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Diplomacy
President Donald Trump poses for a photo with Amir of Qatar Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad Al Thani in Lusail Palace before an official State Dinner, Wednesday, May 14, 2025, in Doha, Qatar. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Trump signed plenty of contracts in the Middle East, but he’s no closer to the two ‘deals’ he really wants

by Shahram Akbarzadeh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском US President Donald Trump’s visit to Arab states in the Middle East this week generated plenty of multibillion-dollar deals. He said more than US$1 trillion (A$1.5 trillion) worth of deals had been signed with Saudi Arabia alone, though the real total is likely much lower than that. Qatar also placed an order for 210 Boeing aircraft, a deal worth a reported US$96 billion (A$149 billion). Trump will no doubt present these transactions as a major success for US industry. The trip also helped counter concerns about US disengagement from the Middle East. For more than a decade, local elites have viewed Washington’s attention as shifting away from the region. This trip was a reaffirmation of the importance of the Middle East – in particular the Gulf region – to US foreign policy. This is an important signal to send to Middle Eastern leaders who are dealing with competing interests from China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. And from a political standpoint, Trump’s lifting of sanctions on Syria and meeting with the former rebel, now president, Ahmed al-Sharaa was very significant – both symbolically and practically. Until recently, al-Sharaa was listed by the United States as a terrorist with a US$10 million (A$15 million) bounty on his head. However, when his forces removed dictator Bashar al-Assad from power in December, he was cautiously welcomed by many in the international community. The US had invested considerable resources in removing Assad from power, so his fall was cause for celebration, even if it came at the hands of forces the US had deemed terrorists. This rapid turn-around is dizzying. In practice, the removal of sanctions on Syria opens the doors to foreign investment in the reconstruction of the country following a long civil war. It also offers an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as Turkey, to expand their influence in Syria at the expense of Iran. For a leader who styles himself a deal-maker, these can all be considered successful outcomes from a three-day trip. However, Trump avoided wading into the far more delicate diplomatic and political negotiations needed to end Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and find common ground with Iran on its nuclear program. No solution in sight for the Palestinians Trump skirted the ongoing tragedy in Gaza and offered no plans for a diplomatic solution to the war, which drags on with no end in sight. The president did note his desire to see a normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel, without acknowledging the key stumbling block. While Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have no love for Hamas, the Gaza war and the misery inflicted on the Palestinians have made it impossible for them to overlook the issue. They cannot simply leapfrog Gaza to normalise relations with Israel. In his first term, Trump hoped the Palestinian issue could be pushed aside to achieve normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel. This was partially achieved with the Abraham Accords, which saw the UAE and three other Muslim-majority nations normalise relations with Israel. Trump no doubt believed the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreed to just before his inauguration would stick – he promised as much during the US election campaign. But after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire in March, vowing to press on with its indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, he’s learned the hard way the Palestinian question cannot easily be solved or brushed under the carpet. The Palestinian aspiration for statehood needs to be addressed as an indispensable step towards a lasting peace and regional stability. It was telling that Trump did not stop in Israel this week. One former Israeli diplomat says it’s a sign Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lost his leverage with Trump. There’s nothing that Netanyahu has that Trump wants, needs or [that he] can give him, as opposed to, say, the Saudis, the Qataris, [or] the Emiratis. More harsh rhetoric for Iran Trump also had no new details or initiatives to announce on the Iran nuclear talks, beyond his desire to “make a deal” and his repeat of past threats. At least four rounds of talks have been held between Iran and the United States since early April. While both sides are positive about the prospects, the US administration seems divided on the intended outcome. The US Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called for the complete dismantling of Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium as a sure safeguard against the potential weaponisation of the nuclear program. Trump himself, however, has been less categorical. Though he has called for the “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program, he has also said he’s undecided if Iran should be allowed to continue a civilian enrichment program. Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium, albeit under international monitoring, is a red line for the authorities in Tehran – they won’t give this up. The gap between Iran and the US appears to have widened this week following Trump’s attack on Iran as the “most destructive force” in the Middle East. The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi called Trump’s remarks “pure deception”, and pointed to US support for Israel as the source of instability in the region. None of this has advanced the prospects of a nuclear deal. And though his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE was marked by pomp and ceremony, he’ll leave no closer to solving two protracted challenges than when he arrived.

Defense & Security
A distressed person behind barbed wire, with an airplane symbol above on a blue background. Concept of immigration deportation and removal policy

From Promised Land to Forced Exodus: Faces of Deportation in Latin America and the Caribbean

by Rocío de los Reyes Ramírez

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract: Migration policies in Latin America and the Caribbean have adopted a more restrictive and punitive approach, influenced by external pressures, especially from the United States. Deportations, detentions and dissuasive measures have intensified, in a context of increasing criminalisation of migrants. Cases such as El Salvador and the Dominican Republic reflect the use of severe control strategies, which have been criticised for possible human rights violations. These practices, although justified on security grounds, generate regional tensions and deepen the vulnerability of displaced populations. Keywords:Latin America, migration, Donald Trump, Ibero-America, deportations, forced returns. Introduction Deportations in Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone significant changes in recent years, reflecting both migration dynamics and international policies. The region has witnessed an increase in migratory movements, driven by economic crises, political conflicts and natural disasters. Latin American population movement configurations have been immersed in a dynamic whose magnitude and urgency have intensified since the beginning of 2025: that of forced returns and mass deportations, driven by changes in the migration policies of receiving countries such as the United States and Mexico. The re-election of Donald Trump has marked a tightening of immigration control measures, with an increase in raids and expulsions of undocumented migrants. But this is not a new phenomenon: mass deportations and forced returns in Latin America have deep roots in the region's history, with moments of particular intensity in different periods. It is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it exclusive to contemporary dynamics. Throughout its history, the region has been the scene of multiple processes of expulsion, forced return and internal displacement, intimately linked to contexts of political violence, economic change, structural racism and state strategies of population control. Already during the 19th century, the consolidation of nation states brought with it policies of exclusion that sought to shape national identity to the detriment of certain groups. In Mexico, after the 1910 Revolution, the Chinese community was persecuted and expelled in an episode that combined racism, economic crisis and exacerbated nationalism.1 In Argentina, during the 1880s, the military campaigns known as the "Conquest of the Desert" provoked massive forced displacements of indigenous peoples to marginal areas, marking a pattern of invisibilisation and internal expulsion.2 In the Caribbean, the dynamics of deportation were also marked by racial and economic conflicts. The Dominican Republic, under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in the 1930s, carried out the so-called “Parsley Massacre” (1937), where thousands of Haitians were killed or forcibly expelled in order to 'whiten' the border and reaffirm Dominican national identity³. And in Cuba, after the triumph of the 1959 Revolution, the flow of political exiles to the United States intensified, generating waves of departures that, in some cases, were accompanied by pressure and coercion from the Castro regime. Central America in the second half of the 20th century was marked by civil wars and authoritarian regimes. El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua experienced profound humanitarian crises that provoked a massive flight of their citizens. Many of these refugees were received in Mexico, Costa Rica or the United States, but after the Peace Accords of the 1990s, forced return policies emerged that did not always provide adequate conditions for reintegration. The case of Guatemala is emblematic: the return of refugees from Mexico, coordinated in part by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was fraught with difficulties, as many of the returnees were returning to territories still without security guarantees.3 The United States played a key role in contemporary deportation processes. The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 was a paradigm shift, facilitating the deportation of immigrants convicted of minor crimes, which particularly affected Latin American communities.4 Honduras and El Salvador were particularly hard hit by these policies. Many of the young deportees had lived most of their lives on US soil and, upon their return to contexts of poverty and violence, found in gangs, such as MS-13 and Barrio 18, a means of survival and even a sense of belonging.5 Similarly, in South America, the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s also resorted to exile and deportation as mechanisms of political control. In Chile, following the 1973 coup d'état, tens of thousands of people were forced into exile, and opponents captured abroad were often smuggled into the country under the coordination of Operation Condor. Argentina replicated these patterns, using illegal deportations and forced disappearances as systematic tools of political repression. More recently, in the insular Caribbean, contemporary dynamics also reveal patterns of selective deportation. In the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, deportations of Haitian and Venezuelan migrants in an irregular situation have intensified in recent years, often in conditions of human rights violations, reproducing old logics of racial and socio-economic exclusion. These examples show that deportations in Latin America and the Caribbean are not isolated or temporary events: they are part of structural patterns that have accompanied state-building processes, the dynamics of internal violence and international population control strategies. Today, in a scenario of growing migratory pressure and increasingly restrictive policies in the main receiving countries, the region is once again facing old challenges in new forms. The echoes of history resound in the new faces of forced exodus, marking a present in which mass expulsions once again occupy a central place on the regional agenda. The United States and the tightening of immigration policy The arrival of Donald Trump for a second presidential term in January 2025 marked an even more severe shift in US immigration policy. While his first administration (2017-2021) had already been marked by restrictive measures, his return to power brought with it not only the restoration of old border control programmes, but also their radicalisation, in a context of growing domestic pressure and political polarisation. Trump has not only taken up policies such as the "Remain in Mexico" policy or the limitation of access to asylum: he has also expanded the margins of action of immigration agencies, hardening the official rhetoric against migrants -especially Latin Americans- and rescuing old legal instruments to justify new practices of accelerated deportation. This new phase is characterised by a combination of administrative, legal and operational measures that seek to deter irregular migration through the restriction of rights, the intensive use of detention and deportation, and the strengthening of pressure mechanisms on countries of origin and transit.   One of the first symbolic and practical steps of this new policy was the reinstatement of the programme officially known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), more popularly known as “Remain in Mexico”. It had originally been implemented in 2019, during his first term, and partially suspended during Joe Biden's administration from 20216. However, after his re-election, Trump not only reactivated it, but also tightened it, broadening its scope and further reducing the possibilities for asylum seekers to await processing on US soil. On 20 January 2025, the US president signed the executive order to reinstate this programme, which obliges asylum seekers to wait in Mexican territory while their cases are resolved in US courts.7 This has led to diplomatic tensions between the two countries. The president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, has expressed her rejection of this policy, describing it as a unilateral decision that affects national sovereignty and the human rights of migrants. The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, reiterated that Mexico is not obliged to accept this measure and that mechanisms will be sought to protect the migrants affected.8 While in its initial version the programme had already forced tens of thousands of asylum seekers to stay in Mexican border cities - leading to the formation of makeshift camps in places such as Matamoros and Tijuana - the reinstatement in 2025 accentuated this phenomenon. More categories of applicants, including minors and persons in vulnerable situations, are now susceptible to refoulement, increasing the pressure on border areas characterised by insecurity, poverty and criminal violence.9 Thus, the camps, which already existed precariously since the first implementation of the programme, have expanded and degraded throughout 2025, creating even more severe humanitarian emergencies. International organisations and human rights organisations have warned that the reactivation and tightening of the MPP violates essential principles of international law, such as non-refoulement, and exposes applicants to serious risks of violence, kidnapping and human trafficking.10 The Mexican government, for its part, has implemented some measures to support migrants, such as the "ConsulApp" application and the "Mexico te abraza" plan (Mexico hugs you), but challenges remain in ensuring their safety and well-being.11 Ultimately, this would tie in with the implementation of 'safe third country' agreements, as some analysts have interpreted it. And although Mexico has not signed any protocols, in practice, these current policies de facto position it in this role. This is because during Donald Trump's first term in office, the US signed agreements with several Central American countries to designate them as “safe third countries”.12 These include Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. These agreements required asylum seekers passing through these countries to seek protection there before arriving in the US. It was a controversial move that generated criticism of conditions in these countries and their capacity to handle the flow of migrants. Although formally presented as instruments to share the burden of international protection, in practice these protocols served to divert and contain asylum seekers in nations that did not have the material and legal conditions to guarantee their safety and basic rights. Particularly in the case of Guatemala, which was the only one to actually implement them in 2019, reports documented how migrants transferred from the US faced a total absence of effective asylum procedures, lack of humanitarian protection, and direct exposure to extreme violence and poverty.13 During the Biden administration (2021-2024), these agreements were formally suspended, however, it appears that the door is now being reopened. The new administration has signalled its intention to renegotiate and expand these instruments. In this way, they are once again at the centre of a more aggressive migration containment strategy, de facto limiting access to asylum in the US and increasing the vulnerability of thousands of migrants expelled to unsafe territories. El Salvador, for its part, has emerged in 2025 as the first Latin American country to formalise an agreement that, without officially naming itself as a "safe third country", operates de facto as such. The agreement, announced by President Nayib Bukele himself as "unprecedented", establishes that El Salvador will accept migrants deported from the United States - including those considered highly dangerous - coming not only from the Central American Northern Triangle, but also from other regions of the continent and the Caribbean.14 Unlike the Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACAs) signed in 2019 and suspended in 2021, this new pact is not limited to the processing of asylum applications but directly assumes the reception and custody of deported persons, with no guarantee that they will be able to restart a regular migration process. Various sources agree that this is an advanced form of border externalisation: the northern giant transfers not only the management of flows, but also the custody of people considered undesirable or dangerous.15 Although the agreement has not been accompanied by specific legal reforms in the US, it has been consolidated through bilateral negotiations that contemplate financial compensation for El Salvador. Human rights organisations have warned that this strategy could be replicated with other governments receptive to these cooperation formulas in exchange for financial incentives. In this context, negotiation attempts have already begun with Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Colombia,16 countries that are being considered to host regional asylum processing centres. Although these mechanisms have not been formalised as "safe third country agreements" in the strict sense, several organisations have warned that they operate under a similar logic: the transfer of migratory responsibilities to nations with limited institutional capacity and contexts of violence or political crisis.17 The "pact" with El Salvador also contemplates the use of national penitentiary centres to detain a large part of these deportees, without a detailed analysis of their legal situation. Although mention has been made of the sending of some profiles considered to be at risk to the Terrorism Confinement Centre (Spanish: Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo, abbreviated CECOT), the implications of this prison model deserve specific treatment, which will be addressed in the following section. Along with the reinstatement of this programme, the new US administration has pushed through a series of measures that further restrict access to the right to asylum for those seeking to enter the US from Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the main changes has been the reintroduction of stricter standards for the initial submission of asylum applications. Migrants must now demonstrate from the outset a "credible fear" of persecution with strong documentary evidence,18 a much higher standard of proof than in previous years. This policy has drastically reduced the percentage of applicants who make it through the first asylum interview. Similarly, as part of the tightening of these immigration policies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has experienced a significant expansion of its powers. This expansion has translated into both an increase in its budget and greater operational discretion to carry out detentions and deportations. During 2025, the budget allocated to ICE increased by 15% over the previous year, reaching record amounts to fund detention centres, internal patrol operations and tracking technology for undocumented immigrants.19 This budget boost has allowed for increased detention operations in places considered "sensitive", such as hospitals, schools and churches, which were previously relatively protected under more restrictive guidelines. But ICE's expansion has not been limited to issues of operational volume, but also of legal scope. The use of internal administrative warrants (without judicial intervention) for the detention of immigrants suspected of minor immigration infractions has been reactivated.20 This measure has been widely criticised by human rights organisations, which point to the weakening of procedural safeguards for detainees and the risk of arbitrary detention. ICE has also strengthened its cooperation with state and local police forces through programmes such as 287(g), which allow police officers to act as immigration agents.21  This collaboration has been particularly controversial in states such as Texas and Florida, where racial profiling and civil rights violations have been reported. The tightening of detention practices has had a direct impact on Latin America and the Caribbean, with a significant proportion of those deported in 2025 coming from countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and, to an increasing extent, Venezuela and Haiti. Thus, the expansion of ICE's power has not only transformed the internal migration landscape in the US but has also intensified the dynamics of forced return throughout the region. However, the shift towards a more punitive approach is not limited to contemporary operational frameworks: the current government has also begun to recover legal tools from the past, such as the Alien Enemies Act, to legitimise new forms of exclusion, detention and deportation. This is a 1798 law that allows the executive to detain and deport citizens of countries considered enemies in times of war. Although historically this law has been applied in wartime contexts, such as during the Second World War, its invocation in a period of peace has generated intense legal and political controversy.22 On 14 March 2025, Trump signed a presidential proclamation designating the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang as a national security threat, calling their presence in the US an "irregular invasion". Under this justification, it authorised the immediate detention and deportation of Venezuelan citizens suspected of links to the organisation, without the need for warrants or conventional legal processes. The president later denied having signed it, attributing the responsibility to his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.23 The implementation of this measure resulted in the accelerated deportation of hundreds of Venezuelans to El Salvador, many of whom had no criminal record and some of whom had legal immigration status in the US, including Temporary Protected Status (TPS).24 Civil rights organisations, such as the ACLU, filed lawsuits alleging that the application of the law violated due process and constitutional protections. 25In response, several federal judges issued orders temporarily halting deportations and requiring judicial hearings before any deportations. But despite the judicial restrictions, the administration continued with the deportations, arguing that the orders did not apply to flights already underway or over international waters. This stance was criticised for defying judicial authority and for using a wartime law for contemporary immigration policy purposes.26 The reactivation of the Alien Enemies Act in 2025 has sparked a national debate on the limits of executive power and the protection of immigrant rights, highlighting the tension between national security and civil liberties in US immigration policy. Not only that: all these measures have generated a wave of mass deportations that have not only overwhelmed the capacity of reception systems in Latin American countries, but have also had a direct impact on the structure of separated families and local communities, often lacking the resources to provide adequate reintegration processes. In Mexican border cities such as Ciudad Juárez, Matamoros and Tijuana, makeshift camps have multiplied, where thousands of people who have been deported or are awaiting a migration resolution live in extremely precarious conditions, as mentioned above. In Central America and the Caribbean, the forced return of migrants - some of them with weak links to their countries of origin or with criminal records - has reactivated dynamics of exclusion, stigmatisation and, in some cases, violence. Taken together, these actions reflect a regional trend towards the externalisation and criminalisation of migration, where migration responsibilities are shifted to countries in the global south and managed through punitive rather than humanitarian strategies. The consequences of these measures are not only individual but also reshape the social and political fabric of the entire region. Detention centres and new deportation dynamics Recent transformations in US immigration policy have not only translated into regulatory and diplomatic tightening: they have also reconfigured places of confinement and removal processes. Mass deportationsalready being pushed since 202327 , have now coincided with a renewed detention architecture, in which confinement and surveillance are not limited to US territory but projected beyond its borders. This phenomenon has given rise to new dynamics of migration management, in which detention centres play a central role. In addition to ICE detention centres on US soil, there is now a network of prison and surveillance facilities located in countries receiving deportees, frequently promoted or supported by Washington under the bilateral security cooperation agreements we have been discussing. The most visible case is that of the CECOT (Terrorism Confinement Center) in El Salvador which, although initially conceived as a tool against local gangs, has begun to receive Salvadoran citizens deported from the US with criminal records.28 The use of this type of facility marks a worrying twist: the systematic criminalisation of deportees and their immediate insertion into highly restrictive prison circuits. The policy of automatic association between migration and criminality has led many deportees to be considered not as citizens to be reintegrated, but as threats to be neutralised. This logic is reinforced by the Salvadoran government's narrative, which has actively promoted CECOT's image of success before the international community, using figures on homicide reduction and territorial control as arguments of legitimacy, albeit with a strong questioning of judicial opacity and arbitrary detentions.29 This transnational prison model has profound human rights, social reintegration and regional security implications. Far from offering sustainable solutions, it reinforces the stigmatisation of returned migrants and multiplies barriers to their inclusion in communities of origin. In turn, it turns countries such as El Salvador into functional extensions of the US immigration and penal system, fuelling political and social tensions.30 When in March 2025, the US deported 238 Venezuelan nationals to CECOT on charges of belonging to the Tren de Aragua criminal group, the move was widely criticised by human rights organisations and international governments as a violation of due process and the fundamental rights of migrants. The Salvadoran government, for its part, defended the action, claiming that the deportees were "proven criminals" and that their incarceration in this centre was part of a strategy to combat transnational organised crime.31 However, relatives of the detainees and humanitarian organisations have denounced that many were identified as members of the Tren de Aragua based solely on tattoos or physical characteristics, without concrete evidence. The situation has generated diplomatic tensions, especially with Venezuela, whose government has requested the intervention of international bodies to protect its citizens and has described the deportations as a "crime against humanity".32 To date, there is no record of similar agreements between the US and other Latin American countries, such as Guatemala or Honduras, to receive deported migrants in high-security prisons. Although these countries have announced plans to build mega-prisons, there is no public evidence that they are being used to house deportees from the US. In parallel, the so-called policy of self-deportation has gained momentum: an increasingly documented phenomenon in which thousands of migrants voluntarily choose to return to their countries of origin in fear of being arrested, separated from their families or detained in inhumane conditions. This practice, indirectly promoted by the tightening of the legal and police environment, represents a form of covert expulsion, in which the state does not need to apply force: it is enough to install fear. 33 The Trump administration has intensified this strategy through various measures. These include the implementation of the CBP Home app, which allows undocumented immigrants to manage their voluntary departure from the country. In addition, "incentivised self-deportation" programmes have been announced, offering financial assistance and coverage of transportation costs to those who decide to return to their countries of origin. These initiatives have been presented as humanitarian solutions, although they have been criticised by human rights organisations as coercive and discriminatory. The government has also imposed economic sanctions on immigrants with active deportation orders, such as daily fines of up to a thousand dollars, with the aim of pressuring them to leave the country voluntarily. These policies have been accompanied by media campaigns displaying images of immigrants arrested and charged with serious crimes, seeking to reinforce the perception of threat and justify the measures adopted. These actions have generated a climate of fear and uncertainty among migrant communities, leading many to opt for self-deportation as the only alternative to avoid detention and family separation. However, experts warn that this decision may have long-term legal consequences, such as the impossibility of applying for visas or re-entering the country for several years.34 It has come to the point, last week, of arresting Hannah Dugan, a Miilwaukee County judge by the FBI, allegedly accused of assisting a documented immigrant who was to be detained.35 In this context, the self-deportation policy is yet another tool in the Trump administration's restrictive and punitive approach to migration, prioritising deterrence and control over the protection of human rights and the search for comprehensive solutions to the migration phenomenon. The proliferation of self-deportations and increasing allegations of human rights violations soon escalated into the judicial arena. As claims of arbitrary detention, inhumane conditions of confinement and family separation increased, various courts began to examine the legal limits of these policies. The climax came in April 2025 with the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. J. G. G. G.36 , which assessed the constitutionality of certain expedited deportation practices applied to Venezuelan and Central American asylum seekers. Although the Court did not completely invalidate the executive measures, it did set important limits: it recognised the right to a pre-removal hearing in cases where there is a credible risk of persecution and called on Congress to urgently review the immigration legal framework.37 In addition, the court ruled that legal challenges must be brought in the district where the detainees are located, in this case, Texas, and not in Washington D.C. This Supreme Court ruling marks a turning point. While it does not dismantle the mass deportation apparatus, it introduces legal brakes that could slow down or modulate its application. Congress, under pressure from the ruling, now faces the challenge of reforming a dysfunctional, polarised and increasingly judicialised immigration system. In the short term, federal agencies such as ICE and CBP will have to adjust their operational protocols to avoid litigation, which could generate internal tensions and new immigration outsourcing strategies. Ultimately, this decision opens a new scenario in which immigration policies will have to face not only social and international scrutiny, but also the limits imposed by constitutional law and the US judicial system. Expulsions in the Caribbean: the case of the Dominican Republic In the context of a regional tightening of migration policies, the Dominican Republic has significantly intensified its efforts to control irregular immigration, especially from Haiti. Under the administration of President Luis Abinader, a policy of mass deportations has been implemented, which has raised concerns both domestically and internationally. The deportations have taken place against a backdrop of growing social fear of cross-border crime and the infiltration of armed actors from the neighbouring country. In this context, the government has reinforced border control with a combination of military presence, surveillance technology and migration deterrence measures. Between January and December 2024, the Dominican authorities deported more than 276,000 foreigners in an irregular migratory situation, the majority of whom were Haitian nationals38 . This figure represents a significant increase compared to previous years and reflects a systematic and sustained deportation policy.39 Precisely in October 2024, the government announced a plan to deport up to 10,000 Haitians per week, which intensified operations across the country. These operations include raids in neighbourhoods, arrests in hospitals and the demolition of informal settlements inhabited by Haitians. One of the most controversial practices has been the deportation of pregnant and lactating Haitian women directly from public hospitals. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and UN experts have condemned these actions as inhumane and discriminatory. Cases have been documented of women being deported while in labour , putting their health and that of their children at risk.40 The Dominican government defends these policies as necessary to maintain order and national security, arguing that they are carried out in accordance with the law. However, international criticism has mounted, with allegations that these mass deportations violate fundamental human rights and aggravate the humanitarian crisis in Haiti. The situation has generated diplomatic tensions between the two countries and has been the subject of concern from the international community, which is urging the Dominican Republic to review its migration policies and ensure respect migrants' rights. This case exemplifies the challenges faced by Latin American and Caribbean countries in managing migration flows, especially when humanitarian crises, security policies and bilateral tensions are combined. Ultimately, the Dominican response - although framed by legitimate sovereignty concerns - also raises profound questions about the proportionality of measures, respect for due process and regional co-responsibility in the face of the Haitian collapse. Conclusion The Latin American and Caribbean region is going through a critical moment in terms of migration. Recent waves of mass deportations, forced returns - direct or induced - and new border control strategies have deepened a regional crisis that has been brewing for years. These dynamics, far from being isolated phenomena, are part of a systematic strategy of migration containment promoted by the US, where political discourse and practice have turned migrants into scapegoats for all national ills. Donald Trump has been the most visible - and aggressive - face of this policy. His obsession with migrants, especially those from Latin America and the Caribbean, has resulted in an institutional architecture designed to curb mobility at any cost. Under his leadership, not only have physical and legal walls on the southern border been reinforced, but programmes such as "Remain in Mexico", safe third country agreements and, more recently, the controversial use of regulations such as the Alien Enemies Act have been promoted. At the core of this strategy is a profoundly punitive vision that identifies the migrant as a threat, a potential enemy or an invader, thus legitimising policies of mass exclusion and systematic expulsion. The impact of these policies in Latin America and the Caribbean is profound. Beyond the numbers, what is at stake is the stability of societies already marked by inequality, violence and institutional fragility. Mass deportations - affecting not only border crossers but also those who had already put down roots in the US - are overwhelming the capacities of receiving states. Every week, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic receive contingents of returnees who must be reintegrated in contexts of structural precariousness. In this context, the arrival of thousands of deported or self-deported Venezuelans in places such as CECOT in El Salvador illustrates a new phase: the direct criminalisation of migrants. The use of mega-prisons as a migration management tool represents a worrying drift, where security replaces integration and fear replaces law. Alongside this, the policy of self-deportations has gained strength, a form of covert expulsion in which the state does not need to apply force: it is enough to install fear. Families choose to return voluntarily for fear of being detained, separated or held in inhumane conditions. In recent months, this practice has even been economically incentivised, with programmes promoted by the Trump Administration offering to pay for the return ticket, as if it were a favour, when in reality it is a forced flight disguised as a personal choice. This has generated a far-reaching reconfiguration of migration. The fracturing of family networks, the interruption of the flow of remittances and the uncertainty over the legal status of millions of people have altered not only regional mobility, but also the economic models that depend on exile as a source of income. Remittances, which represent a significant percentage of GDP in countries such as Honduras and El Salvador, are threatened by these return policies, directly affecting consumption, community investment and the ability to sustain millions of households. Moreover, the legal and judicial system now faces its own limits. The intervention of the US Supreme Court has highlighted the constitutional challenges to these measures, opening a space for legal dispute over how far the executive can go in its crusade against migration. However, the effects are already underway. The reality is that many Latin American and Caribbean countries are assuming, voluntarily or forcibly, the role of advanced border of the global North. The overall balance is bleak: a utilitarian vision of human mobility is imposed, whose fate depends more on electoral cycles in the north than on their fundamental rights. However, resistance is also emerging: from the courts to the streets, through grassroots organisations, solidarity networks and proposals for fairer regional policies. The future of mass deportations is not set in stone. It will be decided in multiple scenarios: in presidential speeches in Washington, but also in the legal decisions of the courts; in public policies in Bogotá, San Salvador or Santo Domingo, but also in the mobilisation capacity of the societies affected. Latin America and the Caribbean have an opportunity and a responsibility: not to resign themselves to the role of passive recipients of an imposed policy, but to build a regional strategy for mobility, rights and dignity. References 1 CHAO ROMERO, Robert. The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940. University of Arizona Press, 2010.2 VIÑAS, David. Indians, army and frontier. Siglo XXI Editores, 1982.3 FERRER ,Ada. Cuba: An American History. Scribner, 2021.4 AMERICAS ALLIANCE. 28 years of IIRIRA: a horrible legacy of a white supremacist and deeply xenophobic immigration law. 30/9/24. Available at: htt p s://w w w.alianzaamericas..Note: All hyperlinks are active as of 3 May 2025.5 AMBROSIUS, Christian. Deportations and the Roots of Gang Violence in Central America. School of Business & Economics. Discussion Paper, Berlin, 12/2018. Available at: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/fub188/22554/discpa p er2018_12.6 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL. A Guide to the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), update 2025. Available at: https://www.am e ricanimmigrationcouncil.7 MARÍN, Rossana. "El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de EE. UU. restableció el programa migratorio 'Quédate en México'", INFOBAE. 22/1/2025. Available at: https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/el-departamento-de-seguridad-nacional-de-eeuu-restablecio-el-prog r8 RIVERA, Fernanda. "México se opone al regreso del programa 'Quédate en México'", Meganoticias. 20/1/25. Available at: https://www.m e ganoticias.mx/cdmx/noticia/mexico-se-opone-al-regreso-del-programa-quedate-en-mexico/587032.9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. The 'Migrant Protection Protocols' and Human Rights Violations in Mexico. Special Report, 2020. Available at: https:// w w w.hrw.10 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Precautionary Measures on the "Stay in Mexico" Programme. 2025. Available at: https://www . oas.org/en /11 CAMHAJI, Elías. "México aguarda con preocupación la avalancha de decretos migratorios de Trump", El País. 20/1/25. Available at: https:// e lp ais.com/mexico/2025-01-20/mexico-aguarda-con-preocupacion-la-avalancha-de-decretos-migratorios-de-trump.12 The concept of a "safe third country" originates from the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1951. According to this convention, when a person applies for asylum in one country, that country can refer him or her to another country that offers the same guarantees of protection. However, goodwill is not enough; the receiving country must meet certain requirements to be considered "safe".13 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL. Deportation with stopover: Failure of the protection measures established by the Cooperation Agreement on Asylum signed between the United States and Guatemala. 10/6/20. Available at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/report s -briefs/deportacion-con-escala-fracaso-de-las14 EL MUNDO NEWSPAPER. US and El Salvador finalise 'unprecedented' asylum agreement: Bukele". 3/2/2025. Available at: https://diario.elmundo.sv/politica/eeuu-y-el-sa l15 BBC NEWS MUNDO. "Bukele agrees with US to accept deportees of other nationalities, including 'dangerous criminals' in prison". 4/2/25. Available at: https://ww w .bbc.com/mundo/ a16 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL. Migration outsourcing: new agreements under analysis with Haiti, Dominican Republic and Colombia. Special report, March 2025.17 RANRUN.ES. "International civil society denounces that externalising the US border will not stop migrants".11/4/25. Available at: https://run r un.es/noticias/501342/sociedad-civil-civil-sociedad-civil-internacional-denuncian-que-externalizar-la-frontera-ee –18 U. S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. Credible Fear Screening and Interview Process, update 2025. Available at: http s ://www.usci s .19 GILBERTO BOSQUES CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. "La política migratoria de EE. UU. y su impacto en América Latina", Informe Especial. April 2025. Available at: https:/ / www.gob.mx/sre/acciones-y-programas/centro-de-estudios-internacionales-gilberto-bosques20 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. "The United States: A Migration System that Criminalises. Report 2025. Available at: https://www.amnesty . o rg/en/latest21 ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union). Police-ICE collaboration under the 287(g) program. Analysis paper updated in 2025. Available at: https:// w ww.a c lu.22 PIEMONTESE, Antonio. "'Alien Enemies Act', what the 1798 law invoked by Trump to repatriate alleged Venezuelan gang members says". WIRED. 10/3/25. Available at: htt p s://en.wired. dice-la-ley-de-1798-invocada-por-trump-para-repatriar-a-supuestos-pandilleros-venezolanos.23 THE REPUBLIC. "Trump denies signing proclamation invoking the Alien Enemies Act to deport Venezuelan migrants". 22/3/25. Available at: https://larepublica.pe/mundo/2025/03/22/donald-trump-niega-haber-firmado-la-proclamacion-invocando-la-ley-de-enem i24 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a US humanitarian programme that grants protection to nationals of countries affected by armed conflict, natural disasters or other extraordinary circumstances.25 INFOBAE. "US civil organisations question the deportation of Venezuelans". 17/3/25. Available at: https://www.infobae.com/america/agenc i.26 CNN. "Several federal judges issued orders to temporarily halt the deportations and require judicial hearings before any removals. But despite the judicial restraints, the Administration continued the deportations." 9/4/25. Available at: https://cnnesp a nol.cnn.com/2025/04/09/eeuu/judges-block-deportations-some-people-read-foreign-enemies e27 TELEMUNDO. The U.S. quintuples its deportations this year and considers more and more migrants as inadmissible". 17/9/23. Available at: www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/inmigracion/estados-unidos-ha-deportado-a-mas-de-380000-personas-en-los-ultimos - si-rc n28 EL PAÍS. "Bukele opens the CECOT mega-prison to deportations from the USA". 7/2/25. Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2025-02-07/bu k ele-abre-el-mega p risiones-del-cecot-a-deportados-de-eeuu..29 EL PAÍS. "Bukele's mega-prison, symbol of his war against the gangs, arouses international alarm". 23/3/23. Available at: https://elpais .30 MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Satellite States: The Prison Externalisation of Migration in Central America, n.º 54. 2025, pp. 45-63.31 LAS AMÉRICAS NEWSPAPER. "El Salvador defends the deportation of Venezuelans from the USA and links them to organised crime". 19/3/25. Available in: http s :32 NEWSWEEK, El Salvador. "Venezuela says sending US migrants to Salvadoran jail is "crime against humanity"". 18/3/25. Available at: https://newsweekespanol.com/elsalvador/2025/03/18/v e nezuela-dice-que-envio-de-migrantes –33 EL PAÍS. "Trump fills the White House gardens with photos of arrested immigrants to celebrate his first 100 days". 29/4/25. Available at: https://elp a is.com/us/immigracion/2025-04-28/trump-llena-los-jardines-de-la-casa-blanca-de-fotos-de-inmigrantes-arrestados-para-c e lebrar-sus-primeros-100-dias..34 COLOMÉ, Carla Gloria. "El gobierno de Trump celebra el aumento de las autodeportaciones: "Estamos viendo niveles altísimos de migración inversa", El País. 2/4/25. Available at: https://elpais.com/us/migracion/2025-04-02/el-gobierno-de-trump-celebra-el-aumento-de-las-autodeportaciones-e s tam o s-viendo-niveles-altisimos-de-migracion-inversa.html.35 COL, Devan. "Indictment against Wiscosin judge underscores Trump administration's aggressive approach to immigration enforcement", CNN USA 25/4/25. Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/04/25/eeuu / indictment-j u eza-wisconsin-aggressive-approach-trump-immigration-trax-law.36 Trump v. J.G.G. is the tentative name used by some media and legal documents to refer to a recent and significant court case before the U.S. Supreme Court in April 2025. The case pits the federal government, led by the Donald Trump Administration, against a migrant identified by his initials J.G.G., in protection of his identity, as is customary in immigration and human rights proceedings.37 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Trump v. J.G.G. Opinion of the Court, April 2025. Available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20 2 5/tr ump_ v _jgg.html (accessed 28 April 2025).38 CNN EN ESPAÑOL. "La República Dominicana deportó en 2024 a 276.000 haitianos". 2/1/25. Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/01/02/latinoame r ic a39 TELEMUNDO NOTICIAS. "Dominican Republic intensifies deportations of Haitians: 10,000 per week". 12/12/2024. Available at: https://www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/internacional/republica-dominicana-deportaciones-masivas- h aitianos-10000-una-semana-r40 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. "Deportations of pregnant women in the Dominican Republic". November 2024. Available at: https: / /www.a m nesty.org/en/documents/amr27/8597/2024/en/ "Statement on mass deportations in the Dominican Republic". November 2024. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/es/documents/amr27/8597/2024 /

Diplomacy
Concept image of USA - Vietnam trade war, Economy conflict, US tariffs on exports, Trade frictions

Opinion – The US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in its Second Year

by Julian McBride

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The United States and Vietnam, former adversaries but now significant trading partners, are in their second year of the comprehensive strategic partnership, further improving their ties. In 2025, the comprehensive strategic partnership makes a major two-year milestone as both America and Vietnam are thirty years into normalization, as five decades ago, both countries were intertwined in one of the most deadly wars in modern history. The comprehensive strategic partnership is a significant counterbalance in international relations in the Indo-Pacific region against China’s rising soft power and naval force projection into the South China Sea. In its second year, questions remain: Will the partnership hold up, and is there still room to grow between Washington and Hanoi? On September 10th, 2023, then-U.S. President Joe Biden and the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong of Vietnam signed the comprehensive strategic partnership, which is a major turning point in Southeast Asia. The elevation of relations between Hanoi and Washington puts America along the same bilateral status as Russia and China in Vietnam’s hierarchy, signifying a major diplomatic breakthrough between the former two countries. Under the upgraded relations, Vietnam and the United States will further strengthen cooperation in trade, investments, science, technology, and climate action, with more opportunities in other sectors. Southeast Asia is an emerging global supply chain hub for not just the United States but the entire world, and Hanoi is a top ten major trading partner of Washington. The opportunity to grow supply chains in the Indochina region with Vietnam as a starting point would be an essential step toward digressing from the People’s Republic of China, which the United States government looks to do, especially as the latter two superpowers now compete for global hegemonic status. The United States and Vietnam share the ideals of growing their technological and economic sectors. The growth of semiconductors in Eastern Asia continues to grow not only in Taiwan, China, Japan, and South Korea but also in Vietnam. Amkor, an American firm, is opening a $1.6 billion firm in Vietnam for this endeavor. Furthermore, Reuters reported in January 2024 that fifteen American firms are vying to invest $8 billion in semiconductors in Vietnam. American companies and business owners currently heavily invest in Vietnam, such as Intel, Apple, Nike, Amkor, Marvell, and First Solar, and the list can continue to grow in the comprehensive strategic partnership. Simultaneously, Vietnamese companies such as VinFast and VGN Corporation are increasing investments in the United States. VinFast’s growth in North Carolina is helping the local economy by creating more manufacturing opportunities. Though Vietnam and the United States have reached new peaks in upgraded relations, it is vital to mention that the comprehensive strategic partnership is not a mutual defense accord including direct military assistance. During the joint signing, neither Washington nor Hanoi mentioned ‘containment’ of Beijing’s ambitions, even though the South China Sea continues to grow into a potential regional powder keg. Vietnam’s upgraded partnership with the United States correlates with India’s current strategy of not fully aligning to one side to trigger ire or retaliation from the People’s Republic of China but strategically keeping full diplomatic cohesion with all regional powers while maintaining its sovereignty. Vietnam is also a close ally of Russia as the United States ignored the original requests for their self-determination post-WWII. Though they do not supply the Russian military’s illegal aggression in Ukraine, it is tantamount for the U.S. government not to push or strong-arm Hanoi closer to Moscow. Nevertheless, in the future, the U.S. and Vietnamese Armed Forces could establish backchannels to warn each other of any potential military threat by the People’s Liberation naval movements around the South China Sea without openly engaging in military cooperation that could draw strong actions from China and Russia. Hanoi looks to advance its interests amidst rising economic and technological competition in the Indo-Pacific and growing American investments will only push Vietnam’s marketing further. Simultaneously, Washington gains a growing economic and diplomatic presence in Southeast Asia. To promote a growing relationship, the United States can also further reconciliation efforts in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, as many of Vietnam’s demographic majority and elderly still remember the American aggression in the Indochina conflicts. In its second year, Hanoi and Washington continue to grow ties through several key sectors that advance both country’s national interests and further open opportunities between the East and West. Rebuilding and rewriting the wrongs of the past, the United States reached out to Vietnam to solidify a comprehensive strategic partnership, which is decades in the making and a landmark agreement long envisioned by Ho Chi Minh. With opportunities to expand into the technology, economic, and trade sectors, Hanoi and Washington continue to grow bilateral ties in year two of the partnership. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license

Diplomacy
BOGOTA - COLOMBIA, 01-25-2021:The candidate of the political party Pacto historico, Gustavo Petro.

Petro: A Promised Change Unfulfilled

by Carlos Andrés Ramírez

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The impact of a government is not only measured by its institutional performance, but also by its ability to transform the mental habits of politicians, officials, and citizens. Political action must offer collectively desirable futures. Retrospectively, however, many future projects are like lottery tickets that have already been played: records of unfulfilled illusions. The case of Petro’s government is no exception—but that doesn’t mean everything remains the same in Colombia. Change came and didn’t come. In some respects, the “government of change” has, in reality, remained stationary. This is the case, to begin with, regarding corruption. From campaign financing to suspicions of gifts offered to congress members in exchange for approving reforms, and including the various scandals involving the president’s son, the administration has been embroiled in numerous controversies. In Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Colombia dropped several positions, although it still ranks similarly to Brazil or Argentina, and at levels consistent with those seen under President Duque during most of his term. On matters of peace and security, and despite a shift in strategy, the government’s results are just as poor as its predecessor’s. The opposition’s narrative—that Petro’s arrival has brought the country to the brink of collapse in terms of security—is unsustainable. Red zones like Catatumbo have a long and complex history, and the Gulf Clan wasn’t invented yesterday. Nonetheless, the “Total Peace” policy is unlikely to be more than a grandiose slogan, with tangible results limited to a few local successes—such as the demobilization of one ELN dissidence group in Nariño and a temporary truce among the main gangs in Buenaventura. The protection of social leaders has not substantially improved (174 assassinations in 2024), the homicide rate, though slightly reduced, remains very high (25.4 per 100,000), crimes such as extortion have increased (18% rise between 2023 and 2024), and by April 2025, 21 police officers had been killed—four times more than during the same period the previous year. At the macroeconomic level, this government has not been the disaster predicted by the opposition, but broadly speaking, it also fits within the country’s stationary movement. President Petro has boasted, for example, about inflation rates (5%) and the unemployment rate (8.2%). However, inflation control is partly the result of measures taken by the Central Bank, and although Petro inherited the highest inflation in 23 years (13.1%), the average inflation rate during the Uribe, Santos, and Duque administrations was 4.88%. Petro’s unemployment figures are positive, but for much of Santos’s second term they were similarly favorable. Multidimensional poverty has continued its uninterrupted 14-year decline and, nationally, stands at 11.5% for 2024 (0.6% lower than the previous year). Economic growth under Petro has been rather modest (1.7% in 2024). Under Duque, average annual growth was 3%, and both previous administrations had higher averages. Growth expectations for 2025 don’t exceed 3%. In short, there’s been neither collapse nor spectacular takeoff. A constant, inertial movement is not change. So where is the change, then? In terms of public policy and governance practices, first, there has been a rethinking of the executive’s relationship with big business and the military leadership. Colombian capitalism has not mostly been built by heroic, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who innovate and take risks, but rather by a kind of “crony capitalism” based on reciprocal favors between economic and political elites—and, as shown emblematicly in the Odebrecht case, their capacity to cover for one another. Petro’s bitter relationship with Sarmiento Angulo is part of this. That Petro is branded by the opposition as an “enemy of business” and labeled a “communist” is a natural reaction to a disruption in the usual dynamics between the presidency and large corporate conglomerates. The same can be said, secondly, about criticisms regarding the alleged weakening and “demoralization” of the Armed Forces. As proven by the initial appointment of Iván Velásquez as Minister of Defense, Petro has emphasized the need to reject the criminalization of social protest and human rights violations that, for decades, were legitimized by the counterinsurgency discourse of the “internal enemy.” The purging of generals has been part of this aim. Opposition marches have been aggressive, but there hasn’t been a hint of police brutality. The contrast—especially with the right-wing governments of Uribe and Duque, marked by extrajudicial executions and repression of the Social Uprising—could not be more stark. Naturally, the right links Petro’s civilian approach with poor security outcomes. Duque, however, is his opposite, and the results were no better. Thirdly, Petro has pursued an ambitious social policy, and as the failed health reform illustrates—derailed by the convergence of pharmaceutical managers, traditional politicians, and health service providers—he has shown a willingness to challenge powerful groups. This framework also includes the pension reform approved in Congress, which will benefit 2.8 million elderly Colombians. Likewise, there has been a strengthening of rural communities through the creation of 13 new peasant reserve zones and the acquisition and formalization of land at volumes far surpassing those of the previous two governments. In the same vein, there’s the labor reform (blocked in Congress), which will be submitted to a public referendum. The reform aims to restore workers’ rights eroded over the past 20 years and coincides with a historic 9.5% increase in the minimum wage. Also worth mentioning are the development of 300 energy communities and the guarantee of free higher education in public institutions. Seniors, rural workers, formal laborers, ethnic communities, and youth are the direct beneficiaries of these policies—groups that have not typically been at the center of recent Colombian governments. Beyond concrete practices or policies, however, the greatest transformation brought by the “Government of Change” is cognitive openness. Petro has sparked controversies that have de-naturalized hegemonic ideas. The virulent reactions against him are partly due to his break from the establishment’s common sense on many issues—that is, he has turned into public problems, requiring justification and debate, what was previously accepted as obvious, generalized consensus. It has been a pleasure to see politicians and journalists forced to react to discussions on “degrowth,” the “energy transition,” or the “extractivist model”; compelled to justify the mantra that better labor conditions mean higher unemployment; to reflect on whether illegal crops are effectively fought with glyphosate spraying; or to ask, in disbelief, whether habitual submission to the United States is truly desirable, or whether a “pragmatic” foreign policy allows one to speak, with Petro’s moral clarity, about the genocide in Gaza. Not everything the president has said on these topics has been accurate, of course, but the point is how the generation of these debates contributes to the development of a more plural, reflective, and democratic political culture in Colombia. The impact of a government cannot be measured solely in terms of institutional performance, but also in terms of changes in the mental habits of professional politicians, public officials, and citizens. In that sense—more than in any other—the Government of Change has indeed lived up to its name.

Energy & Economics
In an event center pavilion we see a brand activation that seeks to show what Latin America and its renewable energies will be like

Energy losses are a brake on Latin America’s energy transition

by Fermín Koop

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Nearly a fifth of the energy generated in the region never makes it to usage. Experts call for more energy planning, investment and control Latin America has made significant steps towards its energy transition. The region already generates 60% of its electricity from renewable sources, a figure that the International Energy Agency expects to continue to rise. However, there is one factor in this journey that receives limited attention – and is affecting the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from energy. Energy losses – the difference between the amount of electricity generated and the amount that is ultimately accounted for via consumer bills – averaged 17% per year in Latin America over the past three decades, according to a report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). It says this is three times higher than in developed countries. That represents between five and six million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per year, equivalent to the emissions of 1.3 million cars. Specialists have termed these as “compensatory emissions”, as more electricity generation is required to compensate for the losses. Countries with a higher share of fossil fuel generation, such as Argentina, Mexico and Colombia, are mainly responsible for these additional emissions. Energy losses affect all countries in the region and occur for both technical and non-technical reasons. The former refers to problems in transmission and distribution lines, mostly due to a lack of investment and infrastructure maintenance; the latter corresponds to energy delivered and not paid for by users, such as theft and energy fraud. “Energy losses have the potential to affect the fulfilment of the climate targets,” Ana Lía Rojas, executive director of the Chilean Association of Renewable Energy and Storage (Acera), tells Dialogue Earth. “Every unit of energy that is lost means more generation is needed to meet demand.” Energy losses Most electricity is produced in power plants and sent over long distances through high-voltage transmission lines. It then reaches consumers through the distribution network – the poles and wires that connect homes and businesses. This infrastructure can suffer from various problems that result in technical energy losses. For example, losses due to the resistance of the conductive material through which the energy flows, ageing infrastructure and malfunctioning transformers. While these are inherent problems in electricity transmission, experts agree that there is a general lack of investment in transmission and distribution networks across Latin America. “Decision-makers prioritise having energy, and the grid is left as a second priority. You have to invest in parallel in the grid and in generation – it’s about seeing the system as a whole,” Ramón Méndez, Uruguay’s former energy director, tells Dialogue Earth. “A deficient infrastructure can become a major economic and technical problem.” Between 2015 and 2021, investment in distribution and transmission infrastructure in the region fell by about 40%. Not only can this lead to energy losses, but it also leaves grids more exposed to extreme weather events and can lead to service problems, which particularly affect vulnerable populations. In Latin America, most electricity losses occur in the distribution system. This is mostly due to non-technical factors, such as energy theft, says Santiago López Cariboni. A professor of economics at the University of the Republic of Uruguay, he co-authored the IDB’s energy losses report. “It is energy that is produced and transported, but not consumed legally. People break or tamper with meters or run a cable straight from the grid to their homes or businesses,” López Cariboni tells Dialogue Earth. “Even if governments could cut off the power to all those homes, they wouldn’t do it – it would create a huge social and economic problem.” A user that steals energy consumes up to three times more than one that does not, estimates López Cariboni. By not paying a tariff, people have no incentive to consume less or to have low-consumption technology. According to the IDB report, irregular connections are related to the disorderly growth of Latin American cities in recent decades. The dumping of energy Although it does not generate emissions, renewable energy can also generate a problem of energy losses. This has happened recently in Chile. The share of solar and wind energy reached a record 40% of the country’s energy generation in 2024. However, as their weight in the mix increases, so do energy losses. This phenomenon, also known as curtailment, occurs because the development of renewable projects is progressing much faster than available transmission and storage capacity. In 2024, 5,900 gigawatt hours (GWh) of power were wasted in Chile, 148% more than in 2023. The figure represents 20% of the solar and wind energy generated by the country, estimates Lía Rojas. Jorge Leal Saldivia, a partner at the Chilean renewable energy company LAS Energy, says this wasting corresponds mainly to solar energy generated in the north of the country. “The transmission infrastructure is not in place to be able to bring that energy to central and southern Chile. The lines become congested, and the energy has to be dumped,” he tells Dialogue Earth. Rodrigo Palma, a researcher at the Energy Centre of the University of Chile, tells Dialogue Earth there have been delays in energy planning: “The entry into operation of solar and wind has not stopped, and the rate of entry is greater than the rate of capacity-building by the state. This may slow down the penetration of renewables into our energy system.” By 2040, all coal-fired power plants will have to cease operating in Chile. This is expected to be mostly compensated for by renewable energy. In April, the government announced a tender for eight new projects to upgrade the grid, adding to 12 projects launched last year. One of the biggest initiatives, the Kimal-Lo Aguirre transmission line, is now under review after complaints from social and environmental groups. Possible solutions Half of the 26 countries analysed in the IDB report have experienced greater energy losses in recent years, highlighting the urgent need for solutions. Honduras, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic lose more than 30% of their energy, followed by more than 20% in Jamaica, Paraguay and Guyana. The IDB also highlights how grids face increasing vulnerability and impacts due to climate change. Specialists consulted by Dialogue Earth highlight the need for comprehensive planning by governments to address losses. For technical losses, the incorporation of technology can help, such as smart meters and storage. For the non-technical ones, a social policy perspective needs to be added, says López Cariboni. “Societies justify energy theft by necessity; they see energy as a right,” he explains. “For those who can pay, you can work with sanctions and regulations. But for those who can’t, the state should formalise those losses and take it as part of their budget. It’s more public expenditure, but it’s an expenditure that is already being made.” Martin Dapelo, a member of the board of directors for the Argentine Chamber of Renewable Energies (Cader), questions the lack of progress in the region on smart metering. “It is the first big step. We are missing out on the possibility of measuring in real time,” he tells Dialogue Earth. In storage, Chile has so far been the only country in the region to take the first steps. Distributed generation – energy generated by consumers themselves in small-scale, localised systems – is also on the region’s solutions list. These arrangements place solar or wind farms at the site of consumption, for example among housing or industry. This removes the need for energy transportation, avoiding grid overload. “We have gotten used to the idea that planning has to be indicative, and that it is the market that decides which direction to take with the energy sector. The case of Chile, with an oversupply of solar, but without transmission grids, shows that this is not the case,” say Méndez. “The optimal system is one that looks at the whole and determines the best combination.” This article was originally published by Dialogue Earth under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence

Defense & Security
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem meets with the President of Mexico Claudia Sheinbaum at the Palacio Nacional in Mexico City, Mexico, March 28, 2025

Mexico: The New War on Drugs

by Alberto Hernández Hernández

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The pressure exerted by Trump on Mexico has prompted a shift in the López Obrador government's anti-drug strategy, which now operates under the logic of negotiation imposed by Trumpism. In the Obradorist ideology, it was unthinkable to launch a new war against the narcos—partly because there is now suspicion that deals were made with organized crime, and partly because opposition to such a war was one of the key narratives that propelled former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to power. He consistently and harshly criticized the confrontation initiated by President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012). The “hugs, not bullets” policy of the former Mexican president empowered the drug cartels, and its effects spilled onto the streets of the United States, where designer drugs (fentanyl, methamphetamines) proliferated like never before. However, the electoral campaign and Donald Trump’s return to the White House spotlighted the drug trafficking issue, highlighting that it was costing 100,000 American lives a year. That surely struck a chord with the average American and hurt the Democratic Party’s candidate. “Donald Trump embodies what I want for my country,” said a white woman from the Midwest—a sentiment echoed by many who witnessed the destructive effects of these drugs in neighborhoods in Chicago, Philadelphia, or Los Angeles. This segment of the population turned out en masse to vote for Trump, joining millions of others who, for ideological, political, or economic reasons, gave the New York politician a sweeping victory. That resounding win shook the status quo—just look at the turmoil in global stock markets—but it also generated Trump’s own agenda with his trade partners. One key item: declaring war on the Mexican cartels, which he elevated to the status of “terrorist organizations” that must be destroyed. It was a powerful message for President Claudia Sheinbaum, who had not made the direct confrontation with the cartels a priority. She likely saw them as part of the structure López Obrador had built for the first stage of the so-called Fourth Transformation, and believed it best not to disturb them beyond occasional arrests and seizures. Sheinbaum had been inclined to continue that routine agenda in dealings with her main trading partner. However, Trump’s victory and his increasingly aggressive rhetoric against the cartels led to a direct confrontation with criminal organizations. Trump increased the pressure by deploying spy ships in Pacific waters off the Baja California coast. Mexican skies saw surveillance aircraft capable of capturing images of homes in the Golden Triangle—the border region between the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango, traditionally a haven for drug lords. Additionally, the U.S. security agency presence in Mexico was reinforced. Thus, the indulgent and criminal “hugs, not bullets” policy began to fade, leaving cartel leaders stunned. They have responded with a forward-escape strategy, creating an atmosphere of persecution and violence across different regions of the country—costing thousands of Mexican lives and pushing the public’s fear perception beyond 61%, according to INEGI. The myth López Obrador promoted—that “fentanyl is not produced in Mexico”—collapsed when Omar García Harfuch, the Public Security Secretary, recently stated that more than 800 laboratories have been destroyed. The problem, however, isn’t just the cartels and their capacity to produce and distribute drugs on American streets. It also includes the entire political scaffolding that enables the business to function efficiently—something it could not have achieved without the complicity of politicians with drug lords or intermediaries. And while one might think Trump would be pleased with the results of his pressure, that’s not the case. He bluntly stated that the Mexican government merely wants to make him “happy”—by sealing the northern border, making arrests and deporting drug lords, destroying labs, and even allowing U.S. agents to collaborate with Mexico’s national security system. They’ve even permitted spy flights and menacing naval patrols in Pacific waters. But even with these surprising results, the pressure continues—both publicly and diplomatically. Kristi Noem, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, recently met with President Sheinbaum at the National Palace. Beyond the formal courtesies, the headline came when Noem, upon returning to the U.S., revealed that she had handed Sheinbaum a list of requests to continue strengthening the good relationship between the two countries. President Sheinbaum was stunned when tariffs became a reality. Although Mexico and Canada weren’t mentioned in Trump’s public list of targeted countries, that was because the tariffs had already been decided before the press conference: a 25% tariff would apply to imports of steel and aluminum, as well as to products not covered by the USMCA—representing roughly 50% of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. In short, Trump’s pressure on Mexico has altered the policy upheld by Obradorism and now operates under the logic of Trump-style hard negotiation: “If the adversary yields at the first push, you can keep pressuring and gain more.” Some say that the list handed over through diplomatic channels includes the names of many currently serving politicians. That’s the reality, amid an anti-crisis narrative that tries to sell the idea that defeats are victories and losses are gains. And now, the time has come to find out where President Sheinbaum draws her red line.

Energy & Economics
The image displays mineral rocks alongside US currency and flags of Ukraine and the USA, highlighting the complex relationship involving economics, power, and resources.

Why Zelensky – not Trump – may have ‘won’ the US-Ukraine minerals deal

by Eve Warburton , Olga Boichak

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Last week, the Trump administration signed a deal with Ukraine that gives it privileged access to Ukraine’s natural resources. Some news outlets described the deal as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “caving” to US President Donald Trump’s demands. But we see the agreement as the result of clever bargaining on the part of Ukraine’s war-time president. So, what does the deal mean for Ukraine? And will this help strengthen America’s mineral supply chains? Ukraine’s natural resource wealth Ukraine is home to 5% of the world’s critical mineral wealth, including 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as vital for defence, construction and high-tech manufacturing. However, there’s a big difference between resources (what’s in the ground) and reserves (what can be commercially exploited). Ukraine’s proven mineral reserves are limited. Further, Ukraine has an estimated mineral wealth of around US$14.8 trillion (A$23 trillion), but more than half of this is in territories currently occupied by Russia. What does the new deal mean for Ukraine? American support for overseas conflict is usually about securing US economic interests — often in the form of resource exploitation. From the Middle East to Asia, US interventions abroad have enabled access for American firms to other countries’ oil, gas and minerals. But the first iteration of the Ukraine mineral deal, which Zelensky rejected in February, had been an especially brazen resource grab by Trump’s government. It required Ukraine to cede sovereignty over its land and resources to one country (the US), in order to defend itself from attacks by another (Russia). These terms were highly exploitative of a country fighting against a years-long military occupation. In addition, they violated Ukraine’s constitution, which puts the ownership of Ukraine’s natural resources in the hands of the Ukrainian people. Were Zelensky to accept this, he would have faced a tremendous backlash from the public. In comparison, the new deal sounds like a strategic and (potentially) commercial win for Ukraine. First, this agreement is more just, and it’s aligned with Ukraine’s short- and medium-term interests. Zelenksy describes it as an “equal partnership” that will modernise Ukraine. Under the terms, Ukraine will set up a United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund for foreign investments into the country’s economy, which will be jointly governed by both countries. Ukraine will contribute 50% of the income from royalties and licenses to develop critical minerals, oil and gas reserves, while the US can make its contributions in-kind, such as through military assistance or technology transfers. Ukraine maintains ownership over its natural resources and state enterprises. And the licensing agreements will not require substantial changes to the country’s laws, or disrupt its future integration with Europe. Importantly, there is no mention of retroactive debts for the US military assistance already received by Ukraine. This would have created a dangerous precedent, allowing other nations to seek to claim similar debts from Ukraine. Finally, the deal also signals the Trump administration’s commitment to “a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine” – albeit, still without any security guarantees. Profits may be a long time coming Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration and conservative media in the US are framing the deal as a win. For too long, Trump argues, Ukraine has enjoyed US taxpayer-funded military assistance, and such assistance now has a price tag. The administration has described the deal to Americans as a profit-making endeavour that can recoup monies spent defending Ukrainian interests. But in reality, profits are a long way off. The terms of the agreement clearly state the fund’s investment will be directed at new resource projects. Existing operations and state-owned projects will fall outside the terms of the agreement. Mining projects typically work within long time frames. The move from exploration to production is a slow, high-risk and enormously expensive process. It can often take over a decade. Add to this complexity the fact that some experts are sceptical Ukraine even has enormously valuable reserves. And to bring any promising deposits to market will require major investments. What’s perhaps more important It’s possible, however, that profits are a secondary calculation for the US. Boxing out China is likely to be as – if not more – important. Like other Western nations, the US is desperate to diversify its critical mineral supply chains. China controls not just a large proportion of the world’s known rare earths deposits, it also has a monopoly on the processing of most critical minerals used in green energy and defence technologies. The US fears China will weaponise its market dominance against strategic rivals. This is why Western governments increasingly make mineral supply chain resilience central to their foreign policy and defence strategies. Given Beijing’s closeness to Moscow and their deepening cooperation on natural resources, the US-Ukraine deal may prevent Russia — and, by extension, China — from accessing Ukrainian minerals. The terms of the agreement are explicit: “states and persons who have acted adversely towards Ukraine must not benefit from its reconstruction”. Finally, the performance of “the deal” matters just as much to Trump. Getting Zelensky to sign on the dotted line is progress in itself, plays well to Trump’s base at home, and puts pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table. So, the deal is a win for Zelensky because it gives the US a stake in an independent Ukraine. But even if Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves turn out to be less valuable than expected, it may not matter to Trump.

Diplomacy
HAJJAH , YEMEN – October 26, 2020:Tribal mobilization to support government forces in northwest Yemen

Yemen’s Ansar Allah reaches ceasefire deal with US that excludes strikes on Israel

by Aseel Saleh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While Trump declared the truce agreement a US victory, Ansar Allah said that Washington contacted them in order to “avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement reached a ceasefire deal with the United States on Wednesday, May 7, according to Oman, which mediated the negotiations. The deal stipulates the halt of Ansar Allah’s attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an end to US aggression on Yemen. However, it does not prevent the Yemeni movement from launching attacks on Israel.  “Following recent discussions and contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman with the United States and the relevant authorities in Sana’a, in the Republic of Yemen, with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides,” Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, wrote on X. “In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” the minister added. Peoples Dispatch spoke to a member of the Communist Party of Jordan, Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh, to discuss the ceasefire, which he described as a “sudden development in the war in the Red Sea.” Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh indicated that “both the US and Oman didn’t comment on Ansar Allah’s missiles targeting Israel, especially that this agreement was reached shortly after a Yemeni missile reached Ben Gurion airport, near the occupied city of Lydda (also known as Lod).” As per Al-Hatabeh’s analysis, “important questions about this agreement are left without answers. Taking into consideration the Omani role in the American – Iranian negotiations, is the ceasefire in the Red Sea part of the deal? Another question will arise from this assumption, did America give up some of Israel’s interests in order to reach an agreement with Iran? Where does this agreement leave Netanyahu’s government, especially after Ansar Allah’s spokesman told Reuters that the agreement doesn’t include Israel.” Ansar Allah says the US contacted them seeking a truce One day before Oman announced that the deal was sealed, US President Donald Trump alluded that a ceasefire agreement was about to be reached, claiming that Ansar Allah agreed to stop the fight with the US because they “capitulated”.  “They just don’t want to fight, and we will honor that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated,” Trump said from the White House on Tuesday, May 6. “They will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that’s what the purpose of what we were doing. So that’s just news. We just found out about that. So I think that’s very, very positive,” he added. Although Trump bragged about the deal, presenting it as a US victory, analysts suggest that it was Ansar Allah that forced the world’s greatest military superpower to the negotiating table, after paralyzing US naval traffic off the Yemeni coast.  Ansar Allah’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, confirmed during an interview with Almasirah TV channel, that the movement “did not make any request to the Americans to hold ceasefire talks”. Abdulsalam asserted that, on the contrary, the movement recently received US requests and messages seeking a truce, via the Sultanate of Oman. The Yemeni official pointed out that US endeavors to reach a ceasefire with Ansar Allah were a great disappointment to Israel. “The Israelis have endured great disappointment after the stance of the US, which tried to walk away and avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen,” he said. However, Abdulsalam clarified that Ansar Allah is still “assessing this US position so that the facts on the ground do not contradict its statements”. He further warned that in the event that the US “would not abide by the agreement in any way”, the movement “will respond”. Abdulsalam considered the deal “a success to be added to Yemen’s credit, as it enhances a situation that would leave the “usurper entity” [Israel] in a situation of loneliness, in confrontation with the great popular and military stance led by Yemen on behalf of the Arab and Islamic nation.” The ceasefire was announced two months after Trump ordered a large-scale aerial campaign against Yemen on the pretext of protecting US shipping, air, and naval assets and to restore “navigation freedom” from Ansar Allah’s attacks. Trump’s order followed Ansar Allah’s decision to resume a ban on Israeli ships due to Israel’s continuous blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yemen threatens Israel with a devastating and painful response for attacking Sana’a airport  While Ansar Allah agreed to a truce with the US, it vowed to escalate its operations against Israel as long as its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza is not lifted.  In response to Israel’s aggression on Sana’a International Airport on Tuesday, that destroyed terminal buildings and caused USD 500 million in damage, Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Chairman, Mahdi al-Mashat, threatened that “Sanaa’s response will be devastating, painful, and beyond what the Israeli enemy can endure.” “From this moment onward, stay in your shelters or leave for your homelands immediately. Your failed government will no longer be able to protect you,” Al-Mashat warned Israeli people.  Moreover, the Yemeni senior official reaffirmed that no aggression will deter Yemen from its “rightful decision” to support the people of Palestine “until the genocide ends and the siege on Gaza is lifted.” The Yemeni Armed Forces’ spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, also confirmed in a televised statement late Wednesday, that the movement will continue its ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, alongside the comprehensive aerial blockade on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

Energy & Economics
Flags of America and China atand on table during talks between diplomats and businessmen. American and Chinese representatives sit opposite each other to discuss relations between countries.

China and US agree to cut tariffs imposed in April

by Abdul Rahman

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The agreement was an acknowledgment of the significance of their trade for mutual economic development and the health of the global economy, the joint statement says. China and the US agreed to roll back high tariffs imposed on one another last month for a period of 90 days. The agreement was announced in a joint statement issued on Monday, May 12. The agreement was a result of a high-level meeting on trade and economic affairs held between Chinese and US delegations in Geneva, Switzerland over the weekend. As described in a press conference on Monday by the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent who was part of the US delegation, both sides have agreed to reduce the tariffs by 115%. That would mean that the US will reduce its tariffs on China to 30% from its present 145% while the Chinese will lower their tariffs to 10% from its present 125%. These new tariff rates would be effective from Wednesday for the next 90 days. Both the countries also agreed to explore a more stable arrangement in the interim period. China also agreed to reverse additional measures imposed in response to US President Donald Trump’s tariff war, such as putting various US companies on the sanctions list and placing export controls on rare earth minerals. The parties committed to taking these measures as an acknowledgment of the mutual significance of their bilateral trade and its importance for the global economy and for “moving forward in the spirit of mutual opening, continued communication, cooperation and mutual respect,” a joint statement says. The 30% US tariff includes a 10% baseline tariff imposed on all imports by Trump in April after suspending his reciprocal tariff regime for 90 days, and a 20% tariff imposed by the Trump administration before April in the name of stopping the illegal flow of the drug fentanyl. Answering a question on the cooperation between both the countries over fentanyl, the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Lin Jian criticized “the wrongly slapped tariffs on Chinese imports” by citing the issue and claiming that “if the US truly wants to cooperate with China, it should stop vilifying and shifting the blame.” Jian also advised the US “to seek dialogue with China based on equality, respect and mutual benefit.” Relief for the global economy  Trump announced a reciprocal tariff regime on April 2 against all those countries which had a trade surplus with the US, including China. After global backlash, Trump later postponed the implementation of the regime for 90 days, inviting countries to seek bilateral agreements to avoid high tariffs while imposing a 10% common tariff. The Trump administration had claimed that reciprocal tariffs were required in order to lower the US trade deficit, which is over a trillion dollars. China, the third largest trade partner of the US, faced the highest tariff rates under Trump’s tariff war and chose to retaliate. It also called the policy a violation of international law and an attempt by the US to weaponize trade. On Tuesday, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated his country’s position that there are no winners in trade and tariff wars, claiming bullying and hegemony will only result in self-isolation. He was addressing the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) forum in Beijing. The tariff war between the world’s leading economies was seen as a disaster for the global economy and trade. A large number of US businesses had also opposed Trump’s tariff war. They had claimed high tariffs may lead to a rise in prices which harm both the consumer and domestic production. Several businesses filed lawsuits in the US claiming Trump’s reciprocal tariff regime was illegal and harmful for their ability to do business. US trade representative Jamieson Greer, who was part of the negotiating team in Geneva, claimed that the talks with various countries, including China, is the first step to reducing the US trade deficit and ending the national emergency declared by Trump to authorize the reciprocal tariff decrees, South China Morning Post reported. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also hailed the agreement as “substantive progress” for mutual economic development. It expressed hope that “the US side will build on the meeting, continue to work with China in the same direction, completely rectify its wrong practices of unilateral tariff hikes, and keep strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation.” Acknowledging that “high levels of tariffs were equivalent to an embargo and neither side wanted that,” Bessent declared on Monday that the US wants a trade relationship with China, though a balanced one. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also hoped that the US would pursue the matter much more seriously and “inject more certainty and stability into the world economy.” Both the countries have agreed to establish “a joint mechanism” to continue their trade and economic negotiations in future. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

Diplomacy
KYIV, UKRAINE - May 1, 2022. Flags of Finland and NATO.

Finland: Two Years in NATO

by Sergey Andreev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском April 2025 marks the second anniversary of Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the prospect of joining the alliance began to be seriously considered after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, a final decision was repeatedly postponed due to the unclear advantages of this move and insufficient public support. Despite close economic ties with Russia and a tradition of cautious diplomacy known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen line” (often criticized as “Finlandization”), the 2022 international crisis pushed Finland to join NATO. Since then, the once-neutral country has shifted its foreign policy, increased defense spending, and expanded its arms exports. Government and Military Perspectives In December 2024, the Finnish government presented a new Defense Report in Helsinki, replacing the previous strategy issued in September 2021. Back in 2021, Finland had highlighted the growing military activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, along with the increased interest of major powers in the natural resources of the North and the Northern Sea Route. Notably, the country didn’t name any specific enemy, choosing to keep its message broad and carefulThe 2024 document takes a much more serious tone. It clearly names Russia as the main source of global instability and describes China as a growing power that challenges the U.S. and its allies. Terrorism is mentioned too, but much less often. Some of the main points about global security include the following - The return of a "large-scale, protracted war" to the European continent;- The Special Military Operation (SMO) is interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008;- An increase in hybrid attacks and incidents involving critical infrastructure;- Growing Chinese influence on Finland and its neighboring countries;- An unpredictable and unstable defense and international security environment, with a clear tendency toward further deterioration;- The largest NATO military buildup on the eastern flank since the end of the Cold War;- Accession to NATO is described as “the most significant transformation in Finland’s defense policy since World War II”;- Ongoing integration of Finland’s armed forces into NATO’s structures and joint defense planning;- Finland is now planning its defense together with NATO, focusing not just on its own territory but also on the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In the section on shifts in global power, Russia is named as the main cause of instability. It is described as “the most significant and immediate threat to the Allies, to security, and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Other claims include: a long-standing effort to weaken the European Union, a push to restore its great power status, and an attempt to divide Europe into spheres of influence using military force. Russia is also accused of using hybrid tactics—such as spreading fear, influencing public opinion, stirring political divisions, and blocking decisions—to target European countries and their people. Its Special Military Operation is seen as the beginning of a broader, more direct, and unpredictable conflict with the West. China is characterized as a less aggressive player. It is noted that Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, has intensified intelligence activities in the United States and Europe, and has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia, the development of which will determine Moscow’s ability to exert influence over Europe. At the same time, Finnish strategists place greater emphasis on the ongoing competition between China and the United States for global political, military, economic, and technological dominance. In matters concerning NATO’s role in defense, it is noted that the Alliance has intensified its cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, increased its military presence on the eastern flank and the number of military exercises, and is continually updating both general and regional defense plans in the event of a large-scale conflict. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO has become geographically closer to strategically important areas for Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Belarus, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, ensuring the security of maritime transport routes and the modernization of military infrastructure in Northern European countries is viewed as a key condition for the potential reinforcement of troops from North America. The role of the European Union is described as complementary to NATO, while it is also noted that the EU is increasing defense spending and expanding technological cooperation. The report was published after the election victory of Republican U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his isolationist views, which is partially reflected in the document through emphasis on European independence in security matters and the need for further military expenditures. On intra-European regional issues, the report focuses on cooperation with the member states of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic States, and the United Kingdom, as well as on Germany’s shift in security policy, France’s increased defense spending, and Poland’s growing purchases of military equipment. In military and technology matters, the document highlights the growing role of unmanned systems (both remote-controlled and autonomous), artificial intelligence, and advanced human capabilities like improved thinking and synthetic biology. It stresses the need to use the latest scientific and tech innovations in developing weapons — a step that could help make up for fewer soldiers on the battlefield. Cyberspace and outer space are seen as new areas of military and technological competition. This view is based on several factors: the rapid growth of space technologies (driven by private companies), easier access to space, and heavy reliance on cyber tools and satellites for both military and civilian use. Information warfare is also becoming more influential alongside traditional combat. The document notes that small countries can benefit in such conflicts by using innovations smartly and managing resources well. Still, Helsinki does not rely only on high-tech solutions. A key part of Finland’s military strategy is preparing both its army and population for long-term, grinding conflicts. This includes signing long-term arms supply contracts, building strategic reserves, keeping supply chains strong, and staying ready to protect their way of life. Among the main conclusions, the authors of the report present the following: - Finland and Europe are facing a significant decline in security, with no short-term improvement expected.- Russia poses and will continue to pose a constant security threat to Europe and Finland;- Finland will provide military assistance to Ukraine for as long as necessary;- Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region, and the High North have formed a unified geostrategic space; the Baltic Sea region holds strategic importance for Finland;- Finland’s defense will rely on maintaining conscription, strengthening the training of its military reserve, a strong public will to defend the country, and support from NATO membership.- Commitment to total defense — a combination of all national and international military and civilian measures that ensure the protection of the country under any circumstances (seven components are listed: government administration, international relations, defense capability, internal security, economy, functional capabilities of the population, and psychological resilience of people); There is a need to improve working conditions in the defense industry, increase production, and secure steady, reliable supply chains. A gradual increase in Finland’s military spending. - The development of the EU’s defense potential, and movement toward greater independence of the European Union both in policy and in the development of military technologies and defense supplies;- NATO’s readiness to provide the full spectrum of forces necessary for large-scale, high-intensity combat operations; Finland, in turn, must also create all the necessary conditions for the presence of allied troops on its territory. Similar assessments are presented in the Military Intelligence Review of Finland — 2025 (previous publications date back to 2021 and 2023), prepared by the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces. Russia is also named as the main threat there, which “seeks to reduce Western influence, secure its sphere of influence,” “views security policy as a zero-sum great power game in which NATO expansion strengthens the position of the United States and thereby weakens Russia’s security,” and “the interests or security of neighboring countries are not an important factor in Moscow’s calculations.” In addition, Russia is accused of seeking to turn the Global South against Western countries, in particular, there is a reference to “an attempt to present the BRICS group as part of an anti-Western ‘global majority’” . As for the Northern European direction, the Finnish General Staff notes the buildup of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic region, attributes to Moscow attempts to gain unrestricted access to the Northern Sea Route and to weaken the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO structures. Helsinki predicts that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s priority will be the accelerated buildup and modernization of forces in the reestablished Leningrad Military District, bordering Scandinavia. Finnish military officials do not believe in a quick settlement of the situation in Ukraine and forecast a deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West in the coming years, a struggle by Russia for shipping in the Baltic Sea “by any means,” continued attacks on underwater infrastructure in the Baltic (a reference to damage to undersea cables, although no exact culprit is named), escalation of the race between the West, Russia and China for the resources of the High North, and increased intelligence and sabotage activities by Russian special services in Finland. China is not viewed in an entirely negative light; instead, there is recognition of Beijing's ambition to become a political, economic, military, and technological leader by 2049, marking the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China's growing influence over countries of the Global South is also noted. Russia–China relations are seen as a "lifeline" for the Russian economy and a means of circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing is not seen as an equal partner, but as someone benefiting from Russia’s growing isolation. This makes Russia more dependent on China. The war in Ukraine is seen as helping China, since it distracts the West from China's global rise. At the regional level, Helsinki plans to enhance cooperation and update the foundational NORDEFCO agreement during its presidency of the organization in 2025. This push for renewal is driven by the evolving security environment and Finland’s recent accession to NATO alongside Sweden. Back in April 2024, the defense ministers of the member states signed a memorandum outlining a new vision for NORDEFCO. According to the document, by 2030 the countries plan to improve joint military planning and operations, make it easier to move troops across borders, boost cooperation and intelligence sharing, both directly and through NATO and the EU, and keep strengthening the defense industries of the Nordic countries. NORDEFCO is not officially seen as a mutual defense agreement or a command system like NATO; however, in recent years, it has started to show features usually found in a defense alliance, mostly because of the actions of some of its members. In 2021, the defense ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden signed a deal to strengthen cooperation, allowing for "joint action in times of peace, crisis, or conflict." In 2022, they gave each other permission to use their airspace and military bases. That same year, the defense ministers of Finland, Norway, and Sweden updated their three-way agreement, further growing their military cooperation. After Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway made a joint promise to fully support them if either country were attacked. While NORDEFCO has not yet become an organization like NATO, the current level of defense cooperation between the Nordic countries at the regional level — and repeated promises to help each other in case of conflict — suggest that in the coming years, this effort might start to look like a smaller version of NATO in Northern Europe. This kind of setup would likely be less full of red tape, quicker at making decisions, and made up of countries that share similar views and speak with one voice. It would also have a lower risk of going backward — unlike some NATO members who, in recent years, have threatened to block decisions, added extra demands for new members, or even talked about leaving the Alliance. Defense and Military-Industrial Complex Expenditures Threats identified by Finnish politicians and the military automatically require growing expenditures and an acceleration of the defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2014 to 2020, Finland’s military spending remained annually at the level of 1.5% of GDP, while in absolute terms it gradually increased — from $3.57 billion to $3.9 billion. Amid the pandemic in 2021, the figure dropped to $3.65 billion, but by the end of 2022 it amounted to $4.47 billion, and in 2023 — to $6.85 billion, or 2.4% of GDP. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides similar estimates: growth from $3.72 billion in 2014 to $6.89 billion in 2024, with the budget for 2025 estimated at $7.47 billion. Helsinki does not intend to stop there — on April 1, 2025, following recommendations from the Ministry of Defense, the government began preparations for a phased increase of the military budget to at least 3% of GDP by 2029. Over four years, it plans to raise allocations by €3.7 billion, expand the state defense order, and develop new rearmament programs for the 2030s. Helsinki also views the prospects of its domestic defense industry with optimism — according to the Finnish think tank SaferGlobe (which, according to its website, is “engaged in the study and development of tools to promote sustainable peace and security”), in 2023 arms exports reached €333 million (of which €141 million accounted for weapons intended for civilian use in self-defense, sports, and hunting) — a record since record-keeping began in 2002. About 85% of military exports were distributed within Europe. The largest importing countries by value were Sweden (€51 million), Latvia (€34 million), and Lithuania (€19 million) — together, these three countries accounted for more than half of all military product exports. In value terms, the largest share of exported military products (32%) consisted of land vehicles and their components. The next largest export categories were ammunition (17%), as well as explosives and charges (15%). The largest exports of civilian weapons were to the United States (€52 million), Canada (€15 million), and Australia (€9 million). The year 2023 also set a record for issued export licenses for military products — €667 million. The largest recipient countries of export licenses were Slovakia (€201 million), Japan (€154 million), and Ukraine (€88 million). Similar conclusions were reached by the state investment company Finnish Industry Investment (Tesi), which in autumn 2024 surveyed 368 domestic defense companies: 144 of them were identified as “fast-growing startups and growth companies,” while the rest were described as “more established players with a long history, mainly providing consulting services to the Finnish Defence Forces.” The highest growth rates were shown by producers of dual-use goods, whose net profit has increased annually by 30–40% since 2022. At the same time, companies engaged exclusively in the military sector faced difficulties in attracting investment. 50% of defense companies were located in the capital region of Uusimaa, where the leaders were Helsinki (74 companies) and its satellite city Espoo (65); another 16% were based in the Pirkanmaa region centered around Tampere (40). Rounding out the top five were the high-tech “capital” Oulu (21) and another satellite of Helsinki, Vantaa (14). By type of activity, the majority of companies (246) operated in the support and logistics sector; 70 were engaged in the design of combat command and control systems (C4I — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence); 20 firms cooperated with the land forces, 13 with the navy, 10 with the air force, five worked in joint operations, and the remaining four were involved in space technologies. A New Strategy — A New President Finland’s entry into NATO happened during the second and final term of President Sauli Niinistö. While he followed the West’s general approach on the war in Ukraine and supported anti-Russian sanctions, he still tried to keep some level of political dialogue with Russia. After February 2022, this became almost impossible, and Finland officially ended its nearly 80-year policy of staying neutral. In the two-round election held in January and February 2024, Finnish voters chose Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party as their new president. Stubb studied in the United States and France, and previously worked as a Member of the European Parliament, as well as Finland’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Back in 2014, when Finland still followed the "Paasikivi–Kekkonen line" of cautious foreign policy, Stubb was one of the only top officials who openly supported joining NATO. On the topic of relations with Russia, he said that “Russia’s integration with the West was an illusion.” This view may be influenced by his family history. Stubb’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Käkisalmi — a town that was given to the Soviet Union after the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, renamed first as Kexholm (in Swedish), and later as Priozersk. On his father's side, Stubb’s grandparents came from Vyborg, which also became part of the Soviet Union after the war. However, the family had already moved to Helsinki before the conflict started. In his inaugural speech on March 1, 2024, Alexander Stubb uncompromisingly stated to the citizens of Finland that “the post–Cold War era is over” (placing the blame on Russia), “the instruments of cooperation have been turned into weapons,” “the world is in a transitional state,” and “the creation of a new world order takes time.” He added that Finns “will have to respond quickly to changing circumstances, as was the case with NATO membership,” and that “when times become difficult, I too will be ready to make tough decisions to ensure the security of our country.” In addition to his campaign promises, the newly elected president confirmed his commitment to the previously introduced “value-based realism” (arvopohjainen realismi), which he pledged to be guided by in the conduct of foreign policy if elected. Later, this was officially included in the government’s report on foreign and security policy in June 2024. Among other ideas, the report especially highlighted the following: commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, international law, and human rights; strengthening the country’s defense; staying out of military conflicts; and being open to dialogue with countries that do not share these values. The election of A. Stubb as president strengthened the pro-Western trends in Finland’s foreign policy. On September 1, 2024, the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States entered into force, under which Finland opens 15 of its military facilities for possible use by U.S. forces, while Helsinki will not charge rent for premises or land made available to the United States. On September 27 of the same year, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced the placement of NATO headquarters on Finnish territory — in Mikkeli in the southwest of the country, 140 km from the border with the Russian Federation, and in the northern region of Lapland. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish authorities announced preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines (a similar step had previously been taken by the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia), stating that this is “a cost-effective way to supplement the capabilities of the armed forces,” but adding that the country would remain “committed to the humanitarian goals of the convention” even after a possible withdrawal. On April 15, 2025, a Finnish servicemember took part for the first time in a flight aboard a NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during Ramstein Alloy 2025 exercises in the Baltic region. The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) includes personnel from 17 countries, in addition to which Canada, France, Finland, and Lithuania also contribute their staff. NATO noted that the E-3A is the first multinational flying unit created by the Alliance. Statements regarding Russia, despite initial uncompromising tone, began to soften after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, who held a different view of the Ukrainian conflict compared to the strongly pro-Ukrainian administration of Joe Biden. As early as April 2024, Alexander Stubb stated that there was no need to conduct political dialogue with Russia, and considered military action the only path to peace in the context of Ukraine. Under the new Washington administration, the Finnish president approved of the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian leaders, but again repeated the Ukrainian position on the need for a “just peace” and Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. During his March 2025 visit to Florida, Stubb attempted to dissuade Donald Trump from cooperating with Russia and also called for tougher sanctions against Moscow. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish president admitted that European countries had started talking about renewing contact with Russia. He said that Finland must "morally prepare" for rebuilding political ties with Russia, since "nothing changes the fact that Russia exists and will always be a neighbor." However, he did not give any timeline for when relations might be restored. The situation around the war in Ukraine is made more difficult by the Trump administration’s growing isolationism, along with threats to pull out of talks and a trade war that Washington has launched against almost the entire world (though some parts of it have been paused). This raises fears of a new “Great Depression.” The European Union’s success at the negotiating table will depend on how united its member states are, since they have different geopolitical interests. Although Finland supports calls for a ceasefire, it does not plan to stop its military support for Ukraine or oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Alexander Stubb, on at least two occasions (in November 2024 and March 2025), publicly warned Ukraine against following a “Finnish scenario.” This would mean giving up on NATO membership and possibly giving up territory—similar to what Finland did after World War II, when it accepted neutrality and lost 11% of its land. In a comment on efforts to resolve the conflict in 2025, Stubb criticized Finland’s past policy of “good neighborliness” with the Soviet Union. He said that while Finland kept its independence in 1944, it lost land, part of its sovereignty, and the ability to make its own decisions freely.