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Defense & Security
President Donald Trump announces the Golden Dome missile defense system P20250520JB-0081

Trump’s Golden Dome plan threatens to fuel a new arms race

by Julia Cournoyer

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The plan for an advanced missile defence shield over the US offers no guarantee of success and risks undermining global security. Last week, US President Donald Trump unveiled his $175 billion plan to build the ‘Golden Dome’: a coast-to-coast missile defence shield designed to protect the US against hypersonic, ballistic, and space-based weapons. But far from enhancing US national security, the initiative risks exacerbating global instability and accelerating strategic competition. The concept for the Golden Dome is ambitious. The proposal envisions a multi-layered defence architecture involving hundreds or even thousands of satellites in orbit, equipped with advanced sensors and interceptors, including space-based lasers. These would detect, track, and neutralize incoming missiles and other threats at various stages of flight. In both vision and rhetoric, the plans echo Ronald Reagan’s 1983 Strategic Defence Initiative, often referred to as ‘Star Wars.’ Like the Golden Dome, the SDI proposed a layered defence system that would rely on cutting-edge, and largely untested, technologies to intercept incoming missiles before they could reach US territory. But despite years of investment, the SDI never produced a workable system and was eventually cancelled, exposing the gap between ambition and capability that still exists today. The plan also draws inspiration from Israel’s Iron Dome system. But this comparison is misleading. Israel is much smaller than the US, and its Iron Dome protects the country from short-range, unguided rockets – threats that are limited in number, speed, and direction. Trump’s plan, by contrast, seeks to defend the entire US homeland from far more advanced and numerous threats, including long-range ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles and orbital delivery systems. The scale, complexity, and technical sophistication required are of a completely different order. Costs – and risks Despite Trump estimating that the system will cost $175 billion and could be built in just three years, the Congressional Budget Office has warned that the space-based components alone could cost as much as $542 billion to deploy and operate over the next 20 years. Fundamental questions remain unanswered: what the system will look like, who will build it, and whether it will function as intended. Investing the necessary resources to develop such an advanced system would require significant trade-offs that could come at the expense of other defence priorities.  The US does not currently have the full spectrum of technology it needs to intercept hypersonic or ballistic missiles in space, which would require interceptors or lasers capable of operating over vast distances with near-instant precision. Pursuing the Golden Dome risks prioritising an expensive and unproven system over more immediate and achievable capabilities, such as improving regional missile defences and cyber resilience to countering emerging threats like drones. The plan also has potentially dangerous strategic consequences. A system that aspires to make the US invulnerable to missile attack would almost certainly be seen by its adversaries as an attempt to undermine the logic of nuclear deterrence. If Washington is perceived to be developing a shield that could one day neutralize a retaliatory nuclear strike, it risks triggering a dangerous global arms race. Beijing and Moscow have already criticized the Golden Dome project as ‘deeply destabilizing’ and could respond with a range of countermeasures, including expanding their offensive arsenals or developing new delivery systems. This arms race could also incentivize the deployment of space-based weapons at a time when space remains dangerously under-regulated. The Golden Dome could therefore undermine global security, making the world a more dangerous place – including for the US. Leverage for diplomacy? Given these risks, the US should instead use the Golden Dome plan as leverage to launch renewed arms control diplomacy. Washington should use the proposal to reinitiate dialogue with other major powers, including Russia and China, on mutual restraint, transparency, and the governance of emerging missile and space-based technologies.  This is especially urgent given the deterioration of existing arms control frameworks. The last major arms control agreement between the US and Russia, the New START Treaty, was suspended by President Vladimir Putin in 2023. It is set to expire in 2026 with no successor in place. Despite China’s growing arsenal, arms control talks between the US and China were also suspended in July 2024 over US arms sales to Taiwan. Meanwhile, rapid advances in missile technology, space systems, and artificial intelligence are outpacing the rules and norms designed to manage them. As geopolitical tensions rise, so does the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The need to revive strategic dialogue is therefore more pressing than ever. While China and Russia may be sceptical of US intentions, the Golden Dome’s space-based elements could create a rare opportunity for renewed arms control dialogue on space security. This might not necessarily focus on warhead reductions, but on more immediate and achievable areas of shared concern.  Space security Space security is one of the most promising and necessary avenues for engagement. As nuclear-armed powers become increasingly reliant on space-based systems for both military and civilian purposes (from early warning systems and communications to navigation and surveillance), the risks of miscalculation or unintended escalation in orbit are growing. A pragmatic and urgently needed step would be to launch dialogue on the norms that should govern behaviour in space, including avoiding close approaches to satellites, limiting the deployment of certain space-based systems, or improving transparency. Even modest measures, such as agreeing to share notifications of satellite launches or discussing dual-use capabilities, could help to build trust and reduce the likelihood of conflict in orbit. By focusing on space, where interests overlap and mutual vulnerabilities are clear, the US could help to re-establish the foundations for wider future strategic dialogue.  Avoiding past mistakes In the 1980s, Reagan’s SDI consumed vast resources, heightened international tensions, and failed to deliver a functioning defence system. It also contributed to an arms race that left the world more divided, not more secure. The Golden Dome risks repeating those same mistakes, but with more players, faster technologies, and fewer guardrails in place. At a time when arms control frameworks are crumbling and global tensions are rising, the announcement of the Golden Dome should be seen as a strategic opportunity to initiate renewed discussions on space security. Framing the proposal as a starting point for dialogue, rather than a signal of unilateral ambition, could help to stabilize a dangerously volatile moment. Otherwise, the project risks pushing the world one step further towards a more contested, militarized, and insecure future.

Defense & Security
Brussels, Belgium – November 06 2023: new pack of economic EU sanctions against Russia, vector cartoon illustration on white

Who supports EU sanctions against Russia’s war in Ukraine? The role of the defence of European values and other socioeconomic factors

by Alessandro Indelicato , Juan Carlos Martína

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, following the military actions that began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The conflict is having devastating consequences, including widespread death and displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and a global energy crisis, also heightening geopolitical tensions (Kurapov et al., Citation2023). Pertiwi (Citation2024) contended that since the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union (EU) has adopted sanctions as the key policy response targeting Russia’s aggressive behaviour. These restrictive measures were applied by the EU in multiple rounds and packages and gradually became the cornerstone of the EU’s policy towards Russia. (p. 61) There is extant literature studying the direct consequences of the war, such as humanitarian crises, economic impacts and geopolitical instability. Numerous countries have experienced food shortages and rising prices due to disruptions in supply chains, worsened by the crisis in Ukraine and the closure of airspace (Hellegers, Citation2022). Concurrently, the war has caused an unprecedentedly volatile energy market, as many European countries were obliged to seek alternative energy sources to Russian imports, demanding more oil and natural gas from alternative suppliers (Liadze et al., Citation2022). The invasion has also fuelled inflation across the EU, not only affecting energy, which is essential in all the sectors of the economy but also other sectors like food, for example, as Ukraine is a major global grain producer (Ozili, Citation2024). The added value and main contribution of this paper is based on the use of grounded social scientific methods like the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS and the Ordered Probit, to analyse the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions against Russia, providing more nuanced insights on what factors are the most important to be in favour and against the sanctions. Thus, in particular, our study contributes to filling one of the important gaps mentioned by Pertiwi (Citation2024) in the analysis of the literature on the EU’s approach to sanctions on Russia. Concretely, our study fills in part the fifth gap in the analysis of causal mechanisms that examine the sanctions, including relevant actors like the EU citizens. Thus, we first provide an in-depth analysis of European citizens’ views on EU sanctions to weaken Russia and support Ukraine. And then, we analyse the main factors that affect the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia and in favour of Ukraine. The study includes data from 26,461 respondents across the 27 EU Member States, collected through the 98th Eurobarometer survey (Winter 2022–2023), which examined the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature review. Section 3 presents the dataset used, and the methodological approach. In Section 5, the results are presented, followed by Section 5, which offers a thorough discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising the main conclusions drawn from the study, identifying implications, limitations of the study, and potential directions for future research. Literature reviewAttitudes towards EU’s sanctions against Russia war in Ukraine Public sentiment for the EU is a complex phenomenon to study and needs to be approached from different angles, including identity, governance, security and the economy. How the public perceives the EU as a guardian of democratic values and good governance directly influences support for its policies, including sanctions on Russia. Boomgaarden et al. (Citation2011) argue that if the people believe that the EU is going to safeguard democratic principles, then they will identify sanctions as a proper means of safeguarding such principles. However, if there is a lack of trust in the EU to defend such values, there will be little support for such sanctions. The purpose of European identity is primarily to determine people’s views on the EU’s actions. Kende et al. (Citation2018) believe that European identity can have a profound impact on solidarity with common EU policies, such as sanctions. This would imply that the framing of a common European identity can become the most important factor in eliciting public consent for EU programmes, especially in the midst of geopolitical crises. Thus, public opinion on sanctions is also based on perceptions of the EU’s ability to act in the interests of citizens. According to McLean and Roblyer (Citation2016), if citizens perceive the EU as doing the best it can for its citizens, particularly in terms of economic stability and governance, they are more likely to support sanctions against Russia. However, if the EU is perceived as wasteful, or its policies are perceived as economically harmful, then the potential for support for sanctions will be low. This explains the need to ensure that EU action is consistent with shared perceptions of political effectiveness and economic benefit. The imposition of economic sanctions is one of the highest prioritised tools in the modern world, especially against threats to stability and security. The EU sanctions on Russia, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, have stimulated an immensely wide public discussion (Karlović et al., Citation2021). An important question is: What is the role of perceived security threats in shaping public opinion about these sanctions? It has been made known through investigation that subjective security risk strongly predicts public opinion regarding EU sanctions against Russia. Frye (Citation2019) argues that sanctions are not always supported but vary depending on how people view security threats. Public support is higher when sanctions are framed as protection against an external threat. When sanctions are perceived as a threat to national or economic security, they can generate opposition. The EU’s collective response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict also shows that public opinion on sanctions is shaped by both security interests and normative expectations of justice and self-determination (Bosse, Citation2024). This mutual influence can lead to mixed public responses, with some seeing sanctions as an ethical necessity, while others withdraw their support due to perceived economic and national security risks. The way EU sanctions are proposed and implemented also influences public opinion. According to Sjursen (Citation2015), citizens will be more supportive of sanctions if they see EU institutions as representative and transparent. Conversely, an image of bureaucratic distance or lack of public participation in decision-making can undermine trust and lead to opposition. Thus, in line with this background, we pose our first research question as follows: (1) How do European values and security threats influence the intensity of public support for EU sanctions against Russia?Socioeconomic factors in shaping attitudes towards EU sanctions Support for economic sanctions against Russia is widespread among the EU, varying according to socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics and political engagement. As Frye (Citation2017) has noted, economic prosperity is a key predictor of support for sanctions. Those who are financially ‘safe’ are more likely to support EU-imposed sanctions, as they are less directly affected by the economic burden. Previous studies have shown that those in more affluent income groups or with stable household finances are more likely to support foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, that represent broader European values, even if they are economically costly (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). This is consistent with the findings of Lepeu (Citation2025), which recognises that citizens who rate their own economic situation as ‘very good’ are far more likely to support sanctions than those facing financial hardship. On the other hand, citizens facing economic hardship are less likely to be sanction-supportive if they believe that sanctions will negatively impact inflation, increase unemployment or suppress national economic stability. Onderco (Citation2017) found that economic hardship is associated with higher scepticism towards foreign policy decisions that lack tangible personal benefits. This means that the economic price of sanctions is likely to disproportionately affect support among lower-income individuals. Generational differences also play a role in shaping public opinion on sanctions. Older individuals (over 55 years) are more supportive of EU sanctions, as they have a historical perspective on European security and are more politically engaged (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). On the other hand, younger people (15–34 years) have weaker support, possibly because they have different priorities, such as financial stability and employment, which could be considered more pressing than geopolitical concerns (Onderco, Citation2017). Alexandrescu (Citation2024) also suggests a new generational divide in attitudes towards coercive diplomacy, suggesting that efforts to build popular support for sanctions must consider young Europeans’ concerns and values about economic consequences and political transparency. Political interest is a second important predictor of support for EU sanctions. Politically knowledgeable and engaged citizens tend to be more supportive of EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). Thus, there is political ideology duality: left and centre-left voters support sanctions if they are anchored in a broader vision of upholding international law and human rights, while centre-right and populist voters are likely to be more sceptical if sanctions are perceived as infringing on national sovereignty (Onderco, Citation2017). As in the literature, the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions depends on several socioeconomic and demographic factors, our second research question builds on the following: (2) Do socioeconomic characteristics influence the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions against Russia?Dataset and methodology The dataset of the study is based on the Standard Eurobarometer 98.2 (EB98) survey Winter 2022–2023 which was conducted from 12 January to 6 February 2023 in 39 countries or territories. In the study, we only use the dataset from the 27 Member States of the EU, without considering the data from the other twelve additional countries included. The dataset was collected about a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, covering the following five topic areas identified by the European Commission (Citation2024): (1) The EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine; (2) the actions taken as a unified EU response to the invasion; (3) the consequences of the war in Ukraine; (4) the European security threat; and (5) the future EU actions in the wake of the war., and aims to analyse the solidarity of European citizens with the Ukrainian people. The sample size for each country was around 1000 respondents except for Malta with 503, making a total of 26,461 respondents. The endogenous variable of the study is obtained by applying the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS approach to the items of the survey included to measure the degree of support of the respondents towards the measures taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The following five items were included in the analysis: (1) financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine; (2) imposing economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals; (3) providing financial support to Ukraine; (4) providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war; and (5) welcoming into the EU people fleeing the war. The question introduction was the same for all the items: The EU has taken a series of actions as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these actions taken? The responses to the question for each item were given using a complete 5-point Likert scale, where: 1 = totally agree; 2 = tend to agree; 3 = do not know; 4 = tend to disagree; and 5 = totally disagree. The scale was reversed to enhance interpretability, ensuring that higher values are aligned with those citizens who expressed higher support for the measures taken by the EU. The analysis of the variables affecting the citizens’ support was based on the selection of 14 exogenous variables, including age, gender, political interest, perception of the situation in the country, employment personal perception, financial household perception, the labour market perception of the country, the provision of public services perception, the overall image of the EU, the perception of the threat posed by the Russian war in Ukraine to security in the EU and the country itself, the personal perception that standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, and the political orientation. More information about the exogenous variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The Ordered Probit model will provide interesting and nuanced results of whether some exogenous variables affect the support of the EU sanctions taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion. For example, for each of the variables included in the analysis, it will be possible to analyse to what extent some of the categories support more or less the sanctions. Similarly, it will be possible to determine if some of the variables have a significant effect on the level of support. Methodology Opinion surveys are affected by the subjective judgments of respondents, leading to potential inaccuracy in interpreting response categories (Disegna et al., Citation2018). For instance, ‘totally agree’ for one respondent could be equivalent to simply ‘tend to agree’ for another. For this reason, Fuzzy Set Logic methods are becoming very popular in social sciences to manage the uncertainty associated with survey responses effectively (Cantillo et al., Citation2021; Indelicato & Martín, Citation2024). The study uses the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS Approach to calculate the endogenous variable that measures the support (sup) of the respondents towards the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The method is grounded in the fuzzy set theory proposed by Zadeh (Citation1965), which was introduced for handling the inherent uncertainty and vagueness of information provided by answers to social surveys (Carlsson & Fullér, Citation2001; Disegna et al., Citation2018; Mamdani & Assilian, Citation1999). There are multiple fuzzy set representations that can be used to associate the categories of the answers given in the survey (Nguyen et al., Citation2005). In the study, we use the Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs), which are the most used fuzzy sets (Anand & Bharatraj, Citation2017; Wang, Citation2017). The final representation of the answers from the dataset is as follows: (1) totally disagree is represented by (0, 0, 30); (2) tend to disagree by (20, 30, 40); (3) do not know by (30, 50, 70); (4) tend to agree by (60, 70, 80); and (5) totally agree by (70, 100, 100). The hybrid nature of the method is based on the application of the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), which calculates the synthetic indicator (Hwang & Yoon, Citation1981). We omit the mathematical formulation of the method for simplicity and ease of exposition. Interested readers can consult many existing papers, such as (Cantillo et al., Citation2023; Indelicato et al., Citation2023; Martín et al., Citation2020; Martín & Indelicato, Citation2023). We will use sup which provides relative support for the sanctions on Russia taken by the EU after invading Ukraine, as the dependent variable for the econometric model. The variable will be categorised into five quintiles according to the ranking of the indicator in order to use an ordered probit model. The marginal effects of the results will be used to analyse the main determinants that explain the highest support of EU citizens. In the study, we use the Daly normalisation for all the categories that act as exogenous variables in the model. Thus, it is possible to determine the marginal effects of each category with respect to the sample-weighted average. We omit the discussion of the technicalities of the model and exogenous variables normalisation. Interested readers can consult Daly et al. (Citation2016), Greene and Hensher (Citation2010), Hensher et al. (Citation2015) and Martin and Roman (Citation2021). Results Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the exogenous variable that measures the support of EU individuals for the sanctions against Russia taken by the EU for the whole sample (panel a) and for those who totally agree and totally disagree with the EU imposing the sanctions to defend European values (panel b). The results indicate that a small number of respondents do not support the sanctions imposed by the EU at all, with 170 citizens giving a score of 1 to all survey items included in the scale. Conversely, a significant portion of the population holds a more neutral position, as shown by responses falling in the range of 0.3–0.6. Additionally, a substantial number of citizens – specifically, 6430 – express their strong support for the sanctions by responding with a score of 5 to all items.  Figure 1. Support kernel density. Panel (b) of the figure clearly distinguishes between the two categories of respondents. It shows that those who strongly support the defence of European values are more in favour of the sanctions compared to those who strongly oppose them. Similar figure patterns are obtained for the categories of those who have a positive or negative image of the EU, and for those who think that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is seen as an important threat to the security of the EU. Nevertheless, this will be further discussed with the results of the ordered probit model. Table 1 shows the main drivers to support or not the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The table is obtained from the marginal effects obtained from the ordered probit model, which is in the fifth quintile of the support distribution, and refers to the citizen group of the strong supporters (Table A3, in the appendix). It can be seen that the main drivers to support the sanctions are totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion, the EU is defending European values, having a very good or rather good image of the EU, totally agreeing that the EU security is under threat with the Russian invasion, and to have a very good financial situation in the household. All the coefficients are significant at 999 per thousand. The results of the ordered probit model, as well as the complete table of the marginal effects, can be consulted in the appendix. Table A2 shows that all the exogenous variables affect the support level except the area in which the respondent resides, so the support is transversal to whether the European lives in a rural, middle town or large town. It is also interesting to observe that all the threshold parameters of the ordered probit model result significant, i.e. the five different quintiles of the distribution can be allocated without the need to collapse some of the categories used in the estimation.  Table 1. Main drivers to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. Interestingly, the main drivers to be in the population segment of those who do not strongly support the EU sanctions are the opposite categories of supporting the sanctions: totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the defence of European values, totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the fact that the invasion of Ukraine is a security threat to the EU and having a very bad image of the EU. The coefficients of Table 1 have been extracted from Table A3, and need to be interpreted as follows: the coefficients are the marginal effects of the category to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. For example, the coefficient of 0.105 for individuals who totally agree that the EU is defending European values by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicates that this group has a 10.5 per cent higher likelihood of being strong supporters of EU sanctions compared to the average citizen in the overall sample. In a similar manner, the coefficient of −0.225 for the category of total disagreement indicates a 22.5 per cent lower probability of being a strong supporter. Other interesting results that can be seen in the complete marginal effects table (Table A3, in the appendix) are that the type of urbanisation where the respondent lives, namely rural village, small and mid-size town or large town, is the only variable of the twelve under analysis which does not have any significant effect on being a strong supporter of the sanctions. For the rest of the variables, there is always a category with more odds of being or not in the category of strong supporters. It is interesting to note that the younger generations (between 15 and 24 and between 25 and 34) are less likely to be in the category of strong supporters than those over 55, who are significantly more likely to be in this category. Similarly, those who have a strong political interest, have a good personal job situation, think that the economic situation of their country is rather good, are leftist or left-centre, think that the employment situation of the country is rather good, are males, or have a rather good financial situation have a higher probability of being in the category of strong supporters. Conclusions In a recent speech by Jens Stoltenberg, former Secretary General of NATO, the following assessment was made: In just a few weeks, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid. We will make important decisions. To continue to strengthen and adapt our Alliance to a new security reality and protect our people and our values. I look forward to the day when we can welcome both Finland and Sweden into our Alliance. This will make Finland and Sweden safer. NATO stronger. And the whole Euro-Atlantic area more secure. (NATO, Citation2022) Although NATO’s strategic decision affects the entire geopolitical landscape, public perceptions of EU sanctions need to be addressed through a more nuanced, evidence-based approach. Public opinion on sanctions is driven not only by security concerns but also by economic and political factors that underpin individual belief systems. To measure the determinants of support for such policies, this study applies both the fuzzy hybrid approach and the ordered probit model. The first method calculates the endogenous variable that measures the level of support of each respondent. The second method is used to find the main factors of a set of 14 exogenous variables or covariates that affect the support. Our results reveal that there are four important drivers to be a strong supporter of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022: (1) totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, (2) having a very good overall EU image, (3) totally agreeing that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to the security of the EU, and (4) having a very good household financial situation. Other factors, such as age, gender, or political orientation, among others, are less determinant in explaining the strong support category. The dataset for the study was obtained from the 98th Eurobarometer, covering winter 2022–2023, providing a solid foundation for the objectives pursued in the study. Our results imply that, at least in the salient category of being a strong supporter of the EU sanctions, European Parliamentarians and the political parties involved should promote a triad: the defence of European values (Anghel & Jones, Citation2023), a more integrated security defence system that will permit the EU to be more independent from NATO and US (Del Sarto Citation2016; Howorth Citation2018), and a solid campaign of improving the EU image, highlighting the benefits of being in the union (Elmatzoglou, Citation2020). The European values of human rights and dignity, as well as the principles of living in liberal democracies, should not be undermined by misinformation campaigns from autocratic regimes. The invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest security threat in Europe since the end of the Cold War, fostering a wave of fear and real politics about the necessity of increasing the military budget. Europeans have seen more closely how the lives of human beings are worth almost nothing when their homes are bombed, and they have to leave with just the bare minimum, stopping their daily lives and becoming refugees in countries that may not welcome them with open arms. There is a need for effective communication campaigns that change the focus from generic issues such as ‘Europeanness’ fostering a common national identity or sense of belonging to a pragmatic branding strategy that achieves a power actor in the new turbulent geopolitical battlefield. Recent developments, in the light of newly elected President Donald Trump’s views on NATO and US foreign aid, have added uncertainty to the EU’s strategic calculus on sanctions. Trump’s concerns about NATO’s burden-sharing and his ambivalent stance on continued US military aid to Ukraine have set off alarm bells among EU policymakers and underscored the need for a European security policy that is less dependent on US leadership (Sorgi, Citation2025). Thus, it is the time for a more than-less European Union mentality that decreases Euroscepticism, a time to strengthen public support for the EU. This shift requires an emphasis on the tangible benefits that EU membership brings to member states, including economic stability, enhanced security, and the promotion of shared values like democracy and human rights. By fostering greater awareness and understanding of the EU’s role in addressing cross-border challenges, citizens can better appreciate the advantages of unity over division. Engaging with local communities, encouraging open dialogues, and actively involving citizens in EU decision-making processes can further bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens, reinforcing a sense of belonging and shared purpose. This study has some limitations that can be addressed in future studies. First, the dataset is a point-in-time measure of public opinion, surveyed in the winter of 2022–2023. Due to the dynamic nature of the geopolitical environment, longitudinal studies are needed to examine how public support for EU sanctions may change over time in response to political, economic and military events. Second, other external factors can also be examined to gain a better picture of how other factors could shape people’s opinions. These range from cultural equivalence with Ukraine to geographical proximity to the war zone, exposure to social media narratives, and interaction with Ukrainian refugees. The role of media frames and disinformation campaigns in determining views on EU sanctions is another area that would require more work. Third, latent variables such as societal resilience, institutional trust, geopolitical affinity, and adherence to European values could provide a better understanding of the reasons for support or opposition to EU sanctions. Such variables could also explain the differences in public opinion between EU member states and between different demographic groups. Furthermore, as previous studies on public support (Onderco et al., Citation2023) have also shown, a comparative analysis with previous surveys, for example, in 2008 (Russia-Georgia war), 2014 (annexation of Crimea and Donbas war) with the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022–2023, could also be very useful. Although not directly compared in the current study, future research would benefit from a historical analysis component to explore the continuities and shifts in public opinion during these major geopolitical events and how they change in different EU countries. This would provide a better insight into how threat perceptions, economic concerns and EU identity evolve in response to Russian aggression and EU foreign policy initiatives. Supplemental Material Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2025.2476484. Additional informationFunding Dr Alessandro Indelicato research is funded by the research fellowship “Catalina Ruiz,” provided by the Consejo de Economía, Conocimiento y Empleo of the Gobierno de Canarias, the Agencia Canaria De Investigación Innovación Y Sociedad De La Información (ACIISI), and Fondo Social Europeo of the EU, through the Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain). Martín, J. C., & Indelicato, A. (2025). Who supports EU sanctions against Russia’s war in Ukraine? The role of the defence of European values and other socioeconomic factors. European Politics and Society, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2025.2476484 References 1. Alexandrescu, M. (2024). Beyond geopolitics: Unraveling public support for economic sanctions in the B9 states at the beginning of the Ukrainian War (2022). SAGE Open, 14(3), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/215824402412683192. Anand, M. C. J., & Bharatraj, J. (2017, March 27). Theory of triangular fuzzy number. Proceedings of NCATM (p. 80).3. Anghel, V., & Jones, E. (2023). Is Europe really forged through crisis? Pandemic EU and the Russia–Ukraine war. Journal of European Public Policy, 30(4), 766–786. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.21408204. Bøggild, T., Göbel, S., Lutscher, P., & Nyrup, J. (2024). Standing with Ukraine? How citizens trade off self-interest and principles in supporting war-torn international partners. 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A. (2016). Normative empire Europe: The European Union, its borderlands, and the ‘Arab Spring’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(2), 215–232. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.1228215. Disegna, M., D’Urso, P., & Massari, R. (2018). Analysing cluster evolution using repeated cross-sectional ordinal data. Tourism Management, 69, 524–536. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2018.06.02816. Elmatzoglou, I. (2020). EU branding. Efforts to improve the EU image. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 16(4), 326–335. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-020-00180-517. European Commission. (2022). EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. Issue February. European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2772(open in a new window)18. European Commission. (2024). EDIS: Our common defence industrial strategy. Accessed January 15, 2025, from https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en(open in a new window)19. Frye, T. (2017). Property Rights and Property Wrongs: How Power, Institutions, and Norms Shape Economic Conflict in Russia. Cambridge University Press.20. Frye, T. (2019). Economic sanctions and public opinion: Survey experiments from Russia. Comparative Political Studies, 52(7), 967–994. https://doi.org/10.1177/001041401880653021. Gorg, H., Jacobs, A., & Meuchelböck, S. (2023). Who is to suffer? Quantifying the impact of sanctions on German firms. IZA Discussion Paper No. 16146. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4456331(open in a new window)22. Greene, W. H., & Hensher, D. A. (2010). Modeling ordered choices: A primer. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO978051184506223. Hellegers, P. (2022). Food security vulnerability due to trade dependencies on Russia and Ukraine. Food Security, 14(6), 1503–1510. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-022-01306-824. Hensher, D. A., Rose, J. R., & Greene, W. H. (2015). Applied choice analysis. Cambridge University Press.25. Howorth, J. (2018). Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: Threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence relations? Journal of European Integration, 40(5), 523–537. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.151226826. Hwang, C.-L., & Yoon, K. (1981). Methods for multiple attribute decision making. In C.-L. Hwang & K. Yoon (Eds.), Multiple attribute decision making (pp. 58–191). Springer.27. Indelicato, A., & Martín, J. C. (2024). The effects of three facets of national identity and other socioeconomic traits on attitudes towards immigrants. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 25(2), 645–672. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-023-01100-128. Indelicato, A., Martín, J. C., & Scuderi, R. (2023). A comparison of attitudes towards immigrants from the perspective of the political party vote. Heliyon, 9(3), e14089. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e1408929. Isernia, P., Martini, S., & Cozzi-Fucile, C. (2024). Shaping public attitudes towards EU sanctions: The role of political narratives in France, Germany, and Italy. Journal of European Public Policy, 31(1), 79–102. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.222616830. Karlović, A., Čepo, D., & Biedenkopf, K. (2021). Politicisation of the European foreign, security, and defence cooperation: The case of the EU’s Russian sanctions. European Security, 30(3), 344–366. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.196447431. Kende, A., Hadarics, M., & Szabó, Z. P. (2018). National and European identities as predictors of attitudes toward economic and social policies. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(5), 615–629. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.235732. Koval, N., & Vachudova, M. A. (2024). European Union enlargement and geopolitical power in the face of war. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.1367733. Kurapov, A., Pavlenko, V., Drozdov, A., Bezliudna, V., Reznik, A., & Isralowitz, R. (2023). Toward an understanding of the Russian-Ukrainian war impact on university students and personnel. Journal of Loss and Trauma, 28(2), 167–174. https://doi.org/10.1080/15325024.2022.208483834. Lepeu, J. (2025). Ukraine, the de-targetization of EU sanctions, and the rise of the European commission as architect of EU foreign policy. International Politics, 1–14.35. Liadze, I., Macchiarelli, C., Mortimer-Lee, P., & Juanino, P. S. (2022). The economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.36. Makarychev, A., & Terry, G. (2020). An estranged ‘marriage of convenience’: Salvini, Putin, and the intricacies of Italian-Russian relations. Contemporary Italian Politics, 12(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2019.170692637. Mamdani, E. H., & Assilian, S. (1999). An experiment in linguistic synthesis with a fuzzy logic controller. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 51(2), 135–147. https://doi.org/10.1006/ijhc.1973.030338. Martin, J. C., & Roman, C. (2021). The effects of COVID-19 on EU federalism. Eastern Journal of European Studies, 12(Special issue), 126–148. https://doi.org/10.47743/ejes-2021-SI0639. Martín, J. C., & Indelicato, A. (2023). A fuzzy-hybrid analysis of citizens’ perception toward immigrants in Europe. Quality & Quantity, 57(2), 1101–1124. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-022-01401-040. Martín, J. C., Moreira, P., & Román, C. (2020). A hybrid-fuzzy segmentation analysis of residents’ perception towards tourism in Gran Canaria. Tourism Economics, 26(7), 1282–1304. https://doi.org/10.1177/135481661987346341. McLean, E., & Roblyer, D. (2016). Public support for economic sanctions: An experimental analysis. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13(1), 233–254. https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORW01442. NATO. (2022). Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the kultaranta talks in Finland. Retrieved January 10, 2025, from https://www(open in a new window). nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_196300.htm43. Nguyen, H. T., Nguyen, H. T., & Walker, E. A. (2005). A first course in fuzzy logic. Chapman and Hall/CRC, Taylor & Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.1201/978142005710244. Onderco, M. (2017). Public support for coercive diplomacy: Exploring public opinion data from ten European countries. European Journal of Political Research, 56(2), 401–418. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.1218345. Onderco, M., Smetana, M. (2023). Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post-Ukraine. Global Policy, 14(2), 305–317.46. Ozili, P. K. (2024). Global economic consequences of Russian invasion of Ukraine. In P. Pietrzak (Ed.), Dealing with regional conflicts of global importance (pp. 195–223). IGI Global.47. Pertiwi, L. A. (2024). The EU’s approach to sanctions on Russia: A critical analysis of the existing literature. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 18(3), 61–86. https://doi.org/10.51870/NOEX447548. Pospieszna, P., Onderco, M., & van der Veer, R. (2024). Comparing public attitudes towards internal and external EU sanctions: The role of populism, trust and Euroscepticism. East European Politics, 40(2), 345–366. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2023.228908949. Raik, K., Blockmans, S., Dandashly, A., Noutcheva, G., Osypchuk, A., & Suslov, A. (2023). Tackling the constraints on EU foreign policy towards Ukraine: From strategic denial to geopolitical awakening. Instituto Affari Internazionali. https://cris(open in a new window). maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/137103994/joint_rp_20.pdf50. Sjursen, H. (2015). Normative theory: An untapped resource in the study of European foreign policy. In K. E. Jrgensen, A. K. Aarstad, E. Drieskens, K. Laatikainen, B. Tonra (Eds.), The Sage handbook of European foreign policy (Vol. 2, pp. 197–214). SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/978147391519051. Sorgi, G. (2025, February 25). EU eyes €200B secret weapon as Trump dominates Ukraine peace talks. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ukraine-peace-talks-donald-trump-russia-war-200-billion-kremlin-us-politics-g20/(open in a new window)52. Staunton, E. (2022). A useful failure: Macron’s overture to Russia. Survival, 64(2), 17–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.205581953. Tchantouridzé, L. (2022). The Aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Appeasement of Russia and the War in Ukraine. Journal of Peace and War Studies, 77.54. Vignoli, V., & Coticchia, F. (2024). Italian political parties and the war in Ukraine: A strategic dilemma between NATO commitments and domestic constraints. Italian Journal of International Affairs, 59(1), 67–89.55. Wang, Q. (2017). Research on the assessment of psycholinguistic teaching effect with triangular fuzzy information. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, 32(1), 1139–1146. https://doi.org/10.3233/JIFS-1653156. Zadeh, L. A. (1965). Information and control. Fuzzy Sets, 8(3), 338–353.57. Zavershinskaia, A., & Spera, M. (2024). Divided Europe: How France, Germany, and Italy shape the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. European Foreign Affairs Review, 29(2), 231–256.

Defense & Security
Old Tank standing in the Tigray area in the North part of Ethiopia

The prospects for another war in Tigray

by Worku Aberra

Another war appears imminent in Tigray; this time the conflict threatens to engulf the region. Eritrea appears ready to join the fighting . Despite the heavy toll of the 2020–2022 war, both the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government have resumed belligerent rhetoric. If fighting resumes, the underlying causes are the TPLF’s pursuit of secession, Abiy Ahmed’s authoritarian rule, and his territorial ambitions. The TPLF has pursued independence since its formation in 1975  by advocating the right to self-determination; it has promoted a narrative rooted in historical exceptionalism and the right to self-determination. That vision matured into a program of statehood during the years the TPLF controlled the Ethiopian government. Between 1991 and 2018, it used state power to lay the political, economic, and military groundwork for secession. Ethnic federalism, introduced under the rhetoric of self-rule, eroded national cohesion. A constitutional clause granted regional states the right to secede unilaterally. Ethiopian nationalism was deliberately undermined; ethnic nationalism was systematically promoted. Ethnic regions were later militarized through the creation of special forces that operated beyond constitutional limits, ostensibly for regional security. Tigray assembled the most powerful of these units—well-armed, well-trained, and well-structured, designed as a paramilitary force prepared to enforce constitutional claims to territory ). These units appear intended to serve as the armies of the independent states they envisioned. In parallel to this build-up, heavy military equipment vital to national defense was transferred to Tigray under the pretext of countering threats from Eritrea. The TPLF later used its special forces and this hardware to wage war against the Ethiopian state. Unrestrained by legal, political, or institutional checks, the TPLF exercised full control over the Ethiopian state. It used that power to extract the country’s natural resources, seize physical assets, and divert financial capital. Under the guise of implementing market reforms recommended by the IMF and World Bank, it transferred state-owned enterprises to firms under its command. The TPLF used the state’s economic apparatus and its control over the private sector to advance its long-term goal of Tigrayan independence. As the TPLF moved toward secession, Ethiopia stood primed for fragmentation, by its constitution, by its leaders, and by its institutions. When a popular revolt removed the TPLF-led government in 2018, the leadership retreated to Mekelle and intensified its campaign for independence. The TPLF escalated its confrontation with the federal government through a series of provocative actions: holding regional elections in September 2020 in defiance of federal authority, expelling federal military officers from Tigray, obstructing troop movements and logistics, and organizing large-scale military parades to project force. Each move appears calculated to provoke a military confrontation with the central government. Convinced that the moment had arrived, the TPLF launched a coordinated assault on the Northern Command on November 4, 2020, as a decisive step toward secession. After two years of devastating war, it failed to achieve its long-term objective. On November 2, 2022, it accepted a cessation of hostilities under the terms of the Pretoria Agreement. Support for secession has increased, fueled by the federal government’s conduct during the war, particularly its decision to invite the Eritrean army into Tigray (Reuters). The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, once a bastion of unity, has splintered. Tigrayan clergy formed a separate synod and severed all ties with the central hierarchy. In the diaspora, former advocates of unity champion independence. Among educated Tigrayans, disillusionment runs deep. Many interpreted the nationwide support for the federal war effort, mostly due to the TPLF’s authoritarianism, as a broader denunciation of Tigrayan identity. For this group, the war was not a political confrontation, but a genocidal campaign. That belief has hardened into a dominant narrative: that civilian deaths were not accidental byproducts of conflict, but deliberate acts of extermination. A rival project of state-building has emerged at the federal level, based on irredentism rather than ethnic autonomy. Abiy Ahmed, an authoritarian ruler backed by a narrow Oromo elite, has declared his intention to govern a unitary state stretching from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. He has repeatedly insisted that Ethiopia must secure a seaport, peacefully or by military force. Despite having no coastline, his government established a navy with France’s assistance; he signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to build a naval base—later cancelled—and has advanced a plan for an economic union encompassing Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia.Federal authorities have also provided weapons to factional leaders in Puntland and Jubaland to undermine the Somali government). While economic integration offers benefits, Abiy’s strategy to annex or dominate neighbouring states risks regional instability, diplomatic estrangement, and military confrontation. A government committed to external expansion is unlikely to tolerate internal disintegration. Tigrayan secessionism and Abiy’s expansionism stand as twin causes of the impending war. The immediate triggers of renewed war have already surfaced. Abiy Ahmed can invoke a legal casus belli against Eritrea, which continues to occupy Ethiopian territory despite repeated demands from Western governments and multilateral organizations). Eritrea, in turn, could claim self-defence. The TPLF could justify a war by claiming that the federal government has failed to fully implement the Pretoria Agreement. Both sides blame each other for the collapse of the agreement and have resumed hostile rhetoric and provocative actions. The TPLF, ignoring the Pretoria Agreement, has declared that it does not require federal permission to engage with Eritrea). Its leaders have publicly affirmed sovereignty, consistent with the constitutional framework. An Eritrean official has offered explicit support for Tigrayan independence; this has introduced an unpredictable external variable into an already volatile situation). On the federal side, the government has revoked the TPLF’s legal status as a political party, eliminating what remained of the formal political channel). At the same time, Abiy launched a European tour on May 22, likely to secure diplomatic backing for a new campaign). The symmetry with the prelude to the first war is striking: escalating rhetoric, foreign lobbying, and mutual delegitimization. What unfolds is not a fresh crisis but the second act of a war poorly resolved. The TPLF has fractured under the weight of the war it helped to unleash. An internal power struggle—driven by disputes over military conduct, political legitimacy, and personal ambition—split the organization in August 2024 into two factions: one led by Debretsion Gebremichael, the chair; the other by Getachew Reda, the vice chair. Each accuses the other of betraying the people of Tigray). The TPLF fighters are also divided. A large faction supports the Debretsion group, while Getachew’s faction has secured the backing of armed groups in southern Tigray, reportedly trained by the Ethiopian government in the Afar region). These forces have pledged to defend the administrative structure he established. The likelihood of intra-Tigrayan armed conflict is high. Tensions have escalated further as Getachew has leveled serious criminal accusations against the TPLF’s military command. In interviews aired on government television on May 13 and 14, he alleged that senior generals committed war crimes, operated illegal gold mines, embezzled state funds, trafficked humans, smuggled arms, and stripped steel from public infrastructure for sale—even as the war was taking place ). The accused commanders have denied all charges and denounced him as a traitor aligned with the federal government. He further reported that the number of registered TPLF fighters DDR had been inflated and that commanders had embezzled funds intended for their salaries. He accused the same officers of plotting to assassinate him. These are not casual allegations—they come from a man who served as deputy chair of the party, member of the executive, member of its wartime command, spokesperson during the conflict, head of the Pretoria delegation, and former regional president. According to Getachew, the TPLF’s military leadership has a vested interest in restarting the war to avoid accountability. He argues that peace would expose their crimes, while renewed conflict offers protection. As evidence, he cites the leak of secret peace talks in Djibouti between the TPLF and the federal government by one of the implicated generals. The federal government, upon learning of the leak, ended the negotiations. In another case, he claims that when the federal government attempted resettlement of Tigrayans in contested areas, the TPLF commanders demanded that fighters accompany the returnees; the government refused. Getachew alleges the generals are using displaced civilians as “hostages” to obstruct reconciliation. He claims to hold documentary evidence supporting these accusations. While he describes the TPLF as a “criminal enterprise,” he occasionally softens the charge, placing blame on a few bad actors. This contradiction raises a crucial question: if an organization protects offenders and functions as a criminal network, can it still claim political legitimacy? The conflict between the TPLF and the federal government has persisted, but alliances have shifted dramatically. During the first Tigray war, a coalition of federal troops, Eritrean forces, Amhara special forces, and the Fano militia fought the TPLF. That coalition has disintegrated. In April 2023, the federal government disbanded the Amhara special forces while retaining similar units in other regions). It then launched a military campaign to disarm the Fano, provoking armed resistance across the Amhara region. The government has struggled to suppress the rebellion and has lost control of large areas. It accuses the TPLF of aiding the Fano. At the same time, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have unraveled. Abiy Ahmed’s declaration that Ethiopia would obtain a seaport—by negotiation or by force—has pushed the two states into hostility). In a startling reversal, the TPLF has begun to align with Eritrea, its former enemy. Reports suggest the Debretsion faction has initiated cooperation with Eritrean officials, despite Eritrea’s continued occupation of territories claimed by Tigray). Getachew alleges that senior TPLF commanders have coordinated military planning with Eritrean authorities. Gebru Asrat, the former Tigray regional president, has made similar claims). Eritrea appears prepared to re-enter the war, this time as a TPLF ally. One Eritrean official has gone further and has expressed support for Tigrayan independence, as stated earlier. But given their history of mutual hostility, unresolved border disputes, and clashing ambitions, the alliance remains fragile. It may serve tactical needs, but it is unlikely to survive strategic realities. Strategic miscalculation is a crucial risk in this war, as it was in the previous one. During the first Tigray war, both the federal government and the TPLF overestimated their military capacity and underestimated their opponent’s. The war yielded no victory. Instead, both sides accepted a cessation of hostilities after enduring political crisis, economic hardship, and human catastrophe. The result crippled both actors. Despite renewed threats, confrontational posturing, and aggressive rhetoric, neither side appears ready for war. In Tigray, the public is exhausted. People demand peace, basic services, the return of the displaced, and the restoration of infrastructure. The struggle for basic needs outweighs the desire to engage in another war. While support for independence remains high, many Tigrayans question whether the embattled TPLF can govern a region, let alone a future state. Among Tigrayans, the yearning for peace far exceeds the willingness to fight another war. The Eritrean government, although it commands a disciplined army, lacks the diplomatic support and military capabilities to confront a stronger adversary. Its economic base is fragile; its population is small, overburdened by years of forced conscription, and exhausted by endless mobilization. Eritrea’s international isolation—worsened by sanctions, strained relations with neighbors, and a dismal human rights record—undermines its capacity to secure foreign military or financial assistance. These constraints—weak economy, fragile population base, diplomatic isolation, and limited military resources—reduce Eritrea’s capacity to sustain a protracted war The Ethiopian state faces even greater problems. Armed insurgencies continue in Amhara and Oromia, the country’s two most populous regions. Federal forces have failed to suppress either movement and have lost control over extensive territory. Across the country, support for the government has collapsed. A nationwide strike by healthcare workers—triggered by surging inflation—signals broader unrest). Legitimacy has eroded; institutions have decayed; crises have multiplied. The military—commanded by officers appointed for ethnic loyalty rather than professional competence, crippled by systemic corruption, and plagued by operational incapacity—is unfit for war. These deficiencies became evident when the army suffered a series of humiliating defeats in the last war against the TPLF. External actors can influence both the likelihood and the outcome of a renewed conflict. In the previous war, the United States played a moderating role, driven by its own strategic interests in Ethiopia, the Horn, and the Red Sea. The Biden administration helped contain escalation by the Ethiopian government and dissuaded the TPLF from pursuing independence. It appointed Special Envoy Mike Hammer, whose diplomacy helped secure the Pretoria Agreement). Under President Trump, U.S. policy shifted toward disengagement. That shift may have persuaded the Ethiopian government that war carries no consequences and emboldened the TPLF to pursue secession. Regional powers also have the capacity to influence whether the war erupts and how it unfolds. Egypt, a traditional adversary of Ethiopia and locked in dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, has aligned with Eritrea and had supported the TPLF in the past. Saudi Arabia continues to back the Eritrean regime). The United Arab Emirates has supplied Ethiopia with drones and weapons). Turkey has armed Ethiopia with drones as well, but backs Somalia over Abiy’s memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the breakaway state of Somalia, later cancelled ). Whether another war erupts will depend in part on how these regional powers calculate their interests and the extent to which they are willing to intervene to secure them. Under present conditions, neither side appears capable of waging war. The TPLF—isolated abroad, fractured within, stripped of territory, crippled by corruption, and bereft of popular support—lacks the means to mount a new campaign. The federal government, weakened by internal fragmentation, collapsing legitimacy, and mounting public dissent, cannot sustain another conflict. Rhetoric has escalated, but capacity has not. The Eritrean government commands a well-trained army but lacks the diplomatic support, economic strength, and military capacity to fight a stronger adversary. Its international isolation, small population, and limited resources leave it vulnerable. Eritreans may defend sovereignty but show little enthusiasm for another costly war. Eritrea’s shifting loyalties, Abiy Ahmed’s expansionist ambitions, the Tigrayan elite’s secessionist agenda, the TPLF’s record of miscalculation, and foreign interference have created a volatile situation. Any of these variables could reignite the conflict, dismantle either state, and destabilize the entire region. Even in the absence of strategic advantage, wars can erupt because of misjudgments, personal ambition, or elite rivalries. Peace in the Horn is no local concern; it is a global imperative essential to regional order, international security, and the prevention of another humanitarian catastrophe.

Defense & Security
A distressed person behind barbed wire, with an airplane symbol above on a blue background. Concept of immigration deportation and removal policy

From Promised Land to Forced Exodus: Faces of Deportation in Latin America and the Caribbean

by Rocío de los Reyes Ramírez

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract: Migration policies in Latin America and the Caribbean have adopted a more restrictive and punitive approach, influenced by external pressures, especially from the United States. Deportations, detentions and dissuasive measures have intensified, in a context of increasing criminalisation of migrants. Cases such as El Salvador and the Dominican Republic reflect the use of severe control strategies, which have been criticised for possible human rights violations. These practices, although justified on security grounds, generate regional tensions and deepen the vulnerability of displaced populations. Keywords:Latin America, migration, Donald Trump, Ibero-America, deportations, forced returns. Introduction Deportations in Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone significant changes in recent years, reflecting both migration dynamics and international policies. The region has witnessed an increase in migratory movements, driven by economic crises, political conflicts and natural disasters. Latin American population movement configurations have been immersed in a dynamic whose magnitude and urgency have intensified since the beginning of 2025: that of forced returns and mass deportations, driven by changes in the migration policies of receiving countries such as the United States and Mexico. The re-election of Donald Trump has marked a tightening of immigration control measures, with an increase in raids and expulsions of undocumented migrants. But this is not a new phenomenon: mass deportations and forced returns in Latin America have deep roots in the region's history, with moments of particular intensity in different periods. It is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it exclusive to contemporary dynamics. Throughout its history, the region has been the scene of multiple processes of expulsion, forced return and internal displacement, intimately linked to contexts of political violence, economic change, structural racism and state strategies of population control. Already during the 19th century, the consolidation of nation states brought with it policies of exclusion that sought to shape national identity to the detriment of certain groups. In Mexico, after the 1910 Revolution, the Chinese community was persecuted and expelled in an episode that combined racism, economic crisis and exacerbated nationalism.1 In Argentina, during the 1880s, the military campaigns known as the "Conquest of the Desert" provoked massive forced displacements of indigenous peoples to marginal areas, marking a pattern of invisibilisation and internal expulsion.2 In the Caribbean, the dynamics of deportation were also marked by racial and economic conflicts. The Dominican Republic, under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in the 1930s, carried out the so-called “Parsley Massacre” (1937), where thousands of Haitians were killed or forcibly expelled in order to 'whiten' the border and reaffirm Dominican national identity³. And in Cuba, after the triumph of the 1959 Revolution, the flow of political exiles to the United States intensified, generating waves of departures that, in some cases, were accompanied by pressure and coercion from the Castro regime. Central America in the second half of the 20th century was marked by civil wars and authoritarian regimes. El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua experienced profound humanitarian crises that provoked a massive flight of their citizens. Many of these refugees were received in Mexico, Costa Rica or the United States, but after the Peace Accords of the 1990s, forced return policies emerged that did not always provide adequate conditions for reintegration. The case of Guatemala is emblematic: the return of refugees from Mexico, coordinated in part by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was fraught with difficulties, as many of the returnees were returning to territories still without security guarantees.3 The United States played a key role in contemporary deportation processes. The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 was a paradigm shift, facilitating the deportation of immigrants convicted of minor crimes, which particularly affected Latin American communities.4 Honduras and El Salvador were particularly hard hit by these policies. Many of the young deportees had lived most of their lives on US soil and, upon their return to contexts of poverty and violence, found in gangs, such as MS-13 and Barrio 18, a means of survival and even a sense of belonging.5 Similarly, in South America, the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s also resorted to exile and deportation as mechanisms of political control. In Chile, following the 1973 coup d'état, tens of thousands of people were forced into exile, and opponents captured abroad were often smuggled into the country under the coordination of Operation Condor. Argentina replicated these patterns, using illegal deportations and forced disappearances as systematic tools of political repression. More recently, in the insular Caribbean, contemporary dynamics also reveal patterns of selective deportation. In the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, deportations of Haitian and Venezuelan migrants in an irregular situation have intensified in recent years, often in conditions of human rights violations, reproducing old logics of racial and socio-economic exclusion. These examples show that deportations in Latin America and the Caribbean are not isolated or temporary events: they are part of structural patterns that have accompanied state-building processes, the dynamics of internal violence and international population control strategies. Today, in a scenario of growing migratory pressure and increasingly restrictive policies in the main receiving countries, the region is once again facing old challenges in new forms. The echoes of history resound in the new faces of forced exodus, marking a present in which mass expulsions once again occupy a central place on the regional agenda. The United States and the tightening of immigration policy The arrival of Donald Trump for a second presidential term in January 2025 marked an even more severe shift in US immigration policy. While his first administration (2017-2021) had already been marked by restrictive measures, his return to power brought with it not only the restoration of old border control programmes, but also their radicalisation, in a context of growing domestic pressure and political polarisation. Trump has not only taken up policies such as the "Remain in Mexico" policy or the limitation of access to asylum: he has also expanded the margins of action of immigration agencies, hardening the official rhetoric against migrants -especially Latin Americans- and rescuing old legal instruments to justify new practices of accelerated deportation. This new phase is characterised by a combination of administrative, legal and operational measures that seek to deter irregular migration through the restriction of rights, the intensive use of detention and deportation, and the strengthening of pressure mechanisms on countries of origin and transit.   One of the first symbolic and practical steps of this new policy was the reinstatement of the programme officially known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), more popularly known as “Remain in Mexico”. It had originally been implemented in 2019, during his first term, and partially suspended during Joe Biden's administration from 20216. However, after his re-election, Trump not only reactivated it, but also tightened it, broadening its scope and further reducing the possibilities for asylum seekers to await processing on US soil. On 20 January 2025, the US president signed the executive order to reinstate this programme, which obliges asylum seekers to wait in Mexican territory while their cases are resolved in US courts.7 This has led to diplomatic tensions between the two countries. The president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, has expressed her rejection of this policy, describing it as a unilateral decision that affects national sovereignty and the human rights of migrants. The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, reiterated that Mexico is not obliged to accept this measure and that mechanisms will be sought to protect the migrants affected.8 While in its initial version the programme had already forced tens of thousands of asylum seekers to stay in Mexican border cities - leading to the formation of makeshift camps in places such as Matamoros and Tijuana - the reinstatement in 2025 accentuated this phenomenon. More categories of applicants, including minors and persons in vulnerable situations, are now susceptible to refoulement, increasing the pressure on border areas characterised by insecurity, poverty and criminal violence.9 Thus, the camps, which already existed precariously since the first implementation of the programme, have expanded and degraded throughout 2025, creating even more severe humanitarian emergencies. International organisations and human rights organisations have warned that the reactivation and tightening of the MPP violates essential principles of international law, such as non-refoulement, and exposes applicants to serious risks of violence, kidnapping and human trafficking.10 The Mexican government, for its part, has implemented some measures to support migrants, such as the "ConsulApp" application and the "Mexico te abraza" plan (Mexico hugs you), but challenges remain in ensuring their safety and well-being.11 Ultimately, this would tie in with the implementation of 'safe third country' agreements, as some analysts have interpreted it. And although Mexico has not signed any protocols, in practice, these current policies de facto position it in this role. This is because during Donald Trump's first term in office, the US signed agreements with several Central American countries to designate them as “safe third countries”.12 These include Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. These agreements required asylum seekers passing through these countries to seek protection there before arriving in the US. It was a controversial move that generated criticism of conditions in these countries and their capacity to handle the flow of migrants. Although formally presented as instruments to share the burden of international protection, in practice these protocols served to divert and contain asylum seekers in nations that did not have the material and legal conditions to guarantee their safety and basic rights. Particularly in the case of Guatemala, which was the only one to actually implement them in 2019, reports documented how migrants transferred from the US faced a total absence of effective asylum procedures, lack of humanitarian protection, and direct exposure to extreme violence and poverty.13 During the Biden administration (2021-2024), these agreements were formally suspended, however, it appears that the door is now being reopened. The new administration has signalled its intention to renegotiate and expand these instruments. In this way, they are once again at the centre of a more aggressive migration containment strategy, de facto limiting access to asylum in the US and increasing the vulnerability of thousands of migrants expelled to unsafe territories. El Salvador, for its part, has emerged in 2025 as the first Latin American country to formalise an agreement that, without officially naming itself as a "safe third country", operates de facto as such. The agreement, announced by President Nayib Bukele himself as "unprecedented", establishes that El Salvador will accept migrants deported from the United States - including those considered highly dangerous - coming not only from the Central American Northern Triangle, but also from other regions of the continent and the Caribbean.14 Unlike the Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACAs) signed in 2019 and suspended in 2021, this new pact is not limited to the processing of asylum applications but directly assumes the reception and custody of deported persons, with no guarantee that they will be able to restart a regular migration process. Various sources agree that this is an advanced form of border externalisation: the northern giant transfers not only the management of flows, but also the custody of people considered undesirable or dangerous.15 Although the agreement has not been accompanied by specific legal reforms in the US, it has been consolidated through bilateral negotiations that contemplate financial compensation for El Salvador. Human rights organisations have warned that this strategy could be replicated with other governments receptive to these cooperation formulas in exchange for financial incentives. In this context, negotiation attempts have already begun with Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Colombia,16 countries that are being considered to host regional asylum processing centres. Although these mechanisms have not been formalised as "safe third country agreements" in the strict sense, several organisations have warned that they operate under a similar logic: the transfer of migratory responsibilities to nations with limited institutional capacity and contexts of violence or political crisis.17 The "pact" with El Salvador also contemplates the use of national penitentiary centres to detain a large part of these deportees, without a detailed analysis of their legal situation. Although mention has been made of the sending of some profiles considered to be at risk to the Terrorism Confinement Centre (Spanish: Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo, abbreviated CECOT), the implications of this prison model deserve specific treatment, which will be addressed in the following section. Along with the reinstatement of this programme, the new US administration has pushed through a series of measures that further restrict access to the right to asylum for those seeking to enter the US from Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the main changes has been the reintroduction of stricter standards for the initial submission of asylum applications. Migrants must now demonstrate from the outset a "credible fear" of persecution with strong documentary evidence,18 a much higher standard of proof than in previous years. This policy has drastically reduced the percentage of applicants who make it through the first asylum interview. Similarly, as part of the tightening of these immigration policies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has experienced a significant expansion of its powers. This expansion has translated into both an increase in its budget and greater operational discretion to carry out detentions and deportations. During 2025, the budget allocated to ICE increased by 15% over the previous year, reaching record amounts to fund detention centres, internal patrol operations and tracking technology for undocumented immigrants.19 This budget boost has allowed for increased detention operations in places considered "sensitive", such as hospitals, schools and churches, which were previously relatively protected under more restrictive guidelines. But ICE's expansion has not been limited to issues of operational volume, but also of legal scope. The use of internal administrative warrants (without judicial intervention) for the detention of immigrants suspected of minor immigration infractions has been reactivated.20 This measure has been widely criticised by human rights organisations, which point to the weakening of procedural safeguards for detainees and the risk of arbitrary detention. ICE has also strengthened its cooperation with state and local police forces through programmes such as 287(g), which allow police officers to act as immigration agents.21  This collaboration has been particularly controversial in states such as Texas and Florida, where racial profiling and civil rights violations have been reported. The tightening of detention practices has had a direct impact on Latin America and the Caribbean, with a significant proportion of those deported in 2025 coming from countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and, to an increasing extent, Venezuela and Haiti. Thus, the expansion of ICE's power has not only transformed the internal migration landscape in the US but has also intensified the dynamics of forced return throughout the region. However, the shift towards a more punitive approach is not limited to contemporary operational frameworks: the current government has also begun to recover legal tools from the past, such as the Alien Enemies Act, to legitimise new forms of exclusion, detention and deportation. This is a 1798 law that allows the executive to detain and deport citizens of countries considered enemies in times of war. Although historically this law has been applied in wartime contexts, such as during the Second World War, its invocation in a period of peace has generated intense legal and political controversy.22 On 14 March 2025, Trump signed a presidential proclamation designating the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang as a national security threat, calling their presence in the US an "irregular invasion". Under this justification, it authorised the immediate detention and deportation of Venezuelan citizens suspected of links to the organisation, without the need for warrants or conventional legal processes. The president later denied having signed it, attributing the responsibility to his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.23 The implementation of this measure resulted in the accelerated deportation of hundreds of Venezuelans to El Salvador, many of whom had no criminal record and some of whom had legal immigration status in the US, including Temporary Protected Status (TPS).24 Civil rights organisations, such as the ACLU, filed lawsuits alleging that the application of the law violated due process and constitutional protections. 25In response, several federal judges issued orders temporarily halting deportations and requiring judicial hearings before any deportations. But despite the judicial restrictions, the administration continued with the deportations, arguing that the orders did not apply to flights already underway or over international waters. This stance was criticised for defying judicial authority and for using a wartime law for contemporary immigration policy purposes.26 The reactivation of the Alien Enemies Act in 2025 has sparked a national debate on the limits of executive power and the protection of immigrant rights, highlighting the tension between national security and civil liberties in US immigration policy. Not only that: all these measures have generated a wave of mass deportations that have not only overwhelmed the capacity of reception systems in Latin American countries, but have also had a direct impact on the structure of separated families and local communities, often lacking the resources to provide adequate reintegration processes. In Mexican border cities such as Ciudad Juárez, Matamoros and Tijuana, makeshift camps have multiplied, where thousands of people who have been deported or are awaiting a migration resolution live in extremely precarious conditions, as mentioned above. In Central America and the Caribbean, the forced return of migrants - some of them with weak links to their countries of origin or with criminal records - has reactivated dynamics of exclusion, stigmatisation and, in some cases, violence. Taken together, these actions reflect a regional trend towards the externalisation and criminalisation of migration, where migration responsibilities are shifted to countries in the global south and managed through punitive rather than humanitarian strategies. The consequences of these measures are not only individual but also reshape the social and political fabric of the entire region. Detention centres and new deportation dynamics Recent transformations in US immigration policy have not only translated into regulatory and diplomatic tightening: they have also reconfigured places of confinement and removal processes. Mass deportationsalready being pushed since 202327 , have now coincided with a renewed detention architecture, in which confinement and surveillance are not limited to US territory but projected beyond its borders. This phenomenon has given rise to new dynamics of migration management, in which detention centres play a central role. In addition to ICE detention centres on US soil, there is now a network of prison and surveillance facilities located in countries receiving deportees, frequently promoted or supported by Washington under the bilateral security cooperation agreements we have been discussing. The most visible case is that of the CECOT (Terrorism Confinement Center) in El Salvador which, although initially conceived as a tool against local gangs, has begun to receive Salvadoran citizens deported from the US with criminal records.28 The use of this type of facility marks a worrying twist: the systematic criminalisation of deportees and their immediate insertion into highly restrictive prison circuits. The policy of automatic association between migration and criminality has led many deportees to be considered not as citizens to be reintegrated, but as threats to be neutralised. This logic is reinforced by the Salvadoran government's narrative, which has actively promoted CECOT's image of success before the international community, using figures on homicide reduction and territorial control as arguments of legitimacy, albeit with a strong questioning of judicial opacity and arbitrary detentions.29 This transnational prison model has profound human rights, social reintegration and regional security implications. Far from offering sustainable solutions, it reinforces the stigmatisation of returned migrants and multiplies barriers to their inclusion in communities of origin. In turn, it turns countries such as El Salvador into functional extensions of the US immigration and penal system, fuelling political and social tensions.30 When in March 2025, the US deported 238 Venezuelan nationals to CECOT on charges of belonging to the Tren de Aragua criminal group, the move was widely criticised by human rights organisations and international governments as a violation of due process and the fundamental rights of migrants. The Salvadoran government, for its part, defended the action, claiming that the deportees were "proven criminals" and that their incarceration in this centre was part of a strategy to combat transnational organised crime.31 However, relatives of the detainees and humanitarian organisations have denounced that many were identified as members of the Tren de Aragua based solely on tattoos or physical characteristics, without concrete evidence. The situation has generated diplomatic tensions, especially with Venezuela, whose government has requested the intervention of international bodies to protect its citizens and has described the deportations as a "crime against humanity".32 To date, there is no record of similar agreements between the US and other Latin American countries, such as Guatemala or Honduras, to receive deported migrants in high-security prisons. Although these countries have announced plans to build mega-prisons, there is no public evidence that they are being used to house deportees from the US. In parallel, the so-called policy of self-deportation has gained momentum: an increasingly documented phenomenon in which thousands of migrants voluntarily choose to return to their countries of origin in fear of being arrested, separated from their families or detained in inhumane conditions. This practice, indirectly promoted by the tightening of the legal and police environment, represents a form of covert expulsion, in which the state does not need to apply force: it is enough to install fear. 33 The Trump administration has intensified this strategy through various measures. These include the implementation of the CBP Home app, which allows undocumented immigrants to manage their voluntary departure from the country. In addition, "incentivised self-deportation" programmes have been announced, offering financial assistance and coverage of transportation costs to those who decide to return to their countries of origin. These initiatives have been presented as humanitarian solutions, although they have been criticised by human rights organisations as coercive and discriminatory. The government has also imposed economic sanctions on immigrants with active deportation orders, such as daily fines of up to a thousand dollars, with the aim of pressuring them to leave the country voluntarily. These policies have been accompanied by media campaigns displaying images of immigrants arrested and charged with serious crimes, seeking to reinforce the perception of threat and justify the measures adopted. These actions have generated a climate of fear and uncertainty among migrant communities, leading many to opt for self-deportation as the only alternative to avoid detention and family separation. However, experts warn that this decision may have long-term legal consequences, such as the impossibility of applying for visas or re-entering the country for several years.34 It has come to the point, last week, of arresting Hannah Dugan, a Miilwaukee County judge by the FBI, allegedly accused of assisting a documented immigrant who was to be detained.35 In this context, the self-deportation policy is yet another tool in the Trump administration's restrictive and punitive approach to migration, prioritising deterrence and control over the protection of human rights and the search for comprehensive solutions to the migration phenomenon. The proliferation of self-deportations and increasing allegations of human rights violations soon escalated into the judicial arena. As claims of arbitrary detention, inhumane conditions of confinement and family separation increased, various courts began to examine the legal limits of these policies. The climax came in April 2025 with the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. J. G. G. G.36 , which assessed the constitutionality of certain expedited deportation practices applied to Venezuelan and Central American asylum seekers. Although the Court did not completely invalidate the executive measures, it did set important limits: it recognised the right to a pre-removal hearing in cases where there is a credible risk of persecution and called on Congress to urgently review the immigration legal framework.37 In addition, the court ruled that legal challenges must be brought in the district where the detainees are located, in this case, Texas, and not in Washington D.C. This Supreme Court ruling marks a turning point. While it does not dismantle the mass deportation apparatus, it introduces legal brakes that could slow down or modulate its application. Congress, under pressure from the ruling, now faces the challenge of reforming a dysfunctional, polarised and increasingly judicialised immigration system. In the short term, federal agencies such as ICE and CBP will have to adjust their operational protocols to avoid litigation, which could generate internal tensions and new immigration outsourcing strategies. Ultimately, this decision opens a new scenario in which immigration policies will have to face not only social and international scrutiny, but also the limits imposed by constitutional law and the US judicial system. Expulsions in the Caribbean: the case of the Dominican Republic In the context of a regional tightening of migration policies, the Dominican Republic has significantly intensified its efforts to control irregular immigration, especially from Haiti. Under the administration of President Luis Abinader, a policy of mass deportations has been implemented, which has raised concerns both domestically and internationally. The deportations have taken place against a backdrop of growing social fear of cross-border crime and the infiltration of armed actors from the neighbouring country. In this context, the government has reinforced border control with a combination of military presence, surveillance technology and migration deterrence measures. Between January and December 2024, the Dominican authorities deported more than 276,000 foreigners in an irregular migratory situation, the majority of whom were Haitian nationals38 . This figure represents a significant increase compared to previous years and reflects a systematic and sustained deportation policy.39 Precisely in October 2024, the government announced a plan to deport up to 10,000 Haitians per week, which intensified operations across the country. These operations include raids in neighbourhoods, arrests in hospitals and the demolition of informal settlements inhabited by Haitians. One of the most controversial practices has been the deportation of pregnant and lactating Haitian women directly from public hospitals. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and UN experts have condemned these actions as inhumane and discriminatory. Cases have been documented of women being deported while in labour , putting their health and that of their children at risk.40 The Dominican government defends these policies as necessary to maintain order and national security, arguing that they are carried out in accordance with the law. However, international criticism has mounted, with allegations that these mass deportations violate fundamental human rights and aggravate the humanitarian crisis in Haiti. The situation has generated diplomatic tensions between the two countries and has been the subject of concern from the international community, which is urging the Dominican Republic to review its migration policies and ensure respect migrants' rights. This case exemplifies the challenges faced by Latin American and Caribbean countries in managing migration flows, especially when humanitarian crises, security policies and bilateral tensions are combined. Ultimately, the Dominican response - although framed by legitimate sovereignty concerns - also raises profound questions about the proportionality of measures, respect for due process and regional co-responsibility in the face of the Haitian collapse. Conclusion The Latin American and Caribbean region is going through a critical moment in terms of migration. Recent waves of mass deportations, forced returns - direct or induced - and new border control strategies have deepened a regional crisis that has been brewing for years. These dynamics, far from being isolated phenomena, are part of a systematic strategy of migration containment promoted by the US, where political discourse and practice have turned migrants into scapegoats for all national ills. Donald Trump has been the most visible - and aggressive - face of this policy. His obsession with migrants, especially those from Latin America and the Caribbean, has resulted in an institutional architecture designed to curb mobility at any cost. Under his leadership, not only have physical and legal walls on the southern border been reinforced, but programmes such as "Remain in Mexico", safe third country agreements and, more recently, the controversial use of regulations such as the Alien Enemies Act have been promoted. At the core of this strategy is a profoundly punitive vision that identifies the migrant as a threat, a potential enemy or an invader, thus legitimising policies of mass exclusion and systematic expulsion. The impact of these policies in Latin America and the Caribbean is profound. Beyond the numbers, what is at stake is the stability of societies already marked by inequality, violence and institutional fragility. Mass deportations - affecting not only border crossers but also those who had already put down roots in the US - are overwhelming the capacities of receiving states. Every week, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic receive contingents of returnees who must be reintegrated in contexts of structural precariousness. In this context, the arrival of thousands of deported or self-deported Venezuelans in places such as CECOT in El Salvador illustrates a new phase: the direct criminalisation of migrants. The use of mega-prisons as a migration management tool represents a worrying drift, where security replaces integration and fear replaces law. Alongside this, the policy of self-deportations has gained strength, a form of covert expulsion in which the state does not need to apply force: it is enough to install fear. Families choose to return voluntarily for fear of being detained, separated or held in inhumane conditions. In recent months, this practice has even been economically incentivised, with programmes promoted by the Trump Administration offering to pay for the return ticket, as if it were a favour, when in reality it is a forced flight disguised as a personal choice. This has generated a far-reaching reconfiguration of migration. The fracturing of family networks, the interruption of the flow of remittances and the uncertainty over the legal status of millions of people have altered not only regional mobility, but also the economic models that depend on exile as a source of income. Remittances, which represent a significant percentage of GDP in countries such as Honduras and El Salvador, are threatened by these return policies, directly affecting consumption, community investment and the ability to sustain millions of households. Moreover, the legal and judicial system now faces its own limits. The intervention of the US Supreme Court has highlighted the constitutional challenges to these measures, opening a space for legal dispute over how far the executive can go in its crusade against migration. However, the effects are already underway. The reality is that many Latin American and Caribbean countries are assuming, voluntarily or forcibly, the role of advanced border of the global North. The overall balance is bleak: a utilitarian vision of human mobility is imposed, whose fate depends more on electoral cycles in the north than on their fundamental rights. However, resistance is also emerging: from the courts to the streets, through grassroots organisations, solidarity networks and proposals for fairer regional policies. The future of mass deportations is not set in stone. It will be decided in multiple scenarios: in presidential speeches in Washington, but also in the legal decisions of the courts; in public policies in Bogotá, San Salvador or Santo Domingo, but also in the mobilisation capacity of the societies affected. Latin America and the Caribbean have an opportunity and a responsibility: not to resign themselves to the role of passive recipients of an imposed policy, but to build a regional strategy for mobility, rights and dignity. References 1 CHAO ROMERO, Robert. The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940. University of Arizona Press, 2010.2 VIÑAS, David. Indians, army and frontier. Siglo XXI Editores, 1982.3 FERRER ,Ada. Cuba: An American History. Scribner, 2021.4 AMERICAS ALLIANCE. 28 years of IIRIRA: a horrible legacy of a white supremacist and deeply xenophobic immigration law. 30/9/24. Available at: htt p s://w w w.alianzaamericas..Note: All hyperlinks are active as of 3 May 2025.5 AMBROSIUS, Christian. Deportations and the Roots of Gang Violence in Central America. School of Business & Economics. Discussion Paper, Berlin, 12/2018. Available at: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/fub188/22554/discpa p er2018_12.6 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL. A Guide to the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), update 2025. Available at: https://www.am e ricanimmigrationcouncil.7 MARÍN, Rossana. "El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de EE. UU. restableció el programa migratorio 'Quédate en México'", INFOBAE. 22/1/2025. Available at: https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/el-departamento-de-seguridad-nacional-de-eeuu-restablecio-el-prog r8 RIVERA, Fernanda. "México se opone al regreso del programa 'Quédate en México'", Meganoticias. 20/1/25. Available at: https://www.m e ganoticias.mx/cdmx/noticia/mexico-se-opone-al-regreso-del-programa-quedate-en-mexico/587032.9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. The 'Migrant Protection Protocols' and Human Rights Violations in Mexico. Special Report, 2020. Available at: https:// w w w.hrw.10 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Precautionary Measures on the "Stay in Mexico" Programme. 2025. Available at: https://www . oas.org/en /11 CAMHAJI, Elías. "México aguarda con preocupación la avalancha de decretos migratorios de Trump", El País. 20/1/25. Available at: https:// e lp ais.com/mexico/2025-01-20/mexico-aguarda-con-preocupacion-la-avalancha-de-decretos-migratorios-de-trump.12 The concept of a "safe third country" originates from the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1951. According to this convention, when a person applies for asylum in one country, that country can refer him or her to another country that offers the same guarantees of protection. However, goodwill is not enough; the receiving country must meet certain requirements to be considered "safe".13 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL. Deportation with stopover: Failure of the protection measures established by the Cooperation Agreement on Asylum signed between the United States and Guatemala. 10/6/20. Available at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/report s -briefs/deportacion-con-escala-fracaso-de-las14 EL MUNDO NEWSPAPER. US and El Salvador finalise 'unprecedented' asylum agreement: Bukele". 3/2/2025. Available at: https://diario.elmundo.sv/politica/eeuu-y-el-sa l15 BBC NEWS MUNDO. "Bukele agrees with US to accept deportees of other nationalities, including 'dangerous criminals' in prison". 4/2/25. Available at: https://ww w .bbc.com/mundo/ a16 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL. Migration outsourcing: new agreements under analysis with Haiti, Dominican Republic and Colombia. Special report, March 2025.17 RANRUN.ES. "International civil society denounces that externalising the US border will not stop migrants".11/4/25. Available at: https://run r un.es/noticias/501342/sociedad-civil-civil-sociedad-civil-internacional-denuncian-que-externalizar-la-frontera-ee –18 U. S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. Credible Fear Screening and Interview Process, update 2025. Available at: http s ://www.usci s .19 GILBERTO BOSQUES CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. "La política migratoria de EE. UU. y su impacto en América Latina", Informe Especial. April 2025. Available at: https:/ / www.gob.mx/sre/acciones-y-programas/centro-de-estudios-internacionales-gilberto-bosques20 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. "The United States: A Migration System that Criminalises. Report 2025. Available at: https://www.amnesty . o rg/en/latest21 ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union). Police-ICE collaboration under the 287(g) program. Analysis paper updated in 2025. Available at: https:// w ww.a c lu.22 PIEMONTESE, Antonio. "'Alien Enemies Act', what the 1798 law invoked by Trump to repatriate alleged Venezuelan gang members says". WIRED. 10/3/25. Available at: htt p s://en.wired. dice-la-ley-de-1798-invocada-por-trump-para-repatriar-a-supuestos-pandilleros-venezolanos.23 THE REPUBLIC. "Trump denies signing proclamation invoking the Alien Enemies Act to deport Venezuelan migrants". 22/3/25. Available at: https://larepublica.pe/mundo/2025/03/22/donald-trump-niega-haber-firmado-la-proclamacion-invocando-la-ley-de-enem i24 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a US humanitarian programme that grants protection to nationals of countries affected by armed conflict, natural disasters or other extraordinary circumstances.25 INFOBAE. "US civil organisations question the deportation of Venezuelans". 17/3/25. Available at: https://www.infobae.com/america/agenc i.26 CNN. "Several federal judges issued orders to temporarily halt the deportations and require judicial hearings before any removals. But despite the judicial restraints, the Administration continued the deportations." 9/4/25. Available at: https://cnnesp a nol.cnn.com/2025/04/09/eeuu/judges-block-deportations-some-people-read-foreign-enemies e27 TELEMUNDO. The U.S. quintuples its deportations this year and considers more and more migrants as inadmissible". 17/9/23. Available at: www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/inmigracion/estados-unidos-ha-deportado-a-mas-de-380000-personas-en-los-ultimos - si-rc n28 EL PAÍS. "Bukele opens the CECOT mega-prison to deportations from the USA". 7/2/25. Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2025-02-07/bu k ele-abre-el-mega p risiones-del-cecot-a-deportados-de-eeuu..29 EL PAÍS. "Bukele's mega-prison, symbol of his war against the gangs, arouses international alarm". 23/3/23. Available at: https://elpais .30 MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Satellite States: The Prison Externalisation of Migration in Central America, n.º 54. 2025, pp. 45-63.31 LAS AMÉRICAS NEWSPAPER. "El Salvador defends the deportation of Venezuelans from the USA and links them to organised crime". 19/3/25. Available in: http s :32 NEWSWEEK, El Salvador. "Venezuela says sending US migrants to Salvadoran jail is "crime against humanity"". 18/3/25. Available at: https://newsweekespanol.com/elsalvador/2025/03/18/v e nezuela-dice-que-envio-de-migrantes –33 EL PAÍS. "Trump fills the White House gardens with photos of arrested immigrants to celebrate his first 100 days". 29/4/25. Available at: https://elp a is.com/us/immigracion/2025-04-28/trump-llena-los-jardines-de-la-casa-blanca-de-fotos-de-inmigrantes-arrestados-para-c e lebrar-sus-primeros-100-dias..34 COLOMÉ, Carla Gloria. "El gobierno de Trump celebra el aumento de las autodeportaciones: "Estamos viendo niveles altísimos de migración inversa", El País. 2/4/25. Available at: https://elpais.com/us/migracion/2025-04-02/el-gobierno-de-trump-celebra-el-aumento-de-las-autodeportaciones-e s tam o s-viendo-niveles-altisimos-de-migracion-inversa.html.35 COL, Devan. "Indictment against Wiscosin judge underscores Trump administration's aggressive approach to immigration enforcement", CNN USA 25/4/25. Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/04/25/eeuu / indictment-j u eza-wisconsin-aggressive-approach-trump-immigration-trax-law.36 Trump v. J.G.G. is the tentative name used by some media and legal documents to refer to a recent and significant court case before the U.S. Supreme Court in April 2025. The case pits the federal government, led by the Donald Trump Administration, against a migrant identified by his initials J.G.G., in protection of his identity, as is customary in immigration and human rights proceedings.37 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Trump v. J.G.G. Opinion of the Court, April 2025. Available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20 2 5/tr ump_ v _jgg.html (accessed 28 April 2025).38 CNN EN ESPAÑOL. "La República Dominicana deportó en 2024 a 276.000 haitianos". 2/1/25. Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/01/02/latinoame r ic a39 TELEMUNDO NOTICIAS. "Dominican Republic intensifies deportations of Haitians: 10,000 per week". 12/12/2024. Available at: https://www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/internacional/republica-dominicana-deportaciones-masivas- h aitianos-10000-una-semana-r40 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. "Deportations of pregnant women in the Dominican Republic". November 2024. Available at: https: / /www.a m nesty.org/en/documents/amr27/8597/2024/en/ "Statement on mass deportations in the Dominican Republic". November 2024. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/es/documents/amr27/8597/2024 /

Defense & Security
Officers of the Lagos State Police Command on guard as during a protest in Lagos on Tuesday, October 1, 2024.  Nigerians are out on Independence day to protest bad governance and high cost of living

A Political Breakthrough?

by Ebenezer Obadare

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Is the nascent consensus on state police in Nigeria a political ruse or a giant step towards true federalism in the country? No matter what happens next, last week’s statement by the Northern States Governors’ Forum expressing “support for the creation of State Police” and calling on “the National Assembly to expedite action on the enactment of the legal framework for its takeoff” will go down as a pivotal moment in the often-contentious debate over genuine federalism and political decentralization in Nigeria. Although it is not the first time that the Forum, the umbrella body of the chief executives of the nineteen northern states, will be expressing unanimous support for the idea (they also did back in September 2022 as the region buckled under the weight of relentless attacks by Boko Haram terrorists), the demand for expeditious action by a group of actors long seen as the epitome of northern resistance to the idea of state police is nothing short of remarkable. While it lasted, that opposition, or, to put it positively, an insistence on keeping policing on the Exclusive Legislative List per Section 214 (1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, essentially preserving federal control over police affairs, was an article of faith among northern political actors, who, when they were not fearful about the potential for its abuse by individual state governors, worried that they may not have the resources to maintain it. In any event, they (i.e., the northern governors) were sure, as they insisted after reneging on an agreement reached at a meeting of the governors of the thirty-six states of the Nigerian federation in August 2012, that “the best way to ensure adequate security in all the states [was] for the federal government to allow commissioners of police to be controlled by the respective governors so that they can take orders from the state executives.” What explains the ostensible volte-face? One possible explanation is the worsening security situation in the northern region and the sense of desperation it has engendered among northern governors, traditional rulers, and other notables. Since the turn of the year, Boko Haram; Lakurawa, a jihadist group believed to be an affiliate of the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP); and lesser-known groups like Mahmuda, a Boko Haram splinter group, have embarked on a murderous spree in the northeastern, northwestern, and north-central parts of the country respectively, killing an untold number of people and laying waste to military bases, religious houses, and other public and private property. Since the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, the group has been directly responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands and the displacement of millions. Given this situation, and considering the helplessness of the Nigerian armed forces, a certain desperation on the part of the governors may be understandable. Yet, it hardly explains how the idea of states administering and controlling their own police (a sound idea on its own merit) is suddenly embraced as the solution to a protracted insurgency that has so far defeated everything thrown at it. This puzzle has opened the door to a less charitable interpretation of the northern governors’ move, as follows: that far from being committed to state police as a matter of principle, the governors only see it as a way to kill two political birds with one stone—sign up for an idea which has become inexorable more or less, but at the same time use a newly-earned control over policing to tighten political control ahead of the next presidential election in March 2027, one that, at the moment (things could change very easily), is shaping up as a north-versus-south confrontation. In other words, assume control of police affairs as a way to defend “northern interest” when the push of electoral politics comes to shove. Whether or not the northern governors indeed have this shared understanding, the hypothesis—for it is nothing more than that at this point—is a reminder of the many reasons why the idea of state police in Nigeria has always been politically charged, and why a consensus on something as apparently straightforward as having individual state governments fund and maintain their own police—the very epitome of federalism, as its advocates see it—has been elusive. The anxiety of opponents of the state police as to its likely abuse, including mobilization against political opponents, is not unfounded. Nor will anyone who has listened to a former state governor proudly recount how he used his commissioner of police to manipulate elections and subvert the democratic process (unwittingly validating another former governor’s point [PDF] about the Nigeria Police Force being one of the five “mini-gods” that anyone trying to understand “the nature of electoral politics in Nigeria…must pay significant attention to”) dispute the contention of critics that the system is “not mature enough.” Mature or not, there is no doubting that the country, and President Tinubu in particular, is at a critical juncture. For a country wracked by violence of various stripes, and one where vigilante groups of various degrees of legality have continued to mushroom, it would seem irresponsible not to seize an opportunity that, on the whole, should increase security while strengthening local accountability. President Tinubu, too, has a decision to make. For a man who fancies himself a federalist and raised on a diet of Awolowo-Yoruba progressivism, he would be hard pressed to explain to himself, never mind his allies in the Yoruba political heartland, how he failed to capitalize on a political moment arguably unprecedented in the country’s checkered history. From this perspective, he has no choice but to sign the “Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Alteration) Bill, 2023 (Establishment of State Police)" [PDF] as soon as it lands on his desk. Were he, contrariwise, to stall, it would be an indication that he perceives the northern governors’ sudden about face as the first move in a political plot calculated to upstage him as president come 2027.  Should that happen, and should the idea of state police continue to languish in legislative limbo, it would not be the first time in Nigeria that politics has waylaid history. Or is it the other way around?

Defense & Security
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem meets with the President of Mexico Claudia Sheinbaum at the Palacio Nacional in Mexico City, Mexico, March 28, 2025

Mexico: The New War on Drugs

by Alberto Hernández Hernández

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The pressure exerted by Trump on Mexico has prompted a shift in the López Obrador government's anti-drug strategy, which now operates under the logic of negotiation imposed by Trumpism. In the Obradorist ideology, it was unthinkable to launch a new war against the narcos—partly because there is now suspicion that deals were made with organized crime, and partly because opposition to such a war was one of the key narratives that propelled former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to power. He consistently and harshly criticized the confrontation initiated by President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012). The “hugs, not bullets” policy of the former Mexican president empowered the drug cartels, and its effects spilled onto the streets of the United States, where designer drugs (fentanyl, methamphetamines) proliferated like never before. However, the electoral campaign and Donald Trump’s return to the White House spotlighted the drug trafficking issue, highlighting that it was costing 100,000 American lives a year. That surely struck a chord with the average American and hurt the Democratic Party’s candidate. “Donald Trump embodies what I want for my country,” said a white woman from the Midwest—a sentiment echoed by many who witnessed the destructive effects of these drugs in neighborhoods in Chicago, Philadelphia, or Los Angeles. This segment of the population turned out en masse to vote for Trump, joining millions of others who, for ideological, political, or economic reasons, gave the New York politician a sweeping victory. That resounding win shook the status quo—just look at the turmoil in global stock markets—but it also generated Trump’s own agenda with his trade partners. One key item: declaring war on the Mexican cartels, which he elevated to the status of “terrorist organizations” that must be destroyed. It was a powerful message for President Claudia Sheinbaum, who had not made the direct confrontation with the cartels a priority. She likely saw them as part of the structure López Obrador had built for the first stage of the so-called Fourth Transformation, and believed it best not to disturb them beyond occasional arrests and seizures. Sheinbaum had been inclined to continue that routine agenda in dealings with her main trading partner. However, Trump’s victory and his increasingly aggressive rhetoric against the cartels led to a direct confrontation with criminal organizations. Trump increased the pressure by deploying spy ships in Pacific waters off the Baja California coast. Mexican skies saw surveillance aircraft capable of capturing images of homes in the Golden Triangle—the border region between the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango, traditionally a haven for drug lords. Additionally, the U.S. security agency presence in Mexico was reinforced. Thus, the indulgent and criminal “hugs, not bullets” policy began to fade, leaving cartel leaders stunned. They have responded with a forward-escape strategy, creating an atmosphere of persecution and violence across different regions of the country—costing thousands of Mexican lives and pushing the public’s fear perception beyond 61%, according to INEGI. The myth López Obrador promoted—that “fentanyl is not produced in Mexico”—collapsed when Omar García Harfuch, the Public Security Secretary, recently stated that more than 800 laboratories have been destroyed. The problem, however, isn’t just the cartels and their capacity to produce and distribute drugs on American streets. It also includes the entire political scaffolding that enables the business to function efficiently—something it could not have achieved without the complicity of politicians with drug lords or intermediaries. And while one might think Trump would be pleased with the results of his pressure, that’s not the case. He bluntly stated that the Mexican government merely wants to make him “happy”—by sealing the northern border, making arrests and deporting drug lords, destroying labs, and even allowing U.S. agents to collaborate with Mexico’s national security system. They’ve even permitted spy flights and menacing naval patrols in Pacific waters. But even with these surprising results, the pressure continues—both publicly and diplomatically. Kristi Noem, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, recently met with President Sheinbaum at the National Palace. Beyond the formal courtesies, the headline came when Noem, upon returning to the U.S., revealed that she had handed Sheinbaum a list of requests to continue strengthening the good relationship between the two countries. President Sheinbaum was stunned when tariffs became a reality. Although Mexico and Canada weren’t mentioned in Trump’s public list of targeted countries, that was because the tariffs had already been decided before the press conference: a 25% tariff would apply to imports of steel and aluminum, as well as to products not covered by the USMCA—representing roughly 50% of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. In short, Trump’s pressure on Mexico has altered the policy upheld by Obradorism and now operates under the logic of Trump-style hard negotiation: “If the adversary yields at the first push, you can keep pressuring and gain more.” Some say that the list handed over through diplomatic channels includes the names of many currently serving politicians. That’s the reality, amid an anti-crisis narrative that tries to sell the idea that defeats are victories and losses are gains. And now, the time has come to find out where President Sheinbaum draws her red line.

Defense & Security
Gaza on map. Israel an Palestine on geopolitical Map. Gaza strip and West Bank. War conflict.

Netanyahu accelerates plans for total occupation of a starving Gaza

by Redacción El Salto

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Israeli army seeks to mobilize 30,000 reservists for a new expansion of its offensive on Gaza. UN-affiliated organizations warn of famine and disease in an enclave where clean drinking water is scarce. The Israeli security cabinet has approved a plan to intensify the operation in Gaza, which includes capturing or seizing additional areas across the Palestinian coastal territory and expanding the area controlled by the IDF. Government members, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, are already using the term “occupation” to clarify the plans for Gaza. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not specified which parts of the territory are involved in the new escalation, anonymous military sources have claimed that the goal is to occupy the entire Gaza Strip. The idea put forth by the Zionist regime, in any case, is to seize the territory and not return it in the future. Hamas has rejected this plan and continues to pursue “a comprehensive agreement that guarantees the safety and protection of our people,” according to one of its senior officials. The announcement includes the destruction of “all infrastructure above and underground,” according to Israeli Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir. The meeting followed IDF orders to mobilize 30,000 reservists last Saturday. Israel is thereby increasing pressure on Gaza during the same month that U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, where he will present his colonization plans aligned with the wishes of the Tel Aviv regime. The plan also entails a new forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to the south of Gaza, expected to last for months. The government of Netanyahu — who is considered a suspected war criminal by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) — faces internal resistance from the Hostage and Missing Families Forum, which has protested what they see as prioritizing territorial conquest over the return of prisoners captured by Hamas on October 7. Fifty-nine people remain held by the Gaza government after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire on March 18. The Forum mentioned before, criticized the Gaza occupation plans, referring to them as the “Smotrich-Netanyahu Plan for the Sacrifice of Hostages,” according to a public statement. The main debate within the security cabinet focused on whether to open routes for humanitarian aid — routes that have been closed since early March, two weeks before the ceasefire collapsed. According to Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Itamar Ben Gvir — also subject to ICJ arrest warrants — argued for keeping all aid routes closed: “I don’t understand why we have to give them anything; they have enough food there. We should bomb Hamas’s food reserves,” the outlet quoted. The Chief of Staff called the idea “dangerous.” According to the same leaks, Ben Gvir also proposed “bombing food warehouses and generators.” The International Criminal Court has reminded that blocking humanitarian aid may constitute a war crime. The Israeli government has leaked to the press that under the new escalation, humanitarian aid would be allowed in only through “international organizations and private security contractors.” On Sunday, May 4, the Country Humanitarian Team (CHT), under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), reported that for nine weeks Israeli authorities had blocked all supplies from entering Gaza: “Bakeries and community kitchens have shut down. The warehouses are empty. Children are starving.” Two days earlier, UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell expanded on the critical situation in Gaza: “In the past month, more than 75% of households have reported increased difficulty accessing water. Families don’t have enough to drink, cannot wash their hands when needed, and often must choose between showering, cleaning, or cooking,” Russell said in a statement. UNICEF also warned of the prevalence of acute watery diarrhea, especially dangerous for children: “Over 9,000 boys and girls have received treatment for acute malnutrition,” the organization added. At the end of April, during ICJ hearings related to South Africa’s case against Israel, Claire Nicolet, Head of Emergencies at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), stated that “Israeli authorities are not only using aid as a bargaining chip but also as a weapon of war.” Since October 7, 2023, 52,567 Palestinians have been killed and 118,610 injured as a result of Israeli attacks, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Of those fatalities, 2,459 occurred after the March ceasefire was broken. 

Defense & Security
3D illustration, Danger of war - Tensions between Pakistan and India are increasing

India-Pakistan ceasefire shouldn’t disguise fact that norms have changed in South Asia, making future de-escalation much harder

by Farah N. Jan

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском India and Pakistan have seen the scenario play out before: a terror attack in which Indians are killed leads to a succession of escalatory tit-fot-tat measures that put South Asia on the brink of all-out war. And then there is a de-escalation. The broad contours of that pattern have played out in the most recent crisis, with the latest step being the announcement of a ceasefire on May 10, 2025. But in another important way, the flare-up – which began on April 22 with a deadly attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed – represents significant departures from the past. It involved direct missile exchanges targeting sites inside both territories and the use of advanced missile systems and drones by the two nuclear rivals for the first time. As a scholar of nuclear rivalries, especially between India and Pakistan, I have long been concerned that the erosion of international sovereignty norms, diminished U.S. interest and influence in the region and the stockpiling of advanced military and digital technologies have significantly raised the risk of rapid and uncontrolled escalation in the event of a trigger in South Asia. These changes have coincided with domestic political shifts in both countries. The pro-Hindu nationalism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has heightened communal tensions in the country. Meanwhile Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Gen. Syed Asim Munir, has embraced the “two-nation theory,” which holds that Pakistan is a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims and India for Hindus. This religious framing was even seen in the naming of the two countries’ military operations. For India, it is “Operation Sindoor” – a reference to the red vermilion used by married Hindu women, and a provocative nod to the widows of the Kashmir attack. Pakistan called its counter-operation “Bunyan-un-Marsoos” – an Arabic phrase from the Quran meaning “a solid structure.” The role of Washington The India-Pakistan rivalry has cost tens of thousands of lives across multiple wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. But since the late 1990s, whenever India and Pakistan approached the brink of war, a familiar de-escalation playbook unfolded: intense diplomacy, often led by the United States, would help defuse tensions. In 1999, President Bill Clinton’s direct mediation ended the Kargil conflict – a limited war triggered by Pakistani forces crossing the Line of Control into Indian-administered Kashmir – by pressing Pakistan for a withdrawal. Similarly, after the 2001 attack inside the Indian Parliament by terrorists allegedly linked to Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi, averting war. And after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which saw 166 people killed by terrorists linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, rapid and high-level American diplomatic involvement helped restrain India’s response and reduced the risk of an escalating conflict. As recently as 2019, during the Balakot crisis – which followed a suicide bombing in Pulwama, Kashmir, that killed 40 Indian security personnel – it was American diplomatic pressure that helped contain hostilities. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later wrote in his memoirs, “I do not think the world properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a nuclear conflagration in February 2019.” Where is Kashmir?  A diplomatic void? Washington as peacemaker made sense: It had influence and a vested interest. During the Cold War, the U.S. formed a close alliance with Pakistan to counter India’s links with the Soviet Union. And after the 9/11 terror attacks, the U.S. poured tens of billions of dollars in military assistance into Pakistan as a frontline partner in the “war on terror.” Simultaneously, beginning in the early 2000s, the U.S. began cultivating India as a strategic partner. A stable Pakistan was a crucial partner in the U.S. war in Afghanistan; a friendly India was a strategic counterbalance to China. And this gave the U.S. both the motivation and credibility to act as an effective mediator during moments of India-Pakistan crisis. Today, however, America’s diplomatic attention has shifted significantly away from South Asia. The process began with the end of the Cold War, but accelerated dramatically after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. More recently, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have consumed Washington’s diplomatic efforts. Since President Donald Trump took office in January 2025, the U.S. has not appointed an ambassador in New Delhi or Islamabad, nor confirmed an assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs – factors that must have hampered any mediating role for the United States. And while Trump said the May 10 ceasefire followed a “long night of talks mediated by the United States,” statements from India and Pakistan appeared to downplay U.S. involvement, focusing instead on the direct bilateral nature of negotiations. Should it transpire that Washington’s role as a mediator between Pakistan and India has been diminished, it is not immediately obvious who, if anyone, will fill the void. China, which has been trying to cultivate a role of mediator elsewhere, is not seen as a neutral mediator due to its close alliance with Pakistan and past border conflicts with India. Other regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia tried to step in during the latest crisis, but both lack the power clout of the U.S. or China. This absence of external mediation is not, of course, a problem in itself. Historically, foreign interference – particularly U.S. support for Pakistan during the Cold War – often complicated dynamics in South Asia by creating military imbalances and reinforcing hardline positions. But the past has shown external pressure – especially from Washington – can be effective. Breaking the norms The recent escalation unfolded against the backdrop of another dynamic: the erosion of international norms since the end of the Cold War and accelerating after 2001. America’s “war on terror” fundamentally challenged international legal frameworks through practices such as preemptive strikes against sovereign states, targeted drone killings and the “enhanced interrogation techniques” of detainees that many legal scholars classify as torture. More recently, Israel’s operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria have drawn widespread criticism for violations of international humanitarian law – but have resulted in limited consequences. In short, geopolitical norms have been ebbed away and military actions that were once deemed red lines are crossed with little accountability. For India and Pakistan, this environment creates both opportunity and risk. Both can point to behaviors elsewhere to justify assertive actions that they have undertaken that, in previous years, would have been deemed a step too far – such as attacks on places of worship and sovereignty violations. Multi-domain warfare But what truly distinguished the latest crisis from those of the past is, I believe, its multi-domain nature. The conflict is no longer confined to conventional military exchanges along the line of control – as it was for the first five decades of the Kashmir question. Both countries largely respected the line of control as a de facto boundary for military operations until the 2019 crisis. Since then, there has been a dangerous progression: first to cross-border airstrikes into each other’s territories, and now to a conflict that spans conventional military, cyber and information spheres simultaneously. Reports indicate Chinese-made Pakistani J-10 fighter jets shot down multiple Indian aircraft, including advanced French Rafale jets. This confrontation between Chinese and Western weapons represents not just a bilateral conflict but a proxy test of rival global military technologies – adding another layer of great-power competition to the crisis. In addition, the use of loitering drones designed to attack radar systems represents a significant escalation in the technological sophistication of cross-border attacks compared to years past. The conflict has also expanded dramatically into the cyber domain. Pakistani hackers, claiming to be the “Pakistan Cyber Force,” report breaching several Indian defense institutions, potentially compromising personnel data and login credentials. Simultaneously, social media and a new right-wing media in India have become a critical battlefront. Ultranationalist voices in India incited violence against Muslims and Kashmiris; in Pakistan, anti-India rhetoric similarly intensified online. Cooler voices prevailing … for now These shifts have created multiple escalation pathways that traditional crisis management approaches weren’t designed to address. Particularly concerning is the nuclear dimension. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is that it will use nuclear weapons if its existence is threatened, and it has developed short-range tactical nuclear weapons intended to counter Indian conventional advantages. Meanwhile, India has informally dialed back its historic no-first-use stance, creating ambiguity about its operational doctrine. Thankfully, as the ceasefire announcement indicates, mediating voices appear to have prevailed this time around. But eroding norms, diminished great power diplomacy and the advent of multi-domain warfare, I argue, made this latest flare-up a dangerous turning point. What happens next will tell us much about how nuclear rivals manage, or fail to manage, the spiral of conflict in this dangerous new landscape.

Defense & Security
Cambodia in Focus on a Tilted Map.

Change of Course or Continuity? Cambodia at a Crossroads

by Grigory Kucherenko

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In December 2024, Cambodia reached a key point in its foreign policy. Japan delivered a group of patrol boats to Cambodia as part of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) regional initiative. This clearly showed that security cooperation between the two countries is growing stronger. In April 2025, Japan is expected to take another big step by becoming the first foreign country allowed access to Cambodia’s strategically important Ream Naval Base — a facility that has been upgraded by China since 2022.These events, happening just months apart, seem to show Cambodia’s effort to expand its foreign partnerships after relying on China for a long time. The handover of Japanese vessels, while China is leading the base's modernization, is more than just a friendly act from Tokyo. It is a smart move by Cambodia, showing how it is trying to use the rivalry between big powers to strengthen its own security and independence. But can Cambodia really protect its sovereignty by trying to balance the interests of powerful countries? Or is this idea of multiple partnerships just an illusion — hiding the fact that Chinese influence continues to grow? The answers to these questions may shape the future of regional security in Indochina. In August 2023, Hun Manet became Cambodia’s new Prime Minister, replacing his father Hun Sen, who had ruled for nearly 40 years. Unlike his father, Hun Manet has a Western education — he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and earned a PhD in economics from the University of Bristol. His background gave some hope to Western diplomats that Cambodia’s foreign policy might move in a direction closer to their values. These hopes were partially fulfilled when Hun Manet’s first major foreign policy statement reaffirmed Cambodia’s commitment to diversifying its international relationships while strictly adhering to the principle of neutrality. This stance was particularly significant, given Cambodia’s longstanding perception among Western analysts as a pro-China state. For years, the Khmer elites have consistently voiced support for the PRC on the international stage, receiving in return substantial investment and infrastructure aid. However, these actions have occasionally strained Cambodia’s ties with neighboring countries — a dynamic noted by officials within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Cambodia has been a member since 1999. A striking example is the discord surrounding the South China Sea territorial disputes. When affected countries sought to use ASEAN as a platform to pressure Beijing, Cambodia opposed the effort, effectively blocking the adoption of a joint statement in autumn 2024 — something unprecedented in ASEAN’s 45-year history. With a few exceptions, the Khmer elites traditionally supported a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War and, afterward, a neutral stance on foreign affairs. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen himself emphasized that Cambodia seeks ties not only with China, but with all countries, considering this the most beneficial foreign policy path for a developing nation. Among Phnom Penh’s close partners is Japan, which conducts an active foreign policy in the region and stands as one of the Kingdom’s largest economic donors. At the same time, it is important to note that Hun Sen described relations with China as "unbreakable" and consistently rejected external criticism, highlighting only the positive aspects of Cambodia’s deepening ties with Beijing. In the first half of December 2024, Cambodia and Japan signed an agreement on the transfer of military patrol boats to Phnom Penh as part of Japan’s FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) initiative. Cambodia became the first ASEAN country to receive such assistance. However, the Kingdom has no intention of turning its back on China. The principle of neutrality, which underpins the country’s foreign policy, means that partnership with Japan does not contradict friendship with the PRC. Rather, the combination of the two reflects a strategy of multi-vector diplomacy, enabling Cambodia to benefit from relationships with a variety of partners. This approach is supported by several factors. First, Prime Minister Hun Manet has repeatedly affirmed his commitment to an "independent and neutral foreign policy based on the rule of law, mutual respect, and adherence to the principles of the UN Charter." In his words, this policy aims "to promote national interests, strengthen existing friendships, and build more solid ties." Second, Phnom Penh consistently accepts aid from all willing donors, including Australia through the Cambodia-Australia Partnership for Resilient Economic Development (CAPRED), the United States, Japan, and, of course, China. In 2023, marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Japan, Cambodia elevated bilateral cooperation to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. With this move, Japan joined a narrow circle of Phnom Penh’s strategic allies — a status previously held solely by China between 2010 and 2023 — advancing from basic diplomatic engagement and standard strategic partnership. Although China surpassed Japan in aid volume back in 2007, Tokyo remains a vital partner for Phnom Penh. Between 1994 and 2021, Japan implemented 210 investment projects in Cambodia totaling $3.1 billion. In 2024, bilateral trade between Japan and Cambodia reached $40.94 billion, placing Tokyo as the Kingdom’s fifth-largest trading partner. This robust economic cooperation underscores Japan’s strategic importance to Cambodia and highlights Phnom Penh’s efforts to diversify its international relationships, avoiding overreliance on any single partner. Despite Japan’s recent delivery of patrol boats to Cambodia, Phnom Penh’s most robust military cooperation remains with China. Between 2016 and 2024, China and Cambodia conducted six joint military exercises under the name “Golden Dragon” (នាគមាស), with each iteration featuring an increase in the number of troops, weaponry, and military equipment involved. Even amid the global threat of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Phnom Penh proceeded with the fourth iteration of these drills, involving nearly 3,000 soldiers — ten times more than in 2016. [1]. The drills also included dozens of combat helicopters, armored vehicles, and various transport assets. This continuous military support from Beijing underscores Cambodia’s growing reliance on Chinese involvement in strengthening its armed forces. Meanwhile, after seven years of joint military exercises with the United States, Cambodia suspended this cooperation in 2017, officially citing scheduling conflicts due to national elections. However, in June 2024, during a meeting between Hun Sen and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Cambodia announced the resumption of military cooperation with Washington. Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to revive joint military drills and to once again accept Cambodian cadets for training at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. For the United States, the primary point of contention has been the Chinese-built Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, despite Phnom Penh’s repeated assurances that the facility is intended solely for use by the Royal Cambodian Navy. Rumors about the base’s development first surfaced in 2018, sparking increased tensions between Phnom Penh and Washington. At the time, however, the U.S. lacked concrete evidence to formally accuse Cambodia of intending to host Chinese military forces on its territory, and American officials limited their response to diplomatic messages expressing concern. In August 2018, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that he trusted Cambodia’s assurances that the base would be used exclusively by its own navy, and he praised the Kingdom for its “firm defense of national sovereignty.” In early December 2024, a U.S. Navy vessel arrived in Cambodia in the first port call in eight years — a visit made possible after a prolonged period of strained relations due to sustained American criticism of Cambodia’s human rights record. Cambodia’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the visit was arranged following a request from the United States and would help to “strengthen and expand the bonds of friendship, as well as enhance bilateral cooperation” between the two countries. *** In recent years, the Asia-Pacific region has become a stage for intensifying geopolitical competition, directly impacting Cambodia’s security environment and foreign policy choices. The strategic interests of major powers such as the United States and China increasingly intersect in the region, prompting smaller states — including Cambodia — to explore new pathways for safeguarding their independence and national security. In response to these shifts, Phnom Penh has sought to strengthen its defense capabilities and diversify international partnerships, as reflected in the agreement with Japan on the transfer of military vessels. This move not only enhances bilateral relations with Tokyo but also signals Cambodia’s intent to play a more active role in regional security affairs. Such involvement could enable Cambodia to navigate between competing global powers and maintain its independence amid mounting pressure from both China and the United States.Russia, as one of Cambodia’s traditional partners, may also seek to bolster its regional presence by intensifying diplomatic engagement and offering avenues for cooperation in defense, security, and military technology. This would help Phnom Penh better balance its external relations and maneuver between great powers more effectively. For Moscow, it presents an opportunity not only to deepen ties with Cambodia, but also to expand its influence in Southeast Asia and counter the growing presence of Western actors in the region. 1. Phan Thi Hai Yen. (2024). Cambodia's Strategic Embrace of China: Military Cooperation and Its Implications. ISRG Journal of Arts Humanities & Social Sciences (ISRGJAHSS), II(V), 191–198.

Defense & Security
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ISIS After Assad: Reshaping Its Presence in Syria’s Power Vacuums and the Challenges of Regional Deterrence

by Mohamed Nabil El-Bendary

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq, international and regional warnings about the resurgence of ISIS have resurfaced, driven by mounting evidence of the group’s reorganization and its exploitation of the security vacuum left by military collapses and political instability. Since late 2024, multiple reports have pointed to a noticeable uptick in ISIS activity, an increase in the frequency of its attacks, and a growing ability to maneuver and recruit—fueled by weak regional coordination and diverging priorities among key international actors. Far from being ideologically defeated, ISIS appears to be reshaping itself within a volatile landscape, threatening to usher in a new phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the following analysis explores the main features of the group’s resurgence, the dynamics of its territorial re-expansion, and the regional and international efforts to contain it—seeking to unpack the nature of this renewed threat and assess its potential implications. International Warnings Over the Growing Threat of ISIS A series of international and regional statements and warnings issued since late 2024 reflect mounting concerns over the reemergence of the terrorist group ISIS on the regional scene, amid fragile security conditions and a diminished capacity to contain unconventional threats. In December 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, in a phone call with the UK Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer, revealed alarming signs of ISIS regrouping. He noted that the organization had managed to seize large stockpiles of weapons following the collapse of Syrian army units that abandoned their arsenals—enabling ISIS to expand its territorial presence in parts of Syria. This alarming development has not only been flagged by Iraq but has also featured prominently in international reports. On February 10, 2025, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, during a briefing before the Security Council, confirmed that ISIS continues to demonstrate a striking ability to adapt and evolve its tactics, despite ongoing security and military pressure from member states and international and regional partners. The 20th report of the UN Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security emphasized that the group has not been ideologically defeated; rather, it is restructuring itself within the security and political voids present in Syria, Iraq, and other areas. In the same context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned in March 2025 of a "real danger" posed by ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, pointing to the lack of political settlements and the breakdown of certain internal security structures as conditions conducive to the group's return. His warning echoed the concluding statement of the meeting of foreign ministers from Syria’s neighboring countries, held in Amman, Jordan, on March 9, 2025. The ministers expressed deep concern over the escalating ISIS threat and underscored the need to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms—particularly in intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations along Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stressed that "combating ISIS is no longer a local issue, but a collective responsibility that demands effective regional readiness and robust international support." He highlighted that the group’s threat has grown not only in terms of manpower but also in terms of military capabilities, and that its reach is now expanding beyond border areas into the Syrian heartland itself. These developments indicate that, despite the significant blows dealt to it in recent years, ISIS continues to benefit from the fluid geopolitical landscape in Syria—one that creates security gaps the group can exploit to reposition and reorganize itself. Furthermore, the conflicting priorities among international and regional actors in the Syrian file are hindering the formation of a unified front to confront this renewed threat. This fragmentation makes the challenge far more complex and reinforces the notion that the battle against ISIS remains far from over—both on the ground and within the broader framework of collective security. Signs of Escalation ISIS continues to consolidate its presence in Syria through its deployment across two geographically separate yet strategically interconnected regions—demonstrating the group’s persistent ability to exploit security gaps and divergences among local and international actors. The first area lies in Syria’s northeastern region, known as al-Jazira, which is nominally under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite this control, ISIS has maintained a notable presence in the southern desert of al-Hasakah province, geographically linked to the northeastern outskirts of the city of Al-Bukamal, particularly around the town of Al-Baghuz—the group’s last urban stronghold before its official collapse. This geographic footprint extends beyond Syria’s borders into Iraq, specifically into the Hadar desert in Nineveh province. Although concrete barriers now separate the two countries, ISIS has retained a clear ability to move across the border, as confirmed by testimonies from residents in the rural areas of al-Hasakah—rekindling memories of the "parallel state" dynamic the group sought to establish during its peak between 2014 and 2017. The year 2024 saw a marked increase in ISIS activity within Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the group carried out 491 operations throughout the year. In its report released on December 30, 2024, the Observatory noted that ISIS has successfully exploited political and military turmoil to reorganize and launch targeted attacks. In line with this, the Soufan Center reported on December 18 that ISIS attacks had tripled in frequency compared to 2023. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on July 17 that the group claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria during just the first half of 2024—clearly reflecting a strategy aimed at “escalating operational activity to compensate for structural decline.”  This upward trend reinforces the growing assumption that ISIS is leveraging fragile security conditions not only to expand its territorial influence but also to challenge other extremist groups—most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria. HTS has faced internal challenges linked to the novelty of its governance experiment and has been weakened by surprise attacks that undermine its structure and heighten insecurity in its areas of control. ISIS, in turn, appears intent on diffusing HTS’s efforts, exacerbating divisions among factions, and exploiting public discontent with local elites. These developments have also triggered serious concerns over potential spillover effects in Iraq, especially given the deeply interwoven geographic linkages between the Syrian and Iraqi theaters of operation. The cross-border mobility of ISIS operatives could reactivate dormant cells in Iraq’s western and northern provinces—particularly given the thousands of radicalized individuals currently held in Iraqi prisons, making these facilities potential targets for jailbreaks or attempts to reassert control, as seen in the earlier Ghweran prison attack in al-Hasakah. In light of this complex battlefield landscape, the fight against ISIS is far from over. The group—demonstrating notable tactical agility—is reconstituting itself within existing voids, capitalizing on fragmentation, and continually seeking new pathways for resurgence through the shifting terrain of regional geopolitics. The inability of certain local and regional powers to formulate a sustainable, collective counterterrorism strategy only further emboldens the group’s ambitions. Contours of a New Phase in the War Against ISIS The final months of 2024 and early 2025 witnessed a series of high-profile operations targeting senior ISIS leaders, signaling a tactical shift in the counterterrorism strategies adopted by international and regional powers. This shift marks the beginning of a new phase in the fight against ISIS—one that moves beyond random strikes to a focused campaign against the group’s leadership infrastructure. On December 20, 2024, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a precision airstrike in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, initially claiming it had killed ISIS’s leader, known as “Abu Yusuf.” However, CENTCOM later revised its statement, clarifying that the target was not the overall leader but a senior commander named Mahmoud “Abu Yusuf,” along with two of his aides. This correction reflects the complex intelligence challenges involved in identifying high-ranking ISIS figures, especially in an environment riddled with infiltration and security deception. In a related development, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani announced in March 2025, via a post on the platform X, the killing of one of the group’s most dangerous operatives: Abdullah Maki Masleh Al-Rifai, known as “Abu Khadijah,” who held the title of “Wali of Iraq and Syria” within ISIS's organizational structure. His elimination, the result of coordinated efforts between Iraqi intelligence and the Joint Operations Command—supported by the international coalition—demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-layered coordination in tracking down the group’s hidden leadership. On the European front, France returned to active operations against ISIS in Syria for the first time in over two years. In December 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that French warplanes had conducted precision strikes on ISIS positions inside Syrian territory. He emphasized that the operation, carried out the previous Sunday, underscored France’s continued commitment to counterterrorism efforts in the Levant. This marked France’s first such strike since September 2022—indicating a potential reactivation of its counterterrorism role and a broader effort to reassert European engagement in Syria, a file that has largely been dominated by the U.S., Russia, and Turkey. These three operations—American, Iraqi, and French—reflect what appears to be a renewed “leadership decapitation campaign” targeting ISIS commanders amid rising concerns over the group’s resurgence in Syria and Iraq. Yet, while such strikes carry strategic importance, they cannot substitute for broader efforts to dismantle the ideological, organizational, and financial foundations that allow ISIS to regenerate. Killing leaders may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities, but it does not ensure its eradication unless accompanied by comprehensive political and security solutions that address the roots of extremism and the institutional fragility on which the group thrives. In a notable development suggesting a qualitative shift in how regional states are approaching the terrorism file, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria announced in February 2025 the establishment of a joint cooperation mechanism to confront ISIS. The agreement emphasizes close coordination between foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, covering areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations. This move reflects a shared recognition that the terrorist threat transcends borders and demands coordinated frameworks that go beyond bilateral interests toward a collective regional security logic. This agreement laid the foundation for a broader process that culminated in a high-level five-party summit on March 8, 2025. The meeting brought together foreign and defense ministers, senior military commanders, and intelligence chiefs from the four founding countries, with Lebanon later joining the process. From the Turkish side, the meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın—highlighting Turkey’s strategic investment in this forum as a platform for reshaping the security landscape in northern Syria and Iraq. More broadly, this nascent regional alliance reflects a growing inclination to reduce dependence on Western powers in managing regional security issues. Instead, it seeks to establish a “new security architecture” led by Middle Eastern nations themselves—reviving the role of Arab and regional capitals in controlling border zones and reclaiming areas that ISIS may seek to exploit as fallback havens for regrouping and redeployment. Conclusion The available data indicates that ISIS is entering a new phase of reactivation and repositioning in the Syrian theater, capitalizing on the security and political collapse following the fall of central authority, and on the conflicting agendas of regional and international actors. Despite targeted strikes against some of its leaders, the group continues to demonstrate its operational adaptability and its ability to evolve amid shifting field dynamics. The resurgence of ISIS attacks and its expansion into ungoverned spaces signal a complex phase of confrontation—one that demands more than just military maneuvers. The success of the war against ISIS in Syria depends not only on precision strikes but also on the establishment of effective regional security partnerships and the activation of political and developmental pathways that address the root causes of extremism. As the group seeks to exploit divisions, its complete disappearance will hinge on the creation of a comprehensive deterrence architecture—one that goes beyond temporary fixes and moves toward sustainable strategies that tackle the structural foundations of militancy, not just its symptoms.