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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the weeks leading up to the appointment of Michel Barnier as France’s new prime minister, there was one word in particular to hang on the lips of those at the Elysée Palace – “coalitation”. The portmanteau of “coalition” and “cohabitation”, “coalitation” serves to refer to the situation of acute governmental deadlock in which France finds itself, more than two months after the snap parliamentary elections called by Emmanuel Macron failed to land any party an absolute majority of seats. Under the Fifth Republic, France has known three cohabitations following parliamentary elections won by the opposition to the president’s party. The first was between the socialist president François Mitterrand and conservative prime minister Jacques Chirac from 1986 to 1988; the second, between president Mitterrand and Édouard Balladur from 1993 to 1995, and the third between president Chirac and socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin from 1997 to 2002. Under such circumstances, the president took on a secondary role, including tasks such as appointing the prime minister or presiding the council of ministers, while the prime minister and national assembly set the political agenda. However, the current situation is very different, recalling more the paralysis of the Fourth Republic than any of the duos listed above. While the presidential camp lacks even a relative majority, none of the parties or coalitions from the recent legislative elections come close to securing one either. Michel Barnier will therefore have to rely on a new coalition or new ad hoc agreements to get his legislative proposals passed and avoid being censured. The French neologism coalitation is therefore more appropriate to describe the situation in which Emmanuel Macron and Michel Barnier find themselves. A notion of performance In addition, such a state of affairs is not without recalling expressions used in the labour world, such as ‘remote working’, ‘presenteeism’, ‘management’ and ‘coworking’. In the 1980s, the expressions ‘management’ and ‘managers’ became widely used terms in France to describe the challenges of optimising resources and managing people in organisations. This period marked the proliferation of neologisms, particularly of English origin, in the business world. It highlighted the importance of individual and collective performance, helping French companies compete in an increasingly global market. By the 1990s, expressions like “New Public Management” and “New Managerialism” emerged in English-speaking countries. These terms were particularly applied to setting performance targets – especially financial ones – in organisations originally serving the public interest, such as health and education sectors. An expression used by Macron? The term “coalitation” was first coined by advisers to the President of the Republic. We can read its use as an attempt to downplay the lack of a presidential majority and to ease the transition into the upcoming cohabitation. This strategy can be seen as a way for the President to maintain the upper hand despite his party’s defeat in the parliamentary elections. It functions as a semantic tool that allows Macron to frame this cohabitation in a modern and new way, setting it apart from previous ones. But the links between this term and management-inspired neologisms also reflect Macron’s profile as a “politician manager” and his managerial approach to politics. An advocate of free enterprise and entrepreneurship, often associated with the “start-up nation” concept, Emmanuel Macron embodies a political philosophy directly influenced by the business world. His terms in office have stood out through their use of team-building seminars, the use of consultants from private firms, and staff reshuffles following unmet performance targets. Inability to renew? Back home, the seemingly contradictory term also echoes the president’s fondness for the expression of “En même temps” (“At the same time”) that has become part of the Macron brand. The adverbial phrase sees him lay out a position, only to deconstruct it and espouse its contrary proposition. Critics say it shows the centrist president’s inability to adopt a stance, opting instead for a verbal fudge of saying one thing, then its opposite and ultimately, nothing at all. The neologism coalitation also embodies a new form of the Macronist “at the same time” philosophy by emphasising the need to find common ground between opposing programmes and political forces. For supporters of the president, this term highlights the relevance and timeliness of an approach developed by Emmanuel Macron. In this context, Michel Barnier’s profile as a negotiator and moderate can be seen as a reaffirmation of this strategy. Historically, however, the use of such neologisms has sometimes served to mask the challenges of ineffective or risky strategies. Some researchers have questioned whether introducing expressions like ‘management’ and ‘manager’ into the French vocabulary truly changed how companies and social relations worked, emphasising the sometimes artificial nature of these approaches. The same applies today to the term “coalitation” as this neologism seems to illustrate Emmanuel Macron’s struggle to offer a new way of doing politics despite the promises made on the night of his re-election. Macron France French Politics PM Barnier Politics

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Lebanese families have been fleeing the country’s south in the thousands amid escalating tensions and an Israeli bombardment that has so far killed hundreds. Their fear, echoed by many onlookers, is that Israel will accompany the airstrikes with something that has the potential to have far worse consequences: a ground invasion of south Lebanon. The rational behind such a move, from the Israeli government’s perspective, is that a ground offensive may be its best chance to push Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River in the middle of the country. This would achieve an Israeli war goal of securing its northern borders and allowing an estimated 60,000 residents who have been forced to flee northern Israel to go back to their homes. Irrespective of motive, a ground invasion and potential occupation is more than wild speculation. Israel has placed thousands of soldiers on standby close to the Lebanon border for such an eventuality. Nor is such a move without precedent. As a scholar of Lebanese history, I know Israel and Lebanon have been here before. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in the middle of the latter’s civil war, imposing a siege on the capital Beirut. The results were catastrophic for the whole region. Not only did the ground invasion result in the death of thousands of civilians, the occupation of Lebanon plunged an already fragile nation into lasting political and economic chaos and led to the birth of Hezbollah, the very group that threatens northern Israel today. Refuge and armed resistance The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 had its roots in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, much as the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel does today. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was accompanied by the Nakba, or “catastrophe,” for the Palestinians. In the violent birth pangs of a Jewish state on land inhabited by, among others, Arab populations with deep ancestral ties to villages, more than 750,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled. Many refugees entered Lebanon, where in 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization was born. By the mid-1970s, the armed resistance group had recruited and trained over 20,000 fighters who actively participated in launching attacks on Israel from Lebanese soil. By 1982, Lebanon was already seven years into its civil war, with violence flaring between Lebanese Christians and Lebanese and Palestinian Muslims. On June 6, 1982, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, a future leader of the country, launched Operation Peace for Galilee and invaded Lebanon with the purpose of eliminating the PLO. More than 40,000 Israeli troops with hundreds of tanks entered Lebanon from three points: by land across the border into south Lebanon; by sea from the coast of Sidon; and by air as the Israeli forces bombed the Beqaa Valley, Beirut and its Palestinian refugee camps. For two months, Beirut was under siege, with water and electricity cut off. As a result of the heavy bombardment and lack of access to basic needs, an estimated 19,000 Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian civilians and combatants died, of which 5,500 were civilians from West Beirut. The Lebanese authorities appealed to the United States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom for help. These countries formed the multinational peacekeeping force, which was designed to restore peace in Lebanon, assist the Lebanese armed forces and evacuate PLO fighters to Tunisia. By August 1982, the multinational force had successfully relocated PLO fighters and began pulling out of Lebanon. They were called back, however, as violence flared. After the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel on Sept. 14, 1982, the Christian Phalangist militia entered the two Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and killed over 2,000 Palestinian civilians. The Israeli government later set up the Kahan Commission of Inquiry to look into the killings, which concluded that Israel was indirectly responsible for the massacres. The birth of Hezbollah All of this history remains relevant to the current situation in the region. Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon, its siege on Beirut and the massacres that followed all led to the birth of Hezbollah. While members of Lebanon’s marginalized Shiite community in the south had long sought to mobilize through pan-Arab political parties and militias, it was Israel’s invasion that galvanized members of the community to ultimately create Hezbollah in 1985. As former Israeli Defense Minister and Prime Minister Ehud Barak noted in a 2006 interview: “It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.” Israel’s invasion also soured Lebanon’s relations with the West. Many Lebanese and Palestinian Muslims considered the multinational force – especially the United States – to be a failure and even an accomplice to Israel. From 1982 onward, Americans and other Westerners became a target. In the following decade, more than 80 Americans and Europeans were taken hostage by Hezbollah fighters. Some were tortured for months; others died in custody. And on Oct. 23, 1983, a terrorist attack targeted the American barracks in Beirut, killing over 300 people, including 220 Marines, 18 sailors and three soldiers. Minutes later, a second suicide attack killed 58 French paratroopers. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the two attacks; some of its members are thought to be among those who officially founded Hezbollah in February 1985. Aiding Hezbollah recruitment Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon failed to accomplish its goals of stemming attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon. If anything, it had the opposite effect by turning many Lebanese against Israel and creating the conditions in which Hezbollah could recruit. Although Israel retreated from Beirut in August 1982, it continued to occupy south Lebanon until 2000. During that period it unlawfully detained many Lebanese suspected of resisting the Israeli occupation. Some were detained without charges in inhumane conditions, while others were illegally transferred into Israel. With such a backdrop, Hezbollah’s legitimacy in the eyes of many Lebanese grew – as did its support. So much so that in 1989, at the end of the Lebanese civil war, the authorities signed an agreement that, although not referencing Hezbollah directly, asserted Lebanon’s right to resist the Israeli occupation in the south. This clause was interpreted by Hezbollah as legitimizing its armed fight against occupation. After occupation ended in 2000, Hezbollah had to reinvent its role, claiming that it would continue fighting against Israel until the liberation of the disputed Shebaa Farms, the Golan Heights and occupied Palestine. In 2006, Hezbollah entered Israeli territory for the first time, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two, demanding the release of Lebanese prisoners in exchange. In retaliation, the Israel Defense Forces attacked Lebanon by air, sea and land, with Israeli ground forces entering Lebanon and carrying out a number of operations on Lebanese territory. A subsequent war saw no such prisoner swap but resulted in the deaths of about 1,100 Lebanese civilians and 120 Israelis, mostly soldiers. History repeating? Until Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, there had been hopes that decades of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel could be on the cusp of turning. In October 2022, Lebanon and Israel signed a maritime border agreement brokered by the U.S – interpreted as the beginning of normalizing relations between two countries technically at war. But the magnitude of the human crisis in Gaza and the series of events that followed in Lebanon have ended such hopes for now. Hezbollah’s vow of solidarity with Hamas has resulted in a running series of tit-for-tat attacks with Israel that have escalated over the past year. The attack using booby-trapped pagers that targeted Hezbollah fighters and killed several civilians across Lebanon on Sept. 17, 2024, has set off a chain of events that have now seen nearly 500 Lebanese killed and Hezbollah extend the geographical scope of its missile attacks in Israel. Its long-range ballistic missiles can reach 250-300 kilometers (155-186 miles) and have reached Haifa and the city’s Ramat David Airbase. The next step in this deadly escalation could well be a ground invasion. But in 1982, such an operation resulted only in catastrophic results for all concerned – and set in place the conditions for decades of hostilities across the Lebanon-Israel border. A similar offensive today would almost certainly have similar results – especially for the people of Lebanon.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After more than 50 days of deadlock in forming a government (an unprecedented political situation under the Fifth Republic), the choice of Michel Barnier to become Prime Minister may appear as a "solution" to end the crisis, but it above all reveals the current political weakness of President Macron, oscillating between the hope of maintaining control and forced failure. But this nomination puts him at odds with the messages sent by voters during the electoral sequence that he himself chose to trigger. Three key lessons Three lessons from the July legislative election are unambiguously necessary to understand the paradoxes of the current sequence. 1. The rejection of “Macronism” In the previous European election, the Macron camp had been soundly defeated. In confirmation, the message from voters in the legislative elections is one of rejection of the power in place since the presidential parliamentary group went from 245 elected representatives to 163 and the two most pronounced opposition blocs went from 89 to 143 (the RN and its allies) and from 153 to 193 for the left bloc. The aggregation of the various votes therefore expresses a desire to see notable political changes come out of the ballot boxes to break with all or part of Macron's policies. But the differences in direction to translate these inflections maintain the confusion. The left wants to repeal the immigration law, while the RN wants to toughen it up, for example. 2. The refusal of the National Rally in power While it was fashionable to declare it moribund, the "republican front" has regained strength in this summer of 2024. Through a political surge, which is as much an ideological rejection as the expression of sincere fears about the damage of the RN at Matignon, the forces hostile to the RN have accepted mutual withdrawals to "block". This electoral gamble paid off, and if the RN has progressed, it has remained far from the expected absolute majority. Nevertheless, this "republican front" has not led to a political alternative: it was only a front of refusal and not the premises of a probable future governmental cooperation. Hence the current impasse and the threats hanging over the survival of the future Barnier government. 3. The marginalization of the Republican right The emergence of Emmanuel Macron in the political game, eager to overcome the divide and the alternations of government between the PS and the Republicans, has put the right in a vice. Stuck between the center right embodied by Macron and the hard right embodied by Le Pen, the Republican Party has seen its voters melt away on both sides. We must add the electoral rise of the RN to the ordeal of the right. On these early legislative elections, the dilemma remained the same. The president of LR, Éric Ciotti, crossed the Rubicon and made an alliance with the RN, while the rest of the party opposed him without however winning back its voters who had gone to the Marconian camp. In the end, LR, proclaimed heir to Gaullism, which gave four presidents to the Fifth Republic, is no more than a parliamentary force, even if the senatorial voting system still ensures it a counter-power in the Senate. Let us note, however, that if we add a large part of Macron's voters with those of LR and RN, we are entitled to affirm that the parliamentary barycenter is clearly positioned to the right of the hemicycle. However – ultimate confusion – it is the left-wing coalition that comes out on top in the hemicycle.span> The Barnier choice against these messages from voters These three lessons are followed by a governmental choice that has all the makings of a paradox, not to say a contradiction. Indeed, if we sum things up brutally, appointing Michel Barnier amounts to choosing a representative of the minority party (LR), whose profile and political positions poorly embody a break with "Macronism", and who owes his appointment to the benevolent neutrality (to date) of the National Rally. Indeed, President Macron made it clear that "non-censurability" was the decisive criterion for his choice. However, he declared that he had made this choice (after the tests of many other names failed) because he had ensured "the conditions of stability and the broadest rallying". Knowing the disappointment of the New Popular Front, this explicitly indicates that President Macron obtained the commitment of the RN not to censor Michel Barnier a priori. Which was confirmed a few minutes after his nomination by Marine Le Pen. Without of course entering the government, the RN therefore becomes the arbiter of its choice, the arbiter of a censure. The parties of the presidential camp have therefore agreed to make an electoral pact with the left front (yet widely hated in their ranks) in the name of the government barrier to the RN, so that the president ends up appointing a prime minister thanks to the RN's promise not to censure him. A choice of both hope and failure President Macron is primarily responsible for the current political chaos , through a dissolution that was as perilous as it was failed, the success of which rested on the bet that the left would be incapable of uniting and would once again have to resolve to a republican front in the face of the "RN threat". However, he is trying to take advantage of the complexity of the moment to keep control. He wants to be the expert in time, extending for several weeks a government clearly disavowed at the ballot box. He wants to be the expert in the partisan game, imposing the trans partisan coalition including the central bloc as the only horizon for access to Matignon. All this, while claiming to do so in respect of the will of the French people… The Macronists who have been calling for more than 50 days for an “overcoming” of divisions, for “inventiveness” in the creation of an unprecedented coalition, are here benefiting from their central position on the left-right axis to refuse a cohabitation-alternation, in favor of a coalition-continuation (which will nevertheless involve some political inflections). But the choice of Michel Barnier, by default certainly, has the virtue of guaranteeing that Emmanuel Macron's political achievements will not be brutally unraveled, as happens in the case of cohabitation, and as the New Popular Front loudly wanted. President Macron can therefore probably feel a little relief today. He can even hope to convince the French, by invoking that France is on the right and that the left-wing coalition has been intransigent. One Man's Political Failure Yet this nomination is weighted with many signals that speak of the political failure of a man. Emmanuel Macron wanted to dynamite the partisan game: he found himself prisoner of a Republic of ukases, each party announcing who they were going to censor on the sole basis of their name. He wanted to embody a policy breaking with the "old world": here he is giving the Fifth Republic one of the oldest prime ministers (after having sacrificed the youngest by dissolving it). The political party he created around his person, Renaissance, published a press release in reaction to the nomination, specifying that it was not signing a "blank check" to Michel Barnier. This situation thus indicates that, even within the Macronist camp, preparations are already being made for the post-Macron period. This is true of Edouard Philippe, already a candidate for his succession, and of Gabriel Attal who secured his influence by being elected leader of his parliamentary group. Emmanuel Macron has consistently been elected (in 2017, 2022, and in the 2024 legislative elections) in the name of a Republican barrier to the National Rally, benefiting from the votes of the left. And now he owes his (provisional) exit from the crisis to the neutrality negotiated with Marine Le Pen. This unbalanced position can only reinforce frustration, even anger against him, in the left-wing electorate, and can sow confusion among some centrists. Not to mention that being at the parliamentary mercy of the National Rally will very quickly place the head of government in a dilemma: whether to make concessions to the RN in exchange for its survival. The immigration law has left scars within the so-called "left wing" of Macronism. Even greater and more symbolic concessions made to the RN could fracture its own party and further confirm the end of "Macronism" - the left/right divide regaining strength and vigor. France Barnier French Politics

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Since 1825, Bolivia has averaged a new government every 26 and a half months. A study by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, Political Science professors at the University of Kentucky, indicates that from 1950 to 2010, there were 23 coup d'état cases in the country. These include 11 successful actions, defined as those that allowed the insurgents to control power for at least a week. The decade in which Bolivia recorded the most coups was the 1970s, with some years experiencing two consecutive cases. Another study by The Washington Post reports that during the country's independent history, there have been over 190 attempts at coups and revolutionary processes. Bolivian historian Manuel Contreras attributes this situation to elements of internal politics, such as the absence of strong institutions and "an unprofessional military prone to this type of adventures". [1] Bolivia is currently facing multiple crises. The most prominent is in the political sphere, stemming from the division between President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales, who lead different factions of the Movement for Socialism–Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP) and are vying for the party’s nomination for the 2025 presidential elections. This fragmentation is also reflected in a conflict with the judiciary, due to rulings made by judges regarding Morales' potential presidential candidacy, among other decisions. Additionally, the country is experiencing significant economic deterioration due to a decrease in foreign currency reserves and fuel shortages, which are heightening social discontent. In this context, it was reported that there was an attempted coup on June 26. The rift between the MAS leaders weakens the institutional framework needed to respond to these various crises. This article briefly reviews all these elements. Background: resignation of former President Evo Morales Evo Morales governed for three terms, from 2006 to 2019. In 2016, a referendum was held to consult citizens about modifying Article 168 of the country's Constitution, which stipulates that the presidency is for five years, with the possibility of re-election only once consecutively. At that time, the "no" vote won, and the constitutional reform project was narrowly rejected. [2] In 2017, Evo Morales filed a challenge of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. The Court determined that Morales could run for a fourth consecutive presidential term in the 2019 elections, arguing that unlimited re-election is a right protected by the American Convention on Human Rights, which, it was claimed, takes precedence over the Bolivian Constitution. [3] On October 20, 2019, Bolivia held general elections. [4] Initially, the results pointed to a runoff between President Evo Morales and former President Carlos Mesa. During the vote count, the Preliminary Results Transmission System (TREP) was abruptly halted and resumed almost 24 hours later with a shift in the trend. [5] Subsequently, Morales was declared the winner in the first round by a narrow margin. [6] Almost simultaneously with the announcement of the new results by the president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Bolivia (TSE), María Eugenia Choque, dozens of police officers positioned themselves near the headquarters where the electoral authorities were receiving the tallies. Accusations of fraud and massive protests were followed, [7] demanding either a runoff or the annulment of the elections. [8] As mentioned, before Evo Morales' presidency, the military in Bolivia attempted several times to overthrow the government in power. During the MAS leader’s mandate, institutional relations were strengthened. Several measures were taken to transform the military mentality and bring it closer to the Bolivian people. In 2009, the Armed Forces adopted the wiphala, the indigenous flag. In 2016, a mandatory “anti-imperialist" school was established for military personnel aspiring to be promoted. Morales referred to himself as the "first private soldier president," increased the military budget from $114 million in 2001 to $483 million in 2018, and was the only democratic president to purchase large quantities of weapons and equipment. At the same time, Morales provoked resentment among the military by removing "neoliberal" commanders and prosecuting the chiefs who handed over missiles to the United States in 2005. Additionally, he imprisoned the officers responsible for the 2003 repression in El Alto, which resulted in the death of 67 protesters. These measures failed to change the "conservative spirit of the armed forces." [9] Over time, a rift was developed between the military and Morales. In late 2019, under the leadership of Williams Kalimán, members of the Army appeared on television asking for Morales' resignation, which led to his ousting. The former president initially rejected accusations of fraud from opposition groups and organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and denounced an attempted coup orchestrated by his political adversaries and sectors of the armed forces. [10] However, he agreed to call for new elections, but this was not enough to ease the tensions. [11] On November 10, 2019, Evo Morales resigned from his position. [12] He then left Bolivia, first for Mexico and later for Argentina, where he was granted political asylum. [13] As a result, the presidential line of succession was disrupted, with several key government figures resigning. In this context, Jeanine Áñez, who was the second vice president of the Senate, assumed the interim presidency on November 12, 2019. Her proclamation took place in a parliamentary session without a quorum, which sparked controversy and accusations of illegitimacy from Morales' party, MAS, and other sectors. In his view, Morales stated from Mexico that "the most insidious and nefarious coup in the history" of his country had been carried out. [14] Struggle among the leaders of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) In the 2020 elections, Luis Arce, former Minister of Finance under Morales, was elected, running as the MAS candidate. [15] Former President Evo Morales returned to Bolivia a year after leaving the country, a day after Arce assumed the leadership of the Andean state. Analysts say that the dispute between the two politicians began on the day of Arce's inauguration in November 2020. In his inaugural speech, Arce did not mention Morales. Political scientist Susana Bejarano says that the president "made a textbook mistake by not giving Morales a place [...]. Without having a role, Morales exerted pressure through his influence, and Arce responded" [16] In recent months, Morales has referred to Arce as "the worst president of the democratic era" and has also accused him of leading the country’s economy to deterioration. For Arce, Morales is his "main opponent," and his supporters accuse Morales of wanting to control the country. [17] In October 2023, Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca were expelled from MAS by the leadership aligned with Evo Morales due to their refusal to attend a congress held in Cochabamba. This clearly defined the two factions: the “Evista” faction, which supports Morales' leadership, and the "Arcista" (or renewal bloc) that did not recognize the expulsion of the president and Choquehuanca. [18] The Minister of Government, Eduardo del Castillo, a prominent figure in the Arcista sector, believes that Morales “conceives of MAS from the person rather than from social organizations.” On the other hand, Morales’ faction accuses the Arcistas of being close to the political right, trying to take over a social base that does not belong to them, and forgetting the revolutionary principles of the movement. [19] Recently, in May, the Arcistas organized a congress in the city of El Alto, where they elected Grover García as the new president of MAS in place of Morales, but the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) did not approve this conclave. Meanwhile, the Evistas attempted to hold their congress in Villa Tunari, in the Cochabamba region, Morales' political and union stronghold, but the TSE also did not recognize that meeting. This has temporarily left the MAS candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections in suspense. [20] Both groups have tried several times to hold national congresses to appoint a new leadership (and thus comply with the Electoral Law) and to select a presidential candidate. [21] However, the TSE has disqualified all the sessions and insists that both factions hold "a joint congress" to comply with the party's statutes. In September 2023, Morales announced his candidacy for the presidency, challenging Arce, who is expected to seek re-election. The former president has accused the government of trying to block his candidacy and has also threatened that there will be "upheaval" in Bolivia if he is disqualified. [22] The Bolivian Congress is bicameral; the Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 representatives, of which MAS holds 75 seats [23], and 24 of them are Arcistas. Meanwhile, the Senate is made up of 36 members [24], with 21 belonging to the MAS caucus, of which 7 are Arcistas. [25] The party also celebrated its 29th anniversary, albeit in a divided manner, with the Arcistas in La Paz and the Evistas in Santa Cruz. This struggle has extended to the Congress, where Arce lost the majority due to the MAS split. Political scientist Fernando Mayorga says that the fracture caused legislators close to Morales to move forward with agreements with the opposition to pass various laws, such as the suspension of the mandates of the Judicial branch magistrates, or to block others, such as the approval of external loans for public finances. [26] This situation has led the government to accuse Morales of provoking a "structural crisis scenario" to "shorten" Arce's mandate. The president has even stated that he is the target of a "soft coup" by Morales' followers. On the other hand, the former president accuses the government of incompetence and corruption [27] and has said that he has "ideological, programmatic, organizational, and even ethical differences" with Arce. He has also pointed out that there are no opportunities for reconciliation with the government because it has shifted to the right. [28] Confrontation with the Judiciary Part of the struggle between the former president and the current president involves the Judiciary, which Evo Morales considers aligned with Luis Arce. Bolivia is the only country in Latin America that elects its high judicial courts [29] by popular vote since 2009. That is how two elections have been held, in 2011 and 2017. [30] At the end of 2023, the term of the magistrates concluded; however, the lack of agreements within MAS (and with the opposition) to define the candidates has delayed the judicial election process. [31] The Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) also contributed to this delay by declaring some laws approved by Parliament to convene the judicial elections unconstitutional. For these reasons, the TCP decided to extend its mandate and that of the other judicial bodies to "avoid a power vacuum." In early June, during a joint session of the Senate and the Lower House, Evistas and opposition legislators approved a bill that suspends the magistrates of the high judicial courts, without the presence of Arcistas legislators. This meeting was convened by the president of the Senate, Andrónico Rodríguez, an ally of Morales. The TCP deemed this process illegal, as the senator did not have the backing to assume the role of president of the Assembly. [32] The Tribunal pointed out that the presidency of Congress is the responsibility of the country's vice president, David Choquehuanca, who, according to Rodríguez, was acting as interim president due to a trip by the country's president, Luis Arce. [33] The law also nullifies all the rulings that the magistrates approved in the last year. A source close to Vice President Choquehuanca stated that overturning these rulings would be "chaotic" and argued that it aims to provoke a political and social crisis. Meanwhile, other experts, such as the constitutionalist Israel Quino, believe that nullifying these legal acts is necessary for the country to "return to the rule of law." [34] At the end of 2023, the TCP issued a ruling nullifying indefinite re-election in the country, which disqualifies Morales from running in the 2025 elections. This decision overturns the 2017 ruling that allowed the former president to be re-elected that year. If the TCP is not renewed, this ruling cannot be reviewed. Supporters of the former president are demanding the resignation of the magistrates from the highest courts, alleging that the Judiciary "follows orders from the government." Meanwhile, Evo Morales accuses the government of sabotaging the judicial elections. After a series of road blockades by Morales' followers, President Arce issued a law in February aimed at holding the elections in September. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that it expects the Congress to issue the call for the elections. [35] The economic situation and social discontent in Bolivia Bolivia's economy grew at an annual rate of 4.7% from 2005 to 2019. The government channeled the profits from natural gas exports into social programs and salary increases, which helped reduce poverty from 60% in 2006 to 37.2% in 2019. [36] A new indigenous middle class also emerged. Gas production increased after Evo Morales' 2006 decree to nationalize hydrocarbons. Additionally, Bolivia has the world's largest lithium reserves, with 23 million metric tons (MT). Along with Chile and Argentina, these countries form the "Lithium Triangle," holding more than two-thirds of the world's reserves. However, Bolivia's production of this element is still very low (600 tons per year), presenting significant growth opportunities for the future. [37] Since the end of the raw materials boom in 2014, Bolivia relied on high public spending and domestic credit to sustain economic growth. Over time, these measures increased debt and reduced international reserves and accumulated fiscal savings. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened the situation. After it ended, the Bolivian economy recovered. However, the level of indebtedness, the decline in natural gas production, and modest international reserves have put pressure on the foreign exchange market, where a parallel exchange rate has emerged. [38] Natural gas production decreased from 56.6 million cubic meters per day (Mm³/d) in 2016, with oil revenue of $1.755 billion, to 31.9 Mm³/d in 2023, with an income of $2.048 billion, according to official information. Bolivia has seen low production in its oil and gas fields, requiring the import of gasoline and diesel, which are then sold at subsidized prices in the domestic market — a cost that is increasingly difficult to sustain. [39] “As a result of the decline in natural gas production, the amount of dollars coming into the country has decreased," says economist Jaime Dunn. According to the Central Bank reports, international reserves dropped from $15.122 billion in 2014 to $1.796 billion in April 2024 [40], attributed to the decline in revenue from gas sales to Brazil and Argentina and the lack of approval for new loans in the Congress. [41] The prices of basic goods have also increased. For months, long lines of people trying to obtain dollars have been observed, as well as the expansion of a parallel market for this currency. The shortage of dollars has impacted both importers and exporters. The most affected product has been fuel purchased from abroad. Bolivia imposed a subsidy on gasoline and diesel more than 15 years ago. Now, specialists warn the country doesn't have the dollars to buy them. This is a problem because Bolivia imports 56% of the gasoline and 86% of the diesel it consumes. Bolivian President Luis Arce has acknowledged that the situation is "pathetic." According to him, it is due to the "lack of a clear hydrocarbon policy in the country" in recent years. [42] To mitigate the situation, he ordered the militarization of the fuel supply system to prevent the smuggling of subsidized diesel to neighboring countries. [43] This combination of fuel and currency shortages has sparked protests from merchants and transporters in various cities across the country. Several sectors have taken to the streets to demand a solution to the rising costs of essential goods. [44] In 2023, there were almost 200 days of blockades. To address the situation, in February, Economy Minister Marcelo Montenegro announced a series of economic reforms, such as easing export restrictions and creating a diesel auction for large producers. However, these measures still seem insufficient. The tension generated by the situation has also affected Arce's popularity, which has dropped to 18% [46] according to polls. [45] Some social protest calls are attributed to supporters of Evo Morales, although these groups deny it. [47] To exacerbate these problems, the country has experienced droughts and high temperatures, which have damaged agricultural production and caused wildfires in the Bolivian Amazon. Lake Titicaca, among other bodies of water, has dropped to historically low levels. Residents of the El Alto neighborhood, in the heights of La Paz, only receive water sporadically during the day. [48] Reactions after the attempted coup In this context of political strife and economic deterioration, it was reported on June 26th that there was an attempted coup led by General Juan José Zúñiga, who has been dismissed and is now in prison. [49] The Minister of Government, Eduardo Del Castillo, stated that the insurrection had been planned for three weeks. The official indicated that the action resulted in 12 gunshot injuries and led to the arrest of about 20 military personnel and civilians. A new high command has also been appointed. Del Castillo emphasized that although the government had received information about previous attempts at destabilization and "soft coups," none had reached the scale of the reported events. [50] Analysts believe that Zúñiga appears to be an unhappy general with little support. [51] According to various journalistic reports, he was perceived as the "general of the people." [52] He was appointed as the General Commander of the Army in November 2022 and reaffirmed in January of this year by the president. Before that, he held the position of Chief of the General Staff. According to the Bolivian newspaper ‘El Deber’, Zúñiga was the closest military officer to Arce and was at odds with former President Evo Morales. [53] According to Army records, in 2020, Zúñiga ranked 48th out of 65 officers in the 1990 class. ‘El Deber’ notes that Zúñiga has close ties with mining and union sectors. However, throughout his career, he has faced accusations of misappropriation of public funds, for which he was sanctioned. In 2022, Zúñiga was mentioned by Evo Morales as the leader of an Army group that engaged in "permanent persecution" against political leaders like him. This elite faction, known as the ‘Pachajchos’, carried out military intelligence operations, [54] they had influence in the assignment of officers' posts, and played an important role in combating smuggling. [55] Following the brief insurrection, it is expected that the fracture between former President Evo Morales and President Luis Arce will deepen. On one hand, the government's version claims to have successfully quelled an attempted military coup in less than four hours. Retired Army Colonel Jorge Santistevan described Zúñiga as an amateur, leading an uprising without military consent, with improvised tactics and an empty speech. "This was an adventure, not a coup," stated analyst Omar Durán. [56] On the other hand, Evo Morales and opposition sectors describe the events as "a self-coup," "a political show," "an adventure," or "a parody" by Luis Arce Catacora, allegedly orchestrated with General Zúñiga and his supporters to victimize the president and boost his popularity. [57] This version aligns with what Zúñiga declared when he was arrested. In several posts on the social network "X", Morales has commented on the situation. He criticized the president's actions, called for a thorough investigation of the events, and even apologized to the international community for seeking their support in the face of the apparent coup (a narrative later adopted by Argentina). [58] Additionally, Evista Senator Luis Adolfo Flores argued that there was no police action to prevent the seizure of the plaza, for example, and he highlighted the "inaction" of the Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo. Another member of the Upper House, William Torrez, agreed that it was not a genuine coup. [59] Senate President Rodríguez posted on social media that "between the self-extended magistrates, a supposed coup or self-coup, the Bolivian people are sinking into uncertainty. This institutional disorder is leading the country to a situation of chaos and distrust." [60]. Luis Arce says that foreign interests are involved in the attempted coup, aiming to benefit from Bolivia's natural resources. He also claims that former President Evo Morales is willing to go to any lengths, even questioning the government's actions, in order to be a candidate for the 2025 elections. [61] On the other hand, the failed coup in Bolivia could worsen the current dollar shortage in the Andean country, said the global investment bank BancTrust & Co., based in London. "Although the coup apparently failed, the crisis will leave its mark. Political instability and the government's weakness will likely make it difficult for authorities and the private sector to access alternative sources of hard currency financing in the future, exacerbating the current crisis," BancTrust & Co. said in a commentary on the situation in Bolivia. [62] On the other hand, the rift between Arce and his mentor, Evo Morales, weakens Bolivian democracy, blocks any strategy against the economic crisis, keeps Congress paralyzed, and opens the door to ventures like that of General Zúñiga. Researcher Armando Ortuño warns that "the military coup was a symptom of political disorder. There is a weak government facing multiple crises." [63] Ortuño points out that in the short term, to address the political crisis, there must be some sort of agreement between Arce and Morales. [64] Jean Pierre Lavaud, a French sociologist, believes that the current major problem stems from "the internal struggle within MAS." [65] Another possible effect of this rift is that the opposition could win the next elections. [66] Additionally, Evo Morales' vice president, Álvaro García Linera, fears that this power struggle between the two leaders could strengthen the military. It will be problematic if Morales' supporters use the military to weaken the president, while the Evistas use them to contain the former president. García Linera argues that the military structure always has its own agenda and could pose a risk to national stability. Legal notice The article was created and published by the Gilberto Bosques Center for International Studies of the Senate of the Republic of Mexico (webpage https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/). The analysis and research do not represent the position of the Senate or its members. References [1] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo [2] Jaime Cárdenas Gracia, “Informe sobre el referéndum boliviano de 2016”, Boletín mexicano de derecho comparado, 50(148), 81-112, abril de 2017. consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-86332017000100081 [3] Jorge Sánchez Morales, “Elecciones generales en Bolivia, 2019. Una reflexión de derecho comparado”, Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, 2020. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.te.gob.mx/editorial_service/media/pdf/250320241450414990.pdf [4] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: Carlos Mesa acusa a Evo Morales de ser el "protagonista de un golpe de Estado" y llama a continuar las protestas”, BBC News Mundo, 23 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50161520 [5] BBC News Mundo, Elecciones en Bolivia: suspenden el recuento provisional de votos cuando todo apuntaba a una segunda vuelta entre Evo Morales y Carlos Mesa, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50119933 [6] BBC News Mundo, “Elecciones en Bolivia: el conteo preliminar sitúa a Evo Morales como virtual ganador sin necesidad de segunda vuelta y en medio de denuncias de fraude”, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50134370 [7] Swiss Info, “Claves sobre el polémico proceso por fraude electoral de 2019 en Bolivia”, 28 de julio de 2021. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024, en: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/claves-sobre-el-pol%C3%A9mico-proceso-por-fraude-electoral-de-2019-en-bolivia/46822282 [8] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: por qué hay cuestionamientos y denuncias de fraude sobre los resultados preliminares que sitúan a Evo Morales como ganador en primera vuelta”, BBC News Mundo, 22 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50146649 [9] Fernando Molina, “De Evo Morales a Luis Arce: las conspiraciones de los militares bolivianos contra el Movimiento al Socialismo”, El País, 28 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-29/de-evo-morales-a-luis-arce-las-conspiraciones-de-losmilitares-bolivianos-contra-el-movimiento-al-socialismo.html [10] Norberto Paredes, “Evo Morales: ¿hubo un golpe de Estado en Bolivia? BBC Mundo consultó a 6 expertos”, BBC, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50375002 [11] Fernando Molina, “Bolivia: ¿golpe o (contra)revolución?”, Nueva Sociedad, noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en:https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-golpe-ocontrarevolucion/?fbclid=IwAR0dIgxoErXdbi2oKUw8JGkYxTFfRlKZaJFGm9DlTN7b0zJ3VwNGXPWYli0 [12] Abraham Zamorano y Boris Miranda, “Evo Morales renuncia a la presidencia de Bolivia: 5 claves que explican por qué tuvo que dimitir el mandatario indígena”, BBC. News Mundo, 10 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50369434#:~:text=Evo%20Morales%20pas%C3%B3%20en%20menos,el%20que%20anunci%C3%B3%20su%20dimisi%C3%B3n. [13] BBC News Mundo, “Asilo a Evo Morales en México: las consecuencias para AMLO del paso del expresidente boliviano”, 14 de diciembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50790682 [14] Deutsche Welle, “Jeanine Áñez asume presidencia interina de Bolivia”, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/jeanine-%C3%A1%C3%B1ez-asume-presidencia-interina-de-bolivia/a-51219169 [15] BBC News Mundo, “Luis Arce, ganador de las elecciones en Bolivia, a la BBC: "Si Evo Morales quiere ayudarnos será muy bienvenido pero eso no quiere decir que él estará en el gobierno"”, 20 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticiasamerica-latina-54610692 [16] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales ensombrece el futuro de Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-07-01/la-fractura-entre-luis-arce-y-evo-morales-ensombrece-el-futuro-de-bolivia.html [17] EFE, “Momentos clave que llevaron a Bolivia a su actual crisis política y social”, El Universal, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/momentos-clave-que-llevaron-a-bolivia-a-su-actual-crisis-politica-y-social/ [18] Fernando Molina, “El partido de Evo Morales expulsa al presidente Luis Arce y agrava la guerra política en Bolivia”, El País, 5 de octubre de 2023. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-10-05/el-partido-de-evo-morales-expulsa-al-presidente-luis-arce-y-agravala-guerra-politica-en-bolivia.html [19] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [20] EFE, “Momentos clave…”, op. cit. [21] Fernando Molina, “Evo Morales anuncia que será candidato a la presidencia de Bolivia en medio de la guerra con Luis Arce”, El País, 24 de septiembre de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-09-24/evo-morales-anuncia-que-sera-candidato-a-lapresidencia-de-bolivia-en-medio-de-la-guerra-con-luis-arce.html [22] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves para entender la crisis política y económica detrás del intento de golpe de Estado denunciado por el presidente de Bolivia”, BBC, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c6p2r06lenjo [23] Cámara de Diputados de Bolivia, ”Composición de la Cámara de Diputados”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://diputados.gob.bo/diputados-home/ [24] Cámara de Senadores de Bolivia, ”Bancadas”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://web.senado.gob.bo/legislativa/bancadas [25] Marco Antonio Chuquimia, ”El 'evismo' es mayoría en el Senado: tiene la presidencia y la jefatura de bancada”, El Deber, 18 de octubre de 2023, consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/el-evismo-es-mayoria-en-el-senado-tiene-la-presidencia-y-la-jefatura-debancada_343939 [26] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce que la falta de diésel en Bolivia es “patética””, El País, 12 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/luis-arce-reconoce-que-la-falta-de-diesel-en-bolivia-es-patetica.html [27] Fernanda Paúl, op cit. [28] Sputnik, ”Evo Morales descarta reconciliación dentro del MAS”, Elpais.cr, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.elpais.cr/2024/03/12/evo-morales-descarta-reconciliacion-dentro-del-mas/ [29] Se eligen por voto popular los cargos del Consejo de la Magistratura, el Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y el Tribunal Agroambiental. Fernando Molina, “La elección popular de jueces en Bolivia se atasca en el Congreso”, El País, 30 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-08-31/la-eleccion-popular-de-jueces-en-bolivia-se-atasca-en-elcongreso.html [30] Idem. [31] Idem. [32] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-boliviano-suspende-a-losmagistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [33] Infobae, “El Congreso de Bolivia aprobó el cese del mandato de altos magistrados en una polémica sesión que comenzó a oscuras”, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/07/el-congreso-de-bolivia-aprobo-el-cesedel-mandato-de-altos-magistrados-en-una-polemica-sesion-que-comenzo-a-oscuras/ [34] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano…”, op. cit. suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-bolivianosuspende-a-los-magistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [35] Fernanda Hernández Orozco, “¿Cómo le ha ido a Bolivia con la elección directa de jueces?”, Expansión, 18 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://expansion.mx/mundo/2024/06/18/como-le-ha-ido-a-bolivia-con-la-eleccion-directa-de-jueces [36] Congressional Research Service, “Bolivia: An Overview, 16 de mayo de 2022”. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2022 en: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11325 [37] Ivan Castano, “Bolivia has the World's Largest Lithium Reserves. Is it Worth Investing In?”, 31 de julio de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/bolivia-has-the-worlds-largest-lithium-reserves-is-it-worth-investing-in [38] Banco Mundial, “El Banco Mundial en Bolivia”, 14 de abril de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bolivia/overview [39] Redacción Movant, “Bolivia: baja en la producción de gas y su impacto económico”, infobae, 12 de mayo de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/05/12/bolivia-baja-en-la-produccion-de-gas-y-su-impacto-economico/ [40] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op .cit. [41] France 24, “Bolivia cierra 2023 con las reservas internacionales más bajas en 17 años”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20240105-bolivia-cierra-2023-con-las-reservas-internacionales-m%C3%A1s-bajas-en-17- a%C3%B1os [42] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. o [43] Pablo Stefanoni, “Bolivia: claves de la asonada militar y sus coletazos”, Nueva Sociedad, junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-claves-de-la-asonada-militar-y-sus-coletazos/ [44] Deutsche Welle, “Militares controlan estaciones de combustible en Bolivia”, 13 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/militares-controlan-estaciones-de-combustible-en-bolivia/a-69348165 [45] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. [46] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce…”, op. cit. l [47] Fernando Molina, “Fracasa el intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia: detenido el general rebelde”, El País, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-26/el-presidente-de-bolivia-denuncia-movilizaciones-irregulares-del-ejercito.html [48] Ivan Ellis, “La caída de Bolivia en un profundo caos y sus implicaciones para la región”, Infobae, 25 de noviembre de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/11/25/la-caida-de-bolivia-en-un-profundo-caos-y-sus-implicaciones-para-laregion/ [49] Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, “Intento fallido de golpe de Estado en Bolivia”, Senado de México, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/analisisinvestigacion/contexto/fallido-golpe-bolivia/viewdocument [50] Infobae, “El Gobierno de Bolivia reveló que los militares planearon el golpe durante tres semanas”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/el-gobierno-de-bolivia-dijo-que-los-militares-planearon-el-golpe-durantetres-semanas-y-que-su-lider-ya-habia-sido-cesado/ [51] The Editors, “Daily Review: Bolivia’s Failed Coup Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg”, World Politics Review, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/daily-review-bolivia-coup-arce/ [52] Pablo Stefanoni, “Arcistas’ vs ‘evistas’: los riesgos de despertar monstruos en Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/arcistas-vs-evistas-los-riesgos-de-despertar-monstruos-en-bolivia.html [53] El Deber, “Toma del Palacio Quemado: Zúñiga, el militar más cercano al Presidente, sacó a la tropa militar, fue aprehendido y dijo que actuó por orden de Arce”, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/toma-del-palacio-quemado-zuniga-el-militarmas-cercano-al-presidente-saco-a-la-tropa-militar-fue-apr_374314 [54] BBC News Mundo, “Quién es Juan José Zúñiga, el general que lideró lo que el presidente de Bolivia calificó de "intento de golpe de Estado" y luego fue arrestado”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c035jg3j13ro [55] El Deber, “Los ‘Pachajchos’ son vistos como un grupo de poder en las Fuerzas Armadas”, 6 de noviembre de 2022. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/los-pachajchos-son-vistos-como-un-grupo-de-poder-en-las-fuerzas-armadas_302903 [56] Tuffí Aré Vásquez, “Golpe fallido, autogolpe, montaje o qué: los datos y las dudas en Bolivia al día siguiente del levantamiento militar”, Infobae, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/golpe-fallido-autogolpemontaje-o-que-los-datos-y-las-dudas-en-bolivia-al-dia-siguiente-del-levantamiento-militar/ [57] Idem. [58] Cuenta en “X” de Evo Morales, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://x.com/evoespueblo/status/1807496134119571492?s=48&t=RUbtGPN92qpBD2NHDoDKUg [59] El Día, “Federaciones del Trópico tildan de "show", "novela" y "autogolpe" lo ocurrido en plaza Murillo”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eldia.com.bo/2024-06-27/pais/federaciones-del-tropico-tildan-de-show-novela-y-autogolpe-lo-ocurrido-en-plazamurillo.html [60] Pablo Stefanoni, op. cit. [61] Federico Rivas Molina, “Luis Arce: “Evo Morales pone en duda el golpe militar fallido por sus aspiraciones políticas personales””, El País, 29 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/luis-arce-evo-morales-pone-en-duda-el-golpe-militar-fallidopor-sus-aspiraciones-politicas-personales.html [62] Daniel Salazar Castellanos, “Intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia podría agravar escasez de dólares, según banco de inversión”, Bloomberg en Línea, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bloomberglinea.com/2024/06/27/intento-de-fallido-golpe-de-estadoen-bolivia-podria-agravar-escasez-de-dolares-segun-banco-de-inversion/ [63] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [64] Idem. [65] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo 66Pablo Biderbost y Guillermo Boscán, “La historia turbulenta de Bolivia: más de 190 intentos de golpes y revoluciones”, The Conversation, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/la-historia-turbulenta-de-bolivia-mas-de-190-intentos-de-golpes-yrevoluciones-233495

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Ghana is considering bids from five companies for the construction of what would be its first nuclear power plant. The companies are: France’s EDF, US-based NuScale Power and Regnum Technology Group; China National Nuclear Corporation; South Korea’s Kepco and its subsidiary Korea Hydro Nuclear Power Corporation; and Russia’s Rosatom. The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo interviewed Seth Kofi Debrah, director, Nuclear Power Institute, Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, on the pros and cons of adding nuclear power to the country’s power mix, and why Ghana needs to diversify and identify new energy sources. What makes the nuclear option attractive to Ghana? The country’s industrialisation ambitions, fuel constraints, limited resources, climate conditions and international commitments to climate change mitigation are among the factors driving Ghana to include nuclear power in the energy mix. Nuclear power is available all year round, making it reliable. The nuclear power plant is expected to operate as a baseload plant (the production facility used to meet some or all of an area’s continuous energy demand), with a capacity factor of about 92%. A conventional nuclear power plant typically operates for 92% of a calendar year as compared to 54% for natural gas power plants, 24% for solar and 34% for wind power plants. Demand for electricity is growing across the nation. Currently, 84% of the population have access to electricity but may not be connected to the electrical grid. This means the power is available in their area but they may be unconnected due to personal circumstances. Electricity demand is expected to grow rapidly on the back of electrification projects planned by successive governments, like the rural electrification project (which aims at supplying electricity to all communities with a population of 500 or greater) and industrialisation initiatives (such as developing the manufacturing, alumina and iron industries). Another reason for choosing nuclear power is that Ghana sees it as a way of supporting its industrial ambitions in the sub-region. For example, Ghana aims to become a net exporter of electricity in the region through the West African Power Pool, a specialised agency of the Economic Community of West African States. It covers 14 of the 15 Ecowas countries and is intended to supply them with reliable energy at a competitive cost. According to the World Bank, the average electrification rate in west Africa is about 42%, which means that almost half of the region’s population has no access to electricity. Ghana has an 84% electrification rate. Ghana believes nuclear power can help it achieve its industrial ambitions while fighting climate change. As a signatory to the Paris Agreement, Ghana has an international obligation to reduce greenhouse gas. Nuclear power does not produce any of the greenhouse gases. Ghana’s electricity sector is dominated by thermal plants that use natural gas – a fossil fuel. Fossil thermal plants make up 64% of the current energy mix. This is an over-dependence on a single fuel source. Natural gas has competing uses in different sectors, so there are frequent fuel shortages. And the price of natural gas is set by international markets, which leads to price volatility. Ghana has its own source of natural gas. But these reserves are expected to start declining by 2028. How dependable is the country’s current energy mix? Ghana’s current energy mix is made up of 1,584MW installed capacity of hydro, 3,758MW of thermal power plants (mostly powered by natural gas) and 112MW of solar generation. But the dependable capacity (the total amount of electricity that the facility can produce and deliver to the power grid) of renewables is non-existent since the source of their power generation is variable. The dependable capacity of the energy mix of a country matters a great deal. The energy mix must have strong baseload capacity (the minimum amount of electric power needed to be supplied to the electrical grid at any given time) before renewables are considered, to ensure reliability. No industralised nation developed its economy based on variable generation of electricity. They needed a reliable backbone that could be depended on at all times. European countries used natural gas, coal, hydro or nuclear as their baseload capacity and added on variable renewables. If Ghana wants to exploit its natural resources and become an industrial giant, it needs sustainable, reliable and affordable baseload electricity. That can be found in a source like nuclear. What’s the government’s case for nuclear? Ghana doesn’t have many other energy options. It has good sources of hydro but most have already been exploited. Potential small dams are being affected by climate change or variability and illegal mining. And the economic justification for more small hydro plants is in doubt. Ghana started its nuclear power journey as far back as the early 1960s but the idea was never realised. The nuclear power programme was restarted in 2007 under former president John Agyekum Kufuor. The programme has followed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s three-phase approach. Ghana is now at phase 2: vendor selection and site preparation. The plant, which is expected to be constructed along the coast of the country, is planned to come online in early 2030. Given Ghana’s financial constraints, is nuclear power a good idea? Nuclear power plants have proven to be among the cheapest sources of electricity around the world. Even though nuclear has a huge upfront financial burden, its long lifespan (over 60 years) and low running cost makes it one of the cheapest baseload sources of electricity. Around the world, advanced countries seek financial support for their nuclear projects. There are various models to finance nuclear power plant procurement, including the option of a public private partnership. How about nuclear waste and the cost of dealing with it? Ghana already operates one of the few radioactive waste storage facilities in Africa. This means that when Ghana builds a nuclear power plant it will already have capacity in nuclear waste management. Radioactive waste management, which deals with nuclear waste, is an issue that needs to be addressed in the early stages of planning a nuclear plant. This is evident in the International Atomic Energy Agency milestone approach which most countries follow to develop a nuclear programme. It shows all the 19 infrastructure issues that need to be addressed throughout the three-phased approach. It is the only power plant that is responsible in dealing with its waste after its lifetime. In effect, it is the only power plan that plans and pays for its waste management during operation and post operation with dedicated funds for waste management. The costs of managing nuclear waste and the nuclear power plant’s decommissioning at the end of its operating life are included in the nuclear power plant tariff. This is a safety requirement as enshrined in the International Atomic Energy Agency safety standards. Furthermore, the country of origin has strict regulations about decommissioning which have to be adhered to by nuclear power plant owners. One of the major concerns by the public is the treatment or storage of the high level spent fuel that is sometimes referred to as “waste”. High level spent fuel is the fuel that has been used up through irradiation. These used fuels usually have over 90% usable fuel that can be re-used through reprocessing.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском *This is an abbreviated version of the same paper published by the author at: Śliwiński K. (2023). Is Geopolitics Still Relevant? Halford Mackinder and the War in Ukraine. Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 4/2023, 7-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2023.1 Abstract This paper starts with an assumption that Geopolitics, understood as one of the great schools of International Relations, is not only still relevant but, indeed, should be one of the essential items in the toolkit of any student or policymaker who peruses the challenging and ever eluding realm of international security. It draws chiefly on the Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder to explain the dynamics of contemporary European Security in general and the ongoing war in Ukraine in particular. The analysis leads the author to a pair of conclusions: firstly, that the conflict in Ukraine is unlikely to end anytime soon and, perhaps more importantly, that the outcome of the war will only be one of many steps leading to the emergence of the new, possibly a multipolar, international system and consequently, and more obviously, a new security system in Europe, which will be strongly influenced by Germany rather than by the United States as before. Keywords: Geopolitics, Heartland, Europe, Security, Ukraine Introduction In the wake of the outburst of the war in Ukraine, the members of the European Union agreed on an extensive package of sanctions against various Russian entities and individuals connected to Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia. Until the attack against Ukraine, the EU had been "muddling through" with numerous countries pursuing their national interests, shaping their individual foreign and security policies, notably vis-à-vis Russia. The attack reinvigorated calls from E.U. bureaucrats for more unity and an actual common defense. EU's chief diplomat Joseph Borrel, during an extraordinary plenary session of the European Parliament on March 1, 2022, urged the European Parliament’s MPs to "think about the instruments of coercion, retaliation, and counterattack in the face of reckless adversaries. […] This is a moment in which geopolitical Europe is being born", he stressed (Brzozowski, 2022). Heartland theory – Geopolitics 101 As an analytical tool, geopolitics has been used since the 19th century. Its reputation was tarnished as a consequence of the policies of the Third Reich before and during WWII. Yet, it is considered a worthy approach that allows explanations that specifically look at the nexus between states' foreign and security policies and their geographical location in a historical context. Geopolitics is one of the grand theories of international relations (Sloan, 2017). Fundamentally, rather than treating states as separate, alienated geographical organisms, geopolitics allows us to look at a broader picture, including regions or even the whole globe, thus making it possible to account for interactions between many states functioning in particular systems defined by geographical criteria. Today's war in Ukraine occurs in a vital region for the European continent – Central and Eastern Europe. One of the founders of Geopolitics, a scientific discipline – Halford Mackinder (British geographer, Oxford professor, founder and director of the London School of Economics) proposed an enduring model in his seminal publication at the beginning of the 20th century - The Geographical Pivot of History. Drawing on the general term used by geographers – 'continental' Mackinder posits that the regions of Arctic and Continental drainage measure nearly half of Asia and a quarter of Europe and, therefore, form a grand 'continuous patch in the north and the center of the continent' (Mackinder, 1919). It is the famous 'Heartland', which, according to his inventor, is the key geographical area for anyone pursuing their dominant position in Euroasia. "[…] whoever rules the Heartland will rule the World Island, and whoever rules the World Island will rule the world" (Kapo, 2021). Notably, the key to controlling the Heartland area lies in Central and Eastern Europe, as it is an area that borders the Heartland to the West. Twenty-First century geopolitics (Dugin vs Mearsheimer) The most influential thinker and writer in Kremlin recently has arguably been Aleksandr Gel'evich Dugin. Accordingly, his 600-hundred pages book, Foundations of Geopolitics 2, published in 1997, has allegedly had an enormous influence on the Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites (Dunlop, 1997). In his book, Dugin, drawing on the founder of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, posits that Russia is uniquely positioned to dominate the Eurasian landmass and that, more importantly, 'Erasianism' will ultimately hold an upper hand in an ongoing conflict with the representatives of 'Atlantism' (the U.S. and the U.K.). Crucially, Dugin does not focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over Eurasia; instead, he advocates a relatively sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will (Dunlop, 1997). The Moscow-Berlin Axis According to Dugin, the postulated New Empire (Eurasian) has a robust geopolitical foothold: Central Europe. "Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Prussia and part of the Polish and Western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally been a consolidating force in Central Europe, uniting this geopolitical conglomerate under its control" (Dugin, 1997). Consequently, while the impulse of the creation of the New Empire needs to come from Moscow, Germany needs to be the centre of its western part. Furthermore "only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow." (Dugin, 1997, 127). Regarding the role of Anglo-Saxons in Central and Eastern Europe, Dugin offers a very straightforward analysis: "The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire presupposes several serious steps towards the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany. The traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis about the need to create a "cordon sanitaire" here, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally dangerous for the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France strove to destabilize the Eastern European peoples in every possible way, to instil in them the idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian influences". It follows logically that "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions, represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is, in general, senseless to speak about continental politics" (Dugin, 1997). "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'. Importantly, as this can inform us to an extent about the future settlement of the conflict: "The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow along its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories". The Tragedy of Great Power Politics In the preface to the update of his seminal book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (2013 edition), John Mearsheimer acknowledges that his analysis had to be updated with regards to the so-called "peaceful rise" of the People's Republic of China as a significant challenger to the role and position of United States in the international system. Consequently, he envisaged that the process would produce a highly sensitive, if not prone to local conflicts environment (Mearsheimer, 2013, 10). Following the logic of power balancing, he claimed that firstly, China had to build formidable military forces and, secondly, dominate Asia similarly to how the United States dominated Western Hemisphere. Correspondingly, China would strive to become a regional hegemon to maximise its survival prospect. This would make China's neighbours feel insecure and prompt counterbalancing by, as one might surmise, strengthening the existing bilateral and multilateral alliances and building new ones (AUKUS being a perfect example). Logically speaking, therefore, if you follow Mearsheimer's argumentation, Russia and India, Japan and Australia, and the Philippines and Indonesia should build a solid coalition to counter the ascent of China. Such developments would be in the interests of the United States, and Washington would naturally play a crucial role under such circumstances. Notably, the rise of China was not likely to be peaceful and produce "big trouble" for international trade as well as peace and security. This was approximately what the Trump administration had in mind when preparing the national security strategy in 2017. The Strategy mentions Russia 25 times, frequently in connection with China, as major challengers to the U.S.: "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and fair, grow their militaries, and control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence" (National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Yet, after even a short analysis of the document, one identifies the difference between the two in terms of how the U.S. perceives the challenge that each represents. Regarding Russia, Washington concludes that Kremilin's main aim is to: "seek to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders". China seems to be more ambitious in the eyes of the Capitol. As evidenced by such statements as: "Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars", "China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour. China's infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free trade flow, threaten other nations' sovereignty, and undermine regional stability."(National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Given this perception, it is no wonder that under Trump, Washington embarked on a new mission that questioned the processes of globalization for the first time in many decades. Under Trump, the U.S.A. introduced numerous economic sanctions against China, which sparked a revolution called 'decoupling'. Johnson and Gramer, writing for foreignpolicy.com in 2020, questioned this policy: "The threat of a great decoupling is a potentially historical break, an interruption perhaps only comparable to the sudden sundering of the first massive wave of globalization in 1914, when deeply intertwined economies such as the Great Britain and Germany, and later the United States, threw themselves into a barrage of self-destruction and economic nationalism that didn't stop for 30 years. This time, though, decoupling is driven not by war but peacetime populist urges, exacerbated by a global coronavirus pandemic that has shaken decades of faith in the wisdom of international supply chains and the virtues of a global economy." (Johnson, Gramer, 2020). With the comfort of looking at hindsight, we should conclude that perhaps luckily for the Far East and international political economy, Mearsheimer was wrong, at least for the time being. Firstly, no military conflicts exist in the Far East or the Pacific. The most potentially dangerous issue remains one of the cross-straight relations, i.e. P.R.C. vs Taiwan (Chinese Taipei). Whether Xi Jinping will risk another diplomatic backlash by an open invasion remains to be seen. The jury is out, and one might claim that with the world being focused on the war in Ukraine, China could get away with an invasion of Taiwan. Then, on the other hand, perhaps there is no need for the P.R.C. to unite all territories of China in the imminent future forcefully. At the same time, as it appears at least mid-2023, contrary to Mearsheimer's predictions, Russia and China seem to be getting closer regarding geopolitics and geoeconomics. On February 4th, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chinese President Xi face-to-face. The leaders convened in Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics — and issued a lengthy statement detailing the two nations' shared positions on a range of global issues. The meeting happened shortly before the Russian invasion, and one could surmise that it was supposed to soften the possible adverse reaction from Beijing to the already prepared military operation by the Kremlin since Putin told Xi that Russia had designed a new deal to supply China with an additional 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Consequently, China abstained from a U.N. Security Council vote condemning the Russian invasion (Gerson, 2022). Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770#sel=1:21:S5F,1:37:3jE (Access 18.10.2023) Andrew Krepinevich's Protracted Great-Power War Andrew Krepinevich's “Protracted Great-Power War - A Preliminary Assessment work” published by the Centre for a New American Security, informs us about the American posture. Accordingly, "Now, however, with the rise of revisionist China and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict and how to wage it successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility and hoping for the best." (Krepinevich, 2020) Among many valuable lessons that history can offer, one should remember that no country can wage a systemic war on its own on two fronts, hoping to be successful. Suppose both China and Russia are seen as strategic challengers to the American position in the international system. In that case, it follows logically that the U.S. needs to make one of them at least neutral (appease them) when in conflict with another. Given China's technological, economic, military, or population challenges, the most optimal choice would be to make Russia indifferent to American 'elbowing' in Central Asia or the Middle East vis-à-vis China. The price for such indifference also seems logical, and it is the dominance of the Russo-German tandem in Central and Eastern Europe and German dominance in the E.U. This would explain at least some developments in Europe regarding energy security, particularly President Biden's administration position on Nord Stream 2 and the not-so-much enthusiastic help to Ukraine from Germany. However, recent developments seem to contrast such logical argumentation. President Biden's administration, as well as the leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces, seem to be committed to continuing the financial, technical and logistical support to Ukrainian President Zelensky's government for "as long as it takes" (the term frequently used in official speeches by Antony Blinken – The Secretary of State). According to the U.S. Department of Defence information (as of Feb 21, 2023), the U.S. committed security assistance to Ukraine in the form of 160 Howitzers, 31 Abrams tanks, 111 million rounds of small arms ammunition and four satellite communication antennas, among others. On top of that, Washington committed more than 30.4 billion U.S. dollars (only since the beginning of the Biden Administration) (U. S. Department of Defence, 2023). The U.S. is the leader of the coalition of many nations (54 to be exact) in efforts to counter the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This situation puts Washington in a predicament as, at least in the mediasphere, experts and former policymakers such as the former C.I.A. Director and U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta does not shy away from identifying the existing state of affairs as a "proxy war" between the United States and the Russian Federation (Macmillan, 2022). 2 Importantly, Kremlin has been playing the “proxy war” card for some time in building its narrative regarding the ongoing “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine. But is "Uncle Sam" still in a position to effectively challenge either Russia or China on their own? In 2001, French historian, sociologist, and political scientist Emmanuel Todd claimed that as of the beginning of the 21st century, the United States was no longer a solution to global problems; instead, it became one of the problems (Todd, 2003). The U.S. guaranteed political and economic freedoms for half a century. In contrast, today, they seem to be more and more an agent of international disorder, causing uncertainty and conflicts wherever they can. Given the geopolitical changes after 1989, the U.S. took for granted its position in the international system and decided to extend its interests across the globe. Surprisingly, perhaps for Washington, even traditional U.S. lies started to demand more independence (see the case of Germany and its role in southern Europe.) (Macron's idea of 'strategic autonomy') . 3 “Emmanuel Macron's comments about Taiwan and his call for European "strategic autonomy" sparked controversy as he advocated for the EU not to become followers of the US and China”. This parallels with President de Gaulle earlier calls for European strategic independence from American influence over European security (Lory, 2023). According to Todd, given the actual balance of power globally, the U.S. would have to fulfill two conditions to maintain its hegemonic position. Firstly, it had to continue controlling its protectorates in Europe and Japan. Secondly, it had to finally eliminate Russia from the elite group of 'big powers', which would mean the disintegration of the post-Soviet sphere and the elimination of the nuclear balance of terror. None of these conditions have been met. Not being able to challenge Europe or Japan economically, the U.S. has also been unable to challenge the Russian nuclear position. Consequently, it switched to attacking medium powers such as Iran or Iraq economically, politically, and militarily engaging in 'theatrical militarism'. (Todd, 2003). In contrast to the French historian, American political scientist Joseph Nye claims, "The United States will remain the world's leading military power in the decades to come, and military force will remain an important component of power in global politics." (Ney, 2019, p.70). He goes on to question whether the rise of China is going to spell the end of the American era: "[…] but, contrary to current conventional wisdom, China is not about to replace the United States as the world's largest economy. Measured in 'purchasing power parity' (P.P.P.), the Chinese economy became larger than the U.S. economy in 2014, but P.P.P. is an economists' measure for comparing welfare estimates, not calculating relative power. For example, oil and jet engines are imported at current exchange rates, and by that measure, China has a US$12 trillion economy compared to a US$20 trillion U.S. economy." […] “Power—the ability to affect others to get what you want—has three aspects: coercion, payment, and attraction. Economic might is just part of the geopolitical equation, and even in economic power, while China may surpass America in total size, it will still lag behind in per capita income (a measure of the sophistication of an economy).” (Ney, 2019, p.70). And yet, as of 2023, America's economic components of her might seem to be very quickly eroding. After the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis and the consequent Covid-19 induced economic crisis, there are several woes on the horizon: Inflation has been rampant (that is one of the effects of federal stimulus after Covid-19), which makes the Federal Reserve continue to increase interest rates, making loans more and more expensive (Goldman, 2022). The stock market has been in the "sell-everything mode", which means the investors are losing a lot of money, so their trust in the economy is decreasing. Thirdly, this time around, the investors are not switching to bonds, which seems to confirm the previous point. Fourthly and finally, "none of this is happening in a vacuum. Russia continues its deadly invasion of Ukraine, which has choked off supply chains and sent energy prices through the roof. On top of that, a labour shortage has sent salaries surging and hindered the normal flow of goods worldwide (Goldman, 2022). Worse still, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, some of the key performance indicators regarding international trade are primarily negative (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2023). As of July 2022, experts debated whether the country was in a technical recession, whereas by now (mid-2023), the actual national debt had surpassed 31.46 trillion U.S. dollars (FiscalData.Treasury.gov, 2023). The German-French engine of the European federalization? The economic and political decrease of the U.S. and the parallel increase of China with Russia holding its position or even reclaiming its influence vis-à-vis NATO countries causes significant challenges to European powers and offers some ground-breaking opportunities. In terms of challenges, especially economically, Germany and France, as mentioned before, find themselves in a predicament. The war in Ukraine has changed the European dynamics due to the pressure of the U. S. to support Ukraine and, consequently, the economic sanctions against The Russian Federation. Similarly, France and Germany have not been very happy with the economic sanctions against Russia and have continually tried to play down the possibility of an all-out EU vs Russia conflict. Listening to the speeches of Macron and Scholz, one cannot but hypothesize that Paris and Berlin would be content with the end of the war as soon as possible at any cost, to be born by Ukraine, to be able to come back to “business as usual.” Apparently, in an attempt to "escape forward", both European powers are proposing further steps to generate even more federal dynamics. Conversely, they suggest that concerning Foreign and Security Policy, the still observed voting pattern based on unanimity - one of the last strongholds of sovereignty, should be abolished, and the decisions should follow a qualified majority voting procedure. Notably, such arguments are made, invoking the potential gains for the EU as a geopolitical actor. In other words, countries such as Poland and Hungary would no longer be able to block Paris and Berlin from imposing their interests on the rest of the EU by presenting them as European. According to this vision, Hungary would no longer be able to ‘sympathize’ with Russia, and Poland would no longer be the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the U.S. interests in Europe in their game with Russia. And so, the war in Ukraine presents a perfect circumstance to call for a European federation. Germany has recently publicized such a vision. On August 24, 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz presented a speech at Charles University in Prague regarding his vision of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts, policymakers, and media pundits widely commented on the speech. It starts with an assertion that Russia is the biggest threat to the security of Europe. That fact produces two breakthrough consequences: firstly, Berlin has to pivot from Russia to its European Partners both economically and politically. Secondly, the European Confederation of equal States should morph into a European Federation (The Federal Government, 2022). Scholz’s vision includes four major ‘thoughts’. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition should be made to majority voting in common foreign or tax policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, “we grow more autonomous in all fields; that we assume greater responsibility for our own security; that we work more closely together and stand yet more united in defence of our values and interests around the world.”. In practical terms, Scholz singles out the need for one command and control structure of European defence efforts (European army equipped chiefly by French and German Companies?). Thirdly, the EU should take more responsibility (at the expense of national governments) regarding migration and fiscal policy against the backdrop of the economic crisis induced by Covid-19 pandemic. This, in practical terms, means, according to Scholz, one set of European debt rules to attain a higher level of economic integration. Finally, some disciplining. “We, therefore, cannot stand by when the principles of the rule of law is violated, and democratic oversight is dismantled. Just to make this absolutely clear, there must be no tolerance in Europe for racism and antisemitism. That’s why we are supporting the Commission in its work for the rule of law. Conclusion The war in Ukraine is arguably proof of the region's role in the security and stability of Europe and its economy. Food supplies, mostly various harvests and energy, are a case in point. On top of that, the region has a lot of raw materials. Ukraine has large deposits of 21 of 30 such materials critical in European green transformation (Ukrinform, 2023). Before the war in Ukraine began, in July 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed non less than a strategic partnership on raw materials. The partnership includes three areas from the approximation of policy and regulatory mining frameworks, through a partnership that will engage the European Raw Materials Alliance and the European Battery Alliance to closer collaboration in research and innovation along both raw materials and battery value chains using Horizon Europe (European Commission, Press Release 2021). As for security, in a traditional sense, the U.S. is involved with Ukraine regarding nuclear weapons. In the letter from March 17, 2023, the director of the Energy Department’s Office of Nonproliferation Policy, Andrea Ferkile, tells Rosatom’s director general that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar “contains US-origin nuclear technical data that is export-controlled by the United States Government” (Bertrand, Lister, 2023). Worse still, The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria J. Nuland, admitted in her testimony on Ukraine in the US Congress that, indeed, “Ukraine has biological research facilities, which we are now quite concerned Russian troops, Russian Forces, may be seeking to gain control of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces should they approach” (C-Span, 2022). 4 See more at: https://www.state.gov/energy-security-support-to-ukraine/ (Access 18.10.2023) As Scott and Alcenat claim, the analysis of the competitive policies of each great power confirms the Heartland concept's importance. They project the utility of Mackinder’s analysis to Central Asia, asserting that: “it is valid in today’s foreign policy and policy analyses. Each power strives for control of or access to the region’s resources. For China, the primary goal is to maintain regional stability as a means for border security and assurance of stable economic relations. For the European Union, the main goal is to gain economic access while simultaneously promoting the democratization of those countries that are politically unstable.” (Scott, Alcenat, 2008). 5 Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (retired) - a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert, a former director of the Centre for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defence of China offered a similar evaluation: “the competition between the two giants (U.S.A. and China) will not occur in the Global South, where the US has already lost out to China. At the same time, in the Indo-Pacific, few nations want to take sides. Instead, it will be in Europe, where the U.S. has most of its allies, and China is the largest trading partner” (Bo, 2023). References Bertrand, N. and Lister, T. (2023) “US warns Russia not to touch American nuclear technology at Ukrainian nuclear plant”, CNN Politics, 19.04. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/18/politics/us-warns-russia-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant/index.html (Access 18.10.2023) Brzozowski, A. (2022) “Ukraine war is 'birth of geopolitical Europe', E.U. top diplomat says.” Euroactiv, 1.03. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/ukraine-war-is-birth-of-geopolitical-europe-eu-top-diplomat-says/ (Access 18.10.2023) Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce (2023) U.S. Economy at the Glance. Available at: https://www.bea.gov/news/glance (Access 18.10.2023) Bo, Zh. (2023) “The true battleground in the US-China cold war will be in Europe”, South China Morning Post, 2.05. Available at: The true battleground in the US-China cold war will be in Europe | South China Morning Post (scmp.com) (Access 18.10.2023) C-Span (2022) US biolabs confirmed in Ukraine. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Wagner Group has maintained an active and controversial presence in Africa since 2017, where it has contributed to regional instability, countered Western influence, and exacerbated human rights abuses. Despite the death of its figurehead in 2023, the emergence of the Africa Corps indicates that Russia’s covert geopolitical strategies in the region will persist. The Wagner Group has gained significant attention since its involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a paramilitary organisation with deep ties to the Russian government, Wagner’s operations blur the lines between state and non-state actions. This ambiguity challenges traditional frameworks of accountability and international law, complicating efforts to address its activities on the global stage. Ukraine is not the group’s only violent contribution to the destabilization of peaceful nations. Wagner has maintained an active presence across Africa since 2017, where it has been accused of numerous human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and targeting civilians. The bulk of these activities have unfolded in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. The Wagner Group’s international impact is multifaceted, affecting strategic, economic, and humanitarian outcomes. Functioning as a tool for Russian geopolitical ambitions, the group has contributed to regional instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, countered Western influence by infiltrating anti-Western and anti-colonial movements and sentiments online, and raised significant concerns regarding human rights and international law. In many of its areas of operations, Wagner’s presence has served as a catalyst for conflict escalation, and regional instability. In CAR and Mali, for instance, the group’s presence has been linked to increased violence and human rights abuses and undermining international and regional efforts towards peace and stability. The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef,” on 23 August 2023, came two months after his march on Moscow, sparked by dissatisfaction with the Russian Ministry of Defence’s actions in Ukraine. It is likely that many of the governments and regimes in Africa that “benefitted” from Wagner’s services were deeply concerned about Prigozhin’s death. At the same time, many may have been relieved, hoping that his death might change the brutal and terror-driven campaign of violence that had plagued the Sahel region at the group’s hands. Additionally, Wagner has provided Russia with a platform to pursue state interests through covert operations. Until the invasion of Ukraine, this allowed Putin to maintain plausible deniability regarding association with Wagner and its controversial activities. In addition to military engagements, Prigozhin orchestrated extensive propaganda and disinformation campaigns across Africa. These operations bolstered Russia’s influence in countries that Wagner operated in, while obscuring the ability for international bodies and states to accurately assess and address the allegations of human rights abuses that came alongside Wagner’s deployments. In CAR, the Wagner Group was deployed in 2018 to provide protection for mines, support the government, and offer personal protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. However, Wagner’s role in CAR far exceeded resource and government protection. The group actively engaged in military operations alongside members of the armed forces, leading to numerous accusations of serious human rights violations, including summary executions and sexual and gender-based violence. Despite these allegations, the group continued to receive support from the CAR government. The media outlet, Corbeau News, reported that President Touadéra had authorised Wagner’s sexual violence. This was evidenced in one of Wagner’s most extreme acts in CAR, which occurred in April 2022 when members of the group entered a military hospital in Bangui and sexually assaulted women and new mothers in the maternity ward. One source within the military administration of CAR stated that it was the third time members from the group had entered the maternity ward and assaulted women. In 2021, reports surfaced that Wagner would deploy to Mali to combat a rebel insurgency. This announcement sparked outrage from France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, who warned Mali against partnering with the group. Similar to its operations in CAR, Wagner’s presence in Mali has been marked by violence and instability. In April 2022, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing the massacre of 300 civilians during a joint military operation involving Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group from 27 March to 31. A key feature of Wagner’s presence has been countering Western influence in strategic regions. The provision of military support to governments and groups engaged in activities against Western-supported entities has been notably destructive. This dynamic was evident in Mali, where in 2022, an extensive disinformation campaign on social media, linked to Wagner, exploited anti-France and anti-imperialist sentiments to undermine the French presence. The campaign, along with “multiple obstructions” from Mali’s military junta led to France announcing the withdrawal of its military forces from Operation Barkhane in Mali in February 2022. Following the announcement, Malians celebrated in the capital, Bamako, and held signs stating, “Thanks Wagner” and “France is a terrorist nation.” Wagner-linked actors then continued their disinformation efforts, attempting to shift blame onto France following the discovery of a mass grave near a military base that French forces had recently vacated. Satellite imagery released by France later revealed Wagner Group mercenaries arranging the bodies in the mass grave. The bodies were believed to have come from a joint-military operation between the Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group in the same area in the days prior. In Africa, Wagner’s operations have been closely linked to the control and exploitation of natural resources. In countries such as CAR and Sudan, Wagner has secured access to valuable resources such as gold and diamonds. Recently, investigative efforts by groups like All Eyes on Wagner have revealed that the group has circumvented sanctions by exporting timber from CAR through Cameroon, in addition to operating an extensive blood diamond trading network. The Wagner Group’s involvement in these countries highlights the group’s role in bolstering autocratic regimes in exchange for strategic and economic benefits. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023 had already fuelled significant speculation about the group’s future. Nonetheless, the group’s strategic plan to support autocratic governments, orchestrate foreign interference, and expand influence remains both politically and economically appealing to Moscow. The potential dissolution of the Wagner Group would pose a significant challenge and require the rebuilding of established relationships in countries where it has operated. The emergence of the Africa Corps, a new organisation seemingly poised to assume many of Wagner’s operations, emphasises the strategic and economic value these activities provide for Russia. With the announcement in January 2024 that 100 Russian soldiers from the Africa Corps would deploy to Burkina Faso, it is clear that the Wagner model is one that will continue.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In a complex moment of geopolitical relations, marked by issues such as armed conflicts or climate change, it is more necessary than ever to pay attention to what is happening in the Sahel and Africa. In a world as turbulent as the one we live in, geopolitics returns to the front pages of newspapers with what is happening in Gaza, the potential consequences of the elections in the United States or France, or, in the Spanish context, the recent visit of our king, Felipe VI, to the Baltic Republics, with particular support and recognition for the Spanish military units serving there, all within the framework of tensions with Russia on the European eastern border. Despite the frequent discussions about the implications these issues have on our lives and our tendency to look beyond our borders for answers, what remains unchanged and continues to surprise me is the lack of interest that the African continent still generates among the public and experts, along with a vast ignorance of the geopolitical importance that the continent is acquiring. For these reasons, today I would like to talk to you about three issues that, from a geopolitical perspective, do not receive the attention and reflection they deserve. First, I would like to remind you that jihadism remains a major threat in many areas of the African continent, especially in the Sahel. In fact, there is barely any discussion about how the security crisis in this part of the world is spreading to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea: Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. As they often do in Africa, jihadist groups are exploiting structural vulnerabilities, various frustrations, and resentments against states that do not always respond to their citizens' demands as they would like, to recruit young people who will swell their ranks. I recently read a republished article by Óscar Guijarro from the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE, in spanish) titled "The Expansion of Jihadism from the Sahel to the Coastal Countries of the Gulf of Guinea", which I found extremely interesting, especially for Spain. These coastal countries, which appear to have more stable political environments than those in the Sahel, are marked by significant inequalities and socioeconomic divisions in different areas (poor north versus richer south), as well as religious differences that jihadist groups exploit to gain influence. The strategic location of these countries and the presence of forest reserves that are used as resources and refuges facilitate the expansion of jihadism and organized crime, including arms and drug trafficking. While it is true that the European Union is providing support to confront the jihadist threat and that the affected countries are adopting military and cross-border security measures, I believe that at the very least, more attention needs to be paid to this part of the world. Being aware of the importance of jihadist movements' penetration in Africa and their impact on global geopolitics should be a priority. Thousands of people are dying and are being displaced in West Africa due to violence of all kinds, and it cannot be something we ignore. A friend of Casa África, a senior official at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, spoke in January before the United Nations Security Council on this matter. Ms. Théroux-Bénoni urged the international community not to ignore the Sahel and reminded that strategies to prevent terrorism must acknowledge the deep regional connections that allow extremist groups to recruit, fundraise, and manage their logistics across multiple countries. She asserted that the current situation in the region represents the worst possible scenario of violent extremism, coups d'état, and setbacks in regional integration, and called for international responses. From the ISS, they constantly remind us that the stability of West Africa is important to the global community for multiple reasons, some related to opportunities and socioeconomic development, and others related to terrorist threats, organized crime, and the illegal trafficking of all kinds of goods, from drugs and weapons to people. Regarding governance, Ms. Théroux-Bénoni stated that we must contribute to creating conditions that make coups d'état and political instability less likely. Another issue that I believe doesn't receive enough attention is what some analysts have already dubbed "new Russianism." Colonel and geopolitical analyst Ignacio Fuente Cobo, in articles published by the IEEE, uses this term to define Russia's neocolonial project to expand its influence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. While we focus on Ukraine and Europe's eastern flank, the truth is that we fail to fully grasp Russia's strategy of strengthening its presence in Africa. A quick glance at articles about the Sahel reveals that Russia is finding allies among the leaders of the region and a population that prefers Russian assistance over the help traditionally provided by France, for example, to solve their problems. Mr. Fuente Cobo discusses an alternative multipolar world order, whose reinforcement is evident, and Russia's interest in seizing natural resources and evading Western sanctions. The fact is that Russia has shown remarkable skill in exploiting the gaps in European cooperation in the Sahel and has managed to strengthen its position in some countries, particularly through the former Wagner group (now Africa Corps) and the military cooperation. The loss of European influence in the area should concern us and guide the design of our policy in the region, which I believe should always be based on mutual respect, attentive listening to our African partners and friends, and a mutually beneficial partnership that avoids paternalism and, especially, the geopolitical double standards that have discredited the West in the eyes of many countries, now more critical than ever of our decisions on the global stage. To conclude, I would like to highlight one of the many reasons why we depend on the African continent and should pay more attention to it: critical minerals, essential for the global energy and digital transition, a topic discussed by Mar Hidalgo García for the IEEE. In this area, Africa not only attracts Europe's attention. We face competition from other powers, such as the United States, Russia, India, Japan, and Australia. China, for instance, has established a strong presence in Africa, achieved through a long-term strategy that remains consistent regardless of the current leadership and involves more than just words. I believe it would be worthwhile to reconsider the focus on migration that seems to dominate the EU’s African strategy and to look beyond it by establishing strategic partnerships and developing infrastructure to negotiate access to African mineral resources, for example. Countless authors and analysts dedicate time to reflecting on the geopolitical implications of the changes occurring in our neighboring countries and to searching for formulas and strategies that can help us strengthen and improve our relations. What perhaps isn't emphasized enough, besides the need to look towards our southern neighbors and care about what happens to them, is that understanding and cooperating with them is the only way to progress and ensure that Europe remains relevant in the world. An equitable partnership based on mutual respect and a shared future is imperative. For the good of all. Article written by José Segura Clavell, Director General of Casa África, and published in Kiosco Insular, eldiario.es, and Canarias 7 on June 28 and 29, 2024.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Elections, in simplified terms, usually involve deciding between continuity or change. That decision was clearly expressed by Mexican voters. The results of the electoral day on June 2nd in Mexico reflect that approximately two-thirds of the votes cast favor continuity and, to some extent, a deepening of the outgoing administration's policies. Starting from the theory, this deepening will apply to foreign policy. Following the electoral day, expectations, proposals, questions, and prospects arise. These lines aim to address those that fall within the international sphere. It is advisable to begin with a brief diagnosis of the context and Mexico's recent international actions. It can be confidently stated that the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy, particularly non-intervention, were invoked with a particular emphasis. This emphasis was maintained throughout López Obrador's six-year term, in line with a nationalist-oriented foreign policy. The reference to these principles was made in regional matters as well as in the global thematic agenda. Regionally, in North America, the path was guided by the principle of respect for sovereignty and recognition of shared responsibility in matters that foster understanding, a spirit of cooperation, and a strategic partnership. However, it became evident that in some sensitive issues, antagonistic views do exist. To the south of our border, the overall assessment indicates a strengthening of ties, with a greater emphasis on Central American countries, through the strengthening of political dialogue and Mexico's cooperation agenda with specific social development programs. However, with some South American countries, Mexico experienced and continues to experience disagreements, which have led to a pause and even a setback in Latin American and Caribbean integration. Across the Atlantic, Mexico's relationship with its European counterparts continued on its path toward intensifying friendship and deepening political dialogue as strategic allies, despite brief disagreements. However, on balance, there is also a pause in the formalization of our modernized Global Agreement with the European Union. With the rest of the world's regions, Mexico sought greater diversification. However, it is still an unfinished endeavor. Despite efforts to promote dialogue and greater cooperation on regional and global agendas, bilateral relations with many countries remained on the sidelines of the priorities. In international forums, Mexico has stood out by advocating for the revitalization of multilateralism to create a more favorable global environment capable of addressing and resolving the multitude of global crises that concern the entire international community. For Mexico, the multilateral arena served as a mechanism to balance and counteract asymmetries with other countries and to enhance Mexico's prestige in favor of a world grounded in International Law, a system of clear rules. There have been achievements in Mexico's multilateral policy during this government. It is important to highlight the greater prominence gained in United Nations (UN) bodies, including the decision to occupy a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the 2021-2022 biennium, those years were extremely challenging for international stability, peace, and security. This is a characteristic element of a State's foreign policy. Thus, Mexico consolidated a continuous, relevant, and stable relationship with the UN's principal body. Despite the complex scenario in which international security was constantly challenged, our diplomacy in the Council adopted a constructive attitude. Mexico played a successful role in bridging distant positions. Mexico's stances and decisions were supported, as has historically been the case, by legal rigor and in favor of peace and human rights, which has earned it recognition. Thus, our multilateral policy succeeded in capitalizing on credibility and trust among the international community. Another achievement of Mexico in the multilateral sphere has been the call to the international community and the effort to persuade major powers and emerging countries of the urgent need to reform the UN considering global reconfigurations. For Mexico, it is clear that the measures required for a comprehensive reform must be guided by the principles of representativeness, democratization, transparency, and effectiveness. With this foundational assessment, what can be anticipated in terms of foreign policy for the upcoming administration led by Claudia Sheinbaum? What recommendations could be made for Mexico's international efforts in the coming years? The answers to these questions revolve around finding consensus on the need to build a State foreign policy, rather than a government policy. A foreign policy with long-term objectives and vision that allows for the accommodation of the nuances and emphases each head of the Executive may bring. To outline some recommendations, we must emphasize that Mexico is a globally strategic country. The voice of our country and the diplomatic prestige accumulated over the years exert tangible influence on the international stage. Our country plays a key role in the trends and dynamics of international trade and global production chains, being among the top ten exporting countries in the world. In addition to this, Mexico will continue to benefit from the relocation of companies and investments. Thanks to this global phenomenon, known as “nearshoring,” our country could solidify its position as an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment, including the one from Asia, and will have the potential to develop clusters of technological innovations, among other sectors. Therefore, broad opportunities for global engagement are emerging for Mexico. However, the conflict dynamics that prevail on the international scene present complex challenges for Claudia Sheinbaum's management of foreign policy. Commercial, military, or geopolitical tensions, such as the situation in the South China Sea, the war between Russia and Ukraine, or the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, pose challenges that require reaching agreements on a wide range of issues, particularly in security, migration, climate change, and sustainable development. Identifying and deepening convergences with key countries will be essential to easing the many international tensions that Mexico will face at the beginning of Sheinbaum's term. Our bilateral relationship with the United States is, without a doubt, the clear priority in Mexico's foreign agenda. Mexico's outlook toward the world begins there, at our northern border. The ties of interdependence are broad and deep. Our country and the United States need each other. Therefore, among the issues that could constitute the first successes of Sheinbaum's international agenda could be taking important steps in advancing and deepening a strategic partnership from which cooperative benefits can be derived, setting aside rhetoric. In our relationship with the United States, the main thematic axes from which opportunities arise are bilateral trade, investments, production chains and competitiveness through innovation; migration; security; and border management. Challenges are also apparent in these areas. The vitality of the bilateral relationship demands, first and foremost, building an effective, institutionalized, and frequent dialogue through periodic summits and high-level meetings, in addition to achieving mutual recognition of shared responsibilities in the most significant issues. This is a critical condition, regardless of who occupies the White House in the coming years. Deepening and further institutionalizing this bilateral dialogue is urgent given the likelihood of a remastered “Trumpism” version reaching the Oval Office. These variables will be conclusive and decisive in paving the way toward 2026, the year of the first USMCA review. The goal is to ensure that the review focuses on the formalities of the process, meaning it should be free from deep renegotiations or political setbacks. We now know that Marcelo Ebrard will have the important mission of leading this difficult task for Mexico. One of Ebrard's assets, in addition to his experience during the negotiation of the USMCA, is that he is a familiar figure to our North American counterparts. Our relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is also of utmost importance. It has become clear that this bilateral relationship is essential for Mexico's present and future. The Asian country plays a crucial role in the network of political relations that the Mexican government must continue to weave and deepen, especially considering and recognizing the predominant, superpower role that China exerts in global politics, technological development, investments, and trade. The geopolitical tensions and trends in which the PRC government has played a leading role grant and validate a stronger position for China in the region and, by extension, on the global chessboard. While few doubted years ago, and no one doubts today, that the dynamism of the Chinese economy is of growing importance in terms of the behavior and current state of the world economy. Furthermore, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Given the positioning that the Asian country has achieved, strengthening the bilateral relationship is vital to achieving the global and regional power balances that are in Mexico's best interest. Therefore, Mexico must approach China both politically and economically. It is essential that the government and the business sector jointly adopt medium and long-term measures to achieve a strategic rapprochement, with an updated agenda and innovative dialogue mechanisms that bring both countries closer together. Achieving this also involves the need to foster mutual understanding through cultural exchanges. Consequently, it will be imperative for the new Mexican President to work towards continuing to intensify and expand our relationship with China, primarily in economic and technological matters, as well as in identifying common ground and affinities on global issues. With Europe as a whole, it will be a priority to achieve the signing of the new Global Agreement with the European Union to deepen our alliance. This includes countries with which our bilateral relations are historic, such as Spain; leading EU countries, such as Germany — our main trading partner in Europe — and France; and the group of Eastern European countries where threats to the established international order are clearly perceived at their borders. Additionally, it will be essential to reaffirm Mexico's interest in working alongside all European countries to formulate joint strategies to restore peace and ensure international security. Our ties with Latin America and the Caribbean deserve special mention. The equation of Mexico's foreign policy toward this region, which is undoubtedly a priority, must reaffirm its commitment to strengthening mechanisms for political coordination, advancing regional integration, and agreeing on common policies and principles to achieve shared economic and social development, well-being for the population, and a migration management approach based on human rights, with an emphasis on the comprehensive protection of migrants. Considering that globally there are now 281 million migrants, Mexico will need to assert its regional convening power by stressing the urgency of addressing the structural causes of this phenomenon, condemning hate speech against migrants, and advocating for the need to develop political and legal frameworks that contribute to the sustainable development and the well-being of populations. In this region, the relationship with Brazil will become increasingly strategic, based on the leadership roles that each country plays and the shared values. In the current context, there is an evident political and ideological affinity between both governments, which translates into an additional advantage that will allow us to further strengthen our bilateral ties. This conclusion also considers Brazil's importance within the BRICS framework. Therefore, Tlatelolco should capitalize on the opportunities for alignment with Itamaraty on regional political issues and contributions to resolving crises in certain countries, such as Haiti. Of course, the comprehensive regional partnership that Mexico promotes and seeks within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the fertile ground that political and diplomatic coordination initiatives could experience within its framework, may spark interest for Brazil and clearly outline synergies leading to closer relations. Perhaps the upcoming visit to Mexico by Brazilian President Lula da Silva will provide the ideal opportunity to illustrate the potential harmony between the two countries in advancing the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean and in articulating global initiatives. Undoubtedly, the bilateral issues with some governments in the region, the aired tensions, and the challenges to Latin American integration are imperative topics for the next president and her cabinet to address. Solutions to these pending matters will not be simple or quick. Common ground is limited, and the ideological distances between different leaderships in the region are evident. The relevance of the region to Mexico cannot be denied, given the shared cultural and historical heritage with these countries. However, the divergence of political directions taken by governing groups and the alternations in power across the region have led to a series of ideological and political transitions toward radical centralization of power, evident in regimes characterized by strong presidential figures. Pragmatic approaches in their most extreme forms loom, and given the structural fragility and vulnerability of their economies, they provoke sociopolitical unrest, instability, and emigration, among other outcomes. Therefore, the challenges are complex, and the priorities emerging from the region are clear. Other areas of opportunity for Claudia Sheinbaum's foreign policy will include diversifying our political and commercial relations with emerging and influential countries in regions of growing global importance, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Opening new diplomatic and consular missions in these areas will be ideal and will yield benefits in the medium term. Reactivating political dialogue and cooperation with all international and regional actors is also imperative. The drive to expand our diplomatic footprint in traditionally neglected regions will increasingly take on a sense of urgency. In addition to this diversification, it will be necessary to strengthen the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID, in spanish). Its institutional strengthening should begin with building an international cooperation agenda based on both the results and needs of supply and demand. It seems necessary to increase the capacity of resources allocated to the international cooperation that Mexico offers. It also seems viable to adopt a more proactive and forward-looking approach to cooperation, with a high value on innovation, where Mexico can position itself as a recipient of cooperation in areas such as technological innovation and energy transition. Equally important is to continue betting on trilateral or triangular cooperation schemes, as this decision is based on recognizing shared visions and priorities with other countries, which contributes to strengthening collaborative ties with countries in the region and in various parts of the world. In addition to all of this, there are several other issues that will need to be addressed. To briefly mention a few, it will be crucial to emphasize the urgency of developing international actions aimed at expanding spaces for multilateral engagement and building common positions on issues such as food security, climate change, and the transition to clean and green energy — topics of personal interest to Claudia Sheinbaum given her background, knowledge, and experience. Other topics, also of a global nature and requiring priority attention, include those related to health; contributions to the refinement and progress of International Law codification; the promotion of innovative instruments such as our Feminist Foreign Policy; and, of course, the formulation of initiatives and leadership in multilateral efforts to restore peace. It is important to pause and emphasize that the issue of international peace is one in which Mexico enjoys a reputation as a builder of bridges for understanding. Our advantages lie not only in our traditional pacifist and conciliatory policy but also in the credibility provided by our multiple memberships, which facilitate Mexico's voice and vote in many international organizations. This will undoubtedly contribute to identifying potential consensus and common positions in favor of sustainable peace. These same multiple memberships and Mexico's prestige can be translated into contributions to the urgent need to reform the UN to ensure an updated international system. Individually or collectively, the issues described constitute crucial topics for defining the international profile and image that will be built around the elected president and what her foreign policy will be during her 6-year term. However, it is worth pausing for a reflection that is undoubtedly relevant. The personal decisions that Claudia Sheinbaum makes regarding her trips abroad will carry significant weight. The future international trips of the Head of the Executive, in case they occur frequently, will be an important element to consider in terms of the international presence that Mexico wishes to adopt. In this regard, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro next November presents itself as a valuable first opportunity for Sheinbaum to appear alongside the leaders of the world's most important economies. The advantages of this trip are obvious, as it goes without saying that Mexico's foreign policy fully aligns with the three general priorities of Brazil's G20 presidency. As in this group, global forums are also expecting Mexico's voice to be represented at the highest level. Likewise, the profile of the future Mexican president necessitates highlighting the enormous environmental challenges and adaptability issues imposed by the evidence of climate change. In this context, it is worth noting that Sheinbaum inspires hope. The odds suggest that she could capitalize on international leadership grounded in her political commitment and academic background in this particular area. She seems to understand clearly that it is essential to advance in energy transition and will need to work towards and persuade others to increase public and private sector investments in the proportion of renewable energy within the country's energy matrix. The environmental policies and the focus on energy efficiency, due to their characteristics and implications of global shared responsibility, will occupy a significant portion of the time and space on both the domestic and international agendas during the next Mexican administration. Sheinbaum has the credentials and interest to make progress in the direction demanded by the global climate emergency and to take on a leading role. The work of Alicia Bárcena, the current Foreign Minister and future Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources, will be crucial in supporting and advancing global agreements on this issue. Bárcena's technical and practical knowledge of this agenda is a guarantee, and her appointment underscores the importance of the environmental agenda. As with the start of any new administration, it may be worthwhile to revisit the interpretation of the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy. This exercise will need to be carried out considering the limited flexibility that the tumultuous global landscape allows. Despite these contextual limitations, adherence to the principled foundation of our international actions should first and foremost offer a range of resources that can be translated into practical solutions for the successful conduct of Mexico's affairs beyond its borders. The principles are, in essence, fundamental elements for the conduct of foreign policy, and at the same time, they are subsidiary to the definition of strategies for Mexico's international actions. They are not, by definition, meant to be declarative priorities. Instead, they constitute the legal framework for acceptable, possible, and desirable actions and decisions, including their role in safeguarding and upholding the national interest. But they will be useful to the extent that they provide predictability, guide our international actions, signal the positions and definitions that should be valid in line with Mexico's international stature, contribute to our diplomatic tradition, and enhance Mexico's prestige and image. In other words, as our history has shown, their value does not lie in declarations but in their contribution to building global agreements with our international partners and allies, both bilaterally and within the framework of multilateral and regional organizations. For these principles to translate into practical advantages, it is desirable to accompany them with the exercise of soft power and the promotion of Mexico through our valuable cultural, natural, artistic, and historical heritage. To achieve all of the above and meet these objectives, it will be necessary to overcome the obstacle of resource scarcity. To be consistent with the goal of exercising a global presence that corresponds to Mexico's position on the international stage, it is imperative to strengthen action capacities and allocate resources. Additionally, organizational schemes must be developed to skillfully direct actions in both bilateral and multilateral arenas to fully achieve the aforementioned foreign policy objectives. The answer will largely lie in relying on and supporting the professionals of Mexican diplomacy and diplomatically skilled personnel who can act within the framework of our constitutional foreign policy principles and prioritize cooperation over conflict. Therefore, it is essential to recognize the need to affirm that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strengthened by the capabilities of the Mexican Foreign Service (SEM, in spanish). It is the oldest service in the country, which has gradually taken on more responsibilities. A service characterized by its committed and professional work in pursuit of Mexican interests and the best causes of humanity. The implementation of this foreign policy, based on the diplomatic tradition embodied by the SEM, should also promote the creation of cooperative synergies through the virtuous tripod of collaboration among universities and research centers, businesses and organized civil society, and the government. Despite its apparent abstraction, foreign policy is as important as domestic policy; this underscores the importance of investing effort and political will in consolidating Mexico's international actions as a State policy. It is clear that global challenges require cooperative actions and common solutions characterized by shared responsibility. Mexican diplomacy possesses sufficient experience, political sensitivity, skill, historical awareness, global perspective, a commitment to serving national interests, and intellectual capital to take the initiative in addressing the solutions that both the world and Mexico demand. The world is increasingly interdependent, interconnected, and globalized. It is also alarmingly radicalized, navigating through axiological debates, as demonstrated by election results in various parts of the world. Mexico needs to contribute to a more stable, orderly, and peaceful world. Finally, these reflections on the international agenda of Mexico's future president would be incomplete without mentioning the person who will lead the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been confirmed by Claudia Sheinbaum herself that Juan Ramón de la Fuente will take on this responsibility. In addition to his personality, which will open doors and contribute to a positive atmosphere for negotiations with his counterparts, his professional experience and shared scientific profile, together with Sheinbaum and Bárcena, combined with a global outlook, are among his strengths. His tenure in the SEM as Mexico's permanent representative to the UN in New York, along with his accumulated international experience working closely with this universal organization's family, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), bolster his credentials in guiding and advancing Mexico's interests in global forums. His appointment is seen as a positive development, and it raises expectations.