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Chileans have elected the most right-wing presidential candidate since the end of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship over three and a half decades ago. In a runoff held on Dec. 14, 2025, José Antonio Kast, a Republican Party ex-congressman and two-time former presidential candidate, won just over 58% of the vote, while his opponent, Jeannette Jara, the left-wing labor minister of current President Gabriel Boric, won nearly 42%. Approximately 15.6 million Chileans were eligible to vote in the first presidential election to take place with mandatory voting and automatic voter registration. As a result of those new election rules, which went into place in 2022, an estimated 5 million to 6 million new voters went to the polls. These voters – found to be largely younger, male and lower-middle class – are seen as lacking a strong ideological identity and rejecting politics altogether. The verdict delivered by Chile’s voters puts it in line with a broader right-wing regional shift – most recently in Bolivia – that has reversed the “pink tide” of left-leaning governments in the past two decades. But as a historian of modern Latin America and Chile, I believe Chile’s election also reflects the important local context of years of increasing disenchantment with the political system. Amid Chile’s expanded electorate, the primary issues of voter concern during this campaign were crime and immigration. An October 2025 poll specifically found delinquency to be the top issue, with immigration, unemployment and health care also marking high. Though Chile has one of the lowest crime rates in Latin America, high-profile cases of organized crime have shaken the nation in recent years. Homicides increased between 2018 and 2022 and have decreased slightly since then. Immigration has also risen significantly, with a large number of immigrants coming to Chile having fled economic and political crises in Venezuela, as well as in Peru, Haiti, Colombia and Bolivia. The foreign-born population in Chile rose from 4.4% in 2017 to 8.8% in 2024. The key constitutional context Many commentators have highlighted the stark polarization of this election, with a Communist Party labor minister campaigning against the arch-conservative Kast, who has lauded the Pinochet dictatorship under which his deceased older brother once served. But there is more to the story. Some observers have drawn comparisons between Kast and other far-right Latin American leaders like Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Javier Milei in Argentina and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. But Chile is not merely following the same far-right playbook of its neighbors. In the weeks leading up to the runoff in Chile, both candidates moved toward the center. Jara vowed to expand the prison system to combat rising crime, while Kast – who had previously threatened expulsion of undocumented migrants – softened his tone to say they would be “invited” to leave. Moreover, Kast learned from his previous failed attempts at the presidency by speaking less about his controversial or more socially conservative positions. For example, he played down opposition to abortion under any circumstances. Chilean voters, in contrast, overwhelmingly approve of the limited abortion rights that were passed by Congress in 2017. Yet beyond the campaign trail messaging, the results also reflect a structural fact of Chilean politics that mirror political realities of other parts of Latin America, and even globally. In every presidential election since 2006, Chileans have voted out the incumbency to swing to the opposing side of the political spectrum. With candidates barred from consecutive presidential terms, the pendulum has swung back and forth since the alternating presidencies of socialist Michelle Bachelet – 2006-2010 and 2014-2018 — and conservative Sebastián Piñera – 2010-2014 and 2018-2022. Boric, a former left-wing student leader, took office in 2022 following a wave of upheaval and popular protests over inequality in 2019-2020. In what was a historic moment, the country voted to begin a process of rewriting its Pinochet-era constitution, which entrenched neoliberal economic policies and limited the government’s capacity to confront inequality. The constitutional convention was made up of directly elected citizens, many of them from grassroots movements. Yet in a stunning reversal, the progressive constitution – which would have protected rights to nature, Indigenous rights and social rights – was roundly defeated in a plebiscite in 2022. Just over a year later, voters similarly rejected a second attempt to rewrite the constitution, albeit under a process that conservative parties helped shape. Boric’s approval ratings, already low, suffered from this failed constitutional process. More than the right-wing elections elsewhere in the region, this national context helps to explain Chile’s own conservative turn. The ever-present discontent of voters Even as the pendulum has swung back and forth in recent Chilean presidential elections, there are deeper continuities across the different Chilean governments in the 21st century. Important among them is generalized voter discontent with the political system. This has traditionally been expressed in popular protests, such as the student movements of 2006 and 2011 and the ‘Estallido Social’– or Social Uprising – of 2019-2020 that were the largest protests since the return to democracy in 1990 and helped propel Boric to power. Public discontent was also expressed in the overwhelming vote to rewrite the constitution, which passed with 78% of the vote in 2020. Even though the constitutional process was ultimately rejected by voters, this underlying discontent has not gone away. One of the recent signs of discontent with the political choices on offer was in the first round of voting on Nov. 16: The third-place candidate was not one of the veteran politicians on the right, but Franco Parisi, a populist economist who has not set foot in Chile in years and who called on his supporters to intentionally vote null – or “spoil” their votes. Discontent has taken many forms – outrage about inequality and neoliberalism in 2019-2020, or unease about economic precarity and crime in the current election. But it has persisted, even as Chile’s political system remains stable. Some observers have pointed out that, unlike in many places around the world, Chile’s democratic norms are holding strong. The fact that power continues to pass peacefully despite major ideological differences is significant, particularly in light of the long struggle for democracy during the Pinochet regime. Kast’s style, for what it’s worth, is not as bombastic as that of U.S. President Donald Trump or Argentina’s Milei. Still, his apparent politeness belies what many fear is a coming erosion of rights: the rights of women to bodily autonomy; the rights of individuals to due process; the rights of workers to dignified conditions. These may well be up for negotiation under the new administration. Kast, a staunch Catholic and father of nine, is opposed to abortion under any circumstances and has even attempted to ban the morning-after pill. He was a supporter of Pinochet up until the regime’s end, campaigning for the “yes” vote in 1988 that would have seen eight more years for the authoritarian leader after 15 years already in power. Kast has likewise vowed to slash public spending and deregulate the economy, a clear echo of the Pinochet years. Despite the momentous shift heralded by Kast’s election, though, it is unlikely to change one of the principal challenges of Chile’s democracy in the 21st century: voter discontent and disenchantment. There has been a consistent trend for the government in power to lose popular support and face strong headwinds in Congress from the opposition. For all the celebration happening right now for Kast and his supporters, it is hard to see that changing once the new government takes office in March 2026.

Following Russian-Indian talks, Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi made statements for the media. The statements were preceded by a ceremony for the exchange of signed documents. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi (retranslated): Your Excellency Vladimir Putin, my dear friend, Representatives of the two countries, and our friends from India, good afternoon. I am delighted to welcome President Putin to the 23rd Russia–India Annual Summit. President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is taking place at a time marked by several historical dates in our relations. President Putin laid the groundwork for our strategic cooperation 25 years ago, and 15 years ago, in 2010, we upgraded our partnership to the level of a special privileged strategic partnership. Over the past 25 years, President Putin has been relentless in promoting these relations by demonstrating his wise leadership and vision. Regardless of the circumstances, it is his leadership that has reinforced our mutual relations and enabled us to achieve new heights. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to President Putin for his friendship and for his unwavering commitment to working with India. Friends, The world has faced numerous ups and downs over the past 80 years, during which humankind has had to endure many crises and challenges. And throughout this time, the friendship between Russia and India has successfully weathered these storms. These relations are based on mutual respect and deep trust and have invariably stood the test of time. Today, we discussed our ties and cooperation in all their aspects with a view to creating an even more solid foundation. We want to reinforce our economic cooperation and elevate it to a new level. This is the objective we share and it is our shared priority. To make this a reality, we have agreed to implement a programme for economic cooperation until 2030. It will provide for diversifying our trade and investment, making them more balanced and sustainable. At the same time, it will help unlock new dimensions in our cooperation. Today, President Putin and I will be taking part in the Russia–India Business Forum. I am convinced that this platform will also help strengthen our business ties and open new doors for exports, joint manufacture and technical innovation. Both countries have been proactive in working on a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and our country. Our cooperation in agriculture and fertilizers is extremely important for our food security and the prosperity of our farmers. I am happy that our countries will work together to promote our mutual production of urea. Friends, Promoting connectivity between our countries is another priority for us. We will redouble our efforts regarding the discussions on the North-South International Transport Corridor and the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor. I am confident that we will effectively cooperate in the interests of promoting polar trade via local trade routes. We have offered an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation in the Arctic, which will create new jobs for Indian young people. At the same time, our deep cooperation in shipbuilding will help us boost our joint initiatives. This is yet another important example of our mutually beneficial cooperation, which is increasing the number of jobs and skills while strengthening regional connectivity. Energy security is another important pillar of partnership between Russia and India. Our cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, which is rooted in our history, has helped us uphold our commitment to providing clean energy, which is extremely important for both countries. I have no doubt that our mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of critical minerals will also be important for a safe and diversified provision of resources to the world. We also maintain our cooperation in such areas as clean energy, high technologies and modern industries. Friends, Our cultural relations and ties between individual representatives of our countries are of special importance for relations between Russia and India. Over the past decades, our peoples have demonstrated respect and admiration for each other’s cultures, and we have coordinated various measures to further strengthen this cooperation. The recent opening of two Indian consulates in Russia is a significant step forward, facilitating contacts for all our citizens and bringing our nations even closer together. This October, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims received blessings at the sacred relics of Buddha Shakyamuni in Kalmykia. I am confident that we will soon implement a 30-day visa-free regime for tourist groups, which will greatly enhance travel between our countries. This measure will not only bring our peoples closer but also invigorate our societies and unlock new opportunities. I am therefore pleased that today we were able to sign two key agreements to advance this initiative. Our collaboration will also deepen in education and professional development, including through increased student and academic exchanges. Friends, Today, we discussed a range of pressing regional and global issues. On Ukraine, India’s position has been consistent from the outset: we stand for peace. We welcome all initiatives and efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful, long-term resolution of this conflict. India has always been ready to support such efforts, and we will continue to do so. India and Russia have always supported one another and worked shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam and the cowardly atrocity at Crocus City Hall are connected by a common, hateful ideology. India firmly believes that terrorism constitutes a direct assault on universal human values. Our unity within the global community is the only effective way to combat this evil. We cooperate closely within the UN, the G20, the SCO, BRICS, and other multilateral forums. We will continue this essential dialogue and cooperation across all these platforms. Your Excellency, I am confident that our enduring friendship will provide the strength needed to address global challenges. Together, we can help lead the way towards a more prosperous future. Once again, I thank you and all members of your delegation for your visit to India. Thank you very much. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr. Prime Minister, dear friend, Ladies and gentlemen, My sincere thanks to the President of the Republic of India, Droupadi Murmu, to you, Mr Prime Minister, and to all our Indian colleagues for the exceptionally warm and cordial welcome extended to the Russian delegation. The discussions we have just concluded with our Indian colleagues, along with our highly productive one-on-one conversation last night – for which I thank you again, Mr Modi, for your generous hospitality – were held in a constructive and friendly spirit, reflecting the privileged partnership between Russia and India. I would note that the Prime Minister and I have established a close working and personal rapport. We have met at the SCO summit in September, we maintain regular contact by telephone and personally oversee the development of our strategic cooperation across all key areas, as well as the progress of major bilateral projects. Today, with the participation of our delegations, we conducted a thorough and comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of Russian-Indian cooperation. We also exchanged views on current international and regional issues. The joint statement we have adopted outlines clear priorities for advancing our ties in politics, security, trade, the economy, and cultural and humanitarian affairs. As you have seen, this was complemented by the signing of a substantial package of intergovernmental, interdepartmental, and corporate agreements. Many of these documents are aimed at expanding our economic partnership. This is only natural, as our nations are important partners in trade, investment, and technology. Last year, our bilateral trade grew by a further 12 percent, reaching a new record. While various estimates differ slightly, the consensus places the figure somewhere between US$64 and US$65 billion. We project trade will stand at a comparable level by year’s end. That said, we believe there is clear potential to increase this volume to US$100 billion. To realise this ambitious goal, we have now agreed upon a joint Programme for the Development of Russian-Indian Economic Cooperation until 2030. This comprehensive roadmap provides clear guidelines. Our intergovernmental commission and the relevant economic ministries and agencies are tasked with removing barriers to the flows of goods and capital, implementing joint industrial projects, and deepening our collaboration in technology and investment. Today, His Excellency the Prime Minister shared a comprehensive list of issues with us. It goes without saying that both Russia and India will be extremely diligent and responsive in reviewing them. Make no mistake, we will work on this matter. Of course, having India create a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union would help boost Russia-India business ties. The effort to draft an agreement to this effect is already in progress. I must express my satisfaction with the fact that the two countries have been consistent in their commitment to switching to national currencies in mutual transactions. Their share in business deals has already reached 96 percent. Our two countries have developed resilient interbank channels for lending and financial transactions. Russian economic actors have been making wider use of the rupees they generate from export contracts. Major joint projects receive their funding in Russian rubles. There has been positive momentum in our energy partnership. Russia is a reliable supplier of energy resources and everything India needs for developing its energy sector. We are ready to continue ensuring uninterrupted fuel supplies for the Indian economy to support its rapid expansion. Of course, our bilateral energy cooperation goes far beyond this horizon. The flagship project to build India’s biggest NPP, Kudankulam, is underway. Two out of six reactors have been connected to the power grid, while the other four are in the engineering and construction stages. Once this NPP reaches its full capacity, it will make a meaningful contribution to India’s energy mix, helping Indian companies and households access affordable and clean energy. We believe that building small modular reactors and floating NPPs could also be relevant, just as using nuclear technology for non-energy purposes, including in healthcare, agriculture and other sectors. We are also working with our Indian partners to create new effective international transport logistics routes. This includes a project to create the North-South corridor linking Russia and Belarus to the Indian Ocean. Infrastructure development along the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, including the Northern Sea Route as its main artery, offers ample opportunities for expanding bilateral trade. There are many other economic sectors in which Russia and India have built a positive track record. We are working on joint initiatives in manufacturing, machine building, digital technology, space exploration and other research-intensive domains. For example, a business agreement that was signed as part of the visit provides for building a major Russian-Indian pharmaceutical plant in the Kaluga Region for producing high-quality anticancer medicine using cutting-edge Indian technology. At the same time, Russian companies will start producing their goods as part of the Make in India programme, which is Prime Minister Modi’s flagship project. Prospects for strengthening interaction between Russian and Indian entrepreneurs and business communities are being discussed in detail at the business forum that is currently underway in New Delhi. Mr Prime Minister and I will attend its plenary session later today. Russian-Indian humanitarian cooperation is ongoing in many spheres. Our peoples have been sincerely interested in each other’s traditions, history and spiritual values for centuries. Our scientific and educational contacts, as well as youth and public exchanges are actively developing. The regular cross festivals of Russian and Indian films invariably enjoy success. Mutual tourist flows grow every year. The Russian RT channel will begin broadcasting to India today. This will certainly help the Indian audience learn more about Russia and Russians and acquire objective information about current developments in our country. Our discussions on key global and regional issues have reaffirmed the similarity of our countries’ positions. Russia and India pursue an independent and sovereign foreign policy. We are working together with our allies in BRICS, the SCO and other countries of the Global Majority to promote the shaping of a more just and democratic multipolar world order, and to protect the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. These include the right of every country to its own path of development, the preservation of its own cultural and civilisational identity, respect for sovereignty and a delicate balance of interests of all members of the international community. Russia and India, as the founding nations of BRICS, have done and continue to do a great deal to enhance the prestige of that organisation. As you know, India will assume the BRICS chairmanship next year. We will provide all-round assistance to our Indian friends in their work on the current BRICS agenda. Of course, I would also like to say that Russia and India have traditionally worked closely together in the military-technical sphere. Our country has been assisting the modernisation of the Indian army, including the air defence, air force and navy, for over 50 years. Overall, we are certainly satisfied with the results of our talks. Our plans include a meeting with President of India Droupadi Murmu. However, I can already express my confidence that this visit and the agreements reached will effectively promote the further strengthening of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership for the benefit of the people of India and Russia. Thank you.

President Vladimir Putin’s current visit to India is his first since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. This gives it a certain symbolic weight: over the past three years, Russia–India relations have not only withstood the impact of Western sanctions and political pressure but have also developed to a degree that would have seemed unimaginable just a decade ago. The President’s trip to India serves as a consolidation of the progress achieved and a signal that the special relationship between Moscow and New Delhi is here to stay, while trade between our countries will continue to grow. Politics The political foundation of the current stage of Russia–India relations was laid in 2000, when Vladimir Putin and Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership. Since then, nothing has changed conceptually in the political relationship between Moscow and New Delhi: neither side seeks to transform the partnership into a formal alliance. The addition of the term “specially privileged” to the phrase “strategic partnership” in 2010 only underscored that relations with India are no less important for Russia than those with China. The vector set 25 years ago has shaped the development of bilateral relations ever since. Moscow supported New Delhi’s bid to join the SCO, where India was eventually admitted in 2017, and has consistently advocated for India’s inclusion among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. India, in turn, has steadily supported Russian initiatives in international organizations and, after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, declined to condemn Russia—much to the disappointment of European and American officials and politicians who had expected moral support from the “world’s largest democracy.” The reasons that allow this strategic partnership to endure and flourish have puzzled outside observers for decades. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet–Indian partnership, formalized by the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, was usually explained through a set of entirely practical considerations: the Soviet leadership’s desire to secure a valuable ally in Asia, to establish close ties with one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and to shield itself from a potential Chinese attack—something that was taken quite seriously in both New Delhi and Moscow at the time. Had clashes along the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas or on the USSR’s Far Eastern frontiers escalated into a full-scale armed conflict, Beijing would have faced the prospect of waging a two-front war in two remote and inhospitable theaters, with complex logistics and harsh climatic conditions. After the end of the Cold War and the normalization of Russian-Chinese relations, this incentive for rapprochement disappeared, yet it had no effect on the relationship between Moscow and New Delhi. It appears that the underlying reason is that the political partnership between Russia and India represents a rare phenomenon in Russian foreign policy practice: it is not reactive, but proactive in nature. It is not a tactical response to an emerging problem, but a deliberately constructed and carefully maintained axis designed to yield mutually beneficial political dividends in the future. At every meeting, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi reaffirm their commitment to the concept of a multipolar world. In the context of a shifting international order moving toward natural polycentricity, any country seeking to preserve internal stability and independence in political decision-making in the new era can do so only by relying on a broad network of interactions with other centers of power—and Russia and India view each other precisely as such centers. No matter how turbulent global politics becomes in the coming decades, New Delhi remains convinced that Moscow will continue to be a reliable and valuable partner, while Moscow is confident that New Delhi will stay the course of strategic autonomy and will not join any anti-Russian alliances, including military ones. Such confidence is rare in relations between major powers, and it has allowed the partnership to withstand difficult moments in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Economy Economic relations between Russia and India are breaking records: the current fiscal year’s trade turnover is likely to exceed $75 billion, a level not seen since the dissolution of the USSR. This growth has been driven by Western sanctions and the subsequent rupture of Russian exporters’ commercial ties with their traditional partners in Europe, accelerating the long-declared “pivot to the East.” It soon became clear, however, that at least part of this pivot to the East amounted to a partial “turn back toward the West.” A significant share of Russian hydrocarbons sold to India and other Eastern states ends up in Europe after being refined. India thus plays the role of a transit hub, ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the “oil pump.” In the end, Russia sells at a discount, Europe buys at a premium, and the margin is pocketed by Indian refineries as a reliability premium amid geopolitical turbulence. This model has two major problems. First, its growth has clear limits and is extremely dependent on the broader foreign-policy environment. The record figures were reached in record time—less than three years—but Russia is now selling to India, in value terms, roughly the same amount of oil it once sold to Europe before the conflict began. This does not mean that trade growth will stop in the next fiscal year; however, the pace will clearly slow, and the stated goal of reaching $100 billion by 2030 will have to be approached gradually rather than through a sharp surge. The second problem will become fully apparent if the West either abruptly lifts or, conversely, tightens sanctions. In the first scenario, India’s role as an intermediary would no longer be needed; in the second, there is a risk that Indian companies—deeply integrated into Western business networks—may choose not to take the risk and withdraw, leaving the intermediary role to firms from other countries. In either case, trade turnover could collapse just as rapidly as it grew. To avoid this situation, and at the same time address the enormous trade imbalance between India and Russia, the very model of economic interaction must change. At present, India exports mainly agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and light-industry goods to Russia. To prevent a collapse in trade should sanctions be lifted or tightened, India’s exports to Russia must expand. The focus should be on heavy machinery and high-tech products to which Russia has lost access due to sanctions. This would benefit both sides. India would gain a guaranteed market and an incentive to develop its own high-tech industries (spare parts, electronics, and so on), which has been declared a priority under the “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat” programs. Russia, in turn, would be able to secure access to goods that it cannot produce domestically in the short term. Another important area of cooperation is the creation of new production chains. Against the backdrop of declining Western investment in its economy and a clear reduction in interest from Western companies, India is in need of capital and technology. Russia, living under sanctions, needs goods. This creates a situation that effectively pushes the two economies toward cooperation and the formation of production chains in which Russia can assume responsibility for research and development (R&D), while India serves as the manufacturing base. With sufficient flexibility, such arrangements would, on the one hand, make it possible to involve companies from third countries in production, and on the other, facilitate the entry of jointly produced Russian-Indian goods into global markets. Finally, India could play with respect to Western technologies and investment the same transit-hub role it already plays with oil—serving as an intermediary through which Western companies interested in maintaining or expanding their business in Russia could invest and export to the Russian market. If this mechanism has worked for oil, it may also work for capital and technology. The only question is political will, well-developed operational mechanisms, and a clearly organized logistical framework capable of reducing transaction costs. Experts & People One of the key factors that can, and should, shape the further rapprochement between Russia and India is raising the level of specialized expertise. An expert in and of himself—whether in the Russian or Indian economy, specific industries, or domestic politics—does not produce or sell a physical good. But as a specialist, he can identify in a timely manner which goods should be sold, to whom, and where. Expert services can save companies considerable resources. At the same time, there is a clear shortage of specialists in both Russia and India, though the deficit is far more pronounced in India. In Russia, in recent years, specialized universities, responding to the demands of the moment, have significantly expanded the training of professionals who work directly with India, primarily economists with knowledge of Hindi (although the training of specialists in Indian law remains seriously underdeveloped). In India, however, there are still no academic institutions that systematically train experts in the modern Russian economy or Russian law with knowledge of the Russian language. Most universities that teach Russian studies are oriented toward history and literature. As a result, the niche of specialists on contemporary Russian realities is often filled by individuals who, in many cases, enter the field by chance and derive all their information about Russia from the U.S. and British press. In this context, training specialists becomes a top priority. This task can be addressed through a comprehensive set of measures—opening branches of Russian universities and analytical centers in India, increasing quotas for Indian students in Russia (including in the social sciences), and intensifying exchange programs. The more highly qualified Russia specialists India has, and vice versa, the more significant the impact of this factor will be. Finally, an important issue is the development of tourism. It is no secret that the flow of tourists from Russia to India is far greater than the flow from India to Russia. Some travel to India for a couple of weeks of warm sea, sunny skies, and fresh fruit in the middle of winter; others come in search of ancient wisdom or just because it is interesting to them. The inbound flow from India, however, is far weaker. First, Indians on average have less disposable income, and those who do tend to prefer domestic tourism, neighboring countries, or Europe. Second, many Indians simply have no idea what there is to see in Russia beyond Red Square and the Hermitage. These problems can and should be addressed by reducing costs and removing barriers. An important step in this direction could be an agreement to waive visas for organized tour groups. However, corresponding measures are also required from Russia’s tourism industry, above all special offers tailored to Indian travelers, who may be interested not only in the classical destinations of Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in natural and industrial tourism. At the time of writing, neither the visit’s program nor the list of signed documents and agreements had been released. Nonetheless, the visit itself is the main event: it signals that the period when the public dimension of the partnership had to be downplayed so as not to ruffle Western feathers has now passed. TEXT

Introduction Soft-power dynamics have gained importance in the global arena. Moving from the classical cultural approach to the digital realm, soft power has now the ability to shift and transform geopolitics through technological influence. In the age of AI – where digital competitiveness across language blocs determines access to innovation, data, and influence – the emergence of a robust, multilingual digital ecosystem has become essential. Within this landscape, Spanish has become a key player. Spanish is a Romance language from the Indo-European language family that is spoken by around 636 million people worldwide. This number represents 7.6% of the global population and makes it the third most widely spoken mother tongue, after Mandarin and Hindi. Therefore, holding that position, Spanish has rapidly become one of the most influential languages in the digital sphere, this can be seen in the fact that Spanish ranks as the second most used language on the web, surpassed only by English. In fact, this digital presence is not a coincidence, it is part of a rapid digital reinvention driven by demographic strength, expanding connectivity, regional and local policies modernization, and a growing tech-savvy diaspora. Therefore, this transformation can be said to be reshaping Spanish-speaking economies, is enabling new digital ecosystems, and is positioning several Spanish-speaking countries as emerging innovation and digital hubs. As the transformations unfold, the digital reinvention of the Spanish-speaking world presents a powerful case of how linguistic, demographic, and technological forces converges to reshape geopolitical and economical power through digital soft-power. Figure 1: Spanish speaking countries. Source: Speak easy. The Acceleration Drivers For a better understanding, there are multiple forces that can explain why this shift is happening now. In economic terms, the demand for fintech, e-commerce, and mobile-based services has grown as Latin America’s expanding middle class accelerates the shift toward digital consumer habits. In demographic terms, with over 60% of the region’s population under 35 years old, it has one of the world’s youngest digital workforces. In addition, the large Spanish-speaking diaspora in the U.S. and Europe further amplifies cross-border entrepreneurship, remittances, and cultural-technological exchange. Moreover, global connectivity — expanded through fiber, 4G/5G networks, the widespread smartphone adoption and including digital transformation projects and financing — has enabled digital inclusion and remote-work globalization. While governments have also introduced strategic initiatives, such as digital identity programs, fintech sandboxes, and AI policies, helping structure the ecosystem. Key Regions Leading the Transformation Spain has become a European gateway for Spanish-speaking startups by providing access to EU-wide digital infrastructure, funding programs, and regulatory harmonization. For instance, Barcelona and Madrid – usually ranked among Europe’s top tech hubs –, and initiatives like ‘España Digital 2026’ or the AI Strategy 2020 have played an important role in supporting Spain in this regard. In addition, Spain is also home of one of the European Blockchain Service Infrastructure (EBSI) nodes and has hosted major innovation events like 4YFN or the Mobile World Congress, which help Latin American founders integrate into the EU market In the Americas, Argentina stands out for its strong AI talent pipeline and world-class developer community. The country produces one of the highest numbers of software engineers per capita in Latin America – just behind Brazil and Mexico –, and some Argentinian Universities – like the UBA and UTN – are constantly top-ranked in math and computer sciences in the region. In addition, Argentina is home to pioneering companies such as Auth0 or Mural, while its AI scene has also contributed to multilingual datasets and early experimentation with Large Language Models (LLM) fine-tuning tailored to Spanish and regional dialects. Argentina’s neighbor, Chile, has taken a leadership role in digital governance, cybersecurity, and regulatory modernization. In 2021, Chile became the first Latin American country to pass a National AI Policy, and it is among the first to establish a Fintech Law and regulatory sandbox, enabling companies like NotCo, Fintual, and Betterfly to scale with legal clarity. In terms of digital governance, Chile’s Digital Government Division is internationally recognized for its interoperability standards and cybersecurity strategy aligned with OECD recommendations. Colombia is another key player in the region as it is rapidly scaling its digital workforce and fintech ecosystem, becoming one of the fastest-growing digital economies in Latin America. For instance, companies such as Rappi, Addi, and Mercado Pago Colombia have turned the country into a logistics and payments innovation center. In addition, the Colombian government has boosted initiatives like Misión TIC 2022 – which objective was to train over 100,000 citizens in software development – or GovTech Colombia – aiming to accelerate digital procurement – to strength its young-tech talent base. Finally, Uruguay is known for having built one of the strongest digital infrastructures in the hemisphere. In this context, Uruguay – ranked among the top in digital connectivity worldwide – has a universal fiber-optic coverage and nearly 100% of households connected to high-speed internet through the public telecom company ANTEL. In addition, its digital ID system, Ceibal, and its national e-government platform, AGESIC, are considered global benchmarks for digital public infrastructure in the region. Figure 2: LATAM Fintech ecosystem growth. Source: Finn Summit. Data collected by Finnovista and the IDB within the framework of this report (2023) and historical data. The 2023 report considers 26 LAC countries, including The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. https://www.finnosummit.com/en/fintech-ecosystem-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-exceeds-3000-startups/ Where does innovation happen? As read in the previous section, innovation is happening already across different key sectors. For instance, AI and LLMs are rapidly being adapted to Spanish, Indigenous languages, and regional contexts. At the same time, the region’s fintech and digital banking sectors are expanding at remarkable speed, positioning Latin America as one of the world’s most dynamic fintech environments. On the other hand, smart cities and digital public infrastructure — such as digital IDs, online government portals, and interoperable public services — are being deployed across major urban areas. In parallel, the EdTech sector is training millions of new professionals and turning the region into an exporter of digital-skilled talent. Finally, e-commerce and logistics innovations are also undergoing transformation, they are evolving introducing blockchain and Web3 frameworks, enabling new forms of decentralized marketplaces and governance. Together, these developments reveal how the Spanish-speaking world is building a connected and technologically adaptive innovation landscape. Figure 3: Innovation competitiveness scores of certain Spanish-speaking countries. Source: ITIF. Latin American Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index 2.0 https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/22/latin-american-subnational-innovation-competitiveness-index-2/ Challenges However, despite the rapid progress shown, several issues continue to limit the digital transformation of the Spanish-speaking world. First, the digital divide remains a major challenge, particularly between urban centers with high-speed connectivity and rural or low-income areas where access to broadband, devices, and digital skills is still limited. Therefore, the resulting gap is visible in education, financial inclusion, and the ability of smaller communities to participate in the digital economy. The second challenge is the regulatory lag, which is also slowing the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI, cryptocurrency, and automation. This can be visible in the fact that many countries are still developing comprehensive frameworks for data protection, AI ethics, and digital asset oversight, usually leaving innovators operating in uncertain legal environments in the meantime. The third challenge is talent mobility. The region continues to experience significant brain drain as skilled workers tend to migrate to the U.S. and Europe. Even though there is an emerging countertrend of “brain return” thanks to remote-work global hiring, competitive salaries in tech, and new government incentives aimed at retaining or repatriating talent, still is not enough and is a challenge to be addressed. Finally, the fourth challenge is the cybersecurity risks, which have also become a big problem. Latin America has become one of the regions most targeted by ransomware and phishing attacks, vulnerabilities in public infrastructure, small businesses, and critical sectors have been highlighted in most of these attacks. In addition, the spread of misinformation and weak data-governance systems further threaten trust in digital services and democratic institutions. What Comes Next? Although significant challenges remain, addressing them requires aligning technological growth with stronger governance, skilled talent, sustained investment in human capital, and resilient digital infrastructure. Therefore, the next phase of digital reinvention will likely focus on region-wide AI standards, cross-border digital markets, and stronger public-private collaboration to scale infrastructure, talent pipelines, and cybersecurity. Thus, countries that successfully integrate education reforms, innovation incentives, and robust digital institutions will position themselves as global players in emerging technologies. Conclusion Spanish, as the third most spoken language in the world, provides a unique base for building a shared digital ecosystem that could connect people across continents – or the world. This linguistic advantage – combined with a young population, a growing connectivity, and a wave of technological innovation – has positioned the Spanish-speaking world at a pivotal moment of digital reinvention. Countries within the Spanish-speaking sphere are not only adapting new tools or technologies; they are building digital public infrastructure, developing and exporting tech talent, and contributing and participating in the global development of AI, fintech, and smart-city solutions. Still, innovation on its own is not enough. Consequently, closing the gap in the digital divide, strengthening cybersecurity, modernizing regulations, and finding ways to retain and reverse brain drain remain the main challenges. If governments and private actors succeed in building resilient digital institutions and harmonizing regional standards, the Spanish-speaking world could emerge as a major center of global technological influence. Ultimately, this transformation has the potential not just to modernize economies, but to redefine how more than 600 million Spanish speakers participate – and shape – in the digital age. Referencias AGESIC (Agencia de Gobierno Digital) (2023). Digital Government Strategy of Uruguay 2020–2025. https://www.gub.uy/agesic/ BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (2022). Fintech Regulation and Payment Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap124.pdf CAF (2022). GovTech Index for Latin America — Colombia Chapter. https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1916 CAF (2022). Urban Mobility Observatory: Digital Public Infrastructure in Latin American Cities. https://www.caf.com/en/knowledge/ CB Insights (2023). Global Fintech Report: Q4 2023 — Latin America Section. https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/fintech-trends-q4-2023/ CMF Chile (2022). Ley Fintech y Marco Regulatorio para Innovación Financiera. https://www.cmfchile.cl ECLAC (2022). State of Digital Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.cepal.org/en/publications ECLAC (2023). Status of Digital Infrastructure in Uruguay. https://www.cepal.org/en European Commission (2023). Spain Digital 2026: Spain’s Digital Transformation Strategy. https://espanadigital.gob.es/ Fira Barcelona (2023). Smart City Expo LATAM Congress Report. https://www.smartcityexpolatam.com GSMA (2023). Mobile World Capital Barcelona: Digital Talent Overview. https://www.mobileworldcapital.com GSMA (2023). The Mobile Economy: Latin America 2023. https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/latin-america/ Government of Chile (2021). National Artificial Intelligence Policy. https://www.ciencia.gob.cl/ia/ IDB (2021) Accelerating the Digitization of SMEs in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.iadb.org/en/project/RG-T3902#:~:text=and%20the%20Caribbean-,Accelerating%20the%20Digitization%20of%20SMEs%20in%20Latin%20America%20and%20the,the%20digital%20transformation%20of%20MSMEs. IDB (2022). The Digital Transformation of Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities, Challenges and Policy Priorities. https://flagships.iadb.org/en/MicroReport/digitalizing-public-services-opportunities-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean IDB (2023). Argentina’s Digital Talent and Innovation Ecosystem. https://www.iadb.org/en IDB (2025) IDB Approves Financing to Support Digital Transformation and Use of Artificial Intelligence in Piauí, Brazil. https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-approves-financing-support-digital-transformation-and-use-artificial-intelligence-piaui-brazil#:~:text=The%20expansion%20of%20connectivity%20is,co%2Dfinancing%20is%20$12.5%20million.&text=The%20Inter%2DAmerican%20Development%20Bank%20(IDB)%20is%20devoted%20to,well%2Dbeing%20in%2026%20countries. Instituto Cervantes (2025). Anuario del Instituto Cervantes 2025: El Español en el Mundo. https://www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/informes_actividad/anuario.htm MIT Technology Review (2023). AI Innovation in Latin America: Spanish-Speaking Ecosystems. https://www.technologyreview.com/ Ministerio TIC (2022). Misión TIC — Informe de Resultados. https://mintic.gov.co OECD (2020). Digital Government Review of Chile: En Chile, hacia un Estado Digital. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/digital-government-in-chile_9789264258013-en.html OECD (2020). Latin American Economic Outlook 2020: Digital Transformation for Building Back Better. https://doi.org/10.1787/20725140 OECD (2022). OECD Digital Government Review of Spain: Enhancing the Digital Transformation of the Public Sector. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2021/07/enhancing-digital-diffusion-for-higher-productivity-in-spain_8b97078e/ce12270a-en.pdf Poorte, Marielle (2025) How many people speak Spanish in the world? 42 Statistics. Speak easy. https://www.speakeasybcn.com/en/blog/how-many-people-in-the-world-speak-spanish#:~:text=42%20statistics%20about%20Spanish%20speakers,most%20widely%20spoken%20Romance%20language. Stanford HAI (2024). AI Index Report 2024 — Regional Spotlight: Latin America. https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/ Statista (2023). Fintech in Latin America – Market Insights and Outlook. https://www.statista.com/topics/5123/fintech-in-latin-america/?srsltid=AfmBOorQcdxpAWPuf6g7Ojqbg8Yb_bQtZZmsl--OxOL29w4nQxKsI8lp#topicOverview UNESCO (2021). Latin America and the Caribbean: Artificial Intelligence Needs, Challenges and Opportunities. https://unesdoc.unesco.org United Nations (2022). World Population Prospects 2022 — Latin America & Caribbean Profile. https://population.un.org/wpp/ World Bank (2020). Argentina: Fostering Technology and Innovation for Productivity. https://documents.worldbank.org World Bank (2021). Digital Economy for Latin America and the Caribbean (DE4LAC) Report. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/digitaldevelopment World Bank (2022). GovTech Maturity Index 2022 — Uruguay Profile. https://www.unesco.org/ethics-ai/en/uruguay World Bank (2023). Colombia Digital Economy Country Assessment (DECA). https://www.worldbank.org

Abstract This paper analyses the escalating tensions between the United States and Venezuela as of 2025, focusing on the Caribbean regional security complex. Under President Donald Trump, U.S. - Venezuela relations have sharply deteriorated, marked by increased military deployments, including the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, and over 4,000 troops near Venezuela. Operation Southern Spear targets alleged narco-terrorist groups linked to Venezuela, with numerous airstrikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels resulting in significant casualties. Despite official claims of counternarcotics objectives, critics question the legality and evidence supporting these actions. Venezuela, backed by Russian arms and military support, has mobilised substantial forces and prepared for guerrilla resistance. The potential for full-scale conflict remains elevated but uncertain, complicated by domestic U.S. opposition, legal constraints, and regional diplomatic backlash. Additionally, Venezuela's rare earth mineral deposits add a strategic dimension to the conflict amid global supply chain concerns. The study highlights the multifaceted geopolitical, military, and economic factors shaping this volatile confrontation. Key Words: the U.S., Venezuela, Regional Security Complex Introduction Recently, the U.S.-Venezuela relations have deteriorated significantly under President Donald Trump, marking a continuation of longstanding tensions rooted in U.S. opposition to the socialist government led by President Nicolás Maduro, including past sanctions and diplomatic isolation. [1] The year 2025 has seen a sharp escalation in U.S. military posturing framed as a counternarcotics campaign, with Trump signing a secret directive in August authorising Pentagon forces against select Latin American drug cartels, including those allegedly tied to Venezuelan entities.[2] This has involved designating groups like Tren de Aragua (TdA) as a foreign terrorist organisation in February and the Cartel de los Soles as a transnational terrorist group in July, with unsubstantiated claims linking them to Maduro's regime in drug trafficking operations targeting the U.S.[3] Recent developments alarmingly include a U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean since August 2025, featuring assets such as Aegis-class destroyers, nuclear-powered submarines, the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, over 4,000 troops deployed off Venezuela's coast, an additional 5,000 on standby in Puerto Rico, F-35 fighter jets, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and B-52 bomber demonstration flights over Caracas. Starting in September, the U.S. has conducted at least 16 airstrikes on suspected drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific waters, resulting in at least 67 deaths. However, critics argue that these lack sufficient evidence of drug ties and raise concerns over extrajudicial killings.[4] Administration officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, have emphasised that these operations are limited to maritime counternarcotics and intelligence gathering, with no current plans for strikes inside Venezuela itself, citing a lack of legal justification for land-based actions under existing Justice Department opinions. However, the administration is seeking a new legal opinion to potentially authorise future land strikes without congressional approval, aligning with Trump's hints that Maduro's leadership is nearing its end.[5] On November 6, 2025, the U.S. Senate rejected a bipartisan resolution under the 1973 War Powers Act that would have required congressional authorisation for any military attack on Venezuela, failing by a 51-49 vote, with only two Republicans — Sens. Rand Paul and Lisa Murkowski — joining Democrats in support.[6] Some have interpreted this vote as giving tacit approval to Trump's "America First" doctrine, which critics compare to past interventions in Panama (1989) or Iraq (2003), warning of risks like regional instability or failed regime change efforts. Economically, the intensified U.S. pressure has led to a surge in Venezuelan bond prices, reflecting investor speculation on the potential for regime change amid the country's $150 billion in defaulted debt and interest payments.[7] Broader implications include debates over Trump's endgame, with experts suggesting limited strikes to pressure elites around Maduro rather than a full invasion. However, this could echo U.S. misadventures in Afghanistan or Libya.[8] From Venezuela's perspective and allied views, these actions represent an imperialistic push to undermine the Bolivarian Revolution, potentially through fabricated pretexts or assassinations, with international actors like China and Russia conducting joint exercises in the region to counter U.S. moves.[9] Congressional Democrats have voiced scepticism over the campaign's legality and transparency, while Republicans largely support executive authority in combating drug threats.[10] Source: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela The U.S. military build-up towards Venezuela Diplomatic relations were terminated in 2019 following the United States' recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president. Consequently, as reported by the media, several South American nations, including Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, have also acknowledged Mr. Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela.[11] In response to President Trump's recognition of the opposition leader, President Maduro severed diplomatic relations with the United States and mandated that its diplomatic personnel vacate Venezuela within 72 hours. He accused Washington of attempting to govern Venezuela remotely and alleged that the opposition was endeavouring to orchestrate a coup. Consequently, the U.S. embassy in Caracas remains closed. The United States continues to recognise the National Assembly elected in 2015, but ceased to acknowledge Guaidó's presidential claim in 2023. The U.S. government maintains that neither Maduro nor his affiliates represent the legitimate Venezuelan government. [12] Furthermore, the United States has markedly augmented its military presence in the Caribbean Sea as part of "Operation Southern Spear," purportedly to address drug trafficking. This initiative includes the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier and thousands of military personnel, constituting the largest military deployment to the region in several decades.[13] As reported by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, recent operations have primarily targeted vessels suspected of drug smuggling. The initial attack was recorded on September 2 in the Caribbean, and since then, the frequency of these attacks has increased, extending into the Eastern Pacific.[14]    Reports suggest the strikes in the Caribbean have occurred near the Venezuelan coast. Previous analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described a potential U.S. surveillance operation off the coast, which the United States has purportedly established to detect and target potential drug traffickers before they integrate with the dense maritime traffic of the Caribbean.[15] Until late summer, the deployment of U.S. Navy ships to the Caribbean was relatively limited compared to previous years. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, this situation changed in August when the administration initiated a significant increase in forces to combat drug smuggling. Deployment levels further escalated with the arrival of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (CSG).[16]    Recent deployments have also involved larger vessels, which bring substantial firepower and additional combat capabilities. A rudimentary method to quantify the enhancement in capability is to examine the displacement of the deployed ships. Figure 3 illustrates the significant increase in the displacement of deployed ships since the commencement of the second Trump administration. The initial major increase occurred with the deployment of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group; the arrival of the Ford CSG nearly doubled the number.[17]   Since September 2025, the U.S. has conducted a series of airstrikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, which it claims are drug-trafficking vessels operated by "narco-terrorist" organisations like the Tren de Aragua gang.[18] On Monday, September 15, President Trump announced that, under his directive, United States military forces executed a second kinetic strike against drug trafficking cartels and narco-terrorists identified as extraordinarily violent within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This strike was conducted while these confirmed narco-terrorists from Venezuela were in international waters, transporting illegal narcotics intended for the United States, which he described as a deadly weapon poisoning Americans. In the same announcement, President Trump asserted that these extremely violent drug trafficking cartels pose a threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy, and vital U.S. interests.[19] The strike on September 15 resulted in the deaths of three individuals aboard the vessel. Subsequently, on Friday, September 19, U.S. military forces executed an additional strike. President Trump asserted that, under his directive, forces conducted a strike against a designated terrorist organisation involved in narco-trafficking. Intelligence confirmed that the vessel was transporting illicit narcotics and was en route to harm Americans. The strike resulted in the deaths of three male narco-terrorists. It remains unclear which group within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility was targeted in the third airstrike.[20] On September 2, 2025, the United States military conducted its initial strike, resulting in the deaths of 11 individuals suspected of narco-terrorism. Following the third strike, the cumulative number of suspected drug traffickers killed reached 17. By mid-November 2025, at least 20 strikes had been announced, resulting in over 80 deaths, with most occurring in the Caribbean and several expanding to the Pacific off South America's coast.[21] U.S. officials, including President Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have justified the actions as part of a counternarcotics campaign against groups like TdA and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), framing them as an "armed attack" on the U.S. and releasing videos of some strikes.[22] Maduro's government has denounced the U.S. actions as acts of aggression and "regime change through military threat," launching its own "massive mobilisation" of troops and military exercises in response.[23] Additionally, the Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, who is in the midst of a spat with Donald Trump over the boat strikes and tariffs, said: "The attack on another boat in the Pacific … killed people. It is murder. Whether in the Caribbean or Pacific, the U.S. government strategy breaks the norms of international law." Interestingly, María Corina Machado, a prominent Venezuelan politician and opposition leader, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2025 for her "unwavering commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in Venezuela", according to The Nobel Prize.[24] Following her award on October 10, 2025, Machado has called for increased international support, urging U.S. leaders like Donald Trump to intensify pressure on Maduro to facilitate a democratic transition, including by calling for military intervention.[25] The military build-up has fueled speculation of a potential U.S. invasion, though President Trump downplayed the possibility, saying he "doubts it". Experts disagree on the likelihood of a full-scale invasion, noting the U.S. has previously opted for sanctions and diplomatic pressure over direct military action. War Speculation As of mid-November 2025 (when this analysis is written), the likelihood of a full-scale war between the United States and Venezuela remains elevated but not imminent or inevitable.[I] While tensions have escalated dramatically through U.S. military build-up and operations in the Caribbean, several restraining factors—including domestic U.S. opposition, legal hurdles, and high risks of failure would suggest a medium probability of limited escalation to airstrikes or missile attacks on Venezuelan targets, but a lower chance of a ground invasion or prolonged conflict. As mentioned above, the U.S. did launch "Operation Southern Spear" on November 13, a joint task force under U.S. Southern Command aimed at defending against "narco-terrorists" allegedly tied to Venezuela.[26] The arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group on November 11 has shifted the focus toward potential anti-Maduro operations, supported by a build-up of over a dozen warships, an attack submarine, amphibious vessels, roughly 15,000 troops (including Marines in joint exercises with Trinidad and Tobago), 10 F-35 fighter jets, drones, and special operations forces in the region and Puerto Rico. [27] President Trump has authorised CIA covert operations in Venezuela and, on November 14, stated he has "sort of made up my mind" on military options after briefings from top officials like Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. [28] He has suggested "the land is going to be next" after maritime strikes, hinting at ground operations or strikes on Venezuelan soil, such as military facilities, drug routes, or even targeting Maduro directly.[29] However, Trump has also mentioned possible discussions with Maduro and expressed caution about actions that could fail or entangle U.S. troops. In response, Venezuela has mobilised around 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militias in large-scale exercises, deploying aging Russian-made equipment like 5,000 Igla missiles and preparing for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and "anarchization" strategies to make the country ungovernable for invaders[30] Maduro has warned that U.S. intervention would turn Venezuela into "another Gaza, Afghanistan, or Vietnam," emphasising national resistance.[31] What could enhance the likelihood of a war between the U.S. and Venezuela? The U.S. holds overwhelming advantages in air, sea, and missile capabilities (e.g., up to 170 Tomahawk missiles in the region, stealth bombers for long-range strikes), making initial air or missile campaigns feasible without ground forces.[32] Venezuela's forces are numerically larger on land but poorly trained, under-equipped, and focused on internal control, with limited operational aircraft and inoperable submarines.[33] Experts note that this imbalance could encourage U.S. escalation, similar to the 1989 invasion of Panama.[34] Trump's administration views the situation as an "armed attack" on the U.S. via drugs and migration, with regime change as a potential endgame to disrupt flows and secure oil deals.[35] The Senate's rejection of a War Powers Act resolution earlier in November gives tacit executive leeway. Analysts describe the region as "on the brink," with the carrier deployment starting a "shot clock" for action before unsustainable costs mount.[36] There are several arguments against a potential war. According to YouGov.US, polls show that 55% of Americans oppose a U.S. invasion, with only 15% in support, including majorities among Democrats, Independents, and even some Republicans.[37] Apparently, Trump's anti-war coalition, including figures like Vice President JD Vance and Hegseth, is sceptical of foreign entanglements.[38] According to experts, there is no current legal justification for land strikes, as the War Powers Act's 60-day limit has expired and Congress is pressing for transparency.[39] Regional leaders (e.g., Brazil's Lula, Colombia's Petro, Mexico's Sheinbaum) condemn the build-up as aggression, suspending intelligence sharing and evoking "gunboat diplomacy." What is more, the UN and human rights criticisms label U.S. actions as potential extrajudicial killings, risking broader isolation.[40] A full invasion could require 50,000 - 150,000 troops, facing guerrilla resistance in challenging terrain and leading to a failed state or protracted insurgency (comparisons to Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya). Experts warn it won't solve drug or dictator issues, damaging U.S. credibility in Latin America (e.g., falling favourability ratings) and diverting from diplomatic alternatives. What about Russia? – Is there the potential for another Cuban Missile Crisis? Russia has been Venezuela's primary arms supplier since the early 2000s under former President Hugo Chávez, providing a wide array of military equipment that forms the backbone of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and plays a central role in its defence strategy amid escalating U.S. - Venezuela tensions in 2025.[41] This arsenal, largely Soviet-era designs manufactured or upgraded by Russia, distinguishes Venezuela's military from others in Latin America, which typically rely on U.S. or European weaponry, and is intended to deter external aggression, particularly from the U.S., through asymmetric warfare capabilities.[42] Among the most critical for countering U.S. air and naval superiority are Russian-derived air defence and missile systems. In this category, according to media, the key assets include: 12 batteries of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), nine Buk-M2E medium-range SAMs, 44 S-125 Pechora-2M short-range SAMs, and thousands of portable Igla-S shoulder-fired SAMs (with up to 5,000 units reported in some estimates).[43] The S-300 and Buk systems are positioned to protect key sites like oil facilities and radar installations, potentially threatening U.S. aircraft, helicopters, and drones at various altitudes. Igla-S launchers are distributed to regular troops and the Bolivarian Militia for low-altitude defence.[44] As for the aircraft and anti-ship capabilities, experts estimate around 20-30 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole fighter jets, armed with Kh-31 "Krypton" anti-ship and anti-radar missiles, serve as the core of Venezuela's air force. [45] These jets, equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles, could challenge U.S. naval vessels in the Caribbean by launching sea-skimming attacks, forcing U.S. forces to operate under heightened risk. Russia has also provided Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters for transport and attack roles.[46] As for ground and artillery systems, Venezuela fields 92 T-72B1 main battle tanks, 123 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, and Smerch multiple rocket launchers.[47] Infantry weapons include Kalashnikov rifles (e.g., AK-103) and Dragunov sniper rifles, with a new factory opened in July 2025 for producing Kalashnikov munitions to sustain supply.[48] Finally, as for other support systems, Russian radar arrays and electronic warfare tools, integrated with Chinese communications, enable jamming of U.S. signals, creating a contested electromagnetic environment.[49] These systems contribute to Venezuela's overall force of about 150,000 active personnel, plus a Bolivarian Militia estimated at 220,000 - 1 million (with government claims up to 8 million), which could use Russian arms for guerrilla-style resistance.[50] Amid heightened U.S. pressure, President Nicolás Maduro drafted a letter in October 2025 requesting additional Russian missiles, radars, drones, upgraded aircraft, and other support directly from Vladimir Putin.[51] According to the media, a Russian Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane, linked to military or Wagner Group operations, landed in Caracas in late October to deliver cargo, potentially including arms or parts.[52] Russia has also allegedly assisted in maintenance and opened a Kalashnikov munitions factory in Venezuela in July 2025. However, experts caution that Russia's commitments may be limited due to its focus on Ukraine, economic strains, and reliance on allies like China and Iran for broader support, suggesting more symbolic gestures (e.g., past bomber deployments in 2018-2019) than substantial reinforcements.[53] This aid seems to be part of a multipolar strategy involving China and Iran, but Russia's role remains pivotal in sustaining Venezuela's deterrent posture. Conclusion What about Venezuela's rare earths? Venezuela does have deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), though they are not among the world's largest or most developed reserves. Known occurrences include the Navay phosphate deposit in southwestern Venezuela, where phosphorites contain REE concentrations averaging around 208 parts per million, with potential for extraction as a byproduct of phosphoric acid production.[54] Additional deposits occur in the Amazon Basin and the Guiana Shield, particularly in the Bolívar and Amazonas states, where REEs are found alongside other critical minerals, such as coltan (a source of tantalum), tin, and tungsten.[55] These areas feature preliminary survey results indicating reserves of around 43 million tons of ore with REE oxide concentrations averaging 1.5%, though much of the extraction is informal and unregulated.[56] Historically, Venezuela has exported small amounts of REE compounds, such as $27,600 worth in 2003, but current production is limited and often tied to illicit mining.[57] REEs play a minor but notable role in the ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela, primarily as part of broader competition over critical minerals rather than as a central driver of the conflict. The main issues in US-Venezuela relations remain oil sanctions, political disputes over the Maduro regime, and human rights concerns, but Venezuela's mineral resources—including REEs and coltan—have drawn international attention amid global supply chain vulnerabilities.[58] The U.S. defence and technology sectors rely on these materials for applications such as fighter jets, missiles, and electronics, and Venezuela's deposits are seen as potential alternatives to China's dominant supply, especially after China's recent export restrictions heightened Western diversification efforts.[59] Mining in these areas is often controlled by armed groups like the ELN and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) dissidents—designated as terrorist organisations by the U.S.—leading to smuggling, environmental damage, and human rights abuses that complicate international involvement.[60] Some analysts suggest that U.S. policies, including sanctions and border measures, may indirectly aim to secure access to these resources to counter China's influence, viewing Venezuela's alliances with Beijing as a strategic threat in the context of rare-earth dependencies.[61] However, REEs are not the primary motivator compared to oil, and their extraction remains largely illicit rather than a formalised point of diplomatic contention.[62] Notes [I] Importantly, on November 29, 2025, President Donald Trump declared that the airspace "above and surrounding" Venezuela should be considered "closed in its entirety. See more at: https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/29/trump-venezuelan-airspace-military-00670743 References [1] U.S. Relations With Venezuela. (2024, July 18). U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/ [2] U.S. Confrontation With Venezuela. (2025, July 11). Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela [3] The United States Continues Its Attempt to Overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: The Forty-Fifth Newsletter (2025). (2025, November 6). Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/us-threats-venezuela/ [4] Bertrand, N., Hansler, J., Lillis, K. B., Cohen, Z., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 7). Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land [5] War looms in Venezuela as Trump tests an “Americas First” doctrine. (2025, November 6). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2025/11/06/war-looms-in-venezuela-as-trump-tests-an-americas-first-doctrine [6] O’Brien, C., & Gould, J. (2025, November 6). Senate sinks measure to block military action against Venezuela. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2025/11/06/congress/senate-venezuela-vote-00640088 [7] Campos, R. (2025, November 7). Venezuela bonds surge as US pressure intensifies on Maduro. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-bonds-surge-us-pressure-intensifies-maduro-2025-11-06/ [8] Kroenig, M., & Marczak, J. (2025, November 6). The expert conversation: What’s Trump’s endgame in Venezuela? Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-expert-conversation-whats-trumps-endgame-in-venezuela/ [9] The United States Continues Its Attempt to Overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: The Forty-Fifth Newsletter (2025). (2025, November 6). Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/us-threats-venezuela/ [10] Bertrand, N., Hansler, J., Lillis, K. B., Cohen, Z., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 7). Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land [11] Juan Guaidó: US backs opposition leader as Venezuela president. (2019, January 24). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46980913 [12] Lee, D. D., & News Agencies. (2025, October 7). Venezuela’s Maduro says US embassy ‘false flag’ bombing foiled in Caracas. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/7/venezuelas-maduro-says-us-embassy-false-flag-bombing-foiled-in-caracas#:~:text=Following%20the%20rupture%20of%20diplomatic,and%20upkeep%20of%20the%20premises. [13] Operation Southern Spear: Latest Development in Operationalizing Robotic and Autonomous Systems. (2025, January 28). America’s Navy. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/4044322/operation-southern-spear-latest-development-in-operationalizing-robotic-and-aut/ [14] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [15] Ibidem. [16] Ibidem. [17] Ibidem. [18] Ducharme, J. (2025, September 22). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. Orion Policy Institute. https://orionpolicy.org/airstrikes-on-drug-traffickers-in-the-caribbean/ [19] Ibidem. [20] Madhani, A. (2025, September 19). Trump says U.S. has carried out another fatal strike targeting alleged drug-smuggling boat. CNBC. https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/trump-us-strike-drug-smuggling-boat/3694397/ [21] Flaherty, A., & Pereira, I. (2025, November 17). Timeline: US strikes on alleged drug boats. CBCNews. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-us-strikes-alleged-drug-boats/story?id=126940218 [22] Jaffe, A. (2025, October 30). Assessing the Facts and Legal Questions About the U.S. Strikes on Alleged Drug Boats. FactCheck.Org. https://www.factcheck.org/2025/10/assessing-the-facts-and-legal-questions-about-the-u-s-strikes-on-alleged-drug-boats/ [23] Lowell, H., & staff, G. (2025, October 23). US military kills five people in strikes on alleged drug-trafficking boats in Pacific. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/22/military-boat-strike-pacific-pete-hegseth [24] Maria Corina Machado Facts. (2025, November 20). The Nobel Prize. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2025/machado/facts/ [25] Nobel Peace Prize Winner: US Escalation Is “Only Way” to Free Venezuela. (2025, October 31). Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2025-maria-corina-machado-weekend-interview/?embedded-checkout=true [26] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [27] Ibidem. [28] Klein, B., Liptak, K., Britzky, H., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 17). Trump has suggested he’s made a decision on Venezuela military operations. Here’s what we know. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/15/politics/venezuela-trump-military-what-we-know [29] Reuters. (2025, November 12). Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ [30] Venezuela announces ‘massive mobilization’ of military forces as America’s largest warship sails into region. (2025, November 12). CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/11/americas/venezuela-military-mobilization-us-buildup-intl-latam [31] Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. (2025, November 12). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ [32] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [33] Ibidem. [34] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [35] Vidaurri, M., Marckwardt, J., & Gedan, B. N. (2025, November 14). A War in Venezuela Would Not Solve Latin America’s Drug and Dictator Problems. STIMSON. https://www.stimson.org/2025/a-war-in-venezuela-would-not-solve-latin-americas-drug-and-dictator-problems/ [36] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [37] Rossell Hayes, A., & Orth, T. (2025, October 31). The U.S. Navy deployment near Venezuela has become even less popular in the past month. YouGov.US. https://today.yougov.com/international/articles/53298-the-us-navy-deployment-near-venezuela-has-become-even-less-popular [38i] Klein, B., Liptak, K., Britzky, H., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 17). Trump has suggested he’s made a decision on Venezuela military operations. Here’s what we know. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/15/politics/venezuela-trump-military-what-we-know [39] Vidaurri, M., Marckwardt, J., & Gedan, B. N. (2025, November 14). A War in Venezuela Would Not Solve Latin America’s Drug and Dictator Problems. STIMSON. https://www.stimson.org/2025/a-war-in-venezuela-would-not-solve-latin-americas-drug-and-dictator-problems/ [40] Tisdall, S. (2025, November 16). The US is now a rogue state - look at its extrajudicial killings off Venezuela’s coast. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/nov/16/us-rogue-state-extrajudicial-killings-venezuela [41] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [42] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [43] Ibidem. [44] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [45] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [46] Ibidem. [47] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [48] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [49] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [50] Romero, S. (2025, November 5). How Venezuela’s Military Might Respond to U.S. Attacks. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/us/venezuela-military-maduro-coup.html [51] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [52] Romero, S. (2025, November 5). How Venezuela’s Military Might Respond to U.S. Attacks. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/us/venezuela-military-maduro-coup.html [53] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [54] Linares, E., Velasquez, G., Manrique, J., Monsalve, J., Lo Mónaco, S., & Shumlyanskyy, L. (2026). REE + Y signatures of the Navay phosphate deposit, SW Venezuela: Seawater paleoredox conditions and diagenetic implications. Journal of South American Earth Sciences, 129. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsames.2023.104532 [55] Venezuela’s rare earth rush. A growing supply chain risk. (2025, November 12). Southern Pulse. https://southernpulse.substack.com/p/venezuelas-rare-earth-rush [56 Killeen, T. J. (2024, July 12). Industrial minerals in the Pan Amazon. MONGABAY. https://news.mongabay.com/2024/07/more-industrial-minerals-on-brazils-borders-with-ecuador-venezuela-and-colombia/ [57] Rare-Earth Metal Compounds in Venezuela. (2025, November 25). OEC. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/rare-earth-metal-compounds/reporter/ven [58] Garcia, J. (2025, October 26). Trading Oil for Influence. The Heights. https://bcheights.com/224288/opinions/column/trading-oil-for-influence/ [59] Russell, M., & Ellner, M. (2025, November 15). The US War on China, Venezuela, and the Global Left. Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/us-war-china-venezuela [60] bus, B. (2025, November 7). ‘Drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping’: the lawless rush for rare earth minerals in Venezuela. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/07/drug-trafficking-extortion-kidnapping-the-lawless-rush-for-rare-earth-minerals-in-venezuela [61] Giunta, C. (2015, May 6). Follow the Minerals: Why the US is Threatened by Venezuela’s ‘Blue Gold.’ Venezuelanalysis. https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11372/ [62] Blakemore, R., Harmon, A., & Engelke, P. (2025, November 19). Critical minerals in crisis: Stress testing US supply chains against shocks. Venezuelanalysis. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/critical-minerals-in-crisis-stress-testing-us-supply-chains-against-shocks/

I. Introduction Elections in the United States are held for government officials at the federal, state, and local levels. At the federal level, the head of state, the President, is elected indirectly by the people of each state, through an Electoral College. All members of the federal legislature, the Congress, are directly elected by the people of each state. There are many elected offices at state level, each state having at least an elective governor and legislature. In addition, there are elected offices at the local level, in counties, cities, towns, and villages, as well as for special districts and school districts which may transcend county and municipal boundaries. The US election system is highly decentralized. While the US Constitution sets parameters for the election of federal officials, state laws regulate most aspects of elections in the US, including primary elections, the eligibility of voters (beyond the basic constitutional definition), the method of choosing presidential electors, as well as the running of state elections. All elections-federal, state, and local-are administered by the individual states, with many aspects of the electoral system’s operations delegated to the county or local level. [1] Under federal law, the general elections of the president and Congress are held in even-numbered years, with presidential elections occurring every four years, and congressional elections taking place every two years. The general elections that are held two years after the presidential ones are referred to as the mid-term elections. General elections for state and local offices are held at the discretion of the individual state and local governments, with many of these races coinciding with either presidential or mid-term elections as a matter of cost saving and convenience, while other state and local races may occur during odd-numbered “off years.” The date when primary elections for federal, state, and local races take place are also at the discretion of the individual state and local governments; presidential primaries in particular have historically been staggered between the states, beginning sometime in January or February, and ending about mid-June before the November general election. [2] With this basic information in mind, this paper explores the US electoral system. This paper first provides an overview of the US electoral system and then explains the US Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) and features of US electoral systems. Finally, the paper compares the US electoral system with Canadian and Mexican electoral systems.  II. US Elections  1. Federal elections The United States has a presidential system of government, which means that the executive and legislature are elected separately. Article II of the US Constitution requires that the election of the US president by the Electoral College must take place on a single day throughout the country; Article I established that elections for Congressional offices, however, can be held at different times. Congressional and presidential elections are held simultaneously every four years, and the intervening Congressional elections, which take place every two years, are called mid-term elections. The US constitution states that members of the US House of Representatives must be at least 25 years old, a US citizen for at least seven years, and be a legal inhabitant of the state that they represent. Senators must be at least 30 years old, an US citizen for at least nine years, and be a (legal) inhabitant of the state that they represent. The president and vice president must be at least 35 years old, a natural born US citizen, and a resident in the US for at least 14 years. It is the responsibility of state legislatures to regulate the qualifications for a candidate appearing on a ballot paper, although in order to get onto the ballot, a candidate must often collect a legally defined number of signatures or meet other state-specific requirements. [3] A. Presidential electionsOverview of the presidential election process The presidential election process in the US follows a typical cycle as Table 1 shows. Table 1: US Presidential Election Cycle (source: USA In Brief: ELECTIONS. https://www.usa.gov/presidential-election-process) The president and the vice president in the US are elected together in a presidential election. It is an indirect election, with the winner being determined by votes cast by electors of the Electoral College. The winner of the election is the candidate with at least 270 Electoral College votes. It is possible for a candidate to win the electoral vote, but lose the nationwide popular vote (receive fewer votes nationwide than the second ranked candidate). This has happened five times in US history: in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016. [4] Electoral College votes are cast by individual states by a group of electors; each elector casts one electoral college vote. Until the Twenty-third Amendment to the US Constitution in 1961, citizens from the District of Columbia did not have representation in the electoral college.  State laws regulate how states cast their electoral college votes. In all states except Nebraska and Maine, the candidate that wins the most votes in the state receives all its electoral college votes (a “winner takes all” system). From 1996 in Nebraska, and from 1972 in Maine, two electoral votes are awarded based on the winner of the statewide election, and the rest (three in Nebraska and two in Maine) go to the highest vote-winner in each of the state’s congressional districts. [5] The Electoral CollegeOverview of the Electoral College  In the US, the Electoral College is the group of presidential electors that is formed every four years for the sole purpose of voting for the president and vice president in the presidential election. This process is explained in Article Two of the US Constitution. The number of electors from each state is equal to that state’s congressional delegation which is the number of senators (two) plus the number of Representatives for that state. Each state appoints electors using legal procedures determined by its legislature. Federal office holders, including US senators and representatives, cannot be electors. In addition, the Twenty-third Amendment granted the federal District of Columbia three electors (bringing the total number from 535 to 538). A simple majority of electoral votes (270 or more) is required to elect the president and vice president. If no candidate receives a majority, a contingent election is held by the House of Representatives, to elect the president, and by the Senate, to elect the vice president. [6] The states and the District of Columbia hold a statewide or district-wide popular vote on Election Day in November to choose electors based upon how they have pledged to vote for president and vice president, with some state laws prohibiting faithless electors. All states except Nebraska and Maine use a party block voting, or general ticket method, to choose their electors, meaning all their electors go to one winning ticket. Nebraska and Maine choose one elector per congressional district and two electors for the ticket with the highest statewide vote. The electors meet and vote in December, and the inaugurations of the president and vice president take place in next January. The merit of the electoral college system has been a matter of ongoing debate in the US since its inception at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, becoming more controversial by the latter years of the 19th century, up to the present day. More resolutions have been submitted to amend the Electoral College mechanism than any other part of the US constitution. An amendment that would have abolished the system was approved by the House in 1969, but failed to move past the Senate. [7] Supporters of the Electoral College claim that it requires presidential candidates to have broad appeal across the country to win, while critics argue that it is not representative of the popular will of the nation. Procedure of Electoral College Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the US Constitution directs each state to appoint a number of electors equal to that state’s congressional delegation (two senators plus the number of members of the House of Representatives). The same clause empowers each state legislature to determine the manner by which that state’s electors are chosen but prohibits federal office holders from becoming electors. Following the national presidential election day on Tuesday after the first Monday in November, each state, and the federal district, selects its electors according to its laws. [8] After a popular election, the states identify and record their appointed electors in a Certificate of Ascertainment, and those appointed electors then meet in their respective jurisdictions and produce a Certificate of Vote for their candidate; both certificates are then sent to US Congress to be opened and counted. [9] In 48 of the 50 states, state laws mandate that the winner of the plurality of the statewide popular vote receives all of that state’s electoral votes. In Nebraska and Maine, two electoral votes are assigned in this manner, while the remaining electoral votes are allocated based on the plurality of votes in each of their congressional districts. The federal district (Washington, D.C.) allocates its 3 electoral votes to the winner of its single district election. States generally require electors to pledge to vote for that state’s winning ticket; to prevent electors from being faithless electors, most states have adopted various laws to enforce the electors’ pledge. [10] The electors of each state meet in their respective state capital on the first Tuesday after the second Wednesday of December, between December 14 and 20, to cast their votes. The results are sent to and counted by the Congress, where they are tabulated in the first week of January before a joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, presided over by the current vice president, who is the president of the Senate. [11] Should a majority of votes not be cast for a candidate, a contingent election takes place: the House of Representatives holds a presidential election session, where one vote is cast by each of the fifty states. The Senate is responsible for electing the vice president, with each senator having one vote. The elected president and vice president are inaugurated on January 20. Since 1964, there have been 538 electors. States select 535 of the electors, this number matches the aggregate total of their congressional delegations. [12] The additional three electors came from the Twenty-third Amendment, ratified in 1961, providing that the district established pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 as the seat of the federal government (namely, Washington, D.C.) is entitled to the same number of electors as the least populous state. In practice, that results in Washington D.C. being entitled to three electors. [13] Figure 1: Current number of presidential electors by state in US (Source: Wikipedia)B. Congressional electionsOverview of US Congress The US Congress is the legislative branch of the federal government of the United States. It is a bicameral legislature, including a lower body, the US House of Representatives, and an upper body, the US Senate. They both meet in the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. Members of Congress are chosen through direct election, though vacancies in the Senate may be filled by a governor’s appointment. As Figure 2 shows, Congress has a total of 535 voting members, a figure which includes 100 senators and 435 representatives. The vice president of the United States, as president of the Senate, has a vote in the Senate only when there is a tie. [14] Figure 2: Current US Congress Structure (Source: Wikipedia) Congress convenes for a two-year term (a Congress), commencing every other January. Each Congress is usually split into two sessions, one for each year. Elections are held every even-numbered year on Election Day. The members of the House of Representatives are elected for the two-year term of a Congress. The Reapportionment Act of 1929 established that there be 435 representatives, and the Uniform Congressional District Act requires that they be elected from single-member constituencies or districts. It is also required that the congressional districts be apportioned among states by population every ten years using the US census results, provided that each state has at least one congressional representative. Each senator is elected at-large in their state for a six-year term, with terms staggered, so every two years approximately one-third of the Senate is up for election. Each state, regardless of size and population, has two senators, so currently, there are 100 US senators for the 50 states. [15] Article One of the US Constitution requires that members of Congress be at least 25 years old for the House and at least 30 years old for the Senate, be a US citizen for seven years for the House and nine years for the Senate, and be an inhabitant of the state that they represent. Members in both chambers may run for re-election an unlimited number of times. [16] Figure 3: US House of Representatives Seats by State (source: Britannica) Congress was created by the US Constitution and first met in 1789, replacing the Congress of the Confederation in its legislative function. Although not legally mandated, in practice members of Congress since the late 19th century are typically affiliated with one of the two major political parties, the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, and only rarely with a third party or independents affiliated with no party. Members of Congress can also switch parties at any time, though this is uncommon. [17] Role & Power of US Congress Article One of the US Constitution states that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a US Congress, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” [18] The House and Senate are equal partners in the legislative process – legislation cannot be enacted without the consent of both chambers. The US Constitution grants each chamber some unique powers. The Senate ratifies treaties and approves presidential appointments while the House initiates revenue-raising bills. The House initiates and decides impeachment while the Senate votes on conviction and removal of office for impeachment cases. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is required before an impeached person is removed from office. [19] US Congress has authority over budgetary and financial policy through the enumerated power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.  The Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 extended congressional power of taxation to include income taxes without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. The US Constitution also grants Congress the exclusive power to appropriate funds, and this power of the purse is one of Congress’s primary checks on the executive branch of the United States. Congress can borrow money on the credit of the US, regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, and coin money. Generally, the Senate and the House of Representatives have equal legislative authority, although only the House may originate revenue and appropriation bills. [20] In addition, Congress has an important role in national defense, including the exclusive power to declare war, to raise and maintain the armed forces, and to make rules for the military. Some critics charge that the executive branch has usurped Congress’s constitutionally defined task of declaring war. While historically presidents initiated the process for going to war, they asked for and received formal war declarations from Congress for the War of 1812, the Spanish–American War, the Mexican–American War, World War I, and World War II, although President Theodore Roosevelt’s military move into Panama in 1903 did not get congressional approval. In 1993, Michael Kinsley wrote that “Congress’s war power has become the most flagrantly disregarded provision in the Constitution,” and that the “real erosion of Congress’s war power started after World War II.” Disagreement about the extent of congressional versus presidential power regarding war has been present from time to time throughout US history. [21] US Congress can establish post offices and post roads, issue patents and copyrights, fix standards of weights and measures, establish courts inferior to the US supreme court, and make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the US, or in any Department or officer thereof. Article Four gives US Congress the power to admit new states into the Union. One of Congress’s foremost non-legislative functions is the power to investigate and oversee the executive branch. Congressional oversight is usually delegated to committees and is facilitated by Congress’s subpoena power (see Tables 2 & 3). Some critics have charged that the US Congress has in some instances failed to do an adequate job of overseeing the other branches of government. In the Plame affair, critics including US Representative Henry A. Waxman charged that Congress was not doing an adequate job of oversight in this case. [22] Table 2: Major Senate committees (source: Wikipedia)Table 3: Major House committees (source: Wikipedia)Power of US Senate Senate approval is required to pass any federal legislation. The US Constitution provides several unique functions for the Senate that form its ability to “checks and balances” the powers of other elements of the federal government. These include the requirement that the Senate may advise and must consent to some of the president’s government appointments; the Senate must also consent to all treaties with foreign governments; it tries all impeachments, and it elects the vice president in the event no person receives a majority of the electoral votes. Legislation Bills may be introduced in either chamber of Congress. However, the Constitution’s Origination Clause provides that All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. [23] Accordingly, the Senate does not have the power to initiate bills imposing taxes. Moreover, the House of Representatives holds that the Senate does not have the power to originate appropriation bills, or bills authorizing the expenditure of federal funds. The constitutional provision barring the Senate from introducing revenue bills is based on the practice of the British Parliament, in which money bills approved by Parliament have originated in the House of Commons per constitutional convention. Although the US Constitution gave the House the power to initiate revenue bills, in practice the Senate is equal to the House in the respect of spending. As Woodrow Wilson wrote: [24] The Senate’s right to amend general appropriation bills has been allowed the widest possible scope. The Senate may add to them what it pleases; may go altogether outside of their original provisions and tack to them entirely new features of legislation, altering not only the amounts but also even the objects of expenditure, and making out of the materials sent them by the popular chamber measures of an almost totally new character. The approval of both chambers is required for any bill, including a revenue bill, to become law. Both the House and the Senate must pass the same version of the bill; if there are differences, they may be resolved by sending amendments back and forth or by a conference committee that includes members of both bodies. Appointment confirmations The president can make certain appointments only with the advice and consent of the Senate. Officials whose appointments require the Senate’s approval include members of the Cabinet, ambassadors, heads of most federal executive agencies, justices of the Supreme Court, and other federal judges.  The powers of the Senate concerning nominations are, however, subject to some constraints. For instance, the US Constitution provides that the president may make an appointment without the Senate’s advice and consent during a congressional recess. The recess appointment remains valid only temporarily; the office becomes vacant again at the end of the next congressional session. Nonetheless, presidents have frequently used recess appointments to circumvent the possibility that the Senate may reject the nominee. Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Myers v. United States, although the Senate’s advice and consent are required for the appointment of certain executive branch officials, it is not necessary for their removal. However, recess appointments have faced a significant amount of resistance and in 1960, the US Senate passed a legally non-binding resolution against recess appointments to the Supreme Court. [25] Treaty ratification Moreover, the Senate has a role in ratifying treaties. The US Constitution provides that the president may only “make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur” in order to benefit from the Senate’s advice and consent and give each state an equal vote in the process. However, not all international agreements are considered treaties under US domestic law, even if the agreements are considered treaties under international law. Congress has passed laws authorizing the president to conclude executive agreements without action by the Senate. In a similar way, the president may make congressional-executive agreements with the approval of a simple majority in each House of Congress, rather than a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Neither executive agreements nor congressional-executive agreements are mentioned in the Constitution, leading some scholars such as John Yoo and Laurence Tribe to suggest that they unconstitutionally circumvent the treaty-ratification process. However, US courts have upheld the validity of such agreements. [26] Impeachment trials  The US Constitution empowers the House of Representatives to impeach federal officials for “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” and empowers the Senate to try such impeachments. If the sitting president of the United States is being tried, the US chief justice presides over the trial. During an impeachment trial, senators are constitutionally required to sit on oath or affirmation. Conviction requires a two-thirds majority of the senators present. A convicted official is automatically removed from office. In addition, the Senate may stipulate that the defendant is banned from holding office. No further punishment is permitted during the impeachment proceedings; however, the party may face criminal penalties in a normal court of law. The House of Representatives has impeached sixteen government officials, of whom seven were convicted (one resigned before the Senate could complete the trial). Only three US presidents have been impeached: Andrew Johnson in 1868, Bill Clinton in 1998, and Donald Trump in 2019 and 2021. The trials of Johnson, Clinton and both Trump trials ended in acquittal; in Johnson’s case, the Senate fell one vote short of the two-thirds majority required for conviction. [27] Election of the vice president Under the Twelfth Amendment, the Senate has the power to elect the vice president if a vice-presidential candidate does not receive a majority of votes in the Electoral College. The Twelfth Amendment requires the Senate to choose from the two candidates with the highest numbers of electoral votes. But Electoral College deadlocks are rare. The Senate has only broken a deadlock once; in 1837, it elected Richard Mentor Johnson. The House elects the president if the Electoral College deadlocks on that choice. [28] Power of US House of Representatives  The US House of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate all revenue bills, impeach federal officials, and elect the US president if the Electoral College is tied. Along with the Senate, it also shares the power to make laws. [29] The organization and character of the House of Representatives have evolved under the influence of political parties, which provide a means of controlling proceedings and mobilizing the necessary majorities. Party leaders, such as the majority and minority leaders, as well as the speaker of the House, play a central role in the operations of the House. However, party discipline (for example, the tendency of all members of a political party to vote in the same way) has not always been strong due to the fact that House members, who must face reelection every two years, often vote the interests of their districts rather than their political party when the two diverge. A further dominating element of House organization is the committee system, under which the membership is divided into specialized groups for purposes such as preparing bills for the consideration of the entire House, regulating House procedure, and holding hearings. Each committee is chaired by a member of the majority party. Almost all bills are first referred to a committee, and ordinarily the full House cannot act on a bill until the committee has “reported” it for floor action. There are approximately 20 standing committees, organized mainly around major policy areas, each having subcommittees, staffs, and budgets. They may hold hearings on questions of public interest, propose legislation that has not been formally introduced as a bill or resolution, and conduct investigations. Among important standing committees are those on appropriations, on ways and means (which handles matters related to finance), and on rules. In addition, there are select and special committees, which are usually appointed for a specific project and for a limited period of time. The committees also play an important role in the control exercised by Congress over governmental agencies. Cabinet officers and other officials are frequently summoned before the committees to explain policy. The US Constitution (Article I, section 6) prohibits members of Congress from holding offices in the executive branch of government—a major difference between parliamentary and congressional forms of government. [30] 2. State elections Overview State laws and state constitutions, controlled by state legislatures regulate elections at state level and local level. Various officials at the state level are elected. Since the separation of powers applies to states as well as the federal government, state legislatures and the executive (for example, the governor) are elected separately. Governors and lieutenant governors are elected in all states, in some states on a joint ticket and in some states separately, some separately in different electoral cycles. The governors of the territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands are also elected. In some states, executive positions such as Secretary of State and Attorney General are also elected offices. All members of state legislatures and territorial jurisdiction legislatures are elected. In some states, members of the state supreme court and other members of the state judiciary are elected. Proposals to amend the state constitution are also placed on the ballot in some states. [31] As a matter of cost saving and convenience, elections for many of these state and local offices are held at the same time as either the federal presidential or mid-term elections. There are a handful of states, however, that hold their elections during odd-numbered “off years.” Governors  As state managers, governors are mainly responsible for implementing state laws and overseeing the operation of the state executive branch. As state leaders, governors advance and pursue new and revised programs and policies using a variety of tools, among them executive orders, executive budgets, and legislative proposals and vetoes. As chiefs of the state, governors serve as the intergovernmental liaison to the federal government on behalf of the state. [32] Governors carry out their management and leadership responsibilities and objectives with the support and assistance of agency & department heads, many of whom they are empowered to appoint. A majority of governors have the power to appoint state court judges as well, in most cases from a list of names submitted by a nominations committee. Although governors have many roles and responsibilities in common, the scope of gubernatorial power varies from state to state in accordance with state constitutions, legislation, and tradition. Governors often are ranked by political historians and other observers of state politics according to the extent and number of their powers. States, commonwealths, or territories vary with respect to minimum age, US citizenship, and state residency requirements for gubernatorial candidates and other state office holders. The minimum age requirement for governors ranges from no formal provision to age 35. The requirement of US citizenship for gubernatorial candidates ranges from no formal provision to 20 years. State residency requirements range from no formal provision to 7 years. [33] State legislature  In the United States, the state legislature is the legislative branch in each of the 50 US states. A legislature generally performs state duties for a state in the same way that the US Congress performs national duties at the national level. Generally, the same system of checks and balances at the federal level also exists between the state legislature, the state executive officer (governor) and the state judiciary. In 27 states, the legislature is called the legislature or state legislature. In other 19 states, the legislature is called the general assembly. In New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the legislature is called the general court, while North Dakota and Oregon designate the legislature the legislative assembly. [34] The responsibilities of a state legislature vary from state to state, depending on the state’s constitution. The primary function of any legislature is to make laws. State legislatures also approve budgets for state government. They may establish government agencies, set their policies, and approve their budgets. For example, a state legislature could establish an agency to manage environmental conservation efforts within that state. In some states, state legislators elect other state officials. State legislatures often have the power to regulate businesses operating within their jurisdiction. They also regulate courts within their jurisdiction. This includes determining types of cases that can be heard, regulating attorney conduct, and setting court fees.With respect to other responsibilities of a state legislature, under the terms of Article V of the US Constitution, state lawmakers have the power to ratify Constitutional amendments which have been proposed by both houses of Congress and they also retain the ability to call for a national convention to propose amendments to the US Constitution. [35] After the convention has concluded its business, 75% of the states will ratify what the convention has proposed. Under Article II, state legislatures choose the manner of appointing the state’s presidential electors. In the past, some state legislatures appointed the US Senators from their respective states until the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913 required the direct election of senators by the state’s voters. Sometimes what the legislature wishes to achieve cannot be done simply by the passage of a bill, but rather requires amending the state constitution. Each state has specified steps intended to make it difficult to revise the constitution without the sufficient support of either the legislature, or the people, or both. Organization All states except Nebraska have a bicameral legislature. The smaller chamber is called the senate, usually referred to as the upper house. This chamber usually has the exclusive power to confirm appointments made by the governor and to try articles of impeachment. (In a few states, a separate executive council, composed of members elected from large districts, performs the confirmation procedures.) Nebraska originally had a bicameral legislature like other states, but the lower house was abolished following a referendum, effective with the 1936 elections. The remaining unicameral (one-chamber) legislature is called the Nebraska Legislature, but its members are called state senators. During the 20th century, state legislatures further emulated the activities and structures of the US Congress as institutions at both levels grew in size and complexity, often accompanied by increases in staffing and member pay. While most state legislatures remain part-time institutions, a handful of states have expanded theirs to meet year-round. [36] Local elections At the local level, county and city government positions are usually filled by election, in particular within the legislative branch. The extent to which offices in the executive or judicial branches are elected vary from city-to-city or county-to-county. Some examples of local elected positions include sheriffs at the county level and mayors and school board members at the city level. Like state elections, an election for a specific local office may take place at the same time as either the presidential, mid-term, or off-year elections. III. Features of US electoral system Voting methods A number of voting methods are used within the various jurisdictions in the US, the most common of which is the first-past-the-post system. In the first-past-the-post system, the highest-polling candidate wins the election. Under this system, a candidate who achieves a plurality (that is, the most) of votes wins. But the State of Georgia uses a two-round system, where if no candidate receives a majority of votes, then there is a runoff between the two highest polling candidates. [37] Since 2002, several cities such as Burlington in Vermont have adopted instant-runoff voting. Voters rank the candidates in order of preference rather than voting for a single candidate. Under this system, if no candidate receives more than half of votes cast, then the lowest polling candidate is eliminated, and their votes are distributed to the next preferred candidates. This process continues until one candidate receives more than half the votes. In 2016, Maine became the first state to adopt instant-runoff voting (known as ranked-choice voting) statewide for its elections, although due to state constitutional provisions, the system is only used for federal elections and state primaries. [38] Figure 4: US voting methods (source: Wikipedia)Eligibility The eligibility of an individual for voting is set out in the US constitution and also regulated at state level. The constitution states that suffrage cannot be denied on grounds of color, race, sex, or age for citizens eighteen years or older. Beyond these basic qualifications, it is the responsibility of state legislatures to regulate voter eligibility. Some states ban convicted criminals, especially felons, from voting for a fixed period of time or indefinitely. The number of adults in the US who are currently or permanently ineligible to vote due to felony convictions is estimated to be 5.3 million. In addition, some states have legacy constitutional statements barring those legally declared incompetent from voting; such references are generally considered obsolete and are being considered for review or removal where they appear. [39] About 4.3 million US citizens that reside in Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico and other US territories do not have the same level of federal representation as those that live in the 50 US states. These areas only have non-voting members in the US House of Representatives and no representation in the US Senate. Citizens in the US territories are also not represented in the Electoral College and therefore cannot vote for the US President. [40] Those in Washington, D.C. are allowed to vote for the president because of the Twenty-third Amendment. Voter registration While the federal government has jurisdiction over federal elections, most election laws are decided at the state level. All US states except North Dakota require that citizens who wish to vote be registered. In many states, voter registration takes place at the county or municipal level. Traditionally, voters had to register directly at state or local offices to vote, but in the mid-1990s, the federal government made a lot of efforts to make registering easier, in an attempt to increase turnout. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the “Motor Voter” law) required state governments that receive certain types of federal funding to make the voter registration process easier by providing uniform registration services through drivers’ license registration centers, disability centers, libraries, schools, and mail-in registration. Other states allow citizens same-day registration on election day. An estimated 50 million Americans are unregistered. It has been reported that registering to vote poses greater obstacles for low-income citizens, Native Americans, racial minorities and linguistic minorities, and persons with disabilities. International election observers have called on US authorities to implement measures to correct the problems of the high number of unregistered citizens. [41] In many states, citizens registering to vote may declare an affiliation with a political party. This declaration of affiliation does not cost money, and does not make the citizen a dues-paying member of a party. A political party cannot prevent a voter from declaring his or her affiliation with the party, but it can refuse requests for full membership. In some states, only voters affiliated with a political party may vote in that party’s primary elections. Declaring a party affiliation is never required. Some states, including Georgia, Virginia, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington, practice non-partisan registration. [42] Non-citizen voting Federal law prohibits non-citizens from voting in federal elections. As of 2024, 7 state constitutions specifically state that “only” a citizen can vote in elections at any level in that state: Florida, Alabama, Arizona, North Dakota, Colorado, Louisiana, and Ohio. [43] Absentee and mail voting Voters unable or unwilling to vote at polling stations on election day may vote via absentee ballots, depending on state law. Originally these ballots were for people who could not go to the polling place on the election day. Now some states let them be used for convenience, but state laws still call them absentee ballots. Absentee ballots can be sent and returned by mail, or requested and submitted in person, or dropped off in locked boxes. About half the states and territories allow “no excuse absentee,” where no reason is required to request an absentee ballot; other states require a valid reason, such as travel or infirmity. Some states let voters with permanent disabilities apply for permanent absentee voter status, and some other states let all citizens apply for permanent status, so they will automatically receive an absentee ballot for each election. Otherwise a voter must request an absentee ballot before the election takes place. [44] In Colorado, Utah, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington state, all ballots are delivered through the mail; in many other states there are counties or certain small elections where everyone votes by mail. [45] As of July 2020, 26 states allow designated agents to collect and submit ballots on behalf of another voter, whose identities are specified on a signed application. Such agents are usually family members or persons from the same residence. 13 states neither enable nor prohibit ballot collection as a matter of law. Among those that allow it, 12 states have limits on how many ballots an agent may collect. Americans living outside the US, including active duty members of the armed forces stationed outside of their state of residency, may register and vote under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). Almost half the states require these ballots to be returned by mail. Other states allow mail along with some combination of e-mail or fax; four states allow a web portal. [46] A significant measure to prevent some types of fraud has been to require the voter’s signature on the outer envelope, which is compared to one or more signatures on file before taking the ballot out of the envelope and counting it. Not all states have standards for signature review. There have been concerns that signatures are improperly rejected from young and minority voters at higher rates than others, with no or limited ability of voters to appeal the rejection. For other types of errors, experts estimate that while there is more fraud with absentee ballots than in-person voting, absentee ballots have affected only a few local elections. [47] Following the US presidential election in 2020, amid disputes of its outcome, as a rationale behind litigation demanding a halt to official vote counting in some areas, allegations were made that vote counting is offshored. Former Trump Administration official Chris Krebs, head of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) during the election, said in a December 2020 interview that, “All votes in the United States of America are counted in the United States of America.” [48] One documented trend is that in-person votes and early votes are more likely to lean to the Republican Party, while the provisional ballots, which are counted later, trend to the Democratic Party. This phenomenon is known as blue shift, and has led to situations where Republicans were winning on the election night only to be overtaken by Democrats after all votes were counted. But Foley did not find that mail-in or absentee votes favored either party. [49] Early voting Early voting is a formal process where voters can cast their ballots before the official election day. Early voting in person is allowed in 47 states and in Washington, D.C., with no excuse required. Only Alabama, New Hampshire and Oregon do not allow early voting, while some counties in Idaho do not allow it. [50] Voting equipment The earliest voting in the US was through paper ballots that were hand-counted. By the late 1800s, paper ballots printed by election officials were nearly universal. By 1980, 10% of American voters used paper ballots that were counted by hand, and then dropped below 1% by 2008. [51] Mechanical voting machines were first used in the US in the 1892 elections in Lockport, New York. Massachusetts was one of the first states to adopt lever voting machines, doing so in 1899, but the state’s Supreme Court ruled their usage unconstitutional in 1907. Lever machines grew in popularity despite controversies, with about two-thirds of votes for president in the 1964 US presidential election cast with lever machines. Lever machine use declined to about 40% of votes in 1980, then 6% in 2008. Punch card voting equipment was developed in the 1960s, with about one-third of votes cast with punch cards in 1980. New York was the last state to phase out lever voting in response to the 2000 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) that allocated funds for the replacement of lever machine and punch card voting equipment. New York replaced its lever voting with optical scanning in 2010. In the 1960s, technology was developed that enabled paper ballots filled with pencil or ink to be optically scanned rather than hand-counted. In 1980, about 2% of votes used optical scanning; this increased to 30% by 2000 and then 60% by 2008. In the 1970s, the final major voting technology for the US was developed, the DRE voting machine. In 1980, less than 1% of ballots were cast with DRE machines. Prevalence grew to 10% in 2000, and then peaked at 38% in 2006. Because DREs are fully digital, with no paper trail of votes, backlash against them caused prevalence to drop to 33% in 2010. [52] The voting equipment used by a given US county is related to the county's historical wealth. A county’s use of punch cards in the year 2000 was positively correlated with the county’s wealth in 1969, when punch card machines were at their peak of popularity. Counties with higher wealth in 1989 were less likely to use punch cards in 2000. This supports the idea that punch cards were used in counties that were well-off in the 1960s, but whose wealth declined in the proceeding decades. Counties that maintained their wealth from the 1960s onwards could afford to replace punch card machines as they fell out of favor. [53] Multiple levels of regulation Elections in the US are actually conducted by local authorities, working under local, state, and federal law and regulation, as well as the US Constitution. It is a highly decentralized system. The secretary of state in about half of US states is the official in charge of elections; in other states it is someone appointed for the job, or a commission. It is this person or commission who is responsible for certifying, tabulating, and reporting votes for the state. Ballot access Ballot access refers to the laws which regulate under what conditions access is granted for a candidate or political party to appear on voters’ ballots. Each state has its own ballot access laws to determine who may appear on ballots and who may not. According to Article I, Section 4, of the US Constitution, the authority to regulate the place, time, and manner of federal elections is up to each state, unless Congress legislates otherwise. Depending on the office and the state, it may be possible for a voter to cast a write-in vote for a candidate whose name does not appear on the ballot, but it is extremely rare for such a candidate to win office. [54] Primaries and caucuses In partisan elections, candidates are chosen by primary elections and caucuses in the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the US Virgin Islands. [55] A primary election is an election in which registered voters in a jurisdiction (nominating primary) select a political party’s candidate for a later election. There are various types of primary: either the whole electorate is eligible, and voters choose one political party’s primary at the polling booth (an open primary); or only independent voters can choose a party’s primary at the polling booth (a semi-closed primary); or only registered members of the political party are allowed to vote (closed primary). The blanket primary, when voters could vote for all parties’ primaries on the same ballot was struck down by the US Supreme Court as violating the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of assembly in the case California Democratic Party v. Jones. In addition, primaries are used to select candidates at the state level, for example, in gubernatorial elections. Caucuses also nominate candidates by election, but they are very different from primaries. Caucuses are meetings that occur at precincts and involve discussion of each political party’s platform and issues such as voter turnout in addition to voting. Eleven states: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia use caucuses, for one or more political parties. [56] The primary and caucus season in presidential elections lasts from the Iowa caucus in January to the last primaries in June. Front-loading – when larger numbers of contests take place in the opening weeks of the season—can have an impact on the nomination process, potentially reducing the number of realistic candidates, as fund-raisers and donors quickly abandon those who they see as untenable. However, it is not the case that the successful candidate is always the candidate who does the best in the early primaries. There is also a period dubbed the “invisible primary” that takes place before the primary season, when candidates attempt to solicit media coverage and funding well before the real primary season begins. A state’s presidential primary election or caucus usually is an indirect election: instead of voters directly selecting a particular person running for president, it determines how many delegates each party’s national political convention will receive from their respective state. These delegates then in turn select their party’s presidential nominee. Held in the summer, a political convention’s purpose is also to adopt a statement of the political party’s principles and goals known as the platform and adopt the rules for the party’s activities. [57] The day on which primaries are held for congressional seats, and state and local offices may also vary from state to state. The only federally mandated day for elections is the election day for the general elections of the president and Congress; all other elections are at the discretion of the individual state and local governments. Criticism and concernsA. Voter suppression and subversion Voting laws and procedures between the states vary as a consequence of the decentralized system, including those pertaining to voter IDs, voter registration, provisional ballots, postal voting, voting machines and vote counting, felony disenfranchisement, and election recounts. Thus the voting rights or voter suppression in one state may be stricter or more lenient than another state. After the 2020 US presidential election, decentralized administration and inconsistent state voting laws and processes have shown themselves to be targets for voter subversion schemes enabled by appointing politically motivated actors to election administration roles with degrees of freedom to subvert the will of the people. One such scheme would allow these election officials to appoint a slate of “alternate electors” to skew operations of the electoral college in favor of a minority political party. [58] B. Vote counting time As detailed in a state-by-state breakdown, the US has a long-standing tradition of publicly announcing the incomplete, unofficial vote counts on election night (the late evening of election day), and declaring unofficial “projected winners,” despite that many of the mail-in and absentee votes have not been counted yet. In some states, in fact, none of them have yet been counted by that time. This tradition was based on the assumption that the incomplete, unofficial count on the election night is probably going to match the official count, which is officially finished and certified several weeks later. A basic weakness of this assumption, and of the tradition of premature announcements based on it, is that the general public is likely to misapprehend that these particular “projected winning” candidates have certainly won before any official vote count has been completed, whereas in fact all that is truly known is that those candidates have some degree of likelihood of having won the election; the magnitude of the likelihood (all the way from very reliable to not reliable at all) varies by state because the details of election procedures vary from state to state. This problem has impacts on all non–in-person votes, even those cast weeks before election day—not just late-arriving ones. [59] C. Structural problems In 2014, political scientists from Princeton University did a study on the influence of the so-called “elite,” and their derived power from special interest lobbying, versus the “ordinary” US citizen within the US political system. These scientists found that the US looked more like an oligarchy than a real representative democracy; thus eroding a government of the people, by the people, for the people as stated by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address. In fact, they found that average citizens had an almost nonexistent influence on public policies and that the ordinary citizen had little or no independent influence on policy at all. [60] Sanford Levinson claims that next to the fact that campaign financing and gerrymandering are seen as serious problems for democracy, also one of the root causes of the American democratic deficit lies in the US Constitution itself. For example, there is a lack of proportional representation in the Senate for highly populated states like California, as regardless of population all states are given two seats in the Senate. [61] Partisan election officials in the US can give an appearance of unfairness, even when there are very few issues, especially when an election official like a secretary of state runs for an election that they are overseeing. Richard Hasen claimed that the US is the only advanced democracy that lets partisan officials oversee elections, and that switching to a nonpartisan model would improve trust, participation and effectiveness of the elections. [62] The Electoral College has been criticized by some people for being undemocratic (it can select a candidate who did not win the popular vote) and for encouraging campaigns to mainly focus on swing states, as well for giving more power to smaller states with less electoral votes as they have a smaller population per electoral vote compared to more populated states. This can be seen through one electoral college vote representing 622,000 voters in California, compared to one electoral college vote representing 195,000 voters in Wyoming. [63] The first-past-the-post system has also been criticized for creating a de facto pure two-party system (as postulated in Duverger’s law) that suppresses voices that do not hold views consistent with the largest faction in a major political party, as well as limiting voters’ choices in elections. [64] IV. Comparison of US Electoral System with Mexican and Canadian electoral systems US electoral system has both similarities and differences with Canadian and Mexican systems. All of three countries have federal systems and bicameral legislatures. All elections in these three countries are on a fixed schedule. In addition, Us and Canada have first-the-post voting systems.  However, there are many differences among these three countries. The elections in Canada and Mexico are managed and administered by a national election agency. Thus elections in both Canada and Mexico are carried out the same way across the country. By contrast, elections in the US are managed and carried out by each state in different ways. The biggest difference is that unlike Canada and Mexico, the US elect the head of government (President) though the Electoral College. In addition, unlike the US and Canada, Mexico has a hybrid system across first-past-the-post voting (single-member district), party-list proportional representation, and/or mixed-member proportional representation. Moreover, unlike Mexican members of Congress, members of US congress do not have term limits. Table 4, 5, and 6 show the similarities and differences among the US, Canada, and Mexican electoral systems. Table 4: Federal elections comparison, US vs Canada (Elections Canada, 2025)Table 5: Federal elections comparison II, US vs Canada (Elections Canada, 2025)Table 6: Comparison of Federal elections, US vs Mexico (source: Wikipedia)Table 7: Political parties in the Mexican Senate (source: Wikipedia)Table 8: Political parties in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (source: Wikipedia) V. Conclusion This paper explained US electoral systems and its features. The paper also explained federal elections in the US, including presidential and congressional and state elections, including local elections. In addition, the paper described the power and role of the US Congress. Moreover, this paper compared US electoral systems with Canadian and Mexican systems and showed the similarities and differences among these three countries’ electoral systems.  Referencias [1] "Elections & Voting". whitehouse.gov. April 2, 2015. [2] For more information, see Wikipedia [3] "Constitutional requirements for presidential candidates | USAGov". www.usa.gov. [4] "Electoral College History". National Archives. November 18, 2019. [5] "Maine & Nebraska". FairVote. Retrieved December 31, 2023. [6] For more information, see Wikipedia [7] Ziblatt, Daniel; Levitsky, Steven (September 5, 2023). "How American Democracy Fell So Far Behind". The Atlantic. [8] Statutes at Large, 28th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 721. [9] Neale, Thomas H. (January 17, 2021). 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 I. Introduction On October 6, 2025, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had a phone call with US President Donald Trump. Two leaders spoke for 30 minutes. During the call, they exchanged phone numbers in order to maintain a direct line of contact, and President Lula reiterated his invitation for Trump to attend the upcoming climate summit in Belem, according to a statement from Lula’s office. At the UN General Assembly in New York on September 23, 2025, two leaders had a brief, unscheduled meeting. President Trump commented that he had “excellent chemistry” with his Brazilian counterpart. Even Trump told reporters that President Lula liked me, I liked him. This Trump’s comment has been interpreted by some analysts as a potential thawing in recent frozen US-Brazil relations. This apparently friendly call and comments from President Trump may signal a turnaround in relations between the two leaders, which have been strained in recent months. Trump and Lula have been at loggerheads since July 2025, when the US leader imposed 50 percent tariffs on Brazilian exports. In announcing those tariffs on Brazil, Trump cited what he described as a “fraudulent” prosecution of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. In addition to sky-high tariffs, Trump tried to further pressure Lula to drop the Bolsonaro case by hitting Brazilian supreme court justices with visa bans and slapping financial sanctions on the judge overseeing the case – Alexandre de Moraes. Ultimately, however, Brazil went ahead with Bolsonaro’s prosecution, and the former president was convicted. Why did President Trump suddenly soften his stance towards Lula now? Trump’s softer tone may have been prompted by hard economic realities in US, according to Pantheon Macroeconomics’ chief economist, Andres Abadia. The US depends heavily on Brazil for its coffee and meat imports, and both have taken a hit amid the tariff war. The result: prices have shot up. Brazil is the largest source of imported coffee for the US – responsible for $1.33billion out of the $7.85billion total coffee imports by the US in 2023, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. But since the 50 percent tariffs kicked in, Cecafe, Brazil’s council of coffee exporters, said that exports to the US fell by 46 percent in August 2025 and had dropped 20 percent more by September 19, 2025. Amid that supply crunch, coffee prices in the US rose 21 percent in August 2025 compared with a year earlier, even as overall food price inflation hovered at about 3 percent, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. “The prospect of higher coffee prices,” Abadia said, “would be definitely bad for President Trump.”[1]  Brazil is also the US’s third-largest source of imported meat behind Australia and Canada, according to the US Department of Agriculture. “As with coffee, higher beef prices would hit President Trump,” Abadia told Al Jazeera. Beef and veal prices rose by almost 14 percent in August 2025 compared with a year earlier, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. According to a new survey published on September 29, 2025, by the New York Times and Siena University, President Trump’s approval ratings have fallen recently, with 58 percent of respondents saying they think the country is headed in the wrong direction. “Inflation is definitely biting in the US,” says Abadia. “And anything that can be done to ease the pain, especially as we approach the holiday season, would be seen as positive.” [2] By contrast, Brazil appears to have weathered Trump’s tariffs better than the US has expected: Its overall exports grew in September 2025, compared with a year earlier, as it expanded its offerings to other markets, including China and Argentina. Lula’s feud with Trump has boosted his popularity, and Washington’s interventions in Brazilian politics have put the country’s conservatives on the back foot. Before next year’s presidential election, Lula is currently polling ahead of his top opponents, although the 79-year-old President has not formally announced his bid.  Abadia believes that there is an opportunity for rapprochement between the two leaders. The most fertile area for compromise may lie in rare earth minerals. Brazil has the world’s third-largest reserves behind China and Vietnam. And for now, they remain largely untapped. “Critical minerals are one area where bilateral interests align,” he said. “The US wants to diversify away from China and play an important role in the Brazilian market.” [3] Trump has shown a clear interest in rare earths, placing them at the heart of his deal with Ukraine, for instance. Brazil, on its part, wants to emerge as an exporter and supplier of these minerals. “Clearly,” noted Abadia, “that would be a positive for cooperation.”  [4] With these episodes in mind, this paper examines why Brazil can challenge US President Trump and force him to soften his position on Brazil. In doing so, this paper explores seven strengths that enables Brazil to challenge the US as well as US President Trump. Brazil’s seven strengths are as follows: 1. niobium; 2. rare earth; 3. agriculture; 4. oil; 5. ethanol; 6. aircraft industry; 7. leader of BRICS. II. Overview of Brazil Brazil, officially the Federative Republic of Brazil, is the largest country in South America. Brazil is also the world’s fifth-largest country by area and the seventh-largest by population, with over 213 million people. The country is a federation composed of 26 states and a Federal District, which hosts the capital, Brasília. Its most populous city is São Paulo, followed by Rio de Janeiro. Brazil has the most Portuguese speakers in the world and is the only country in the Americas where Portuguese is an official language. [5] Brazil is a founding member of UN, the G20, BRICS, G4, Mercosur, Organization of American States, Organization of Ibero-American States, and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. Brazil is also an observer state of the Arab League and a major non-NATO ally of the US.  Brazil is a rising global power. As Figure 1 shows, Brazil is the 8th largest economy in the world in PPP terms and the largest economy in Latin America.    Figure 1: Brazil is the 8th largest economy in the world (source: IMF) Brazil is one of the world giants of mining, agriculture, and manufacturing, and it has a strong and rapidly growing service sector. Brazil is a leading producer of a host of minerals, including iron ore, tin, bauxite (the ore of aluminum), manganese, gold, quartz, and diamonds and other gems, and it exports vast quantities of steel, automobiles, electronics, and consumer goods. Brazil is the world’s primary source of coffee, oranges, and cassava (manioc) and a major producer of sugar, soy, and beef. The city of São Paulo, in particular, has become one of the world’s major industrial and commercial centers.[6] However, Brazil has a lot of domestic problems. Income inequality is very high. As Figure 2 shows, Brazil is one of world’s highest unequal countries along with other Latin American and African countries. The most common tool used to measure different types of inequality is the Gini Coefficient. The Gini Coefficient represents inequality on a scale where 0 equals perfect equality (where everyone has the same wealth, for example). At the other end of the scale, 100 equals a situation of perfect inequality: One person has all the wealth, and no one else has any. Fortunately, income inequality in Brazil, as measured by the Gini index, has dropped. Income inequality in Brazil reached the lowest level in 2024 since the historical series began in 2012, according to Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. Last year, the Gini index dropped to 0.506, a 2.3% decrease from the 0.518 recorded in both 2023 and 2022. [7] Nonetheless, Brazil’s income inequality is still very high.   Figure 2: which countries are most unequal. (source: Statista) Moreover, crime rate in Brazil has been very high. Brazil had the seventh-highest crime rate in the world in 2020. Brazil’s homicide rate was 23.6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2020. Brazil’s most massive problem remains organized crime, as it has expanded in recent years, and violence between rival groups is common. Drug trafficking, corruption, and domestic violence are all pervasive issues in Brazil. [8] Luckily the ranking of Brazil’s crime rate was down in 2024. As Figure 3 & Table 1 show, Brazil became a country with the 15th highest crime rate in the world   Figure 3: Crime rate by country, 2024 (source: World population review) Table 1: Highest crime rate countries in the world, 2024 (source: World population review)   III. Brazil’s Seven Strengths that challenge the US and US President Trump 1. Brazil’s Dominance of Niobium in the world Brazil is one of the world giants of mining. It is a leading producer of a host of minerals, including iron ore, tin, bauxite, manganese, gold, quartz, and diamonds. In particular, Brazil leads the world in reserves and production of niobium as Figure 4 & 5 show.   Figure 4: niobium reserves worldwide by country, 2021 (source: USGS)   Figure 5: production of niobium worldwide by country, 2024 (source: Statista) Brazil holds an overwhelming lead, accounting for 90% of global niobium reserves and approximately 85% of its global production. Canada is the sole major producer, supplying most of the remaining 15%. As Figure 6 shows, in 2023, the Brazilian company Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineracao (CBMM) supplied 76% of global niobium production, followed by the Chinese-owned CMOC, which supplied 11%. The world’s largest deposit is located in Araxa, Brazil and is owned by CBMM. The reserves are enough to supply current world demand for about 500 years, about 460 million tons. Another pyrochlore mine in Brazil is owned and operated by the CMOC and contains 18 million tons, based on a grade of 1.34% niobium oxide. Canadian production is from one mine. Much smaller production, usually as mixed Nb–tantalum (Ta) ores, comes from Australia and sub-Saharan Africa. The US has had negligible niobium production since 1959, and imported about 9.4 kt (thousand tons) of niobium in 2023. [9]    Figure 6: Niobium mine supply, 2000 to 2023. source: SFA (Oxford) Niobium (Nb, formerly known as columbium) is a rare metal that is included on the 2022 US Geological Survey’s Critical Minerals List. This light gray crystalline metal is primarily used in alloys with iron (Fe) as ferro niobium to increase the strength, corrosion resistance, and temperature resistance of steel. It is also found in specialty superconducting magnets such as those found in medical MRI instruments. The extraordinary properties of niobium have rendered it indispensable across a broad spectrum of industrial and technological applications. Its significance became evident in the mid-1930s when niobium was first employed to stabilize stainless steel against corrosion. Later, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, niobium's breakthrough role as a microalloying element (MAE) for steel, typically in the range of 0.05–0.15 wt.%, further solidified its importance. The importance of niobium as an MAE is underscored by its ability to enhance material properties such as high heat and corrosion resistance, increased strength, reduced density, exceptional conductivity, and enhanced biocompatibility. Its presence is essential in the construction of steel structures, including bridges, buildings, pipelines, offshore platforms, and automotive components, where it is predominantly employed as an MAE (∼90 %). [10] Furthermore, niobium plays a central role in the production of superalloys, holding significant importance in aerospace and power generation technologies. Its exceptional conductive properties also find applications in the healthcare industry, such as in MRI machines and in research institutions. Currently, niobium is finding exciting new applications in the transition to low-carbon energy solutions, and it is already a key component in wind turbines. Ongoing research into niobium-based rechargeable batteries holds the potential for further advancements in sustainable energy technologies, and it is being explored for use in solar panels and smart glass that can filter sunlight radiation and control the amount of light and heat entering buildings. [11]  From its applications in defense systems, where its unique properties are irreplaceable, to its pivotal role in green technologies and infrastructure, niobium’s economic and strategic significance is undeniable. Niobium is essential for the advancement of low-carbon and green technologies. Its classification as a critical mineral stems from both its vital applications and the concentrated nature of its supply. One of its most impactful uses is in steelmaking. The addition of just 0.1% niobium to steel produces high-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) variants, allowing for the construction of lighter, more durable structures. This reduces the quantity of material required, as well as contributes to lower carbon emissions. HSLA steels are particularly valuable for building pipelines, wind turbine towers, and hydrogen gas transmission infrastructure. [12] Niobium’s contribution to renewable energy systems is also important. Its excellent strength-to-weight ratio makes it vital for wind turbine frames, while in solar and hydrogen technologies, it boosts the efficiency of solar cells and enhances the longevity of hydrogen fuel cells. In sustainable manufacturing, niobium supports the production of high-performance components via 3D printing, reducing both weight and material waste. [13] The criticality of niobium is largely due to its concentrated supply. Approximately 90% of global niobium production comes from Brazil, with Canada as the only other significant producer. The US has had no domestic production since 1959, and both the US and EU rely wholly on imports. Beyond its scarcity, niobium is difficult to substitute. It is a core material in the defense and aerospace sectors, used in jet engines, missiles, and military systems where few or no viable alternatives exist. Niobium plays a crucial role in advanced materials and high-performance applications, with demand primarily driven by its use in steel, strategic industries, and emerging technologies. Steel alone accounts for 85–90% of global niobium consumption, serving as a microalloying element to enhance strength, toughness, and weldability. As global regulations increasingly push industries towards lighter and stronger materials, average niobium intensities in steel manufacturing are rising.  Currently China is the world’s largest consumer of niobium, with demand propelled by its infrastructure development and car production growth. Steel remains the backbone of niobium usage, with high-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) and structural steels accounting for the majority share through to 2035. Nevertheless, demand from other sectors, such as aerospace and electronics, is steadily increasing. In particular, interest in niobium for use in batteries is growing, although its uptake heavily depends on the successful commercialization of early-stage niobium-based technologies. Despite steel’s continued dominance, emerging applications begin to expand niobium’s demand profile. The CBMM, the world’s leading niobium producer, primarily shaped the supply landscape. The company’s strategy centers on aligning production with demand, allowing it to scale output flexibly in response to market needs. This responsive model, however, could pose challenges for new niobium projects seeking investment, as CBMM’s dominant position reduces incentives for alternative supply. Anticipating a significant rise in demand—particularly from battery markets, which are projected to account for 25% of company revenues by 2030—CBMM has already increased its output of battery-grade niobium. [16] Niobium’s potential in the battery space hinges on its ability to compete with established technologies. Niobium-based anodes offer high-speed charging and long cycle life, often exceeding tens of thousands of cycles. However, their lower energy density than graphite or silicon anodes poses a challenge, especially for electric vehicle applications where energy density is critical. To achieve broader adoption, niobium battery technologies must overcome this performance gap and significantly reduce costs through economies of scale or further technological innovation. In May 2018, President Trump recognized a group of 35 ‘basic’ minerals considered necessary to US national and economic security, which are to be produced nearby. This order follows Trump’s ‘America first’ initiative to reduce US dependence on imported natural resources, with a US Geological Survey (USGS) report reasoning that 20 of the 23 elementary minerals are sourced from China. Niobium is one of these minerals and was recognized as both critical and essential mineral, indicating its significance to the US, even though it’s not an easy mineral to extract and process. [17] Niobium’s qualities make it one of the top 8 strategic raw materials considered indispensable. Niobium has been deemed important to the US’s national welfare in part due to their inherent military and industrial potential. Jeffery A. Green, the president of a bipartisan government-relations firm in Washington DC and a former US Air Force commander, wrote in Defense News that, “with no access to such minerals, including niobium, our precision-guided missiles will not hit their targets, our aircraft and submarines will sit unfinished in depots, and our war-fighters will be left without the equipment they need to complete their missions.”  The scarcity of niobium means that the vast majority is currently imported. The report notes that niobium has not been mined in the US since 1959. Niobium is now imported from Brazil and Canada only. [18] Vacuum-grade niobium’s role in aerospace is not a newfound revelation. Its unparalleled resilience against extreme thermal stresses, withstanding temperatures over 2,400 degrees Celsius, renders it indispensable for critical components in hypersonic vehicles. Beyond its inherent properties, niobium’s crucial role lies in its use for crafting heat-resistant superalloys essential for hypersonic missiles and the broader aerospace sector. Its low density compared to other refractory metals contributes to a high strength-to-weight ratio, which is essential for reducing the weight of aerospace components. This reduction in weight directly impacts fuel efficiency and payload capacity, two critical factors in aerospace design. For example, companies like SpaceX and Hermeus rely on niobium C103 for their spacecrafts, which require extremely high temperatures that surpass that of other superalloys. [19] For decades, niobium has played a pivotal role in the US aerospace industry, with its notable use in the innovative designs of the iconic Gemini and Apollo programs of the 1960s and 70s. However, despite its significance, the US depends entirely on niobium imports, with no substantial domestic mining since 1959. This dependence introduces a severe risk to its supply chain. Of the estimated 8,800 metric tons imported annually in 2022, a significant majority comes from Brazil (66%) and Canada (25%). This heavy reliance on just two primary sources—both neighbors of the US—exposes the US to considerable national security and economic vulnerabilities. The situation becomes even more precarious considering China’s dominant position in the niobium sector and its growing footprint in the hemisphere.  China has recognized the potential of niobium for over a decade. In 2011, a consortium of five Chinese firms acquired a 15 percent stake in CBMM. This engagement intensified in 2016 when China Molybdenum Co. Ltd. (now known as CMOC) secured ownership of the Chapadão and Boa Vista mines, further strengthening China’s position in the niobium market. The importance of niobium was further highlighted in the Brazilian political arena in 2018. Then presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro emphasized niobium’s role in Brazil’s economic independence. Despite Bolsonaro’s campaign rhetoric focusing on safeguarding this critical commodity from foreign control and advocating for its national governance, Chinese influence in the Brazilian niobium sector continued to grow. By 2020, Chinese entities controlled approximately 26 percent of Brazil’s niobium production. This control not only ensures China’s preferential access and influence over pricing dynamics in the niobium supply chain, but also positions it advantageously in a global context.  China managed to maintain and even strengthen its position at the subnational level under President Bolsonaro. CMOC, for example, provided $1.2 million in Covid-19 aid to the city of Catalão, demonstrating China’s strategic engagement beyond mere commercial interests. China’s influence over Brazil’s niobium production conforms to a pattern of growing ownership and sway over the regional mining industry, a trend with substantial environmental, political, and security implications. Such tactics could force nations into making diplomatic compromises, ceding trade advantages, or grappling with economic dilemmas, thereby solidifying China’s geopolitical standing. The US is not immune to this exposure; the US Geological Survey in 2022 identified niobium as the second most critical of 50 minerals, falling behind only gallium in its criticality to US national security and economic growth. [22] Facing such formidable challenges, the US cannot afford to remain a passive observer. Safeguarding its strategic interests and maintaining its global position demands a comprehensive and multifaceted critical mineral strategy, in particular in securing niobium supplies. Incorporating Brazil into the 13-nation Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) could significantly fortify the global niobium supply chain. The MSP represents a concerted multinational endeavor to develop environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards and bolster investments in critical mineral supply chains, an initiative that aligns well with the strategic interests of both Brazil and the broader international community. Brazil’s inclusion would make it the first Latin American country to enter the partnership, signaling its regional leadership and increase in international stature. The integration of Brazil into this partnership is particularly strategic, considering its substantial niobium reserves, in addition to its other critical mineral deposits. This move would add a robust layer of security against potential supply disruptions. [23] President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government, with its strong emphasis on ESG standards, is likely to find the MSP’s principles congruent with its policy priorities. The MSP’s emphasis on elevating global standards in these areas could resonate with Lula’s progressive agenda, potentially making Brazil’s participation both beneficial and attractive. Moreover, Brazil’s inclusion in the MSP would facilitate its adherence to a framework that advocates for the diversification and stabilization of mineral supply chains. This alignment could be important in mitigating China’s dominant influence in the niobium market. By joining the MSP, Brazil would not only assert its role in the global mineral economy but also contribute to a more balanced and less vulnerable critical mineral supply landscape, including niobium. [24] 2. Brazil has the third largest rare earth reserves in the world According to US Geological Survey in 2024, China holds the largest rare earth reserves with 44 million metric tons, followed by Vietnam and Brazil. As Table 2 shows, Brazil holds the third largest rare earth reserves with 21 million metric tons. Other countries with significant reserves include India, Russia, and Australia. [25] However, as Figure 7 shows, Brazil ranked  12th position in the world in the production of rare earth minerals. Table 2: world mine production and reserves of rare earth minerals (source: USGS in 2024)    Figure 7: Global rare earth production by country, 2024 (source: USGS) Surprisingly, Brazilian rare earth exports hit a record high in 2025, according to data from the Brazil National Mining Agency (ANM). Almost the entire volume was shipped to China. Exports of raw rare earth materials—part of a group of minerals deemed strategic for the global energy transition—reached $7.5 million between January 1 and June 30, 2025. That figure is ten times higher than the $705,900 recorded in the same period last year, more than double the $3.6 million exported in all of 2024, and higher than in any other full year since official records started in 1997.  Though the total exports remains small, the surge in exports underscores the growing strategic value of these materials. Rare earth elements are critical in high-tech industries, used in wind turbine components and batteries, particularly for hybrid and electric vehicles. They have also become a flashpoint in US-China trade tensions, which began with President Donald Trump’s tariff war. At one point, China restricted exports of critical minerals to the US in retaliation. With this background, President Trump said in May 2025 that the US needed Greenland “very badly,” renewing his threat to annex the Danish territory. Greenland is a resource-rich island with a plentiful supply of critical minerals, a category that also includes rare earths elements, under its ice sheet. Trump also signed a “rare earth deal” with Ukraine in May 2025. The tussle over rare earths precedes the current Trump administration. China for years has built up near-total control of the materials as part of its wider industrial policy. [27] The International Energy Agency said 61% of mined rare earth production comes from China, and the country controls 92% of the global output in the processing stage. There’s two types of rare earths, categorized by their atomic weights: heavy and light. Heavy rare earths are more scarce, and the United States doesn’t have the capabilities for the tough task of separating rare earths after extraction. “Until the start of the year, whatever heavy rare earths we did mine in California, we still sent to China for separation,” Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told CNN. [28] However, the Trump administration’s announcement of sky-high tariffs on China in April, 2025 derailed this process. “China has shown a willingness to weaponize” America’s reliance on China for rare earths separation, Baskaran said. The US has one operational rare earth mine in California, according to Baskaran. [29] China holds a near-monopoly control over the global processing of rare earths. In 2023, China produced 61% of the world's raw magnet rare earth elements, which are essential in high-tech industries such as electronics, electric vehicles and defense. Its dominance is even more pronounced in refining these materials, making up 92% of the global refined supply. The export controls by China could have a major impact, since the US is heavily reliant on China for rare earths. Between 2020 and 2023, 70% of US imports of rare earth compounds and metals came from the country, according to a US Geological Survey report. [30] The US and Australia have signed a deal intended to boost supplies of rare earths and other critical minerals, as the Trump administration looks for ways to counter China’s dominance of the market. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said the deal would support a pipeline of $8.5bn (A$13bn; £6.3bn) "ready-to-go" projects that would expand his country's mining and processing abilities. It includes $1bn to be invested by the two countries in projects in the US and Australia over the next six months, a framework text says. The US and Australia have been working on these issues since Trump’s first term, but Albanese said the latest agreement would take the partnership to the next level. [31] Under this situation, to counter China’s dominance of rare earths, the Trump administration identified Brazil as a potential strategic partner in rare earth production. Despite holding the world’s third-largest reserves—behind China and Vietnam—Brazil accounts for 0.005% of global output in 2024, according to the USGS, as Figure 7 shows. [32] Accordingly, Brazil's rare earths sector is gaining momentum, with key industry players outlining the country’s potential to become a vital player in the global energy transition. During the Brazil Lithium and Critical Minerals Summit held in Belo Horizonte on June 4-5, 2025, over 300 senior executives and international delegations from China, US, Australia, Canada, the UK, Japan, France, Italy, Portugal, and Argentina discussed Brazil’s abundant resources and the need for strategic partnerships to explore potential reserves and ensure energy security.  [33] 3. Brazil: the world giant of agriculture Brazil is one of the world giants of agriculture. Brazil is the world’s largest producer of sugarcane, soy, coffee, orange,  açaí, guaraná, and Brazilian nut. Brazil is also the second-largest producer of ethanol, and third-largest biodiesel producer. Brazil is also one of the top 5 producers of maize, tobacco, papaya, and pineapple. Brazil is one of the top 10 world producers of avocado, cocoa, cashew, tangerine, guava, mango, rice, tomato, and sorghum. In addition, Brazil is one of the top 15 world producers of grape, melon, apple, peanut, fig, peach, onion, palm oil, and natural rubber.  A. Soybean  According to USDA (United States Department of Agriculture), as Table 3 & 4 shows, Brazil is the world’s largest soybean producing & exporting country in 2024. This is the results of the increase in production of soybean in Brazil as Figure 8 shows. Table 3: World’s Top 10 soybean producing countries, 2024-25 (source: USDA)     Table 4: World’s Top 10 soybean exporting countries, 2023-24 (source: USDA)     Figure 8: Soybean production in Brazil (source: Joana Colussi & Fram Progress) Historically, the US was the world’s largest soybean exporter. In 2013, Brazil surpassed the US in soybean shipments for the first time. Since then, Brazil’s share of the global soybean trade has increased steadily, with Brazilian soybean exports reaching a record 3,744 million bushels in 2023, according to the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Secex). At the same time, American soybean exports were reduced to 1,789 million bushels, half the Brazilian soybean export volume, according to the US Department of Agriculture (see Figure 9). [34]  Figure 9: Total soybean exports by US and Brazil (source: Farmdoc Daily, IL, USA) Over the last 20 years, Brazilian soybean exports jumped fourfold (431%), from 705 million bushels in 2004 to 3,744 million bushels in 2023. This jump occurred mainly in the second decade. Soybeans have become Brazil’s primary agricultural export commodity by volume, accounting for more than 60% of the soybeans grown domestically. The Brazilian soybean crop for the 2022/23 marketing year was 5,680 million bushels, a historic record, according to Brazil’s food supply and statistics agency. [35] Revenues from Brazilian soybean exports totaled a record $53.2 billion in 2023 versus $46.5 billion in the previous year, according to the Foreign Trade Secretariat (Secex). Considering the soybean complex, which also includes soybean oil and soybean meal, the revenue reached $67.3 billion in 2023, representing 40% of the total export revenue for the country. For the first time since the 1997/98 season, Brazil displaced Argentina as the leading global exporter of soybean meal due to severe drought, which cut Argentine soybean yields by half. [36] On the other hand, over the past 20 years, US soybean exports have increased 94% from 922 million bushels in 2004 to 1,789 million bushels in 2023. The US soybean exports have plateaued since 2016, with an average annual volume of 1,993 million bushels. The roughly doubling of exports occurred over the first decade and stagnated in the second decade. Revenues from soybean exports totaled $27.9 billion in 2023 versus $34.4 billion in 2022, according to the USDA. On average over the past five years, the US has exported 49% of total soybean production. The soybean crop for the 2022/23 marketing year reached 4,160 million bushels, slightly lower than the previous year. [37] The dynamics of global soybean trade remain heavily influenced by China, which accounts for approximately 60% of worldwide soybean imports. China predominantly sources its soybean supplies from Brazil and the US. For many years, the US was the top supplier, but in the past 15 years China has depended more on imports from South America, especially from Brazil. From 2019-2023, 73% of Brazil’s exported soybeans have headed to China, versus a 51% average for the US (see Figure 10).   Figure 10: China’s share of US and Brazil soybean exports (source: Farmdoc Daily, IL, USA) Shifting dynamics from China, the top global soybean buyer and consumer, has played a central role in the divergence between the US and Brazil as top global soybean producers.  In 1995, US soybeans accounted for 49% of Chinese soybean imports, with soybeans sourced from Brazil only totaling 2%. The US drought in 2012 kicked off a massive rise in Chinese imports of Brazilian soybeans. As a result, Brazil surpassed US in soybean shipments in 2013 for the first time. By 2024, 71% of China’s soybean imports were sourced from Brazil, with a only 21% sourced from the US. [38] As China purchased more soybeans from Brazil, Brazilian growers expanded acreage to meet export demand as Figure 8 shows. Moreover, the trade war between US and China in 2018 shifted more soybean production to Brazil at the expense of US soybean acreage as China imposed higher tariffs on US soybean. In 2018, Brazil’s soybean accounted for 82% of Chinese soybean imports while US only 18%. In the middle of another trade war between US and China in 2025, China stopped buying US soybeans. Accordingly, this trend of Brazil’s dominance over the US in soybean exports to China is likely to continue even though China resumed to buy US soybeans in accordance with Trump-Xi trade deal reached on October 30, 2025 in South Korea. [39] B. Meats  In the production of animal proteins, Brazil is today one of the largest countries in the world. In 2024, Brazil was the world’s second largest producer of beef and the world’s largest beef exporter as Table 5 and Figure 11 show.  Table 5: Top 10 beef producing countries in the world, 2024-25 (source: USDA)     Figure 11: As of December 2024, top 10 beef exporters in the world (source: AuctionPlus) In 2024, the global beef export market was dominated by five key players, each nation with significant shares of the market. Brazil led the beef market, commanding a substantial 27.8% of global beef exports. Following Brazil, Australia held a notable 14.7% share, positioning itself as a major player in global beef trade. India, another significant contributor, was responsible for 12.7% of the beef exports. The US also played a critical role, contributing 9.1% to the international beef export figures. Argentina rounded out the top five, with 6.6% of the beef market share. These five countries collectively shaped the dynamics of the global beef market, influencing pricing and supply chains. [40] Brazil sets record for beef exports in 2024 worth US$ 12.8 billion. A total of 2.89 million tons were exported, an increase of more than 26% compared to 2023. The volume exported generated US$ 12.8 billion, approximately 22% more than the amount earned in 2023. China maintained its position as the main destination for Brazilian beef, with 1.33 million tons exported, generating revenue of US$ 6 billion. Next came the US, which imported 229 thousand tons, totaling US$ 1.35 billion. Other important markets include United Arab Emirates (132 thousand tons and US$ 604 million), European Union (82.3 thousand tons and US$ 602 million), Chile (110 thousand tons and US$ 533 million) and Hong Kong (116 thousand tons and US$ 388 million). [41] In addition to beef, according to Statista (2025), Brazil was the world’s largest poultry meat  exporter as Figure 12 shows. Moreover, Brazil has been the world’s largest chicken exporter during the period of 2020-25, as Table 6 shows. Chicken meat exports reached 5.294 million tons in 2024, generating $9.928 billion in revenue.   Figure 12: Poultry meat exports worldwide leading countries, 2025| Statista  Table 6: Market share of global chicken meat exports, 2020-2025 (source: WATTPoultry) Over the past 50 years, Brazil has exported nearly 100 million tons of chicken meat to more than 150 nations. Today’s top markets include China, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and European Union—reflecting global recognition of Brazil’s quality standards and food safety. A significant portion of these exports are halal products aimed at Muslim consumers. More than 2 million tons are shipped annually, making Brazil the world’s largest exporter of halal chicken. [42] According to Euromeat News on February 18, 2025, the top 10 biggest exporters of halal meat to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries account for a total trade value of $14.04 billion. Brazil is the largest exporter of halal meat to OIC countries with a trade value worth $5.19 billion, followed by Australia with $2.36 billion and India with $2.28 billion on the second and third spots respectively. The biggest importer of halal-certified food is Saudi Arabia, followed by Malaysia, UAE, Indonesia, and Egypt. Share [43] According to SIAL Daily, an Italian newspaper, countries like Brazil and Australia dominate exports of halal-certified meat, especially to Middle Eastern countries. Brazil is the largest exporter of halal products, particularly meat, supplying significant quantities to many countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. [44] Overall, Brazilian meat & soybean exports have dominated the world. As a result, citizens in the world have problems preparing for meals without Brazilian products. 4. Brazil, one of top 10 producer of oil in the world Brazil is one of top 10 influential oil country in the world. In 2024, Brazil was the world’s 9th largest crude oil producer as Table 7 shows. Brazil was also the world’s 10th largest crude oil exporting country, as Table 8 shows. Brazil company ‘Petrobras’ is the world’s 7th largest oil company, as Figure 13 shows.  Table 7: Top 10 crude Oil Producing Countries in the world, 2024 (source: 2024 Statistical Review of World Energy Data - Energy Institute )     Figure 13: Top 10 oil companies in the world, 2024 (source: Macrotrends)  Table 8: Top 10 crude oil exporting countries in the world, 2025 (source: https://www.seair.co.in/blog/crude-oil-exports-by-country.aspx)   Moreover, as Figure 14 shows, Brazil is one of net oil exporting countries. Figure 14 shows the trade balance in crude petroleum for 2023. Colors represent the difference between each country’s export and import values. Shades of green indicate a trade surplus (exports largest than imports), while shades of red represent a trade deficit (imports largest than exports).   Figure 14: Global trade balance of crude oil, 2023 (source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity: OEC) In 2023, countries with the largest trade surpluses in crude petroleum were Saudi Arabia ($181 billion), Russia ($122 billion), and United Arab Emirates ($96.2 billion).  In 2024, Brazil exported $44.8 billion of crude petroleum, and the main destinations of Brazil’s crude petroleum exports were China ($20 billion), followed by the US ($5.77 billion), Spain ($4.78 billion), and Netherlands ($3.21 billion). In 2024, Brazil imported $8.69 billion of crude petroleum, and the main origins of Brazil’s crude petroleum imports were Saudi Arabia ($1.93 billion), the US ($1.45 billion), Angola ($1.01 billion), and Guyana ($859 million). [45] Brazil exported more crude oil to the world and US than it imported in 2024. Oil trade surplus with the world and US was $36.11 billion and 4.32 billion, respectively. 5. Brazil, the world’s largest producer of sugarcane ethanol Ethanol is a renewable fuel made from various plant materials collectively known as “biomass.” More than 98% of US gasoline contains ethanol to oxygenate the fuel. Typically, gasoline contains E10 (10% ethanol + 90% gasoline), which reduces air pollution. As Table 9 shows, the US was no. 1 producer of fuel ethanol in the world. In 2024, the US produced an estimated 16.2 billion gallons of the biofuel. Brazil was the world’s second-largest ethanol producing country, with an output of 8.8 billion gallons that same year. Table 9: Annual ethanol fuel production by country, 2015-2024   (source: Annual Ethanol Production | Renewable Fuels Association. https:// ethanolrfa.org/markets-and-statistics/annual-ethanol-production) However, the US and Brazil have different ethanol industry. Brazil has sugarcane-based ethanol industry, while the US has corn-based industry. Brazil is the leading producer of sugarcane ethanol, followed by such countries as India, Thailand, and Colombia. While the US produces the most ethanol globally, its production is primarily from corn, not sugarcane.   Brazil has the largest and most successful bio-fuel programs in the world, involving production of ethanol fuel from sugarcane, and it is considered to have the world’s first sustainable biofuels economy. [46]  Brazil’s sugar cane-based industry is more efficient than US corn-based industry. Sugarcane ethanol has an energy balance seven times greater than ethanol produced from corn. Brazilian distillers are able to produce ethanol for 22 cents per liter, compared with the 30 cents per liter for corn-based ethanol. US corn-derived ethanol costs 30% more because the corn starch must first be converted to sugar before being distilled into alcohol. [47]   Although Brazil has sugarcane-based ethanol industry, its corn ethanol industry has also been expanding rapidly, with production reaching 6 billion liters in 2023, representing an 800% surge over the past five years. [48] Brazil is also a significant developer of the second-generation ethanol, from sugarcane waste or “bagasse.” This gives it the advantage of being able to produce significantly more ethanol from the same land and, as technology advances, producers are also able to extract more energy from the bagasse. Second generation ethanol, known as an advanced biofuel, is particularly in demand because it meets growing sustainability related regulatory requirements. This all sounds promising – but it is not to say that the Brazilian ethanol industry is without its challenges. Its great advantages have been the strength of its domestic sugarcane and ethanol production, the availability of a strong internal market and its flexibility. It has also been helped by legislation and regulation. As both the domestic and international ethanol markets change, these advantages continue to prove useful. [49]    Figure 15: US fuel ethanol exports to Brazil (source: Renewable Fuels Association) https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-releases/article/2025/08/rfa-supports-u-s-investigation-of-punitive-brazil-trade-practices The trade volume of fuel ethanol between Brazil and US is low. US exports to Brazil averaged 3,800 barrels per day—or just 2.7% of total US ethanol exports—from January to May, 2024, according to USDA data. As Figure 15 shows, exports to Brazil in 2024 were valued at USD 53 million, down from a peak of USD 761 million in 2018, according to the USTR investigation notice. The US imported just 491 barrels per day from Brazil during the first five months of 2024, equivalent to 81% of total US ethanol imports.  [50] Overall, Brazil shipped about 300 million liters of ethanol to the US in 2024, with the trade flow relying heavily on incentives paid for low-carbon fuels in California. But exports are just a tiny fraction of the size of the domestic market, where so-called flex-fuel cars can run either on 100% ethanol or a mixture of biofuel and gasoline. Historically, most of Brazil’s production has been absorbed by the domestic fuel market where it is sold as either pure ethanol fuel (E100; hydrous ethanol) or blended with gasoline (E27; anhydrous ethanol). Brazil has been a pioneer in using ethanol as motor fuel in what are known as flex fuel engines. [51] 6. Brazil, a major aircraft manufacturer & exporter  The Brazilian aeronautical industry, led by Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.), is an outstanding example of successful national industrial production. The commercial aircraft company, which is among Brazil’s main exporters, is recognized as the only large national company with active international insertion in a high technological intensity sector. This leadership position is the result of a historical trajectory that dates back to the 20th century, from the pioneering achievements of Santos Dumont with the creation of the 14-bis airplane to the continuous efforts over the years to develop a sustainable aeronautical industry in Brazil. The initial incentives for the development of the aeronautical industry in Brazil occurred under the government of Getúlio Vargas, through the national-developmentalist model, when two state-owned companies were created: Fábrica do Galeão and Fábrica de Aviões de Lagoa Santa, with the support from the private sector. During the same period, the Aeronautics Technical Center (CTA) and the Institute of Research and Development (IPD) emerged. The two institutions were considered the foundations for the establishment of a modern aeronautical industry in Brazil. Later, the CTA and the Ministry of Aeronautics argued for the creation of a state-owned company in the aeronautical sector, which led to the foundation of Embraer in 1969.  [52] In a post-World War II context, in which aircraft development became more expensive and complex, Embraer faced two challenges during its early years: the growing technological complexity and the greater concentration of the production structure. To overcome these challenges, Embraer developed a strategy which focused on creating its own technologies and intensifying its international operations through exports, resulting in the expansion of its production capabilities and an active global insertion. From the 2000s onwards, Embraer continued to stand out in the development of high-performance technological aircraft and expanded its operations to executive aircraft and the defense sector, transforming itself into an aerospace conglomerate. According to Flight Global, which publishes the ranking of the 100 largest aerospace companies, Embraer reached 3rd place in the ranking of sales of commercial aircraft, behind Airbus and Boeing in 2022. Embraer has divisions for commercial, executive, military, and agricultural aviation; it also maintains an incubator for aerospace technologies and businesses. While Embraer continues to produce aircrafts for the defense sector, it is best known for the ERJ and E-Jet families of narrow-body short to medium range airliners, and for its line of business jets, including the market-leading Phenom 300. As of May 2024, Embraer has delivered more than 8,000 aircraft, including 1,800 E-Jet planes. [53] On the other hand, concerning aircraft exports, Brazil ranked 7th in 2022, behind France, Germany, Canada, Spain, US, and Ireland. And Brazil ranked 9th in the world in the aircraft/spacecraft exports in 2023. [54] Moreover, as Table 10 shows, according to Aerotime, Embraer is the 7th largest aircraft manufacturer in the world in 2025. [55] Table 10: Top 10 Aircraft Manufacturers in the World, 2025 (source: Aerotime)   7. Brazil, the leader of BRICS BRIC was originally a term coined by British economist Jim O’Neill and later championed by his employer Goldman Sachs in 2001 to designate the group of emerging markets. The first summit in 2009 featured the founding countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, where they adopted the acronym BRIC and formed an informal diplomatic club where their governments could meet annually at formal summits and coordinate multilateral policies. In April 2010, South Africa attended the second BRIC summit as a guest. South Africa joined the organization in September 2010, which was then renamed BRICS, and attended the third summit in 2011 as a full member. Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates attended their first summit as member states in 2024 in Russia. Indonesia officially joined BRICS as a member state in early 2025, becoming the first Southeast Asian member. The acronym BRICS+ (in its expanded form, BRICS Plus) has been informally used to reflect new membership since 2024. [56] As Figure 16 shows, BRICS now consists of 20 countries. The 10 BRICS members are the founding five — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — plus Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The 10 BRICS partners are Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.  Figure 16: BRICS PLUS as of July 2025 (source: Geopolitical Economy) Some in the West consider BRICS the alternative to the G7. Others describe the organization as an incoherent joining of countries around increasing anti-Western and anti-American objectives. BRICS has implemented competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, BRICS PAY, the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication and the BRICS basket reserve currency. [57] BRICS has been growing in size and influence, and this has frightened some Western politicians. Donald Trump is particularly rattled. After he returned to the White House for his second term as US president, Trump threatened very high tariffs on BRICS, and falsely said he had destroyed the organization. Although Trump threatens BRICS, it grows stronger, resisting US dollar. [58] The US government’s fear of BRICS is rooted in the Global South-led organization’s increasing power. As Figure 17 shows, 20 BRICS members and partners already represent more than two-fifths of the global economy: 43.93% of world GDP, when measured at purchasing power parity (PPP). The BRICS 20 also have a combined population of 4.45 billion, meaning that they represent 55.61% of the global population — the majority of the world.   Figure 17: BRICS share of global GDP (source: IMF) One of the key issues discussed at the 2025 BRICS summit in Brazil was de-dollarization — the attempt to create alternatives to the US dollar as the global reserve currency. Brazil’s left-wing President Lula da Silva has long been an advocate of de-dollarization. [58]“The world needs to find a way that our trade relations don’t have to pass through the dollar,” Lula said at the BRICS summit. “Obviously, we have to be responsible about doing that carefully. Our central banks have to discuss it with central banks from other countries,” the Brazilian leader explained, according to Reuters. He added, “That’s something that happens gradually until it’s consolidated.” [60] Lula agreed that de-dollarization is “complicated” and will be a slow, gradual process, but he maintained that it is necessary. At the 2025 BRICS summit, the Brazilian president even reiterated his call for the creation of a new global currency to challenge the US dollar. [61] Lula declared that “BRICS is an indispensable actor in the struggle for a multipolar, less asymmetrical, and more peaceful world.” He lamented that the US-dominated international financial system benefits the rich colonial countries at the expense of the poor, formerly colonized ones. At the BRICS summit on July 6, 2025, the 20 BRICS members and partners signed a lengthy joint statement. The Rio de Janeiro Declaration was 31 pages long and consisted of 126 points, encompassing a wide variety of subjects. The joint declaration made many references to BRICS initiatives to encourage de-dollarization. The declaration called to strengthen the BRICS bank, the New Development Bank, to “support its growing role as a robust and strategic agent of development and modernization in the Global South.” In particular, the document emphasized the need for the New Development Bank to “expand local currency financing.” [62] Dilma Rousseff, the former Brazilian president from Lula’s left-wing Workers’ Party, has been the Chair of the New Development Bank. In her remarks at the BRICS summit, Dilma emphasized that the New Development Bank is promoting financing in local currencies. “Any business or government that borrows in foreign currency becomes subject to decisions made by the Federal Reserve or other central banks in Western developed nations,” she said, warning of exchange-rate risk and currency volatility. As a positive example of an alternative, the BRICS website noted that Dilma “pointed to a project in Brazil funded directly in renminbi, without the need for dollar conversion.” [63] The BRICS declaration similarly urged further development of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), which could serve as an alternative to the US-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF), by providing short-term liquidity to developing countries facing balance-of-payments crises. Another initiative discussed in the declaration was the New Investment Platform (NIP), which seeks to facilitate investments in local currencies, instead of US dollars, Euro, or British pounds. The declaration addressed the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (ICM), which is working on “finding acceptable mechanisms of financing in local currencies.” The joint statement also highlighted the work of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative and BRICS Payment Task Force (BPTF), which it noted identify “the potential for greater interoperability of BRICS payment systems,” as part of “efforts to facilitate fast, low-cost, more accessible, safe, efficient, and transparent cross-border payments among BRICS countries and other nations and which can support greater trade and investment flows.” [64] As a leader of BRICS to push for de-dollarization, Brazil has deepened its bond with China. Growing ties between Brazil and China were a reality well before Donald Trump came into office. But as US president Trump tried to intervene in Brazil’s judiciary and politics and imposed one of the highest tariffs in the world, enthusiasm for collaboration between the two governments seems to be at an all-time high.  “Our ties are at their best moment in history,” China’s President Xi Jinping said in August 2025 after holding an hour-long call with Brazilian President Lula da Silva. “China supports the Brazilian people in defending their national sovereignty and also supports Brazil in safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests,” he added. Xi also told Lula that China “stands ready to work with Brazil to set an example of unity and self-reliance among major countries in the Global South.” [65] China has been a key commercial partner for South America, and the tie with Brazil has for years been the strongest—it’s China’s top trade partner in the region and one of its main foreign investment destinations. In recent years the breadth of the relationship widened, even under former President Jair Bolsonaro, who used anti-China rhetoric and wanted to see Brazil more aligned with the United States. During Lula’s third term, the connection between China and Brazil has strengthened further. 2025 has seen significant developments. In July 2025, Brazil hosted the 17th BRICS summit, and Brazil and China co-announced the construction of a bi-oceanic railway corridor between Brazil and Peru’s Pacific coast. In addition, Chinese car maker BYD rolled out the first electric car built entirely in Brazil, at its new factory in Camaçari, Bahia, its first outside Asia. [66] In the context of the US-China rivalry, Washington is anxious. According to US media, Brazil’s hosting the BRICS summit meeting was a factor in the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs. On the other side of US politics, Senate Democrats recently wrote a letter to Trump  saying “a trade war with Brazil would make life more expensive for Americans, harm both US and Brazilian economies, and drive Brazil closer to China.” [67] China has been Brazil’s top trading partner since 2009, when it overtook the US. As Figure 18 shows, the trade volume between Brazil and China doubled the volume between Brazil and US in 2024. China is the world’s biggest soybean importer, and gets most of its supply from Brazil. In 2024, 28% of Brazil’s exports went to China. In 2023, Brazil was China’s main supplier of soy, beef, cellulose, corn, sugar and poultry.   Figure 18: Brazil’s trade with China vs USA (source: ComexStat & Americas quarterly) The balance of trade between Brazil and China has historically been favorable to Brazil, although China has increased its exports in recent years. And when the US tariffs took effect, China authorized 183 new Brazilian coffee companies to sell to its market, and did the same with other products. A recent new step between Brazil and China is to negotiate for the adoption of mechanisms to track the origin of agricultural products, particularly soy and beef. The goal is to create a system where both countries recognize the same environmental certifications, so that products can be tagged, for example, as “carbon-neutral beef.” There’s also talk of China importing Brazilian ethanol for the production of “sustainable aviation fuels.” [68] Commodities comprise the vast majority of exports, but the trade relationship between Brazil and China is no longer based solely on them. The manufacturing industry represented 23% of Brazil’s exports to China in the first quarter of 2025, an increase of 6 percentage compared to the same period in 2024, according to the Brazil-China Business Council.   The kinds of exchanges have been changing, too, from government to government, to company to company, to company to client. Beyond BYD’s new factory in Camaçari, expected to be fully functional by the end of 2026, green energy and telecommunications services see strong Chinese investment, and Chinese companies operating in fields like delivery apps are expected to be active in Brazil in the coming years. [69] By contrast, as Table 11 shows, US-Brazil trade has been limited compared to China-Brazil trade. Brazilian exports to the US are less than 2% of Brazil’s GDP in 2024, while Brazilian exports to China are more than 4% of Brazil’s GDP. Brazil economy is too large to be bullied by the US. Moreover, Brazil’s strong ties to China guarantees Brazil’s economic independence from the US.  Table 11: Bilateral trade between Brazil and China & US, 2024(source: SECEXMDIC)   IV. Conclusion This paper explained Brazil’s seven strengths that enabled Brazil to challenge the US as well as US President Trump. Brazil has important strategic assets such as niobium and rare earth. Brazil holds the world’s largest niobium reserves, as well as the world’s third largest rare earth reserves. Brazil also has been the world giant of agriculture that has exported the largest amount of soybean and beefs & chicken to the world. In addition, Brazil is the world’s 9th largest crude oil producer and the world’s 10th largest crude oil exporting country. Moreover, Brazil is the world’s largest producer of sugarcane ethanol, as well as the world second largest ethanol producer, leading Bazil to its energy independence. Furthermore, Brazil is a major aircraft manufacturer & exporter. Embraer, a Brazilian company, reached 3rd place in the ranking of sales of commercial aircraft, behind Airbus and Boeing in 2022. Concerning aircraft exports, Brazil ranked 7th in 2022, behind France, Germany, Canada, Spain, United States, and Ireland. And Brazil ranked 9th in the world in the aircraft/spacecraft exports. More importantly, Brazil has been a leader of BRICS that has wielded huge geopolitical influence around the world. On top of that, Brazil has strengthened its ties with China which has been another BRICS leader. Because of these seven strengths, Brazil has not relied on the US for its economy. Rather Brazil has been able to resist US President Trump’s pressure and threats.  Brazil has been different from Mexico which depends on US for its trade and overall economy. Mexico’s total exports in 2024 were valued at US$618.98 billion, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. Mexico’s total exports to the US in 2024 was valued at US$503.26 billion, constituting 81% of Mexico’s total exports and 27.5% of Mexico’s GDP. [70] Brazil’s exports to the US hit a record $40.3 billion in 2024, but it made up 1.9% of Brazil’s GDP in 2024. [71] Thus, Brazil sharply contrasts with Mexico in terms of its economic dependence on the US.  Brazil has also been different from Japan in terms of its security dependence on the US. Japan has heavily depended on the US for its security. As Figure 19 show, as of March 2025, approximately 53,000 US military servicemen have been stationed in Japan. By contrast, as Table 12 shows, there are 58 US soldiers in Brazil as of March 2025. Even 58 US servicemen in Brazil are not stationed there. They are temporarily in Brazil for a moment. Moreover, unlike Japan where there are several military bases in Japan, including major installations like Futenma air station in Okinawa and Yokota air base in Tokyo, there are no US military bases in Brazil. Thus, Brazil has not depended on the US for its security. Accordingly, Brazil sharply contrasts with Japan in terms of its security dependence on US.   Figure 19: US troops overseas (source: https://usafacts.org/articles/where-are-us-military-members-stationed-and-why/) Table 12: Number of US military personnel (source: https://usafacts.org/articles/where-are-us-military-members-stationed-and-why/)  On the other hand, the US has a growing military presence in Australia, primarily through the marine rotational force in Darwin, which involves thousands of US marines rotating annually for training exercises. These rotations, which have happened since 2012, have grown from an initial 200 marines to nearly 2,500 each year. In addition, the US planned to host up to four nuclear-powered submarines at a future base in Australia, beginning as early as 2027. Moreover, Australia has been a member of Quad and AUKUS that are anti-Chinese alliance.  On the economic front, however, Australia exported a total $517.0 billion in merchandise goods in 2024, with $23.8billion of this going to the US. Australian goods exports to US made up 5% of its total goods exports in 2024 and were 0.9% of Australia’s annual GDP. [72]  In 2024, as Figure 20 shows, around 35% of Australia’s merchandise exports by value went to China. China is also Australia’s largest export market for services with a 13.3% share. China is also Australia’s largest import partner with AUD 116 billion in 2024, followed by the US at AUD 93 billion, and Japan at AUD 32 billion. China has been Australia’s largest trading partner since 2009, when it replaced Japan. Thus, Australia is situated in-between Japan (with heavy security dependence on the US) or Mexico (with extreme economic reliance on the US) and Brazil (with economic and security freedom from the US) in terms of its economic and security dependence on US. Australia straddles a middle path between the US and China. Australia depends on China for its economy, while it strengthens its security ties with the US.  Figure 20: Australia’s exports to China, 2024 (source: Australian Bureau of Statistics) In conclusion, Brazil’s seven strengths have made Brazil achieve both economic and security independence from the US. Thus, Brail was able to resist US pressures and threats. Even Brazil has been able to challenge the US. Brazil’s pursuit of de-dollarization and multipolar world order are good examples of such efforts. References[1] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright. 7 Oct 2025. AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/10/7/is-donald-trump-trying-to-dial-back-tensions-with-brazil[2] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright.[3] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright.[4] “Is Donald Trump trying to dial back tensions with Brazil?” Alex Kozul-Wright.[5] For more information on Brazil, see Wikipedia.[6] see Wikipedia[7] For more information about income inequality in Brazil, see “Income Inequality Drops Again and Hits Lowest Level on Record in Brazil.” May.8.2025. Folha De S. Paulo.[8] For more information, see https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/crime-rate-by-country[9] For more information, see https://www.mbmg.mtech.edu/pdf-publications/fs23.pdf[10] Moisés Gómez, Jinhui Li, Xianlai Zeng. “Niobium: The unseen element - A comprehensive examination of its evolution, global dynamics, and outlook.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling. Vol. 209 (October 2024), p.1[11] Moisés Gómez, Jinhui Li, Xianlai Zeng., p. 2.[12] For more information, see https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[13] See https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[14] For more information, see https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[15] See https://www.sfa-oxford.com/market-news-and-insights/niobium-swing-producer-cbmm-driving-the-future-of-advanced-materials/[16] See https://www.mining-technology.com/news/cbmm-opens-niobium-production-facility/?cf-view[17] For more information, see https://niobiumcanada.com/why-is-niobium-a-critical-mineral-resource-for-the-united-states/[18] https://niobiumcanada.com/why-is-niobium-a-critical-mineral-resource-for-the-united-states/[19] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer. CSIS. March 4, 2024.[20] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[21] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[22] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[23] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[24] “Hypersonic hegemony: niobium and the Western Hemisphere’s role in the US-China power struggle.” Guido L. Torres, Laura Delgado Lopez, Ryan C. Berg, and Henry Ziemer.[25] For more information, see USGS website: https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-rare-earths.pdf[26] https://valorinternational.globo.com/business/news/2025/08/05/brazils-rare-earth-exports-hit-record-but-remain-modest.ghtml[27] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf. CNN. June 3, 2025.[28] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf.[29] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf.[30] “What are rare earth minerals, and why are they central to Trump’s trade war?” Ramishah Maruf[31] “US and Australia sign rare earths deal to counter China's dominance.” Natalie Sherman. BBC News. October 20, 2025.[32] https://valorinternational.globo.com/business/news/2025/08/05/brazils-rare-earth-exports-hit-record-but-remain-modest.ghtml[33] https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/060625-brazils-rare-earth-projects-seek-partnerships-to-enhance-energy-security [34] For more information, see https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[35] https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[36] https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[37] https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/09/us-soybean-harvest-starts-with-no-sign-of-chinese-buying-as-brazil-sets-export-record.html[38] https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/how-does-u-s-soybean-production-compare-to-brazil/[39] https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/how-does-u-s-soybean-production-compare-to-brazil/[40] For more information, see https://pulse.auctionsplus.com.au/aplus-news/insights/whos-got-beef-and-wheres-it-going[41] https://pulse.auctionsplus.com.au/aplus-news/insights/whos-got-beef-and-wheres-it-going[42] https://www.thepoultrysite.com/news/2025/08/brazil-marks-50-years-as-top-global-chicken-exporter[43] “Top 10 exporters shipped halal meat worth $14.04 bn to OIC countries.” EuroMeat News. February 18, 2025.[44] For more information, see https://newsroom.sialparis.com/topics/news/middle-east-food/[45] For more information, see https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/crude-petroleum/reporter/bra[46] D. Budny; P. Sotero (April 2007). "Brazil Institute Special Report: The Global Dynamics of Biofuels" (PDF). Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center. [47] The Economist, March 3–9, 2007 "Fuel for Friendship" p. 44[48] The flourishing ethanol industry in Brazil, Brazilian Farmers.[49] https://www.hfw.com/insights/bioenergy-series-the-evolution-of-the-brazilian-ethanol-industry/ [50] https://ethanolrfa.org/media-and-news/category/news-releases/article/2025/08/rfa-supports-u-s-investigation-of-punitive-brazil-trade-practices[51] https://www.czapp.com/analyst-insights/trump-targets-brazil-over-ethanol-tariffs-amid-falling-us-exports/[52] For more information, see "The Remarkable Story of Brazilian Jet Maker Embraer." Bloomberg. July 5, 2024.[53] "Embraer Delivers 1800th E-Jet". Embraer. Archived from the original on 2 May 2024. Retrieved 21 July 2024.[54] https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/aircraft-and-spacecraft-exports-by-country[55] https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/largest-airlines-aircraft-manufacturers[56] "Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?" (PDF). Think Tank, European Parliament. 15 March 2024.[57] For more information, see Wikipedia.[58] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[59] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[60] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[61] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[62] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[63] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[64] https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/07/10/trump-threat-brics-us-dollar-western-imperialism/[65] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[66] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[67] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[68] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[69] https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-deepens-bond-china/[70] https://trading economics.com /mexico/exports-by-country[71] https://www.publicnow.com/view/8D388094BA5934BD1B86E434070AA54216D7E628?1756817187 & SECEXMDIC[72] See Australian Bureau of Statistics; https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/australias-trade-united-states-america

Drug trafficking is the illegal trade, in large quantities, of drugs or narcotics (RAE, 2025). However, while this definition is accurate, it is insufficient to describe the complexity of a global phenomenon that transcends borders and involves the production, purchase, and distribution of illicit substances. Drug trafficking has developed hand in hand with global trade and interconnection (Saldaña, 2024). In other words, the evolution of drug trafficking is closely linked to globalization, which has strengthened the logistical, technological, and financial networks that enable its expansion. Therefore, more than isolated crime, drug trafficking must be understood as a transnational system of power that feeds on globalization itself. Drug Trafficking as a Transnational System of Power Drug trafficking is described by some authors as a profoundly complex transnational phenomenon resulting from globalization (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). This phenomenon involves and connects global networks of production, logistics, financing, and consumption, all made possible by economic interdependence, information technologies, and established global logistical routes. These authors analyze drug trafficking from a multidimensional perspective, identifying seven interrelated spheres that sustain this activity: the economic (money laundering and investment diversification), institutional (corruption and institutional capture), organizational (organized criminal networks and advanced logistics), social (presence in territories with state vacuums and community legitimization), technological (use of cryptomarkets, encryption, and innovation), geopolitical (route adaptability and resilience against state policies), and cultural (narratives and subcultures that normalize illicit practices) (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). These dimensions form a web of relationships in which criminal groups not only control the flow of drugs but also influence economic and political structures. As Interpol (n.d.) warns, this global network undermines and erodes the political and economic stability of the countries involved, while also fostering corruption and generating irreversible social and health effects. Furthermore, drug trafficking is intertwined with other crimes — such as money laundering, corruption, human trafficking, and arms smuggling — thus forming a globalized criminal ecosystem, a global issue and a national security concern for nations worldwide. Origins and historical context There are records of the use of entheogenic drugs for ritual or medicinal purposes in Mesoamerican cultures — such as the Olmecs, Zapotecs, Mayas, and Aztecs (Carod Artal, 2011) — as well as in Peru (Bussmann & Douglas, 2006), the Amazon region, and even today among the Wixárika culture in Mexico (Haro Luna, 2023). Likewise, there was widespread and diverse drug use among the ancient Greeks and Romans, including substances such as mandrake, henbane, belladonna, cannabis, and opium, among others (Pérez González, 2024). However, modern drug trafficking can trace its origins to the First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Chinese Empire (Qing Dynasty) and the British Empire, marking the first international conflict directly linked to the drug trade. During the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, several drugs —such as heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamines — made their debut in the pharmaceutical field, being used in medicines and therapeutic remedies (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). This period is considered the pharmaceutical revolution, characterized by the emergence of researchers, research centers, and major discoveries in the field. During that time, the term “drug” began to be associated with “addiction.” The pharmaceutical revolution had its epicenter in Germany; however, it was the British and Americans who promoted its expansion (Luna-Fabritius, 2015) and contributed to the normalization of psychoactive substance consumption. Military promotion, use and dependence Armed conflicts — from the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) to the First World War (1914–1918) — played a key role in spreading and promoting the military use of psychoactive substances. For instance, stimulants such as alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines, and methamphetamines were used to combat sleep, reduce fatigue, boost energy, and strengthen courage, while depressants like opium, morphine, and marijuana were used to relieve combat stress and mitigate war trauma (Marco, 2019). The dependence that developed led to a process of expansion among the civilian population, which entered a period of mass experimentation that often resulted in substance abuse and chemical dependency (Courtwright, 2001). In response, the first restrictive laws emerged, particularly in the United States (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). However, the high demand for certain substances, such as opium, gave rise to the search for markets capable of meeting that demand. Thus, Mexico — influenced by Chinese immigration that introduced the habit of smoking opium in the country — became, by the 1940s, the epicenter of poppy cultivation and opium processing in the region known as the Golden Triangle (Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua). It became the main supplier for drug markets in the United States and other parts of the continent, at times providing up to 90% of the demand during periods of shortage (Sosa, 2025). Even during World War II (1939–1945) — when the traditional supply of heroin and morphine to Europe was disrupted — Mexico strengthened its role in the illicit trade by providing smoking opium and processed morphine or heroin. These developments, alongside the implementation of opiate regulations in Mexico, helped consolidate and structure Mexican drug trafficking, which has persisted for more than sixty years (Sosa, 2025). Social expansion and regulatory restrictions The end of World War II brought stricter restrictions and regulations, but that did not prevent socio-cultural movements such as the hippie movement (in the 1960s) from adopting the use of marijuana, hashish, LSD, and hallucinogenic mushrooms (Kiss, 2025) without facing severe repercussions. That same hippie movement — which promoted pacifism and opposed the Vietnam War (1955–1975) — in one way or another encouraged drug use among young people. Moreover, the demand for substances by returning veterans led to the internationalization of drug markets, fostering, for example, the heroin trade from Southeast Asia (Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) (Saldaña, 2024). The Nixon administration and the US “War on Drugs” The dependency became so severe that it was considered a public health emergency in the United States. On June 18, 1971, Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” at an international level, labeling drug trafficking as “public enemy number one” (Plant & Singer, 2022). Nixon’s strategy combined international intervention with increased spending on treatment and stricter measures against drug trafficking and consumption (Encyclopedia.com, n.d.), along with the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973. Although the War on Drugs was officially declared in 1971, it had a precedent in 1969 with the failed Operation Intercept, whose goal was to combat marijuana trafficking across the U.S.–Mexico border (M. Brecher, 1972). As part of his international strategy, Nixon launched several operations such as Operation Condor with Mexico (1975 and 1978), Operation Stopgap in Florida (1977), and Operation Fulminante, carried out by Colombian President Julio César Turbay in 1979. Most of these efforts were aimed at combating marijuana trafficking. The results were mixed, but the consequences were significant, as drug traffickers resisted and adapted — giving rise to a more active and violent generation and marking the consolidation of modern drug trafficking. The Consolidation of Modern Drug Trafficking: Colombia and Reagan Era. During the 1980s and 1990s, drug trafficking evolved into a highly organized industry. Figures such as Félix Gallardo [1], Amado Carrillo Fuentes [2], Pablo Escobar [3], Carlos Lehder [4], Griselda Blanco [5], Rafael Caro Quintero [6], and later Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera [7], among others (Wikipedia, 2025), symbolized the growing power of the cartels in Colombia and Mexico. During this period, criminal organizations consolidated their operations, and the profits from drug trafficking fueled violence and corruption. Moreover, the struggle for power — not only in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, or the United States but also in other regions of Latin America — and the competition for markets led to greater sophistication, as well as the construction of infrastructure and distribution networks. Pablo Escobar’s famous phrase, “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”), reflects the immense power and influence that drug traffickers wield, even over governments and authorities. Colombia, through the Cali and Medellín cartels, dominated the production and export of cocaine via a triangulation network that connected through Mexico or the Caribbean, with the final destination being the United States, where the Reagan administration (1981–1989) intensified the War on Drugs, focusing on criminal repression rather than public health. The Reagan’s War on Drugs was characterized for setting aggressive policies and legislative changes in the 1980s which increased the law enforcement and the punishment, as a consequence the prison penalties for drug crimes skyrocketed from 50,000 in 1980 to more than 400,000 by 1997 (HISTORY.com Editors 2017) Mexican cartels consolidation and Mexico’s transition to a consumer nation Around the same time, on the international arena, following the fragmentation of the Guadalajara Cartel in the 1980s, the emergence of new Mexican cartels — the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Tijuana Cartel, and Juárez Cartel — combined with the downfall of Colombia’s Cali and Medellín cartels in the mid-1990s, catapulted Mexican cartels into prominence. They seized control of trafficking routes and diversified their operations, thus consolidating their role in the global drug market. Later, the September 11, 2001, attacks altered U.S. security policy, affecting border transit, increasing security measures, and tightening inspections along the southern border with Mexico (Rudolph, 2023) — one of the main drug distribution routes into the United States. Although some studies suggest that U.S. security policies at land ports of entry had only marginal pre- and post-9/11 effects (Ramírez Partida, 2014), in reality, these measures significantly impacted Mexico more than the US. Mexico transitioned from being primarily a producer, distributor, and transit country for drugs to also becoming a consumer nation. In 2002, more than 260,000 people were reported to use cocaine, whereas today the number exceeds 1.7 million addicts, according to data from the federal Secretariat of Public Security (Alzaga, 2010). Likewise, the ENCODAT 2016–2017 survey shows that the percentage of Mexican adolescents who had consumed some type of drug increased from 1.6% in 2001 to 6.4% in 2016 (REDIM, 2025). By disrupting one of the main drug distribution routes to the United States, the situation led to drugs being redistributed and sold within Mexican territory. This, combined with the country’s social and economic conditions, facilitated the recruitment of young people by organized crime groups (Becerra-Acosta, 2010) for the domestic distribution of drugs. Mexico and the Contemporary War on Drug Trafficking The escalation of violence caused by the power struggle among Mexican cartels became so critical that President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) declared an open war against organized crime on December 10, 2006 (Herrera Beltrán, 2006). His strategy involved deploying the armed forces throughout Mexican territory, as well as obtaining financial aid, training, and intelligence through the Mérida Initiative from the United States to support the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America (Embassy of the United States in Mexico, 2011). His successor, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), shifted the focus toward prevention and civil protection, although he continued the militarization process and the transformation of police institutions (BBC News, 2012). The strategies of Calderón and Peña Nieto — often grouped together — while questioned and criticized (Morales Oyarvide, 2011), achieved significant arrests, including figures such as “La Barbie,” “La Tuta,” “El Menchito,” “El Chapo,” “El Marro,” and “El Ratón.” They also eliminated key figures like Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, and Nazario Moreno González. Later, during the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), the strategy shifted once again toward a stance of “hugs, not bullets,” showing clear signs of passivity that allowed cartel expansion (Fernández-Montesino, 2025). His successor, Claudia Sheinbaum (2024–2030), on the other hand, has navigated both internal and external pressures (particularly from the United States), seeking to balance intelligence, coordination, and attention to structural causes (Pardo, 2024), although continued militarization suggests a hybrid strategy remains in place. Fentanyl and synthetic drugs: The future of drug trafficking The president of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Jallal Toufiq, said that “the illicit drug industry represents a major global public health threat with potentially disastrous consequences for humankind.” In addition, the 2024 INCB Annual Report found that illicit synthetic drugs are spreading and consumption is increasing, moreover, these could overtake some plant-based drugs in the future. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025) The press release before mentioned also points out that Africa, Middle East, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific drug markets are increasing, while production in Central America, Peru, Colombia and the Caribbean keeps on developing. On the other hand, the opioid crisis (fentanyl) remains a serious problem for North America and the cocaine keeps affecting Europe with a spillover Africa. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025). The fentanyl crisis in North America is well documented. Data show an increase of 540% in overdose deaths between 2013 and 2016 (Katz 2017), with 20,100 deaths in the USA, while by 2023, the number increase to 72,776 deaths (USA Facts 2025). On the other hand, Canada has reported 53,821 deaths between January 2016 and March 2025 (Government of Canada 2025), while Mexico reported only 114 deaths from 2013 to 2023 (Observatorio Mexicano de Salud Mental y Adicciones 2024). These figures reveal not only the unequal regional impact of the synthetic opioid crisis but also the ongoing adaptation of organized crime networks that sustain and expand these markets. Evolution and Diversification of Organized Crime The phenomenon of adaptation, evolution, and diversification of new illicit markets is not an isolated issue. Experts such as Farah & Zeballos (2025) describe this in their framework Waves of Transnational Crime (COT). The first wave is represented by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, pioneers in moving tons of cocaine to the U.S. market through Caribbean routes. The second wave is represented by the Cali Cartel, which perfected the model and expanded trafficking routes through Central America and Mexico — still focusing on one product (cocaine) for one main market (the United States). The third wave is characterized by the criminalization of criminal structures, the use of armed groups (such as the FARC in Colombia), and the use of illicit production and trafficking as instruments of state policy, with clear effects on public policy functioning. At this stage, there is product diversification, with the main market remaining the U.S., but expansion reaching Europe (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Finally, the fourth wave — the current stage — is defined by total diversification, a shift toward synthetic drugs, and global expansion, involving extra-regional groups (Italian, Turkish, Albanian, and Japanese mafias), where many operations function “under government protection.” This fourth wave offers clear examples of collusion between criminal and political spheres, which is not new. However, the arrest of Genaro García Luna (Secretary of Public Security under Calderón), the links between high-profile Mexican politicians and money laundering or fuel trafficking (Unidad de Investigación Aplicada de MCCI, 2025), and even Trump’s statements claiming that “Mexico is largely governed by cartels” (DW, 2025) reveal a reality in which drug trafficking and criminal organizations are no longer merely producers and distributors of illicit substances. Today, they possess the power and capacity to establish parallel governance systems, exercise territorial control, infiltrate institutions and local economies, and even replace core state functions (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Future Perspectives and Challenges Currently, drug trafficking and organized crime represent structural threats. It is well known and widely studied what drug trafficking means for public security and health, but it has now also become a threat to politics, democracy, and the rule of law. With divided opinions, many analysts argue that the war on drugs has failed — in addition to being costly and, in many cases, counterproductive (Thomson, 2016). Punitive strategies have generated more violence without truly addressing the social causes behind the phenomenon (Morales Oyarvide, 2011). In this context, a paradigm shift is necessary: drug trafficking should not be approached solely as a security issue, but also as a public health and social development problem. Drug use has been a historical constant, and its total eradication is unrealistic. The key lies in harm-reduction policies, international cooperation, and inclusive economic development. Moreover, organized crime demonstrates adaptive resilience, making its eradication difficult — especially given that its operational capacities are so diversified, it maintains alliances with groups worldwide, and globalization and new technologies continually help it reinvent itself. Furthermore, even political and economic tensions among the United States, Mexico, Canada, and China are now intertwined with the trade of synthetic drugs — particularly fentanyl —, revealing the geopolitical magnitude of the problem (Pierson, 2024). Conclusion In summary, drug trafficking has ceased to be a marginal activity and has become a transnational structure capable of influencing politics, the economy, and society. Its persistence can be explained not only by the profitability of the business but also by social inequality, institutional corruption, and sustained global demand. History demonstrates that repression has not eradicated the problem but rather transformed it. Today, it is essential to rethink drug policies from a comprehensive approach that integrates security, public health, education, and international cooperation. Only through a multidimensional strategy will it be possible to contain a phenomenon that — more than an illicit economy — constitutes a global form of parallel governance that challenges the very foundations of the modern state. Notes[1] Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, also known as “El Jefe de Jefes” (“The Boss of Bosses”), “El Padrino” (“The Godfather”), or “The Drug Czar”, was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [2] Amado Carrillo Fuentes, known as “El Señor de los Cielos” (“The Lord of the Skies”), was the former leader of the Juárez Cartel. [3] Pablo Escobar was the founder and former leader of the Medellín Cartel. [4] Carlos Lehder was the co-founder of the Medellín Cartel. [5] Griselda Blanco, known as “The Black Widow,” “The Cocaine Queen,” or “La Patrona” (“The Boss”), was a founder of the Medellín Cartel. [6] Rafael Caro Quintero, known as “El Narco de Narcos” (“The Drug Lord of Drug Lords”), was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [7] Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as “El Chapo,” was the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. ReferencesAlzaga, Ignacio. 2010. 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Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2023, sparked by a power struggle between the two parties. The war has displaced more than 14 million people. Over half the population of about 50 million is facing acute levels of hunger. Several mediation initiatives have been launched since the start of the war, with limited success. The African Union has also been unable to get the main warring parties to agree to a permanent ceasefire. The four countries leading the main peace mediation effort (known as the Quad) are the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They issued a joint statement in September 2025, calling for a ceasefire in Sudan and offering a roadmap to end the internal conflict. I’ve been researching Sudan for over a decade, and in my view, these countries’ capacity to deliver a final political settlement for Sudan is severely constrained. The prospects for peace rest on the resolution of three factors: • the sharp differences between the Sudanese army and the Quad over who should participate in post-war politics• a widening rift between the main protagonists in the war on the terms of ending it• internal divisions within the Quad – particularly between Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia – over how to balance support for the army, curb Islamist influence and manage competing regional interests. The Quad’s plan called for an immediate ceasefire, a three-month humanitarian truce and an inclusive political process to resolve disputes within nine months. The statement was initially welcomed by the Rapid Support Forces and Sudan’s army leaders. However, follow-up meetings between the Quad and representatives of the warring parties have failed to translate any of these proposals into action. Meanwhile, the paramilitary troops and their allies captured the city of El-Fasher in North Darfur after a bloody 500-day siege. This was the army’s last major stronghold in Darfur. Darfur encompasses nearly 20% of Sudan’s territory. It borders Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. The capture has fuelled concerns of a de facto partition of the country in the western region. Against this backdrop, the Quad’s latest initiative seems unlikely to achieve more than a fragile ceasefire. The obstacles Efforts to broker peace in Sudan are hindered by three key challenges. 1. Diverging agendas between the Quad and the Sudanese army Despite broad similarities between the Quad’s roadmap and a proposal the army submitted in March 2025 to the United Nations, key differences remain. The core disagreement lies in the design of the political process to follow the ceasefire. The Quad insists that Islamist factions should be excluded from consultations over fears that these factions have close ties to terrorist groups and Iran. The army’s proposal, by contrast, opposes the exclusion of any party. The military leadership has alliances with elements of the former Islamic Movement. Its fighters still help stabilise the army’s frontlines. 2. A widening gap between the army and Rapid Support Forces on the terms of ending the war The army’s roadmap implicitly allows the paramilitary troops to remain in parts of Darfur for up to nine months, provided that local authorities consent. However, it also requires the withdrawal of the group from El-Fasher and North Kordofan. The Rapid Support Forces’ behaviour on the ground reveals a very different mindset. Rather than preparing to withdraw, the group has expanded militarily in North Kordofan and intensified its drone attacks on Khartoum and other regions. At its core, the dispute reflects conflicting end goals. The paramilitary group seeks to enter negotiations as an equal to the army. It wants a comprehensive restructuring of the armed forces. The army insists that it should be the only unit that supervises any reform of Sudan’s military institutions – the very issue that triggered the outbreak of war in 2023. 3. Internal divisions within the Quad The Quad’s own cohesion has been undermined by internal rifts that have derailed several meetings. The most visible divide lies between Egypt and the UAE. Cairo leans towards the army, seeing it as the guarantor of Sudan’s state institutions against collapse. Abu Dhabi prioritises dismantling the influence of Islamist leaders as the main precondition for peace. Saudi Arabia is wary of Emirati involvement, especially since the Sudanese army has repeatedly rejected UAE mediation and the Rapid Support Forces has attacked Egyptian policy towards Sudan. Washington has tried to manage these tensions by limiting direct mediation roles for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE while keeping them within the broader negotiation framework. These nations have significant leverage over the warring factions. How Sudan got here Sudan’s fragile transition began after the ousting of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019. An uneasy power-sharing arrangement between the army and civilian leaders collapsed in 2021 when army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, jointly seized control in a coup. Their alliance fractured two years later and sparked the 2023 civil war. Despite international pressure, neither side has given in or gained a decisive advantage since. The conflict has been devastating for Sudan’s population of 50 million. Death toll reports since the start of the war have varied between 20,000 and 150,000 people. The country is facing the world’s worst displacement crisis, and health and education systems have collapsed. Further, more than 12 million girls and women, and an increasing number of men, are at risk of sexual violence. Is breakthrough still possible? Despite existing divisions, shifting dynamics on the ground could still produce a limited breakthrough. The worst scenario for the military would be the paramilitary group’s renewed advance into territories it had been pushed out of. That prospect might push army leaders to accept a preliminary ceasefire. This would allow the army to regroup and consolidate existing positions without conceding ground politically. For the Rapid Support Forces, the calculation is different. After spending more than 18 months battling to capture El-Fasher, the group recognises that advancing further towards the capital would come at a high human and political cost. A temporary truce, therefore, could allow it to entrench its governance structures in Darfur and strengthen its military presence there. In this sense, a short-term ceasefire remains the most practical outcome for both sides. Washington’s eagerness to secure conflict-ending deals is likely to push the Quad towards this scenario. But a final political settlement in Sudan remains distant. For now, the most any diplomatic initiative can achieve is to pause the fighting, not to end the war, as it remains difficult to bridge the political gaps between Sudanese powers. 

Since the 1970s, the US-China relationship has been defined by a combination of cooperative and competitive objectives. Competitive interests, however, have prevailed, resulting in a rising competition between the two countries. (Pillsbury, 2015) Candidates in the 2016 presidential election treated China as an adversary, with Donald Trump's China-bashing becoming a trademark of his campaign. Rivalry with China has become the organising premise of American foreign policy under Trump's administration. Republicans and Democrats differ on most issues, but they agree on the need to change America's approach towards China. This has sparked speculation about whether the US-China relationship has devolved into a possibly violent clash or a new Cold War. The Trump administration has openly announced a shift in US policy towards China, with Matt Pottinger claiming that the US has modified its China policy to emphasise competition. Former Vice President of Trump Pence stated that the United States will combat China aggressively on all fronts, including economic, military, diplomatic, political, and ideological. This statement is regarded as "the declaration of a new Cold War." (Pence’s, 2018) Former Trump advisor Stephen K. Bannon has declared economic war on China, blaming its exports on the American working and middle classes. Many people agree that China is economically dominating America, and the US government and industry have done little to solve the situation. Globalists such as Madeline Albright, Tom Friedman, and Fareed Zakaria have grown increasingly concerned about China's lack of reciprocity in economic dealings with the United States. David Lampton, a pro-engagement advocate, has criticised China's WTO membership for increasing bilateral trade surpluses. (Staff R. , 2017) The second stage began when Donald Trump determined to halt Chinese commercial and technological advancements, renouncing liberal internationalism in favor of a new grand strategy against China. (Drezner D. R., 2021) The growing view of Xi Jinping as a harsh leader with an aggressive foreign policy contributes to the sense of an ideological clash. China and the United States have initiated an unconstrained war for bilateral, regional, and global dominance, ushering in a new age of strategic conflict that has yet to be fully defined. (Rudd, 2020) The US-China conflict appears to be a Cold War, and any return to a pre-2017 environment of "strategic engagement" with Beijing is no longer politically viable. (Rudd, 2020)However, (Zakaria, 2019) does not feel that the liberal international order has deteriorated as much as is widely assumed, and China is far from a grave threat to the liberal international system. Despite the best intentions of both countries, the US-China relationship is more likely to devolve into economic and military competition. (Lake, 2018) China's strategy aims to modernize its industrial capacity and secure its position as a global powerhouse in high-tech industries. The strategy aims to reduce reliance on foreign technology imports, increase Chinese-domestic content of core materials, and upgrade its dominant position in major strategic industries, such as pharmaceutical, automotive, aerospace, semiconductors, and most importantly, IT and robotics. The 14th Five-Year Plan of China (2021-2025) emphasizes high-quality growth driven by green and high-tech industries, service sectors, and domestic consumption. The US judged China's old growth model as generating a somewhat balanced win-win relationship between the two economies, based on "comparative advantage" and "cost-benefit" evaluations. However, Beijing's new growth model, particularly the "Made in China 2025" aspiration, is perceived as competition with the US service and knowledge economy, resulting in trade and high-tech warfare between the two countries since 2018. (Bernal-Meza L. X., China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-core competition?, 2021) The US business community, once a staunch supporter of engagement, has complained that China has hacked American industrial secrets, created barriers to American firms investing in China, enforced regulations that discriminate against foreigners, maintained high tariffs that should have been reduced decades ago, and blocked American Internet businesses. In a rare joint statement by the allies, the intelligence chiefs of the Five Eyes countries convened on Tuesday to charge China with stealing intellectual property and using artificial intelligence to hack and spy on the countries. (Bing, 2023) The officials from the United States,Britain,Canada,Australia and Huawei,for example,has tight relations with the Party and has been accused of stealing intellectual property as well as spying on Western countries. The United States is concerned about Huwaie's 5G supremacy, which is why it’s CEO, Meng Wan Zhou, was arrested in Canada. Indeed, its importance was highlighted when the United States imposed restrictions restricting, and in some cases prohibiting, Chinese telecoms operations in the American market, and launched a global effort to persuade friends, partners, and others to follow suit. Thus, while President Trump allowed one company (ZTE) a respite from what appeared to be a ban that would put it out of business, later American limitations on Huawei threatened to destroy China's premier international technology company's global viability. (Goldstein, 2020) When it comes to both green technology and chips, it is now at the center of American politics. The CHIPS Act, approved by Congress last year, included $52 billion in grants, tax credits, and other subsidies to stimulate American chip production. That's the kind of industrial policy that would make Hamilton gape and clap. Over the next few years and decades, China will pour vast sums of money into its own industrial strategy programmes, spanning a wide spectrum of cutting-edge technology. According to one Centre for Strategic and International Studies researcher, China already spends more than 12 times as much of its GDP on industrial programmes as the United States. (BROOKS, 2023) Certain social media sites, such as Facebook and Google, are prohibited in China.In the United States, there is a restriction on TIKTOK and WECHAT. To counter China, the United States has implemented a number of statutes, including the: 1.COMPETES Act 2020.: The House Science, Space, and Technology Committee decided to advance the America Competes Act of 2022, which intends to improve America's scientific and technology efforts in the twenty-first century in order to compete with China in vital fields. The bipartisan Act is divided into eleven sections, with Division K headed "Matters Related to Trade." Trade Adjustment Assistance, Import Security and Fairness Act, National Critical Capabilities Review, Modification and Extension of Generalized System of Preferences, Reauthorization of the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 and Other Matters, and Temporary Duty Suspensions and Reductions are the seven sections of the Act. President Joe Biden has indicated his support for the Act, arguing that it will strengthen America's supply chains and reenergize the economy's innovation engine, allowing it to compete with China and the rest of the globe for decades to come. 2.Chips and Science Act 2022: President Joe Biden signed the Chips and Science (or CHIPS) Act into law, promising local semiconductor producers more than $50 billion to expand home output and "counter China." (Cosgrove, 2023) 3.The United States passed the Inflation Reduction Act 2022: Although China now dominates clean technology manufacturing, the Inflation Reduction Act contains provisions geared primarily at strengthening the United States' clean energy supply chain. Furthermore, the global transition to clean technology such as solar panels and electric vehicles is unavoidable and ongoing as they become more affordable than fossil-fueled alternatives and countries take action to achieve their Paris climate obligations. (NUCCITELLI, 2023) CHIP War After failing to achieve an agreement with Chinese regulators, Intel cancelled a $5.4 billion takeover deal with Israel-based Tower Semiconductor. China is one of Intel's most important markets, and on July 3, Beijing announced a license requirement for exporters of gallium and germanium, rare-earth metals used in semiconductor manufacturing. The chip war is mostly motivated by the United States' concerns about China's military exploitation of semiconductor technology. However, China's military sector has a key weakness: most of its cutting-edge applications rely on foreign technological inputs, particularly microprocessor exports. China will be the world's largest buyer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment in 2021, accounting for 26% of worldwide demand. Biden established an export license requirement in October 2022, limiting China's access to semiconductor innovations manufactured by US corporations. In July 2023, Japan officially prohibited the sale of 23 types of semiconductor equipment to China, which is significantly more widespread than the US restriction, impeding China's development of advanced chips and basic chips used in technology such as automobiles and smartphones. The Netherlands Standing Committee on Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation said in September that it will begin limiting its semiconductor technology exports to China. According to Nikkie Asia, this new legislation would prohibit the Dutch ASML from exporting innovative chip manufacturing methods without first getting government-approved licenses. (CHENG TING-FANG, 2023) These export limitations have pushed Beijing to retaliate, with China's most recent regulation on gallium and germanium shipments serving as a direct retaliation to the US' global allies. According to the New York Times Magazine, Taiwan manufactures more than 90% of the world's most advanced microchips and could risk armed confrontation if China goes on the offensive in the future. (Palmer, 2023) Former national security advisor Robert O'Brien, on the other hand, believes that in the case of an impending invasion,the US would destroy Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturers rather than allow them to fall into the hands of China. The chip battle has further pushed Taiwan into an awkward position in the changing geopolitical landscape. (Carr, 2023) The Biden administration intends to restrict shipments of advanced artificial intelligence chips designed by Nvidia to China as part of a broader set of actions aimed at preventing Beijing from gaining advanced US technologies to enhance its military. The action is intended to address regulatory gaps and limit China's access to advanced semiconductors, which might feed AI advances and sophisticated computers crucial to Chinese military purposes. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, emphasised that the administration's goal is not to harm Beijing economically. (Alexandra Alper, 2023) In the words of Lampton, "There was a widespread public perception that the Sino-American economic playing field had been unfair to Americans, with the assertion that the American economy was hollowed out, in part due to overt and covert technology transfer to China" (Lampton, 2015) . China's new growth strategy is leading to more rivalry than complementarity in the China-US economic partnership. The fact that "China's achievement in moving up in the global supply and value chains has led to Beijing's larger share of global surplus and the reduction of the profit margin for traditional core states" has disturbed the United States. (Li X. , 2020) As Lenin would have argued, the dynamics of the US-China rivalry are an inter-imperial rivalry driven by inter-capitalist struggle. Competition for the global market could quickly escalate into escalating confrontations of zones of influence, if not war. Conclusion The US-China rivalry is characterised by a complex interplay of economic, technological, and ideological issues. Although the relationship resembles a new Cold War, some argue that it is best understood as a capitalist intra-core competition driven by inter-imperial rivalry. As Lenin foresaw, competition for global markets may escalate into conflicts over areas of control. The contest is likely to last and have an impact on the global order for many years to come since both nations have made large investments in industrial strategy and technology. Advanced semi-conductors and AI chips are necessary for the next race for technological supremacy. 6G telecom and quantum computing. The globe was forced to protect the supply chain for rare earth materials due to this high-tech rivalry. Since they are currently the epicentre of the world's military and economic might. For many years to come, its influence will shape international politics, trade disputes, and technological advancements. Global struggle for these minerals is anticipated in the twenty-first century, much like the wars for oil and gas in the twentieth. Rare earths will be the focus of the twenty-first century. Mineral-rich nations like Brazil, India, Australia, and Vitenam will also become strategically significant for other reasons. As competition for these resources intensifies, international relations will shift and geopolitical alignment will result. 5Gs is no longer the focus of this new technical cold war. It now comes down to controlling the basic materials that enable technology. For this reason, JD Vance adds, "Give us your financial resources, and we'll take care of you." In the trade and technology conflict that has intensified since the Biden Administration increased the restrictions on sales of cutting-edge American technology to China, the Pentagon has designated rare earth as a strategic mineral that is essential for US defence.In response to US technology sanctions, China restricted the export of rare earth materials.It has nothing to do with economics, but rather with military supremacy on a worldwide scale. This is how the US sees the discovery of these rare earth minerals. Donald Trump is threatening Canada, Greenland, and Ukraine for this reason. Due to their large stockpiles of rare earth materials, they are able to protect the global supply chain in this way.Interestingly, however, China produces 63% of rare earth minerals and refines 83% of them. It can store 44 million metric tonnes of reserves in this manner. The US would still have 4-5 million tonnes of metric reserves if it were to seize the deposits of Greenland, Canada, and Ukraine.Thus, they are negligible compared to 44 million metric tonnes in China. If China wisely controls its rare earth export strategy, it will be powerful enough to remind the world of its might without being overly harsh. Then it can demonstrate that Beijing is just as adept at using resources as Washington is at using dollars or sanctions. However, if the world manages to get past it or if China's grip wanes, its greatest advantage may begin to diminish. The next few months are critical because tanks and missiles are not being used in the largest power fight this time. Minerals and magnets will be used to combat it. Bibliography Alexandra Alper, K. F. (2023, October 18). Biden cuts China off from more Nvidia chips, expands curbs to other countries. 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