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I. Introduction In late December 2025, mass protests erupted across Iran, driven by public anger over the deepening economic crisis. Initially led by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran, the demonstrations quickly spread to universities and major cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Mashhad, becoming the largest unrest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Over time, the movement expanded beyond economic demands to include calls for freedom and, in some cases, the overthrow of the regime. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans such as “Death to the Dictator”. [1] In response, since late December 2025 Iranian state security forces have engaged in massacres of dissidents. The Iranian government has also cut off internet access and telephone services in an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing. The Iranian government has accused the United States and Israel of fueling the protests, which analysts suggest may be a tactic to increase security forces’ willingness to kill protesters. A Sunday Times report, based on information from doctors in Iran, said more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the unrest. The Interior Ministry in Iran verified 3,117 people had been killed in protests. [2] The Iranian protests, the largest in the Islamic republic’s 46-year history, appear to have subsided for now in the face of a violent government crackdown. US President Donald Trump has threatened to “hit very hard” if the situation in Iran escalates, reigniting concerns about possible American intervention in the region. Even Trump called Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “sick man” in an interview with Politico on January 17th, 2026, and said, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” It appeared to be the first time Trump had called for the end of Khamenei’s rule in Iran. [3] Despite having repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the regime were to start killing protesters, Trump has held off on any immediate military action against the Islamic Republic. While the US reportedly sent the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the Middle East on January 15th, 2026, President Trump has not specified what he might do. However, on January 28th, 2026, Trump posted on social media: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran... It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” Saying that time is running out, Trump demanded that Iran immediately negotiate a nuclear deal. He also suggested his country’s next attack on Iran could be worse than last year’s. However, US allies in the Gulf are known to oppose such US attacks on Iran. On January 14th, 2026, the New York Times’s headline “Trump’s Gulf allies don’t want him to bomb Iran” caught people’s attention. Earlier, The Wall Street Journal also reported the previous day that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are lobbying the Trump administration against attacking Iran. Those Sunni Muslim countries have long felt threatened by Shiite Iran. Particularly, Saudi Arabia is the leading country of Sunni Islam and has long competed with Iran, the leading nation of Shia Islam, for regional dominance in the Middle East. Then a question arises: Why Sunni Arab countries, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran? This paper deals with this puzzle. It first explains the relationship between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries and then examines why Suni Arab countries are against US military strikes on Shiite Iran. II. The relationships between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law. Shia identity is rooted in victimhood over the killing of Husayn, the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, in the seventh century, and a long history of marginalization by the Islam’s dominant sect of Sunni majority, As Figure 1 shows, the Sunni majority, which approximately make up 85 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims, viewed Shia Islam with suspicion, and extremist Sunnis have portrayed Shias as heretics and apostates. Figure 1: Branches of Islam (source: CFR) Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the “guardianship of the jurist”, a controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between religious scholarship and political leadership. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith. Khomeini claimed that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams. [4] Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini’s success, but they did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions. The relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries is largely defined by geopolitical rivalry and sectarian competition, primarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia, playing out in proxy conflicts (Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq) and political influence, fueled by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and historical Sunni-Shia Islamic differences. This rivalry exploits religious narratives to gain regional hegemony, supporting opposing sides in regional conflicts and influencing domestic politics in countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran have deployed considerable resources to proxy battles, particularly in Syria, where the stakes are highest. Saudi Arabia closely monitors potential restlessness in its oil-rich eastern provinces, home to its Shia minority, and deployed its military forces, along with other Gulf countries, to suppress a largely Shia uprising in Bahrain. It also assembled a coalition of ten Sunni countries, backed by the US, to fight Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen. The war, fought mostly from the air, has exacted a high civilian toll. Saudi Arabia had provided hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support to the predominantly Sunni rebels in Syria, while Iran had allocated billions of dollars in aid and loans to prop up Shia Assad government in Syria and had trained and equipped Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight in Syria. [5] The relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries is summarized as follows: A. Key players of Shia and Sunni Muslim world are as follows :  Iran (Shia): As a Shia-majority theocracy, Iran seeks regional influence.  Saudi Arabia (Sunni): As a key US ally and the leading Sunni nation, Saudi Arabia promotes Wahhabism.  Other Sunni nations: Egypt, UAE, and Jordan generally align with Saudi Arabia against Iran. B. Key drivers of tensions between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries are below:  Geopolitical struggle for dominance: Both Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for leadership in the Middle East, seeing the other as a main threat.  Religious divide (Sunni vs Shia): Iran’s Shia theocracy challenges Sunni-led countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the leader of the Sunni Muslim world.  The Iranian Revolution in 1979: The Iranian revolution created a revolutionary Shia nation, alarming conservative Sunni monarchies and intensifying regional power struggles. C. The rivalry is expressed as follows:  Proxy wars: Iran supports Shia military groups (e.g., Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon), while Saudi Arabia backs Sunni factions and governments, leading to conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.  Sectarian polarization: Both Iran and Saudi Arabia use sectarian narratives to mobilize support, while Saudi Arabia marginalizes Shia minorities in Sunni countries and exacerbates internal conflicts.  Regional alliances: Sunni countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, facing a mutual threat from Iran, have increasingly normalized ties with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords for regional security. III. Why Sunni Muslim nations, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran? Sunni Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, oppose US military strikes against Iran due to fear of potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout & disruption, regional instability, and concerns about expanding Israeli influence. Despite geopolitical rivalry between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries, these Sunni countries prioritize national security, avoiding a full-scale conflict that could devastate the Gulf region. 1. The first reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout & disruption. A. Fear of Retaliation Sunni-majority nations fear that if the US attacks Iran, Iran will retaliate against them, damaging critical oil infrastructure and causing economic devastation. The Gulf states’ primary short-term concern is a potential Iranian retaliation targeting strategic infrastructure on their territory, including symbols of governance, oil and gas production facilities, desalination plants, and military bases, in particular those hosting US forces. Another major concern is Iranian action to disrupt shipping lines near the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately a quarter of global oil and gas traffic passes. [6] In addition, any harm to Iran would also affect the economies of the Gulf states that maintain trade relations with it, particularly the United Arab Emirates, Iran’s principal trading partner in the Middle East. The Iranian strike on Qatar in June 2025 was a reminder of the vulnerability of infrastructure in the Gulf, even though Iran reportedly provided advance warning. Indeed, reports indicated that Iran conveyed messages to its Gulf neighbors urging them to persuade the US to refrain from attacking Iran, while warning that such an attack would trigger retaliation against military bases on their territory. Moreover, Iran could also activate its regional proxies - by putting pressure on the Houthis not only to target Israel but also to renew disruptions to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and potentially even carry out strikes on the Gulf states themselves. [7] Unlike Israel, the Gulf states are geographically very close to Iran and have more limited military capabilities. Most of their population, economy, and infrastructure are concentrated along narrow coastal strips exposed to the Gulf shoreline. They experienced firsthand Iran’s drone and missile attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in 2019 and learn a simple lesson: Even a “limited” Iranian attack can be devastating. In line with this threat perception, several Gulf states reportedly are acting to prevent a US military strike on Iran through mediation and facilitation. [8] The Gulf states oppose a US strike on Iran not because they believe such a move is unjustified in principle but rather because they are convinced that they would bear the immediate cost. Their opposition may also reflect the concern that the attack plans would not, in their view, produce the desired results. Accordingly, behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar and Oman, has led quiet efforts to persuade the US to avoid military intervention, warning that regime collapse or military escalation would shake oil markets and endanger their stability. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman have focused on preventing the use of escalatory rhetoric and military steps that could lead to miscalculation and escalation. Strikes against the Gulf states using drones, missiles, maritime sabotage, or regional proxies are readily available and familiar options for Iran. For the Gulf states, an Iran-US confrontation constitutes a direct threat to their internal, economic, and security stability. Mediation, therefore, is a defensive tool from their perspective - an attempt to keep the battlefield away from Gulf territory, even if this does not resolve the root causes of the confrontation. It is also possible that reports about efforts to prevent a US strike are intended to allow time to improve defensive preparedness with US assistance, particularly against missile attacks. In any case, the image of the Gulf states as opposing a strike against Iran and seeking to prevent it serves their interest in reducing tensions between themselves and Iran. B. Economic fallout & disruption A violent confrontation between Iran and the Gulf states could prompt serious economic consequences. “If Iran decides to block trade routes, for example, this would have a significant effect on the economies of the Gulf states,” Pauline Raabe from the Middle East Minds think tank in Berlin said. [9] Iran could block passage in the Persian Gulf by closing the Strait of Hormuz. “We have already seen what this means to international shipping when the Houthi rebels, a proxy group of Iran, fired on vessels in the Red Sea,” she explained, referring to the attacks on shipping in what the Houthis claimed was in support of Hamas in Gaza. Such a development in the Persian Gulf would, of course, have enormous economic consequences “first for the Arab countries, but then for the global economy as a whole,” Raabe said. An economic shock wave with catastrophic global implications would have immediate impacts on the temporary or prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with global energy markets suffering the most from such repercussions, triggering a significant disruption in international gas and oil supplies worldwide. The economic damage would be especially significant for regional economies. As Figure 2 shows, the Gulf countries, whose economies heavily depend on gas and oil exports, would experience an immediate and significant decline in their main sources of income. As Figure 2 shows, in 2024, Saudi Arabia earned $237 billion in oil export revenue, while Iraq earned $110 billion, and the United Arab Emirates $98 billion. Figure 2: Net Oil Export Revenues 2024 Widespread economic contraction and hardship, severe budget deficits, and currency devaluations would be some of the immediate consequences of these revenue declines, potentially triggering widespread political and social instability. Ironically, Iran, the country most likely to consider such a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, would also suffer severe economic repercussions. As Figure 2 shows, in 2024, Iran earned $51 billion in oil export revenue. Its oil revenues, which are vital and driving forces for its fragile and struggling economy, would be halted, and its ability to import necessary goods, such as food and refined petroleum products, would be significantly restricted, thereby causing further instability for its regime. The top priority for the Arab Gulf states, without a doubt, is the uninterrupted export of their oil without the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. Data from Kpler and Vortexa show that in recent months, Iran has accumulated about 166 million barrels of floating storage near Chinese waters. Even if Iran’s oil loadings were disrupted for a while, this stockpile could sustain sales to China for three to four months. By contrast, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or any attack on tankers in the Persian Gulf would be extremely damaging for Arab producers, particularly because Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even with alternative pipelines, can protect only about half of their export volumes, while Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain have no alternative export routes. Eckart Woertz, director of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs in Hamburg, also notes that the Gulf nations are keen to avoid any disruptions as they are currently focused on their economic transformation processes. “Saudi Arabia wants to reposition itself economically with its ‘Vision 2030’ and any unrest would be a major hindrance,” he told DW, a German television network. This also applies to more traditional industries, such as the extraction of natural resources, especially oil. “Any uncertainty is detrimental to these industries, as they depend on trust and functioning supply chains. Both are prerequisites for the economy in the Gulf states,” Woertz said. [10] 2. The second reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about regional instability and insecurity caused by US military strikes. A. Regional instability and insecurity: There is a strong preference for diplomatic solutions to avoid a chaotic, uncontrollable conflict that could engulf the entire Middle East. Just as an Iranian strike against targets in the Gulf states constitutes a tangible threat, the Gulf states also fear that a US campaign in Iran could precipitate a rapid collapse of the regime in Tehran. They do not view the swift fall of the Islamic Republic as a desirable outcome as it could trigger widespread instability, including succession struggles within Iran, the disintegration of governing institutions, the empowerment of extremist actors, potential waves of refugees, and, above all, the loss of a clear address for crisis management. Dr Karim Emile Bitar, a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po Paris noted that the Saudi leadership is particularly apprehensive about chaos and fragmentation in Iran, whether from a sudden collapse of the Iranian Islamic Republic or US-led war-induced regime change. Officials in Saudi Arabia are especially concerned about domestic security, including the potential for unrest among Shia communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. “Any escalation might empower radical groups, embolden opposition movements throughout the region, and exacerbate sectarian polarization,” added Dr Bitar. [11] Such turmoil also raises the specter of separatist movements in Iran’s peripheral areas that are home to the country’s minority ethnic groups with their own histories of secessionist drives, such as ethnic Arabs, Kurds, or Baluch people. Such developments would pose acute security risks for countries like Pakistan and Turkey. From this perspective, the danger lies not only in Iran’s internal fragmentation but in the wider regional contagion that would follow. In turn, the Gulf states have a vested interest in maintaining stability in the region even though authoritarian structures continue. Woertz, director of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs, argues that “the leaders of the Gulf states apparently prefer to rely on the familiar old regime rather than getting involved with a new, potentially unknown faction,” although they still have strong reservations about the Iranian regime. [12] In simple words, most regional actors approach the prospect of escalation through a lens of risk aversion rather than ideological alignment. The prevailing judgment among leaders in most regional countries is that escalation is strategically irrational, while maintaining the status quo remains the least dangerous option. In recent years, the Gulf states have taken significant actions to improve relations with Iran as part of a policy of détente, which, in their view, has proven effective. “They don’t want to jeopardize that.” Woertz notes. From their perspective, “the devil they know” is preferable to the instability that could spill over into the Gulf, generate waves of refugees, and disrupt trade. The Arab Spring may also serve as a reference point, demonstrating that regime collapse does not necessarily bring clarity and stability but rather prolonged instability. [13] Iran is a known actor; its red lines, internal constraints, and regional patterns of behavior are familiar. By contrast, a post-Islamic Republic Iran-especially one emerging from a protest movement that is not monolithic-could be much less predictable. Moreover, the monarchies in the Gulf states fear a “contagion effect,” namely the possibility that the collapse of the Iranian regime and the emergence of a democratic-liberal political system in its place would inspire waves of protest in the region (as could have happened following the 2009 protests in Iran and the subsequent development of the Arab Spring). Finally, the collapse of the Iranian regime could also lead to a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power and a significant strengthening of Israel. Iranian hostility toward Israel, even at the rhetorical level, helps preserve a familiar equilibrium in the region. 3. The third reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about expanding Israeli influence: If Iran collapses or weakens, US-backed Israel’s influence in the Middle East could rapidly increase, posing a threat to Arab countries in the region. Arab governments that once tolerated the idea of US-led regime change in Iran now urge restraint, recognizing that Israeli expansionism has become the region’s main threat. Only a few years ago, many Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf, may have viewed a US attack on Iran for regime change favorably. For decades, they regarded Iran with deep suspicion, often treating it as the region’s main threat. But now, as US President Donald Trump reportedly mulls exactly such an attack, Arab leaders, including Gulf rulers long at odds with Iran, are lobbying the US administration not to carry out military strikes on Iran. Even Gulf governments that have engaged in indirect conflict with Iran — such as Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia — do not support US military action there, according to analysts who study the region. That is partly because the monarchies of the Gulf worry that the ripple effects of escalating US-Iran tensions, or possible state failure in Iran, would harm their own security, undermining their reputation as regional safe havens for business and tourism. But it is also because some Gulf governments have come to see Israel, Iran’s archenemy, as a belligerent state seeking to dominate the Middle East. They believe that Israel could pose a greater threat to regional stability than an already weakened Iran does. In the wake of 7 October 2023 when the Hamas attacked Israel, Arab states have increasingly regarded Israel, not Iran, as the foremost threat to regional stability. “Ever since the US essentially lifted all restraints on Israel during the Biden administration, regional players have started to see Israel’s aggressive foreign policy as a direct and unmanageable threat. Israel has bombed seven countries in the region since 7 October 2023,” Dr Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told TNA. “Bombing Iran goes against the calculus and interests of the Arab Gulf States,” said Bader al-Saif, a history professor at Kuwait University. “Neutralizing the current regime, whether through regime change or internal leadership reconfiguration, can potentially translate into the unparalleled hegemony of Israel, which won’t serve the Gulf States.” Yasmine Farouk, the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula project director at the International Crisis Group, argues that Gulf countries are worried about “the chaos that a regime change in Iran would cause in the region” and how Israel might use “that vacuum.” For 27 months since 7 October 2023, Arab leaders have watched Israel’s rampage throughout the region, in pursuit of its “Greater Israel” project, an expansionist biblical vision for territory spanning from the Euphrates River in Iraq to the Nile River in Egypt. To this end, Israel has significantly expanded its illegal occupation of Arab lands. Not only has Israel carried out genocide in Gaza and indicated its plans to take the territory over, but it has also deepened its hold in the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon. Perhaps most alarming for Arab leaders, after months of Netanyahu openly declaring his expansionist ambitions, was Israel’s unprecedented assault on Qatar, a US ally, in September 2025. That escalation had been preceded only a few months earlier, in June 2025, by Israel convincing the US to bomb Iran in an assault aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and ensuring Israel remains the region’s sole nuclear power. The Israeli strike rattled Gulf governments not only because many have been courted by Israel as potential allies (signing the Abraham Accords) in recent years, but also because they, like Israel, had long regarded the US as their main security guarantor. “If the alliance with the US does not protect you from what these countries see as Israel’s designs for regional hegemony, then you will need a new coalition to balance against Israel,” Yasmine Farouk added. “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have moved in this direction. Soon after the Israeli attack on Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, signed a security pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Though Iran is not officially part of this coalition, it does serve as a buffer against Israel. Chaos in Iran - or a pro-Israeli puppet being installed in Iran - is seen as a very dangerous blow to the effort to balance against Israel’s increasingly aggressive regional posture.” In short, Israel’s aim of absolute regional hegemony has never been clearer, and a US strike on Iran would represent both an extension of Israeli aggression and an expansion of its regional power. This is the structural shift at the heart of Arab opposition to a potential US attack on Iran. Moreover, it is also worth noting that Arab countries have themselves moved diplomatically closer to Iran in recent years, in part because of Israeli aggression and expansionism. The Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations in 2023 and moved closer after Israel’s attack on Qatar in September 2025. Iran’s relationship with Egypt has also improved. Recent events, and in particular Israel’s unchecked aggression and territorial expansion, have forced a structural shift in how Arab states assess regional threats. Gone, at least for now, are the days when Saudi Arabia viewed Iran as its foremost enemy, when Qatar saw Saudi Arabia as its principal threat, or when Egypt treated Qatar as the chief source of regional instability. Increasingly, Arab regimes, with perhaps the exception of the UAE, now view Israel as the region’s most destabilizing force. Israeli expansionism, its willingness to strike across borders without regard for accepted international norms, and its open pursuit of regional hegemony have fundamentally changed how Arab leaders assess risk. IV. The positions of major Gulf countries on US attack on Iran In early 2026, the strategic landscape of the Middle East is shaped by a striking convergence: while many regional governments deeply distrust Iran’s intentions and regional behaviors, there is a near-universal assessment that a US military intervention would be profoundly destabilizing. Across the Gulf, the Levant, and Turkey, leaders increasingly see war with Iran not as a solution to regional insecurity, but as a catalyst for economic shock, domestic unrest, and long-term strategic degradation. [14] The specific reason why a specific country opposes US military attacks on Iran is as follows. 1. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia’s position reflects a decisive shift from confrontation toward risk management. Saudi Arabia has signaled a refusal to facilitate US strikes, including denying the use of its airspace, driven primarily by vulnerability rather than sympathy for Iran. Iran maintains the capability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and to target Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure — most notably Abqaiq, Khurais, and Ras Tanura — with missiles and drones, as demonstrated in 2019. Even limited retaliation would disrupt global energy markets and severely undermine ‘Vision 2030’, which depends on foreign investment, tourism, and the perception of internal stability. Saudi leadership also assesses that a regional war would divert financial and political capital from other priorities, including regional diplomacy and post-Gaza reconstruction efforts that Saudi Arabia increasingly frames as part of its leadership role rather than a purely humanitarian endeavor. 2. Qatar For Qatar, the risks are existential. Qatar shares the world’s largest natural gas field with Iran, making sustained stability in the Gulf essential to its economic model. Any conflict that disrupts production, shipping, or joint field management would directly threaten state revenues. Compounding this exposure is Qatar’s hosting of Al Udeid Air Base, which would almost certainly be viewed by Iran as a legitimate retaliation target. Qatari strategy has long relied on diplomatic mediation as a form of deterrence; a US intervention would collapse this posture and force Doha into a conflict it has consistently sought to avoid. 3. United Arab Emirates (UAE) The UAE maintains a public stance of strategic neutrality, but this reflects calculated self-interest rather than ambiguity. Abu Dhabi’s leadership is acutely aware that its global financial hub status, logistics networks, and tourism economy are predicated on regional calm. A conflict with Iran would endanger shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, threaten port infrastructure, and likely trigger capital flight from Dubai. Despite ongoing tensions with Iran and security coordination with Israel, Emirati planners judge that the economic costs of war would far exceed any prospective strategic benefit from weakening Iran. 4. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman The smaller Gulf states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman view US intervention in Iran primarily through the lens of exposure. Kuwait faces strong parliamentary and public resistance to involvement in another regional conflict. Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet, recognizes that its territory would be among the first targets in any Iranian retaliation. Oman, which has long positioned itself as a neutral intermediary, sees military escalation as incompatible with its foreign policy identity and economic resilience. All three countries fear that war would inflame sectarian tensions, disrupt trade, and undermine already fragile domestic social contracts. 5. Egypt Egypt’s opposition is rooted in regime insecurity and economic fragility. The Suez Canal remains Egypt’s most critical source of foreign currency, and any regional conflict that disrupts Red Sea or Gulf shipping would have immediate fiscal consequences. Egyptian leaders also fear that war with Iran would energize domestic protest movements and Islamist networks, exploiting anti-US sentiment amid existing economic hardship. For Egypt, a US–Iran conflict represents a high-impact destabilizing event rather than a distant strategic concern. 6. Jordan Jordan’s position reflects chronic vulnerability. Jordan is already under severe economic strain and hosts a large refugee population relative to its size. Regional war could disrupt trade routes, risk spillover violence, and inflame public opposition to both Israel and the US. Jordanian authorities assess that even limited escalation could translate into disproportionate domestic instability, undermining the monarchy’s balancing act between internal legitimacy and external alignment. 7. Turkey Turkey’s concerns center on displacement and strategic autonomy. Turkey fears that conflict in Iran could generate large-scale refugee flows toward its eastern border, exacerbating domestic backlash against existing refugee populations. Turkey also relies on Iranian energy imports and has invested heavily in maintaining a flexible posture between Iran, NATO, and Russia. A US intervention would collapse this balancing strategy, impose economic costs, and complicate Ankara’s efforts to position itself as a regional diplomatic actor, including in post-Gaza reconstruction initiatives. 8. Israel Israel remains the sole regional actor publicly supportive of weakening or dismantling the Iranian regime. Privately, however, Israeli security assessments are more cautious. After prolonged military operations across multiple fronts, the Israeli Defense Force faces resource constraints, personnel fatigue, and growing concerns about air defense sustainability. Israeli planners increasingly judge that a US intervention would not be likely to produce rapid Iranian regime collapse and more likely to trigger a prolonged multi-front conflict involving Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and other Iranian-aligned actors. There is also recognition that external attack could consolidate Iranian domestic support for the regime rather than fracture it. V. Conclusion This paper explained the relationships between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries and why those Sunni Muslim nations, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran. This paper explained that Sunni Muslim nations oppose US military strikes against Iran for three reasons: The first reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout and disruption. The second reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about regional instability and insecurity caused by US military strikes. The third reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about the Israeli influence expansion. References [1] Barin, Mohsen (31 December 2025). "Iran's economic crisis, political discontent threaten regime". DW News. [2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-president-warns-us-attack-on-supreme-leader-would-mean-full-scale-war/ [3] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/17/trump-to-politico-its-time-to-look-for-new-leadership-in-iran-00735528?_kx=LSFywwe4GSg_lcFWo5DyId8VKdphy2F0zhlZVneJnA97jKgVYFyty4cB80GJkTHR.U5D8ER&utm_id=01KF7GKF35MAAW8BRA143VFM9M&utm_medium=campaign&utm_source=Klaviyo [4] https://www.cfr.org/photo-essay/sunni-shia-divide#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%20has%20a%20sizable,to%20Saudi%20and%20Iranian%20sources. [5] https://www.cfr.org/photo-essay/sunni-shia-divide#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%20has%20a%20sizable,to%20Saudi%20and%20Iranian%20sources [6] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [7] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [8] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [9] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-gulf-states-are-wary-of-a-strike-on-iran/a-75593784 [10] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-gulf-states-are-wary-of-a-strike-on-iran/a-75593784 [11] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-middle-east-fears-us-israel-attack-iran [12] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-middle-east-fears-us-israel-attack-iran [13] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [14] https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/why-middle-eastern-states-oppose-us-military-inter vention-in-iran/

In Latin America, corruption is not an anomaly of the democratic system, but rather a structural cog that weakens it, fuels populism, and perpetuates inequality. Corruption is a constant in most Latin American countries. Regardless of ideology and party alternation, corruption has remained persistent across much of the region and, in many cases, has even increased. Between 2014 and 2024, only five countries in the region—Uruguay, Costa Rica, Colombia, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic—registered an improvement in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In Paraguay the index shows no variation, while in the remaining 14 countries the perception of corruption increased. Large-scale abuse of power by senior government officials, the public bureaucracy, and major private corporations contributes to undermining citizens’ trust in their representatives and in democratic institutions as a whole. How corruption is expressed Corruption in Latin America takes multiple forms and manifests itself at different levels of political, economic, and social life. In its most visible and highest-impact expression are large corruption schemes involving top state authorities and major private companies. Cases such as that of the construction firm Odebrecht, whose illicit practices spread to several countries in the region and came to light between 2014 and 2016, revealed the existence of transnational networks of bribery and illegal political financing. Similarly, scandals such as the “Mensalão” and Operation “Lava Jato” in Brazil exposed the depth of these schemes and their ability to cut across governments and political parties, seriously compromising the credibility of democratic institutions. One of the most sensitive areas in which this dynamic is expressed is the financing of electoral campaigns. The lack of clear regulations, transparency, and effective oversight has turned political financing into a privileged gateway for corruption. As a result, electoral processes tend to produce governments constrained by private interests that, once in power, seek to recoup their investment through legislative favors, budgetary allocations, or regulatory decisions, thereby weakening democratic representation. However, corruption is not limited to these major scandals. It also manifests itself in everyday practices that directly affect the relationship between citizens and the state. The payment of bribes to access public services, expedite procedures, or exercise rights that should be universally guaranteed contributes to normalizing illegality and steadily erodes trust in public institutions. At the same time, corruption in Latin America transcends the state sphere and extends into the private sector. Tax evasion, consumer fraud, and other fraudulent practices are frequent and generate serious social costs. In addition, the advance of drug trafficking has deepened these dynamics, promoting corruption at different levels of the state and society and reinforcing a vicious circle that undermines legality and institutional legitimacy. Delegitimization of democracy Although corruption is not exclusive to the political sphere, when it involves politicians, members of governments, or public officials, its impact on the loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions among the population is greater. The persistence of high levels of corruption in the state is an indicator of significant failures in control mechanisms among state institutions—that is, in so-called inter-institutional accountability, a fundamental dimension for the proper functioning of liberal representative democracy. Without oversight bodies and institutions with effective capacity to investigate and punish corruption, the quality of democracy is seriously affected. The fragility or inefficiency of oversight institutions and bodies is also reflected in insufficient sanctions, delays in institutional timelines for applying the corresponding penalties, and, in many cases, their complete absence. This undoubtedly contributes to a sense of impunity and serves as an incentive for the repetition of corrupt practices. The persistence of corruption, and the difficulties in imposing exemplary and effective punishment on those responsible, has influenced the loss of citizens’ trust in traditional political parties and leaderships, and even in the democratic system itself, boosting electoral support for populist parties and leaders. At the beginning of the century these had a left-wing profile (the so-called twenty-first-century socialism), but today they assume a clear far-right profile. These are movements and leaders critical not only of traditional political elites but also, to varying degrees, of traditional democratic institutions—especially institutions of political oversight and accountability, such as the judiciary, prosecutors’ offices, and audit bodies, among others. These populist parties and leaders come to power, in most cases, with promises to put an end to the corruption inherited from “traditional politics.” Nevertheless, once in government they tend to dismantle or co-opt oversight bodies and institutions. Examples of this were the governments of Morales in Bolivia, or the government of former president Bolsonaro in Brazil. The latter dismantled the existing network of anti-corruption bodies because, according to him, there was no corruption in his government. With the co-optation or limitation of oversight institutions and bodies, populist governments face fewer obstacles to engaging in corrupt practices. And in the context of an eroded democratic regime, institutions find it more difficult to punish those responsible. The correlation between corruption and inequality Societies marked by social and economic inequality are more vulnerable to corruption, and at the same time corruption increases those very inequalities. It is no coincidence that Latin America is considered the most unequal region in the world: according to Oxfam’s report for Latin America and the Caribbean Wealth Unchecked, Democracy at Risk. Why Latin America and the Caribbean Need a New Fiscal Pact, the top 1% of the population concentrates around 45% of regional wealth, in a context of persistently high levels of corruption. Corruption deepens inequality because it gives the corrupt greater capacity to influence government decisions and changes in legislation for their own benefit. This leads to democracies captured by particular interests and with less efficient outcomes for the population as a whole, which in turn contributes to weakening trust in democracy as a system capable of meeting, at least in basic terms, citizens’ needs and expectations. The other side of this phenomenon is the case of Uruguay. The Latin American country with the lowest perception of corruption, according to Transparency International, is also the one with the lowest level of inequality in the region and the only full democracy in Latin America, according to The Economist index. It is also, together with Argentina, one of the two countries with the highest support for democracy in the region: 70% of Uruguayans express support for democracy, compared with a regional average of 52%, according to Latinobarómetro. The corollary seems clear, though undoubtedly difficult to implement: reducing corruption requires strengthening oversight institutions and bodies, accompanied by a reduction in social inequality.

On 3 January 2026, the US carried out a surprise military operation in Venezuela, capturing President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. The US has made little effort to cloak its operation in either solidarist language, such as appeals to democracy promotion, human rights, or liberal peacebuilding – or in pluralist rhetoric emphasizing the preservation of international order. Instead, Washington has presented the action in largely instrumental and strategic terms, signalling a willingness to sidestep both dominant justificatory traditions within international society. While Maduro and Flores are charged with narco-terrorism conspiracy and cocaine importation conspiracy, international debates focus on the future of Venezuela’s oil (Poque González 2026). On 7 January administration officials said the US plans to effectively assume control over the sale of Venezuela’s oil “indefinitely” (Sherman 2026) and President Donald Trump confirmed that he expected the US to run Venezuela, insisting that the country’s interim government was “giving us everything that we feel is necessary” (Sanger et al. 2026). Attention is fixed not only on Washington’s plans for Venezuela’s oil sector and control over its export revenues, but also on the replies from Moscow and Beijing, Maduro’s chief foreign backers and heavyweight players in energy politics. Consequently, this article asks two questions. First, to what extent does American control of Venezuelan oil threaten China’s and Russia’s energy interests? Second, what does the resulting US–China–Russia triangle imply for how energy security itself is being redefined? A constructivist perspective, recognizes that oil is an idea—valuable not only because it burns but because control over it symbolizes power and authority (Kuteleva 2021). Thus, when the US claims the right to supervise Venezuelan oil revenues, it is not only increasing leverage over barrels, but asserting the authority to define legitimate energy exchange itself. In this context, while the material threat is limited for China and already largely sunk for Russia, the symbolic, institutional and political threat is profound. A straightforward constructivist interpretation of the US–China–Russia triangle centres on status. China had cultivated Venezuela as an “all-weather strategic partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025b) and major debtor, only to watch Maduro captured days after senior Chinese officials visited Caracas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025a). In constructivist terms, this is an obvious status injury: China appeared present but powerless. China’s energy diplomacy had functioned as proof of its global influence, and the nullification of China’s energy ties with Venezuela by US force undermines China’s narrative as a protective patron for the Global South. Beijing accused Washington of “hegemonic thinking” (Liu and Chen 2026), “bullying” (Global Times 2026a), and violating Venezuelan sovereignty and “the rights of the Venezuelan people” (Global Times 2026b). This strong pluralist language is not incidental—it is a bid to reclaim moral authority and redefine the event as norm-breaking rather than capability-revealing. Similarly, Russia’s involvement in Venezuela was never purely economic. Moscow saw the alliance with Venezuela as a way to advance its anti-American agenda and to signal that it could cultivate allies in Washington’s traditional backyard (Boersner Herrera and Haluani 2023; Gratius 2022; Herbst and Marczak 2019). It used Venezuela as leverage against the US, subsidised the regime during periods of domestic recession, and framed support as proof of great-power reliability. As senior Russian executives put it, “economic considerations took a back seat to political goals of taking swipes at the US” (Seddon and Stognei 2026). US control of Venezuelan oil thus removes a symbolic platform on which Russia enacted its identity as an energy superpower and geopolitical spoiler. While Russia continues loud sovereignty talk, its demonstrated incapacity to protect partners pushes it toward opportunistic bargaining (“concert” deals, see Lemke 2023) rather than overt defense of UN-pluralist restraint. As such, Dmitry Medvedev (2026) bluntly claimed that the US special military operation in Venezuela all but justifies Russia’s own actions in Ukraine. Venezuela is not a core supplier for China in volumetric terms. In 2025, Venezuelan exports to China averaged roughly 395,000 barrels per day—about 4% of China’s seaborne crude imports, according to Kpler data cited by the FT (Leahy and Moore 2026). China has diversified routes, strategic reserves covering at least 96 days of imports, and strong purchasing power in global markets (Downs 2025). Hence, from a narrow supply perspective, the loss of Venezuelan oil is manageable. That said, around one-fifth of China’s crude imports come from suppliers under US or western sanctions, primarily Iran, Venezuela and Russia, much of it disguised via transshipment near Malaysia (Downs 2025). Independent “teapot” refiners (Downs 2017)—who account for about a quarter of China’s refining capacity—are structurally dependent on this discounted, politically risky oil. Consequently, Trump’s seizure of Maduro alarmed China not mainly because of Venezuela itself, but because it demonstrated Washington’s capacity to escalate from sanctions to physical control of an energy sector, and thus potentially to Iran. Here, constructivism reveals the problem: “sanctioned oil” is not simply cheaper crude; it is a political category—oil marked as illegitimate by a dominant legal-financial order. The US move signals that this stigma can be converted into coercive authority, turning commercial vulnerability into geopolitical dependence. This reclassification transforms Chinese domestic actors into security subjects. “Teapot” refiners are no longer just businesses; they become strategic vulnerabilities whose survival depends on US tolerance. Analysis warn that a cutoff of Iranian oil could force many to shut down entirely (Leahy and Moore 2026). In this context, US control of Venezuelan oil reshapes Chinese energy security discourse from one of diversification and market access to one of hierarchy and exposure to political permission. Russia’s oil interests in Venezuela were largely written down years earlier. In 2020, Rosneft had sold most formal assets after pouring around $800m into loans and projects that produced little return (The Economist 2020). Much of the remaining exposure consisted of debts and shadow ownership arrangements. More important is the damage to Russia’s sanctions-evasion architecture. Russia had become the leading marketer of Venezuelan oil by trading crude as debt repayment and using banks partly owned by sanctioned Russian institutions, creating what the 2019 Atlantic Council report described as “a counter financial system to the one dominated by the West” (Herbst and Marczak 2019). The recent reporting on the US tracking a tanker linked to Venezuela, Russia and Iran illustrates how this counter-order is being contested operationally (Sheppard et al. 2026). The vessel sailed under false flags, was sanctioned for carrying Iranian oil, later re-registered under Russian jurisdiction, and became vulnerable to boarding under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea because it was “without nationality.” Such episodes show that energy security is increasingly constituted by maritime law, insurance rules, and surveillance practices. US control over Venezuelan oil expands this regime of enforcement, making Russia’s informal trading networks less viable. A constructivist approach suggests that American control of Venezuelan oil is best understood not as a supply shock, but as an act of social stratification in the international system. Energy markets have always been hierarchical, but the hierarchy was largely implicit: reserve currencies, shipping insurance, futures exchanges, and contract law already privileged Western institutions. What is new is the explicit performance of hierarchy—the public demonstration that a great power can redefine ownership, legality, and access through coercion and administrative authority. This produces a stratified energy order: First, rule-makers – states whose legal systems, sanctions regimes, and corporate actors define what counts as legitimate oil (primarily the US and its allies). Second, rule-takers – states whose energy security depends on access to these institutions (most importers). And third, rule-evaders – states forced into informal networks (Russia, Iran, Venezuela) whose energy becomes socially “tainted.” China occupies an unstable middle category: economically powerful but institutionally dependent. Venezuela’s takeover publicly signals that material power is insufficient without normative control over legality. Referencias Boersner Herrera, Adriana, and Makram Haluani. 2023. ‘Domestic and International Factors of the Contemporary Russo–Venezuelan Bilateral Relationship’. Latin American Policy 14 (3): 366–87. Downs, Erica. 2017. The Rise of China’s Independent Refineries. Geopolitics. Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/rise-chinas-independent-refineries/. Downs, Erica. 2025. China’s Oil Demand, Imports and Supply Security. Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/chinas-oil-demand-imports-and-supply-security/. Global Times. 2026a. ‘China Condemns US Demands for Venezuela to Partner Exclusively on Oil Production as “Bullying,” Breaches of Intl Law: FM – Global Times’. Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352547.shtml. Global Times. 2026b. ‘China’s Legitimate Rights and Interests in Venezuela Must Be Safeguarded, Chinese FM Responds to Claim about US to Sell Venezuelan Sanctioned Oil – Global Times’. Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352555.shtml. Gratius, Susanne. 2022. ‘The West against the Rest? Democracy versus Autocracy Promotion in Venezuela’. Bulletin of Latin American Research 41 (1): 141–58. Herbst, John E., and Jason Marczak. 2019. Russia’s Intervention in Venezuela: What’s at Stake? Policy Brief. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/. Kuteleva, Anna. 2021. China’s Energy Security and Relations with Petrostates: Oil as an Idea. Routledge. Leahy, Joe, and Malcolm Moore. 2026. ‘Donald Trump’s Venezuela Action Raises Threat for China’s Oil Supplies’. Oil. Financial Times, January 8. https://www.ft.com/content/f64826fa-5c36-4fb3-8621-ee0b9d9a1ff5. Lemke, Tobias. 2023. ‘International Relations and the 19th Century Concert System’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Liu, Xin, and Qingqing Chen. 2026. ‘US Reportedly Sets Demands for Venezuela to Pump More Oil; Experts Say “Anti-Drug” Claims a Pretext, Exposing Neo-Colonialism – Global Times’. The Global Times, January 7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202601/1352544.shtml. Medvedev, Dmitry. 2026. ‘Год начался бурно’. Telegram, January 9. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/626. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. 2025a. ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on January 5, 2026’. January 5. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202601/t20260105_11806736.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. 2025b. ‘Xi Jinping Meets with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros’. May 10. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250513_11619919.html. Poque González, Axel Bastián. 2026. ‘Energy Security and the Revival of US Hard Power in Latin America’. E-International Relations, January 12. https://www.e-ir.info/2026/01/12/energy-security-and-the-revival-of-us-hard-power-in-latin-america/. Sanger, David E., Tyler Pager, Karie Rogers, and Zolan Kanno-Youngs. 2026. ‘Trump Says U.S. Oversight of Venezuela Could Last for Years’. U.S. The New York Times, January 8. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/trump-interview-venezuela.html. Seddon, Max, and Anastasia Stognei. 2026. ‘How Russia’s Venezuelan Oil Gambit Went Awry’. Venezuela. Financial Times, January 9. https://www.ft.com/content/e09a6030-325f-4be5-ace3-4d70121071cb. Sheppard, David, Chris Cook, and Jude Webber. 2026. ‘US Tracking Oil Tanker off UK Coast Linked to Venezuela, Russia and Iran’. Shipping. Financial Times, January 6. https://www.ft.com/content/a699169a-983a-4472-ab23-54bceb9dd2bd. The Economist. 2020. ‘Why Putin’s Favourite Oil Firm Dumped Its Venezuelan Assets’. The Economist, April 2. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/02/why-putins-favourite-oil-firm-dumped-its-venezuelan-assets.

Show strength, challenge traditions, put America’s interests — and its own — at the center: the first year of President Trump’s second term was a whirlwind of national and international change. In foreign policy in particular, he profoundly reshaped the role of the United States — and called the existing order into question. Opinion polls In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. presidents to convince large majorities of Americans of their policies and to achieve high approval ratings. The situation is no different for President Trump: his approval ratings were last positive in March of last year. Since then, Trump has become increasingly unpopular. RealClearPolitics aggregates various polls and now sees a disapproval rate for Trump of almost 56 percent. [1] Only on the issue of border security does approval remain positive; for all other issues such as immigration, security, foreign policy, or the economy, disapproval is rising.[2] Inflation, healthcare, and jobs are the most important issues for the Americans surveyed, for which a majority now sees the competence with the opposing Democrats. Even Trump’s Republicans are rather dissatisfied with the president’s economic policies: according to an AP poll, only 16 percent of Republicans think he has done much to reduce the cost of living. In general, however, they still support Trump: eight out of ten Republicans surveyed give him a good rating. [3] Domestic Policy “Move fast and break things” – is the mantra of the Silicon Valley, that the Christian Science Monitor uses to describe the past year of the president. Trump made a lightning start: “He expanded the boundaries of presidential power and, in his first year after returning, issued more executive orders than in his entire first term. He bypassed Congress, challenged the courts, invaded Venezuela and arrested its head of state, took revenge on his supposed opponents, and redecorated the White House with gold fixtures and a large-planned ballroom.” Trump’s second term makes his first term look like a rehearsal: “It’s almost as if he spent his first four years in office figuring out how much power he really had and then came back determined to fully exercise that power.” According to an analysis by the progressive think tank the Center for American Progress, after the first year of Trump’s second administration, the American workforce is feeling the effects of misguided economic policies: “2025 was marked by chaotic tariff announcements, rising costs for everyday necessities, increasing unemployment, as well as historic cuts in healthcare, food assistance, and clean energy, which drove costs even higher.” The economic turbulence of the first year has left most Americans skeptical about the new year. The think tank cites a survey showing that nearly 70 percent of respondents expected 2026 to be a year of economic difficulties. “Despite Trump’s claim that 2025 was the ‘best first year in history’ for an American president, Americans’ perceptions of their economic security and the latest economic data tell a different story.” “Is Trump trying to lose the midterm elections for Congress?” asks former Republican presidential adviser Karl Rove in the Wall Street Journal: “It was a year full of rapid changes, controversies, and upheavals. It was also a year full of puzzles.” Why does the president repeatedly take actions that go against his political interests? “Trump misses the opportunity to win over key swing voters for the Republicans.” As an example, Rove cites immigration policy and Trump’s approach at the border: “He stopped the flow of illegal migrants. He was right. We didn’t need a new law, just a different president. But Trump did not capitalize on the success to publicize it.” Instead, the Trump team misplayed its hand by sending immigration officers to hardware stores to arrest day laborers without valid papers who had otherwise done nothing wrong. “Americans are increasingly unsettled by the president’s erratic appearances and late-night tirades. Whether it is his age or his advisers, who cannot rein in his worst instincts, Trump behaves differently from any American president before him.” Trump dominates many news cycles but drives no substantial political change, writes conservative analyst Yuval Levin in The Atlantic: “He has worked more around the formal powers of the presidency than with them, and his goal often seems less about governing and more about showing strength.” This approach appears attractive, especially to those on the political right who feel disadvantaged by the American elites. Trump has been able to extract real concessions from some institutions. However, this approach is short-sighted and reactive. Levin writes that in his first year in office, Trump signed fewer laws than any other modern president, and most of them were limited in scope and purpose. The only significant law was essentially an extension of existing tax policy. Otherwise, there were interventions like DOGE and deals. In doing so, the president’s discretionary powers are “used as a lever to influence behavior, rather than using the government’s administrative authority to set predictable, uniform rules for entire areas of society. In other words: they use arbitrariness as an instrument. This can be a source of real power in the short term, but it is ultimately very dangerous for public life in the United States.” Donald Trump will get a third term — by overshadowing his successor, analyzes John Harris of Politico. Trump is on the path to changing the character of the American government and the United States’ international relations more profoundly than any of his predecessors in recent decades: “The reach of Trump’s policies and his disruptive way of implementing them will almost inevitably dominate the campaign and the first term of his successor — perhaps even more so if that successor is a Democrat.” In this way, Trump gets a third term, even if he is not unconstitutionally trying to stay in office. “The task of repairing what Democrats and many others see as Trump’s vandalism means that the first day of the next president will be backward-looking — and probably also the first month and the first year.” Trump has expressed his mix of ideas, grievances, and vanities in a much more concrete, programmatic way than friends or opponents would have expected. He has become more radical and less restrained. “In his first term, his critics cried, ‘This is not normal!’ Only now, it is normal.” Foreign Policy Benn Steil from the Council on Foreign Relations analyzes “Trump’s new world order” and the contradiction between his campaign promise to focus on the U.S. and interventions such as in Venezuela: “The obvious contradiction reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy thinking, which aligns with Trump’s preference but is independent of it: dominate what is easy to dominate, and appease or ignore what is not.” There is said to be a consensus within the administration, which is committed to maintaining the hemisphere’s dominance. There is an attempt to offset a withdrawal from persistent overseas conflicts with a simultaneous demonstration of strength closer to home. The goal is to restore the world order that existed before World War I, when America’s global ambitions were more restrained and its neighborhood was safer. What role will the United States play internationally this year? Leslie Vinjamuri of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs asks: “Will it be a stabilizing force? A peacemaker? Or will it continue to sow unrest?” Events at the start of the year have shown that Trump sees value in the latter. Trump does not feel bound by precedent, norms, or laws, and is not deterred by them. Neither allies, Congress, nor courts have so far given reason to believe that this could change. Trump is slowly changing public perception of sovereignty, territory, and national security: “There are already many people that look at maps of Greenland and think differently about its geography, significance, and proper place in the international order.” Whether Trump’s desire for public recognition will divert him from his pursuit of global power — or whether the public will be swept along by Trump — remains to be seen. William Alan Reinsch from the Center for Strategic and International Studies analyzes the president’s trade policy and constant new tariff threats. Whether these are economically sound steps is debatable, but they are undoubtedly politically savvy moves. The constant announcement of new “shiny objects” makes any detailed analysis of previous actions irrelevant: “When these decisions are announced, few facts are released, and by the time journalists, scholars, and other analysts have figured out what was actually decided and taken the time to assess its significance, the public has already moved on, captivated by the next shiny object.” The result is a lack of accountability. “When historians eventually write about this era, there will be accountability, but it will be too late.” The framers of the Constitution intended a government that acts prudently. Checks and balances were meant to ensure that no single branch of government holds disproportionate power over the others. When a president pursues so many political actions that they flood the space and undermine the oversight mechanisms, these accountabilities disappear. Donald Trump started 2026 as the true leader of Europe, writes Nile Gardiner of the Trump-friendly Heritage Foundation. In the first year of his second term, the Trump administration had already shaken the foundations of Europe to its core: “Trump may not be popular in Europe, but he is increasingly respected as a force to be reckoned with.” Trump is wrongly accused of being an isolationist. In reality, he cares far more about Europe than his predecessors: “He is the most transatlantic American president since Ronald Reagan and regards the salvation of Europe as a vital national interest of the United States. His approach to Europe is downright revolutionary. He is the first U.S. president to question the European project, and his ultimate goal is of great significance: the salvation of Western civilization itself.” The U.S. has every right to comment on the EU and Europe’s future because Americans have financed Europe’s security for decades. Whether President Trump actually has a plan is questioned by Thomas de Waal of the Carnegie Endowment. One version suggests he is trying to revive the Monroe Doctrine and govern the Western Hemisphere — a return “to an era of imperialism and spheres of influence”: “The threat he currently poses is primarily a threat of chaos. Calling the challenge a new Monroe Doctrine is only partly correct: it is more of a ‘Gone-Rogue Doctrine.’ However, it is no longer possible to establish spheres of influence in the 21st century in the old style. Trump needs to be reminded that he already has a modern variant: a friendly alliance stretching from Vancouver to Kiev, which he is now losing.” References [1] https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/approval/donal d-trump/approval-rating [2] Beispielhaft bei Strength in Numbers: https://www.gelliottmorris.com/p/new-poll-trump-slipson-immigration [3] https://apnews.com/article/poll-trump-republicansimmigration-economy-inflation-costs634472fc2ee3b4477a7be997bbd0c69e

On January 25, 2011, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets in mass demonstrations demanding freedom, social justice, and the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, who had held office since 1981. Just 18 days later, on February 11, 2011, newly appointed Vice President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Omar Suleiman announced on state television that Mubarak was stepping down as president and transferring power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to celebrate the victory of the revolution and the beginning of a new chapter in the country's history. However, within months, the general euphoria gave way to the realization that the "new republic" faced serious political and economic challenges. The dramatic events of early 2011 marked the beginning of a long, complex, and at times painful process, the consequences of which can still be seen today. As the fifteenth anniversary of the revolution approaches, Egypt has managed to maintain internal stability and demonstrate sustainable economic growth, but at the same time, the country faces several complex internal and external challenges in politics, economics, security, and other areas. From revolution to counterrevolution Having taken the reins of power in February 2011, the Military Council immediately declared itself no alternative to a civilian government, and by late June 2012, power was transferred to the first president elected since the revolution, Mohamed Morsi, a candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood*. Having received 51.73% of the vote in the second round of the presidential election, Morsi narrowly defeated the last Mubarak-era prime minister, Ahmed Shafik, and became the first president in modern Egypt without a military background. However, the now-deceased Morsi, who came to embody the rise and fall of political Islam in Egypt, was not destined to remain in power for long. Just a year later, on July 3, 2013, he was ousted by Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi amid mass demonstrations. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood* considered the incident a military coup, while el-Sisi, who later became president, repeatedly repeated that the army intervened only after mass demonstrations against Morsi. Morsi's ouster provoked diametrically opposed reactions among regional players. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE quickly became key external donors and allies of the new Egyptian authorities, relations with Qatar and Turkey (the main sponsors of Islamic political movements in the Middle East) deteriorated sharply. Relations with the United States, Egypt's key ally since the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, also cooled somewhat. Following the dispersal of a Muslim Brotherhood* protest in Cairo in August 2013, then-US President Barack Obama canceled joint US-Egyptian military exercises, declaring that traditional cooperation could not continue as usual. The allocation of $1.3 billion in annual US military aid has repeatedly become a subject of political bargaining. Strengthening relations with Moscow Against this backdrop, Egypt has moved toward some rapprochement with Moscow. Since 2014, el-Sisi, first as Defense Minister and then as President, has made a series of visits to Russia, attending two celebrations marking the anniversaries of Victory over Nazi Germany in 2015 and 2025. Furthermore, el-Sisi participated in two Russia-Africa summits in Sochi in 2019 and St. Petersburg in 2023, and attended the BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024. In December 2025, the second Russia-Africa ministerial conference was held in Cairo, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, with whom el-Sisi met. However, relations with Russia were seriously tested by the terrorist attack on board a Kogalymavia (DBA Metrojet) Airbus A321 on October 31, 2015, en route from Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg. As a result of the incident, Russia completely suspended direct air service to Egypt for several years, dealing a painful blow to the country's tourism sector. Meanwhile, Egyptian authorities steadfastly refused to classify the incident as a terrorist attack, hold those responsible for negligence accountable, or provide appropriate compensation to the families of the victims. Nevertheless, the positive dynamics in Russian-Egyptian relations have now been fully restored. According to the Association of Tour Operators of Russia (ATOR), Egypt has once again become one of the top five most popular foreign destinations for Russians, behind Turkey, China, and the UAE, having welcomed over 1.4 million Russian tourists in the first nine months of 2025, a 36.8% increase compared to the same period in 2024. By effectively exporting Egyptian services to the Russian market, tourism offsets the imbalance in the two countries' trade balance, which traditionally skews heavily in Russia's favor. Furthermore, Russia contributes to the food security of Egypt, the world's largest wheat importer, accounting for over 60% of its total imports. Egypt, in turn, is also actively increasing its agricultural exports to Russia — oranges, mangoes, and other Egyptian origin agricultural products are increasingly found on the shelves of Russian retail chains. The flagship project of Russian-Egyptian cooperation is, without a doubt, the construction of the first nuclear power plant, El Dabaa, in the Matrouh Governorate on the Mediterranean Sea, which is being carried out by the Russian state corporation Rosatom. In terms of scale, this project is often compared to the Aswan High Dam, built with Soviet support in the 1960s. Relations with external players Gradually, el-Sisi succeeded in restoring allied relations with the United States. "My favorite dictator," Trump described el-Sisi during his first term. Following the summit in the Saudi city of al-Ula in early 2021, which marked the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, Cairo followed its Arabian partners in quickly restoring relations with Doha. In November 2022, photos of a meeting between el-Sisi, Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the opening ceremony of the FIFA World Cup in Doha circulated around the Arab world. This trilateral meeting marked the starting point for the normalization of relations between Cairo and Ankara. Regarding relations with Israel, el-Sisi continued the unpopular rapprochement, openly praising the success of the Egyptian-Israeli peace model. EgyptAir's national carrier began flying to Tel Aviv under its official livery, rather than under the brand of its subsidiary Air Sinai, as it had previously. However, the national carrier's direct flights to Israel were suspended in October 2023 amid the escalation between Israel and the Palestinian movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the energy sector, Egypt is actively purchasing natural gas from Israel's Leviathan field offshore the Mediterranean. Consolidation of power by al-Sisi In terms of domestic policy, el-Sisi has managed to significantly consolidate power in recent years. In 2019, Egypt held a referendum on constitutional amendments allowing el-Sisi to remain in power until 2030. el-Sisi has positioned himself as a leader who successfully confronts domestic and external challenges. Under his leadership, major national projects have been implemented, including the expansion of the Suez Canal, the construction of a new administrative capital, and the country's first nuclear power plant. Following the purge of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, Egyptian authorities have moved to tighten control over the most influential media outlets. Recent years have seen the rise of the media holding company United Media Services, which is believed to be affiliated with the General Intelligence Service. Founded in 2016, the company has now grown into one of the largest media giants in the Arab world, encompassing over 40 subsidiaries, including approximately 15 television channels. Economic challenges Post-revolutionary Egypt faced several economic challenges amid political instability and a deteriorating security situation. To secure new IMF loan tranches, el-Sisi implemented a series of unpopular measures that Mubarak had resisted, including a gradual increase in fuel and electricity prices. In 2024, a decision was made to quadruple the price of even subsidized bread, a staple food for the poor. Given the importance of subsidized flatbread in the diet of the poor, Egyptian authorities had resisted raising the price for three decades, which stood at just five piastres (about 0.1 cents at the current exchange rate). However, even constant IMF tranches and financial assistance from the Gulf monarchies failed to help Egypt avoid a deep economic crisis amid declining tourism revenues, a population explosion, and a high degree of dependence on external factors. Following the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip in October 2023, the economic situation was exacerbated by regular shelling of ships in the Red Sea by Yemeni Houthis, which led to a more than halving of Suez Canal revenues. According to Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati, Egypt's total losses from shelling of ships in the Red Sea as of October 2025 amounted to $9 billion. Amid constant political and economic turmoil, the Egyptian pound was gradually devalued from 5.6 pounds per dollar in 2010 to 47 pounds per dollar by early 2026. At its peak, the US currency exceeded 50 pounds per dollar. The discovery of new large gas fields (particularly the Zohr field offshore the Mediterranean) allowed Egypt to increase its liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports to 3.5 million tons by 2019. However, amid a population explosion and growing local consumption, this positive effect quickly faded, and by 2023, Egypt had abandoned gas exports during the peak summer season and transitioned to a model that combines exports and imports depending on seasonality. In advance of peak consumption during the hot summer season, in early 2026, Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding to purchase 24 LNG cargoes from Qatar. Despite significant challenges, a significant influx of investment from Gulf countries (particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia) is helping to keep the Egyptian economy afloat. Qatar has also steadily increased investment in the Egyptian economy in recent years. The main sources of income for the Egyptian economy are exports, tourism, the Suez Canal, and remittances from Egyptians abroad. According to the World Bank, Egypt consistently ranks among the top ten countries in the world by this last indicator. And according to the Central Bank of Egypt, in the first 11 months of 2025, Egyptians transferred $37.5 billion to their homeland, a 42.5% increase compared to the same period in 2024. According to the World Bank, Egypt has demonstrated steady economic growth year after year, measured by nominal GDP, which amounted to approximately $389 billion by the end of 2024. The country consistently ranks among the fifty largest economies in the world. Based on GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP), the picture looks even more optimistic — Egypt is among the world's twenty largest economies. However, constant natural population growth negates the potential positive impact of economic growth on well-being. Per capita GDP by the end of 2024 was only approximately $3,300 (158th place in the world). Social inequality remains a separate and acute socioeconomic challenge for Egypt. According to official data, 29% of Egyptians live below the poverty line. Meanwhile, according to the international consulting firm Henley & Partners, Egypt is home to 14,800 dollar millionaires, 49 individuals with a net worth exceeding $100 million, and 7 billionaires. Given the discrepancy between macroeconomic indicators and per capita well-being, demographics pose a distinct challenge for Egypt. Thus, Egypt's population grew from 91 million in 2011 to 118 million in 2025 (13th in the world and first among Arab countries), posing a serious challenge to social infrastructure, healthcare, education, and the labor market. However, according to the Ministry of Health, a slight slowdown in population growth and a decline in the fertility rate from 3.5 children per woman in 2014 to 2.41 in 2024 are expected recently. External challenges In terms of security, Egypt remains hostage to a number of destabilizing external factors, such as hotbeds of tension along virtually its entire border amid the de facto split of Libya and Sudan, as well as dubious prospects for sustainable peace in the Gaza Strip. In developing its foreign policy stance in the region, Egypt is forced to perform diplomatic feats, balancing its own interests with the often-conflicting interests of key partners in the Gulf and the United States. However, it should be acknowledged that Trump's ceasefire initiative in Gaza allowed Cairo to strengthen its status as a key mediator in the Middle East at the Sharm El Sheikh Peace Summit last November, where Trump, el-Sisi, Al Thani, and Erdogan signed a peace agreement on the Gaza Strip. A separate and serious external challenge for Egypt remains the Blue Nile Renaissance Dam, commissioned by Ethiopia, which threatens to deplete the country's water resources. However, abundant rainfall in Africa in recent years has mitigated this issue and even led to floods in Sudan in 2025. *** The main outcome of the 15 years since the Egyptian revolution of 2011 is the restoration of a political system in which the army and security forces act as the de facto guarantors of statehood. Egypt has demonstrated a high level of political resilience compared to other countries engulfed by the events of the Arab Spring, such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In the economic and security spheres, Egypt remains vulnerable to external factors that directly impact Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and foreign investment. Despite steady nominal GDP growth, the past 15 years have not led to an improvement in the overall well-being of the population. However, Egypt has succeeded in developing infrastructure and new cities, as well as in implementing major national projects such as the new administrative capital and the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant, which could become drivers of economic growth and further development in the medium term. The declining birth rate creates the preconditions for eliminating the imbalance in the ratio of the working-age to non-working-age population, which will also contribute to balanced growth in the long term. In the absence of major internal and external shocks, Egypt can be expected to enter a trajectory of sustainable growth and consolidate its status as a key political and economic player in the region. * The organization was recognized as terrorist in Russia by a decision of the Supreme Court.

In the chilling expanse of the Arctic, where ice and ocean frame the edges of the known world, a geopolitical drama has quietly gathered momentum. The world’s strategic gaze is no longer fixed solely on the traditional theatres of diplomacy in Europe, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the High North — and particularly Greenland, the vast Arctic territory within the Kingdom of Denmark — has emerged as a critical arena where great-power competition, national security priorities, global trade dynamics, and climate change converge. This transformation did not occur overnight. For decades, military planners, geographers, and strategic thinkers recognized the Arctic’s latent importance. Yet only in recent years have those projections translated into urgent geopolitical reality. At the center of this shift stands the United States’ National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), unveiled in late 2025, which redefines American priorities in a world shaped by renewed great-power rivalry. While the strategy addresses multiple global theatres, its emphasis on territorial security, critical resources, strategic geography, and adversarial competition underscores why Greenland has moved from the periphery to the heart of international geopolitics. Greenland today sits at the intersection of U.S. homeland defense, NATO cohesion, Arctic militarization, global trade transformation, and the accelerating race for critical minerals. The tensions surrounding the island reveal not only disputes among allies but also deeper structural changes in the international system. This article argues that Greenland is no longer a remote outpost but a strategic fulcrum of the Arctic, whose future will shape the balance of power in the High North and beyond. In addition, it analyses the geopolitical and strategical concerns from the US over Greenland. America’s Strategic Recalibration in the 2025 National Security Strategy The NSS 2025 marks a clear departure from post-Cold War doctrines centered on expansive multilateralism and global institution-building. Instead, it reflects a return to strategic realism, prioritizing the protection of core national interests, territorial security, and the prevention of adversarial dominance in critical regions. The strategy defines the United States’ primary objective as “the continued survival and safety of the United States as an independent, sovereign republic,” coupled with maintaining decisive military, technological, and economic power. Although the Indo-Pacific remains central, the strategy elevates the Western Hemisphere and adjacent strategic regions, emphasizing the need to prevent hostile encroachment on areas vital to U.S. security and economic resilience. Supply chains, critical minerals, missile defense, and strategic geography feature prominently throughout the document. Within this framework, Greenland has transitioned from a peripheral Arctic territory to a linchpin of U.S. strategic defense and resource security. While the NSS does not outline a standalone Arctic doctrine, its underlying logic — securing access to essential materials, protecting strategic approaches to the homeland, and denying adversaries positional advantages — aligns directly with the intensifying focus on Greenland. Latest developments: US position over Greenland. As already mentioned, the release of the NSS 2025 made one thing clear: US foreign policy is now defined by an assertive approach towards the entire Western Hemisphere – where Greenland is part of –. Moreover, this implies that the US might claim the right to intervene in other countries’ domestic affairs in order to guarantee its strategic and corporate interests. Therefore, after Venezuela – in addition to its rhetoric towards Cuba and Mexico – Greenland has become a hot topic, due its geopolitical, economical and strategical position and of course as part of the US “national security” and interest. In early 2026, Greenland became the unlikely epicenter of a high-stakes geopolitical drama. The U.S., under President Donald Trump, signaled an unprecedented level of interest in the island, framing it as a critical node in Arctic security, homeland defense, and global strategic competition. The announcement of a “framework of a future deal” at the World Economic Forum in Davos marked the peak of months of tension, including the president’s prior rhetoric suggesting military action to assert U.S. control — a prospect that sent shockwaves across Europe and NATO. The pathway to this framework was turbulent. Earlier proposals from the Trump administration, dating back to his first term, had openly floated buying Greenland, citing both security imperatives and access to mineral wealth. While these overtures were dismissed by Denmark and Greenland, they set the stage for heightened U.S. scrutiny. Diplomatic meetings in January 2026, including a contentious session in Washington on January 14, ended with what officials described as a “fundamental disagreement” over sovereignty. By January 18, European allies and Denmark had issued a joint statement affirming that Greenlandic sovereignty belongs exclusively to the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland itself, while NATO and Danish troops deployed to the island to reassure Arctic security through “Operation Arctic Endurance.” Against this backdrop, Trump’s Davos announcement of a “framework” was simultaneously dramatic and deliberately vague. He described it as a long-term, “infinite” agreement designed to guarantee U.S. strategic goals, including the potential deployment of advanced missile defense systems—the so-called “Golden Dome”—and enhanced NATO involvement. The framework reportedly also aims to prevent Russian and Chinese investments in Greenland and may include increased U.S. access to the island’s mineral resources, though Greenlandic and Danish officials have made clear that no sovereignty transfer is under consideration. Crucially, no formal document has yet been produced, leaving many details unconfirmed and heightening uncertainty among allies. Greenland’s Geographic Centrality: The broader US security interest of the Island. Figure 1: Arctic states, counties and other administrative regions with capitals. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Credit for the border data: Runfola, D. et al. (2020) geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0231866. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231866e. Figure 2: Arctic Population Centers. Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. When viewed from a polar perspective, the Arctic is not a distant fringe but the shortest connective space between North America, Europe, and Eurasia. The Arctic as seen in Figure 1 is composed of several administrative areas, including Canada, Alaska (USA), Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Greenland (Denmark). The latter can be said to be located at the center between North America and Europe and Eurasia, underscoring its geopolitical importance. In other words, Greenland occupies the central Atlantic–Arctic axis, the shortest air and missile trajectories between Russia and North America and a pivotal position between the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Russian Arctic coast. This geography carries deep strategic implications and clarifies the logic behind US interest in the island. First, Greenland is part of the so-called GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a crucial corridor and central axis for monitoring naval and air activity in the North Atlantic-Arctic corridor. The GIUK Gap played an important role during the Second World War and the Cold War and nowadays it has become crucial in securing air and sea surveillance through radar stations, while securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) as well as supply lines making them uninterrupted between NATO’s European members and the USA. The GIUK Gap can assist in ensuring maritime visibility and assist anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in case of conflicts. The presence of Russian submarines in the Arctic is a central pillar of Russia’s military strategy and nuclear deterrence, making the region one of the most militarized maritime spaces in the world. Russia views the Arctic as both a strategic sanctuary and a launch platform. In consequence, its Northern Fleet – headquartered on the Kola Peninsula –, is the most powerful of Russia’s fleets and operates a large share of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as the Borei and Delta IV classes. These submarines carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and are designed to remain hidden under Arctic ice, ensuring a second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict. The ice cover, combined with Russia’s familiarity with Arctic waters, provides concealment and operational depth. In addition to SSBNs, Russia deploys nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the Arctic. These vessels conduct intelligence gathering, protect ballistic missile submarines, and pose threats to NATO naval forces and undersea infrastructure, including communication cables. Russian submarines regularly transit through key chokepoints such as the GIUK Gap, bringing them into strategic relevance for Greenland, Iceland, and NATO’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) posture. In addition, the Arctic also supports Russia’s broader bastion defense concept, which seeks to create heavily defended maritime zones where submarines can operate safely. Air defenses, surface ships, icebreakers, and coastal missile systems complement submarine operations. As climate change reduces sea ice and increases accessibility, Russian submarine activity in the Arctic is expected to remain intense, reinforcing the region’s importance for NATO surveillance, early warning systems, and transatlantic security — especially for locations like Greenland that sit astride critical Arctic–Atlantic routes. Second, Greenland’s high latitude makes it an ideal place for early detection of long-range missile launches. Russia has long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), if ever launched from Russia toward the United States, the total flight time would be roughly between 25 to 35 minutes – depending on the launch location and target. But because of the Earth’s curvature, the shortest path from Russia to the continental US goes over the Arctic which is why Greenland is so strategically important for early detection and missile-warning defense. In practical terms, US decision-makers would have only minutes to assess the threat and respond after a launch is detected, therefore Greenland is critical for US security. Establishments such as the U.S. Pituffik Space Base underscore how Greenland functions as a first line of surveillance against possible ballistic missile threats from the Eurasian landmass. Therefore, Greenland is indispensable to early-warning and missile-defense systems. Sensors, radars, and space-tracking infrastructure based on the island form a crucial layer of “U.S. homeland defense”. Finally, Greenland is the only large Arctic landmass under Western democratic control outside Eurasia. Russia dominates the Eurasian Arctic coastline, while Alaska and Canada anchor North America. Greenland bridges these spaces, serving as a keystone for transatlantic Arctic security. Its isolation does not diminish its importance; rather, it magnifies it. – making Greenland a linchpin of US homeland defense and NATO’s northern security architecture. Greenland and NATO: The Fragile Architecture of Arctic Security Figure 3: NATO’s and Russia’s militarization in the Arctic. Figure 3 exposes a stark asymmetry in Arctic militarization between NATO and Russia. Moscow maintains a dense, continuous network of military installations stretching from the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait. These bases support air defense, naval operations, missile forces, and surveillance, forming an integrated arc of control along Russia’s northern frontier. NATO’s Arctic posture, by contrast, is structurally different. Rather than territorial saturation, it relies on discrete strategic nodes, interoperability over mass, and coordination among multiple sovereign states. Within this fragmented architecture, Greenland constitutes NATO’s most critical node, functioning as the geographic and operational linchpin between North America and Northern Europe. Without Greenland, NATO’s Arctic posture would fracture into disconnected segments—North America on one side and Scandinavia on the other—with no central anchor to bind the alliance’s northern defenses. The United States already maintains a crucial presence on the island through the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in northwest Greenland. The installation is indispensable for early missile warning, space surveillance, and tracking adversary launches across the polar region. Complementary allied infrastructure, such as the UK’s logistical presence at Camp Viking in Norway, underscores NATO’s node-based approach rather than a strategy of continuous territorial control. It is precisely Greenland’s role as this irreplaceable strategic node that explains the sharp European response in 2025–2026 to U.S. rhetoric suggesting unilateral action or coercive pressure regarding the island. The deployment of European troops under Operation Arctic Endurance was not merely symbolic; it was a clear assertion that Greenland is a collective NATO concern, not a bilateral bargaining chip between Washington and Copenhagen. In this sense, the military logic of Arctic defense translated directly into alliance politics. Yet the episode also revealed the limits of U.S. power when confronting established allies. Danish and Greenlandic officials consistently emphasized that sovereignty constituted a non-negotiable “red line.” Greenland’s Prime Minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, framed the issue not as a local dispute but as one of global order, stressing that Greenland would align with Denmark, the EU, and NATO while retaining full control over its territory. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reinforced this position by confirming enhanced cooperation while deliberately refraining from endorsing any transfer of sovereignty—an illustration of the alliance’s careful balancing act between accommodating U.S. strategic priorities and preserving the credibility of its member states. When viewed in this broader context, the episode appears less as an attempt at dramatic territorial acquisition and more as an effort to formalize and modestly expand pre-existing arrangements. The 1951 U.S.–Denmark agreement already permitted permanent U.S. military presence, exclusive jurisdiction over defense areas, and broad operational freedom at installations such as Pituffik. The proposed framework likely reinforced these rights while adding provisions for expanded NATO participation and strategic safeguards against Russian or Chinese influence. From Washington’s perspective, the episode allowed the appearance of a strategic victory, even as sovereignty and political control remained firmly with Greenland and Denmark. Analytically, the Greenland case illustrates a central tension in contemporary U.S. foreign policy: the interplay between assertive unilateralism and the constraints of alliance politics. By elevating Greenland into a symbol of hemispheric and Arctic security, the United States signaled its willingness to test diplomatic norms using both the rhetoric of necessity and instruments of coercion, including threatened tariffs. Yet the ultimate outcome—an unratified verbal framework reinforcing existing agreements—demonstrates the limits of coercion within a multilateral system. In this sense, Greenland has become a lens through which to observe the evolving dynamics of great-power competition, alliance management, and Arctic geopolitics. Its strategic geography, resource potential, and political status converge to make the island central to 21st-century security calculations. The resulting “framework of a future deal” represents not a victory of acquisition but a negotiation of influence—one that codifies U.S. ambitions while respecting allied sovereignty, subtly reshaping the contours of Arctic security and transatlantic relations. Greenland’s Resources: Strategic Minerals in a Fragmenting World Beyond military geography, Greenland’s subsoil wealth significantly enhances its geopolitical importance. The island holds substantial deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), lithium, graphite, niobium, titanium, uranium and zinc. As it is well known these strategic materials are indispensable and critical for renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, advanced electronics, missile guidance and radar technologies and space and defense infrastructure. Last but not least there is also oil and gas, but the conditions and viability to extract them make them an economic challenge. In the context of the control of natural resources, the NSS 2025 repeatedly stresses the need to reduce U.S. dependence on adversarial supply chains — an implicit reference to China’s dominance in rare-earth processing. Therefore, US eyes are on Greenland, as it represents one of the few politically aligned alternatives with large-scale potential reserves – ironically not under Chinese or Russian influence, but under US “allies” control. Yet resource abundance does not automatically translate into strategic advantage. Mining in Greenland faces severe challenges: extreme climate conditions, environmental risks, limited infrastructure, and strong local opposition to environmentally destructive projects. As a result, Greenland’s mineral wealth is strategically valuable but politically sensitive. Its development requires local consent and long-term cooperation, not coercion — a fact often overlooked in external strategic calculations. The Arctic Trade Revolution: Melting Ice, Shifting Routes Figure 4: Arctic Seaways (Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage and Transpolar Sea Route). Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Climate change is transforming the Arctic faster than any other region on Earth. As sea ice recedes, new maritime routes are becoming seasonally viable, with potentially transformative consequences for global trade. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Arctic coast already reduces transit times between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, even though some parts are free of ice for some months per year. On the other hand, a future transpolar route, cutting directly across the Arctic Ocean, could bypass traditional chokepoints such as: The Suez Canal, The Panama Canal or The Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Greenland importance relies on its geographic position that places it adjacent to these emerging corridors. Potential roles for the island include: the search-and-rescue hubs, refueling and logistics points, maritime surveillance and communications infrastructure. This elevates Greenland from a military asset to a potential gatekeeper of future Arctic trade, linking regional security directly to global economic flows. Icebreakers and Power Projection: Mobility as Sovereignty Figure 5: Major Icebreakers and Ice-Capable Patrol Ships highlight a decisive but underappreciated imbalance. Source: generated with Chat GPT using Routers Nov 2022 data. The transit in the Arctic can be defined by the possibility to move freely without any inconvenience due its extreme conditions – or at least with the least inconveniences. In consequence major ice breakers and ice-capable patrol ships became very important assets for the countries in the region. In a simple comparison, Russia possesses more icebreakers than NATO combined, as shown in Figure 5, including nuclear-powered vessels capable of year-round Arctic operations. These ships are instruments of sovereignty, enabling continuous military presence, escort of commercial shipping, enforcement of Arctic regulations and rapid crisis responses. By contrast, the United States has long underinvested in icebreaking capacity. NATO relies on a patchwork of national fleets, with Finland and Sweden contributing significantly but still lagging behind Russia’s scale. The strategic implication is clear: Russia controls mobility while NATO controls nodes. In such an environment, fixed strategic anchors like Greenland become even more critical. Competing Arctic Visions Russia Russia views the Arctic as a core strategic and economic priority, central to its national identity, security, and long-term development. Its Arctic vision emphasizes sovereignty, military security, and the exploitation of vast natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons and minerals. Moscow sees the Northern Sea Route as a critical shipping corridor that can enhance Russia’s control over Arctic navigation and generate economic revenues. To support this vision, Russia has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, icebreaker fleets, and military modernization, positioning itself as the dominant Arctic power and framing the region as vital to its great-power status. The Arctic is not an extension of Russian power; it is central to it. Figure 6: Cargo volume in Russia’s Northern Sea Route (1933-2023) China China approaches the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” framing its vision around scientific research, economic opportunity, and global governance. Beijing emphasizes participation in Arctic affairs through international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and promotes cooperation rather than territorial claims. Its strategy emphasizes long-term access to resources, influence over Arctic governance norms, and participation in future trade routes. Its concept of a “Polar Silk Road” reflects an interest in future shipping routes, energy projects, and digital connectivity, linking the Arctic to China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative. Even though China presents its Arctic engagement as peaceful and mutually beneficial, while gradually expanding its strategic and economic footprint in the region, it also has interest in Greenland’s mining sector, for example, which has heightened concerns about strategic leverage rather than direct control. Figure 7: Map of China’s Polar Silk Road. Source: Map by Arto Vitikka, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. United States The U.S. approach, as reflected in the NSS 2025, is reactive but intensifying. Greenland crystallizes American concerns about strategic vulnerability, supply-chain dependence, and alliance credibility. Yet pressure tactics risk undermining the very alliances that make Arctic stability possible. The United States views the Arctic as an increasingly important region for national security, environmental stewardship, and economic opportunities. At the same time, it recognizes the strategic implications of growing Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Arctic States The European Arctic states emphasize sustainability, human security, and regional cooperation as the foundation of their Arctic vision. Their policies prioritize environmental protection, responsible resource management, and the rights and livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, while balancing economic development in sectors such as fisheries, renewable energy, and limited resource extraction. These states strongly support multilateral governance through institutions like the Arctic Council and stress adherence to international law. Collectively, they view the Arctic as a region where stability, cooperation, and climate leadership are essential, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and accelerating environmental change. Canada Canada’s Arctic vision centers on sovereignty, Indigenous partnership, and sustainable development, reflecting the region’s importance to national identity and security. Ottawa emphasizes the protection of its northern territories and views the Northwest Passage as internal waters, while supporting a rules-based Arctic order. A core pillar of Canada’s approach is its collaboration with Indigenous peoples, recognizing their rights, knowledge, and role in governance and stewardship. Canada also prioritizes climate change adaptation, environmental protection, and responsible economic development, seeking to ensure that increased Arctic activity benefits northern communities while maintaining peace and stability in the region. India India’s Arctic vision is primarily science-driven and climate-focused, reflecting its broader emphasis on environmental security and multilateral cooperation. Through its Arctic research station, Himadri, and active participation in the Arctic Council as an observer, India seeks to understand the Arctic’s impact on global climate systems, particularly the Indian monsoon. New Delhi also recognizes the long-term economic and geopolitical significance of the Arctic but approaches the region cautiously, prioritizing sustainable development, international collaboration, and respect for Arctic states’ sovereignty. Strategic Futures: Cooperation or Fragmentation The future of Greenland and the Arctic more broadly will hinge on whether the region evolves toward structured cooperation or strategic fragmentation. In a cooperative scenario, Greenland becomes a stabilizing anchor within a renewed Arctic security framework, where the United States, Denmark, and NATO align their defense priorities with Greenlandic self-determination and environmental safeguards. Such an approach would emphasize multilateral governance, transparency in resource development, confidence-building military measures, and shared investment in infrastructure, search-and-rescue capabilities, and climate resilience. Cooperation would not eliminate competition, particularly with Russia and China, but it would establish rules, norms, and mechanisms to prevent escalation and miscalculation in an increasingly accessible Arctic. By contrast, a fragmented Arctic would be characterized by unilateral actions, coercive diplomacy, and the erosion of trust among allies. Pressure tactics aimed at securing access, influence, or control over Greenland could weaken NATO cohesion, fuel local resistance, and open political space for external actors to exploit divisions. In such a scenario, the Arctic risks becoming a patchwork of contested zones rather than a managed strategic commons. Therefore, fragmentation would increase the likelihood of militarization without coordination, resource development without legitimacy, and crisis dynamics without effective communication channels — conditions that historically precede instability rather than security. Conclusion Greenland’s elevation from a peripheral Arctic territory to a central object of U.S. strategic concern reflects a deeper transformation in American national security thinking. Under the logic of the National Security Strategy 2025, geography has reasserted itself as a core determinant of power. Greenland matters to Washington not because of symbolic territorial ambition, but because it sits at the intersection of missile warning, homeland defense, transatlantic security and critical resource resilience and control. From early-warning radars at Pituffik to the GIUK Gap’s role in anti-submarine warfare, the island functions as a forward shield for the United States rather than a distant outpost. In this sense, U.S. interest in Greenland is less about expansion and more about insulation — protecting the American homeland in an era of compressed warning times and renewed great-power rivalry. At the same time, the Greenland episode exposes the limits of unilateralism in a system still structured by alliances and sovereignty norms. While Washington’s strategic rationale is compelling, its use of coercive rhetoric and pressure tactics toward Denmark and Greenland revealed a misalignment between U.S. security imperatives and alliance diplomacy. The backlash from European allies and the reaffirmation of Greenlandic sovereignty demonstrated that even overwhelming military and economic power cannot easily override the political legitimacy of allied states. Ultimately, the United States secured no new sovereignty, only the likely reinforcement of pre-existing military arrangements — underscoring that influence in the Arctic must be negotiated, not imposed. From a U.S. perspective, Greenland thus represents both a strategic necessity and a diplomatic constraint. The island is indispensable to missile defense, space surveillance, and Arctic access, yet it remains politically autonomous and embedded within a NATO framework that demands consultation and restraint. This dual reality forces Washington to reconcile its desire for strategic certainty with the realities of alliance management. The “framework of a future deal” reflects this compromise: a mechanism to safeguard U.S. security interests while formally respecting Danish and Greenlandic control. The outcome illustrates that American power in the Arctic is real, but conditional — strongest when exercised through institutions rather than outside them. Looking ahead, Greenland will remain a focal point of U.S. Arctic strategy not because of dramatic territorial ambitions, but because it is irreplaceable. No alternative location offers the same combination of geographic centrality, political alignment, and strategic utility. As missile technologies advance, Arctic routes open, and resource competition intensifies, Greenland’s role in U.S. security planning will only grow. Yet the lesson of recent tensions is clear: securing Greenland’s strategic value requires partnership, legitimacy, and long-term engagement rather than pressure. In the final analysis, Greenland is not only a measure of American power, but a barometer of the Arctic’s future political order. The island sits at the intersection of U.S. homeland defense, European security, and the growing assertiveness of Russia in the High North, while also remaining a point of interest for external actors such as China or India. Europe views Greenland primarily as a stabilizing pillar within a rules-based Arctic governed through NATO coordination, international law, and multilateral institutions. Russia, by contrast, treats the Arctic as a strategic rear area and military bastion, where control, mobility, and deterrence dominate its vision of regional order. The United States is thus navigating between these competing logics — seeking to secure its own vital interests without fracturing alliance cohesion or accelerating Arctic militarization. Whether Greenland becomes a cornerstone of cooperative security or a flashpoint of strategic rivalry will depend less on geography, which is fixed, and more on political choices. In this sense, Greenland encapsulates the broader Arctic dilemma: a region where power, restraint, and cooperation must coexist if stability in the High North is to be preserved. Also, it is important to highlight Greenland’s voice – referring to sovereignty and identity. Usually under great-power maneuvering, Greenland’s own population has often been sidelined. Yet Greenland is not merely an object of strategy; it is a political community with a strong Indigenous identity, environmental concerns, and aspirations for greater autonomy. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind its constitutional status within the Kingdom of Denmark, their principle of self-determination and the political costs of alienating local consent. Alienating local consent would not only undermine legitimacy, but also weaken the long-term sustainability of any security arrangement. Finally, the Arctic transformation is no longer a distant projection but an unfolding reality. Climate change is accelerating the opening of Arctic Sea routes, reshaping patterns of trade, mobility, and access, and in doing so redefining how sovereignty and power are exercised in the High North. In this emerging environment, traditional markers of security such as missile defense and military presence will increasingly coexist with less conventional—but equally strategic—assets, including icebreakers, critical minerals, infrastructure, and regulatory authority over maritime corridors. The future balance of power in the Arctic will therefore depend not only on geography or military capability, but on the ability of states and alliances to adapt to a rapidly changing region where environmental transformation, economic opportunity, and strategic competition intersect. How the United States, its allies, and other Arctic stakeholders respond to this transformation will shape whether the Arctic evolves as a space of managed cooperation or intensifying rivalry. References Agneman, G. (2025, February 04). Trump wants Greenland – but here’s what the people of Greenland want. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/trump-wants-greenland-but-heres-what-the-people-of-greenland-want-248745 Aljazeera. (2026, January 15). European troops arrive in Greenland as talks with US hit wall over future. Retrieved from Aljazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/15/european-troops-arrive-in-greenland-as-talks-with-us-hit-wall-over-future Aljazeera. (2026, January 18). Trump announces new tariffs over Greenland: How have allies responded? Retrieved from Aljazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/18/trump-announces-new-tariffs-over-greenland-how-have-eu-allies-responded Arctic Centre University of Lapland. (n.d.). Arctic Region. Retrieved from https://arcticcentre.org/en/arctic-region/maps/polar-silk-road/ Bassets, M. (2026, Enero 11). “Por las buenas o por las malas”: así puede Trump conquistar Groenlandia. Retrieved from El País: https://elpais.com/internacional/2026-01-10/por-las-buenas-o-por-las-malas-asi-puede-trump-conquistar-groenlandia.html Bateman, T. (2026, January 14). Danish minister says 'fundamental disagreement' remains after 'frank' Greenland talks with US. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cn824zzp670t BBC News. (2026, January 21). Trump drops threat of tariffs over Greenland after Nato talks in Davos. Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cjrzjqg8dlwt Bierman, P. (2025, February 19). Greenland’s melting ice and landslide-prone fjords make the oil and minerals Trump is eyeing dangerous to extract. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/greenlands-melting-ice-and-landslide-prone-fjords-make-the-oil-and-minerals-trump-is-eyeing-dangerous-to-extract-249985 Bierman, P. (2025, February 19). Greenland’s melting ice and landslide-prone fjords make the oil and minerals Trump is eyeing dangerous to extract. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/greenlands-melting-ice-and-landslide-prone-fjords-make-the-oil-and-minerals-trump-is-eyeing-dangerous-to-extract-249985 Bierman, P. (2026, January 14). US military has a long history in Greenland, from mining during WWII to a nuclear-powered Army base built into the ice. Retrieved from The Conversatiion: https://theconversation.com/us-military-has-a-long-history-in-greenland-from-mining-during-wwii-to-a-nuclear-powered-army-base-built-into-the-ice-273355 Bonsoms, J. (2025, Dececmber 16). ‘Extreme melting’ episodes are accelerating ice loss in the Arctic. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/extreme-melting-episodes-are-accelerating-ice-loss-in-the-arctic-272114 Brincat, S. (2026, January 18). Trump has threatened European countries with higher tariffs if he doesn’t get Greenland. Will it work? Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/trump-has-threatened-european-countries-with-higher-tariffs-if-he-doesnt-get-greenland-will-it-work-273698 Brincat, S., & Naranjo Cáceres, J. Z. (2026, January 07). Trump wants Greenland. Europe’s tepid response is putting NATO and global security at risk. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/trump-wants-greenland-europes-tepid-response-is-putting-nato-and-global-security-at-risk-272819 Brooks, J. (2026, January 20). Pro-Greenland protesters mock Trump’s MAGA slogan with ‘Make America Go Away’ caps. Retrieved from AP: https://apnews.com/article/denmark-greenland-maga-trump-protest-cd1213dd73e9ea1e4da43285704c95ea Bryant, M., & Sabbagh, D. (2026, January 15). Greenland's defence is 'common concern' for Nato, Danish PM says as European troops fly in. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/15/greenland-defence-nato-denmark-prime-minister-european-troops Burrows, E., Ciobanu, C., & Niemann, D. (2026, January 16). European troops arrive in Greenland as talks with US highlight 'disagreement' over island's future. Retrieved from AP: https://apnews.com/article/greenland-united-states-denmark-trump-vance-rubio-meeting-b10f5151008f1f18a788dc0751473c0e CNN. (2026, January 21). Trump says he’s formed a ‘framework of a future deal’ on Greenland. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-administration-news-01-21-26 Davies, M. (2026, January 19). Starmer holds phone call with Trump over Greenland tariff threat. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyn90l1dneo Dodds, K. (2026, January 09). As the Arctic warms up, the race to control the region is growing ever hotter. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/as-the-arctic-warms-up-the-race-to-control-the-region-is-growing-ever-hotter-273118 Dunbar, M. (2026, January 18). Trump's calls to seize Greenland ignite fresh criticism from Republican party. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/18/trump-greenland-republican-party FitzGerald, J. (2026, January 19). Why does Trump want Greenland and what could it mean for Nato? Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c74x4m71pmjo Fleck, A. (2025, January 24). NATO’s and Russia’s Militarization of the Arctic. Retrieved from statista: https://www.statista.com/chart/33824/military-bases-in-the-arctic-belonging-to-nato-and-russia/?srsltid=AfmBOoqwc5PmGe6_JB6mYjQSP9pr9fIZE_LcEtMOo_rtnCD86zMcQpwn Gjedssø Bertelsen, R. (2025). Divided Arctic in a Divided World Order. Strategic Analysis, 48(Issue 6: Changing Dynamics in the Arctic: Actors and Alliances), 568-577. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2025.2453322 Government Offices of Sweden. (2026, January 18). Statement by Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Retrieved from Government Offices of Sweden: https://www.government.se/statements/2026/01/statement-by-denmark-finland-france-germany-the-netherlands-norway-sweden-and-the-united-kingdom/ Grillo, F. (2026, January 08). As the US eyes Greenland, Europe must turn a global problem into an opportunity. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/as-the-us-eyes-greenland-europe-must-turn-a-global-problem-into-an-opportunity-272872 Gupta, P. (2024, September 18). Understanding the potential of the Northern Sea Route. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/understanding-the-potential-of-the-northern-sea-route Harvey, L. (2026, January 16). European nations send additional troops to Greenland as US annexation threats escalate. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/15/world/europe-troops-greenland-trump-nato-intl-hnk Hastings Dunn MBE, D., Webber, M., & Wolff, S. (2026, January 07). US action against Greenland would undermine Nato, but now is not the time to panic. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/us-action-against-greenland-would-undermine-nato-but-now-is-not-the-time-to-panic-272911 Holland, S., Mason, J., & Erickson, B. (2026, January 07). Trump discussing how to acquire Greenland, US military always an option, White House says. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-advisers-discussing-options-acquiring-greenland-us-military-is-always-an-2026-01-06/ huaxia. (2026, January 19). China urges U.S. to stop using so-called "China threat" as pretext for pursuing selfish gains. Retrieved from Xinhua: https://english.news.cn/20260119/57899ee8d43345ddbfa222828ec1d0a4/c.html Jakes, L., Tankersley, J., & Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2026, January 22). Trump Touts Greenland Framework as NATO Mulls U.S. Sovereignty Over Bases. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/01/21/us/trump-davos-greenland-news Karjee, M. (2025, August 20). Russia’s Arctic Corridor: Between Ice and Isolation. Retrieved from E-International Relations: https://www.e-ir.info/2025/08/20/russias-arctic-corridor-between-ice-and-isolation/ Katila, A. (2026, January 15). As US and Denmark fight, Greenland’s voices are being excluded once again. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/as-us-and-denmark-fight-greenlands-voices-are-being-excluded-once-again-273131 Kennedy-Pipe, C. (2026, January 14). Whether or not US acquires Greenland, the island will be at the centre of a massive military build-up in the Arctic. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/whether-or-not-us-acquires-greenland-the-island-will-be-at-the-centre-of-a-massive-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-273301 Khanna, M. (2025, March 19). China and the Arctic: An Overview. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-and-the-arctic-an-overview Kirby, P. (2026, January 16). European military personnel arrive in Greenland as Trump says US needs island. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd0ydjvxpejo Kotak, S. (2025, September 08). Leveraging India’s Arctic Observer Status: Scientific Diplomacy as a Lever for Climate, Resource and Security Advancement. Retrieved from World & New World Journal: https://worldandnewworld.com/india-arctic-observer-status/ Kottasová, I., & Edwards, C. (2026, Enero 19). Trump le dice a Noruega que ya no se siente obligado a "pensar únicamente en la paz" en carta sobre el Nobel y Groenlandia. Retrieved from CNN Español: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/19/eeuu/trump-paz-noruega-nobel-reux Kumar, A., & Haldar, S. (2024, October 2024). An evolving partnership in the Arctic between China and Russia. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/an-evolving-partnership-in-the-arctic-between-china-and-russia L. Montgomery, S. (2026, January 14). 4 reasons why the US might want to buy Greenland – if it were for sale, which it isn’t. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/4-reasons-why-the-us-might-want-to-buy-greenland-if-it-were-for-sale-which-it-isnt-246955 Lebowitz, M. (2026, January 18). Treasury secretary defends Greenland tariffs: 'The national emergency is avoiding the national emergency'. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/treasury-secretary-bessent-tariffs-national-emergency-greenland-eu-rcna254650 Levison, J., & Russell, L. (2026, January 19). Why Trump says the US 'needs' Greenland - and what the fallout could be. Retrieved from Sky news: https://news.sky.com/story/why-trump-says-the-us-needs-greenland-and-what-the-fallout-could-be-13285350 Lubold, G., Kube, C., Williams, A., & Alba, M. (2026, January 14). Buying Greenland could cost as much as $700 billion. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/buying-greenland-cost-much-700-billion-rcna253921 Manners, I. (2026, January 09). Four ways to understand what’s going on with the US, Denmark and Greenland. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/four-ways-to-understand-whats-going-on-with-the-us-denmark-and-greenland-272873 Nicholas, P., & Smith, A. (2026, January 20). Trump won't say whether he would use force to seize Greenland. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/trump-greenland-use-of-force-nobel-norway-europe-tariffs-ukraine-rcna254786 Passi, R. (2018, February 21). One belt, one road, and now one circle. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/one-belt-one-road-and-now-one-circle Paul, J. (2026, January 08). Greenland is rich in natural resources – a geologist explains why. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/greenland-is-rich-in-natural-resources-a-geologist-explains-why-273022 Reuters. (2021, July 16). Greenland ends unsuccessful 50-year bid to produce oil. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/greenland-puts-an-end-unsuccessful-oil-adventure-2021-07-16/#:~:text=Naaja%20Nathanielsen%2C%20Greenland's%20minister%20of,profits%20or%20make%20a%20loss Rønberg, N., Gjerding Nielson, E., & Haugaard, M. (2026, January 06). Kampen om Grønlands fremtid. Retrieved from Nyheder: https://nyheder.tv2.dk/live/2025-01-06-kampen-om-groenlands-fremtid/over-200-soldater-i-groenland-lige-nu?entry=c342b2d3-e01d-4f60-b1dc-8df98fdac85b Sergunin, A., & Konyshev, V. (2025, April 21). The Arctic Great Game: The Need for Cautious Optimism. Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-arctic-great-game-the-need-for-cautious-optimism Sheftalovich, Z., & Jack, V. (2026, January 07). How Trump gets Greenland in 4 easy steps. Retrieved from Politico: https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-greenland-easy-steps-nato-policy-deal-military/ Shetty, K. (2023, June 06). The Northern Sea route: A gamechanger or a road to hegemony? Retrieved from ORF: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-northern-sea-route Slothuus, L. (2026, January 12). Why Greenland’s vast natural resources won’t necessarily translate into huge profits. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/why-greenlands-vast-natural-resources-wont-necessarily-translate-into-huge-profits-273137 Soufi Burridge, T., Gardiner, C., & Pereira, I. (2026, January 16). France, other NATO countries send troops to Greenland for exercises after meeting with Vance and Rubio. Retrieved from ABC News: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/france-nato-countries-send-troops-greenland-exercises-after/story?id=129241103 Talmazan, Y. (2026, January 15). European troops arrive in Greenland as Trump throws another curveball. Retrieved from NBC News: https://www.nbcnews.com/world/greenland/european-troops-arrive-greenland-trump-throws-curveball-rcna254166 Tanno, S., & Waldenberg, S. (2026, Enero 10). Trump dice que Estados Unidos tomará Groenlandia "por las malas" sino puede hacerlo por las buenas. Retrieved from CNN Español: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2026/01/10/eeuu/trump-groenlandia-malas-trax Testoni, M. (2026, January 16). US-Greenland negotiations have hit a wall. Here are three ways the crisis could end. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/us-greenland-negotiations-have-hit-a-wall-here-are-three-ways-the-crisis-could-end-273629 tg24. (2026, January 16). Groenlandia, scattata la missione "Arctic Endurance": cosa sapere. Retrieved from tg24: https://tg24.sky.it/mondo/2026/01/16/groenlandia-arctic-endurance-esercitazione-militare Bertrand, N., Liptak, K., Atwood, K., & Sclutto, J. (2026, January 23). No written document memorializes the future deal framework for Greenland, sources say. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/22/politics/future-deal-framework-greenland Blake, A. (2026, January 23). Trump’s Greenland framework sounds a lot like an already existing 1951 deal. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/22/politics/us-greenland-framework-1951-deal Curtis, J., & Stefano, F. (2026, January 23). President Trump and Greenland: Frequently asked questions. Retrieved from House of Commons Library: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10472/ Kola, P. (2026, January 23). What we know about Trump's 'framework of future deal' over Greenland. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c86vvjxe9z7o Meredith, S. (2026, January 28). Greenland will not give in, PM says, as Denmark warns world order as we know it is over. Retrieved from CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/28/greenland-trump-nato-denmark-security-defense.html The White House. (2025, November). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Retrieved from The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Background (Venezuelan Presidential Crisis [2019–2023] and the 2024 Presidential Elections) Between 2019 and 2023, Venezuela experienced a political crisis centered on the legitimacy of the country’s presidency, stemming from “irregular” elections that declared Nicolás Maduro the winner. As a result, the Fourth Legislature of the Venezuelan National Assembly — controlled by the opposition — declared Maduro a usurper of the presidency and appointed Juan Guaidó as interim president under Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution (León, 2019). Subsequently, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice declared the National Assembly unconstitutional (BBC News Mundo, 2019), as well as Guaidó’s appointment, thereby triggering a political crisis that would persist until 2023. During this period, Maduro and Guaidó governed in parallel. Guaidó’s government was recognized by the United States, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and several European countries and international organizations, while Maduro’s government was recognized by Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, and South Africa, among others. Countries such as Mexico, New Zealand, India, and Indonesia remained neutral. Figure 1: Countries recognizing Guaidó’s presidential legitimacy as of February 8, 2019, during the peak year of international recognition for Guaidó. Black: Venezuela; Grey: Neutral; White: No official position; Dark green: Recognizes Guaidó; Bright green: Supports the opposition National Assembly; Red: Recognizes Maduro. By Jose001aef23 – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=76054258 Figure 2: Recognition of Venezuela’s president in 2023. Black: Venezuela; Red: Recognition of Maduro; Dark blue: Recognition of Guaidó; Light blue: Support for the Fourth National Assembly; Grey: Explicitly neutral. By ZiaLater – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=75890028 The crisis lasted for nearly four years and was marked by economic sanctions, social unrest, widespread public dissatisfaction, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a dialogue between opposition parties and the Maduro government that ultimately culminated in the signing of the Barbados Agreement. In the end, Guaidó’s interim government — despite enjoying broader international backing — failed to achieve its initially stated objectives, and the National Assembly formally dissolved it in January 2023. The Barbados Agreement (International Crisis Group, 2023) — signed in 2023 between the Venezuelan government and the opposition with the aim of guaranteeing electoral safeguards and political rights, as well as protecting national interests — paved the way for presidential elections held on July 28, 2024. However, both the outcome of the elections and the way they were conducted gave rise to allegations of irregularities and electoral fraud (Infobae, 2024; Singer, 2024; Gómez Forero, 2024; Diario Las Américas, 2024). According to the National Electoral Council (CNE), Maduro won the election with 51.95%, while Edmundo González received 43.18%. By contrast, the opposition platform Comando Con Venezuela (CCV) released results claiming González won with 67.05%, compared to 30.49% for Maduro. It is important to note that González ran as the opposition candidate after María Corina Machado, an opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was barred from participating in the election. Figure 3: Comparison of the 2024 presidential election results according to the CNE and the CCV. Source: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_presidenciales_de_Venezuela_de_2024#cite_note-:19-27 As of now, Maduro remains in power in Venezuela. González, meanwhile, is exiled in Spain and has been recognized as the winner or president-elect by Argentina, Costa Rica, Italy, Ecuador, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Israel, among others. Relations with the United States (Suspension of Relations and Current Situation) Diplomatic relations between the United States and Venezuela have steadily deteriorated since Hugo Chávez — who governed Venezuela with an anti-imperialist and socialist discourse — was president. From Chávez’s tenure through the 2019 presidential crisis, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Venezuela, and bilateral relations experienced periodic fluctuations. However, beginning in 2019, relations worsened significantly, culminating in a formal rupture initiated by Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro severed diplomatic ties with the United States after Donald Trump, during his first term, recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president (CNBC, 2019). Although the National Assembly later dissolved the interim government, the United States did not recognize Maduro. At present, relations between the two countries are critical. With Trump’s return to the White House, the already minimal level of interaction has shifted toward threats, warnings, and displays of power, including a military deployment described by Trump as “the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America” (Maher & Liptak, 2025). This escalation has been justified — or framed — by the Trump administration as part of an effort to protect U.S. citizens from drug flows originating in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. As part of its broader campaign against drug trafficking, Trump has also designated certain organized crime groups as terrorist organizations (The White House, 2025). Among these newly designated groups — relevant to this analysis—are the Tren de Aragua gang (Knickmeyer, 2025) and the Cartel of the Suns (Cártel de los Soles) (Wells & Blasey, 2025; InSight Crime, 2025). Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have accused Nicolás Maduro of being the leader of the Cartel of the Suns (Savage, 2025). The U.S. Department of State has even offered a reward of up to $50 million for information leading to Maduro’s arrest (U.S. Department of State, 2025). Maduro, for his part, has denied all such accusations and alleged ties. Tensions in the Caribbean The threats and actions carried out in recent months between the United States and Venezuela have culminated in an unprecedented U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean Sea. The United States has mobilized up to 15,000 troops in the region, in addition to reinforcements and personnel stationed in Puerto Rico. The arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford alongside the USS Iwo Jima, as well as warships, destroyers, submarines, fighter jets, bombers, helicopters, drones, and other military assets, has further reinforced the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea (Ellis, U.S. Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team, 2025). Alongside this military buildup, the United States launched Operation Southern Spear, aimed at deterring Venezuela and targeting alleged drug-trafficking speedboats in international waters. From the start of these attacks in early September through December 16, 2025, 25 attacks had been recorded, resulting in at least 95 deaths (Muñoz Morillo, 2025). The U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean has been supported by Trinidad and Tobago. The United States and Trinidad and Tobago have conducted joint training exercises and military drills in the region over recent months (Infobae, 2025), and Trinidad and Tobago has also agreed to allow U.S. military aircraft to transit through its airports (Rios, 2025). Venezuela responded by suspending a joint gas agreement and declaring Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, persona non grata (DW News, 2025). For its part, Venezuela has mobilized approximately 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militia members in large-scale exercises and has deployed 5,000 Igla missiles (Sliwinski, 2025). The Venezuelan government has also urged preparations for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and social destabilization to render the country ungovernable (Reuters, 2025) — a strategy that may be viewed as the most effective response given the asymmetry between the two sides. Maduro further warned that Venezuela would not become the “Gaza of South America”, while proclaiming a message of “peace, life, and love — no to hatred, no to war” (Swissinfo.ch, 2025). Maduro has likewise turned to international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as regional bodies including CELAC and ALBA, to denounce the escalation of tensions in the region. He has even called for Colombian military support in light of the critical situation in the Caribbean (El Colombiano, 2025). However, recent polarization in Latin America has been reflected in the responses. Lula (Brazil) and Petro (Colombia) have applied the strongest pressure regarding regional destabilization, while Mexico, maintaining an ambiguous neutrality, has taken a more cautious stance, emphasizing sovereignty and self-determination. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago have aligned with the U.S. position (Rivas Molina, Galarraga Gortázar, Marcial Pérez, & Esteban Lewin, 2025). Finally, outside the region, Russia (OIR-MPPCI Cojedes, 2025) — one of the main suppliers of arms and military equipment to the Bolivarian National Armed Forces — along with Iran (Sputnik, 2025) and China (Revista Economía, 2025), all allies of Venezuela, have expressed various forms of support for the South American country, though their rhetoric has focused primarily on concerns over what the U.S. military deployment and harassment could trigger in the region. War Speculation and the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine All of the above brings together the necessary elements to consider the possibility of an invasion or a declaration of war by the United States against Venezuela, and such possibilities clearly exist. However, there are key factors that, for now, would prevent the outbreak of a new war. Regardless of the logistical difficulties involved in a large-scale invasion, the United States lacks a clear casus belli to declare war. Moreover, U.S. domestic politics — particularly the opposition — are not fully convinced that an invasion would be the best course of action. Nonetheless, Trump has shaped and carried out a series of political maneuvers, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and more recently a total oil blockade (BBC News, 2025), aimed at paving the way for a potential invasion or declaration of war, though so far without success. It is important to note that most of these actions — whether justified or not — such as the designation of cartels as terrorist groups, extrajudicial attacks in international waters against alleged drug-trafficking vessels, the military deployment in the Caribbean, and the seizure of a sanctioned oil tanker (BBC News, 2025), primarily generate heightened expectations of an impending war. In addition, on December 2, 2025, the U.S. government published its National Security Strategy (The White House, 2025). Without delving into details and for the purposes of this article, the strategy seeks to maintain the United States as a global power — while acknowledging the rise of China — and to consolidate U.S. dominance over the “Western Hemisphere” by controlling the American continent, establishing a supremacy-based relationship with aligned European countries, and ensuring that neither the European Union nor any other bloc emerges as an alternative center of power (González Posso, 2025). Rare Earths, Oil, and a Possible Regime Change in Venezuela? At this point, the reasons behind the escalation of tensions between Venezuela and the United States may not appear entirely clear, although they are hardly surprising and can be understood considering the divergent worldviews held by both countries. This sequence of events — fraudulent elections, military deployments, sanctions, and economic blockades — has gradually breathed new life into a pre-existing rupture that had previously remained stagnant. However, as is often the case, there is always a broader underlying context that tends to be overlooked. Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, estimated at around 300 billion barrels, representing approximately 18% of global reserves. It also possesses substantial natural gas reserves and deposits of more than 40 types of minerals and precious stones, including iron, bauxite (aluminum), coal, gold, coltan, diamonds, nickel, zinc, and rare earth elements, among others (Blanco, Rey S., Romero, Rosendo, & Berroterán). No less significant, Venezuela ranks seventh among the world’s 17 megadiverse countries, hosting roughly 9% of global flora and fauna (Álvarez Bernard, 2022). In addition, Venezuela holds the tenth-largest freshwater reserves globally — approximately 1,233 km³ — and contains an extensive network of rivers and lakes, which are essential for agricultural and livestock activities, supported by fertile soils, as well as for electricity generation and hydroelectric power (Montoya, n.d.). Given Venezuela’s natural resource potential, it is unsurprising that the United States has sought to “recover all the oil, land, and other assets that they previously stole from us,” as Trump wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social (Trump, 2025). Trump’s remark refers to the nationalization of oil projects carried out by Hugo Chávez in 2007, which affected major U.S. oil companies ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil (Al Jazeera Staff, 2025). As for a possible regime change in Venezuela, all remains speculative. Maduro continues to hold onto power, or at least presents an image of firmness before the cameras. At the same time, speculation about a potential war or invasion places him in a precarious position, fueling rumors and theories about resignation or exile. What is clear, however, is that U.S. pressure on the Venezuelan government is real. Although Maduro and Trump held a phone call in late November in search of a diplomatic off-ramp, the demands of both sides prevented any agreement. Prior to that call, in September, Maduro sent a letter to Trump seeking to “preserve peace through dialogue” (TRT Español, 2025). One month later, according to The New York Times, Maduro reportedly offered the United States significant participation in Venezuela’s oil fields, while remaining in power — a proposal that displeased U.S. officials and led to the suspension of talks at that time (Haberman & Kurmanaev, 2025). Discussion The situation between Venezuela and the United States is highly significant from a geopolitical perspective. On one hand, the United States appears to be poised and waiting for the green light to launch a potential large-scale invasion. On the other, Maduro, through his characteristic anti-imperialist discourse, is attempting to navigate and prolong the survival of his regime. This is no minor issue. Maduro’s continued hold on power has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency, its numerous irregularities, and even electoral fraud. Nevertheless, the recent escalation of tensions with the United States has worked to his advantage, reinforcing his anti-imperialist rhetoric and strengthening his Bolivarian nationalist narrative. Unfortunately, these recent developments are more likely to further suffocate the Venezuelan population than to consolidate Maduro’s position. Regardless of the underlying causes, Venezuelans have endured years of hardship, and toying with the prospect of war is far from sensible — a reality Maduro himself has implicitly acknowledged by attempting to de-escalate tensions by any available means. However, whether driven by ambition, ideology, or sheer will to power, the simplest exit — stepping down from office — does not appear to be, nor is it likely to become, part of his plans. Thus, while Maduro projects strength domestically and repeatedly calls for peace and rejects war at public rallies, he is experiencing a level of strain whose sustainability remains uncertain. The external pressure exerted by the United States — both diplomatic and in the form of a total economic blockade — is likely, sooner or later, to yield results for Washington. It is important to recall that Venezuela has survived in recent years largely due to oil revenues. With a total blockade focused on that asset, Venezuela’s economic situation would deteriorate further, with potentially severe social and political consequences. In short, the near-term outlook is far from optimistic. As for the United States, it appears ironic and contradictory that Trump — a figure who has boasted of having “ended” seven wars and portrayed himself as a staunch advocate of peace — is now demonstrating the opposite in the Caribbean by deploying the largest naval force seen in the region in years. One could argue that a war has not yet begun and may never materialize, but the very nature of these actions and their consequences cast doubt on his credibility, not to mention the attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels in international waters. It is understandable that the deployment of the U.S. naval forces in the region may be intended as an “extreme” form of diplomatic pressure. However, this does not justify — in terms of international relations, even if it might within the framework of U.S. foreign policy — the interference in and violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. Even more concerning is that the very rhetoric so often condemned by Maduro has long been one of the primary tools used by the United States to maintain its influence and intervention in the region since the last century. Nevertheless, the erosion of this approach in the medium and long term could prove costly for the United States. At this stage, as can be observed, drug trafficking and the economic and social crisis have been relegated to the background; they function merely as pretexts. What is truly at stake are national — or personal — interests, influence, and power in a world where the more one possesses, the better. This dynamic is clearly illustrated by the recent support Venezuela has received from Russia and China, which has been largely rhetorical rather than material (Paredes, 2025), in contrast to earlier instances when their backing was direct and tangible. The current situation, although complex, could have been avoided, as its underlying causes have been developing for several years. However, it would be irresponsible to take sides. One cannot defend an “illegitimate government,” nor align with a state that has consistently undermined the sovereignty of others in pursuit of its national interests — an approach that is even explicitly embedded in its national security strategy. International condemnation should be directed at both parties, and while diplomacy should prevail, this case is ironically contradictory, as both actors have operated outside international norms. Against this backdrop, multiple questions arise: What will ultimately happen? Will Maduro step down and negotiate a “democratic” transition? Will the United States invade Venezuela and succeed in overthrowing the Maduro regime? How long will the economic blockade and attacks on alleged drug-trafficking vessels continue? What role will Venezuelan society play, and will the opposition be able to capitalize on this moment? What role will other countries in the region truly assume? Many questions remain unanswered, and the coming weeks are likely to bring significant developments. References Al Jazeera Staff. (17 de December de 2025). Trump aide Stephen Miller suggests Venezuelan oil belongs to US. Obtenido de Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/17/trump-aide-stephen-miller-suggests-venezuelan-oil-belongs-to-us Álvarez Bernard, D. (21 de Enero de 2022). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Ecología Verde: https://ecologiaverde.elperiodico.com/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela-3609.html BBC News. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Fuerzas de EE.UU. interceptan y confiscan un buque petrolero sancionado frente a las costas de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c14vp73mk16o BBC News. (17 de Diciembre de 2025). Trump ordena el bloqueo "total y completo" de todos los petroleros sancionados que entren y salgan de Venezuela. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cx2p45d0g2xo BBC News Mundo. (21 de Enero de 2019). El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela declara "inconstitucional" a la Asamblea Nacional y anula el nombramiento de Juan Guaidó como su presidente. Obtenido de BBC News Mundo: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46952641 Blanco, Á., Rey S., S., Romero, D. E., Rosendo, M., & Berroterán, Z. (s.f.). Influencia de la distribución de los recursos naturales en el desarrollo regional de Venezuela. Universidad Central de Venezuela. Facultad de Humanidades y Educación. Escuela de Geografía., 118. CNBC. (24 de January de 2019). Maduro says Venezuela is breaking relations with US, gives American diplomats 72 hours to leave country. Obtenido de CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/venezuela-president-maduro-breaks-relations-with-us-gives-american-diplomats-72-hours-to-leave-country.html Diario Las Américas. (10 de Agosto de 2024). ONG señala que el CNE omitió tres auditorías post electorales en Venezuela. Obtenido de Diario Las Américas: https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/ong-senala-que-el-cne-omitio-tres-auditorias-post-electorales-venezuela-n5361569 El Colombiano. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). Régimen de Maduro lanza llamado desesperado a Colombia en busca de apoyo militar ante tensión con EE. UU. Obtenido de El Colombiano: https://www.elcolombiano.com/internacional/maduro-pide-ayuda-militar-colombia-tension-ee-uu-EN31879278 Ellis, E., US Army War College, & The Conversation Digital Storytelling Team. (26 de November de 2025). We've tracked the US military build-up in the Caribbean. Here's what it could do. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://stories.theconversation.com/tracking-the-us-military-in-the-caribbean/ Gómez Forero, C. (30 de Julio de 2024). ¿Por qué ver estos decimales ayudaría a hablar de un fraude en Venezuela? Obtenido de El Espectador: https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/elecciones-venezuela-2024/por-que-ver-estos-decimales-nos-ayudaria-a-hablar-de-un-fraude-en-venezuela/?outputType=amp González Posso, C. (7 de Diciembre de 2025). Corolario Trump a la doctrina Monroe: I take west – O la paz por la fuerza –. Obtenido de Indepaz: https://indepaz.org.co/corolario-trump-a-la-doctrina-monroe-i-take-west-o-la-paz-por-la-fuerza/ Haberman, M., & Kurmanaev, A. (2025 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y Maduro hablaron por teléfono la semana pasada. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/28/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-maduro-llamada-venezuela.html Infobae. (30 de Julio de 2024). El burdo cálculo matemático en la información oficial que aumenta las sospechas sobre la manipulación de la elección en Venezuela. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/30/el-burdo-calculo-matematico-en-la-informacion-oficial-que-aumenta-las-sospechas-sobre-la-manipulacion-de-la-eleccion-en-venezuela/ Infobae. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago aprobó el uso de sus aeropuertos por aviones militares de Estados Unidos para combatir el narcotráfico. Obtenido de Infobae: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2025/12/15/trinidad-y-tobago-aprobo-el-uso-de-sus-aeropuertos-por-aviones-militares-de-estados-unidos-para-combatir-el-narcotrafico/ InSight Crime. (22 de September de 2025). Cartel of the Suns. Obtenido de InSight Crime: https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile/ International Crisis Group. (20 de Octubre de 2023). Pacto en Barbados: la ruta sinuosa de Venezuela hacia comicios competitivos. Obtenido de International Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/es/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/barbados-deal-sets-venezuela-rocky-path-competitive-polls Knickmeyer, E. (19 de February de 2025). PBS News. Obtenido de Trump administration designates 8 Latin American cartels as ‘foreign terrorist organizations’: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-designates-8-latin-american-cartels-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations León, I. (11 de Enero de 2019). Efecto Cocuyo. Obtenido de Prensa de la AN rectifica comunicado que proclama a Juan Guaidó Presidente de la República: https://web.archive.org/web/20190702155934/http://efectococuyo.com/principales/prensa-de-la-an-rectifica-comunicado-que-proclama-a-juan-guaido-presidente-de-la-republica/ Maher, K., & Liptak, K. (17 de December de 2025). Trump orders ‘total and complete blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers coming to and leaving Venezuela. Obtenido de CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/16/politics/blockade-venezuela-sanctioned-oil-tankers#:~:text=%E2%80%9CVenezuela%20is%20completely%20surrounded%20by,%2C%E2%80%9D%20Trump%20said%20Tuesday%20night. Montoya, J. D. (s.f.). Recursos naturales de Venezuela. Obtenido de Desarrollo Sustentable: https://www.desarrollosustentable.co/recursos-naturales-de-venezuela/#:~:text=Biodiversidad:%20recursos%20animales%20y%20plantas%20de%20Venezuela,-Aves%20de%20Venezuela&text=Venezuela%20es%20un%20pa%C3%ADs%20con,el%20ave%20nacional%20del%20pa%C3%ADs. Muñoz Morillo, M. (16 de Diciembre de 2025). Un nuevo ataque de EE.UU. contra 3 narcolanchas deja 8 muertos en el Pacífico. Obtenido de Euro News: https://es.euronews.com/2025/12/16/un-nuevo-ataque-de-eeuu-contra-3-narcolanchas-deja-8-muertos-en-el-pacifico Noticias DW. (25 de Noviembre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago anuncia ejercicios militares con EE. UU. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/trinidad-y-tobago-anuncia-nuevos-ejercicios-militares-con-estados-unidos/a-74755359 OIR-MPPCI COJEDES. (10 de Diciembre de 2025). Rusia considera “especialmente preocupante” tensión en el Caribe. Obtenido de Ciudad Cojedes: https://ciudadcojedes.com/rusia-considera-especialmente-preocupante-tension-en-el-caribe/ Paredes, N. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Por qué China y Rusia parecen haber abandonado a Nicolás Maduro en plena escalada con EE.UU. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cj97rxlw8zro República Bolivariana de Venezuela. (30 de Diciembre de 1999). Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Obtenido de https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/constitucion_venezuela.pdf Reuters. (12 de November de 2025). Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. Obtenido de Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ Revista Economía. (5 de Noviembre de 2025). China defiende su alianza con Venezuela y critica la presión militar de EE.UU. en el Caribe. Obtenido de Revista Economía: https://www.revistaeconomia.com/china-defiende-su-alianza-con-venezuela-y-critica-la-presion-militar-de-ee-uu-en-el-caribe/ Rios, M. (15 de Diciembrre de 2025). Trinidad y Tobago permitirá el tránsito de aviones militares de EE.UU. por sus aeropuertos; Venezuela toma medidas. Obtenido de CNN Latinoamérica: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/12/15/latinoamerica/trinidad-y-tobago-transito-de-aviones-militares-eeuu-trax Rivas Molina, F., Galarraga Gortázar, N., Marcial Pérez, D., & Estaban Lewin, J. (18 de Diciembre de 2025). América Latina toma partido ante la amenaza de Estados Unidos a Venezuela. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2025-11-30/america-latina-toma-partido-ante-la-amenaza-de-estados-unidos-a-venezuela.html Savage, C. (18 de Noviembre de 2025). Trump y compañía dicen que Maduro lidera un ‘cártel’. Esto es lo que significa. Obtenido de The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2025/11/18/espanol/estados-unidos/trump-cartel-soles-maduro.html Singer, F. (14 de Agosto de 2024). La ONU concluye que las elecciones en Venezuela no cumplieron las medidas “de integridad y transparencia”. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/america/2024-08-14/la-onu-concluye-que-las-elecciones-en-venezuela-no-cumplieron-las-medidas-de-integridad-y-transparencia.html Sliwinski, K. (15 de Diciembre de 2025). El aumento de tensiones en el Caribe: EE.UU. y Venezuela en medio de un complejo regional de seguridad. Obtenido de World & New World Journal: https://worldandnewworld.com/es/eeuu-venezuela-crisis-caribe/ Sputnik. (9 de Diciembre de 2025). Irán expresa su apoyo a Venezuela ante las "provocaciones hostiles" de EEUU. Obtenido de Sputnik: https://noticiaslatam.lat/20251217/mapa-como-avanza-la-operacion-especial-de-rusia-en-ucrania-1126329635.html Swissinfo.ch. (15 de Noviembre de 2025). Maduro dice que Venezuela no será la Gaza de Suramérica en plena tensión con EE.UU. Obtenido de Swissinfo.ch: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/maduro-dice-que-venezuela-no-ser%C3%A1-la-gaza-de-suram%C3%A9rica-en-plena-tensi%C3%B3n-con-ee.uu./90337213 The White House. (20 de January de 2025). Designating Cartels And Other Organizations As Foreign Terrorist Organizations And Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/ The White House. (November de 2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Obtenido de The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf TRT Español. (22 de Septiembre de 2025). Carta de Maduro a Trump invita a "preservar paz con diálogo" y rechaza "fake news" de narcotráfico. Obtenido de TRT Español: https://www.trtespanol.com/article/cdae6966f705 Trump, D. (17 de December de 2025). @realDonaldTrump. Obtenido de Truth Social: https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115731908387416458 US Department of State. (7 de August de 2025). Nicolás Maduro Moros. Narcotics Rewards Program: Wanted. Obtenido de US Department of State: https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros Wells, I., & Blasey, L. (17 de November de 2025). US to designate Venezuela's Cartel de los Soles as terrorists. Obtenido de BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxr3w2464eo

In a 2025 marked by punitive polls, fragmented systems, and democracies under pressure, Latin America confirmed that voting remains an instrument of change, but no longer a guarantee of stability or democratic strengthening. The year ends with a powerful image: a president, a president-elect, and a defeated candidate — with radically different ideas and political visions — showing respect for electoral results, the electoral authority, and one another in Chile. An act that should be ordinary in any democracy became something almost revolutionary. It may seem like a mere formality, but it is not. In a Latin America divided by hate speech and polarized politics, these gestures of institutional courtesy and democratic normality make a difference. An intense electoral cycle shaped 2025. Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras held presidential elections that, in one way or another, redefined the regional political landscape. These were accompanied by numerous legislative elections, local contests, and referendums. Mexico, meanwhile, experimented with the unprecedented popular election of judges and magistrates, a reform meant to democratize the justice system but which, in practice, represented setbacks in electoral governance conditions that once seemed resolved. Holding elections that meet integrity standards is no minor matter at a time when the region is undergoing processes of democratic erosion. The quality of these elections determines whether alternation in power is possible, whether democracy can persist, resist, and remain resilient when facing multiple challenges such as political-criminal violence, citizen fatigue, institutional co-optation, affective polarization, and ideological radicalization. The ballot speaks: five regional patterns An assessment of the 2025 elections reveals five patterns that transcend national borders and illustrate key features of today’s regional political dynamics. First: protest voting has consolidated. From the overwhelming victory of the far right over the left in Chile on December 14 — when José Antonio Kast won 58% of the vote — to President Daniel Noboa’s failed referendum in Ecuador, the dramatic collapse of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, and the governing Libre party’s third-place finish in Honduras, the message has been consistent: voters punish those in power, regardless of ideology. In Bolivia, MAS suffered a dramatic defeat after nearly two decades of dominance. The party of Evo Morales and Luis Arce, which won 75 of 130 seats in 2020, was reduced to just two in the August elections. For the first time, Bolivia held a presidential runoff on October 19, where Rodrigo Paz of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won with 54.5% of the vote. In Honduras, the ruling party’s candidate, Rixi Moncada, placed third, while conservative candidate Nasry “Tito” Asfura of the National Party became president-elect following a highly contentious race marked by external intervention, numerous episodes of political violence, and 24 days of uncertainty before results were finalized. Noboa suffered a devastating defeat in the November 16 referendum: “No” prevailed on all four questions, including rejecting the authorization of foreign military bases (60% voted NO) and rejecting the call for a Constituent Assembly (61% NO). This outcome surprised many, as it came just seven months after Noboa won the presidency with 55.6% of the vote. Interpretations are still developing, but it suggests that citizens are unwilling to grant “blank checks” to their leaders. Second: pragmatism is replacing ideology. Paz’s centrist message of “capitalism for all” in Bolivia, Noboa’s security-focused campaign in Ecuador, and the rejection of ruling parties across the region show that many Latin American voters in 2025 are moving beyond ideological alignment. Voters seem less interested in long-term transformative projects and more in immediate responses to pressing problems: insecurity, economic crises, and corruption. This trend has benefited conservative forces. In Chile, a far-right candidate — openly nostalgic for Pinochet — won for the first time, promising drastic public spending cuts, tough “law and order” policies, opposition to abortion and marriage equality, and aggressive measures against crime and irregular migration. Kast’s victory adds to right-wing governments like Javier Milei in Argentina, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Santiago Peña in Paraguay, and Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic. This new “blue wave” shapes the current political map, though with different tones and levels of radicalization. Third: party fragmentation, divided governments, and minority presidencies. Except in Ecuador, where polarization between correísmo and anticorreísmo shaped both the April presidential election and the November referendum, other countries experienced deep fragmentation. In Bolivia, seven competitive presidential candidacies contended in the first round. In Honduras, three candidates fiercely competed in one of the country’s most tightly contested elections. High fragmentation often produces minority presidents and divided governments. This year, Bolivia and Ecuador joined Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, where presidents govern with weak congressional support. By contrast, two countries have extremely powerful presidents with unified governments: Mexico and El Salvador, where ruling parties hold supermajorities capable of passing constitutional reforms without negotiating with the opposition. Fourth: the hollowing of the political center and the crisis of moderate parties and leaderships. As previously argued with María Esperanza Casullo, “center-and-something” parties (center-left and center-right) have long struggled to attract votes from the middle. Moderate politics seems to lack electoral appeal in Latin America. This declining representative capacity of the political center has created a vacuum often filled by outsiders or new parties claiming to embody fresh demands and alternatives from the margins. This vacuum feeds polarization strategies. Fifth: institutional credibility crisis. With the exception of Chile — where results were announced two hours after polls closed and immediately accepted — electoral processes in Honduras and Ecuador faced serious challenges from political actors who refused to recognize the results. In Ecuador, after the April runoff, Luisa González of the Citizens’ Revolution questioned transparency. In Bolivia, accusations of irregularities persisted throughout the August elections. In Honduras, more than two weeks after the November 30 vote, the presidential result remained undefined. Trust in electoral institutions — the cornerstone of democracy — shows troubling cracks that deepened throughout 2025. Many countries now face governance crises alongside fragmented systems, hate speech, interpersonal and institutional distrust, and extreme polarization. Three lessons for the future This electoral year leaves lessons that will shape regional politics in coming years. First: political-criminal violence conditions democracy. Several elections took place amid criminal violence. Honduras recorded six politically motivated homicides during the campaign, four targeting candidates from the ruling Libre party. The NGO Cristosal documented 67 political violence incidents between September 2024 and November 2025, including assassinations, attacks, threats, and harassment. Ecuador held its referendum under a State of Emergency due to “internal armed conflict,” declared in response to escalating drug-related violence and loss of state control over prisons. Mexico continues to hold elections in violent contexts, particularly at the local level. The “Voting Between Bullets” project by Data Cívica and México Evalúa has documented rising political-criminal violence since 2018, with 2024 being the most violent year yet, especially locally. Second: external influence is redefining electoral sovereignty. U.S. involvement in the Honduran presidential election, as well as in Argentina’s legislative elections weeks earlier, raised alarms about political autonomy in the region. In Ecuador, Noboa actively sought to establish U.S. military bases, a proposal rejected by 60% of voters. This level of foreign intervention — openly supporting candidates, conditioning economic aid, pressuring electoral decisions, or warning of retaliation — sets a dangerous precedent that reshapes the regional political game. External actors become potential “balancers” of competition, creating tilted playing fields. Third: polarization can demobilize voters. Ecuador showed that even amid extreme polarization, voter mobilization is not guaranteed. The moderate vote, which could have tipped the balance in the referendum, simply vanished or dissolved between the two radical positions. This suggests polarization may demobilize sectors that feel unrepresented by either extreme, paradoxically weakening democratic participation. Democracies at risk Despite difficulties, elections are still being held with reasonable levels of integrity. Power alternation occurred in several countries. Most losing candidates — even reluctantly — accepted results. This shows that electoral institutions still retain some strength. However, democratic erosion comes not from the absence of elections, but from those elected through them. It arises from leaders who challenge democracy’s pluralistic foundations. Today’s central dispute is over what “true democracy” means: a system prioritizing rights and institutional checks, or one concentrating power in the name of the “popular will.” This debate cuts across countries as different as Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico. In 2025, Latin American democracies faced multiple threats: low institutional trust, persistent violence, co-opted electoral authorities, vulnerability to external actors, and illiberal governments fostering polarization. Protest voting was one of the year’s most visible patterns, but part of something broader: extreme electoral volatility, where citizens reject governments of any ideology in search of immediate solutions. The challenge for 2026 — when countries like Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil (municipal elections) head to the polls — will be to safeguard electoral autonomy and professionalism, strengthen pluralism, depolarize public life, limit external interference, and continue reinforcing democratic institutions without yielding to narratives that promise order at the expense of hard-won rights.

Amidst US bombs and lies about Venezuelan drug trafficking as a pretext for regime change, the subordinated position of Caribbean states’ economies plays a role in U.S. aggression. It is no exaggeration to say that for over half a millennium, the Caribbean has been a stage for imperial incursions. In the past two months, the US has increased its military presence in the Caribbean Sea, including carrying out an airstrike campaign, while claiming that these operations are necessary to protect US citizens from illicit drug trafficking allegedly occurring off the coast of Venezuela. As of November 15th, the US military has launched eleven deadly air strikes on small boats in Caribbean waters and eleven on South America’s Pacific Coast, killing over eighty people. In these operations, the US Navy also raided a tuna fishing boat, detaining the fisherfolk on board for several hours before releasing them.[1] To date, the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it publicly executed are trafficking drugs. These extrajudicial killings have struck fear into the hearts of millions of ordinary people across the region, especially the fisherfolk who depend upon traversing the sea for their livelihoods. Meanwhile, Caribbean countries have either blatantly come out in support of the imperial violence at their doorsteps or been hesitant to respond. When these attacks began, Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) as well as Guyana expressed enthusiastic support for US militaristic incursions and extrajudicial murders.[2] As tensions escalated, the Guyanese government attempted to backpedal from its original position. However, the T&T Prime Minister, Kamla Persad Bissessar, has maintained a pro-US stance. PM Persad Bissessar is on record saying, “I have no sympathy for traffickers, the US military should kill them all violently.”[3] This position by the T&T government was reiterated even after the US murdered two of its citizens, Chad Joseph and Rishi Samaroo, in these airstrike campaigns. T&T allowed the US warship, USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, to dock in the country’s capital between October 26-30 and for US military agents to “address shared threats like transnational crime and build resilience through training, humanitarian missions, and security efforts” on T&T soil.[4] The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) - the intergovernmental regional organization - has dragged its feet to take a position, waiting a whole month on October 18, to release a presser wherein it reaffirmed the region as a “zone of peace,” with Trinidad and Tobago excepting itself from this stance. The foot dragging is sinister when it is known for a fact that the US propaganda of conducting “anti-narcotics” operations is/are a ruse. These hostile US military aggressions in the Caribbean Sea and on South America’s Pacific Coast are part of a broader US imperial geopolitical strategy aimed at toppling the government of Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro. The aim, as Trump has publicly intimated,[5] is to get the Venezuelan government to grant the US more beneficial access to Venezuela’s resources. One might ask: Why are governments, like Trinidad and Tobago, enabling US imperial terror in the region? And why have CARICOM governments not taken an unequivocal anti-imperialist position? The answer lies in the subordinated position of these states’ economies within the global economy. Caribbean states are historically structured to be neoliberal, pro-imperial, and anti-democratic – while political elites are beholden to enacting external interests. Moreover, internal political dynamics – in terms of racial and class struggles – are also a factor, influencing the timing and intensity of these Caribbean governments’ responses to present US imperial terror. Debunking the Myth of the Venezuela Narco State The first order of business is dispelling the myth that Venezuela is a ‘narco-state.’ US officials have framed the current operations — boat strikes, deployments of destroyers and aircraft — as counter-narcotics efforts designed to stem the flow of illicit drugs from Venezuela to the US. However, the Caribbean route is not among the primary conduits for major volumes of cocaine and methamphetamines into the US. Most trafficking flows of narcotics to the US are overland, through Central America and via Pacific routes.[6] It is no surprise therefore that the US government has not provided any proof of its claims that the people it has extrajudicially murdered in the Caribbean Sea or on South America’s coast are engaged in drug trafficking. Additionally, the scale and nature of force being used are far beyond what traditional interdiction operations require – with the Trump administration claiming that interdiction has not worked, hence deadly air strikes are necessary. In addition to the lack of evidence of a Venezuelan route being key to drug trafficking into the US, there is also no credible proof linking the Maduro government to organized drug trafficking, despite the Trump regime’s claims, which are parroted uncritically by many Caribbean media and politicians. Within the US’s own intelligence establishment, one report explicitly states: “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA [Tren de Agua] and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”[7] The report goes on to say: “Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services view TDA as a security threat and operate against it in ways that make it highly unlikely the two sides would cooperate in a strategic or consistent way.” These facts stand out, especially given the evidentiary long and sordid history of the US’s leading role in drug trafficking in the Americas, and the US as the #1 supplier of weapons to those involved in the global drug trade in the region. The US government’s real motive is to destabilize and topple the Maduro government in Venezuela, in favor of a regime that undermines Venezuela’s sovereignty. Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney and many others remind us that capitalist imperialism depends upon neocolonial puppet governments occupied by a predatory elite who facilitate accumulation by extractivism, dispossession, and exploitation. Positioned to usurp Maduro in Venezuela by imposition and not elections, is 2025 Nobel “Peace” Prize winner, María Corina Machado. Machado is a key US ally, Trump admirer, supporter of Israel and its bombing of Gaza, and an overall admirer of repressive regimes in Latin America – including El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Brazil’s former president, Jair Bolsonaro. Machado has been begging for foreign military intervention in Venezuela to remove the Maduro government while professing that her administration, if granted power through non-electoral means, intends to open up Venezuela’s doors to foreign exploiters. If the current iteration of US imperial antagonism in the region leads to regime change in Venezuela, the US is poised to have control over the resources in the southern Caribbean – namely Guyana and T&T – as well as on the South American Coast: again, namely Guyana and then Venezuela. This will give the US direct control over shipping routes in the region, as it prepares for a wider economic confrontation with China. Hence, these alleged “anti-narcotics” operations which have taken the lives of over eighty Caribbean and South American people, are just a smokescreen for deeper US geopolitical interests. Dependency and the Character of the State Caribbean states are disregarding the lives of the Venezuelan, Latin American, and their own Caribbean populations using external security narratives, largely because there is a true dictatorship of foreign capital in the region. As US Vice-President JD Vance let slip, places like the Caribbean countries were always intended to remain extractive workstations, not autonomous, functioning nations.…at all.[8] T&T, for example, has long been dependent on oil and gas extraction for the bulk of its national income. However, the country has been experiencing a decline in natural gas and crude oil production over the past decade and the country’s liquefaction complex and petrochemical plants producing ammonia, methanol, and other key exports – which depend upon gas input – have been suffering.[9] Combined with the collapse in energy prices in 2014, this situation has produced a decline in foreign exchange inflows and government revenues.[10] With the demand for US dollars far outstripping the supply, T&T is facing one of the most severe foreign exchange crises in the Caribbean, causing uproar across the working, middle, and upper classes of society alike.[11] As such, the T&T government is desperate for the resuscitation of its flailing oil and gas sector. The T&T government spent decades developing a “Dragon” gas deal, where Shell would lead operations that funnel gas located in Venezuelan waters to T&T, where it can be exported as LNG. This deal, considered by the T&T state to be the lifeline that would save the local economy from collapse, has become a weapon in Washington, DC’s arsenal against Venezuela. In the midst of the extra-judicial killings in the region, the US has revoked licenses approving the deal and re-approved them under new terms meant to ensure the involvement and profits of US companies. The continued structural dependency of T&T on foreign capital and imperial markets renders its misleaders susceptible to these coercive measures to ensure that Caribbean states align with US capitalist imperialist policies. Economic coercion is an important part of the context for Kamla Persad Bissessar’s support for imperialism, but her position cannot be traced to this alone. Persad Bissessar and the educated elite and comprador class she represents come out of some of the “best” primary, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions locally and internationally. Are these elites supposed to provide independent, critical thinkers who would decolonize “post” colonial societies? Are they only unwitting agents of imperialism or are they willing participants? From the time of many states' flag independence, foreign interventions have secured for the local Caribbean elites’ (or comprador classes) party longevity and/or political dominance, and/or visas and dual citizenships, and/or the ability to accumulate wealth for themselves by exploiting the people and land within their countries. As Frantz Fanon’s “Wretched of the Earth” and Walter Rodney’s “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” detailed, these elites lack the sort of creativity and vitality to independently develop into an industrial bourgeoisie. They therefore turn to propping up foreign entities and dependent economic relations. Consequently, Caribbean state-making and the establishment of territorial statuses in the context of US and European imperialist capitalism has reproduced institutions that are unresponsive to Caribbean people. Whether through hopes of securing or acquiring foreign investment, or due to rank economic blackmail that threatens foreign investments elites through sanctions and other restrictions – many Caribbean states choose to serve US and Western imperialism as an almost “practical” strategy of economic “stability”. However, such imperial service only guarantees continued underdevelopment and economic beggary. Herein, T&T’s misleadership is positioning the country as a beggar to the US and reinforcing US sanctions on Venezuela, which makes it hard for Venezuela to sell its own oil and gas to states that need it, including T&T. Worse still, the US does not want China to remedy this situation between Venezuela and Trinidad. So not only are some Caribbean leaders and party supporters encouraging naked US imperialism cloaked in the deceptive language and rhetoric of “anti-drug trafficking” and “protecting the region,” they are also upholding a condition of dependency of the region on the US, advancing US attempts to subvert Chinese influence in the region, and in the process supporting direct attacks on states in the region’s right to self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover, local internal racial and class dynamics are also shaping the timing and intensity of Caribbean governments responses to US aggression in the region. In the post-WWII construction of party politics in T&T, middle-class parties carried forward the colonial divisions between the predominantly African and Indian segments of the population that multiracial worker movements had fought so hard to overcome. Kamla Persad Bissessar, as leader of the party popularly known as the one representing “Indian interests,” is advancing and exploiting this racial wedge to garner support for her pro-imperial policies. This party has actively engaged in criminalizing poor African communities as well as Venezuelan migrants, while downplaying the fact that the many poor and marginalized Indians are similarly caught in the net of US imperialism. Persad Bissessar and her party affiliates’ own ideas of “purity” mixed with class notions of entitlement merge with the supremacist foundations of US local and foreign politics. It’s bad enough that a Prime Minister — a lawyer — supports extra-judicial murders in violation of International Law, but how does one align with a political ideology that produced people like Senator James Reed, who, circa 1919, openly dismissed dealing with “a nigger from Liberia, a nigger from Honduras, a nigger from India…each (having) votes equal to that of the great United States.” Before one argues that this was long ago, consider what right-wing political commentator Ann Coulter told Vivek Ramaswamy why she’d never vote for him regardless of how his views match hers. We acknowledge that political leaders, seeking re-election, opt for the path of least resistance which in this case means not offending the mighty United States. But this cannot just be naïveté. It is in this context that Kamla Persad Bissessar has broken with even the basic understanding of what CARICOM is, and is astonishingly peddling the idea that each island seeking its own interest is somehow more progressive than banding together as one bloc! In other words, she and those who support her stance have embraced regional colonial divide-and-conquer tactics. The US has always stood in opposition to a unified body in the region. As then US diplomat Charles Whittaker put it: “A strongly federated West Indies might be detrimental to American interests.” As such, they undermined the West Indian Federation in the 1950s and sabotaged the New International Economic Order throughout the 1970s. The Caribbean misleaders proclaiming disunity as strength subscribe to political ideologies that interlock with a particular brand of politics in the West that has been openly Euro-nationalist and imperialist. Hence, at a time when many resource-rich countries are forming partnerships and alternative trading and security blocs, the political misleaders in the Caribbean calling for further fragmentation should warrant deeper investigation. Media, Political Misleadership, and How the State Weaponizes “Security” It is important to clarify that crime does exist in the Caribbean region, just as it exists elsewhere throughout the world. The size of Caribbean countries are also important to note, because though it is true that the amount of drugs flowing through the Caribbean are low relative to the global drug trade, the little that does pass through is indeed wreaking havoc, given the geographical and population sizes of these countries. The increase in guns and violent crime associated with the global drug trade in places like T&T has become a critical factor affecting everyday life for ordinary people there. This context has enabled the T&T government to justify and legitimate US military aggression in the name of “fighting” the drug trade in the region. Thus, most people cheering on the US military are simply desperate for a sense of safety. However, it is precisely this need for safety that is being weaponized — to increase unsafe conditions as new US-produced military weaponry and technologies become even more commonplace in the region. There is a direct and indirect connection between (geo)political and economic decisions made by successive generations of ruling elites in the Caribbean, and North American narratives of crime, which have – going back to the 19th century in some countries – allowed (and made space for) imperial aggression in the region. Over a number of decades, the United States has taken advantage of crises caused by rising violent crime to pursue its own security interests – even though rises in violent crime in the region is directly linked to US imported and manufactured weapons, and US consumer demands for items that the US state deems “illegal.” To establish and maintain US dominance — and the accompanying cheap labor[12] from the surplus populations which exist in a region notorious for high levels of unemployment and underemployment — the US has deployed constant applications of violence, packaged as maintaining “law and order” in the drive to “progress” and “catch up” with the West. It’s no coincidence that modern policing began in the Caribbean as militarized slave patrols in St Lucia.[13] Then, like now, the purpose is the same: protect wealth from the workers who created it. However, the real effectiveness lay in conditioning the exploited to adopt the values of the elites. To date, Western elite definitions of progress and development for the wider working people in the Caribbean region dominate, even as the dependent status of Caribbean economies make this impossible for the majority of the people in the region. Thus, US reliance on expanding its military apparatus for economic growth is justified through the construction of permanent threats that the US supposedly has to “defend” itself against. Another such narrative, like the need to “promote democracy” in Venezuela, is also within this vein of western imperialist propaganda. The US and western imperialists maintain that Venezuela is not a democracy, despite the presence of robust, active citizen’s assemblies and communes, as well as elections that occur under the presence of election observers – including from the US. Nonetheless, the western imperialist narrative maintains that Venezuela is not democratic and thus their people can be bombed for some purported “greater good.” Meanwhile, these same imperialist narratives call genocidal Israel a democracy deserving of “protection” and “defense,” as it exterminates Palestinians and decimates Palestinian land. This propaganda – not analysis based on any facts – readily frames western imperialism as “defensive,” “pro-security,” and “pro-safety” and those not in line with it as “aggressive” and “undemocratic.”[14] In lockstep with imperialists, local political figures too have long used or encouraged the use of dehumanizing language when discussing criminalized people and communities. When the T&T Prime Minister, Police Commissioner, and other influential authority figures refer to human beings as “carcasses,”[15] “pests,” “fleas” or “cockroaches,” the message sent is that these are not citizens or members of society and therefore, not worthy of certain basic courtesies and legal obligations, including the right to life. When this sort of thinking is widespread, issues of social justice fall by the wayside. Instead, heavy, often murderous attacks on real or alleged drug runners who come from poor, precarious, vulnerable communities become justified while the power brokers, bankers and their institutions[16] that launder money do not get so much as a paper weight dropped on them. Likewise, the local and international media is playing a significant role in the unfolding crisis. Save for a few columnists, the local media has been disgraceful, little more than sycophantic stenographers for egregious narratives coming from Washington. Initially, the local media conducted little to no critical research into the many available sources discrediting[17] false allegations connecting the Maduro administration to drug cartels. They parroted language that criminalized the victims of the attacks without presenting any evidence proving that they were guilty of violating any laws. They were silent on the voluminous literature connecting the CIA and the US military to colonial land and resource grabs that violate international and local laws.[18] They also proliferated the myth that Nicolas Maduro “lost” or “rigged” elections in Venezuela, contrary to information provided by election observers. The lack of critical and independent journalism is a clear dereliction of duty, supporting imperialist narratives and providing cover for extrajudicial murder. Conclusion The neoliberal era shortly after many states’ independence extended the life of bourgeois colonial thought in the Caribbean, interpreting the human “firstly, [as] a figure that is homo economics, and, secondly, a figure that can only operate within the field of white supremacy and capitalism.”[19] In this environment, Caribbean resistance weakened, having to establish itself alongside the intensification of neoliberal processes – foremost amongst them being state repression and militarist aggression supported by the US hegemon – so that Caribbean peoples could be definitively integrated into a Western capitalist system as “bottom labor-exporting economies,” whose labor commodification was masked by discourses on ‘growth’ and ‘development.'[20] It is in analyzing the characteristics of Caribbean states and governance within them – including how they interpret “development” – that helps us to answer why so many states elect to do imperial service: Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) states are fundamentally anti-democratic with no real regard for Caribbean life within them. The T&T government’s deliberate facilitation of US imperial aggression in the region mirrors the position of several African states. The post-genocide Tutsi-dominated regime of Paul Kagame in Rwanda, leveraging its image as a victim of colonialism and genocide, justifies domestic repression of Hutus and expansionist military ventures in neighboring states, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo in close alliance with the United States, France, and Israel. In exchange for U.S. and western military, financial, and political backing, Rwanda facilitates imperial access to Congo’s mineral wealth — coltan, gold, and tin — channeling profits both to Western capital and Rwandan elites. Thus, Rwanda functions as a pro-U.S. imperial proxy, advancing the global system of resource extraction and accumulation on behalf of Western powers. In addition, Rwanda along with a growing list of African states, including Ghana, Eswatini, and South Sudan have accepted the terms of bilateral agreements with the US government to receive people who have been criminalized and deported under the Trump regime’s attack on communities racialized as non-white in the US.[21] By enlisting themselves to be locations for the outsourcing of US racist incarceration policies, they are enabling the geographical expansion of the US military industrial prison complex to more and more corners of the world. These Caribbean and African misleaders will go down in history as active enablers and facilitators of the very imperial greed, oppression, and exploitation that the masses have been resisting since the days of direct colonial domination. Only invigorated mass resistance that takes power away from Caribbean neocolonial (puppet) elites engaged in imperial service can rectify these conditions. Global Africans in the Caribbean and around the world must claim power and reclaim movement histories that fought back against capitalist imperialism. Originally published in Pambazuka News and republished in Black Agenda Report References [1] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/venezuela-says-u-s-warship-raided-a-… [2] https://www.caribbeanlife.com/trinidad-guyana-us-moves-venezuela/ [3] https://newsday.co.tt/2025/09/03/kamla-says-kill-all-traffickers-as-tru… [4] https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/26/world/us-warship-docks-trinidad-venezeul… [5] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/17/trump-maduro-venezuela [6] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2025.ht… [7] https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U1bd-D1PIZg&pp=ygUZIGogZCB2YW5jZSBnbG9i… [9] https://www.finance.gov.tt/2020/03/16/effect-of-the-oil-price-collapse-… [10] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14271.pdf; https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/06/04/Trinidad-and-T…. [11] Chamber of Industry and Commerce 2025; University of the West Indies Campus News 2024. [12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAJgGFtF44A [13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kavkiH9YHag&pp=ygUaanVsaWFuIGdvIHBvbGlj… [14] See, for example, the Trilateral Commission’s “The Crisis of Democracy” in which influential thinkers who shaped US policy complained that decolonising countries were exercising too much democracy, which needed to be contained, leading to the proliferation of NGOs all over the peripheralized world. [15] https://trinidadexpress.com/news/local/kamla-state-resources-won-t-be-wasted/article_5d0c61fd-d633-4dd3-8e3e-6995a454c774.html [16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcpZPGOksp0 [17] https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025NationalDrugThreatA…; https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/32f71f10c36cc482/d9… [18] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/455652.Dark_Alliance; https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/1628-whiteout?srsltid=AfmBOor…; https://www.betterworldbooks.com/product/detail/the-politics-of-heroin-…; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxbW0CCuT7E [19] Bogues, Anthony. 2023. “Sylvia Wynter: Constructing Radical Caribbean Thought.” BIM: Arts for the 21st Century 11(1): 33–41, p.37. [20] Henry, Paget. 2000. “Caribbean Marxism: After the Neoliberal and Linguistic Turns.” In Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy, Africana Thought, New York: Routledge, 221-46, p.228. [21] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/more-african-nations-are-receiving-t…

Abstract This is the first part of an analysis examining the initial perceptions and evolving realities of the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022. Early Western media and political narratives were optimistic about Ukraine’s military resilience and potential victory, highlighting heroic resistance, Western support, and Russian operational failures. However, the reality has been more complex, as Ukraine faced significant challenges, including numerical and equipment inferiority, underfunding, limited combat brigades, and a lack of strategic reserves. Despite these hardships, Ukraine managed to resist Russia’s initial advances, as exemplified by symbolic events such as the defence of Snake Island. The article explores the human and economic costs of the ongoing war. Ukraine requires an estimated $524 billion in reconstruction funding, following a 30% drop in GDP in 2022 and ongoing economic hardships. Western aid has been substantial, exceeding €400 billion, but the conflict’s economic fallout also burdens donor countries, causing inflation and growth slowdowns. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Introduction At the very beginning of the ‘Special Military Operation’ – an invasion of Ukraine by Russia - most academics, policymakers, political leaders, and media pundits were hugely impressed by Ukraine’s initial military response. Most were genuinely of the opinion that Russia was weak, economic sanctions would cripple its economy, President Putin had little to no public support, and that with enormous help from the U.S. as well as most EU Member states, Ukraine would not only resist the attack but ultimately win the war with Russia on its own territory and perhaps even facilitate the government change in Kremlin. Any skeptical views regarding the possible Ukrainian victory were swiftly silenced and dismissed as pro-Putin propaganda or even deliberate disinformation, therefore suggesting that any sceptics are more or less Putin’s agents. Let’s look at some media titles from March 2022 onward (the war started on 24 February, 2022). Overenthusiastic narrative At the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, many initial media reports and analyses were pessimistic, predicting a swift Russian victory based on military disparities. However, by March 2022, as Ukrainian forces demonstrated unexpected resilience — repelling advances on Kyiv and inflicting significant losses on Russian troops—some Western media outlets began publishing more enthusiastic and optimistic pieces about Ukraine's potential to prevail. These often-highlighted Ukrainian morale, Western support, and Russian operational failures. Below, the reader will find several examples from that early period, drawn from a range of sources including news articles and opinion pieces. Admittedly, media coverage of this topic is inherently biased, with Western outlets generally favouring Ukraine's perspective. In contrast, Russian state media promoted the opposite narrative (e.g., RIA Novosti's premature victory declaration on February 28, 2022, which was quickly retracted). One of the events that genuinely inspired the world at the very beginning of the war was the so-called Snake-Island Campaign. Snake Island is a tiny (0.17 km²) Ukrainian outpost in the Black Sea, about 48 km off the coast of Odesa. Despite its size, the island is geostrategically vital: it hosts radar stations, enables missile launches, and controls maritime routes for grain exports from Odesa. Russian control threatened Ukraine's southern coast and Black Sea shipping.[1] On the invasion's first day, the Russian cruiser Moskva (Black Sea Fleet flagship) radioed: "Snake Island, this is a Russian warship. I repeat: put down your arms... or you will be bombed." The 13 Ukrainian border guards replied: "Russian warship, go f… yourself." Russians captured the island via helicopter assault; defenders were taken POW but later exchanged and awarded Ukraine's Hero of Ukraine title. Consequently, legacy media began painting a rather rosy picture of the Ukrainian campaign. Below, the reader will find several examples: - The Atlantic - "Ukraine Is Winning. Don't Let Up Now." (March 28, 2022). This opinion piece by Eliot A. Cohen expressed strong optimism about Ukraine's battlefield performance, crediting heroic resistance and Western aid while critiquing Russia's weaknesses. Key quotes: "Truly magnificent Ukrainian resistance — heroic and clever at once — backed by Western arms and intelligence accounts for much of this." and "If Ukraine prevails, its example will be at least a partial deterrent to further adventures by Russia, and perhaps by China." The article urged continued support to secure a Ukrainian victory. [2] - The Washington Post - "Ukraine-Russia talks stir optimism, but West urges caution" (March 29, 2022). This news report highlighted positive developments from peace talks in Istanbul, where Russia pledged to reduce military operations around Kyiv, fostering hope for a resolution favourable to Ukraine. It noted enthusiasm around Ukraine's proposals for neutrality with security guarantees, though tempered by skepticism. A key optimistic element: The talks "stirred a glimmer of hope" amid Ukraine's successful defence, with Ukrainian negotiators pushing for international backing to end the conflict on terms that preserved sovereignty. [3] - Associated Press (AP) - "Russia says it will cut back operations near Ukraine capital" (March 29, 2022). This wire report conveyed optimism following Russia's announcement of scaling back assaults on Kyiv and Chernihiv, interpreting it as a sign of Ukrainian leverage in negotiations. Key quote: "Russia announced Tuesday it will significantly scale back military operations near Ukraine’s capital and a northern city, as the outlines of a possible deal to end the grinding war came into view at the latest round of talks." It portrayed this as a potential turning point, with Ukraine's delegation outlining a framework for neutrality backed by guarantor nations.[4] - Deutsche Welle (DW) - "Ukrainians have won the information war" (March 7, 2022). While primarily focused on the information domain, this article by historian Margaret MacMillan extended optimism to the broader conflict, arguing that Ukraine's narrative success bolstered its military position. Key quote: "The Ukrainians have won the information war... This is helping them win support around the world, which in turn is translating into real help on the ground." It emphasized global sympathy, fuelling aid that could tip the scales toward Ukrainian victory.[5] - In a rather absurd tone, the Polish media reported that a Kiev female resident destroyed a Russian military drone with a jar of pickles when enjoying a cigarette on her balcony.[6] Reality on the ground was somewhat different, however. In fact, as Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, rightly observed, before the invasion by Russia, the Armed Forces of Ukraine faced several significant challenges: 1. Numerical and Equipment Inferiority: As of the end of 2021, the Russian army was about five times larger than the Ukrainian army, with four times more tanks and armoured combat vehicles, 3.4 times more artillery, and 4.5 times more attack helicopters. The Ukrainian Navy was notably weaker, lacking aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes, or submarines.[7] 2. Underfunding and Stagnation: Despite politicians declaring that more than 5% of GDP was allocated to security and defence, less than half of the allocated budget went to the Ministry of Defence. There was no increase in funding for developing and procuring weapons and equipment, with most money going to financial support for the military personnel. This led to stagnation, with a lack of finances for development and combat readiness, personnel outflow, and understaffed military units. 3. Limited Combat Brigades: At the time of appointment of the author as Commander-in-Chief in August 2021, there were only 24 combat brigades in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with 12 already engaged in combat in the East and South. Only 12 combat brigades remained available for deployment in the event of aggression. 4. Insufficient Modern Weapons: Ukraine had very few modern weapons compared to Russia. The total need for funds to repel aggression, including replenishing missile and ammunition stocks, was estimated at hundreds of billions of hryvnias, which the Armed Forces did not have. 5. Lack of Strategic Reserves and Preparedness: The Armed Forces were unable to create sufficient strategic reserves, which are crucial in a strategy of defeat. Ukraine was significantly inferior in personnel, weapons, and military equipment, and lacked the preparation to meet the scale of the impending invasion. These challenges left Ukraine vulnerable and enabled Russia to pursue a strategy of defeat through swift, decisive military action. Reality on the ground – how much has the war cost so far? Russia's invasion has imposed staggering financial burdens on Ukraine and its Western allies through December 2025. Available reports evaluate these costs, encompassing direct damages, economic contractions, and international aid expenditures, drawing from economic assessments and aid trackers. Ukraine has endured profound economic devastation. According to the World Bank's February 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, the country requires an estimated $524 billion for reconstruction over the next decade, reflecting cumulative physical damages from infrastructure destruction, housing losses, and disrupted industries.[8]     Source: UKRAINE FOURTH RAPID DAMAGE RDNA4 AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT. (2025, February). World Bank Group. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022025114040022/pdf/P180174-ca39eccd-ea67-4bd8-b537-ff73a675a0a8.pdf The war has apparently obliterated key sectors: agriculture, energy, and manufacturing suffered massively, with export routes like Black Sea ports blocked, leading to a 30% GDP contraction in 2022 alone. By mid-2025, Ukraine's GDP remained 25-30% below pre-war levels, with annual losses projected at $40-50 billion due to reduced output and trade.[9] Military expenditures have surged, consuming over 50% of the national budget, totalling around $100 billion since 2022, funded partly through domestic borrowing and inflation, which peaked at 26% in 2022. [10] Humanitarian costs, including the displacement of 6 million refugees and internal migrants, add billions in social support.[11] Overall, projections estimate Ukraine's total war-related economic harm at $2.4 trillion by 2025, though this likely understates indirect effects like human capital loss and environmental damage.[12] Western nations, primarily the United States and European Union members, have shouldered high costs through aid and indirect economic repercussions. Total bilateral aid from Western donors exceeded €400 billion ($430 billion) by June 2025, including military, financial, and humanitarian support.[13] The U.S. has committed $175 billion in appropriations, with $130.6 billion spent by August 2025, including $66.9 billion in military assistance like weapons and training.[14] EU institutions and member states provided nearly $197 billion, encompassing $63.2 billion from EU budgets and refugee support for 8 million arrivals.[15] The UK itself pledged £12.8 billion, with £7.8 billion for the military.[16] Beyond aid, the war triggered economic shocks in the West. Energy prices soared due to sanctions on Russian oil and gas, contributing to EU inflation averaging 8-10% in 2022-2023 and to a 0.5-1% reduction in annual GDP growth.[17] The U.S. faced similar inflationary pressures, with global growth slowing to 3.1% in 2022, partly from supply disruptions.[18] Proximity to the conflict amplified costs for Eastern EU states, with cumulative GDP shortfalls estimated at €200-300 billion across Europe by 2025.[19] All in all, the war's financial toll surpasses $3 trillion combined for Ukraine and its supporters, straining budgets and exacerbating global inequalities.[20] Sustained aid is vital for Ukraine's resilience, but escalating costs underscore the need for diplomatic resolutions to mitigate further economic fallout. To be continued… References [1] Colibășanu, A., Crowther, A., Hickman, J., & Scutaru, G. (2022, September 27). The Strategic Importance of Snake Island. CEPA. https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-strategic-importance-of-snake-island/ [2] Cohen, E. A. (2022, March 28). Don’t Let Up Now. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/west-strategy-against-russia-ukraine-war/629387/ [3] Fahim, K., Stern, D. L., Lamothe, D., & Khurshudyan, I. (2022, March 29). Don’t Let Up Now. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/29/ukraine-russia-turkey-negotiations/ [4] Jones, T. (2022, March 30). Optimism, pessimism or skepticism? News outlets focus on the right thing in Russia-Ukraine coverage. Poynter. https://www.poynter.org/commentary/2022/optimism-pessimism-or-skepticism-news-outlets-focus-on-the-right-thing-in-russia-ukraine-coverage/ [5] Haas, B. (2022, March 7). Ukrainians have won the information war. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainians-have-won-the-information-war-historian-margaret-macmillan/a-61022603 [6] Wawrzusiszyn, D. (2022, March 8). To były pomidory, a nie ogórki. Znaleziono Ukrainkę, która strąciła drona słoikiem. Na:Temat. https://natemat.pl/400859,znaleziono-ukrainke-ktora-stracila-drona-sloikiem-z-ogorkami [7] Zaluzhnyi, V. (2025, November 29). Politics and War. Reality vs Expectations. LIGA.Net. https://www.liga.net/en/politics/opinion/politics-and-war-reality-vs-expectations#comment-list-4601543 [8] Ukraine. (2025, December 9). World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/ukraine [9] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [10] Samoiliuk, M. (2025, December 8). Ukraine War Economy Tracker. Centre For Economic Strategy. https://ces.org.ua/en/tracker-economy-during-the-war/ [11] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war [12] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [13] Davis Jr., E., & Wolf, C. (2025, March 11). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. U.S.News. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/these-countries-have-committed-the-most-aid-to-ukraine [14] U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine. (2025, March 12). U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/releases/2025/01/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine [15] EU Assistance to Ukraine (in U.S. Dollars). (2025, November 19). Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253 [16] Mills, C. (2025, July 17). Military assistance to Ukraine (February 2022 to January 2025). UK Parliament. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/ [17] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [18] Jenkins, B. M. (2023, March 7). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout. European Commission. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html [19] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [20] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war