Subscribe to our weekly newsletters for free

Subscribe to an email

If you want to subscribe to World & New World Newsletter, please enter
your e-mail

Energy & Economics
Soon Saudi Women Driving Car, May 2018 From Inside Jeddah Motor Show.

Saudi women right to drive: statistics and economic impact

by World & New World Journal

Saudi Arabia had long banned women from driving, but now women can obtain driver’s licenses and drive. With this new change, Saudi women’s mobility and economic activities may expand. How are Saudi women reacting, and what are neighboring countries’ responses? Women’s fight By the mid-20th century, Saudi Arabia underwent a deep transformation, fueled by oil revenues. In consequence, new ministries and agencies emerged to manage economic development, while a new technocratic elite began to form, who later clashed with the conservative Wahhabi establishment. Strikes and nationalist movements exposed social inequalities, leading the monarchy to tighten control throughout the country. This period of modernization was thus marked by both progress and restrictions, such as the 1957 ban on women driving. [1] As the driving ban kept active, between 1990 and 2017 many different protests (groups of women driving), campaigns (“Teach me how to drive so I can protect myself” or #Women2Drive [2]) and movements against the driving ban surged. Important figures like Wajeha al-Huwaider [3], Loujain al-Hathloul [4] or Manal al-Shariff [5] (among others) defied the female driving ban in Saudi Arabia and by 2018, after many obstacles, their struggle culminated in victory. Announced by the end of 2017 and taking effect on June 24th, 2018, [6] the ban was lifted, and women were able to apply and issue driving licenses and drive in public. The move was part of the measures taken by the young Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in line with his vision and policy towards an economic and social change in the Kingdom. Statistics and impact of the measure The lift of the driving ban for women exceeded by far expectations, Saudi authorities were expecting about 2,000 women to have received licenses by the time the ban was lifted [7], but in just the first seven months, as many as 40,000 women issued driving licenses, according to Saudi Arabia traffic department. [8]. Then, according to a report from the General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT), after 19 months the numbers increased to 174,624. The report showed that 90% of the total driving licenses issued for Saudi women concentrated in Riyadh, Makkah and the Eastern Province [9]. PwC projected 3 million women would become new drivers in the Kingdom by 2020. (PwC, 2018) I Figure 1: Women’s driving licenses: expectation vs actuals One year after women were first allowed to drive, the She Drives KSA national research project surveyed nearly 30,000 people across Saudi Arabia in 2019. [10] Its aim was to understand the effects on households, travel behavior, sustainable development, and traffic safety. The main findings of this research are the next ones: Households and cars: The number of households with at least one licensed female driver jumped from 22% before the reform to nearly 64% after. Around one in four households bought a new car, and demand for parking — especially on-street — increased noticeably.  Figure 2: Households with license female driver Private drivers: Reliance on private chauffeurs fell sharply, from almost half of households (46%) to just over a quarter (27%). Most families linked this change directly to women driving themselves. Among those who still employ drivers, the majority are non-Saudis, mainly from India.  Figure 3: Reliance on private chauffeurs before and after the ban lift. Women and licenses: Nearly two-thirds of women surveyed now hold a license, though training often involves long waiting times. For many, the change has had real economic impact: about 16% reported a shift in their employment status, and more than 64% said their income had increased since they began driving. Training typically costs between 2,000 and 3,000 SAR.  Figure 4: Economic outcomes reported by women She Drives KSA. Travel behavior: Patterns of daily mobility have shifted. Far fewer women now ride as passengers in family cars, while many have taken the wheel themselves. Use of ride-hailing services has fallen by almost 17%. Women mainly drive to work, education, entertainment, and errands. Nearly three-quarters of licensed women drive frequently, and many also escort siblings, children, or parents. Most describe driving as making them feel more independent, confident, and proud. Car preferences: Most women with a license plan to buy their own car, with a clear preference for new vehicles. Safety, price, stability, and fuel efficiency are the most important criteria, while affordability remains the biggest obstacle. Attitudes: Men and women alike view women driving positively, though women are more likely to link it to empowerment and higher income. The majority in both groups reject the idea that women drivers add to pollution. Traffic safety: Women express greater confidence about safety than men. More than 70% disagree that women driving leads to more accidents. About 15% of female drivers reported having been in an accident, but almost all were minor, with no fatalities. Supportive policies: There is strong backing for measures to ease the transition, including more women’s driving schools, lower training costs, and better roads and parking facilities. Almost 90% of women, and around three-quarters of men, want training costs reduced.  Figure 5: Policy support: reduce women’s driving training costs. In simple words, after one year, women driving in Saudi Arabia has reduced reliance on private drivers, boosted car purchases, and contributed to women’s economic empowerment. While men are slightly more cautious on safety, the overall societal impact is viewed positively, and this positive impact seems to continue in the future. Economic transformation, opportunities and challenges for the Kingdom In economic terms the move was a step towards Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Vision 2030. In addition to a social openness of the Saudi society and the diversification of the Saudi economy away from oil. According to the Euro Group Consulting [11] the decision to lift the ban will have profound immediate and long-term effects on women’s mobility, independence and economic participation in the Kingdom. (Following the mentioned She Drives KSA report, the first results are already visible). In addition to a small and meaningful achievement in women’s rights and gender equality, letting women drive can be translated into an increase in the economic participation and the increase of the female workforce, which the Kingdom was expecting to increase from 22% to 30%. The target was achieved and exceeded earlier than expected, being 36% by 2021. [12] Economic inclusion has created new job opportunities in sales, marketing, field services, transportation, logistics, while also driving new businesses. This shift has been a cornerstone of the cultural and social transformation the Kingdom seeks to implement. (Euro Group Consulting, n.d) Recalling the PwC report [13], adding 3 million new female drivers creates immediate opportunities in several specific sectors. The demand for driving licenses and schools rose sharply, specifically those targeting women. Car sales were expected to increase, with a projected annual growth of 9% for 2025, compared to the previous 3%. The used car market and the car leasing are forecast to grow too. And motor insurance was also expected to expand to SAR 30 billion by 2020. Car manufacturers like Toyota and General Motors (Chevrolet and GMC brands), for example, found the move beneficial, as they implemented strategies to increase their sales as a “new niche” was born, but not only that, the sector became also an opportunity for the creation of new jobs. In addition, a Bloomberg Economics report indicated that the lift of the ban could add up $90 billion to Saudi Arabia by 2030. [14] The opportunities, however, are not for big companies only, women have seen an opportunity in terms of entrepreneurship, for example in women-only ride-hailing services or the case of Reema Juffali, who became the first Saudi woman racing driver, the first Saudi woman to hold a racing license and also the first Saudi woman to win an international motor race. Reema nowadays competes in the International GT Open with her own Saudi team, Theeba Motorsport [15] Women on the roads would impact social behavior, habits and patterns, especially in the consumer and leisure side. On the other hand, there are challenges for the longer-term, the obvious one is a better infrastructure, including roads, intersections and parking spaces. But also, in the economic spectrum challenges would appear. For example, insurance companies might increase their costs, due the uncertainty and lack of data related to women drivers and their behavior, while the car leasing market might be affected too. Countries reactions Internally the lift of the ban was welcomed and celebrated, the historical fight had achieved a great victory for the women. But the international community also reacted to the new measure. Donald Trump said it was a “positive step” towards promoting women’s rights. [16] On the same line Antonio Guterres posted a similar message in X. [17] OHCHR and UN experts “warmly welcome this historic development” [18] and went farer by stressing the need for a full gender equality in the Kingdom Amnesty International also welcomed the move and called for an end to all forms of discrimination against women [19]. International media highlighted the development and saw it as a potentially transformative reform, while others also questioned whether it was symbolic or really part of a deeper change. [20] Other institutions, like the International Bar Association or the Baker Institute pointed out the importance of the move toward greater freedom [21] as well as the consequences and impacts on transportation, labor market, health effects, etc., respectively. [22] Regional media reactions highlighted the reform and its importance in a conservative Muslim society. They showed relief and encouragement, as women in most of the countries in the region, like the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait or Jordan, could drive freely. [23] On the other hand, some religious scholars and clerics within Saudi and the region showed a more cautious line. (Middle East Policy Council). Final notes Overall, the decision to allow women to drive in Saudi Arabia is a big win for the women. At the same time, it has already created and impacted positively in terms of society and economy, especially in the automotive and labor sector. If the government can capture and get the best from this shift, including investment in infrastructure, regulatory adaptation and development of new services to meet the needs of women drivers and drivers in general, the Kingdom would enter a better era with a promising future. While data and the future look promising for the Kingdom, reactions internationally – while welcoming the move – also pointed to important topics to be improved and to put effort on them as soon as possible. The road ahead might not be that easy, even Saudi is trying to transform its image internationally, internally and due its ideology and foundation basis, challenges would be tough to achieve. References [1] Commins, D. (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. New York: I. B. Tauris[2] RTBF, R. (2011, May 23). Histoire du monde: le droit de conduire. Retrieved from RTBF Actus. https://www.rtbf.be/info/emissions/article_histoire-du-monde-le-droit-de-conduire?id=6150133[3] BBC News. (2008, March 11). Saudi women make video protest. Retrieved from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7159077.stm[4] Noman, M. (2014, December 03). #BBCtrending: Saudi woman driving blog ‘arrest’. Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-30316837[5] Independent. (2012, February 05). Saudi women in drive ban legal bid. Retrieved from Independent: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/saudi-women-in-drive-ban-legal-bid-6483456.html[6] ECDHR. (n.d.). What progress has been achieved for Saudi woman drivers? Retrieved from ECDHR: https://www.ecdhr.org/what-progress-has-been-achieved-for-saudi-women-drivers/[7] BBC. (2018, June 24). Saudi Arabia’s ban on women driving officially ends. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44576795[8] Matt, M. (2019, June 25). The journey to nowhere: Little hope for Saudi women since driving ban was lifted. Retrieved from abc News: https://abcnews.go.com/International/journey-hope-saudi-women-driving-ban-lifted/story?id=63667888[9] Saudi Gazette. (2020, March 08). Over 174,000 women driving licenses issued in 19 months. Retrieved from Saudi Gazette: https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/590574#:~:text=RIYADH%20%E2%80%94%20Ever%20since%20they%20were,the%20national%20and%20international%20levels[10] Kamargianni, N. B.–G. (2020). Impact of women driving cars on the sustainable development and traffic safety in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - Phase 2 Survey Results.[11] Euro Group Consulting. (n.d.). The road to change: Women driving and economic participation in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from Euro Group Consulting: https://eurogroupconsultingmea.com/the-road-to-change-women-driving-and-economic-participation-in-saudi-arabia/[12] Arab News. (2022, March 09). Saudi Arabia hits female labor force target almost 10 years early: Uber report. Retrieved from Arab News: https://arab.news/y5qum[13] PwC. (2018). Women driving the transformation of the KSA automotive market. PwC.[14] Pittaway, A. (2022, March 30). Four years of women drivers in Saudi, what has changed? Retrieved from Global Fleet: https://www.globalfleet.com/en/taxation-and-legislation/global/features/four-years-women-drivers-saudi-what-has-changed?a=API07&t%5B0%5D=Global%20Fleet%20Conference&curl=1[15] Theeba Motorsport. (2025). Reema Juffali (driver profile). Retrieved from Theeba Motorsport: https://www.theebamotorsport.com/drivers/reema-juffali[16] BBC. (2017, September 27). Saudi Arabia driving ban on women to be liftedRetrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41408195[17] Guterres, A. (2017, September 27). X. Retrieved from @antonioguterres: https://x.com/antonioguterres/status/912831976083771392[18] Office of the High Commissioner. (2017, September 28). End of Saudi driving ban for women should be just the first step - UN Experts. Press release. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/09/end-saudi-driving-ban-women-should-be-just-first-step-un-experts[19] Amnesty International. (2018, May 25). The driving ban and women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/the-driving-ban-and-rights-in-saudi-arabia/[20] Baker, A. (2018, June 28). Is the end of Saudi Arabia’s driving ban a rebrand or a revolution? Retrieved from Time: https://time.com/5324404/saudi-arabia-driving-ban-rebrand-or-revolution/[21] Kaur, C. (2018, June). Saudi Arabia lifts ban on driving for women after lengthy campaign. Retrieved from International Bar Association: https://www.ibanet.org/article/c8d82237-545d-4fca-ad14-3e56add4734b[22] Krane, J., & Farhan, M. (2018, June 13). Women driving in Saudi Arabia: Ban Lifted, what are the economic and health effects? Retrieved from Baker Institute for Public Policy: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/impact-lifting-saudi-arabias-ban-women-drivers[23] Middle East Policy. (n.d.). Saudi Arabia Debates Right of Women to Drive. Retrieved from Middle East Policy Council: https://mepc.org/commentaries/saudi-arabia-debates-right-women-drive/

Energy & Economics
Stuttgart, Germany - 10-01-2022: Person holding cellphone with logo of Saudi Arabian property developer NEOM Company on screen in front of webpage. Focus on phone display. Unmodified photo.

Neom: economic perspectives and its mobility pillar

by World & New World Journal

Saudi Vision 2030 First announced on April 25th, 2016, by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Vision 2030 became the roadmap and goals the Saudi government was expecting to achieve within the next 15 years. The Saudi Vision 2030 is a wide government program which aims to achieve and increase an economic diversification, including also a social and cultural transformation, all in line with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s vision of Saudi Arabia for the future. Presented as an “ambitious yet achievable blueprint” the Saudi Vision 2030 is based on three pillars: 1) The first one is to make Saudi Arabia the “heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds”; 2) Become a global investment powerhouse and 3) transform the Kingdom into a global hub connecting Asia, Europe and Africa. Moreover, Saudi Vision 2030 is centered in three specific themes, which includes specific objectives and goals to be achieved by 2030: 1) A vibrant society: focus on society - citizens and residents – by prioritizing physical, psychological and social wellbeing in order to create a society that can enjoy a high quality of life, a healthy lifestyle and an attractive living environment. 2) A thriving economy: create an environment that supports economic growth and job creation for Saudis, focusing on young, skilled and talented people, but also attracting the best global talents. The Kingdom is aiming to become a leading and competitive global economy, open to business and investments, and looking for innovations, diversifications and ensuring sustainability. 3) An ambitious nation: No matter the role – citizens, businesses, non-profit organizations - everyone contributes to the development of Saudi Arabia. This should be complemented with an effectively governed country. After 10 years from its inauguration, Saudi Vision 2030 has already been working on different projects and initiatives. Including tourism, heritage, medical, sports, cultural, environmental, energy and business, among other key projects, the Saudi Vision 2030 therefore has become a unique and ambitious long-term project for the Kingdom. NEOM A highlight from the Saudi Vision 2030 is NEOM, a futuristic and planned region located in the northwest part of the country, next to the Red Sea, which aims to be powered fully by renewable energy and led by the Public Investment Fund. The area considered for NEOM is 26,500 km2 and it includes industrial complexes, floating ports and a global trade hub (Oxagon), sustainable tourist and luxury resorts (Magna, Trojena and Sindalah) and a futuristic linear city (The Line), among others… Overall it is “gigaproject”, itself.  Figure 1: Map of NEOM region and its subprojects. Source: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc./Refugio Mariscal. https://www.britannica.com/place/Neom#/media/1/2270136/340484 NEOM pillars In line with the Saudi Vision 2030, NEOM also has defined 15 sectors as their pillars: biotech, design & construction, education and R&D, energy, entertainment & culture, financial services, food, health & well-being, manufacturing, media, mobility, sports, technology & digital, tourism and water. Mobility Focusing only on the mobility pillar, NEOM seeks to lead in innovation and integration of autonomous solutions in the mobility area, while creating smart and sustainable solutions (powered by renewable energy) to connect and provide a multi-modal regional mobility system. The proposed mobility system is important as it would be the link between people and the services provided in the region. Moreover, as a futuristic and smart project, it seeks to change the traditional car-centered approach into a shared, on-demand, intelligent and active approach, in which short walks, the use of bicycles, as well as shared and on-demand multi-modal public transportations would be prioritized, increasing health and people’s wellbeing. In addition, the Kingdom has used this opportunity to help it fight against climate change and global warming and achieve its 2030 and 2050 goals of reducing emission by 45% and reaching net zero emissions, respectively. Somehow mentioned already, the proposals and challenges include the promotion of low-carbon transport systems, green spaces and resilient infrastructure integrated into a seamless environment. Going a bit more in detail, the mobility plan in NEOM focuses on 6 main areas: rail mobility, urban mobility, roads and infrastructure, advanced air mobility, water mobility and digital mobility. Smart transportation systems and investments To manage the urban and intercity transportation efficiently and sustainably, NEOM is investing heavily in smart logistics, automation, and zero-emission mobility. Modern transport vehicles, integrated rail systems, and innovative water and air mobility solutions are central to this vision. Land Transportation and Logistics Autonomous Transfer Vehicles (ATVs) These are designed for high-capacity horizontal transport in large construction sites, warehouses, and port terminals. They reduce operator requirements with autonomous navigation supported by laser and ultrasonic sensors; they are managed centrally through remote control and fleet management software. With customizable dimensions, ATVs, save time, reduce costs, and integrate logistics data. Straddle Carrier Systems Used mainly in port terminals and storage areas (NEOM’s port area), these carries handle containers and heavy loads of 5 to 100 tons. They reach speeds of up to 80 m/min, have 360° turning capability, and operate with lithium batteries, optimizing high-frequency logistics operations. Electric Town Tractors and Platform Trucks Electric town tractors provide a silent, emission-free and cost-effective solution for NEOM’s urban logistics, with fast-charging technology, long range and a modular design. In addition, electric platform trucks support high-capacity internal logistics solutions in NEOM’s factories, construction sites and warehouses. Electric Cars and EV Industry Ceer, the first Saudi electric vehicle brand, will design, manufacture and sell sedans and SUVs, with a target market focus on the Kingdom and in the MENA region. In addition, companies like Lucid Group Inc. (focused on long-range and fast-charging electric cars) is building a factory with an expected peak production of 155,000 vehicles per year, encouraging, along with Ceer, to shift towards the EV, while promoting the development of EV infrastructures and zero-emissions environments. Companies like REDEX also support this shift by developing systems to monitor energy, EV integration, and green hydrogen production data. Shared and micro mobility Motorcycles, scooters and bicycles are gaining popularity in the Kingdom and companies like UAE-based Udrive has seen a potential market and has launched projects for shared mobility and vehicles rentals, aiming to grow this sector further in the Kingdom. Public Transport and Buses Following a 2024 MoU with Hyundai Motors, NEOM tested the Hyundai Universe Fuel Cell Bus in Trojena as a VIP service. This hydrogen-powered bus marks a milestone for zero-emission mobility. Supporting infrastructure is growing, with Enowa (NEOM’s energy and water subsidiary) installing the first hydrogen refueling station in the area.  Figure 2: Hyundai’s Fuel Cell Bus Diagram. Source: Hyundai UNIVERSE Fuel Cell. https://ecv.hyundai.com/global/en/products/universe-fuel-cell-fcev Rail Transportation SYSTRA has led NEOM’s integrated electric rail project since 2021, conducting feasibility studies, technology benchmark and pre-design. The system includes: - The Spine: a $1.5 billion, 75 km backbone with high-speed, metro and freight lines. It features 14 viaducts, 7 roads, 9 overpasses, and 152 culverts, connecting The Line, Nea, City Station, Neom Bay Mansions, Neom Bay Airport, and Oxagon. It is designed to minimize environmental impact and connect the region. - Industrial City Connector: metro and freight lines serving NEOM’s industrial zone. - Tourism: a funicular line in the touristic mountainous area. Future solutions like the Hyperloop are also under consideration.  Figure 3: Oxagon’s development area. Source: NEOM. https://www.neom.com/en-us/regions/oxagon Water Transportation System IDOM is designing a sustainable waterborne transportation system along NEOM’s 650 km of coastline and islands. This system will ensure safe, high-quality, and accessible services for all users. Additionally, REGENT plans to establish a regional R&D and training hub in NEOM to develop its flagship electric Seaglider vessel for passenger transport, tourism, and other uses.  Figure 4: REGENT Seaglider. Source: Regent. https://www.regentcraft.com/seagliders/viceroy Air Mobility NEOM is partnering with Volocopter (investment of 175 million EUR) to develop eVTOL air taxis and emergency response vehicles. An initial fleet of 15 aircraft has been launched, with testing of an unmanned traffic management (UTM) system underway. Future plans include connecting NEOM cities with eVTOLs.  Figure 5: Volocopeter VoloCity (prototype). Source: Electric VTOL News / Volocopter. https://evtol.news/volocopter-volocity/ Principles and Green Infrastructure Across all modes, NEOM emphasizes on-demand and connected services, active and micro mobility, electric and zero-emission vehicles powered by renewable energy, and autonomous public transport. Green infrastructure initiatives include over 160 EV charging points, mobile solar charging, systems, and shared EV and micromobility program, as well as the mentioned hydrogen station. NEOM is collaborating with Pony.ai to develop autonomous vehicles and introduce the first robotaxis in Saudi Arabia, supported by a $100 million investment. Oxagon, Trojena and The Line Subprojects Oxagon, Trojena and The Line are part of NEOM, and they will rely on, promote and develop certain mobility strategies according to their proper characteristics, these are as follow: - Oxagon: it is a purpose-built coastal city, located on the Red Sea. It aims to become a hub that works under a circular economy with efficient, sustainable and profitable gains, the port city will rely on embedded robotics, automatization, AI and IoT. Due to its characteristics, therefore, the city transportation links must ensure connectivity (within and outside the city) and it will be integrating transport corridors, as well as a well designed sustainable mass transit system for the industrial area itself. - Trojena: calling to become a world-class center for winter sports and adventures Trojena is moving into the inclusion of Advanced Air Mobility, autonomous electric pods, a funicular and an urban ropeway, balancing the adventurous experience with a car-free and natural environment. - The Line: A futuristic city fueled only by renewable energy, which will prioritize people and nature, enhancing the urban living conditions and the urban sustainability. The idea behind The Line is to prioritize health and wellbeing over transportation and infrastructure. It would be home to up to 9 million people, who would live in an urban-nature environment, with ideal climate all-year-round and with 5 min-walk access to all facilities and 20 min maximum commuting times. A city without cars but connected with other systems such as a high-speed transit system, an ART (autonomous rapid transit), a PRT (premium rapid transit), shuttles, pods, bicycles, scooters and elevators.  Figure 6: The Line living and architectural concept. Countries reactions and current situation When the Saudi Vision 2030 was launched many countries reacted positively, including the UAE, Bahrain and the US, while others like China or India showed some pragmatic interest. Still, reactions could be said to be positive overall. Diversification, trade, economic alliances and opportunities, investments, cooperation, jobs creation and openness to the world seemed to be positive points. Nonetheless, there were certain concerns regardless the society and the economy of the country (specifically the financial viability for the “gigaprojects” involved) Now, after 9 years from being launched, Saudi Vision 2030 still seems a far and ambitious vision difficult to achieve, considering that 2030 is 5 years from now, yet it is possible to see that there is advance and a plan that has been paved already. At different levels, there has been an improvement, and more is coming. In recent years, the Kingdom has been in the eyes of the world due to its ambitious plans and on-site constructions have already started, it will be a matter of time to see the results. On the other hand, in terms of innovation and R&D, there has been a boost in different strategic areas, and money seems to be flowing into the Kingdom. Clear examples are shown in the mobility area where companies like REGENT, Volocopter and Pony.ai have invested huge amounts of money, have established and have worked together within the future transportation for the NEOM region and the country itself. In the same line, Ceer, the first Saudi automotive brand, is aiming to impact not only in the region but in the whole region. Conclusión NEOM’s mobility pillar is more than a transport strategy – it is a testbed for new technologies, from hydrogen buses to seagliders and eVTOLs. If successful, it will not only modernize Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure but also position the Kingdom as a global leader in sustainable and innovative mobility. Still, challenges remain: large-scale financing, infrastructure delivery, and societal adaptation. For now, we will have to wait some years until we can see radical or real changes, after all, Saudi Arabia seems to be working hard and in line with its Saudi Vision 2030. Referenceshttps://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/features/2016/04/26/Full-text-of-Saudi-Arabia-s-Vision-2030 (Consulted 11/09/2025)https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/explore/projects/neom (Consulted 11/09/2025)https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/explore/projects/the-line (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.volocopter.com/en (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.regentcraft.com/seagliders/viceroy (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://ceermotors.com/about-us/ (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2016/04/26/Global-reactions-to-Saudi-Vision-2030-announcement (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://boltflight.com/saudi-arabias-jaw-dropping-reputation-surge-how-vision-2030-is-transforming-the-kingdom-into-a-global-powerhouse/ (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/our-investments/giga-projects/neom/ (Consulted 12/09/2025)https://www.fada.com.tr/en/blogs/en-the-role-of-smart-transportation-systems-in-saudi-arabia-s-neom-project/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.idom.com/en/project/water-mobility-strategy-design-water-mobility-project-management-office-pmo-for-neom/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.idom.com/en/new/defining-the-water-public-transport-system-of-the-future/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.htwo.hyundai.com/en/worldwide/press-releases/article/Hyundai_Motor_Group_Pioneers_Hydrogen_Mobility_in_NEOM_to_Drive_Sustainable_Transport (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://futuretransport-news.com/saudi-arabia-hyundai-trials-hydrogen-bus-in-neoms-mountainous-terrain/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.constructionweeksaudi.com/news/neom-hyundai-hydrogen-bus (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://redex.eco/news/redex-signs-mou-with-neoms-mobility-sector-to-support-its-sustainable-transport-ambitions/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.systra.com/uk/project/neom-oxagon-creating-an-integrated-transport-system-for-a-city-of-the-future/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.leapforward.onegiantleap.com/the-future-of-mobility-is-here/ (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://lucidmotors.com/?ref=leapforward.onegiantleap.com (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2369040 (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)https://www.urbantransportnews.com/news/unveiling-the-spine-project-a-deep-dive-into-railway-construction-tunnelling-at-neom (Consulted 19/09/2025 and 20/09/2025)

Defense & Security
Flags of Ukraine and the European Union on flagpoles near the office of the President of Ukraine. Kyiv

Assessment of the Limitations of the EU's guarantees regarding Ukraine's security and territorial integrity

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This analysis critically examines the European Union's security guarantees for Ukraine as of 2025, amid ongoing conflict and geopolitical tensions. Despite ambitious diplomatic efforts and increased defence spending, the EU faces significant economic and military challenges that undermine its capacity to ensure Ukraine's security and territorial integrity.Economically, the EU struggles with sluggish growth, structural inefficiencies, high public debt, and trade deficits, particularly with China, limiting resources for sustained military investment. Militarily, the EU's fragmented forces and reliance on NATO contrast sharply with Russia's extensive, war-driven military production and strategic nuclear capabilities.The war in Ukraine demonstrates the increasing prominence of drones and missiles, areas where the EU lags behind both Ukraine and Russia in production scale and innovation. Furthermore, the shifting global order towards multipolarity and the strategic alignment of Russia and China further constrain the EU's role as a formidable security actor beyond its borders. Key Words: EU, Ukraine, Security, Guarantees Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement on September 5, 2025, warning that any foreign troops deployed to Ukraine — particularly in the context of the "coalition of the willing" led by France and the UK — would be considered legitimate targets for Russian forces. This was in direct response to a summit in Paris on September 4, where 26 countries pledged to contribute to a potential postwar security force for Ukraine, which could involve deploying troops on the ground, at sea, or in the air to deter future aggression after a ceasefire. Putin's exact words, as reported from his appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, included: "Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction."[i] He further emphasised that even post-ceasefire, he saw no need for such forces if a long-term peace is achieved, adding, "If decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop."[ii] The "coalition of the willing" refers to a group of primarily European and Commonwealth nations, co-chaired by France and Britain, formed in early 2025 to provide security guarantees for Ukraine amid ongoing peace efforts led by US President Donald Trump. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Putin's stance, calling the presence of any foreign or NATO forces near Russia's border a threat and unacceptable.[iii] While Putin did not explicitly name the "coalition of the willing" in his quoted remarks, the timing and context—immediately following the Paris summit announcements—make it clear his warning targets their proposed deployments.[iv] As bold as President Putin's statement is, the EU has been making lots of noise in recent months regarding European guarantees for the future of Ukrainian security and its territorial integrity. This analysis aims to provide a "hard-eyed" assessment of the formidability of these claims, following a previous piece that analysed European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine's territorial integrity, published here: An analysis of European Diplomatic Efforts to Support Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity. Challenges and Opportunities. EU Economic Stance and Prospects As of 2025, the European Union's economy remains sluggish, troubled by structural inefficiencies and mounting external pressures. Arguably, the EU bloc is increasingly uncompetitive on the global stage. Despite some stabilisation in inflation and resilient labour markets, the overall trajectory suggests a region struggling to keep pace with the United States and China, with GDP growth forecasts hovering around a dismal 1% — well below the global average of 3.2%. This underperformance is not a temporary hiccup but a symptom of deep-rooted issues, including overregulation, demographic decline, and dependency on volatile external factors.[v] Critics argue that the EU's adherence to rigid "globalist" policies, such as burdensome environmental regulations and fragmented fiscal strategies, has stifled innovation and exacerbated trade imbalances, leading to a €305.8 billion deficit with China in 2024 alone. It is pretty probable that without radical reforms, the EU risks sliding into prolonged stagnation or even collapse, as high energy costs erode competitiveness in export markets. State of the Union (2025,10 September ) openly admits that "In the trade of goods, the EU has long had a trade deficit with China. The deficit amounted to €305.8 billion in 2024, surpassing the €297 billion deficit of 2023, but lower than the record trade deficit of €397.3 billion reached in 2022. In terms of volume, the deficit increased from 34.8 million tons in 2023 to 44.5 million tons in 2024. In the period 2015-2024, the deficit quadrupled in volume, while it doubled in value.China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and its biggest for imports. EU exports to China amounted to €213.3 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €519 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 0.3% and 4.6% respectively. In 2024, EU imports of manufactured goods accounted for 96.7% of total imports from China, with primary goods comprising just 3%. The most important manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (55%), followed by other manufactured goods (34%), and chemicals (8%). In 2024, EU exports of manufactured goods constituted 86.9% of total exports to China, with primary goods making up 11.5%. The most exported manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (51%), followed by other manufactured goods (20%), and chemicals (17%).[vi] The EU's core metrics reveal an economy that is stable but uninspiring, to put it mildly, with persistent disparities across member states that undermine cohesion.   *Created by Grok – prompt: critical evaluation of the EU economic situation as of 2025. These figures highlight internal fractures: Southern Europe (e.g., Spain at 2.6%) outperforms the core (Germany at 0%), but overall, the bloc's growth is "stuck in first gear," with services stagnant and manufacturing barely registering. Household savings are rebuilding, but consumer confidence remains low amid trade disruptions and geopolitical noise. At its core, the EU suffers from endemic structural flaws that no amount of monetary tinkering can fix. An ageing population—projected to strain fiscal sustainability—exacerbates labour shortages and boosts welfare costs, while policies to increase participation among older workers and women remain inadequate.[vii] Productivity has lagged behind that of the US and Asia for over 15 years, hindered by fragmented regulations that impede innovation in AI and biotech.[viii] The much-touted Green Deal, while environmentally ambitious, imposes extreme costs on industries, with 44% of firms reporting trade disruptions from China (mostly dumping). Energy dependency, exposed by the Ukraine war, has led to sky-high costs that "erode competitiveness," pushing the EU toward deindustrialisation. Critics decry the EU as a "technocratic regime" where national sovereignty is eroded by Brussel’s alleged blackmail tactics, rendering parliaments mere puppets and stifling bold reforms. The EU's economy is dangerously exposed to global headwinds, with risks tilted firmly downward.[ix] Escalating US-China trade tensions, including potential Trump-era tariffs, threaten exports (over 50% of GDP), particularly in the automotive and machinery sectors.[x] Geopolitical conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East disrupt supply chains and energy prices, while climate events add further volatility.[xi] The loss of the "peace dividend" forces a diversion of resources to defence, inflating costs and deterring investment. Capital outflows to a faster-growing US, driven by tax cuts, compound the issue, leaving Europe starved of investment. Politically, instability, such as France's government collapse over budget cuts (€44 billion), signals deeper fractures, risking social unrest and further eroding confidence.[xii] The analysis above only scratches the surface. To have a better picture, one should also look at current and projected budget deficits and public debts. For example, according to the EU-27, the total public debt was approximately €14.2 trillion in Q1 2025.[xiii] As for budget deficits, the aggregate EU-27 deficit stood at -2.9% of GDP in Q1 2025, according to Eurostat. [xiv] Looking forward, the situation does not seem to look much better. The prospects for public debt and budget deficits in the EU-27 over the next 5 to 10 years are characterised by gradual upward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios due to persistent deficits, ageing populations, increased defence spending, and potential shocks like higher interest rates or geopolitical tensions. Based on the latest forecasts from the European Commission (Spring 2025), IMF (April 2025 World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor), and other analyses as of September 2025, debt levels are expected to stabilise or edge higher in the short term (2025–2026), with longer-term sustainability risks emerging from megatrends like climate adaptation and demographic shifts. No comprehensive projections extend fully to 2035, but medium-term analyses (up to 2030) suggest debt could rise to 85–90% of GDP for the EU aggregate if fiscal consolidation is uneven. Deficits are projected to hover around -3% of GDP, testing the Maastricht 3% limit, with calls for prudent policies to avoid unsustainable paths.[xv] It is against this backdrop that the SAFE investments, of which I have written here, here, here and here will have to be somehow balanced against other public policies, including immigration, education, public healthcare or housing. The picture does not look good for the EU, to put it mildly. Current European Military Capabilities as Compared to Russia The EU The European Union's military and defence capabilities remain fragmented, relying on the collective forces of its 27 member states rather than a unified army. As of 2025, the EU and the UK boast approximately 1.4 million[xvi] active personnel, over 7,000 tanks, 1,300 combat aircraft, and a naval fleet including 18 submarines and multiple aircraft carriers, primarily from France and Italy. Combined defence spending has risen to approximately 2% of GDP, totalling €343 billion as of 2024, but gaps persist in strategic enablers, such as air defence, munitions, and cyber capabilities.[xvii] The EU's strengths include industrial bases in countries such as Germany and France, which support exports and innovation in areas like drones and AI. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) facilitate missions, while PESCO fosters joint projects. Recent initiatives, such as the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan, aim to mobilise €800 billion for investments, including €150 billion via the SAFE loan instrument, targeting two million artillery rounds in 2025, enhanced drone systems, and military mobility.[xviii] The EU's major weaknesses include a heavy reliance on NATO, particularly on US troops, with estimates suggesting that Europe needs an additional 300,000 soldiers and €250 billion annually to achieve independence. This includes addressing shortfalls in tanks (1,400 needed), artillery, and shells (one million for sustained combat). Challenges include political divisions, with Hungary blocking aid, and supply chain vulnerabilities amid climate threats.[xix] Overall, while progress toward a "European pillar" in NATO accelerates, achieving full strategic autonomy by 2030 hinges on member states' commitment to joint procurement and increased spending. The Russian Federation Russia's military capabilities in 2025 are formidable yet strained by the ongoing Ukraine war, with approximately 1.1 million active personnel, including 600,000 deployed near Ukraine.[xx] According to the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Russia's Defence spending reached 15.5 trillion roubles ($150 billion), or 7.2% of GDP, up 3.4% in real terms from 2024, funding war efforts and modernisation. Inventory includes roughly 5,000 tanks (after refurbishing Soviet stocks amid 3,000+ losses), 1,000 combat aircraft (down from pre-war due to 250 losses), and a navy with one aircraft carrier, 60 submarines, and 800 vessels total, emphasising submarine advancements.[xxi] Russia's strengths seem to lie in strategic nuclear forces (1,550 deployed warheads, up to 2,000 non-strategic), electronic warfare, drone production (over 100 daily), and global power projection via naval deployments. Adaptations include glide bombs and unmanned systems, enabling incremental gains in Ukraine despite 750,000 - 790,000 casualties.[xxii] According to experts, Russia's weaknesses include degraded conventional forces against NATO, stagnation in innovation, sanctions-driven dependencies on China/Iran/North Korea, labour shortages, and rising costs that hamper the development of advanced technology.[xxiii] Reforms prioritise nuclear deterrence, robotics, and force enlargement, but demographic/economic constraints may limit rebuilding over a decade. Overall, Russia sustains attrition warfare but faces sustainability challenges for broader threats.[xxiv] The Realities of the Current Wars – the case of the war in Ukraine The war in Ukraine is surprisingly static in a sense in which the First World War was static. We can observe numerous troops fighting a 21st-century version of a trench war, at least to an extent where the front lines seem pretty much fixed. Technological aspects of the Ukrainian war are, however, decidedly different from a hundred years ago. The war in Ukraine is marked by an extensive use of drones. The analysis of available data from the military, UN reports, and media, up to mid-2025, indicates that the weapons causing the highest number of casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war are primarily drones and artillery systems. These two account for most of both military and civilian losses, with a notable shift toward drones in recent years. Total casualties exceed 1.2 million (primarily military, including killed and wounded), though exact figures are estimates due to underreporting and classification issues.   *Generated by Grok. Prompt: What weapons cause the most significant number of casualties in the Ukrainian war? Multiple Sources. Please see below.[xxv] According to publicly available data, military casualties dominate, with around 1.2 million total for Russia and Ukraine combined.[xxvi] As for civilians, the estimates indicate around 50 thousand casualties, mostly from wide-area explosives.[xxvii] Can the EU be a Formidable Military Power of Tomorrow? The existing intel indicates that the drones are responsible for 70 to 80% of battlefield casualties. Exact numbers are naturally difficult to come by, but experts estimate that the total usage of drones likely exceeds production slightly due to imports/donations. Having said that, the production is probably the best indicator. Consequently, the cumulative totals since 2022 exceed 10 million, with 2025 projected to add 7-9 million drones to the battlefield.[xxviii] If this trajectory continues, it means that the future wars will increasingly be fought with drones and missiles, probably operated by AI systems. So how about the EU? The EU production is small-scale and high-value, with countries like France (Parrot SA, Thales) and Germany (Flyability) among the global top 10 manufacturers. No specific unit numbers, but the EU lags in mass production, urging scaling to millions annually for defence. The current output is likely in the tens to hundreds of thousands, primarily focused on (ISR) – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.[xxix] Tellingly, "Defence Data 2024-2025" from the European Defence Agency (EDA) does not even explicitly mention drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At best, the document alludes to the substantial increase in defence investment, procurement, and R&D in the EU Member States in the future, strongly suggesting that unmanned systems, including drones, are part of ongoing and future defence capability developments.[xxx] Interestingly, it is Ukraine that outpaces the EU in its own domestic production of drones. According to the Global Drone Industry 2025 Market Report, Ukraine produced over 2 million drones domestically in 2024 and, per President Zelensky in early 2025, has the capacity to build 4 million drones annually.[xxxi] Among other interesting information, one finds: 1. The global drone market was valued at about $73 billion in 2024 and is forecast to reach $163+ billion by 2030, with a 14%+ CAGR in the latter 2020s2. Military and defence end-use accounted for about 60% of the total drone market value in 2024.3. DJI (Chinese producer) held an estimated 70%+ share of the global drone market by 2024. One of the most promising developments in this respect appears to be the Eurodrone, officially known as the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS), a twin-turboprop unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions. It is being developed collaboratively by Airbus (leading the project), Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo, under the management of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), to meet the needs of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The program aims to provide a sovereign European capability that's affordable, operationally relevant, and certified for flight in non-segregated airspace, thereby reducing reliance on non-European systems, such as the U.S.-made Reaper drone.[xxxii] As of 2025, it's in the development phase, with the prototype assembly underway and a maiden flight targeted for mid-2027, followed by initial deliveries around 2029-2030. As such, it is still more of a project rather than any real formidable capability.   Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/20005/total-forecast-purchases-of-weaponized-military-drones/   Source: https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis Apart from drones and UAVs, it is missiles that feature prominently in the modern battlefield. Here, the EU's production capabilities seem equally modest. EU production has indeed tripled overall since 2022, driven by the war. Still, it remains defensive-oriented, with slower scale-up due to component shortages (e.g., rocket motors) and a reliance on U.S. partners. Offensive long-range strike capabilities are limited, with focus on air-defence interceptors under initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI).[xxxiii] Key systems include U.S.-made Patriot (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) and European Aster 30 (via MBDA's Eurosam). Global Patriot production is 850 – 880 annually, but Europe receives only 400 – 500. Aster output is 190 – 225 in 2025, nearly all for Europe. Combined, EU availability is 600 – 700 interceptors per year. Under a 2:1 targeting ratio (multiple interceptors per incoming missile), this equates to defending against 235 – 299 ballistic missiles annually. Projections aim for 1,130 by 2027 and 1,470 by 2029, with licensed production in Germany (e.g., Rheinmetall).[xxxiv] Recent analyses indicate Russia has significantly boosted its missile manufacturing since 2022, shifting to a wartime economy with 24/7 operations and foreign inputs (e.g., from North Korea and Iran). Estimates for 2025 suggest an annual output in the thousands, far outpacing pre-war levels, though exact figures are classified and reliant on external intelligence.[xxxv] As for ballistic missiles, Russia's Production of short- and medium-range systems such as the 9M723 (Iskander-M) and Kh-47M2 (Kinzhal) has surged. Pre-war estimates pegged 9M723 at around 72 units per year, but by June 2025, this had risen to at least 720 annually, with monthly output at 60 – 70 units. Kinzhal production stands at 10 – 15 per month (120 – 180 annually). Combined, these yield 840 – 1,020 ballistic missiles per year, marking a 66% increase over the past year and a 15–40% jump in Iskander output alone during the first half of 2025. Regarding cruise missiles, Russia's output has similarly expanded, with the Kh-101 rising from 56 pre-war to over 700 annually. Total land-attack cruise missiles (including 3M-14 Kalibr, Kh-59, and P-800 Oniks adaptations) could reach up to 2,000 per year. Stocks are estimated at 300 – 600 units currently, with projections for 5,000 by 2035. All in all, most experts point to a significant "missile gap" favouring Russia, where its 840 – 1,020 annual ballistic missiles alone exceed the EU's defensive capacity (e.g., intercepting only 300 ballistic threats per year). Russia's total missile/drone output dwarfs EU efforts. However, that is not all; one should also examine the usage and development of AI and AI-driven and operated military systems. This limited analysis does not allow an in-depth look into the matter. I have written about it here, claiming that the current war in Ukraine is also a huge lab for testing AI and AI-driven military systems. Apparently, the "AI arms race" gives Russia's wartime AI applications (e.g., drone swarms) a practical edge, potentially outpacing the EU's ethical focus by 2–3 times in deployment speed. Russia's budget allocations (5–15%) exceed the EU's EDF share (4–8%), but EU venture surges (500% growth) and NATO ties provide qualitative advantages in reliable, regulated AI. Gaps include Russia's hands-on war experience versus the EU's potential lag, with calls for international law bans and more substantial EU investments to counter the risks of escalation. Optimistically, Europe's rearmament ($865 billion) could close the divide by 2030, but analysts warn of vulnerabilities without faster AI scaling.[xxxvi] Last but not least, similar arguments can be made about the munition production capabilities. To cut a long story short, the answer to the question presented in the title of this section has to be rather negative. For example, even NATO officials, including Secretary General Mark Rutte, claimed Russia produces three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO in a year," implying 9 – 12 million annually, or even 20.5 million for a 12 times advantage. However, analysts critique these as exaggerated, noting Russia's industrial limits make figures above 4 – 6 million unfeasible without full mobilisation. External supplies bolster output: North Korea delivered ~7 million rounds by mid-2025. Russia's $1.1 trillion rearmament plan through 2036 supports long-term growth, but 2025 estimates hover at 3 – 4 million new/refurbished shells.[xxxvii] The New World Order - Incoming!!! Importantly, if the EU were to offer security and territorial integrity guarantees to Ukraine outside NATO, it would not face Russia alone. It would, or should I instead say will, face Russia and China cooperating and supporting each other, with other members of BRICS, remaining negatively neutral, that is, informally supporting Russia. I suggest that, especially a European reader, carry out a little experiment. I propose that they take any map of the world that is printed in China and locate Europe. When looking at the map, the reader is advised to compare the sizes of the territories of the EU countries with those of Russia (and China combined). Apart from that the reader is advised to compare the GDP output of the EU as Against that of Russia and China, their GDP structures, the international trade vectors, structures and volumes, the number of people, natural resources (rare earths as well as gas and coal, the number and strength of TNCs (Trans-National Companies) with headquarters in Asia and Europe. In other words, carry out a simple geopolitical comparison. To say that the EU does not look impressive as compared to Russia and China is to say nothing. When carrying out such a comparison, the observer should swiftly realise that the EU is a small region in the upper left-hand corner of the map and that its relevance and importance regarding most, if not all, of the indicators mentioned above is diminishing. The fact of the matter is that we are witnessing an absolute overhaul of the international system towards a multipolar model with the centre of gravity away from the collective west. There does not seem to be much room for Berlin, Paris or Brussels for that matter to operate as a formidable security agent outside Europe perimeter not only by the virtue of the lack of capabilities and military tools but perhaps most importantly by the lack of international recognition by the three Great powers (USA., China and Russia) and global actors such as BRICS. References[i] Soldatkin, V. (2025, September 5). Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be fair targets. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-any-western-troops-ukraine-would-be-fair-targets-2025-09-05/[ii] Walker, S. (2025, September 5). Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘legitimate targets’, Putin says. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/05/western-troops-ukraine-legitimate-targets-vladimir-putin-says[iii] Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘targets’ for Russian forces: Putin. (2025, September 5). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/5/western-troops-in-ukraine-would-be-targets-for-russian-forces-putin[iv] Putin says Russia would consider foreign troops deployed in Ukraine “legitimate targets.” (2025, September 5). CBS NEWS. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-putin-says-foreign-troops-legitimate-targets/[v] The Conference Board Economic Forecast for the Euro Area Economy. (2025, September 5). The Conference Board. https://www.conference-board.org/publications/eur-forecast[vi] China. EU trade relations with China. Facts, figures and latest developments. (2025, September 9). European Cmmission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en#:~:text=Trade%20picture,%2C%20and%20chemicals%20(17%25).[vii] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[viii] 3 priorities to boost Europe’s competitiveness in a changing world. (2025, February 20). World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/02/europe-growth-competitiveness/[ix] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025[x] Barkin, N. (2025, September 2). Watching China in Europe—September 2025. German Marshall Fund. https://www.gmfus.org/news/watching-china-europe-september-2025[xi] Petersen, T. (2024, December 12). European Economic Outlook 2025: Multiple Crises Dampen the Upswing. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://bst-europe.eu/economy-security-trade/european-economic-outlook-2025-multiple-crises-dampen-the-upswing/[xii] Experts react: The French government has collapsed again. What does this mean for France, the EU, and Macron? (2025, September 8). Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-the-french-government-has-collapsed-again-what-does-this-mean-for-france-the-eu-and-macron/[xiii] Public debt at 88% of GDP in the euro area. (2025, July 21). Eurostat. https://formatresearch.com/en/2025/07/21/debito-pubblico-all88-del-pil-nellarea-euro-eurostat/[xiv] Government finance statistics. (2025, October 21). Eurostat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_finance_statistics[xv] International Monetary Fund. (2025). World economic outlook: A critical juncture amid policy shifts. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO, Europe’s debt set to surge again in new era of uncertainty, IMF warns. (2025, April 24). POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-debt-surge-uncertainty-international-monetary-fund/, Global Economy Faces Trade-Related Headwinds. (n.d.). World Bank Group. Retrieved September 13, 2025, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects , Euro Area: IMF Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Mission on Common Policies for Member Countries. (2025, June 19). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/mcs-06182025-euro-area-imf-cs-of-2025-mission-on-common-policies-for-member-countries or Stráský, J., & Giovannelli, F. (2025, July 3). OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/07/oecd-economic-surveys-european-union-and-euro-area-2025_af6b738a/full-report/repurposing-the-eu-budget-for-new-challenges_b90b1f1d.html[xvi] European Commission (2025, February 21). Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed. Brugel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed[xvii] European Commission, EU defence in numbers. European Council, Council of the European Union. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/[xviii] European Commission, Acting on defence to protect Europeans. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en[xix] Mejino-Lopez, J., & Wolff, G. B. (2025). Boosting the European Defence Industry in a Hostile World. Interconomics, 60(1), 34–39. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/boosting-the-european-defence-industry-in-a-hostile-world.html[xx] Carlough, M., & Harris, B. (n.d.). Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries. Retrieved June 3, 2025, from https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/comparing-size-and-capabilities-russian-and-ukrainian-militaries[xxi] Defense Intelligence Agency. (2025). 2025 worldwide threat assessment: Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, United States House of Representatives. U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/2025%20Worldwide%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf[xxii] U.S. Naval Institute Staff. (2025, May 29). Report to Congress on Russian Military Performance. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2025/05/29/report-to-congress-on-russian-military-performance[xxiii] Boulègue, M. (2025, July 21). Russia’s struggle to modernize its military industry. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-people/mathieu-boulegue[xxiv] Foreman, J. (2025, July 9). Military lessons identified by Russia, priorities for reform, and challenges to implementation. New Eurasian Strategies Centre. https://nestcentre.org/military-lessons/[xxv] Adams, P. (2025, July 18). Kill Russian soldiers, win points: Is Ukraine’s new drone scheme gamifying war? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80p9k1r1dlo, Drones become most common cause of death for civilians in Ukraine war, UN says. (2025, February 11). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-become-most-common-cause-death-civilians-ukraine-war-un-says-2025-02-11/, Grey, S., Shiffman, J., & Martell, A. (2024, July 19). Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/, Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians. (2025, August 1). Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://aoav.org.uk/2025/ukraine-casualty-monitor/, Court, E. (2025, February 13). What is the death toll of Russia’s war in Ukraine? Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://kyivindependent.com/a-very-bloody-war-what-is-the-death-toll-of-russias-war-in-ukraine/[xxvi] The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, July 16, 2025. (n.d.). Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-16-2025[xxvii] Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to July 31, 2025. (2022, February 24). STATISTA. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/[xxviii] A Perspective on Russia, Facon, S. (n.d.). A Perspective on Russia. Centre for New American Security. Retrieved September 11, 2025, from https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-russia/ See also: The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond. (2025, May 28). Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond and Reeves, T. (2025, May 28). JUST IN: Russia Expands Drone Capabilities as Ukraine Conflict Continues. National Defence. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/28/as-russia-ukraine-war-continues-so-does-drone-innovation[xxix] Top 10 Drone Manufacturing Countries in 2025: Global Leaders, Trends, and Analysis. (2025, July 19). QUASA. https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis[xxx] European Defence Agency. (2025). Defence Data 2024-2025. European Defence Agency. https://www.eda.europa.eu[xxxi] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (2025, July 16). Tech Space 2.0. https://ts2.tech/en/global-drone-industry-2025-market-report/[xxxii] Global Drone Industry: 2025 Market Report. (n.d.). EUROPEAN MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – MALE RPAS (EURODRONE). Retrieved September 15, 2025, from https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/european-medium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-male-rpas-eurodrone/[xxxiii] Casimiro, C. (2025, August 14). European Defense Production Triples Since Russia-Ukraine War: Report. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/european-defense-production-tripled/[xxxiv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, July 6). Europe’s Missile Gap: How Russia Outcompetes Europe in the Conventional Missile Domain. MIssile Matters - with Fabian Hoffmann. https://missilematters.substack.com/p/europes-missile-gap-how-russia-outcompetes[xxxv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, September 8). Denial Won’t Do: Europe Needs a Punishment-Based Conventional Counterstrike Strategy. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/denial-wont-do-europe-needs-a-punishment-based-conventional-counterstrike-strategy/[xxxvi] Zysk, K. (2023, November 20). Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence AI in a Time of War. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war and Cohen, J. (2025, June 30). The Future of European Defense. Goldman Sachs. https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense[xxxvii] Lehalau, Y. (2025, July 25). Is Russia Outpacing NATO In Weapons Production? Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nato-weapons-production-us-germany/33482927.html

Energy & Economics
map of Latin America with purple, blue and black colors, artificial intelligence background artificial intelligence robots surrounding with hands the map of Latin America. Futuristic and three-dimensional style This content was generated by an Artificial

The crossroads of AI in the LAC region

by Carlos Arturo Covarrubias Gutiérrez

The shadow of artificial intelligence looms over the world; depending on the region, it takes the shape of a Chinese dragon or of Miss Manifest Destiny. But AI is among us, little by little taking up space, absorbing ideas without asking, constantly feeding itself in an endless cycle that, whether we accept it or not, undoubtedly consumes the Earth’s energy. While it is an ambiguous promise to affirm that the wave of AI will eventually end, the reality is that it is here, not only consuming but also spreading information that, as we know, is mostly the equivalent of junk content and misinformation — though at a scale greater than anyone would have foreseen. At the same time, it is managing to change the globalizing culture of the internet, transforming the feelings, tastes, and aversions of future generations. It is therefore imperative in these current times to think about what steps the LAC region (Latin America and the Caribbean) should or should not take in the face of the unbridled advance of AI. It is on the basis of this vital point for the future and destiny of LAC that the present reflection is made. It is crucial to delve into some of the opportunities that currently exist in the region for the development, implementation, and transformation of artificial intelligence in Latin America and the Caribbean. As we know, the region is home to enormous wealth, opportunities, and human capital — both labor and intellectual — that, if necessary, it can provide both momentum and renewal to the idea of artificial intelligence from the so-called peripheral countries, in this case, Latin America and the Caribbean. As an example, we can point to Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile (the lithium triangle) (Obaya, 2021), countries in which key raw materials such as lithium and copper give them a crucial role in the future goals of the countries where the main AI companies and corporations originate. This can bring both opportunities and future technological, economic, and social dependencies. That is why the region must learn to manage its resources to its advantage through active regional networks, with ethical and participatory governance, as well as a strong and structured digital diplomacy with a collective voice. But above all, with technological ethics combined with a rationality-based regulatory framework prepared to address humanitarian, social, environmental, and business needs in a harmonious way — also encouraging sociocultural communities to participate actively, considering the natural life cycle of the norms which could, as a likely outcome, eventually form part of a new international regulatory framework. This would be especially necessary given the shortcomings of the international community in addressing issues of constant innovation and impact. In the framework of AI’s evolution and development, this may not be too complicated due to the inherent characteristics of this technology — a technology that will end up being so embedded in daily human life that it will be difficult not to be part of it without being left behind, especially considering the undeniable commercial, social, planetary, and geopolitical relevance represented by dominance over the AI market. And this is without even mentioning the possible arrival of generative AI, which would raise even more issues and concerns. It is also significantly important to understand some of the advances and initiatives being planned or deployed in the LAC region, such as Mexico’s collaboration with Nvidia to develop a Mexican AI language (Mota, 2025). Another example is AI4D, an initiative of Canada’s IDRC, along with other foreign strategic partners (Artificial Intelligence for Development, n.d.). This initiative promotes inclusive, ethical, and human-centered AI, aiming to include itself in different regions of the Global South. Among some of the cases that demonstrate the enormous potential of this initiative are the CENIA in Chile (Centro Nacional de Investigación en Inteligencia Artificial, CENIA, n.d.) and BID Lab in LAC (BID Lab, n.d.), both of which foster comprehensive technological development in the region. While all of the above sounds like a real opportunity to foster the development of a region historically lagging in many social, economic, and technological matters, we must also document our pessimism. That is, we must keep in mind some of the key challenges that, depending on where we put the pin on the map, reveal a diversity of problems that could alter the course of many of these opportunities and initiatives. Among some of the relevant issues are corruption, political instability, technical and economic gaps in LAC—as in other regions of the Global South—criminal networks that in some cases are categorized as terrorist, and others. It is also very important to consider the potential future use of artificial intelligence as automated and systematic instruments of repression by authoritarian governments; its implementation within the criminal organizations of the region; the use of LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems) (Perrin, 2025); or the creation of new easily producible drugs that could cause regional destabilization. In this last regard, the events in Nepal cast a shadowy expectation of the collusion of digital platforms and the use of AI for strategic and recolonizing purposes in service of capital and platforms — without the need for the pretext of drugs or terrorism. In addition, it is important to consider the historical scars of exploitation, abuse, and oppression in the LAC region by foreign forces. Therefore, it is not only important but imperative for the interests of the region to work within a framework of equality and not subordination to the current and future interests of the companies and nations that will focus on the region, which undoubtedly possesses geostrategic strength. Thus, the international rhetoric of the nations forming part of LAC must change or transform in order to put the interests of the region first, to make the most of the wave of artificial intelligence with strategy and geopolitical thought. This is not to mention some of the challenges that as a region we will have to face, such as the fragmentation of regional institutions in LAC, the lack of coordination, and the absence of a unified regional agenda outlining the steps to be taken as a region toward AI implementation, innovation, education, and ethical use — as well as the influence of global powerbrokers, namely digital platforms, in their capacity to remove and install governments in the Global South. The challenge, as can be seen, is enormous. However, the context of the new tripolar world order fuels positive expectations for LAC’s integration in a position of strength to act with national and regional aims that benefit the majority. References Artificial Intelligence for Development. (s.f.). Ai4D.ai. Recuperado el 17 de septiembre de 2025, de https://www.ai4d.aiBID Lab. (s.f.). BID Lab. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Recuperado el 17 de febrero de 2025, de https://bidlab.org/esCentro Nacional de Investigación en Inteligencia Artificial – CENIA. (s.f.). Investigación UC. Recuperado el 17 de febrero de 2025, de https://investigacion.uc.cl/centros-de-excelencia/centro-nacional-de-investigacion-en-inteligencia-artificial-ceniaMota, C. (2025, julio 31). La estrategia de Nvidia en México. El Heraldo de México. https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2025/7/31/la-estrategia-de-nvidia-en-mexico-719056.htmlObaya, M. (2021). Una mirada estratégica sobre el triángulo del litio. Buenos Aires: Fundar.Perrin, B. (2025, enero 24). Lethal autonomous weapons systems & international law: Growing momentum towards a new international treaty. ASIL Insights, 29(1). https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/1

Defense & Security
Mersin Turkey - 23.06.2021: Yavuz Drillship on the mediterranean sea. Drillships of Turkey which is search and drill for natural gas and oils.

Mavi Vatan: The turkish strategy for Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea

by Jessica Martínez Pluma

In February 2019, the Turkish Naval Force carried out a large-scale military exercise in the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to test the operation of the new weapons and naval systems acquired by the country over the last decade. At first, this event did not generate adverse reactions from the international community, but six months later alarm bells rang when, during a speech by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at Turkey’s National Defense University, a map was publicly displayed showing what the Republic of Turkey considered to be its sovereign maritime domains. This later became associated with a concept known as Mavi Vatan. Proposed by Admiral Cihat Yaycı and developed by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Mavi Vatan or the Blue Homeland Doctrine is a project and geostrategic representation of Turkey with the intention of claiming the state’s supposed jurisdiction over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. It demonstrates Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the limits established by international law—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)—and upholds its right to the legitimate defense of sovereignty over what it asserts are its maritime domains: 462,000 km² comprising its territorial waters, its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and its continental shelf (Denizeau, A., 2021).  Figure 1: Map of ‘Mavi Vatan’ or the Blue Homeland Doctrine publicly displayed during President Erdoğan’s speech at Turkey’s National Defense University (August 2019). Source: Wikimedia Commons ‘Mavi Vatan’ not only represents a historical claim regarding the events of 2004, when the Republic of Cyprus became an official member of the European Union and established its own maritime borders as a state, which, under the framework of international law, pushed the Republic of Turkey into a narrow strip of sea in which to operate. At the same time, Mavi Vatan emerged as a solution to the growing security challenges that have arisen in the last decade of the 21st century, challenges that have threatened not only the integrity of the state itself but also all those elements that guarantee its survival in the international arena; in this case, Turkey’s access to energy resources. With projections that the Republic of Turkey will reach 90 million inhabitants by 2030 (Martín, L; n.d.), the Turkish state is aware of the increasing energy demands needed to adequately meet the needs of a rapidly growing population. To satisfy that demand, it is compelled to seek optimal sources of income to achieve this purpose. In response—and knowing of the large hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in recent years (Zeballos Rivero, M., 2024)—Turkey has turned to Mavi Vatan as a solution. If successfully implemented, it would allow Turkey to establish an area for the exploration and exploitation of resources lying beneath these waters to cover its urgent energy needs. The problem? Turkey is not the only interested party. Countries such as Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt, sharing coastlines with the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, are also engaged in heated disputes over legitimate access to these energy resources. However, the most pressing rivalry remains between Turkey and Cyprus, who, having relatively greater capacities to extract energy resources, have been at the forefront of an active dispute to claim sovereignty over these hydrocarbons.  Figure 2: Map of the EEZs of the Eastern Mediterranean countries and also of Mavi Vatan. Source: Emmanouilidis, C. (2020, August 31). Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. European Data Journalist Network. https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/es/cp_data_news/tensiones-en-el-mediterraneo-oriental/ On the one hand, there is the Cyprus–Egypt–European Union alliance, which has agreed upon and mutually recognized the maritime boundaries corresponding to each of them in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, while clearly omitting the possible sovereignty claims of other countries in the disputed area (s.autor, 2024). On the other hand, there are Turkey’s individual efforts, which, in its quest to gain access to hydrocarbon resources in the sea in question, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2019 with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to establish an EEZ stretching from Turkey’s southern coast to the northwestern area of the North African country. This agreement granted the Turks rights to hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the zone (s.autor, 2024). Although the agreement was suspended in 2021, Turkey has continued to promote ongoing exploration expeditions in the region, which have even extended to Somali waters, with whom it already has agreements in this field. The firm actions taken by states in the region demonstrate that, beyond being an ambition for access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the dispute actually represents an active risk to stability and security in the region. Firstly, from the energy dimension: given the importance of energy resources for human development, the continuation of hostilities among the involved states prevents the establishment of cooperative mechanisms that would allow all parties to benefit from the issue. Instead, it risks generating a zero-sum game in which only the strongest state would emerge victorious while the others remain vulnerable to an imminent energy crisis, thereby putting thousands of human lives at risk. Secondly, from the military dimension, there is the latent possibility that an armed conflict could erupt at any moment in the Eastern Mediterranean over immediate access to the contested resources. Without underestimating the military capabilities of the other countries involved, it is important to highlight the case of Turkey, which in recent years has significantly expanded its military capacities as part of the reformulation of its Foreign Policy. This has allowed Turkey to position itself as the ninth-strongest military power in the world (Global Fire Power, 2025) and the second-largest army within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the opposite side lies Cyprus, which, although it does not possess the same military capabilities as the Republic of Turkey, does benefit from the direct support of the European Union, which, if necessary, could easily respond to potential acts of aggression in a military conflict in the region. Both sides of the dispute—Turkey and the European Union along with Cyprus—truly have sufficient resources to escalate the conflict if they so desire, but they have not done so for reasons that remain unclear. For now, the situation remains uncertain. Beyond warnings or complaints from some states and/or international organizations, there has been no decisive action to put an immediate end to the conflict, since, in reality, no large-scale crisis has yet warranted such a response. However, it is important not to underestimate the phenomenon: the fact that it has not yet generated a major impact does not mean it could not do so one day, especially considering the great capacities the involved states have both to act and to respond to possible aggression. Historically, disputes over energy resources have generated unprecedented wars that have cost thousands of lives—for example, the Gulf War in 1991. It is therefore necessary to continue monitoring such situations to prevent them from escalating into conflicts as violent as those of the past. Thus, diplomatic channels between all parties to the conflict must be pursued, with the aim of generating cooperative solutions that foster peace and prosperity among nations, rather than new problems. ReferencesDenizeau, A. (abril, 2021) “Mavi Vatan, the ‘Blue Homeland’: The Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey”, Études de l’Ifri, Ifri.E. (2019, 30 diciembre) La lucha por los recursos en el Mediterráneo Oriental. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/la-lucha-por-los-recursos-en-el-mediterr%C3%A1neo-oriental-/1685950Global Fire Power (2025). 2025 Military Strength Ranking. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.phpJager, J.; Norris, A. (2021, 27 septiembre). The Mavi Vatan Doctrine and Blue Homeland Anthem: A Look At Turkey’s Maritime Worldview. Center for International Maritime Security. https://cimsec.org/the-mavi-vatan-doctrine-and-blue-homeland-anthem-a-look-at-turkeys-maritime-worldview/Kaya Ulger, I. (2020, 14 octubre) Turquía continúa defendiendo su “patria azul”. Anadolu Ajansi. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/turqu%C3%ADa-contin%C3%BAa-defendiendo-su-patria-azul-/2005458Mason, S. (2020, 20 septiembre). Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy - War on the Rocks. War On The Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/Martín, L. (s. f.).   ‘Mavi Vatam’: la doctrina turca de la ‘patria azul‘. Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/-mavi-vatam-la-doctrina-turca-de-la-patria-azul-3Menjón, D. M. (2021, 7 octubre). Dossier Geopolítico Especial: Teoría de la “Patria Azul”. Turquía se proyecta sobre el mar (de la energía). Hermes Kalamos. https://www.hermes-kalamos.eu/dossier-geopolitico-especial-teoria-de-la-patria-azul-turquia-se-proyecta-sobre-el-mar-de-la-energia/S. a. (2024, 10 abril) Cihat Yayci: Libia es un socio estratégico y un aliado para proteger y promover la seguridad de Turquía. OtraLecturA https://otralectura.com/2024/03/15/cihat-yayci-libia-es-un-socio-estrategico-y-un-aliado-para-proteger-y-promover-la-seguridad-de-turquia/S.a. (s. f.). Mavi Vatan-2019 Tatbikatının Ardından Enerji-Politik Ağırlıklı Bir Değerlendirme. Euronewsport İş dünyasından haberler. https://euronewsport.com/mavi-vatan-2019-tatbikatinin-ardindan-enerji-politik-agirlikli-bir-degerlendirme/Zeballos Rivero, M. (2023, 22 marzo). Creciente tensión entre Turquía y Grecia por reservas de gas en el Mediterráneo. Global Affairs And Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/creciente-tension-entre-turquia-y-grecia-por-reservas-de-gas-en-el-mediterraneo 

Diplomacy
India vs Pakistan conflict concept background with flags and map in the backdrop. Political, war, trade, India pakistan sports

Comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's foreign policy through a postcolonial lens

by Sana Mumtaz

The 1947 partition of British India gave rise to two sovereign states, India and Pakistan, that inherited similar colonial legacies but developed starkly divergent foreign policy paths. These differences were not purely strategic but were rooted in how each state interpreted its postcolonial condition. While India adopted a policy of non-alignment to protect its sovereignty in a bipolar world, Pakistan aligned itself early with Western powers, prioritizing security over autonomy. These choices, driven by internal insecurities, historical trauma, and leadership visions, shaped their global engagements for decades. This paper argues that the postcolonial experiences of both countries profoundly influenced their foreign policies, with India pursuing strategic autonomy and soft power projection, while Pakistan adopted dependency-based alignments driven by survival instincts and regional insecurity. Post-colonialism and Foreign Policy Identity Post colonialism refers to the condition of states that have emerged from the yoke of colonial rule and are navigating their way toward independent identity formation, both domestically and globally. It is a political, cultural, and psychological process that involves reasserting autonomy after years of subjugation (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). For India, postcolonial diplomacy was a tool to construct an independent identity distinct from the former colonizers and the Cold War superpowers. Nehru's advocacy for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s was deeply rooted in India’s postcolonial ethos of resisting domination, militarism, and Western dependency (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan’s postcolonial trajectory was markedly different. The trauma of partition, including widespread violence and the loss of territory, fostered an intense sense of vulnerability. Lacking economic strength and surrounded by perceived hostilities particularly India Pakistan's leadership quickly sought external patrons, viewing alignment as essential for its survival. In 1954, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and later the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), receiving substantial U.S. aid in return (Ahmar, 2024). This early dependence on Western powers shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy as one centered on external security guarantees rather than autonomous diplomacy. India’s Evolving Foreign Policy India's foreign policy evolved in three broad phases: 1. Idealist non-alignment (1947–1971)2. Pragmatic balancing (1971–1991)3. Multi-alignment with strategic autonomy (1991–present). In its early years, India sought to play a moral leadership role among decolonized nations, promoting peace, non-intervention, and South-South cooperation. Nehru’s role in establishing the NAM in 1961 underscored India's desire to remain outside Cold War binaries and carve a distinct place for itself on the world stage (Taneja, 2019). However, India’s 1962 border war with China revealed the limitations of idealism. This military defeat prompted a rethinking of foreign policy, leading to closer ties with the Soviet Union. By 1971, India had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signaling a partial alignment to protect regional interests, especially as it supported Bangladesh’s liberation (Ahmar, 2024). India’s economic liberalization in 1991 was a turning point. With its economy opening to global markets, foreign policy began prioritizing trade, investment, and strategic partnerships. India launched the “Look East” policy, now rebranded “Act East,” to deepen ties with ASEAN and East Asian powers. Simultaneously, India cultivated strong relations with the United States, particularly in defense, nuclear cooperation, and technology transfer (IRJSSH, 2024). Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has expanded its global footprint further by participating in multilateral platforms like the QUAD, BRICS, G20, and the SCO. It has also invested in soft power diplomacy, promoting yoga, Bollywood, and higher education as cultural exports. India’s campaign for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its 2023 G20 presidency signal its aspiration to emerge as a major global player. Pakistan’s Security-Oriented Diplomacy Unlike India’s autonomy-focused policy, Pakistan’s foreign policy has remained anchored in strategic partnerships, primarily driven by regional security anxieties. Its early Cold War alliances with the U.S. brought military and economic support, including weapons, aid, and development funding. However, these benefits came at the cost of diplomatic flexibility. Pakistan became part of the American containment strategy rather than a voice for postcolonial solidarity (Ahmar, 2024). During the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted to diversify foreign ties by engaging China and Islamic states. Yet, Pakistan remained entangled in great-power politics. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked another watershed moment: Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S.-backed resistance, supplying weapons and training to the mujahideen. While this brought short-term geopolitical relevance and aid, it also sowed the seeds of extremist militancy that later destabilized the region (The Guardian, 2025). In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan again aligned with the U.S. as a key ally in the War on Terror, receiving billions in aid. However, mistrust over counterterrorism commitments led to strained relations. More recently, Pakistan has deepened ties with China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion-dollar initiative under the Belt and Road Initiative. CPEC has transformed infrastructure and energy access but raised concerns about rising debt and reduced strategic independence (Financial Times, 2025). Simultaneously, Pakistan has relied heavily on Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE for financial bailouts. However, the country’s emphasis on Islamic solidarity has not always translated into diplomatic support—especially on the Kashmir issue—where economic interests increasingly override religious or ideological ties (Economic Times, 2025). Comparative Analysis Although born from the same colonial womb, India and Pakistan followed radically different paths in foreign relations. India’s strategic approach has evolved from Nehruvian idealism to Modi’s pragmatic multi-alignment, allowing it to maintain relationships with the U.S., Russia, and China simultaneously. It has strengthened its global standing through economic diplomacy and soft power, investing in trade, culture, and multilateralism (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan, meanwhile, has remained stuck in a pattern of dependency, cycling through major power patrons to meet its security and economic needs. Its alliances have often been transactional and security-driven, resulting in short-term gains but long-term vulnerabilities. This reliance on external support has constrained Pakistan’s ability to assert an independent foreign policy agenda (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). India’s soft power and diaspora networks have significantly enhanced its global image, while Pakistan’s foreign relations have been more narrowly focused and reactive. Moreover, India’s diversified diplomatic strategy has helped it gain global influence despite regional tensions. Pakistan’s narrower diplomatic focus has limited its ability to pivot globally beyond its traditional allies. Conclusion India and Pakistan’s foreign policies reflect not just their immediate strategic calculations but also how each internalized its postcolonial legacy. India transformed its colonial trauma into a quest for autonomy and leadership among the Global South. Its foreign policy matured from idealism to realism, culminating in strategic flexibility and global engagement. Pakistan’s path, however, was shaped by existential insecurity, leading to a foreign policy centered on alliances for survival. This comparative lens reveals the long-term consequences of early postcolonial choices. India’s foreign policy has grown more self-reliant and global, while Pakistan remains vulnerable to dependency, volatility, and limited diplomatic bandwidth. Understanding these divergent trajectories is crucial for comprehending the subcontinent’s enduring tensions and each state’s future on the global stage. Bibliography Ahmar, M. (2024). Post-Independence Compulsions and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. Pakistan Horizon.Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2016). Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches (2nd ed.). Taylor & Francis.Cvetanovska, D., Nurgaliyeva, L., & Saidov, A. (2016). India–Pakistan Relations from Foreign Policy Perspective. Journal of Political Studies, 23(1), 45–59.Economic Times. (2025). Why countries still support Pakistan despite terrorFinancial Times. (2025). Pakistan’s strongman courts the US while drawing closer to China.IRJSSH. (2024). Comparison of foreign policy of Pakistan and India during 1947 to 2023. International Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3(1), 861–871.Taneja, K. (2019). India’s Grand Strategy: From Nonalignment to Multi-Alignment. Oxford University Press.The Guardian. (2025). Thawing of relations between Pakistan and the US.

Defense & Security
Bricked wall with stop terrorism sign

Causes of women involement in terrorism

by Eraj Farooqui

AbstractThis paper explores the complex factors that contribute to women's participation in terrorism, a subject that has attracted more scholarly interest, particularly in the wake of 9/11. The discipline is nonetheless politicised and divided despite a great deal of study, which is frequently made worse by a lack of primary data. Women, who are typically thought of as quiet and non-violent, have taken on important roles in terrorist groups, especially during the 1990s, where they have participated in high-profile attacks and leadership roles. The study identifies the main factors: political, religious, personal, and gender equality—that motivate women's participation. Examples show how different organisations differ in that some encourage women to participate actively, while others limit their positions. The study also examines how terrorism has changed over time, with a particular emphasis on its gendered aspects, and assesses how contemporary organisations such as the Islamic State have reshaped the roles of women in terrorist networks. Finally, by illuminating the ideological, cultural, and societal factors that lead to women's radicalisation and involvement, this research offers an in-depth examination of the relationship between gender and terrorism.Keywords:  Terrorism , Women , Political , Religion , Personal , Gender-equality Introduction The reasons behind female terrorism have been extensively studied and debated by numerous academics. Even though there is a wealth of study, a substantial portion of it is contradictory or incomplete. Frequently, the highly politicised word of terrorism has led to contradictory claims in the research. To understand why individuals resort to women terrorism, scholars highlight political, religious, social, and personal causes. In our culture, women were seen as housewives and peaceful members of society, and terrorist groups were controlled by men. Research on women and terrorism can be done on a variety of subjects; however, this paper will mostly focus on the causes of why women participate in terrorism. After 9/11 the academic research on scholarly papers on terrorism have increased by 300% since 9/11.[1] The connection between terrorism and gender is often overlooked due to governments' reluctance to reveal the primary causes and the reluctance to provide reliable data. Researchers often avoid original sources for security reasons. A 2009 review by Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor found a reluctance to describe events, excessive narrative analysis, and reliance on secondary sources. [2] The word "terror" comes from the Latin verb "terrere" which means to frighten. It was originally used by the Romans in 105 B.C. to characterise the terror that engulfed Rome during the attack by the Cibri tribe. During the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror, Maximilien Robespierre incited fear among the people.[3]The word "terrorist" was used by Edmund Burkey in the Regicide Peace letter. With the end of Reign of Terror, the word ‘terrorism’ gained popularity.[4] Terrorism, a deliberate use of force or intimidation, is a significant issue in the 21st century, often driven by ideological, religious, or political factors. However, the term "terrorism" has no widely recognised definition. There are four distinct stages of modern terrorism. The first wave of terrorism began in Russia and spread to Western Europe and the United States, using revolutionary and anarchist beliefs.[5]  The final wave is founded on religious beliefs that the world is currently dealing with. This wave started in 1979 when Iran underwent an Islamic revolution. Because of gender norms, terrorists are frequently perceived as masculine attackers. Women are perceived as powerless, passive, and victims during times of conflict, but it is important to remember that if they participate in terrorism, they may pose a greater threat than men.[6]And since 1990, women have gained prominence in terrorist organisations, assuming leadership positions and taking part in more brutal assaults. More media attention is given to female attackers, and people are more curious about the motivations behind their actions. Additionally, terrorist organisations are recruiting more women as a result of this. Although they have historically been involved in terrorist organisations, women's numbers have been small. As an example, the number of female suicide attackers has surged from eight in the 1980s to well over 100 since 2000, indicating a growth in the involvement of women in terrorist actions.[7]  On the other hand as per Bloom’s report over 257 suicide attacks were carried out by female bombers between 1985 and 2010, accounting for 25% of all terrorist incidents. Since 2002, the proportion of female bombers in several nations has surpassed 50%.[8]The first known incidence of female political violence happened in 1878, when Zasulich shot Fedor Trepov, the governor of Saint Petersburg. David Rapoport identified this as one of the four waves of modern terrorism.[9] Weinberg and Eubank claim that women have primarily assumed leadership positions in left-wing revolutionary bands while being assigned to inferior positions in right-wing organisations. They mostly perform supporting and auxiliary functions for numerous religious institutions. [10]Gender, Palestinian Women, and Terrorism: Women's Liberation or Oppression? was written by Anat Berko and Edna Erez. stated that during his questioning, he discovered that many Palestinian men did not approve of women participating in suicide bombings because they saw them as inferior to men.[11] After doing study with a local terrorist organisation, Jacques and Taylor chose 30 male and female suicide bombers. He finished by studying the fact that males prefer to join terrorist organisations for religious and nationalistic reasons, but female suicide terrorists are motivated by personal ones. Mia Bloom’s book the Bombshell: Women and Terrorism examines the motivations of women who participate in terrorism,[12] with an emphasis on relationships, respect, revenge, and redemption. According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[13]The main reason women join the LTTE is to fight for gender equality; they participate in every aspect of the group and do so to avoid being discriminated against and repressed by the male-dominated society.  The following studies will provide an academic perspective on the causes of women's involvement in terrorism. The main focus will be on four causes: political, religious, personal, and gender equality, as well as a list of important terror occurrences conducted by female terrorists as a result of some key ideological beliefs. Religious Cause: Religious convictions have been the foundation of many terrorist organisations throughout history. The Crusaders can be categorised as a terrorist group. Although the Crusaders' main objective was to propagate Christianity, they also committed heinous acts of terrorism. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the fourth wave of contemporary terrorism, and David Rapport claims that it was the first instance of religious terrorism in the modern era. Religious terrorism's core principle is the promotion of violence in the name of furthering religious beliefs. For example, Al-Qaeda and ISIS promote an Islamic caliphate globally.[14] However, attempting to do so by using cruel and aggressive methods. Islam and terrorism have become more associated since 9/11, as terrorist organisations have posed a serious threat to Western ideologies and societal influences.[15] Gonzalez-Perez notes that suicide bombers frequently use the idea of martyrdom and benefits in the afterlife to lure people into justifying their acts.[16] Women are also part of religious terrorist organisations but there are two argument over women involvement in jihadi group. As explaind by Muhammad Khayr Haykal in his book Al-Jihad wa al-qital fi al-siyasah al-shar'iyyah. 1. Women were seen as having a responsibility in raising money for Jihadis, caring for children, and providing medical treatment.[17] 2.    The Islamic state should set up training facilities for women to learn how to wield weapons and combat techniques, according to Islamic legal expert Muhammad Khayr Haykal. According to him, all Muslims should be held accountable for jihad if it turns into fard ‘ayn, and women must be prepared for this possibility in order to perform their duty. This strategy permits the practice of female jihadism in martyrdom missions and on the battlefield.[18] Role of women in Al-Qaeda According to Robet Pape in his book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.[19]Highlights that male terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda oppose women's participation in terrorism. However the Tamil Tigers used twenty-three female attackers, the Palestinians used six, the Lebanese used six, the Chechens used fourteen, and the PKK used ten. Consequently, he concluded that Islamic fundamentalists oppose female fighters.[20] However, after the rise of the Islamic state, which encourages women to join their organisation and accept arms, the Pape argument is no longer regarded as legitimate. For example, some 200 women joined the Islamic State in Syria in 2014 after migrating from Western nations. Additionally, they more than doubled their numbers in 2015, reaching over 550 women.[21] This suggests that the Islamic State may assign women a direct role, such as suicide bombing, in a way that is different from that of many other jihadist organisations, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  In Al-Qaeda the women played a secondary role for.e.g: Al Qaeda also benefited strategically from the assistance that women provided. For instance, the female terrorists of Al Qaeda were strongly using the internet to try to convince men to join the worldwide Jihad. Some males are inclined to join these groups because they feel ashamed of their masculinity as a result of these communication strategies.[22]Women's roles in jihadist organisations are valued in that they bear children and raise them to be potential recruits for terrorist organisations. Usama Bin Laden thanked women by saying: "You have inspired and encouraged [men] to join jihad, and you have raised all the men who fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, and you are the ones who produced the squadron of heroic men who carried out the raids in New York and Washington."[23] On the other hand Ayman al-Zawahiri's wife, Umayma al-Zawahiri, also urged her "Muslim sisters" to raise their kids on the love of jihad in God's way and "to induce their brothers, husbands, and sons to protect Muslims' lands and properties. To support (male) jihadists with prayers and financial support. [24] Al Khansa'a was one of the authors of the online magazine that inspired Muslim sisters with her articles; while she did not advocate for women to fight in combat, she did counsel them to stay in shape and exercise so they would be prepared for jihad.[25] Al-Qaeda Iraq's founder and Al-Qaeda member Abu Musab al Zarqawi urged Iraqi women to join the military. In Talafa, Iraq, a US military recruiting centre was the target of the first female suicide bomber. According to the announcement made by al Qaeda in Iraq on its website, "A blessed sister carried out a brave strike defending her beliefs. May God include our sister among the group of martyrs.’’[26]According to Mia Bloom the attack was carried out under the alias "ghost group" because it was still forbidden for Al Qaeda Central to collaborate with women on suicide bombings.[27] The identities of male suicide bombers are mentioned by AQI members, but the names of female suicide bombers are never mentioned. As a result, it is challenging to determine the purpose or driving force for their membership in terrorist organisations. Despite the lack of data regarding female suicide bombers, certain enquiries and interviews provide us with comparable reasons why they chose to join AQI as female terrorists. After losing a loved one, women join terrorist organisations in order to kill the offender and get revenge for the deaths of their husbands and brothers. Furthermore, AQI members urged young females to die as martyrs, claiming that they would immediately enter heaven and be the prophet Muhammad's neighbours.[28] Al-Qaeda is therefore mostly a male organisation that discourages women from engaging in violent activities. Women's roles are limited to becoming teachers, fund-raisers, social media advocates, and moms of potential jihadists. Role of women in Islamic State(IS) Islamic State was founded in 1999. The Islamic State had the greatest number of foreign terrorist fighters in history, making it a unique terrorist organisation. About 41,490 foreign nationals from 8 nations joined the Islamic State with the goal of restoring the caliphate. Of the foreign terrorist fighters, about 4761 (13%) were female. Following Eastern Europe (44%), Western Europe (42%), the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand (36%), and other regions, Eastern Asia had the greatest percentage (70%) of women connected with the Islamic State.[29] The biggest motivation for joining an Islamic terrorist organisation is religion. Women typically played a supporting role in Islamic terrorist organisations prior to the rise of the Islamic State. However, the role of women in these organisations has grown stronger after the fall of Al-Qaeda and the rise of Islamic State in the Middle East. Muriel Dagauque, a Muslim woman who converted to Islam and was married to a Muslim man, was one of the Islamic State suicide bombers. She moved to Iraq with her spouse from Europe in order to become a martyr, and on November 9, 2005, she bombed herself.[30] Many jihadist suicide bombers are comforted by the assurance that they will be sitting next to God (Allah), experiencing only joy and no agony, before the first drop of their blood ever hits the earth.[31]Women joined the Islamic State mostly for religious reasons. Umm Layth, also known as Aqsa Mahmood, was a 21 year old Scottish university student who travelled to Syria to take part in Islamic State terrorist activities. Mahmood expressed her opinions on jihad with the following sentences.: "If not you, then your grandkids or their grandchildren. But do not worry, our cubs will eventually shed your blood. This Islamic dominion will become well-known and dreaded all over the world. Choose a side; this is a fight against Islam. You may either support them or support us.''[32] Role of women Chechnya Terrorism: Islam is the predominant religion in Chechnya, and Wahhabist terror ideology is linked to Chechen terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism.[33]The Wahhabi sect appears to have spread to the Chechen territories through other terror cells in the Middle East, such as al Qaeda.[34] This ideology which glorifies martyrdom and promotes jihad in order to establish a worldwide Muslim caliphate is a rationale for carrying out acts of retaliation and acting on behalf of a national separatist movement.[35] Chechen women, due to their Islamic influence, often wear black and traditional Muslim clothing, such as a head scarf or jilbab, which allows them to conceal weapons and bombs, as seen in the Dulbrov theatre incident.[36] Religion is one factor that contributes to women joining terrorist organisations, but it is not the only one; other factors also play a role. Political Cause According to Gus Martin, terrorism can occur under a variety of circumstances when there is political repression. First, the group is resentful of the injustices they perceive in society. The group also believes that their social dissent is insignificant. Last but not least, the group believes that there are problems with the system that can be fixed, which leads them to confront the conflict.[37] Despite the widespread belief that women do not participate in political violence, women have been planning attacks and taking part in political violence since 1800.[38] Violence is a tactic used by women who are dissatisfied with the government, have their opinions ignored, and are under-represented in organisational structures With anarchist and revolutionary beliefs, anarchism was the beginning point of the first wave of contemporary terrorism, which swept from Western Europe to America. Nonetheless, women's political motive persisted until the second wave of terrorism, when nationalism emerged as the primary driver of women's participation in terrorism.[39] However, they were only allowed to serve as scouts and messengers during the second wave of terrorism. David Rapoport claims that because women once again assumed leadership roles, there are some similarities between the first and second waves.[40] Vera Zasulich shot the governor of St. Petersburg; she said that she had a political purpose for doing so because the governor was well-known for his Polish insurrection and had ordered to execute political prisoner Arkhip Bogolyubov. This infuriated the revolutionary forces, and six people made the decision to kill the governor, but Zasulich was the first to take the initiative. This was the beginning of the first wave of terrorism. Despite the fact that women participated in political violence, her case is notable as the first instance of female political violence in the modern era or the first to be acknowledged. [41] Russian university students founded the group, which specifically targeted political figures. Vera Figner and Gesia Gelfman, Sofia Perovskaya, and three ladies from Narodnaya Volya had a key role in the March 13, 1881, assassination of Russian Emperor Alexander II in St. Petersburg.[42] The reason behind this act was that Tsar Alexander II released his renowned Emancipation Manifesto in 1861 after the Russian intellectuals struggled to achieve their demands. This was intended to end the peasantry's enslavement and, if feasible, bring about a new, more liberal era. Perovskaya and other disappointed reformers decided to accelerate change as it became evident that this new age was a false dawn. As a result, hundreds of revolutionaries left St Petersburg in 1874 to tour the Russian countryside and read pamphlets to the peasants about socialism, nihilism, and anarchism in an attempt to educate them for the day when they would destroy the Tsar.[43] In 1954 the Algerian muslim formed a group called National Liberation Front. Their major goal was to achieve independence from the colonial power France. FLN rose to prominence thanks to its female members, Zohra Drif, Dajmila Bouhard, and Samia Lakhdar. They were able to cross the French checkpoint and leave bombs in various locations, and as a result, three people died in an explosion on September 3, 1956, and several others were injured.[44]This movement occurred at the time of second wave of contemporary terrorism which was based on the idea of nationalism and anticolonialism. As per reports between 1970 and 1984, 451 Italian women joined terrorist organisations and then engaged in political violence. The bulk of these women had degrees and performed identical duties to those of male terrorists, they found, with 35% of them being students, 23% being clerks, secretaries, nurses, technicians, and 20% being instructors. A paramilitary group called Red Brigade was established in 1970 and was engaged in terrorist activities around the nation. Because it supported Italy's withdrawal from NATO and dominated the Marixist-Leninist worldview. Known for its kidnapping and murderous activities, Red Brigades also killed former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and abducted James L. Dozier, a senior US officer at NATO. Barbara Balzerian had murdered him. Many female members of the Red Brigades participated in the group's violent assaults, and Margherita Cagol (Mara), one of the Red Brigade's co-founders and one of the first victim in an armed conflict with the police, became a symbol of the left-wing movement.[45]The most violent communist organisation throughout the 1970s and 1980s was the Red Army Faction which engaged in ideologically motivated terrorism in West Germany. Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin, co-founders, protested consumerism by burning a department store in Frankfurt in 1968.[46] A major problem is the Chechen people's desire for independence from Russia, which is driven by their nationalist and separatist beliefs. In the lengthy history of the Chechen Republic, Russians, have been the target of several violent attacks. Since June 7, 2000, Khava Barayeva and Luisa Magomadova stormed the temporary headquarters of an elite OMON (Russian Special Forces) squad in Alkhan Yurt, Chechnya, sparking the start of Chechnya's "Black Widows" movement. With two fatalities and five injuries, the incident brought attention to the group's notorious actions.[47]According to the report, women were responsible for 47% of all terrorist incidents and 81% of suicide attacks in the Chechen region between 2000 and 2005.[48] For more than 30 years, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) battled the Sri Lankan central government, mostly because of the Tamil minority's ethnic oppression. Their goal was to establish their own nation in Sri Lanka's north and east.[49] The use of female suicide bombers and the LTTE's high proportion of female members were well-known. The proportion of female LTTE members varied between 20 and 30 percent, with some estimates reaching as high as 50 percent in certain years.[50]According to LTTE theorist Anton Balasingham's wife, Adele Ann, a Tamil woman's decision to join the group was a sign to society that she was dissatisfied with the status quo and had the ability to rebel against authority.[51]To sum up, female revolutionaries have contested the idea that they are less capable of committing acts of terrorism or have less political clout, and. Additionally, nationalism and revolution are the main goals of the majority of terrorist organisations that are focused on women. Personal reason Personal causes, such as revenge, family instability, rape, personal tragedy, and revenge, are important motivations for the individual to join terrorism. Women are more likely to cite these as their original motivation in joining terrorist organizations than men. Mia Bloom, Jaques and Taylor, and Robert Pape have all proposed that the reasons behind female terrorists are different from those of male terrorists. According to them, the emotions of female terrorists such as family problems, discontent, and the desire to commit suicide are what motivate them. These motivations are further divided by Bloom into four categories: respect, relationship, revenge, and redemption. [52] 1. Women who experience sexual assault, including rape, may retaliate violently; some may even choose suicide bombing as a last resort. After women were raped in Iraq, Samira Ahmad Jassim, dubbed the "mother" of suicide bombers, was accused of encouraging rape victims to commit honour suicide and conducting 28 suicide attacks, according to the Die Welt article..[53] 2. During the Chechen War, Russian soldiers sexually assaulted many Chechen women. According to estimates from Doctors Without Borders, 85 percent of Chechen women experienced sexual assault at the hands of law enforcement and military during the Chechen War. Journalist Svetlana Makunina claims that after being drugged and raped, Chechen women were left with no choice but to commit suicide bombing.On the evening of May 21, 1991, LTTE suicide bomber Dhanu killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu. She clarified that she took this action after being gang-raped by Indian peacekeeping troops. 3. Another crucial element that encourages women to join terrorist groups is relationships. Family members and relatives, who are important in the recruitment process, could function as a conduit between the terror group and women. Sidney Jones claims that while some women freely choose to wed male terrorists, others are coerced by their relatives.[54] Many women join ISIS for a variety of reasons, including a desire to contribute to the caliphate, a desire for friendship with like-minded individuals, or direct pressure by family members and acquaintances.[55] For e.g., Shamima Begum was influenced by her friend Sharmena to join IS. Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers stated that instead of acting on their own initiative, female Palestinian suicide bombers are “at the mercy of, or in love with, their handlers.”[56] (women join terrorist organisations because they are forced by male) 4. Guillermo Galdos, and “Eliana Gonzales,” points out that male influence is not an essential prerequisite for recruiting women into violent organizations. In order to join revolutionary movements, women have reported willingly leaving their boyfriends, husbands, and kids. The oldest woman in Columbia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Eliana Gonzales Acosta, for instance, abandoned her husband, sister, and daughter to join the group.[57] 5. Many people who have been directly impacted by the acts of another group resort to terrorism. The revenge theory is the name given to this. An individual is more inclined to engage in terrorism if they have lost a friend or loved one to a terrorist organisation or the military.[58] Additionally, according to Jacques and Taylor, revenge influences people's decision to join terrorist groups.[59] In literature and art, the stereotype that women are more revengeful than males is mirrored. According to William Cosgrove's The Mourning Bride, "Heaven is furious, like love turned to hate, and Hell is furious, like a woman scorned.”[60]Russian negotiator suggests the difference between men and women is that “[Chechen women] are ‘zombified’ by their own sorrow and grief.[61] The Russian and international press called Chechen women bombers "Black Widows" as it was revealed that many were acting in retribution for the deaths of their husbands, kids, and brothers.[62]Since the takeover of the Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002, nineteen female bombers have appeared in black mourning garments with bombs attached to their bodies. They held 850 people hostage for two and a half days. Until Russian forces imposed persecution on the people and executed the terrorist. While these motivations were not limited to revenge or family difficulties, they were also gender specific. There are more men killed in these battles, resulting in an imbalance of women battling for retribution. Furthermore, women constitute the majority of rape victims in these communities, which motivates them to join. Gender Equality: According to Vetter and Perlstein, one of the reasons why women join terrorist organisations is because of gender equality. However, Jacques and Taylor disagree with this notion.[63]FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, was established to combat societal inequality and provide women with opportunities for advancement. Despite being predominantly dominated by women, the organization offers women's rights, sexual freedom, and opportunities for advancement in a patriarchal society.[64] FARC recruits in rural areas, where women often have fewer opportunities, highlighting the organization's societal focus on women's rights.[65]A woman who had spent many years of her life in the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army) was interviewed by Anne Phillips in 2012.[66]For the numerous reasons mentioned above, this woman, code-named "Athena," joined the FARC before turning thirteen. She explains why she joined this group  as it provides gender equality. She had economic reasons because she was from a rural area and lacked access to economic and educational opportunities. Women in Colombia's rural communities face a lack of opportunities, which leads to prostitution. Many women turn to the FARC as a viable alternative to prostitution. The FARC gives women a stable income. Women turn to the FARC because they are guaranteed food and other requirements. They are given the same opportunities as males and are able to support themselves. Also, by women joining terrorist organizations they are challenging gender stereotypes in their societies. O’Rourke says that women dislike these gender norms and rise out against them in opposition of the stereotyped female in their culture.[67]The LTTE gives women the same incentive to advance gender equality. According to LTTE women, they felt liberated and empowered within the organisation. By establishing sexual limitations and providing equal training chances, the LTTE established an environment that was equal for men and women. Women held leadership roles inside the LTTE and believed they were on par with the men themselves. Often, women join these groups to either learn about or escape gender inequality. CONCLUSION: The primary goal of this article was to examine the primary motivator for women to join terrorist organisations. For more than a century, women have been participating in terrorist activities, but only in recent decades have studies of terrorism examined female terrorists. Political, religious, personal, and gender equality are some of the motivations for women to join terrorist groups and participate in liberation movements. Since the 19th century, women have joined a variety of terrorist organisations; some conduct these horrible deeds to defend their beliefs or territory. Religion is another reason these women wish to sacrifice themselves in the name of Islam. They act in this way because they believe that, despite their crimes, they will be admitted to heaven if they commit murder for Islam. Women's terrorist operations might occasionally be motivated by personal issues. Although forced marriage, family issues, rape, the death of a loved one, and defiance of the patriarchal society are some of the main causes, other traumas could also influence their choices. However, each of the four factors has a major impact on women's decision to participate in terrorism. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, for example, are heavily influenced by religion. The Tamil Tigers and FARC, on the other hand, are primarily driven by personal motives and gender equality. Furthermore, the political cause of Red Brigade and the National Liberation Front has been their main source of motivation. "Personal, political, and religious motivations are the main cause behind women's involvement in terrorism," claim Cunningham and Bloom. In order to curb terrorists' actions in the modern world, it is critical to comprehend their objectives and the reason behind their organisation. Furthermore, since many highly educated women have joined terrorist organisations, we cannot claim that education may have a major influence. There is extremely little research on gender and terrorism, particularly on women's participation in terrorist actions. To determine the primary reason women, participate in terrorism, we must conduct additional research in this field. Due to the fact that the information offered is highly generalised. What steps should the government take to prevent women from joining terrorist organisations? What other variables might encourage women to join terrorist organisations? Researchers from all social science fields should conduct some research on these pressing concerns as political scientists alone are unable to provide these answers. Bibliography[1] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[2] Jessica Shepherd, “The Rise and Rise of Terrorism Studies,” last modified July 3, 2007, accessed December 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research.[3] Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism, 1st ed. (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2010).[4]Zeynep Bayar, “The Role of Women in Terrorism,” City University of New York (CUNY) , accessed December 15, 2024, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4346&context=gc_etds.[5] David Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.[6] “Women and Terrorist Radicalization Final Report,” Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, January 1, 2013), last modified January 1, 2013, accessed December 13, 2024, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/a/99919.pdf.[7] LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 682.[8] Mia Bloom, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism,” Gender Studies 28, no. 1–2 (June 1, 2011): 682.[9] David Rapopart, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2004).[10] Leonard Weinberg and William L Eubank, “Women’s Involvement in Terrorism,” Gender Studies 28, no. 2 (June 2011): 22–49.[11] Anat Berko, “Gender Palestinian Women, and Terrorism: Women’s Liberation or Oppression?,” ed. Edna Erez, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 6 (April 27, 2007): 493–519.[12] Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).[13] Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 4 (April 10, 2008).[14] Rosemarie Skaine , Female Suicide Bombers (United Kingdom: McFarland, 2006).[15] Graham Bird, Brock Blomberg, and Gregory Hess, “International Terrorism: Causes, Consequences and Cures,” World Economy 31 (2008): 259.[16] Rosemarie Skaine , Female Suicide Bombers (United Kingdom: McFarland, 2006), 12.[17] Ibn al Bukhari, Sahih Al- Bukhari. Trans Muhammad Muhsin Khan (United States: Islamic University, 1979).[18] Muhammad Khayr Haykal, Jihad and Fighting according to the Shar‘ia Policy (Beirut: Dar al-Barayiq, 1993).[19] Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terror (NewYork: Random House Books, 2005).[20] Rosemarie Skaine , Female Suicide Bombers (United Kingdom: McFarland, 2006).[21] Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, May 22, 2015).[22] Zeynep Bayar, “The Role of Women in Terrorism,” City University of New York (CUNY) , accessed December 15, 2024, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4346&context=gc_etds.[23] Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (February 20, 2014).[24] Nelly Lahoud, “Umayma Al-Zawahiri on Women’s Role in Jihad,” Jihadica, last modified February 26, 2010, https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1422&context=honors201019.[25] Mia Bloom, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism,” Gender Studies 28, no. 1–2 (June 1, 2011).[26] “Woman Suicide Bomber Strikes Iraq,” BB, last modified September 28, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4289168.stm. [27]Ibid[28] Aqeel Hussein and Damien McElroy, “Mother of All Suicide Bombers’ Warns of Rise in Attacks,” The Telegraph, last modified November 15, 2008, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/3464411/Mother-of-all-suicide-bombers-warns-of-rise-in-attacks.html.[29] Joana Cook and Gina Vale, From Daesh to “Diaspora”: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2018).[30] Zeynep Bayar, “The Role of Women in Terrorism,” City University of New York (CUNY) , accessed December 15, 2024, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4346&context=gc_etds.[31] Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).[32] Susan Swarbrick, “Scots ‘Jihadi Bride’ Talks of ‘Revenge’ in Hate-Filled Blog,” The Herald, last modified July 6, 2015, https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13415875.scots-jihadi-bride-talks-of-revenge-in-hate-filled-blog/.[33] W. Andy Knight and Tanya Narozhna, “Social Contagion and the Female Face of Terror: New Trends in the Culture of Political Violence,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 12, no. 1 (March 14, 2011).[34] Ibid.,33[35] Ibid.,33[36] LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 690.[37] Gus Martin , Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues , 8th ed. (SAGE Publications, Inc, 2024), 60.[38] Maha Butt, “Feminist IR Theory and Terrorism,” International Affairs Forum, accessed December 16, 2024, https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=0&ContentID=9152#:~:text=Analyzing%20terrorism%20from%20a%20feminist's,female%20terrorists%20as%20'women%20terrorists..[39] David Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.[40] Elena Gapova, “Gender Equality vs. Difference and What Post-Socialism Can Teach Us,” Womens Studies International Forum 59 (November 1, 2016).[41] “Vera Zasulich,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vera_Zasulich#cite_note-5.[42]Elena Gapova, “Gender Equality vs. Difference and What Post-Socialism Can Teach Us,” Womens Studies International Forum 59 (November 1, 2016).[43] James Crossland, “The Women Who Ended an Emperor,” History Workshop, last modified April 21, 2021, https://www.mybib.com/#/projects/39m8D0/citations/new/webpage.[44] Zeynep Bayar, “The Role of Women in Terrorism,” City University of New York (CUNY) , accessed December 15, 2024, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4346&context=gc_etds.[45] Ruth Glynn , Approaching Women, Terror, and Trauma in Cultural Perspective, 2013.[46] “Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof,” Encyclopedia.com, accessed January 2, 2025, https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/andreas-baader-and-ulrike-meinhof.[47] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists,” The Institute for National Security Studies, last modified August 2006, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Female-Suicide-Bombers-63-80.pdf.[48] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (September 22, 2006).[49]Peng Wang, “Women in the LTTE: Birds of Freedom or Cogs in the Wheel?,” Journal of Politics and Law 4, no. 1 (2011).[50] Karla J. Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 3 (May 2003).[51]“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/srilanka/terroristoutfits/ltte.htm.[52] Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[53]Mia Bloom, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism,” Gender Studies 28, no. 1–2 (June 1, 2011).[54] Sidney Jones, “Inherited Jihadism: Like Father, like Son,” International Crisis Group, last modified July 4, 2007, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/inherited-jihadism-father-son.[55] Daniel Milton and Brian Dodwell, “Jihadi Brides? Examining a Female Guesthouse Registry from the Islamic State’s Caliphate,” Combating Terrorism Center 11, no. 5 (May 2018).[56]Edward E. Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions,” International Interaction 12, no. 1 (January 9, 2008).[57]“GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[58]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 710.[59]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 322[60] “GENDER and TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS of FEMALE TERRORISTS ,” DNI.gov, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2023-00139-Gender_and_Terrorism_Thesis.pdf.[61]Ibid.,63[62] Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 5 (September 22, 2006).[63]Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008).[64]Natalia Herrera and Douglas Porch, “‘Like Going to a Fiesta’ – the Role of Female Fighters in Colombia’s FARC-EP,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (January 26, 2009).[65]Mia Kazman, “Women of the FARC,” William J.Perry Center, accessed December 23, 2024, https://wjpcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Women-of-the-FARC.pdf[66]Christine Balling, “Why Women Turn to the FARC -- and How the FARC Turns on Them,” Foreign Affairs, last modified June 1, 2012, accessed December 23, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2012-06-01/fighting-mad.[67]LindseyA O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 702

Diplomacy
2025 SCO Summit - Tianjin Meijiang International Convention and Exhibition Center

SCO Summit 2025: an illusion of smiles and handshakes

by Hammad Gillani

Introduction The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization with significant Chinese influence and spans over the vast Eurasian region. Considered to be among the world’s largest regional organizations, SCO has gained immense attraction and a boost in its mission, particularly in 21st-century geopolitics.(SCO 2017) Since its very inception in 2001, the SCO has been promoting three main objectives, including regional stability (terrorism, extremism and separatism), multilateral cooperation (politics, trade, economy and culture), and a multipolar global order.(Calderonio 2025) The fundamental geopolitical dynamics have been further elucidated by the SCO summit in 2025. Held in Tianjin province of China, the SCO 2025 was a notable diplomatic event where friends and foes were brought under a common framework. By extraordinary meet-and-greets, the summit sends a clear message to the Western bloc that accepting the realities is the key to success in the current international structure. While, on the stage, the summit depicted a united multipolar world, but the internal differences between the member states reveal the illusion behind the optics. Tianjin Summit: Strategic Signaling to the West The CCP selected Tianjin city for the summit, primarily due to the following reasons: · Historically, Tianjin had been under the control of European powers. China signals the West of its supremacy by holding a summit in the same city.· Located very close to Beijing, Tianjin is a port city that represents China’s economic might.· Tianjin is a technological and industrial hub of China. It represents China's readiness to advance its vision of peaceful development.· Tianjin is also a critical junction of China’s BRI project, which further glorifies China’s growing economic significance in the international arena. No doubt, China tried its best to project its economic superiority to the west by selecting Tianjin for the summit. But this selection can be considered as China centrism by the member states. It will give rise to the feelings of Chinese brand promotion rather than collective ownership. Summit Significance The current geopolitical dynamics make the 2025 SCO summit unique. This year witnessed the revival of President Trump in the Oval Office, which altered the political and economic status quo of the international arena in a very short period of time.(Jonathan Swan 2023) The Russia-Ukraine war is still there. The Trump administration has tried its best to somehow resolve the Ukraine war, but it has miserably failed to do so. The previous Biden administration, along with the European allies, had frozen the Russian assets. In addition, the ongoing Israel-Gaza tensions have further added fuel. This year witnessed the combined US-Israel efforts to denuclearize Iran through military means. Israel has put an iron hand on the axis of resistance. Last but not least, 2025 once again witnessed a military standoff between Pakistan and India, where China provided immense support to Pakistan.(Clary 2025) Similarly, the situation in the Middle East has completely deteriorated. The 2025 SCO summit gathers half of the world’s states on a single platform with a prime motto of multi-polarity to be the sole solution to increasing crises in the international arena. In spite of all this, this summit didn’t result in any new development. As usual, the initiatives were taken but remain merely declaratory. The consensus-driven decision-making has caused serious hurdles for the SCO to deduce some fruitful results. The difference of opinion of the member states belonging to different parts and blocs of the world creates a mess that at the end cannot produce any concrete decision. Dead Economies: Response to Trump After the recent tensions between the US and India due to the tariff issue, President Trump titled both Russia and India as dead economies. In a broad context, Trump slammed the eastern powers, saying that without US assistance, their economies are considered as fatal.(Kay 2025) However, President Trump's bold claims were shattered by the attendance of 26 world leaders at the SCO summit in 2025. To foster regional and global cooperation, nations from opposing ideologies came together under the SCO banner. Furthermore, the idea that China, Russia, and India were isolated nations that the West ignored was destroyed. Instead, the three major regional titans teamed up to strengthen their connections even more. Yet, one can say that this collective response to the West is just for a stage show. It is due to the fact that SCO is surrounded by internal rivalries and differences of opinion in driving the international structure. Concerns of Central Asian states are its best manifestation. According to them, SCO is becoming more a China-centric platform rather than a multi-vocal stage. Moreover, Chinese debt trap diplomacy and Uyghur issues are also a cause of divide. Similarly, Indian strategic rivalry with China and its close ties with the West, i.e., QUAD, will always be a major loophole in the SCO. The member states know the reality that the world is heading towards Multipolarity, but the US dominance and hold in the international arena can’t be neglected. UN Chief Participation The participation of the United Nations Chief, Antonio Guterres, in the SCO meeting at this juncture also gives more strength to the multipolar manifestation of the international system. This visit is of huge importance, as Trump's political and pro-Israeli actions have caused the allies, particularly the UN and European allies, to lose their confidence. By attending the SCO summit, Guterres positively sent the message that only the new international order dominated by China could provide a practical solution to global regional peace and security. Xi, in response, showed his willingness to work with the UN.(Fisayo 2025) But his statement is more like just a symbolic gesture. This is due to the fact that SCO, up till now, can’t meet the institutional level of the UN, NATO or the EU. With weak institutional structure, including consensus-based decision-making, absence of supranational authority, no permanent parliament or court, etc., the SCO is still very far away from that of the Western security and economic bloc. Thus, the participation of the UN Chief was no doubt of much significance, but the participation has to go beyond declaring statements and symbolic gestures. East Meets West: NATO Boots in SCO NATO’s prominent member state, Turkey, participated in the SCO summit 2025.(Xinhua 2025) In view of recent geopolitical dynamics, the revival of Turkey has increased its vitality. The role of Turkey in post-Assad Syria and its continuous support to Gaza has emboldened its footprints in the region. The strained relations between Turkey and Israel further added to the duel. Moreover, in the recent Indo-Pak conflict of May 2025, Turkey played its vital part assisting Pakistan alongside China against India. President Erdogan’s participation signals to the West that nations have many balls in the air to play with. Not only Turkey, but also the Slovakian Prime Minister also participated in the summit. Note that Slovakia is a member of both NATO and the European Union. Fico has a pro-Russian view, maintaining neutrality in the foreign policies. His government also denies President Trump’s proposal of raising NATO defense spending up to 5%. Similarly, the ideological rift with the EU has further broadened the gap. While meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit 2025, President Putin praised Robert Fico’s policies, saying, “We are very grateful that you and your government are following an independent foreign policy and are not contributing to the widespread anti-Russo sentiment that is engulfing most of Europe. Right now, there are constant attempts to spread fear about Russia's alleged plan to attack Europe.”(Reuters 2025) In addition, many non-NATO US allies participated in the SCO summit 2025. These include Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia unquestionably belongs to the Russian Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). But the latest peace brokered by the Trump administration between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh has reduced the Russian influence in the region. Their participation in the summit at such a critical time suggests that the eastern flank, especially the PRC and China, can’t be ignored.(Yerevan 2025) Now, it seems like there is a clear divide in the western blocs i.e. NATO or the EU, and the SCO is going to attract these divided western members. But, that’s not the only case. There is also another side of the coin. No doubt, Turkey is taking interest in eastern initiatives, but still it is not given any permanent member status by China and Russia. It is still under the observer status. This is because Turkey has been an essential member of NATO for a very long period of time. As of now, Turkey is trying to balance its relationship with east and west. It can’t simply ignore the Western dominance and, at the same time, can’t leave the rising multipolar world alone. Similarly, several EU states, including Hungary and Slovakia, have some differences with the European Union, but it does not mean that they will be completely switching their blocs. Moreover, these EU states have a very low status in the Eastern Bloc, while on the other hand, they enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in the EU. Sino-Indian Convergence The participation of Indian Prime Minister Modi in the SCO summit 2025 after a five-year gap was an immediate shift. India emerged as a key ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States recognized India as the region's “Net Security Provider.”(Hassan and Ali 2025) But the recent clash between the Trump administration and India over the tariff issue and Trump’s supportive statements for Pakistan have created a political divide between the two allies. Participation of the Indian prime minister in the SCO summit explicitly signals to the US that they have an independent foreign policy, and if not the US, then the eastern flank is ready to cooperate with them. And the world witnessed that both Xi and Putin welcomed PM Modi warmly, signaling to the US that they have been successful in destroying the Indo-Pacific struggle of the US against China. President Xi stated while meeting with PM Modi, “Let the dragon and elephant dance together.”(Simone McCarthy 2025) Now, this statement by the Chinese leader is just like a symbolic gesture. The realities can’t be ignored. China is continuously increasing its military arsenals and building a new military city, but where? In the backyard of India. In addition, there are border disputes between both the states. For this, the Indian strategic thinking cannot compromise its security over diplomatic relations with China. Here, the long-term vital ally of India is only the US in the Indo-Pacific. The dragon and elephant will not dance together until and unless historical grievances, security dilemma and public perception are all addressed. Institutional Limitations of SCO   US Foreign Policy Failure From the very first day of his second tenure, President Trump has been trying to create a divide between China and Russia. During his election campaign, he used to propagate a pro-Putin stance, stating that he will be going to end the Ukraine war in just 24 hours.(Hagstrom 2023) Similarly, he has given multiple times this statement that Russia is a very big power, and the US doesn’t want to strain its relation with Russia. Trump also accepted Putin’s demands of expelling NATO from its eastern borders. At the same time, Trump started a tariff war against China. He tried to get the favor of the Russian president while creating tensions with China. This policy is not new. President Richard Nixon had done this before. But the current geopolitical dynamics have completely changed as compared to the past, and this is the reason that Trump’s Nixonian version has miserably failed.(Wright 2025) In doing so, it seems that the Trump administration has lost the trust of its historical allies, including the European states and India. Despite the fact that the ongoing situation is going against the US, we can’t ignore the strategic hold of the US in the international arena. Whether it is trade, security or technology, the US is still considered to be the dominant player. The rising multipolarity has no doubt created dents in the Western system, but the dollar monopoly in the international markets is still playing its part, with many nations, whether by choice or not, conducting their financial transactions in the US dollar. Cooperation and Caution in SCO The SCO member states are somehow caught in between balancing and hedging. They not only try to balance between East and West but also between China and Russia. The Central Asian republics can’t ignore Russia, which is sitting in their backyard. Similarly, they want Chinese to invest but simultaneously restrain from overdependence on China. Then comes the case of Iran, which tends to be active in eastern diplomatic and security initiatives. The western sanctions and isolation forced it to join the eastern camp. But, due to its economic constraints, Iran does not have much say in the decision-making process. Last but not least, Pakistan and India. Both rivals try to improve their image by projecting their different stances in the Eastern Bloc. Pakistan plays its part in the SCO to gain regional popularity, but its fragile economy is again the main hurdle. On the other hand, India does a to-and-fro motion by maintaining close strategic relations with the West, especially the US and on the sidelines, not ignoring Russia completely. This creates a fractured picture, which demonstrates that the outer layer is hard, but the inner one is soft enough to be broken by just a small shock. Conclusion The 2025 SCO summit has become a landmark event where friends and foes were seen under a common banner. It can be considered a political power show where China and Russia conveyed a clear message to the West that capitalist behavior is no longer a viable option for anyone. The world is moving towards a multipolar region where there are multiple options for states to collaborate with. But, simultaneously, the internal contradictions, fractured structure and geopolitical hedging have surrounded the SCO stage. Thus, we can conclude that the SCO is more a symbolic platform where cohesion and coherence is still absent. Only the illusion of photo shoots, smiles and handshakes are apparent. References Calderonio, Vincenzo. 2025. “A Basis for Human Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence Computation.” ArXiv, 1–14. http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.12498.Clary, Christopher. 2025. “Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025 • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center. 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/four-days-in-may-the-india-pakistan-crisis-of-2025/.Fisayo, Jeremiah. 2025. “China’s Support for Multilateralism Is Essential, Says UN Chief Antonio Guterres at Key Summit.” Euro News. 2025. https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/30/chinas-support-for-multilateralism-is-essential-says-uns-antonio-guterres-at-key-summit.Hagstrom, Anders. 2023. “Trump Describes How He Could Solve Russia-Ukraine Conflict in 24 Hours.” Fox News. 2023. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-describes-how-he-could-solve-russia-ukraine-conflict-24-hours?msockid=3238bbf1abda66eb085dadedaada6754.Hassan, Abid, and Syed Hammad Ali. 2025. “Evolving US Indo-Pacific Posture and Strategic Competition with China.” Policy Perspectives 22 (1). https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.22.1.ra4.Jonathan Swan, Maggie Haberman & Charlie Savage. 2023. “How Trump Plans to Wield Power in 2025: What We Know - The New York Times.” New York Times. 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-2025-second-term.html.Kay, John Reed & Chris. 2025. “Donald Trump Slams India and Russia as ‘Dead Economies’ after Tariff Stand-Off.” 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/390be64a-1527-4f71-a322-59af41133914.Reuters. 2025. “Slovak Prime Minister Fico to Meet Xi, Putin, Zelenskiy This Week.” Reuters. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/slovak-prime-minister-fico-meet-xi-putin-zelenskiy-this-week-2025-09-01/.SCO. 2025. “General Information | External Communication | The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” Accessed September 6, 2025. https://eng.sectsco.org/20170109/192193.html.Simone McCarthy, Nectar Gan & Rhea Mogul. 2025. “India’s Modi Meets Xi on His First China Trip in Seven Years as Trump’s Tariffs Bite.” CNN. 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/31/china/india-china-xi-modi-meeting-intl-hnk.Wright, Mark Antonio. 2025. “Why a ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Won’t Split Xi and Putin.” National Review. 2025. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-prospects-of-a-reverse-nixon-to-split-russia-and-china-grow-dimmer/.Xinhua. 2025. “Xi Meets Turkish President.” Xinhua News. 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202508/31/content_WS68b44ea4c6d0868f4e8f5365.html.Yerevan. 2025. “Armenia Intends to Join SCO in Line with Its Balanced Policy - Pashinyan.” Arka News Agency. 2025. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenia-intends-to-join-sco-in-line-with-its-balanced-policy-pashinyan/. 

Diplomacy
NEW YORK, USA - JUNE 21 2013 - United Nations security council hall headquartered in New York City, in a complex designed by architect Niemeyer open to public.

The UN in crisis: Justice without power, power without justice

by Francisco Edinson Bolvaran Dalleto

Abstract The United Nations (UN), eighty years after its creation, faces a structural crisis that reveals the tension between justice and power. This essay examines how the design of the Security Council, with its veto power, perpetuates an unequal order inherited from 1945 and limits the effectiveness of the collective security system. Through theoretical perspectives — Morgenthau, Schmitt, Habermas, Falk, and Strange — it is shown that international law remains subordinated to power interests, that proclaimed universality masks hegemonies, and that global economic dynamics lie beyond institutional reach. Cases such as Kosovo, Libya, Gaza, and Myanmar illustrate the paralysis and delegitimization of the Responsibility to Protect. Considering this scenario, two paths emerge: reforming multilateralism with limits on the veto and greater representativeness or resigning to a fragmented order. The conclusion is clear: without adaptation, the UN will become a symbolic forum, making chronic its inability to respond to current challenges. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN, warned: “The United Nations was not created to take us to heaven, but to save us from hell.” [1] Eighty years after its founding, that promise seems to falter in the face of multiple wars, such as those in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, or Myanmar, among many others, with a sense of ineffectiveness, loss of prestige, and collective impotence being perceived: does the UN no longer fulfill the role it once assumed? At first glance, blame falls solely on the nature of the institution itself. But the root of the problem seems to lie not only in New York, but also in the main capitals of the world. The UN is nothing more than what States allow it to be. Its effectiveness depends on the will of those who comprise it; and the uncomfortable truth is that the great powers prefer to limit its scope rather than cede parcels of sovereignty. As John Rawls pointed out, a just international system requires that peoples accept common principles of justice. [2] Today, by contrast, it is a constant that collective interest systematically gives way to particular interest. The Security Council is the most evident symbol of this contradiction. It remains anchored in post-war logic, with five permanent members clinging to the privilege of the veto. That power, already met with skepticism in San Francisco in 1945, turned into a tool of paralysis. As Canada denounced in 2022, the veto is “as anachronistic as it is undemocratic” and has prevented responses to atrocities. [3] Aristotle said that “justice is equality, but only for equals.” [4] In the UN, the Assembly proclaims sovereign equality, while the Council denies it in practice: some States remain “more equal” than others. The UN Charter articulates its backbone in a few luminous rules: the prohibition of the use of force (Art. 2.4), non-intervention in internal affairs (Art. 2.7), and, as a counterbalance, the collective security system of Chapter VII (Arts. 39–42), which grants the Security Council the authority to determine threats to peace and authorize coercive measures. In parallel, Art. 51 preserves the right of self-defense against an “armed attack.” [5] This normative triangle — prohibition, collective security, defense — is the promise of a world governed by law and not by force, but it must be put into practice. In the 1990s, a dilemma arose: what to do when a State massacres its own population or is unable to prevent it? The political-legal response was the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), affirmed at the 2005 World Summit (paras. 138–139). [6] Its architecture is sequential: (I) each State has the primary responsibility to protect its population against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (II) the international community must help States fulfill that responsibility; and (III) if a State manifestly fails, the international community, through the Security Council, may adopt collective measures — preferably peaceful ones; as a last resort, coercive — case by case and in accordance with the Charter. Properly understood, R2P is not a license to intervene; it is a duty to protect framed within International Law. The historical record shows both its necessity and its perverse effects. Kosovo (1999) inaugurated, without authorization from the Council, the narrative of “humanitarian intervention,” based on a supposed “legitimate illegality.” [7] The precedent left a dangerous standard: humanitarian purposes invoked to circumvent the hard core of the Charter. Libya (2011) seemed to be the “ideal case” of R2P: the Council authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. [8] However, the shift toward regime change eroded the trust of Russia and China, which since then have blocked robust resolutions on Syria, hollowing out the effectiveness of R2P. [9] The lesson is bitter: when protection is perceived as a vehicle of hegemony, the norm is delegitimized, and the veto becomes reflexive. Gaza and Myanmar display the other face of paralysis. In Gaza, the Council’s inability to impose sustainable ceasefires — despite patterns of hostilities that massively impact the civilian population — has shifted the debate to the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice through interstate actions and provisional measures. [10] In Myanmar, the genocide of the Rohingya mobilized condemnations, sanctions, and proceedings before the International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ICJ), [11] but did not trigger a coercive response from the Council. R2P exists on paper; its implementation is captive to the veto. Thus, the “right to have rights” that Arendt spoke of still depends on geopolitics. [12] History teaches that international law has always been strained by force. Rousseau warned that the strong seek to transform their power into law. [13] That is what the winners of 1945 did by crystallizing their hegemony in the Charter. And so, what Kant dreamed of as perpetual peace remains chained to an unequal order. [14] The UN, more than a republic of law, still seems a field of power. That fragility has opened space for alternatives. The BRICS, for example, have emerged as a heterogeneous bloc that combines the cohesion of historically homogeneous powers such as China and Russia with the diversity of India, Brazil, and South Africa. Paradoxically, their strength lies in articulating that heterogeneity against a common enemy: the concentration of power in the Security Council. [15] In a multipolar world, heterogeneity ceases to be a weakness and becomes a driver of plurality and resistance. The UN crisis is not only about security; it is also economic and distributive. The universalist promise of the Charter (Arts. 1.3 and 55–56, on cooperation for development) coexists with a global financial architecture whose heart beats outside the UN: the IMF and World Bank, designed in Bretton Woods, project a structural power — in Susan Strange’s terms — that conditions public policies, access to liquidity, and investment capacity. [16] The sovereign equality proclaimed in New York becomes blurred when the asymmetry of weighted voting in financial institutions (and the conditionality of credit) makes some States more “equal” than others. This is not a recent claim. Since the 1960s, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and, later, the Declaration on a New International Economic Order (1974), sought to correct structural problems such as the deterioration of terms of trade and the dependence between “center” and “periphery” countries, as Prebisch had pointed out. [17] However, the results were limited: ECOSOC lacks teeth, UNDP mobilizes cooperation but fails to change the rules of the system, and the 2030 Agenda sets important goals but without mandatory enforcement mechanisms. [18] The pandemic and the climate crisis have further worsened these inequalities, highlighting problems such as over-indebtedness, the insufficiency in the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and climate financing that often arrives late and under unsuitable conditions. In this scenario, the New Development Bank of the BRICS emerges, seeking to open a path toward greater financial autonomy for developing countries. [19] International economic justice is the reverse side of collective security. Without fiscal space or technological transfer, the Global South remains trapped between development promises and adjustment demands. The UN has political legitimacy to outline a Global Economic Council (as proposed by the Stiglitz Commission in 2009) [20] to coordinate debt, international taxation, and global public goods, but it currently lacks normative muscle. The result is fragmentation: fiscal minilateralism, climate clubs, and value chains that distribute risks to the South and rents to the North. The solution does not lie simply in “more aid,” but in prudent rules such as: (I) a multilateral debt restructuring mechanism under UN auspices; [21] (II) effective international taxation on intangibles and the digital economy; [22] (III) binding compliance with the loss and damage fund in climate matters; [23] and (IV) a reform of quotas in IFIs that reflects the real weight of emerging economies. [24] Without constitutionalizing — even gradually — this economic agenda, sovereign equality will remain an empty liturgy and the discontent of the Global South a political fuel that erodes the UN from within. The truth is that the United Nations of 1945 no longer responds to the challenges of 2025. As the president of Brazil recently said: “The UN of 1945 is worth nothing in 2023.” [25] If States do not recover the founding spirit — placing collective interest above particular ones — the organization will remain prisoner of the veto and the will of a few. The question, then, is not whether the UN works, but whether States really want it to work. Taking the above into account, this essay will analyze the UN crisis from three complementary dimensions. First, the theoretical and philosophical framework that allows us to understand the tension between power and law will be addressed, showing how different authors highlight the structural roots of this contradiction. Second, historical episodes and current examples will be reviewed to illustrate the paralysis and democratic deficit of the organization. Finally, possible scenarios for the future will be projected, engaging in the exercise of evaluating the minimum reforms that could revitalize multilateralism in contrast to the alternative of critical global fragmentation. Considering all together, the argument is that the UN finds itself trapped between justice without power and power without justice, and that its survival depends on its ability to adapt to an international order radically different from that of 1945. I. The contradiction between power and law: Hans Morgenthau and political realism To understand the paralysis of the UN, it is useful to turn to Hans Morgenthau, a pioneer of realism in international relations. In his work “Politics Among Nations” (1948), he warned that the international order is always mediated by the balance of power and that legal norms only survive to the extent that they coincide with the interests of powerful States. [26] His idea is provocative: international law is not an autonomous order, but a language that powers use so long as it does not contradict their strategic objectives. Applied to the UN, this analysis is clear: the institution reflects less universal ethical commitment and more correlation of historical forces. The Security Council is not a neutral body, but the mirror of the hegemony of 1945, crystallized in Article 27 of the Charter, which enshrines the right of veto. The supposed universality of the UN is subordinated to a mechanism designed precisely to ensure that no action contrary to the superpowers could be imposed. Contemporary critiques confirm Morgenthau’s intuition. When Russia vetoes resolutions on Ukraine, [27] or the United States does the same regarding Gaza, [28] it becomes evident that international justice is suspended in the name of geopolitics. The legal is subordinated to the political. In this sense, the UN crisis is not an accident, but the logical consequence of its design, and what Morgenthau pointed out seventy years ago remains valid: as long as there is no coincidence between law and power, international norms will remain fragile. Political realism helps explain why the UN fails when it is most needed. States continue to act according to their national interests, even when this contradicts the international norms they themselves have subscribed to. The Security Council has become a space where powers project their strategies of influence, blocking collective actions whenever these affect their geopolitical priorities. The war in Ukraine, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide show that international law is applied selectively, reinforcing the idea that rules are valid only when they do not interfere with the power of the strongest. This pattern evidently erodes the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of societies, because it generates the perception that the organization is incapable of representing the collective interest and, instead, merely reflects the correlation of forces of each historical moment. II. Carl Schmitt and the Myth of Universal Order Another voice that resonates is that of Carl Schmitt, who in “The Nomos of the Earth” (1950) argued that every international legal order arises from a founding political decision, that is, an act of power. [29] For Schmitt, there is no “universal law” that imposes itself; what is presented as universal is, in reality, the crystallization of a particular domain. The UN perfectly embodies this diagnosis. The founding discourse of San Francisco in 1945 spoke of “we the peoples of the United Nations,” [30] but in reality the Charter was written under the predominance of the winners of the Second World War. What was presented as a universal order of peace and security was, in fact, the codification of the Allied hegemony. Schmitt helps explain why the UN has never escaped that original logic. Although the General Assembly proclaims sovereign equality in Article 2 of the Charter, the structure of the Council reproduces the privilege of a few. [31] The international law of the UN appears, in Schmittian terms, as a “nomos” imposed by the winners, not as a true universal community. The consequence is a legitimate deficit that has persisted until today and explains much of the perception of ineffectiveness. The original structure of the UN perpetuates an unequal design that remains in force. The veto privilege is not only a defensive mechanism for the winners of the Second World War, but it has also functioned as a lock — one without keys — that prevents any real evolution of the system. Over eight decades, demands for reform have clashed with the resistance of those who benefit from keeping the rules intact. The contradiction is evident: developing States, which today represent the majority in the General Assembly, lack effective power in the most important decisions on international security. The gap between the universalist discourse of sovereign equality and the hierarchical practice of the Council undermines the credibility of the multilateral order. As long as this tension persists, the UN will hardly be able to become the space of global governance that the world requires more urgently than ever in the 21st century. III. Habermas and the Need for a Deliberative Community In contrast to this pessimism, Jürgen Habermas offers a different perspective. In “The Inclusion of the Other” (1996) and in later essays, he proposed moving toward a “constitutionalization of international law,” understood as the creation of a global normative space in which decisions are not based on force, but on rational deliberation. [32] From this perspective, the UN would be an imperfect embryo of a community of world citizens. The impact of this idea is enormous: it suggests that, beyond current deadlocks, the UN embodies the possibility of transforming power relations into processes of public deliberation. Article 1 of the Charter, which speaks of “maintaining international peace and security” and of “promoting friendly relations among nations,” can be read not only as a political mandate but also as a normative ideal of cosmopolitan coexistence. [33] Criticism of Habermas is evident: his proposal errs on the side of idealism in a world where national security interests remain paramount. However, his contribution is valuable because it allows us to think of the UN not only as a paralyzed body but also as a field of normative struggle. The problem is not only the strength of the vetoes but also the lack of will to transform that space into a true deliberative forum. [34] Thinking of the UN as a deliberative community requires recognizing that its current procedures do not guarantee authentic dialogue. Debate in the General Assembly is often reduced to formal statements, while crucial decisions, as everyone knows, are taken in restricted circles. The lack of effective mechanisms for the participation of non-state actors, such as regional organizations or civil society, further limits the inclusive character of the institution. Genuine deliberation should open spaces where multiple voices can influence decision-making processes, not only through speeches but by building binding consensus. However, the most powerful States fear losing control over the international agenda, which generates a vicious circle: an elitist governance system is maintained that protects privileges, but at the cost of sacrificing legitimacy and effectiveness. Thus, the promise of a deliberative order is reduced to a normative horizon that has not yet been realized. IV. Richard Falk and the Global Democratic Deficit A more recent contribution comes from Richard Falk, jurist and former UN rapporteur, who has insisted on the “democratic deficit” of the international order. In his view, the UN suffers from a structural contradiction: while the Charter proclaims the sovereignty of peoples, in practice it concentrates power in a small club of States. [35] This not only limits its effectiveness but also erodes its legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples of the world. The case of Palestine is emblematic. The General Assembly has repeatedly recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, but the veto in the Council blocks any effective measure. [36] Falk interprets this as evidence that the UN operates under a “democracy of States” but not under a “democracy of peoples.” The impact is devastating: millions of people perceive the organization not as a guarantor of rights, but as an accomplice to inequality. This leads us to a brief analysis of the International Criminal Court (ICC), born from the Rome Statute (1998), which promised a civilizational breakthrough: that the most serious crimes (“which affect the international community as a whole”) would not go unpunished. [37] Its design is cautious: complementarity (it acts only if the State is unwilling or unable), restricted jurisdiction (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and — with limits — aggression), and jurisdiction based on territory, nationality, or referral by the Security Council. The two major milestones of the Council — referrals of Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011) —demonstrated both the potential and the limits. There were procedural advances and arrest warrants, but also contested operative clauses and very little cooperation for arrests. [38] The implicit message to the Global South was ambiguous: justice is universal, but its activation depends on the map of alliances in the Council. At the same time, key powers are not parties to the Statute (United States, China, Russia) and yet influence when the Court acts. The result fuels the argument of “winners’ justice” that several African foreign ministries have raised. The Court has tried to rebalance its map: investigations in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Ukraine, as well as arrest warrants against high-ranking authorities in cases of aggression or serious international crimes, have partly disproved the idea of a one-sided persecution. But the Achilles’ heel persists: without State cooperation, there are no executions of warrants; without the Council, there is no activation in key contexts; with the Council, there is a veto. In addition, Article 16 of the Statute allows the Council to suspend investigations for 12 renewable months, a political valve that subordinates the judicial to the geopolitical. [39] Integrating Falk’s critique into this essay makes it possible to highlight that the UN crisis is not only institutional but also democratic. Article 1.2 of the Charter proclaims respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, but this ideal becomes empty when the veto power systematically contradicts it. [40] The democratic deficit of the UN is not limited to the Security Council but runs through the entirety of its institutional architecture. Developing countries have little influence on global economic governance, despite being the most affected by decisions on debt, trade, or climate financing. Unequal representation in bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank, together with dependence on international cooperation, reproduces relations of subordination that contradict the principles of equality and self-determination. Moreover, world citizenship lacks a real channel of influence: peoples see their demands diluted in state structures that do not always — or almost never — reflect their needs. This divorce between peoples and States turns the UN into an incomplete democracy, where the most vulnerable collective subjects fail to make their voices heard. Overcoming this limitation is essential to restoring the legitimacy of multilateralism. V. Susan Strange and the Geopolitics of the Economy Finally, Susan Strange adds another dimension: the economic one. In “The Retreat of the State” (1996), she argued that power in the contemporary world does not reside only in States, but also in transnational forces — financial markets, corporations, technologies — that escape institutional control. [41] The UN, designed in 1945 under the logic of sovereign States, lacks instruments to govern this new scenario. The impact is evident. While the Security Council is paralyzed in debates over traditional wars, global crises such as climate change, pandemics, or the regulation of artificial intelligence show that real power has shifted toward non-state actors. [42] Strange warns that if international institutions do not adapt to this reality, they risk becoming irrelevant. In this sense, the UN faces not only a problem of veto or representativeness, but also a historical mismatch: it was designed for a world of States and conventional wars, but today we live in a world of transnational interdependencies. The Charter, in its Article 2.7, continues to emphasize non-interference in the internal affairs of States, but this clause seems insufficient to govern global threats that transcend borders. [43] And it is vitally important to note that the global threats of the 21st century do not fit the traditional paradigm of interstate wars that has been preconceived. Challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and technological revolutions pose risks that no State can face alone. However, the UN lacks effective mechanisms to coordinate global responses in these areas. The fragmentation of climate governance, competition for vaccines during the pandemic, and the absence of clear rules to regulate large digital corporations illustrate the magnitude of the challenge. In this context, state sovereignty proves insufficient, and the principle of non-interference becomes obsolete. If the UN does not develop innovative instruments that integrate transnational actors and strengthen multilateral cooperation, it risks becoming a merely declarative forum, incapable of offering concrete solutions to the problems that most affect contemporary humanity — and it is important that these critiques be heard before it is too late. VI. Current Scenarios All the above opens up a momentous dilemma of our time: either we reform multilateralism so that law contains “force,” or we normalize “exception” forever. [44]Scenario A: A minimal but sufficient cosmopolitan reform. A critical group of States —supported by civil society and epistemic communities — agrees to self-limit the veto in situations of mass atrocities (ACT-type codes of conduct), promotes the expansion of the Council with some permanent presence of the Global South (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and one African seat, probably South Africa), and strengthens “Uniting for Peace” mechanisms to circumvent blockages. [45] The ICJ gains centrality with advisory opinions politically bound by prior compliance commitments, the ICC ensures interstate cooperation through regional agreements, and the UN creates a rapid civil deployment capacity for the protection of civilians, minimal cybersecurity, and climate response. [46] In the economic sphere, a Global Economic Council emerges within the orbit of the UN to coordinate debt, climate, and international taxation with common standards. [47] Scenario B: Ordered fragmentation of anarchy. Blockages become chronic. Security shifts to ad hoc coalitions and minilateralisms (NATO Plus, QUAD, expanded BRICS), economic governance is decided in restricted membership forums, and the UN remains a symbolic forum without decision-making capacity. [48] Exception becomes the rule: “preventive interventions,” widespread unilateral sanctions, proliferation of private military companies, opaque cyber-operations, and a data ecology controlled by a few platforms. [49] International law endures as a language, but its social force dissipates; incentives push toward strategic autonomy and legal security by blocs. In other words, the future of the UN will depend on its ability to balance justice and force in an international environment marked by multipolarity. I insist that one possible path is to advance toward gradual reforms that strengthen transparency, broaden the representativeness of the Council, and grant greater autonomy to the General Assembly and judicial bodies. Another, far more radical, is the consolidation of parallel mechanisms that de facto replace the role of the UN through regional alliances, ad hoc coalitions, and alternative economic forums. Both paths involve risks: reform may stagnate in the lowest common denominator, while fragmentation may deepen inequalities and conflicts. However, what seems clear is that maintaining the status quo will only prolong paralysis and further weaken the legitimacy of the multilateral system. The choice between reform or irrelevance will, ultimately, be the decisive dilemma of the 21st century. I believe that three milestones will indicate where we are headed: (1) effective adoption of commitments to abstain from vetoes in the face of mass atrocities; (2) funded and operational implementation of the climate loss and damage mechanism; (3) cooperation with the ICC in politically sensitive cases, without ad hoc exceptions. [50] VII. Conclusion: Between Disillusionment and Hope The UN marks eighty years caught in Pascal’s dilemma: “force without justice is tyranny, justice without force is mockery.” [51] The diagnosis is clear: the Security Council has turned justice into a mockery, while the great powers have exercised force without legitimacy. [52] The result is a weakened organization, incapable of responding to the most urgent tragedies of our time. However, it would be a mistake to fall into absolute cynicism. Despite its evident limitations and alongside all that has been mentioned, the UN remains the only forum where 193 States engage in dialogue, the only space where there exists even a minimal notion of common international law. [53] Its crisis should not lead us to abandon it, but rather to radically rethink it. Perhaps the path lies in what Habermas calls a “constitutionalization of international law,” as previously proposed, or in a profound reform of the Security Council that democratizes the use of force. [54] History teaches that institutions survive if they manage to adapt. [55] If the UN does not, it will be relegated to the status of a giant that humanity needs but that is paralyzed, a symbol of a past that no longer responds to the challenges of the present. [56] But if States recover something of the founding spirit of 1945, perhaps it can still save us from hell, even if it never takes us to heaven. [57] VIII. References [1] Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld. Citado en Brian Urquhart. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[2] John Rawls. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.[3] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[4] Aristóteles. Política. Traducido por Antonio Gómez Robledo. México: UNAM, 2000.[5] Naciones Unidas. Carta de las Naciones Unidas. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 26 de junio de 1945.[6] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[7] Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. New York: Penguin, 1968.[8] Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 1795; repr., Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003.[9] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[10] Susan Strange. States and Markets. London: Pinter, 1988. 11. Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.[12] Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.[13] Martha Finnemore. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.[14] Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.[15] Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.[16] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[17] Joseph Nye. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.[18] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[19] Robert Keohane y Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.[20] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[21] Stephen Krasner. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.[22] Robert Cox. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.[23] Robert Cox. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.[24] Charles Kindleberger. The World in Depression, 1929–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.[25] John Ikenberry. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.[26] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[27] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[28] Michael Doyle. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.[29] Charles Beitz. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.[30] Andrew Moravcsik. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53[31] Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.[32] Friedrich Kratochwil. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.[33] Nicholas Onuf. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.[34] Christian Reus-Smit. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.[35] Martha Finnemore y Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.[36] Michael Barnett y Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.[37] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[38] Allen Buchanan y Robert Keohane. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405–37.[39] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[40] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.[41] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[42] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[43] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[44] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[45] Corte Internacional de Justicia. Advisory Opinions. La Haya: CIJ, varios años.[46] Naciones Unidas. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A/59/565, 2 December 2004.[47] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[48] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[49] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[50] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[51] Blaise Pascal. Pensées. París: Éditions Garnier, 1976.[52] Brian Urquhart. Hammarskjöld. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[53] Naciones Unidas. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 1945.[54] Jürgen Habermas. The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.[55] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[56] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[57] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Defense & Security
Indonesia and Pakistan, two crossed flags isolated on white background. 3d image

Civil-Military Relations in Transition: Learning from Indonesia’s Democratic Reform to Curtail Pakistan’s Military Dominance in Politics and the South Asia Region.

by Muhammad Younus , Halimah Abdul Manaf , Dyah Mutiarin

We explore a crucial comparative study between Indonesia and Pakistan, which have long histories of military intervention in politics. Written by Muhammad Younus and colleagues, it seeks to answer a pressing question: How can Pakistan reduce military dominance in its politics by learning from Indonesia’s democratic reform? The work's central theme is the struggle between military power and civilian supremacy. By analyzing Indonesia’s successful democratization after Suharto’s fall in 1998 and comparing it with Pakistan’s repeated cycles of military rule, the authors highlight institutional, political, and social reforms that can help Pakistan overcome entrenched interventionism. Military Rule in Pakistan: Historical Roots and Persistence Let's trace Pakistan’s persistent military dominance to its security-centric founding context. From independence in 1947, Pakistan faced border conflicts with India and a fragile political leadership that left a power vacuum. The deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan deprived Pakistan of strong civilian leaders, allowing the military to step in as guardian of national survival. Other factors reinforced this role: Border insecurities – the wars with India (1947–48, 1965, 1971, and later crises) created a perception that only the army could guarantee sovereignty.Geopolitics of the Cold War – Pakistan’s strategic location drew U.S. and Western support, channeling resources to the military rather than civilian governance.Weak political institutions – fragmented elites and fragile parties enabled military takeovers in 1958, 1977, and 1999. Economic and business roles of the military – Pakistan’s military developed vast commercial interests, strengthening its autonomy from civilian governments. As a result, Pakistan has spent nearly half its history under direct military rule, with civilian governments often overshadowed by the so-called establishment or deep state. This hybrid arrangement has created enduring instability and undermined democratic consolidation. Indonesia’s Trajectory: From Military Authoritarianism to Reformasi In contrast, Indonesia experienced a different but comparable pattern of military dominance. After independence in 1945, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) played a founding role in defending sovereignty. Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957–65), the military expanded its influence, but during Suharto’s New Order (1967–1998), the military became fully entrenched in politics, bureaucracy, and business. The military’s “dual function” doctrine allowed officers to control defense and governance. Civil liberties were suppressed, and military-backed elites monopolized power. However, Suharto’s collapse in 1998 amid economic crisis and mass protests triggered the Reformasi era, which brought sweeping democratic reforms: Military representatives were removed from parliament. The TNI was separated from the police and confined to defense roles. Civil society and student movements mobilized to keep the military in check. Successive civilian governments gradually asserted constitutional authority. While challenges remain, Indonesia is now regarded as one of the most successful cases of democratic transition in Southeast Asia. Comparative Themes Between Indonesia and Pakistan We identify multiple comparative themes that connect and contrast Indonesia and Pakistan. These themes highlight similarities in their historical trajectories and expose the structural differences that explain why Indonesia successfully reduced military intervention while Pakistan continues to struggle. - Muslim-Majority Identity and Political Legitimacy Both Indonesia and Pakistan are Muslim-majority states, and Islam plays a central role in legitimizing governance. In Pakistan, Islam was a founding ideology: the creation of Pakistan in 1947 was justified as a homeland for South Asian Muslims. As a result, the military often presents itself as the guardian of Pakistan’s Islamic identity and territorial integrity, using religion to strengthen its political authority. For instance, General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime (1977–1988) fused Islamization with military rule, giving the armed forces a dual role as defenders of both faith and nation. Islam also permeates social and political life in Indonesia, but its role in legitimizing military dominance has weakened. Despite being the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, Indonesia developed a more pluralist political identity under Pancasila ideology, which emphasized unity and diversity. This pluralism limited the military’s ability to monopolize religious legitimacy. Thus, while both militaries operated in religious societies, Pakistan’s military more successfully embedded itself as a religious-political actor than Indonesia’s TNI. - Colonial Legacies and Institutional Development Colonial experiences profoundly shaped state institutions. Indonesia’s 350 years under Dutch rule created a centralized but rigid bureaucracy, while Pakistan’s British colonial legacy emphasized indirect rule through local elites. In Indonesia, the Dutch left behind weak political institutions but a militarized control structure, which the TNI easily adopted after independence. In Pakistan, the British institutional legacy emphasized bureaucracy and military professionalism, but weak democratic roots allowed the army to dominate once independence brought political instability. Both states inherited fragile democratic institutions at independence. Still, Indonesia’s authoritarian consolidation under Suharto created a long, stable period of military dominance, whereas Pakistan experienced repeated coups and oscillations between military and civilian governments. - Military Dictatorships and Modes of Authoritarianism Both countries experienced prolonged military dominance, but the nature of their authoritarianism differed. In Indonesia, Suharto’s New Order (1967–1998) created a centralized, corporatist system where the military had constitutional political space under the “dual function” doctrine. Under a stable authoritarian order, the TNI occupied bureaucratic, political, and business roles. Citizens experienced repression, but the system provided economic growth and relative stability until the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis triggered a collapse. In Pakistan, military rule has been more fragmented and cyclical. Generals Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf seized power through coups, justifying intervention as necessary to restore stability. However, no institution was as stable as Suharto's system. Instead, Pakistan alternated between weak civilian governments and recurring military takeovers. The instability prevented the military from being permanently curtailed, as civilian institutions remained fragile. - Geopolitics and the Cold War Indonesia and Pakistan were strategically significant during the Cold War, but their alignments diverged. Pakistan aligned closely with the United States, joining alliances like SEATO and CENTO. As a frontline state against communism and later against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military received significant financial and military aid. This external support strengthened the army as an autonomous actor, independent of civilian oversight. Indonesia, under Sukarno, initially pursued non-alignment and even leaned toward the socialist blocs. But after the failed 1965 coup attributed to communists, Suharto realigned Indonesia with the West, becoming a key anti-communist ally. Unlike Pakistan, however, Indonesia’s external support did not give the TNI unchecked autonomy in the long run. When Suharto fell, the international community supported democratic reform, not military dominance. Thus, while both militaries were empowered by Cold War geopolitics, Pakistan’s international patronage entrenched military supremacy, whereas Indonesia’s geopolitical reorientation facilitated eventual reform. - Demography and Population Pressure Both Indonesia and Pakistan are densely populated developing countries. High population growth, urbanization, and inequality have strained governance. In Indonesia, the population pressure was partly managed through economic growth under Suharto and decentralization after democratization, though inequality and corruption remain challenges. In Pakistan, population growth and poor governance deepened social unrest. Military regimes often justified intervention by claiming that civilian governments failed to manage these pressures. Population dynamics thus fueled instability in both countries, but Indonesia’s reformist elites turned these pressures into momentum for democratization, while Pakistan’s elites often relied on military backing instead. Civil Society and Public Attitudes Civil society is a critical difference. In Indonesia, students, NGOs, and media mobilized strongly during the 1997–98 crisis. Their sustained activism ensured that reforms were not reversed after Suharto’s fall. Public opinion strongly supports civilian supremacy, and the memory of military abuses under Suharto reinforces this sentiment. In Pakistan, civil society is weaker and fragmented. While lawyers’ movements and urban middle-class activism have occasionally resisted authoritarianism (e.g., the Lawyers’ Movement of 2007–09), civil society has not been consistently able to constrain the establishment. However, recent shifts show rising criticism of military interference, suggesting potential for change. Public Mindsets: Shifts in Perceptions Another contribution of this analysis is the changing public attitudes in both countries. In Pakistan, regime changes (such as Imran Khan’s ouster) have shifted from individualistic to collective voting behavior, where people increasingly prioritize national over personal benefits. A shift from state-centric to people-centric perspectives, demanding governance that serves citizens rather than the state or establishment. Growing criticism of military involvement in politics is unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. Stronger participation in elections, with citizens using the ballot to challenge establishment influence. Calls for a new social contract, clarifying the responsibilities of political and military institutions. In Indonesia, public opinion strongly favors civilian leadership and views the military’s role as limited to national defense. While some sectors still favor military involvement in anti-corruption efforts, the dominant sentiment is democratic and reformist. Additional Regional Perspectives: Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand While this study focuses on Indonesia and Pakistan, a broader South and Southeast Asian perspective reveals that civil–military contestation is not unique to these two countries. Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand provide parallel yet distinct experiences of military intervention in politics, enriching the comparative landscape. Bangladesh Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has struggled with repeated military interventions. Coups in 1975 and 1982 entrenched the army as a dominant political actor, often presenting itself as the guardian of national stability. Like Pakistan, the military developed political parties and cultivated influence even during civilian rule. However, unlike Indonesia’s post-1998 trajectory, Bangladesh has oscillated between civilian governments led by rival parties (Awami League and BNP) and military-backed caretaker administrations. The persistence of confrontational party politics provides fertile ground for military influence, similar to Pakistan’s fragile democracy. Myanmar Myanmar represents one of the most entrenched military-dominated systems in the region. Since the 1962 coup, the Tatmadaw institutionalized military supremacy under the guise of “discipline-flourishing democracy.” Even during the 2011–2020 hybrid transition, the constitution reserved parliamentary seats and key ministries for the military, limiting civilian authority. The 2021 coup confirmed the Tatmadaw’s unwillingness to cede real power. Compared to Indonesia’s Reformasi and Pakistan’s hybrid arrangements, Myanmar illustrates a worst-case scenario: the military refuses reform and resists domestic and international pressure. Thailand Thailand’s modern political history is punctuated by repeated coups (more than a dozen since 1932). The Thai military often positions itself as the arbiter of political conflict, stepping in during crises and withdrawing after resetting political rules. The 2014 coup, followed by the 2017 constitution, institutionalized military oversight of civilian politics. Unlike Pakistan’s Islam-centered legitimacy or Indonesia’s nationalist developmentalism, Thailand’s military has leaned on monarchy-centered legitimacy and nationalism to justify interventions. Despite periods of electoral democracy, the military’s entrenched influence makes Thailand comparable to Pakistan in terms of cyclical authoritarianism, but distinct from Indonesia’s relatively consolidated democratic transition. Recommendations for Pakistan and Other South Asian Countries We draw from Indonesia’s reform success to propose recommendations for Pakistan. These can be grouped into political leadership, institutional reform, military restructuring, and civil society engagement. Strengthen Civilian Leadership and Authority Pakistan’s repeated political crises stem partly from weak leadership and fragmented parties. To emulate Indonesia, Pakistan’s leaders must: Assert authority over military appointments, ensuring that promotions and postings reflect professional criteria rather than political manipulation. Demonstrate unity among parties by agreeing not to invite or legitimize military intervention against rivals. In Indonesia, elite consensus was critical to sidelining the TNI. Build legitimacy through governance performance, reducing the military’s justification for intervention. Reduce the Military’s Commercial Empire The Pakistan Army runs one of the world’s largest military-business complexes (e.g., Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust). This gives the military financial independence and political clout. We recommend: Gradual divestment of military-run businesses to civilian authorities. Transparent auditing of military-owned enterprises. Laws restricting the army’s involvement in commercial ventures. Indonesia pursued similar reforms by curbing TNI’s business interests after 1998, a move Pakistan could replicate. Pursue Constitutional and Institutional Reforms Civilian supremacy must be enshrined legally. Key steps include: Amending the constitution to clarify the military’s defense-only role. Strengthening parliamentary committees on defense and national security to provide oversight. Enhancing judicial independence to protect civilians from military overreach. Indonesia’s constitutional amendments and reforms limiting TNI’s legislative seats offer a model. Professionalize the Military A professional military is less likely to interfere in politics. Recommendations include: Reforming military training curricula to emphasize apolitical professionalism. Enhancing civilian expertise in defense policy, reducing dependence on military decision-making. Encouraging cross-branch appointments to reduce the Army’s dominance over other services (Navy, Air Force). Empower Civil Society and Media Civil society pressure was a decisive factor in Indonesia’s Reformasi. For Pakistan: NGOs, lawyers, students, and independent media must be supported to demand transparency and accountability. Educational reforms should foster democratic values, encouraging citizens to resist authoritarianism. Digital platforms should be used to strengthen civic activism and counter establishment narratives. Encourage Civil-Military Dialogue and Trust-Building Instead of open confrontation, Pakistan must create structured spaces for civilian-military dialogue. These should: Clarify roles and responsibilities. Build trust so the military sees its institutional strength as linked to democratic stability. Encourage joint decision-making on security issues within constitutional limits. International Support for Reform Indonesia benefited from international backing after Suharto’s fall. Similarly, Pakistan’s reform agenda would require: External partners emphasizing democratic reforms in aid and cooperation. Regional diplomacy reduces Pakistan’s security anxieties, often fueling military dominance. Conclusion Civil-Military Relations in Transition is both a scholarly contribution and a practical guide. Juxtaposing Indonesia’s reformist success with Pakistan’s struggles shows that military interventionism is not inevitable but can be curtailed through leadership, reform, and public mobilization. For Pakistan, the Indonesian example offers hope and caution: reforms require political consensus, a strong civil society, and an unwavering commitment to democratic norms. Without these, cycles of intervention may persist. With them, however, Pakistan could achieve the same democratic consolidation that Indonesia has pursued since 1998. The article emphasizes that sustainable democracy rests on civilian supremacy, institutional reform, and citizen empowerment. Only by embedding these principles can Pakistan move toward stable, democratic governance and curtail the political role of its military establishment.