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Diplomacy
President Trump at the G20 (48162425211)

'Personal Chemistry' vs. Disagreements in Syria: What Awaits Turkey Under D. Trump’s Presidency?

by Kamran Gasanov

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The victory of the “non-systemic” Donald Trump in the presidential election this time may not have been a surprise, but, as in 2016, it leaves no one indifferent. The world can be roughly divided into those who welcome the Republican's success and those who see the election results as bad news.   The first group includes the leadership of Israel, Georgia, Hungary, and Slovakia. The second group comprises Ukraine, Germany, France, China, and Iran. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan falls into the jubilant camp—he places high hopes on bilateral relations and joint solutions to global crises.  Does R. T. Erdoğan have grounds for optimism? “Chemistry” and Non-Interference in Internal Affairs Looking back at Donald Trump’s previous four years in office, it becomes clear that the results for Turkey were ambiguous. On the one hand, a personal chemistry developed between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald Trump — the American leader has a natural affinity for strong leaders, as Angela Merkel recently noted in her book.   Even as a presidential candidate, Trump praised Erdoğan in an interview with The New York Times for successfully suppressing the attempted coup. In the same interview, given a week after the failed coup attempt, Trump suggested that the U.S., not being a model of democracy itself, has no right to demand Ankara adheres to civil liberties. Furthermore, he indicated that he would not prioritize ideological issues in relations with a NATO ally. Overall, Donald Trump largely fulfilled his campaign promises. The White House refrained from emphasizing human rights issues or openly supporting the opposition — despite having plenty of reasons to do so. During Trump’s first term, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan cracked down on the organizers of the coup attempt and conducted mass purges within the military, law enforcement, judiciary, and education systems. He also arrested Kurdish politicians, including the founder of the Peoples' Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtaş, and consolidated his power by transitioning from a parliamentary to a presidential system.At the time, the U.S. liberal press was particularly concerned that Trump was “ignoring Mr. Erdoğan's authoritarian repression of his own people”. Four months after Donald Trump's inauguration, he welcomed his Turkish counterpart to the Oval Office and acknowledged Turkey's efforts in the fight against ISIS (a terrorist organization banned in Russia). Shortly thereafter, in August 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces launched Operation Euphrates Shield to clear the Syrian city of Al-Bab of terrorists. Under Donald Trump, Ankara-Washington relations had their contentious issues, but many of them were largely inherited from Barack Obama's administration. The attempted coup in Turkey occurred during the Democratic administration in the U.S., and none of the Western leaders, except the British Prime Minister, condemned the coup. It was under Obama that Turkish-American relations entered a genuine crisis.   Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began turning away from NATO and the EU, strengthening ties with Russia by negotiating the Turkish Stream pipeline, purchasing S-400 missile systems, and constructing the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. At the same time, the Obama administration refused to extradite preacher Fethullah Gülen, whom the Turkish leadership considers the mastermind behind the coup attempt. The Apple of Discord — Syria   The primary, though not the only, sticking point between Trump and Turkey was Syria. On one hand, U.S. support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the fight against ISIS began under Barack Obama, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized him for supporting terrorism. However, under Donald Trump, the U.S. continued supplying weapons to the YPG, which became part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under Pentagon patronage.  At the same time, Trump welcomed Turkey's fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), even though Ankara views the YPG as the PKK’s Syrian offshoot. In November 2017, however, the White House announced it would halt arms supplies to the Kurdish militias. The logic was that ISIS had been defeated, and the U.S. needed to focus on resolving the Syrian conflict and containing Iran. To achieve these goals, allies were essential, and Turkey, as a long-standing NATO member with the region’s most powerful army, clearly outweighed the YPG in strategic importance. Under Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had the opportunity to address the negative legacy of Barack Obama in Syria. In 2018, he launched Operation Olive Branch, seizing control of the Kurdish canton of Afrin alongside the Syrian armed opposition. In October 2019, Turkey conducted Operation Peace Spring.  Before its commencement, Turkey hoped that the U.S. would facilitate the withdrawal of Kurdish forces to the southern part of the country. Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Erdoğan warned that if the Pentagon failed to achieve this, the Turkish Armed Forces would unilaterally establish a so-called “safe zone” along the Turkish border. This zone would involve pushing out the YPG and their political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). On October 7, two days before the operation, Trump applied pressure on Turkey, threatening to “destroy and obliterate” its economy. Ultimately, Turkey carried out its operation. While the U.S. did not officially approve it, they withdrew their troops from the combat zones. On October 17, the U.S. and Turkey reached an agreement to pause the operation, allowing Kurdish forces to leave a 30-kilometer zone in northern Syria.   Details of the conflict resolution were finalized on October 22, when Erdoğan and Putin signed a memorandum in Sochi. According to the agreement, YPG members were required to withdraw 32 kilometers south from the entire Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey, along with the Syrian armed opposition, maintained control over the areas it had captured, stretching from Tel Abyad to Ras al-Ayn.  Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey agreed to conduct joint patrols in territories cleared of YPG, extending “up to 10 kilometers from the border to the west and east of the Peace Spring operation zone, excluding the city of Qamishli”. Relations between the American and Turkish presidents were further strained by Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems. Under Donald Trump, Turkey was removed from the F-35 fighter jet development program as punishment for the deal.   Another point of contention arose in July 2018, when Trump threatened Turkey with “major sanctions” over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson. Erdoğan suggested exchanging Brunson, who was accused of ties to Gülenists, for Fethullah Gülen.   In the end, Brunson was released in October the following year, but Ankara made it clear that the court’s decision was not a result of Trump’s pressure but rather an independent ruling by a democratic state. Donald Trump’s Pragmatism  Despite points of divergence inherited from Barack Obama and new conflicts that emerged, Donald Trump consistently sought to remain pragmatic. He acted from a position of strength, but avoided alienating his partner.  On October 15, Trump imposed 50% tariffs on Turkish steel, and just two days later, he called Erdoğan a “hell of a leader” and thanked him for halting military actions in Syria.   Toward the end of his term, Trump attempted to ease tensions with Turkey. During a White House meeting on November 13, 2019, he openly admitted to being a “big fan” of the Turkish leader, describing their relationship as “wonderful”. In return, Erdoğan referred to the Republican president as a “dear friend”.   At the same meeting, Trump expressed hope to resolve disagreements over the S-400 and F-35 issues “through dialogue”. What Are the Expectations?  Donald Trump’s first term left a lasting impression on Turkish society. The Republican’s threats in 2018 triggered the first collapse of the lira, and now, with Turkey’s economy in deep crisis, similar incidents are even more dangerous.  Economist Fatih Ozatay fears that a new trade war initiated by Trump could provoke retaliatory actions from other players, including China. A reduction in global trade volumes would impact Turkey’s economy by shrinking its export opportunities and further increasing pressure on the lira. Optimism from Turkish Leadership The Turkish leadership remains optimistic. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was among the first world leaders to congratulate the Republican on his return to the Oval Office. As soon as the U.S. election results were announced, Erdoğan posted on the social media platform “X”: “Congratulations to my friend Donald Trump, who won the U.S. presidential election after a hard-fought battle and was re-elected as president”. The following day, Erdoğan called Trump, expressing hope for future cooperation. An invitation for Trump to visit Turkey has already been sent. Peace in Ukraine Turkey has invested significant effort into resolving the Ukrainian conflict. Notably, the first and only successful attempt at addressing the conflict was made in Istanbul in March 2022. Turkey also acted as a mediator in the “grain deal”, the exchange of Ukrainian and Russian prisoners, and the largest prisoner swap between Russia and the West since the Cold War.   Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned that the war in Ukraine is heading either toward a frozen conflict or escalating into a global war. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly criticized the West for escalating the conflict. He recently described the decision to approve long-range strikes as “fueling the war” by Joe Biden.   “You won't achieve anything by following the principle 'after us the deluge'” Erdoğan cautioned. The Turkish leadership understands that no matter how much Erdoğan attempts to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow, all efforts will come to nothing without a shift in the White House’s stance. Under Joe Biden, Ankara grew disillusioned with the West’s willingness to negotiate, but with Donald Trump, things could change.  “If we see that the U.S. administration under Donald Trump approaches this issue from a settlement perspective, we can easily bring this war to an end”, Erdoğan stated. He emphasized that Turkey remains committed to pursuing peace, and if Trump’s peace-oriented rhetoric becomes reality, the chances of success will significantly increase. Gaza – Under Question, Hope for Syria When it comes to the Middle East, the main “issues” remain Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. In Lebanon, peace was achieved at the end of November — Joe Biden secured a ceasefire. The current head of the White House has promised to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well, but so far, no progress has been observed. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan believes that under Donald Trump, the Middle East could see “lasting peace and stability”, with the Republican exerting “significant influence on the political and military balance” in the region. Trump's skills as a businessman to impose his will and negotiate could lead to agreements. It is worth recalling that the Abraham Accords — Israel's agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco — were reached under his administration, and for Palestine, he developed the “Deal of the Century”. At the same time, Turkey understands Donald Trump and his team have a pro-Israel stance — this is evident from his previous decisions regarding Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the nuclear deal. In the new administration, Secretary of State Mark Rubio aims to eliminate Hamas rather than negotiate with it. The future Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, an evangelical, considers the construction of the Third Jewish Temple on the site of one of Islam's holiest sites, the Dome of the Rock, to be acceptable. Hakan Fidan highlighted Trump’s pro-Israel team at the end of November: “If you look at [Trump’s] cabinet, it signals that his pro-Israel team will support all of Netanyahu's expansionist ambitions. However, if we rely on Trump's own words, 'I did not come to start new wars but to end them,' we might see an opposing trend. We will observe how these two contradictory signals balance with each other and how this will impact the region soon”. In an earlier statement, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested to the newly elected U.S. President that halting arms supplies to Israel would help resolve the situation in the region. However, it is unlikely that this request will be heeded, especially considering that even Joe Biden, who has been critical of Benjamin Netanyahu, did not dare to take such a step. Cooperation in Syria appears more realistic for Ankara, albeit with reservations. Speaking at the COP29 conference in Baku, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again stated that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) might resume fighting against Kurdish militias in Syria and complete Operation “Peace Spring”, advancing both westward and eastward from already controlled territories.  In his “analysis of Trump”, Hakan Fidan expressed hope that Trump would withdraw 800 American soldiers from all of northeastern Syria, which would enable the TAF to carry out the operation. However, the minister expressed doubts that President Trump would agree to such a step immediately: “My impression of Donald Trump is this: despite his statements on various issues, he tends to postpone decisions on critical matters”. “A Trusted Ally” in the White House  While the situation with Israel is relatively clear—Donald Trump is surrounded by anti-Iran and anti-Palestinian hawks—Turkey has fewer allies in the new administration. One notable exception is political strategist Susie Wiles, who will serve as the Chief of Staff at the White House. Wiles is a veteran of politics and a trusted adviser to Trump, having worked on his presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2020. She has strong ties to lobbying networks and a deep understanding of the president's interests.   Wiles has extensive experience working with prominent lobbyist Brian Ballard, who represented Turkey's interests in Washington. A key moment in this relationship was the 2017 meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Brian Ballard, which advanced the lobbying of Turkish business interests in the United States. Susie Wiles, leveraging her connections and influence, successfully conveyed Turkey's priorities to Donald Trump and his administration, resulting in significant actions — such as attempts to close legal cases against the Turkish bank Halkbank, whose executives were accused of illegally transferring billions of dollars to Iran. Wiles' ties to Brian Ballard suggest that she will continue to advocate for Turkey's interests in her new role, particularly in the context of strategic trade between the two countries. The political strategist's influence could potentially soften the “America First” stance when it comes to Turkey, possibly leading to compromises in areas like Syria. For the finalization of Operation “Peace Spring”, Ankara requires a “green light” from the U.S., which currently backs the YPG. Wiles' position may play a pivotal role in facilitating this agreement. Optimism for the Future? The Erdoğan administration's hopes for improved relations with the U.S. under Donald Trump are not solely based on prior positive experiences with him and his encouraging statements on various issues. Turkish leadership had a highly unpleasant experience interacting with Joe Biden's team. Early in his presidency, Biden officially recognized the mass deaths of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. His administration exerted pressure on Turkey over its stance on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and anti-Russian sanctions, even imposing sanctions on Turkish companies.   The State Department and the White House frequently criticized Turkish authorities for human rights violations and the erosion of democratic principles in the country, almost openly supporting the opposition bloc during the 2023 presidential elections. Additionally, largely due to Pentagon opposition, Turkey refrained from completing its operation in Syria. Just days before Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's meeting in 2019, the House of Representatives approved sanctions against Turkey for its military operation in Syria. While many issues during Trump’s previous presidency could be attributed to an anti-presidential Congress, this time, the Republican president will face fewer restraining mechanisms, as his party dominates both the Senate and the House of Representatives.   It is also worth noting that the anti-Turkish Armenian and Greek lobbies wield greater influence over the Democratic Party than over the Republicans. Donald Trump's pragmatism, combined with his support from Congress and the presence of a “trusted ally” within his administration, provides grounds for improving Turkish-American relations. However, systemic issues between the two countries remain, imposing limitations even on a “dear friend” like Trump.  Turkey continues to diversify its foreign policy. Ankara is unwilling to sacrifice key economic, energy, and infrastructure projects with Russia and China as it integrates into the SCO and BRICS. The Syrian case could become a factor of either convergence or antagonism, particularly if Trump refuses to compromise on the Kurdish issue.  At the same time, potential escalation in Idlib, which could hinder normalization between Damascus and Ankara, would enhance U.S. influence in Turkish politics. Lastly, if Trump fails to bring peace to Palestine, Turkey is likely to intensify its policies and rhetoric against Israel, further straining relations with the newly elected president.

Diplomacy
Frejus, France - 0-05-2023: french politician François Bayrou is seen at the funeral of former politician François Leotard.

Macron clings to continuity and relies on the wildcard of the socialists and the far-right

by Enric Bonet

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The French president appoints veteran centrist François Bayrou as prime minister after Bayrou threatened to withdraw his party from the presidential coalition. Strong with the weak and weak with those at his own level — quite small, in fact. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, displayed this behavior on Friday at the start of a new chapter in the endless decline of his presidency. The head of state, who in the past acted ruthlessly against union protests (2023) and the Yellow Vest Revolt (2018), gave in to the pressures of veteran centrist François Bayrou. The leader of the MoDem Party managed to impose himself as head of the Executive against Macron's initial intentions. It was a morning worthy of an episode of the series ‘Baron Noir’. A true reflection of the agony of the presidential model of the Fifth Republic. Nine days after the successful motion of no confidence against the conservative government of Michel Barnier, the Élysée announced that the appointment would take place on Friday morning. The president had already missed his initial deadline to make the appointment by Thursday night, and prolonging the uncertainty would have further heightened the sense of ridicule. On the same Friday, at five in the morning, Macron called Bayrou, whose name had been at the top of all predictions to replace the former European Brexit negotiator, and told him he would not be chosen, according to the TF1 network. That call led to a heated meeting of nearly two hours at the presidential headquarters. During the meeting, Bayrou threatened Macron with withdrawing his party's (MoDem) deputies from the presidential coalition if he was not chosen as prime minister. “I joined you to do great things, not small ones. (…) It’s simple: if you don’t appoint me, I will withdraw my people”, warned the three-time presidential candidate (2002, 2007, and 2012), according to ‘Le Monde’. Such a move would have dealt a severe blow to an already weakened Macronism, which holds only 164 deputies (out of 577) and represents the second-largest bloc in the National Assembly, behind the left (192). Macron gave in at the end of a tumultuous morning. Instead of his preferred choices when he woke up that day — Sébastien Lecornu (Defense Minister) or Roland Lescure (former Industry Minister) — he opted for the 73-years-old Bayrou. Interestingly, the French head of state, who arrived at the Élysée in 2017 promising to revitalize the Fifth Republic, has now moved from appointing the oldest prime minister in that regime's history (Barnier) to another of the same age. Both are career politicians with 40-year trajectories. And with the added complication in the case of the newly appointed Prime Minister, who is burdened by a corruption case set to be retried on appeal in 2025. Less neoliberal than Macron "I don't think Macron is thrilled about facing the final stretch of his presidency with a prime minister like Bayrou, who has a tough and complicated character," explains political scientist Virginie Martin about the mayor of Pau, a town of 80,000 inhabitants in southwestern France. His appointment as head of the executive reflects, on one hand, the internal tensions within Macronism, which is clearly in decline. On the other hand, it shows the president's stubbornness in retaining control of the government rather than accepting an opening of the Executive towards the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP), which narrowly won the snap elections on July 7. Although Macronism obtained less than 15% of the votes in the European elections and came third in the first round of the legislative elections with 20%, it does not relinquish power. It takes advantage of parliamentary fragmentation into three nearly irreconcilable blocs (the left, Macronist center-right, and the far-right) and the extensive powers granted to the president by the Constitution. “It seems incomprehensible to me from an electoral standpoint,” criticized Marine Tondelier, secretary-general of the Greens, regarding the appointment of one of Macron’s earliest significant allies. The current president and the leader of MoDem joined their political paths in February 2017. At that time, they reached an agreement that led to Bayrou’s withdrawal from that year’s presidential campaign, which proved key to Macron’s victory in May. Just a few weeks before that pact, the veteran leader had made harsh remarks about his future ally: “It won’t work (…), because the French will see what’s behind this hologram. There is an attempt by financial powers that are no longer satisfied with economic control but also want political power.” Since then, relations between the two have never been entirely smooth. As he did again this Friday, Bayrou has repeatedly threatened to withdraw MoDem from the presidential coalition, which also includes Macron’s party, ‘Renaissance’, and Horizons. “He is an heir to the Christian democratic tradition. He is neither a Thatcherite liberal nor an anarcho-liberal — in the pure style of Javier Milei,” explains political scientist Jean Petaux regarding the main ideological difference between Bayrou and Macron, whose political DNA is more influenced by neoliberal ideas. Budgets defined by austerity "I am aware of the Himalaya we have before us," Bayrou stated on Friday afternoon during his inauguration ceremony at Matignon. He was referring to France's delicate financial situation, as the country is set to close the year with a public deficit exceeding 6%, more typical of a period of severe crisis. His first test will be the drafting and adopting the 2025 budget law. As Barnier previously attempted, the newly appointed prime minister will likely try to address the deficit with budgets marked by harsh austerity — his predecessor had planned a €40 billion cut in public spending. He may attempt to soften this by introducing some form of special tax on the wealthiest. The former Brexit negotiator “had already proposed a temporary tax on the windfall profits of large corporations. During the parliamentary debate, the left and Bayrou’s party deputies agreed to approve an amendment proposing that this tax be applied for more than two years,” recalls Petaux. The traditional right-wing party, ‘Les Républicains’ (LR), will likely support the approval of the public budget. Despite his strained relationship with former President Nicolás Sarkozy, who still holds some influence over LR, Bayrou may convince the post-Gaullist party to remain in the government, which it joined in September under Barnier. Key figures in the current government — Sarkozy ally Rachida Dati (Culture), conservative Catherine Vautrin (Territories), and the xenophobic Bruno Retailleau (Interior) — are confident they will retain their positions. A non-aggression pact with the Socialists? In contrast, ‘La France Insoumise’ (aligned with Spanish Parties ‘Podemos’ or ‘Sumar’), which represents the Popular Front party with the largest number of deputies, announced a motion of no confidence against Bayrou. “If they want to keep the same people in key positions, including Retailleau in Interior, and do nothing about pensions, ecology, and tax justice, I see no other option but censure,” stated the ecologist Marine Tondelier. Her party is divided but seems to lean toward outright opposition, like ‘La France Insoumise’. The big question is the position of the Socialist Party (PS) and the far-right National Rally (RN). Their stance will determine whether Bayrou lasts longer in Matignon than Barnier, who was censured less than three months after his appointment. The center-left party stated that it “will not participate in the government and will remain in opposition.” However, it distanced itself from its ‘La France Insoumise’ allies by opening the door to a non-censure agreement. Their conditions include the prime minister refraining from using Article 49.3, which allows laws to be passed without a parliamentary vote and contributed to Barnier's downfall. They also demanded that he abandon plans to push a tough immigration law early next year. "I feel that there are many false moves by the Socialists," says Martin, a professor at Kedge Business School. Their distancing from ‘La France Insoumise’, which is pursuing an uncertain strategy aimed at forcing Macron's resignation and preparing for early presidential elections, is due to "the pre campaign for the 2026 municipal elections" as well as "the Socialist Party's congress next year." The party's secretary-general, Olivier Faure, a supporter of unity among progressive forces, risks losing his position at that internal summit due to the offensive from the party's right wing, led by former President François Hollande and the mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo. A cordial relationship with Le Pen If Bayrou ultimately fails to secure a non-aggression pact with the Socialists, he will have the option of Marine Le Pen. The National Rally (RN) welcomed the appointment of the MoDem leader with apparent satisfaction, as he maintains a somewhat cordial relationship with Le Pen’s movement. “In 2022, he lent his signature to Le Pen so she could run in the presidential elections,” arguing for political pluralism. “He also proposed the creation of a ‘bank for democracy’ to address the far-right’s financing issues, which led them to seek funds (up to 11 million euros) from a Russian bank close to the Kremlin,” Martin recalls. Nevertheless, the major point of commonality between Bayrou and Le Pen is their legal troubles. Despite being one of Macron’s earliest allies, Bayrou has played a secondary role over the past seven years due to his alleged involvement in a scheme involving fake assistants in the European Parliament. The Paris Court acquitted him in early 2024, but it did convict eight MoDem officials and imposed a €400,000 fine on the party. Additionally, the prosecution appealed against the ruling, and the case will be retried on appeal. It is a scheme very similar to the one for which the far-right leader was tried this past fall. His verdict is expected on March 31, and he faces a possible five-year disqualification with immediate effect. This could trigger a political earthquake in France. The future of the Fifth Republic's crisis will depend not only on Parliament but also on the courts. This article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

Energy & Economics
Press Conference by European Commission President Ursula von der LEYEN and Mario DRAGHI on the Report on the Future of EU Competitiveness in Brussels, Belgium on September 9, 2024.

Press statement by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the Mercosur leaders' meeting

by Ursula von der Leyen

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ladies and Gentlemen, Today marks a truly historic milestone. Let me begin by thanking the Chief Negotiators for their dedication and determination. They worked tirelessly, over many years, for an ambitious and balanced agreement – and they succeeded. The bond between Europe and the Mercosur countries is truly one of the strongest in the world. It is a bond anchored in trust, enriched by a shared heritage, that spans centuries of mutual learning and growth. In fact, exactly 30 years ago, in 1994, my predecessor Jacques Delors stood here in Montevideo. He met with your father, dear Luis, who was then President of Uruguay. Together they shared a bold vision. A vision of deeper integration, not only within Europe and Mercosur, but also between them. Today, in Montevideo, we are turning that vision into reality. We are strengthening this unique partnership as never before. And in doing so, we are sending a clear and powerful message to the world. First, in an increasingly confrontational world, we demonstrate that democracies can rely on each other. This agreement is not just an economic opportunity, it is a political necessity. We are like-minded partners. We both believe that openness and cooperation are the true engines of progress and prosperity. I know that strong winds are blowing in the opposite direction – towards isolation and fragmentation. But this agreement is our clear response. We stand together on the global stage, as partners. Second, we are sending a message to our people and businesses in our regions: This agreement was designed with your interests at heart. It is made to work for you. It means: more jobs – and good jobs – more choices and better prices. The European Union and Mercosur create one of the largest trade and investment partnerships the world has ever seen. We are taking barriers down and we are allowing investments in. We are forming a market of over 700 million consumers. This partnership will strengthen entire value chains; it will develop strategic industries; it will support innovation; and it will create jobs and values, on both sides of the Atlantic. Third, we are showing the world that trade can – and must – be guided by values. Trade agreements are more than economic frameworks. They are a way to build communities of shared values. The EU-Mercosur agreement reflects our steadfast commitment to the Paris Agreement and to the fight against deforestation. President Lula's efforts to protect the Amazon are welcome and necessary. But preserving the Amazon is a shared responsibility of all humanity. This agreement ensures that investments respect Mercosur's extraordinary yet fragile natural heritage. My fourth message is that, economically, this is a win-win agreement. Europe is already a leading investment and trade partner for Mercosur. So you know how we do business together. We are focused on fairness and mutual respect. EU-Mercosur will bring meaningful benefits to consumers and businesses, on both sides. It will facilitate European investments in strategic industries across all Mercosur countries: like sustainable mining, renewable energy and sustainable forest products, just to name a few. It will also make it easier to invest in sectors that directly impact the people's daily lives. For example, expanding the electricity grid to rural and remote areas and advancing digitalisation across the region. Finally, let me address my fellow Europeans: This agreement is a win for Europe. 60,000 companies are exporting to Mercosur today – 30,000 of them are small and medium-sized enterprises. They benefit from reduced tariffs, simpler customs procedures and preferential access to some critical raw materials. This will create huge business opportunities. To our farmers: We have heard you, listened to your concerns and we are acting on them. This agreement includes robust safeguards to protect your livelihoods. EU-Mercosur is the biggest agreement ever, when it comes to the protection of EU food and drinks products. The agreement protects 350 EU geographical indications. In addition, our European health and food standards remain untouchable. This is the reality – the reality of an agreement that will save EU companies EUR 4 billion worth of export duties per year while expanding our markets and opening new opportunities for growth and jobs on both sides. I want to thank President Lacalle Pou for hosting this Summit and for bringing us together in Montevideo. This is a good day for Mercosur, a good day for Europe and a landmark moment for our shared future. A whole generation dedicated their effort, vision and determination to bring this agreement to life. Now, it is our turn to honour that legacy. Let us ensure that this agreement delivers on its promises and serves the generations to come. Thank you very much.

Energy & Economics
Inscription BRICS 2024, Kazan, Russia on a blue background. Official blue logo signage of the BRICS summit 2024 Russia in Kazan. Russia, Kazan, October 26, 2024

Latin American Prospects for BRICS

by Tatiana Vorotnikova

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The BRICS Summit held in Kazan October 22–24, 2024, highlighted several defining developments regarding Latin American countries that will play a significant role in the continent's political and economic evolution soon. With the inclusion of two regional states as associate members of the bloc, Latin American presence in the pool of developing nations striving to expand their influence in shaping a new world order is set to increase. Bolivia and Cuba joined BRICS as partners alongside 11 other countries: Algeria, Belarus, Vietnam, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Together with the core BRICS countries and new members who joined the bloc a year earlier, they form a fundamentally new framework for international cooperation, where the diversity of participants creates a platform for a polyphonic dialogue. While the general outline of their interests aligns, each country has its own priorities and expectations from its participation in BRICS. Interests of Bolivia The multinational state of Bolivia is developing a left-oriented economic model, in which fundamental importance is given to the social redistribution of state revenues, received mainly from the exploitation of the country's resource potential. Bolivia has significant hydrocarbon reserves, primarily natural gas, as well as the largest lithium reserves on the planet, the volume of which is estimated at more than 21 million tons. While the export of Bolivian hydrocarbons (mainly to neighboring Brazil and Argentina) remains a traditional source of budget revenues, the lithium industry has relatively recently become a priority for the country's foreign economic activity. The nationalization of lithium in 2008 marked the beginning of efforts to develop deposits. However, for a number of reasons, including difficulties in attracting investment, the lack of a technological base, and resistance from indigenous populations and local environmental organizations, full-scale exploitation of the deposits—aside from some pilot projects—was never realized. Only in 2021, two Chinese and a Russian company, Uranium One Group, which is part of the management circuit of the State Corporation Rosatom, received a tender for development. By joining BRICS as a partner, La Paz hopes to strengthen its position as a supplier of lithium raw materials to the global market. Given the scale of national reserves of this metal, the Bolivian government is interested in expanding the number of international investors. La Paz is ready to engage with its partners in other fields, such as energy resources and food production. BRICS countries already occupy leading positions in Bolivia's foreign economic relations. Firstly, we are talking about Brazil ($3.5 billion), China ($3.5 billion), and India (about $2 billion), which imports large volumes of Bolivian gold. In addition to trade, China is actively investing in Bolivian infrastructure and technology projects. The significance of collaboration with Russia continues to increase. The lithium agreement is part of a broader strategy between the two governments to encourage investment in key sectors. On the sidelines of the Kazan summit, Presidents Luis Arce Catacora and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin held a bilateral meeting to discuss joint nuclear technologies (a unique high-mountain Nuclear Research and Technology Center (NRTC) for the peaceful use of nuclear energy has been established in Bolivia, built by Russian specialists), along with cooperation in education, lithium contracts, and other agendas that align the interests of the two countries. Additionally, La Paz and Moscow share common principles for shaping a global order and advocate for the creation of a multipolar world. At the same time, it is important to consider Bolivia's complex domestic political situation and the conditions under which the country will approach the 2025 general elections. The dispute over the presidential candidacy threatens to completely dismantle the political project that has been unfolding in the country since 2006. Social divisions and economic crises are fostering a deep sense of uncertainty and pessimism within Bolivian society regarding the country's development prospects. BRICS could present a new opportunity for economic breakthroughs, provided the current course is maintained after the elections. However, it is also possible that with the rise of opposition forces, Bolivia might follow the path of Argentina, which, as is known, withdrew from joining the bloc after a change of power. Cuban Expectations For Cuba, international support from BRICS countries represents a chance to overcome the prolonged and multifaceted crisis that the island cannot resolve on its own. Havana sees its main goals as countering unilateral American restrictive measures and seeking alternative sources of financing.   Cuba maintains trade relations with all BRICS countries, though their share in Cuba’s total trade turnover remains relatively small. China holds a leading position, accounting for approximately 13% of Cuban foreign trade. The most significant growth in trade turnover occurred between 2005 and 2015, but in recent years, Cuban-Chinese relations have seen a decline. In 2018, Cuba joined China's Belt and Road Initiative, but it has yet to yield substantial results.   Latin American countries account for a third of Cuba's foreign trade, with Brazil representing only 3.2%. The expansion of trade and economic ties with Russia has led to an increase in trade turnover to 7%. Thus, enhancing the intensity of external economic relations remains one of Cuba’s primary objectives. At the same time, the primary obstacle to achieving this remains the U.S. economic embargo, which Cuba consistently urges the international community to oppose. While there was a thaw in bilateral relations during Barack Obama's presidency, with mutual efforts to find compromises on key issues, neither side is willing to fully abandon its positions.   It should also not be assumed that Havana’s rapprochement with BRICS signals a complete abandonment of efforts to establish constructive engagement with Washington. The United States will continue to be a focal point for Cuban attention. However, given the new dynamics in the White House following the recent elections, it will be challenging for Havana to maintain the current status quo and avoid heightened pressure that could follow from the hegemon. Contradictions Between Venezuela and Brazil  One of the countries that shares Cuba's aspirations is Venezuela, which is under severe Western sanctions and grappling with a deep economic crisis. Caracas primarily relies on support from Russia and China. However, Venezuela's relationships with other BRICS members are far more complex.   For instance, Venezuelan-Indian ties are primarily based on India's demand for oil from the Bolivarian Republic. Under pressure from U.S. sanctions, India ceased purchasing “black gold” from Caracas in 2019 but remains open to resuming cooperation if restrictions are eased.   At the same time, Delhi provides no political support to the Venezuelan government, and the prospect of expanding ties in other areas appears unlikely. The veto on Venezuela's inclusion in the BRICS group of partners, driven by Brazil’s position, exposed deep contradictions within the region and intensified divisions among representatives of the left wing of Latin America's political spectrum. The fact that Brazil—the only country representing the region within BRICS—became the obstacle for Venezuela caused significant backlash and sharp rejection from Caracas. For Nicolás Maduro and his administration, potential membership in BRICS represents a key foreign policy objective. Maduro's close ties with Russia and strong relations with some Asian and African nations suggested high chances of acceptance. Furthermore, Venezuela maintains robust connections with several BRICS members, including Iran and China, with which it signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in 2023 (similar agreements exist between Beijing and only Russia, Belarus, and Pakistan). Until recently, no open opposition to Venezuela's accession to BRICS had been observed. Venezuela and Brazil have a history of strained diplomatic relations, which were severed in 2019 after then-Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president. Ties were restored only in 2023 with the return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to Brazil’s presidency. However, relations began to deteriorate again after Venezuela’s presidential elections in July 2024, in which Nicolás Maduro was declared the winner. The election results remain unrecognized by many countries, including Brazil, which officially called for the release of electoral protocols and withheld recognition of the Venezuelan government’s legitimacy. The growing rift between the two nations was exacerbated by Brazil’s veto on Venezuela’s inclusion in BRICS, leading to a sharp response from Caracas. In addition to issuing strong statements against Brazil, Maduro recalled his ambassador for consultations. Given that Brazil is set to chair BRICS in 2025, the current tensions have significantly diminished Venezuela’s chances of membership until relations with Brasília are restored. Considering the steadfastness and consistency of Itamaraty in implementing its foreign policy, this issue is likely to be postponed indefinitely. Brazil’s Aspirations   As of today, Brazil remains the only Latin American country represented in BRICS as a full-fledged member. It plays a key role on the global stage in advancing the Global South's agenda.   A central figure in this process is Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who, during his two presidential terms (2003–2006, 2007–2011), pursued an active policy of fostering closer ties with developing nations in Asia and Africa. His commitment to a multilateral approach in foreign policy reflects Brazil’s national tradition of positioning itself as a regional power with global ambitions. The rotation of BRICS chairmanship, coupled with the extension of Dilma Rousseff's tenure as head of the New Development Bank, appears to enhance Brazil’s prospects for expanding its role within the group and globally. In a challenging domestic political landscape, where the government faces significant opposition from a large segment of society, international achievements will be crucial for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.   While Brazil struggles to consolidate its Latin American neighbors and act as a driver of regional integration, its current diplomacy has shifted focus to global initiatives. Participation in international affairs is an integral part of Brazil's national identity. Its historical tradition of engaging in multilateral forums as a regional leader, combined with its accumulated diplomatic expertise, has positioned Brazil as a significant actor on the world stage. This allows the country to wield influence far exceeding that of a developing nation burdened by substantial internal socio-economic challenges and lacking the military capabilities of great powers. Brazil’s vision for a world based on international rules, where every nation has a voice, reflects its aspiration to advance a fairer global order. Through BRICS, Brazil seeks to promote this ideal, leveraging the group’s potential to amplify its influence on the global stage. External Factors Several other Latin American countries, such as Honduras, Nicaragua (both submitted applications ahead of the 2024 Kazan summit), and Colombia, have expressed their desire to join the bloc. This demonstrates a broad interest and intent to deepen cooperation within the Global South paradigm.   Additionally, Argentina's accession to BRICS, which was renounced by President Javier Milei, is likely to remain on the agenda and may be revisited in the future. Considering that an invitation from BRICS was extended and Argentina's political landscape is subject to radical shifts, the prospect of joining the bloc could materialize if pro-BRICS forces return to power in Buenos Aires. Finally, U.S. policy toward the region under Donald Trump’s administration will play a significant role in shaping the participation of Latin American countries in BRICS. While Trump’s cabinet is not yet fully formed and clear policy directions have not been outlined, various speculations are fueling uncertainty and raising expectations among different groups, without providing a clear picture. What is evident, however, is that Latin American countries once again find themselves needing to react to steps taken by the northern hegemon. Attempts to establish independent policies, undertaken over recent decades by many governments in the region, primarily leftist ones, have yet to yield the desired results or become an established reality. As a result, how these nations shape their foreign policies, including in other areas, will, to a certain extent, depend on Washington’s influence. In this context, BRICS, not only for newcomers like Cuba and Bolivia, could serve as a point of leverage to reduce dependence on the United States and create alternative paths for their foreign economic and political engagement. In a world of global uncertainty, Latin American countries are seeking effective mechanisms to advance and strengthen their positions.  Forms of international cooperation, like those provided by the BRICS format, are emerging as essential tools in this effort. This collaboration holds the potential to be both mutually enriching and highly beneficial.

Defense & Security
Central African Republic-august 21, peace keeper conduct patrol on August 21, 2014 in Bangui, Central African Republic

Terrorism in Central African Republic: A Mosaic of State Fragility and Abnormality

by Chukwuemeka N. Oko-Otu , Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract Religious extremism and radicalization have dominated the discourse on the causes of terrorism. However, little is written of other drivers of terrorism, such as economic and social deprivations, which could prompt religious groups to resort to terrorism. Scholars have sufficiently analyzed the imports of radical ideological and religious views on the emergence of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. By contrast, the Seleka and anti-Balaka terrorists of the Central African Republic introduces a new perspective to the explanation of terrorism. This essay uses the analytical framework of abnormality and State fragility to discuss the rise of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The essay argues that the historical precedent of State failure and weak institutions provides a catalyst that propels the use of terrorism by religious groups, the state and organized groups to demand political and economic dividends as well as a tool for power contestations and regime change. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and building nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. They include the transformation of the subsistence farming culture to a masses-driven cash crop economy for exportation, which will manage state fragility and promote civil-military counter-terrorism culture at the grassroots. IMPACT STATEMENT Terrorism is one of the greatest threats to human security and the survival of the state in the 21st century. Since the 9/11 bombings, scholars and policymakers have committed significant resources to unpack the causes and course of terrorism. In this paper, we look away from the prevailing drivers of terrorism such as religious radicalisation and offer another lens through which policymakers and framers of counter-terrorism operations can view the use of terrorism by religious groups, individuals, and non-state actors within a state. The paper argued that where a state is unable to fulfil its social contract with the citizens, such a state permits its citizens to use terrorism as a tool to derive the benefit which the state failed to provide. The paper draws instances from the trajectories of the Balaka and Anti-Seleka terrorist groups operating in the Central Africa Republic. Introduction Terrorism has become a fundamental problem for individuals, groups and the state to manage in different parts of the globe. The growing nature of terrorism has made terrorists strong actors in national politics and international relations. The contemporary world records the increasing influence of terrorists. This has become true in the relations between Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran and other countries of the Middle East. Ironically, the multiplier effect is manifested in protest and politics across American universities and transportation of goods across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Studies on terrorism have linked the increasing use of terror by organized groups and States to ethnic, ideological, political, and religious factors (Schmid, Citation1998; Shultz, Citation1978). Essentially, the discourse on religiously motivated terrorism, although controversial and problematic, is prevalent particularly following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaida, and Boko- Haram (Jackson, Citation2012, p. 1). Elu and Price (Citation2014) linked terrorism in Africa to deprivation. Cilliers (Citation2001) argued that the root causes of terrorism and conflict in Africa include climate change, competition over resources, marginalization of the majority and global militarism. Nevertheless, critical terrorism studies have shown that more than the religiously and ideologically motivated use of terror by organized groups; the state also uses terrorism to drive its political objectives, especially against opposition groups (Lacqueur, Citation2001; Jackson et al., 2015). This study contributes to scholarship on how State failure and weak political institutions provide a catalyst that crystallizes the use of terrorism by religious and organized groups in demanding political dividends and power contestation. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. While Okereke et al. (Citation2016) study is in line with the position of this study, particular focus is on the unique nature of terrorism in CAR. It is this nature of state fragility that has weakened the ability of the state in CAR to provide other necessary societal conditions, resources, social amenities and developments that are needed to curb or eliminate terrorism. For instance, the inability of the state to provide and fund sustainable, functional education has created a society where people can easily be brainwashed to join terror sects. Again, the fragile nature of the CAR state has also undermined its ability to generate sustainable employment and a vibrant economy where a greater per cent of the citizenry could engage in small and medium-scale enterprises or engage in meaningful economic activities that would deny them the idleness that pushes them to terror activities. The place of ethnic, identity and ideological factors in driving terrorism cannot be neglected in CAR. This is because it is the fusion of state fragility and the advanced nature of ethnicity that drove the country into full-fledged terrorism as against mere ethnic crisis, thereby creating the absurdity that ethnic tension has become a driver of terrorism. The connection between economics, education and terrorism is deeply connected. In short, when the three factors are weak in a particular environment like CAR, and they become inflamed with religious fundamentalism, terrorism will be ignited in a very deadly form. The same factor played an active role in the mobilization of men and women who joined the Boko Haram terror sect in Nigeria (Ani kelechi et al., Citation2018). This is because the etymology of the word Boko Haram emanates from the traditional Hausa idea in the colonial era, which conceptualized and projected Western education (Boko) as a sin (Haram). Thus, the uneducated masses in North Eastern Nigeria did not desire further schooling to join a sect that was fighting for a hitherto historic ideology (Kukah, Citation2009). The position of Kukah (Citation2009) was also captured by Zenn et al. (Citation2013), who also linked local grievances to ideology (that was dominant in CAR) and internal politics of Nigeria in developing the study on terrorism. It should be noted that the concept of terrorism has evolved, and the precise meaning has remained contentious and exacerbated (Adibe, Citation2020; Ramsay, Citation2015). Puccetti (Citation2021) has argued that failing states create conditions for fostering terrorism. However, he has maintained that not all failing states experience the emergence of terrorism. Gaibulloev et al. (Citation2024) studied how terrorist groups survive in failed states. They maintain that in a state that is failing, terrorist groups easily survive. However, these studies did not particularly focus their analysis on the Central African Republic. The structural weakness and failure of the state have remained the major drivers of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The central objective of the study is to evaluate the place of state fragility and abnormality in the development of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The key research question is, to what extent is terrorism in the Central African Republic a function of state fragility and abnormality? The situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) represents a new dimension to the motivation for terrorism among organized groups. The CAR is one of Africa’s most economically viable states, but it repeatedly scores at the bottom of global development indices (World Bank, 2020: Boas, Citation2014). Economic and political development in the country remains, at best, a paradox because the poverty rate, inequality, and underdevelopment in the country, do not correlate with the country’s rich natural and human resources. With large-scale unemployment, poverty, terrorism, insurgency, maritime piracy, trafficking, increased insecurity, and delayed economic and political reform and integration, the CAR presents an example of an abnormal and fragile state in Africa. The absence of a standing state security apparatus means that the state does not have a monopoly on national force and security. As a result of weak political institutions, contestation to State power and regime change is a function of a ‘group’s ability to exert a higher degree of terror (Crescent, 2018, p. 8). It is this failed political, economic and security environment that triggers the proliferation of terrorism in the CAR. The study was developed using secondary data sourced from journals and books. The analysis of earlier scholars was sourced thematically and used to enrich the content of the study. This paper is significant because it breaks away from the simplistic explanation of terrorism in CAR as a mere religious and ideological phenomenon. It interrogates how an impoverished population can possess the capability for terrorism and contributes to the argument of state-sponsored terrorism. The paper argues that the insufficiencies of State institutions, a poor economy, and a security apparatus in disarray permit the use of terrorism by an impoverished population to demand political accountability and change. The argument of the paper is structured in two parts. The first part provides an overview of the CAR, clarifies and critiques the concepts of terrorism, state fragility, and abnormality, and the second part analyses the linkages between terrorism and state fragility and abnormality in CAR and concludes. Conceptual clarification terrorism versus state fragility and abnormality terrorism There is no precise definition of the concept of terrorism. The varying use of the concept by scholars, policymakers, and observers to create the desired political effect, the attempt to determine what fits and does not fit as terrorism, and efforts to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence make the concept difficult to define (Shimid, 1998, Weinberg et al., Citation2004). As a ‘contested ‘concept’, terrorism has been variously defined. Lacqueur (Citation1999) has argued that there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution in the character of terrorism. The new terrorist represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the familiar traditional terrorist groups (Hoffman, Citation1999). Terrorism covers the manipulation of fear to attain defined goals. Traditionally, terrorists target the killing of great political figures to ignite massive reactions like the killing of Archduke Ferdinand. However, during colonial rule in Africa, the imperial administrators were increasingly accusing Africans who challenged their exploitative rule as terrorists. This was the case with Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and the Zikist movement in Nigeria, among other nationalist movements that employed radical ideologies towards decolonization. However, the reality is that terrorism and terrorists change in form, scope and dynamics. They are more organised, strategic, and focused on unleashing harm and threats to individuals, groups, and states. While several scholars present terrorists as men and women who are irrational in their decisions, the reality is that terrorists are radicalized to rationally manipulate fear and violence to achieve certain goals that are set out by the protagonists of the terror onslaught (Ani & Uwizeyimana, Citation2021). The complexity in conceptualizing terrorism in CAR and many parts of Africa like Nigeria made Ramsay (Citation2015) to argue that terrorism should not be defined. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. Notwithstanding, Alex Schmid gave a popular definition of the concept. According to him, Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the primary targets (Schmid, 1988, p. 28). Furthermore, the above definition captured the orthodox perspective of terrorism as an act of State and non-state actors. Nonetheless, the definition follows the traditional explanation that terrorism is ideologically, religiously, and politically motivated. It undermined how weak political and economic institutions in a State could permit the use of terrorism to demand social and economic development and reforms by groups (Ani & Osisioma, Citation2014). Such uses of terrorism often have a clear target selection. In such situations, the persistent use of terrorism is aided by weak political and economic structures and intended to coerce the government to improve the economic and social life of the people (Ani & Chukwu, Citation2014; Anikelechi et al., Citation2018). In turn, the government uses terrorism in the absence of strong state security institutions for counterterrorism operations (Ani & Uzodike, Citation2015). Similarly, the absence of a strong political and state security institution permits the sponsorship of terrorism by external actors for their economic interests (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). Evidence of this type of terrorism is found in the Central African Republic, where religious groups form a coalition and use terrorism to demand economic and political dividends from the government. The next section of the essay will conceptualize State fragility and abnormality as a driver of terrorism in Central Africa. The weakness of the state, therefore, creates a sustainable environment for terrorism to strive. When the state is weak, and the machinery of the state cannot effectively deliver on its expected targets of providing the needs of the masses and guaranteeing the security of lives and properties, it naturally creates a lacuna that manifests in what is generally referred to as the ungoverned spaces. This is a collection of areas that are not under active state control, experience partial state control, or have a relatively weak presence of the rule of law (Bernard & Daful, Citation2021; Gov.UK, n.d.). It is this causal relationship between the nature of the state in the Central African Republic and the rise of terrorism that worsened the conditions for the security of lives and properties in the country. These ungoverned spaces are further occupied directly and indirectly by terror actors. Moreover, from these ungoverned space, they begin to launch their influence into other parts of the country and beyond. Downey (Citation2021) maintained that the United States’ war on terror did not deter ungoverned spaces in Africa. State fragility and abnormality As with terrorism, the concept of state fragility is complex and lacks a precise definition. Although a novel concept in development policy, the concept has been variously defined. The United Kingdom Department for International Development uses the term to describe the failure or lack of will and capacity by a State to perform its core functions and responsibilities to the citizens (DFID, 2005). According to the World Bank, fragile States are low-income countries scoring below 3.2 and below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. It applies to states that have higher tendencies to fail in their economic, security, and political obligations to their citizens (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 1). As a result, there is a prevailing atmosphere of poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, insecurity, weak institutional frameworks, lack of territorial control, and a high propensity to conflict and civil war (OECD, Citation2012, Citation2014). A state is described as fragile when there is an increase in poverty and economic decline, with State institutions incapable of handling civilian grievances arising from inequality in the distribution of wealth, representation, and access to public institutions (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 7). It should be noted that these main characteristics of state fragility are widespread in Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and CAR. These states share widespread poverty as a visible status of the economy among their citizens. Again, the nature of their insecurity is widespread within the sovereign state. Unfortunately, the managers of these states focus on advancing their exploitation of state resources, thereby creating opportunities for Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to advertise their quest for followership using social media and, in some cases, declaring dominance over some specified ungoverned spaces within the country (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). The difference among these sects is that Al Shabab survives on sea piracy in the Gulf of Guinea more than any other source of economy when compared to the terrorists in CAR (Anyika et al., Citation2022). Again, while Boko Haram and Al Shabab make use of social media to advertise and advance their network, economy, training and resources with international jihadi fighters and terrorist groups, terrorism in CAR is relatively domesticated (Anikelechi et al., Citation2018) In the Central African Republic, the income level of the masses remains low due to a weak national economy. There is a lack of bubbling production units and companies that could enhance mass production for commercial purposes and export earnings in general. The prevailing atmosphere of poverty and widespread unemployment and underemployment ensures that the society is prone to the negative influence of foreign terror sponsors as well as exposes the masses to the culture of exploitation by those who use their minimal resources to attract the frustrated poor and unemployed into the world of terrorism. The nature of the national geography also gives an advantage towards the expansion of insecurity and terror attacks within the country. Similarly, the concept of State abnormality is novel; the word is used in this paper to describe a State with full prospects and potential in terms of human and natural resources for development and economic growth but lacking in the human initiative and capacity to drive necessary developments and growth. In other words, the natural and economic resources in an abnormal State do not match the level of progress in all ramifications. An abnormal state is, therefore, a State riddled with developmental paradoxes. It is worth noting that all fragile and abnormal states are prone to and riddled with conflicts and threats of violence (Eugene, Citation2020). Moreover, scholars do not agree on the exact indices or parameters for measuring State fragility and abnormality. There is controversy over how the concept is operationalized and who sets the parameters for measuring fragility and abnormality (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 2). However, Besley and Persson argue that in a fragile and abnormal State, there is the pathology of State ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and raising revenues or political violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict or even both pathologies are present at the same time (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Similarly, the World Bank uses the CPIA ratings based on Economic Management, Structural Policies, Social Inclusion and Equity Policies, and Public Sector Management and Institutions to measure fragile States. Moreover, the Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity observed three major features of fragile States – authority, service, and legitimacy failures (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Nonetheless, an overview of the working definitions of different organizations and agencies proposed above reveals three basic variables in measuring fragile and abnormal States. This paper has classified these three variables as legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps based on the core functions of the state. For this paper, the fragile state and abnormality of the state will be measured based on the existence of some legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps in the Central African Republic. Discussion on Terrorism in CAR: The State Fragility and Abnormality Linkages Geographically, the Central African Republic is located at the centre of the African continent. The country’s current borders were established by the French during the scramble and partition of Africa in the late 19th century. Because of its central location, the CAR shares boundaries with multiple countries within the Central African region of the African continent; these countries include Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan. The country covers an area of 622,984 sq. km with a population of about 4.7 million (BBC Africa, 2018). The country is made up of over 80 ethnic nationalities of varying sizes in both land areas of concentration and number and with distinct languages (Alusala, 2017, p. 11). Economically, the Central African Republic is endowed with natural resources, including uranium, oil, gold, diamonds, and timber, as well as a huge potential for hydroelectric power. However, these resources have not been properly harnessed, and the little activity that exists does not generate much income for the state as it is dominated by foreign powers that align with some privileged politicians to exploit them for their selfish interests (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 4). The country came under colonial domination in 1899 and attained political independence from France on 12 July 1960 (Alusala, 2017, p. 13). Statistics show that since 2013, the country has witnessed over 29 terrorist activities by both state and non-state actors resulting in over 1764 deaths and about 851 injured (World Data, Citation2020). The legitimacy gap is a key feature of fragile and abnormal States. Legitimacy gaps describe the institutional instability undermining public decision-making processes’ predictability, transparency, and accountability (Andersen & Engberg-Pedersen, Citation2008). Legitimacy gaps exist in a state where the electoral process that produces political leaders is compromised, tele-guided, or subverted, leading to the emergence of unpopular leaders who execute elitist policies. In such a system, the pervasive inconsistency in the process of regime change permits the use of force, violence, or threats in the acquisition and consolidation of State power. As a consequence, compliance with the state is achieved by force, violence, or threat of it (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 9). The use of violence guarantees that the state maintains an advantage over other armed groups and legitimizes its grip on power (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). The use of terrorism by organized groups and the state in CAR is linked to the fact that there is no clear electoral approach to acquiring State power. At independence in 1960, the government of David Dacko institutionalized the one-party system to maintain its grip on power and whittle down opposition groups. This gave rise to pockets of political crises and protests, which were met with autocracy, kidnapping, and torture of protesters by State security agents (Le Vine, Citation1968, p. 12). Similarly, the second President, Jean-Bidal Bokasso, dissolved the parliament in 1976 and declared himself Emperor for the life of the CAR. His regime was characterized by torture, assassination, and oppression of political opponents, including the murder of over 100 demonstrating school children. Furthermore, when General Andre Kolingba seized power in 1981, he used State machinery to suppress and detain oppositions groups that supported a democratic system in the country. This use of force, violence, and intimidation by leaders to attain or sustain political power created the legitimacy gap that triggered terrorism by the Seleka and Anti-Balaka coalitions in the CAR. Consequently, legitimacy gaps in the country precipitated external/State sponsors of terrorism in CAR. For instance, the French government provided arms and support for the regime of Jean-Bidal Bokasso, who was willing to cut off economic and political relations with China and subsequently for the Anti-Balaka groups against the Selekas in 2013 following the overthrow of the Balaka-led government. Similarly, neighbouring countries like Chad and Sudan continue to support rebel leaders who agree to protect their economic interests (Congressional Research Group, Citation2024). For instance, in 2003, Chadian President Idriss Déby provided support for the Anti-Balaka leader Francoise Bozize, who overthrew Ange-Felix Pattasse. However, in 2013, Deby switched his support for the Seleka leader Michel Djotodia to replace Bozize. Consequently, in 2014, Derby used his militia to stand down the government of Djotodia and airlifted the entire CAR government to N’Djamena, where Catherine Samba-Panza was elected as the President of the transitional government (Lombard, Citation2014). The externalization of legitimacy in the CAR was effectively perfected during the colonial era. There was no unified system of political administration in CAR under the French colonial administration. The French leased the territory to private companies to run for their profit (Marima, Citation2014). In the absence of a unifying force for all peoples within the colony, colonial resistance was coordinated along ethnic lines, leading to the emergence of a multifarious coalition of ethnic groups who struck deals with concessionary companies to replace the French colonial officials (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). By leasing out different parts of the country to private companies to administer, the colonialists had given room for the privatization of state force, interference by foreign powers, and the proliferation of different armed groups with different ideologies of independence. The system has continued since independence and has created what Knoope and Buchanan-Clarke described as: A system whereby CAR politicians are often more concerned with the personal relationships they hold with these outside sources of power than with fulfilling their social contract with CAR citizens. This has resulted in a weak state that has little legitimacy to govern beyond the capital. (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Notwithstanding the introduction of a multi-party system in 1993, successive leaders of the country have failed to sustain the system as a legitimate means of political transition. Rather, it was characterized by meeting the personal ambition of the leaders, intent on staying in power, destroying the opposition, and ensuring their political interests (Siradag, Citation2016, p. 5). Consequently, a well-functioning state must possess the capacity to deliver certain public goods that improve the lives of its citizens as well as provide infrastructure that stimulates economic growth and development (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Fragile and abnormal states are remarkable for their lack of capacity to stimulate economic growth and development and a high dependence on foreign aid (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Capacity gaps in the Central African Republic can be seen from the inability of the government to provide basic amenities for its citizens. Since the country gained independence in 1960, successive governments have failed to establish state institutions that provide social, economic, and political dividends to the people (Sıradag, 2017, p. 1, International Crisis Group, Citation2017). Over half of the country’s 4.6 million people depend on UN humanitarian aid, the highest recipient of UN aid destinations globally (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). The public sector in CAR since independence is characterized by deplorable working conditions, absence of educational opportunities for children, large-scale corruption, mismanagement of public finances, irregular payment of salaries, a lack of sanitation, absence of educational opportunities for children, and permanent insecurity (Boas Citation2014. This situation not only questions the capacity of successive CAR governments but also increases the disillusionment towards government officials. Amidst economic resources, the country ranks as one of the least developed and poorest in the world. Per capita, the national income is a meagre $774, and about 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (Trading Economics, Citation2018). A report by Conciliation Resources showed that the country’s debt tripled to 1.8 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2011. The study further revealed various anomalies in the execution of projects, ranging from corruption and embezzlement of project money to compromised accounting procedures and a lack of vigilance. The CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2016, economic growth in the country slowed from 5 percent to 4.4 percent (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, only 10 of the 460 industries that operated in the country in the 1970s are functional. The only university in the country with a capacity of 1000 students has more than 20,000 students (Paul-Crescent et al. Citation2018, p. 8). These negative functional indicators suggest that the country is not just fragile but also abnormal because it lacks the initiative and capacity to harness its resources. Moreover, the use of terrorism by the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka groups is not aligned with religious identity but with the government’s inability to bridge the socio-economic inequalities in the country (Conflict Scan, Citation2017, p. 3). Successive governments in the country perpetrated inequality in the distribution of infrastructure between the Muslims who dominated the northern region and the Christians who dominated the southern region. Economic marginalization and neglect suffered in these regions provided a background for the use of terrorism by the northerners under the Seleka coalition to demand a fair share of the national resources and control of State power. For instance, the provinces of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto suffered marginalization and neglect as successive governments failed to establish schools, hospitals, roads, and general infrastructure. This led to the emergence of rebel groups who began to launch an attack on government facilities, taking hostages and seeking to take over power to protect their interests (International Crisis Reports, 2017). Furthermore, the replacement of the National Armed Forces with private security created security gaps in the CAR, which permitted the continued use of terrorism by both the State and organized groups (Global Security, Citation2020). When President Bozize came to power in 2003, he established a presidential guard made up of Chadian mercenaries to protect his government. Subsequently, successive governments have continued to maintain private securities at the expense of the national armed forces. The absence of a national security agency for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens means that the state is not the only legitimate monopoly of force. By maintaining private security, the state can carry out successful acts of terrorism against opposition groups. The anti-Balaka group was one of the groups mobilized by the Bozize government in 2003 to provide security for rural communities (CAR Briefing, Citation2014). However, following the rise of the Seleka coalition, he reactivated them in 2013 to protect his administration and help keep him in power till the general elections scheduled for 2016 (Kah, Citation2014, p. 9). Anti-balaka terrorism resulted in the ethnic cleansing of members of the Seleka coalition and created massive refugee crises and internal displacement (Amnesty International, Citation2014). This privatization of State security paved the way for foreign intervention and the upsurge of militia armed groups who perpetrate violence to secure State power, unleash vendetta as well as protect their members. The composition of these groups is constantly changing but is often made up of self-defence militia, highway robbers, and former members of the security and defence force. Between 2002 and 2017, 14 armed groups were identified (International Crises Group, 2017). Similarly, France, Chad, and Cameroon, among other foreign powers, have at one time or another, armed one group or another to protect their geo-strategic and economic interests in the CAR (Boas Citation2014),). In 2013, following serial bombings and killings which resulted in the death of over 2000 civilians, the Seleka, backed by Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, under Michel Djotodia usurped State power from the Christian-led government (International Crisis Group, Citation2017, p. 7). In a retaliatory move, the Anti Balaka began its reign of terror to counter the Seleka coalition. The Anti-balaka group did not start as a religious group but emerged out of the need to provide security to the population; they were motivated by their thirst for revenge (Kah, Citation2014, p. 36). The absence of government security forces in the peripheral and geostrategic areas of the country including Bocaranga, Ndassima, Yassine paved the way for rebel groups to control the rich mineral resources of the region while using revenue generated from the resources to finance their operations (African Union, Citation2018; Lombard, Citation2014). Added to failed security architecture is the question of State dispensation of justice and equity and asses to the State justice system. The State justice system has been subverted and hijacked by some members of the state who maneuver and manipulate the system to serve their selfish interests and intimidate opposition groups (Kah, Citation2014, p. 37, Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Basic institutions such as the Office of the Prosecutor, the tribunals, the gendarmerie, the Police, and the prison services are not operational in most parts of the country (Amnesty International, Citation2014). Conversely, it is imperative to appreciate the religious undertone of insurgency in the CAR. Since the escalation of the conflict in 2013, religion has been used as an instrument to radicalize members of both the Seleka and Anti-Balaka groups. The dynamics of terrorism have drawn the lines between Muslims and Christians in the country. Up till 2013, when the Seleka coalition (dominated by the Muslims) overthrew the government, the country was under a Christian leadership that paid little attention to the development of the Muslim-dominated Northern region of the country. Only two Muslims have been in parliament since the independence of the country (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). This painted a picture of political exclusion and economic marginalization by the Christians. These grievances were easily mobilized by the Seleka leader Djotodia during the coup of 2013. The rise of the Anti-Balaka groups and the consequent bombings of Muslim centers such as Mosques and schools have added to the narrative of religious terrorism (Union Africane, Citation2018). The presence of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko-Haram, the Islamic State, and Al-shabaab increases the risk of infiltration and violent Jihad by the Seleka groups (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). Moreover, although the parties involved in the use of terrorism are drawn along religious lines, they do not claim to establish a state along religious line. Their use of terrorism is motivated by the weak political institutions and economic inequalities which are core features of fragile States (Besley & Persson Citation2011). In its manifesto, the Muslim Seleka coalition had three mandates: to topple the Bozize regime, take control of the state, and seize the natural resources (International Crisis Group, Citation2017). The anti-Balaka, on the other hand, is determined to maintain its grip on power by attacking Muslim civilians and bombing Muslim villages. These two main rebel groups have splintered into several movements over time. Some sources put the number of armed groups currently operating in the country at about twenty (Union Africane, Citation2018). The legitimacy crises in the country and the inability to set a blueprint for political transition and regime change have laid a culture of violence as the fastest way to gain State power, and CAR politicians have consistently used such armed groups to get to power or when in power, to fight bandits and other small criminal groups in remote parts of the country (Paul Crescent et al., 2018, p. 11). Conclusion The sovereign states within the African continent face different forms of nation-building challenges. This ranges from poverty to conflicts and other multiple forms of insecurity. Unfortunately, when the insecurity level within a country grows so that the state cannot fulfil its obligation of ensuring the protection of lives and properties, the state could be considered fragile. Unfortunately, the state does not become fragile in a day or year; rather, state fragility emerges from multiple weaknesses of the state, which strives when abnormal or dysfunctional behaviours are allowed to grow over time by the institutions of the state. Studies on terrorism have shown that economic and weak political institutions within a state make it possible for terror groups to emerge. These terror groups further degenerate the state of security within the polity. This study draws from existing literature to investigate the emergence of terrorism in the CAR. The study reveals that the state’s failure directly manifests in the state’s character and the state’s inability to perform its fundamental roles. The CAR state is very weak due to the inability of the state to transform or refine its mineral resources and use the products to produce good governance. The character of the state was weak in the provision of employment, basic education and eradication of mass poverty within the country, thereby allowing the masses to be dependent on religious and ethnic cleavages as an opium that determined their social relations. Consequently, this affiliation and addiction to religious inclinations soon divided the CAR state and found expression in religious fanaticism and fundamentalism. The paper argued that the use of terrorism by religious groups and the state in the CAR is a direct consequence of the failure to utilize State resources for the betterment of the people and not from the desire to establish a State based on religious ideologies. This is because the primary role of the state is to provide good governance, which is meant to transform the lives of the citizenry. The various religious armed groups are reacting to a long history of negligence, deprivation, isolation, and frustration arising from the government’s inability to mobilize State resources for equitable national development and self-actualization for the citizens. In this context of a broken social contract, the country fits itself into the fragile and abnormal State theory. Worthy of note in the use of terrorism in CAR is the sponsorships by foreign countries, which further buttresses the claim of State fragility. By and large, by situating the CAR within the purview of fragility and abnormality, this paper has opened up underlying historical and developmental issues that are critical in understanding and addressing terrorism in the country. Why terrorism in CAR has not attracted sufficient attention from international actors and their role in escalating terrorism in the CAR country merits further research and study. In conclusion, there is a need for leadership transformation in the CAR State. The leaders of the state must focus on the development of national resources to provide social amenities and meet the basic needs of the masses. They must build a circular state where national identity and patriotism are central to national transformation through intergroup cohesion and resource (human and material) development. It is then that the conditions of sustainable peacebuilding and societal transformations would be created in CAR. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. These include transforming the subsistence farming culture to a mass-driven cash crop economy for exportation, which will manage state fragility, and promoting civil-military counter-terrorism culture at the grassroots. References 1. Adibe, J. (2020). Terrorism, Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies in Africa: Editorial Commentary. African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research, 1(1), 5–10. 2. African Union. (2018). Church attack in Central African Republic, The African Centre of the Study and research on terrorism. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-43964817 3. Alusala, N. (2007). Armed conflict and disarmament: Selected central African Case Studies. Institute of Security Studies Monographs Series No. 129. Retrieved from https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/monograph-129-armed-conflict-and-disarmament.-selected-central-african-case-studies-Nelson-Alusala 4. Amnesty International. (2014). 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Jackson, R. (2015). Terrorism, taboo & discursive resistance: The agnostic potential of the terrorism novel. International Studies Review, 17(3), 396–413. https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12227 30. Kah, H. K. (2014). Anti-Balaka/Séléka, ‘‘‘Religionization’ and Separatism in the History of the Central African Republic. Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue, 9, 23–32. 31. Kah, H. K. (2014). History, external influence and political volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR). Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies, 3(1). 32. Knoope, P. & Buchanan-Clarke, S. (2018). Central African Republic: A conflict misunderstood; institute for justice and reconciliation. Occasional Paper. 33. Kukah, M. H. (2009). Boko Haram some reflections on causes and effect [Unpublished Article], 2009, pp. 1–2. 34. Le Vine, V. (1968). The coup in the Central African Republic. Africa Today, 15(2), 12–14. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4184887 35. Lacqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. Oxford University Press. 36. Lacqueur, W. (2001). The new terrorism: Fanatics and the arms of mass destruction. London: Phoenix. 37. Lombard, L. (2014). A Brief Political History of the Central African Republic. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology, Retrieved from https://culanth.org/fieldsights/539-a-brief-politicalhistory-of-the-central African Republic 38. Marima, T. (2014). Rebels, anti-rebels and refugees in the Central African republic. Think Thank Press. 39. Mutambara, E., Chidi, N. R., Gilbert Chukwu, A., Maxwell, O. E., Aja, N. I., Nwankwo, F. M., & Ani, K. J. (2022). Boko Haram and defence mechanisms of the Nigerian Army: A critical appraisal. African Renaissance, 19(2), 141–158. 40. OECD. (2012). Conflict and Fragility in https://www.oecd.org. OECD Publishing, Paris. 41. OECD. (2014). Terrorism and Violent Extremist Contents in https://www.oecd.org, OECD Publishing, Paris. 42. Okereke, C. N., Iheanacho, J., & Okafor, C. (2016). Terrorism in Africa: Trends and dynamics. African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 5(1), 1–25. 43. Paul-Crescent, M. B., Grâce, M. E. D., & Raymond, M. Z. J. (2018). Persistence of the crisis in the central African Republic: Understanding in order to Act. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Yaounde. 44. Persson, T. (2011). Weak states, strong states and development [Paper presentation]. Development Crises in a Post Crises World. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2011. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ERK5AQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA89&dq=persson+2011+state+capacity&ots=7cn-XHsB6g&sig=-1S5oIvDw7kjxrPKxvKuaOuIvqI 45. Puccetti, L. P. (2021). Failed States and Terrorism: Engaging the conventional Wisdom, E-International relations (pp. 1–5). https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/92285 46. Ramsay, G. (2015). Why terrorism can but should not be defined. 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The ideological evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria: merging local salafism and international jihadism. The RUSI Journal, 158(4), 46–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.826506

Diplomacy
Tbilisi, Georgia - November 25, 2024: People out of focus near text We are Europe, EU and Georgian flag, cross, yellow star on blue house wall. Peaceful protest against result of parliament election

Georgians are protesting their pro-Russian government’s withdrawal from EU accession talks – but Brussels is also at fault

by Amy Eaglestone

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Mass protests have been taking in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. Over 100,000 Georgians who support their country joining the EU have taken to the streets since November 28 in response to the government’s recent announcement that it has suspended EU accession negotiations and will reject EU funding until at least 2028. The ruling Georgian Dream party blames the EU for the failure of accession talks. Announcing the decision, the prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, claimed Brussels was attempting to “blackmail” Georgia and “organise a revolution in the country”. Kobakhidze’s announcement came just a month after the Georgian Dream party claimed a mandate having won a third term at parliamentary elections at the end of October – elections that were reportedly fraught with irregularities. Georgian Dream claimed its victory was a reflection of the will of the people. But observer missions, both international and domestic, said the elections were neither free nor fair. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was monitoring the campaign noted imbalances in financial resources between competing parties, extreme and divisive rhetoric and widespread reports of intimidation and bribery. Georgian Dream, founded and led by pro-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, has spent years attempting to derail the country’s relationship with the EU. This is despite integration into the EU being enshrined in the Georgian constitution and public support for membership holding steady at around 85%. The EU granted Georgia candidate status in 2023. Georgian Dream has failed to meet any of the election promises it made in 2012. When it first came to office it promised to improve democracy and rule of law. In fact, behind the scenes, Ivanishvili’s party has slowly taken over control of what should be independent democratic institutions such as the judiciary and the security forces. Critics say it has created an entire shadow network that relies on corruption to influence political processes, undermining efforts to improve the quality of Georgia’s democracy and rule of law that are necessary for EU integration. Meanwhile Ivanishvili and his party have also maintained a strong relationship with Russia. The country refused to adopt sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine and has reportedly detained Russian nationals trying to flee conscription. Earlier this year the government passed laws that openly defy EU principles. In May, Georgia adopted what is known as the “foreign agents” law. Modelled on similar legislation passed in Russia in 2022, this law requires NGOs receiving more than 20% of funding from abroad to register. Georgia’s civil society sector is 90% funded from abroad, so this law puts virtually all NGOs working on issues related to democracy and rule of law in a vulnerable position. Critics believe the government will use this law to eliminate dissenting voices. In July the government also passed sweeping anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, claiming it was in line with Christian and European values. But the laws went completely against EU guidelines regarding discrimination. Before the laws were introduced the then EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell warned they would derail Georgia’s EU accession. And, after the foreign agents law was passed last July, the EU did indeed halt accession talks, but continued to provide funding aimed at supporting Georgia’s path towards membership. Now Kobakhidze says Georgia will not accept any EU funds until 2028. Is the EU playing difficult? The EU has released a statement condemning the use of force to break up protests, regretting the suspension of talks and reiterating its concerns about democratic backsliding in Georgia. EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, said that the “door to the EU remains open” to Georgia as long as it meets EU requirements for economic and political reform. But – both in the past and now – the EU has been inconsistent in its requirements. When Georgia first applied for candidacy status in March 2022, the EU responded with a list of “12 priorities” to be met before the country could progress with its application. These included addressing political polarisation, ensuring the independence of democratic institutions, and what it called “de-oligarchisation” – to reduce the influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life. Candidacy status was granted in December 2023, despite Georgia not meeting a number of those recommendations. At that point it listed nine steps the country needed to take before it could join. This lack of consistency may have partly been because these processes are unchartered territory for the EU. But it’s also almost certainly due to Brussels responding to broader political and geopolitical trends. Until the war in Ukraine, the EU was not considering adding new countries to the accession list. It was already struggling with rising populism, nationalism and issues with rule of law in some of its member states, including Hungary and Poland. Yet, as geopolitical tensions have risen, the EU has also been trying to keep a foot in the south Caucasus, giving it additional reasons to keep Georgia close. At the same time, joining up with the west is no longer the only viable option for Georgia. Russia and China are also pressuring the Georgian government into closer ties with alternative sources of support. And this doesn’t just apply to Georgia. There is a growing list of countries in the western Balkans and eastern Europe that are struggling to progress in the accession process – including Serbia, Bosnia and Turkey. This is not all the fault of Brussels, obviously. Many of these countries have work to do in terms of the quality of their democracy. But the EU may need to take a good look at its approach to accession processes in light of the changing geopolitical situation. It will need to do more to welcome a new member to the EU than just saying that the door is open.

Energy & Economics
Graph Falling Down in Front Of Kenya Flag. Crisis Concept

Kenya’s economy: how is the government tackling the big challenges?

by Seth Weisz

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Kenya’s government faces the challenge of meeting its debt obligations, while avoiding further unrest. President William Ruto must find ways to raise money, manage the economic recovery from Covid-19 and respond to the threat of climate change. William Ruto was elected as Kenya’s fifth president in September 2022. He had previously served ten years as deputy president and came into office with broad international support. In May 2024, Ruto embarked on the first state visit to the United States by an African leader in 16 years. That same month, his government proposed a raft of taxes designed to reduce Kenya’s budget shortfall – the fiscal deficit is projected to be 4.3% of GDP in 2024/25. The measures were encouraged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had loaned Kenya $2.3 billion to meet the financial obligations resulting from Covid-19 and existing debt-servicing costs. The taxes were drafted into a bill comprising mostly VAT measures, which would place a disproportionate burden on poorer Kenyans. As a result, thousands of citizens, led by the younger generation, took to the streets in protest. This culminated in them storming the parliament buildings on 25 June, with around 50 protesters being killed. The next day, the president declined to sign the bill. Two weeks later, he dismissed his entire cabinet. What are the roots of Kenya’s debt crisis? In the last 15 years, Kenya’s debt has risen significantly. Government debt totalled a manageable 39% of GDP in 2010; by March 2023, it stood at 68% of GDP. This rise in debt is the result of a surge in borrowing between 2013 and 2022, under Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration. Following strong growth rates in the early 2000s, Kenyatta took out large loans to pay for infrastructure projects. Many of these did not result in enough economic growth to cover their costs. One often-cited example of this excessive borrowing is the $5.3 billion loan from China to pay for the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project linking the port city of Mombasa and the capital, Nairobi. Many of these infrastructure projects were victims of corruption, which siphoned money away from large loans. In particular, significant allegations of embezzlement have been levelled over the allocation of the Eurobonds (large international loans) secured by the Kenyan government in 2014 and 2018. The government lost at least 567.4 billion Kenyan shillings ($4.4 billion) to corruption between 2013 and 2018 alone, according to estimates from consulting firm Odipo Dev. Over the last ten years, Kenya has consistently ranked between 120th and 140th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s corruption perception index. During this period, the Kenyan shilling has also lost 31% of its value against the US dollar. This has helped Kenyan exporters, particularly those that export to the United States (9.8% of exports). The dollars that Kenya receives from exporting have been vital to its debt repayment, especially because the country imports more than it exports. Its trade deficit sat at around $18 billion, according to 2022 figures. The shilling’s drop in value poses a significant problem for the treasury. Kenya’s $80 billion debt pile is mostly denominated in dollars, and the depreciation of the shilling has made these repayments significantly harder. Figure 1: Kenyan shilling ten-year exchange rate with the US dollar Source: xe.com The Kenyan government is not solely at fault for the accumulation of debt. IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva called Kenya an ‘innocent bystander’ to external shocks after visiting in May 2023. She was referring primarily to the pandemic, which had caused dramatic short-term rises in unemployment and food security, and to the drought and inflation that followed. Where there is a country in debt distress, such as Kenya, there is often an irresponsible lender as well as the borrower. Campaign group Debt Justice points out that Kenya’s credit dried up after the pandemic, when developing countries were generally seen as riskier lending options. As a result, it had to turn to World Bank and IMF loans, and eventually bonds with double-digit interest rates. In the words of the African Forum on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), Kenya’s debt was the result of ‘a combination of irresponsible lending by developing partners… and an unsatiable appetite to borrow by the government of Kenya.’ In May 2020, the World Bank upgraded Kenya’s risk of debt distress from moderate to high. The pandemic depressed Kenyan exports and economic growth, and the government’s strong fiscal response magnified the existing budget deficit. At this point, both the World Bank and the IMF still viewed Kenya’s debt as fundamentally sustainable. What role has China played in Kenya’s debt burden? Since the Kenyatta administration started borrowing vast sums of money from China in 2013, the Asian giant has been accused of indulging in ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. Many Kenyans fear that the collateral for China’s $5.3 billion loan for the SGR is the strategic Mombasa port. Specifically, if Kenya is forced to default, it has been argued that China will seize the port. Similar accusations have dogged Chinese projects in Uganda and Zambia. In the last financial year, Kenya has repaid China $1.18 billion, a third of which comprised interest payments. Nonetheless, China’s role in Kenya’s debt crisis has probably been overstated. Kenya owes China approximately $6 billion, out of a total of $70 billion of debt. The World Bank and the IMF have judged the $2 billion Eurobond to be the more decisive factor in Kenya’s default risk. While Kenyatta’s government did borrow excessively from China, those loans at least resulted in completed infrastructure projects. The challenges that Kenya faces with Chinese loan repayments are mostly representative of its wider debt struggles. Chinese loans are dollar-denominated, and repaid at 3% above the benchmark global interest rate. What happened in 2024? In 2024, Kenya faced a looming June deadline to repay a $2 billion Eurobond issued in 2014. The IMF stepped in with a $941 million loan in January, bringing the organisation’s total exposure to Kenya to $4.4 billion. To cover the rest of its shortfall, Kenya issued an international bond of $1.5 billion, with an interest rate of 10.4%. The second loan was met with relief by international markets, which no longer feared an immediate Kenyan debt default. Many observers see this level of interest payment as a stark warning of financial ill health. Indeed, six of the 15 countries to issue bonds at 9.5% or higher interest rates since 2008 have eventually defaulted, according to Morgan Stanley analysts. In return for the low-interest loan from the IMF, Ruto’s government agreed to raise taxes. It introduced a finance bill in May 2024, outlining plans to raise 346 billion Kenyan shillings ($2.68 billion). It was these proposals that triggered the country’s mass protests. In the end, the president refused to sign the bill into law after these protests, which had culminated in the storming of Kenya’s parliament on 25 June. At least 50 demonstrators were killed in the violence, bringing worldwide attention to Kenya’s political and economic struggles. Who is protesting and why does it matter? Debt repayment is a controversial topic in many developing countries. Since the so-called ‘third world debt crisis’ in the 1980s, many have been mired in debt. The IMF provided emergency loans to affected countries throughout the 1980s. But these loans were conditional on austerity measures being implemented, privatisation programmes introduced and the countries’ economies opened to foreign capital. As a result, the IMF is frequently accused of seeking to influence the economic strategy of poor countries. Many Kenyan protesters took this line, decrying the IMF programme for tax rises and spending cuts in order to finance Kenya’s debt to the West as colonial. Many debt specialists around the world have sympathised with this view. Binaifer Nowrojee, president of the Open Society Foundations, noted that Kenyans make up just some of the three billion people living ‘in countries that are spending more on servicing their debt than public spending on education or health’. The Ruto government faces the challenge of overcoming the debt crisis and convincing the population to accept measures needed to do so. The protesters are predominantly urban, young and poor – the Kenyans who feel squeezed in the current economy. One study indicates that youth unemployment could be as high as 67%. For example, to buy a motorbike – often critical for employment – young people are forced to turn to microloans, which often leave them in inescapable debt. Kenya’s biggest cities have been at the heart of the anti-tax protests since the movement escalated on 18 June – 57 of the 215 protests took place in just seven cities. Many of the protesters left rural areas in search of economic opportunity and better government services but were left disappointed with the opportunities available. The demonstrators generally see themselves as existing outside civil society. One study finds that the wave of African protests since 2010 have typically been led by ‘political society’ (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). These are the most impoverished urban workers, who have little interaction with the state and tend to accomplish their aims through direct demonstration rather than the electoral system. Where does Kenya go from here? The IMF’s communications director has apologised to Kenyans, but maintains that an austerity programme is critical for the country’s economic health. So long as Ruto’s government seeks to avoid a default, the IMF is likely to insist on its measures being passed. Ruto responded to the 25 June events by branding the demonstrations as ‘treasonous’. He later moderated his position, dismissing almost his entire cabinet on 11 July. The new cabinet includes four members of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by political opponent Raila Odinga. Demonstrations continue against the government, albeit to a lesser extent than in June. In order to address these, Ruto will have to accept that the ‘political society’ behind the protests is not allied to the ODM. Thus far, protesters have not shown themselves to be wedded to a party political or ethnic identity. Their demands – to bring down inequality, introduce measures against corruption and end police brutality – will require political will. Ignoring the protests, on the other hand, risks another crisis. Now that indirect tax rises are too politically toxic, the government must find other ways to increase its revenue. The obvious pivot is to raise direct taxes, particularly income tax and corporation tax. Kenya has a GDP per capita of $1,949, ranking 17 out of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The treasury has historically struggled to convert this into revenue. A recent study finds that Kenya’s tax revenue is equivalent to just 16.5%, down from a high of 17.5% in 2017 (OECD, 2023; KRA, 2024). This puts Kenya below the African average in both tax and non-tax revenue, and far below the Western average of 30-40%. Increasing direct tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa is easier said than done. Prior to independence, colonial governments built tax bases that relied on controlling the movement of goods in and out of the territory (Cooper, 2002). Modern African states – many of which are poor and sparsely populated – have also relied on indirect taxes (Herbst, 2000). The IMF’s encouragement of Kenya to move away from indirect taxes on trade (that is, tariffs) towards taxing consumer expenditure (VAT) has damaged the government’s ability to collect taxation on a natural source. In common with some other African countries, state infrastructure is generally more effective at taxing trade since it is more regulated and accessible to the public authorities than domestic consumer spending. A short-term return to tariffs on foreign goods would be risky. It would be likely to result in higher consumer prices and increased costs of production for Kenyan companies. In the longer term, the government may need to expand formal employment and seek to bring in higher-wage jobs in order to expand the tax base (Cheeseman and Griffiths, 2005). For the time being, Kenya has averted a default. IMF loan interest rates are minimal, and the country won’t have to start repayments on its $1.5 billion bond until 2029. There are also some positive indicators. Kenya’s tax revenue in 2023/24 was $18.8 billion, an 11.1% increase on the previous year (at $16.4 billion). Economic growth rates are stable, at around 5.5% year-on-year. Nonetheless, Kenya is still spending 60% of its revenue on debt servicing, half of which goes to interest repayments alone. The situation is close to unsustainable and, without changes, the country could be facing a negotiated default in the coming years. What about inflation? Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) has a mixed record of managing inflation. The country has seen inflation averaging 6.5% over the last decade. The impact of Covid-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought further rises, but this has been contained at 7.7%, broadly in line with the sub-Saharan average of 7.1%. Figure 2: Inflation in Kenya, 2014-24 Source: World Bank The rise in the value of the shilling in 2024 may begin to translate into a further reduction in inflation, but this is is unlikely to be sustainable. Kenya’s foreign exchange reserves have seen significant volatility, as the country has repaid and subsequently issued large bonds. The CBK’s reserves total around $7 billion – enough to cover less than four months’ worth of imports. If these reserves fall further, then foreign investors may withdraw from Kenya, depreciating the shilling and inducing higher inflation. What about climate change in Kenya? Kenya has suffered repeated droughts over the last decade, with that of 2021-22 being particularly severe. In late 2022, 4.3 million people faced severe food insecurity, as a result of the country’s worst drought for 40 years. Approximately 2.6 million livestock deaths were attributed to the drought. Food prices jumped temporarily by 60-90%. In a country where agriculture comprises 33% of production and exports are predominantly horticultural, food insecurity is widespread. Climate change poses a major challenge to Kenya and its neighbours. Kenyan farmers are vulnerable to increasingly variable rainfall – 98% of agriculture in the country does not use irrigation. The economic damage from droughts – which interrupt work, school and medical appointments and thus have knock-on effects on health and education – is costing Kenya 2-2.8% of GDP every year. By 2050, the crop yields of staples such as maize, rice, coffee and tea are likely to drop by 40-45%. By 2055, food prices are expected to be between 75-90% higher in relative value (World Bank, 2022). Kenya’s ability to develop climate resilience, through effective land and water management, will be vital for its economic health in the next few years.

Defense & Security
Damascus, Syria - May, 2023: Poster with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad on building facade

After 54 years of brutal rule, Syria is at a crossroads. Here are 4 priorities to avoid yet another war

by Mehmet Ozalp

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Who could have predicted that after nearly 14 years of civil war and five years of stalemate, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria would collapse in just a week? With Assad’s departure, the pressing question now is what lies ahead for Syria’s immediate future. When opposition fighters led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the major city of Aleppo in late November with minimal resistance, commentators widely believed it marked the beginning of the Assad regime’s downfall. Many anticipated a bitter fight to the end. Assad was caught off guard, and his forces were clearly unprepared. He withdrew his remaining troops from Aleppo to regroup and gain time for reinforcements to arrive from Russia and Iran, and hope the opposition fighters would stop there. It wasn’t to be. Emboldened by their swift success in Aleppo, HTS fighters wasted no time and advanced on Hama, capturing it with ease. They quickly followed up by seizing Homs, the next major city to the south. Russia provided limited air support to Assad. But Iran, having depleted its forces in Hezbollah’s defence against Israel in Lebanon, was unable to offer significant assistance and withdrew its remaining personnel from Syria. Meanwhile, Assad’s frantic calls for support from Iraq did not go anywhere. Seeing the writing on the wall, the morale of Assad’s forces and leadership plummeted. Fearing retribution in the event of the regime’s collapse, defections began en masse, further accelerating Assad’s downfall. And on the last day, Assad fled the country, and his prime minister officially handed over power to HTS and its leadership. It marked the end of 54 years of Assad family rule in Syria. The Assad legacy The Assad family, including Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, will likely be remembered by the majority of Syrians as brutal dictators. The modern state of Syria was established in 1920 following the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the aftermath of the first world war. Syria became a League of Nations mandate under French control, only gaining independence in 1944. Following a tumultuous period, including a failed unification with Egypt, the Ba'ath Party seized control in 1963 through a coup that involved Hafez al-Assad. In 1966, Hafez al-Assad led another coup alongside other officers from the Alawite minority. This ultimately resulted in a civilian regime, with Hafez al-Assad becoming president in 1970. Hafez al-Assad established himself as an authoritarian dictator, concentrating power, the military and the economy in the hands of his relatives and the Alawite community. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority was largely marginalised and excluded from positions of power and influence. Hafez al-Assad is most infamously remembered for his brutal suppression of the opposition in 1982. The uprising, led by the Islamic Front, saw the opposition capture the city of Hama. In response, the Syrian army razed the city, leaving an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians dead or disappeared and decisively crushing the rebellion. Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, and, the least likely candidate, his younger son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed the presidency. Having been educated in the West to become a doctor, Bashar al-Assad projected a moderate and modern image, raising hopes he might usher in a new era of progress and democracy in Syria. However, Bashar al-Assad soon found himself navigating a turbulent regional landscape following the September 11 2001 terror attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. In 2004, after the United States imposed sanctions on Syria, Assad sought closer ties with Turkey. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became friends, removing visa requirements between their countries and making plans to establish economic zones to boost trade. Erdoğan and Assad then had a falling out during a series of events in 2011, a year that marked a turning point for Syria. The Arab Spring revolts swept into the country, presenting Assad with a critical choice: to pursue a democratic path or crush the opposition as his father had done in 1982. He chose the latter, missing a historic opportunity to peacefully transform Syria. The consequences were catastrophic. A devastating civil war broke out, resulting in more than 300,000 deaths (some estimates are higher), 5.4 million refugees, and 6.9 million people internally displaced. This will be Assad’s legacy. Syria’s immediate challenges Syria now has a new force in power: HTS and its leadership, spearheaded by the militant leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. They will face immediate challenges and four key priorities: 1) Consolidating power. The new leadership will now try to ensure there are no armed groups capable of contesting their rule, particularly remnants of the old Assad regime and smaller factions that were not part of the opposition forces. Critically, they will also need to discuss how power will be shared among the coalition of opposition groups. Al-Jolani is likely to become the founding president of the new Syria, but how the rest of the power will be distributed remains uncertain. It seems the opposition was not prepared to take over the country so quickly, and they may not have a power-sharing agreement. This will need to be negotiated and worked out quickly. The new government will likely recognise the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the territories it controls as an autonomous region within Syria. An independent Kurdish state, however, will be strongly opposed by Turkey, the main external backer of the opposition. Yet, history seems to be moving in favour of the Kurds. There is now the eventual possibility of an independent Kurdish state, potentially combining northern Iraq and northeastern Syria into a single entity. 2) International recognition. Syria is a very complex and diverse place. As such, the new government can only be sustained if it gains international recognition. The key players in this process are Turkey, the European Union, the United States and Israel (through the US). It is likely all of these entities will recognise the new government on the condition it forms a moderate administration, refrains from fighting the Kurdish YPG, and does not support Hezbollah or Hamas. Given their unexpected success in toppling Assad so quickly, the opposition is likely to accept these conditions in exchange for aid and recognition. 3) Forming a new government. The question on everyone’s mind is what kind of political order the opposition forces will now establish. HTS and many of the groups in its coalition are Sunni Muslims, with HTS having origins linked to al-Qaeda. However, HTS broke away from the terror organisation in 2016 and shifted its focus exclusively to Syria as an opposition movement. Nevertheless, we should not expect a democratic secular rule. The new government is also unlikely to resemble the ultra-conservative theocratic rule of the Taliban. In his recent interview with CNN, al-Jolani made two key points. He indicated he and other leaders in the group have evolved in their outlook and Islamic understanding with age, suggesting the extreme views from their youth have moderated over time. He also emphasised the opposition would be tolerant of the freedoms and rights of religious and ethnic minority groups. The specifics of how this will manifest remain unclear. The expectation is HTS will form a conservative government in which Islam plays a dominant role in shaping social policies and lawmaking. On the economic and foreign policy fronts, the country’s new leaders are likely to be pragmatic, open to alliances with the regional and global powers that have supported them. 4) Rebuilding the country and maintaining unity. This is needed to prevent another civil war from erupting — this time among the winners. A recent statement from HTS’s Political Affairs Department said the new Syria will focus on construction, progress and reconciliation. The new government aims to create positive conditions for displaced Syrians to return to their country, establish constructive relations with neighbouring countries and prioritise rebuilding the economy. Syria and the broader Middle East have entered a new phase in their modern history. Time will tell how things will unfold, but one thing is certain: it will never be the same.

Diplomacy
Meeting of Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna with his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan 03.07.2024

Special Keynote Address - HH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

by HH Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al Saud

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Special Keynote Address by HH Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al SaudDelivered at the 20th Regional Security Summit The IISS Manama Dialogue on 7th of December 2024 in Bahrain. This text is a verbatim transcript of the speech (As Delivered) HH Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: “In the name of God, all merciful, may you have a very blessed morning. Firstly, I would like to express my elation for joining the 20th Manama Dialogue while reiterating my thanks and appreciation for the Kingdom of Bahrain, two last decades, for hosting the most prominent Manama Dialogue, that is of increasing importance as a main dialogue platform, gathering officials from all over the world in order to discuss the most important issues that touch the security of the area at a time we need it, mostly towards security solutions, facing mutual solutions. Not to mention, I thank the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the chairman for so kindly inviting me. This is convened at a critical time that the global system is going through, an accelerating crisis and polarisation with increased mutual threats. Our area is not separated from the global arena, and vice versa is true, given the conflict that is crossing borders, affecting global security, creating risks for the global economy. Hence, the framework for the 20th Dialogue is leadership in the Middle East to create prosperity, which is increasing in importance – to attain prosperity, which is correlated to security and peace, that are based on permanent peace, that is sustainable and not on the basis of interests. For the Kingdom, it has forever been earnest in its political overcoming of crises, responding to economic development, not to mention that we have been committed to regional tolerance, cooperation and dialogue, a strengthening of partnerships and creation of new integration on the basis of economy. But the crises and the wars are deviating us towards a dangerous crossroad. Hence, it is upon us, in cooperation with the global community, to mutually mobilise ourselves effectively to correct the path, going back to tolerance and cohabitation in peace, ridding ourselves of wars [that are] leaving thousands of victims, void of attainment of strategic goals. Hence, our pivotal goal for political security is to focus on the challenges standing in the way of perpetrators towards a better future, not to mention that we have seen that this reality is achievable, but it calls for commitment and effort by everyone with a political will, even courage, steering away from personal or self-interest. Peace needs enabling to face all those standing in the way of achieving it and realising it, and above all, it needs earnest partners from all sides. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the continuity of war in Gaza is touching the region and global security and is standing in the way, as Israel has impunity and is getting away without punishment. One stand is important to preserve the peace and the global security. Otherwise, it will deteriorate all efforts to remedy the situation. Hence, the global community should intensify their efforts in order to have a ceasefire and entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza, release of all the detainees. We warn against speech of hatred that is feeding victims’ inclusive declarations, that are threatening Gaza settlements, and against the twostate solution.  When it comes to the Kingdom, the path to peace is clear but has obstacles. And if we look at the reality of crises, we find out that peace is a common denominator based on the two-state solution. Should the global community care to protect what credibility is left, they have to put their hands in the hands of the Kingdom and earnest countries in order to translate words into actions and realise the two-state solution based on responding to the needs and security. Everybody has to follow, including Israel. The Kingdom believes … the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is earnest to follow the peace followed by the Arab Peace summit and the two last summits. Not to mention, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with its alliance [inaudible] for the two-state solution, based on pragmatic steps to materialise the Palestinian state, ending occupation, based on the rights of selfdetermination by the Palestinian people void of any other obstacles from other parties. It is high time, in order for us to overcome the freeze of peace efforts, to move from speech to industry of peace. Not to mention, the Kingdom is going to continue its efforts in that way to have two states, Israel and Gaza, going back to the original borders, with Jerusalem as its capital. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the Kingdom reiterates, it is important to be earnest against acceleration and escalation to avoid bad results, hence welcoming ceasefire in Lebanon, hoping that international exerted efforts to meet the 701 Resolution of the United Nations to empower Lebanon, ridding them of humanitarian suffering. As the rest of the crises – in Sudan, Libya, etc. – calls for shunning violence and military action towards political solution, void of external intervention, towards sovereignty, void of accelerating humanitarian and risk of collapse of national systems. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the Kingdom’s vision is a cornerstone to support socio-economic development on a sustainable basis with a foreign policy reflecting the priority of the vision towards creating a brighter reality that will seep into the entire area, hence invested all efforts for regional stability and mutual security by empowering unity among the brothers based on dialogue among countries of the region while mediating peace efforts. The events today call for worry, yet the Kingdom looks at an interactive future of the Middle East given our ample resources, geographical proximity amid three continents, rich resources, reiterating that the area continues to have importance globally – not to mention the popular call for peace in order to realise economic integration while being sure that lack of security is not inevitable, but due to political feuds, calling for political solution and ridding ourselves of the zero formula that is not a win–win situation. We look forward to an alternative path [that] falls into interests that are wide-ended as opposed to self-interest, towards hope and a better future for the people of the area. Thank you very, very much.” As Delivered Disclaimer:This speech is published under the principles of press freedom, with no commercial intent, and solely for the purpose of informing interested individuals. The speech was publicly delivered by HH Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al Saud at the 20th Regional Security Summit The IISS Manama Dialogue. This publication aims to provide access to the content for informational purposes and does not imply endorsement or official authorization by the event organizers. Public Information:This speech addresses critical global and regional security issues and is therefore of significant public interest. Its publication aims to make these important topics accessible to a broader audience, fostering awareness and understanding. Transparency and Accessibility:Providing the speech in written form enhances access to key political and security-related information, making it easier for readers to engage with the content.

Diplomacy
PARIS, FRANCE - JUNE 13, 2018: Woman reading The Daily Telegrpah newspaper in the office showing on cover U.S. President Donald Trump meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore

Return of Donald Trump: Continuity or Change with the DPRK?

by Jesús Aise Sotolongo

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com