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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском It is generally accepted that an international order is not the result of specific agreements, but the product of a common understanding of what can and cannot be done in relations between states. It is also generally accepted that all significant powers need to have relatively common ideas about why they recognize each other's right to exist and do not interfere in their internal affairs. In particular, the late Henry Kissinger wrote a lot about this, whose ideas were considered the standard of geostrategic thinking not only in the West, but also in our country. However, the coming times, apparently, will require a more creative approach to established views on how states can guarantee each other respect for basic interests and values. After all, it is the attack on them that always becomes the cause of conflict, as we are convinced by the example of the current military-political confrontation in Europe. In his speech at the UN Security Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that any agreement with the West on European security will have to contain "safeguards against unscrupulous interpretations." It is currently quite difficult to imagine what such safety catch might look like in physical terms, although the diplomats probably already have ideas on this topic. It can be guessed what the nature of such mechanisms should be. It is clear that the mechanisms should be aimed against the negative manifestations of the West's behavior. First, it is the West's desire to constantly create threats to others, as a central part of the global diplomatic game. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the physical ability to create such threats. The safety catches in this case are technical ways to ensure a situation where a state (or bloc) cannot change its behavior to hostile or take advantage of the omission in its selfish interests. Precisely cannot. Because "does not want" no longer works after, for example, Finland joined NATO. And the alliance itself simply trampled all the formal and informal principles on which they tried to build a security system in Europe after the Cold War. We see that not a single concluded then agreement works. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the main treaties on which the "rigid" framework of European security was based. NATO expansion to the east, in fact - the expansion of the territorial base of the American military presence in Europe - made all agreements in the field of conventional weapons meaningless. So, to come up with a new legal basis for peace in Europe is not a trivial task at all. And it remains to rely on the recognized skill of Russian diplomacy. A universal order that would suit everyone is unlikely now. It has always been relative before. However, in the century before last, there was at least a general idea among the leading powers about the principles on which the internal order in each of them should be based. Now it is difficult to think that Western countries will agree to recognize the right of Russia, China or other states to determine their own lives. First, any security order will inevitably be technical in nature, and not based on a common understanding of challenges and threats. This means that it will have little room for principles and a lot for specific parameters of how the West will not be able to threaten Russia's core interests. Russia's proposals at the end of 2021 already contained a fairly large number of such features of a functioning European security system. Apparently, they will have to return to them after the United States is ready to sit down at the table of serious negotiations. Much here will depend on how soon the understanding of the impossibility of continuing to pursue an irresponsible policy prevails in America itself. At least now, anxiety for the future of their country is heard in the statements of some American politicians. We will see to what extent their understanding that the reasons for the US difficulties relate to the internal situation can be translated into concrete decisions. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine that there will be a place for such a concept as trust in future agreements. Unfortunately, it is not available to all political systems without exception. We ourselves see how the Americans openly declare that any new administration can easily revise the agreements reached by the previous one. Continuity of policy is disappearing in the West – and this has always been the basis of stable diplomatic relations. Moreover, the modern world is extremely diverse. Trust is possible – as in the relations between Russia and China – in situations where both sides share a common understanding of the main threats. Russia and the West cannot have such a common understanding now. Simply because the entire surrounding world poses a threat to the United States and its satellites. And until Westerners can adapt to the new international reality, it will be quite difficult to take their words seriously. Therefore, trust in matters of European security should be based on the physical impossibility for the West to violate any agreements. And no one in Russia doubts that the desire to do so will periodically arise there. Thirdly, the legal basis for European security will most likely become broader. The situation in Europe has long ceased to be the business of the Europeans themselves. Especially since the positions of two powers with the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world – Russia and the United States – directly touch here. Their indirect proximity is a concern for the entire world and has little to do with the affairs of Europe. It is no coincidence that the most adequate proposals for ending the armed confrontation in Ukraine are currently coming from China, India, Brazil, or even African countries. The Europeans, in turn, are not prepared to offer anything at all that would reflect objective reality. They are simply going with the flow. In other words, security in Europe is simultaneously a local and global problem. The broader international community itself must guarantee how the West will comply with its probable obligations. And finally, the technical aspects themselves could include things that have not been widely used in international practice before. For example, the complete or almost complete demilitarization of individual territories and entire states. Unfortunately, the practice of the last 30 years has shown that not all states can bear such a heavy burden as the right to independently determine the parameters of their defense policy. The Baltic republics of the former USSR, Finland or the same unfortunate Ukraine could live quite happily if their political elites were not tempted to use the conflict with Russia to retain power despite any economic difficulties. Then they would probably have to work better on internal development, fit into the world economy, and not turn into centers of instability. In other words, the countries that cannot play an independent role in determining regional security should be relieved of the physical ability to create problems for it. Perhaps such an experience will become more widespread in the future. At least because the risk of turning sovereign states into springboards for confrontation between great powers is too great. The main technical and legal parameters of the European security system have yet to be invented by diplomats and agreed upon by politicians. However, it is already clear from bitter experience that it is no longer possible to leave the situation here in a state of uncertainty – it is too threatening to universal peace and survival.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском *This is an abbreviated version of the same paper published by the author at: Śliwiński K. (2023). Is Geopolitics Still Relevant? Halford Mackinder and the War in Ukraine. Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 4/2023, 7-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2023.1 Abstract This paper starts with an assumption that Geopolitics, understood as one of the great schools of International Relations, is not only still relevant but, indeed, should be one of the essential items in the toolkit of any student or policymaker who peruses the challenging and ever eluding realm of international security. It draws chiefly on the Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder to explain the dynamics of contemporary European Security in general and the ongoing war in Ukraine in particular. The analysis leads the author to a pair of conclusions: firstly, that the conflict in Ukraine is unlikely to end anytime soon and, perhaps more importantly, that the outcome of the war will only be one of many steps leading to the emergence of the new, possibly a multipolar, international system and consequently, and more obviously, a new security system in Europe, which will be strongly influenced by Germany rather than by the United States as before. Keywords: Geopolitics, Heartland, Europe, Security, Ukraine Introduction In the wake of the outburst of the war in Ukraine, the members of the European Union agreed on an extensive package of sanctions against various Russian entities and individuals connected to Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia. Until the attack against Ukraine, the EU had been "muddling through" with numerous countries pursuing their national interests, shaping their individual foreign and security policies, notably vis-à-vis Russia. The attack reinvigorated calls from E.U. bureaucrats for more unity and an actual common defense. EU's chief diplomat Joseph Borrel, during an extraordinary plenary session of the European Parliament on March 1, 2022, urged the European Parliament’s MPs to "think about the instruments of coercion, retaliation, and counterattack in the face of reckless adversaries. […] This is a moment in which geopolitical Europe is being born", he stressed (Brzozowski, 2022). Heartland theory – Geopolitics 101 As an analytical tool, geopolitics has been used since the 19th century. Its reputation was tarnished as a consequence of the policies of the Third Reich before and during WWII. Yet, it is considered a worthy approach that allows explanations that specifically look at the nexus between states' foreign and security policies and their geographical location in a historical context. Geopolitics is one of the grand theories of international relations (Sloan, 2017). Fundamentally, rather than treating states as separate, alienated geographical organisms, geopolitics allows us to look at a broader picture, including regions or even the whole globe, thus making it possible to account for interactions between many states functioning in particular systems defined by geographical criteria. Today's war in Ukraine occurs in a vital region for the European continent – Central and Eastern Europe. One of the founders of Geopolitics, a scientific discipline – Halford Mackinder (British geographer, Oxford professor, founder and director of the London School of Economics) proposed an enduring model in his seminal publication at the beginning of the 20th century - The Geographical Pivot of History. Drawing on the general term used by geographers – 'continental' Mackinder posits that the regions of Arctic and Continental drainage measure nearly half of Asia and a quarter of Europe and, therefore, form a grand 'continuous patch in the north and the center of the continent' (Mackinder, 1919). It is the famous 'Heartland', which, according to his inventor, is the key geographical area for anyone pursuing their dominant position in Euroasia. "[…] whoever rules the Heartland will rule the World Island, and whoever rules the World Island will rule the world" (Kapo, 2021). Notably, the key to controlling the Heartland area lies in Central and Eastern Europe, as it is an area that borders the Heartland to the West. Twenty-First century geopolitics (Dugin vs Mearsheimer) The most influential thinker and writer in Kremlin recently has arguably been Aleksandr Gel'evich Dugin. Accordingly, his 600-hundred pages book, Foundations of Geopolitics 2, published in 1997, has allegedly had an enormous influence on the Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites (Dunlop, 1997). In his book, Dugin, drawing on the founder of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, posits that Russia is uniquely positioned to dominate the Eurasian landmass and that, more importantly, 'Erasianism' will ultimately hold an upper hand in an ongoing conflict with the representatives of 'Atlantism' (the U.S. and the U.K.). Crucially, Dugin does not focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over Eurasia; instead, he advocates a relatively sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will (Dunlop, 1997). The Moscow-Berlin Axis According to Dugin, the postulated New Empire (Eurasian) has a robust geopolitical foothold: Central Europe. "Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Prussia and part of the Polish and Western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally been a consolidating force in Central Europe, uniting this geopolitical conglomerate under its control" (Dugin, 1997). Consequently, while the impulse of the creation of the New Empire needs to come from Moscow, Germany needs to be the centre of its western part. Furthermore "only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow." (Dugin, 1997, 127). Regarding the role of Anglo-Saxons in Central and Eastern Europe, Dugin offers a very straightforward analysis: "The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire presupposes several serious steps towards the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany. The traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis about the need to create a "cordon sanitaire" here, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally dangerous for the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France strove to destabilize the Eastern European peoples in every possible way, to instil in them the idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian influences". It follows logically that "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions, represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is, in general, senseless to speak about continental politics" (Dugin, 1997). "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'. Importantly, as this can inform us to an extent about the future settlement of the conflict: "The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow along its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories". The Tragedy of Great Power Politics In the preface to the update of his seminal book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (2013 edition), John Mearsheimer acknowledges that his analysis had to be updated with regards to the so-called "peaceful rise" of the People's Republic of China as a significant challenger to the role and position of United States in the international system. Consequently, he envisaged that the process would produce a highly sensitive, if not prone to local conflicts environment (Mearsheimer, 2013, 10). Following the logic of power balancing, he claimed that firstly, China had to build formidable military forces and, secondly, dominate Asia similarly to how the United States dominated Western Hemisphere. Correspondingly, China would strive to become a regional hegemon to maximise its survival prospect. This would make China's neighbours feel insecure and prompt counterbalancing by, as one might surmise, strengthening the existing bilateral and multilateral alliances and building new ones (AUKUS being a perfect example). Logically speaking, therefore, if you follow Mearsheimer's argumentation, Russia and India, Japan and Australia, and the Philippines and Indonesia should build a solid coalition to counter the ascent of China. Such developments would be in the interests of the United States, and Washington would naturally play a crucial role under such circumstances. Notably, the rise of China was not likely to be peaceful and produce "big trouble" for international trade as well as peace and security. This was approximately what the Trump administration had in mind when preparing the national security strategy in 2017. The Strategy mentions Russia 25 times, frequently in connection with China, as major challengers to the U.S.: "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and fair, grow their militaries, and control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence" (National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Yet, after even a short analysis of the document, one identifies the difference between the two in terms of how the U.S. perceives the challenge that each represents. Regarding Russia, Washington concludes that Kremilin's main aim is to: "seek to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders". China seems to be more ambitious in the eyes of the Capitol. As evidenced by such statements as: "Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars", "China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour. China's infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free trade flow, threaten other nations' sovereignty, and undermine regional stability."(National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Given this perception, it is no wonder that under Trump, Washington embarked on a new mission that questioned the processes of globalization for the first time in many decades. Under Trump, the U.S.A. introduced numerous economic sanctions against China, which sparked a revolution called 'decoupling'. Johnson and Gramer, writing for foreignpolicy.com in 2020, questioned this policy: "The threat of a great decoupling is a potentially historical break, an interruption perhaps only comparable to the sudden sundering of the first massive wave of globalization in 1914, when deeply intertwined economies such as the Great Britain and Germany, and later the United States, threw themselves into a barrage of self-destruction and economic nationalism that didn't stop for 30 years. This time, though, decoupling is driven not by war but peacetime populist urges, exacerbated by a global coronavirus pandemic that has shaken decades of faith in the wisdom of international supply chains and the virtues of a global economy." (Johnson, Gramer, 2020). With the comfort of looking at hindsight, we should conclude that perhaps luckily for the Far East and international political economy, Mearsheimer was wrong, at least for the time being. Firstly, no military conflicts exist in the Far East or the Pacific. The most potentially dangerous issue remains one of the cross-straight relations, i.e. P.R.C. vs Taiwan (Chinese Taipei). Whether Xi Jinping will risk another diplomatic backlash by an open invasion remains to be seen. The jury is out, and one might claim that with the world being focused on the war in Ukraine, China could get away with an invasion of Taiwan. Then, on the other hand, perhaps there is no need for the P.R.C. to unite all territories of China in the imminent future forcefully. At the same time, as it appears at least mid-2023, contrary to Mearsheimer's predictions, Russia and China seem to be getting closer regarding geopolitics and geoeconomics. On February 4th, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chinese President Xi face-to-face. The leaders convened in Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics — and issued a lengthy statement detailing the two nations' shared positions on a range of global issues. The meeting happened shortly before the Russian invasion, and one could surmise that it was supposed to soften the possible adverse reaction from Beijing to the already prepared military operation by the Kremlin since Putin told Xi that Russia had designed a new deal to supply China with an additional 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Consequently, China abstained from a U.N. Security Council vote condemning the Russian invasion (Gerson, 2022). Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770#sel=1:21:S5F,1:37:3jE (Access 18.10.2023) Andrew Krepinevich's Protracted Great-Power War Andrew Krepinevich's “Protracted Great-Power War - A Preliminary Assessment work” published by the Centre for a New American Security, informs us about the American posture. Accordingly, "Now, however, with the rise of revisionist China and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict and how to wage it successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility and hoping for the best." (Krepinevich, 2020) Among many valuable lessons that history can offer, one should remember that no country can wage a systemic war on its own on two fronts, hoping to be successful. Suppose both China and Russia are seen as strategic challengers to the American position in the international system. In that case, it follows logically that the U.S. needs to make one of them at least neutral (appease them) when in conflict with another. Given China's technological, economic, military, or population challenges, the most optimal choice would be to make Russia indifferent to American 'elbowing' in Central Asia or the Middle East vis-à-vis China. The price for such indifference also seems logical, and it is the dominance of the Russo-German tandem in Central and Eastern Europe and German dominance in the E.U. This would explain at least some developments in Europe regarding energy security, particularly President Biden's administration position on Nord Stream 2 and the not-so-much enthusiastic help to Ukraine from Germany. However, recent developments seem to contrast such logical argumentation. President Biden's administration, as well as the leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces, seem to be committed to continuing the financial, technical and logistical support to Ukrainian President Zelensky's government for "as long as it takes" (the term frequently used in official speeches by Antony Blinken – The Secretary of State). According to the U.S. Department of Defence information (as of Feb 21, 2023), the U.S. committed security assistance to Ukraine in the form of 160 Howitzers, 31 Abrams tanks, 111 million rounds of small arms ammunition and four satellite communication antennas, among others. On top of that, Washington committed more than 30.4 billion U.S. dollars (only since the beginning of the Biden Administration) (U. S. Department of Defence, 2023). The U.S. is the leader of the coalition of many nations (54 to be exact) in efforts to counter the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This situation puts Washington in a predicament as, at least in the mediasphere, experts and former policymakers such as the former C.I.A. Director and U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta does not shy away from identifying the existing state of affairs as a "proxy war" between the United States and the Russian Federation (Macmillan, 2022). 2 Importantly, Kremlin has been playing the “proxy war” card for some time in building its narrative regarding the ongoing “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine. But is "Uncle Sam" still in a position to effectively challenge either Russia or China on their own? In 2001, French historian, sociologist, and political scientist Emmanuel Todd claimed that as of the beginning of the 21st century, the United States was no longer a solution to global problems; instead, it became one of the problems (Todd, 2003). The U.S. guaranteed political and economic freedoms for half a century. In contrast, today, they seem to be more and more an agent of international disorder, causing uncertainty and conflicts wherever they can. Given the geopolitical changes after 1989, the U.S. took for granted its position in the international system and decided to extend its interests across the globe. Surprisingly, perhaps for Washington, even traditional U.S. lies started to demand more independence (see the case of Germany and its role in southern Europe.) (Macron's idea of 'strategic autonomy') . 3 “Emmanuel Macron's comments about Taiwan and his call for European "strategic autonomy" sparked controversy as he advocated for the EU not to become followers of the US and China”. This parallels with President de Gaulle earlier calls for European strategic independence from American influence over European security (Lory, 2023). According to Todd, given the actual balance of power globally, the U.S. would have to fulfill two conditions to maintain its hegemonic position. Firstly, it had to continue controlling its protectorates in Europe and Japan. Secondly, it had to finally eliminate Russia from the elite group of 'big powers', which would mean the disintegration of the post-Soviet sphere and the elimination of the nuclear balance of terror. None of these conditions have been met. Not being able to challenge Europe or Japan economically, the U.S. has also been unable to challenge the Russian nuclear position. Consequently, it switched to attacking medium powers such as Iran or Iraq economically, politically, and militarily engaging in 'theatrical militarism'. (Todd, 2003). In contrast to the French historian, American political scientist Joseph Nye claims, "The United States will remain the world's leading military power in the decades to come, and military force will remain an important component of power in global politics." (Ney, 2019, p.70). He goes on to question whether the rise of China is going to spell the end of the American era: "[…] but, contrary to current conventional wisdom, China is not about to replace the United States as the world's largest economy. Measured in 'purchasing power parity' (P.P.P.), the Chinese economy became larger than the U.S. economy in 2014, but P.P.P. is an economists' measure for comparing welfare estimates, not calculating relative power. For example, oil and jet engines are imported at current exchange rates, and by that measure, China has a US$12 trillion economy compared to a US$20 trillion U.S. economy." […] “Power—the ability to affect others to get what you want—has three aspects: coercion, payment, and attraction. Economic might is just part of the geopolitical equation, and even in economic power, while China may surpass America in total size, it will still lag behind in per capita income (a measure of the sophistication of an economy).” (Ney, 2019, p.70). And yet, as of 2023, America's economic components of her might seem to be very quickly eroding. After the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis and the consequent Covid-19 induced economic crisis, there are several woes on the horizon: Inflation has been rampant (that is one of the effects of federal stimulus after Covid-19), which makes the Federal Reserve continue to increase interest rates, making loans more and more expensive (Goldman, 2022). The stock market has been in the "sell-everything mode", which means the investors are losing a lot of money, so their trust in the economy is decreasing. Thirdly, this time around, the investors are not switching to bonds, which seems to confirm the previous point. Fourthly and finally, "none of this is happening in a vacuum. Russia continues its deadly invasion of Ukraine, which has choked off supply chains and sent energy prices through the roof. On top of that, a labour shortage has sent salaries surging and hindered the normal flow of goods worldwide (Goldman, 2022). Worse still, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, some of the key performance indicators regarding international trade are primarily negative (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2023). As of July 2022, experts debated whether the country was in a technical recession, whereas by now (mid-2023), the actual national debt had surpassed 31.46 trillion U.S. dollars (FiscalData.Treasury.gov, 2023). The German-French engine of the European federalization? The economic and political decrease of the U.S. and the parallel increase of China with Russia holding its position or even reclaiming its influence vis-à-vis NATO countries causes significant challenges to European powers and offers some ground-breaking opportunities. In terms of challenges, especially economically, Germany and France, as mentioned before, find themselves in a predicament. The war in Ukraine has changed the European dynamics due to the pressure of the U. S. to support Ukraine and, consequently, the economic sanctions against The Russian Federation. Similarly, France and Germany have not been very happy with the economic sanctions against Russia and have continually tried to play down the possibility of an all-out EU vs Russia conflict. Listening to the speeches of Macron and Scholz, one cannot but hypothesize that Paris and Berlin would be content with the end of the war as soon as possible at any cost, to be born by Ukraine, to be able to come back to “business as usual.” Apparently, in an attempt to "escape forward", both European powers are proposing further steps to generate even more federal dynamics. Conversely, they suggest that concerning Foreign and Security Policy, the still observed voting pattern based on unanimity - one of the last strongholds of sovereignty, should be abolished, and the decisions should follow a qualified majority voting procedure. Notably, such arguments are made, invoking the potential gains for the EU as a geopolitical actor. In other words, countries such as Poland and Hungary would no longer be able to block Paris and Berlin from imposing their interests on the rest of the EU by presenting them as European. According to this vision, Hungary would no longer be able to ‘sympathize’ with Russia, and Poland would no longer be the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the U.S. interests in Europe in their game with Russia. And so, the war in Ukraine presents a perfect circumstance to call for a European federation. Germany has recently publicized such a vision. On August 24, 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz presented a speech at Charles University in Prague regarding his vision of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts, policymakers, and media pundits widely commented on the speech. It starts with an assertion that Russia is the biggest threat to the security of Europe. That fact produces two breakthrough consequences: firstly, Berlin has to pivot from Russia to its European Partners both economically and politically. Secondly, the European Confederation of equal States should morph into a European Federation (The Federal Government, 2022). Scholz’s vision includes four major ‘thoughts’. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition should be made to majority voting in common foreign or tax policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, “we grow more autonomous in all fields; that we assume greater responsibility for our own security; that we work more closely together and stand yet more united in defence of our values and interests around the world.”. In practical terms, Scholz singles out the need for one command and control structure of European defence efforts (European army equipped chiefly by French and German Companies?). Thirdly, the EU should take more responsibility (at the expense of national governments) regarding migration and fiscal policy against the backdrop of the economic crisis induced by Covid-19 pandemic. This, in practical terms, means, according to Scholz, one set of European debt rules to attain a higher level of economic integration. Finally, some disciplining. “We, therefore, cannot stand by when the principles of the rule of law is violated, and democratic oversight is dismantled. Just to make this absolutely clear, there must be no tolerance in Europe for racism and antisemitism. That’s why we are supporting the Commission in its work for the rule of law. Conclusion The war in Ukraine is arguably proof of the region's role in the security and stability of Europe and its economy. Food supplies, mostly various harvests and energy, are a case in point. On top of that, the region has a lot of raw materials. Ukraine has large deposits of 21 of 30 such materials critical in European green transformation (Ukrinform, 2023). Before the war in Ukraine began, in July 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed non less than a strategic partnership on raw materials. The partnership includes three areas from the approximation of policy and regulatory mining frameworks, through a partnership that will engage the European Raw Materials Alliance and the European Battery Alliance to closer collaboration in research and innovation along both raw materials and battery value chains using Horizon Europe (European Commission, Press Release 2021). As for security, in a traditional sense, the U.S. is involved with Ukraine regarding nuclear weapons. In the letter from March 17, 2023, the director of the Energy Department’s Office of Nonproliferation Policy, Andrea Ferkile, tells Rosatom’s director general that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar “contains US-origin nuclear technical data that is export-controlled by the United States Government” (Bertrand, Lister, 2023). Worse still, The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria J. Nuland, admitted in her testimony on Ukraine in the US Congress that, indeed, “Ukraine has biological research facilities, which we are now quite concerned Russian troops, Russian Forces, may be seeking to gain control of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces should they approach” (C-Span, 2022). 4 See more at: https://www.state.gov/energy-security-support-to-ukraine/ (Access 18.10.2023) As Scott and Alcenat claim, the analysis of the competitive policies of each great power confirms the Heartland concept's importance. They project the utility of Mackinder’s analysis to Central Asia, asserting that: “it is valid in today’s foreign policy and policy analyses. Each power strives for control of or access to the region’s resources. For China, the primary goal is to maintain regional stability as a means for border security and assurance of stable economic relations. For the European Union, the main goal is to gain economic access while simultaneously promoting the democratization of those countries that are politically unstable.” (Scott, Alcenat, 2008). 5 Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (retired) - a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert, a former director of the Centre for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defence of China offered a similar evaluation: “the competition between the two giants (U.S.A. and China) will not occur in the Global South, where the US has already lost out to China. At the same time, in the Indo-Pacific, few nations want to take sides. Instead, it will be in Europe, where the U.S. has most of its allies, and China is the largest trading partner” (Bo, 2023). References Bertrand, N. and Lister, T. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” Venezuelan election authorities proclaimed incumbent Nicolás Maduro victor in the 28 July presidential poll despite evidence brandished by the opposition showing its candidate won by a landslide. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Phil Gunson explains what the ensuing outcry means for Venezuela’s protracted crisis. What happened? Under enormous international attention, Venezuela held presidential elections on 28 July. The polls pitted unpopular incumbent Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013 after being anointed by late President Hugo Chávez as his successor, against a relatively unheralded opposition candidate, Edmundo González. González had established a commanding lead in pre-election opinion polls, in large part thanks to the endorsement of banned opposition leader María Corina Machado. Six hours after most polling stations closed, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Maduro victorious, but neither then nor in the days since has it provided any breakdown of the results by polling station or evidence to substantiate its announcement. Convinced that the election had been stolen, opposition supporters, many from working class communities, took to the streets the following day. They have been met with a violent response from state security services, which have made clear they will stand with the Maduro administration and unfurled a wave of targeted arrests. With Maduro digging in, the past few days’ turbulence could leave in its wake a weakened government, a galvanised but frustrated opposition, and a broad front of foreign governments all struggling to determine their next moves. How did we get here? Much of the controversy that swirled around the 2024 presidential campaign and election is a legacy of the domestic and international rancour that followed the previous, disputed presidential vote six years ago. In 2018, the prohibition of certain opposition candidates and parties – who mostly boycotted the poll – as well as a heavily tilted electoral playing field helped President Maduro secure a second term. But his victory was dismissed as illegitimate by the U.S., the European Union and many of Venezuela’s neighbours. The next year, over fifty countries opted instead to recognise Juan Guaidó, chair of the opposition-led parliament, as interim president. Washington imposed sweeping economic sanctions as successive opposition efforts sought to topple Maduro, only for the government to hold its ground through a wave of political repression, with the help of almost seamless backing from the military and support from Russia, Iran, Cuba and other states. At the same time, the Norwegian government facilitated sporadic rounds of talks between the government and opposition. Despite prolonged deadlock, these talks ultimately led to a breakthrough: the Barbados Agreement of October 2023 saw the Maduro government promise improved conditions for the 2024 election, while receiving in return (via parallel talks with President Joe Biden’s administration) conditional sanctions relief. The government’s concessions nevertheless came with strings attached. Although the authorities allowed the main opposition coalition, the Unitary Platform, to hold a primary election, they reaffirmed a ban on the runaway winner, Machado, holding elected office and blocked the candidacy of her chosen substitute, Corina Yoris. González, a 74-year-old retired diplomat, was the opposition’s third choice, but despite being an unknown with no previous political experience, he soon garnered massive support, touring the country with the hugely popular Machado. Ten candidates, backed by 38 political parties, eventually appeared on the official electronic ballot, many of them thinly veiled plants by the government, which intended them as a ploy to divide and confuse opposition voters and create the appearance of a diverse and competitive election. But the campaign rapidly took a shape that was not to the government’s liking – a two-horse race, in which reputable polling companies all gave González a massive lead, of up to 30 points and more, over Maduro. Most striking was the rapturous reception given to opposition campaign rallies in urban slums and agricultural states in the interior, which had until recently been the strongholds of chavismo – the political movement created by late president Chávez. “María Corina was here last week and filled the main street”, said an opposition supporter in the Andean state of Mérida. “Maduro came the next day and only filled half of it, despite all the buses from out of town”. The government did its best to impede the opposition’s rallies, banning Machado from traveling by air, cancelling public transport in the vicinity, digging up highways and setting up roadblocks ahead of them. It closed down radio stations, blocked websites and kept the opposition message largely out of the mass media. Millions of voters were disenfranchised. For the Venezuelan diaspora – estimated to number eight million migrants and refugees who have left the country over a decade of economic contraction and political tumult – arbitrary rules prevented them from registering to vote; at home, enrolment was marred by lack of information, as well as of time and opportunities to register. The National Electoral Council, dominated by a pro-government majority, failed even to adhere to its own election timetable, and overlooked or omitted a number of key steps. As in previous campaigns, the government abused its power by using state resources to bolster the Maduro campaign, while extorting contributions from private businesses and closing down those that gave any assistance to their adversary. With all signs nevertheless pointing to an opposition victory, many observers, including Crisis Group, foresaw that the Maduro administration would resort to even more extreme tactics to avoid losing power. But in the event, at least in the run-up to the election, it proved more restrained than expected. The government refrained from banning González’s candidacy or using its control of the Supreme Court to have the party ticket on which it was registered declared invalid. Ongoing talks between Washington and Caracas, as well as pressure from neighbouring and relatively friendly left-leaning governments in Brazil and Colombia, may possibly have dissuaded Maduro from adopting such draconian measures. Hopes that a low turnout among opposition voters alongside chavismo’s tried and tested methods of electoral mobilisation would again lead to victory may also have persuaded authorities not to act earlier. But none of this meant that the administration was prepared, when push came to shove, to give up power. What happened on election day? Election day itself was largely peaceful and voting took place normally, with only a minority of polling stations reporting irregularities. Exit polls and quick counts organised by the opposition indicated that Maduro was headed for defeat. But there were soon signs that the government might not be prepared to concede. As polls closed, opposition witnesses and election workers in voting precincts across the country reported that electoral authorities (at times supported by chavista operatives and members of the security forces), were trying to deny them copies of the vote tallies, called “actas”. These actas are printed out by each voting machine once polls close and constitute the physical corroboration of the electronic result that is sent to CNE headquarters and amalgamated into a final nationwide vote count. All participating political parties are entitled to them by law. Concerned about the implications, at 11pm, Unitary Platform coordinator Omar Barboza publicly called on the government not to “take a wrong step”. The hours after the polls closed (technically at 6pm, although many remained open later, even without people in line to vote) were tense, with both sides claiming to have won but with no official results from the electoral authorities. Shortly after midnight, CNE president Elvis Amoroso – a close ally of President Maduro – announced that, with 80 per cent of returns tallied, Maduro had obtained 51.2 per cent of the vote and that his lead of around 700,000 votes indicated an “irreversible” tendency. Machado and González then appeared before the cameras, with Machado saying, “We won, and everyone knows it”. The commission pronounced Maduro the election winner in a Monday morning event in Caracas. What evidence is there to suggest that the results may have been falsified? Both opposition and international suspicions of foul play have been heightened by the failure of guardrail systems to function as intended. In principle, the integrity of the vote should be protected by the actas, the paper tallies that each of the 30,026 voting machines produces once the polling station has closed. This safeguard was introduced under late president Chávez, and makes the Venezuelan system, according to electoral experts, one of the best in the world. Yet the CNE has so far failed to publish or distribute electronically the breakdown of voting by polling station and voting machine, despite Amoroso’s promises to do so. It also did not complete the post-voting audit of over half the machines, which the rules required it to. Its website, until the time of writing, was offline. Presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, a former member of the CNE board, said on 30 July that an electoral observer representing his campaign could attest that the results bulletin CNE head Amoroso read out on election night was not the one generated by the electronic voting system. Caracas has offered little by way of explanation for the apparent irregularities. The government has accused the opposition of hacking the system, saying that a cyberattack initiated in North Macedonia accounts for the delay in transmitting the results from voting machines (the North Macedonian government has said it has no evidence such an attack took place). But, regardless, the CNE has been unable to explain why problems with the electronic system would affect the tally sheets, which are printed before transmission, or why it cannot provide the actas it says it received on the evening after polls closed. Machado and the Unitary Platform, meanwhile, say they have managed to obtain over 80 per cent of the physical tallies through a network of observers, covering around 90 per cent of voting precincts. A day after the election they posted the breakdown of the vote, together with images of each acta, on a website that permits members of the public to consult them. The government immediately moved to block access to the site, which has not stopped thousands of Venezuelans reaching it through the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). Against this backdrop, the Carter Center, the only professional international observer mission for the polls allowed to produce a public assessment, stated on 31 July that the election “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic”. The Center cited the lopsided playing field during the campaign and said that, given the lack of access to the full tally, it could not “verify or corroborate the results of the election” declared by the CNE. How much post-election unrest has there been and what is the risk of further violence? The government’s announcement sparked unrest on 29 July, the day after the election, which saw spontaneous demonstrations against the Maduro government. Protesters burned tires, blocked highways and toppled several statues of Hugo Chávez. The demonstrations, which mainly drew inhabitants of poorer communities that used to be pro-government strongholds, were met with force by security forces and chavista para-police groups known as colectivos. At least twenty deaths have so far been reported along with over 1,000 arrests, according to the government and human rights organisations. Machado and González expressed solidarity with the demonstrators and called for restraint by government forces, but have not convened marches themselves. The opposition is no doubt conscious that since the first major anti-Maduro protest wave in 2014, the government has brutally quashed such demonstrations on numerous occasions, leading to over 250 people killed and thousands of arrests as unarmed protesters have clashed with riot squads from the police and National Guard. The government’s ferocious response to protests in 2017 provoked international outrage and paved the way for the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to open an investigation into possible commission of crimes against humanity. There is little to suggest that things would be easier for demonstrators this time. The armed forces high command has made clear that it will stand by Maduro. Military leaders were present at his investiture by the CNE as president-elect on Monday morning, and on the following day gave a press conference in combat fatigues to reiterate their “unconditional” backing for his government. On Tuesday, Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino published a statement accusing international “fascist structures” of trying to discredit the exemplary demonstration of civic duty by Venezuelans and reaffirming the military’s “loyalty” to Maduro. In an apparent effort to avoid violence, Machado and González opted to organise brief rallies (what they called “popular assemblies”) on 30 July; another nationwide gathering has been called for Saturday. Sources close to the opposition affirm they have also made efforts to talk directly to the government, but these have so far been rebuffed. This has left them struggling with the question of how simultaneously to sustain pressure on the authorities to revisit the results without eliciting an even more severe response, while holding together an opposition coalition that has traditionally squabbled over tactics and strategy. Meanwhile, arrests of leading opposition figures – including Freddy Superlano, the national coordinator of opposition party Voluntad Popular and a close ally of Machado – signal that Maduro is ready to crack down hard on the opposition. Jorge Rodríguez, Maduro’s right-hand man and head of the National Assembly, has called for Machado and González to be arrested and tried. Six members of Machado’s election team, who have spent months in the residence of the Argentine ambassador to avoid arrest, risked capture after the government ordered Argentine diplomats expelled. (Brazil then offered to represent Argentine interests in Venezuela as long as the embassy remained closed.) For now, Maduro seems to be abstaining from taking this step, although the government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services indicate that it is ready to tighten its authoritarian grip across the country, even at the cost of becoming a regional pariah. What should the outside world do? Countries in the region and further afield that have commented on the election have generally pressed for full transparency concerning the 28 July poll results, including publication of a complete breakdown of voting by polling station. The exception is countries with strong links to Maduro, including Russia, China, Cuba, Bolivia and Honduras, among others. Caracas has brooked no criticism. On the day after the election, after six Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay) bluntly declined to recognise Maduro’s victory without a detailed breakdown of the figures, Caracas ordered their diplomatic representatives expelled. (Panama had already ordered its diplomats out.) The government followed up by banning flights to and from Panama, the Dominican Republic and Peru, leaving Venezuelans feeling more isolated from the world once again. On Thursday, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement that “it is clear to the United States … that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes”. Top Venezuelan officials and government propagandists insist that the refusal of many countries to accept Maduro’s re-election is simply a rerun of the aftermath of the 2018 election, and that a right-wing conspiracy, led by the U.S., is using González’s supposed victory as a pretext for another bid to overthrow the Venezuelan government. Some key countries – in particular Brazil and Colombia (both neighbours of Venezuela), and with certain reservations, Mexico – have sought to cling precariously to what little hope remains for compromise, refraining from declaring outright that the result is a fraud while insisting on the need for transparency. But with the Maduro government seemingly bent on intensifying polarisation and dismissing all challenges to its version of events, the chances of reaching any kind of consensus on how to resolve the electoral dispute currently look remote. A session on 31 July of the Organization of American States failed to pass a resolution on the issue, with half the member states abstaining or declining to attend. (Venezuela, while formally a member, does not participate in the organisation.) Diplomatic efforts by Brazil as well as Colombia and the U.S. are reportedly ongoing, but face a key obstacle. If any moves to greater transparency in the vote count will put Maduro’s hold on power at risk (as increasingly seems to be the case), then he is highly unlikely to move in that direction. For now, he has put the matter of settling the dispute in the hands of the Supreme Court, which like the CNE is loyal to him and will simply endorse the result. Despite Maduro’s extreme prickliness, the risks that an unresolved election dispute will extend Venezuela’s political and economic crisis – at the expense of its people and the region – make it essential that Bogotá, Brasilia and Mexico City continue to press the Venezuelan government to prove the result in an independent and impartial forum, or be ready to agree an alternative route to some form of negotiated transition. What happens now? For now, Maduro’s plan appears to be to batten down the hatches and try to ride out the storm. In the past, he has been able to take advantage of outside pressure to rally his supporters and quell dissent within chavismo, claiming Caracas is resisting imperialist interventionism abetted by the forces of domestic “fascism”. This may well work again, at least over the short term. The ruling Socialist Party, or PSUV, and the armed forces have stood by him despite what appears to have been a brazen refusal to accept the verdict from the ballot box. Still, Maduro is likely to emerge from the process weakened, both at home and abroad. His candidacy was not universally popular among chavistas, and his failure to deliver a credible triumph at the polls or lay the basis for economic growth and social peace will have further eroded his standing. His reputation abroad, notably among more sympathetic governments in Latin America, is likely to suffer, and at some stage the country and senior officials might face additional U.S. and EU sanctions. It remains to be seen whether a president who has been unable so far to disprove opposition claims of election victory and who can apparently only promise deeper international isolation and a stagnant economy, will still command respect among the factions that make up the movement. As for the opposition, indignation as to the outcome is leavened by what they believe their candidate achieved, reportedly gaining four million votes more than Maduro – representing not only their first ever apparent victory over chavismo at this level, but the biggest margin of victory ever in a Venezuelan presidential election. They are, for now, much more united than they have been for several years. But that does not solve the bind they are in. Assuming Maduro clings to power, further dilemmas await them. Parliamentary and local elections are due to take place next year, but the government might be tempted to bring them forward. If it does, the opposition will face a quandary that has tormented it for much of chavismo’s 25 years in power: do they stick to the method of contesting elections, despite the government’s apparent disregard for the most basic rules of democracy, or do they boycott the polls, a tactic they have used in the past but which simply allowed the government to win by default? If they do spurn elections, it is unclear what other options the opposition might embrace beyond the campaigns of street protest and foreign sanctions that have thus far failed to dislodge the government, and in the case of sanctions, deepened the country’s humanitarian misery. Despite the opposition’s frustration at yet another election dispute following years of patient negotiations, it remains the case that a solution to Venezuela’s long-running political crisis – and a peaceful, gradual return to democratic governance – will require full-scale talks between the two sides. If the current crisis has any upside, it is the opportunity it could present to convince a majority on both sides that the moment for talks has now arrived. Opposition leaders, governments in the region, and multilateral bodies – above all the UN – should continue to press for a full accounting of the election results. But they should also use all the channels at their disposal to urge Maduro and senior officials to understand the electoral crisis as the latest episode of a debilitating dispute that, without a course correction, will simmer endlessly to the detriment of the Venezuelan people. They should insist that the government’s efforts over the last five years to restore its political legitimacy will come to naught without a comprehensive negotiation process aimed at defusing tensions, reestablishing representative politics and rekindling economic growth. As efforts by third countries to restart negotiations continue, the opposition and its allies should prepare themselves to discuss difficult issues if they do. These include inevitable demands from senior chavistas for robust guarantees to protect them from legal peril in the event that they leave high office. At the same time, they should avoid the temptation, always present when options seem limited or non-existent, to threaten coercive force or slap on more sanctions so as not to be seen to be “doing nothing”. The solution to Venezuela’s ills does not lie in piling more punishment on a population that is already suffering a humanitarian emergency, but instead using existing sanctions and the prospect of their lifting as an incentive for the government to compromise. Whether there will be an opening for meaningful talks any time soon is anyone’s guess. Right now, chavismo seems more girded for intransigence than negotiation and compromise. Hopes for a better outcome remain slender. Some voices in the opposition are advocating a face-saving deal for Maduro, in which he would step down in favor of a consensus candidate agreed to by both the government and opposition ahead of a fresh election. It is not a proposal that appears to have great prospects for success at this point in time. But at a deeply troubling moment for Venezuela, options for a way out of the hardening deadlock should be nurtured and sustained.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Wagner Group has maintained an active and controversial presence in Africa since 2017, where it has contributed to regional instability, countered Western influence, and exacerbated human rights abuses. Despite the death of its figurehead in 2023, the emergence of the Africa Corps indicates that Russia’s covert geopolitical strategies in the region will persist. The Wagner Group has gained significant attention since its involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a paramilitary organisation with deep ties to the Russian government, Wagner’s operations blur the lines between state and non-state actions. This ambiguity challenges traditional frameworks of accountability and international law, complicating efforts to address its activities on the global stage. Ukraine is not the group’s only violent contribution to the destabilization of peaceful nations. Wagner has maintained an active presence across Africa since 2017, where it has been accused of numerous human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and targeting civilians. The bulk of these activities have unfolded in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. The Wagner Group’s international impact is multifaceted, affecting strategic, economic, and humanitarian outcomes. Functioning as a tool for Russian geopolitical ambitions, the group has contributed to regional instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, countered Western influence by infiltrating anti-Western and anti-colonial movements and sentiments online, and raised significant concerns regarding human rights and international law. In many of its areas of operations, Wagner’s presence has served as a catalyst for conflict escalation, and regional instability. In CAR and Mali, for instance, the group’s presence has been linked to increased violence and human rights abuses and undermining international and regional efforts towards peace and stability. The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef,” on 23 August 2023, came two months after his march on Moscow, sparked by dissatisfaction with the Russian Ministry of Defence’s actions in Ukraine. It is likely that many of the governments and regimes in Africa that “benefitted” from Wagner’s services were deeply concerned about Prigozhin’s death. At the same time, many may have been relieved, hoping that his death might change the brutal and terror-driven campaign of violence that had plagued the Sahel region at the group’s hands. Additionally, Wagner has provided Russia with a platform to pursue state interests through covert operations. Until the invasion of Ukraine, this allowed Putin to maintain plausible deniability regarding association with Wagner and its controversial activities. In addition to military engagements, Prigozhin orchestrated extensive propaganda and disinformation campaigns across Africa. These operations bolstered Russia’s influence in countries that Wagner operated in, while obscuring the ability for international bodies and states to accurately assess and address the allegations of human rights abuses that came alongside Wagner’s deployments. In CAR, the Wagner Group was deployed in 2018 to provide protection for mines, support the government, and offer personal protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. However, Wagner’s role in CAR far exceeded resource and government protection. The group actively engaged in military operations alongside members of the armed forces, leading to numerous accusations of serious human rights violations, including summary executions and sexual and gender-based violence. Despite these allegations, the group continued to receive support from the CAR government. The media outlet, Corbeau News, reported that President Touadéra had authorised Wagner’s sexual violence. This was evidenced in one of Wagner’s most extreme acts in CAR, which occurred in April 2022 when members of the group entered a military hospital in Bangui and sexually assaulted women and new mothers in the maternity ward. One source within the military administration of CAR stated that it was the third time members from the group had entered the maternity ward and assaulted women. In 2021, reports surfaced that Wagner would deploy to Mali to combat a rebel insurgency. This announcement sparked outrage from France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, who warned Mali against partnering with the group. Similar to its operations in CAR, Wagner’s presence in Mali has been marked by violence and instability. In April 2022, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing the massacre of 300 civilians during a joint military operation involving Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group from 27 March to 31. A key feature of Wagner’s presence has been countering Western influence in strategic regions. The provision of military support to governments and groups engaged in activities against Western-supported entities has been notably destructive. This dynamic was evident in Mali, where in 2022, an extensive disinformation campaign on social media, linked to Wagner, exploited anti-France and anti-imperialist sentiments to undermine the French presence. The campaign, along with “multiple obstructions” from Mali’s military junta led to France announcing the withdrawal of its military forces from Operation Barkhane in Mali in February 2022. Following the announcement, Malians celebrated in the capital, Bamako, and held signs stating, “Thanks Wagner” and “France is a terrorist nation.” Wagner-linked actors then continued their disinformation efforts, attempting to shift blame onto France following the discovery of a mass grave near a military base that French forces had recently vacated. Satellite imagery released by France later revealed Wagner Group mercenaries arranging the bodies in the mass grave. The bodies were believed to have come from a joint-military operation between the Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group in the same area in the days prior. In Africa, Wagner’s operations have been closely linked to the control and exploitation of natural resources. In countries such as CAR and Sudan, Wagner has secured access to valuable resources such as gold and diamonds. Recently, investigative efforts by groups like All Eyes on Wagner have revealed that the group has circumvented sanctions by exporting timber from CAR through Cameroon, in addition to operating an extensive blood diamond trading network. The Wagner Group’s involvement in these countries highlights the group’s role in bolstering autocratic regimes in exchange for strategic and economic benefits. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023 had already fuelled significant speculation about the group’s future. Nonetheless, the group’s strategic plan to support autocratic governments, orchestrate foreign interference, and expand influence remains both politically and economically appealing to Moscow. The potential dissolution of the Wagner Group would pose a significant challenge and require the rebuilding of established relationships in countries where it has operated. The emergence of the Africa Corps, a new organisation seemingly poised to assume many of Wagner’s operations, emphasises the strategic and economic value these activities provide for Russia. With the announcement in January 2024 that 100 Russian soldiers from the Africa Corps would deploy to Burkina Faso, it is clear that the Wagner model is one that will continue.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском China's geopolitics and Russia's concessions While the Western media continues to speculate about China's role in the Russian war of aggression, Beijing is seeking to maximize its benefits: from China's point of view, the aim is to exploit Moscow's dependence on the People's Republic and expand cooperation in its own interests - and not just in economic terms. In geopolitical terms, this relates in particular to China's access to the Sea of Japan, but Beijing's plans extend as far as the Arctic. A paragraph from a joint statement by Presidents Xi and Putin, which at first glance seems inconspicuous, could have far-reaching geopolitical implications and become a serious security policy challenge for Japan and South Korea. New balance of power opens up room for maneuver for Beijing The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced a premiere of a special kind on July 24: for the first time, fighter jets from the USA and Canada had to take off over the Bering Sea as two Chinese H-6K bombers approached the coast of Alaska. These were accompanied by two Russian Tupolev Tu-95MSs.[i] Just a few days earlier, Russia and China had held a joint naval and air force exercise called "Joint Sea-2024" near the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. But while these joint military exercises attracted media attention, Beijing and Moscow are creating facts in the background that could have far-reaching consequences for the security architecture in the Sea of Japan and around the Korean peninsula: Russia's ruler Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping recently published a joint declaration on deepening their strategic partnership.[ii] The background to the paper was the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, or the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, 75 years ago. It contains the following resolution: "Russia and China wish to conduct a constructive dialog with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the navigation of Chinese ships across the lower reaches of the Tumen River." What seems inconspicuous could, from Seoul and Tokyo's perspective, change the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China to their own disadvantage and have a decisive impact on the sensitive security architecture in the region. The Tumen River: will China's maritime impasse disappear? The 521-kilometre-long Tumen River forms the border between China and North Korea and becomes the border river between North Korea and Russia downstream before flowing into the Sea of Japan. At present, Chinese ships can only navigate the river freely as far as the village of Fangchuan at the eastern end of the inland province of Jilin. Permission from both Russia and North Korea is required for the remaining 15 kilometers to the Sea of Japan. A Soviet-era "Friendship Bridge" less than ten meters high also blocks the passage of larger ships. Historically, China held the area until the Russian Empire gained control in the 1860s. China has repeatedly called on Russia and North Korea to permanently allow Chinese ships to navigate the river to the Sea of Japan and has proposed the creation of a special economic zone along its banks. China's goal is clear: Beijing is keen to gain access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River. Japan and South Korea: concerns about geopolitical implications There is concern in Japan that the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China could shift to Japan's disadvantage: In an interview with the daily newspaper Nikkei Asia, Chisako Masuo, professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyushu University, warns that in the future, Chinese coast guard patrol vessels could enter the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River alongside larger ships. "This could force the Japanese navy to withdraw its coast guard vessels from the Senkaku Islands, which would weaken surveillance in the East China Sea."[iii] Japan and China are in dispute over the Senkaku Islands. Japan controls them, China calls them Diaoyu and claims them for itself. Recently, the presence of Chinese ships in the waters around the islands has increased again. "There are likely to be similar concerns in South Korea. Chinese ships could now reach the Korean peninsula from both sides. In addition, both Japan and South Korea are close allies of the USA. A deterioration in the security situation - even if it is only perceived - would therefore also have an impact on the plans of the US armed forces," analyses journalist Michael Radunski, who reported from Beijing as a correspondent for several years[iv]. The Sea of Japan: Gateway to the Arctic Beijing is pursuing a much broader goal beyond access to the Sea of Japan: access to the Arctic. In a paper published on May 13, 2024, researchers from northern China's Dalian Maritime University argue that access to the Sea of Japan could strengthen China's position in the Arctic and significantly advance Beijing's vision of a "Polar Silk Road."[v] If the Arctic is indeed largely ice-free by mid-century, new and shortened sea routes would open up for Chinese shipping. "With the Polar Silk Road, China is also embedding the Arctic region in the so-called New Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative), a large-scale Chinese project to expand an intercontinental infrastructure and trade network. The potential shipping routes of the "Polar Silk Road" run west of Greenland along the Canadian coast (Northwest Passage), from Scandinavia along the Siberian coast of Russia (Northeast Passage) and centrally between Spitsbergen and Greenland (Transpolar Route) into the Bering Strait," states David Merkle, China expert at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in a comprehensive analysis of Chinese policy in the northern polar region. [vi] Currently, a significant proportion of Chinese trade has to pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia. A blockade of this strait, which is only around 50 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, would pose a serious threat to China's energy security. In addition, an ice-free Arctic would shorten the existing sea routes from Asia to Europe by around 8,000 kilometers and to North America by around 4,500 kilometers. Overcomeable challenges or deliberate uncertainty? Russia and North Korea have so far been extremely sceptical of China's plans. Moscow fears that China's influence in North-East Asia could increase. Meanwhile, North Korea also has a lot at stake: until now, all Chinese goods have crossed the Tumen River via a bridge and been transported overland to the port of Rajin. "Therefore, the idea of allowing China to ship directly to the Pacific via the Tumen River would make this port redundant. North Korea would lose a lot of revenue as a result," states Melik Kaylan from the business magazine Forbes.[vii] He points out that massive dredging and widening would be required to make the Tumen navigable for large ships. In his view, the idea of restoring Chinese access seems like a fantasy, "an improbable one". So why did Putin and Xi bring up this idea? His explanation: "The coastal strip was ceded to Russia by the Qing dynasty in the 19th century and the People's Republic of China has been demanding it back for decades. Putin is running out of incentives he can offer Beijing to support his war in Ukraine. Such an offer goes down well with the Chinese public - but triggers anger in Moscow among supporters of the Putin regime, who are filled with Great Russian fanaticism. (...) But Putin is making a certain point: if Beijing gains direct access to the Sea of Japan, the strategic equation will change radically. Currently, the Chinese navy has to sail around the entire Korean peninsula to get to this area. Suddenly, Beijing could directly threaten Japan (and various disputed islands)."[viii] Consequently, the burden on the US and its allies to expand maritime projection, protection, readiness and resources would increase dramatically. So is it all just a PR stunt designed to create uncertainty among the US and its allies - and also generate applause among the Chinese public? This theory is contradicted by the fact that there are hardly any reports in the state media of the People's Republic that address the issue. Furthermore, there is increasing movement in the matter: Chinese online portals have reported that Putin agreed further resolutions at his meeting with North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un in mid-June. Accordingly, North Korea and Russia are said to have already signed a bilateral agreement on the construction of a new bridge over the Tumen River. "It can be seen that cooperation between Russia and China is becoming ever closer in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and increasing Western sanctions. The redesign of this bridge is not only an infrastructure project, but also a symbol of strategic cooperation between the two countries [Russia and China] and heralds a new era of economic cooperation," judges Yi Dan Qing Cheng, who writes under a pseudonym and is one of the few commentators from China to have dealt with the issue in a journalistic capacity.[ix] Outlook There is no question that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has changed the balance of power and relations between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang in June. Putin traveled to North Korea for the first time in a quarter of a century to personally deepen relations between the two states. Meanwhile, Russia is dependent on Chinese goods: in 2023, goods worth a record value of more than 240 billion US dollars were traded between Russia and China, an increase of 26.3 percent compared to the previous year. These shifts in Russia's power and dependencies open up new opportunities for the People's Republic, including geopolitically. If the project to provide Chinese access to the Sea of Japan is successfully pursued, China could develop the Tumen Delta as a secondary shipyard for its naval and patrol vessels and position them strategically close to Japan's international maritime borders. The region appears to be preparing for growing tensions: The foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the USA announced in Tokyo at the end of July that they would be expanding their cooperation within the framework of the so-called Quad. Specifically, this involves the area of cyber security - but also maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. References [i] Siehe ausführlicher: Zwerger, Patrick 2024: Uralt-Bomber aus Russland und China treffen auf US-Jets, abrufbar unter: https://www.flugrevue.de/militaer/tupolew-tu-95ms-und-harbin-h-6-uralt-bomber-aus-russland-und-china-vor-alaskas-kueste/, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [ii] Außenministerium der Volksrepublik China 2024: Gemeinsame Erklärung der Volksrepublik China und der Russischen Föderation zur Vertiefung der umfassenden strategischen Kooperationspartnerschaft im neuen Zeitalter anlässlich des 75. Jahrestages der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern, abrufbar unter: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iii] Tajima, Yukio 2024: China eyes Sea of Japan access via Russia-North Korea border river, Nikkei Asia, abrufbar unter: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-eyes-Sea-of-Japan-access-via-Russia-North-Korea-border-river, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iv] Radunski, Michael 2024: Chinesisch-russische Partnerschaft: Wie Peking sich Zugang zum Japanischen Meer verschaffen will, China.Table, 28.06.2024. [v] Chang, Yen-Chiang, Xingyi Duan, Xu (John) Zhang & Ling Yan 2024: On China’s Navigation Rights and Interests in the Tumen River and the Japanese Sea, abrufbar unter: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08920753.2024.2347817?src=exp-la, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vi] Merkle, David 2023: Der selbsternannte Fast-Arktisstaat: Chinas Politik in der nördlichen Polarregion, in: Auslandsinformationen, abrufbar unter: https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/der-selbsternannte-fast-arktisstaat, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vii] Kaylan, Melik 2024: Russia Offers China A River To The Sea In The Pacific, abrufbar unter: https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2024/06/25/russia-offers-china-a-river-to-the-sea-in-the-pacific/, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024. [viii] Ebd. [ix] Yi Dan Qing Cheng 2024: Was er unserem Land versprochen hat, hat Putin eingehalten. Die Umgestaltung der Tumen-Brücke hat die Sorgen der chinesischen Seite gemildert, abrufbar unter: https://www.163.com/dy/article/J6JBCD8K0552P34A.html, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Keir Starmer’s Labour party has won the UK general election in a landslide. Its huge majority should, in theory, give Starmer the clout to see through most of his political agenda. But in reality, the victory celebrations might prove short-lived, given the size of the challenges in front of him. When Tony Blair came to power in 1997, he inherited a strong economy and a tide of booming national optimism. Starmer, by contrast, inherits an economy in the doldrums and a mandate seemingly more motivated by a desire to remove the Conservatives than by enthusiasm for Labour’s manifesto. The new cabinet will be faced with an array of problems demanding immediate attention. What one senior Labour official has reportedly dubbed Sue Grey’s “shit list” spans multiple government departments, from education to justice to infrastructure. Looking at these problems in turn, we might ask: is the party over before it’s even begun? 1. Thames Water The UK’s largest water company is in a deep financial hole, with more than £18 billion of debt, evaporating investment, and a long-running standoff between shareholders and the industry regulator, Ofwat, over the paying of dividends. This, combined with the considerable investment required to overhaul Thames Water’s creaking infrastructure, has put the company on the brink of collapse. Ofwat is expected to publish its plan for the water industry on July 15, less than two weeks into the new government’s first term. The regulator is expected to rule out allowing Thames Water to raise bills as it had planned to. If so, or if Ofwat insists that infrastructure pledges be met, then Starmer might well have to consider an expensive nationalisation of this water company. 2. Overcrowding in prisons According to the Prison Governors’ Association (PGA), prisons in England and Wales are 99% full. With knock-on effects for the court system’s ability to hear cases and pass sentencing, the PGA warns that “the entire criminal justice system stands on the precipice of failure”. Labour has promised to reform the planning system so prisons are designated as sites of national importance, meaning it can build more of them. However, it will still take years to yield the 20,000 extra jail places Labour has pledged. And even if this does happen, there is no clear consensus that simply increasing capacity will solve all the problems, without similarly resourcing the rehabilitative arm of the Prison Service. The obvious solution to creating more capacity in the short term is early releases. This can include prisoners nearing the end of their sentences and those who are deemed of low risk to the public. Currently, judges are also being asked to consider their sentencing options. 3. Public sector pay negotiations Given Labour’s historical links with the major public sector trade unions, including Unite and Unison, public sector workers may be hoping that the new government will counter 14 years of pay stagnation under the Conservatives. However, early on in the election cycle, it became clear that some unions were not happy with Labour’s manifesto. Unite refused to endorse it and the new chancellor, Rachel Reeves, has made no effort to suggest money will flow more freely while she heads up the Treasury. With inflationary pressures easing and interest rates predicted to fall by late summer, some will argue that the case for pay rises is dissipating. Yet for others, lack of action on pay will be an admission that Britain’s standard of living has slipped permanently. 4. Universities going under The financial crisis in England’s universities has long been brewing. Many are faced with a precipitous collapse in overseas student numbers and an accompanying loss of income – a problem compounded by their overall operating loss when providing for home students. Home tuition fees have barely risen since the £9,000 fee was introduced in 2012 – while in real terms they have dropped by a third. The £9,250 universities now receive for each home student compares badly with the actual cost for teaching a student, which is calculated at £12,000. Many universities are wrestling with high interest rates and a slowdown in the property market, making loans taken out on capital investments increasingly difficult to pay. Some politicians have called for domestic tuition fees to be raised. However, as Nick Clegg and the Lib Dems can attest, tuition fees are one of the “third rails” of British politics – touch it and you die. Starmer is left with only two realistic options: get rid of the limits on international student numbers, or significantly revisit the way universities are funded – but again, this would require throwing money at the problem. As with other aspects of its manifesto, Labour has been vague on its proposals for higher education, perhaps in an attempt to leave all options on the table. 5. NHS funding shortfall The health service currently has a budget shortfall of £12 billion. This reflects multiple challenges – from treatments getting more expensive and crumbling infrastructure to ballooning waiting times and disputes over pay. Although Labour has seemingly recognised that funding is important, its manifesto refused to put a number on how much it would commit. Instead, the pledges were accompanied by promises of modernisation and reform to improve the service. The Institute for Fiscal Studies estimates Labour’s pledges to be worth £1.8 billion – way short of the required amount. The state of the NHS is a constant litmus test for any government, so addressing this will always be a top priority. However, with meagre public finances, it might be easier said than done. 6. Failing local councils Local authorities in England have been among the worst affected by the Conservative programme of austerity. Eight have declared effective bankruptcy since 2018, and one in five say they could follow suit without intervention from central government. So far Labour, like the other parties, has not said how it plans to address this, but Starmer cannot afford not to. The more councils go bankrupt, the more people will struggle to access the basic everyday systems they rely on, which are funded by local government. As with universities, there is a strong case here for reform. English local government is among the most centralised in the western world, with tight restrictions on financing and budgets. Ultimately, the UK is in an economic rut and many of the things that might get the country out of it require one thing: money. Starmer has pledged fiscal discipline while also eschewing a return to austerity. There are clear contradictions to this approach which mean that at the minute, the sums don’t add up.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In a complex moment of geopolitical relations, marked by issues such as armed conflicts or climate change, it is more necessary than ever to pay attention to what is happening in the Sahel and Africa. In a world as turbulent as the one we live in, geopolitics returns to the front pages of newspapers with what is happening in Gaza, the potential consequences of the elections in the United States or France, or, in the Spanish context, the recent visit of our king, Felipe VI, to the Baltic Republics, with particular support and recognition for the Spanish military units serving there, all within the framework of tensions with Russia on the European eastern border. Despite the frequent discussions about the implications these issues have on our lives and our tendency to look beyond our borders for answers, what remains unchanged and continues to surprise me is the lack of interest that the African continent still generates among the public and experts, along with a vast ignorance of the geopolitical importance that the continent is acquiring. For these reasons, today I would like to talk to you about three issues that, from a geopolitical perspective, do not receive the attention and reflection they deserve. First, I would like to remind you that jihadism remains a major threat in many areas of the African continent, especially in the Sahel. In fact, there is barely any discussion about how the security crisis in this part of the world is spreading to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea: Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. As they often do in Africa, jihadist groups are exploiting structural vulnerabilities, various frustrations, and resentments against states that do not always respond to their citizens' demands as they would like, to recruit young people who will swell their ranks. I recently read a republished article by Óscar Guijarro from the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE, in spanish) titled "The Expansion of Jihadism from the Sahel to the Coastal Countries of the Gulf of Guinea", which I found extremely interesting, especially for Spain. These coastal countries, which appear to have more stable political environments than those in the Sahel, are marked by significant inequalities and socioeconomic divisions in different areas (poor north versus richer south), as well as religious differences that jihadist groups exploit to gain influence. The strategic location of these countries and the presence of forest reserves that are used as resources and refuges facilitate the expansion of jihadism and organized crime, including arms and drug trafficking. While it is true that the European Union is providing support to confront the jihadist threat and that the affected countries are adopting military and cross-border security measures, I believe that at the very least, more attention needs to be paid to this part of the world. Being aware of the importance of jihadist movements' penetration in Africa and their impact on global geopolitics should be a priority. Thousands of people are dying and are being displaced in West Africa due to violence of all kinds, and it cannot be something we ignore. A friend of Casa África, a senior official at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, spoke in January before the United Nations Security Council on this matter. Ms. Théroux-Bénoni urged the international community not to ignore the Sahel and reminded that strategies to prevent terrorism must acknowledge the deep regional connections that allow extremist groups to recruit, fundraise, and manage their logistics across multiple countries. She asserted that the current situation in the region represents the worst possible scenario of violent extremism, coups d'état, and setbacks in regional integration, and called for international responses. From the ISS, they constantly remind us that the stability of West Africa is important to the global community for multiple reasons, some related to opportunities and socioeconomic development, and others related to terrorist threats, organized crime, and the illegal trafficking of all kinds of goods, from drugs and weapons to people. Regarding governance, Ms. Théroux-Bénoni stated that we must contribute to creating conditions that make coups d'état and political instability less likely. Another issue that I believe doesn't receive enough attention is what some analysts have already dubbed "new Russianism." Colonel and geopolitical analyst Ignacio Fuente Cobo, in articles published by the IEEE, uses this term to define Russia's neocolonial project to expand its influence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. While we focus on Ukraine and Europe's eastern flank, the truth is that we fail to fully grasp Russia's strategy of strengthening its presence in Africa. A quick glance at articles about the Sahel reveals that Russia is finding allies among the leaders of the region and a population that prefers Russian assistance over the help traditionally provided by France, for example, to solve their problems. Mr. Fuente Cobo discusses an alternative multipolar world order, whose reinforcement is evident, and Russia's interest in seizing natural resources and evading Western sanctions. The fact is that Russia has shown remarkable skill in exploiting the gaps in European cooperation in the Sahel and has managed to strengthen its position in some countries, particularly through the former Wagner group (now Africa Corps) and the military cooperation. The loss of European influence in the area should concern us and guide the design of our policy in the region, which I believe should always be based on mutual respect, attentive listening to our African partners and friends, and a mutually beneficial partnership that avoids paternalism and, especially, the geopolitical double standards that have discredited the West in the eyes of many countries, now more critical than ever of our decisions on the global stage. To conclude, I would like to highlight one of the many reasons why we depend on the African continent and should pay more attention to it: critical minerals, essential for the global energy and digital transition, a topic discussed by Mar Hidalgo García for the IEEE. In this area, Africa not only attracts Europe's attention. We face competition from other powers, such as the United States, Russia, India, Japan, and Australia. China, for instance, has established a strong presence in Africa, achieved through a long-term strategy that remains consistent regardless of the current leadership and involves more than just words. I believe it would be worthwhile to reconsider the focus on migration that seems to dominate the EU’s African strategy and to look beyond it by establishing strategic partnerships and developing infrastructure to negotiate access to African mineral resources, for example. Countless authors and analysts dedicate time to reflecting on the geopolitical implications of the changes occurring in our neighboring countries and to searching for formulas and strategies that can help us strengthen and improve our relations. What perhaps isn't emphasized enough, besides the need to look towards our southern neighbors and care about what happens to them, is that understanding and cooperating with them is the only way to progress and ensure that Europe remains relevant in the world. An equitable partnership based on mutual respect and a shared future is imperative. For the good of all. Article written by José Segura Clavell, Director General of Casa África, and published in Kiosco Insular, eldiario.es, and Canarias 7 on June 28 and 29, 2024.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Elections, in simplified terms, usually involve deciding between continuity or change. That decision was clearly expressed by Mexican voters. The results of the electoral day on June 2nd in Mexico reflect that approximately two-thirds of the votes cast favor continuity and, to some extent, a deepening of the outgoing administration's policies. Starting from the theory, this deepening will apply to foreign policy. Following the electoral day, expectations, proposals, questions, and prospects arise. These lines aim to address those that fall within the international sphere. It is advisable to begin with a brief diagnosis of the context and Mexico's recent international actions. It can be confidently stated that the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy, particularly non-intervention, were invoked with a particular emphasis. This emphasis was maintained throughout López Obrador's six-year term, in line with a nationalist-oriented foreign policy. The reference to these principles was made in regional matters as well as in the global thematic agenda. Regionally, in North America, the path was guided by the principle of respect for sovereignty and recognition of shared responsibility in matters that foster understanding, a spirit of cooperation, and a strategic partnership. However, it became evident that in some sensitive issues, antagonistic views do exist. To the south of our border, the overall assessment indicates a strengthening of ties, with a greater emphasis on Central American countries, through the strengthening of political dialogue and Mexico's cooperation agenda with specific social development programs. However, with some South American countries, Mexico experienced and continues to experience disagreements, which have led to a pause and even a setback in Latin American and Caribbean integration. Across the Atlantic, Mexico's relationship with its European counterparts continued on its path toward intensifying friendship and deepening political dialogue as strategic allies, despite brief disagreements. However, on balance, there is also a pause in the formalization of our modernized Global Agreement with the European Union. With the rest of the world's regions, Mexico sought greater diversification. However, it is still an unfinished endeavor. Despite efforts to promote dialogue and greater cooperation on regional and global agendas, bilateral relations with many countries remained on the sidelines of the priorities. In international forums, Mexico has stood out by advocating for the revitalization of multilateralism to create a more favorable global environment capable of addressing and resolving the multitude of global crises that concern the entire international community. For Mexico, the multilateral arena served as a mechanism to balance and counteract asymmetries with other countries and to enhance Mexico's prestige in favor of a world grounded in International Law, a system of clear rules. There have been achievements in Mexico's multilateral policy during this government. It is important to highlight the greater prominence gained in United Nations (UN) bodies, including the decision to occupy a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the 2021-2022 biennium, those years were extremely challenging for international stability, peace, and security. This is a characteristic element of a State's foreign policy. Thus, Mexico consolidated a continuous, relevant, and stable relationship with the UN's principal body. Despite the complex scenario in which international security was constantly challenged, our diplomacy in the Council adopted a constructive attitude. Mexico played a successful role in bridging distant positions. Mexico's stances and decisions were supported, as has historically been the case, by legal rigor and in favor of peace and human rights, which has earned it recognition. Thus, our multilateral policy succeeded in capitalizing on credibility and trust among the international community. Another achievement of Mexico in the multilateral sphere has been the call to the international community and the effort to persuade major powers and emerging countries of the urgent need to reform the UN considering global reconfigurations. For Mexico, it is clear that the measures required for a comprehensive reform must be guided by the principles of representativeness, democratization, transparency, and effectiveness. With this foundational assessment, what can be anticipated in terms of foreign policy for the upcoming administration led by Claudia Sheinbaum? What recommendations could be made for Mexico's international efforts in the coming years? The answers to these questions revolve around finding consensus on the need to build a State foreign policy, rather than a government policy. A foreign policy with long-term objectives and vision that allows for the accommodation of the nuances and emphases each head of the Executive may bring. To outline some recommendations, we must emphasize that Mexico is a globally strategic country. The voice of our country and the diplomatic prestige accumulated over the years exert tangible influence on the international stage. Our country plays a key role in the trends and dynamics of international trade and global production chains, being among the top ten exporting countries in the world. In addition to this, Mexico will continue to benefit from the relocation of companies and investments. Thanks to this global phenomenon, known as “nearshoring,” our country could solidify its position as an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment, including the one from Asia, and will have the potential to develop clusters of technological innovations, among other sectors. Therefore, broad opportunities for global engagement are emerging for Mexico. However, the conflict dynamics that prevail on the international scene present complex challenges for Claudia Sheinbaum's management of foreign policy. Commercial, military, or geopolitical tensions, such as the situation in the South China Sea, the war between Russia and Ukraine, or the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, pose challenges that require reaching agreements on a wide range of issues, particularly in security, migration, climate change, and sustainable development. Identifying and deepening convergences with key countries will be essential to easing the many international tensions that Mexico will face at the beginning of Sheinbaum's term. Our bilateral relationship with the United States is, without a doubt, the clear priority in Mexico's foreign agenda. Mexico's outlook toward the world begins there, at our northern border. The ties of interdependence are broad and deep. Our country and the United States need each other. Therefore, among the issues that could constitute the first successes of Sheinbaum's international agenda could be taking important steps in advancing and deepening a strategic partnership from which cooperative benefits can be derived, setting aside rhetoric. In our relationship with the United States, the main thematic axes from which opportunities arise are bilateral trade, investments, production chains and competitiveness through innovation; migration; security; and border management. Challenges are also apparent in these areas. The vitality of the bilateral relationship demands, first and foremost, building an effective, institutionalized, and frequent dialogue through periodic summits and high-level meetings, in addition to achieving mutual recognition of shared responsibilities in the most significant issues. This is a critical condition, regardless of who occupies the White House in the coming years. Deepening and further institutionalizing this bilateral dialogue is urgent given the likelihood of a remastered “Trumpism” version reaching the Oval Office. These variables will be conclusive and decisive in paving the way toward 2026, the year of the first USMCA review. The goal is to ensure that the review focuses on the formalities of the process, meaning it should be free from deep renegotiations or political setbacks. We now know that Marcelo Ebrard will have the important mission of leading this difficult task for Mexico. One of Ebrard's assets, in addition to his experience during the negotiation of the USMCA, is that he is a familiar figure to our North American counterparts. Our relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is also of utmost importance. It has become clear that this bilateral relationship is essential for Mexico's present and future. The Asian country plays a crucial role in the network of political relations that the Mexican government must continue to weave and deepen, especially considering and recognizing the predominant, superpower role that China exerts in global politics, technological development, investments, and trade. The geopolitical tensions and trends in which the PRC government has played a leading role grant and validate a stronger position for China in the region and, by extension, on the global chessboard. While few doubted years ago, and no one doubts today, that the dynamism of the Chinese economy is of growing importance in terms of the behavior and current state of the world economy. Furthermore, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Given the positioning that the Asian country has achieved, strengthening the bilateral relationship is vital to achieving the global and regional power balances that are in Mexico's best interest. Therefore, Mexico must approach China both politically and economically. It is essential that the government and the business sector jointly adopt medium and long-term measures to achieve a strategic rapprochement, with an updated agenda and innovative dialogue mechanisms that bring both countries closer together. Achieving this also involves the need to foster mutual understanding through cultural exchanges. Consequently, it will be imperative for the new Mexican President to work towards continuing to intensify and expand our relationship with China, primarily in economic and technological matters, as well as in identifying common ground and affinities on global issues. With Europe as a whole, it will be a priority to achieve the signing of the new Global Agreement with the European Union to deepen our alliance. This includes countries with which our bilateral relations are historic, such as Spain; leading EU countries, such as Germany — our main trading partner in Europe — and France; and the group of Eastern European countries where threats to the established international order are clearly perceived at their borders. Additionally, it will be essential to reaffirm Mexico's interest in working alongside all European countries to formulate joint strategies to restore peace and ensure international security. Our ties with Latin America and the Caribbean deserve special mention. The equation of Mexico's foreign policy toward this region, which is undoubtedly a priority, must reaffirm its commitment to strengthening mechanisms for political coordination, advancing regional integration, and agreeing on common policies and principles to achieve shared economic and social development, well-being for the population, and a migration management approach based on human rights, with an emphasis on the comprehensive protection of migrants. Considering that globally there are now 281 million migrants, Mexico will need to assert its regional convening power by stressing the urgency of addressing the structural causes of this phenomenon, condemning hate speech against migrants, and advocating for the need to develop political and legal frameworks that contribute to the sustainable development and the well-being of populations. In this region, the relationship with Brazil will become increasingly strategic, based on the leadership roles that each country plays and the shared values. In the current context, there is an evident political and ideological affinity between both governments, which translates into an additional advantage that will allow us to further strengthen our bilateral ties. This conclusion also considers Brazil's importance within the BRICS framework. Therefore, Tlatelolco should capitalize on the opportunities for alignment with Itamaraty on regional political issues and contributions to resolving crises in certain countries, such as Haiti. Of course, the comprehensive regional partnership that Mexico promotes and seeks within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the fertile ground that political and diplomatic coordination initiatives could experience within its framework, may spark interest for Brazil and clearly outline synergies leading to closer relations. Perhaps the upcoming visit to Mexico by Brazilian President Lula da Silva will provide the ideal opportunity to illustrate the potential harmony between the two countries in advancing the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean and in articulating global initiatives. Undoubtedly, the bilateral issues with some governments in the region, the aired tensions, and the challenges to Latin American integration are imperative topics for the next president and her cabinet to address. Solutions to these pending matters will not be simple or quick. Common ground is limited, and the ideological distances between different leaderships in the region are evident. The relevance of the region to Mexico cannot be denied, given the shared cultural and historical heritage with these countries. However, the divergence of political directions taken by governing groups and the alternations in power across the region have led to a series of ideological and political transitions toward radical centralization of power, evident in regimes characterized by strong presidential figures. Pragmatic approaches in their most extreme forms loom, and given the structural fragility and vulnerability of their economies, they provoke sociopolitical unrest, instability, and emigration, among other outcomes. Therefore, the challenges are complex, and the priorities emerging from the region are clear. Other areas of opportunity for Claudia Sheinbaum's foreign policy will include diversifying our political and commercial relations with emerging and influential countries in regions of growing global importance, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Opening new diplomatic and consular missions in these areas will be ideal and will yield benefits in the medium term. Reactivating political dialogue and cooperation with all international and regional actors is also imperative. The drive to expand our diplomatic footprint in traditionally neglected regions will increasingly take on a sense of urgency. In addition to this diversification, it will be necessary to strengthen the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID, in spanish). Its institutional strengthening should begin with building an international cooperation agenda based on both the results and needs of supply and demand. It seems necessary to increase the capacity of resources allocated to the international cooperation that Mexico offers. It also seems viable to adopt a more proactive and forward-looking approach to cooperation, with a high value on innovation, where Mexico can position itself as a recipient of cooperation in areas such as technological innovation and energy transition. Equally important is to continue betting on trilateral or triangular cooperation schemes, as this decision is based on recognizing shared visions and priorities with other countries, which contributes to strengthening collaborative ties with countries in the region and in various parts of the world. In addition to all of this, there are several other issues that will need to be addressed. To briefly mention a few, it will be crucial to emphasize the urgency of developing international actions aimed at expanding spaces for multilateral engagement and building common positions on issues such as food security, climate change, and the transition to clean and green energy — topics of personal interest to Claudia Sheinbaum given her background, knowledge, and experience. Other topics, also of a global nature and requiring priority attention, include those related to health; contributions to the refinement and progress of International Law codification; the promotion of innovative instruments such as our Feminist Foreign Policy; and, of course, the formulation of initiatives and leadership in multilateral efforts to restore peace. It is important to pause and emphasize that the issue of international peace is one in which Mexico enjoys a reputation as a builder of bridges for understanding. Our advantages lie not only in our traditional pacifist and conciliatory policy but also in the credibility provided by our multiple memberships, which facilitate Mexico's voice and vote in many international organizations. This will undoubtedly contribute to identifying potential consensus and common positions in favor of sustainable peace. These same multiple memberships and Mexico's prestige can be translated into contributions to the urgent need to reform the UN to ensure an updated international system. Individually or collectively, the issues described constitute crucial topics for defining the international profile and image that will be built around the elected president and what her foreign policy will be during her 6-year term. However, it is worth pausing for a reflection that is undoubtedly relevant. The personal decisions that Claudia Sheinbaum makes regarding her trips abroad will carry significant weight. The future international trips of the Head of the Executive, in case they occur frequently, will be an important element to consider in terms of the international presence that Mexico wishes to adopt. In this regard, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro next November presents itself as a valuable first opportunity for Sheinbaum to appear alongside the leaders of the world's most important economies. The advantages of this trip are obvious, as it goes without saying that Mexico's foreign policy fully aligns with the three general priorities of Brazil's G20 presidency. As in this group, global forums are also expecting Mexico's voice to be represented at the highest level. Likewise, the profile of the future Mexican president necessitates highlighting the enormous environmental challenges and adaptability issues imposed by the evidence of climate change. In this context, it is worth noting that Sheinbaum inspires hope. The odds suggest that she could capitalize on international leadership grounded in her political commitment and academic background in this particular area. She seems to understand clearly that it is essential to advance in energy transition and will need to work towards and persuade others to increase public and private sector investments in the proportion of renewable energy within the country's energy matrix. The environmental policies and the focus on energy efficiency, due to their characteristics and implications of global shared responsibility, will occupy a significant portion of the time and space on both the domestic and international agendas during the next Mexican administration. Sheinbaum has the credentials and interest to make progress in the direction demanded by the global climate emergency and to take on a leading role. The work of Alicia Bárcena, the current Foreign Minister and future Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources, will be crucial in supporting and advancing global agreements on this issue. Bárcena's technical and practical knowledge of this agenda is a guarantee, and her appointment underscores the importance of the environmental agenda. As with the start of any new administration, it may be worthwhile to revisit the interpretation of the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy. This exercise will need to be carried out considering the limited flexibility that the tumultuous global landscape allows. Despite these contextual limitations, adherence to the principled foundation of our international actions should first and foremost offer a range of resources that can be translated into practical solutions for the successful conduct of Mexico's affairs beyond its borders. The principles are, in essence, fundamental elements for the conduct of foreign policy, and at the same time, they are subsidiary to the definition of strategies for Mexico's international actions. They are not, by definition, meant to be declarative priorities. Instead, they constitute the legal framework for acceptable, possible, and desirable actions and decisions, including their role in safeguarding and upholding the national interest. But they will be useful to the extent that they provide predictability, guide our international actions, signal the positions and definitions that should be valid in line with Mexico's international stature, contribute to our diplomatic tradition, and enhance Mexico's prestige and image. In other words, as our history has shown, their value does not lie in declarations but in their contribution to building global agreements with our international partners and allies, both bilaterally and within the framework of multilateral and regional organizations. For these principles to translate into practical advantages, it is desirable to accompany them with the exercise of soft power and the promotion of Mexico through our valuable cultural, natural, artistic, and historical heritage. To achieve all of the above and meet these objectives, it will be necessary to overcome the obstacle of resource scarcity. To be consistent with the goal of exercising a global presence that corresponds to Mexico's position on the international stage, it is imperative to strengthen action capacities and allocate resources. Additionally, organizational schemes must be developed to skillfully direct actions in both bilateral and multilateral arenas to fully achieve the aforementioned foreign policy objectives. The answer will largely lie in relying on and supporting the professionals of Mexican diplomacy and diplomatically skilled personnel who can act within the framework of our constitutional foreign policy principles and prioritize cooperation over conflict. Therefore, it is essential to recognize the need to affirm that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strengthened by the capabilities of the Mexican Foreign Service (SEM, in spanish). It is the oldest service in the country, which has gradually taken on more responsibilities. A service characterized by its committed and professional work in pursuit of Mexican interests and the best causes of humanity. The implementation of this foreign policy, based on the diplomatic tradition embodied by the SEM, should also promote the creation of cooperative synergies through the virtuous tripod of collaboration among universities and research centers, businesses and organized civil society, and the government. Despite its apparent abstraction, foreign policy is as important as domestic policy; this underscores the importance of investing effort and political will in consolidating Mexico's international actions as a State policy. It is clear that global challenges require cooperative actions and common solutions characterized by shared responsibility. Mexican diplomacy possesses sufficient experience, political sensitivity, skill, historical awareness, global perspective, a commitment to serving national interests, and intellectual capital to take the initiative in addressing the solutions that both the world and Mexico demand. The world is increasingly interdependent, interconnected, and globalized. It is also alarmingly radicalized, navigating through axiological debates, as demonstrated by election results in various parts of the world. Mexico needs to contribute to a more stable, orderly, and peaceful world. Finally, these reflections on the international agenda of Mexico's future president would be incomplete without mentioning the person who will lead the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been confirmed by Claudia Sheinbaum herself that Juan Ramón de la Fuente will take on this responsibility. In addition to his personality, which will open doors and contribute to a positive atmosphere for negotiations with his counterparts, his professional experience and shared scientific profile, together with Sheinbaum and Bárcena, combined with a global outlook, are among his strengths. His tenure in the SEM as Mexico's permanent representative to the UN in New York, along with his accumulated international experience working closely with this universal organization's family, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), bolster his credentials in guiding and advancing Mexico's interests in global forums. His appointment is seen as a positive development, and it raises expectations.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Good afternoon, everyone. It is an honor for me and for Argentina to participate in this Peace Summit organized by President Zelenski, with whom we have established a close relationship. We Argentinians are fully aware of the value of peace and democratic coexistence as guiding principles of life in society, and that is why I want to especially thank you for the invitation to this event. I want to express, on behalf of the Argentinian people, our utmost support for the people of Ukraine and our friend, President Zelenski, as defenders of the idea of freedom, we condemn any form of violence, whether between individuals, but particularly, we repudiate war as an illegitimate mean of resolving conflicts between nations. War, tragic by nature, can never be the answer to problems that should be resolved in the political sphere. War is not a legitimate tool for resolving conflicts; it is the last resort of a people who must defend themselves, nothing more, nothing less. We are defenders of the idea of freedom. Liberalism, as we understand it, is the respect and protection of the life projects of others, based on the principle of non-aggression, in defense of the right to life, freedom, and private property. As defenders of freedom, we can advocate for nothing other than peace among free peoples and nations. When we say that the guiding principle of our doctrine is the defense of individuals' lives, liberty, and property, we are expressing that there is a direct relationship between peace, commerce, and prosperity. There is no economic prosperity without free trade, and there is no free trade without peace. Free trade naturally promotes peace, because as Bastiat said, "where trade enters, bullets do not," or as Milton Friedman said, "I may hate my neighbor, but if he doesn't buy my product, I go bankrupt." As a fervent believer in the philosophical consciousness found in liberalism and peace, I make this brief defense of these principles today, as they seem to have gone out of fashion. I believe it is an important step for Argentina to be present first at the G7 Summit and now here at this Peace Summit. It is part of the great shift we are undertaking as a country after decades of turning our back on the world. There is a new Argentina that is once again embracing the ideas that, 150 years ago, made it one of the most prosperous countries in the world. There is a new Argentina that also seeks to reclaim the prominent role in the concert of nations that it once held and never should have abandoned. Know that Argentina will always be committed to defending the ideas that made great the West, and that for us, peace among free nations is not only a moral duty but also a necessary condition for prosperity. Thank you all very much.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In recent years, Malaysia has emerged as a strategic economic hub in Southeast Asia. In recent years, Malaysia has become a key node in the global production chains of electronic components, especially in the semiconductor sector. The nation can also rely on abundant natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, of which it is an important exporter. Along with other Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, Malaysia presents itself as an attractive destination for foreign investors looking to relocate their manufacturing plants. The trend towards de-risking, in the context of the geoeconomic competition between China and the United States, sees multinationals and governments committed to diversifying their supply chains and strengthening domestic production to minimize dependence on Beijing. Malaysia is a dynamic and complex country. Its society is composed of numerous ethnic groups whose diversity sometimes makes it more difficult for the government to satisfy their different interests. This social complexity is also reflected in the intricate state system, which combines a monarchical aspect with a federal system, where citizens elect their representatives at both the state and federal levels. Despite the multiparty system, for over six decades, Malaysia was governed by a single party, the United Malays National Organization (Umno), which dominated the political landscape [1]. However, this continuity was interrupted in 2018, with four different governments taking turns in power due to corruption scandals and internal political struggles: an unprecedented upheaval in Malaysian history, which from independence in 1957 until then had only seen six prime ministers. The establishment of a new administration in November 2022, under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, has not brought the hoped-for stability, and tensions remain in the country, risking the exacerbation of internal divisions and undermining the confidence not only of citizens but also of foreign investors. The Malaysian political system between complexity and unusual instability Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy, where power is distributed among the monarchy, the federal government led by the prime minister, and the central bicameral parliament, as well as the state governing bodies. The political landscape of the country is characterized by strong multiparty politics, meaning that coalitions rather than a single majority party tend to govern, leading in recent times to the formation of fragile alliances and frequent shifts in alignments among parliamentary groups. Malaysia is composed of thirteen states, nine of which are kingdoms led by a sovereign (or sultan), and three federal territories. Each state has its own constitution, an executive council, and a legislative assembly elected by the citizens. The nine sultans, gathered in the Conference of Rulers, every five years appoint the head of state of Malaysia, or Yang di-Pertuan Agong [2]. The core of the country's democratic life is the central Parliament, composed of 70 members of the Senate (26 members elected by the state assemblies and 44 appointed by the head of state, also on the advice of the prime minister) and 222 members of the House of Representatives (elected every five years during the general elections) [3]. Another element of complexity in the country's structure is the dual legal system: a state system, which has jurisdiction over the entire population, and a Sharia-based system for the Muslim community. In fact, Islam is the state religion, and the majority ethnic group of Malays (also known by the English term ‘Malays’) is constitutionally Muslim; therefore, about two-thirds of the population are subject to Sharia. The Islamic authority has jurisdiction over the Muslim population on religious issues, matters of morality, and family affairs [4]. Despite the complexity of its political system, Malaysia, as mentioned, had a stable government from 1957 to 2018 under the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, composed of parties representing ethnic groups and conservatives such as Umno, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). However, in 2018, the BN was defeated by the multi-ethnic opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH), which brings together more progressive and liberal parties [5]. The downfall of the BN government was partly due to an internationally resonant corruption and financial fraud scandal related to the sovereign wealth fund 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), involving key figures of the ruling coalition, including then Prime Minister Najib Razak [6]. After Pakatan Harapan's victory in 2018, Mahathir Mohamad, who had previously served as Prime Minister with Umno from 1981 to 2003, returned to office. However, internal conflicts and changes in parliamentary alliances within PH led Mahathir to resign [7]. He was succeeded by Muhyiddin Yassin, one of the parliamentarians who had defected from the PH, leading the newly formed coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN). However, Muhyiddin also lost the majority after 17 months, handing over the reins to seasoned politician Ismail Sabri Yaakob of Umno in August 2021 [8]. Ismail Sabri, leading a government with a fragile majority, was compelled to call for early elections driven internally by his party's push and with the aim of securing a stronger mandate [9]. The succession of these governments through internal political maneuvers in parliament has further eroded public trust in the political class, already damaged by corruption scandals. Moreover, the timing of the political system crisis did not favor government officials, who also had to simultaneously manage the pandemic period and the disastrous economic and social consequences that ensued. In this climate of dissatisfaction and growing political polarization, the 2022 elections resulted in Malaysia's first ‘hung parliament’, where no party managed to secure enough seats to govern outright. The Pakatan Harapan, Anwar's coalition, secured 82 seats out of 222, surpassing the PN – which includes the nationalist Malaysian United Indigenous Party (PPBM) and the conservative Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) – which garnered 74 seats [10]. Meanwhile, the BN managed only 30 seats, demonstrating Umno's struggle to rebuild its image after corruption scandals [11]. The Islamic-inspired PAS, however, won the most seats as a single party, with 41. After lengthy negotiations, the head of state tasked PH with forming a unity government, with cooperation from Umno. Anwar, a key opposition figure for decades, succeeded in obtaining the position of prime minister [12]. Since November 2022, Anwar has been leading the country, but political uncertainties have not ceased with the establishment of his government. Anwar is not seen as a leader capable of forcefully imposing his political line, due to the breadth of his coalition which relies on coexistence and compromise among different political factions within the majority, threatening the government's stability. The need to find broad consensus within his coalition has so far prevented Anwar from implementing significant reforms in the country, especially those that could affect the protections guaranteed to the Malay majority. Umno, with which he governs, despite losing some support from the Malaysian electorate in the recent elections, has historically represented the interests of this segment of the population and does not seem inclined to support Anwar's more liberal and inclusive policies [13]. Furthermore, Muhyiddin's PN coalition, and particularly the PAS party, are proving to be formidable opponents for Anwar's unity government, confirming the positive trend of the 2022 elections. This was evident in the recent state elections where PAS reaffirmed its government in three Malaysian states [14]. A more polarized society: socioeconomic tensions intensify. Disillusionment towards traditional political parties has accentuated political, ethnic, and religious fractures in Malaysia, which have long undermined social cohesion and contributed to the persistence of economic inequalities in the country. One of the major challenges for the government is to mitigate economic disparities among ethnicities and promote social harmony in a country where bumiputera or bumiputra (indigenous populations, including the Malay majority, comprising over two-thirds of the total population), Chinese ethnicity (approximately 20%), and Indian ethnicity (around 6%) coexist [15]. Economic differences between indigenous populations and foreign-origin citizens became more pronounced after independence: during this period, the most prosperous economic activities were predominantly controlled by the Chinese community, which was also gaining increasing political prominence. This led to heightened tensions with Malays, culminating in ethnic riots on the streets of Kuala Lumpur in 1969 [16]. To address these disparities, the government has instituted a regime of preferential policies to promote the prosperity and economic empowerment of bumiputera, which have expanded and evolved over the years. For instance, the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971 introduced quotas for ethnic representation in public institutions and universities, along with increased support for bumiputera businesses [17]. While these policies have improved the social conditions and historical economic disparities of bumiputera, the regime of ethnic-based affirmative action has also led to economic inefficiencies and social tensions, fostering patronage and clientelism practices by parties seeking political support from the broader Malay population [18]. Another factor of increasing division in the country is the tension between the Muslim majority and religious minorities (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu) [19]. For instance, the strict implementation of Sharia law has often clashed with civil laws, creating tensions among different religious communities. In recent years, there has also been a rise in religious conservatism at the social level, manifested in the strong electoral performance of PAS, a party that advocates for Malay interests and promotes further Islamization of society, absorbing much of Umno's electorate [20]. To counter this phenomenon of Islamic conservatism, known as the "green wave" [21], Anwar's PH politicians leverage the fear that a more Islamized society may erode civil liberties, resonating particularly among more liberal or non-Malay segments of the population. Conversely, the PN seeks support by accusing Anwar and PH of aiming to limit rights and the preferential system that protects Malays [22]. As a consequence of these socio-economic tensions, Malaysian politics has become increasingly fragmented and polarized, with voting reflecting a radicalization of ethnic and religious identities. Balancing the promotion of socio-economic equity among the country's diverse ethnic groups on one hand and building a more competitive and inclusive social fabric on the other, remains a crucial challenge for Malaysia. The country continues to seek policies that effectively address the needs of all citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion. Challenges to Malaysia’s economic development While Malaysia's political and social situation remains uncertain, the country's economic prospects appear more promising, albeit with some challenges. Thanks to targeted industrial development policies and facilitation of foreign investment, the country has transitioned in a few decades from an agriculture-based economy to an industrialized economy. Particularly, the services sector drives the country's economic growth, accounting for approximately 50% of Malaysia's GDP in 2022, followed by the manufacturing sector at about 23% [23]. The mining sector is also pivotal to the country's economy, alongside the extraction of oil and natural gas. Malaysia is rich in commodities such as tin, bauxite, and copper, which help diversify the Malaysian economy. However, oil and natural gas remain among the most valuable natural resources for Kuala Lumpur, enabling Malaysia to be nearly self-sufficient in energy production. Petronas (Petroliam Nasional Berhad), Malaysia's national oil company, is one of the largest players globally in the energy and oil sectors. As a state-owned entity, Petronas significantly contributes to Malaysia's fiscal revenues, in addition to providing employment and training to the population [24]. In this regard, given the centrality of gas and oil in the country's energy mix, one of the challenges Malaysia will face in the coming decades is transitioning towards renewable energy sources [25]. To advance the country's development, the government is outlining measures to transform Malaysia into a leading production hub, while also fostering growth in the domestic industrial ecosystem. This direction is reflected in the New Industrial Master Plan (NIMP) 2030 introduced in September 2023, which aims to boost the nation's manufacturing sector, targeting an annual GDP growth of 6.5% in this sector. Specifically, Kuala Lumpur is focusing on technology with a specific emphasis on the semiconductor sector. As early as the 1970s, Malaysia was an important hub for semiconductor production, but in the subsequent decades, other players such as Samsung from Korea and TSMC from Taiwan took over the sector. However, the recent geopolitical competition between China and the United States has once again made Malaysia an attractive destination for microchip multinationals, with significant investments revitalizing the sector in the country. Currently, Malaysia holds a significant position in the final stages of microchip production — namely ‘packaging’, assembly, and ‘testing’ — with a 13% share of the global market. Recently, several leading companies in the industry have announced new investments in the country [26]. For instance, Intel has announced $7 billion investments in facilities for microchip packaging and testing, while the U.S. giant Nvidia is planning to invest over $4 billion in collaboration with Malaysian company YTL Power International to create infrastructure for artificial intelligence and ‘supercomputing’ [27]. Additionally, the government has announced the ambitious construction of one of the largest ‘integrated circuit design parks’ in Southeast Asia, aiming to transform the country from a critical hub in the final stages of the value chain to a powerhouse in semiconductor design as well [28]. However, competition with other Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, requires Malaysia to continue investing to attract capital and strengthen the national industrial ecosystem. To this end, on May 28, 2024, Anwar announced the National Semiconductor Strategy, which plans to mobilize approximately $5.3 billion in fiscal support over the next ten years to drive sector growth. Kuala Lumpur aims to mobilize domestic and foreign investments totaling over $100 billion under the new strategy. The government also aims to train more than 60,000 highly skilled engineers to help the country become a leader in the semiconductor supply chain [29]. However, there are additional critical factors for the development of Malaysia's economy, such as its dependence on exports and the presence of multinational corporations and foreign capital, which make the economy vulnerable to external factors. Global demand and fluctuations in international markets can significantly influence Malaysia's economy, as evidenced by the slowdown in GDP growth from 8.7% in 2022 to 3.7% in 2023, primarily due to weaker external demand and a decline in commodity prices. Exports, crucial for the country's economy, declined by 7.8% in 2023, with contractions also seen in Malaysia's key export sectors such as palm oil, petroleum, and electrical and electronic products. The reduced demand for Malaysian products is also attributed to economic uncertainties in major trading partners such as the United States and China – the former dealing with uncertain monetary policy and the latter seeking new stimuli for economic growth while addressing the real estate sector crisis [30]. Malaysia must also be cautious not to overly rely on the presence of foreign companies to drive its economic development. So far, Malaysia, along with other Southeast Asian neighbors like Vietnam and Indonesia, has been among the beneficiaries in the geo-economic competition between China and the United States. Many multinational corporations, especially in the tech sector, have set up manufacturing facilities or initiated partnerships in Malaysia. However, the resurgence of current conflicts and geopolitical tensions could lead to fragmentations along value chains and further relocations. In an increasingly polarized international system, excessively relying on economic development from the presence of foreign firms could become a risky choice. Despite these challenges, the Malaysian economy has benefited from foreign investments and domestic consumption, supported by government subsidies and price controls to contain inflation [31]. Economic growth for 2024 is projected at 4.5%, driven by increasing domestic demand and higher export demand [32].   Conclusion In recent years, Malaysia has emerged as a strategic economic center in Southeast Asia: the country has attracted investors due to its expanding manufacturing sector and has shown remarkable adaptability, becoming a key player in global production chains-especially in the semiconductor sector. To minimize uncertainties related to current global geoeconomic tensions, the country should continue to focus on a more robust and self-sustaining domestic industrial ecosystem. In addition, recent political instability, characterized by frequent changes of government and growing ethnic and religious tensions, is likely to undermine the confidence of investors and the population.  In sum, Malaysia's success will also depend on its ability to balance economic growth with social cohesion, while addressing challenges arising from economic disparities, ethnic tensions, and economic dependence on foreign markets. The performance of inbound foreign direct investment (Ide) in Malaysia.   [1] M.M.N. Nadzri, “The 14th General Election, the Fall of Barisan Nasional, and Political Development in Malaysia, 1957-2018”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 37, n. 3, dicembre 2018, pp. 139-71. [2] ”List of The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong”, The Government of Malaysia’s Official Portal. [3] “Introduction”, Portal Rasmi Parlimen Malaysia – Pengenalan, 10 dicembre 2019. [4] Malaysia 1957 (Rev. 2007) Constitution, Constitute. [5] R.C. Paddock, “Malaysia Opposition, Led by 92-Year-Old, Wins Upset Victory”, The New York Times, 9 maggio 2018; “MalaysiaGE: full results”, The Straits Times, maggio 2018. [6] “Explainer: Malaysia’s ex-PRIMO MINISTRO Najib and the Multi-billion Dollar 1MDB Scandal”, Reuters, 23 agosto 2023; “Goldman Sachs and the 1MDB Scandal”, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 14 maggio 2019; S. Adam, L. Arnold e Y. Ho, “The Story of Malaysia’s 1MDB, the Scandal That Shook the World of Finance”, Bloomberg, 24 maggio 2018. [7] S. Lemière, “The Never-ending Political Game of Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad”, Brookings, 30 ottobre 2020 [8] “The Rise and Fall of Malaysia’s Muhyiddin Yassin”, Reuters, 16 agosto 2021; Y.N. Lee, “Malaysia’s New Prime Minister Has Been Sworn in – but Some Say the Political Crisis Is ‘far From Over’”, CNBC, 3 marzo 2020. [9] A. Ananthalakshmi, R. Latiff e M.M. Chu, “Malaysian PM calls for early polls as ruling party seeks to rise above graft cases”, Reuters, 10 ottobre 2022. [10] A. Ananthalakshmi, R. Latiff e M.M. Chu, “Malaysia Faces Hung Parliament in Tight Election Race”, Reuters, 19 novembre 2022. [11] K. Ganapathy, “‘End of an Era’ for Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional, After Corruption Issues Hurt Candidates at GE15: Analysts”, Channel News Asia, 21 novembre 2022. [12] “Anwar Ibrahim: The Man Who Fulfilled His Goal to Lead Malaysia”, BBC News, 24 novembre 2022. [13] F. Hutchinson, “Malaysian Unity Government’s Power Was Retained but Constrained in 2023”, East Asia Forum, 28 gennaio 2024. [14] R.S. Bedi, “Analysis: Strong State Poll Performance by Perikatan Nasional Boosts Stock for Some PAS Leaders, but Obstacles Lie Ahead”, Channel News Asia, 16 agosto 2023. [15] Bumiputera Statistics 2022, Department of Statistics Malaysia Official Portal. 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