Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine of February 2022 has propelled EU enlargement to the top of Europe’s political agenda and linked it inextricably to the question of European security. The reshaping of the global political landscape, where strategic competition, growing global instability and attempts to undermine the rules-based international order are prominent features, has added further complexity to EU enlargement. The geopolitical imperative has seemingly expedited EU enlargement, while the merit-based transformative objectives of the process sit uncomfortably in the balance. This article provides a critical analysis of the evolution of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, zooming in on the EU perspective and key initiatives of its Member States. It explains how the initial ambition and hope that the enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans embodied drifted towards enlargement fatigue. It also outlines the hurdles confronting the enlargement process and the Western Balkans, the efforts exerted to revive EU enlargement, and finally considers the questions facing the EU during the new legislative term. EU enlargement perspective – strict but fair? EU enlargement is perceived historically as having played a transformative role. It supported the consolidation of democracy in the Southern European countries and later, in the Central and Eastern European countries, the EU accession process is seen as having fostered stability, democratisation and economic prosperity. The arduous transformative process has, however, been longer and bumpier for the Western Balkans. North Macedonia has been stuck in the EU’s lobby for almost 20 years, Montenegro since 2011, Serbia since 2012 and Albania since 2014. This was partly due to the hardening of rule of law conditionality. A key lesson identified from Romania and Bulgaria’s EU accession path was that the transformation of a country, in particular in the rule of law area, was not only a long process but it was also fraught with obstacles, notably resistance from applicant governments. To remedy the shortcomings identified, the 2005 negotiating framework for Croatia strengthened rule of law conditionality by introducing a specific Chapter 23 on ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’ in addition to the existing Chapter 24 on ‘justice, freedom and security’ in the EU acquis communautaire. This approach continued and was hardened during the EU accession negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. The Western Balkans were first promised a “European perspective” at the Zagreb Summit of 2000. At the June 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki, the EU reaffirmed that the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU. To deliver on this, the enlargement process was tied to substantial financial and technical support through which the EU has aimed to push for the democratisation and resilience of Western Balkan institutions, societies and economies. EU support was made conditional upon the Western Balkans meeting ‘European standards’ (conditionality), including (and especially) rule of law prerogatives. This approach was reflected in the negotiating framework adopted in June 2012 for negotiations with Montenegro, in the High-Level Accession Dialogues respectively with North Macedonia (then former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, fYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law with Kosovo, [1] all launched in 2012. The European Commission, but most adamantly civil society in the Western Balkans, repeatedly pointed to the failings of the region’s governments to implement reforms, leading to façade compliance. In parallel, the ‘Brussels dialogue’ between Kosovo and Serbia has oscillated between normalisation and a state of strained peace and conflict prevention, with the signature of the April 2013 ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’ (known as the Brussels Agreement) constituting an exception of ephemeral hope. [2] Moreover, slowly but firmly, stabilitocracy grew roots. Autocrats in the Western Balkans, ruling through informal power structures, state capture by ruling parties, patronage and control of the media, managed to combine EU accession with stronger domestic control. [3] Certain Member States turned a blind eye to or downplayed the democratic backsliding, (indirectly) supporting autocratic leaders accused of nurturing stabilitocracy. Notable examples include Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanović and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić who Member States initially hoped would be able to settle the Kosovo status question. EU enlargement fatigue: the breaking point The multiple and overlapping crises that Europe has faced since 2008, from the global financial crisis to the perceived 2015 migration crisis, to the 2020 Covid crisis and the energy and inflationary crisis that followed, relegated the EU integration of the Western Balkan countries to second tier. At the beginning of the Juncker Commission, it had become clear that EU enlargement would be for the long haul. The unfortunate European Council decision of October 2019 not to open EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania manifested the fatigue felt with the EU enlargement process, not only in the Western Balkans but on the EU side too. The merit-based process no longer rewarded prospective members engaging in reforms. While Skopje turned a page with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s election in May 2017, ending stabilitocracy, signing the historic June 2018 Prespa Agreement with Greece that solved the name issue, it was NATO that granted North Macedonia membership in March 2020. The EU accession process was (and continues to be) often kept hostage by the vetoes of individual Member States which are utterly unrelated to the economic and democratic conditions that supposedly govern the process. The exasperation felt in the Western Balkan countries because of the empty promises and broken dreams, gave rise to alternative scenarios and Plan Bs if EU enlargement to the Western Balkans were not to materialise. It opened the doors of the region to other donors and contested powers, in particular Russia through disinformation, China on investments in infrastructure, and Turkey and the Gulf countries through investments and cultural programmes. Their influence in the region came to the detriment of EU leverage. [4] With EU enlargement on the backburner, ways to keep the momentum for reform and initiatives from the region were welcomed. The Berlin Process, a diplomatic initiative by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was launched in 2014 with a view to reinvigorating the integration process. A platform focusing on increased high-level regional cooperation and connectivity between the Western Balkan Six —Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia— and the EU Member States, the process also involves the EU institutions, international financial institutions and the region’s civil society. In addition, the 2013 Brdo-Brijuni Process is a regionally owned platform for political dialogue on sensitive bilateral and regional issues, initiated by Slovenia and Croatia. The ‘Western Balkans Six’ format enables the region’s governments to agree on and promote joint initiatives, with the full cooperation of the European Commission. These initiatives were also a way to show other powers —notably Russia, Turkey and China— that the EU is in the region to stay. Revitalising EU enlargement? The 2018 Strategy for the Western Balkans of the Juncker Commission marked a U-turn, putting the enlargement perspective of the region back on the EU agenda. It also set the tone for the 2019-2024 legislative term. Already during her campaigning for votes in the European Parliament for the confirmation of her nomination as Commission President following the 2019 European elections, Ursula von der Leyen had expressed her support for enlargement. This became clear in her Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Commission, in which she committed to supporting the European perspective of the Western Balkans. [5] At the same time, experts argued that a move from Juncker’s political Commission to Von der Leyen’s geopolitical and therefore “politicized” Commission would translate to more pressure from Member States on the Commission. That could compromise the Commission’s role as guardian of the EU Treaties, they explained. [6] In a way, EU Member States’ backroom dealings that led to a deviation from the expected Spitzenkandidat process in 2014, were a precursor to how they would deal with the EU enlargement process. The February 2020 revamped EU enlargement methodology, urged by French President Emmanuel Macron, aimed to make the process more credible, more dynamic and predictable. It also sought to make the enlargement process more robust by putting pressure on those candidate countries (notably Serbia) that have been comfortably hiding behind empty political promises for reform while nurturing stabilitocracy. In terms of EU decision-making, the new methodology decreased the number of Member State’s veto points in the Council by introducing the opening of clusters instead of individual chapters, which was hoped would expedite the enlargement process. In addition, some experts highlighted that “by reinvigorating democratic reform, facilitating foreign and security policy alignment, and making real once more the idea that Western Balkan countries are welcome as new Member States, the EU would suck the oxygen from competing and malign illiberal influences”. [7] Nevertheless, at the outset, the prospective new members perceived the novelties in the enlargement methodology as yet another way to slow down the accession process. The new methodology further reinforced the requirements for rule of law reforms (including the oversight of the relevant institutions) allowing Member States to put negotiations on hold, re-open closed chapters, reconsider funding availability and, in the worst-case scenario, suspend accession negotiations altogether. Moreover, it took the Commission more than three years to implement the methodology, fuelling the uncertainty felt in the Western Balkans. At the same time, North Macedonia, in particular, and Albania as its collateral victim, given that its accession progress was coupled to that of North Macedonia, faced intense resistance to progress on its EU accession path both from France and the Netherlands. The European Council gave its long-awaited green light to start North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations in March 2020 (together with Albania). But even then, the unity in Council was tarnished by Bulgaria, which requested that a statement be attached to the March 2020 Council conclusions, insisting, among other things, on scrapping references to the Macedonian language and to the existence of an ethnic Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. [8] These hurdles have effectively meant that accession negotiations have not started with either North Macedonia or Albania. In that light, more initiatives parallel to the EU enlargement process were launched, raising controversy. On the Western Balkans side, Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia agreed on the Open Balkans Initiative (better known as Mini-Schengen), in August 2021, although it had been under discussion since 2019. Its stated aim was to deepen political and economic ties by opening the borders between the three countries and creating a common market that would bring the countries closer to EU integration. Kosovo and Montenegro have expressed support for this idea, while Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to garner the necessary political support. Geopolitical EU enlargement: a turning point The 2022 Russian war in Ukraine has “injected new urgency into the enlargement debate but it has also underscored enlargement as a strategic necessity” for European security. [9] In June 2022, EU leaders expressed their full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and called for acceleration of the accession process. The latest EU Strategic Agenda “underscores the importance of enlargement as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity” [10] That geopolitical urgency led at last to the official opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in July 2022. The enlargement momentum, which accelerated the opening of accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and an offer for conditional candidacy to Georgia in December 2023, spilled over to Bosnia and Herzegovina despite its constitutional blockage. The EU decided to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2024. These political decisions were a clear signal that the EU is still serious about the enlargement process. At the same time, in line with the general framework of the Copenhagen political criteria and the 2006 renewed EU consensus on enlargement, the Council’s latest conclusions on enlargement of 12 December 2023 stressed the need for fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits. The June 2024 endorsement of the rule of law benchmarks (Chapters 23 and 24 in the ‘fundamentals cluster’) at Montenegro’s Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) is a key milestone for the country’s EU accession path, but also of the centrality of the merit-based approach. In parallel, the Council led by French President Macron, has also stressed the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own development, including its capacity to integrate new members. This new hurdle in the way of EU accession has led experts and policy-makers alike to consider the latest Council decisions on EU accession as “relatively symbolic”. Besides the length and unpredictability of the enlargement process, this is also the case because of the number of obstacles applicants have found on their way to the EU, including vetoes over bilateral disputes that are unrelated to the Copenhagen criteria. [11] In addition to the vetoes North Macedonia has faced consecutively from Greece and Bulgaria, Tirana’s opening of the first cluster of negotiation chapters was obstructed more recently by Athens over the jailing of an ethnic Greek Albanian mayor accused of electoral fraud. The momentum for EU enlargement has revived concerns about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, i.e., the EU’s preparedness for accepting new members. These concerns have revived the debate on the need for EU institutional reforms to ensure the effective functioning of the Union post-enlargement. Yet much of this debate is linked to the decision-making bottlenecks in the Council, when responding to urgent and complicated crises (particularly the war in Ukraine). In terms of the legal feasibility of EU enlargement, the Treaty of Lisbon contains the necessary provisions regarding institutions and decision-making processes for the EU to be able to welcome new members without any Treaty changes. In addition, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU has liberated seats in the European Parliament that would make the absorption of small new members possible. In reaction, some experts and policy-makers have seen the determination with which France and a few other Member States push for EU internal reforms as yet another attempt to either hinder EU enlargement and/or rather move towards a multi-speed EU. [12] Against this backdrop, the rise of the populist right in the European elections and national elections across the EU has amplified the mantra that EU “values and the rule of law are our compass, both internally and externally”, [13] led by a group of Member States with France in the lead. Hence, support for EU enlargement may be more complicated in the Council, where a number of EU governments have shifted to the far right and when, in a super-election year, more such parties are likely to find themselves at the helm of or in governing coalitions in the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the European Commission and Parliament are likely set to continue to support EU enlargement in the 2024-2029 legislative term. In her political priorities, incoming Commission President von der Leyen has framed enlargement as “a moral, political and geostrategic imperative” for the EU and appointed a Commissioner dedicated specifically to enlargement. In support for boosting enlargement, von der Leyen has also committed to presenting in her first 100 days in office, pre-enlargement policy reviews across a wide array of EU policy sectors, implying that there will be post-enlargement phase. [14]  The political priorities also note that the “emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental values…will always remain the cornerstone of the EU’s enlargement policy”. [15]  This could entail further delays in the accession process, for reasons already explained. The Parliament has applied a ‘cordon sanitaire’ on all leadership positions (Committee chairs and vice-chairs, Quaestors and Vice-Presidents) to block those seen as positioning themselves against the EU project (namely the far right). It is hoped this will ensure that the EP’s mainstream positions hold, including its strong support for EU enlargement. In that regard, David McAllister MEP (EPP, Germany) was re-elected chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), which is the main committee legislating on and scrutinising progress in EU enlargement. Initiatives on EU enlargement for a new legislative term 2024-2029 Several ideas have been discussed in EU circles on how to move forward with enlargement and capitalise on the current enlargement momentum. The EU has also launched new initiatives aiming to incentivise the Western Balkans to make the necessary reforms to meet the enlargement requirements. The discussion on gradual integration or “phasing-in”, in the words of the European Commission, is not a new concept. The idea of fashioning a new kind of conditionality, a way to encourage reform especially in the rule of law, but also in regional integration, good neighbourly relations, reconciliation and the resolution of bilateral disputes, now goes beyond the promises of the revised EU enlargement methodology. It became more concrete with the adoption of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, in May 2024, whose stated aim is to support the Western Balkans partners on their EU path by encouraging faster socio-economic convergence with the EU. Specifically, in return for socio-economic and fundamental reforms, including in the rule of law and fundamental rights, the Western Balkans countries will benefit from EU integration in the areas where they have met the acquis requirements. In addition to those conditions, Serbia and Kosovo are expected to engage constructively on the normalisation of their relations, leading to tangible results. At the centre of this new plan is the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, a new financial instrument that will provide €6 billion (€2 billion in grants and €4 billion in loans) over the 2024-2027 period. An additional €2 billion was allocated to the Facility as part of the mid-term revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027. For their part, each candidate and prospective candidate has prepared a detailed reform agenda explaining how it will undertake EU-related reforms. But experts have raised questions on whether the financial support is sufficient for such broad-based and demanding reforms, whether the carrots offered are enough to convince Western Balkan governments to implement reforms, whether conditionality is applicable and how it will be monitored and measured. [16] The idea of introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) —55 percent of Member States representing at least 65 percent of the EU population— in the Council of the EU for decisions pertaining to the common foreign and security policy has inspired experts and politicians alike to consider QMV for decision in the intermediary steps of EU enlargement. The European Parliament has been a strong proponent of this idea during the last legislative term, but importantly, this idea has gained traction in the Council itself, the ultimate decision-maker on EU enlargement. Specifically, a Slovenian-German non-paper to the General Affairs Council of January 2024 proposed that the opening (and only the opening) of negotiating clusters, including the Opening Benchmark Assessment Reports (OBAR) be decided in Council by QMV. This proposal is supported by some 15 other Member States. Experts have explained that introducing QMV could facilitate bypassing blockages that result from bilateral disputes between Member States and candidate countries. [17] It has also been argued that QMV could be way of providing a realistic accession scenario for the Western Balkan countries thus, on the one hand, helping the EU regain its credibility in the eyes of the Western Balkans while, on the other, rendering the enlargement process fairer and more effective. [18] Combining these two broad themes, some experts have pushed for a ‘staged accession’ to restore positive momentum to EU enlargement and ease the most serious concerns that EU Member States have regarding the prospect of further enlargement. Among other things, this proposal suggests granting QMV powers —rather than veto powers— to new Member States upon accession, in anticipation of and conditioned on streamlining the whole EU decision-making process. In that case, ‘new Member States’ could be regarded as avant-garde, in that their exclusion from veto voting power would align them to the revamped EU, which would itself progressively adapt institutionally by reducing unanimity requirements. In parallel, this provisional period of socialization would allow new Member States to be gradually introduced to the intricacies of EU policy-making. [19] The geopolitical imperative for enlargement is likely to be felt more strongly in the coming years. Russia, China and others remain active in the Western Balkans and continue to “capitalise on every opportunity that the EU fails to use and on any moment of strategic confusion and hesitance”. [20] The return of Donald Trump to the White House will likely mean a call for the EU to tackle its own responsibilities on its continent. It will take resolute EU leadership for progress in EU accession to be concrete. It implies that the enlargement process should be recalibrated so that the Western Balkan candidates are not left lingering behind the Eastern trio. It also requires that the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) starting later next year adequately reflects enlargement as a priority. Geopolitical choices cannot resort to ‘selective democracy’ as each of the Western Balkan countries should be treated on its merits. Ultimately, the EU integration of the Western Balkans needs to be understood as a win-win for all. References and footnotes 1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.2 Ioannides, I. (2018). “Peace and Security in 2018: An evaluation of the EU peacebuilding in the Western Balkans”. EPRS, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2018)6218163 Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (2017). “The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy”. Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz. https://www.biepag.eu/publication/policy-paper-the-crisis-of-democracy-in-the-western-balkans-authoritarianism-and-eu-stabilitocracy/ 4 Bechev, D. (2017). Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. Yale University Press. See also Shopov, V. (2021). “Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans”. European Council for Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-how-china-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/ 5 Von der Leyen, U. (2019). “A Union that strives for more. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024”. Directorate-General for Communication. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/063d44e9-04ed-4033-acf9-639ecb187e87_en?filename=political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf 6 Blockmans, S.; Gros, D. (2019). “From a political to a politicised Commission?” Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/from-a-political-to-a-politicised-commission/ 7 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 8 Ioannides, I. (2020). “The New EU Budget and Recovery Fund: A Positive Omen for the EU Enlargement Process?” IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-new-eu-budget-and-recovery-fund-a-positive-omen-for-the-eu 9 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 10 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 11 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 12 Buras, P.; Morina, E. (2023). “Catch-27: The contradictory thinking about enlargement in the EU”. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/ 13 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 14 Von der Leyen (2024). “Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024−2029”. Strasbourg, July 18, 2024, p. 25, p. 30. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 15 Von der Leyen (2024). Mission Letter from Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, to Marta Kos, Commissioner-designate for Enlargement. Brussels, September 17, 2024, p.5. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1a2d0ad0-270d-441b-98c8-b6be364d8272_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20KOS.pdf 16 Uvalic, M. (2024). “The Potential of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans”. Civil Society Forum – Tirana 2023. European Policy Institute – Skopje. https://epi.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/The-Potential-of-the-New-Growth-Plan-for-the-Western-Balkans.pdf 17 Zweers, W.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Dimitrov, N. (2024). “Unblocking decision-making in EU enlargement: Qualified Majority Voting as a way forward?” Clingendael, DGAP, ELIAMEP, and Solutions. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/PB_Unblocking_decision-making_in_EU_enlargement.pdf 18 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 19 Emerson, M.; Lazarević, M.; Blockmans, S.; Subotić, S. (2021). “A Template for Staged Accession to the EU”. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/a-template-for-staged-accession-to-the-eu/ 20 Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Dimitrov, N. (2023). “It’s a Package Deal! Reforming and Enlarging the European Union in a Contested World”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/its-a-package-deal-reforming-and-enlarging-the-european-union-in-a 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It was to be expected, and we were poorly prepared for it, Donald Trump’s phone call to Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly ended 75 years of transatlantic relations. We, the French, had long warned that our security interests with the United States were not always aligned and that these differences could lead to serious disputes. There was the Suez Canal in 1956, there was Iraq in 2003, and there was, in a more moderate sense, Macron’s brain-dead stance on a dispute arising from Turkey’s actions in Syria in 2019. From now on, there will be February 12, 2025. But today, the situation is more serious because it is the security of Europe itself that is at stake, the very security that forms the heart of the existence of the Atlantic alliance. One can understand that the war in Ukraine is unwinnable and that a solution must be found to stop this war. One can understand that Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a red line for Russia. One can also understand that the United States wants Europeans to take a more significant share of the burden of their defence. However, the problem is that the United States made Ukraine’s NATO membership a goal of the Atlantic alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, against the advice of France and Germany at the time, thus worsening a relationship with Russia that was already deteriorating. The problem also is that Trump wants to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia without inviting the European Union and other European countries to the negotiating table, while Europe’s security is at stake. The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe’s conventional security, as US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to give security guarantees to Ukraine and completely discredit themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have shown that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe’s security.Or they provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the cost of a financial burden that will affect the European Union’s competitiveness in the long term.In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. This solution, however, seems outdated given the new context. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), it is better for Europeans to fully take on Europe’s security. This would mean taking control of NATO: Europeans must quickly discuss this option and communicate their decision to Secretary General Mark Rutte. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Germany’s presumptive new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, faces challenges both at home and overseas following his conservative alliance’s election victory on Feb. 23, 2025. A strong showing from the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) – which Merz, in line with other mainstream German parties, refuses to countenance as a coalition party as part of an unofficial “firewall” against extremism – will make forming a functioning government tricky. But in the moments after the election results, it was the future of the European Union and its relationship with America that was his immediate focus: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” To understand why that is such a concern for Germany now and what “real independence” from Washington means, The Conversation U.S. turned to Garret Martin, an expert on U.S.-Europe relations at American University, for answers. What prompted Merz’s ‘real independence’ line? Presumably it was a response to a series of recent announcements and actions by the Trump administration that have shocked the German political establishment. This includes the sudden revelation that the U.S. would negotiate directly with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, but seemingly without the Europeans or Ukrainians involved. That development went down like a lead balloon in Berlin, especially considering Germany’s significant financial support of Kyiv since 2022. Moreover, the German establishment has also frowned at a series of recent declarations by members of the Trump administration. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he harshly criticized Europe for allegedly undermining freedom of expression, provoked clear pushback from German leaders. Trump, for his part, hardly endeared himself to his German allies when he denounced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator.” And, of course, Elon Musk’s interference in the German elections – as well as his open support for the far-right Alternative for Germany – provoked a fierce response from Merz. The then-candidate promised that Musk would need to be prepared for legal consequences for his meddling. How would this ‘real independence’ be achieved? Defining what “real independence” means and being able to implement such a drastic change in transatlantic relations will be a tall order. If by “real independence” Merz means that Germany would no longer rely on the U.S. for its security, then that would require several major steps. Merz would first need to convince his likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, that this is the right goal. After all, German governments are bound by very detailed coalition agreements. Second, Merz would need to significantly increase German defense spending. As it stands, Germany’s annual defense budget is slightly over US$90 billion, or 2% of its GDP. But a recent study by the economic think tank Bruegel suggests Berlin would need to increase its budget by $145 billion annually to defend Europe without the assistance of the U.S. But to achieve this, Merz will likely need to increase defense spending by such a level that it will contravene the country’s “debt brake.” This 2009 constitutional rule essentially caps the annual deficit that the government can take on. But overturning this mechanism would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the German Parliament. Merz’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union party won 28.6% of the vote – and even with the support of the country’s main center-left party, the Social Democrats, Merz will fall short of the parliamentary votes needed. Finally, “real independence” would also require convincing other European Union partners to join him down that path. Assuming that the Trump administration continues its current trajectory and further undermines NATO, the EU would have to step in to become a more prominent security actor for the continent. It might also require, as Merz hinted, that the United Kingdom and France be ready to share their nuclear weapons, since the U.S. may not be trusted anymore to defend NATO countries. All of these steps would cover “real independence” only in the security sphere and not touch other crucial policy areas, such as trade and energy. And that would be an equally tall order given the level of economic ties binding Germany to the U.S., as well as the looming threat of tariffs. What does this mean for German-US relations? Merz’s “real independence” statement would have been noteworthy coming from any German chancellor. But it is even more striking when one considers the fact that Merz is a committed transatlanticist who deeply admires the U.S. and counts Ronald Reagan as one of his role models. At 69, Merz came of age during the final years of the Cold War, when the U.S. played a key role in enabling German reunification. He worked for years for Atlantik-Brücke, a lobbying group pushing for closer transatlantic ties. And he has, by his own account, traveled more than 100 times to the U.S. Independence will not likely mean a complete divorce between the U.S. and Germany – the ties binding the two countries, whether economic, cultural or political, run too deep. However, we can expect that Berlin will not hesitate to take a more combative approach toward Washington when necessary, so to protect German and European interests. As Merz pointed out, it is clear that the Trump administration does “not care much about the fate of Europe.” What does this signal for Merz’s view of Germany’s position in the EU? Merz’s win will certainly lead to important shifts in Germany’s position in the EU, and could be a major boost for a union in need of leadership. His predecessor, Olaf Scholz, was hampered by a weak economy, divisions within his coalition and indecisive leadership in Europe. Moreover, poor relations with French President Emmanuel Macron also stalled the Franco-German partnership, normally a key engine of leadership in the EU. Merz certainly plans to take a very distinct approach toward the EU than his predecessor. His calls for “real independence” will certainly be very welcome in France, which has long called for Europe to be more responsible for its own security. As such, it opens up the possibility of far closer ties between Paris and Berlin than we saw in recent years. Moreover, Merz, with his more hawkish position toward Russia, could be counted on to provide greater support for Ukraine.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From January 20 to 24, 2025, the traditional World Economic Forum (WEF) took place in Davos. The organizers registered approximately 2,000 participants from over 130 countries, including around 1,600 executives from major corporations, among them 900 CEOs. The political agenda of the WEF was supported by more than 50 heads of state and government. As part of the official program, about 300 sessions were held, 200 of which were broadcast live. Press accreditation was granted to 76 media companies. For official events, 28,043 square meters of space were allocated, accommodating 117 meeting rooms and 23 lounge areas. Additionally, several participating companies (such as HSBC, EY, and Cognizant) rented additional venues separately for their own events. WEF President Børge Brende, announcing this meeting, emphasized that in 2025, due to geopolitical conflicts, ongoing economic fragmentation, and the acceleration of climate change, the forum would be held under conditions of exceptionally high global uncertainty for the first time in decades. The theme of the Forum was “Cooperation in the Age of Intelligence”. On January, WEF experts presented four reports. The first one, a traditional report and the 20th edition, analyzed the most significant global risks and threats facing the international community. The study is based on a survey of over 900 experts from various fields and covers short-term (2025), medium-term (until 2027), and long-term (until 2035) perspectives. The key risks identified for these periods include the following:- in 2025 the most serious threat for most respondents is interstate armed conflicts, followed by extreme weather events and geoeconomic conflicts, including sanctions and trade measures;- by 2027 key risks include disinformation and fake news, which undermine trust in institutions and intensify social polarization, tension, and instability, as well as an increase in cyberattacks and espionage cases;- by 2035 environmental threats are a major concern, including extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, ecosystem destruction, critical changes in Earth's systems, and natural resource shortages. Additionally, technological risks such as the negative consequences of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies are highlighted.The authors emphasize the need to strengthen international cooperation and increase resilience to global threats. According to them, rising geopolitical tensions, climate challenges, and other risks require coordinated global action to prevent the escalation of existing issues and the emergence of new crises. The second report presents the perspectives of leading experts on the global economic outlook for 2025. They predict moderate economic slowdown, driven by geoeconomic fragmentation and protectionist measures. The most resilient economic growth is expected in the United States and South Asian countries, while Europe, China, and Latin America may face significant challenges. Inflation is projected to rise in most countries, primarily due to increased government spending and shifts in global supply chains. Most experts consider a further escalation of the U.S.-China trade war likely, along with continued regionalization of global trade, leading to the formation of more isolated economic blocs and reduced global interdependence. While experts acknowledge the high potential of artificial intelligence (AI), they emphasize the need for greater investment in infrastructure and human capital to fully leverage its benefits. The third study provides a comprehensive analysis of employment issues. The main conclusion is that ongoing changes, global trends and new technologies will cause 92 million people to leave the labor market worldwide by 2030, but will also create 170 million new jobs. One of the challenges in this regard is the need to improve skills and train for new specialties. The fourth report assesses the state of global cooperation across five key areas: trade and capital, innovation and technology, climate and natural capital, health and well-being, and peace and security. After analyzing more than 40 indicators, the authors conclude that due to heightened geopolitical tensions and instability, overall cooperation remains at the same level. However, positive trends are observed in areas such as climate, innovation, technology, and health. Davos as a Symbolic Benchmark of Switzerland Despite existing criticism, the Davos Forum remains a key platform for the annual interaction of leading figures in global politics, business, and the expert community. Without Switzerland's neutral status, the Davos Forum likely would not exist. However, it was Klaus Schwab, who founded the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 24, 1971, who played a crucial role in transforming this event and its host location into one of Switzerland’s comparative advantages in political and economic terms. Despite his advanced age, Schwab continues to be an active ideologue and architect of Davos, moderating key discussions while fine-tuning his creation and addressing annual criticism. Yet, he has his own limitations—despite Switzerland’s neutrality and his personal reputation for impartiality, Schwab once again refrained from inviting Russian representatives, even at the level of individual entrepreneurs and experts. Such a move, rather than formal attempts to broaden participation and accessibility, could have enhanced the forum’s status. The participation of a Russian delegation would have been particularly relevant in this critical year for global politics, marked by the unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump, which is set to shape most geopolitical and geo-economic processes worldwide. Including Russian representatives could have strengthened the WEF’s competitive standing, but once again, it did not happen. The Swiss leadership highly values the opportunities that the Davos platform provides, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and, most notably, foreign economic relations. In September 2024, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament—the Council of States (the smaller chamber) and the National Council (the larger chamber)—decided to continue state support for the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and allocated budget funding for the period 2025–2027. During the discussions, lawmakers emphasized that the event strengthens Switzerland’s role as a global hub for international dialogue, while also having a positive economic impact on the Graubünden region. As the host country of the forum, Switzerland actively leverages it to advance its own interests. This year, six out of the seven members of the Swiss Federal Council (Cabinet of Ministers) attended the WEF. As part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Swiss Economy Minister Guy Parmelin signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Kosovo and Thailand, bringing Switzerland’s total number of FTAs to 37. There are also plans to adapt and update the existing FTA with China. One of Bern’s key priorities remains securing an FTA with the MERCOSUR bloc. As a result, a focal point of this year’s WEF was Argentine President Javier Milei, who, during an “exceptionally warm bilateral meeting,” invited Swiss President Karin Keller-Sutter to visit Buenos Aires in 2025. The Trump Factor The opening of the current WEF coincided with the inauguration of Donald Trump, who, in recent months, has made numerous provocative statements and promises, swiftly beginning their implementation upon taking office on January 20. The U.S. president signed nearly 100 executive orders, including the repeal of 78 regulations enacted by his predecessor, Joe Biden. Among these were directives for all federal agencies and departments to address rising living costs and to end government-imposed censorship of free speech. The most significant orders included the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization, as well as the declaration of a state of emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border to enforce strict immigration controls. In one way or another, the presence of the “new-old” president was felt across nearly all discussion platforms at the forum. On January 23, Donald Trump addressed the participants of the Davos Forum via video conference, outlining the following agenda:- NATO defense spending: Member states should increase their defense budgets from 2% to 5% of GDP to ensure a more equitable distribution of financial burdens within the alliance.- Trade tensions with the EU: The EU and its member states treat economic relations with the U.S. unfairly. European business regulations, including tax policies, disadvantage American companies, particularly in the tech sector, prompting Trump’s call for tariffs on European imports.- Criticism of the EU’s Green Deal: Labeling it as a “new green scam”, Trump emphasized that the U.S. would ramp up oil and gas production and expand power plant construction to become the “capital of artificial intelligence and cryptography”.- Oil prices and the Ukraine conflict: Trump suggested that lower oil prices from Saudi Arabia could help resolve the Ukraine conflict and urged Saudi leadership to take necessary steps, emphasizing their responsibility in the matter.- Tariffs on companies outsourcing production: Countries whose companies manufacture outside the U.S. will face tariffs to incentivize production relocation to American soil.- China's role in Ukraine: Trump called on China to support ending the Ukraine conflict, while stating his own efforts to mediate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.- U.S. domestic policy shift: A large-scale deregulation program is underway in the U.S., including tax cuts and potential elimination of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which Trump views as discriminatory.Trump’s speech elicited mixed reactions among forum participants. His focus on protectionist policies and sharp criticism of international partners raised concerns about potential consequences for the global economy, particularly among European attendees. Additionally, his stance signaled an escalation in the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is expected to play out through potential trade conflicts, tensions in the South and East China Seas, continued arms sales to Taiwan, and other geopolitical developments. The Europe Factor   At Davos, Europe is traditionally represented by the European Union, with the United States as its primary political and economic partner. Ursula von der Leyen, re-elected as President of the European Commission and beginning her new term on December 1, 2024, addressed the forum on January 21. Her speech largely responded to challenges outlined by Donald Trump before the WEF began, setting out the EU’s key priorities for the coming years: overcoming economic stagnation, enhancing competitiveness, and further integrating the single market across all 27 member states. A central theme of her address was the “Competitiveness Compass” initiative, first introduced in late 2024. This strategy, shaped by recommendations from Mario Draghi’s influential report, aims to drive economic reform and growth within the EU. The European Commission planned to unveil the full document by the end of January. At Davos, Ursula von der Leyen effectively introduced the concept of “Europe United” as a counterbalance to “America First” and cautioned the U.S. against igniting a trade war with the European Union. She emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue on shared interests, stating: “Our priority will be to initiate discussions as early as possible, focusing on common interests and readiness for negotiations. We will be pragmatic, but we will always adhere to our principles. Protecting our interests and defending our values is the European way”. At the same time, the European Commission president highlighted the high level of interdependence between the European and American economic models. She underscored that the era of global cooperation has given way to intense geostrategic competition, stating: “The world's largest economies are competing for access to raw materials, new technologies, and global trade routes—from artificial intelligence to clean technologies, from quantum computing to space, from the Arctic to the South China Sea. The race is on”. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) emphasized that Brussels must be prepared for U.S. trade tariffs which are expected to be more “selective and targeted”, especially given the “existential crisis” facing the EU economy. She also noted that the ECB is not overly concerned about the impact of inflation from other countries, including the U.S., on the eurozone. The UK was also represented at Davos, with its delegation led by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves. She used the trip primarily to promote Britain’s economic landscape, focusing on the country’s political and economic stability, its business-friendly environment, and recent government efforts to reduce regulatory barriers—all under the central message: “Now is the time to invest in Britain”. However, the extent to which this narrative aligns with reality remained beyond the scope of the Forum. The true assessment was left to the executives of major corporations with whom Reeves held meetings, including JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs, discussing investment opportunities in the UK's infrastructure and green projects. Additionally, the UK delegation engaged in negotiations aimed at restoring and strengthening ties with sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the U.S. and the Gulf states. The Ukraine Factor Due to the ongoing Ukraine conflict, Davos once again served as a prelude to the Munich Security Conference, which traditionally takes place in early February in Bavaria. While the war and Donald Trump’s influence shaped many discussions, Ukraine was not the central focus of the forum, resulting in a somewhat reduced emphasis compared to previous years. Ukraine’s interests at the World Economic Forum (WEF) were primarily represented by V.Zelensky, who took it upon himself to “educate” European politicians and “interpret” the signals previously sent by Donald Trump. His focus was on defense spending, emphasizing that a significant portion should go toward supporting the Kyiv regime, the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, and the need for “real security guarantees”. In the first days after taking office, the U.S. president made several key clarifications regarding his previously stated 24-hour timeline for resolving the Ukraine conflict — this period has now been significantly extended. The reason lies in the fact that, regardless of the revocation of Zelensky’s well-known decree, Ukraine must have a head of state authorized to negotiate and officially confirm any agreements or their outcomes. As of late January, no such figure was present in Kyiv, and Washington is aware of this reality. Switzerland, while emphasizing its neutral status (despite being designated by Russia as an “unfriendly state”), consistently maintains that it provides Ukraine only humanitarian aid and diplomatic support at Kyiv’s request. At the 2024 WEF, the well-known Bürgenstock Conference was announced, which later took place in the summer. However, in 2025, no similarly large-scale initiatives were introduced. Nevertheless, discussions at the Forum once again touched on the possibility of granting Switzerland the right to represent Kyiv’s interests on the international stage. Additionally, it was reported that a Swiss-Ukrainian memorandum was signed, with Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko representing Kyiv. The agreement focuses on the participation of Swiss private businesses in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. V.Zelensky used Davos as an opportunity to meet with world leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who had recently blocked additional aid to Ukraine. However, his main competitor in Germany’s upcoming snap Bundestag elections, Friedrich Merz, was more open to the idea of support, and Zelensky also held a discussion with him. Both meetings were held behind closed doors, and no details were disclosed. Meanwhile, German Green Party leader Robert Habeck managed to avoid an impromptu conversation with Zelensky, who had attempted to engage with him on the spot. At a January 23 briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova commented on V.Zelensky’s speeches at Davos 2025, describing them, among other things, as “narcotic madness”. The Germany Factor Germany, still holding its position as the political and economic leader of the European Union, was represented at Davos by key political heavyweights: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Economy and Climate Protection Minister (and Vice-Chancellor) Robert Habeck, and CDU/CSU Chairman Friedrich Merz. All three have been selected by their respective parties as key candidates for chancellor in Germany’s snap Bundestag elections scheduled for February 23, 2025. Given this, it was no surprise that they used the Swiss platform as part of their election campaigns. The current head of the German government had an objective advantage: he delivered a keynote speech on behalf of Germany, in which he focused on the presence of traditional standard factors (the largest economy in the EU; efficient small, medium and large businesses; government support for investments; low level of government debt), which should help to overcome the crisis. Regarding the United States, he declared his interest in maintaining close relations with the new administration, but “without false fawning and servility”. D. Trump and his team, according to him, will keep the whole world on edge in the coming years, but the German leadership will be able to cope with this. O. Scholz's main message is that constructive European-American interaction “is of decisive importance for security throughout the world and is the engine of successful economic development”. It is noteworthy that there were many empty seats in the hall and after the Chancellor's speech there were no questions for him for a long time, which greatly surprised the moderator of the session, K. Schwab. O. Scholz's closest associate, Finance Minister J.Kukis, who was appointed to this position to replace K. Lindner, who was dismissed in early November 2024, was participating in the Forum. He was unable to provide any special pre-election support to his boss during the Forum, and did not distinguish himself in any special way. Incidentally, K. Lindner himself preferred to remain in Germany and continue to fight there for the votes of voters, which are extremely necessary for the liberals to overcome the five percent barrier and get into the Bundestag. F.Merz, who is very likely the future head of the German Cabinet, and his possible future deputy R. Habeck also sought to prove their chances of winning the elections during their speeches. O. Scholz and F.Merz organized meetings with leading representatives of German business, trying to show which of them understood their problems better and was ready to solve them constructively. Despite all their differences, they were united on one issue - the need to soften the provision on the “debt brake” enshrined in the Basic Law (Constitution) and increase support for entrepreneurs. External observers considered that F.Merz was more convincing, including regarding the transatlantic economic vector. R.Habeck unexpectedly engaged in self-criticism during the podium discussion, stating that he initially believed that the difficult economic situation in the country was due to a short-term cyclical crisis, but it turned out that this was a consequence of a long-term structural crisis. Such “self-education” of the minister cost Germany dearly. During the Forum (January 22) in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, an Afghan refugee subject to deportation committed a crime, killing a child and an adult who was protecting him. This event pushed the issue of migration regulation to the top of the election campaign agenda. Unexpectedly, F.Merz found himself in a sticky situation, when his parliamentary request as the leading representative of the opposition in the current Bundestag for stricter controls at the external borders of the FRG could only count on success with the support of the unpopular Alternative for Germany and the center-left Sahra Wagenknecht Union. From Davos, Olaf Scholz traveled to Paris for a meeting with Emmanuel Macron. The French president was unable to attend the Forum due to domestic political circumstances and the need to manage the situation on the ground. The two leaders discussed the prospects for cooperation between their countries in strengthening their economic and political frameworks, as well as the European Union as a whole. None of the three key chancellor candidates managed to present a clear vision for Germany’s economic and political future, one that would be based on creativity, radical progress, technological breakthroughs, and prosperity—transforming the country into an innovation powerhouse not only for Europe but for the collective West as a whole. This means that Germany risks falling behind, failing to establish itself as an economic model capable of competing on equal terms with Donald Trump’s transforming North American economic space.Under Friedrich Merz, Olaf Scholz, and Robert Habeck, Germany faces the danger of remaining trapped in the past, relying too heavily on its post-war economic miracle—Made in Germany—which was achieved through the brilliance of ordoliberal economists and engineers. Davos 2025 made it clear that leaning solely on past achievements is no longer enough to drive a radical leap toward the future. If the German political elite, represented by the “handshake” established parties, remains in such reactionary positions in relation to the need for qualitative changes in economic policy, then the German standard will have no chance to take a leading place among the world's innovation locations. Here we will briefly indicate that, according to the estimates of the authors of the global risks report, the main ones for Germany are (in descending order): a shortage of highly qualified labor, recession / stagnation of the economy, illegal migration, disinformation, and a shortage of energy resources. They are the ones that largely determine the content of the current election campaign for the German parliament. The China Factor Among the political heavyweights representing the countries of the Global South at Davos 2025, the participation of the Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Ding Xuexiang, stands out. In his keynote speech, he emphasized Beijing's commitment to economic globalization, which is “not a zero-sum game, but a process of mutual benefit and common progress” and declared that protectionism does not lead to success, and trade wars have no winners. Among the key messages were that China is economically attractive, does not seek a trade surplus, is ready to import more competitive and high-quality goods and services to achieve balanced trade, is open to investment from foreign companies, and is ready to solve problems faced by both domestic and foreign firms. While condemning protectionism, he emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the role of the UN. While mildly critical of the “new-old” US president, he never mentioned him by name. Ding repeatedly referred to Xi Jinping, including his initiatives on global development and security. As part of the Forum, Ding Xuexiang hosted a private luncheon with top global financiers and business leaders, including the CEOs of BlackRock, Bridgewater Associates, JPMorgan, Blackstone, and Visa. Discussions centered on China’s ongoing economic reforms, efforts to stabilize the real estate market, stimulate domestic demand, and attract foreign investment. Experts noted that global business leaders responded positively to Ding Xuexiang’s statements, signaling growing confidence in China’s economic direction. In general, he fulfilled the standard mission assigned to him: to increase the international community's confidence in China's economic policy and confirm its role as a key player in the global economy. At the same time, the Forum participants remained concerned about a slowdown in China's economic growth, especially in the context of a possible increase in tariffs by the United States. The Artificial Intelligence Factor One of the leitmotifs of the forum, along with rethinking economic growth, industrial development prospects, climate and restoring trust, were discussions on the rapid development of AI, its impact on the labor market, prospects and challenges associated with the integration of this technology into various sectors of the economy. Experts identified a few trends that will emerge by 2030. AI and automation will increase the demand of enterprises for specialists in the field of AI, big data analysis, digital marketing, and cybersecurity. About half of the current skills of such employees in these areas may become obsolete, which suggests the need for timely adaptation of secondary and higher education to such a challenge. Employees whose professions will become unclaimed due to automation, especially in traditional sectors, will have to undergo advanced training programs. Special attention in the expert sessions was given to the ethical aspects of AI application and the related problems of developing the necessary standards. Issues of international cooperation took an important place, including in the context of ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits of AI application, as well as minimizing the potential risks it generates for society (for example, possible discrimination and bias in algorithms, as well as the protection of users' personal data). In terms of geopolitical rivalry in the field of AI, the global race for leadership in this area, which has already begun between the United States, China and several EU countries, was discussed. Experts pointed out the concerns of the leaders of the latter regarding the need to strengthen the positions of European companies in this area. Strategies for government stimulation of innovation and support for businesses developing AI were discussed. In addition, the participants in the discussions considered the possibilities of using artificial intelligence technologies to achieve sustainable development goals, including combating climate change, improving healthcare and increasing resource efficiency. Examples of using AI to monitor the environment, optimize energy consumption, develop new methods of treating diseases, and improve various aspects of life were of interest. *** The World Economic Forum 2025 in Davos was predictably held under the sign of global challenges, the Ukraine conflict, and increased economic competition, set against the backdrop of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes. Børge Brende, summarizing the event, accurately noted that the current time is “a moment of serious consequences and uncertainties”. This is largely linked to the return of Donald Trump to the White House. At the Forum, the United States’ priorities in strengthening national interests were outlined, including the goal of reducing import flows. This move drew criticism from the European Union and other participants, who expressed growing concerns about the escalation of trade conflicts and the fragmentation of the global economy. The President of the European Commission highlighted the prospects for strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and increasing its independence, considering the intensifying rivalry between the American and Chinese economic spheres. In this regard, representatives of China advocated for reducing trade tensions and strengthening regional alliances, while Germany emphasized the current risks facing its economic standard, outlining the difficulties of finding ways to minimize them. The Ukrainian conflict once again became one of the central topics, but with the formal support of the leaders of the collective West, delegations from the global South showed a restrained reaction to V.Zelensky's speech and messages. Discussions about AI became quite meaningful. Overall, Davos 2025 and its participants confirmed the important role of the WEF as a platform for discussing global challenges and finding constructive answers to them. The need for collective efforts to solve the most pressing issues was noted. One of B. Borge's final messages: the only way to achieve progress in solving global problems is to work together and “find solutions that will make the world a better place”. It is evident that Russia could have significantly contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of this approach.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском “Changes! We’re waiting for changes!” proclaimed Viktor Tsoi nearly 40 years ago, at the dawn of the Soviet perestroika. If one were to summarize the multitude of diverse and contradictory events, trends, and sentiments of the past year in a single phrase, it would be that the modern world is eagerly awaiting change. Much like the former USSR in the 1980s, few today can clearly define what these changes should entail or what their ultimate outcome will be. Yet, the idea of maintaining the status quo has evidently found little favor with the public over the past year. This impatient anticipation of change was reflected, for instance, in the outcomes of numerous elections held over the past 12 months across the globe. In total, more than 1.6 billion people went to the polls, and in most cases, supporters of the status quo lost ground. In the United States, the Democrats suffered a resounding defeat to the Republicans, while in the United Kingdom, the Conservatives were decisively beaten by the Labour Party. In France, Emmanuel Macron's once-dominant ruling party found itself squeezed between right-wing and left-wing opposition, plunging the Fifth Republic into a deep political crisis. The seemingly stable foundations of political centrism were shaken in Germany, South Korea, and Japan. Even the party of the highly popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi failed to retain its parliamentary majority after the elections, and in South Africa, the African National Congress led by Cyril Ramaphosa also lost its majority. Pessimists might argue that abandoning the status quo in itself solves no problems, and the much-anticipated changes, as the final years of the Soviet Union demonstrated, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Replacing cautious technocrats with reckless populists often backfires, affecting those most critical of the entrenched status quo. Optimists, on the other hand, would counter that the rusted structures of state machinery everywhere are in desperate need of radical modernization. They would add that the costs inevitably associated with maintaining the existing state of affairs at all costs far outweigh any risks tied to attempts to change it. The international events of the past year are also open to various interpretations. Pessimists would undoubtedly point out that none of the major armed conflicts carried over from 2023 were resolved in 2024. On the contrary, many of them showed clear tendencies toward escalation. For instance, in late summer, Ukraine launched an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia, and in mid-November, the U.S. authorized Kyiv to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets deep within Russian territory. Meanwhile, the military operation launched by Israel in Gaza in the fall of 2023 gradually expanded to the West Bank, then to southern Lebanon, and by the end of 2024, to parts of Syrian territory adjacent to the Golan Heights. From the optimists' perspective, however, the past year demonstrated that the disintegration of the old international system has its limits. A direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO did not occur, nor did a large-scale regional war break out in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, or the Korean Peninsula. The economic results of 2024 are equally ambiguous. On one hand, the global economy remained heavily influenced by geopolitics throughout the year. The process of “technological decoupling” between the U.S. and China continued, and unilateral sanctions firmly established themselves as a key instrument of Western foreign policy. On the other hand, the world managed to avoid a deep economic recession despite the numerous trade and investment restrictions. Global economic growth for the year is expected to reach around 3%, which is quite respectable for such turbulent times, especially considering that the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not yet been fully overcome. In 2024, the average annual global temperature exceeded pre-industrial levels by more than 1,5 °C for the first time, crossing another critical “red line”. However, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) held in November in Baku fell short of many expectations. At the same time, China reached its peak carbon emissions by the end of the year, achieving this milestone a full five years ahead of previously announced plans. In the past year, the UN Security Council managed to adopt only 12 resolutions, mostly of a humanitarian nature, clearly reflecting the declining effectiveness of this global governance body. For comparison, in 2000, the Security Council approved 29 resolutions, including key decisions on conflict resolution in the Balkans and Africa. At the same time, 2024 saw continued efforts to explore new formats for multilateral cooperation, including mechanisms within the BRICS group, which held its 16th summit in Kazan for the first time in its newly expanded composition. With enough imagination, one can easily find evidence in the past 12 months to confirm any omen or superstition traditionally associated with leap years. However, all these signs and superstitions predicting upheavals and catastrophes—while aligning with the pessimistic conclusions about the year now ending—do not apply to the year ahead. Human nature, after all, tends to lean more towards optimism than pessimism; if it were the other way around, we would still be living in caves. As they bid farewell to a difficult and challenging year, people around the world continue to hope for better times. And the mere act of hoping for the best is already significant in itself. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe aptly remarked, “Our wishes are forebodings of our capabilities, harbingers of what we are destined to achieve”. Originally published in Izvestia.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The French president appoints veteran centrist François Bayrou as prime minister after Bayrou threatened to withdraw his party from the presidential coalition. Strong with the weak and weak with those at his own level — quite small, in fact. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, displayed this behavior on Friday at the start of a new chapter in the endless decline of his presidency. The head of state, who in the past acted ruthlessly against union protests (2023) and the Yellow Vest Revolt (2018), gave in to the pressures of veteran centrist François Bayrou. The leader of the MoDem Party managed to impose himself as head of the Executive against Macron's initial intentions. It was a morning worthy of an episode of the series ‘Baron Noir’. A true reflection of the agony of the presidential model of the Fifth Republic. Nine days after the successful motion of no confidence against the conservative government of Michel Barnier, the Élysée announced that the appointment would take place on Friday morning. The president had already missed his initial deadline to make the appointment by Thursday night, and prolonging the uncertainty would have further heightened the sense of ridicule. On the same Friday, at five in the morning, Macron called Bayrou, whose name had been at the top of all predictions to replace the former European Brexit negotiator, and told him he would not be chosen, according to the TF1 network. That call led to a heated meeting of nearly two hours at the presidential headquarters. During the meeting, Bayrou threatened Macron with withdrawing his party's (MoDem) deputies from the presidential coalition if he was not chosen as prime minister. “I joined you to do great things, not small ones. (…) It’s simple: if you don’t appoint me, I will withdraw my people”, warned the three-time presidential candidate (2002, 2007, and 2012), according to ‘Le Monde’. Such a move would have dealt a severe blow to an already weakened Macronism, which holds only 164 deputies (out of 577) and represents the second-largest bloc in the National Assembly, behind the left (192). Macron gave in at the end of a tumultuous morning. Instead of his preferred choices when he woke up that day — Sébastien Lecornu (Defense Minister) or Roland Lescure (former Industry Minister) — he opted for the 73-years-old Bayrou. Interestingly, the French head of state, who arrived at the Élysée in 2017 promising to revitalize the Fifth Republic, has now moved from appointing the oldest prime minister in that regime's history (Barnier) to another of the same age. Both are career politicians with 40-year trajectories. And with the added complication in the case of the newly appointed Prime Minister, who is burdened by a corruption case set to be retried on appeal in 2025. Less neoliberal than Macron "I don't think Macron is thrilled about facing the final stretch of his presidency with a prime minister like Bayrou, who has a tough and complicated character," explains political scientist Virginie Martin about the mayor of Pau, a town of 80,000 inhabitants in southwestern France. His appointment as head of the executive reflects, on one hand, the internal tensions within Macronism, which is clearly in decline. On the other hand, it shows the president's stubbornness in retaining control of the government rather than accepting an opening of the Executive towards the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP), which narrowly won the snap elections on July 7. Although Macronism obtained less than 15% of the votes in the European elections and came third in the first round of the legislative elections with 20%, it does not relinquish power. It takes advantage of parliamentary fragmentation into three nearly irreconcilable blocs (the left, Macronist center-right, and the far-right) and the extensive powers granted to the president by the Constitution. “It seems incomprehensible to me from an electoral standpoint,” criticized Marine Tondelier, secretary-general of the Greens, regarding the appointment of one of Macron’s earliest significant allies. The current president and the leader of MoDem joined their political paths in February 2017. At that time, they reached an agreement that led to Bayrou’s withdrawal from that year’s presidential campaign, which proved key to Macron’s victory in May. Just a few weeks before that pact, the veteran leader had made harsh remarks about his future ally: “It won’t work (…), because the French will see what’s behind this hologram. There is an attempt by financial powers that are no longer satisfied with economic control but also want political power.” Since then, relations between the two have never been entirely smooth. As he did again this Friday, Bayrou has repeatedly threatened to withdraw MoDem from the presidential coalition, which also includes Macron’s party, ‘Renaissance’, and Horizons. “He is an heir to the Christian democratic tradition. He is neither a Thatcherite liberal nor an anarcho-liberal — in the pure style of Javier Milei,” explains political scientist Jean Petaux regarding the main ideological difference between Bayrou and Macron, whose political DNA is more influenced by neoliberal ideas. Budgets defined by austerity "I am aware of the Himalaya we have before us," Bayrou stated on Friday afternoon during his inauguration ceremony at Matignon. He was referring to France's delicate financial situation, as the country is set to close the year with a public deficit exceeding 6%, more typical of a period of severe crisis. His first test will be the drafting and adopting the 2025 budget law. As Barnier previously attempted, the newly appointed prime minister will likely try to address the deficit with budgets marked by harsh austerity — his predecessor had planned a €40 billion cut in public spending. He may attempt to soften this by introducing some form of special tax on the wealthiest. The former Brexit negotiator “had already proposed a temporary tax on the windfall profits of large corporations. During the parliamentary debate, the left and Bayrou’s party deputies agreed to approve an amendment proposing that this tax be applied for more than two years,” recalls Petaux. The traditional right-wing party, ‘Les Républicains’ (LR), will likely support the approval of the public budget. Despite his strained relationship with former President Nicolás Sarkozy, who still holds some influence over LR, Bayrou may convince the post-Gaullist party to remain in the government, which it joined in September under Barnier. Key figures in the current government — Sarkozy ally Rachida Dati (Culture), conservative Catherine Vautrin (Territories), and the xenophobic Bruno Retailleau (Interior) — are confident they will retain their positions. A non-aggression pact with the Socialists? In contrast, ‘La France Insoumise’ (aligned with Spanish Parties ‘Podemos’ or ‘Sumar’), which represents the Popular Front party with the largest number of deputies, announced a motion of no confidence against Bayrou. “If they want to keep the same people in key positions, including Retailleau in Interior, and do nothing about pensions, ecology, and tax justice, I see no other option but censure,” stated the ecologist Marine Tondelier. Her party is divided but seems to lean toward outright opposition, like ‘La France Insoumise’. The big question is the position of the Socialist Party (PS) and the far-right National Rally (RN). Their stance will determine whether Bayrou lasts longer in Matignon than Barnier, who was censured less than three months after his appointment. The center-left party stated that it “will not participate in the government and will remain in opposition.” However, it distanced itself from its ‘La France Insoumise’ allies by opening the door to a non-censure agreement. Their conditions include the prime minister refraining from using Article 49.3, which allows laws to be passed without a parliamentary vote and contributed to Barnier's downfall. They also demanded that he abandon plans to push a tough immigration law early next year. "I feel that there are many false moves by the Socialists," says Martin, a professor at Kedge Business School. Their distancing from ‘La France Insoumise’, which is pursuing an uncertain strategy aimed at forcing Macron's resignation and preparing for early presidential elections, is due to "the pre campaign for the 2026 municipal elections" as well as "the Socialist Party's congress next year." The party's secretary-general, Olivier Faure, a supporter of unity among progressive forces, risks losing his position at that internal summit due to the offensive from the party's right wing, led by former President François Hollande and the mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo. A cordial relationship with Le Pen If Bayrou ultimately fails to secure a non-aggression pact with the Socialists, he will have the option of Marine Le Pen. The National Rally (RN) welcomed the appointment of the MoDem leader with apparent satisfaction, as he maintains a somewhat cordial relationship with Le Pen’s movement. “In 2022, he lent his signature to Le Pen so she could run in the presidential elections,” arguing for political pluralism. “He also proposed the creation of a ‘bank for democracy’ to address the far-right’s financing issues, which led them to seek funds (up to 11 million euros) from a Russian bank close to the Kremlin,” Martin recalls. Nevertheless, the major point of commonality between Bayrou and Le Pen is their legal troubles. Despite being one of Macron’s earliest allies, Bayrou has played a secondary role over the past seven years due to his alleged involvement in a scheme involving fake assistants in the European Parliament. The Paris Court acquitted him in early 2024, but it did convict eight MoDem officials and imposed a €400,000 fine on the party. Additionally, the prosecution appealed against the ruling, and the case will be retried on appeal. It is a scheme very similar to the one for which the far-right leader was tried this past fall. His verdict is expected on March 31, and he faces a possible five-year disqualification with immediate effect. This could trigger a political earthquake in France. The future of the Fifth Republic's crisis will depend not only on Parliament but also on the courts. This article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском "Strategic autonomy" remains France's goalThe outcome of the US election has far-reaching political and economic implications for France, forcing the country, which is itself experiencing a serious political crisis, to define its own role in the world and in Europe. This was already clear in the run-up to the elections and was also commented on in initial reactions to the outcome. In the areas of trade and climate protection, but especially in the areas of security and defense, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States is an incentive for France to strengthen its own and European independence in order to protect French and European interests. The call for European partners to develop a foreign and security policy that strengthens Europe and reduces dependence on America without calling transatlantic cooperation into question remains the declared goal. Cooperation with Germany in particular is of crucial importance here.Security and defense policy: Europe is keyFrench President Emmanuel Macron has already worked with President Trump from 2017 to 2021. For him, another encounter with a President Donald Trump will therefore be nothing new. In France, at any rate, it seemed that internal preparations had also been made for the possibility of a second Trump administration. French representatives, in particular President Macron, had campaigned for strengthening European defense and making it more independent of the USA, especially when it came to NATO and defense. At national level, France has set up a special task force within the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs to deal with the various scenarios that a second Trump administration could bring. This task force is headed by Tristan Aureau, former Head of Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Europe and current Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot. With the actual election of Trump, however, there are still major challenges ahead for France and Europe that can only be tackled with a united European stance.The war in UkraineThere is also great concern in France that President Trump could freeze the war in Ukraine without involving the European partners by negotiating a ceasefire. A Trump-style freeze would mean abandoning the Ukrainian partner and that Ukraine would have to cede the territories conquered by Russia. This contradicts the French understanding that the war in Ukraine is a European issue that must first and foremost be resolved by the Europeans, certainly in consultation with the USA.Middle East conflictWhile Donald Trump has repeatedly reiterated his unreserved support for Israel, he has just as often made it clear that he wants to end the war as quickly as possible. The fact is that Trump is popular with Netanyahu's government, partly due to his actions during his first term in office (moving the US embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights). What exactly can be expected of him now is not known. In any case, France has repeatedly called for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon in recent weeks and emphasised this once again on the day of the US election.[i] Unlike the Trump-Netanyahu relationship, the relationship between Netanyahu and Macron has also suffered in recent weeks from the statements on the founding of the state of Israel, which have also caused irritation in France.[ii] It now remains to be seen to what extent the relationship between France and the US will develop on this issue as wellNATOAs far as NATO and the American security guarantees for Europe are concerned, France has traditionally emphasized the importance of NATO and advocated close cooperation with the USA. At the same time, however, France has been advocating for years - essentially what Trump is also calling for - that Europe should be the key to its own security and defense. As the EU's only remaining nuclear power with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, France aspires to influence world events, but also knows that this claim to leadership can only realistically be implemented with European partners in European security and defense policy.[iii] Macron made this clear in his second Europe speech at the Sorbonne in spring 2024, among other things, when he explained that they were aware that the US was focusing on itself and on China, and that Europe was not a geopolitical priority - regardless of which administration was in place in Washington. [iv] Even under an American Democratic government, Europe could no longer have assumed that there would be no partial US troop withdrawal. France's former ambassador to NATO, Muriel Domenach, also made it clear in an interview with the Grand Continent shortly before the US elections that it was not serious "[...] for Europe, with its wealth, heritage and responsibility, to resign itself to making its security entirely dependent on American decisions".[v] Trade policy: the fear of new import tariffsIn terms of trade policy, France is concerned about the effects of very likely protectionism under a second Trump administration, which could affect the French agricultural and aviation sectors in particular. Trump's announcements of import tariffs of 20% on all foreign products and also the prospect that Trump could impose import tariffs of 25% on wines and spirits from France, as he did in 2020, are causing great unease in France.However, a closer look reveals that trade policy under Joe Biden was also rather protectionist. One example of this from a French perspective is the Inflation Reduction Act, which was fundamentally oriented against China, but also had enormous consequences for Europe and France. During his state visit to Washington in December 2022, Emmanuel Macron had already taken a critical view of this plan and condemned it as "super aggressive".[vi]French reactions after the electionWhile Emmanuel Macron and the people involved in the government were quick to congratulate Trump and call for cooperation with the new American president, the right-wing and left-wing camps had different reactions.President and government: respect, willingness and cooperationThese words best summarize the reactions of politicians in government positions. President Emmanuel Macron congratulated Donald Trump via X on his election as US President even before the official announcement of the election results. Macron made it clear that he was prepared to work together, respecting their respective convictions and working together for peace and prosperity.[vii]Benjamin Haddad, Secretary of State for Europe, reacted in the same way, saying that we must find common ground and work together, while the answer to the challenges that the future brings lies "with ourselves". Thus, "Europeans [...] cannot accept that their security is decided without them, that tomorrow a capitulation is imposed on the Ukrainians, without the Ukrainians, without the Europeans."[viii]The reactions from the right: safe distance, warm congratulationsPrior to the elections, the French right had moderated its statements on Trump and muzzled its leaders in particular - with the exception of party leader Jordan Bardella - from commenting on Trump for party political reasons. The danger was considered too great that the political model proclaimed and exemplified by Donald Trump would stand in contrast to the institutionalization and de-demonization of the Rassemblement National. The deputy leader of the RN parliamentary group in the National Assembly, Jean-Philippe Tanguy, declared that Donald Trump was too negative for the party and embodied "excited populism". Nevertheless, Bardella had already indicated before the elections that he felt close to the ideas of President-elect Trump by expressing his admiration for American patriotism.[ix] After hesitant statements, however, it then became clear that the Rassemblement National supports Donald Trump. Bardella explained that France now had the task of taking its fate into its own hands and that a European defense had to be built.[x] Marine Le Pen, soberly agreed with this tone and called for this new political era to contribute to an improvement in bilateral relations and lead to constructive cooperation at international level.[xi]Eric Ciotti, who had only split from Les Républicains in the parliamentary elections, moved closer to the Rassemblement National and founded the new right-wing party A Droite, was very euphoric and described Trump's victory as a "wonderful victory of the American people against a system. A hope for peace, a defeat for the wokists. A way forward for the right in France and Europe. All the way to victory."[xii]Perplexity and cataclysm in the left-wing campThe goodwill and the euphoria prevailing in some quarters on the right contrasts with the reactions on the left in France. Social Democrat Raphael Glucksmann, Member of the European Parliament, described Donald Trump's election as a "global catastrophe" and a "nightmare for democracy, human rights and Europe".[xiii] The leader of the French Greens, part of the left-wing New Popular Front in the National Assembly, Marine Tondelier, expressed courage to the American citizens in the face of the "spreading hell".[xiv] Jean-Luc Mélénchon, founder of the left-wing populist party La France Insoumise, said that Trump's election was a consequence of a non-existent left-wing alternative in the US elections.[xv]Appeal to European and Franco-German cooperationHowever, the initial reactions were followed by Emmanuel Macron's direct appeal to Germany and Europe to come together and tackle the challenges of the future."I have just had an exchange with Chancellor @OlafScholz. We will work for a more united, stronger and sovereign Europe in this new context. By working together with the United States of America and defending our interests and values."[xvi]For Macron, a return to Franco-German cooperation is essential for a united, sovereign and independent Europe. This is also in line with the line taken by Friedrich Merz, who on election day in the USA, in a widely read guest article in the French daily newspaper Le Monde, lamented the European Union's constant hesitation in helping Ukraine and accused it of not sufficiently distancing itself from the Americans.[xvii] As early as November 7, the European summit hosted by Viktor Orbán in Hungary - a fervent supporter of Trump - will be about demonstrating this European unity.But Germany and France in particular must now show, regardless of the fact that both countries are in crisis mode, that they are once again moving closer together in this sense.References[i] https://www.leparisien.fr/international/israel/guerre-au-proche-orient-jean-noel-barrot-sera-en-israel-et-dans-les-territoires-palestiniens-ce-mercredi-05-11-2024-BAYPPARFV5DPBJ2HN5GLA7SXHE.php (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[ii]https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/10/16/les-tensions-entre-emmanuel-macron-et-benyamin-netanyahou-montent-d-un-cran-apres-les-propos-du-president-francais-sur-la-creation-d-israel-par-l-onu_6353358_3210.html (Aufruf 5. November 2024).[iii]https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/22-DGAP-MEMO-US2024_Jacob_DE.pdf (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[iv]https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/discours-sur-leurope (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[v]https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2024/10/30/vu-de-washington-le-maintien-de-100-000-personnels-en-europe-ne-va-pas-de-soi-une-conversation-avec-muriel-domenach-ancienne-ambassadrice-a-lotan/ (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[vi]https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/12/01/emmanuel-macron-blasts-joe-biden-subsidies-in-state-visit_6006235_4.html (Aufruf: 4. November 2024).[vii]https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1854073283420754221 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[viii]https://www.europe1.fr/international/presidentielle-americaine-leurope-doit-prendre-son-destin-en-main-reagit-la-porte-parole-du-gouvernement-francais-4277243 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[ix]https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/11/02/donald-trump-l-encombrant-modele-du-rassemblement-national_6372584_3210.html (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[x]https://x.com/J_Bardella/status/1854084071858876485 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xi]https://x.com/MLP_officiel/status/1854083504700600705 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xii]https://x.com/eciotti/status/1854060752946245644 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xiii]https://www.instagram.com/p/DCBWcJBsUgp/?img_index=1 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xiv]https://www.europe1.fr/international/presidentielle-americaine-leurope-doit-prendre-son-destin-en-main-reagit-la-porte-parole-du-gouvernement-francais-4277243 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xv]https://www.leparisien.fr/international/etats-unis/enfer-qui-se-profile-espoir-pour-la-paix-de-lfi-au-rn-les-reactions-des-politiques-francais-a-lelection-de-trump-06-11-2024-FP4V4HGZUZGOFGAQEOVGMST5F4.php (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xvi]Emmanuel Macron, https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1854075136468521077 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xvii]https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/11/05/friedrich-merz-president-de-la-cdu-la-politique-etrangere-et-de-securite-europeenne-est-dans-un-etat-de-desolation_6377309_3232.html (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On July 6, 2024, the military leaders of Mali (Assimi Goïta), Niger (Abdourahamane Tchiani) and Burkina Faso (Ibrahim Traoré) signed a treaty establishing the Confederation of Sahel States, or, more precisely, the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States—retaining the acronym AES (Alliance des États du Sahel in French). The document was signed in Niamey, Niger, during the summit of the Alliance of Sahel States, a military pact formed by the same countries on September 17, 2023. The Confederation’s founding signaled the determination of the governments of the three Sahel nations, which came to power via a series of military coups in 2020–2023, to chart a joint course of political and economic development. The AES was announced after Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrew in January 2024 from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—a regional bloc that urged the trio’s leaders to restore civilian rule in their countries. At the opening of the Niamey summit, Niger’s military leader said, inter alia, that his “people have irrevocably turned their back on ECOWAS” and that the new alliance would be a community immune to the “stranglehold of foreign powers.” At the same time, the three leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and objectives of the UN and the African Union. They asserted that by forming the Confederation, the three countries would strengthen their sovereignty and more effectively counter terrorism and external Western influence. The charter of the AES stipulates that “any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more Contracting Parties shall be considered as an aggression against the other Parties and shall give rise to a duty of assistance and relief by all the Parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force.” From Alliance to Confederation The first step towards political and economic integration of the three countries was the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States on September 17, 2023, which grouped a total of over 72 million people and is primarily aimed at building a trilateral architecture of collective defense. The decision to set up the Alliance was taken after negotiations in Ouagadougou in early September 2023 between representatives of the three nations and a delegation from the Russian Defense Ministry, headed by Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In other words, Russia played its role in founding the AES, thereby assuming certain obligations to support the Alliance’s counterterrorism efforts. The prospect of deeper integration of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso was first raised in late 2023, and in early July 2024, after Yevkurov’s next visit to the Sahel (Mali and Niger), the Confederation of Sahel States was established. The inaugural summit, in addition to security and military cooperation, addressed further trilateral cooperation in the socio-economic sphere. This suggests that the AES’s scope of activity will likely include the construction of new industrial facilities and the expansion of ties in areas such as energy, finance, healthcare, education, agriculture and natural resource management, as well as mining, transport, combating cybercrime, ICT development, sports and employment. The AES leaders decided to establish an investment bank and a stabilization fund, which, however, will only function if they can secure sufficient funding. Furthermore, the countries agreed to pool their resources to build large-scale transport and communications infrastructure, facilitate trade and the free movement of goods and people, and invest in various sectors of the economy. One example that demonstrates the feasibility of these plans is Niger’s agreement to sell 150 million liters of diesel to Mali at almost half the going rate, supporting a nation plagued by enduring electricity shortages. The three leaders also reaffirmed the decision taken after the meeting of the Alliance’s foreign ministers on May 17, 2024, to coordinate diplomatic actions and formulate common approaches to relations with external partners, although combating terrorism seems likely to remain the Confederation’s main priority. The trio has on many occasions pointed to the key reasons behind their collective actions: the failure of the AU and ECOWAS to provide adequate support in the fight against jihadists; “illegal sanctions” that harm the people of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger; and ECOWAS’s unwillingness and/or inability to break free from Western influence. In other words, this integration is driven not only by the desire for collective security, but also by the pushback to the former colonial ruler, France (with which the trio has severed all defense ties), and, more broadly, the collective West, which has clearly underestimated the Sahel’s frustration with years of ineffective military intervention [1]. As a result, French military contingents and most U.S. troops have withdrawn from the three nations, with Russian forces taking their place. So the Confederation’s main stated goal is to support one another in combating terrorism (the Sahel accounts for 43% of the world’s terrorism-related deaths). The Niamey summit saw calls to put an end to this scourge. The leader of Burkina Faso, in particular, addressed the forum participants with the following words: “In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who fought and won for us this land that we call Mali, Burkina and Niger. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who helped the whole world rid itself of Nazism and many other scourges. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors that were deported from Africa to Europe, America, Asia … and who helped to build those countries as slaves. In our veins runs the blood of worthy men, robust men, men who stood tall…” Yet this raises the question: will the armies of these three nations, which previously struggled to tackle the “Islamist evil,” grow much stronger if they come together? After all, the conflict in Mali involved military personnel from many African nations, not to mention Europeans, yet the problem of terrorism persisted. In some areas of all three countries, Islamists are “successfully” replacing public authorities and drawing recruits from the local population, and these processes have not stopped after the Alliance was established, nor after the Confederation was formed. Attacks on various facilities and civilians continue—in the first half of 2024, the number of victims of Islamist violence in the three countries exceeded 300, a significant increase compared to the same period in 2023. The AES has taken pride in routing the insurgents from the Malian town of Kidal in November 2023, but it is still unclear how lasting the trio’s victory in this direction has been. Or is all hope now pinned on Russia? The security landscape in the Sahel varies from country to country but remains very complex throughout the region. This is partly because the armed conflicts in the three nations have different origins and are not purely “Islamist.” In fact, disputes between herders and farmers, which all past governments of the trio tried and failed to resolve, pose a major and perhaps even greater threat to stability than the confrontation with the Tuareg. Meanwhile, this matter has not even been taken up by the military, possibly because it stems from socio-economic issues, and solving such problems is far more difficult than political or military ones. In response to instability, the regimes are tightening the screws and becoming more repressive, with opposition figures being arrested. Although references to Western experts may seem out of place in the context of today’s global upheavals, history has shown that increased repressiveness is a common feature of all illegitimate regimes, and governments that came to power through military coups are illegitimate by definition. If the military leaders fail to achieve significant breakthroughs soon in ensuring security, reconciling herders with farmers (whose conflict, exacerbated by Islamists, is only aggravated amid climate change in the Sahel), providing basic services to citizens and more, public discontent will grow and likely lead to more military coups, throwing the future of the Confederation into question. While the trio’s leaders currently enjoy at least the appearance of public support, if they do not hold elections in the next few years, there will be someone in their inner circle tempted to take their place. Especially since the military withdrew their countries from ECOWAS without consulting the public, which now fears the potential introduction of a visa regime between the trio and other West African nations. As of now, the Confederation has yet to prove itself as a solid union to the point where one can predict either positive or negative outcomes for its future. True, various joint projects are being set up—so far only on paper—ranging from food security and water resource management to energy, transport and ICT development, but these plans are financially fragile, and their implementation remains a distant goal. The three nations still use the CFA franc, with France controlling most of their foreign currency assets. The AES’s activities are apparently supposed to be funded through “membership fees,” but this has always been a major stumbling block. For ECOWAS, for example, the timely payment of dues has been intractable throughout the 50 years of its existence. For landlocked Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the smooth functioning of logistics corridors for receiving goods from other continents is critical. This brings into focus the need to form a customs union and restore “working” relations with neighboring states—Benin and Côte d’Ivoire—which have recently soured, particularly due to plans to establish U.S. military bases in these countries. The Sahel is rich in natural resources—uranium, gold, iron ore, lithium, tin, copper, zinc, manganese, limestone, phosphates, marble, salt, gypsum and oil—but will the trio manage to extract them on their own (though jointly) in commercial quantities to gain economic sovereignty, not just political one? Or all hopes are again pinned on Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and other non-Western nations? And if so, is “sovereignty” the right word here? Of course, “dependence” on Russia, for example, would differ from neocolonialism by ensuring “fairness” and “equality between partners,” as evidenced by recent contacts between Moscow and the trio. The factor of ECOWAS The original mission of ECOWAS, established in 1975, was to achieve economic integration of the countries in West Africa, which involved establishing free trade zones, facilitating the free movement of labor, goods and capital across national borders, introducing a common currency—the eco—as well as improving and expanding regional infrastructure such as highways, railroads, seaports, airports, gas and oil pipelines, and more. There were also plans for joint energy projects and the development of shared communication, banking and customs systems, among others. In 1990, a trade liberalization scheme was formally adopted, which entailed gradual elimination of customs duties, and, indeed, by 2001, duties on raw materials and semi-finished products had been abolished, a common customs nomenclature was compiled, and free movement of labor was achieved. However, even at that time, more effective regional integration was hindered by the participation of certain West African nations in other groupings. In 1994, the French-speaking countries of the region (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) along with Portuguese-speaking Guinea-Bissau, founded the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), where a duty-free trade regime has been in place since 1996, excluding only agricultural products and aviation equipment. The members of this union—now except for the Sahel trio—have consistently resisted deeper economic integration within ECOWAS, largely because of their alignment in all spheres of life with France, which continues to provide them with substantial financial and political-military support as the former colonial power. Moreover, the nations dominating WAEMU—Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal—are reluctant to see Nigeria as a regional leader. But these are subjective reasons for the slowdown in integration. Meanwhile, there are also several objective reasons why virtually no economic project within ECOWAS has been brought to fruition. ECOWAS was founded as an economic community and operated in an environment where most countries in the region had extremely low levels of economic development, the export commodity structure was monocultural and largely uniform, and the member states’ leaders had noticeable political disagreements. These and other divisive factors meant that integration processes were often more symbolic than practical and that the impact of free trade zones was weak. Civil wars and political conflicts—which erupted in individual countries time and again but had a negative effect both on the security of the region as a whole and on integration processes—made it inevitable that ECOWAS would gradually shift its focus from economic issues to political-military ones, especially since one of the Community’s founding documents, the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression, stated that economic integration could only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and mutual understanding among member states. ECOWAS has an extensive sanctions toolkit, which is used against its member states in the event of their “disobedience.” The regional bloc imposed extremely tough sanctions on Mali and Niger in the early 2020s. In Niger, for example, the prices of rice and sorghum rose by over 16%, wheat and maize by 12%, millet by 6.4% and meat by 5.2% after the sanctions were imposed. Moreover, a $400 million deal to export crude oil from Niger to China via a pipeline linking the Agadem field to Benin’s port was delayed and put at risk. Even after ECOWAS lifted its sanctions, Benin chose not to reopen its land border (apparently under the influence of Paris), which further strained relations between the two nations. In all fairness, it should be noted that ECOWAS generally opts for diplomatic means to resolve various disputes, including those resulting from military coups, so the imposition of sanctions against some of the continent’s poorest countries and their expulsion from the organization were extraordinary precedents. While it may be tempting to see such actions as evidence of the Community’s “noble” intentions to uphold a principled stance on illegal changes of power, there was clearly some external influence in the cases of Mali and later Niger (Burkina Faso was not sanctioned). France relies on uranium supplies, with Niger accounting for 20% of total imports, so the Elysee’s desire to “teach the Sahel states a lesson” is quite “understandable.” Especially since Nigerien authorities in the summer of 2024 revoked the licenses of France’s Orano and Canada’s GoviEx to exploit uranium deposits. The 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provided for the imposition of sanctions, including suspension of loans, discontinuation of aid program funding and more, if member states fail to comply with their commitments. However, in January 2022, after Bamako announced its decision to extend the transition period by five years, citing internal political instability, ECOWAS not only suspended Mali’s membership in the organization, but also imposed diplomatic, economic and trade sanctions against this country. These included freezing Mali’s assets in the central banks of the Community’s member states, closing land and air borders and imposing an export ban on all goods (with the exception of materials for the control of COVID-19, oil products and electricity), which dealt a heavy blow to the economy of this landlocked nation that imports 70% of its food and depends on humanitarian aid supplies. Some of the sanctions were lifted only in July 2022, a month after the Goïta government agreed to a 24-month transition period. Niger, which saw a military coup on July 30, 2023 that ousted civilian President Mohamed Bazoum, faced sanctions in February 2024. As part of these restrictions, land and air borders between Niger and other ECOWAS member states were closed, accounts of Niger’s state-owned enterprises in the ECOWAS Central Bank were frozen and financial assistance was suspended. Immediately after the developments in July, ECOWAS issued an ultimatum, giving the coup leaders a one-week deadline to reinstate deposed President Bazoum and threatening to use force. However, military intervention never materialized, although the ECOWAS Standby Force was activated for potential deployment in Niger. The very fact that ECOWAS could issue such a threat to one of its members undoubtedly alarmed the leaders of the three nations (and others), who are closely connected in various ways. As a result, their trust in the bloc was shattered, which led them to take further action—quit the association and form new alliances. They also believed that ECOWAS not only failed to help them in combating Islamic extremism, but instead weakened their positions by imposing sanctions. Indeed, ECOWAS, which in the 1990s and 2010s sought to diversify its economic ties and political contacts with the outside world, has in recent years adopted a pro-Western stance on many international issues, which is not surprising since the direction of any organization is largely shaped by the views of its leaders and sponsors. Regardless of who holds the rotating one-year ECOWAS chairmanship, Nigeria has always played first fiddle in the bloc and will continue to do so for a long time, as it shoulders nearly half of the Community’s expenses, including most of the funding for its peacekeeping operations. As the saying goes, “he who pays the piper calls the tune.” Nigeria’s current president, Bola Tinubu, who also chairs ECOWAS, spent nearly a decade studying, working and living in the United States. From the moment he came to power in 2023, he has been determined to cultivate ties with the West, primarily with the U.S. and the UK, but also with France. The position of Nigeria and ECOWAS toward the trio is a vivid testimony to the enduring significance of the “role of the individual in history”: a country that had maintained friendly relations with Russia for decades is now gradually distancing itself from it and shifting its foreign policy orientation. For better or worse, after the coup in Niger and a harsher response from ECOWAS compared to the events in Mali and Burkina Faso, relations between the trio and the Community broke down, with Bamako and Ouagadougou expressing their readiness to leave the organization. As a result, on January 28, 2024, despite the Community’s decision to lift sanctions against Niamey, the governments of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS, driving the process of regional disintegration further. Shortly before that, the Sahel trio had one after another pulled out of the G5 Sahel—Mali in the spring of 2022, Burkina Faso and Niger in November 2023—leading to its collapse (the G5S had also included Mauritania and Chad). After the Confederation was founded, ECOWAS signaled its willingness to negotiate the possible return of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to the Community, especially since it had not received any formal notice of their departure, even though the proper procedure requires member states wishing to leave the bloc to provide one year's notice. The three countries made their announcement in January 2024, which should have given the ECOWAS a chance to try to convince them to reconsider their decision until January 2025, but the trio ignored the procedural rules and refused to continue fulfilling their obligations to ECOWAS. It seems that ECOWAS leaders have not yet come to understand that the trio is fighting not only for survival in the face of the Islamist threat, but also for an overhaul of trade and economic patterns, which subject underdeveloped nations to severe exploitation by developed powers. The Republic of the Niger, for example, is unhappy that despite being the world’s fourth largest producer of uranium and lighting up a third of France, 80% of its population has no electricity. So Niger has had to seek help from Nigeria, which, incidentally, cut off electricity supply after the July 2023 coup. In response to the establishment of the Confederation, the head of one of the Community’s bodies, the ECOWAS Commission, Omar Alieu Touray, said the three countries risked “diplomatic and political isolation,” the loss of millions of euros in investments and the possible introduction of visa requirements for their citizens wishing to travel to ECOWAS member states. Touray also warned that in addition to the numerous threats to peace and security along with economic challenges, there was also a risk of disintegration of the region, as ECOWAS on the one hand and the AES on the other become increasingly entangled in the conflict between non-African powers. As France and the U.S. are strengthening military ties with some ECOWAS countries (notably Côte d’Ivoire), the three AES members have established military relations with Russia after expelling Western troops. But is the rift between the AES and ECOWAS truly so noticeable? For example, on July 18, 2024, a delegation from the ECOWAS Water Resources Management Centre visited Burkina Faso to mark the 49th anniversary of the Water Museum’s founding. Since many countries in the region, including key players like Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, stand to lose economically from strained relations with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which are important trade partners, it seems that efforts to bring these “prodigal children” back into the Community’s fold will continue until they result in either a positive or negative outcome. There have been speculations about the possible withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from WAEMU, which also imposed sanctions against these nations. However, since the trio has not yet developed the banking and financial infrastructure necessary for an independent system and cannot quickly ditch the CFA franc, which is used by WAEMU member states, their stance toward this currency union remains neutral. The founding of the Confederation raises questions—not least about the future of regional cooperation in West Africa. As Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have decided to chart their own course, ECOWAS’s role and policies are likely to change, although it is still unclear in what direction. There is also concern among the African public that the AES may attract into “their ranks” other countries grappling with similar issues and disillusioned with the regional bloc. For example, the idea of closing French military bases in Senegal has already been floated. Developing relations with Russia and other non-Western nations Russia has become a new strategic ally for the Sahel nations in their fight against Islamists, who are active across the three countries. Supported by the Russian military, Mali’s army has managed, as noted above, to retake the northeastern town of Kidal from insurgents in November 2023. Since April 2024, a mechanism for coordination between the militaries has been in the works, and operations are underway to divide the territory under Islamist control, which stretches from eastern Mali through northern Burkina Faso to Niger. Trade and economic cooperation are also expanding: since September 2023, several Russian private and state-owned companies have signed agreements with the AES countries in areas such as mining, industrial construction and others. While Russia focuses primarily on food security (Moscow shipped 50,000 tonnes of free grain to the Sahel in 2023) and developing the digital economy, China and Turkey are making inroads into energy production and mining precious and rare-earth metals. Moreover, Niger’s agreement to bring the extraction of these resources under the Confederation’s control reflects the trio’s willingness for deeper cooperation with Beijing and Ankara.***Without a doubt, the decision of the three nations to exit ECOWAS and form the Confederation demonstrates their readiness to strengthen their sovereignty, yet they did so amid resentment over sanctions and euphoria from their own assertiveness and growing ties with Russia. These steps cannot but deserve respect, especially against the backdrop of the turbulent geopolitical situation around the world and widespread, and largely valid, discussions that major European powers, including France, are losing their autonomy in foreign policy issues. Announcing the establishment of an integration project is one thing; strengthening it and making use of the benefits of cooperation is quite another. A telling example is ECOWAS, which has not become a truly effective economic or political community in the fifty years of its existence and now is even starting to fall apart. The problem for the AES is that “strengthening sovereignty” in its member states will take place in the context of weak economies, further strained by wars and conflicts, and lingering reliance on various forms of external aid, a habit that will take time to break. At the same time, dismantling the long-standing patterns of cooperation with the West, particularly with the former colonizer, cannot be done overnight. French enterprises and specialists—engineers, doctors, teachers, oil workers and others—are still working in the three countries; many families are linked to France through relatives living and children studying and working there; political, business and creative elites own real estate in France. In other words, it is too early to speak of a complete break with the former colonial ruler, although, of course, the three regimes see the Confederation as an opportunity to distance themselves from the legacy of French colonialism and the Françafrique policy. Ibrahim Traoré, for example, spoke very strongly against France’s presence in Africa at the Niamey summit. But speeches alone cannot bring about real change. In the context of its “return” to Africa, Russia appears determined—quite justifiably so—to support the AES in many, if not all, of its endeavors, but their outcomes will largely depend on the consistency and persistence of the military leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in defending their current ideals. It seems that relations between the members of the Confederation of Sahel States and Russia will deepen, especially since the AES sent a letter to the UN Security Council President in August 2024 condemning Ukraine (which could not but be welcomed by Moscow) for supporting terrorism in the Sahel and demanded that the Security Council prevent Kiev’s subversive actions in Africa. This primarily refers to the Islamist attack on a convoy of Russian and Malian soldiers in northern Mali, in which Ukrainian militants were confirmed to have participated by Ukraine itself. As a result, Bamako and Niamey broke off diplomatic relations with Kiev, and on August 7, 2024, Mali and Niger petitioned the Security Council to investigate Ukraine’s support for rebel groups in the Sahel. As the leaders of the three nations affirmed in their joint statement at the Niamey summit, they “have taken full responsibility before history.” However, only time will tell what the results of these actions—the withdrawal from ECOWAS and the creation of the AES—will be. In any case, the process of polarization in Africa between pro-Western nations and alliances on the one hand, and those trying to escape neocolonial dependence on the other, has already started and seems to have become irreversible. 1. Filippov V.R. African Policy of French President E. Macron: Chronicle of Actions and Evolution of Ideas. M.: IAS RAS, 2023.