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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the weeks leading up to the appointment of Michel Barnier as France’s new prime minister, there was one word in particular to hang on the lips of those at the Elysée Palace – “coalitation”. The portmanteau of “coalition” and “cohabitation”, “coalitation” serves to refer to the situation of acute governmental deadlock in which France finds itself, more than two months after the snap parliamentary elections called by Emmanuel Macron failed to land any party an absolute majority of seats. Under the Fifth Republic, France has known three cohabitations following parliamentary elections won by the opposition to the president’s party. The first was between the socialist president François Mitterrand and conservative prime minister Jacques Chirac from 1986 to 1988; the second, between president Mitterrand and Édouard Balladur from 1993 to 1995, and the third between president Chirac and socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin from 1997 to 2002. Under such circumstances, the president took on a secondary role, including tasks such as appointing the prime minister or presiding the council of ministers, while the prime minister and national assembly set the political agenda. However, the current situation is very different, recalling more the paralysis of the Fourth Republic than any of the duos listed above. While the presidential camp lacks even a relative majority, none of the parties or coalitions from the recent legislative elections come close to securing one either. Michel Barnier will therefore have to rely on a new coalition or new ad hoc agreements to get his legislative proposals passed and avoid being censured. The French neologism coalitation is therefore more appropriate to describe the situation in which Emmanuel Macron and Michel Barnier find themselves. A notion of performance In addition, such a state of affairs is not without recalling expressions used in the labour world, such as ‘remote working’, ‘presenteeism’, ‘management’ and ‘coworking’. In the 1980s, the expressions ‘management’ and ‘managers’ became widely used terms in France to describe the challenges of optimising resources and managing people in organisations. This period marked the proliferation of neologisms, particularly of English origin, in the business world. It highlighted the importance of individual and collective performance, helping French companies compete in an increasingly global market. By the 1990s, expressions like “New Public Management” and “New Managerialism” emerged in English-speaking countries. These terms were particularly applied to setting performance targets – especially financial ones – in organisations originally serving the public interest, such as health and education sectors. An expression used by Macron? The term “coalitation” was first coined by advisers to the President of the Republic. We can read its use as an attempt to downplay the lack of a presidential majority and to ease the transition into the upcoming cohabitation. This strategy can be seen as a way for the President to maintain the upper hand despite his party’s defeat in the parliamentary elections. It functions as a semantic tool that allows Macron to frame this cohabitation in a modern and new way, setting it apart from previous ones. But the links between this term and management-inspired neologisms also reflect Macron’s profile as a “politician manager” and his managerial approach to politics. An advocate of free enterprise and entrepreneurship, often associated with the “start-up nation” concept, Emmanuel Macron embodies a political philosophy directly influenced by the business world. His terms in office have stood out through their use of team-building seminars, the use of consultants from private firms, and staff reshuffles following unmet performance targets. Inability to renew? Back home, the seemingly contradictory term also echoes the president’s fondness for the expression of “En même temps” (“At the same time”) that has become part of the Macron brand. The adverbial phrase sees him lay out a position, only to deconstruct it and espouse its contrary proposition. Critics say it shows the centrist president’s inability to adopt a stance, opting instead for a verbal fudge of saying one thing, then its opposite and ultimately, nothing at all. The neologism coalitation also embodies a new form of the Macronist “at the same time” philosophy by emphasising the need to find common ground between opposing programmes and political forces. For supporters of the president, this term highlights the relevance and timeliness of an approach developed by Emmanuel Macron. In this context, Michel Barnier’s profile as a negotiator and moderate can be seen as a reaffirmation of this strategy. Historically, however, the use of such neologisms has sometimes served to mask the challenges of ineffective or risky strategies. Some researchers have questioned whether introducing expressions like ‘management’ and ‘manager’ into the French vocabulary truly changed how companies and social relations worked, emphasising the sometimes artificial nature of these approaches. The same applies today to the term “coalitation” as this neologism seems to illustrate Emmanuel Macron’s struggle to offer a new way of doing politics despite the promises made on the night of his re-election. Macron France French Politics PM Barnier Politics

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After more than 50 days of deadlock in forming a government (an unprecedented political situation under the Fifth Republic), the choice of Michel Barnier to become Prime Minister may appear as a "solution" to end the crisis, but it above all reveals the current political weakness of President Macron, oscillating between the hope of maintaining control and forced failure. But this nomination puts him at odds with the messages sent by voters during the electoral sequence that he himself chose to trigger. Three key lessons Three lessons from the July legislative election are unambiguously necessary to understand the paradoxes of the current sequence. 1. The rejection of “Macronism” In the previous European election, the Macron camp had been soundly defeated. In confirmation, the message from voters in the legislative elections is one of rejection of the power in place since the presidential parliamentary group went from 245 elected representatives to 163 and the two most pronounced opposition blocs went from 89 to 143 (the RN and its allies) and from 153 to 193 for the left bloc. The aggregation of the various votes therefore expresses a desire to see notable political changes come out of the ballot boxes to break with all or part of Macron's policies. But the differences in direction to translate these inflections maintain the confusion. The left wants to repeal the immigration law, while the RN wants to toughen it up, for example. 2. The refusal of the National Rally in power While it was fashionable to declare it moribund, the "republican front" has regained strength in this summer of 2024. Through a political surge, which is as much an ideological rejection as the expression of sincere fears about the damage of the RN at Matignon, the forces hostile to the RN have accepted mutual withdrawals to "block". This electoral gamble paid off, and if the RN has progressed, it has remained far from the expected absolute majority. Nevertheless, this "republican front" has not led to a political alternative: it was only a front of refusal and not the premises of a probable future governmental cooperation. Hence the current impasse and the threats hanging over the survival of the future Barnier government. 3. The marginalization of the Republican right The emergence of Emmanuel Macron in the political game, eager to overcome the divide and the alternations of government between the PS and the Republicans, has put the right in a vice. Stuck between the center right embodied by Macron and the hard right embodied by Le Pen, the Republican Party has seen its voters melt away on both sides. We must add the electoral rise of the RN to the ordeal of the right. On these early legislative elections, the dilemma remained the same. The president of LR, Éric Ciotti, crossed the Rubicon and made an alliance with the RN, while the rest of the party opposed him without however winning back its voters who had gone to the Marconian camp. In the end, LR, proclaimed heir to Gaullism, which gave four presidents to the Fifth Republic, is no more than a parliamentary force, even if the senatorial voting system still ensures it a counter-power in the Senate. Let us note, however, that if we add a large part of Macron's voters with those of LR and RN, we are entitled to affirm that the parliamentary barycenter is clearly positioned to the right of the hemicycle. However – ultimate confusion – it is the left-wing coalition that comes out on top in the hemicycle.span> The Barnier choice against these messages from voters These three lessons are followed by a governmental choice that has all the makings of a paradox, not to say a contradiction. Indeed, if we sum things up brutally, appointing Michel Barnier amounts to choosing a representative of the minority party (LR), whose profile and political positions poorly embody a break with "Macronism", and who owes his appointment to the benevolent neutrality (to date) of the National Rally. Indeed, President Macron made it clear that "non-censurability" was the decisive criterion for his choice. However, he declared that he had made this choice (after the tests of many other names failed) because he had ensured "the conditions of stability and the broadest rallying". Knowing the disappointment of the New Popular Front, this explicitly indicates that President Macron obtained the commitment of the RN not to censor Michel Barnier a priori. Which was confirmed a few minutes after his nomination by Marine Le Pen. Without of course entering the government, the RN therefore becomes the arbiter of its choice, the arbiter of a censure. The parties of the presidential camp have therefore agreed to make an electoral pact with the left front (yet widely hated in their ranks) in the name of the government barrier to the RN, so that the president ends up appointing a prime minister thanks to the RN's promise not to censure him. A choice of both hope and failure President Macron is primarily responsible for the current political chaos , through a dissolution that was as perilous as it was failed, the success of which rested on the bet that the left would be incapable of uniting and would once again have to resolve to a republican front in the face of the "RN threat". However, he is trying to take advantage of the complexity of the moment to keep control. He wants to be the expert in time, extending for several weeks a government clearly disavowed at the ballot box. He wants to be the expert in the partisan game, imposing the trans partisan coalition including the central bloc as the only horizon for access to Matignon. All this, while claiming to do so in respect of the will of the French people… The Macronists who have been calling for more than 50 days for an “overcoming” of divisions, for “inventiveness” in the creation of an unprecedented coalition, are here benefiting from their central position on the left-right axis to refuse a cohabitation-alternation, in favor of a coalition-continuation (which will nevertheless involve some political inflections). But the choice of Michel Barnier, by default certainly, has the virtue of guaranteeing that Emmanuel Macron's political achievements will not be brutally unraveled, as happens in the case of cohabitation, and as the New Popular Front loudly wanted. President Macron can therefore probably feel a little relief today. He can even hope to convince the French, by invoking that France is on the right and that the left-wing coalition has been intransigent. One Man's Political Failure Yet this nomination is weighted with many signals that speak of the political failure of a man. Emmanuel Macron wanted to dynamite the partisan game: he found himself prisoner of a Republic of ukases, each party announcing who they were going to censor on the sole basis of their name. He wanted to embody a policy breaking with the "old world": here he is giving the Fifth Republic one of the oldest prime ministers (after having sacrificed the youngest by dissolving it). The political party he created around his person, Renaissance, published a press release in reaction to the nomination, specifying that it was not signing a "blank check" to Michel Barnier. This situation thus indicates that, even within the Macronist camp, preparations are already being made for the post-Macron period. This is true of Edouard Philippe, already a candidate for his succession, and of Gabriel Attal who secured his influence by being elected leader of his parliamentary group. Emmanuel Macron has consistently been elected (in 2017, 2022, and in the 2024 legislative elections) in the name of a Republican barrier to the National Rally, benefiting from the votes of the left. And now he owes his (provisional) exit from the crisis to the neutrality negotiated with Marine Le Pen. This unbalanced position can only reinforce frustration, even anger against him, in the left-wing electorate, and can sow confusion among some centrists. Not to mention that being at the parliamentary mercy of the National Rally will very quickly place the head of government in a dilemma: whether to make concessions to the RN in exchange for its survival. The immigration law has left scars within the so-called "left wing" of Macronism. Even greater and more symbolic concessions made to the RN could fracture its own party and further confirm the end of "Macronism" - the left/right divide regaining strength and vigor. France Barnier French Politics

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The French election results are everything except what predictions had forecast. Only days ago, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party was tipped to win. But as results came in it became clear it was the loser of these National Assembly elections. The far right National Rally is coming third, behind Macron’s centrist Ensemble coalition in second. And in first place, somewhat against the odds, is the three-week-old left-wing alliance the New Popular Front. This is a major twist in the roller coaster that French politics has been since June 9 when Macron called a snap election. Macron, who will serve as president until 2027, now faces a turbulent period of government. Results are still coming in, and will for another few hours. However, the New Popular Front is tipped to win 177 to 192 seats, Macron’s alliance 152 to 158 seats, and the National Rally 138 to 145 seats. Only a week ago polls were predicting 200 to 260 seats for the National Rally and a decimated Centrist coalition. The latter certainly did better than expected, so did the moderate right of the Les Républicains party, with 63 to 67 seats in the new house. However, the results mean that no party will likely be able to form a parliamentary majority on its own, and France is heading for what will likely be a turbulent coalition government. Overall, this election is a significant victory for the left. However, the New Popular Front is unlikely to be able to deliver on its key electoral promises, contrary to what divisive hard-left populist Jean-Luc Mélanchon claimed in a victory speech he gave on behalf of La France Insoumise, the lead party within the New Popular Front coalition. Why will the coalition that came first not be able to form a government on its own? The French parliamentary system under the Fifth Republic was designed for two large blocs: the moderate right and the moderate left, with a small centre in the middle and even smaller extremes on the far left and far right. This is how it’s been working since 1958, with only two exceptions in over six decades: President Valéry Giscard D'estaing (1974-1981) and President Macron (since 2017), two centrists presidents who took the nation by surprise. Today, however, the situation is unheard of with three major coalitions very close to one another in the French lower house. None will be able to form a government on their own: they simply do not have the numbers. To achieve a majority in the French lower house, a coalition needs 289 of the 577 MP seats. Even today’s winner – the New Popular Front – is far from this magic number. So, how do you govern France with no leading majority coalition? In theory, any French government must have the support of the lower house – the National Assembly – in order to govern effectively and pass legislation. If a majority of MPs do not support the government, the government falls and a new government is constituted from that majority. With today’s results, potential crossbenchers have multiplied in the French lower house, creating what is likely to be France’s most unstable political landscape since the French Fourth Republic that went through 22 governments within 12 years, between 1946 and 1958. That being said, France’s next government will be left-leaning. It is unclear for now whether it will be uncompromisingly left or simply mildly labour – this will depend on how elected members of the new house decide to work with one another and transform election coalitions into government coalitions. What is clear, however, is that the New Popular Front will need to broker a deal with Macron’s coalition if it wants to govern and soften its agenda of reforms. The problem is that the most radical fringe of the New Popular Front (populist left-wing party La France Insoumise) does not wish to work with Macron, which they have spent the last two years detesting loudly. Although it is victorious today, the New Popular Front may very well implode, shortly or in a few months. Macron still has enough MPs to assemble a motley coalition spanning from the moderate labour of the Socialist Party and the Greens to the most moderate members of Les Républicains. But the Socialist Party is initially likely to try to work with its new unexpected ally of the France Insoumise (far left) to deliver a more left wing agenda and act as a power broker between the hard left and Macron’s centrists. In most other European countries, today’s results would not be an issue. Italy, Belgium and Germany for example are used to having coalition governments in office. France does not know how to do this. Its institutions are not designed for such types of government precisely because Charles De Gaulle wanted to avoid coalition government when he drafted the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic under which France is still operating. Besides institutions, French political culture is a little more sectarian and flamboyant by tradition, and collaboration is seen as a sin and a betrayal rather than a virtue. If the left and Macron’s centre are not able to collaborate for at least 12 months (the minimum constitutional delay for a new election), they can be sure that they will pave the way for the National Rally to win the next election as a result of popular exasperation. What do the results mean for Europe and the rest of the world? For now, and after much upheaval, very little is likely to change with regard to French foreign policy, regardless of the government that will emerge in the coming days or weeks. This is because although the National Rally has increased its MPs in the house – a small victory within a bigger defeat – the other parties are generally pro-European and pro-Ukraine. They are divided on internal politics, but much less so on foreign policy. French sovereignty, nuclear deterrence, multilateralism will remain keystones of French foreign policy. One notable difference with the former Macron government is that with a larger left in the lower house, pressure on Israel to stop the war in Gaza is likely to increase. A democracy in crisis? These elections have clearly shown that the French are unhappy with their political class, despairing of unresponsive centralised state services that seem to work for forms and permits rather than for the people, tired of waiting weeks and sometimes months to get a doctor’s appointment in rural areas, tired of restrictive green legislation they are not consulted about. The yellow vest movement was a violent eruption of frustrations that are now being voiced at the polling booth. France’s type of democracy is in crisis and its next government is unlikely to resolve structural issues and practical problems that plague French peoples’ everyday life, because such issues cannot be fixed overnight. Within a month, the French have voted three times. Never before has the far right done so well despite its ultimate defeat. Whether this was a vote sanction (a vote used to protest, rather than to show support to a political program) or a genuine move toward the far right, these results remain a warning that the French are longing for change.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Emmanuel Macron’s second Sorbonne speech showed that the French leader wants to shape a European legacy that will outlast his presidency. In doing so, he also highlighted the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship. In the end, it was a typical speech by French President Emmanuel Macron that members of the government and MPs, journalists and students heard on Thursday morning at the Sorbonne in Paris. It was too long, as the president himself admitted after about an hour. It was also too complicated, many listeners agreed: for almost seven years, translators, analysts, and often Macron’s own advisors have struggled with the metaphors and the convoluted three, four or five-point plans expounded by the president, who has been frequently accused in France of no longer being able to reach his fellow citizens. And yet it was a speech that no other current top politician in Europe would likely be capable of delivering. An emotional speech, sometimes angry and disappointed, then confident again, at times even rousing. A courageous speech, with a firework of analyses and proposals that addressed many pressing issues for the future of the EU. In between defense policy, the green and digital transformations of the economy and international trade policy, the protection of borders and asylum policy, and the threats to the liberal democracies of the West, one central concern dominated this long speech: the sovereignty of the European Union—an echo of his first Sorbonne speech of 2017, which has remained the obsession of the youngest and most pro-European president in French history. Disappointments in Defense Policy Right from the start, Macron measured himself against his own promises, particularly in security and defense policy, where strengthening the EU’s sovereignty is most urgently needed. In 2017, he proposed an EU intervention force, a defense budget, a doctrine for the armed forces, and the promotion of a strategic culture. Global political developments have since proved him right; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has left Germany and other countries “bare” in terms of security policy since 2022. However, the EU has still not implemented Macron's proposals and so the security of 450 million EU citizens could once again depend on a few thousand voters in US swing states in the November presidential election there. If Macron is to be believed, however, there have been successes since 2017 that need to be built on after the forthcoming European Parliament elections this June. In terms of security policy, he included the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which 13 EU member states have joined since 2017. The initiative only delivered a real operational impact in the form of the Takuba special forces mission, which fought terrorist groups in the Sahel from 2020 under French leadership. Berlin refused to take part in Takuba and it ended after a few months. The mission was also unable to prevent the EU from being ousted by Russia and other states in the Sahel and suffering a massive loss of influence. If Takuba is presented as a success, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is in bad shape. Achievements to Be Built on in Future By contrast, the initiative to strengthen European sovereignty in economic policy, which Macron predictably emphasized in his speech, was truly successful from a French perspective. The fact that the German government agreed to take on joint EU debt in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is seen across party lines in Paris as the president's biggest European policy victory since 2017. Macron recalled that the then finance minister and current German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, even spoke of a “Hamiltonion moment” in an interview, alluding to a permanent joint EU budget. For Macron, this remains the prerequisite for genuine EU sovereignty and therefore a goal for the remaining three years of his presidency.
 

France is confident that it will be able to persuade the German government to take this step in the coming years. In his speech, Macron referred several times to a recently published report by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, which contains proposals for strengthening the EU single market and for joint investments and is likely to influence the agenda of the next European Commission. While Macron was giving his Europe speech, journalists in Brussels were speculating about the French president's support for Mario Draghi, another former Italian head of government who has ambitions for the commission presidency. The current president, Ursula Von der Leyen, who is German, was not mentioned at all in the speech. Draghi will also present recommendations for increasing EU competitiveness—very much in line with Macron. Signals to the German Partner Joint debt issuance will inevitably lead to renewed conflict between Germany and France in the coming months. Perhaps that is why Macron praised the relationship with Germany so frequently, emphasizing the value of the Aachen Treaty signed in 2019, cooperation during the pandemic and two joint arms projects that have recently made progress. Nevertheless, the French president could not resist a few digs. He emphasized the importance of nuclear power for the EU’s energy supply, praised French initiatives to form a “nuclear alliance” at the EU level, and called for the expansion of the “Europe of the atom.” More surprising than this old conflict was his allusion to the cannabis legalization introduced by Germany’s coalition government. He said some partners believed that the liberalization of drug policy was right, while he believed it to be wrong. Instead, the authority of the state should be strengthened. Fault Lines in the Franco-German Relationship Beyond these policy issues, the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship also became evident in the second Sorbonne speech: Macron repeatedly emphasized the danger of the EU becoming a “vassal” of the United States, losing its independent voice in the world, and degenerating into a “corner of the West.” Macron said the era of free trade and globalization was coming to an end and he referred to the triad of European dependencies often cited in France these days, most of which are particularly aimed at Berlin: Russian gas, Chinese export markets, and US security guarantees. Both the US and China were increasingly ignoring international rules that only the EU abided by, he claimed. The EU was acting “naively,” endangering the competitiveness of its industries and risking being responsible for its own failure in the process. The palpable fear of decline that ran through Macron’s speech did not only refer to the economy. The old fear of the Europeans, especially the French, of being culturally dominated by the US also flared up in many places. The multilingualism of Europe's youth, which Macron had invoked in 2017, is in a bad way. Despite Brexit, English dominates the EU institutions in Brussels. This is unlikely to change in the future, on the contrary. Thanks to Netflix and TikTok, young people all over Europe speak the same language. The EU, Macron said, barely controlled this digital space anymore and produced no content. Even worse than the withering of multilingualism was the fact that the EU no longer offered any positive narratives. For observers of French politics, this clearly echoed Macron’s concerns about opinion polls ahead of the European elections. His party alliance is lagging far behind the far-right Rassemblement National party, whose 28-year-old leading candidate Jordan Bardella is particularly popular with first-time voters and on social media. Macron’s second Sorbonne speech was therefore also intended to boost the campaign of his party’s leading candidate in the European elections, Valérie Hayer. However, Macron confined himself to a few allusions, probably also because he is for the first time being perceived as a burden for his party’s chances in the election campaign. Departure from Macron While preparing his speech, Macron must have thought back more than once to his first Sorbonne speech in 2017. The new speech heralds the beginning of his farewell as president of France. He has around three years left to turn the optimistic promises made at the beginning of his first term into a European policy legacy that will outlast his presidency. At the end of his speech, Macron quoted Hannah Arendt: “The only way to influence the future” was to “make promises and keep them.” Macron has promised a lot since 2017. No matter what else one might think of him: he is a visionary, the likes of whom has not been seen in the German chancellery for many years. Perhaps that is why the great European, the former German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, who died in December, wanted Macron to give a speech in recognition of his life's work. However, Macron still owes the EU the second part of Arendt's quote—the fulfillment of promises—in many areas. He knows that. And so, in parts of his speech, he came across as a driven man, one who is running out of time. This was also evident in another quote that Macron placed at the end of his speech, which raises the biggest question of all, the answer to which is anything but certain in France: Referring to Ernest Renan’s famous lecture, also delivered at the Sorbonne, in 1882, entitled: “What is a nation?” Macron called for the EU to ask itself the same essential question. If he succeeds in providing this impetus over the next three years, the EU would once again have something to offer, including to the young listeners of his speech. And Macron would have kept his big promise on European policy.


President Emmanuel Macron has set his strategy for this year’s European Parliament election. At its heart are pro-Europeanism, support for Ukraine – and an eye to shaping the leadership of EU institutions Populist radical-right parties are expected to win big in the European Parliament election this June, as a major study by the European Council on Foreign Relations found. The results are likely to drive a rightward shift in who runs the EU institutions, including the European Commission. With his party set to come a poor second on current polling, last month President Emmanuel Macron dismissed his prime minister and replaced the government. To show he is not – yet – a lame duck president, he has put himself at the heart of proceedings. The political choice he is presenting to the country is one between himself and the far-right. Unapologetic pro-Europeanism and support for Ukraine are central planks in this offer. And, although this is not the first time he has made the far-right his main target, this time around the president is seeking to do so from the centre-right. This is almost certainly with a view to building the strongest political position to weigh in on the pivotal decisions around who runs the EU institutions, once Europe has voted this summer. Macron matters When the president introduced his new government last month, the scenography of the occasion told its own story: he was seated on a stage with his entire government looking on at him from the side. France’s new government is indeed concentrated more than ever around the person of the president. Many of its members, including the prime minister, Gabriel Attal, owe him their political careers and rose to prominence under his aegis. Those ministers who were seen as insufficiently committed to the president’s agenda – or with whom he disagreed publicly – were shown the door. In many ways, this was a silent admission of failure. After his Renaissance party fell short in the 2022 legislative election, the president tasked the prime minister, Elisabeth Borne, with building coalitions in parliament to get the government’s legislation through. This largely failed, with the government resorting to the “49.3 mechanism” to ram through major legislation such as pensions reform. Last December it even lost control of parliamentary business altogether, to the point where a split Renaissance voted for an immigration law largely framed by the right and far-right. Macron appears to have responded to this bruising experience by making himself the central decision-maker in France, with the prime minister’s role to implement the priorities handed down to him. However, the composition of the government also tells its own story – one that has the next election in view. Macron has reached further into the right of the political spectrum. Out of 11 new ministers, seven previously served in right-wing administrations. And it is not just about personnel: when Attal addressed the National Assembly on 20 January, he expanded on themes that are typically associated with more conservative policymaking, such as underlining the value of work, the importance of accountability, and the need to deregulate. The president appears to be courting what remains of the traditional French right. Targeting the far-right For the coming four months until the election, Macron’s camp is facing an uphill battle against a rising far-right . With 31 per cent in the polls, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National party is racing ahead in voting intentions. (Support for the far-right Reconquête! stands at 7 per cent.) The president’s camp also runs the risk of losing voters to the socialist-ecologist list in the wake of the controversial pensions and immigration votes. As a consequence, Macron is visibly taking on the far-right, denouncing the “incoherence” of its politics – as he has done before, in his two presidential wins and the 2019 European election. “Let’s act, let’s do, let’s change our habits, and demonstrate that we can change things and people’s everyday lives”, Macron hammered home when announcing his priorities for the new government. His prime minister echoed this: “What I want is action, action, action, results, results, results.” The promotion of younger, talented faces is also something that has served Macron well before. At age 34 and 38, both the prime minister and the new foreign minister are the youngest ever to hold their respective offices in the Fifth Republic. And the similarities between Attal and the leader of Rassemblement National, Jordan Bardella, have not gone unnoticed. Both are young, popular, and effective communicators who have often faced off over the years. Unapologetically pro-European The final new-old trick is for the president to place support for the European project at the heart of his political offering. Since his meteoric rise in politics in 2017, support for the European Union has long provided the sharpest contrast with the far-right. For these reasons, the president has lately doubled down on his pro-Europeanism, pushing for EU solutions to domestic policy questions, from immigration, to climate, to energy. Even amid a difficult domestic context, this has been his go-to option: in response to recent nationwide protests by farmers, Macron pointed to the EU’s common agricultural policy and trade policy as ways to remedy the crisis. Again, his new personnel embody the pro-EU – and pro-Ukraine – politics. Foreign minister Stéphane Séjourné has been a member of the European Parliament since 2019, and was leader of the Renew group until his elevation. Séjourné’s appointment signals Macron will maintain his pro-enlargement, pro-Ukraine approach – the surest way for him to appear the clearest choice for those who want to stop the far-right. Séjourné reasserted France’s support for EU enlargement, a position Macron had made clear at the Globsec conference in Bratislava in May 2023. His first trip as a minister was to Ukraine, where he stated that it “is and will remain France’s priority”. He followed this up with a visit to Germany and Poland, affirming France’s interest in the “Weimar format” of close cooperation between Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw. * With populism and the radical right on the rise, centrist parties are in retreat across Europe. Current polling suggests the liberal Renew group in the European Parliament will shrink after the election, reducing its influence over who gets the top EU jobs. If Macron is able to limit the damage – finishing close to Rassemblement National would be enough – without deviating from his pro-European and pro-Ukrainian stances, he will have safeguarded his political standing in Europe. And he will do so just at the moment of prime influence over shaping the EU institutions. Macron’s right-of-centre positioning of his new government would also be compatible with a European Council that will likely tilt right. The coming months in French politics are set to be a bumpy ride. They will reveal whether the president can see off the far-right in more or less the same way as before – or whether offering the same choices with new faces will prove insufficient this time around.

Since at least a decade, migration has remained a hot-button issue in European politics, providing fodder for parties on the right of the ideological spectrum. With a steady increase in its migrant population from 8.5 percent in 2010 to over 10 percent in 2022, the situation is no different in France where the issue has long presided over French politics. Just after the European Union (EU) reached an agreement on Migration and Asylum in December, the French Parliament passed a law to reform its approach to immigration while combating illegal immigration. After the outright rejection of President Emmanuel Macron’s previous more lenient version of the immigration bill that was painstakingly drafted for 18 months, the version that eventually passed through Parliament was significantly toughened to appeal to the far-right. Even while granting temporary residence permits for work sectors plagued with labour shortages, the bill introduces tough controls. These include stricter conditions for immigrants to bring over family members, annual quotas for immigration, preferential access to state subsidies and welfare benefits to French citizens in a country traditionally known for its generous and inclusive welfare system, additional visa fees for foreign students, stripping crime-accused dual nationals off their French citizenship, diluting the right to automatic citizenship for those born in France, and installing an easier process to expel undocumented migrants. “The kiss of death” Unlike France’s controversial pension overhaul that was non-democratically imposed in March 2023 by bypassing Parliament and invoking special constitutional powers, the immigration bill was voted on in the lower house. The toughened legislation received 349 votes in favour and 186 against, where many in Macron’s own Renaissance Party and his centrist coalition either abstained or opposed the bill. On the other hand, all 88 members of the far-right voted in favour of the bill, lending their strong endorsement and backing. Many in the French media labelled this move as far-right Opposition leader Marine Le Pen’s “kiss of death” after the initial impression that her party the National Rally would either abstain or vote against the bill. Even though Macron managed to democratically pass legislation that was central to his second mandate, the optics of the compromise could not have been poorer. The results of a poll demonstrate that while 70 percent of the French population including 87 percent, of Macron’s own supporters support the new bill, 73 percent assumed that the bill was inspired by Le Pen’s ideas, leading to the outcome being touted as a massive “ideological victory” for Macron’s contenders on the far-right. Le Pen’s surprise coup and the strict measures that the bill contains also enraged Macron’s coalition members on the left, accusing him of caving into pressure from the far-right and risking the French Republic’s fundamental values. Moreover, the bill, through its incorporation of the beliefs of the far-right, has alienated supporters who voted for Macron as an alternative to the far-right, and are now accusing him of becoming their “stepping stone” rather than repelling their ideas. While France’s health minister Aurélien Rousseau resigned from his post, the Greens’ Yannick Jabot referred to the bill as the arrival of Trumpism in France. Furthermore, the process has exposed the governance difficulties associated with Macron’s weak mandate from the 2022 election, which led to a loss in parliamentary majority. The whole affair has prompted a government reshuffle and the resignation of French Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne with the hope of focusing on fresh priorities, ahead of EU elections scheduled for June where eurosceptic parties are leading the charge. Mainstreaming the far-right In their endeavour to assuage voter concerns amidst hardened public opinion on immigration, parties across the board have found themselves in a bind to tackle the issue of migration, which the far-right has successfully fed upon. Thus, the centre’s co-opting of the talking points of the far-right is a phenomenon being observed throughout European politics, whereby the mainstream is mainstreaming and legitimising the politics of the far-right. For Macron too, this is not the first time that he’s accommodated or imitated far-right rhetoric for political survival as evident in his increasingly hardline rhetoric on Islam in 2023. In September last year, Macron’s then-Education Minister Gabriel Attal, who has recently been appointed as France’s new Prime Minister, announced a ban on wearing the Muslim abaya in schools in the interests of secularism. The ball is now in the hands of France’s constitutional court to examine whether the law complies with the constitution or requires amendments. In addition, the caveat that while European countries, including France, crack down on immigration, they are simultaneously facing declining populations and need migrant labour, is inescapable. As France moves to the right on immigration, Macron may have managed to democratically pass a law on the most contentious issue in French politics. But his own image, as a defender of liberal democracy and a centrist alternative to the far-right, remains in tatters.

Macron has raised doubts about how serious France is when it comes to managing the negative externalities of China’s rise. Just when it seemed the European Union was finally achieving strategic coherence as a global geopolitical actor, French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China has shattered that myth. The French president and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, headed to China last week, hoping to project a sense of unity vis-à-vis Beijing at a time when global fault lines are sharpening among major powers. The two leaders were aiming to stabilise an increasingly difficult trade relationship with their largest trading partner as well as try to push China into taking a more active role in ending the Ukraine war. Other European leaders, like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, have also tried to engage Chinese leadership in recent months. But Macron went beyond others as he advocated “strategic autonomy” for Europe as a “third superpower.” Arguing that Europe faces “the great risk” if it “gets caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy”, Macron stirred up instant controversy by suggesting that Europe must reduce its dependency on the U.S. and avoid getting dragged into a confrontation between China and the U.S. over Taiwan. In case of an aggravation of the U.S.-China conflict, Macron advocated, “we [Europe] will not have the time nor the means to finance our own strategic autonomy, and we will become vassals, whereas we could become the third pole [in the world order] if we have a few years to develop this”. Though von der Leyen went to China at Macron’s invitation, the visit has been overshadowed by Macron’s posturing and Beijing’s apparent glee that it is indeed possible to drive a wedge in transatlantic relations. Macron was given a red carpet welcome in China, and his comments have received widespread coverage. The Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times said the comments were “clearly the result of Macron’s long-term observation and reflection” and represented a path that was “relatively objective, rational, and in line with Europe’s own interests”. Macron has described the visit as an attempt to “consolidate common approaches” over the war in Ukraine and to force China to acknowledge the costs of its ties with China. But it was hardly evident how this was achieved during and after the visit. Ursula von der Leyen, who has been largely given the cold shoulder in China, has been much more emphatic in her denunciation of the Chinese 12-point plan to end the war in Ukraine and has been underlining the need for “de-risking” in Europe’s trade ties with China. But Macron’s intervention has led to an intense backlash from all sides. The Europeans are making it evident that there is hardly any widespread support for the French leader’s position. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China said in a statement that Macron’s comments are “severely out of touch” with sentiment across European leadership and that he does not speak for Europe. In particular, the officials of central and eastern Europe have been vocal in their dismay and opposition to Macron’s policy preferences. “Instead of building strategic autonomy from the United States, I propose a strategic partnership with the United States,” Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki bluntly put it to his European partners. Those European nations that are on the frontlines of Russian military aggression see the challenges of today in existential terms. They have no time for a French philosophical treatise on statecraft. With France and Germany devoid of any significant military prowess, the reliance of the EU on the U.S. is a strategic imperative. Macron’s ill-timed comments have once again revealed the divergences between the “old” and “new” Europe, even though “old” Europe has not been supportive of Macron’s worldview. Reactions from the U.S. have been equally scathing. Though the White House has maintained that it is “focused on the terrific collaboration and coordination that we have with France”, the Republicans have latched onto this controversy. The Republican senator Marco Rubio rhetorically asked if, after Macron’s comments, the US should just consider focusing its foreign policy on containing China and leave Europe to handle the war in Ukraine. Mike Gallagher, the Republican chairman of the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, described Macron’s comments as “embarrassing” and “disgraceful.” And of course, former President, Donald Trump was more colourful in his response when he said that Macron “is over with China kissing [Xi’s] ass in China.” Macron’s stance will be concerning to Washington as they are likely to embolden China, even as it reignites the debate about how much America should commit to European security. Macron has been under siege in France, with his approval ratings down in the dumps and his government narrowly surviving a vote of no confidence last month. So posturing on the global stage on an issue that has had a long pedigree in French politics perhaps makes sense for him politically. Ad he has made controversial comments in the past as well, such as NATO experiencing “brain death” and trying to offer Russian President Vladimir Putin “security guarantees” months after his invasion of Ukraine. But at a time when the West has tried with great difficulty to project a serious China policy and when Chinese aggression, especially against Taiwan, has been explicit, making remarks that end up doing exactly the opposite of what the visit was intended for in the first place betrays a lack of resolve that Beijing will be only too pleased to exploit. And for France’s partners in the Indo-Pacific, Macron has raised doubts about how serious France is when it comes to managing the negative externalities of China’s rise.