/2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/10/in-honduras-the-mixed-track-record-of-president-xiomara-castro_6015218_4.html; Latin America countries hold rallies in support of Palestine, site of Anadolu Agency (AA), 4/3/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/latin-america-countries-hold-rallies-in-support-of-palestine/3154305; Latin America: Demonstrations expressing support for Palestinians scheduled in several regional cities Oct. 20-22, site of Crisis24, 20/10/2023, https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/10/latin-america-demonstrations-expressing-support-for-palestinians-scheduled-in-several-regional-cities-oct-20-22; Gaza solidarity sweeps across Latin America, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 23/10/2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231023-gaza-solidarity-sweeps-across-latin-america; Alejandro Santos Cid, University Gaza solidarity protests extend to Mexico: ‘We are urgently calling for an end to genocide’, site of EL PAÍS, 4/5/2024, https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-05-04/university-gaza-solidarity-protests-extend-to-mexico-we-are-urgently-calling-for-an-end-to-genocide.html; site of PRIMICIAS, 7/10/2023, https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/ecuador-condena-ataque-hamas-israel (in Spanish) [10] See Lithium, severing ties with Israel, or rapprochement with Russia? What is the secret to the failed Bolivian coup?, site of RT, 28/6/2024, https://arabic.rt.com/world/1578053- الليثيوم-غزة-أم-موسكو-أيهم-كلمة-السر-في-الانقلاب-البوليفي-الفاشل/; and Türkiye and Bolivia: Experiences of Resisting Coups in a Changing World, site of Turk Press, 29/6//2024, https://www.turkpress.co/node/102003 [11] Patricia Garip, What Does Latin America Think About the Israel-Hamas War?, site of Foreign Policy, 29/1/2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/29/israel-hamas-gaza-war-latin-america-chile-argentina-colombia-mexico-genocide/ [12] Lazar Berman, Israel livid as Brazil’s Lula says Israel like ‘Hitler,’ committing genocide in Gaza, site of Times of Israel, 18/2/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-livid-as-brazils-lula-says-israel-like-hitler-committing-genocide-in-gaza/ [13] Argentina shifts historic position on Palestine as UN member state, Buenos Aires Times, 10/5/2024, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-shifts-historic-position-on-palestine-asun-member-state.phtml [14] AP and TOI STAFF, Argentinian president’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension, Times of Israel, 3/6/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/argentinian-presidents-surprising-devotion-to-judaism-and-israel-provokes-tension/; Argentina/ Israel, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/arg/partner/isr; and Israel/ Argentina, OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg [15] 4 Trends Among Latin American Internet Users That Will Impact the Market in 2022, site of Americas Market Intelligence (AMI), 9/1/2022, https://americasmi.com/insights/trends-latin-american-internet-users-marketing/#:~:text=In%20Latin%20America%2C%2083%25%20to,websites%2C%20broken%20down%20by%20country; and Annie Pforzheimer, Latin American Views on the Gaza War Are in Flux, site of The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune journal, November 2023, https://jstribune.com/pforzheimer-latin-american-views-on-the-gaza-war-are-in-flux [16] Survey conducted in Spring 2024, see Majorities disapprove of the way Biden is dealing with the Israel-Hamas war, site of Pew Research Center, 10/6/2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/11/how-well-is-biden-handling-international-issues/gap_2024-06-11_us-image-2024_5_06 [17]Gian Luca Gardini (ed.), External Powers in Latin America: Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism and South-South Cooperation (Routledge, 2021), pp. 153-163; and Political stability – Country rankings, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/Latin-Am [18]Chase Harrison, Explainer: Latin America’s Relationship with Israel and Palestine, site of Americas Society (AS), Council of the Americas (COA), 16/11/2023, https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-latin-americas-relationship-israel-and-palestine; and “Cultivating Ties: Deepening trade and investment between Latin America and the GCC,” site of Economist Impact, The Economist Group, 2022, https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/economist_impact__dcci_latam_report_10th_march_2022_english_web.pdf

Diplomacy
Gaza at war city destroyed by idf attacks, aerial rare view Drone view over North Gaza in the war with Israel. Gaza-March,20,2024

Israel’s Punitive War on Palestinians in Gaza- Academic Article

by Camilla Boisen, New York University Abu Dhabi

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In this article, I consider how Israel’s justifications for war and rationalization of its conduct align with historical justifications for punitive war and unlicenced warfare. Approaches to forcible punishment in early modern writings in the Western Just War Theory tradition (JWT) relate both to defensive and offensive war. In the early modern period, the use of force for self-defence is a type of inter-state punishment justified by the aim of deterrence and the goal of preserving the state. Offensive war, by contrast, is deemed justified to deter aggressors, pre-emptively, or violators of the natural law, even warranting a rejection of a principle of discrimination between perpetrator and innocents.1 Most of the early modern jurists insisted that a right to inflict punishment was integral to claims of just war. For Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), wars were only justified to vindicate rights, which included wars to defend the common good,2 or interventions by a third party when crimes have been committed against another state. Before him, Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546) warned of the danger associated with resort to the principle of punishment because it allowed space for acts of revenge or vengeance masquerading under the pretext of humanitarian protection – a guise that remains a common feature of contemporary international politics.3 Since the Spanish conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century, settlers have justified their retaliatory actions against indigenous resistance as necessary for their own “self-preservation.” Furthermore, the “doctrine of double effect” provided moral justification, allowing them to consider the killing of innocents acceptable as an effect of achieving a moral objective such as preservation by means of self-defence.4 In exceptional circumstances where the levels of depravity were deemed abhorrent, the punishment of whole communities for violating the laws of nature was justified.5 The right to punish is no longer a regulative principle of international law. It was gradually replaced by principles of collective security, humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. With its focus on preventative war, modern international law has reduced just causes for war (threat or use of force) to essentially two: first, self-defence under United Nations (UN) Charter Chapter VII: Article 51, and second, when authorized by the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security (Article 39).6 Even though older theories by jurists in the law of nations have been superseded, international law and the JWT are not discordant doctrines. JWT provides the intellectual framework to international humanitarian law (IHL); minimally, for a war to be considered morally just, it must first and foremost be lawful.7 The Western JWT tradition provides two distinct judgments on war premised on the assumption that war can be justified in certain cases (jus ad bellum), while also establishing ethical limits on how war should be conducted (jus in bello).8 It is no wonder that the philosopher Immanuel Kant would describe its theorizers as “sorry comforters” in that they legitimized (and moralized) the intersection between the demands of morality and the pragmatism of foreign policy.  The permissive interpretation of IHL we are witnessing in Gaza since October 2023, as Jessica Whyte aptly describes, by a deliberate starvation policy to depopulate Gaza that also seeks to disavow any intent to do so, reveals Israel (and its allies) as Kant’s “unsorry comforters.”9 The use of starvation as an instrument of war, the imposition of military strategies akin to a scorched earth policy,10 and widespread violence against civilians suggest that Israel is using collective punishment against Palestinians in Gazan.11 This conduct has now led International Criminal Court (ICC) chief prosecutor Karim Khan to seek indictments against Israeli (and Hamas) leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Despite the excessive civilian death toll that has stemmed from Israel’s proclaimed self-defensive and genocide-preventive measures, Israeli authorities have remained steadfast in their military goal of irrevocably destroying Hamas’s military capacity rather than eradicating Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Since the 7 October 2023 attack on southern Israel by Hamas-led forces, Israel has claimed that its military operations in Gaza are justified in two interrelated ways. First, it is executing its right to self-defence in retaliation for the attack on Israeli citizens, including civilians, by a terrorist organization whose avowed aim is to destroy Israel.12 Secondly, in exercising its right to self-defence, it is engaging in “genocide-prevention” – by destroying the capacity of Hamas and Palestine to perpetrate a “second Holocaust.” At the Hague, Tal Becker, legal advisor to the Israeli Defense Forces, insisted “Israel is in a war of defence against Hamas, not against the Palestinianpeople.”13 In international law, deliberate targeting of citizens is not permissible or condoned. Collateral damage is.14 The extent of the death toll and destruction of civilian infrastructure – hospitals, schools, and mosques, in addition to residential neighbourhoods – suggests, however, that these distinctions have largely been ignored.15 Israel’s deployment of advanced Ai systems has allowed its forces to reshape the acceptance of the technology’s margin of error, including the risks of collateral damage and civilian casualties. This is just one of the ways Israel’s actions distort or pervert JWT criteria, prompting new moral (and legal) questions for advanced warfare, including where to draw the boundaries of existing ethical constraints.16 If we reference those boundaries to modern international law, Israel’s counteroffensive in Gaza is punitive because it violates the principle of proportionality. What further confines us to this limited international law framework is the current focus on whether Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. Since 7 October, the devastating civilian casualties caused by Israel, along with destructive rhetoric from Israeli leaders, quickly led to accusations of genocide and counter-accusations that Hamas committed genocide on7 October.17 The question is being considered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) thanks to a case brought by the Republic of South Africa. In large measure, the acrimonious global debate about genocide in Gaza is mired in legal technicalities due to the stringent requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNGC). Because the question admits only of a yes/no answer, other aspects of the conflict are missed: maybe we are witnessing an attack on civilians that amounts to “more than genocide”?18 Viewed historically, mass state violence against civilians is not an anomaly or exception in the international system as genocide implies: it is intrinsic to the very idea of statehood, and the kind of natural right of self-defence that Israel is invoking is central to the identity of many western states, whose formation is closely tied to imperial and colonial expansion.19 Early modern just war theorists often discussed wars in colonial contexts. Their theories accepted forms of punishment as well as unlicensed warfare in its normative schema, such as retribution, deterrence, restraint, and reform. They constitute a paradigm of punitive warfare.  Whether they realize it or not, commentators today are drawing on this paradigm in relation to Gaza. Edward Luttwak, for instance, arguably endorsed Samuel von Pufendorf’s (1632-1694) call for unrestricted warfare to achieve peace in his controversial 1999 article “Give War a Chance” (despite it being unclear if he has actually read the Saxonian jurist).20 Today he lauds Israel’s counteroffensive in Gaza as a military success, while bemoaning the severity of the constraints “that has been placed on Israel’s combat operations” as “a major impediment to its fight.”21 That any action taken against an enemy other is justified finds support among many Israelis, who have no faith in diplomacy and view Israeli security solely in terms of pre-emption, intimidation, and deterrence. They believe in always supporting the military against a relentless and cruel enemy.22 Israel’s war in Gaza is punitive in the sense meant by some of the early modern international jurists. Here I demonstrate how Israel is reviving archaic forms and justifications of state practice that are deeply rooted in the Western tradition of just war and the justification of punitive wars. By revisiting these ideas, my aim is not to furnish Israel with justifications for its war in Gaza from the archive of the law of nature and of nations, but rather to place it within the intellectual history of punitive war. This contextualization is anything but a consolation, for as I conclude, the genocide concept is an outgrowth of this history.  Historicizing the Right to Punitive War  The early modern just war theory discourse of punishment opens up at least two ways to think about Israel’s war as punitive. First, for security reasons, that is for reasons of self-preservation, which also include measures of preventative and non-proportional warfare (defensive punitive wars). Secondly, by constructing Palestinians as “barbarians” (see below), as the quintessential host is humani generis, enemy of humankind, thereby legitimating violence in the name of the state and the jus gentium, that affords them a right to punish “crimes against natural law” (offensive punitive wars). For the Europeans, this particular right opened a way to punishment without injury to the state, and thus cemented amoral pathway for colonial ventures and exploitation. Portraying Hamas as Nazis – the archetypical genocidaires – functions to criminalize Palestinians and allows the Israeli leadership to present them as a persistent genocidal threat.23 Defensive Punitive Wars  Punitive wars were a common feature in JWT during the medieval period. Pope Innocent IV (1195–1254), for instance, used his universal jurisdiction to include the spiritual care of the souls of infidels, which at this time meant principally Muslims, and retained a right to intervene with impunity in their domestic affairs.24 The medieval concept of punitive war emerged from the rejection of the Roman Law principle of self-defence in early Christian theology. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), for instance, contended that killing in self-defence could not align with God’s law because it stemmed from humans’ attachment to their earthly life. Augustine linked punishment with sin and heresy, advocating for persecution and punishment driven by the desire to do good and eradicate evil, thus framing the punishment of heretics as an act of charity. Gregory the Great (540–604) championed this idea, threatening divine retribution against rulers who did not support the clergy’s efforts to suppress and punish barbarians and heretics. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Church had expanded its authority to punish its enemies, ultimately merging just war theory with the concept of holy war.25 The gradual shift from a punitive to a defensive conception of war is expressed in the thought of sixteenth-century theologians, where the two paradigms coexist. Writing in the context of the Spanish conquest of the Americas, for the Salamanca theologian Vitoria every punitive war has a defensive character, and no defensive war is effective without a punitive element.26 Punishment was not grounded in vengeance, or vendetta; it had to fit the crime, which promoted a principle of proportionality.27 Although we have obligations based on our universal common rights, these do not justify waging war on the Indians, whether to punish them for violating natural law or to convert them to Christianity by force for their eternal salvation. The natural rights of the Indians are inviolable, and it would be unjust for the Spaniards to violate these rights with impunity.28 Yet, Vitoria contemplates the possibility of saving innocents by prohibiting and punishing offenders “from practicing any nefarious custom or rite.”29 Vitoria, nevertheless, imposes strict conditions on such humanitarian endeavours, insisting that they must bedriven by “right intention.” Punishing to save innocents from cannibalism is a noble intention, but using it as a pretext for war is unjustifiable. Slaughtering of innocents is not permissible, however, Vitoria does introduce exceptions to this rule in extenuating circumstances that relate to a prince’s necessity to obtain peace and security.30 Unlike Vitoria, the Italian jurist Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) recognized a state’s right to punish as an instrument of self-preservation.31 Sovereigns are justified in using preemptive force to deter threats, prioritizing state preservation even before these threats fully develop. The kind of state’s right to what Dirk Moses has termed “permanent security” is theorized with a remarkable clarity in Gentili’s writing.32 This also implies that general deterrence can be invoked as a justification for punishment that exceeds the balance between the wrongdoer and the enforcer. While Gentili maintains that war(and post-war punishment) should address a broadly defined injury, the concept of deterrence as a proactive measure can be applied even before any act directly impacts the state.33 Both Vitoria and Gentili acknowledged the reformative and retributive aspects of punishment, as well as punishing an offender to prevent future misconduct by the offender or by others,34 implicitly conflating punishment with deterrence. For Gentili, self-defence falls under the “category of expediency,” which is considered an autonomous source of justice and, as such, is less restrictive about the requirements of predicate injury. Grotius, as we will see, insisted on an even more permissive right to punitive war against those who offend against nature. This implies that a sovereign can justifiably wage war against another state for any violations without needing to prove harm or have that harm be “proportionate.” That is, the anticipation of injury, along with the harm already endured, provides a legitimate justification for war.35 Generally, cruelty in war is forbidden, but harsher warfare against uncivilized peoples is permitted, because “with respect to barbarians violence is more potent than kindness.”36 The reasoning that certain wartime circumstances, like self-defence or genocide, justify exceptions to norms of restraint for war and in war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) extends to the discussion of Israel’s war in and on Gaza. This JWT archetype has been invoked in the Gaza context by the prominent political theorist Michael Walzer.37 His views are significant because his book, Just and Unjust Wars (1977), revived the JWT in academic and public discourse, and he has applied the doctrine to Israel’s past attacks on Gaza, urging the principle of distinction while defending Israel’s right to retaliate against Hamas’s missiles.38 Because of academic reputation and occasional criticisms of Israeli military retaliation with statements (Israel today does not have cause “for revenge against the people ofGaza”39), he is regarded as a prestigious commentator with moral standing. He has now written about the conflict in Gaza since 7 October 2023. Walzer’s scrupulous regard for civilian protection would seem to distance him from the likes of Gentili. However, he allows for extensive civilian destruction in two circumstances.  First, his advocacy for “emergency ethics” (morally) justifying the targeting of civilians during war indicates a continuation of early modern arguments about punitive warfare. Walzer argues that military leaders may dispense with the ordinary moral constraints, including the prohibition against killing non-combatants, when the political community is existentially threatened, which he calls the “supreme emergency.”40 Supreme emergency requires that two conditions be met, namely, first, that the threat be imminent, and second, that it be a kind of radical threat to human lives and values that is beyond ordinary military defeat.41 Supreme emergency pertains to jus in bello because it considers revisions to the rules that guide conduct in war. The historical context for conceptualizing this doctrine is the Allied carpet bombing of German cities in World War II. Nazism represented an existential threat to British national existence, and the Allies were entitled to bomb German civilians until that immediate security threat passed.42  Second, Walzer goes further and argues in terms of permanent security, reflecting the colonial logic of thinkers like Gentili. He now argues even Hamas does not constitute an immediate threat (“supreme emergency”), massive Palestinian civilian casualties can still be justified in terms of Israel’s longer-term security.43 The justification of a military campaign with a shocking civilian casualty count through reasoning in terms of self-preservation is reminiscent of early modern thinkers:  Israel is fighting a war of existential importance, but there was no concrete threat of genocide against the Israeli civilian population. This war is existential in that if Israel does not succeed in securing its borders and deterring future attackers, many citizens would probably leave the country. But at this moment, it is not a supreme emergency. Therefore, the country is bound to the same standards that it adhered to in previous conflicts.44 As of this moment, and according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, Israel is illegally occupying Gaza, and only has the right to enforce immediate security, not permanent security. It can respond to immediate threats but not wage an endless campaign to achieve “absolute victory” to ensure that Gaza “never again” poses a threat. However, Walzer justifies, as Gentili had, an ongoing military campaign that produces a massive civilian casualty count in terms of anticipatory self-preservation (permanent security).45 By arguing for an existential threat exists that satisfies the principles of jus ad bellum, while simultaneously arguing the Israeli state must still satisfy the principles of jus in bello because there is no supreme emergency, Walzer has found a way to justify a war conducted in a manner that results in a massive civilian casualty count.  Walzer’s emphasis on self-preservation as a rationale for jus ad bellum is comparable then to Gentili’s “category of exception,” where the harm suffered does not need to be “proportionate,” also a condition for jus ad bellum, to justify and commit warfare.46 So while Walzer insists that Israel’s response is neither genocidal nor punitive, he clearly believes it to be proportionate: “if there were almost 10,000 Hamas fighters among the30,000 Palestinians killed, it’s not a bad ratio for such a war on urban terrain.”47 In order to maintain his view that the war is being conducted ethically, Walzer appears willing to give the Israeli state the benefit of the doubt. He denies, for example, reports that Israel is bombing Hamas targets after they enter their homes, thereby guaranteeing largescale civilian casualties, especially on women and children.48 Gentili’s JWT exposes Walzer’s appetite for offensive war against Hamas, because of the ambiguity between defensive and offensive war when justified for reasons of permanent security. However, permanent security concerns were not the only grounds for offensive war, including those of a punitive kind.  Offensive Punitive Wars  The issue of whether Europeans had the right to wage war as a means of punishing non-Europeans is a central topic in early modern just war theory discussions. Gentili was adamant that the Spaniards were justified in waging war against the Indians due to their practices of “abominable lewdness even with beasts” and cannibalism. This justification was based on the idea that the Indians, through such actions, had violated the natural and divine laws that form the bonds of union between all people,49 and “it is ordained by nature herself that all sinners should be punished.”50 The issues of European expansion, indigenous rights, moral questions of dignity, safety, self-preservation and humanitarian intervention were manifest in one of the most famous debates of the sixteenth century between the humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1494–1573), and the Dominican Bartholomé de Las Casas (1484–1566), at Valladolid in 1550. Here, the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V commanded that all wars of conquest be suspended until a panel of intellectuals convened in the imperial Spanish capital of Valladolid deliberated on the question by what right Spaniards subdue the Amerindians, and subject them topunishment.51  One of the many issues to be resolved was whether the Spanish were justified in punishing the American Indians for their violations of natural law. The contours of Sepúlveda’s argument can be simply stated: Native Americans were barbarians by both habits (e.g. by engaging in human sacrifice) and nature, tainted by their barbarous vices, and by right of nature, people in this state must obey the more civilized and prudent, or be punished for resisting the universal moral order. Designating this supposed natural defect in the capacity for rational thought to the American Indians cemented a strict God sanctioning order of classification. Resistance of this natural order of dominion gave their Spanish overlords grounds for waging just war against them. The American Indians, Sepúlveda insisted, had to be saved from themselves and subjected to their European masters in order to bring them into the fold of Christianity, and to save their souls. His stipulation for just war maintained first, that the American Indians killed innocents among themselves, hailing their salvation as a just enterprise and something to be encouraged. “If anyone doubts,” Sepúlveda contended, “no one who is a real Christian doubts that all men who wander outside the Christian religion die an eternal death.”52 To protect “innocent persons from such injurious acts” would give the Spanish “the right, already granted by God and nature, to wage war against these barbarians to submit them to Spanishrule.”53 And second, that these depraved acts of indecency were sanctioned and systematized by their own public customs and political institutions – a point, which caused Sepúlveda greater concern than individual acts of depravation.54 This institutionalization of evil required nothing less than a regime change and total victory through war and forcible subjection, a method that “is the most expeditious and best suited for accomplishing these ends and securing the salvation of souls.”55 The Spanish duties to humanity were irrefutable, as far as Sepúlveda was concerned, and they were morally obligated to civilize and Christianize the American Indians. It seemed obvious to Sepúlveda that the Indians lacked sufficient reason to be entrusted with their own affairs. The common bond of humanity, established by divinity and the natural law, considers all people as our neighbours, Sepúlveda asserted, “provided we can do so without harm to ourselves.”56 God has given human beings commandments concerning his or her neighbour, and we have a duty to obey such divine laws. If we do not, then we commit heresy.  Sepúlveda grounded this enlargement of just war theory beyond a principle of self-defence. Even if the Indians possessed natural rights (afforded to all humankind by the Natural Law) – to for instance self-defence, property and political autonomy, they had so blatantly misused them that they are now forfeited as a result of their ungodly practices.57 Wars were a necessary mean to combat their resistance in obeying the Natural Law. These crimes were a direct affront to God, and it was incumbent upon the Spanish to avenge, punish and restrain such crimes. Punitive wars such as these were salutary, but nothing to be celebrated.58 Sepúlveda was not concerned, as Las Casas had been, about the collateral damage of punitive wars, exactly because Natural Law permits collective punishment of those who violate its tenets. In fact, there is a slippage between what we might term collateral damage (unfortunate, but legitimate violence) and collective punishment (moral imperative to reform or deter) because the category of “innocent” is suspended. Sepúlveda is expounding the latter:  And the point he [Las Casas] makes about being obliged to refrain from waging a war aimed at punishing the few guilty parties if it cannot be accomplished without a much larger number of innocent people coming to grief is irrelevant. For in a city or community where human sacrifice was performed by public authority, all are guilty, since all approve of the practice.59, As evidenced further below, Israel’s claim that there are no “uninvolved civilians,” and that any casualties among “human shields” are morally the responsibility of Gazans, aligns with Sepúlveda’s reasoning. In a recent Israel Affairs article, the philosopher Per Bauhn adjudicates on the question of moral responsibility for non-combatants’ death in Gaza. He exonerates Israel and attributes all culpability to Hamas. By posing an “unjust danger to the state of Israel”, Bauhn says, “Hamas has created a situation in which Israel is morally justified in waging a war of self-defence that puts Palestinian non-combatants at risk of being accidentally killed.”60 This claim is not only deeply rooted in permanent security reasoning, it also presupposes that moral responsibility is a zero-sum concept. Yet, the Israeli leadership and the IDF are not exempt from moral scrutiny by the culpability attributed to Hamas for the conflict in Gaza, which the two morally distinct judgements of just war theory also implies.  What we have seen so far is that the idea of placing belligerents outside of the moral realm is a central framework for that of extreme emergency exceptions but also for offensive punitive wars. One of the fundamental presuppositions of theorizing about war is the belief that civilization consists in the gradual elimination of force from our relations with others. Thus, to uphold civilization means finding a way of regulating and humanizing armed conflict. However, there are those who do not fight under the auspice of a state; those who fall outside or are deemed to be outside of the civilized world. Laws of war do not apply to them to the same degree as actors within the society of civilized states, and these can be punished. Pirates, barbarians, and non-Europeans all fell within this exclusionary category among many classic international jurists.  Sonja Schilling describes how this narrative logic of deviance is closely associated with punitive war.61 Civilized humanity stands against a brutal, barbaric invader. The loser faces annihilation, and if civilization is defeated, humanity will revert to a dreadful state of constant warfare. The hostis humani generis idea assumes a consistent and unquestioned conflict between civilization and the Other, situated in a marginal area between the empire and a non-white wilderness. Evidenced below, Israeli officials frequently invoke the term wilderness, as an imposing “nature,” meaning it is a space where, due to its inherent characteristics, the state of nature exists.62 The act of claiming ownership achieves something important as it brings land into the legal or civilized domain for the first time.63 From the 1980s onwards, Palestinian violence against Israel was increasingly depicted not as a negotiable territorial dispute, but as a fundamental conflict between civilization and its inherent Other.64 As Schilling remarks “[t]he civil societies of both the United States and Israel are constructed as conceivable institutional enablers of civilization because these countries adhere to the universal and international principles of human rights.”65 Grotius prominently asserted the limitations of recognizing belligerency with whom we cannot hope to build moral relations, maintaining a strict distinction between lawful and unlawful enemies.66 For him “unlawful” enemies ultimately demarcated the boundary of international society, and the lingering problem remained whether they can be transformed into legal combatants recognized and protected by the law of nations. Grotius would – reluctantly – insist that promises and good faith should be kept even with pirates and brigands. Given that both Hamas, as an unlawful enemy (violent non-state actor), and Israel (recognized sovereign state) continue to be impervious to the ethical and legal standards of war, the importance of Grotius’s distinction seems less relevant. Wars against unlawful enemies cannot retain recognition that confers legal validation. Pirates are a particular kind of enemy. Pirates violate the commercial rights of humankind. In defending these commercial rights no declaration of war, for instance, is needed, since these violators have already declared war against all.67 In fact, Grotius writes that determining the “manner” of a war is best done on account of the enemy you are fighting: “they are Enemies, who publicly denounce War against us, or we against them; the rest are but Pirates, or Robbers.”68 Pirates and atheists are outside the moral community. War between “lawful” enemies implies that there is a thin aspect of respect that requires explanation when they are acting coercively against one another (one does not need to like one’s neighbour to have a binding social relationship). We can imagine that if a lawful enemy commits heinous crimes against humanity that warrant punitive action, it would need to be declared and follow the rules of the laws of war as a recognition of that relationship.  The right of punishment was fundamental for Grotius to determine how to enforce rights and duties to regulate relationships between states.69 The right to inflict punishment follows from the right to defend oneself, the right to recover property and the right to exact debt. Grotius specified four just causes of war, self-defence, recovery of property, obtaining what is owed, and the exacting of punishment.70 The first, afforded by natural law, arising “directly and immediately from the Care of our own Preservation.”71The latter was in effect punitive wars to address uncorrected wrongs – a state right he positioned as central to upholding international order and peace. States have permissive rights to punish human beings or peoples who grievously transgress or sin against natural law by engaging in acts of cannibalism, unnecessary killings, inhumanity toward parents, piracy, as well as religious impiety in public.72 Given that Grotius allows a permissive right to punish violations of the natural law, what exactly is the purpose of the punishment? There are a number of possibilities, of course. It could be retribution for committing a moral wrong, or a deterrent to prevent future violations, or indeed, it could be to reform the character of peoples, to force them to see the error of their ways. Grotius’s underlying assertion is that punishment has to have a deterrent effect; and this is where punishment may be considered a moral power. To deter someone from consorting with animals, for example, would be to prevent them from committing amortal sin, and to prevent an indelible stain on their soul.73 Punishment, then, is not exacted for retaliation or vengeance, but rather as precaution.  With his doctrine of a natural right to punish, Grotius recognized that there are some violations of the law of nature which affect us all, and for the sake of humankind should not go unpunished.74 Barbarians, who are more “beasts than men” are to all the world “a Foe,” and “such abominable Crimes do they allow of in their public Decrees, that if any City upon Earth should enjoin, or had enjoined, the like, it ought to have been, by the general Voice of Mankind, lain in ruin.”75 Gentili had pressed this permissibility even further. Not only were wars undertaken for the common interest of humankind and on behalf of others more honourable, upholding fundamental standards of justice for humanity, violators who commit the kind of crimes that legitimises such wars, must be defeated through a form of violence aimed at total destruction.76 The kinds of enemies that warrant this kind of punitive measures, as we have seen, are unjust or unlawful enemies. However, in “solemn wars,” those that are fought against a lawful enemy, Grotius generally cautions moderation in situations of war against women and children:“[W]e must not attempt any Thing which may prove the Destruction of Innocents,” Grotius says, “unless for some extraordinary Reasons, and for the Safety of many.”77 Retaliation, or collective punishment, against a whole people is forbidden, and to pretend that “Enemies are but one entire Body engaged against us” is absurd,78 because disproportionate punitive actions exceeded the need to maintain the peace.Recovering the Pufendorian Perspective on Licence for War  Unlike Grotius, Pufendorf denies that, in times of war, there are any moral jus in bello rules. The end of war is peace, and peace is most effectively achieved by unconstrained vengeance. There is a rich history to consider concerning the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello – and, as David Boucher shows, we can see how this relationship fluctuates. Since 9/11, the growing emphasis had been on jus ad bellum, and less emphasis on the principles of jus in bello.79 The disastrous consequences of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and now Israel, the balance seems to have swung the other way towards jus in bello. It is Israel’s conduct of the war that has come under severe scrutiny, not its right to go to war on the basis of a just cause (self-defence).80 For Pufendorf, such jus in bello scrutiny was unnecessary, as he allowed for unrestricted use of force in wars of self-defence.  Wars for Pufendorf could never really be properly punitive. Pufendorf is famous for denying the reality of independent international law, because ultimately law needs an author and an enforcer, and for Pufendorf it is God. International Law is for him the law of nature as applied to states.81 It is the law of nature that regulates the relations among states, and states are regulated by the moral constraints of the natural law. Pufendorf is much more preoccupied by the morality of war, and not its legality. As such, pace the arguments of Sepúlveda and Grotius, there could be no justifiable grounds for reforming the practices of the American Indians.82 Because the force of inflicting “punishment” in the international context does not emanate from a (temporal) authoritative superior, states cannot have the right to punish, but they may, of course, have just cause for war. If a belligerent puts itself outside the protection of the natural law, by for instance being an aggressor –and thereby violating the fundamental law of nature it has placed itself outside of its protection. This opens up a sort of licence for unrestricted war of self-defence. It is, in essence, defence against “unjust” violence. Pufendorf is very clear on the fact that “a state of hostility of itself grants one the license to do another injury without limit.”83  The very violation of the duty of peace against another provokes the licence of any force necessary to bring the war to an end and achieve peace; without this licence, Pufendorf argues, the end of war could never be feasible. Pufendorf conceptualizes states the same way as individuals in the state of nature. To protect one’s own security, Pufendorf prescribes any means necessary that “will best prevail against such a person, who, by the injury done to me, has made it impossible for me to do him an injury, however Imay treat him, until we have come to a new agreement to refrain from injuries in thefuture.”84 According to Pufendorf, the violation of the law of nature releases the victims from the obligation to observe it in relation to the violator. Excess in war is justifiable, and without this permission to go to extremes, the war will never have an end in sight. The aim of force is not to reform the offender by punishing them, but to protect our security, property, and rights. Pufendorf does, however, caution those states who engage in gratuitous violence against the enemy. On prudential grounds restraint should be exercised. One never knows when the table might turn, and the enemy becomes dominant and acts gratuitously towards you. As such, behaving in a manner that is considered inappropriate by other civilized nations can be counterproductive as one’s own reprehensible or cruel acts may be emulated and then used against them. Other reasons to observe the customs of warfare are that they can add to the prestige and honour of a ruler and ultimately it is in the interest of countries to be cooperative and not to cause unnecessary damage to states they may find themselves in alliance with again once the conflict is over, despite the fact that, in a state of war, they have a legal right to do as they please.85 Information: Here is a part called “Israel’s Justification for War against Gazans” – To read the full Article please visit the Original Source under: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2024.2406098?scroll=top&needAccess=true  Conclusion  Andrew Fitzmaurice has convincingly demonstrated how Raphael Lemkin developed the concept of genocide out of a critique of colonialism, thus inverting the Genocide Studies and Settler Colonial Studies preoccupation with the deployment of the genocide concept to explain 500 years of colonialism. This reframing allows Fitzmaurice to ask important questions about how colonialism has impacted the concept of genocide itself.133 “It is a moot point,” Fitzmaurice remarks “whether the word ‘genocide’ can be meaningfully used to describe the horrors of colonization in centuries that preceded the context in which Lemkin coined the term.”134 To comprehend the dispossession and destruction experienced by occupied peoples in the colonies, Lemkin aligns with the tradition of anti-imperial thought, wherein the framework of universal human rights and therefore also genocide emerged in response to issues concerning the status of colonized population. In these concluding remarks, I draw kinship with Fitzmaurice’s thought in positing the notion of genocide as a product of the history of the critique of colonialism that began with Las Casas, one of Lemkin’s heroes. However, I diverge from his emphasis on genocide as a concept emerging from the anti-imperial tradition, instead viewing genocide (as a practice), as an extension of what Benton calls “projects of peace making.” Colonial wars were invariably punitive wars, and genocide is a product of the punitive war theory tradition.  Israel’s arguments for the war in Gaza rely on an indiscriminate use between both defensive and offensive moral justifications for war. Previously, just war was seen as a punishment for an injustice committed by an adversary, with a jurisdictional enlargement of the right to punish that also included violations of natural law without being limited to direct injury. Now our focus on the right to self-defence, which categorizes wars as either “defensive” or “aggressive” to justify them, shows a noticeable absence of the normative application of the right to punish in modern international law.135 However, rather than absence between the older conception of punishment and modern international law and practice, Israel’s military actions in Gaza expose its continuity. The formal disappearance of the principle of the right to punish as an articulated objective of modern international law has not, therefore, meant the disappearance of punitive wars. Instead, punitive measures are often undertaken under a different guise as modern international law continues to implement measures addressing behaviour that violates its norms. Since7 October 2023, we have seen Israel reasserting this right in justification and conduct by measures of collective punitive actions, deterrence, and punishment of the unlawful genocidal enemy other. We have seen a justification for actions that place the responsibility for the immoral act of violating the laws of wars onto the victims, that is Palestinians, of that immoral act. The genocide concept has had a central role to play for this kind of political deceit, not least because of the way that “genocide prevention” that Israel purports its war to be is unavoidably punitive. The problem of caging in punitive action in the language of justification is that it places the argument into a sacrosanct place that causes hesitation in obligatory and legal frameworks meant to prevent it. Calling something justified does not make it so even when something bares the character but not the spirit of an idea. Just war theories have nuance and contingency not simply to be flexible to permissibility, but also the opposite, to redraw what is impermissible. In practice, however, the intent to punish and deter, which is integral to JWT tradition, is hard to distinguish from the intent to destroy, as the punishing and deterring we are witnessing in Gaza, often involves causing significant destruction to many people.  Acknowledgements I am grateful to A. Dirk Moses, David Boucher, Andrew Fitzmaurice, and Matthew C. Murray for making invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Also, to Katia Yesiyeva and Salaam Farhan for their research support. Lastly, to the Fall 23 Saving Strangers FYWS students, whose critical engagement with Walzer and Luttwak in the context of Gaza war prompted me to write this article. It goes without saying that any infelicities are mine alone.  Disclosure Statement  No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).  Notes on Contributor  Camilla Boisen is a senior lecturer in the Writing Program at New York University, Abu Dhabi. She is a historian of political thought, and has published widely on the intellectual history of empire and humanitarian intervention. She is also the co-author of Justice, Merit, and the Political Theory of Academic Knowledge Production (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024). Notes 1 The organising terms “defensive” and “offensive” punitive war is loosely derived from Alexis Blane and Benedict Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 241–65. For example, “[p]urely defensive uses of force are permissible to both individuals and states alike; each has the right to forceful self-defence when not the aggressor. However, once the immediate threat abates, only the state has the right to use force for a punitive end, to revenge a wrong that it suffers. […] The right to offensive uses of force belongs solely to the state and can be employed beyond its own borders in defence both of the interests of its citizens and of its own interests as a collectivity” (249).2 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck, trans. John Morrice et al. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), ii, xx, II, viii.3 Rajan Menon, The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).4 A. Dirk Moses, The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 2. For discussion on the doctrine of double effect, see Alison McIntyre, “Doing Away with Double Effect,” Ethics 111, no. 2 (2001): 219–55.5 Natural law was a (perceived) shared framework that yielded ever-revealing truths of natural design to create rules and establish the just and right conduct of individuals and governments. Its content and prescriptions changed, but it was always presented as a set of transfixed immutable laws sanctioned by God.6 Essentially, starting a war without UN Security Council approval is illegal, so states must demonstrate either that they acted in self-defence or had the host government’s consent. In recent decades some states have opted for another permissible justification, claiming that their use of force was implicitly authorized by the Security Council, as seen with some NATO members in Kosovo and the US, UK, and Australia in Iraq or that it was done for humanitarian purposes. See also Alex Bellamy, “The Responsibilities of Victory: ‘Jus Post Bellum’ and the Just War,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 601–25; Kevin Jon Heller, “The Illegality of ‘Genuine’ Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of International Law 32, no. 2 (2021): 613–47; Jennifer M. Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Philip Cunliffe, “The Doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a Practice of Political Exceptionalism,” European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 2 (2017): 466–86.7 Mary E. O’Connell, “The Just War Tradition and International Law against War: The Myth of Discordant Doctrines,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 35, no. 2 (2015): 33–51.8 In the classical just war theory, the principles of proportionality and necessity are applied twice: first, in the criteria for deciding to go to war (jus ad bellum), and second, in the rules for how war is conducted (jus in bello). This means the theory demands that both the war as a whole and each specific action within it must be proportionate and necessary. See Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality and Necessity in Jus in Bello,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War, ed. Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 418–39.9 Jessica Whyte, “A ‘Tragic Humanitarian Crisis’: Israel’s Weaponization of Starvation and the Question of Intent,” Journal of Genocide Research (17 April 2024), https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2339637. On the “foundational myth” of the Geneva Conventions see Boyd van Dijk’s excellent work, Preparing for War: The Making of the Geneva Conventions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).10 Eiland quoted in ibid., 14.11 Collective punishment refers to any non-individual punitive measure or sanction imposed on all members of a group for actions they did not commit. Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention declares a war crime: “Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”12 Commentators have consistently challenged the legality of Israel’s excessive use of force in Gaza. See, for example, Ralph Wilde, “Israel’s War in Gaza is Not a Valid Act of Self-defence in International Law,” Opinio Juris, (9 November 2023), http://opiniojuris.org/2023/11/09/israels-war-in-gaza-is-not-a-valid-act-of-self-defence-in-international-law/. The second ruling of 24 May 2024 by the ICJ that Israel should with immediate effect cease the military offensive in Rafah points now to the danger of excessive force amounting to genocide, and therefore military action should cease. One judge, however, underlined that the court could not ban Israel from taking legitimate action in self-defence.13 “War against Hamas in Gaza is act of self-defence, Israel tells world court,” UN News, 12 January 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145452.14 The principle of collateral damage forms part of the necessary criteria that has to be met to establish wars legitimacy. According to IHL, civilians cannot be directly targeted, but they may be lawfully killed as collateral damage. Although numbers are classified, militaries used a specific value of the collateral damage estimation (CDE), which gauges the accepted number of civilian casualties for any military action. From an ethical standpoint of how much collateral can be accepted in order to obtain the purpose of a war or military humanitarian intervention is the question. Charles P. IV Trumbull, “Proportionality, Double Effects, and the Innocent Bystander Problem in War,” Stanford Journal of International Law 59, no. 1 (2023): 35–74. Regardless, the principle of collateral damage continues to be morally troubling. See also F. M. Kamm, “Terror and Collateral Damage: Are They Permissible?,” Journal of Ethics 9, nos. 3–4 (2005): 381–401.15 Israeli President Isaac Herzog remarked on 13 October that the entire people of Gaza are responsible for the 7 October attacks as part of a wider phenomenon of modern war where the targeting of civilians is increasingly prevalent. Elyse Semerdjian, “Gazification and Genocide by Attrition in Artsakh/Nagorno Karabakh and the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” Journal of Genocide Research (17 July 2024): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2377871.16 Bethan McKernan and Harry Davies, “‘The Machine Did it Coldly’: Israel used AI to Identify 37,000 Hamas Targets,” The Guardian, 4 April 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes.17 Raz Segal, for example, is vocal in labelling Israel’s war in Gaza a genocide. See Raz Segal, “A Textbook Case of Genocide,” Jewish Currents Magazine, 13 October 2023, https://jewishcurrents.org/a-textbook-case-of-genocide.18 A. Dirk Moses, “More than Genocide,” Boston Review, 14 November 2023. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/more-than-genocide/.19 See Moses, The Problems of Genocide.20 Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs, no. 78 (1999): 36–44.21 Edward N. Luttwak, “Why Israel is Winning in Gaza,” Tablet, 9 February 2024, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/israel-winning-gaza.22 Comments by American-Israeli analyst and cited in Steven Erlanger, “Netanyahu, Defiant, Appears to Have Gone Rogue, Risking a Regional War,” New York Times, 2 August 2024.23 Zoé Samudzi, “‘We are Fighting Nazis’: Genocidal Fashionings of Gaza(ns) After 7 October,” Journal of Genocide Research (18 January 2024): https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2305524.24 F. E. Peters, The Monotheists: Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Conflict and Competition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 146; James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), chaps. 1–2. I have laid out aspects of the early modern theories of punishment in JWT before. See Camilla Boisen and David Boucher, “The medieval and early modern legacy of rights: The rights to punish and to property,” in Medieval Foundations of International Law, ed. William Bain (New York: Routledge, 2017), 148–65.25 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 24–25.26 Pärtel Piirimäe, “Alberico Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War and its Impact on Seventeenth-Century Normative Views” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 187–209, 189–93.27 See Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68; Blane and Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” 248.28 Francisco Vitoria, Political Writings, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 219.29 Vitoria, Political Writings, 288. Emphasis in original. The connection between the right of property and Vitoria’s argument concerning saving the innocent is explored in William Bain, “Saving the Innocent, Then and Now: Vitoria, Dominion, and World Order,” History of Political Thought 34 (2013): 588–613.30 A. Dirk Moses, “Empire, Resistance, and Security: International Law and the Transformative Occupation of Palestine,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development 8, no. 2 (2017): 384. See also Vitoria, Political Writings, 324.31 Blane and Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” 250.32 Moses, The Problems of Genocide.33 Ibid., 251; Alberico Gentili, Three Books on the Law of War, trans. John C. Rolfe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), i, chapter xiv, 62.34 It is worthwhile to consider the underlying metaphysical differences between Vitoria and his protestant successors. As a Thomist, Vitoria was deeply invested in the idea of human sociability, rooted in mutual affection within society, including between different peoples. Consequently, wars of retribution and reprisal conflicted with these core beliefs. In contrast, Grotius, along with other seventeenth-century natural law theorists, adhered to what Kant described as a theory of "unsociable sociability," which underpinned the social contract – a concept unnecessary for Vitoria, who, following Aristotle, believed societies naturally predate the individual. Contrarily, for someone like Grotius, the notion of unsociable sociability was based on the assumption that self-preservation is humanity's primary goal, and this was considered the first law of nature. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that these seventeenth-century natural law writers would allow for a more aggressive pursuit of self-interest than Vitoria, for instance, had endorsed. I thank Andrew Fitzmaurice for bringing this important difference to my attention.35 Blane and Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” 251–2. See also fn.8 above.36 Gentili, On the Law of War, iii, chap ii, 293.37 Recently also by Per Bauhn, “Just War, Human Shields, and the 2023–24 Gaza War,” Israel Affairs (21 August 2024): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537121.2024.2394289?src = .38 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Boston: Basic Books, 2015); Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, “Israel: Civilians & Combatants,” New York Review of Books, 14 May 2009; Michael Walzer, “Israel Must Defeat Hamas, But Also Must Do More to Limit Civilian Deaths,” New Republic, 30 July 2014.39 Michael Walzer, “Justice Demands the Defeat of Hamas, Not Revenge against the Palestinians,” K. Jews, Europe, XXIst Century, 19 October 2023, https://k-larevue.com/en/michael-walzer-justice-demands-the-defeat-of-hamas-not-revenge-against-the-palestinians/.40 Walzer’s doctrine of supreme emergency has met with understandable criticism over the years. Especially Walzer’s moral exercise of it. See for example Alex J. Bellamy, “Supreme Emergencies and the Protection of Non-Combatants in War,” International Affairs 80, no. 5 (2004): 829–50; Robin May Schott, “Just War Theory and the Problem of Evil,” Hypatia 23, no. 2 (2008): 122–40.41 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 251–5.42 Ibid., 253.43 Michael Walzer, “Gaza and the Asymmetry Trap,” Quillette, 1 December 2023, https://quillette.com/2023/12/01/gaza-and-the-asymmetry-trap/.44 Michael Walzer, “What is a Just War,” Zeit Magazine, 17 April 2024, https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/leben/2024-04/michael-walzer-just-war-israel-gaza-english.45 International Criminal Court, “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,” 9 July 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf.46 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 305.47 Walzer, “What is a Just War.”48 Yuval Abrhaham, “‘A Mass Assassination Factory’: Inside Israel’s Calculated Bombing of Gaza,” 972 Magazine, 30 November 2023, https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza/; Yuval Abhraham, “‘Lavender’: The AI Machine Directing Israel’s Bombing Spree in Gaza,” 972 Magazine, 3 April 2024, https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/49 Gentili, On the Law of War, i, chap. xxv, 122–123.50 Ibid., iii, chap. xi, 330.51 Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490–1700 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 69.52 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, “The Defence of the Book, On the Just Reasons for War (Apologia pro libro de iustiis belli causis)” in Sepúlveda on the Spanish Invasion of the Americas: Defending Empire, Debating Las Casas, ed. and trans. Luke Glanville, David Lupher, and Maya Feile Tomes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 191–224, 207.53 Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indian (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 86.54 Sepúlveda, “The Defence,” 204–7.55 Ibid., 213.56 Ibid., 210.57 David Boucher, The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and Human Rights in Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 172; Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1959), 35–42.58 Sepúlveda, “Contained Herein is a Debate or Disputation (Aquí se contiene una disputa o controversia),” Sepúlveda on the Spanish Invasion of the Americas, 225–350, 281.59 Ibid., 283.60 Bauhn, “Just War, Human Shields, and the 23–24 Gaza War,” 3.61 Sonja Schilling, Enemies of All Humankind: Fictions of Legitimate Violence (Hannover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2016), 91.62 Ibid.63 Ibid., 100.64 Ibid., 208.65 Ibid., 200.66 I have laid out some of these ideas before in “Hugo Grotius, Declaration of War, and the International Moral Order,” Grotiana 41 (2020): 282–303. It must be said that Grotius is somewhat ambivalent about punishment of violent non-state actors. He advocates for the eradication of pirates and other actors against humanity, but he is, of course, also famous for his tract defending Jacob van Heemskerck, commander of a fleet of eight vessels belonging to the United Amsterdam Company (and Grotius’ cousin), whose actions in attacking the Portuguese in 1603 were performed without authorization from the Dutch state. Grotius would go on to argue that the seizure of the Portuguese ship Santa Catarina and its cargo were good prize in a just war. See also Randall Lesaffer, “Grotius on Reprisals,” Grotiana 41 (2020): 330–48.67 Hans W. Blom and Mark Somos, “Public-Private Concord through Divided Sovereignty: Reframing Societas for International Law,” Journal of the History of International Law 22 (2020): 565–88.68 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, iii.ii.i, 1246.69 Piirimäe, “Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War,” 202.70 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ii, xx.71 Ibid., ii, i, 397.72 Ibid., ii, xx, 1021–24;1027–31;1051–52.73 Ibid.74 Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature, 215. See also Camilla Boisen, “The Law of Nations and The Common Law of Europe: the Case of Edmund Burke,” in International Law in the Long Nineteenth Century 1776—1914 – From the Public Law of Europe to Global International Law?, ed. Randall Lesaffer and Inge Van Hulle (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 20–44. The idea that wars waged for the purpose of self-preservation, including pre-emptive ones and wars undertaken by third parties against those who disrupted the sociability of the international order was commonplace among early modern thinkers. Specifically, Grotius believed this principle was why the society of nations functioned as a society rather than existing in a state of nature, as Hobbes suggested. Grotius contended that what elevated the law of nations to the status of a legal order, rather than a mere convention, was the readiness of its members to sanction those who posed a threat to others.75 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ii, xx, 1024.76 Claire Vergerio, War, States, and International Order: Alberico Gentili and the Foundational Myth of the Laws of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 116.77 Ibid., iii, xi, viii, 1439.78 Ibid., xvi, 1452–53.79 David Boucher, “The Just War Tradition and its Modern Legacy: Jus ad bellum and jus in bello,” European Journal of Political Theory 11, no. 2 (2011): 92–111.80 That being said, the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 has many implications for Israel’s claims of a right to self-defense (jus ad bellum). The occupation is per se illegal, and not simply the way it is conducted (jus in bello). Israel cannot claim self-defense when it is committing an ongoing act of aggression through the illegal occupation; moreover, Palestinians have, under international law, a right to resist alien occupation, colonial domination, and racist regimes. See: UNGA resolution 3314 (1974), UNGA resolution 37/43 (1982), and Article 1(4) of API to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. I am grateful to Jinan Bastaki for pointing this out.81 Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Eight Books (1672), trans. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), i.ii.6; ii, iii, 23.82 Ibid., viii, iii, 4–7.83 Ibid., viii, vii, 2.84 Ibid., vi, 7.85 Francesca Iurlaro, The Invention of Custom Natural Law and the Law of Nations, ca. 1550–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 142. It is important not to downplay the significance of natural law by over-focusing on interest and self-preservation as states’ main motivation for agreeing to follow customs. In opposition to Iurlaro, Peter Schröder rightly points to the error in giving too much consideration to interest as a basis for Pufendorf ’s international political thought. Pufendorf thinks that states’ behaviour can be regulated by natural law, the primary concept of which is socialitas. See Peter Schröder, “Sovereignty and Interstate Relations,” in Pufendorf's International Political and Legal Thought, ed. Peter Schröder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 155–74. In same volume, see also Boisen, “Pufendorf ’s Enduring Legacy for International Law,” 251–69.133 Andrew Fitzmaurice, “Anticolonialism in Western Political Thought: The Colonial Origins of the Concept of Genocide,” in Moses, Empire, Colony, Genocide, 55–80.134 Ibid., 74.135 Piirimäe, “Alberico Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War,” 189. The modern focus on self-defence, and its implications, is explored in detail in James Turner Johnson, “Then and Now: The Medieval Conception of Just War Versus Recent Portrayals of the Just War Idea,” in Medieval Foundations of International Relations, 117–31.

Diplomacy
NATO symbol on the background of the American flag. Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The future of NATO after the US elections

by Evelyn Gaiser, Konrad Adenauer Foundation , Max Willem Fricke, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском More European responsibility for a sustainable transatlantic relationship ' US geopolitical priorities will continue to shift to the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. ' Regardless of the outcome of the US elections, it can be assumed that US defense resources will be withdrawn from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. ' Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, espionage, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. Militarily, Russia is threatening the European NATO partners. Europe must function as a credible deterrent against this threat. ' In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. ' The US is still the backbone of NATO's defense capabilities in areas such as reconnaissance and deterrence. European countries must contribute significantly more to their defense capability to complement US support and take over parts of it in the medium term. ' By collaborating with partners in the Indo-Pacific, Germany and other European NATO members promote interoperability and competence and signal to the US a willingness to contribute to security beyond the defense of the European Alliance area. ' Whoever rules from the White House after January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and engagement in NATO is scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. Introduction The US election campaign is being followed with great interest by security experts and transatlanticists in Europe. This is because the outcome of the election on November 5 will have a major impact on the future of NATO - and thus the most successful defense alliance of all time. This Monitor analyzes what an election victory by Donald Trump on the one hand and an election victory by Kamala Harris on the other could mean for the transatlantic alliance and how the European NATO partners must position themselves to keep transatlantic relations on a sustainable footing. The geopolitical priorities of the USA will continue to shift towards the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. For decision-makers in Germany and other European NATO states, this means that there is an urgent need to consistently develop their defense policy and take responsibility for security policy. This is the only way to ensure peace and freedom in the European NATO states in the future. A decisive strengthening of European defense capabilities should be the key to shaping a sustainable and future-proof transatlantic partnership. Concerns about a second term for Donald Trump: Trumpproofing NATO There is concern in many European capitals that a second term in office for Donald Trump could have a decisive impact on the stability of transatlantic relations and NATO.1 The buzzword “Trumpproofing NATO” is therefore being used on both sides of the Atlantic to prepare for a possible second Trump administration. There are plenty of reasons for this. Trump has openly threatened to reduce the US troop presence in Europe, restrict intelligence sharing with NATO allies, cut a deal with Russia over Ukraine's head and revoke NATO's Article 5 security guarantee for those who do not contribute sufficiently.2 Take him seriously, not literally!  Trump's unpredictability is part of his political strategy. And so, Europe should prepare for various scenarios. The recommendation made by Republican MPs to their transatlantic partners at the recent NATO summit in Washington appears to be quite groundbreaking: Trump is not to be taken literally, but he should certainly be taken seriously.3 European decision-makers should also look at existing security policy ideas from Trump's environment, as he could - without a security policy strategy of his own - use these as a guide. “Dormant-NATO” - possible withdrawal of large parts of US troops  The concepts of conservative security policy pioneers such as Elbridge Colby4, Sumantra Maitra5 and Dan Caldwell6 are well-known. Colby was the architect of the national security strategy under Trump in 2018 and is considered a candidate for a top security policy post in a possible Trump II administration.7 Caldwell is Vice President and Maitra is a Senior Fellow at the influential Trump-affiliated think tank “Center for Renewing America”. The aforementioned experts advocate an increase in defense spending by European NATO members far above the 2014 target of two percent of gross domestic product.8 Furthermore, they call not only for increased burden-sharing, but also for burden-shifting within NATO.9 So far, Western Europe has acted as a free rider and exploited the US involvement in NATO (“freeriding”) - an insight that has long been shared by Republicans and Democrats, albeit in different tones.10 However, the Republicans go further: in view of rising debts, problems with recruiting soldiers and a defense industry that cannot keep up with the challenge posed by Russia and China, the US can no longer avoid a realignment of NATO.11 Maitra's “Dormant NATO” concept suggests that the USA should only be active in Europe with a limited naval and air force presence in future and would only operate in acute threat situations and in extreme emergencies with nuclear deterrence.12 The majority of the infantry, armored forces, logistics and artillery previously provided by the USA should therefore be provided by the Europeans.13 According to Maitra, the costly US leadership role in NATO is no longer in the interests of the United States, as Russia no longer poses an immediate threat to the US.14 Europe is therefore called upon to take over the conventional defense of its own continent, which is also justified by the fact that the US must focus its security policy resources on the Indo-Pacific and the protection of Taiwan. About Ukraine, Trump is considering a deal with Russia if he wins the election. The content of such a deal could be the end of NATO's eastward expansion and the rejection of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Trump could also negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Moscow's Ukrainian territorial claims - over the heads of Ukraine.15 JD Vance - Isolationist approaches of a vice-presidential candidate Donald Trump's vice-presidential candidate JD Vance also criticizes NATO and calls for US resources to be prioritized in Asia, particularly to deter a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, his position on Ukraine stands out in particular: he is completely opposed to US military aid for Ukraine.16 Vance believes that Ukraine cannot win the war against Russia in purely numerical terms and is in favor of negotiations with Russia.17 Another accent of the vice presidential candidate is his clear criticism of the rules-based world order. With him as Vice President, a break with the traditional foreign policy of the United States could become more likely.18 However, Vance has also shown himself to be very changeable in terms of his opinions and convictions, which is why he - like Trump - is difficult to assess overall. Despite the ambiguities and versatility that Trump and his foreign and security policy makers stand for, they are united by a tendency towards isolationism and criticism of NATO. Although a withdrawal from NATO is unlikely, Trump could drastically reduce the US role in the European security architecture. A Trump II scenario could pose further dangers for Ukraine in particular. Continuity under Kamala Harris? While the transatlantic agenda of a Democratic presidential candidate Biden was considered predictable, the nomination of Kamala Harris has brought a new dynamic to the debate about the future of transatlantic relations in case of a Democratic victory. Against this backdrop, it makes sense to look at the defense policy approaches that a Kamala Harris presidency could entail. Would Kamala Harris mean continuity in transatlantic relations? Would Harris be a transatlanticist? Kamala Harris gained important insights into foreign and security policy not only as Vice President, where she was present in the Oval Office or Situation Room for all important foreign policy decisions,19 but also as a Senator on the Home-land Security and Intelligence Committees. This applies to the investigation into Russian influence on the 2016 US elections in the Intelligence Committee, which is also likely to have shaped her view of Vladimir Putin.20 Kamala Harris is regarded as an advocate of transatlantic cooperation. As Vice President, Harris took part in Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland in the summer, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky six times and attended the Munich Security Conference three times. There she reaffirmed the USA's unwavering commitment to NATO and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.21,22 Her previous statements during the election campaign - particularly at the Democratic Party conference - also indicate that her foreign policy approach will continue to be in line with Joe Biden's NATO policy. Harris emphasized the importance of alliances, her commitment to NATO and her support for Ukraine against the Russian occupation. In the TV duel against Donald Trump, she described NATO as “the greatest military alliance the world has ever known ”23 and announced that she would continue to support Ukraine if she won the election. However, she left open whether she would supply Ukraine with added weapons or authorize the use of American weapons against targets on Russian soil.24 Her current security advisor, Phil Gordon, a proven expert and friend of Europe, is also being touted as a candidate for a high-ranking position in a possible Harris administration.25 There are therefore initial indications that the transatlantic alliance would continue to play an important role in foreign and security policy under Kamala Harris. Tim Walz: Foreign policy profile Harris' candidate for Vice President, Tim Walz, does not yet have a clear foreign policy profile. However, as a long-standing and high-ranking representative of the National Guard, he has ability in military matters. In the past, he has spoken out against military operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.26 He also joined Republican politicians in 2016 who spoke out against cuts to the military, as it needs to be well funded in order to meet the challenges in the world.27 The China expert spoke out against Trump's trade arms race with China, but also denounced human rights violations. Walz clearly condemned the Russian war of aggression, signed a law as governor of Minnesota that ended the state's investments in Russia28 and expressed his support for Ukraine29. However, many of his foreign policy positions are unlikely to be completed and will depend on which advisors he chooses to surround himself with. Generational change in the White House Despite Kamala Harris' fundamental support for NATO, her inauguration would mark a generational change in the White House. While President Joe Biden, who was born three years before the end of the Second World War, was significantly socialized politically by the Cold War, Harris began her political career a good twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and does not share the same historical ties to Europe. At the same time, Harris must respond to changing domestic and geopolitical realities. The United States is still the global superpower with a claim to military leadership. However, NATO has recently lost support in public opinion in the USA and the willingness to fund European defense is dwindling.30 Support for Ukraine is also viewed increasingly critically.31 There is also a consensus in broad circles of the Democratic Party that Europe must take more responsibility for its own defense. The economic policy agenda now announced by Harris in the election campaign would be enormously costly.32 This makes a significant increase in defense spending unlikely. The public, politicians and experts33 now perceive China as by far the greatest threat to the security and prosperity of the United States, and Harris is also concerned about China's quest for global political power. Harris has already announced at the party congress that she will ensure that America wins the competition for the 21st century against China.34 In view of increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the transfer of additional military resources, particularly air force and navy, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region will be unavoidable in the medium term. About NATO, the difference between a Harris and a Trump-led administration is likely to lie in the scope and speed of the withdrawal of US defense resources from Europe. While a withdrawal under Trump could be implemented quickly, an election victory for Harris is more likely to mean a gradual withdrawal and would give the Europeans time to position themselves better in terms of defense policy.35 NATO is still the most important instrument for European defense cooperation. Against the backdrop of the volatile security environment and the shift in priorities in the USA, Europeans must take on more responsibility for the defense of their own continent. This is the only way to ensure that NATO is still a successful defense alliance in the future. However, this debate should not be about Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, but about improving military capabilities to deter and defend against attacks on alliance territory. In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. This can only take place in close coordination with the USA and within NATO structures. Europe's security still depends on the USA. Because even if the European pillar of NATO is placed on a more stable footing, European security can only be guaranteed with American support for the near future. The USA is indispensable in NATO. The partners lean on its capabilities and are guided by developments. The US defense budget accounts for around two thirds of defense spending within NATO. There are currently around 85,000 soldiers stationed in Europe.36 This means that US defense spending is almost ten times higher than that of Germany, which has the second highest defense budget in NATO. A substantial proportion of US defense spending currently goes towards protecting European NATO members.37 At the same time, nine NATO countries, including Canada, Spain, and Italy, still spend less than two percent of their GDP on defense. Most of the so-called "strategic enablers", such as reconnaissance, aerial refueling and satellite communications, are currently provided by the USA, whose forces, in contrast to most European armies, are quickly deployable, combat-ready and equipped with sufficient stocks of ammunition.38 Despite all the debates that are taking place in this regard, the nuclear umbrella is likely to remain Europe's life insurance in the future. "New" threat situation requires a rethink. Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference39 in 2007 was followed by action: Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, its illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of the protracted conflict in the Donbass in 2014, its withdrawal from the arms control and security architecture and finally its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.40 The assumption is that, in the event of military success in Ukraine, Putin will declare further territorial claims and take military action. Security experts warn that Russia could press ahead with its imperial expansionism in just a few years and be capable of waging war against a NATO country.41 Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, cyber-attacks and disinformation.42 However, Russia is not the only threat to European security. From the Sahel to the Middle East, there are numerous complex challenges: Terrorism, ongoing conflicts and fueled instability on the southern flank have a negative impact on Europe. The resulting migration movements also have destabilizing effects. Military exercises with Chinese participation in Belarus and cyber-attacks on European NATO partners are also signs of China's growing claim to power in Europe. The ever-closer cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a challenge for NATO. Decisive strengthening of the European security architecture for a sustainable transatlantic relationship For NATO to support a sustainable foundation, the European and German security architecture must be better secured and coordinated in the future. In the long term, defense spending in Europe should be increased beyond the envisaged two percent of gross domestic product and permanently integrated into national budgets. Resilience means creating resilience, deterrence, and defense capability. In the case of Germany, the threat situation and the resulting security policy requirements do not yet appear to be sufficiently anchored in political awareness. A consistent rethink is needed here. More efficient organization of defence structures and military procurement is needed. At present, the Bundeswehr is only partially capable of defending the country and the alliance, also in view of the gaps that have arisen due to the transfer of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. A study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy found that at the current rate of procurement, Germany would need up to almost 100 years to reach the military stocks of 20 years ago.43 Although the turnaround in Germany has been proclaimed, it has not been sufficiently driven forward politically and has not been set up sustainably in terms of financial policy - beyond the special fund. A consistent implementation of the turnaround for a defensible Germany would inevitably require painful savings elsewhere. This must be considered in the domestic political discourse to prepare the public for future necessities. This also includes the debate on compulsory military service and the creation of a new security culture in society. This will only be possible if the threat situation and, conversely, the need for a turnaround are communicated in all their urgency and consistency. In the German arms industry, ability building and close cooperation and coordination with European partners are of crucial importance.44 Promises made to NATO partners must be backed up financially, in terms of personnel, structure and material. While Russia has switched to a war economy, Europe is finding it difficult to significantly increase production. This also requires a stabilization of defence spending. To build up sustainable abilities, the industry needs planning security. And the budget, which provides for hardly any growth in defense spending, does not offer this.45 It is precisely this planning security that would enable the defense industry to create new jobs in the long term and thus take on employees who currently have less of a future in the weakening automotive industry, for example. The (not yet officially published) draft for the new National Security and Defense Industry Strategy, which aims, among other things, to ease access to loans and capital market-based financing for the security and defense industry (SVI), sends a positive signal. The draft states that the “SVI activities are fundamentally compatible with ESG criteria” (Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance) from the perspective of the federal government.46 Strengthening joint commitment in the Indo-Pacific It is not only the USA that has recognized the danger of China's desired supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. European NATO members also see increasing challenges in Asia and have an interest in supporting a rules-based order and free sea and trade routes in the Indo-Pacific, which is of crucial importance not least for an export nation like Germany. European NATO states, including Germany, are becoming increasingly involved in the Indo-Pacific region.47 At the anniversary summit in Washington in July, NATO toughened its tone towards China and clearly stated the danger posed by the ever closer cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.48 At the same time, cooperation with the so-called Asia-Pacific 4, the NATO partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, is becoming closer. This cooperation must be further strengthened, for which the partner countries Australia49 and Japan50 or the multinational maneuver RIMPAC51 are particularly suitable. By cooperating with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and participating in multinational exercises and freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs), Germany and other European NATO members not only defend their interests and promote interoperability and competence, but also signal to their partner, the USA, their willingness to get involved beyond the defense of the European alliance territory and make a contribution to transatlantic security.52 NATO is not a one-way street: clearly communicating added value for the USA. Without the leadership of the United States, NATO will not be able to continue its success story. For this reason, it is crucial to convince the American side and to highlight the strategic interest of the US in preserving this treaty-based peace order and stability in Europe.53 In doing so, the European NATO partners should not only effectively communicate their defense policy progress, but also increasingly provide up-to-date data and figures on the benefits of NATO engagement for the US. The evidence shows that US security engagement has significant positive effects on US trade. According to calculations, trade losses that could result from a US withdrawal from international security commitments in the medium and long term would exceed the potential savings in defense resources.54 European partner states are also making significant purchases of military equipment in the US, as illustrated by the example of the F35 fighter aircraft, for which numerous European states have concluded purchase agreements.55 Since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, European demand for US military equipment has risen sharply and in 2023 the US Department of Defense recorded record sales of military equipment and hardware, particularly to European partners and allies.56 NATO's deterrent effect has been instrumental in preventing armed conflict in member countries since its start. The stability that the alliance guarantees therefore also relieves the strain on American resources. Whoever takes office in the White House on January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and involvement in NATO are scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. A vacuum in Europe would not only be used by Russia, but also by China to expand its presence and influence on the continent. A US withdrawal from NATO in favor of a stronger focus on its strategic rival China could therefore ultimately play right into the latter's hands. References 1 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 2 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/07/11/trump-nato-republicans-con-gress/ (last request 15.08.2024) 4 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/31/elbridge-colby-trump-foreign-policy-military-china/ (last request 16.08.2024) 5 https://americarenewing.com/team/sumantra-maitra/ (last request 20.08.2024) 6 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/foreign-policy-republican-american-power (last request 02.09.2024) 7 https://www.politico.eu/article/former-president-donald-trump-ally-europe-joe-biden-us-elec-tions-pentagon/ (last request 16.08.2024) 8 https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-ally-warns-eastern-europe-to-rapidly-increase-defense-budgets/ (last request 21.08.2024) 9 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 29.08.2024) 10 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 11 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 15.08.2024) 12 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 13 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 14 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 15 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 16 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/j-d-vance-trump-foreign-policy-china-ukraine-vice-presi-dent-pick/ (last request 15.08.2024) 17 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 18 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 19 https://english.elpais.com/usa/elections/2024-09-02/kamala-harriss-foreign-policy-continuity-in-substance-a-new-style-in-form-and-the-hot-potato-of-gaza.html# (last request 02.09.2024) 20 Vgl. https://www.npr.org/2024/07/24/nx-s1-5049698/a-perspective-on-kamala-harris-poten-tial-foreign-policy-priorities (last request 08.08.2024)21 Vgl. https://de.usembassy.gov/de/rede-von-us-vizepraesidentin-kamala-harris-auf-der-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-2023/ (last request 08.08.2024) 22 Der Artikel 5 zum Bündnisfall der NATO sieht vor, dass im Falle eines bewaffneten Angriffs gegen ein Mitgliedsland, die anderen Mitgliedsstaaten dem angegriffenen Land Beistand leisten. Vgl. Nordatlantikvertrag: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selec-tedLocale=de (last request 08.08.2024) 23 https://www.youtube.com/live/SGRydccYp0c?si=L4RBnZ0pBsF_JGmm (last request 12.09.2024) 24 https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4874527-the-debate-failed-on-foreign-policy/ (last request 12.09.2024) 25 Vgl. https://www.politico.eu/article/philip-gordon-us-politics-kamala-harris-us-elections-eu-rope-joe-biden-emmanuel-macron/ (last request 08.08.2024) 26 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/07/harris-walz-us-election-progressive-foreign-policy-war-israel-gaza-ukraine/ (last request 09.08.2024) 27 https://fpc.org.uk/us-presidential-election-what-would-a-harris-walz-foreign-policy-look-like/ (last request 02.09.2024) 28 https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/gov-walz-signs-bill-ending-state-investments-in-russia/ (last request 02.09.2024) 29 https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/tim-walz-vp-harris-veterans-00172782 (letzter Ab-ruf 14.08.2024) 30 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/08/americans-opinions-of-nato/ (last request 12.09.2024) 31 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67649497 (last request 09.08.2024) 32 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/08/16/kamala-harris-2024-policy-child-tax-credit/ (last request 19.08.2024) 33 https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5038077/pacing-challenge (last request 30.08.2024) 34 https://www.ft.com/content/5d50d474-dc4d-4504-8002-7a81874153a8 (last request 03.09.2024) 35 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/natos-missing-pillar (last request 21.08.2024) 36 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 (last request 09.08.2024) 37 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 03.09.2024) 38 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 30.08.2024) 39 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (last request 04.09.2024) 40 https://ecfr.eu/publication/defending-europe-with-less-america/?amp (last request 03.09.2024)41 https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wir-mussen-raketenabwehr-aufbauen-bundeswehr-sieht-russland-in-funf-bis-acht-jahren-zu-krieg-gegen-nato-fahig-11406908.html (last request 15.08.2024) 42 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 43 https://www.ifw-kiel.de/de/publikationen/aktuelles/kriegstuechtig-in-jahrzehnten-deutsch-land-ruestet-viel-zu-langsam-gegen-russische-bedrohung-auf/ (last request 18.09.2024) 44 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 45 https://www.dbwv.de/aktuelle-themen/verband-aktuell/beitrag/wuestner-sich-die-augen-zu-halten-reicht-nicht (last request 15.08.2024) 46 https://table.media/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/12162241/Entwurf_Strategie-Staerkung-SVI.pdf (last request 12.09.2024) 47 https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/german-air-force/pacific-skies-24- (last request 05.09.2024) 48 Vgl. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nato-jubil%C3%A4umsgipfel-2024-mehr-verantwortung-zemle/ (last request 08.08.2024) 49 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/fernbeziehung (last request 04.09.2024) 50 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/die-zusammenar-beit-zwischen-japan-und-der-nato (last request 04.09.2024) 51 https://www.cpf.navy.mil/RIMPAC/ (last request 05.09.2024) 52 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/memo-to/nato-leaders-indo-pacific/ (last request 05.09.2024) 53 https://youtu.be/2_djNsTnJcI (last request 14.08.2024) 54 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR518.html (last request 04.09.2024) 55 https://euro-sd.com/2024/07/articles/39541/f-35-in-europe-a-takeover/ (last request 04.09.2024) 56 https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3736017/dod-has-seen-huge-in-crease-in-military-sales-since-ukraine-invasion/ (last request 04.09.2024)

Defense & Security
Iron Dome Rocket Interceptions of Hamas Rockets- Southern Israel- Night Attack On Ashdod City

Iran’s leaders have everything to lose in a direct war with Israel. Why take such a massive risk?

by Shahram Akbarzadeh, Middle East Studies Forum

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With Iran’s firing of some 180 ballistic missiles at Israel overnight, the Middle East is again on the brink of what would be a costly, ruinous regional war. Israel and its ally, the United States, shot down most of the missiles. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately vowed to retaliate for the attack. He called it a “big mistake” that Iran will “pay for”. The strike marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s calculations following weeks of escalating Israeli attacks on the leaders of its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their forces in both Gaza and Lebanon. Iran has traditionally outsourced its fighting to Hezbollah and Hamas. It has been very much concerned about getting dragged into direct confrontation with Israel because of the ramifications for the ruling regime – namely the possible internal dissent and chaos that any war with Israel might generate. When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran in late July, Iran’s leaders said they would respond appropriately. They basically left it to Hezbollah to do that. And as Israel intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks, another Iranian proxy group, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, claimed to have retaliated by launching missiles and drones at Israeli cities and US destroyers in the Red Sea. Israel responded with airstrikes on Yemen. In this context, from the Iranian point of view, it looked like Iran was just sitting on the fence and not performing its leadership role in challenging Israel. So, to a large extent, Iran had to exert its role as the leader of the so-called “axis of resistance” and get into the fight. Fighting Israel is very much a pillar of state identity in Iran. The Iranian political establishment is set up on the principle of challenging the United States and freeing Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. Those things are ingrained in the Iranian state identity. So, if Iran doesn’t act on this principle, there’s a serious risk of undermining its own identity. A delicate balancing act Yet there are clearly serious risks to this type of direct attack by Iran. Domestically, the Iranian political regime is suffering from a serious crisis of legitimacy. There have been numerous popular uprisings in Iran in recent years. These include the massive “Women, Life, Freedom” movement that erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody for allegedly not properly wearing her hijab. There is also a major dissenting view in Iran that challenges the regime’s anti-US and anti-Israel state identity and its commitment to perpetual conflict with both countries. So, the authorities in Iran have been concerned that direct confrontation with Israel and the US would unleash these internal dissenting voices and seriously threaten the regime’s survival. It’s this existential threat that has stopped Iran from acting on its principles. In addition, Iran has a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp and has an agenda of improving Iran’s relations with the West. He has been talking about reviving the Iran nuclear deal with the international community, sending signals that Iran is prepared to talk with the Americans. But the problem is the regional dynamics have completely changed since that deal was negotiated with the Obama administration in 2015. Iran has been a pariah state in recent years – and even more so since the conflict between Israel and Hamas began a year ago. Since then, no Western country would deem it appropriate or politically expedient to engage in nuclear talks with Iran, with the aim of alleviating international sanctions on the regime. Not at a time when Iran is openly calling for the destruction of Israel, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks on Israel, and now engaging in confrontations with Israel itself. So the timing is awful for Pezeshkian’s agenda of repairing the damage to Iran’s global standing. Ultimately, though, it’s not the president who calls the shots in Iran – it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council who consider matters of war and peace and decide on the course of action. The supreme leader is also the head of state and appoints the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC generals have been advocating for more serious and resolute action against Israel ever since the war in Gaza started. And it looks like the supreme leader has finally listened to this advice. So, the regime has been maintaining a delicate balance of these factors:preserving Iran’s state identity and what it stands for in the region, and the need to manage internal dissent and ensure its survival. In normal circumstances, it was easy for Iran to maintain this balance. It could manage its internal opponents through brutal force or appeasement and advocate an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Now, the scales have tipped. From the Iranian perspective, Israel has been so brazen in its actions against its proxies, it just didn’t look right for Iran to continue sitting on the fence, not taking action. As such, it has become more important for Iran to emphasise its anti-American, anti-Israel state identity and perhaps deal with an acceptable level of risk coming from a rise in internal dissent. Where things go from here With its attack on Israel, Iran is also prepared for another risk – direct retaliation from Israel and all-out war breaking out. The conflict in the region is really going according to Netanyahu’s playbook. He has been advocating for hitting Iran and for the United States to target Iran. Now, Israel has the justification to retaliate against Iran and also drag the United States into the conflict. Unfortunately, Iran is also now prepared to see the entire Persian Gulf get embroiled in the conflict because any retaliation by Israel and perhaps the United States would make US assets in the Persian Gulf, such as navy ships and commercial vessels, vulnerable to attacks by Iran or its allies. And that could have major implications for trade and security in the region. This is the way things are heading. Iran would know that hitting Israel would invite Israeli retaliation and that this retaliation would likely happen with US backing. It seems Iran is prepared to bear the costs of this.

Defense & Security
Pacific Island Forum (PIF), vector flag of members

Australia stepping up to assist Pacific cybersecurity

by Anthony Adams, Monash University

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In Brief Australia has made a long-term commitment to developing cybersecurity capabilities across the Pacific Islands region. The emerging challenge is to ensure that Australia receives the best return on its investment across the region. With Pacific Island nations developing cybersecurity capabilities at different rates, a one size fits all approach will not work. When allocating development spending, Australia should target Pacific Island nations’ respective cybersecurity capability gaps and tailor assistance that aligns with the domestic priorities of each nation, while remaining bound to a consensus driven regional framework. The Australian government’s Cyber Security Strategy (2023–2030) underpins its long-term commitment to investing in the development of sustainable cybersecurity across the Pacific Islands region. These investments include spending AU$26.2 million on deploying cybersecurity experts to nations in the region and AU$16.7 million on helping these nations identify and address vulnerabilities to cyberattacks. This commitment reinforces two key points that underpin Australia’s regional security. First, as a leading regional economic partner and neighbour, Australia’s security and prosperity are intrinsically tied to its Pacific neighbours. Maintaining a strong and active presence is crucial to safeguarding Australia’s interests and preventing states with differing values and strategic goals from dominating the region at Australia’s expense. Second, Pacific Island nations face entrenched environmental and development challenges, such as their small size, lack of natural resources, geographical remoteness, high telecommunications and transportation costs and inadequate infrastructure. These factors limit their ability to develop sustainable cybersecurity capabilities without sustained assistance. These challenges expose Pacific Island nations — and by extension, Australian interests — to a heightened risk of cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime. With the region’s ability to develop cybersecurity capabilities being constrained by these challenges, Australia has a key role to play in both actively promoting its own strategic interests and helping Pacific Island nations enhance their foundational capabilities. The goal for the Australian government is to invest in regional cybersecurity development strategically, ensuring optimal long-term returns for its national interests and fostering sustainable development across the region. Australia will need to invest in identifying and remediating cyber vulnerabilities, reducing the likelihood of attacks and mitigating the impacts of attacks. These efforts could be supported by leveraging regional and bilateral frameworks to identify areas of shared cybersecurity capability interest and strengthening domestic legislation in Pacific Island nations to combat cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime.  The Pacific Islands Forum has developed the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, the 2023 Lagatoi Declaration on Digital Transformation of the Pacific and the 2018 Boe Declaration of Regional Security as consensus-based multilateral frameworks. Through these mechanisms, Pacific Island governments have pledged to bolster regional cyber resilience, including safeguarding their national critical infrastructure. These pledges empower nations to work together on matters of shared interest while respecting their different levels of cybersecurity policy maturity and capability.  These forums provide an opportunity for Australia to target cybersecurity engagement and collaboration towards areas of mutual interest. Australia can also leverage bilateral agreements including the Fiji–Australia Vuvale Partnership and the Australia–Kiribati Tobwaan Te Reitaki (Nurturing Cooperation) Memorandum of Understanding to focus cybersecurity investment on areas of strategic interest and to reinforce strategic values and priorities.  The likelihood of cyberattacks targeting Pacific Island nations, and consequently Australian interests in the region, is closely tied to the effectiveness of each nation’s cybercrime legislation. Strengthening these laws typically reduces the probability of cyberattacks within a jurisdiction. Governments that enact robust legislation to combat cybercrime enhance protection for Australia’s regional cybersecurity interests. Conversely, nations with inadequate cybercrime provisions pose higher risks of data compromise affecting Australian interests. While multilateral declarations commit Pacific Island nations to working together on matters of shared interest, they are not legally binding and rely on nations implementing domestic cybersecurity-related legislation to enact the intent of these declarations.  The state of domestic cybercrime legislation varies across the region. Several nations, including the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, have not committed resources to developing or uplifting domestic legislation pertaining to cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime. Others, including Tuvalu and Nauru, have established foundational legislation to define cybercrime and related matters.  In contrast, nations including Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga and Australia have partnered with the Council of Europe to collaborate on the creation and improvement of domestic cyber resilience legislation, historically aligned with the Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest Convention) and its protocols. Such legislation typically includes definitions of cyber crime and cyber-related crime, the ability to collaborate with law enforcement agencies and permission to exchange information to support cross-border cybercrime investigations.   Cybersecurity capabilities differ among Pacific Island nations, as each country develops its capacity to detect and counter cyber threats independently. Australia should expect that national governments will strengthen their cybersecurity capabilities at varying rates, reflecting their distinct domestic policy focuses and investment priorities. As nations evolve their ability to address cyber threats, their approach to regional engagement and collaboration on cybersecurity is likely to change. This dynamic relationship has significant implications for cyber diplomacy, especially regarding the targeting of support for cyber capability development, emphasising the importance of demand-driven cybersecurity development assistance. Nations with an open approach to engagement typically demonstrate a willingness to engage with regional and development partners and are more likely to collaborate on shared interests. These nations prioritise cyber resilience policies that promote domestic self-reliance while aligning with international standards, treaties and conventions. On the other hand, nations with a closed approach are likely to prioritise the development and maintenance of domestic cyber resilience capabilities over regional engagement and collaboration. These nations are less inclined to identify and collaborate with development partners and other stakeholders on shared interests and instead prioritise cyber resilience policies that promote domestic self-reliance. Australia’s investment will be best served where it responds to this demand-driven approach by targeting the domestic cybersecurity policy priorities of each partner nation based on their relative cybersecurity capability maturity and approach to collaboration. Examples of this demand-driven approach in action include the Fiji–Australia Vuvale Partnership and the Australia–Kiribati Tobwaan Te Reitaki (Nurturing Cooperation) Memorandum of Understanding, which each allow Australia to provide targeted bilateral assistance for information sharing, collaboration and cybersecurity capability building that aligns with both nations’ interests. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1727215200

Diplomacy
Caracas/Venezuela. 11/22/18: The president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, participates in an event at the Government Palace in Caracas.

What Explains Support for Populism in Latin America?

by Dinorah Azpuru, Wichita State University

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In the 21st century, populism has resurfaced in Latin America, but it has also emerged as a political force in other developing countries, as well as in Eastern European countries and several advanced industrial democracies. The support for populism in Latin America offers a lens through which to understand this phenomenon globally. In countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, citizens voted for populist presidents multiple times between 1998 and 2019, also expressing their support through moderately high approval ratings. Over time, however, some of these leaders transitioned from populism to authoritarianism, as seen in Venezuela and Nicaragua around 2018. This shift marks a critical point in understanding how populism can evolve into more repressive forms of governance. The most recent wave of Latin American populism began with Hugo Chávez’s election in Venezuela in 1998, followed by Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. These leaders, despite their populist appeal, took an authoritarian drift, accumulating power, limiting political opposition, and undermining checks and balances. They co-opted state institutions and placed constraints on independent media, distorting the democratic process. It is crucial to distinguish between the social-democratic left, seen in countries like Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile in the early 2000s, and the populist left in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua during the same period. A new wave of populism emerged in Mexico and Brazil in 2018, and El Salvador in 2019, with leaders like Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) in Mexico and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. While these leaders still enjoy high levels of support, they have also resorted to undemocratic tactics to bolster their executive power. Support for populist leaders in Latin America is not monolithic. It can be linked to various factors, including ideology, policy preferences, and perceptions of presidential performance. Populist supporters can be categorized into two distinct groups: “convenience followers” and “hardcore supporters.” Convenience followers are willing to support populist leaders temporarily, based on perceived performance, while hardcore supporters remain loyal despite undemocratic actions. In examining the dimensions of support for populism, it becomes clear that demographic variables, while relevant, are not as significant as other factors. For example, in many countries, women and more educated citizens tend to be less supportive of populist leaders. Ethnic identity also plays a role, particularly in countries like Bolivia. However, these factors alone do not fully explain the appeal of populist leaders. Ideology and policy preferences are crucial in understanding the support for populism. Those who identify with the political left were more likely to support leftist populist presidents in countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, while those on the right were more inclined to support right-wing populists like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. This alignment suggests that populist leaders can effectively mobilize support by appealing to the ideological preferences of their base. The perceived performance of populist leaders also plays a significant role in their support. Populist leaders who can create the perception of a thriving economy, reduced corruption, and improved security are more likely to maintain high levels of support. This is true even when the reality may not match these perceptions, as populist leaders are often skilled at shaping public opinion to their advantage, especially when they attack critical media. Another important aspect of populist support is the relationship between citizens’ attitudes toward democracy and their support for populism. Paradoxically, populist supporters often express satisfaction with democracy while simultaneously endorsing authoritarian practices, such as unchecked presidential power and the suppression of opposition. This contradiction highlights the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of populist support. The distinction between convenience followers and hardcore supporters further illustrates the diversity of populist support. Convenience followers are pragmatic, supporting populist leaders as long as they perceive them to be effective. Hardcore supporters, on the other hand, are more ideologically committed and willing to overlook or even endorse undemocratic actions by their leaders. Both groups contribute to the persistence of populism, but hardcore supporters pose a greater risk to democratic institutions by legitimising authoritarian behaviour. In conclusion, the resurgence of populism in Latin America and beyond is a multifaceted phenomenon driven by a combination of demographic, ideological, and performance-related factors. While populist leaders may initially rise to power by tapping into legitimate grievances and desires for change, their tendency to undermine democratic norms and institutions poses a significant threat to the stability and health of democracies worldwide. Understanding the dynamics of populist support is crucial for those who seek to defend and strengthen democratic governance in the face of rising populist movements. These insights are taken from the author’s recent book: Explaining Support for Populism in Contemporary Latin America (Routledge 2024).

Energy & Economics
Packing and Shipping Boxes with the National flags of China on shopping carts with pin markings on the world map idea for expanding Chinese e-commerce's Rapid global growth.trade war. China economic

Chinese exports to Central Asia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

by Henna Hurskainen

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract  This paper looks at the development of Chinese exports to Central Asian countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The analysis, which relies on export data from China to Asian countries at a general product level, shows that China’s exports to Central Asia have significantly increased since the start of the war. In particular, exports to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have increased significantly. The analysis focuses on exports in Harmonized System (HS) categories 84, 85, 87, and 90. Many of the products sanctioned by the West in trade with Russia belong to these categories, but the categories also include many non-sanctioned products. Although the value of China’s exports to Central Asia is still smaller than direct trade with Russia, China’s exports – especially to Kyrgyzstan – have seen dramatic increases in the HS 84, 85, 87, and 90 categories. Along with the export growth from China to Central Asia, exports in these categories from Central Asia to Russia have also increased significantly.  Keywords: China, Central Asia, Russia, exports 1. Introduction  This policy brief sheds light on the development of Chinese exports to Central Asia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. The analysis, which focuses on China’s dollar-denominated exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan between 2018 and 2023, is based on the monthly and yearly customs data on goods exports from CEIC, China Customs Administration, Kazakhstan Bureau of National Statistics, and UN Comtrade. The analysis considers exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in some key product categories in the same time frame. Data on Chinese exports to Russia and the rest of the world (excluding Russia and Central Asian countries) help broaden the analysis.  The European Union, the United States, as well as a number of other countries, imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The sanctions packages targeted trade, investment, and cooperation with Russia, including sanctions on exports and imports of goods and services. While China has yet to impose sanctions on Russia, Chinese companies increasingly face the threat of secondary sanctions.  There is evidence that trade sanctions imposed against Russia have been circumvented by redirecting trade through Russia's neighboring countries (e.g. Chupilkin et al., 2023) and that China exports to Russia dual-use goods exploited by the Russian military (Kluge, 2024). This analysis shows that Chinese exports to Central Asia increased significantly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The soaring trade with Kyrgyzstan, a relatively tiny economy, is particularly notable. Chinese exports to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also rose sharply. Exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in selected key export categories increased in 2022, with Kazakhstan’s exports growing significantly, making it the largest exporter to Russia among Central Asian countries.  The paper analyzes the export of China to Central Asia by examining Harmonized System (HS) categories 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical equipment), 87 (Vehicles), and 90 (Optical and medical instruments). Categories 88 (Aircraft) and 89 (Ships) were omitted from the analysis since their export volumes were irregular and the data are inconsistent. These categories are important since many of the sanctions goods belong to these broad categories and often involve sophisticated technologies essential to Russian military efforts. Additionally, China is a major technology producing country and Russia’s main supplier of sanctioned technology products (Simola, 2024). Not all products in these categories are subject to sanctions and instead the analysis here only provides a broad view of the development of categories with sanctioned products.  The three-part analysis in this brief begins with a discussion of the development of Chinese exports to Central Asian countries at a general level. We then consider Chinese exports to Central Asia in HS categories 84, 85, 87 and 90, and conclude with an overview of Central Asia country exports to Russia in the same HS categories.  2. Chinese trade relations with Central Asia  From a trade perspective, China dominates trade relations with Central Asian countries. Most Central Asian countries run trade deficits with China. While Central Asian countries are geographically proximate with China (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan share borders with China), total exports to these countries have traditionally represented a small slice of China’s total exports. In 2018, for example, Kazakhstan accounted for around 0.5 % of China’s total exports, and the shares of China’s exports to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were between 0.01 % and 0.2 %. China’s exports to Russia in 2018 were around 2 % that year. In 2023, however, exports to Kazakhstan had grown to 0.7 % of China’s total exports, and exports to other Central Asian economies were between 0.03 % and 0.6 %. The share of exports to Kyrgyzstan grew from 0.2 % to 0.6 % in terms of China’s total exports. In comparison, Chinese exports to Russia in 2023 represented 3 % of China’s total exports. In terms of annual growth, Kyrgyzstan on-year increase between stands out, with Chinese exports (measured in dollars) growing by 150 % in 2021 and 110 % in 2022.  The countries in the region are not a homogeneous group. Their economies differ in size and trade patterns. Measured by GDP, Kazakhstan was the largest regional economy in 2023, with a GDP of $260 billion. The second largest was Uzbekistan ($90 billion), followed by Turkmenistan ($59 billion), Kyrgyzstan ($14 billion), and Tajikistan ($12 billion) (World Bank, 2024). China’s top export destination in 2023 was Kazakhstan ($25 billion) and Kyrgyzstan ($20 billion). Turkmenistan had the least exports ($1 billion).  In addition to Russia’s war of aggression, new trade routes and warm bilateral relations may have played a role in Chinese exports to Central Asia. New trade routes have opened under the Belt & Road Initiative, and Xi Jinping’s relations with the leaders of Central Asian countries have been generally friendly.  China has been particularly active in Kyrgyzstan, where it has helped to build several transport infrastructure projects to improve transport connections within the country and the region. Especially in mountainous areas, new transport routes and improved logistics connections could have a major impact on trade volumes. Kyrgyzstan also changed presidents in 2021 following snap elections to quell a wave of protest. Kyrgyzstan’s newly elected president, Sadyr Zhaparov, emphasizes China’s importance as Kyrgyzstan’s trading partner and investor, and has called for closer relations with China.  A new trade route from China to Kazakhstan was opened in the summer of 2023 during the China-Central Asia Summit. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Kazakhstan in 2022, the leaders announced to deepen bilateral relations.  Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have established friendly relations with Xi and China. With regard to vehicle exports, it is worth noting that the re-export of cars through the Eurasian Economic Union to Russia previously received tax relief, a policy that ended this year. 3. An overview of  Chinese exports to Central Asia Between 2018 and 2023, China primarily exported textile and wood-related products, as well as machinery, electronics, and vehicles to Central Asia (Figure 1). Compared to China’s overall export structure to the world (Figure 2), the share of textile and wood products in China’s exports to Central Asia is significantly higher. In contrast, approximately 50 % of China’s global exports consist of machinery, electronics, and vehicles, whereas these categories account for about 30–40 % of China’s exports to Central Asia.   In dollar terms, Chinese exports to Central Asia grew by 170 % from 2018 to 2023. This growth parallels China's export growth to Russia, which increased by 130 % over the same period. For comparison, Chinese exports to the rest of the world grew by around 40 % in that period. The largest export growth was seen in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (Figure 3), with exports to Kyrgyzstan experiencing an explosive increase at the beginning of 2021. While more moderate, export growth to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also took off in the first half of 2022. Chinese exports to Kazakhstan, which were valued at $11 billion in 2018, surged to $25 billion in 2023. Chinese exports to Uzbekistan tripled from $4 billion in 2018 to $12 billion in 2023. Chinese exports more than tripled to Kyrgyzstan during the period from $6 billion in 2018 to $20 billion in 2023. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan are significant given the country’s modest GDP. Growth in Chinese exports to Russia mirrors the growth in exports to Central Asia (Figure 3). In dollar terms, however, China's exports to Russia are about double to those of China’s total exports to Central Asia.   The largest export categories to Central Asia in China’s 2023 export structure were footwear, textiles, and clothes ($20 billion); machinery and vehicles ($11 billion); electronics ($3 billion); and iron and steel ($2 billion). Exports of iron and steel to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan were minimal, but significant for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with growth starting in early 2023.  Chinese exports of footwear, textiles and clothes to Kyrgyzstan (and exports generally) began took off in early of 2021 (Figure 4). Kazakhstan’s export growth in the same category started after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Exports of machinery and vehicles to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Figure 4) skyrocketed in 2023. Chinese exports of iron and steel to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also soared in 2023 (Figure 5). In the export of electronics, Uzbekistan stands out as exports from China more than doubled in 2023 from 2022 levels (Figure 5). Electronics exports to Kyrgyzstan started increase in early 2021 (Figure 5).     When examining annual changes in these export categories, the dollar-based annual growth of Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan clearly stands out from other Central Asian countries across all export categories (see Figures 6 and 7). The annual growth to Kyrgyzstan began to increase in early 2021 and remains high throughout 2022. For instance, Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in electronics and in footwear, textiles and clothes peaked around 300 % in early 2022. Chinese exports to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are significantly smaller in dollar terms than for other Central Asian countries, so they do not stand out in earlier figures. However, annual growth patterns show that China’s annual export growth to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan also rose in 2022.     This section examines Chinese exports to Central Asian countries in the HS categories 84 “Machinery,”1 85 “Electrical equipment,”2 87 “Vehicles”,3 and 90 “Optical and medical instruments.”4 HS categories 88 “Aircraft”5 and 89 “Ships”6 were omitted from the analysis since the export volumes were irregular and inconsistent. The data used in the analysis is the sum of HS8-level customs data for the respective category, so values may slightly differ from the actual HS2-level values.  China’s dollar-denominated exports in machinery (HS 84) increased in 2022 and 2023 from the pre-invasions period (Figure 8). Growth in exports is already apparent in 2022 for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, while the rise in Uzbekistan begins in 2023. Exports of machinery to Russia started to increase in 2021, with higher growth in 2022 and 2023 (Figure 9). China’s exports to the rest of the world in the same category rose through 2021, and decreased from 2022 to 2023 (Figure 9).   For electrical equipment (HS 85), China’s exports increased significantly compared to the period before the war, especially to Kyrgyzstan, where exports surged in 2022 and continued to grow in 2023 (Figure 10). China’s exports to Uzbekistan also surged in 2023. Exports to Kazakhstan decreased from 2021 to 2022, but grew in 2023, slightly surpassing the 2021 level. When examining Chinese exports to Russia, dollar-denominated changes follow a similar trend (Figure 11). During the same period, China’s exports to the rest of the world increased from 2021 to 2022 and decreased in 2023, a trend similar to that of machinery (Figure 11).   In the export of vehicles (HS 87), China’s exports to Central Asia followed a similar trend in exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, i.e. initial growth in 2022 and strong growth in 2023 (Figure 12). Chinese exports to Russia also surged in 2023 (Figure 13). In the vehicle category, Chinese exports to the rest of the world grew steadily in 2021, 2022, and 2023 (Figure 13).   For optical and medical instruments (HS 90), China’s exports to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan increased significantly in 2022, and grew further  in 2023, albeit at a more moderate pace (Figure 14). China’s exports to Uzbekistan increased post-invasion in 2022 and 2023, although export levels were similar to 2019 and 2020. Exports to Turkmenistan grew by 260 % in 2022 from the previous year, although this is less noticeable in the figures due to the smaller dollar value amounts related to other Central Asian countries. China’s exports of optical and medical instruments to Russia grew steadily, with a sharper increase beginning in 2022 (Figure 15). However, China’s exports to the rest of the world in this category decreased from 2021 to 2022 (Figure 15).   In summary, China’s dollar-denominated exports to Central Asia increased significantly over the past couple of years, particularly those to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Reflecting the general trend of China’s exports to Central Asian countries, the highest dollar amounts for Chinese exports involved products to Kazakhstan across all analyzed harmonized system categories. The most significant dollar-denominated export growth was observed for Kyrgyzstan: the annual growth rate of China’s exports in electrical equipment in 2022 approaches 400 %, and for vehicles nearly 500 % in 2022 and about 300 % in 2023. Additionally, in optical and medical instruments, China’s 2022 exports grew by nearly 300 % to Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan from the previous year. When comparing China’s exports to Central Asia with its exports to Russia, it is evident that the dollar value of China’s exports to Russia is higher than to Central Asian countries, and the dollar value changes in exports are also more significant. For instance, in 2023, China’s exports of machinery to Russia amounted to $24 billion, while exports to the entire Central Asia region were approximately $7 billion. In the electrical equipment category, China’s exports to Russia were $13 billion compared to $5 billion to Central Asia. In the vehicles category, exports to Russia were $18 billion, while exports to Central Asia were $8 billion. On the other hand, the annual growth rates of individual Central Asian countries are higher in percentage terms compared to Russia. For example, as illustrated in Figure 12, China’s exports to Kyrgyzstan grew from $41 million in 2021 to $1.5 billion in 2022, while China’s exports to Russia increased from $1.2 billion dollars to $1.8 billion in the same period. The annual growth rates for Russia do not exhibit similar spikes, nor do they significantly exceed the growth rates for any Central Asian country in any category. 5. Central Asian exports to Russia in HS categories 84, 85, 87 and 90 In the HS categories 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical equipment), 87 (Vehicles), and 90 (Optical and medical instruments), exports from Central Asian countries to Russia exhibited significant growth in 2022 (Figures 16 and 17), with continued expansion in 2023 (with the exception of Kazakhstan in vehicles and parts). In total, exports from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) in these categories grew in 2022 by 600 % from the previous year. Notably, Kazakhstan was the biggest export in dollar terms. Its exports to Russia surged across all categories in 2022, with on-year growth rates for machinery, electrical equipment and sound devices, and optical and medical instruments ranging between 400 % and 600 %. In addition to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan recorded substantial increases in exports in 2022, particularly in the machinery and electrical equipment categories. Kyrgyzstan’s exports machinery increased from $2 million in 2021 to $49 million in 2022, a jump of about 2,500 %. However, when comparing the Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in electrical equipment, the dollar value in exports to Russia seems considerably smaller. Thus, no direct conclusion should be drawn from the fact that higher quantities of electronics pass through Kyrgyzstan to Russia. Although not depicted in the graph, it is important to highlight Turkmenistan’s growth in the export of electrical equipment in 2023 when it grew from $2,075 (2022) to $3 million in 2023, onyear growth of approximately 200,000 %. Similarly, Uzbekistan’s annual growth in exports of optical and medical instruments was around 40,000 % in 2022. As to vehicles and parts, Kyrgyzstan’s export growth commenced already in 2021. In the optical and medical instruments category, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan experienced notable export growth, particularly in 2023. At the HS category levels of 84, 85, 87 and 90, data for Tajikistan’s exports to Russia were unavailable.     6. Conclusion Chinese exports to Central Asia have significantly increased since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with concurrent growth China’s exports to Russia. Notably, there was a substantial surge in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan prior to invasion. Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan, which has a modest GDP, saw the largest dollar-value increase from 2021 to 2023 in the categories of footwear, textiles, and clothes, as well as machinery and vehicles starting in 2022. The annual growth rates in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan show clear increases in the major export categories in 2022.  In dollar terms, Chinese exports to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also rose significantly from 2018 to 2023. For Uzbekistan, the largest growth in China's exports began in 2021 in electronics. Exports to Kazakhstan grew the most in 2022–2023 in the categories of footwear, textiles, and clothes, and machinery and vehicles.  The trade categories with notable growth in Chinese exports to Central Asian countries were machinery (HS 84), electrical equipment (HS 85), vehicles (HS 87), and optical and medical instruments (HS 90). Generally, the steepest rise in Chinese exports to Central Asia occurred in the vehicles category, with significant increases in exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 2022 continuing to a sharp rise in 2023. The trend for Chinese vehicle exports to Russia is similar. It is worth noting that Chinese vehicle exports to the rest of the world also accelerated after 2020. Additionally, there was substantial growth in Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan in the electrical equipment category in 2022 and 2023. In these categories, Chinese exports to Russia are significantly higher in dollar terms that exports to Central Asia. However, the annual growth rates in between 2018 and 2023 of Chinses exports to individual Central Asian countries have generally seen larger increases in percentage terms than those for Russia.  Exports from Central Asian countries to Russia in the selected key export categories increased significantly across all examined categories in 2022. Among Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan was the largest exporter to Russia in dollar terms from 2018 to 2023, with sharp growth in 2022 in all four categories examined in this paper. Additionally, the exports of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia grew significantly in 2022, particularly in the categories of machinery, and electrical equipment. The most notable annual growth in exports was posted by Turkmenistan – an increase from $2,075 in 2022 to $3 million in 2023, a 200,000 % increase in electrical equipment exports from the previous year. References Chupilkin, Maxim and Javorcik, Beata and Plekhanov, Alexander. (2023). The Eurasian Roundabout: Trade Flows Into Russia Through the Caucasus and Central Asia. EBRD Working Paper No. 276, Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4368618 or https://ssrn.com/abstract=4368618 Kluge, Janis. (2024). Russia-China economic relations: Moscow’s road to economic dependence, SWP Research Paper, No. 6/2024, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, https://doi.org/10.18449/2024RP06 Simola, H. (2024). Recent trends in Russia’s import substitution of technology products. BOFIT Policy Brief 5/2024, June 2024.  World Bank, 2024, read 14.8.2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/brief/central-asia 1 Harmonized System code 84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof.  2 Harmonized System code 85: Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles.  3 Harmonized System code 87: Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof.  4 Harmonized System code 90: Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof. 5 Harmonized System code 88: Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof.  6 Harmonized System code 89: Ships, boats, and floating structures.

Defense & Security
iran missle atacks israel, middle east conflict blocks

Iran’s strike on Israel was retaliatory – but it was also about saving face and restoring deterrence

by Aaron Pilkington, University of Denver

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and Iran are at war. In truth, the two sides have been fighting for decades, but the conflict has played out largely under the cover of covert and clandestine operations. The recent actions of both sides in this once “shadow war” have changed the nature of the conflict. It is not clear that de-escalation is on the horizon. On Oct 1, 2024, Iran launched a massive, direct attack against Israel notionally in retribution for Israel’s dual assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. It was the second such barrage in six months. By many accounts, the previous Iranian attack against Israel on April 13 – which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones – caused very little damage to Israel. Perhaps because of this, and likely in part due to U.S. encouragement of restraint, Israel’s immediate military response then – an airstrike against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in the Isfahan province – was somewhat measured. Many onlookers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that both sides would prefer to de-escalate rather than engage in ongoing open warfare. But further Israeli military operations since then have prompted escalatory Iranian military responses, forcing the conflict back out of the shadows. With Hamas’ capabilities and leadership degraded in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s military leaders announced in June that they were “ready to face” Hezbollah – the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group whose persistent rocket attacks against northern Israel have caused tens of thousands to evacuate the area. Israel pivots north Israel’s pivot from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chairman, Haniyeh, during his stay in Tehran. The purported Israeli operation was seen as an affront to Iran’s sovereignty. It was also an embarrassment that highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran’s internal security apparatus. Even though Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei vowed a “harsh response” against Israel, by September Iran had taken no action. Tehran’s inaction caused many Middle East analysts to question if the Iranian response would ever materialize – and by extension, what that would mean for Khamenei’s commitment to his proxy forces. If indeed Iran’s leadership opted for restraint following the assassination of Hamas’ top political leader, the same could not be said for its reaction to Israel’s multiphase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September. Israel began with a clandestine operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s command and control through the means of sabotaged explosive communications devices. Israel then carried out airstrikes eliminating Hezbollah’s top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country’s leaders describe as a “limited [ground] operation” into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border. Tehran’s Oct 1. attack in response against Israel was, according to many Middle East experts and indeed Iranian military leaders, primarily a retaliation for the two high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran’s defense strategy, I argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel’s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence. Challenging Israel’s advance Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel embarks on ground operations into southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops must now deal with what is perhaps the world’s most capable guerrilla fighting force – one that performed quite successfully during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Nevertheless, Israel’s ability to achieve a tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah’s top leaders – even in the midst of an ongoing localized war, and even after Israel’s leaders announced their intention to engage Hezbollah – reveals a far superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah. And that presents a huge blow to what is seen in Iran as the Islamic Republic’s crown jewel within its “Axis of Resistance.” In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership, regroup and organize against Israel’s ground invasion. The brutal art of save face? It also serves to help Iran save face, especially in how it’s seen by other parts of its external proxy network. Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault. Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support has no doubt contributed to Hamas being successfully degraded as a threat by Israel, with many of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israel’s military leaders to claim the group has been effectively defeated. Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic. Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found. Now that Israel has shifted its attention to Lebanon and scored several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to stand back and watch for two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate within Iran’s borders. And second, Iran’s proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see if Tehran will continue supporting them – or will abandon them, as it seemingly has done with Hamas. Reclaiming deterrence Perhaps above all, in Tehran’s calculus over how to respond is Iran’s need to restore a deterrence. The two defining features of Iran’s interrelated external, or “forward defense,” and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones. These Iranian defense strategies seek to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional U.S. allies with punishment via proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks; and second, by offering scapegoat targets against which Iran’s enemies can express their rage. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran’s hostile policies. Israel’s degradation of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran’s ability to deter attacks against the homeland. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk. Who plays the next move? These interweaving imperatives likely prompted Iran’s leaders to launch a second massive, direct missile attack on Oct. 1 against Israel. How effective the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran’s aims is unknown. The Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90% of the ballistic missiles reached their intended targets, while Israel and the United States characterize the attack as having been “defeated and ineffective,” despite unverified cellphone videos showing several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel. What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack. IRGC leaders met this warning with a counterthreat of their own that if Israel responds to the Oct. 1 attack militarily, Iran will again respond with unspecified “crushing and destructive attacks.” Rhetorically, neither side is backing down; militarily this may be true, too. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will dictate how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.

Defense & Security
Israel against Hezbollah, two tank silhouettes facing each other with their respective flags on top

Israel Gambles on All-Out Confrontation with Hezbollah

by Urban Coningham, RUSI Leadership Centre

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah, which have been followed by an ongoing air campaign, signal a new phase in the conflict amid heightened regional tensions. The sophisticated remote pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah on 17–18 September were followed by an intensive Israeli air campaign against the militant group, which is ongoing. These events were hailed by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant as a new phase in the country’s conflict with Hezbollah and a shift of gravity in Israel’s conflict from south to north. These actions, driven by intelligence breakthroughs and rapid decision-making, mark a critical moment in the ongoing conflict in the region and could have far-reaching implications for regional stability and Israel's political landscape. Israel’s ‘Use it or Lose it’ Moment The sensational events of last week were, arguably, a suboptimal military outcome for Israel. Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility for either attack, though the capability and intelligence from allies point to its involvement. The pager and then the walkie-talkie attacks were originally designed to be the opening salvo in a coordinated and total attack against Hezbollah. This would undoubtedly have been devastating, rendering communications obsolete for Hezbollah while being prepared to simultaneously hit hard with drone and missile strikes, maybe even alongside a ground incursion. Despite this careful planning, US sources have reported that Israel’s leaders were forced to either act instantly or risk losing this asset. This was a ‘use it or lose it’ moment, and has ultimately led Israel to ramp up its pressure on the north to follow what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah fairly identified as a ‘declaration of war’.  After the activation of the pager attack was forced upon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel followed up with the movement of the 98th Division, a paratrooper division, from Gaza to the northern border on 18 September. In addition to this, Gallant visited aircraft bases on the northern border in the immediate aftermath of the pager attack. Israel then activated another of its assets in the walkie-talkie attack, another ‘use it or lose it moment’ as reeling Hezbollah security officials (as well as embedded Iranian officers) began to look for other infiltrations. Israel has since begun a brutal missile campaign against Hezbollah with strikes in Southern Lebanon as well as in Beirut, where Israel reported the successful assassination of Ibrahim Aqil, a senior Hezbollah commander. According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, these attacks killed almost 500 and wounded many more on 23 September alone. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to Israel’s demand to withdrawing its troops and missile silos to beyond the Litani River. After activating their pager asset, Israeli commanders were forced to activate their walkie-talkie asset before it was detected. The forced use of these two key assets led Netanyahu to believe that this was his best chance to push for a victory against Hezbollah with further missile strikes and assassinations. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to its demands What is clear is that throughout this last week Netanyahu has been led by events, and not the other way around. Despite this, he will be delighted that he is one step closer to reclaiming the ‘Mr Defence’ reputation that has seen him serve a record eight terms as prime minister. After the shock of 7 October and the hostages that Israel has not been able to bring home, this is a moment of victory for the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence services and Netanyahu himself in re-asserting the competence and superiority of Israeli capabilities.  Israel will ultimately hope that ramping up pressure on Hezbollah through its continuing assassination and missile campaign will force its troops back behind the Litani River (some 18 miles from the current border, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701). This would allow Israel to return 200,000 displaced refugees to cities and villages in the north and score a major political and legitimacy goal.  A Crushing Blow for Hezbollah For Hezbollah, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks represented the most significant failure for the organisation since the 2006 war. In three days, Israel’s intelligence services blatantly proved their ability to infiltrate and destroy Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures. This began with the remote detonation of several thousand pagers on Tuesday and was followed up by the remote detonation of thousands of walkie-talkies used by the terrorist group on Wednesday. For Hezbollah this is a serious blow that carries a number of serious implications for the group. Firstly, the successful outcome of the Israeli operation exposed  fundamental weaknesses in the group’s command-and-control mechanisms. Hezbollah already operates in an extremely difficult command-and-control environment due to extensive human intelligence and Pegasus spyware, where Israeli intelligence can compromise mobile phones simply by sending them a signal. This environment has forced Hezbollah to operate on a network of cells which rely on almost constant top-down delegation. The inevitable restructuring as well as the human capacity that Hezbollah has lost will hamper the group’s ability to effectively resist Israel’s attacks. Secondly, there has been an impact on Hezbollah’s legitimacy.  Israel’s attacks are a humiliation for the group, representing as they do a colossal security failure. Hezbollah’s inability to prevent the attacks and protect Lebanon (as it claims to do) makes its position extremely difficult. The severity of this legitimacy hit is demonstrated by Nasrallah being forced to admit that Hezbollah has suffered a major and unprecedented blow. Finally, Hezbollah’s position is made more difficult by its lack of credible options to respond. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion.  At the same time, however, Nasrallah has furious internal stakeholders demanding revenge. The only real pressure valve available to him in this extremely difficult position is being able to claim attacks by the Axis of Resistance as consequences for Israel’s actions. This axis is comprised of an aligned group in the region, led by Iran and including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and various militia groups, who claim to resist Israel and its allies. Wider Questions for the Axis of Resistance This is a major test for the Axis of Resistance. Iran has watched seemingly powerlessly as Hezbollah, its ally, has been pummelled again and again by Israel. The refugees streaming out of Southern Lebanon towards Beirut are another example of the pressure Israel is applying on Hezbollah. Iran is also yet to respond to Israel’s assassination of Ismayel Haniyeh in Tehran in July. Iranian leaders and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures will be increasingly frustrated that they have been unable to re-establish credible deterrence against Israel. This is a particularly sore point as it is fairly clear by now that their April missile and drone strikes against Israel were ineffective in achieving this. We can expect to see an evolving Iranian strategy that aims to place maximum diplomatic pressure on Israel through moves such as encouraging proxies to strike at Israel, as well as threatening regional stability and shipping lanes. We may also see Iran to make diplomatic overtures to the West to exert more diplomatic pressure. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion Something to be aware of is that there are multiple smaller militia groups and individual cells within Hezbollah that have the potential for escalation. Many of these smaller or splinter groups may feel that they must respond to Israel with an independent attack that pre-empts or goes beyond Hezbollah’s so far very measured response. This danger is illustrated by previous attacks on UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, such as the attack that resulted in the death of Private Sean Rooney in December 2022. If one of these smaller groups was to hit an Israeli population centre, either on purpose or by mistake, the tension could easily spill over into a larger-scale conflict. The US–Israel Relationship An interesting dynamic to note is that the pager attacks and subsequent missile campaign represent another case of Israel making aggressive decisions without first consulting the US. Prior examples of this include the decision to invade Rafah, rejecting any possibility of a future Palestinian state as part of negotiations, and missile campaigns on non-combat areas in Gaza. As the US is Israel’s main ally and security guarantor, this trend embodies the increasing risk appetite of the current Israeli government. This is likely due to an assessment of the strategic environment, particularly Iran’s reluctance to enter a full-scale conflict, but also represents a political calculation by Netanyahu. Once again, the only way for Netanyahu to safeguard his short-term survival is by taking decisions that ensure Israel remains in a state of conflict. Followers of Israeli politics will not need reminding that Netanyahu faces three criminal cases that will progress as soon as he loses the premiership. The escalation perhaps also reflects a weakness in the US’s security arrangements, as it has been unable to effectively dissuade and disincentivise its own allies from escalation. The US has made it very clear that its priority, especially approaching the presidential election, is for regional de-escalation. This is illustrated by the exhaustive diplomatic efforts made since 7 October to reach a settlement between Iran, Hezbollah and Israel in order to keep the border cool. When the new US administration takes office later this year, its first priority in terms of Middle East policy must be addressing the balance of power between Washington and the Israeli prime minister.

Defense & Security
Concept of military aggression in Middle East.

The Developments in the Middle East: a Reflection of the World’s Bigger Picture

by Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affair

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in early October 2023, many observers jumped to a grim conclusion that, from then onward, the Middle East was hurtling at an ever-increasing speed toward another major regional conflict. The military operation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip was to be followed by fierce hostilities in the West Bank, then by a large-scale border clash between Israel and Lebanon, and, finally, by an Israeli–Iranian war, which had been looming on the political horizon for years and was literally just a step away, with the likely involvement of several key regional and global actors, including the United States. Limits to escalation  But in the 11 months that have passed since the Hamas attack on Israel, no major war has broken out in the Middle East. Israel, as predicted, is stuck in Gaza for long. The death toll among Palestinian civilians has passed 40,000, with the number of wounded approaching 100,000, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons now in the seven figures. For the people of Gaza, everything happening there is not a targeted anti-terrorist operation, but an all-out war in every sense. While the neighboring West Bank also saw an escalation, it was much more limited—around 600 Palestinians and several dozen Israelis have died there over the past 11 months. This is still many times more than in previous years (28 people were killed there in 2020, 86 in 2021, and 146 in 2022), but it is clear now that the West Bank has not become a second Gaza today, nor is it likely to become one overnight. Along the line of confrontation between the IDF and Hezbollah forces on the Israeli–Lebanese border, nothing extraordinary has occurred so far either, except for a rocket strike at a soccer field in the town of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights on July 27, which killed 12 Druze teenagers. True, Hezbollah has fired an unprecedented number of missiles at Israel over the past 11 months, up to 6,000 according to some reports. Israel, in response, has launched massive retaliatory and even preemptive strikes on southern Lebanon. But the preliminary results of this duel were relatively minor: 21 civilian and 20 military deaths on the Israeli side, and around 375 fighters and civilians killed on Hezbollah’s side. Even the latest attack on Sunday, August 25, which was announced in advance and involved 340 rockets along with dozens of Hezbollah drones, seems to have caused no significant damage to Israel. In any case, nothing comparable to the IDF’s deep incursion into southern Lebanon in July 2006 (known as the Second Lebanon War) is happening now or is likely to happen soon. In recent months, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to escalate by conducting precision strikes on prominent figures of its adversaries. On April 1, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an Iranian embassy annex building in Damascus, killing 16 people, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, one of the top military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 30, senior Hezbollah operative Fuad Shukr was killed in a Beirut suburb, and on July 31, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran (Israel never claimed responsibility for his death). After each of these incidents, experts predicted a sharp increase in the risks of escalation. But the Iranian leadership’s response to these developments was surprisingly restrained (as was Tehran’s earlier response to the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani in early 2020 by the U.S. military in a Baghdad suburb). The leaders of most Arab states also showed restraint in their response to the events in Gaza. The highly emotional reaction of the Arab street did not translate into decisive actions comparable to the oil embargo imposed on Israel and its allies following the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Efforts to further promote the Abraham Accords between Israel and the conservative Arab monarchies continued, albeit fading from the public eye. The only consistent supporters of Palestine were the stubborn Yemeni Houthis, who have attacked foreign ships in the Red Sea. However, it was Egypt—not Israel—that suffered the most from these attacks, losing nearly half of its revenues from the Suez Canal. Reasons for restraint  Although the trigger of a major regional war was pulled almost a year ago, the bomb itself never exploded. This situation calls for an explanation, particularly to assess the risk that the bomb might eventually detonate in the foreseeable future, among other things. One explanation for the current situation around Palestine lies in the distinct nature of Hamas, which has an ambiguous reputation in the Arab world. Cairo does not hold it in high regard, and Egypt’s current military leadership, not without reason, draws parallels between Palestinian radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Russia) at home, which has been driven deep underground, but was, alongside Israel, among the founding fathers of Hamas. Damascus has not forgotten that at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the political opposition rather than President Bashar Assad. Opinions of Hamas are divided in the Gulf states—while the group can count on some patronage and even political support in Doha, Abu Dhabi is much more skeptical and doubtful of the former rulers of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, all regional actors are under pressure from the international community, which for various reasons does not want further escalation. The U.S. has no interest in a major regional war in the Middle East with an uncertain outcome, especially in the run-up to the presidential election in November. Thus, Washington is focused on maintaining the regional status quo. China has even less reason to welcome such a conflict, in the first place because it would immediately drive global hydrocarbon prices up and create many transportation and logistics issues for Beijing. Moscow could possibly count on some short-term gains from a major Middle East conflagration. The West would have to shift attention away from Ukraine for a while, while prices for Russian oil and gas would skyrocket. But the negative consequences of long-term destabilization in such an important region for Russia are so great that they undoubtedly outweigh any short-term gains. It is no coincidence that at his meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on August 13, President Vladimir Putin emphasized Moscow’s commitment to preventing further escalation and promoting a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It is also plausible that during the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Iran on August 5, Moscow urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to refrain from radical responses to Israel—not only to minimize possible civilian casualties but also to avoid provoking a direct conflict with the U.S. Postmodernity as inoculation against war  However, the core reasons lie not outside, but inside the region. It appears that key actors—from Egypt to Syria, and from Turkey to Iran—are unwilling to engage in a full-blown war. Middle Eastern leaders are reluctant to shoulder the numerous risks and costs associated with a major armed conflict in one way or another. True, the arms race in the Middle East region received a powerful new boost in October 2023 and is likely to accelerate later. Belligerent anti-Israeli rhetoric—not only in the Arab world but also in Iran and Turkey—will also persist. Isolated tragic incidents—both planned and accidental—will continue. Yet a major war is a different matter. This is not because all Middle Eastern leaders are exceptionally compassionate and peace-loving, but because almost none of them today can be fully confident in their own power and resilience. It is still possible to maintain a limited military presence near and far, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan does in Syria and Libya. But repeating the experience of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions wounded, is now a no-go: Middle Eastern societies have changed too much over the past 40 years, and the region has advanced too far down the path of postmodernity. It is hardly a coincidence that the strongest proponents of escalation are the Houthis, who are the least affected by the postmodern values and lifestyle in the Middle East. Perhaps even Tehran can no longer count on the unconditional loyalty of the new generation of Iranian citizens, who would have to pay with their own blood for the decisions of the political and military elite leading to a major regional war. In any case, the victory of the only “reformist” candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in the recent presidential election is a clear signal from society to the leadership of the Islamic Republic that people want peace, stability and economic development, rather than new military exploits or social and political upheavals that invariably accompany them. Even Israel—for all the outward determination of the current cabinet to see things through to the end—is no exception to this rule. The costs of the Gaza operation have already topped $60 billion, a staggering sum for a relatively small country, meaning inevitable budget deficits, tax hikes and cuts to social programs. Israel’s call-up of reservists has already drained the national economy, and its effects will be felt for a long time. Most importantly, as the Gaza offensive has once again shown, starting a war is easy, but ending it is very difficult. The prospect of a second Gaza in the West Bank or southern Lebanon is far from appealing, even for a politician as determined as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Armageddon is off the table? It is fair to assume that the current situation in the Middle East reflects the broader state of global politics. After February 24, 2022, many experts expressed a gloomy belief that “the world is entering a new era of big wars” and that the confrontation between Russia and the West would inevitably lead to a chain reaction of major armed conflicts all over the planet. They predicted an imminent U.S.–China military clash over Taiwan, an armed standoff between China and India in the Himalayas or between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, a rapid escalation on the Korean Peninsula and numerous new conflicts across Africa, among others. Fortunately, none of the above scenarios have so far come to pass. Many other ominous predictions have not come true either. ECOWAS member states opted out of a military intervention in Niger. The Libyan National Army’s threat of a border conflict with Algeria never materialized. Even Venezuela’s eccentric leader Nicolas Maduro seems to have changed his mind about going to war with neighboring Guyana over disputed territories. The number of conflicts in the world has not decreased, but the ongoing ones are predominantly low-intensity conflicts rather than conventional wars, after all. The international system, though shaken, has overall remained standing—for now. Of course, it is too early to sit back. The situation can explode at any moment and almost anywhere: there are more than enough flashpoints around the world, while the level of trust or even basic communication between the great powers has dropped to near zero. In today’s international environment, any negative scenarios are possible, down to the most apocalyptic ones. And this unsettling uncertainty is now very much felt in the Middle East as well. But for now, there is still hope that the unfolding transition to a new world order will be less destructive and less costly for humanity than many professional pessimists have imagined in recent years.