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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском My analysis of South Korean relations with Egypt and a comparison with China, my academic and research specialty, comes as Egypt and South Korea celebrate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations on April 14, 2025. Relations between the two countries have witnessed continuous development, encompassing various political, economic, cultural, and educational fields over the past three decades. Egyptian-Korean relations date back to 1948, when Egypt officially recognized the independence of the Republic of South Korea. Egyptian-South Korean cooperation currently extends to development cooperation for the next five years to meet development requirements, promote the transition to a green economy, and expand sustainable infrastructure projects.  Especially with South Korea's selection of Egypt as a strategic partner in its development cooperation plans for the period 2022-2026. While China is investing in its massive Belt and Road Initiative, and Russia is using its security arms to strengthen its presence in Africa, South Korea is focusing on a different kind of belt related to food security. The South Korea-led Rice Belt Initiative, particularly within the African continent, aims to boost rice production in African countries by introducing high-yielding rice varieties, providing seeds, providing training, and supporting irrigation systems. Through partnerships with eight African countries, most notably Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda, South Korea is investing in agricultural capacity building and promoting rice cultivation and distribution in these and other African countries to enhance food security through partnerships between South Korea and African countries.  Through major South Korean initiatives, such as official development assistance, capacity building programs, technology transfer, and the Rice Belt, South Korea aims to bridge the development gap and strengthen its role as a pivotal global power. With the arrival of US President “Trump” in his second term, following a series of trade wars against China during his first term and his increase in tariffs on China by more than 100%, relations between the United States and China have become fraught with tension, especially with China's firm response to the US administration with a policy of reciprocal retaliation, Beijing's reciprocal increase in tariffs imposed on US goods and products, and even China's imposition of trade restrictions on US companies operating within its territory, particularly those owned by the well-known American businessman “Elon Musk”. Here we see the extent to which South Korea currently benefits from the tensions between the Chinese and American superpowers, as it is a smaller player in managing relations between the major powers.  This is precisely what Keun Lee, former vice chairman of the National Economic Advisory Council to the South Korean president, winner of the 2014 Schumpeter Prize, and author of “China: Technological Leapfrogging and Economic Catch-Up: A Schumpeterian Perspective”, which is issued by: (Oxford University Press, 2022), in this aforementioned book, Keun Lee analyzes the situation for South Korea and the nature of the dispute between China and the United States, emphasizing that South Korean companies are reaping significant benefits from the trade and technological restrictions imposed by the United States on China, which have at least slowed the “Sinicization” of manufacturing and global value chains. Since South Korea and China produce a large number of the same goods and types, such as: (consumer electronics, batteries, cars, ships), and more, according to Keun Lee’s analysis, the less China’s share of the American and Western market diminishes, the more South Korea will have. Indeed, Western and American sanctions, in particular, imposed on the Chinese tech giant Huawei, have given a boost.  Strong sales of wireless systems produced by Samsung. Similarly, if Chinese industry has less access to Western technology, it is likely to turn to South Korean companies. South Korea is attempting to capitalize on this by adopting a new development strategy for partnerships with Egypt and other African countries, and holding the first South Korea-Africa summit in June 2024. Here, we can draw a simple comparison between the development roles of China and South Korea within the African continent. China primarily focuses on its massive financial power through its Belt and Road Initiative, as well as its efforts to fundamentally change the nature of African countries. What is interesting is that South Korea, which possesses significant strengths, has decided to join the bandwagon to win in Africa. South Korea is keen to move away from following the Chinese model in Africa. As noted during the first South Korea-Africa summit in June 2024, South Korea is serving as a bridge or communication channel in the international community as a responsible middle power, based on its own development experience compared to China.  Noting South Korea's keenness to avoid presenting itself as a strong competitor to China or others within the African continent The modern history of South Korean relations with Africa begins with the Korean War on June 25, 1950, with the participation of units from the Ethiopian and South African armies within the United Nations forces. This included the “Mehal Sevare Unit”, the bodyguard unit of the Ethiopian emperor, which was sent to support South Korea, despite Ethiopia being one of the poorest countries in the world at the time. This Ethiopian aid contributed to building friendly and special relations between the two countries after the war ended. As a result, an African Union office in South Korea was established within the Ethiopian embassy, and the South Korean government established a memorial garden in honor of the Ethiopian soldiers who participated in the war in support of South Korea. Given the importance of the partnership with South Korea, President El-Sisi's keenness during his visit to South Korea was to enhance the Egyptian state's efforts to localize South Korean industry in Egypt, reflecting the promising prospects for diverse and anticipated Egyptian partnerships with South Korea. Here, we find President El-Sisi's commitment to localizing South Korean technology in Egypt, which was clearly demonstrated by the localization of the South Korean railway car industry in Egypt in the Suez Canal Economic Zone. This aims to gradually enhance Egyptian local content and bolster Egyptian supply efforts to markets in the Arab region and Africa, through Egyptian partnerships between the public and private sectors in South Korea. Therefore, we find President Sisi keen to benefit from South Korean expertise in localizing technology and attracting foreign investment, which contributes to the creation of approximately 5,000 job opportunities for Egyptian youth in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, achieving social and economic progress in the region. On the development front, South Korea is keen to provide development grants to Egypt and all African countries, through the “Korea International Cooperation Agency” (KOICA), especially in the fields of higher education, intellectual property, vocational training, information technology, establishing an electronic system for government procurement, women's economic empowerment, and combating violence. Meanwhile, South Korea's concessional development financing is diversified, covering (railways, subway car manufacturing, knowledge transfer programs, and government capacity building programs). Egyptian-South Korean cooperation has increased in light of the strategic partnership between the two countries, particularly in light of South Korea's selection of Egypt as its strategic partner in development cooperation for the next five years.  Many South Korean projects in Egypt are being financed through the concessional financing window provided by the Korea Economic Development Cooperation Fund (KEDCF), a subsidiary of the Export-Import Bank of Korea. This was evident in a $460 million South Korean development financing agreement with Egypt to implement the project to manufacture and supply 40 train units (320 cars) for the second and third lines of the Greater Cairo Metro. South Korean companies also have a significant presence in the New Administrative Capital and the Suez Canal Development Corridor, most notably Hyundai Rotem in the Suez Canal Economic Zone. The Hyundai Rotem Group includes more than 14 South Korean companies operating in three main sectors: trains and railway equipment, military industries related to land weapons, heavy machinery and equipment, energy infrastructure, and iron and steel. It is also a leading company in modern technologies related to the use of hydrogen fuel in vehicles and equipments. Egyptian-South Korean relations are diverse across several fields, not limited to development cooperation efforts between the two countries, but also extend to trade, investment, and culture, with many South Korean companies investing in Egypt in various fields, such as technology, communications, electronics, and others. During his recent visit to South Korea, the Egyptian government and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi were keen to advance cooperation with the South Korean side and provide full support for South Korean investments in Egypt, encompassing a wide variety of fields. Korea is one of Egypt's most important trading partners in East Asia. South Korea is also an important source for the transfer of industrial expertise and technology to Egypt.  There are many areas of potential cooperation between South Korea and Egypt in the Dabaa nuclear power plant projects, the most prominent of which, are: (joint manufacturing in the electronics sector, where Korean products for Samsung and LG are manufactured by Egyptians). Furthermore, 90% of Egypt's electronics exports are conducted in cooperation with South Korea. In addition, there is fruitful cooperation between the two countries in electric vehicle projects, seawater desalination, and railway development projects. In 2022, South Korea announced a $1 billion loan to Egypt from the South Korean Development Cooperation Fund. This comes as part of South Korea's efforts to build a cooperative partnership with Egypt and promote sustainable development between the two countries. This agreement also aims to conclude trade agreements and expand the scope of South Korean cooperation with Egypt in the environmentally friendly transportation, maritime, and space development sectors. At the same time, both countries agree on the importance of overcoming the climate crisis, especially after Egypt hosted the (COP27 international climate conference) in Sharm El-Sheikh. In recent years, South Korea has been seeking to create a state of rapprochement with the African continent, especially Egypt. The first Korea-Africa summit, held in early June 2024, marked a historic milestone, as South Korean ex-President “Yoon Suk-yeol” and leaders from 48 African countries met to deepen trade and economic cooperation. This led to the convening of the Korea-Africa Summit, a new initiative launched by South Korea to support cooperation with African countries in light of the challenges facing countries worldwide, particularly food security, climate challenges, and supply chain issues. Given Egypt's prominent position in Africa, South Korea sought to establish a strategic partnership with Africa, particularly Egypt, based on three axes: promoting trade and investment to achieve economic development and confronting global challenges, such as: (climate change and food security, and promoting peace, security, and cooperation in international forums). During the first Africa-South Korea summit, South Korean ex-President Yoon announced South Korea's commitment to increasing development assistance to Africa, pledging $10 billion over the next six years. This significant financial support underscores South Korea's interest in Africa's vast mineral wealth and its potential as a major export market. In his closing remarks, ex-President “Yoon” stated that: “the important Minerals Dialogue launched by South Korea and Africa sets an example for a stable supply chain through mutually beneficial cooperation and contributes to the sustainable development of mineral resources worldwide”. On the Chinese side, given the Chinese government's commitment to holding China-Africa summits, known as “FOCAC”, since 2002, which bring together most African leaders, these China-Africa summits hold significant significance for Western governments and the US administration. While Washington maintains its primary military alliance in East Asia through U.S. Forces Korea—stationing approximately 28,500 troops in South Korea—its growing concern also extends to Africa, where China’s expanding influence, exemplified by the China-Africa summits, represents a new source of geopolitical friction and tension in U.S.-China relations. Through its advanced economic ties with African countries, China provides significant assistance to African regimes that the United States and Europe are seeking to pressure to review their records on human rights, good governance, monopoly policy, and other issues. Sino-African relations have also witnessed rapid development, especially in the economic field, which China prefers as an easy and acceptable path in its dealings with developing countries, whether in the form of trade exchange, loans, grants, or investment gifts. These are characterized by the absence of political conditionality, which distinguishes them from their Western counterparts and makes them acceptable to poor African societies, both at the official and opular levels. This facilitates the task of the Chinese actor in penetrating these societies until Beijing became the main trading partner of the African continent, as Beijing considers its relations with Africans an important part of its strategy to enhance its economic and political influence at the global level and to be the center of the circle for these countries within the concept of its soft and quiet power, within the framework of the policy of relations between the countries of the South-South.  To this end, China seeks to increase its political position within the African continent and address African sensitivities, which are burdened with negative perceptions of Western colonialism. This is achieved by talking about reforming international institutions and glorifying national sovereignty, which was rediscovered after the Western colonial withdrawal from Africa. China also declares its solidarity with the countries of the South through economic positions and development promises. This is the same kind of talk that Africans hear from major powers like Beijing, in the face of Western ambitions. Based on this, we understand the extent of competition between China and South Korea in Egypt and other African countries, and their adoption of African summit policies through solidarity and development cooperation with Egypt and across the African continent, with African countries' ambitions to diversify their businesses, they are pushing both Beijing and Seoul to embrace their vision of building a multipolar world, the right of Africans to a permanent seat on the Security Council after UN reform, opposition to colonialism in all its new forms and manifestations, and the depoliticization of domestic issues such as human rights and democracy, among others.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the Muscat Round Pave the Way for a Potential Deal Between Washington and Tehran? The US-Iranian talks held in Muscat concluded on Saturday, April 12, 2025, successfully addressing contentious issues between the two nations, particularly the Iranian nuclear program crisis. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi led the Iranian delegation, while Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff headed the US team, with Oman serving as mediator throughout the proceedings. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the prevailing atmosphere during the discussions. President Donald Trump characterized the talks as "progressing very well," while Witkoff described the Oman negotiations as "very positive and constructive." According to Araqchi, all parties demonstrated their commitment to advancing discussions until reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Upon conclusion of these productive negotiations, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced a second round of indirect talks would be held on Saturday, April 19, again in Muscat with Omani mediation. Round One The US-Iran talks in Muscat hold significant importance as they represent the first diplomatic engagement since negotiations ceased between April 2021 and September 2022, which had occurred in a 4+1 format with indirect US participation. Notably, these Muscat discussions mark the first diplomatic exchange under both Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump. Several key implications emerge from these talks: 1- A face-saving negotiation format for both sides: Following the announcement of planned discussions, Washington consistently pressed for direct talks to expedite the process and quickly reach an agreement. Tehran, conversely, insisted on indirect engagement, at least initially, to build confidence in American sincerity. According to published reports, the American and Iranian delegations occupied separate rooms in Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi's residence, exchanging written messages through Omani mediators—satisfying Iran's requirement for indirect negotiations. Reports also indicate that after the approximately two-and-a-half-hour session concluded, Araghchi met briefly with Uytkov, conversing for several minutes in the Omani Foreign Minister's presence before departing—thereby fulfilling Washington's desire for direct engagement. Beyond these procedural arrangements for the initial round, such compromises demonstrate both sides' willingness to overcome obstacles impeding an agreement, potentially foreshadowing solutions to other challenges expected during future negotiation rounds. 2- Disagreement over the framework for negotiations: A disagreement over the scope of negotiations has persisted between the two sides since the initial round of talks. Iran adamantly maintains that discussions should focus exclusively on nuclear matters, leaving out both the missile program and regional role concerns. Supporting this position, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei stated on April 13 that an agreement had been reached to limit negotiations to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, confirming these topics would constitute the agenda for upcoming talks. Meanwhile, Washington remains adamant about including additional issues in negotiations with Tehran, particularly arms programs, with the missile program at the forefront. Witkoff stated that any diplomatic agreement with Iran would depend on verification of its uranium enrichment programs and, ultimately, confirmation of the missile arsenal Iran has developed over the years. Tehran has repeatedly declared openness to measures verifying it does not possess nuclear weapons, often citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's fatwa prohibiting such weapons. Such declarations may indicate willingness to reduce its nuclear program and potentially return to the 3.67% enrichment levels stipulated in the 2015 agreement—significantly lower than current levels exceeding 60%. However, Iran has firmly rejected completely dismantling its nuclear program (like the "Libyan model") or transferring highly enriched uranium to third countries, citing distrust of Washington and concerns about another withdrawal from agreements as occurred during Trump's presidency in 2018. Regarding the missile program, Revolutionary Guards spokesman Ali Mohammad Naeini responded to Witkoff's statement about including the missile arsenal in negotiations by declaring that Iran's military capabilities, including its missile program, represent a "red line" that remains non-negotiable under any circumstances. 3- Potential Iranian economic incentives: Some sources indicate that, in response to Trump's letter, Iran offered "economic benefits" that could advantage American companies if an agreement was reached between the two sides. These sources estimated potential benefits at $1 trillion or more. The proposal aligns with President Pezeshkian's April 9 statement that Supreme Leader Khamenei would not object to American investments entering Iran, "but without conspiring against Iran." Araghchi confirmed this position in his Washington Post article published that same day, calling on the United States to prefer diplomatic options when dealing with Iran and describing the Iranian economy as a "trillion-dollar opportunity" for American companies and businessmen. Tehran's attempts reveal a desire to motivate the Trump administration, which prioritizes trade and investment as key determinants of political engagement. One reason Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement was Washington's lack of benefit from investment deals allowed by the opening to Iran, while Europeans gained advantages, particularly in oil and petrochemical sectors. Consequently, Tehran is strategically focusing on economic opportunities, potentially driving Iran toward diplomatic approaches with Washington and an agreement that would lift the burden of sanctions imposed on the country. 4- European exclusion: No European party participated in the Muscat negotiations, and Washington likely held no consultations with the "European Troika" (Britain, France, and Germany) that participated with Iran in the 2015 agreement. Sources indicate that the meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of the three European countries, on the sidelines of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on April 3, failed to produce any joint plan addressing contentious issues with Iran. The exclusion reflects tense relations between Washington and its European allies, stemming from numerous disagreements—most notably the current US administration's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war and the tariffs imposed on most countries, including European ones. Moreover, it highlights Trump's desire to engage with Iran unbound by other parties' interests. Europeans prefer a diplomatic approach to dealing with Tehran, an approach Trump does not see as entirely reliable. Instead, he considers the military option a viable alternative should negotiations fail or not yield an agreement with Tehran. Nevertheless, the "European Troika" maintains significant leverage over Tehran through the so-called "trigger mechanism." The mechanism enables automatic reinstatement of UN sanctions imposed on Iran prior to the 2015 agreement if any of these countries complains to the Security Council about Iran's violation of the agreement. Such leverage perhaps explains why the Iranian delegation in Muscat requested its American counterpart ensure Washington assumes responsibility for preventing activation of the "trigger mechanism" against Tehran. Consequently, the "European Troika" countries will remain parties to negotiations between the United States and Iran, regardless of their format. Potential Effects Following the initial US-Iran discussions in Muscat, several potential repercussions can be anticipated: 1- Postponing the military option: The positive atmosphere during the Muscat talks, coupled with the announcement of future rounds of discussions, suggests Washington may delay military action regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Initially, the Trump administration advocated for military intervention as a pressure tactic to compel Tehran back to negotiations and secure a swift agreement on its nuclear program. Nevertheless, with ongoing dialogue between both parties, any military options might remain on hold until the results of these diplomatic exchanges become clearer. The escalating costs of military conflict may compel both sides to favor diplomatic negotiations and concessions. Tehran recognizes that American strikes on its nuclear facilities—whether conducted unilaterally or with Israeli cooperation—would present an overwhelming challenge to counter and manage. Similarly, Washington acknowledges that bombing Iran's nuclear installations could expose American forces and bases throughout the region to retaliatory attacks from Tehran or its armed proxies, while potentially disrupting vital maritime traffic. Given these high-stakes calculations, both nations may increasingly prioritize diplomatic solutions to resolve their differences, with Washington maintaining military action only as a final option should negotiations fail. 2- Supporting the chances of signing an agreement: Unlike previous negotiations during the Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi administrations, realistic data suggests Tehran faces severe time constraints. Trump has imposed a temporary deadline for Iran to resolve its nuclear program, with military action serving as the alternative. The military option has gained momentum as Tehran lost substantial capabilities among its regional proxies, which would have increased the cost of any attack against it. Moreover, according to Israeli and American accounts, the Israeli strike on October 26, 2024, successfully destroyed critical defense systems within Iranian territory. The approaching October 18 expiration date of the 2015 nuclear agreement intensifies pressure on Iran. Urgency mounts as the nation seeks a solution before the European Troika countries activate the "trigger mechanism" prior to that deadline. Unlike negotiations during the Rouhani and Raisi administrations, current talks will likely proceed more rapidly. Trump's April 13 statement that he expects "a decision on Iran will be made very quickly" further suggests the possibility of an expedited agreement with Iran. 3- Internal Iranian opposition: The move to hold negotiations with Washington may face opposition from some hardline fundamentalist groups. Despite Tehran's negotiations with Washington receiving approval from Khamenei and influential institutions rather than originating from Pezeshkian's government, resistance to these discussions remains possible. Statements from hardline Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) member Hamid Rasaei suggest underlying opposition when he claimed "the current negotiations were conducted with the Supreme Leader's approval to prove their failure, and for some optimistic officials to discover once again that the Americans are not committed and that it is irrational to rely on them." Additionally, any potential deal allowing American investments into the Iranian market might trigger objections based on constitutional restrictions. Articles 81 and 153 specifically prohibit granting concessions to foreign companies and foreign control of resources. From this perspective, such diplomatic moves could encounter resistance from institutions controlling key economic sectors, including the Revolutionary Guard and the bazaar. Some hardliners may interpret these developments as "Westernization of the economy," viewing them as concerning repetitions of historical scenarios embedded in Iranian collective memory. 4- Strengthening the role of the Iranian Foreign Ministry: The information that preceded the Muscat round of talks claimed three figures had been appointed to represent the Iranian delegation: Ali Larijani, advisor to the Supreme Leader; Mohammad Foruzandeh, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council; and Mohammad Javad Zarif, former assistant to the Iranian president for strategic affairs. However, the actual Iranian delegation to Oman was headed by Foreign Minister Araghchi, and included his aides for political affairs, Takht-e Ravanchi; Kazem Gharibabadi, for legal and international affairs; and Ismail Baghaei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, along with other negotiators and technical experts. The composition aligned with Araghchi's earlier assertion that responsibility for the negotiations would fall to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such prioritization indicates the regime's desire to send diplomatic messages, similar to events following former Iranian President Rouhani's election in 2013, which ultimately led to the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement. The diplomatic approach contrasted with periods when Tehran leaned toward hardline positions, during which broad powers were granted to the National Security Council to manage the nuclear issue, as seen during the terms of former presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Raisi. The regime's strategy appears inseparable from other domestic preparations made in anticipation of signing an agreement with the West. Notable examples include moving toward approval of conditions necessary for joining the Financial Action Task Force on Terrorism and Money Laundering (FATF), which would help Iranian banks access services provided by the SWIFT international financial transfer system. Some analysts attribute additional internal measures to this effort, including revisions to the strict provisions of the "chastity and hijab" law, the release of individuals under house arrest such as prominent reformist figure Mehdi Karroubi, and the easing of certain restrictions on internet use. 5- Russian and Chinese discontent: Negotiations between the United States and Iran may provoke discontent from Russia and China, fellow parties to the 2015 nuclear agreement. Both nations fear Tehran might forge an agreement with Washington that would undermine the coordination among Russia, China, and Iran. These concerns intensify amid severely strained Washington-Beijing relations following the announcement of historically high mutual tariffs between the two countries. Adding to the tension is Trump's apparent indifference resulting from Russian President Putin's delay regarding the US peace plan for Ukraine. Accordingly, Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi's visit to Moscow was announced ahead of the second round of talks scheduled for April 19 to brief the Russian side on the progress of the talks with Washington. Additionally, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Vasilievich Vershinin, during a meeting of supporters of the UN Charter in Moscow. The diplomatic efforts represent an attempt to allay Russian concerns and send a message to Washington that Tehran has other international alternatives if the current negotiations fail. In conclusion, the Muscat negotiations served as an exploratory round for both American and Iranian delegations, allowing each side to clarify intentions and demonstrate commitment before proceeding to subsequent steps. Complex and difficult differences persist between the parties, yet both clearly favor diplomatic solutions, at least temporarily, with success hinging upon American demands and potential Iranian concessions. Future rounds will likely experience heightened tension, leaving all possibilities open regarding the ultimate outcome of these diplomatic efforts.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Bukele appears to have the green light from the United States to deepen his authoritarian project with the help of Beijing. Recently, the ruling Salvadoran party, Nuevas Ideas, inaugurated a political training school in Nuevo Cuscatlán. The event was headlined by Félix Ulloa, Vice President of the Central American country, and China’s ambassador to El Salvador, Zhang Yanhui. According to the Central American news portal Expediente Público, the institute was reportedly sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), following a previous visit to Beijing by Ulloa and Xavier Zablah Bukele – leader of Nuevas Ideas and cousin of the Salvadoran president – during which several interparty cooperation agreements were finalized. This event highlights the diversified strategies China employs to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere. While public attention toward the Asian giant typically focuses on intergovernmental diplomacy, trade relations, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), less consideration is given to the forms of cooperation carried out by various international outreach bodies tied to the CCP in Latin America. The Czech think tank Sinopsis, which specializes in Chinese studies, notes: “Unlike many other countries, China’s foreign affairs extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and transcend official state-to-state diplomacy […] This system consists of various bodies and operates under the overarching concept of total diplomacy.” The CCP behind the scenes According to Central American and Chinese-language media, Zablah Bukele and Félix Ulloa held a meeting in April 2024 with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the CCP. On that occasion, representatives of bukelismo signed an agreement with the CCP’s cadre school, securing Chinese sponsorship for the newly inaugurated Political Training Institute of Nuevas Ideas. The ILD was established in 1951 to promote ties between the CCP and other communist parties across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the organization turned its focus to cultivating relationships with leftist groups of all kinds, from European social democrats to liberation movements in the Global South. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, the ILD began adopting a pragmatic approach, fostering good relations with both left- and right-wing parties. For instance, center-right organizations like Argentina’s Republican Proposal (PRO) have maintained ties with the CCP since 2009. Xi Jinping, while maintaining this approach, has made the ILD’s operations more assertive, turning it into a key instrument of Chinese foreign influence. Various think tanks and scholars of Chinese foreign policy have noted the quiet diplomacy exercised by the Asian giant through the ILD and other bodies. These include the United Front Work Department and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which function as parallel bureaucracies to the MoFA and are characterized by opaque activities and a purported autonomy from Beijing. However, these organizations aim to connect various sectors of foreign politics and civil society with the CCP. In particular, the ILD builds influence networks by training foreign politicians. Beyond offering training courses funded in China, the department has promoted the construction of training centers in countries such as Tanzania. In this way, the ILD seeks to forge close ties with foreign elites who, in addition to promoting Chinese soft power narratives – such as the superiority of the one-party model or the primacy of development over democracy and civil liberties – can lobby on Beijing’s behalf in agencies, cabinets, and parliaments. In this sense, Chinese support for Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute marks a significant step forward in cooperation between the CCP and El Salvador’s ruling party. The ILD’s training programs have also become spaces for transmitting authoritarian know-how. Researchers such as Lina Benabdallah and Christine Hackenesch point out that the CCP promotes the Chinese governance model to foreign elites – a model based on mass surveillance technologies, personal data storage, and internet censorship, typically provided by state-owned enterprises like Huawei. These practices are presented as alternatives for strengthening public security and internal stability, but in practice, they reinforce state control and restrict civil liberties in adopting countries. The paradoxes of Bukelismo The link between Nuevas Ideas and the CCP raises questions about the ideological leanings of Nayib Bukele. Just a few weeks ago, the Salvadoran president hosted U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in San Salvador to seal, in Rubio’s words, “a historic agreement, the most extraordinary in the world” on migration. Suppose this event signaled El Salvador’s intent to become one of the United States’ most important regional partners. How should we now interpret the growing political cooperation with China, the U.S.’s main strategic rival? On one hand, it is understandable that El Salvador’s ruling party seeks alignment with the CCP. The inauguration of Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute, with ILD’s blessing, is another episode of authoritarian cooperation in Latin America, where a regime well-versed in repression and control transfers knowledge and resources to another with similar aims. Similar patterns have been observed in the region with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which collaborate among themselves and with extra-regional autocracies like Russia, Iran, and China itself. Given this, it is not surprising that a self-proclaimed socialist regime and another linked to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) would cooperate beyond ideological differences. In fact, this has been the ILD’s hallmark in the 21st century: pragmatism in engaging with parties across the spectrum, ensuring long-term ties with various governments. This phenomenon reflects a central feature of our times: the erosion of the left-right divide in favor of a new tension between democracies and autocracies. On the other hand, the indoctrination of Nuevas Ideas’ cadres might even be tolerable to Trump, given that some CCP perspectives align with his political agenda. The pursuit of a multipolar order that secures spheres of influence for major powers – such as the South China Sea or Greenland – as well as the promotion of illiberal models of democracy – like China’s “whole-process democracy” or the unitary executive without checks and balances – are not foreign concepts to Make America Great Again. Based on this, Bukele may seem to have the green light to deepen his authoritarian project with Beijing’s help. As long as the PRC does not interfere with U.S. strategic interests in El Salvador – such as migration management or control of critical infrastructure – the 47th American president might remain content, regardless of China’s growing soft power in the hemisphere.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In 1995, World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin warned that whereas the conflicts of the previous 100 years had been over oil, “the wars of the next century will be fought over water.” Thirty years on, that prediction is being tested in one of the world’s most volatile regions: Kashmir. On April 24, 2025, the government of India announced that it would downgrade diplomatic ties with its neighbor Pakistan over an attack by militants in Kashmir that killed 26 tourists. As part of that cooling of relations, India said it would immediately suspend the Indus Waters Treaty – a decades-old agreement that allowed both countries to share water use from the rivers that flow from India into Pakistan. Pakistan has promised reciprocal moves and warned that any disruption to its water supply would be considered “an act of war.” The current flareup escalated quickly, but has a long history. At the Indus Basin Water Project at the Ohio State University, we are engaged in a multiyear project investigating the transboundary water dispute between Pakistan and India. I am currently in Pakistan conducting fieldwork in Kashmir and across the Indus Basin. Geopolitical tensions in the region, which have been worsened by the recent attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, do pose a major threat to the water treaty. So too does another factor that is helping escalate the tensions: climate change A fair solution to water disputes The Indus River has supported life for thousands of years since the Harappan civilization, which flourished around 2600 to 1900 B.C.E. in what is now Pakistan and northwest India. After the partition of India in 1947, control of the Indus River system became a major source of tension between the two nations that emerged from partition: India and Pakistan. Disputes arose almost immediately, particularly when India temporarily halted water flow to Pakistan in 1948, prompting fears over agricultural collapse. These early confrontations led to years of negotiations, culminating in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960.   Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty has long been hailed as one of the most successful transboundary water agreements. It divided the Indus Basin between the two countries, giving India control over the eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – and Pakistan control over the western rivers: Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. At the time, this was seen as a fair solution. But the treaty was designed for a very different world. Back then, India and Pakistan were newly independent countries working to establish themselves amid a world divided by the Cold War. When it was signed, Pakistan’s population was 46 million, and India’s was 436 million. Today, those numbers have surged to over 240 million and 1.4 billion, respectively. Today, more than 300 million people rely on the Indus River Basin for their survival. This has put increased pressure on the precious source of water that sits between the two nuclear rivals. The effects of global warming, and the continued fighting over the disputed region of Kashmir, has only added to those tensions. Impact of melting glaciers Many of the problems of today are down to what wasn’t included in the treaty, rather than what was. At the time of signing, there was a lack of comprehensive studies on glacier mass balance. The assumption was that the Himalayan glaciers, which feed the Indus River system, were relatively stable. This lack of detailed measurements meant that future changes due to climate variability and glacial melt were not factored into the treaty’s design, nor were factors such as groundwater depletion, water pollution from pesticides, fertilizer use and industrial waste. Similarly, the potential for large-scale hydraulic development of the region through dams, reservoirs, canals and hydroelectricity were largely ignored in the treaty. Reflecting contemporary assumptions about the stability of glaciers, the negotiators assumed that hydrological patterns would remain persistent with the historic flows. Instead, the glaciers feeding the Indus Basin began to melt. In fact, they are now melting at record rates. The World Meteorological Organization reported that 2023 was globally the driest year in over three decades, with below-normal river flows disrupting agriculture and ecosystems. Global glaciers also saw their largest mass loss in 50 years, releasing over 600 gigatons of water into rivers and oceans. The Himalayan glaciers, which supply 60-70% of the Indus River’s summer flow, are shrinking rapidly. A 2019 study estimates they are losing 8 billion tons of ice annually. And a study by the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development found that Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Himalayan glaciers melted 65% faster in 2011–2020 compared with the previous decade. The rate of glacier melt poses a significant challenge to the treaty’s long-term effectiveness to ensure essential water for all the people who rely on the Indus River Basin. While it may temporarily increase river flow, it threatens the long-term availability of water. Indeed, if this trend continues, water shortages will intensify, particularly for Pakistan, which depends heavily on the Indus during dry seasons. Another failing of the Indus Waters Treaty is that it only addresses surface water distribution and does not include provisions for managing groundwater extraction, which has become a significant issue in both India and Pakistan. In the Punjab region – often referred to as the breadbasket of both nations – heavy reliance on groundwater is leading to overexploitation and depletion. Groundwater now contributes a large portion – about 48% – of water withdrawals in the Indus Basin, particularly during dry seasons. Yet there is no transboundary framework to oversee the shared management of this resource as reported by the World Bank. A disputed region It wasn’t just climate change and groundwater that were ignored by the drafters of the Indus Waters Treaty. Indian and Pakistan negotiators also neglected the issue and status of Kashmir. Kashmir has been at the heart of India-Pakistan tensions since Partition in 1947. At the time of independence, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was given the option to accede to either India or Pakistan. Though the region had a Muslim majority, the Hindu ruler chose to accede to India, triggering the first India-Pakistan war. This led to a U.N.-mediated ceasefire in 1949 and the creation of the Line of Control, effectively dividing the territory between Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Since then, Kashmir has remained a disputed territory, claimed in full by both countries and serving as the flashpoint for two additional wars in 1965 and 1999, and numerous skirmishes. Despite being the primary source of water for the basin, Kashmiris have had no role in negotiations or decision-making under the treaty. The region’s agricultural and hydropower potential has been limited due to restrictions on the use of its water resources, with only 19.8% of hydropower potential utilized. This means that Kashmiris on both sides — despite living in a water-rich region — have been unable to fully benefit from the resources flowing through their land, as water infrastructure has primarily served downstream users and broader national interests rather than local development. Some scholars argue that the treaty intentionally facilitated hydraulic development in Jammu and Kashmir, but not necessarily in ways that served local interests. India’s hydropower projects in Kashmir — such as the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams — have been a major point of contention. Pakistan has repeatedly raised concerns that these projects could alter water flows, particularly during crucial agricultural seasons. However, the Indus Waters Treaty does not provide explicit mechanisms for resolving such regional disputes, leaving Kashmir’s hydrological and political concerns unaddressed. Tensions over hydropower projects in Kashmir were bringing India and Pakistan toward diplomatic deadlock long before the recent attack. The Kishanganga and Ratle dam disputes, now under arbitration in The Hague, exposed the treaty’s growing inability to manage transboundary water conflicts. Then in September 2024, India formally called for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty, citing demographic shifts, energy needs and security concerns over Kashmir. The treaty now exists in a state of limbo. While it technically remains in force, India’s formal notice for review has introduced uncertainty, halting key cooperative mechanisms and casting doubt on the treaty’s long-term durability. An equitable and sustainable treaty? Moving forward, I argue, any reform or renegotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty will, if it is to have lasting success, need to acknowledge the hydrological significance of Kashmir while engaging voices from across the region. Excluding Kashmir from future discussions – and neither India nor Pakistan has formally proposed including Kashmiri stakeholders – would only reinforce a long-standing pattern of marginalization, where decisions about its resources are made without considering the needs of its people. As debates on “climate-proofing” the treaty continue, ensuring Kashmiri perspectives are included will be critical for building a more equitable and sustainable transboundary water framework.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This study examines the short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications of recent "tariff wars" on the European Union (EU). The imposition of tariffs by the United States, particularly the "Liberation Day" tariffs announced by President Trump on April 2, 2025, led to significant disruptions in global supply chains, negatively impacted GDP growth, increased financial market volatility, and exacerbated geopolitical tensions. The EU faces challenges in navigating this shifting geopolitical landscape while maintaining its economic interests and influence. However, the EU has opportunities to leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market, foster international cooperation, and emerge as a more resilient global actor. The paper concludes by discussing the potential end of transatlanticism, the future of the EU, and the implications for globalisation in light of the current "tariff chaos." Keywords: Tariffs, Geopolitics, European Union, Trade Wars Introduction Before we examine the topic of tariffs, let us recall that the terms "tariff war" or "trade war" are not strictly academic. International Security scholars generally believe that the notion of war is reserved for military conflicts (both domestic and international) that involve at least a thousand casualties in any given year.[1] One of the most prominent sources in this regard is the Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, published by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, and the International Peace Research Institute at Uppsala University in Uppsala.[2] Therefore, "tariff war" or "tariff wars" are more journalistic and hyperbolic. Hence, they are used in this study with quotation marks. Journalists and commentators from various backgrounds often use inflated language to impress their readers. On the other hand, wars are cataclysmic events that have game-changing consequences. In this sense, some tools that state leaders use to achieve political and economic goals, such as tariffs, may have short- and long-term outcomes. Nonetheless, scholars who tend to be precise in their explanations will mainly discuss economic competition rather than "economic war" or "wars." This study investigates the short-, medium-, and possible long-term implications of "tariff wars" on the European Union. These implications appear multifaceted and encompass stability, political relationships, and a broader international order."Liberation Day" On April 2, US President Trump announced new tariffs under the banner of "Liberation Day" – a minimum baseline of 10 per cent tariffs on goods imported from all foreign countries and higher, reciprocal tariffs on nations that impose tariffs on US exports.[3]  Crucially, the White House claims that the new tariffs are reciprocal: "It is the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 per cent, and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated".[4] We did not have to wait for strong reactions to occur worldwide. China vowed to retaliate against the 34 per cent tariffs imposed by the US on Wednesday (April 2 2025) and protect its national interests while condemning the move as "an act of bullying".[5] Doubling down, a few days later, Trump threatened a 50 per cent tariff on China on top of previous reciprocal duties,[6] to which Chinese President Xi Jinping already replied hawkishly.[7] In an equally hawkish response, the Trump administration declared that Chinese goods would be subject to a 145 per cent tariff.[8] In a twist of events, on April 9, the US  declared a 90-day-long pause for previously declared tariffs covering the whole world (keeping a minimum of 10 per cent, though) except against China.[9] The next couple of weeks will show whether the world will enter the "tariff arms race" or we will enter some "tariff détente". Importantly, as one can surmise, "Xi has sold himself domestically and internationally as the guy standing up to America, and people that want to stand up to America should get in line behind Chairman Xi".[10] For the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described US universal tariffs as a significant blow to the world economy and claimed that the European Union was prepared to respond with countermeasures if talks with Washington failed. Accordingly, the EU was already finalising a first package of tariffs on up to 26 billion Euro ($28.4 billion) of US goods for mid-April in response to US steel and aluminium tariffs that took effect on March 12.[11] Consequently, on April 7, 2025, a meeting was organised in Luxembourg[12] regarding the EU's response to US tariffs on steel and aluminium and the preparation of countermeasures, which included a proposal to impose 25 per cent tariffs on US goods. Interestingly, the "Liberation Day" tariffs do not include Russia. According to numerous commentators, this indicates Moscow's importance as a future trade partner once the Ukrainian war is over. However, the official explanation issued by the White House suggests that the existing sanctions against Russia "preclude any meaningful trade."[13] Tariff imposition: short, medium and long-term consequences Several observable phenomena can be identified regarding their economic ramifications: First, the imposition of tariffs can lead to significant disruptions in global supply chains, thereby affecting industries that rely heavily on international trade. This disruption can lead to increased costs and reduced competitiveness for EU businesses, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.[14] While national measures may yield political and economic benefits in the short term, it is essential to note that global prosperity cannot be sustained without cooperative and stable international trade policies. Second, the Gross Domestic Product is likely to be impacted. The imposition of tariffs has been shown to negatively affect GDP growth. For instance, the US-China "trade war" decreased the GDP of both countries, which could similarly affect the EU if it becomes embroiled in similar conflicts.[15] Third, we examine volatility in the financial markets. "Tariff wars" contribute to financial market volatility, which can cause a ripple effect on EU economic stability. This volatility can deter investment and slow economic growth.[16] Fourth, political targeting and retaliation. "Tariff wars" often involve politically targeted retaliations, as seen in the US-China trade conflict. The EU has been adept at minimising economic damage while maximising political targeting, which could influence its future trade strategies and political alliances.[17] Fifth, global alliances are shifting. The EU may need to reconsider its trade alliances and partnerships in response to these shifting dynamics. This could involve forming new trade agreements or strengthening existing ones to mitigate the impact of "tariff wars."[18] Next, increased geopolitical competition and economic nationalism can exacerbate tensions between major powers, potentially leading to a crisis in globalization. As an aspiring global player, the EU must navigate these tensions carefully to maintain its influence and economic interests.[19] Social impacts should also be considered. "Trade wars" can lead to changes in employment and consumer prices, thus affecting the EU's social equity and economic stability. These changes necessitate policies that enhance social resilience and protect vulnerable populations.[20] Does Team Trump have a plan? The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration appear to be part of a broader strategy that Trump describes as a declaration of economic independence for the US, notably heralding them as part of the national emergency. The long-term effects of this strategy depend on how effectively the US can transition to domestic production without facing significant retaliation or trade barriers from other nations. Notably, the US dollar's status as the world's primary reserve currency has been supported by military power since the introduction of the Bretton Woods system. The US military, especially the US Navy, has helped secure trade routes, enforce economic policies, and establish a framework for international trade, favouring the US. dollar. The countries that subscribed to the system also gained access to the US consumer market. Importantly, what is explained by the Triffin Dilemma, back in the 1960s, the US had a choice: to either increase the supply of the US Dollar,  sought after by the whole world as a reserve currency and international trade currency and that way to upkeep global economic growth, which was pivotal for the US economy or to end the gold standard. In 1971, the US finished its Bretton Woods system. What followed was a new system primarily dictated by neoliberalism based on low tariffs, free capital movement, flexible exchange rates and US security guarantees.[21] Under that neoliberal system, reserve demand for American assets has pushed up the dollar, leading it to levels far in excess of what would balance international trade over the long run.[22] This made manufacturing in the US very expensive, and consequently, the deindustrialisation of the US followed. Therefore, it appears that Trump wants to keep the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and reindustrialise the US. According to Stephen Miran, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (a United States agency within the Executive Office of the President), two key elements to achieve this goal are tariffs and addressing currency undervaluation of other nations.[23] The second element in that duo is also known as the Mar-a-Lago Accord.[24] Scott Bessent, 79th US Secretary of the Treasury, picked up this argument.[25] In a nutshell, the current "tariff chaos" is arguably only temporary, and in the long term, it is designed to provide an advantage for the US economy.A readjustment of sorts fundamentally reshapes the existing international political economy. Whether or not this plan works and achieves its goals is entirely different. As market analysts observe, "For the past two decades, the US has focused on high-tech services like Amazon and Google services, which have added to a service surplus. However, the real sustainable wealth comes from the manufacturing of goods, which, for the US, went from 17 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in 2023 of GDP. The entire process of building goods creates many mini ecosystems of production/capital value that stay in a country for many decades. […] Initially, the Chinese started in low-tech and low-cost labour manufacturing before 2001, but shifted towards becoming major manufacturers of high-tech products like robotics and EV automobiles. […] For President Trump to levy high tariffs on the Chinese in the current moment, he is doing everything that he can to resuscitate US manufacturing".[26] EU's options The EU and the US share the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with 2024 data showing EU exports to the US at 531.6 billion euros and imports at 333.4 billion euros, resulting in a 198.2 billion Euro trade surplus for the EU.[27] While the EU faces significant challenges due to "tariff wars," there are potential opportunities for positive outcomes. The EU can leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market and enhance its role in global trade. By adopting proactive trade policies and fostering international cooperation, the EU can mitigate the negative impacts of "tariff wars" and potentially emerge as a more resilient and influential global actor. However, this requires careful navigation of the complex geopolitical landscape and a commitment to maintaining open and cooperative trade relations. It seems likely that the EU can leverage recent US tariffs to strengthen ties with China and India, potentially reducing its dependency on US trade. China is the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade at 739 billion euros in 2023, though a large deficit favouring China (292 billion euros in 2023).[28] The EU's strategy is to de-risk, not decouple, focusing on reciprocity and reducing dependencies; however, competition and systemic rivalry complicate deeper ties. Meanwhile, India's trade with the EU was 124 billion euros in goods in 2023, and ongoing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, expected to conclude by 2025, could yield short-term economic gains of 4.4 billion euros for both.[29] India's fast-growing economy and shared interest in technology make it a potentially promising partner. EU and China: Opportunities and Challenges Economically, there are more opportunities than challenges. China remains the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching 739 billion euros in 2023, down 14 per cent from 2022 due to global economic shifts.[30] The trade balance shows a significant deficit of 292 billion euros in 2023, driven by imports of telecommunications equipment and machinery, whereas EU exports include motor cars and medicaments. The EU's strategy, outlined in its 2019 strategic outlook and reaffirmed in 2023, positions China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, focusing on de-risking rather than decoupling. Recent actions, such as anti-dumping duties on Chinese glass fibre yarns in March 2025, highlight tensions over unfair trade practices. Despite these challenges, China's market size offers opportunities, especially if the EU can negotiate for better access. However, geopolitical rivalry complicates deeper ties, including EU probes, in Chinese subsidies. Politically, the EU and China differ significantly in this regard. Regarding human rights policies, the EU consistently raises concerns about human rights issues in China.[31] These concerns often lead to friction, with the European Parliament blocking trade agreements and imposing sanctions on them. Moreover, China's stance on the war in Ukraine has created tension, with the EU viewing Russia as a major threat, and China's support of Russia is a significant concern.[32] China is often perceived in Western European capitals as not making concessions on issues vital to European interests.[33] The understanding of the war's root causes, the assessment of implications, risks or potential solutions - in all these areas, the Chinese leadership on the one hand and the European governments and the EU Commission in Brussels on the other hand have expressed very different, at times even contrary, positions.[34] Finally, China's political model demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, challenging Western emphasis on democracy and human rights.[35] EU and India: Growing Partnership and FTA Prospects and Political Challenges Economically, it seems that there are more opportunities than challenges. India, ranked as the EU's ninth-largest trading partner, accounted for 124 billion euros in goods trade in 2023, representing 2.2 per cent of the EU's total trade, with growth of around 90 per cent over the past decade.[36] Services trade reached nearly 60 billion euros in 2023, almost doubling since 2020, with a third being digital services.[37] The EU is India's largest trading partner, and ongoing negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA), investment protection, and geographical indications, initiated in 2007 and resuming in 2022, aim for conclusion by 2025.[38] A 2008 trade impact assessment suggests positive real income effects, with short-term gains of 3–4.4 billion euros for both parties. The EU seeks to lower Indian tariffs on cars, wine, and whiskey. Simultaneously, India has pushed for market access to pharmaceuticals and easier work visas for IT professionals. However, concerns remain regarding the impact of EU border carbon taxes and farm subsidies on Indian farmers. Politically, challenges to EU-India relations stem from several sources. Trade has been a persistent friction point, with negotiations for a free trade agreement facing roadblocks (Malaponti, 2024). Despite the EU being a significant trading partner for India,[39] differing approaches to trade liberalization have hindered progress. India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[40] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[41] Finally, while the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper, more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[42] Conclusions "What does Trump want? This question is on the minds of policymakers and experts worldwide. Perhaps we are witnessing the opening salvo of a decisive phase of the US-China economic conflict - the most serious conflict since 1989. It is likely the beginning of the end of the ideology of Globalism and the processes of globalisation. It is arguably aggressive "decoupling" at its worst and the fragmentation of the world economy. For the EU, this is a new situation which dictates new challenges. Someday, probably sooner than later, European political elites will have to make a choice. To loosen or perhaps even end the transatlantic community and go against the US. Perhaps in tandem with some of the BRICS countries, such as India and China, or swallow the bitter pill, redefine its current economic model, and once again gamble with Washington, this time against the BRICS. It seems that the EU and its member states are at a crossroads, and their next choice of action will have to be very careful. In a likely new "Cold War" between the US and this time, China, the EU might not be allowed to play the third party, neutral status. One should also remember that Trump, like Putin or Xi, likes to talk to EU member states' representatives directly, bypassing Brussels and unelected "Eureaucrats' like Ursula Von der Leyen. In other words, he tends to leverage his position against the unity of the EU, which should not be surprising given the internal EU conflicts. More often than not, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, or Nordic members of the EU clash on numerous Issues with Berlin, Paris and most importantly, Brussels. (I write more about it here: Will the EU even survive? Vital external and internal challenges ahead of the EU in the newly emerging world order. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4577).   References [1] See more at:  For detailed information, consult one of the most comprehensive databases on conflicts run by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme at: https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia[2] Pettersson, Therese. 2019. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 19.1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-191.pdf[3] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/[4] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify… op. cit.[5] Hanin Bochen, and Ziwen Zhao. "China vows to retaliate after 'bullying' US imposes 34% reciprocal tariffs". South China Morning Post. April 3 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/us/diplomacy/article/3304971/trump-announced-34-reciprocal-tariffs-chinese-goods-part-liberation-day-package[6] Megerian, Chris and Boak, Josh. "Trump threatens new 50% tariff on China on top of 'reciprocal' duties". Global News. April 7, 2025. https://globalnews.ca/news/11119347/trump-added-50-percent-tariff-china/[7] Tan Yvette, Liang Annabelle and Ng Kelly. "China is not backing down from Trump's tariff war. What next?". BBC, April 8 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg51yw700lo[8] Wong, Olga. “Trump further raises tariffs to 120% on small parcels from mainland, Hong Kong”. South China Morning Post, 11 April 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3306069/trump-further-raises-tariffs-120-small-parcels-mainland-hong-kong?utm_source=feedly_feed[9] Chu, Ben. “ What does Trump's tariff pause mean for global trade?”, BBC, 10 April, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz95589ey9yo[10] Wu, Terri. "Why US Has Upper Hand Over Beijing in Tariff Standoff". The Epoch Times April 7, 2025. https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/why-us-has-upper-hand-over-beijing-in-tariff-standoff-5838158?utm_source=epochHG&utm_campaign=jj  [11] Blenkinsop, Philip, and Van Overstraeten, Benoit. "EU plans countermeasures to new US tariffs, says EU chief." April 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-prepare-countermeasures-us-reciprocal-tariffs-says-eu-chief-2025-04-03/[12] Payne, Julia. The EU Commission proposes 25% counter-tariffs on some US imports, document shows". Reuters, April 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/eu-commission-proposes-25-counter-tariffs-some-us-imports-document-shows-2025-04-07/  [13] Bennett, Ivor. "US seems content to cosy up to Russia instead of imposing tariffs." Sky News, April 4, 2025. https://news.sky.com/story/us-seems-content-to-cosy-up-to-russia-instead-of-coerce-it-with-tariffs-13341300[14] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research, 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[15] Ilhomjonov, Ibrohim, and Akbarali Yakubov. "THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USA ON THE WORLD ECONOMY," June 16, 2024. https://interoncof.com/index.php/USA/article/view/2112[16] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[17] Fetzer, Thiemo, and Schwarz Carlo. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." Economic Journal 131: no. 636 (May 2021): 1717–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa122[18] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship …op. cit.[19] Mihaylov, Valentin Todorov, and Sławomir Sitek. 2021. "Trade Wars and the Changing International Order: A Crisis of Globalisation?" Miscellanea Geographica 25: 99–109. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051[20] Wheatley, Mary Christine. "Global Trade Wars: Economic and Social Impacts." PREMIER JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, November 5, 2024. https://premierscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/pjbm-24-368.pdf[21] Money & Macro, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ts5wJ6OfzA&t=572s[22] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System." November 2024. Hudson Bay Capital. https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf[23] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System"... op.cit.[24] Zongyuan Zoe Liu, "Why the Proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord May Not be the Magic Wand That Trump Is Hoping For", 9  April 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-proposed-mar-lago-accord-may-not-be-magic-wand-trump-hoping  [25] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent Breaks Down Trump's Tariff Plan and Its Impact on the Middle Class. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLnX1SQfgJI[26] Park, Thomas. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7316122202846765056/[27] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250311-1[28] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[29] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know." World Economic Forum. March 7 2025. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/eu-india-free-trade-agreement/[30] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[31] "The paradoxical relationship between the EU and China'. Eastminster: a global politics & policy blog, University of East Anglia. http://www.ueapolitics.org/2022/03/29/the-paradoxical-relationship-between-the-eu-and-china/[32] Vasselier, Abigaël. "Relations between the EU and China: what to watch for in 2024". January 25 2025. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/relations-between-eu-and-china-what-watch-2024 [33] Benner, Thorsten. "Europe Is Disastrously Split on China." Foreign Policy, April 12 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/12/europe-china-policy-brussels-macron-xi-jinping-von-der-leyen-sanchez/[34] Chen, D., N. Godehardt, M., Mayer, X., Zhang. 2022. "Europe and China at a Crossroads." 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/europe-and-china-at-a-crossroads.[35] Sharshenova, A. and Crawford. 2017. "Undermining Western Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: China's Countervailing Influences, Powers and Impact." Central Asian Survey 36 (4): 453. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2017.1372364.[36] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en[37] See more at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/key-outcomes-second-eu-india-trade-and-technology-council[38] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know"… op. cit.[39] Malaponti, Chiara. 2024. “Rebooting EU-India Relations: How to Unlock Post-Election Potential.” https://ecfr.eu/article/rebooting-eu-india-relations-how-to-unlock-post-election-potential/.[40] Sinha, Aseema, and Jon P. Dorschner. 2009. “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?” Polity 42 (1): 74. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19.[41] Chandrasekar, Anunita. 2025. “It’s Time to Upgrade the EU-India Relationship.” https://www.cer.eu/insights/its-time-upgrade-eu-india-relationship.[42] Gare, Frédéric and Reuter Manisha. “Here be dragons: India-China relations and their consequences for Europe”. 25 May 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/here-be-dragons-india-china-relations-and-their-consequences-for-europe/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The alliance between Trump’s expanding deportation campaign and Salvadoran President Bukele’s carceral authoritarianism has major implications for human rights and the future of democracy. In February 2023, the Salvadoran government released drone footage of thousands of shirtless men with shaved heads, shackled and crouched in tight formation, being herded into a newly built prison called the Center for the Confinement of Terrorism – CECOT.  The high-tech mega prison was constructed at breakneck speed under the rule of President Nayib Bukele, as he declared victory in the so-called “war on gangs” in the country.  As the largest prison in the world, CECOT can hold up to 40,000 people. However, plans to double the mega prison’s capacity (80,000) are already underway, with the US expected to “send enough to fill it,” as reported by the Wall Street Journal.  From state of emergency to state of exception The year before CECOT’s inauguration, President Bukele declared a “state of emergency,” suspending constitutional rights like due process, legal defense, and freedom of assembly, and allowing measures like mass arrests, and indefinite pretrial detention.  “CECOT is nothing more than an extermination prison for the poor,” says Marisel Ramírez, a member of the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc, a coalition of Salvadoran trade unions, civil society groups, and political organizations. “The regime invests in mega-prisons instead of health, education, or structural reforms.” Today, El Salvador’s detention rate has outpaced that of the United States – the former world leader in incarceration by far. 1 in every 57 Salvadorans is now incarcerated, triple the rate of the US.  In March 2025, various human rights organizations in El Salvador, such as Human Rights Institute of the Central American University (IDHUCA); Foundation for the Study and Application of the Law (FESPAD); Passionist Social Service, among others, produced a report compiling documented cases of mistreatment, torture, and the inhumane conditions of detainees over the three years of the “state of exception.” Their findings include: • 85,000+ people have been detained by the state during this period• 6,889 cases of human rights violations have been filed by human rights organizations• 52% of detainees are 19–30 year-old men• 265–375 deaths in state custody have been verified by different data agencies Their report demands the repeal of the “state of exception,” reparations for the families and victims of human rights violations, and independent investigations of all human rights abuses. Welcome to CECOT Many of CECOT’s prisoners are denied due process. Visitation is prohibited. Communication with family, friends, and even lawyers is prohibited. Inmates are also completely stripped of privacy. Cells are packed with up to 80 people for 23.5 hours a day. They share metal bunks and an open toilet, under constant surveillance by prison guards. There is no form of education or recreation offered at the facility. Letters and reading material are prohibited. And there are no reports of any inmates being released. CBS News reported El Salvador’s justice minister saying, “the only way out is in a coffin.” In fact, Google Earth images and videos have recently circulated social media showing a CECOT courtyard that appears to be stained with blood.  CECOT has become a symbol of a global trend towards militarization, mass incarceration, and political repression under the pretense of “domestic security.” As Trump’s offshore detention of migrants in CECOT shines an international spotlight on Bukele’s policies, urgent questions are arising: 1. How far will the US go in utilizing Bukele’s repressive infrastructure for its own agenda?2. How did a self-described “dictator” rise to power in El Salvador?3. How are communities in El Salvador responding? The US – Bukele alliance While CECOT was built for domestic repression and incarceration, it is now a site of international collaboration between extreme-right-wing governments. Bukele’s prison has been openly endorsed – and now directly funded – by the US government.  On March 15, in an unprecedented move, the Trump administration deported roughly 250 Venezuelan migrants to CECOT prison in El Salvador, ignoring a federal judge’s order to halt the deportations. Invoking the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) of 1798 against Venezuelan nationals accused of being part of the gang Tren de Aragua, Trump attempted to pave a “legal” pathway for his policy of mass deportations. Yet a report from CBS News claims that the majority of those deported have no criminal record in the US, and human rights and advocacy groups have rejected any legal basis for Trump’s use of the AEA.  One of the deportees, a Maryland resident and union worker named Kilmar Abrego Garcia, has become a central figure in the broader legal and political crisis surrounding Trump and Bukele’s authoritarian alliance.  The case of Kilmar Abrego Garcia Kilmar was born in El Salvador and holds protected status in the US, where he has lived for over 14 years. The Trump administration admitted he was deported in error and the Supreme Court has ordered the US government to facilitate his return. Nevertheless, Trump has defied the order, and Bukele refuses to release Abrego. Recently, Trump has accused Abrego of being part of the Salvadoran gang, MS-13, without evidence or due process. Since the day CECOT was inaugurated, the government has used social media to promote positive ideas about the prison and Bukele’s iron-grip approach. Far-right politicians and YouTube influencers are regularly welcomed to tour CECOT, posing in front of groups of detainees for their online audiences. However, Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen was denied entry to the facility on April 16, when he traveled to El Salvador to advocate for Kilmar’s release. In the late hours of April 17, the senator was finally able to meet with Abrego off-site from the prison. In a press conference held on April 18 in Dulles International Airport, the Senator told reporters that the Maryland father is not being held at CECOT but is still being illegally detained in a different Salvadoran prison. “The reason they relented is pretty clear — they were feeling the pressure,” said the senator. Kilmar’s wife credited the growing movement for justice for the small win in a statement released by the advocacy group CASA:  “Now I know that my husband is alive…Thank you to everyone, including Senator Van Hollen, my CASA family, all our Union’s, faith leaders and community for continuing this fight for my family to be reunited.” The USD 15 million deal behind CECOT The detention of migrants in El Salvador’s prison system has faced heavy criticism. Many are asking, why is the Salvadoran government continuing to hold migrants at CECOT without any evidence that they have committed a crime? During his visit to El Salvador, Maryland Senator raised this very question to Vice President Félix Ulloa in regard to Abrego Garcia, who said that the Trump administration is paying El Salvador to keep migrants like Garcia at CECOT. The Trump administration has reportedly agreed to pay El Salvador USD 6 million to house hundreds of migrants deported from the US for up to a year. In Van Hollen’s press conference on April 18, he told reporters that the deal between Trump and Bukele may be for as much as USD 15 million. “Homegrowns are next” Migrants are not the only ones being targeted for deportation to CECOT. During Bukele’s White House visit on April 14, Trump was recorded saying he wants to send US citizens to CECOT too. The “homegrown criminals” are next. “You’ve got to build about five more places,” he said. To which Bukele responded, “we’ve got space.”  Legal experts and human rights organizations have asserted that the offshore detention of US citizens is illegal, but Trump confirmed later that “We are looking into it, and we want to do it.” The US – Bukele alliance represents a convergence in the growing international authoritarian trend. But this alliance didn’t emerge overnight. It is the result of a deliberate political project that Bukele has been advancing for years. But to understand how the country got to this point, we have to look back at how Bukele transformed El Salvador into, as he calls it, a dictatorship.  The world’s “coolest dictator” For years, El Salvador faced one of the highest homicide rates in the world, driven by the extortion practices of gangs, like MS-13. The gang started in Los Angeles, California, initially to defend Salvadoran immigrants from other established gangs in the area, but became more structured and violent over time. After mass deportations in the 1990s, MS-13 expanded throughout Central America, gaining a high level of territorial control in El Salvador. Communities were often caught in the crossfire, with widespread insecurity and little trust in state institutions to protect them. Bukele rose to power promising an end to the violence, using harsh anti-gang rhetoric and militarization to appeal to the widespread fear and frustration, ultimately winning popular support. However, according to organizers with the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc, Bukele’s security policy is based on a pact with the gangs – not a war on them. They explain that while the president claims there are 80,000 gang members and terrorists in prison, the National Civil Police only reports the seizure of 4,000 weapons, 20,000 cell phones, and USD 4 million. There have been no arrests of top gang leaders, nor have those who have committed crimes in the US been extradited to that country.  Suppression of the left Movement leaders describe Bukele’s rise as one of clear authoritarianism – cloaked in anti-gang rhetoric, backed by the US, and enforced through mass repression. He enjoys popular support “because people perceive improved security, and he has imposed the idea that traditional parties were corrupt and waged a war that led to tragedies.” Activists assert that eliminating the left in the country as a viable political option has been a deliberate goal of Bukele’s “business clan.” They say Bukele has specifically targeted the FMLN, a former guerilla group that led the armed struggle against US-backed dictatorship in the 1980s, and later helped secure key democratic reforms through the Peace Accords.  “The FMLN is a victim of a smear campaign by the regime…whose influence in the state and society has significantly diminished. After governing for 10 years, the FMLN has no presence in the Legislative Assembly and no longer governs any mayoralties,” reads a statement by the Bloc. To better understand how Bukele consolidated power and suppressed his opposition, activists point to key moments in recent history. Here is a brief timeline of Bukele’s regime: 2019 – Bukele elected president• Breaking with the two dominant parties (ARENA and FMLN), he formed the party Nuevas Ideas, and presented himself as a young, social media savvy reformist.  2020 – Bukele storms Legislative Assembly with military• Flanked by heavily armed soldiers and police, Bukele enters the Legislative Assembly to pressure lawmakers to approve a USD 109 million loan, in order to militarize his police and soldiers to allegedly combat gangs. • International human rights groups condemn the action, while activists draw connections to El Salvador’s history of military dictatorships. 2021 – Removes Constitutional Court judges, adopts Bitcoin• Replacing judges in the Constitutional Court with loyalists, and removing the Attorney General, Bukele gains unchecked control over all three branches of government.• El Salvador becomes the only country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as a legal tender, despite mass protests.• Bukele’s new court rules that presidential reelection is now legal, ignoring a constitutional ban. Bukele announces his intent to run for reelection in 2024. • The US government applies some pressure on Bukele to maintain legal appearances.• Critics argue that a major part of Bukele’s propaganda is the idea that he’s “changing the country,” using symbolic gestures, minor public projects, and some changes to the state like reducing the number of provincial and municipal governments.  2022 – “State of emergency” declared• Following a spike in homicides, Bukele declares a “state of emergency,” suspending constitutional rights, and launching a so-called “war on gangs.”• Mass arrests without warrants begin. Many are detained without evidence or due process. Activists call the state of emergency a “mechanism of social containment.” They report popular leaders being targeted, generating fear and limiting popular protests. 2023 – CECOT prison unveiled• The 40,000 person-capacity mega prison is inaugurated with a propaganda blitz displaying prisoners in dehumanizing ways.• Bitcoin investment loses over 50% of its value, costing El Salvador hundreds of millions.• Irregularities around public procurement connected to the Bukele family arise. The public procurement law is practically repealed, limiting public access to details about government spending and contracts.• Political opposition in government has been practically eliminated. 55/60 representatives are from Bukele’s party, NI. 43/44 mayoralities are controlled by NI and its allies. The majority of the population rejects the FMLN and even the traditional, non-governing right parties.  2024 – Bukele wins reelection• Despite a constitutional ban on reelection, Bukele runs for president and wins. He is backed by his courts and military, amid a climate of fear and mass imprisonment justified by “domestic security” rhetoric.• The US government supports his illegal reelection.• Investigations reveal that the Bukele family has significantly increased their land holdings during Nayib Bukele’s presidency (USD 9.2 million in value), placing them among the top 2% of large coffee producers in El Salvador.• Bukele reverses a landmark ban on metal mining, sparking a nationwide protest movement. Today, Bukele’s “state of exception” continues indefinitely. Reports of torture, disappearances, and political arrests grow. Meanwhile, the Salvadoran President is promoting himself worldwide as a model far-right leader and enjoying a lucrative alliance with the US government.  As the repression intensifies, so too does grassroots resistance. People’s movements for the freedom of political prisoners, and against the “state of exception” continue to build, the most important of these being the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc.  Salvadoran resistance The Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc is an organization of 35 social organizations from various sectors of society: students, women, peasants, unions, professionals, and more.  Marisel Ramírez, an organizer with the Bloc, told Peoples Dispatch: “These organizations came together in January 2021 to denounce the major setbacks we have suffered since the Bukele business clan took office, and to demand an end to the government’s repressive policies.” Explaining the Bloc’s strategies and tactics, Marisel said that “the organizations that belong to the bloc act according to their own demands, highlighting the serious human rights violations committed under the state of emergency.” In her words, the resistance doesn’t take just one form – it plays out across a range of interconnected fronts. Here are just a few examples: 1. Movement of Victims of the State of Emergency (MOVIR)• Families of the detainees mobilize their communities and protest the arbitrary arrests, demanding justice and freedom for their loved ones. 2. Salvadoran Student Force• Students are consistently fighting back against the arrests of university students under the state of exception. 3. Feminist Resistance • Women are organizing and mobilizing around the economic, emotional, and familial impacts of the arbitrary arrests of innocent people, as well as the abuse of power by the military and police.These forces, Marisel said, “demand ‘sexual favors’ in exchange for ‘benefits’ – not taking people away, expediting judicial processes, and access to personal hygiene products.” 4. The Confederation of Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Federations (CONFRAS)• Mobilizes peasants and farm workers and denounces the shortage of agricultural labor caused by the high migration triggered by the state of exception. Despite Bukele’s iron-grip approach and mass incarceration campaign, resistance in El Salvador is growing – led by families of the detained and disappeared, student organizers, feminist collectives, and peasant unions who refuse to be silenced. Their struggle aims to demonstrate that CECOT is not just a prison – it is a weapon of political power aimed at the poor and fueled by international complicity.  What’s becoming increasingly clear is that the US is seeking to expand its deportation machine and outsource incarceration and repression to third countries like El Salvador. As these transnational policies develop, urgent questions remain: To what extent will Trump bulldoze legal obstacles in order to utilize this repressive model? Will US citizens begin facing deportation and detention in CECOT? And, how will the people in the US respond to this deepening authoritarian alliance? Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq, international and regional warnings about the resurgence of ISIS have resurfaced, driven by mounting evidence of the group’s reorganization and its exploitation of the security vacuum left by military collapses and political instability. Since late 2024, multiple reports have pointed to a noticeable uptick in ISIS activity, an increase in the frequency of its attacks, and a growing ability to maneuver and recruit—fueled by weak regional coordination and diverging priorities among key international actors. Far from being ideologically defeated, ISIS appears to be reshaping itself within a volatile landscape, threatening to usher in a new phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the following analysis explores the main features of the group’s resurgence, the dynamics of its territorial re-expansion, and the regional and international efforts to contain it—seeking to unpack the nature of this renewed threat and assess its potential implications. International Warnings Over the Growing Threat of ISIS A series of international and regional statements and warnings issued since late 2024 reflect mounting concerns over the reemergence of the terrorist group ISIS on the regional scene, amid fragile security conditions and a diminished capacity to contain unconventional threats. In December 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, in a phone call with the UK Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer, revealed alarming signs of ISIS regrouping. He noted that the organization had managed to seize large stockpiles of weapons following the collapse of Syrian army units that abandoned their arsenals—enabling ISIS to expand its territorial presence in parts of Syria. This alarming development has not only been flagged by Iraq but has also featured prominently in international reports. On February 10, 2025, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, during a briefing before the Security Council, confirmed that ISIS continues to demonstrate a striking ability to adapt and evolve its tactics, despite ongoing security and military pressure from member states and international and regional partners. The 20th report of the UN Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security emphasized that the group has not been ideologically defeated; rather, it is restructuring itself within the security and political voids present in Syria, Iraq, and other areas. In the same context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned in March 2025 of a "real danger" posed by ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, pointing to the lack of political settlements and the breakdown of certain internal security structures as conditions conducive to the group's return. His warning echoed the concluding statement of the meeting of foreign ministers from Syria’s neighboring countries, held in Amman, Jordan, on March 9, 2025. The ministers expressed deep concern over the escalating ISIS threat and underscored the need to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms—particularly in intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations along Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stressed that "combating ISIS is no longer a local issue, but a collective responsibility that demands effective regional readiness and robust international support." He highlighted that the group’s threat has grown not only in terms of manpower but also in terms of military capabilities, and that its reach is now expanding beyond border areas into the Syrian heartland itself. These developments indicate that, despite the significant blows dealt to it in recent years, ISIS continues to benefit from the fluid geopolitical landscape in Syria—one that creates security gaps the group can exploit to reposition and reorganize itself. Furthermore, the conflicting priorities among international and regional actors in the Syrian file are hindering the formation of a unified front to confront this renewed threat. This fragmentation makes the challenge far more complex and reinforces the notion that the battle against ISIS remains far from over—both on the ground and within the broader framework of collective security. Signs of Escalation ISIS continues to consolidate its presence in Syria through its deployment across two geographically separate yet strategically interconnected regions—demonstrating the group’s persistent ability to exploit security gaps and divergences among local and international actors. The first area lies in Syria’s northeastern region, known as al-Jazira, which is nominally under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite this control, ISIS has maintained a notable presence in the southern desert of al-Hasakah province, geographically linked to the northeastern outskirts of the city of Al-Bukamal, particularly around the town of Al-Baghuz—the group’s last urban stronghold before its official collapse. This geographic footprint extends beyond Syria’s borders into Iraq, specifically into the Hadar desert in Nineveh province. Although concrete barriers now separate the two countries, ISIS has retained a clear ability to move across the border, as confirmed by testimonies from residents in the rural areas of al-Hasakah—rekindling memories of the "parallel state" dynamic the group sought to establish during its peak between 2014 and 2017. The year 2024 saw a marked increase in ISIS activity within Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the group carried out 491 operations throughout the year. In its report released on December 30, 2024, the Observatory noted that ISIS has successfully exploited political and military turmoil to reorganize and launch targeted attacks. In line with this, the Soufan Center reported on December 18 that ISIS attacks had tripled in frequency compared to 2023. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on July 17 that the group claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria during just the first half of 2024—clearly reflecting a strategy aimed at “escalating operational activity to compensate for structural decline.”  This upward trend reinforces the growing assumption that ISIS is leveraging fragile security conditions not only to expand its territorial influence but also to challenge other extremist groups—most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria. HTS has faced internal challenges linked to the novelty of its governance experiment and has been weakened by surprise attacks that undermine its structure and heighten insecurity in its areas of control. ISIS, in turn, appears intent on diffusing HTS’s efforts, exacerbating divisions among factions, and exploiting public discontent with local elites. These developments have also triggered serious concerns over potential spillover effects in Iraq, especially given the deeply interwoven geographic linkages between the Syrian and Iraqi theaters of operation. The cross-border mobility of ISIS operatives could reactivate dormant cells in Iraq’s western and northern provinces—particularly given the thousands of radicalized individuals currently held in Iraqi prisons, making these facilities potential targets for jailbreaks or attempts to reassert control, as seen in the earlier Ghweran prison attack in al-Hasakah. In light of this complex battlefield landscape, the fight against ISIS is far from over. The group—demonstrating notable tactical agility—is reconstituting itself within existing voids, capitalizing on fragmentation, and continually seeking new pathways for resurgence through the shifting terrain of regional geopolitics. The inability of certain local and regional powers to formulate a sustainable, collective counterterrorism strategy only further emboldens the group’s ambitions. Contours of a New Phase in the War Against ISIS The final months of 2024 and early 2025 witnessed a series of high-profile operations targeting senior ISIS leaders, signaling a tactical shift in the counterterrorism strategies adopted by international and regional powers. This shift marks the beginning of a new phase in the fight against ISIS—one that moves beyond random strikes to a focused campaign against the group’s leadership infrastructure. On December 20, 2024, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a precision airstrike in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, initially claiming it had killed ISIS’s leader, known as “Abu Yusuf.” However, CENTCOM later revised its statement, clarifying that the target was not the overall leader but a senior commander named Mahmoud “Abu Yusuf,” along with two of his aides. This correction reflects the complex intelligence challenges involved in identifying high-ranking ISIS figures, especially in an environment riddled with infiltration and security deception. In a related development, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani announced in March 2025, via a post on the platform X, the killing of one of the group’s most dangerous operatives: Abdullah Maki Masleh Al-Rifai, known as “Abu Khadijah,” who held the title of “Wali of Iraq and Syria” within ISIS's organizational structure. His elimination, the result of coordinated efforts between Iraqi intelligence and the Joint Operations Command—supported by the international coalition—demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-layered coordination in tracking down the group’s hidden leadership. On the European front, France returned to active operations against ISIS in Syria for the first time in over two years. In December 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that French warplanes had conducted precision strikes on ISIS positions inside Syrian territory. He emphasized that the operation, carried out the previous Sunday, underscored France’s continued commitment to counterterrorism efforts in the Levant. This marked France’s first such strike since September 2022—indicating a potential reactivation of its counterterrorism role and a broader effort to reassert European engagement in Syria, a file that has largely been dominated by the U.S., Russia, and Turkey. These three operations—American, Iraqi, and French—reflect what appears to be a renewed “leadership decapitation campaign” targeting ISIS commanders amid rising concerns over the group’s resurgence in Syria and Iraq. Yet, while such strikes carry strategic importance, they cannot substitute for broader efforts to dismantle the ideological, organizational, and financial foundations that allow ISIS to regenerate. Killing leaders may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities, but it does not ensure its eradication unless accompanied by comprehensive political and security solutions that address the roots of extremism and the institutional fragility on which the group thrives. In a notable development suggesting a qualitative shift in how regional states are approaching the terrorism file, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria announced in February 2025 the establishment of a joint cooperation mechanism to confront ISIS. The agreement emphasizes close coordination between foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, covering areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations. This move reflects a shared recognition that the terrorist threat transcends borders and demands coordinated frameworks that go beyond bilateral interests toward a collective regional security logic. This agreement laid the foundation for a broader process that culminated in a high-level five-party summit on March 8, 2025. The meeting brought together foreign and defense ministers, senior military commanders, and intelligence chiefs from the four founding countries, with Lebanon later joining the process. From the Turkish side, the meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın—highlighting Turkey’s strategic investment in this forum as a platform for reshaping the security landscape in northern Syria and Iraq. More broadly, this nascent regional alliance reflects a growing inclination to reduce dependence on Western powers in managing regional security issues. Instead, it seeks to establish a “new security architecture” led by Middle Eastern nations themselves—reviving the role of Arab and regional capitals in controlling border zones and reclaiming areas that ISIS may seek to exploit as fallback havens for regrouping and redeployment. Conclusion The available data indicates that ISIS is entering a new phase of reactivation and repositioning in the Syrian theater, capitalizing on the security and political collapse following the fall of central authority, and on the conflicting agendas of regional and international actors. Despite targeted strikes against some of its leaders, the group continues to demonstrate its operational adaptability and its ability to evolve amid shifting field dynamics. The resurgence of ISIS attacks and its expansion into ungoverned spaces signal a complex phase of confrontation—one that demands more than just military maneuvers. The success of the war against ISIS in Syria depends not only on precision strikes but also on the establishment of effective regional security partnerships and the activation of political and developmental pathways that address the root causes of extremism. As the group seeks to exploit divisions, its complete disappearance will hinge on the creation of a comprehensive deterrence architecture—one that goes beyond temporary fixes and moves toward sustainable strategies that tackle the structural foundations of militancy, not just its symptoms.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sudan’s war, now entering its third year, has taken another unexpected turn. In March 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), also known as the Janjaweed, withdrew from Khartoum, abandoning the presidential palace and airport. This retreat marks a significant contrast to the paramilitary group’s earlier victory when troops stormed the capital in April 2023. The fall of Khartoum is a turning point. But, based on my research into Sudan’s political turmoil over the past three decades, I don’t believe recent developments mark the war’s final chapter. What began as a power struggle between two military factions is now transforming into a much wider conflict, marked by deepening fragmentation and the rise of armed civilian groups. Across the country, new militias are emerging, many formed by civilians who once had no part in the war. The army encouraged civilians to fight, but now it faces a growing number of independent armed groups. In cities and rural areas alike, civilians have taken up arms. Some are fighting alongside the army, answering calls from the military leadership, including army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to defend their neighbourhoods and families. Others have formed self-defence units to protect against looting and violence. Some have joined breakaway militias that have their own agendas. These groups don’t share a single goal. Some fight for self-defence, others for political power. Some for revenue and wealth. Others are seeking ethnic control – Sudan’s population has 56 ethnic groups and 595 sub-ethnic groups. This is what makes Sudan’s war even more dangerous: fragmentation is creating multiple mini-wars within the larger conflict. How the Rapid Support Forces lost Khartoum Several key factors forced the RSF to retreat from Khartoum after it claimed control of the Sudanese capital city two years earlier. • Internal fractures: The RSF, built on tribal loyalty, struggled to hold together as the war dragged on. Many factions felt sidelined by its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. • Civilian resistance: The RSF’s reliance on brutality backfired, alienating even those who might have supported them. Instead of consolidating control, they turned civilians into enemies. The RSF relied on terror – looting, mass killings and sexual violence. Instead of gaining control, they provoked fierce resistance. Armed civilians, originally taking up arms in self-defence, have become an informal militia network working against the RSF. • Foreign intervention: Reports suggest Egyptian airstrikes and tactical support helped the army take Khartoum. Additionally, Turkish-made Bayraktar drones weakened RSF positions. With supply lines cut, the RSF had no choice but to retreat. Khartoum was not just a battlefield defeat for the RSF. It was a turning point in how the war is fought – it’s no longer a military struggle but a battle involving armed civilians across Sudan. Based on reports from humanitarian organisations, conflict monitors and local testimonies, a clearer picture has emerged of a growing number of armed groups operating across Sudan. These groups have formed in response to the escalating conflict. Recent analyses highlight that arms trafficking and intensified community mobilisation have accelerated within the past two years. Neighbourhood defence units have emerged in urban areas like El-Gezira in central Sudan, El-Fasher in North Darfur, Al-Dalang in South Kordofan, El-Obeid in North Kordofan, Babanusa in West Kordofan and Khartoum. They were initially formed to protect residential zones from the RSF but have since expanded their roles and increasingly operate outside the oversight of the army. Tribal and regional militias have also become more prominent, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan. In these regions, entrenched ethnic and political rivalries have intertwined with the current war. Some of these militia groups have aligned with the army. Others remain independent, pursuing their own agendas, which include securing territory. In Darfur, growing anger at Hemedti’s favouritism towards his own tribe (Rizeigat) led to defections. Internal divisions within the RSF have played a major role in its recent losses. Some former RSF fighters have formed their own militias. The RSF was never a unified force, but a tribal alliance dominated by the Dagalo family and Rizeigat elites. Initially, gold revenues secured loyalty, but as the war has dragged on, internal fractures have deepened. Another ethnic-linked group is the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North. It has expanded its control in Kordofan and Blue Nile, two resource-rich regions in southern Sudan. The group allied with the RSF to push its own agenda, which includes securing greater autonomy for these regions and promoting a secular political framework that challenges Khartoum’s Islamist-leaning governance. Other ethnic militias also operate in eastern Sudan, supported by neighbouring countries such as Eritrea, further escalating the situation. Islamist-linked militias are also on the rise. The main example of these groups is El Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, which emerged as a key player supporting the army against the RSF. Reports link the group to remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime (1993-2019) – the dissolved Popular Defence Forces. This was a paramilitary group established in the mid-1980s to defend Arab tribes and support the military. It flourished under the al-Bashir regime. What next? While the RSF’s retreat from Khartoum is a major victory for the Sudanese army, it doesn’t mean stability is returning. Instead, Sudan is now facing a dangerous new reality: the rise of civilian militarisation. If not reined in, these groups could evolve and establish de facto warlord-run territories where local commanders wield unchecked power. This would undermine any prospects for centralised governance in Sudan. With militias multiplying and no clear political solution, Sudan risks becoming a battlefield of warring factions. Meanwhile, international mediators are struggling to find a solution while foreign interference continues. The United Arab Emirates, a major RSF backer, still supports Hemedti financially, ensuring he remains active in Sudan’s gold trade.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском South Sudan’s fragile peace deal is unravelling as political tensions flare and violence resurfaces. More than a broken trust is the cause, and the nation’s leaders will need to be pressured into peace.  South Sudan is once again on the edge of a civil war. In March 2025, Vice President Riek Machar was placed under house arrest by President Salva Kiir’s government. His party, the SPLM-IO, quickly declared that the 2018 peace deal, the agreement that ended five years of brutal conflict, had effectively collapsed. The United Nations has warned that the situation looks dangerously similar to the lead-up to South Sudan’s past civil wars. Armed clashes between rival groups have already broken out. Kenya sent former Prime Minister Raila Odinga to mediate the crisis, but so far, tensions remain high. South Sudan has been here before. After gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, it quickly plunged into civil war just two years later. What began as a power struggle between Kiir and Machar turned into a deadly ethnic conflict. By the time a peace deal was signed in 2018, more than 400,000 people were dead, and millions had been forced to flee their homes. The 2018 peace agreement, formally known as the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), was meant to end that war for good. It brought Machar back as vice president and called for national elections, the integration of armed forces, and the formation of a permanent constitution. It looked promising at first. But six years later, many of its key promises remain unfulfilled, and the country is once again on the brink. What went wrong with the 2018 deal? The biggest problem with the 2018 deal is that it focused too much on power-sharing between Kiir and Machar, and not enough on the root causes of the conflict. It brought the two rivals back into government but did little to heal the ethnic divisions or build trust between their followers. Most importantly, it failed to fully integrate their armed forces. Instead of one national army, South Sudan still has multiple rival groups loyal to different leaders. This failure made the peace fragile from the start. Without a unified army or a functioning justice system, violence could return at any moment, and now it has. The deal also suffered from constant delays. Elections that were supposed to happen in 2022 were pushed to 2024 and have now been delayed again to 2026. The transitional government has been slow to draft a new constitution or set up key institutions. Critics say Kiir’s government has little interest in real democratic reform. Why is the crisis escalating now? Machar’s house arrest was the breaking point. His party accuses the government of undermining the agreement, and reports suggest that fighting has already started in some areas, including Unity State and Jonglei. The UN has expressed alarm, and several foreign governments have urged South Sudan to de-escalate before the violence spreads further. The government, meanwhile, claims Machar is supporting local militias, a charge he denies. This growing distrust is making it harder to bring both sides back to the negotiating table. Kenya has stepped in to help mediate, but with little progress so far. Odinga’s visit is a positive step, but the situation on the ground remains volatile. Could this lead to another civil war? Unfortunately, yes. All the warning signs are there. Armed groups are mobilising. The central government is cracking down on political opposition. And most of the peace deal’s reforms have stalled. If full-blown war breaks out, the humanitarian consequences will be devastating. South Sudan is already struggling with hunger, flooding, and mass displacement. Millions rely on humanitarian aid, and new fighting would make it even harder for that aid to reach those in need. South Sudan’s youth, who have grown up knowing little but war, risk losing any hope for a peaceful future. Many feel abandoned by leaders who promised peace and delivered more political games. The international community played a big role in securing the 2018 peace deal. But since then, global attention has faded. While donors continue to fund humanitarian work, they’ve largely backed away from holding South Sudan’s leaders accountable for delays and violations. That needs to change. The African Union, IGAD, the UN, and Western governments still have influence, if they choose to use it. They can apply diplomatic pressure, impose sanctions, and demand real reforms. More importantly, any future deal must include voices beyond Kiir and Machar: civil society leaders, women, youth, and religious figures who understand what peace means at the community level. What does South Sudan need now? South Sudan doesn’t need another temporary fix between two politicians. It needs deep, long-term change. That means building a functioning government, creating a unified army, and setting up systems that can hold leaders accountable. The country also needs truth and reconciliation. Thousands of families are still waiting for justice, and no peace deal will hold unless those wounds are addressed. Ordinary South Sudanese citizens must be part of this process, not just political elites. At its heart, this is a story of broken trust. South Sudan’s leaders promised to end a war and build a country. Today, those promises are in ruins. But the future isn’t written yet. With the right pressure, the right leadership, and the right voices at the table, a peaceful future is still possible. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском China is simultaneously the world's biggest polluter and the global leader in renewables This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice Fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Kazakhstan’s transition to renewable energy (RE) has seen a significant surge in recent years. This rapidly growing green transition has allowed the country to meet its interim RE targets. By 2030, the country aims to generate 15 percent of its total energy output through renewables and increase this share to 50 percent by 2050. Moreover, Kazakhstan has committed to reaching carbon neutrality by 2060.  The biggest partner in this endeavor has been China, whose role in the RE transition has grown and diversified over the years. For Kazakhstan, the benefits of this partnership are clear: industrialization of its economy and, more importantly, decreasing carbon emissions and improving air quality and public health. For China, the benefits go beyond mere lucrative investments and exporting its RE technology and include gaining soft power and offsetting its environmentally destructive footprint in Kazakhstan.  Harnessing renewable energy to combat air pollution In addition to rich oil and gas resources, Kazakhstan has vast renewable energy potential, thanks to its large territory and abundance of wind and sunny days. It is the ninth largest country by area and holds 77 percent of Central Asia’s solar potential and 90 percent of the regional wind potential.   The presence of wind corridors in vast Kazakh steppes with wind speeds of more than five miles per second, which is present in all regions, makes Kazakhstan ideal for the operation of wind turbines. Additionally, at least 50 percent of Kazakhstan's territory is suitable for installing solar panels.  Most of the RE potential remains untapped, with Kazakhstan still relying on Soviet-era energy infrastructure built to utilize fossil fuels. In 2024, 66 percent of the country’s electricity was generated through coal, 21 percent via natural gas, 6.6 percent from hydroelectricity, and only 6.4 percent from renewables.  Air pollution is a nationwide problem in Kazakhstan. In 2025, 35 cities spread across the country faced significant air pollution, according to the National Hydrometeorological Service of Kazakhstan. A major source of this pollution pandemic is coal burned by thermal power plants, industrial complexes, and households.  The list of adverse effects of air pollution is long. According to Kazakhstani doctor Denis Vinnikov, who has researched air pollution’s effects on health, long-term exposure to polluted air increases the risk of developing cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, such as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). In addition, air pollution increases the likelihood of almost all types of cancer and tumors. One of the most polluted cities in Kazakhstan, Almaty, is one of the national leaders with the highest cases of COPD.  Kazakhstan’s recognition of the adverse effects of its coal-intensive energy sector on the environment and public health has pushed the government to ramp up renewable energy production in the last decade. China’s multiple roles in renewables The Kazakh-Chinese green energy endeavors are part of China's wider bilateral cooperation, covering energy, agriculture, machinery, and mining, among other areas. China is one of Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partners. In 2022, the countries signed a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership. Between 2005 and 2023, China invested over USD 25 billion in Kazakhstan.  The two sides also work closely within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global connectivity project focusing on energy, trade, and transport infrastructure in global majority states. Between 2013 and 2020, China invested USD 18.5 billion in Kazakhstan within the BRI framework. China has participated in Kazakhstan’s green transition from the very beginning. In an interview with Global Voices, Yunis Sharifli, a non-resident fellow at the China Global South Project, described China as the “first-comer” to Kazakhstan’s RE sector. Yana Zabanova, a research associate at the Research Institute for Sustainability, said in an interview with Global Voices: China has been the main technology supplier to Kazakhstan's renewable energy sector, both in the solar PV and increasingly in the wind sector, and Chinese companies have also served as important investors and EPC [engineering, procurement, and constuction] contractors for renewable energy projects in the country. China’s role grew exponentially starting in 2018 when the government launched renewable energy auctions, which gifted government contracts to the lowest bidder. Since 2018, a single private Chinese company, Universal Energy, has built 10 RE plants, three solar and seven wind, with a total capacity of 630 Megawatts by winning government tenders.   Additionally, state-owned Chinese companies have secured contracts via intergovernmental negotiations. There are several examples of this, such as the Zhanatas and Shelek wind power plants (WPP), which are already operational, and five more RE plants in the development stage with a total capacity of 2.6 GW.   In an interview with Global Voices, Ainur Sospanova, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Qazaq Green RES Association, provided her expert assessment of China’s share in Kazakhstan’s RE sector: In the solar energy sector, it is almost 100 percent because it is impossible to compete against Chinese solar panels. In the wind energy sector, it is at least 70 percent and continues to grow. Thus, since 2018, China has expanded its role to project developer and financier through loans issued by Chinese banks and equity financing.  China's share in Kazakhstan’s renewable projects is set to grow even more upon the completion of two Chinese plants that will localize the production of energy storage systems and components for WPP. Gaining soft power and improving its image Paradoxically, China is simultaneously the biggest polluter in the world and the global leader in renewables. While China is constructing two-thirds of the world's wind and solar projects, 93 percent of global construction from coal power took place in China in 2024. This paradox is also present in BRI projects, including those in Kazakhstan.  China frequently touts its solar and wind energy projects as part of the BRI. At the same time, one-fourth of coal-fired power generation in the world is financed through the BRI. Though China Power International Holding and Kazakhstani Samruk Energy have agreed on solar and wind projects to develop renewables, deals are also inked to develop oil, gas, coal, cement, and steel industries in Kazakhstan, which adversely affect the environment and the well-being of local communities. Sharifli explained: When we look at the global discontent with China’s presence, we see two worries: debt trap and environmental pollution. So renewable energy is very important in this context. China’s investments in renewables are aimed at tackling these worries by gaining soft power and improving its reputation. This benefits not only China but also the BRI. Chinese companies that have invested in RE in Kazakhstan, such as Risen Energy, Universal Energy, and Power China, put the BRI at the heart of how they frame their companies. Chinese think tanks also suggest that the Chinese government welcome RE development overseas despite concerns.   In contrast to the Chinese-built oil processing, steel, and cement plants in Kazakhstan, RE projects have thus caused no controversy and helped China improve its reputation in Central Asia. Sharifli noted that since 2021, public attitudes towards China in Kazakhstan have started becoming more positive, partially due to Chinese investments in RE, according to a survey conducted by the Central Asia Barometer.  “Renewable energy plants are usually located in the steppe, far away from the settlements, they don’t interfere with the daily lives of people and look idyllic. There is no trash, there is no pollution, there is no dirty water or soil,” said Zabanova, who has visited multiple RE plants in Kazakhstan as part of her research.  China’s investments in renewables in Kazakhstan serve as an example of how solar and wind energy projects are used in diplomacy. They not only allow Chinese companies to export their excess capacities to profitable foreign markets but also help China mask its environmental damage and create a favorable perception abroad.