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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Summary -The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have longstanding political and security interests in north and east Africa.- But the late 2010s saw a “geoeconomic turn” in their foreign policy. This has led the three Gulf states to make inroads into sub-Saharan Africa.- Energy and infrastructure are at the heart of this new economic involvement. These sectors serve Gulf interests, but they are also where Africa’s needs are greatest.- This is improving the image of Gulf states in Africa. This ties in with a trend among African governments to diversify their own international partners and foster competition among them.- The EU and its member states remain influential in Africa, but their involvement is declining. The Gulf expansion in Africa could exacerbate this—unless Europeans find a way to respond. The geoeconomic turn Africa is big business in today’s geopolitics and geoeconomics. “Great powers” have returned to compete on the continent, with rising powers like Turkey and Gulf monarchies snapping at their heels. African leaders, meanwhile, are capitalising on the fragmentation of the global order to foster competition among all these powers. In this evolving landscape, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent Qatar are looking beyond their traditional African interests. The three Gulf states have long extended their reach into east and north Africa. There, they have worked to secure land and trading routes, extract resources and project influence over their preferred versions of Islam. In so doing they have tried (and spent big) to empower friendly governments and political actors through a combination of diplomatic, economic and security-related assistance. This political-military posturing has often drawn them into competition with one another—for instance through their involvement in the conflicts in Yemen and Libya. The UAE has been by far the most assertive of the three states in this regard, with recent Emirati involvement in Sudan’s civil war prompting regional and international condemnation. Despite these political interests, the late 2010s saw a “geoeconomic turn” in the foreign policy of the Gulf powers. This has led them to make inroads deeper into Africa. The covid-19 pandemic and falling oil prices hit sectors crucial to these states economies: aviation, for instance, as well as tourism and logistics. These oil and gas producers also know that fossil fuels will be out of the picture at some point in the future, thanks to the global energy transition. With its booming markets and rich natural resources, sub-Saharan Africa brings opportunities for Gulf states to diversify their economies. Moreover, African governments offer them backing to pursue a dual approach to the energy transition: no pressure to lose the oil and gas right now (and Africa offers plenty of prospects in that regard) but opportunities also position themselves as leaders in sectors vital to future economies—from renewables to minerals. Such pragmatic engagement should guarantee Gulf states greater returns than costly security politics in their “near abroad”. This could all affect European interests in Africa, not least because the continent is also becoming a crucial partner for Europeans to sustain and diversify their own energy supplies. In our 2024 paper “Beyond competition” we examined the UAE’s involvement in African energy sectors, setting out how Europeans might mitigate the risks that poses and grasp the opportunities. This policy brief expands on that research. First, it breaks down the UAE’s, Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s geoeconomic activities in sub-Saharan Africa, zooming in on energy as a central focus of their strategy. Next, it analyses the divergences in the Gulf states’ economic expansion, and how these interact with their traditional African interests. Finally, it explains how Europeans should grapple with this emerging phenomenon. Africa and a fragmenting global order Over the past five years, economic and geopolitical turmoil has changed how big and rising powers compete in Africa—and how African countries relate to the rest of the world. This is the case for both political and economic engagement. Africa The African embrace of diversification reflects a broader movement within the global south that advocates a reimagined global order. Within this, a key demand is for equity, inclusivity and agency in global governance structures—indicating a deliberate pivot away from historical dependencies on Western-led models. This includes traditional frameworks of aid and development. This multipolar moment gained momentum as the tumult of the post-covid years and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine intensified. As Western states focused on economic and geopolitical upheavals closer to home, many African leaders saw neglect and self-centredness. This was exemplified in African criticism of Western vaccine hoarding, and then of the redirection of aid to Ukraine at the expense of African crises. So African leaders have increasingly sought out alternative partners.   But these developments only exacerbated a more longstanding trend. From the early 2000s onwards, Western engagement with Africa has steadily declined. Other powers—such as China, Turkey and Russia—have expanded their influence. Indeed, Russia and China in particular have leveraged African aspirations and grievances against Western-led frameworks. This has helped them legitimise their political, economic and military projection in Africa. It could also open up space for stronger West-free alliances, such as through the BRICS+ grouping (which the UAE joined and to which Saudi Arabia was invited in 2024). Gulf The African embrace of multipolarity resonates with Gulf powers, which underpin their own foreign policy with an aim to cultivate partnerships across the east-west and north-south spectrum. Gulf states do not explicitly adopt anti-Western rhetoric. But, to address their domestic imperatives, they are strategically tapping into African governments’ call for alternative partners. The three states offer their African partners development cooperation and financing that depart from the Western model. They tend to offer a more flexible and rapid deployment of funding. Their state-backed economic models also align political agendas with strategic investments. This allows them to leverage their financial resources to fill the capital and political void left by other international players. Such alignment is timely and could be mutually beneficial as African and Gulf states navigate the shifting dynamics of global power distribution. It also seems to be boosting Gulf states’ political capital with African governments. But the monarchies’ strategic interests may not always line up with Africa’s long-term development goals, which could foster extractive and exploitative relationships. Their expansion in Africa could also reduce the space for Europeans to rebuild their ties with the continent. Europe Europeans maintain a significant presence in Africa. But the fragmenting global order could challenge their status, particularly in the face of the second Trump presidency and its implications for Western unity. European economic engagement in Africa has been declining for some time, just as Western governance, aid and financing models are meeting competition For now the EU remains sub-Saharan Africa’s largest trading partner, with trade flows between the two regions valued at approximately $300bn annually. Yet, the EU’s share of trade with sub-Saharan Africa has dropped significantly since 1990. This reflects competition from countries like China, whose rapid ascent is evident in its large increases of both imports and exports with the region. Indeed, China now rivals the EU in terms of imports to sub-Saharan Africa.   Sub-Saharan Africa’s imports from China have grown especially in the consumer-goods sector, but also increasingly in the energy and other industrial sectors. The EU, meanwhile, continues to dominate in imports of high-value goods such as machinery, chemicals and vehicles. Sub-Saharan Africa exports primarily raw materials, minerals, and oil to Europe, akin to its exports to other regions, such as China and the Gulf countries. Emerging players like the UAE have witnessed a steady growth in their overall share (though percentages do not reach 10% of the total yet). Gulf-Africa (geo)economic relations on the riseInvestment and finance The scale of Gulf financial engagement in Africa underscores the monarchies’ expansion. In 2022 and 2023 the Gulf Cooperation Council states collectively funnelled nearly $113bn of FDI into the continent, exceeding their total investments over the previous decade ($102bn). The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are investing most in sectors that not only reflect their interests, but in which Africa’s needs are greatest: energy and climate and infrastructure It is the infrastructure (and connectivity) investments that form the backbone of their expansion. Interests among the states overlap, but the UAE invested first and by far the most in ports, logistics networks and special economic zones. Saudi Arabia is the main investor in roads. All three states have stakes in sub-Saharan Africa’s air connectivity, though Saudi Arabia to a lesser extent to date.  These investments open up new opportunities across the continent. They also boost the Gulf states’ geostrategic presence, helping to fill a gap in Africa’s infrastructure that China has only partially filled over the last 20 years—while the EU is only now trying to launch a comeback with the Global Gateway. Moreover, Gulf states are helping to fill the funding gap that Western financiers left as they withdrew. In 2021, for example, the UAE pledged $4.5bn to support energy transition efforts in Africa. This financial commitment is meant to support green energy, infrastructure development and the wider energy transition. In March 2024, four Emirati banks helped the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) raise $1.15bn in the largest syndicated loan ever pooled together by the AFC. Saudi Arabia, which has long provided development assistance to Africa through the Saudi Development Fund, signed a 2023 memorandum of understanding with the AFC to jointly finance infrastructure across the continent. In late 2024 the Saudi government pledged $41bn through a mix of financing tools to finance start-ups, provide import-export credit and spur private sector growth in Africa over the next 10 years. In 2022 Qatar pledged a $200m donation for climate adaptation projects in African countries vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including funding for drought and flood mitigation programmes, as well as renewable energy access in off-grid communities. In 2024 it contributed to the creation of Rwanda’s Virunga Africa Fund I, launched with $250m to strengthen social services and private sector growth in innovative domains in Rwanda and the rest of Africa. However, many of the investments and deals are opaque and come with limited accountability. This raises questions about whether Gulf-Africa financial and investment partnerships will truly be mutually beneficial. The balance of power often tilts in favour of the Gulf monarchies due to their financial strength, which may lead to asymmetrical outcomes—including a potential increase of debt burdens in Africa. Despite focusing on critical sectors for Africa’s development, these investments may not shift the underlying dynamics of extractivism that have historically characterised Africa’s relations with external players. As the trade data clearly show, this includes the Gulf states. Trade The UAE’s foreign policy has long been more focused on trade than that of the other two Gulf states. Accordingly, trade (including those goods it re-imports and exports via its economic zones) between the UAE and sub-Saharan Africa has grown robustly over the past decade. Qatar and Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, have seen more limited change. The UAE ventured early into trade, logistics and services to secure sustainable revenues—particularly Dubai, an emirate with very limited oil reserves. Emiratis have undertaken extensive expansion of port and transport infrastructure across Africa (led by logistics giants such as the Dubai-based DP World and, more recently, Abu Dhabi Ports). This has helped turn the UAE into a trade gateway between Africa and the world.   The composition of Gulf-Africa trade reveals deeper dynamics in the economic relationship. In line with their global trading patterns, fuels and hydrocarbon derivatives dominate Emirati, Qatari and Saudi exports to sub-Saharan Africa. This reflects the centrality of fossil fuels in Gulf states’ expansion in the continent. The population of sub-Saharan Africa is rapidly growing; the region is also industrialising and urbanising at pace. The whole of Africa’s energy demand will likely increase by 30% by 2040—including fossil fuels. This creates new markets for Gulf states in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan African exports to the Gulf, meanwhile, are largely made up of metals and minerals, including gold, as well as agricultural products. This underscores how the export relationship is largely extractive. Gold trade is particularly notable in the sub-Saharan Africa-UAE relationship, helping consolidate the country as a key global importer and refiner of the precious metal.   These trade patterns highlight mutual dependencies but also expose structural imbalances. Sub-Saharan Africa’s export profile—heavily skewed toward raw commodities—limits its benefits to African states, while Gulf countries capitalise on higher-value imports and exports. Energy diplomacy and the green transition Africa’s vast natural resources mean the continent is central to the global energy transition. Alongside reserves of oil and gas, it boasts plentiful minerals essential for renewable technologies (such as lithium, cobalt and rare earth elements), abundant solar energy potential, and well-preserved forests for carbon offset. This, combined with the region’s large and increasing energy demand, helps centre energy and climate in the Gulf’s African expansion. A rapid transition away from fossil fuels is unrealistic for the Gulf states, given their reliance on them for export revenues and GDP. In Africa, meanwhile, oil and gas still account for 40% of energy consumed by end users (its final energy consumption). As discussed, this creates new markets for Gulf states in which they can help meet Africa’s current and future demand. But Africa also acts as a gateway to new energy value chains. Gulf leaders know the hydrocarbon era is waning. This means they could lose the leverage oil and gas brought them in global energy governance. To maintain their relevance, they aim to lead in green economies too. They therefore work to integrate Africa’s energy markets and resources into their broader strategy for sustainable economic transformation. Hydrocarbons Gulf countries’ economies are betting on African governments’ interest in further exploiting their oil and gas resources to increase revenues and fulfil growing demand. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are mostly eyeing investments in distribution (downstream), and transportation and storage (midstream); while they have traditionally shown limited interest in Africa’s oil and gas exploration and production (upstream). Qatar, by contrast, is more focused on exploring upstream production and increasing its stakes in Africa’s LNG sector. This aligns with Qatar’s unique energy profile as a leader in the global LNG market. It also gels with its long-term strategy to consolidate global dominance in natural gas, especially as the energy transition increases demand for cleaner-burning fuels like gas. The UAE might be eyeing Africa’s LNG sector as well, as it expects natural gas to contribute more significantly to its energy mix by 2050, but currently relies on Qatar for nearly one-third of its supply. Africa may prove helpful in expanding gas investments. Emirati energy giant Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, for example, has a stake in Mozambique’s Rovuma LNG project and a gas deal with BP in Egypt.   African countries find common ground with the Gulf states in resisting the rapid phase out of oil and gas advocated by advanced economies. For African nations, oil and gas remain vital sources of revenue, industrial growth and energy security; Gulf states need these resources as they are integral to their global influence and economic diversification efforts. This challenges the European position on oil and gas, and their reciprocal alignment could cement stronger consensus around a dual approach to the energy transition. Green value chains The UAE’s “We the UAE 2031” vision and Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” are economic reform plans that include commitments to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons. This underscores their leaders’ recognition that fossil fuels may not be around forever, but mainly that green value chains hold great value. The UAE and Saudi Arabia (but much less so Qatar) are therefore investing in the green energy transitions, both at home and abroad. Their investment also allows them to maintain their influence in global energy decision-making, including the speed and pathways to a net-zero world and economy. With its abundant solar and wind resources, sub-Saharan Africa is an ideal testing ground for Gulf countries to expand their renewable energy expertise. It is also an environment in which they can develop scalable projects and build exportable green technology capacities. All three Gulf states are investing in solar and wind plants across sub-Saharan Africa. They have also shown appetite in other renewable fields, such as batteries, green hydrogen and thermal energy. The UAE leads in this through its companies Masdar and AMEA Power; Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power is also getting in on the act. Qatar has been eyeing opportunities for investments, though it favours joint or brownfield investments in large foreign companies’ projects to limit risks and costs.   Though several of these commitments are today pledges, their involvement could potentially contribute to expanding access to energy in Africa, helping address the continent’s critical energy deficit. Their dual-track approach to the energy transition allows them to advocate for a pragmatic transition that balances decarbonisation with energy security and economic development, enhancing their reputation among African governments as forward-thinking states on energy. Critical minerals At the same time, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing in mineral value chains. This underlines the strategic importance of these resources in their economic diversification and technological ambitions. Gold is the top import product from Africa to the UAE. But other minerals such as copper also rank high in Emirati imports—and in those to Saudi Arabia as well. These minerals are the backbone of the green economy. They are also critical for the digital transformation (including AI and defence, with the UAE eyeing dual-use minerals as it develops its national defence industry), but also infrastructure. In line with its trade-focused foreign policy, the UAE is seemingly more interested in tapping into the trade of these commodities. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, seems keen to access raw resources for import, necessary to boost its industrial ambitions at home. Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia aims to develop domestic manufacturing and high-tech industries, such as electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies. Accessing African minerals aims to support this strategy by providing the necessary input for domestic production, and enabling Saudi Arabia to move up the value chain.   For African countries, the global race for critical minerals is a unique opportunity to move beyond their traditional role as providers of raw commodities. Many African governments recognise the potential of these resources to catalyse industrialisation, create jobs and generate more value domestically. This shift in perspective has led to increasing demands for investments that prioritise local processing and manufacturing rather than merely extracting and exporting raw materials. However, the extent to which Gulf players will align with these aspirations remains uncertain. Where the Gulf states diverge Despite some similar drivers, Emirati, Saudi and Qatari approaches in Africa vary significantly. The nuances stem from the states’ different domestic imperatives and foreign policy strategies. Although the shift to geoeconomics is clear, this underlines how the three states—especially the UAE—could still influence security across the continent as well as in their traditional regions of interest. Country profiles The UAE lacks significant domestic industrial capacity (except for the gold sector). This means it needs bigger and better trade routes to secure its revenues. Here, Africa’s expanding consumer markets and its centrality in green value chains offers an opportunity. Abu Dhabi adopts a risk-prone, largely state-backed, approach—though this is mitigated by a strong orientation towards economic returns. The UAE’s presence is becoming increasingly entrenched across the African continent. Despite focusing outwardly on economics, the UAE’s ability to leverage political influence to safeguard its interests has not gone away, as its involvement in Sudan shows. This politico-security approach is less visible in other parts of Africa, though it remains a tool that could shape Emirati-African relations in the years ahead. As the UAE’s economic interests expand in Africa, its leaders may find they have more to protect—which could increase the risk of them deploying the security approach.  The UAE’s energy diplomacy reinforces the idea that the country’s involvement in Africa will extend beyond economic ventures: the 2024 COP28 climate conference in Dubai, for instance, laid bare Emirati ambitions to position the UAE as a global leader in the energy transition. African alignment with the monarchy on the need for a dual approach makes Africa a key arena for Abu Dhabi to mobilise consensus. Saudi Arabia faces urgent domestic socio-economic imperatives linked to a growing population (largely under the age of 25) and high unemployment rates. This contrasts with the UAE and Qatar, which grapple with a shortage of domestic workforce. Africa is therefore appealing as a contributor to Riyadh’s economic transformation programme, which envisages a strong diversification of the economy. Green value chains rank high amid these efforts. But internal socio-economic constraints and the urgency of domestic reforms have prompted Riyadh to adopt a risk-averse stance. This has resulted in cautious and geographically limited engagement across the African continent. This caution contrasts with Riyadh’s more interventionist posture in the 2010s in the near abroad. Its aggressive policies to gain allies on the African side of the Red Sea strained rivalries with its neighbours. This included, for instance, the monarchy’s war against Houthis in Yemen from 2015, and its interference that contributed to the ousting of Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir in 2019. Saudi Arabia now relies more on soft power and economic diplomacy, leveraging its traditional leadership of the Muslim world and development aid to advance its influence. This has led it towards a new approach largely oriented towards stabilisation—especially in the Horn of Africa—and multilateral dialogue. Yet, as Riyadh seeks to balance economic imperatives with geopolitical caution, its engagement in Africa remains transactional. Today, it is driven by immediate strategic needs rather than a long-term vision. Qatar, unlike the UAE and Saudi Arabia, is less constrained by energy transition-related pressures. Its reliance on gas provides Doha with greater economic stability (albeit vulnerable to overdependence on gas for revenues) and a competitive edge in the global energy market. Qatar has not to date significantly changed its approach to Africa, which is characterised by a focus on selective, strategically significant investments that hold both political and economic relevance. These targeted initiatives aim to strengthen bilateral ties in key sectors rather than pursuing broad-based engagement. This restraint is a reflection of Doha’s limited institutional knowledge of Africa and an overall risk-averse foreign policy, which often leads to it to engage in brownfield investments rather than expand into new ventures. Qatar, similar to Saudi Arabia, pursues a soft-power approach to political affairs on the continent. This is characterised by a strong emphasis on conflict mediation. It has played key diplomatic roles in past negotiations, such as in the Darfur conflict, the Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute and Somali reconciliation efforts. More recently, in March 2025 it hosted mediations between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, managing to bring both sides to the table where other negotiators failed. This approach aims to enhance its global standing as a facilitator of dialogue and peace. Its Africa strategy is a balancing act between economic priorities and broader diplomatic ambitions.   What this means for Europe The EU and its member states will have to work with Gulf states in Africa. If they fail to do so, their political and economic decline on the continent could accelerate. This would also likely open up space for power blocs such as Gulf-China and Gulf-Russia partnerships to deepen their relations with African countries. But a lack of engagement with Gulf states also means Europeans would miss out on opportunities. Crucially, Europeans could benefit from collaboration with Gulf powers to align with African governments in shaping reciprocal green industrial transitions. These risks and opportunities stem from the strengths and weaknesses of Gulf states’ involvement in Africa.   These features also create synergies between Europe and Gulf states in Africa. The EU and its member states can add unique value to sectors vital to Gulf states’ interests, which could help mitigate the risks both sides face. Gulf countries, for example, would benefit from European technological know-how and innovation in sectors such as renewable energy. Moreover, Europeans have extensive experience and interest in human capital development; Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s soft-power approach means they have a growing interest in providing education and training. This could combine to help build the skilled and educated workforce that Africa’s rapid development and industrialisation requires. More synergies exist in Europeans’ longstanding political and institutional presence across Africa, as well as their focus on regulatory frameworks and experience dealing with African markets and governance structures. This could all be of use to the less Africa-experienced Gulf countries, helping to minimise their exposure to political and economic uncertainties. Europeans would gain reciprocal benefits through access to Gulf states’ financial resources, their capacity to roll out large scale projects, and their work to expand connectivity. The monarchies are also building greater influence in forums such as the UN and the G20, and more specifically in the energy sector (the COP climate conferences, for example, but also Saudi Arabia’s Future Minerals Forum). Through this, Europeans could leverage their relations with Gulf states in Africa to respond to the demands of the global south for equality in global governance. This would not only bolster Europe’s role in Africa’s sustainable growth but also help Europeans maintain a competitive edge in the evolving global energy and geoeconomic landscape. African governments would also benefit. Cultivating a diverse range of international partners lies at the heart of their newly enhanced bargaining geopolitical and economic power. This means that fostering Europe-Gulf cooperation could be vital for Africans to mitigate the risks of a declining European presence and the expanding (but still nascent) expansion by Gulf states. How Europeans should respond Initially, the EU and its member states should focus on four opportunities for cooperation with Gulf and African states. 1.Energy cooperation and access. The growing presence of Gulf states in Africa’s energy transition means Europeans can help improve access to (clean) energy across the continent. Gulf states are investing in power-generation projects and transport networks. These could enhance Africa’s economic growth, contribute to its market expansion (also through regional integration), and make the continent more attractive for other investors. Europe’s technological expertise in renewable energy complements the Gulf states’ investment capabilities and ambitions in this sector. a.Opportunity: Europeans should consider joint investment with Gulf states in Africa’s renewable energy projects. The UAE’s Masdar and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power can roll out large-scale renewable projects. European governments and companies would benefit from collaboration with such companies and with African governments, not only to help boost Africa’s renewable capacity but also to reduce the risks and costs of investment. For example, the government of Mauritania is already collaborating with the UAE’s Infinity Power and the German developer Conjuncta to develop a 10 gigawatt green hydrogen plant in the country. European energy companies should also leverage Qatar’s risk-aversion and interest in reducing risks via partnerships to expand their operations (as hinted at in a 2024 deal between Italy’s Enel Green Power and the Qatar Investment Authority). b.Risk: If Europeans do not take up such opportunities, Gulf countries could end up dominating Africa’s renewables sector. Their involvement in the continent’s energy market expansion may prioritise Gulf-centric policies over European or African climate and energy as well as industrial interests. Without a stronger European presence, Europe risks missing opportunities to contribute shaping Africa’s energy landscape in a way that aligns with both European interests and global climate objectives. 2.Cross-regional infrastructure development. The Gulf states’ investment in infrastructure and regional connectivity mean Europeans could help boost Africa’s economic growth and stimulate investors’ interest. Given the sheer scale and complexity of these projects, trilateral cooperation would help distribute costs, risks and expertise. By proactively collaborating with Gulf states, in particular the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Europeans can secure a role in Africa’s infrastructure transformation. This would help them ensure that major projects also align with European trade interests and long-term strategic priorities. a.Opportunity: The EU and member states should cooperate with Gulf and African states on infrastructure, focusing on the UAE’s maritime and logistics capabilities and Saudi Arabia’s substantial infrastructure investment. This would enable them to accelerate critical projects, from roads to power plants and energy distribution systems. Europeans should also collaborate with Gulf and African states on cross-regional railways. Trilateral cooperation on such initiatives as the “Lobito Corridor” (linking Angola, DRC and Zambia) would contribute to the development of high-impact infrastructure that no single state could easily undertake alone. b.Risk: If Europe does not do this, it risks being sidelined from new trade corridors and supply chains that will shape the continent’s economic and geopolitical landscape. Control over critical infrastructure—ports, railways, logistics hubs and energy networks—is a vital tool of geoeconomic influence, determining who facilitates and benefits from Africa’s economic growth. If Europe remains passive, Gulf and other external actors could shape Africa’s infrastructure in ways that reduce European access, limit European firms’ market participation and weaken Europe’s overall influence on regional economic integration. 3.Capacity building and human capital development. Africa’s rapid development requires an educated and skilled workforce. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have a growing interest in education and vocational training, an area in which Europeans have extensive experience. This is another potential area for trilateral cooperation. a.Opportunity: The EU and member states should collaborate with African and Gulf countries to launch joint capacity-building initiatives. Europeans would bring a unique contribution to these efforts through their experience in advanced training models, institution-building and regulatory frameworks. Moreover, African countries should proactively coordinate new Gulf efforts with European know-how, particularly in vital sectors such as energy and infrastructure. b.Risk: Inaction from European and African governments could mean Gulf-led training programmes shape Africa’s workforce according to the monarchies’ strategic priorities. This risks limiting European influence in Africa’s future development. It could also compromise European access to a skilled African workforce—essential to ensure foreign investors can ensure they meet African demands for local content. 4.Financial instruments and investment mechanisms. Africa’s development requires significant capital inflows, but investors often see the continent as high risk. The Gulf states’ growing role as both a financier and developer of Africa’s energy infrastructure presents opportunities for joint de-risking strategies. This would help both European and Gulf investors to overcome these risks. By pooling resources and expertise, Europe and Gulf countries can expand the capital available to fill Africa’s financing gaps—particularly for large-scale energy and infrastructure projects. a.Opportunity: European financial institutions should work with their African counterparts and Gulf investors and developers to de-risk their investment in Africa. This should include, for example, the European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, but also member states’ development banks such as the KfW (Germany) or Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (Italy). Such collaboration would help them de-risk investments and roll out large-scale infrastructure and energy projects, or scale up existing ones. This collaboration would appeal particularly to risk-averse countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. b.Risk: Without this, Gulf investors could increasingly dominate Africa’s investment landscape. This shift could result in financial structures that, while effective for Gulf interests, may not align with European business practices, regulatory standards or long-term sustainability goals. That would likely result in European companies facing a more competitive and opaque investment environment. It could also erode Europe’s ability to promote investments that meet both Africa’s needs and European objectives. These four initial opportunities could act as a testing ground for trilateral cooperation. This, in turn, may create new synergies between all three parties. Europeans would then be well placed to build on this initial engagement to safeguard its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in Africa; while developing new partnerships with rising powers that may benefit Europeans well beyond the continent.  Acknowledgements We would like to thank the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for their generous support that allowed us to organise workshops and conduct extensive research and travel. We are immensely grateful to Kim Butson, our editor, for helping us keep a clear direction, and for her unwavering patience especially in the last editorial phases. And to Nastassia Zenovich for giving such a great visual shape to our ideas. We are also very thankful to the entire ECFR Africa and MENA teams’ colleagues for regular brainstorming and helping us challenge our assumptions. Last but not least, this paper would not have been possible without the many officials, diplomats, experts and thinkers in Europe, Africa and the Gulf, who generously dedicated their time and ideas, contributing significantly to shaping this project.This article was first published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) [here].

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From war threats to negotiations In the early months of 2025, Iran and the United States stood on the brink of open military conflict. The escalation was driven by several factors that coincided in time, heightening the effect of instability. It was one of the most dangerous periods in the history of their relations. Until very recently, Iran lived under a cloud of anxious expectation: would war erupt, or could the situation be contained? The first reason behind the sharp escalation is, without doubt, Donald Trump’s return to office. It is well known that during his first presidency in 2018, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), reinstated prior sanctions and introduced new, extremely severe ones against Tehran. Trump took a hardline stance toward the Islamic regime, viewing it as a threat to human rights and regional stability. By early February of this year, he had already issued strict demands to Iran: to drastically scale back—or possibly entirely dismantle—its nuclear program, relinquish nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cease support for allied groups in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias). He threatened large-scale bombings if Tehran disagreed, but also left room for negotiations. It is worth recalling that Trump personally authorized the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), accusing Shiite militias under Soleimani’s leadership of alleged mass killings of civilians in Syria. In contrast, Iranians see Soleimani as a noble warrior and a professional soldier, who saved the peoples of Syria and Iraq from terrorist atrocities, and were outraged by his extrajudicial killing. From an economic perspective, it was during Trump’s first term that Iranian oil exports plummeted nearly tenfold, from over 2.5 million barrels per day in April 2018 to 300,000 barrels per day in June 2019. Although sanctions remained in place under President Joe Biden, their enforcement became more lenient. As a result, by 2024, Iran had begun rapidly rebuilding its oil exports, which rose to 1.9 million barrels per day by the summer of last year. This sparked hopes for a gradual economic recovery. However, Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 meant a new wave of threats. In his first month back in office, Trump gave Iran a two-month deadline to make concessions or face a firm response. The second reason is Israel’s aggressive and expansionist policy. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, long described Israel as a colonial-settler project created by the West, inherently driven to expand by seizing territory from neighboring Muslim countries and committing crimes against their Muslim populations, all with the ultimate goal of forcibly establishing “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates. In reality, there have been some differences between Israeli governments: under left-wing leadership, Israel tends to act more peacefully and moderately, while right-wing administrations pursue more aggressive and harsh policies. In recent years, however, Israel’s actions toward its neighbors have become especially aggressive—exactly as Khomeini had described—after the rise to power of the most radical ultra-right forces. The devastation that this government has brought upon the Gaza Strip, razing it to the ground, speaks for itself. After the fall of Bashar Assad’s strong leadership in Syria, Israel immediately seized the opportunity to destroy all of Syria’s heavy weaponry, effectively disarming the country. Israel then moved to capture more Syrian land beyond the annexed Golan Heights and committed new violations there. The Iran policy of the current Israeli government is focused on overthrowing the regime and installing puppet authorities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, known for his uncompromising hostility toward the regime in Iran, has spoken openly of his desire to see its end. There were rumors in Iran’s media space suggesting that Israel might be considering Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, as a symbolic leader for a future “secular Iran.” Within Iran, perceptions of the Pahlavi dynasty are overwhelmingly negative: it is seen as a pro-Western dynasty detached from traditional Islamic roots, which exploited national resources and oppressed Muslims and the Islamic clergy. Nonetheless, a portion of Iranian youth and some opposition commentators in the country hold radical views, harbor hostility toward Islam and Arabs, and support Trump, Netanyahu and the Pahlavi dynasty. This group would likely side with the enemy if hostilities broke out. Furthermore, Iran began to lose its regional influence. Israel carried out a series of successful operations against Iranian allies, primarily targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Syria. Key Hezbollah commanders and several IRGC officers were killed, and arms depots were destroyed. It is remarkable that some Syrian Islamists, who had previously been hostile to Israel, welcomed this development as a form of revenge for Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime and thus became temporary tactical allies of Israel. Following the December 2024 coup that brought anti-Iranian Islamists to power, Syria—once a strategic ally of Iran—is now increasingly taking a negative stance toward Tehran. By the start of this year, a sense of pessimism had settled over Iran. Feelings of confusion, anxiety and the realization of diminished influence in the Middle East became widespread among many Iranians, especially conservative ones. At the same time, a different sentiment was growing in Tehran among Iranian patriots and supporters of the Islamic regime: if the U.S., Israel or both launched a military attack, Iran’s response would be as harsh as possible. IRGC officials and prominent religious figures have made this clear. A change within: tracing Iran’s path to negotiations After a long period of tough rhetoric, Iran has made a strategic shift in its foreign policy in recent weeks. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had firmly banned any negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear program, suddenly changed course. What drove this decision? It is important to recognize that this shift resulted not only from an external threat but also from a deep internal reassessment, one that was rational, compelled by the circumstances, yet conscious. Until recently, Iran stuck to the principle of “no concessions under pressure.” Khamenei pointed to the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, which the U.S. exited during Trump’s presidency in 2018. From Khamenei’s perspective, new talks would be meaningless and dangerous because “the Americans will deceive again.” However, by April 2025, the situation had changed so much that Iran’s political and military elites began convincing the supreme leader of the need for dialogue. Reformist circles—especially the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian—played the leading role in this process. He insisted that without negotiations, Iran faced the risk of catastrophe: a major war, domestic unrest and even the fall of the regime. Reports from Tehran suggest he emerged as the main negotiator within the political establishment, persuading Khamenei to invoke the concept of maslahat (expediency)—a religiously sanctioned method for setting aside principles in order to save the Islamic regime. This decision was informed by several factors: - Economic crisis: according to official data, inflation between March 21 and April 20, 2025, reached 39%, while youth unemployment in the last quarter of 2024 stood at 20%. While Iran has seen worse in its recent past, these figures are nonetheless troubling. Furthermore, reserve funds were significantly depleted last year, investments have all but disappeared due to sanctions, and foreign currency reserves have declined. The country has also been hit by an energy crisis.- Erosion of ideology: satellite channels broadcasting from the U.S. and the UK have significantly expanded their reach. Outlets like Manoto, BBC Persian and Iran International have long championed secular, pro-Western views while criticizing the Islamic regime. What has particularly alarmed the authorities is the promotion of the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty: despite its brutal rule and fight against traditional Iranian and Islamic values—still remembered by the older generation—some youths have begun to see the Pahlavis as a possible “alternative” to the ruling clerical establishment.- Risks in domestic politics: political analysts, military officials and intelligence agencies warned the leadership about the risk of a “nationwide uprising” that could be sparked by an external attack. The concern was not just about protests but the potential for pro-Western groups to cooperate with foreign aggressors. The Iranian Interior Ministry said that these elements had become more active amid the 2022 protests and were receiving support from abroad. All these signals from the army, the clergy, the administration and the intelligence agencies compelled the Iranian leadership to adopt a political survival strategy. Drawing on the experience from the Iran–Iraq War, Khamenei reasoned that “continued confrontation would lead to catastrophe.” This is why he allowed the talks to begin while keeping control over their scope and substance. The nuclear program: compromise is possible, surrender is not One of the key issues in the Iran–U.S. negotiations remains the future of the Iranian nuclear program. Despite years of mutual accusations and broken trust, Tehran appears open to tactical compromises but not to surrender. According to sources within Iranian political circles, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has agreed to discussions on all parameters of the nuclear program, including uranium enrichment levels and the terms for international inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities. However, a complete dismantling of the nuclear program is widely seen as out of the question, as it would be perceived as a national humiliation within Iranian political culture. Khamenei and top IRGC officials—guardians of the regime’s ideological foundations—have repeatedly reinforced this position in their public statements. The scenario under consideration in Tehran includes these possible concessions: - a temporary halt to uranium enrichment beyond 60%,- a reduction in the stockpile of highly enriched uranium,- broader IAEA access to selected nuclear sites,- a declaration affirming the peaceful purposes of the nuclear program with legal guarantees. In return, Iran will push for major sanctions relief—not only in the financial sector but also in technology, including the lifting of the ban on investments in the oil and gas industry. These restrictions, in force since the late 1990s, have been particularly damaging: former Iranian official Hossein Selahvarzi put the total economic loss to Iran since 2012 at over USD 1 trillion. Iran’s missile program remains a separate and highly sensitive issue. It is regarded as an untouchable symbol of national pride and strategic autonomy. The supreme leader has made it clear that Iran’s nuclear capabilities “ensure the country’s security” in the face of potential isolation or attack. As a result, Tehran is likely to reject any proposals for reducing its missile potential. All this means that negotiations are possible, but their scope is quite limited. The outcomes of the two latest rounds of indirect talks in Oman and Rome offer some optimism. Flexing muscles: a show of force as a negotiating tool The prospect of talks between Iran and the U.S. does not preclude military tensions. On the contrary, this year both countries carried out a series of shows of force to send a message: “We are approaching negotiations from a position of strength.” Iran, on the one hand, has stepped up military activity along its external borders. In April 2025, Tehran for the first time supplied its allies in Iraq with long-range ballistic missiles and drones, including the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6. These moves were seen both as acts of support for Shiite militias and as a signal of Iran’s readiness to launch strikes in the event of major conflict. The military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz took on special significance, as Iran’s navy conducted a series of maneuvers with missile boats, mines and underwater drones. Up to 20% of the world’s sea-traded oil, or about 18 million barrels per day, passes through the strait. Its possible blockade was considered a measure of last resort to pressure international markets if another round of sanctions was imposed. In addition, Iran has increased its military footprint in the southern provinces, expanding bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Hormozgan. This builds operational depth in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack and reinforces the internal narrative that “Iran will not surrender but stands ready to defend itself.” The U.S., in turn, responded by deploying six B-2 Spirit strategic bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, within striking range of key targets in Iran. These warplanes can carry both nuclear and precision-guided conventional weapons. The U.S. also sent a carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf and reinforced air defense systems at its bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq. Thus, the military buildup in the region is not just preparation for a possible conflict but part of the diplomatic game. Tehran is demonstrating that it can deliver a firm response and that any concessions it makes are not a sign of surrender but a pragmatic step toward stability. Meanwhile, Washington is signaling its readiness for a military scenario in order to gain leverage in the talks. Russia as a mediator: interest in stability and strategic partnership Amid rising tensions between Iran and the U.S., Russia is emerging more clearly as a potential mediator and stabilizing force. Its role is shaped not only by current political dynamics but also by the deep structural ties built between Moscow and Tehran over the past years. In April, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow to discuss preliminary outcomes of consultations on a new nuclear deal with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Beyond nuclear diplomacy, the parties addressed a broad range of regional issues, including Syria, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This meeting was more than a diplomatic gesture; it reflects the genuine interests of both countries. Moscow is interested in the continuity of Iran’s current regime as a source of stability and a partner in the emerging multipolar world. Tehran, for its part, refrains from anti-Russian rhetoric, does not endorse resolutions against Russia at international platforms and shows respect for Moscow’s interests in the region. Russian–Iranian ties are strengthening not only politically but also infrastructurally. In 2023, both countries made significant progress in advancing the International North–South Transport Corridor, a project designed to link St. Petersburg with the Indian port of Mumbai via Iran. This initiative, backed by both Russia and Iran, offers an alternative to Western-centric logistics routes, and its success depends on the stability of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Moscow has already shown itself to be an effective broker in regional conflicts. In 2023, Russian diplomats helped revive dialogue between Iran and Azerbaijan after a long period of hostility fueled by disputes over borders, religious matters and relations with Israel. This experience could be leveraged in the context of Iran–U.S. negotiations, especially given the deep mistrust and the lack of direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Russia’s position is clear: Moscow is opposed to any destabilization of Iran, as it threatens to undermine regional balance, strengthen Western influence and jeopardize the partnership with Iran. As Sergey Lavrov has emphasized, Russia will support any steps aimed at de-escalation and the lifting of sanctions from Iran, as long as sovereignty and international law are respected. Thus, Russia is more than just an ally of Iran; it is one of the few actors that maintains channels of trust-based communication with both Tehran and several Western nations. This makes Moscow a potentially successful mediator, especially at a time when the U.S. has limited options for direct dialogue with Iran, and European brokers have lost much of their former influence. Possible scenarios and a window of opportunity The situation around Iran has reached a critical juncture. Amid a deep internal crisis, sanctions pressure and rising external tensions, Tehran must choose between a limited deal with the West that preserves its strategic assets or a drawn-out standoff that risks plunging the region into broader instability. First scenario: moderate de-escalation If the U.S. and Iran reached a compromise on the nuclear dossier, even in a limited format, it would create a short-term opportunity for stabilization. Iran would benefit from partial sanctions relief, increased oil export capacity and attract investment in critical sectors. In return, Tehran would commit to transparency, lower uranium enrichment levels and IAEA oversight. This scenario could also partially ease tensions around Israel, reducing the risk of direct conflict. However, even this scenario does not remove several fault lines: - The ideological hostility between Iran and Israel,- Tehran’s unwavering position on the missile program,- U.S. military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.This “frozen détente” could last for one to three years, assuming both sides show political will and avoid provocations. Second scenario: a new wave of escalation If the negotiations reach a deadlock—whether due to Washington’s excessive demands, Iran’s refusal to compromise on sensitive issues or outside interference—the situation could quickly spin out of control. In that case, possible outcomes include: - Direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities (by Israel or the U.S.),- Retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Qatar,- Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,- More active operations by Shiite militias in the region. Inside Iran, this could trigger another major wave of protests, especially if the economy takes another hit from stricter sanctions. There is also a risk that some radical opposition groups could try to take advantage of the unrest to start an uprising with high casualties—something Iran’s counterintelligence has already warned about.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Bukele appears to have the green light from the United States to deepen his authoritarian project with the help of Beijing. Recently, the ruling Salvadoran party, Nuevas Ideas, inaugurated a political training school in Nuevo Cuscatlán. The event was headlined by Félix Ulloa, Vice President of the Central American country, and China’s ambassador to El Salvador, Zhang Yanhui. According to the Central American news portal Expediente Público, the institute was reportedly sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), following a previous visit to Beijing by Ulloa and Xavier Zablah Bukele – leader of Nuevas Ideas and cousin of the Salvadoran president – during which several interparty cooperation agreements were finalized. This event highlights the diversified strategies China employs to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere. While public attention toward the Asian giant typically focuses on intergovernmental diplomacy, trade relations, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), less consideration is given to the forms of cooperation carried out by various international outreach bodies tied to the CCP in Latin America. The Czech think tank Sinopsis, which specializes in Chinese studies, notes: “Unlike many other countries, China’s foreign affairs extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and transcend official state-to-state diplomacy […] This system consists of various bodies and operates under the overarching concept of total diplomacy.” The CCP behind the scenes According to Central American and Chinese-language media, Zablah Bukele and Félix Ulloa held a meeting in April 2024 with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the CCP. On that occasion, representatives of bukelismo signed an agreement with the CCP’s cadre school, securing Chinese sponsorship for the newly inaugurated Political Training Institute of Nuevas Ideas. The ILD was established in 1951 to promote ties between the CCP and other communist parties across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the organization turned its focus to cultivating relationships with leftist groups of all kinds, from European social democrats to liberation movements in the Global South. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, the ILD began adopting a pragmatic approach, fostering good relations with both left- and right-wing parties. For instance, center-right organizations like Argentina’s Republican Proposal (PRO) have maintained ties with the CCP since 2009. Xi Jinping, while maintaining this approach, has made the ILD’s operations more assertive, turning it into a key instrument of Chinese foreign influence. Various think tanks and scholars of Chinese foreign policy have noted the quiet diplomacy exercised by the Asian giant through the ILD and other bodies. These include the United Front Work Department and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which function as parallel bureaucracies to the MoFA and are characterized by opaque activities and a purported autonomy from Beijing. However, these organizations aim to connect various sectors of foreign politics and civil society with the CCP. In particular, the ILD builds influence networks by training foreign politicians. Beyond offering training courses funded in China, the department has promoted the construction of training centers in countries such as Tanzania. In this way, the ILD seeks to forge close ties with foreign elites who, in addition to promoting Chinese soft power narratives – such as the superiority of the one-party model or the primacy of development over democracy and civil liberties – can lobby on Beijing’s behalf in agencies, cabinets, and parliaments. In this sense, Chinese support for Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute marks a significant step forward in cooperation between the CCP and El Salvador’s ruling party. The ILD’s training programs have also become spaces for transmitting authoritarian know-how. Researchers such as Lina Benabdallah and Christine Hackenesch point out that the CCP promotes the Chinese governance model to foreign elites – a model based on mass surveillance technologies, personal data storage, and internet censorship, typically provided by state-owned enterprises like Huawei. These practices are presented as alternatives for strengthening public security and internal stability, but in practice, they reinforce state control and restrict civil liberties in adopting countries. The paradoxes of Bukelismo The link between Nuevas Ideas and the CCP raises questions about the ideological leanings of Nayib Bukele. Just a few weeks ago, the Salvadoran president hosted U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in San Salvador to seal, in Rubio’s words, “a historic agreement, the most extraordinary in the world” on migration. Suppose this event signaled El Salvador’s intent to become one of the United States’ most important regional partners. How should we now interpret the growing political cooperation with China, the U.S.’s main strategic rival? On one hand, it is understandable that El Salvador’s ruling party seeks alignment with the CCP. The inauguration of Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute, with ILD’s blessing, is another episode of authoritarian cooperation in Latin America, where a regime well-versed in repression and control transfers knowledge and resources to another with similar aims. Similar patterns have been observed in the region with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which collaborate among themselves and with extra-regional autocracies like Russia, Iran, and China itself. Given this, it is not surprising that a self-proclaimed socialist regime and another linked to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) would cooperate beyond ideological differences. In fact, this has been the ILD’s hallmark in the 21st century: pragmatism in engaging with parties across the spectrum, ensuring long-term ties with various governments. This phenomenon reflects a central feature of our times: the erosion of the left-right divide in favor of a new tension between democracies and autocracies. On the other hand, the indoctrination of Nuevas Ideas’ cadres might even be tolerable to Trump, given that some CCP perspectives align with his political agenda. The pursuit of a multipolar order that secures spheres of influence for major powers – such as the South China Sea or Greenland – as well as the promotion of illiberal models of democracy – like China’s “whole-process democracy” or the unitary executive without checks and balances – are not foreign concepts to Make America Great Again. Based on this, Bukele may seem to have the green light to deepen his authoritarian project with Beijing’s help. As long as the PRC does not interfere with U.S. strategic interests in El Salvador – such as migration management or control of critical infrastructure – the 47th American president might remain content, regardless of China’s growing soft power in the hemisphere.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This study examines the short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications of recent "tariff wars" on the European Union (EU). The imposition of tariffs by the United States, particularly the "Liberation Day" tariffs announced by President Trump on April 2, 2025, led to significant disruptions in global supply chains, negatively impacted GDP growth, increased financial market volatility, and exacerbated geopolitical tensions. The EU faces challenges in navigating this shifting geopolitical landscape while maintaining its economic interests and influence. However, the EU has opportunities to leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market, foster international cooperation, and emerge as a more resilient global actor. The paper concludes by discussing the potential end of transatlanticism, the future of the EU, and the implications for globalisation in light of the current "tariff chaos." Keywords: Tariffs, Geopolitics, European Union, Trade Wars Introduction Before we examine the topic of tariffs, let us recall that the terms "tariff war" or "trade war" are not strictly academic. International Security scholars generally believe that the notion of war is reserved for military conflicts (both domestic and international) that involve at least a thousand casualties in any given year.[1] One of the most prominent sources in this regard is the Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, published by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, and the International Peace Research Institute at Uppsala University in Uppsala.[2] Therefore, "tariff war" or "tariff wars" are more journalistic and hyperbolic. Hence, they are used in this study with quotation marks. Journalists and commentators from various backgrounds often use inflated language to impress their readers. On the other hand, wars are cataclysmic events that have game-changing consequences. In this sense, some tools that state leaders use to achieve political and economic goals, such as tariffs, may have short- and long-term outcomes. Nonetheless, scholars who tend to be precise in their explanations will mainly discuss economic competition rather than "economic war" or "wars." This study investigates the short-, medium-, and possible long-term implications of "tariff wars" on the European Union. These implications appear multifaceted and encompass stability, political relationships, and a broader international order."Liberation Day" On April 2, US President Trump announced new tariffs under the banner of "Liberation Day" – a minimum baseline of 10 per cent tariffs on goods imported from all foreign countries and higher, reciprocal tariffs on nations that impose tariffs on US exports.[3]  Crucially, the White House claims that the new tariffs are reciprocal: "It is the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 per cent, and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated".[4] We did not have to wait for strong reactions to occur worldwide. China vowed to retaliate against the 34 per cent tariffs imposed by the US on Wednesday (April 2 2025) and protect its national interests while condemning the move as "an act of bullying".[5] Doubling down, a few days later, Trump threatened a 50 per cent tariff on China on top of previous reciprocal duties,[6] to which Chinese President Xi Jinping already replied hawkishly.[7] In an equally hawkish response, the Trump administration declared that Chinese goods would be subject to a 145 per cent tariff.[8] In a twist of events, on April 9, the US  declared a 90-day-long pause for previously declared tariffs covering the whole world (keeping a minimum of 10 per cent, though) except against China.[9] The next couple of weeks will show whether the world will enter the "tariff arms race" or we will enter some "tariff détente". Importantly, as one can surmise, "Xi has sold himself domestically and internationally as the guy standing up to America, and people that want to stand up to America should get in line behind Chairman Xi".[10] For the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described US universal tariffs as a significant blow to the world economy and claimed that the European Union was prepared to respond with countermeasures if talks with Washington failed. Accordingly, the EU was already finalising a first package of tariffs on up to 26 billion Euro ($28.4 billion) of US goods for mid-April in response to US steel and aluminium tariffs that took effect on March 12.[11] Consequently, on April 7, 2025, a meeting was organised in Luxembourg[12] regarding the EU's response to US tariffs on steel and aluminium and the preparation of countermeasures, which included a proposal to impose 25 per cent tariffs on US goods. Interestingly, the "Liberation Day" tariffs do not include Russia. According to numerous commentators, this indicates Moscow's importance as a future trade partner once the Ukrainian war is over. However, the official explanation issued by the White House suggests that the existing sanctions against Russia "preclude any meaningful trade."[13] Tariff imposition: short, medium and long-term consequences Several observable phenomena can be identified regarding their economic ramifications: First, the imposition of tariffs can lead to significant disruptions in global supply chains, thereby affecting industries that rely heavily on international trade. This disruption can lead to increased costs and reduced competitiveness for EU businesses, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.[14] While national measures may yield political and economic benefits in the short term, it is essential to note that global prosperity cannot be sustained without cooperative and stable international trade policies. Second, the Gross Domestic Product is likely to be impacted. The imposition of tariffs has been shown to negatively affect GDP growth. For instance, the US-China "trade war" decreased the GDP of both countries, which could similarly affect the EU if it becomes embroiled in similar conflicts.[15] Third, we examine volatility in the financial markets. "Tariff wars" contribute to financial market volatility, which can cause a ripple effect on EU economic stability. This volatility can deter investment and slow economic growth.[16] Fourth, political targeting and retaliation. "Tariff wars" often involve politically targeted retaliations, as seen in the US-China trade conflict. The EU has been adept at minimising economic damage while maximising political targeting, which could influence its future trade strategies and political alliances.[17] Fifth, global alliances are shifting. The EU may need to reconsider its trade alliances and partnerships in response to these shifting dynamics. This could involve forming new trade agreements or strengthening existing ones to mitigate the impact of "tariff wars."[18] Next, increased geopolitical competition and economic nationalism can exacerbate tensions between major powers, potentially leading to a crisis in globalization. As an aspiring global player, the EU must navigate these tensions carefully to maintain its influence and economic interests.[19] Social impacts should also be considered. "Trade wars" can lead to changes in employment and consumer prices, thus affecting the EU's social equity and economic stability. These changes necessitate policies that enhance social resilience and protect vulnerable populations.[20] Does Team Trump have a plan? The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration appear to be part of a broader strategy that Trump describes as a declaration of economic independence for the US, notably heralding them as part of the national emergency. The long-term effects of this strategy depend on how effectively the US can transition to domestic production without facing significant retaliation or trade barriers from other nations. Notably, the US dollar's status as the world's primary reserve currency has been supported by military power since the introduction of the Bretton Woods system. The US military, especially the US Navy, has helped secure trade routes, enforce economic policies, and establish a framework for international trade, favouring the US. dollar. The countries that subscribed to the system also gained access to the US consumer market. Importantly, what is explained by the Triffin Dilemma, back in the 1960s, the US had a choice: to either increase the supply of the US Dollar,  sought after by the whole world as a reserve currency and international trade currency and that way to upkeep global economic growth, which was pivotal for the US economy or to end the gold standard. In 1971, the US finished its Bretton Woods system. What followed was a new system primarily dictated by neoliberalism based on low tariffs, free capital movement, flexible exchange rates and US security guarantees.[21] Under that neoliberal system, reserve demand for American assets has pushed up the dollar, leading it to levels far in excess of what would balance international trade over the long run.[22] This made manufacturing in the US very expensive, and consequently, the deindustrialisation of the US followed. Therefore, it appears that Trump wants to keep the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and reindustrialise the US. According to Stephen Miran, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (a United States agency within the Executive Office of the President), two key elements to achieve this goal are tariffs and addressing currency undervaluation of other nations.[23] The second element in that duo is also known as the Mar-a-Lago Accord.[24] Scott Bessent, 79th US Secretary of the Treasury, picked up this argument.[25] In a nutshell, the current "tariff chaos" is arguably only temporary, and in the long term, it is designed to provide an advantage for the US economy.A readjustment of sorts fundamentally reshapes the existing international political economy. Whether or not this plan works and achieves its goals is entirely different. As market analysts observe, "For the past two decades, the US has focused on high-tech services like Amazon and Google services, which have added to a service surplus. However, the real sustainable wealth comes from the manufacturing of goods, which, for the US, went from 17 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in 2023 of GDP. The entire process of building goods creates many mini ecosystems of production/capital value that stay in a country for many decades. […] Initially, the Chinese started in low-tech and low-cost labour manufacturing before 2001, but shifted towards becoming major manufacturers of high-tech products like robotics and EV automobiles. […] For President Trump to levy high tariffs on the Chinese in the current moment, he is doing everything that he can to resuscitate US manufacturing".[26] EU's options The EU and the US share the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with 2024 data showing EU exports to the US at 531.6 billion euros and imports at 333.4 billion euros, resulting in a 198.2 billion Euro trade surplus for the EU.[27] While the EU faces significant challenges due to "tariff wars," there are potential opportunities for positive outcomes. The EU can leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market and enhance its role in global trade. By adopting proactive trade policies and fostering international cooperation, the EU can mitigate the negative impacts of "tariff wars" and potentially emerge as a more resilient and influential global actor. However, this requires careful navigation of the complex geopolitical landscape and a commitment to maintaining open and cooperative trade relations. It seems likely that the EU can leverage recent US tariffs to strengthen ties with China and India, potentially reducing its dependency on US trade. China is the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade at 739 billion euros in 2023, though a large deficit favouring China (292 billion euros in 2023).[28] The EU's strategy is to de-risk, not decouple, focusing on reciprocity and reducing dependencies; however, competition and systemic rivalry complicate deeper ties. Meanwhile, India's trade with the EU was 124 billion euros in goods in 2023, and ongoing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, expected to conclude by 2025, could yield short-term economic gains of 4.4 billion euros for both.[29] India's fast-growing economy and shared interest in technology make it a potentially promising partner. EU and China: Opportunities and Challenges Economically, there are more opportunities than challenges. China remains the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching 739 billion euros in 2023, down 14 per cent from 2022 due to global economic shifts.[30] The trade balance shows a significant deficit of 292 billion euros in 2023, driven by imports of telecommunications equipment and machinery, whereas EU exports include motor cars and medicaments. The EU's strategy, outlined in its 2019 strategic outlook and reaffirmed in 2023, positions China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, focusing on de-risking rather than decoupling. Recent actions, such as anti-dumping duties on Chinese glass fibre yarns in March 2025, highlight tensions over unfair trade practices. Despite these challenges, China's market size offers opportunities, especially if the EU can negotiate for better access. However, geopolitical rivalry complicates deeper ties, including EU probes, in Chinese subsidies. Politically, the EU and China differ significantly in this regard. Regarding human rights policies, the EU consistently raises concerns about human rights issues in China.[31] These concerns often lead to friction, with the European Parliament blocking trade agreements and imposing sanctions on them. Moreover, China's stance on the war in Ukraine has created tension, with the EU viewing Russia as a major threat, and China's support of Russia is a significant concern.[32] China is often perceived in Western European capitals as not making concessions on issues vital to European interests.[33] The understanding of the war's root causes, the assessment of implications, risks or potential solutions - in all these areas, the Chinese leadership on the one hand and the European governments and the EU Commission in Brussels on the other hand have expressed very different, at times even contrary, positions.[34] Finally, China's political model demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, challenging Western emphasis on democracy and human rights.[35] EU and India: Growing Partnership and FTA Prospects and Political Challenges Economically, it seems that there are more opportunities than challenges. India, ranked as the EU's ninth-largest trading partner, accounted for 124 billion euros in goods trade in 2023, representing 2.2 per cent of the EU's total trade, with growth of around 90 per cent over the past decade.[36] Services trade reached nearly 60 billion euros in 2023, almost doubling since 2020, with a third being digital services.[37] The EU is India's largest trading partner, and ongoing negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA), investment protection, and geographical indications, initiated in 2007 and resuming in 2022, aim for conclusion by 2025.[38] A 2008 trade impact assessment suggests positive real income effects, with short-term gains of 3–4.4 billion euros for both parties. The EU seeks to lower Indian tariffs on cars, wine, and whiskey. Simultaneously, India has pushed for market access to pharmaceuticals and easier work visas for IT professionals. However, concerns remain regarding the impact of EU border carbon taxes and farm subsidies on Indian farmers. Politically, challenges to EU-India relations stem from several sources. Trade has been a persistent friction point, with negotiations for a free trade agreement facing roadblocks (Malaponti, 2024). Despite the EU being a significant trading partner for India,[39] differing approaches to trade liberalization have hindered progress. India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[40] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[41] Finally, while the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper, more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[42] Conclusions "What does Trump want? This question is on the minds of policymakers and experts worldwide. Perhaps we are witnessing the opening salvo of a decisive phase of the US-China economic conflict - the most serious conflict since 1989. It is likely the beginning of the end of the ideology of Globalism and the processes of globalisation. It is arguably aggressive "decoupling" at its worst and the fragmentation of the world economy. For the EU, this is a new situation which dictates new challenges. Someday, probably sooner than later, European political elites will have to make a choice. To loosen or perhaps even end the transatlantic community and go against the US. Perhaps in tandem with some of the BRICS countries, such as India and China, or swallow the bitter pill, redefine its current economic model, and once again gamble with Washington, this time against the BRICS. It seems that the EU and its member states are at a crossroads, and their next choice of action will have to be very careful. In a likely new "Cold War" between the US and this time, China, the EU might not be allowed to play the third party, neutral status. One should also remember that Trump, like Putin or Xi, likes to talk to EU member states' representatives directly, bypassing Brussels and unelected "Eureaucrats' like Ursula Von der Leyen. In other words, he tends to leverage his position against the unity of the EU, which should not be surprising given the internal EU conflicts. More often than not, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, or Nordic members of the EU clash on numerous Issues with Berlin, Paris and most importantly, Brussels. (I write more about it here: Will the EU even survive? Vital external and internal challenges ahead of the EU in the newly emerging world order. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4577).   References [1] See more at:  For detailed information, consult one of the most comprehensive databases on conflicts run by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme at: https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia[2] Pettersson, Therese. 2019. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 19.1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-191.pdf[3] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/[4] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify… op. cit.[5] Hanin Bochen, and Ziwen Zhao. "China vows to retaliate after 'bullying' US imposes 34% reciprocal tariffs". South China Morning Post. April 3 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/us/diplomacy/article/3304971/trump-announced-34-reciprocal-tariffs-chinese-goods-part-liberation-day-package[6] Megerian, Chris and Boak, Josh. "Trump threatens new 50% tariff on China on top of 'reciprocal' duties". Global News. April 7, 2025. https://globalnews.ca/news/11119347/trump-added-50-percent-tariff-china/[7] Tan Yvette, Liang Annabelle and Ng Kelly. "China is not backing down from Trump's tariff war. What next?". BBC, April 8 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg51yw700lo[8] Wong, Olga. “Trump further raises tariffs to 120% on small parcels from mainland, Hong Kong”. South China Morning Post, 11 April 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3306069/trump-further-raises-tariffs-120-small-parcels-mainland-hong-kong?utm_source=feedly_feed[9] Chu, Ben. “ What does Trump's tariff pause mean for global trade?”, BBC, 10 April, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz95589ey9yo[10] Wu, Terri. "Why US Has Upper Hand Over Beijing in Tariff Standoff". The Epoch Times April 7, 2025. https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/why-us-has-upper-hand-over-beijing-in-tariff-standoff-5838158?utm_source=epochHG&utm_campaign=jj  [11] Blenkinsop, Philip, and Van Overstraeten, Benoit. "EU plans countermeasures to new US tariffs, says EU chief." April 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-prepare-countermeasures-us-reciprocal-tariffs-says-eu-chief-2025-04-03/[12] Payne, Julia. The EU Commission proposes 25% counter-tariffs on some US imports, document shows". Reuters, April 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/eu-commission-proposes-25-counter-tariffs-some-us-imports-document-shows-2025-04-07/  [13] Bennett, Ivor. "US seems content to cosy up to Russia instead of imposing tariffs." Sky News, April 4, 2025. https://news.sky.com/story/us-seems-content-to-cosy-up-to-russia-instead-of-coerce-it-with-tariffs-13341300[14] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research, 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[15] Ilhomjonov, Ibrohim, and Akbarali Yakubov. "THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USA ON THE WORLD ECONOMY," June 16, 2024. https://interoncof.com/index.php/USA/article/view/2112[16] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[17] Fetzer, Thiemo, and Schwarz Carlo. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." Economic Journal 131: no. 636 (May 2021): 1717–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa122[18] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship …op. cit.[19] Mihaylov, Valentin Todorov, and Sławomir Sitek. 2021. "Trade Wars and the Changing International Order: A Crisis of Globalisation?" Miscellanea Geographica 25: 99–109. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051[20] Wheatley, Mary Christine. "Global Trade Wars: Economic and Social Impacts." PREMIER JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, November 5, 2024. https://premierscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/pjbm-24-368.pdf[21] Money & Macro, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ts5wJ6OfzA&t=572s[22] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System." November 2024. Hudson Bay Capital. https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf[23] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System"... op.cit.[24] Zongyuan Zoe Liu, "Why the Proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord May Not be the Magic Wand That Trump Is Hoping For", 9  April 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-proposed-mar-lago-accord-may-not-be-magic-wand-trump-hoping  [25] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent Breaks Down Trump's Tariff Plan and Its Impact on the Middle Class. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLnX1SQfgJI[26] Park, Thomas. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7316122202846765056/[27] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250311-1[28] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[29] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know." World Economic Forum. March 7 2025. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/eu-india-free-trade-agreement/[30] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[31] "The paradoxical relationship between the EU and China'. Eastminster: a global politics & policy blog, University of East Anglia. http://www.ueapolitics.org/2022/03/29/the-paradoxical-relationship-between-the-eu-and-china/[32] Vasselier, Abigaël. "Relations between the EU and China: what to watch for in 2024". January 25 2025. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/relations-between-eu-and-china-what-watch-2024 [33] Benner, Thorsten. "Europe Is Disastrously Split on China." Foreign Policy, April 12 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/12/europe-china-policy-brussels-macron-xi-jinping-von-der-leyen-sanchez/[34] Chen, D., N. Godehardt, M., Mayer, X., Zhang. 2022. "Europe and China at a Crossroads." 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/europe-and-china-at-a-crossroads.[35] Sharshenova, A. and Crawford. 2017. "Undermining Western Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: China's Countervailing Influences, Powers and Impact." Central Asian Survey 36 (4): 453. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2017.1372364.[36] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en[37] See more at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/key-outcomes-second-eu-india-trade-and-technology-council[38] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know"… op. cit.[39] Malaponti, Chiara. 2024. “Rebooting EU-India Relations: How to Unlock Post-Election Potential.” https://ecfr.eu/article/rebooting-eu-india-relations-how-to-unlock-post-election-potential/.[40] Sinha, Aseema, and Jon P. Dorschner. 2009. “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?” Polity 42 (1): 74. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19.[41] Chandrasekar, Anunita. 2025. “It’s Time to Upgrade the EU-India Relationship.” https://www.cer.eu/insights/its-time-upgrade-eu-india-relationship.[42] Gare, Frédéric and Reuter Manisha. “Here be dragons: India-China relations and their consequences for Europe”. 25 May 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/here-be-dragons-india-china-relations-and-their-consequences-for-europe/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq, international and regional warnings about the resurgence of ISIS have resurfaced, driven by mounting evidence of the group’s reorganization and its exploitation of the security vacuum left by military collapses and political instability. Since late 2024, multiple reports have pointed to a noticeable uptick in ISIS activity, an increase in the frequency of its attacks, and a growing ability to maneuver and recruit—fueled by weak regional coordination and diverging priorities among key international actors. Far from being ideologically defeated, ISIS appears to be reshaping itself within a volatile landscape, threatening to usher in a new phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the following analysis explores the main features of the group’s resurgence, the dynamics of its territorial re-expansion, and the regional and international efforts to contain it—seeking to unpack the nature of this renewed threat and assess its potential implications. International Warnings Over the Growing Threat of ISIS A series of international and regional statements and warnings issued since late 2024 reflect mounting concerns over the reemergence of the terrorist group ISIS on the regional scene, amid fragile security conditions and a diminished capacity to contain unconventional threats. In December 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, in a phone call with the UK Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer, revealed alarming signs of ISIS regrouping. He noted that the organization had managed to seize large stockpiles of weapons following the collapse of Syrian army units that abandoned their arsenals—enabling ISIS to expand its territorial presence in parts of Syria. This alarming development has not only been flagged by Iraq but has also featured prominently in international reports. On February 10, 2025, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, during a briefing before the Security Council, confirmed that ISIS continues to demonstrate a striking ability to adapt and evolve its tactics, despite ongoing security and military pressure from member states and international and regional partners. The 20th report of the UN Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security emphasized that the group has not been ideologically defeated; rather, it is restructuring itself within the security and political voids present in Syria, Iraq, and other areas. In the same context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned in March 2025 of a "real danger" posed by ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, pointing to the lack of political settlements and the breakdown of certain internal security structures as conditions conducive to the group's return. His warning echoed the concluding statement of the meeting of foreign ministers from Syria’s neighboring countries, held in Amman, Jordan, on March 9, 2025. The ministers expressed deep concern over the escalating ISIS threat and underscored the need to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms—particularly in intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations along Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stressed that "combating ISIS is no longer a local issue, but a collective responsibility that demands effective regional readiness and robust international support." He highlighted that the group’s threat has grown not only in terms of manpower but also in terms of military capabilities, and that its reach is now expanding beyond border areas into the Syrian heartland itself. These developments indicate that, despite the significant blows dealt to it in recent years, ISIS continues to benefit from the fluid geopolitical landscape in Syria—one that creates security gaps the group can exploit to reposition and reorganize itself. Furthermore, the conflicting priorities among international and regional actors in the Syrian file are hindering the formation of a unified front to confront this renewed threat. This fragmentation makes the challenge far more complex and reinforces the notion that the battle against ISIS remains far from over—both on the ground and within the broader framework of collective security. Signs of Escalation ISIS continues to consolidate its presence in Syria through its deployment across two geographically separate yet strategically interconnected regions—demonstrating the group’s persistent ability to exploit security gaps and divergences among local and international actors. The first area lies in Syria’s northeastern region, known as al-Jazira, which is nominally under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite this control, ISIS has maintained a notable presence in the southern desert of al-Hasakah province, geographically linked to the northeastern outskirts of the city of Al-Bukamal, particularly around the town of Al-Baghuz—the group’s last urban stronghold before its official collapse. This geographic footprint extends beyond Syria’s borders into Iraq, specifically into the Hadar desert in Nineveh province. Although concrete barriers now separate the two countries, ISIS has retained a clear ability to move across the border, as confirmed by testimonies from residents in the rural areas of al-Hasakah—rekindling memories of the "parallel state" dynamic the group sought to establish during its peak between 2014 and 2017. The year 2024 saw a marked increase in ISIS activity within Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the group carried out 491 operations throughout the year. In its report released on December 30, 2024, the Observatory noted that ISIS has successfully exploited political and military turmoil to reorganize and launch targeted attacks. In line with this, the Soufan Center reported on December 18 that ISIS attacks had tripled in frequency compared to 2023. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on July 17 that the group claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria during just the first half of 2024—clearly reflecting a strategy aimed at “escalating operational activity to compensate for structural decline.”  This upward trend reinforces the growing assumption that ISIS is leveraging fragile security conditions not only to expand its territorial influence but also to challenge other extremist groups—most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria. HTS has faced internal challenges linked to the novelty of its governance experiment and has been weakened by surprise attacks that undermine its structure and heighten insecurity in its areas of control. ISIS, in turn, appears intent on diffusing HTS’s efforts, exacerbating divisions among factions, and exploiting public discontent with local elites. These developments have also triggered serious concerns over potential spillover effects in Iraq, especially given the deeply interwoven geographic linkages between the Syrian and Iraqi theaters of operation. The cross-border mobility of ISIS operatives could reactivate dormant cells in Iraq’s western and northern provinces—particularly given the thousands of radicalized individuals currently held in Iraqi prisons, making these facilities potential targets for jailbreaks or attempts to reassert control, as seen in the earlier Ghweran prison attack in al-Hasakah. In light of this complex battlefield landscape, the fight against ISIS is far from over. The group—demonstrating notable tactical agility—is reconstituting itself within existing voids, capitalizing on fragmentation, and continually seeking new pathways for resurgence through the shifting terrain of regional geopolitics. The inability of certain local and regional powers to formulate a sustainable, collective counterterrorism strategy only further emboldens the group’s ambitions. Contours of a New Phase in the War Against ISIS The final months of 2024 and early 2025 witnessed a series of high-profile operations targeting senior ISIS leaders, signaling a tactical shift in the counterterrorism strategies adopted by international and regional powers. This shift marks the beginning of a new phase in the fight against ISIS—one that moves beyond random strikes to a focused campaign against the group’s leadership infrastructure. On December 20, 2024, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a precision airstrike in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, initially claiming it had killed ISIS’s leader, known as “Abu Yusuf.” However, CENTCOM later revised its statement, clarifying that the target was not the overall leader but a senior commander named Mahmoud “Abu Yusuf,” along with two of his aides. This correction reflects the complex intelligence challenges involved in identifying high-ranking ISIS figures, especially in an environment riddled with infiltration and security deception. In a related development, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani announced in March 2025, via a post on the platform X, the killing of one of the group’s most dangerous operatives: Abdullah Maki Masleh Al-Rifai, known as “Abu Khadijah,” who held the title of “Wali of Iraq and Syria” within ISIS's organizational structure. His elimination, the result of coordinated efforts between Iraqi intelligence and the Joint Operations Command—supported by the international coalition—demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-layered coordination in tracking down the group’s hidden leadership. On the European front, France returned to active operations against ISIS in Syria for the first time in over two years. In December 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that French warplanes had conducted precision strikes on ISIS positions inside Syrian territory. He emphasized that the operation, carried out the previous Sunday, underscored France’s continued commitment to counterterrorism efforts in the Levant. This marked France’s first such strike since September 2022—indicating a potential reactivation of its counterterrorism role and a broader effort to reassert European engagement in Syria, a file that has largely been dominated by the U.S., Russia, and Turkey. These three operations—American, Iraqi, and French—reflect what appears to be a renewed “leadership decapitation campaign” targeting ISIS commanders amid rising concerns over the group’s resurgence in Syria and Iraq. Yet, while such strikes carry strategic importance, they cannot substitute for broader efforts to dismantle the ideological, organizational, and financial foundations that allow ISIS to regenerate. Killing leaders may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities, but it does not ensure its eradication unless accompanied by comprehensive political and security solutions that address the roots of extremism and the institutional fragility on which the group thrives. In a notable development suggesting a qualitative shift in how regional states are approaching the terrorism file, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria announced in February 2025 the establishment of a joint cooperation mechanism to confront ISIS. The agreement emphasizes close coordination between foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, covering areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations. This move reflects a shared recognition that the terrorist threat transcends borders and demands coordinated frameworks that go beyond bilateral interests toward a collective regional security logic. This agreement laid the foundation for a broader process that culminated in a high-level five-party summit on March 8, 2025. The meeting brought together foreign and defense ministers, senior military commanders, and intelligence chiefs from the four founding countries, with Lebanon later joining the process. From the Turkish side, the meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın—highlighting Turkey’s strategic investment in this forum as a platform for reshaping the security landscape in northern Syria and Iraq. More broadly, this nascent regional alliance reflects a growing inclination to reduce dependence on Western powers in managing regional security issues. Instead, it seeks to establish a “new security architecture” led by Middle Eastern nations themselves—reviving the role of Arab and regional capitals in controlling border zones and reclaiming areas that ISIS may seek to exploit as fallback havens for regrouping and redeployment. Conclusion The available data indicates that ISIS is entering a new phase of reactivation and repositioning in the Syrian theater, capitalizing on the security and political collapse following the fall of central authority, and on the conflicting agendas of regional and international actors. Despite targeted strikes against some of its leaders, the group continues to demonstrate its operational adaptability and its ability to evolve amid shifting field dynamics. The resurgence of ISIS attacks and its expansion into ungoverned spaces signal a complex phase of confrontation—one that demands more than just military maneuvers. The success of the war against ISIS in Syria depends not only on precision strikes but also on the establishment of effective regional security partnerships and the activation of political and developmental pathways that address the root causes of extremism. As the group seeks to exploit divisions, its complete disappearance will hinge on the creation of a comprehensive deterrence architecture—one that goes beyond temporary fixes and moves toward sustainable strategies that tackle the structural foundations of militancy, not just its symptoms.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Signed in 2024, the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has reshaped regional dynamics, potentially granting Ethiopia sea access via Berbera in exchange for Somaliland’s recognition. This move challenged Somalia’s territorial integrity and prompted Mogadishu to align itself with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia. While the crisis reflects Ethiopia’s strategic push for a maritime presence, it also captures Somaliland’s long-standing quest for independence. In the wider Red Sea region, regional tensions are exacerbated by extra-regional actors which include the UAE, Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have their own interests therein. Although, external actors do not directly cause conflict, their involvement emboldens local actors and escalates rivalries. Hence, the Red Sea region has a growing importance in contemporary global geopolitics. Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Geopolitical Ambitions and the Quest for Recognition The year 2024 began with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The latter, formerly British Somaliland, was part of Somalia, from which it unilaterally seceded after Siad Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has been self-ruled and is considered a de facto state. However, the Hargheisa authority does not enjoy any international legal recognition. If implemented, the agreement with Addis Ababa would give Somaliland its first significant de jure recognition. In return, the Hargheisa authorities would grant Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera and the concession of a coastal area for military use. The situation revolves around three key regional players: Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland. Each of these actors has engaged in activities driven by its own objectives and strategic priorities. Ethiopia’s decision is influenced by several practical economic and strategic factors. Following the Eritrean War in the early 1990s, Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports and became the world’s most populous landlocked country. Since 1998, Djibouti’s ports have handled 95 per cent of trade to and from Addis Ababa. Sea access through Djibouti costs Ethiopia between $1.5 and $2 billion annually which Ethiopia’s rulers, since 2019, begun to express more strongly that they consider this spending excessive and unsustainable in the medium to long term. To reduce Addis Ababa’s dependence on Djiboutian ports, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed believes it is necessary to find a viable alternative. Before the MoU, Ethiopia had considered several alternatives to Djibouti, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Kenya. The idea of developing an economic and trade corridor between Addis Ababa and the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden began to take shape in the final months of 2023. Somaliland’s main port has been operated by the Emirati company – DP World since 2015, which has developed its infrastructure and increased its cargo transit capacity. Ethiopia estimates that it can divert between 12 and 15 per cent of the total volume passing through Djibouti’s ports to Berbera and, in the long term, connect its industrial zones to several trade corridors. From a strategic point of view, Ethiopian assessments are influenced by Addis Ababa’s national role conception. Ethiopia sees itself as the leading regional power because of its history and traditional economic and political weight in the region. Consequently, Ethiopian elites perceive the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as their natural strategic spheres. For this reason, the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs recently announced the ‘Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.’ The new agenda aims to expand the sphere of national interest and action eastwards towards the sea, unlike in the past when the focus of Ethiopia’s strategic projection was mainly on the Nile Basin. Indeed, Ethiopia’s ambitions as a regional power are challenged by its lack of a maritime gateway. For Addis Ababa, having a presence in the Red Sea would provide two strategic benefits: first, it would strengthen its standing in the region; second, it would bolster Ethiopia’s international role by enhancing cooperation in multilateral anti-piracy efforts. In short, the Ethiopian government sees maritime projection as a strategic resource and a gateway to the geopolitics of the coming decades, which will focus on Asia and the Indo-Pacific in particular. Therefore, one of the key clauses of the MoU allows Ethiopia to establish a military outpost in Lughaya, a town overlooking the Gulf of Aden, for at least fifty years. According to Ethiopian plans, the naval base will become the headquarters of the nascent Ethiopian navy. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a further step on the difficult path to independence. In the past year, the issue of Somaliland’s independence has gained renewed attention and relevance. This pursuit of self-determination is deeply rooted in a historical context that stretches back to the 19th century, predating the regime of Siad Barre. The Somalilanders’ path began during a pivotal time when the British Empire established agreements with various Somali clans, particularly the Gadabuursi, Issa, and Habr Awal. In 1884, the region was officially designated as British Somaliland, a protectorate that enjoyed a measure of autonomy and governance, distinguishing it from the colonial dominance exerted by Italian authorities in southern Somalia. Following the unification of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960, the social, economic, and political conditions of the people of Somaliland began to deteriorate, leading to widespread discontent and a strong desire for independence. Over time, the Siad Barre regime cast a long shadow over Somaliland, leading to widespread discrimination and marginalisation. The political and economic machinations of the central government often neglected the aspirations of the Somaliland people, fuelling a growing sense of injustice. In this context, collective memory became a powerful cornerstone of identity, highlighting the stark contrasts between Somaliland’s struggles and Somalia’s divergent trajectories in the turbulent post-Siad Barre era. Hargheisa’s quest for independence is rooted in historical grievances and reflects the unique identities and trajectories of its people. The Somaliland narrative often draws comparisons with the current situation in the rest of Somalia. Over the past three decades, this de facto state has made significant progress towards sustainable institutional and administrative development albeit on a very limited budget. The democratisation process is also crucial to further the development of Somaliland’s independence. The recent national elections held last November demonstrated the political maturity of all parties involved. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated government to the electoral process is a remarkable event in the region and stands out as one of the few such instances in the continent. The achievements of the institution-building process in Somaliland are even more striking when compared to the path taken by Somalia. Somalia’s Diplomatic Counterbalance and the Emergence of an Anti-Ethiopian Block  The signing of the MoU by Ethiopia and Somaliland raised concerns among regional actors, particularly Somalia. As Somaliland is formally and legally recognised as an integral part of Somalia, there were fears that Hargeisa’s claims to independence were gaining momentum. Mogadishu was particularly concerned that Ethiopia’s official recognition of Somaliland’s claims could trigger a domino effect, leading other regional and extra-regional actors to follow suit. Therefore, Somalia saw Ethiopia’s actions as a deliberate act of intimidation that threatened its territorial integrity at a sensitive time for its political future. Somalia faces several challenges, including the struggle to establish an effective institutional framework, particularly with regard to the relationship between the central government and the federal states, and also the fight against the terrorist group – al-Shabaab. In response to the MoU, the Somali executive, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, launched an intense diplomatic campaign to prevent its implementation and recognition by the international community. Somalia has sought support from regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU). In doing so, Somalia has consolidated alliances with both regional and extra-regional actors. As a result, the dynamics between these three actors – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland have become increasingly intertwined. Mogadishu’s natural anti-Ethiopian partners are two of Addis Ababa’s historical rivals: Eritrea and Egypt. Compared to 2018, the year of normalisation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the situation today is very different. The positions of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quickly diverged following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (2022), which ended the two-year conflict in Tigray. Eritrea, which had supported the Ethiopian military campaign, refused to negotiate with the Tigrayan authorities, represented by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The distance between the two leaders has widened as Ethiopia’s claims to the sea have grown. Indeed, Asmara fears that Ethiopia is eyeing its ports, a fear fuelled by the rhetoric of Abiy and other Ethiopian leaders. Conversely, Isaias has used his leadership and many regional relationships to foster a kind of ‘anti-Ethiopian coalition’. One significant change has been Egypt’s increasing involvement in the region. Mogadishu’s rapprochement with Cairo was formalised in August 2024 with the signing of a defence agreement. This agreement centres on Egypt’s intention to support Somalia’s request for the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops currently stationed in Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly known as Atmis, replaced by the Aussom mission on 1 January 2025). The strengthening of Somali-Egyptian relations, supported by Asmara and involving Djibouti through a security cooperation agreement, has consolidated an anti-Ethiopian bloc. This alignment represents a significant shift in the regional balance and illustrates Egypt’s changing Africa policy. Since 2020, Egypt has reaffirmed the importance of its southern relations. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has gradually reassessed Egypt’s African relations and promoted a geopolitical strategy that emphasises a north-south axis, rather than the east-west axis that dominated in previous decades. The Red Sea region, including the Nile Basin, is now a key part of this new strategic framework, which is shaped by Egypt’s historical rivalry with Ethiopia. Between the two states, the balance on the Nile has changed. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given Ethiopia a strategic advantage over Egypt. Egypt therefore had to adapt its approach to the ongoing dynamics by deciding to expand the areas of contention toward the sea. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia therefore provided an opportunity to increase Egypt’s footprint in the region. Regional Tensions and Extra-regional Actors in the Red Sea The MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland has opened a new phase in tensions. The focus of regional tensions is shifting to the coastal areas, particularly the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are marked by a number of security and defence agreements. Common strategic interests underpin the alignment of the anti-Ethiopian bloc, which includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt. Somalia views any legal recognition of Somaliland’s independence as an existential threat. For Djibouti, the economic damage from increased trade through Berbera is marginal but potentially devastating to its fragile internal balance of power. Eritrea perceives Ethiopia as an ongoing threat, and the current Ethiopian government is seen by Asmara as highly unreliable, raising concerns about a potential escalation of violence along their shared borders. Finally, for Egypt, the assessment of its regional position is of particular importance. Traditionally, Cairo has regarded the waters between Suez and Aden as its ‘lake’. As a result, like Addis Ababa, it regards the entire region as part of its sphere of influence. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey are among the most active players in the region. The UAE has supported the MoU to capitalise on investments in Berbera and Addis Ababa. Turkey, on the other hand, has taken a more balanced approach, thanks to its strong political and commercial ties with Ethiopia and Somalia. For Ankara, however, Somalia’s integrity must not be questioned. Following their rapprochement in 2021, the UAE and Turkey have maintained good relations. Despite their different strategies and some disagreements, both nations share a common interest in maintaining a central role in regional affairs. Other extra-regional players, such as France and Saudi Arabia, are also active in the background. France supports the MoU as part of its ongoing efforts to increase its presence in East Africa, which began at the same time as its withdrawal from the Sahel region. Its base in Djibouti is destined to become more central to French policy as French military presence in West Africa is being reduced. French officials see this increased influence in regional affairs as essential to France’s future interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical focus is shifting from the Gulf to the Red Sea, opposes the implementation of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. It seeks to counter regional projects promoted by the UAE. This might be as a result of the long-standing political rift between the two Gulf monarchies. Extra-regional actors do not directly cause an increase in regional conflicts. Rather, it is local actors who, feeling empowered by their connections with these extra-regional partners, perceive their environment as more permissive and gain the confidence to take assertive actions that they may not have considered before. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on why Ethiopia and Somaliland decided to sign the MoU at this historic moment. This perspective also helps to explain other regional crises, such as the civil war in Sudan and the conflict in Tigray. The different transformations in the international system have created a context in which local actors can seek multiple forms of external support. Increased alignment and overlap between local and regional rivalries has increased the willingness of actors to take assertive action, leading to a general increase in inter- and intra-state tensions. However, the flexible nature of alliances can also mitigate the risk of the trickle-down effect that often accompanies such alliances. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ecuador shows the red card to a possible return of the Correísmo. Daniel Noboa remains president of Ecuador. The young head of state won the run-off election for the highest state office against his left-wing populist challenger Luisa González by a surprisingly clear margin of over eleven percent. The refusal of the loser to acknowledge her defeat once again demonstrates the great polarization in the country. After a peaceful election, this division into two camps is one of the biggest challenges facing the winner of the election, alongside curbing organized crime and the complicated economic situation. When the National Electoral Council announced an "incontrovertible trend" in favor of President Daniel Noboa just a few hours after the polling stations closed on 13 April, his supporters erupted in jubilation. This was particularly great, as the victory of 55.65% to 44.35% after more than 99% of the votes had been counted was much clearer than all the polls had predicted. The expected close election result had given rise to general concern that the election could have unpleasant repercussions in the form of electoral disputes, which would be detrimental to Ecuadorian democracy. The strong result for incumbent Daniel Noboa is beyond question but should not be read as total approval of Noboa's policies by the electorate. Rather, it clearly shows that, despite all the criticism of the government, Ecuadorians do not want to return to the "socialism of the XXI century" and its Ecuadorian figurehead Rafael Correa, from whose all-consuming shadow the defeated presidential candidate Luisa González was unable to emerge. Correismo's resistance to recognizing the election result on election night seems more than questionable given Noboa's clear lead of more than one million votes. The election campaign While Noboa was clearly committed to retaining the dollar as a means of payment, a further opening towards the USA and a relentless fight against organized crime in the run-up to the run-off election, González stood for a completely different course. She questioned the dollarization of Ecuador, proposed recognition of the Maduro regime in Venezuela with the resumption of diplomatic relations and, with regard to the fight against drug-related crime, wanted to follow the example of former Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, whose policy of "abrazos, no balazos" ("hugs, no bullets") was more of a sham pacification and a modus vivendi with the drug gangs than a real approach to the issue. Businessman's son Daniel Noboa, who has only been in power since November 2023 thanks to an extraordinary election following the end of former President Guillermo Lasso's government, has been characterized by a pragmatic approach in his brief time in office since November 2023. His government prioritized concrete and high-profile measures, particularly in the fight against crime, over ideological discourse. However, due to his short time in office, many of his actions were characterized more by campaign tactics than strategy. In contrast, Luisa González attempted to link her program to the legacy of former President Rafael Correa but made certain nuances and strategic distancing. In particular, she was critical of the Communications Law (also known as the "muzzle law"), which had been used as the basis for the persecution of journalists and the media during Rafael Correa's time in office (2007-2017). In the weeks leading up to the run-off, the focus of the election campaign was on the economy, security, and organized crime. There was no shortage of mutual accusations and all too often polemics took precedence over arguments. In view of the continuing catastrophic security situation, in which people are losing their lives in violence every hour and kidnapping rates in the country have risen by 73.9% between 2023 and 2024,[i] concepts are urgently needed. Clever marketing After the young electorate between the ages of 18 and 29 voted for the 37-year-old Noboa in the first round of voting, this time the older population groups also appear to have voted for the president. The general voter turnout was 83.76%, around two percentage points higher than in the first round of voting. In a country where many people have lost confidence in politics and its representatives, Noboa still seems to represent their hopes of overcoming the grievances, the outdated elites and the Correísmo. With his presence in the social media and a renewed self-presentation with giant papier-mâché figures distributed throughout the country, he once again managed to achieve a strong public presence. People of all ages and social classes could be seen roaming the streets of the capital Quito, for example, taking selfies with the papier-mâché Noboas, which were then shared millions of times on social networks. With such marketing tricks, his determined and youthful appearance and the fear of large parts of Ecuador of a return of the Correísmo, Noboa was able to extend his lead compared to the virtually undecided first round of elections on February 9 and win five provinces that had previously gone to Luisa González - El Oro, Guayas, Imbabura, Orellana and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas. Major construction sites For Ecuador and its old and new president, however, Noboa's election victory means only a brief respite in a situation that remains tense. The challenges remain enormous. The new National Assembly elected in February is divided into two large blocs that support Noboa and González (or Correa). There are also a number of smaller blocs and individual deputies, on whose support Noboa will be dependent due to the lack of a majority of his own. Noboa will have to demonstrate his ability to act and make convincing political proposals in order to achieve governance that serves the common good. The future of the country will depend on how well it manages to identify points of consensus and tackle the structural challenges. In this context, technical and non-partisan initiatives that manage to bundle the country's national priorities offer an opportunity. A national deficit of more than five billion US dollars, high foreign debt, and too few sustainable sources of revenue for the state will make governing difficult. Debt repayments and difficult renegotiations with the International Monetary Fund regarding the granting of further loans are also on the cards. The new government must therefore also aim to create jobs and get people into regular employment. Around 70 percent of the population still lives from the informal sector. In other words, only around 30 percent of the population work in the context of a formal employment relationship and pay taxes regularly. The president must also develop a coherent strategy for restructuring the energy system in order to avoid the hours-long power cuts that plagued the country last year. A supply system that is dependent on hydropower, dilapidated infrastructure, and a lack of diversification in the energy mix hang like a sword of Damocles over the president and could soon earn him the displeasure of the population. Last but not least, the Noboa government must get to grips with the enormous security problem associated with organized crime and various forms of illegal economic activity. The support of the USA and international cooperation in general will play a significant role in this. However, a clear and sustainable strategy for anti-mafia legislation on the part of the government is also needed. Concrete proposals are also needed to remove criminal elements from organs of the partly infiltrated state security apparatus. Outlook For Europe and Germany, Noboa's victory and the associated four-year term of office represent a fantastic opportunity to tackle the phenomenon of organized crime in a structured and targeted manner through coordinated cooperation with international allies. Noboa wants to bring his agenda closer to the USA, particularly in the areas of security and trade. As far as the European Union is concerned, strengthening cooperation and investment in areas such as the environment and energy could also be crucial for his government's future positive multilateral orientation. One sign of hope is Noboa's clear support for the port security initiative launched by EUROPOL as well as EU projects to promote comprehensive prison reform and the fight against the mafia. Cooperation on trade, economic and security issues could make Ecuador a stable partner in the Andean region in the face of left-wing authoritarian systems such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This is particularly important in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, especially in view of the fact that over 70 percent of all cocaine exports reach Europe via Ecuadorian ports. However, without a clear ethical awareness among Europeans of the drama and the effects of drug trafficking in Ecuador and Latin America, the situation in the Andean country will not improve, but rather worsen due to the demand effect, with all the social and violent consequences for the population. A litmus test for Daniel Noboa's ability to act could be his promise to start a new constitutional process. Ecuadorian institutions are still hampered by the authoritarian legacy of Rafael Correa's constitution, which is still in force. A transparent process with the participation of civil society could give Noboa legitimacy and help the country to leave the Correa legacy behind for good.  References [i] Un asesinato por hora desde el 1 de enero: Ecuador vive el inicio de año más violento desde que hay registros.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском So far in the 21st century, we are witnessing the consolidation of an international division of labor in which the levers of economic, political, and technological power are increasingly decoupled from local capacities for the vast majority of nations and relocated to the international arena. The cooperative competition among oligopolistic forces vying for control of key assets to secure global hegemony—energy, finance, digital technology, logistics, military, and space—is one of the fundamental vectors of this framework. The constant expansion of these forces is rooted in the constitutive interaction between giant corporations in strategic sectors and the core states of the new poly-globalization—namely the United States and China—whose geopolitical rivalry is intrinsically linked to the success of the accumulation regime. The oligopolies and their centers of origin appropriate the market and innovation rents generated by the new productive map, accumulating a structural and relational power (in Susan Strange’s terms) that is quickly and markedly outpacing the rest. In this way, both companies and states outside these core zones are being pushed into increasingly dependent positions regarding the technologies, goods, and basic services produced by the winning oligopolies. They are, we might say, being shifted to the new extended periphery. How does this happen? What role does technology play, and where is Latin America in this story? GEOPOLITICS Today, the United States and China sit at the center, while the rest of the world occupies the periphery. UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebecca Grynspan (2023) describes the novel emergence of “centers within the periphery” as part of a process she calls poly-globalization: both China’s rise to the top ranks of global power and the consolidation of highly productive and commercial hubs in other parts of Asia challenge the sustainability of the post–Cold War unipolar world and the traditional North–South divide. Within this framework, historical peripheral dependency does not disappear, but rather changes in form and geography—especially considering that a growing number of developed countries are becoming productively and technologically dependent on countries like China, more so than the reverse (a case in point is Germany in the automotive industry; Zhang & Lustenberger, 2025). However, the periphery is not a homogeneous entity, and not all regions and countries have the same capacities or room for maneuver within this scheme, where starting points significantly shape long-term trajectories. Developed countries (formerly located at the center) remain better equipped than developing countries to face the challenges of their new condition. We can conceptualize the peripheral configuration as tiers or peripheral rings: there is no “semi-periphery”, but rather tiers or rings within the periphery. From this perspective, we might say that Western Europe constitutes a first peripheral ring (1st tier periphery), and industrialized Asia a second ring (2nd tier periphery). Latin America, in this framework, occupies a third ring: it possesses certain accumulated productive capabilities, but due to being more "distant" from the center in terms of the criticality of its production, it receives fewer benefits from integration into major global value chains in terms of investment and technological learning (as Evolutionary Economics and Latin American Development Theory have long pointed out, producing semiconductors, AI, or green hydrogen technology —as in Taiwan, India, or Germany, respectively— is not the same than assembling automobiles as in Mexico and Argentina). In this scenario, the Latin American region—historically subordinated to a single center (the North-Center)—is now subordinate to two. China has been rapidly tightening its economic ties with the region, primarily through trade and financial assistance (Dussel Peters, 2021; Ugarteche & De León, 2020; Villasenin, 2021). Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, rose from less than 1% of the region’s total FDI in 2012 to 10.8% in 2019 (although it still lags behind investment from the US and the European Union) (Dussel Peters, 2022). The Asian giant is already Brazil’s main trading partner, is rapidly deepening its ties with Mexico, and an increasing number of countries across the continent have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, including Argentina since 2022 (the other two major Latin American economies have not joined so far). However, the benefits of these relationships for the region remain ambivalent: on the one hand, they have reduced financial dependence on the US—a significant achievement—but they have not yet translated into higher value-added development such as export diversification or upgrading. On the contrary, they have tended to reinforce the trend toward re-commoditization of local economies (Wainer, 2023; Alami et al., 2025). DIGITAL ECONOMY The current dynamics of the tech industry are particularly illustrative of the broader landscape described above, and for that reason, we take it as a focal point of observation. Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei—the flagship tech giants of the US and China, commonly referred to as Big Tech (BT)—operate collectively as a global oligopoly. This formation increasingly relegates Latin America to the role of data provider and accelerates the shift of other industrial powers from technology innovators to adopters—that is, to a position of subsidiarity. To this picture we must add Nvidia, the Musk ecosystem, and DeepSeek, among other firms whose products and executives carry significant weight in the global chain of technological decision-making, beyond even their specific market shares. No country outside of the US and China has leading firms in AI, cloud computing, advanced chip knowledge, or 5G champions (with the exception of Ericsson in the latter sector, which remains Swedish. It’s worth noting that Nokia is not included here, as although its production and brand profile are still centered in Norway, the largest shareholding stake belongs to BlackRock). An example of an interesting yet ultimately failed challenge to Big Tech dominance in large-scale projects is the European federated cloud initiative Gaia-X (European Association for Data and Cloud AISBL, https://gaia-x.eu/about/). Originally promoted by the Ministers of economic affairs of Germany and France, Gaia-X is a non-profit international association that brings together companies, state agencies, and third-sector organizations involved in European industrial and technological development (such as SAP, Siemens, the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, or Luxembourg’s National Data Service, alongside hundreds of SMEs). Its aim is to pool capabilities in order to create a large shared cloud infrastructure that allows companies and public bodies to store and develop applications securely—that is, independent of servers located outside the continent that fail to meet European data protection standards. In short, the goal is to enable competition with US tech giants and ultimately establish a “gold standard” in data security that tends to exclude them—driven by European governments’ stated concern over the region’s digital sovereignty. The conceptually appealing strategy of combining the complementary capacities of local companies of different sizes on a single platform and offering joint products, initially acted as a carrot for the industry (over 300 members joined, up from 22 at the beginning). However, over time, even the governments most vocal about sovereignty declined to adopt Gaia-X as a primary provider: Germany, for instance, signed a €3 billion agreement with Oracle Cloud (a strategic partner of AWS, Microsoft, and Nvidia) to provide cloud services in 2024. To this day, US tech giants continue to control 70% of the European cloud market (Gooding, 2024). Gaia-X remains a valuable project with over five years of development, but with frankly limited real-world reach—also, it must be said, due in part to the tech giants’ own offensive, as they increasingly offer services aimed at the “territorialization” of data (e.g., https://www.oracle.com/cloud/sovereign-cloud/what-is-sovereign-cloud/). As things stand, the European industrial powers do not control the supply, circulation, or demand of digital technologies, and major Asian players—such as India or Taiwan—occupy intermediate links in the value chains of either the Western bloc or China, depending on the case. This kind of displacement is not so surprising when we consider the oligopolistic dynamics that currently govern the global economy, involving the leadership of core countries across all strategic sectors. Particularly in the digital economy. Oligopoly is a market structure in which a small number of firms control the supply of certain goods and/or services—that is, a large-scale market dominated by a few major sellers, who are often interconnected. Oligopolies are everywhere (in oil, automotive, telecommunications, and more), but in certain sectors, structural traits such as the hyper-scale at which production is viable and profitable, the pace of innovation required for sectoral expansion, or the relevance of brand reputation drive the formation of so-called natural oligopolies (NOs): markets in which open competition (several smaller actors producing the same and rotating their market shares over time) would tend to hinder efficient production. In these markets, the number of firms capable of minimizing total industry costs is “naturally” low, due to the high entry barriers that are established. Each NO actor holds considerable market power, allowing it to develop productive and technological capacities in a privileged way over long periods. As a result, the minimum threshold for joining the oligopoly becomes increasingly difficult for outsiders to overcome. This is the case in sectors such as the extraction of scarce and critical natural resources (like lithium), energy generation and supply (e.g., wind farms), large physical and cyber-physical infrastructure for logistics (commercial ports and oceanic bridges, 5G, or submarine internet cables), or transversal digital technologies (like AI, big data, or cloud computing). All of these require massive upfront investments, accumulated know-how, strong commercialization capacity, and the ability to retain rents—which includes “artificial” legal barriers such as intellectual property rights, trade secrets, and various mechanisms to capture innovation rents. It’s not the same to have oil reserves in your territory and develop or invite companies to exploit them (which several countries do, with companies of varying sizes) as it is to develop powerful AI models using 20 years of data from the entire public internet (which only OpenAI-Microsoft of the US originally achieved with ChatGPT, even though the data came from millions of people around the world). In fact, comparable AI capabilities have only been reached by Google’s Gemini and the open-source DeepSeek model recently developed in China following US sanctions on Nvidia chip acquisitions. In a technological oligopoly, the ability to invest and innovate at scale grants companies significant prospective power: they can pour enormous sums into R&D and start-up acquisitions to develop innovations that will pay off a decade later—after numerous failed attempts costing millions—thus shaping future markets in the process (Google, for example, has heavily invested in AI development since the 1990s and has, at times, acquired one start-up per week). Additionally, NO actors actively exclude potential competitors outside the oligopoly through more questionable mechanisms such as collusion or lobbying, among others (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). Today, given the broad productive and geographic scope of global value chains and the extreme concentration of investment capacity typical of financial capitalism, more and more markets are becoming structured as natural oligopolies. Especially in digital technologies. Only Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, and Google together dominate 75% of the global cloud computing market (with respective shares of 47.8%, 15.5%, 7.7%, and 4%, according to Gartner, 2024), a sector whose relevance is crucial for the development of technologies such as generative AI. In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft also became owners or lessees of more than half of the world’s submarine bandwidth capacity—a market historically controlled by states and large telecommunications companies like NEC, Alcatel, and Fujitsu, which still make up the backbone of global data traffic infrastructure (Business Research Insights, 2025). Huawei is the world’s largest supplier of telecommunications equipment, particularly for 5G networks and smartphones, holding a 28% share of the global market and over 4,000 patents (Merino et al., 2023). This helps explain Donald Trump’s insistence on making it both a material and symbolic target in the US-China trade war. The fact that Big Tech companies share technological and market domains—beyond specializing in particular niches—fuels an intense internal competitive race that, unlike monopolies, drives continuous innovation. This means that, in addition to competing to outdo one another, these firms also cooperate extensively to maintain their global leadership far ahead of the rest of the market: each company develops interoperability features to ensure their apps function properly on others’ platforms, and they share open source projects on GitHub (now owned by Microsoft), for instance. Microsoft has contributed significantly to the development of AI in China through its Microsoft Research Asia lab in Beijing and collaborations with Chinese institutions such as the National University of Defense Technology (Hung, 2025)—efforts that neither the US nor Chinese governments have blocked. Long before the current reloaded geopolitical confrontation emerged, core-country governments had already been promoting initiatives aimed at the expansion and globalization of their tech firms, such as China’s Digital Silk Road (Borrastero, 2024) or Silicon Valley itself in the US (it bears repeating just how much state R&D funding is packed inside an iPhone; Mazzucato, 2013). And what each state has done to strengthen its own technological base has ended up, in some way, benefiting the other. Consider, for example, that what China’s customs agency classifies as “foreign-invested enterprises” are mostly US-based companies, which control three-quarters of the country’s most advanced high-tech products. These include large-scale electronics exports that often involve importing key components from the US, assembling them in China via foreign companies like Foxconn (which builds Apple’s iPhones), and then exporting them. At the same time, private Chinese firms have also expanded their role in these core exports, going from virtually zero in the 1990s to over 20% today (Kenji Starrs, 2025). The offshoring of US tech production has helped the US continue leading by producing more cheaply, and has helped China learn how to lead too. As can be seen, the actors of a Global Technological Oligopoly (GTO) are deeply interdependent. To this picture, we must add the increasingly blatant symbiosis between dominant governments and individual stakeholders, as exemplified by the Trump-Musk case. We are no longer simply talking about "public-private complexes", "revolving doors" or "intimate relations". These notions describe very close ties, but between separate entities. What we are seeing now is a kind of fusion (or confusion) between a tiny handful of public and private actors who are able to govern strategic global value chains and set the rules of the game for the rest of the world. In China’s case, the country is characterized by what Weber and Qi (2022) describe as a “state-constituted market economy”: a strong state deeply intertwined with a fundamentally marketized economy, resulting in a political-economic balance that differs somewhat from Western models but still yields a global power that is difficult to challenge. In sum, we are witnessing a competition scheme designed for the very few, that generates a spiraling cycle of leveraged success in which core states play a crucial role. LATIN AMERICA A scheme like this reinforces Latin America's historic peripheral condition. GTO companies operate directly within the territory (setting up data centers, having subsidiaries, providing services, among other things), but they also rely on regional actors to amplify the generation of indigenous data, the large-scale paid consumption of BT’s technological infrastructures, and the global dissemination of their business models. The free domestic use of email applications or social networks enables data capture, but not the monetization of digital assets, whose massive volume comes from services provided to businesses and governments (as someone aptly put it, Amazon is famous for its store but rich from its servers; Lacort, 2021). In Latin America, there is a handful of large technology companies – the so-called 'tecnolatinas' – that replicate the e-marketplace, fintech, or cryptocurrency development models characteristic of the BT, managing to stand out as champions in the regional league far ahead of the rest. However, they continue to be dependent users of the fundamental technologies produced by the GTO. Mercado Libre, originally from Argentina, is the largest and most widely used digital platform on the continent, the one with the highest market value, and the first to be listed on Nasdaq. Modeled after Alibaba, it is a marketplace with an integrated online payments and credit system, technology development and service divisions, and an extensive ground-based logistics infrastructure. For its data storage and management, Mercado Libre is a client of Amazon Web Services (AWS): it processes over 40 purchases per second across 18 countries and has migrated more than 5,000 databases to Amazon DynamoDB (AWS, 2021). As of 2024, it was using nearly a dozen services from the tech giant with which it had signed an agreement to reduce its data computing costs by 13% (AWS, 2024). The other two regional champions, both Brazilian in origin, also maintain strong ties with the BTs: the marketplace Magazine Luiza runs on Google Cloud; and the fully digital bank Nubank (of Nu Holdings) is an AWS client, has received investments from Warren Buffett, Tencent Holdings and Sequoia Capital, and many of its executives have worked at Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Alibaba. The following chart illustrates the stark imbalance in market value and profits between the GTO firms, other global tech giants, and two of Latin America's top champions, in descending order: Source: Own elaboration based on data from Forbes Global 2000 (2024).* Originally in Borrastero & Juncos (2024).** Magazine Luiza is not publicly traded.  Regional firms, in turn, capture data from countless Latin American users, acquire local start-ups, participate in scientific research networks, and work with governments to access tax and especially regulatory benefits—mechanisms that enable their gradual “giantization” (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). In short, they are part of this kind of stratified oligopoly led by Big Tech, which tecnolatinas help sustain while securing their regional slice of the pie. Far from being a marginal arena, despite Latin America’s relatively low share in global cross-border data flows compared to Asia or Europe (UNCTAD, 2021), the region represents a key market to conquer. This includes sectors with crucial resources for Big Tech’s vertical integration strategies, such as lithium. For instance, Tesla is one of the main buyers of Arcadium Lithium, which operates in the salt flats of northern Argentina, and along with other tech moguls like Bill Gates, is planning new direct investments and investments in companies developing technologies related to extraction (such as Lake Resources, which works on reducing freshwater usage in lithium mining) (López King, 2025). Big Tech companies form true global ecosystems for resource capture and the monetization of informational assets, supported by states and firms across the globe. SYSTEMIC RISKS One of the main problems of the dynamics described so far is the deepening of the international division of learning which—already highly unequal—continues to grow at breakneck speed, while technological learning becomes increasingly fundamental to value creation, and peripheral states are less and less equipped to deal with ever-larger corporations. In this context, peripheral countries risk becoming mere providers of informational raw material for platforms developed in the global centers, and end up having to pay for the digital intelligence extracted from them. Meanwhile, industrial hyper-concentration makes it increasingly difficult for the market to address these structural issues on its own. Rent refers to income derived from control over a scarce and strategic asset. The oligopolistic control of such rent-generating assets by central countries drives an endogenous concentration of rent in the central regions, and the result, in terms of income distribution both between and within nations, is a deepening of inequality at all levels (UNCTAD, 2021; Milanovic, 2019; Torres and Ahumada, 2022). Another major issue stemming from the scale reached by dominant actors and the penetration of their digital infrastructures is how difficult it has become to reverse the technological path — in terms of how to generate and provide services in a different way, while maintaining the reach and quality. Just imagine, for example, trying to establish alternative global data traffic routes or to produce world-class AI for diagnosing and treating rare diseases, without at some point relying on the technological resources of the oligopoly. The key question is how societies across the globe can harness these accumulated technological capabilities for collective purposes, without depending so heavily on heteronormative political and market-driven decisions. The list of systemic risks is a long one, and there isn’t space here to delve into the broader political dimensions of the issue. But it is worth highlighting these two particular risks tied to the current techno-economic order, given their impact on the very possibility of building concrete alternatives. LOCAL INITIATIVE Latin America enjoys neither structural power (that is, the ability to shape the rules of the game in terms of production, finance, security, or the global control of knowledge and culture), nor relational power in relation to other regions with accumulated techno-productive capacities (the ability to influence other actors into doing something they otherwise wouldn’t, following Strange’s 1988 classification). This essay may lean more toward pessimism of the intellect than optimism of the will when it comes to the global order within which Latin America must forge a new place.  Yet it is clear that the continent holds bargaining potential, rooted in the fact that it remains a highly coveted region for all the reasons discussed above—and many more (including the fact that it is, for now, a territory free of military wars). In the context of a “divide and conquer” logic typical of today’s intensified inter-core battles, strategies of absolute alignment with any single power are far from the wisest. The global oligopolistic economy will only deepen Latin America’s peripheral status if countries in the region fail to adopt a solidary non-alignment—or poly-alignment—approach, one that allows them to consolidate minimum thresholds of technological sovereignty. From dependent adoption to sovereign adoption (deciding what and how to adopt in order to learn), and from there to emancipation (integrating and developing what is needed for the people’s well-being). In Brazil, multiple state-led projects are underway to develop a sovereign data economy in collaboration with small and medium-sized enterprises and the academic sector (Gonzalo & Borrastero, forthcoming), along with large-scale initiatives to build national tech and energy infrastructures by leveraging the techno-productive capabilities accumulated over decades by Petrobras, BNDES, the national research council, and public venture capital funds (Alami et al., 2025). Mexico and Colombia are currently undergoing political processes inspired by the ideals of a “common home” and the care of virtual lands, advocating for continental unity on the one hand and strict regulation of Big Tech on the other (BBC News Mundo, 2025; Forbes Central America, 2025; Government of Colombia, 2024; Colombian Presidency, 2025; Wired, 2025). Argentina has a range of digital development projects based on policy frameworks designed to autonomously leverage the productive capacity the country has accumulated since the 1940s (Gonzalo & Borrastero, 2023)—though these efforts have been obstructed by the pro-Trump government of Javier Milei. EPILOGUE As these lines are being written, stock markets around the globe are tumbling amid the tariff war unleashed by the United States, forcing everyone else to adjust. Even the “Magnificent Seven” (Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla) have lost billions in just a few days. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The South China Sea (SCS) is a strategic region in international geopolitics and a hotspot of disputes involving sovereignty, economy, and security. This text analyzes the positions of two key actors in the region — China and the Philippines — whose growing tensions have been a defining factor in the evolution of the conflict. Located in Southeast Asia, the SCS borders China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, and connects the Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest maritime routes. Its wealth in fishery and energy resources has intensified disputes over the Pratas, Macclesfield, Paracel, and Spratly Archipelagos, which are claimed entirely or partially by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In this context, the SCS holds significant geopolitical importance. From the classical perspective of Alfred T. Mahan, maritime control is essential for a country to consolidate itself as a power, as it enables access to strategic resources, trade routes, and the projection of military power. Today, this remains a key factor of political, economic, and military influence in the macro-region that authors such as Ulises Granados (2022) refer to as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, the SCS conflict is a dispute rooted in the construction of geographic and political meanings. According to Gerard Toal, space is not fixed but rather a construction shaped by power relations and discourses. One example is its naming: China calls it the South Sea, the Philippines refer to it as the West Philippine Sea, and Vietnam calls it the East Sea. Each name not only reflects a territorial claim but also a geopolitical imaginary. Interests in the SCS date back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Japan exerted control over some areas through the state and its corporations. However, after World War II, sovereignty over these territories remained undefined, leading to competing claims from neighboring countries. During the Cold War, the United States strengthened its alliance with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations to contain communism, while China consolidated its presence in areas like the Paracel Islands. This context has been key in shaping the current competition over the sea. The Chinese government claims sovereignty in the SCS based on historical precedents going back to the Han dynasty. Beijing argues it recovered the Spratly and Paracel Islands after World War II, invoking the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945), which called for the return of territories occupied by Japan. In 1958, China issued the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, incorporating the Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel (Xisha), Macclesfield (Zhongsha), and Spratly (Nansha) Islands into its sovereign territory. Later, in 2009, it reaffirmed its claim through the Nine-Dash Line (NDL), a delimitation drawn in 1947 that encompasses nearly 80% of the SCS. Although this line is not clearly defined in international law, Beijing maintains that it holds sovereign rights within it and that disputes should be resolved without intervention from extra-regional actors — a stance that contrasts with the Philippines’ actions, which have sought international support to strengthen their position. From China’s perspective, its claims in the SCS are essential to its sovereignty and national security. For this reason, it has increased its naval, paramilitary, and civilian presence. Maritime projection and control of trade routes are also key aspects of its strategy to advance initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which is fundamental to its regional and international economic growth. In contrast, the Philippines has claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands since the 1970s and has resorted to legal and media avenues to denounce China. In 1995, it protested China’s construction of structures on Mischief Reef, and in 1997, it stationed the Sierra Madre ship in the Spratlys. Today, the Philippine Navy maintains operations in the area. Moreover, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, tensions escalated in 2009 when China reaffirmed the Nine-Dash Line. In response, in 2013, the Philippines brought the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), arguing that China was violating the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and asserting its rights over exclusive economic zones. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China's claims lacked legal basis under international law. However, China rejected the ruling, stating that it does not reflect its interpretation of territorial sovereignty based on its history and legal frameworks. Moreover, Beijing considered the Philippine complaint a unilateral action. In 2024, the Philippines enacted the “Maritime Zones Law” and the “Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act,” which define its maritime rights in the South China Sea. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected both laws, arguing they violate its sovereignty. From the Philippine perspective, China’s actions represent a challenge to its security, prompting it to seek support from ASEAN for a joint response in the SCS. However, the bloc’s positions are divided: the Philippines actively denounces China, Vietnam takes a more pragmatic approach, and Malaysia avoids confrontation. These differences have led ASEAN to adopt a moderate stance, prioritizing diplomacy over conflict. In summary, the Philippines is strengthening its alliance with the United States under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which ensures assistance in the event of an attack in the Pacific, including the SCS. This cooperation aligns with the U.S. geopolitical strategy in Asia, which has evolved from Obama’s “Asia Pivot” to the “Indo-Pacific” vision, focused on a “rules-based order” and the security of trade routes. However, the exclusion of China has led to perceptions that this strategy is a containment mechanism against the world’s second-largest economy. For example, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argues that the U.S. strategy aims to “besiege and contain China” through alliances that promote confrontation. He also claims it undermines regional cooperation, while the Asian giant promotes a “community with a shared future in the Asia-Pacific” based on integration and stability. Thus, China employs the concept of the Asia-Pacific and, although it remains cautious in its rhetoric, insists that its approach prioritizes cooperation and avoids a bloc-based logic in the region. In this context, during Balikatan, a joint military exercise between the U.S. and the Philippines in April 2024, Washington deployed Typhon missile systems in the northern part of the country. By the end of the year, Manila expressed interest in acquiring them, which Beijing perceived as a threat. In 2025, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stated he would reconsider the U.S. military presence if China ceased its territorial claims. China has not officially responded, and these remarks could be part of Philippine political rhetoric, reflecting its perception of threat in the region. Additionally, the Philippines has strengthened security cooperation with Japan, which also faces territorial disputes with China. In 2024, they signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement to facilitate military deployments, and Japan supported the modernization of the Philippine Navy. In 2025, both nations reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. While Manila strengthens its position through strategic alliances, Beijing views this as an attempt to internationalize the conflict. Another point is that the Philippines’ approach varies depending on the administration in power. During Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016–2022), Manila prioritized closer ties with Beijing, favoring economic cooperation. In contrast, the arrival of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in 2022 strengthened the alliance with the United States, increasing defense and security cooperation, but also escalating tensions with China. On the other hand, while the U.S. has expanded its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, Trump’s first term (2017–2021) had a more isolationist approach compared to the Obama (2009–2017) and Biden (2021–2025) administrations. The Philippine government hopes to maintain the agreements reached in 2024, although their continuity will depend on how the new Trump administration (2025–) manages its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, the Philippines cannot fully align with just one actor, as both China and the U.S. are essential to its economy. The United States is its main export market, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority, while China is its largest source of imported goods, top investor, infrastructure partner, and shares agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Therefore, while Manila strengthens its defense cooperation with the U.S. and maintains strategic interests in the South China Sea, its relationship with China remains crucial due to its economic importance. Final Considerations From a geopolitical perspective, cooperation between the Philippines and the United States seeks to counterbalance China's presence in the region, while China reinforces its position in the SCS for sovereignty and security reasons. In this context, the relationship between Manila and Washington, along with the stance of ASEAN members, will be decisive in the evolution of the conflict. Thus, the dispute in the South China Sea reflects a geopolitical competition between regional and extra-regional actors for control of strategic areas, where each defends its own interests. Although none of the parties appear to seek open conflict, increasing militarization and patrols have raised the risk of incidents that could escalate tensions. In this context, the future will depend on the willingness of actors to negotiate concessions, although the lack of consensus and divergent interests make a definitive solution unlikely in the short term. In this way, Alfred T. Mahan’s theories on maritime power remain relevant in the SCS, although their application is not absolute. Beyond the control of sea routes, the competition also unfolds through the construction of narratives by regional and external actors. The way these narratives shape alliances and perceptions will be key in defining power dynamics in the region.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Good morning, everyone. Forty-three years after the beginning of the Malvinas War, we gather once again as a nation to commemorate our veterans and those who fell in combat, under the proud gaze of their families, to whom I also extend this tribute. Today, we remember those Heroes who gave their lives for the Homeland, who are part of the pantheon of those who forged our history through their sacrifice. Today, we honor them by reaffirming, with genuine determination, Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, as well as the surrounding maritime areas. Unfortunately, in recent decades, our sovereign claim over the islands has been directly or indirectly harmed by the economic and diplomatic decisions of the political caste. No one can take seriously the claim of a nation whose leadership is known worldwide for its corruption and incompetence, and for dragging Argentina into the arms of the world’s scum. A country that systematically impoverishes its land and sides with dictators and petty tyrants enters any diplomatic negotiation from a position of weakness. And if we add the disarmament and deliberate demonization of the Armed Forces, we had the perfect recipe for the Malvinas Islands to remain forever in foreign hands. The first step we must take, then, is to rise as a country in every sense — both materially and spiritually — and to reclaim the place in the international community that we should never have lost. And there is no other way to achieve this than by applying the ideas of liberty, both within our borders and beyond, by opening ourselves to international trade and adopting a foreign policy aligned with the free nations of the world. This is the first government in a long time that understands that a sovereign country must, first and foremost, be a prosperous country. Only then can we take the second step: to dignify our Armed Forces through the necessary investments that only a prosperous nation can afford. Growth is in vain if public spending is not reorganized, strengthening those areas in which the State should be involved and eliminating those that are unnecessary, because when the State assumes responsibilities that do not belong to it, it is always to the detriment of essential functions. Despite the political caste’s decades-long effort to convince us otherwise, Argentina needs a strong Armed Forces. They are essential to defend our vast territory from potential threats in a global context of growing uncertainty. They are also indispensable in any diplomatic discussion. In this regard, history is unforgiving: a strong country is a respected country. This does not mean that might makes right, but foreign policy cannot be conducted from a naïve and childish idealism either. For us, the Armed Forces are a source of pride. The time when they were undervalued has come to an end. Proof of this is that, on July 9 of last year, for the first time, more than 2,000 of our veterans led the military parade during the Independence Day celebrations, before a proud and grateful crowd for their actions in defense of the Homeland. That is also why we have just enacted a decree instructing the Ministry of Defense to grant the rank of Reserve Second Lieutenant to those Reserve Officer Candidate Soldiers who are veterans of the Malvinas War. This rank would have been granted to them upon completion of their military service, but it was left unfulfilled as they were discharged directly after the war ended. This is, simply put, about settling a debt with these Heroes — a debt that has been ignored for 43 years by successive governments and that we now intend to correct once and for all. Without all the above, any notion of sovereignty loses its meaning. Sovereignty is not about the State owning many companies, nor about financing the film industry, or second-rate concerts, or similar things. Believing that more State means more sovereignty is an Orwellian concept under which politics has historically tried to conceal its dirty dealings — resulting in a poor people enslaved by an omnipresent State. We, on the other hand, have come to reclaim that word, which until recently had been hijacked, and to restore the meaning it truly deserves. A sovereign people is a flourishing, vigorous, respectable people — and above all, a people proud of its Armed Forces. A nation like the one built by the generation of the 1880s, which, after a century of humiliation, we are rebuilding. As I’ve said on other occasions, we are not here to apply extravagant formulas, but rather to return to those strategies that once made us successful. And when it comes to sovereignty over the Malvinas, we have always made it clear that the most important vote is the one cast with feet. We hope that one day the people of the Malvinas will choose to vote with their feet — for us. That is why we seek to make Argentina such a powerful nation that they will prefer to be Argentine, and persuasion or deterrence won’t even be necessary to achieve it. That is why we have embarked on the path of liberation we are now walking — so that Argentina becomes the freest country in the world, once again has the highest GDP per capita on the planet, and inspires people around the world to dream of the Argentine dream. That is what this government understands by sovereignty. It is the standard by which we measure ourselves, and we will not settle for anything less. To conclude, on this second April 2nd that I experience as President, I want to once again reaffirm our unwavering claim over the Malvinas Islands, reinforcing our commitment to exhaust all diplomatic means within our reach so that they may return to Argentine hands. Finally, to the veterans, to their families, and to all those who wear the uniform in defense of the Homeland, I extend my eternal gratitude on behalf of all Argentines. May God bless the Argentine Republic, may the forces of heaven be with us! Long live freedom, damn it! Thank you very much! Long live the Homeland!