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Energy & Economics
The concept of a fragile, vulnerable, unstable world order.

World Order Transformation: Economy, Ideology, Technology

by Aleksandr Dynkin

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The concept of a multipolar (or polycentric) world order [1] was first coined by Academician Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 [Primakov 1996]. Like everything new, it was not immediately accepted, but ultimately became a significant contribution to both domestic and world theory of international relations, offering a compelling alternative to Western approaches, particularly the one proposed in Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations [Huntington 1993]. It informed the idea of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and India, implemented by Primakov and later embodied in the BRICS group. By now, the idea of multipolarity has been recognized in global political science, has entered the conceptual framework and the language of international diplomacy and is used in Russia’s doctrinal documents. In 2015, we proposed the scenario of a new bipolarity [2] as one of the possible trajectories for global development. Today, many scholars, both Chinese and American, [3] suggest that China-centric and U.S.-centric poles are emerging. This article discusses the “multipolarity — new bipolarity” dichotomy. Long Global Macro-Transformations World history shows that a new world order typically emerges after the end of a major war (see Table 1). Table 1. International system (world order)    Source: systematized by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS Europe was usually the “kitchen” where the world order was cooked. Take the last 200 years. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe emerged and lasted for 100 years. The century-long stability of that system could be explained by the homogeneity of the political organization of its guarantor states. All members of the Concert of Europe were monarchies. World War I produced the Versailles system, which lasted only 20 years. One of the reasons for its short life was the exclusion of the Soviet Union, Germany and China. The Yalta-Potsdam system was formed by the victors in World War II. Its guarantors were the “Big Three” powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the UK—along with France and China. The three defeated powers—Germany, Japan and Italy—were discriminated and disenfranchised. This system existed for 45 years and was initially thought to be polycentric, but quickly degenerated into a bipolar order, and the Cold War commenced. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the system became unipolar, dominated by the West, primarily the U.S. It disregarded Russia’s interests and, from 2018 onward, began discriminating against China as well. February 2022 can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s demise. However, today’s predictions suggest it will take at least 10 years before the new post-unipolar system becomes stable. The economic center of gravity is a spatial indicator of the economic strength of states, borrowed from physics. To put it simply, this is a geographical point of equilibrium for GDP, trade and investment flows of different countries. Figure 1 shows a map of how the world’s economic center of gravity shifted for over a thousand years. It appeared in Central Asia, on the territory of the Ghaznavid Empire (modern-day Afghanistan). The center then migrated northwest, while the devastation in post-war Europe forcefully pushed it (within just 10 years) to the West, toward Greenland. Then it turned east again. The sharpest shift, to the southeast, occurred in 2000–2010 and is associated with the rise of China. The economic center of gravity has almost returned to the same meridian but remained more than 2,000 km north of the starting point, which indicates a return to the millennial balance of economic power between the West and the East. Figure 1. “Journey” of the three-dimensional economic center of gravity    Source: Dobbs R., Remes J., Manyika J. et al. Urban world: Cities and the rise of the consuming class. McKinsey Global Institute, 2012. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/urbanization/urban-world-cities-and-the-rise-of-the-consuming-class. Statistic calculations by IMEMO RAS for 60 years of peace (1960–2021) indicate the stability of the center’s latitudinal (horizontal) position. This suggests a relatively consistent proportion of GDP production by the countries in the Global South and Global North, under the economic leadership of the Northern Hemisphere. The shift to the East has also been clearly confirmed. According to our projections up to 2050, the future position of the globe’s center of economic activity will lie on the border of India and China. This method of analysis reveals a high level of inertia in time and geographic monotonicity of changes in the balance of economic power of states. It also shows that wars can drastically disrupt the natural course of events. The center of gravity method can also be applied to the arsenals of strategic and tactical weapons (see Figure 2). For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had a huge advantage, but then there was a clear pivot to the northeast—the creation of superior nuclear capabilities in the Soviet Union. With the onset of arms control in 1993, a reversing loop emerged, heading southwest. This was followed by a curve to the east with an implied southward inclination, which reflects the growing nuclear stockpiles of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the rapid buildup of strategic and tactical nuclear forces in China. The military center of gravity follows its economic peer with a lag of 20 years, reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of Asian powers. These interpretations also clearly demonstrate the end of unipolarity and point to the rise of multipolarity. Figure 2. Movement of the nuclear center of gravity Source: calculations by K.V. Bogdanov, Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. Technology. Politicians tend to be techno-optimists. Barack Obama predicted that 3D printing would transform the entire world. [4] George W. Bush promised that decoding the human genome would revolutionize medicine. [5] All false starts. Economists traditionally measure the rate of technological progress (TP) using the total factor productivity (TFP) index. To put it simply, this is the part of economic growth driven not by an increase in inputs—labor and capital—but rather by improvements in the efficiency of their use. Technological progress means not only the generation of new scientific and technological ideas but also their mass replication. Without economic validation of the impact of wide dissemination of innovations, scientific or technological achievements remain in history as brilliant breakthroughs with only local economic effects, giving rise to journalistic generalizations at best, such as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” or “the sixth techno-economic paradigm.” Statistical metrics rely on data of technologically advanced nations, while catching-up countries have room for growth by approaching the TP frontier, i.e. adopting and improving existing ideas and technologies. Technological leaders spend more resources pushing the TP frontier, while those catching up can accelerate at lower costs, effectively staying in the “wind shadow” of the leaders. The TFP index growth rate has been steadily declining in developed countries for many years, but this has been especially conspicuous since the mid-2000s. Today, the growth is below 1.5% and even 1% per year (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Average annual growth of total factor productivity, % Source: calculations by IMEMO RAS based on the data from the International Productivity Monitor. No. 38, Spring 2020. http://www.csls.ca/ipm/ipm38.asp#:~:text=Martin%20Neil%20Baily%2C%20Barry%20P.%20Bosworth%20and %20Siddhi%20Doshi%0ALessons%20from%20Productivity%20Comparisons%20 of%20Germany%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States%C2%A0; Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth. World Bank Group, and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. China. 2019. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1335-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/833871568732137448/pdf/Innovative-China-New-Drivers-of-Growth.pdf. A similar pattern of dramatic TFP deceleration was observed in China. The consensus interpretation of these figures is that the main effects of the Third Industrial (i.e., computer) Revolution have largely been exhausted, and no new general-purpose breakthrough technologies (such as electricity, internal combustion engines, or computers and mobile communications) have emerged. However, it seems that the intellectualization of technologies and approaches to project management, as well as informatization, simply do not fit into the traditional factor-based view of progress that was established many years ago. The scale of knowledge is growing, new professions are springing up, the role of emotional intelligence and cognitive functions is increasing. All this dramatically changes the structure of capital assets (see Figure 4). From the beginning of the 21st century and until the 2008 crisis (2000–2007), equipment accounted for over 50% of the increase in capital’s contribution (investment) to output growth, whereas in 2019–2021, almost 63% of this increase was attributable to intellectual property assets. This result of our research suggests a refocusing of technological progress from final products to intellectual technologies, enabling the production of a range of innovative goods and services tailored to highly segmented demand. Figure 4. Transformation of the capital structure in the U.S. private sector Source: Total Factor Productivity for Major Industries—2022. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prod3_03232023.htm. There are now hopes that the pace of technological progress may accelerate due to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, which will spark a new industrial revolution. An indirect sign of its imminence is the sharp rise in the rate of business births and deaths in the U.S. economy in 2020–2022. [6] The spillover of labor from companies that are losing efficiency to corporations with increasing market shares has also accelerated. These are some sort of leading indicators that suggest the structural results of TP are approaching. Similar developments occurred 30 years ago, on the cusp of the computer revolution. The above-mentioned intellectualization of fi ed capital, where trusted AI will be applied, adds credibility to these hopes. In addition, AI is one of the critical areas of technological sovereignty. It is no coincidence that Vladimir Putin described AI as “crosscutting, universal and essentially revolutionary technology.” [7] The Russian President announced the preparation of a new edition of the National AI Development Strategy and a respective decree. I believe that this prioritization is justified. China’s experience in the semiconductor race is a good model to be emulated (see Figure 5). Its distinguishing feature is the focus on companies as drivers of development, with massive, cumulatively growing state support. Figure 5. Focusing on China’s priorities (nanometer chip race) Source: Systematized by I.V. Danilin, IMEMO RAS The U.S. strategy of curbing technological development of Russia (in all areas) and China (in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and electric cars) leads to stiff competition in high technology, which is fraught with fragmentation, diversification of technical standards, legal norms and rules. And this is another argument in favor of a new bipolarity. Demographic processes. According to UN projections, by the middle of the 21st century, Russia will drop from its current 9th place to 14th in terms of population, while remaining the most populous country in Europe. [8] A more significant problem for Russia is population aging. The proportion of elderly people, who are typically not part of the labor force, is increasing. Japan, Spain and Italy are leading this process today, but neither China nor India will be spared. Nigeria appears to be the only major country where population and the share of young people will continue to grow until the end of the 21st century. As of December 2023, one in 10 people worldwide was aged 65 or over, with health spending taking up 10% of global GDP. [9] In this context, the importance of medical technologies cannot be overstated, as they can extend not only people’s life expectancy but also the duration of their healthy and socially active life, thereby easing labor market pressures. Needs always steer technological progress toward overcoming economic growth constraints tied to the scarcest resource in any given historical period. A serious risk associated with the problem of aging is a slowdown in innovation, since it is people under 40—the age group that will shrink throughout the 21st century—who are the primary drivers and consumers of innovation. So far, this risk has been mitigated by the large youth cohorts in China and India. This is why these two nations are experiencing almost exponential growth in patenting, massive reengineering and, consequently, in middle-class numbers. Demographics give India an edge until around 2060, which is already evident in the growth rates of Indian economy. Combined with the influx of hi-tech investments and the contribution of the Indian diaspora, India has good prospects, making its position crucial to the future architecture of the world order, regardless of how it evolves. The U.S. understands this and has been figuratively “clinging” to this nation for the past 20 years. I believe that the Russian Academy of Sciences should significantly bolster scientific and educational ties with India and its dynamically developing neighbors in Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. The anticipated tension in the global market of new generations of innovators aggravates inter-country competition for this scarcest resource. I think that the international reputation of the Russian Academy of Sciences is a powerful tool to attract and retain young people and foster their creative motivation. We should reassert this as we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. Ideology. Dirigisme [10], or statism, is the main trend in both economic theory and economic policy of the West. A pivot to a more state-controlled economy began with the disappointing outcomes of the Washington Consensus, which aimed to guide post-socialist countries from planned to market economies. The 2008–2009 financial crisis cemented the trend toward statism, and the COVID-19 pandemic elevated it to unprecedented proportions. In the U.S., Democrats are among the most vocal proponents of greater government intervention in all spheres of life, but they are not alone. Republicans are also actively advocating industrial policy, repudiation of free trade, as well as strict control over Big Tech, among other measures. The popularity of the so-called cultural Marxism is on the rise. [11] Its origins go back to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (H. Marcuse, E. Fromm and others). These ideas are moving from the realm of ideological and theoretical confrontations into political activism. For example, the leaders of the BLM movement publicly self-identify as “trained Marxist organizers.” The essence of the strategy inspired by “cultural Marxism” is the rejection of direct political struggle on the barricades, since the proletariat has been “bought off by the bourgeoisie and is no longer capable of anything,” and the ranks of the classic proletariat are rapidly thinning. The direction of social change is set, on the one hand, by intellectuals with personal power and, on the other hand, by marginalized groups seeking to assert their “right to identity.” The strategy of activists who form this paradoxical combination of intellectuals and marginalized individuals is the creeping takeover of the main institutions of power and society by planting “correct” ideas in the mass consciousness. In the U.S., the fighters for political correctness have already hijaked the school system, university campuses, major media outlets and the entertainment industry (Hollywood). Civil servants are forced to take courses in critical race theory, which postulates not only the socially constructed nature of race and the recognition of systemic racism [Delgado, Stefancic 2017: 45] but also a sense of guilt in one part of society toward another. This, in turn, allegedly requires addressing moral and material injustices by organizing public life in line with such an ideology. Similar concepts are being pushed into public discourse as well. It is already dominated by the ideas of radical feminism, cancel culture, anti-systemic racism and postcolonialism, the fight against global warming and the green agenda, which claims to be universal and non-negotiable. As a result, the energy transition is motivated more by ideology than by the comparative market efficiency of energy supplies. Different environmental-political discourses—eco-nationalism, eco-imperialism and green growth—are competing in shaping the green agenda, eroding the attractiveness of the dominant sustainable development model. Another universal weapon in fighting any dissent is political correctness. Large corporations, government agencies and universities are developing and implementing strategies to promote DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) principles, which are nothing but tools of ideological control over employees. Universities are required to fi reports on their compliance with such principles and efforts to promote them, which causes mounting criticism as they violate academic freedom and cultivate ideological conformity. [12] However, ideological censorship has already taken deep root in various spheres of public life, and questioning its compatibility with democracy is deemed politically incorrect. Revising cultural norms has become a cultural norm in and of itself, deepening divisions in modern polarized societies, primarily in the U.S., but also in Old Europe [Semenenko 2023: 27-35]. Another curious phenomenon is associated with the new agenda. In the 20th century, the left championed progress, advocating faster economic growth, rapid technological advancement and better social welfare. Now the ideas of zero or even negative growth and post-growth are popular among them. [Buchs, Koch 2017: 218]. Such ideological narratives exacerbate the question of how to treat the poor countries of the South, but also their own poor: the welfare state for all no longer fit into this agenda. On the contrary, it becomes a selective tool of backing the “right” minorities. This creates a breeding ground for stronger positions of populist forces. Such contradictory internal political processes distort public consciousness as well as domestic and foreign policy decision-making. The new elites are extremely ideologized. The U.S. political system is becoming less effective at regulating the economy. Two rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, have downgraded the U.S. credit rating to AA+ from the top mark of AAA. In November 2023, Moody’s lowered its outlook on the U.S. credit rating to “negative” from “stable.” All three agencies agree on the main reason for the downgrade: the growing dysfunctionality of the political system. In foreign policy, the U.S. has withdrawn from 16 major international treaties and agreements on arms control, global trade, climate and the Arctic since the beginning of the century [Dynkin 2020]. In other words, the unipolar world order with its unbridled appetite for expansion has brought the world into a zone of extra-high risks. And the paradigms that are dominant in the West have proven incompatible with either Russian or Chinese value-oriented political projects. Therefore, the ideological sphere will inevitably see increased confrontation, marking another step toward bipolarity. IMEMO RAS researchers have repeatedly warned about the West’s miscalculated strategic hopes: 1) that Russia would face an economic catastrophe because of an unprecedented sanctions war in modern history; 2) that the unipolar world order would remain unchallenged; 3) that a global blockade of Russia’s export-oriented economy would be feasible. And we were not the only ones who made these warnings. In response, we only heard propagandistic clichés like “a gas station masquerading as a country,” “a regional power” and “Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters”. This kind of “expertise” led the Washington establishment to believe that Russia is a “declining power” whose strategic interests could be safely neglected. This “strategic lunacy” is a consequence of a universalist mindset—a product of the West’s political experience and culture, which tends to elevate Anglo-Saxon and European historical tradition to absolutes—and of a failure to understand the shifts in the balance of power in the 21st century. Today, Russia is the world’s fourth-largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), while the top fi e global economic powers include three BRICS nations and none from the blooming “garden” of Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief who has recently been fired. Now a new narrative has been launched into the propaganda orbit: “Russia is about to attack Eastern Europe.” The logical gap between the image of a declining power and that of an “aggressive bear” is conveniently ignored. This primitive, one-dimensional perception of complex non-linear processes can only lead to disappointment—just as it did when the West lulled itself into believing that Chinese reforms would eventually lead to political pluralism. As a result, the West has an inexhaustible stream of surprises. It appears that their experts are increasingly out of touch with Russian (and any other non-Western) realities. Figuratively speaking, they are staring into a distorting rearview mirror constructed by their own rhetoric and propaganda. But the main real surprise was the fantastic resilience of the Russian economy. I dare say that no other economy in the world, not even China’s, could withstand such aggressive pressure. The high resistance of the Russian economy to external shocks can be explained by three fundamental reasons. First, it is the result of difficult, sometimes agonizing institutional and structural reforms. These efforts have ultimately produced a self-sufficient, adaptive and highly diversified market economy. Second, the crisis of 2022 was the fifth (!) in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The government, federal regulators and the Bank of Russia have accumulated hard-earned professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical strategies. The same can be said about business. Our economic entities have demonstrated time and again that there are always more effective solutions than there are problems. Finally, the West miscalculated its ability to isolate our economy. The dual containment of Russia and China, in fact, only strengthens ties between the BRICS member states. Transformations of the 2020s. The first half of the 2020s has fi y buried what was once known as “European security.” It is impossible to glue this “broken cup” back together without Russia. The unwillingness of the Ukrainian side and the West to stop the armed conflict at its very beginning, the dangerous escalation, NATO’s constant violation of its own “red lines” and the accession of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Alliance are all symptoms of the European security system transforming into a transatlantic one. Meanwhile, the Eurasian security system is taking shape. The outcomes of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China hint that the “political East” is starting to form, if not as an alternative to the long-standing “political West,” then at least as an equal partner. Without considering its interests, any debate about “rules-based” global security will be mere fantasy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Moscow after his recent reelection is in the same vein. Of course, geography cannot be changed, and Russia has been and will remain a European power. However, it is also the geographic center of Eurasia, providing the infrastructure backbone for the Eurasian partnership—from the Northern Sea Route and up to the Trans-Siberian Railway, Baikal–Amur Mainline, Trans-Asian Highway and cross-continental pipelines. The “post-Ukrainian” world seems to be moving toward a new, indivisible Eurasian security architecture, relying on existing institutions: the Union State, CSTO, EAEU, CIS, BRICS, SCO and ASEAN. Minsk has put forward an initiative to develop a Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity—a strategic vision for a new system of international relations to replace the “rules-based” world order. An important event of 2024 in this context is the expansion of the BRICS club (see Figure 6). Its combined economic power could potentially reach $67 trillion, surpassing the total GDP of the G7 countries. Figure 6. Economic potential of BRICS countries Source: calculations by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the IMF, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Steel Association, Energy Transition Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2023, International Energy Agency. And there are still 28 more countries on the “waiting list”. In several important markets such as metals, automotive industry, oil and mineral fertilizers, BRICS already matches or exceeds the potential of the G7 nations. Russia, which took over the BRICS rotating presidency in 2024, faces the task of energizing the harmonized economic and technological policies of the members. This approach is the institutional cornerstone of the future polycentric world. What will the coming world order look like? It is difficult to say which of the two trends—bipolarity or polycentrism—will prevail in the end. It is more likely that they will coexist: for example, rigid bipolarity in the Global North and polycentrism in the Global South. Signs of military, economic and technological bipolarity are already visible in the North. Interestingly, New Delhi tends to categorize China as a country of the North [Jaishankar 2020: 240]. This viewpoint has substance, as China is far ahead of other countries of the Global South in terms of GDP per capita ($12,541). For comparison, India’s GDP per capita is $2,612. [13] The decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies has not affected trade flows yet, but only technology and investment. In 2023, China saw a reversal of foreign direct investment inflows, with funds previously invested being withdrawn. Negative trends took hold, and the outflow approached negative $1.5 trillion (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific macro-region is gaining greater internal dynamics, unlike Europe or North America. Figure 7. U.S.–China Economic Decoupling Source: UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/; State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/. Meanwhile, the trend toward political polycentricity persists. For example, New Delhi and Ankara were initially poles apart on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. This is also the dawning of post-unipolarity, where the new centers of power are increasingly guided by their own interests in decision-making rather than by any “rules” or advice from Washington, Beijing or Moscow. It would be unrealistic to expect that the future world order will be free of conflict. The world will retain its diversity, with different potentials of countries and their competition. It is crucial that, despite their differences, the interests of larger and smaller nations are respected, and problems are solved through constructive dialogue. Russia was the first to challenge the notorious unipolar world order. Today we can state that most countries in the Global South have responded to this challenge and refused to subscribe to the Western interpretation of the conflict in Ukraine . The future world order is taking shape right before our eyes. I am sure that a multipolar world is preferable for Russia as a developed, self-sufficient and sovereign nation. But this world also requires a new system of global governance, development and strengthening of its institutions, such as BRICS, G20, SCO and EAEU. For instance, the EAEU member states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) are faring much better than the five other post-Soviet countries. In 2022, GDP per capita in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union was 3.5 times higher than the average for the fi e other CIS states that are not part of the EAEU (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) (see Figure 8). Our strategy in these organizations requires a solid approach and “stereoscopic” vision from socio-economic, scientific, technological and political perspectives. Here, the Russian Academy of Sciences should play a major role as a leader of scientific and expert community. Figure 8. Economic trends of EAEU and CIS countries Source: EEC. https://eec.eaeunion.org/?ysclid=lr7rtdg7np631919243; IMF. https://www.imf.org/; World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/.  Conclusion In conclusion, there are compelling arguments both for multipolarity and for a new bipolarity. Leading U.S. experts are asking similar questions: “What order will replace the crumbling US-led system is far from certain. Will China push aside the United States as the global hegemon to lead a world according to rules written in Chinese characters? Will the world become bipolar, divided between two more or less rigidly defined blocs led by the United States and China? Will a genuinely multipolar world emerge based on several states or coalitions of more or less equal strength?” [Graham 2023: 272]. These questions are yet to be answered, and definitive conclusions in this case are premature. Given this high uncertainty, one should be prepared for any scenario. The essential prerequisite for such readiness is Russia’s strategic autonomy based on military-strategic parity with the U.S. The fundamental question to which the author has no answer today is: how likely is the emergence of a new world order without a major war? In 2024, presidential or parliamentary elections will take place (or have already taken place) in 50 countries, which account for more than 45% of the world’s GDP and population. Perhaps their results will clarify our vision of the near future. Dynkin A.A. (2024). World order transformation: economy, ideology, technology. Polis. Political Studies, 5, 8-23. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.05.02 This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”. The author expresses gratitude to his colleagues at IMEMO RAS R.I. Kapelyushnikov, V.D. Milovidov, I.S. Semenenko, I.V. Danilin, S.V. Zhukov, K.V. Bogdanov, A.P. Guchanova for consultations and assistance in preparing this article. References Büchs, M., & Koch, M. (2017). Critiques of growth. In M. Büchs, & M. Koch. Postgrowth and Wellbeing: Challenges to Sustainable Welfare (pp. 39-56). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-59903-8_4 Delgado, R.,& Stefancic, J. (2017). Critical race theory. Anintroduction. New York: New York University Press. Graham, T. (2023). Getting Russia right. 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The world order or international system is a stable set of institutions and norms of military-political and economic relations, which is institutionalized and legitimate in the international legal sense. The world order remains stable during the active life of at least one generation—a universal measure of social time. However, in the wake of geopolitical macro-crises, illegitimate systems emerge, forcibly imposed by the winner. This was the case with the unipolar world order. 2. Dynkin A., Burrows M. Here’s the Playbook for Getting U.S.–Russian Cooperation Back on Track. The National Interest. 07.12.2015. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-the-playbook-getting-us-russian-cooperation-back-track-14527. 3. For example, see: [Yan Xuetong 2016; Kupchan 2021]. 4. Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address. The White House. President Barack Obama. 12.02.2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address. 5. President Bush Calls on Senate to Back Human Cloning Ban. Remarks by the President on Human Cloning Legislation. The East Room. The White House. President George W. Bush. 10.04.2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020410-4.html. 6. Private sector establishments birth and death, seasonally adjusted. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 25.10.2023. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.t08.htm. 7. Artificial Intelligence Journey 2023 conference. President of Russia. Official website. 24.11.2023. http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/72811. 8. World Population Prospects 2024, Online Edition. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/MostUsed/. 9. Global Health Expenditure database. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/nha/database. 10. Dirigisme is a policy of active state intervention in the national economy, pursued by France and the UK in mid-1940s. 11. Mendenhall A. Cultural Marxism is Real. The James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal. 04.01.2019. https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2019/01/cultural-marxism-is-real/. 12. AFA Calls for an End to Required Diversity Statements. Press Release. AFA. Princeton, NJ. 22.08.2022. https://academicfreedom.org/afa-calls-for-an-end-to-required-diversity-statements/. 13. World Economic Outlook Database (October 2023 Edition). International Monetary Fund. 10.10.2023. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October.

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japan,australia,usa and india friendship against china.Quad plus countries flags Quad plus countries flags over china flag.Quad plus countries. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific

by Liviu Horovitz , Elisabeth Suh

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

Defense & Security
Paris, France, Europe, May 01, 2024, pro-Palestinian demonstrator at the Paris procession on May 1

Political Insights (8): European Positions on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli War on Gaza Strip:

by Hossam Shaker

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.

Defense & Security
Russia versus the European Union, country confrontation concept, European Union flag versus Russian flag, conflict of interest concept

The new order will be with safeguards

by Timofey Bordachev

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском It is generally accepted that an international order is not the result of specific agreements, but the product of a common understanding of what can and cannot be done in relations between states. It is also generally accepted that all significant powers need to have relatively common ideas about why they recognize each other's right to exist and do not interfere in their internal affairs. In particular, the late Henry Kissinger wrote a lot about this, whose ideas were considered the standard of geostrategic thinking not only in the West, but also in our country. However, the coming times, apparently, will require a more creative approach to established views on how states can guarantee each other respect for basic interests and values. After all, it is the attack on them that always becomes the cause of conflict, as we are convinced by the example of the current military-political confrontation in Europe. In his speech at the UN Security Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that any agreement with the West on European security will have to contain "safeguards against unscrupulous interpretations." It is currently quite difficult to imagine what such safety catch might look like in physical terms, although the diplomats probably already have ideas on this topic. It can be guessed what the nature of such mechanisms should be. It is clear that the mechanisms should be aimed against the negative manifestations of the West's behavior. First, it is the West's desire to constantly create threats to others, as a central part of the global diplomatic game. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the physical ability to create such threats. The safety catches in this case are technical ways to ensure a situation where a state (or bloc) cannot change its behavior to hostile or take advantage of the omission in its selfish interests. Precisely cannot. Because "does not want" no longer works after, for example, Finland joined NATO. And the alliance itself simply trampled all the formal and informal principles on which they tried to build a security system in Europe after the Cold War. We see that not a single concluded then agreement works. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the main treaties on which the "rigid" framework of European security was based. NATO expansion to the east, in fact - the expansion of the territorial base of the American military presence in Europe - made all agreements in the field of conventional weapons meaningless. So, to come up with a new legal basis for peace in Europe is not a trivial task at all. And it remains to rely on the recognized skill of Russian diplomacy. A universal order that would suit everyone is unlikely now. It has always been relative before. However, in the century before last, there was at least a general idea among the leading powers about the principles on which the internal order in each of them should be based. Now it is difficult to think that Western countries will agree to recognize the right of Russia, China or other states to determine their own lives. First, any security order will inevitably be technical in nature, and not based on a common understanding of challenges and threats. This means that it will have little room for principles and a lot for specific parameters of how the West will not be able to threaten Russia's core interests. Russia's proposals at the end of 2021 already contained a fairly large number of such features of a functioning European security system. Apparently, they will have to return to them after the United States is ready to sit down at the table of serious negotiations. Much here will depend on how soon the understanding of the impossibility of continuing to pursue an irresponsible policy prevails in America itself. At least now, anxiety for the future of their country is heard in the statements of some American politicians. We will see to what extent their understanding that the reasons for the US difficulties relate to the internal situation can be translated into concrete decisions. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine that there will be a place for such a concept as trust in future agreements. Unfortunately, it is not available to all political systems without exception. We ourselves see how the Americans openly declare that any new administration can easily revise the agreements reached by the previous one. Continuity of policy is disappearing in the West – and this has always been the basis of stable diplomatic relations. Moreover, the modern world is extremely diverse. Trust is possible – as in the relations between Russia and China – in situations where both sides share a common understanding of the main threats. Russia and the West cannot have such a common understanding now. Simply because the entire surrounding world poses a threat to the United States and its satellites. And until Westerners can adapt to the new international reality, it will be quite difficult to take their words seriously. Therefore, trust in matters of European security should be based on the physical impossibility for the West to violate any agreements. And no one in Russia doubts that the desire to do so will periodically arise there. Thirdly, the legal basis for European security will most likely become broader. The situation in Europe has long ceased to be the business of the Europeans themselves. Especially since the positions of two powers with the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world – Russia and the United States – directly touch here. Their indirect proximity is a concern for the entire world and has little to do with the affairs of Europe. It is no coincidence that the most adequate proposals for ending the armed confrontation in Ukraine are currently coming from China, India, Brazil, or even African countries. The Europeans, in turn, are not prepared to offer anything at all that would reflect objective reality. They are simply going with the flow. In other words, security in Europe is simultaneously a local and global problem. The broader international community itself must guarantee how the West will comply with its probable obligations. And finally, the technical aspects themselves could include things that have not been widely used in international practice before. For example, the complete or almost complete demilitarization of individual territories and entire states. Unfortunately, the practice of the last 30 years has shown that not all states can bear such a heavy burden as the right to independently determine the parameters of their defense policy. The Baltic republics of the former USSR, Finland or the same unfortunate Ukraine could live quite happily if their political elites were not tempted to use the conflict with Russia to retain power despite any economic difficulties. Then they would probably have to work better on internal development, fit into the world economy, and not turn into centers of instability. In other words, the countries that cannot play an independent role in determining regional security should be relieved of the physical ability to create problems for it. Perhaps such an experience will become more widespread in the future. At least because the risk of turning sovereign states into springboards for confrontation between great powers is too great. The main technical and legal parameters of the European security system have yet to be invented by diplomats and agreed upon by politicians. However, it is already clear from bitter experience that it is no longer possible to leave the situation here in a state of uncertainty – it is too threatening to universal peace and survival.

Diplomacy
EU, USA and Russian flags with chess pieces symbolizing the conflict and control of Ukraine

The Geopolitics of the War in Ukraine. (Is Geopolitics Still Relevant?)

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском *This is an abbreviated version of the same paper published by the author at: Śliwiński K. (2023). Is Geopolitics Still Relevant? Halford Mackinder and the War in Ukraine. Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 4/2023, 7-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2023.1 Abstract This paper starts with an assumption that Geopolitics, understood as one of the great schools of International Relations, is not only still relevant but, indeed, should be one of the essential items in the toolkit of any student or policymaker who peruses the challenging and ever eluding realm of international security. It draws chiefly on the Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder to explain the dynamics of contemporary European Security in general and the ongoing war in Ukraine in particular. The analysis leads the author to a pair of conclusions: firstly, that the conflict in Ukraine is unlikely to end anytime soon and, perhaps more importantly, that the outcome of the war will only be one of many steps leading to the emergence of the new, possibly a multipolar, international system and consequently, and more obviously, a new security system in Europe, which will be strongly influenced by Germany rather than by the United States as before. Keywords: Geopolitics, Heartland, Europe, Security, Ukraine Introduction In the wake of the outburst of the war in Ukraine, the members of the European Union agreed on an extensive package of sanctions against various Russian entities and individuals connected to Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia. Until the attack against Ukraine, the EU had been "muddling through" with numerous countries pursuing their national interests, shaping their individual foreign and security policies, notably vis-à-vis Russia. The attack reinvigorated calls from E.U. bureaucrats for more unity and an actual common defense. EU's chief diplomat Joseph Borrel, during an extraordinary plenary session of the European Parliament on March 1, 2022, urged the European Parliament’s MPs to "think about the instruments of coercion, retaliation, and counterattack in the face of reckless adversaries. […] This is a moment in which geopolitical Europe is being born", he stressed (Brzozowski, 2022). Heartland theory – Geopolitics 101 As an analytical tool, geopolitics has been used since the 19th century. Its reputation was tarnished as a consequence of the policies of the Third Reich before and during WWII. Yet, it is considered a worthy approach that allows explanations that specifically look at the nexus between states' foreign and security policies and their geographical location in a historical context. Geopolitics is one of the grand theories of international relations (Sloan, 2017). Fundamentally, rather than treating states as separate, alienated geographical organisms, geopolitics allows us to look at a broader picture, including regions or even the whole globe, thus making it possible to account for interactions between many states functioning in particular systems defined by geographical criteria. Today's war in Ukraine occurs in a vital region for the European continent – Central and Eastern Europe. One of the founders of Geopolitics, a scientific discipline – Halford Mackinder (British geographer, Oxford professor, founder and director of the London School of Economics) proposed an enduring model in his seminal publication at the beginning of the 20th century - The Geographical Pivot of History. Drawing on the general term used by geographers – 'continental' Mackinder posits that the regions of Arctic and Continental drainage measure nearly half of Asia and a quarter of Europe and, therefore, form a grand 'continuous patch in the north and the center of the continent' (Mackinder, 1919). It is the famous 'Heartland', which, according to his inventor, is the key geographical area for anyone pursuing their dominant position in Euroasia. "[…] whoever rules the Heartland will rule the World Island, and whoever rules the World Island will rule the world" (Kapo, 2021). Notably, the key to controlling the Heartland area lies in Central and Eastern Europe, as it is an area that borders the Heartland to the West. Twenty-First century geopolitics (Dugin vs Mearsheimer) The most influential thinker and writer in Kremlin recently has arguably been Aleksandr Gel'evich Dugin. Accordingly, his 600-hundred pages book, Foundations of Geopolitics 2, published in 1997, has allegedly had an enormous influence on the Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites (Dunlop, 1997). In his book, Dugin, drawing on the founder of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, posits that Russia is uniquely positioned to dominate the Eurasian landmass and that, more importantly, 'Erasianism' will ultimately hold an upper hand in an ongoing conflict with the representatives of 'Atlantism' (the U.S. and the U.K.). Crucially, Dugin does not focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over Eurasia; instead, he advocates a relatively sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will (Dunlop, 1997). The Moscow-Berlin Axis According to Dugin, the postulated New Empire (Eurasian) has a robust geopolitical foothold: Central Europe. "Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Prussia and part of the Polish and Western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally been a consolidating force in Central Europe, uniting this geopolitical conglomerate under its control" (Dugin, 1997). Consequently, while the impulse of the creation of the New Empire needs to come from Moscow, Germany needs to be the centre of its western part. Furthermore "only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow." (Dugin, 1997, 127). Regarding the role of Anglo-Saxons in Central and Eastern Europe, Dugin offers a very straightforward analysis: "The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire presupposes several serious steps towards the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany. The traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis about the need to create a "cordon sanitaire" here, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally dangerous for the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France strove to destabilize the Eastern European peoples in every possible way, to instil in them the idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian influences". It follows logically that "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions, represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is, in general, senseless to speak about continental politics" (Dugin, 1997). "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'. Importantly, as this can inform us to an extent about the future settlement of the conflict: "The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow along its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories". The Tragedy of Great Power Politics In the preface to the update of his seminal book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (2013 edition), John Mearsheimer acknowledges that his analysis had to be updated with regards to the so-called "peaceful rise" of the People's Republic of China as a significant challenger to the role and position of United States in the international system. Consequently, he envisaged that the process would produce a highly sensitive, if not prone to local conflicts environment (Mearsheimer, 2013, 10). Following the logic of power balancing, he claimed that firstly, China had to build formidable military forces and, secondly, dominate Asia similarly to how the United States dominated Western Hemisphere. Correspondingly, China would strive to become a regional hegemon to maximise its survival prospect. This would make China's neighbours feel insecure and prompt counterbalancing by, as one might surmise, strengthening the existing bilateral and multilateral alliances and building new ones (AUKUS being a perfect example). Logically speaking, therefore, if you follow Mearsheimer's argumentation, Russia and India, Japan and Australia, and the Philippines and Indonesia should build a solid coalition to counter the ascent of China. Such developments would be in the interests of the United States, and Washington would naturally play a crucial role under such circumstances. Notably, the rise of China was not likely to be peaceful and produce "big trouble" for international trade as well as peace and security. This was approximately what the Trump administration had in mind when preparing the national security strategy in 2017. The Strategy mentions Russia 25 times, frequently in connection with China, as major challengers to the U.S.: "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and fair, grow their militaries, and control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence" (National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Yet, after even a short analysis of the document, one identifies the difference between the two in terms of how the U.S. perceives the challenge that each represents. Regarding Russia, Washington concludes that Kremilin's main aim is to: "seek to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders". China seems to be more ambitious in the eyes of the Capitol. As evidenced by such statements as: "Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars", "China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour. China's infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free trade flow, threaten other nations' sovereignty, and undermine regional stability."(National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Given this perception, it is no wonder that under Trump, Washington embarked on a new mission that questioned the processes of globalization for the first time in many decades. Under Trump, the U.S.A. introduced numerous economic sanctions against China, which sparked a revolution called 'decoupling'. Johnson and Gramer, writing for foreignpolicy.com in 2020, questioned this policy: "The threat of a great decoupling is a potentially historical break, an interruption perhaps only comparable to the sudden sundering of the first massive wave of globalization in 1914, when deeply intertwined economies such as the Great Britain and Germany, and later the United States, threw themselves into a barrage of self-destruction and economic nationalism that didn't stop for 30 years. This time, though, decoupling is driven not by war but peacetime populist urges, exacerbated by a global coronavirus pandemic that has shaken decades of faith in the wisdom of international supply chains and the virtues of a global economy." (Johnson, Gramer, 2020). With the comfort of looking at hindsight, we should conclude that perhaps luckily for the Far East and international political economy, Mearsheimer was wrong, at least for the time being. Firstly, no military conflicts exist in the Far East or the Pacific. The most potentially dangerous issue remains one of the cross-straight relations, i.e. P.R.C. vs Taiwan (Chinese Taipei). Whether Xi Jinping will risk another diplomatic backlash by an open invasion remains to be seen. The jury is out, and one might claim that with the world being focused on the war in Ukraine, China could get away with an invasion of Taiwan. Then, on the other hand, perhaps there is no need for the P.R.C. to unite all territories of China in the imminent future forcefully. At the same time, as it appears at least mid-2023, contrary to Mearsheimer's predictions, Russia and China seem to be getting closer regarding geopolitics and geoeconomics. On February 4th, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chinese President Xi face-to-face. The leaders convened in Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics — and issued a lengthy statement detailing the two nations' shared positions on a range of global issues. The meeting happened shortly before the Russian invasion, and one could surmise that it was supposed to soften the possible adverse reaction from Beijing to the already prepared military operation by the Kremlin since Putin told Xi that Russia had designed a new deal to supply China with an additional 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Consequently, China abstained from a U.N. Security Council vote condemning the Russian invasion (Gerson, 2022). Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770#sel=1:21:S5F,1:37:3jE (Access 18.10.2023) Andrew Krepinevich's Protracted Great-Power War Andrew Krepinevich's “Protracted Great-Power War - A Preliminary Assessment work” published by the Centre for a New American Security, informs us about the American posture. Accordingly, "Now, however, with the rise of revisionist China and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict and how to wage it successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility and hoping for the best." (Krepinevich, 2020) Among many valuable lessons that history can offer, one should remember that no country can wage a systemic war on its own on two fronts, hoping to be successful. Suppose both China and Russia are seen as strategic challengers to the American position in the international system. In that case, it follows logically that the U.S. needs to make one of them at least neutral (appease them) when in conflict with another. Given China's technological, economic, military, or population challenges, the most optimal choice would be to make Russia indifferent to American 'elbowing' in Central Asia or the Middle East vis-à-vis China. The price for such indifference also seems logical, and it is the dominance of the Russo-German tandem in Central and Eastern Europe and German dominance in the E.U. This would explain at least some developments in Europe regarding energy security, particularly President Biden's administration position on Nord Stream 2 and the not-so-much enthusiastic help to Ukraine from Germany. However, recent developments seem to contrast such logical argumentation. President Biden's administration, as well as the leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces, seem to be committed to continuing the financial, technical and logistical support to Ukrainian President Zelensky's government for "as long as it takes" (the term frequently used in official speeches by Antony Blinken – The Secretary of State). According to the U.S. Department of Defence information (as of Feb 21, 2023), the U.S. committed security assistance to Ukraine in the form of 160 Howitzers, 31 Abrams tanks, 111 million rounds of small arms ammunition and four satellite communication antennas, among others. On top of that, Washington committed more than 30.4 billion U.S. dollars (only since the beginning of the Biden Administration) (U. S. Department of Defence, 2023). The U.S. is the leader of the coalition of many nations (54 to be exact) in efforts to counter the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This situation puts Washington in a predicament as, at least in the mediasphere, experts and former policymakers such as the former C.I.A. Director and U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta does not shy away from identifying the existing state of affairs as a "proxy war" between the United States and the Russian Federation (Macmillan, 2022). 2 Importantly, Kremlin has been playing the “proxy war” card for some time in building its narrative regarding the ongoing “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine. But is "Uncle Sam" still in a position to effectively challenge either Russia or China on their own? In 2001, French historian, sociologist, and political scientist Emmanuel Todd claimed that as of the beginning of the 21st century, the United States was no longer a solution to global problems; instead, it became one of the problems (Todd, 2003). The U.S. guaranteed political and economic freedoms for half a century. In contrast, today, they seem to be more and more an agent of international disorder, causing uncertainty and conflicts wherever they can. Given the geopolitical changes after 1989, the U.S. took for granted its position in the international system and decided to extend its interests across the globe. Surprisingly, perhaps for Washington, even traditional U.S. lies started to demand more independence (see the case of Germany and its role in southern Europe.) (Macron's idea of 'strategic autonomy') . 3 “Emmanuel Macron's comments about Taiwan and his call for European "strategic autonomy" sparked controversy as he advocated for the EU not to become followers of the US and China”. This parallels with President de Gaulle earlier calls for European strategic independence from American influence over European security (Lory, 2023). According to Todd, given the actual balance of power globally, the U.S. would have to fulfill two conditions to maintain its hegemonic position. Firstly, it had to continue controlling its protectorates in Europe and Japan. Secondly, it had to finally eliminate Russia from the elite group of 'big powers', which would mean the disintegration of the post-Soviet sphere and the elimination of the nuclear balance of terror. None of these conditions have been met. Not being able to challenge Europe or Japan economically, the U.S. has also been unable to challenge the Russian nuclear position. Consequently, it switched to attacking medium powers such as Iran or Iraq economically, politically, and militarily engaging in 'theatrical militarism'. (Todd, 2003). In contrast to the French historian, American political scientist Joseph Nye claims, "The United States will remain the world's leading military power in the decades to come, and military force will remain an important component of power in global politics." (Ney, 2019, p.70). He goes on to question whether the rise of China is going to spell the end of the American era: "[…] but, contrary to current conventional wisdom, China is not about to replace the United States as the world's largest economy. Measured in 'purchasing power parity' (P.P.P.), the Chinese economy became larger than the U.S. economy in 2014, but P.P.P. is an economists' measure for comparing welfare estimates, not calculating relative power. For example, oil and jet engines are imported at current exchange rates, and by that measure, China has a US$12 trillion economy compared to a US$20 trillion U.S. economy." […] “Power—the ability to affect others to get what you want—has three aspects: coercion, payment, and attraction. Economic might is just part of the geopolitical equation, and even in economic power, while China may surpass America in total size, it will still lag behind in per capita income (a measure of the sophistication of an economy).” (Ney, 2019, p.70). And yet, as of 2023, America's economic components of her might seem to be very quickly eroding. After the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis and the consequent Covid-19 induced economic crisis, there are several woes on the horizon: Inflation has been rampant (that is one of the effects of federal stimulus after Covid-19), which makes the Federal Reserve continue to increase interest rates, making loans more and more expensive (Goldman, 2022). The stock market has been in the "sell-everything mode", which means the investors are losing a lot of money, so their trust in the economy is decreasing. Thirdly, this time around, the investors are not switching to bonds, which seems to confirm the previous point. Fourthly and finally, "none of this is happening in a vacuum. Russia continues its deadly invasion of Ukraine, which has choked off supply chains and sent energy prices through the roof. On top of that, a labour shortage has sent salaries surging and hindered the normal flow of goods worldwide (Goldman, 2022). Worse still, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, some of the key performance indicators regarding international trade are primarily negative (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2023). As of July 2022, experts debated whether the country was in a technical recession, whereas by now (mid-2023), the actual national debt had surpassed 31.46 trillion U.S. dollars (FiscalData.Treasury.gov, 2023). The German-French engine of the European federalization? The economic and political decrease of the U.S. and the parallel increase of China with Russia holding its position or even reclaiming its influence vis-à-vis NATO countries causes significant challenges to European powers and offers some ground-breaking opportunities. In terms of challenges, especially economically, Germany and France, as mentioned before, find themselves in a predicament. The war in Ukraine has changed the European dynamics due to the pressure of the U. S. to support Ukraine and, consequently, the economic sanctions against The Russian Federation. Similarly, France and Germany have not been very happy with the economic sanctions against Russia and have continually tried to play down the possibility of an all-out EU vs Russia conflict. Listening to the speeches of Macron and Scholz, one cannot but hypothesize that Paris and Berlin would be content with the end of the war as soon as possible at any cost, to be born by Ukraine, to be able to come back to “business as usual.” Apparently, in an attempt to "escape forward", both European powers are proposing further steps to generate even more federal dynamics. Conversely, they suggest that concerning Foreign and Security Policy, the still observed voting pattern based on unanimity - one of the last strongholds of sovereignty, should be abolished, and the decisions should follow a qualified majority voting procedure. Notably, such arguments are made, invoking the potential gains for the EU as a geopolitical actor. In other words, countries such as Poland and Hungary would no longer be able to block Paris and Berlin from imposing their interests on the rest of the EU by presenting them as European. According to this vision, Hungary would no longer be able to ‘sympathize’ with Russia, and Poland would no longer be the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the U.S. interests in Europe in their game with Russia. And so, the war in Ukraine presents a perfect circumstance to call for a European federation. Germany has recently publicized such a vision. On August 24, 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz presented a speech at Charles University in Prague regarding his vision of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts, policymakers, and media pundits widely commented on the speech. It starts with an assertion that Russia is the biggest threat to the security of Europe. That fact produces two breakthrough consequences: firstly, Berlin has to pivot from Russia to its European Partners both economically and politically. Secondly, the European Confederation of equal States should morph into a European Federation (The Federal Government, 2022). Scholz’s vision includes four major ‘thoughts’. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition should be made to majority voting in common foreign or tax policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, “we grow more autonomous in all fields; that we assume greater responsibility for our own security; that we work more closely together and stand yet more united in defence of our values and interests around the world.”. In practical terms, Scholz singles out the need for one command and control structure of European defence efforts (European army equipped chiefly by French and German Companies?). Thirdly, the EU should take more responsibility (at the expense of national governments) regarding migration and fiscal policy against the backdrop of the economic crisis induced by Covid-19 pandemic. This, in practical terms, means, according to Scholz, one set of European debt rules to attain a higher level of economic integration. Finally, some disciplining. “We, therefore, cannot stand by when the principles of the rule of law is violated, and democratic oversight is dismantled. Just to make this absolutely clear, there must be no tolerance in Europe for racism and antisemitism. That’s why we are supporting the Commission in its work for the rule of law. Conclusion The war in Ukraine is arguably proof of the region's role in the security and stability of Europe and its economy. Food supplies, mostly various harvests and energy, are a case in point. On top of that, the region has a lot of raw materials. Ukraine has large deposits of 21 of 30 such materials critical in European green transformation (Ukrinform, 2023). Before the war in Ukraine began, in July 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed non less than a strategic partnership on raw materials. The partnership includes three areas from the approximation of policy and regulatory mining frameworks, through a partnership that will engage the European Raw Materials Alliance and the European Battery Alliance to closer collaboration in research and innovation along both raw materials and battery value chains using Horizon Europe (European Commission, Press Release 2021). As for security, in a traditional sense, the U.S. is involved with Ukraine regarding nuclear weapons. In the letter from March 17, 2023, the director of the Energy Department’s Office of Nonproliferation Policy, Andrea Ferkile, tells Rosatom’s director general that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar “contains US-origin nuclear technical data that is export-controlled by the United States Government” (Bertrand, Lister, 2023). Worse still, The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria J. Nuland, admitted in her testimony on Ukraine in the US Congress that, indeed, “Ukraine has biological research facilities, which we are now quite concerned Russian troops, Russian Forces, may be seeking to gain control of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces should they approach” (C-Span, 2022). 4 See more at: https://www.state.gov/energy-security-support-to-ukraine/ (Access 18.10.2023) As Scott and Alcenat claim, the analysis of the competitive policies of each great power confirms the Heartland concept's importance. They project the utility of Mackinder’s analysis to Central Asia, asserting that: “it is valid in today’s foreign policy and policy analyses. Each power strives for control of or access to the region’s resources. For China, the primary goal is to maintain regional stability as a means for border security and assurance of stable economic relations. For the European Union, the main goal is to gain economic access while simultaneously promoting the democratization of those countries that are politically unstable.” (Scott, Alcenat, 2008). 5 Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (retired) - a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert, a former director of the Centre for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defence of China offered a similar evaluation: “the competition between the two giants (U.S.A. and China) will not occur in the Global South, where the US has already lost out to China. At the same time, in the Indo-Pacific, few nations want to take sides. Instead, it will be in Europe, where the U.S. has most of its allies, and China is the largest trading partner” (Bo, 2023). References Bertrand, N. and Lister, T. 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Available at: https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5005055/user-clip-biolabs-confirmed-ukraine (Access 18.10.2023) Dunlop, J. B. (1997) “Aleksandr Dugin's Foundations of Geopolitics.” Stanford. The Europe Centre. Freeman Spogli Institute and Stanford Global Studies. Available at: https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics (Access 18.10.2023) U. S. Department of Defence (2023) Support for Ukraine. Available at: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Support-for-Ukraine/ (Access 18.10.2023) European Commission, Press Release (2021). “EU and Ukraine kick-start strategic partnership on raw materials” 13 July 2021, Available at: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-ukraine-kick-start-strategic-partnership-raw-materials-2021-07-13_en (Access 18.10.2023) FiscalData.Treasury.gov (2023) “What is the national debt?” Available at: https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/ (Access 18.10.2023) Gerson, J. and Klare, M. (2022) “Is ‘Taiwan Next’ No Sign of Sino-Russian Coordination over Ukraine or Preparations an Invasion of Taiwan". Available at: Is "Taiwan Next"? No Sign of Sino-Russian Coordination over Ukraine or Preparations for an Invasion of Taiwan — Committee for a SANE U.S.-China Policy (saneuschinapolicy.org) (Access 18.10.2023) Goldman, D. (2022) “4 reasons the economy looks like it's crumbling — and what to do about it”. May 14, 2022 Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/14/economy/recession-signs/index.html (Access 18.10.2023) Johnson, K and Gramer, R. (2020) “The Great Decoupling” foreignpolicy.com, Available at: http://acdc2007.free.fr/greatdecoupling620.pdf (Access 18.10.2023) Kapo, A. (2021). “Mackinder: Who rules Eastern Europe rules the World.” Institute for Geopolitics, Economy and Security, February 8, 2021. Available at: https://iges.ba/en/geopolitics/mackinder-who-rules-eastern-europe-rules-the-world/ (Access 18.10.2023) Krepinevich, A. Jr. (2020) “Protracted Great-Power War. A Preliminary Assessment”. Available at: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/protracted-great-power-war (Access 18.10.2023) Lory, G. (2023) “Is Macron's idea of 'strategic autonomy' the path to follow for E.U. relations with the U.S.?” Euronews, April 13, 2023. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/04/13/is-macrons-idea-of-strategic-autonomy-the-path-to-follow-for-eu-relations-with-the-us (Access 18.10.2023) Mackinder, H. (1919) Democratic Ideals and Reality. A study in the politics of reconstruction. London: Constable and Company L.T.D. Mackinder, H. (1943) “The round world and the winning of the peace”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 21(2), (July), p. 600. Macmillan, J. (2022) “With NATO and the U.S. in a 'proxy war' with Russia, ex-CIA boss Leon Panetta says Joe Biden's next move is crucial". A.B.C. News, 25.03. Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-25/nato-us-in-proxy-war-with-russia-biden-next-move-crucial/100937196 (Access 18.10.2023) Mearsheimer, J. (2013) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norhon & Company 2nd Edition. National Security of the United States of America (2017) The White House: Washington. Available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf (Access 18.10.2023) Ney, J. S. Jr. (2019) “The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump.” International Affairs Vol 95(1), pp. 63-80 Osborn, A. (2022) “Russia's Putin authorises 'special military operation' against Ukraine.” Reuters, 24.02. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/ (Access 18.10.2023) Scott, M and Alcenat, W. (2008) “Revisiting the Pivot: The Influence of Heartland Theory in Great Power Politics.” Macalester College, 09.05. Available at: https://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/CCAS/departments/PoliticalScience/MVJ/docs/The_Pivot_-_Alcenat_and_Scott.pdf (Access 18.10.2023) Sloan, G. (2017) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History. London: Routledge. Soldatkin, V. and Aizhu, Ch. (2022) “Putin hails $117.5 bln of China deals as Russia squares off with West.” Reuters, 04.02. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-tells-xi-new-deal-that-could-sell-more-russian-gas-china-2022-02-04/ (Access 18.10.2023) The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, 29 August 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752 (Access 18.10.2023) Todd, E. (2003) Schyłek imperium. Rozważania o rozkładzie systemu amerykańskiego. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog. Ukrinform (2023) Ukraine has deposits of 21 raw materials critical to EU Available at: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3280369-maasikas-ukraine-has-deposits-of-21-raw-materials-critical-to-eu.html (Access 18.10.2023)

Diplomacy
June 10, 2024 Washington DC President Joe Biden hosted the 10th Juneteenth celebration, which Vice President Kamala Harris

Joe Biden faces the record of his foreign policy

by Romuald Sciora

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After his visit to France, which is taking place these days, a crucial NATO summit, scheduled in Washington from July 9 to 11, awaits the American president, who, soon to end his term, must face the sad record of his foreign policy. Obviously, if we compare him to Trump, who was nothing but chaos and incompetence, there is no comparison. Nevertheless, if we are somewhat honest, we must recognize that the Biden years, as far as international affairs are concerned, will have been cruel. Cruel for America, which will have seen its influence diminish even more, and for the Western bloc in general, dragged along by it, to which the global South has ceased to give credit, in particular because of the double standards practiced in Gaza and Ukraine. The first major error was to condition the return of the United States to the Iranian nuclear agreement on Iran's strict compliance with the terms of 2015 and on new negotiations on ballistic missiles. While it was the United States that unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Vienna nuclear deal with Iran, under the Trump administration in 2018, leading Iran to increase its uranium enrichment and reduce its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it would have been more adroit for the Biden administration to make a gesture of goodwill towards Tehran by first returning to the agreement before making its legitimate demands. This would have changed nothing in substance, but everything in form, and we might not be here today. As imperfect as the agreement wanted by Obama was, and as unpleasant as the Mullahs' regime is, the JCPOA at least had the merit of having stabilized the region somewhat. Joe Biden's second mistake in international policy, this one of historic magnitude, of course concerns Ukraine. Readers of these correspondences know that, as the son of a Ukrainian woman and with family not far from the front line of the Minsk agreements, I condemned the illegal invasion led by Putin, a mafia president if ever there was one, on February 24, 2022. They may also remember that I pleaded, at the beginning of the war, for a “muscular” response from NATO, namely the creation of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, as Zelensky had requested. This was, in my opinion, the only way to calm things down and bring the Russian president, whose army had proven incapable of reaching kyiv, to the negotiating table. This is not the option that Washington has chosen. Instead, it has decided to arm the Ukrainian forces and push them to continue and continue a war that they will probably, and unfortunately, not be able to win, neither in the short term nor in the medium term – the long term does not exist since they will probably be abandoned by America by then –, due to a lack of sufficient men and equipment. Since we knew that without the risky deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian soil, which would probably have led to a new world war, the battle was lost in advance, it was irresponsible not to invite Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate when, in the fall of 2022, Ukraine found itself, if not in a position of strength, at least in a favorable position in the Donbass. A missed opportunity that may not come again. The Ukrainian defeat that seems to be looming would therefore not only be that of Kiev, but also that of the policy of an American president trapped in the prism of the Cold War. This policy, devoid of strategy, will have consisted largely of waging a proxy war with Russia, without any precise objective, other than that of pushing Ukraine to fight until an improbable “final victory”. Finally, third and fourth significant errors: the visionless approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adopted by the 46th President of the United States throughout his term, who has never really tried to relaunch the peace process and the two-state solution, as well as his lack of consistency in his relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he nevertheless detests. A lack of consistency that led Joe Biden and his entourage to condemn the massacres committed by the IDF in the Gaza Strip while providing it with the weapons necessary to perpetrate them and which forced the United States to build an artificial port at more than 320 million dollars in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gazans, because Israel subjects land access points to drastic controls. Other inconsistencies in current American diplomacy could be noted, such as the sanctions against Cuba, decided by Trump and maintained by his successor, who, however, when he was vice-president, had been at the origin of the resumption of relations with Havana. But the image that will remain indelibly attached to Biden's international policy, and which will have set the tone for the majority of Americans, is the debacle in Kabul in August 2021. Biden is obviously not responsible for the Afghan disaster as a whole, but this unprecedented rout of American power is his work and bears his signature. While nothing was forcing the United States into haste, it was he who stubbornly clung to the August 31 date to conclude the American withdrawal negotiated by his predecessor. This chaotic end was then perceived as a humiliating defeat, revealing the failure of American foreign policy and the mismanagement of conflicts. Paralyzed in front of their screens, the American people saw their military power, a power that they were told was unparalleled in human history, thwarted by "peasants armed with Kalashnikovs and riding mopeds," to quote a television commentator. Joe Biden is a sincere man, full of good intentions, but a man who is definitely a prisoner of the past and therefore overwhelmed by the geopolitical challenges of today's world. In the Ukrainian crisis, he has led America and its allies into a deadlock, while his adversaries have consolidated a Sino-Russian bloc, allied with North Korea and Iran, and supported by South Africa, as well as many other states around the world, perhaps even India. The November election will obviously not be played out on the international stage, but this theme will nevertheless be present in the debates. Joe Biden will then find himself confronted with a record that few of his predecessors suffered while campaigning for re-election. To find a similar situation, we have to go back to the time of Jimmy Carter.

Diplomacy
Burning EU Flag

One step closer to the normalization of the far right

by Jaime Bordel Gil

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском More than a “before and after”, these elections represent a new chapter in the progressive integration of the far right into European politics. On the night of June 9th, the polls for the much-feared 2024 European elections closed. These were the elections of a change of cycle, the breakthrough of the far right, or the end of the grand coalition. In the end, it wasn’t as dramatic as expected, and the worst predictions of a possible right-wing majority did not come true. It is true that the earthquake some predicted did not occur, but for some time now, the tectonic plates of the EU have been moving in the same direction. The far right improved its results for the fifth consecutive time, which should not leave anyone indifferent. The grand coalition will not break, and the European institutions will not collapse due to the far-right tremor. However, for some time now, the European foundations have been shaking due to a far-right tectonic movement that could eventually bring the house down. The far right is growing, but it’s not taking over If we look at the results at the European level, beyond the respective victories in France and Italy, it seems that the far right is not growing as much as expected. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) of Giorgia Meloni gain four seats but do not surpass the Renew Liberals, who lose 22 seats but remain the third-largest group with 80 MEPs. Identity and Democracy (ID), the group of Le Pen and Salvini, gains slightly more, nine seats, but with 58 seats, it remains the fifth-largest group in the chamber and sees its growth hampered by the departure of Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would have brought it a whopping 15 MEPs. These numbers may vary slightly, and if some deputies currently among the non-affiliated, like Viktor Orbán's Fidesz, are incorporated, the ECR could become the third-largest group ahead of the liberals. However, this would not significantly alter the majorities in the European Parliament, where the grand coalition between the conservatives, social democrats, and liberals will continue to govern the main EU policies. Nevertheless, the European People's Party (EPP) will have a bargaining tool with its partners: the possibility of blocking certain laws by making agreements with the far right. The combined seats of the conservatives and radical right-wing parties are not enough to form an alternative majority that, as Giorgia Meloni intends, would exclude the social democrats. However, the 184 MEPs from the EPP, together with the two far-right groups, could be sufficient to block legislation on key issues such as the green transition. Additionally, around thirty non-affiliated deputies also hold far-right positions (15 from AfD, 11 from Fidesz, and three from Alvise), further complicating the EU's green and social agenda. The radical right will not bring down the European structure for now, but its influence will increase in this new period. They do not yet have the strength to cause everything to collapse, but election after election, their ideas continue to permeate the European agenda. In the previous legislature, they already made their mark on key legislation such as the European Migration Pact, where despite voting against many motions, Jorge Buxadé managed to become the rapporteur for one of them related to the creation of a biometric database of irregular immigrants. This five-year term will likely start with a prominent commissioner chosen by the far-right, and with Giorgia Meloni seated on the European Council, they will have much more to say than in 2019. We shall see where it ends. More than a "before and after," these elections represent another chapter in the progressive normalization and integration of the far-right into European politics. Their ideas are here to stay, and although they do not yet have the capacity to lead majorities or elect presidents of the Parliament or the European Commission, they are managing to alter the frameworks of numerous debates, such as immigration and the green transition. This is the real danger, and this election reinforces that we continue to discuss these issues in the terms desired by Meloni, Orban, or Le Pen. Bipartisanship resists Another point that I believe needs to be highlighted about this election is that bipartisanship is holding up better than many expected. While it's true that the heyday of the two major political families adding up to over 400 members will never return, for the first time since 2004, the People's Party and the Socialists have not lost seats together, breaking a trend that seemed irreversible. The EPP gained nine seats, winning the elections in three of the five most populous states: Germany, Spain, and Poland. The Social Democrats obtained 137 seats, slightly below the 139 they had in the previous legislature, avoiding the drop predicted by almost all polls. The Liberals and Greens, on the other hand, have collapsed, each losing about twenty seats. As I was saying, the heyday of social democratic hegemony passed long ago, but beyond the endurance of the Iberian social democracy — the only ones alongside the Cypriots to independently exceed 30% — there are some good signs that suggest this family may be moderately satisfied. In France and Greece, two paradigmatic examples of the crisis in this space, Pasok and PSF, which seemed long defunct, are now vying for leadership in opposition again. In Italy, the Democratic Party (DP), despite insufficient results, has outplayed the 5 Star Movement in the opposition, solidifying its position as the main opposition force to Giorgia Meloni's government. And in the Netherlands, a coalition with the Greens has managed to surpass the ultra-right Geert Wilders. It's evident that the current situation for social democrats is not ideal, but if we look back ten years, many parties that seemed on the brink of disappearance have recovered and could even become a government alternative in a few years. This directly links to the crisis of an alternative left that in many European countries has shifted from being a viable alternative to a minority space. In France and Spain, these spaces that once made socialists tremble now find themselves divided and subordinate. In Greece, Syriza remains the second force, but in 2019 it led the center-left by 15 points and one million votes, a difference that has now been reduced to just 2%. In northern Europe, things seem to be going a bit better as the green left, formerly the Socialist People's Party, has won the elections in Denmark, while in Finland, the Left Alliance — a member of The Left — is the second force with 17% of the votes. Interestingly, this is where the far-right has fallen the most, being the sixth force in Finland, fourth in Sweden, and ninth in Denmark. These results provide a glimmer of hope and show to the left in other regions a path to defeat the far-right. This is the landscape we find ourselves in. In the face of a far-right that is gradually gaining power and influence in Europe, the only ones seeming to withstand the far-right surge are the two traditional families, the EPP and the Social Democrats. The former, increasingly unabashed in their alliances with the radical right, remain committed to drawing a distinction between the "good" ultras, such as the Atlanticists like Meloni and Poland's Law and Justice Party, and the "bad" ultras, who are anti-European and aligned with Putin, like the AfD or Salvini. This distinction allows them to present agreements with parties that have repeatedly shown scant respect for human rights as respectable. And the latter, either through action or omission of others, have managed to weather the storm following the 2008 crisis and remain in many countries as the alternative to far-right governance. Who would have thought this ten years ago when many were signing the death warrant for social democratic parties. This is the Europe that remains. The rise of far-right influence and the consolidation of bipartisanship are the two main headlines of a night that will go down in history more for Macron's advancement than for immediate repercussions on Union governance, where everything will continue more or less the same. No earthquakes, but with tectonic shifts that may one day bring everything crashing down. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

Defense & Security
Shenzhen, Guangdong, China - Apr 27 2023: A China Coast Guard boat is cruising on the sea.

Philippines: Calming Tensions in the South China Sea

by International Crisis Group

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group”Tensions between China and the Philippines are increasing the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2024 – Spring Update, Crisis Group looks at how the EU can support regional diplomacy to mitigate maritime disputes. Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea and the dangers it would pose to global trade. Several countries are implicated in the set of complex sovereignty disputes in the sea, which stem from rival claims to various features and the maritime entitlements they generate, but recent incidents involving Beijing and Manila have triggered the greatest concern. The Philippines controls nine outposts in the Spratlys, a contested group of land and maritime features at the heart of the South China Sea. A submerged reef known as Second Thomas Shoal has become a dangerous flashpoint, with Chinese boats continually trying to block Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship housing a handful of soldiers that a former Philippine government purposely grounded in 1999 in a bid to assert sovereignty over the atoll. China, which also claims the shoal, first started interfering with these missions in 2014, but relations between the two countries in the maritime domain have never been as volatile as during the last seven months. Chinese boats have regularly rammed the Philippine supply vessels or doused them with water cannons, occasionally wounding the sailors on board. Manila has a Mutual Defence Treaty with Washington, making this burgeoning maritime dispute part of the geopolitical competition between the U.S and China. In effect, the South China Sea has become a zone where conflict risks are rife – and where Washington and Beijing could be drawn into direct confrontation. Considering these developments, the EU and its member states should: • Seek greater diplomatic engagement with both Beijing and Manila to keep tensions in check. They should also expand their diplomatic presence across South East Asia and, where relevant, establish reliable channels through which they could communicate with high-level authorities in China and other claimant states should disputes at sea escalate; • Work to promote respect for international law, particularly the law of the sea, as a source of neutral rules for dispute resolution and conflict prevention, for example by organising public events, roundtables and dialogues in Manila and elsewhere. While this measure may not bridge the divides between Manila and Beijing, it could at least help establish a level of mutual support and understanding among the other South China Sea claimant states; and • Strengthen coast guard cooperation with the Philippines, focusing on building capacity in areas such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. Troubled Waters The sovereignty disputes that underpin the tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea go back decades. But it was Beijing’s manoeuvres to take control of Mischief Reef (in the east of the Spratlys) from Manila in 1995 that altered the perceived balance of power between the two states and in the region, setting off the territorial dispute that has now taken a turn for the worse. China’s assertiveness in the sea has grown in the past few years, along with its military capabilities. The brewing territorial dispute made headlines in 2012 when Beijing in effect took control of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll 220km west of the Philippine mainland but within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), after a maritime altercation. The incident prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to file a case challenging China’s territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On 12 July 2016, the presiding arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of Manila, dismissing China’s claim to all the waters within its “nine-dash line”, which constitute almost the entire South China Sea. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. Beijing not only rejected the adjudication and the subsequent ruling, but it had also already undercut efforts to settle the dispute through legal channels by building and fortifying seven artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was winding its way through the system. This move fundamentally changed the status quo, enabling Beijing to post permanent garrisons in the area for the first time. By many accounts, China has thus ensured itself control of the sea in any situation below the threshold of armed conflict. A short lull in the maritime dispute appeared to follow. After coming to power in 2016, Aquino’s successor, Rodrigo Duterte, pursued a pragmatic policy toward Beijing. Duterte downplayed the tribunal’s decision and cast sovereignty issues aside, hoping to benefit from Beijing’s economic largesse in exchange. Yet his ambitious gambit did not pay off. Tensions at sea continued in the form of regular standoffs between the country’s coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fisherfolk struggled to reach their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the precious oil and gas reserves within its EEZ to which it is entitled under international law. In March 2021, Chinese ships massed around Whitsun Reef, an unoccupied feature in the sea, ringing alarm bells in Manila, where senior officials voiced public criticism of China’s behaviour for the first time in years. By the end of the Duterte administration, the Philippines had revived its ties with the U.S. and become more assertive still, filing several diplomatic protests with the Chinese government. Elected in 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Duterte’s successor, was initially disposed toward friendly relations with Beijing, but the relationship soured only a few months into his presidency. Although China remains the Philippines’ top trading partner, Marcos, Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping did not achieve the desired results: Beijing neither agreed to make major new investments nor curtailed its “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea, understood as coercive actions that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. These rebuffs have helped push Marcos, Jr. toward strengthening ties with Washington, and the Biden administration has, on several occasions, publicly committed that the countries’ Mutual Defence Treaty would be deemed triggered in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft or public vessels. In perhaps the most significant recent development, after a series of high-level visits by U.S. officials to Manila, the two countries agreed to scale up implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which gives U.S. troops rotational expanded access to Philippine military bases, and which China perceives as a provocation, especially given these bases’ proximity not just to the South China Sea but also to Taiwan. Manila has also received defence and diplomatic support from a host of other countries, particularly Japan and Australia. Despite the dispute it has with Vietnam over parts of the South China Sea, it has engaged, more quietly, with Hanoi, and acquired maritime defence equipment from India, thus expanding its circle of partners. Joint naval exercises with various countries have included large-scale ones with the U.S. in April, which involved the deployment of missiles that can reach targets almost 1,600km away – something that was sure to draw Beijing’s attention – and took place just after Manila wound up its first-ever trilateral presidential summit with Washington and Tokyo. In the meantime, the Marcos, Jr. administration has pursued what it calls a “transparency initiative”, publicising information about maritime incidents by inviting journalists to join its coast guard ships or posting video recordings of events almost as they are happening. Dramatic footage of Chinese vessels blocking, ramming or attacking its resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal with water cannons has generated widespread condemnation in the Philippines and abroad. Many consider these tactics to be bullying. For its part, and despite the 2016 ruling, Beijing asserts that Manila is intruding into its waters and maintains that it is demonstrating maximum restraint. China has also recently referred to a so-called gentleman’s agreement under former President Duterte that it says foresaw preserving a status quo in the South China Sea, with Manila ostensibly agreeing to supply only humanitarian goods and no construction materials to the BRP Sierra Madre; Manila denies that there was any such arrangement. Given the Philippines’ determination to continue resupplying its troops on the BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal will likely remain a flashpoint. Due to the constraints imposed at sea by the Chinese maritime militia and coast guard, Manila is starting to look into other means of provisioning its outpost, some of which are likely to irk Beijing even more, such as airdrops or closer U.S. naval escorts. In September 2023, a U.S. plane was in the shoal’s vicinity during a resupply mission, while a U.S. warship passed through waters nearby in December. But the shoal is not the only possible source of tension. Chinese vessels, both official and non-official, sail through many areas where Philippine fisherfolk traditionally work, while other features, such as Scarborough Shoal, are also points of friction. A large-scale encounter or accident at sea could be especially dangerous. Should a Filipino or Chinese national die during such a confrontation, it could stir nationalist sentiments in Manila and Beijing and heighten threat perceptions on both sides. In case of loss of life on the Philippine side, Manila would expect its U.S. ally to assist under the Mutual Defence Treaty, especially given the recent exchanges with Washington on that topic, although the U.S. has not said precisely how it would come to the Philippines’ aid. How such a dangerous situation would evolve depends in large part on Manila’s political decision to invoke the treaty and the choices Washington makes about how to fulfill its commitments. In principle, Beijing and Manila remain open to negotiations. But the bilateral consultative mechanism, a confidence-building measure designed in 2017 to manage maritime issues between the two countries, among other things, has generated no results of note. Meanwhile, efforts to create a Code of Conduct, which aims to reduce tensions at sea by setting up norms and rules between claimants and has been under discussion between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for over two decades, have stagnated. Why the Sea Matters The South China Sea is a vital waterway through which around one third of global shipping passes. Peace and stability in the sea are a prerequisite for safe trade and are demonstrably in the interest of the EU and its member states. At over 40 per cent, the share of the EU’s trade with the rest of the world transiting the sea is even higher than the global average. Instability in the area would deal a major blow to the European economy; even a slight disturbance of shipping routes could result in higher transport costs, shipping delays and acute product shortages. Should there be an escalation that pits China against the U.S. in a direct conflict, the consequences could be catastrophic and global. European positions toward South China Sea disputes have traditionally highlighted the importance of all parties respecting international law and the need for peaceful resolution, while being careful not to take sides. But over the last few years, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have driven a greater sense of urgency and something of a shift in European thinking. First, the EU and several of its member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies, designed to guide and promote cooperation with countries throughout the region. Secondly, Brussels has increased its diplomatic support for the Philippine position following maritime altercations, offering supportive statements in December 2023 and March 2024. Brussels and several European capitals now back Manila in regularly underlining the importance of UNCLOS and maritime law in the South China Sea context. Meanwhile, Europe’s presence in the region is growing, if slowly and in part symbolically. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific for the first time, while European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first trip to the Philippines by someone holding that office and an opportunity to express, at the highest level, the EU’s readiness to strengthen cooperation with the government in maritime security, among other areas. A German frigate entered the South China Sea in 2021, and French and Italian ships made port calls in Manila in 2023. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines agreed to resume negotiations over a free trade agreement, while a month later France announced talks regarding a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. While EU interest in the region is rising, European stances on the South China Sea are complex, with member states harbouring different views on maritime disputes in the region and, more broadly, on big-power competition. Some, such as France – which is the only EU member state to have overseas territories in the region (and which has significant EEZ interests there) – see themselves as having stakes higher than others and are keen to participate in the region’s discussions on security. Others, such as Greece and Hungary, are less concerned with maritime flare-ups so far away and tend to ascribe greater importance to maintaining good relations with Beijing. What the EU and Its Member States Can Do As the EU and its most powerful member states are drawn deeper into the South China Sea, they should raise their diplomatic game in the region – both to ensure awareness of mounting tensions and to look for ways to manage corresponding risks. As a practical matter, Brussels could leverage its status as an ASEAN Strategic Partner to seek more participation in that bloc’s security mechanisms and regional forums; the EU and member states could seek higher levels of engagement with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea on matters concerning the South China Sea; and Europe could post more diplomats to the region, including permanent defence attachés who speak the language of naval diplomacy. Of particular importance will be maintaining strong lines of communication with Beijing, where Europe is seen as still having some distance from the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which works to its diplomatic advantage. While to some extent this communication will be traditional bilateral statecraft, it may also mean looking for new opportunities and new channels for dialogue. For example, some member states could also seek to follow the precedent set by France and China in establishing a coordination and deconfliction mechanism between their militaries. Brussels should also continue raising the South China Sea in its engagement with Beijing as it did during the EU-China summit in 2023. Maintaining these channels will become both more difficult and more important if and when the EU and member states expand their operational presence in the region – for example, if they decide to establish a calibrated maritime presence in the South China Sea, as proposed by the EU envoy to the Indo-Pacific. Such a move is still deemed unlikely for now. As for public diplomacy, Brussels and EU member states should consider practical ways to promote principles of the law of the sea in the region, making the case that broader regional support for and adherence to these principles would provide neutral ground for peacefully avoiding and resolving disputes. While it is hard to see this approach appealing to Beijing, which has rebuffed the UNCLOS tribunal’s decision, there could still be benefits in forging closer cooperation among other claimant states. Convenings in Manila and other regional capitals could cover topics related to the continuing disputes but also to cross-cutting themes of regional interest such as fisheries. With negotiations over a regional Code of Conduct stuck, like-minded countries in the region could use these occasions to at least develop common positions on discrete issues that might be addressed by the Code or that could foster regional confidence-building in the South China Sea. Finally, in the realm of capacity building, European governments should continue to strengthen coast guard cooperation with South China Sea claimant states, helping them develop tools and protocols that might be used where appropriate to avoid confrontation and conflict. Since Aquino’s administration, Manila has tried to boost its coast guard capabilities. Given that many of the other claimant states’ vessels in the South China Sea are coast guard ships, and find themselves embroiled in maritime confrontations, a common approach on rules of engagement could help avoid misunderstandings at sea. Building on the EU’s integrated coast guard system, the EU could host or sponsor joint workshops to develop operating principles for the region’s law enforcement vessels and exchange best practices with Philippine authorities. Brussels could also fund agencies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen coast guard expertise on issues such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. European member states could also participate in joint activities with the Philippine and other ASEAN coast guards to strengthen fisheries control and maritime border protection and deter piracy or smuggling.

Diplomacy
Putin and Kim

Ukraine recap: Putin love-in with Kim Jong-un contrasts with western disarray over peace plan

by Jonathan Este

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Hotfoot from signing a security pact with North Korea on Wednesday, Vladimir Putin has popped up in Vietnam, another of the few remaining countries where the Russian president is still welcome (or doesn’t face arrest under the war crimes warrant issued by the International Criminal Court last year). Here he was congratulated by the president, To Lam, for his election victory earlier this year and for maintaining stability and continuity in Russia. Putin, meanwhile, made much of the Soviet Union’s historical support for the Vietnamese people’s struggle for independence and unity from the 1950s to the 1970s, referring, without a hint of irony, to Vietnam’s “heroic struggle against foreign invaders”. The visit has been billed as part of Putin’s strategy to promote a new “multipolar” world order, free from US control. But it should be noted that the pragmatic Vietnamese have already hosted Joe Biden and Xi Jinping over the past nine months. Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy” depends on the country being “actively neutral” – with one eye on China, Vietnam has also upgraded relations with the US, Australia and South Korea in recent times. So, while there will be plenty of expressions of goodwill from Vietnam’s leadership, they are less likely to commit to anything more concrete as things stand. North Korea knows little of such diplomatic niceties, though, and has fewer choices when it comes to its friends. Very little detail has emerged of the new pact with Russia, except that it would require each country to come to the aid of the other if attacked. But it’s likely that close to the top of the agenda would have been Russia’s military requirements. North Korea’s supplies of artillery and ammunition are thought to have been vital in helping Russia overcome the harsh sanctions imposed by the US as well as Beijing’s unwillingness to directly provide arms for the war in Ukraine. Kim, in turn, wants Russian know-how when it comes to sophisticated military tech as well as economic support when it comes to feeding his country’s starving population. But warm relations between the two countries is nothing new. Official pronouncements emphasised the “traditionally friendly and good” relations between Russia and North Korea “based on the glorious traditions of common history”. For Kim, writes Robert Barnes, a senior lecturer in history at York St John University, this is something of a family affair which harks back to the 1930s when the North Korean leader’s grandfather Kim Il-sung was a relatively unknown Korean communist leading a small guerrilla band fighting the Japanese in Manchuria. Kim spent much of the second world war in the Soviet Union, where he joined the Red Army and rose to the rank of major. After the conflict, he was handpicked by Stalin to lead the Korean Workers’ party and then North Korea when it was established in 1948. The Korean war which followed almost led to a nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the west. Hopefully, concludes Barnes, nothing as dramatic will result from this latest iteration of the relationship between the two countries. But pariah states such as North Korea aren’t the only countries where Putin can command a degree of support, if the recent European parliamentary elections are any guide. As Natasha Lindstaedt notes here, the rise of the far right in EU member states such as Germany, France, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria is throwing up an increasingly powerful group that stands in opposition to EU support for Ukraine. It may seem counterintuitive that such an avowed anti-fascist as Putin is courting extreme right organisations such as Germany’s Alternative for Deutschland party (AfD) or Hungary’s Fidesz party. But Lindstaedt believes that leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán have shown little concern for the institutions of democracy – as shown by Hungary’s adoption of a similar foreign agents’ law which acts to curtail press freedom and the work of NGOs. She concudes: “Putin is seen by the far right as a strong and conservative leader that can defend himself against the liberal west, which is trying to undermine these values.” The west, meanwhile, remains divided over the manner and extent of its support for Ukraine. The good news for Kyiv is that the recent G7 meeting in Puglia, southern Italy, ended in an in-principle agreement to use the US$3 billion (£2.36 billion) interest from US$350 billion of Russian assets frozen in the western banking system to underwrite a US$50 billion loan to Ukraine. But Gregory Stiles and Hugo Dobson, experts in international relations at the University of Sheffield, sound a cautionary note suggesting that the details of how this will work are likely to take months to agree. Meanwhile, they write, five of the seven leaders – US president Joe Biden, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Canada’s Justin Trudeau, the UK’s Rishi Sunak and Japan’s Fumio Kishida – all face elections this year which none of them are guaranteed to survive. And, to take just one example, if Biden loses in November to Donald Trump, the likelihood of this deal proceeding becomes significantly reduced. Summit on peace Many of these leaders went on to Switzerland at the weekend for the Summit on Peace in Ukraine. Stefan Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham, was following proceedings and concludes that it’s hard to judge the meeting an unqualified success. Out of 160 countries and international organisations invited, only 92 attended. Biden was a no-show and Canada’s premier, Justin Trudeau, was the only G7 leader to stay for both days of the conference. The main problem, writes Wolff, was that the only peace plan on the table was that proposed some time ago by Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. This calls for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, including Crimea, and the payment of reparations for rebuilding his country. Seven other peace plans, proposed by the likes of China (which also failed to send anyone), Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, a group of African states led by South Africa and the Vatican were not discussed. Most of these call for a ceasefire, which is anathema to Kyiv and its backers in the US and UK, as it would accept, for the time being at least, Russia’s territorial gains on the ground, including the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Putin, meanwhile, was trolling hard from the sidelines, releasing his terms for a ceasefire deal, which are for Ukraine to accept Russian annexation of Crimea and not just the land his troops currently occupy, but all of the four regions he annexed in September 2022. Putin’s column As previously noted here, a season of relative success on the battlefield, has left Putin in a bullish mood. It emerged recently that (despite being seriously disadvantaged by the war in Ukraine and the harsh western sanctions which have ensued) the boss of Russian energy giant plans to build an 80-metre column in St Petersburg to commemorate Peter the Great’s triumph in the great northern war, after which Russia declared itself to be an empire for the first time. As George Gilbert, an expert in Russian history at University of Southampton notes, anything honouring Peter the Great is a sure-fire way of buttering up the Russian president, who sees himself as a latter-day incarnation of the man who built his home town of St Petersburg, glossing over the fact that Peter saw his capital as a way of making Russia more of a west-facing country. Gilbert gives us some historical context about the conflict, in which Russia lined up alongside much of what would become Poland and Germany as well as Britain, by virtue of its king, George I, also being the ruler of Hanover. The key battle, he writes, was at Poltava, which is in the middle of what is now Ukraine, which involved defeating a crack regiment of Cossack cavalry, which you’d have to imagine is very much grist to Putin’s mill. One suspects, though, that it’s Peter the Great’s imperial achievements that Putin wants to emulate most of all.

Energy & Economics
USA and China trade war concept. suitable also as South China Sea conflict

Are tariffs, of all things, the salvation of free trade?

by Jan Cernicky

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском We can talk about selective tariffs - but not about protective tariffs - Concerns about the effects of economic dependencies are increasingly overshadowing the benefits of open global trade. - In the current geopolitically charged situation, there may be situations in which trade policy dependencies - for example in the case of rare earths - can be mitigated by state intervention. - In such cases, selective tariffs are the best choice. Subsidies to build up own production capacities are significantly less efficient, more expensive and undermine the market principle. - Protective tariffs for industries whose products are sufficiently available on the global market, such as the automotive and steel industries, should be rejected. - The fundamental goal should be the preservation of rule-based world trade in accordance with WTO rules. Any kind of state intervention must be justified on the basis of solid data. Background During Chinese party leader Xi Jinping's visit to Europe in May, there was once again a lot of talk about economic dependencies. They are seen as a threat to the "economic security" of Germany and Europe. What often seems to fade into the background is that the arguments for a global division of labor remain valid: it enables general prosperity precisely because certain countries and regions concentrate on the production of individual goods and consequently do not produce others themselves. On the other hand, it is also true that the economic damage more than compensates for these advantages if a state such as China uses economic dependencies as political leverage and, in the worst case, stops supplying goods for which it has a monopoly. In principle, China has achieved such a monopoly for refined rare earths and some other smelted metals.1 However, this clearly does not apply to electric cars, steel or solar cells. The reason for such quasi-monopolies is simple: Chinese companies export the products in question so cheaply that production elsewhere in the world is not worthwhile. If this were solely due to the fact that Chinese companies produce better, the only correct response would be to roll up our sleeves and become better ourselves. In the case of rare earths from China, however, the advantage of Chinese manufacturers is largely due to direct and indirect subsidies. In such an environment, in which Chinese producers have massive cost advantages due to politically granted benefits, it is not worthwhile for private companies outside China to build up their own capacities for the production of rare earths, for example. Even if prices were to rise and economic production were possible, this would not be rational; state-supported Chinese companies can easily survive periods of low prices. The usual market mechanism, whereby companies with the most competitive solutions survive, does not apply here. Even technologically superior production methods do not prevail due to Chinese subsidies. Possible reactions The best economic solution is undoubtedly for the state not to react at all and to see the availability of very cheap products that are available for domestic consumption or for further processing as an advantage. The fact that the products in question have been made cheaper by Chinese taxpayers' money can be gratefully accepted. It would be a genuine and courageous system competition not to respond with the same instruments, but to maintain a market economy system and thus exploit the weaknesses of the counter-design. Shaping the economic framework conditions politically in such a way that innovations that provide alternatives to the use of the raw materials in question can be developed more easily would be a reaction that is still justifiable within the framework of the social market economy. This would be, for example, favorable recycling processes. In most cases, such innovations are possible. However, their introduction and application is significantly more expensive than importing standard products from China. If dependence on China is really not justifiable in individual cases,2 there are two possibilities for state intervention in the form of subsidies or tariffs, which may be justifiable in rare individual cases, but are not provided for within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Important indicators for the assessment of dependencies are, for example, the lack of substitutability of the imported good, the degree of concentration of supply in a country and the relevance of the good in question for the domestic economy. However, state intervention to protect domestic production sites, such as is being discussed for electric cars or steel, appears to be explicitly unjustifiable. There is a sufficiently diversified supply of such products on the global market and there is no dependency on just one country. Economic effects of tariffs and subsidies Tariffs and subsidies both aim to compensate for the price difference to cheaper foreign competitors. Tariffs make imports more expensive, while subsidies make domestic production cheaper through state subsidies. Both have a negative welfare effect, but the correlation is more harmful in the case of subsidies. Figure 1 uses a schematic example, which is not based on empirical data, to illustrate the effect if the costs of producing rare earths in Germany were reduced to the level of the import price from China (country 1) through subsidies.   With the subsidies, it is now economically viable for the subsidized companies to produce the rare earths from ore in Germany. The actually cheaper ways of importing rare earths from alternative countries or using other technical solutions remain more expensive and would hardly be used. The goal of reducing dependencies would therefore be achieved in a very expensive way. Large sums of taxpayers' money would be spent on this. In this example, the most expensive possible route is discussed in order to clearly demonstrate the negative consequences. In reality, however, it is very unlikely that the cheapest route in economic terms will be subsidized. This is because there are always many different providers and technical solutions, which means that all the options are often not even known or can only develop in the long term. It is therefore very unlikely that the optimal subsidy recipients will be selected. A benefit is created for a specific, relatively arbitrarily selected application, but not for others. The effectiveness of the market is thus distorted and the competitiveness of the location decreases as a result. As the subsidies compensate for a competitive disadvantage, it is unlikely that high additional tax revenues will be generated. The funds spent are no longer available for other state investments. The result is a loss of welfare on this scale. Only the subsidized companies benefit from this. The price at which rare earths can be purchased in Germany does not change. It is also possible to subsidize production abroad in order to reduce dependence on one country. Such models are being attempted via "raw material partnerships", for example. Such an approach can be significantly cheaper than subsidizing domestic production. In the example (Figure 1), only the significantly lower import price from country 2 would have to be subsidized. However, the other disadvantages of subsidies listed above also apply in this case. In particular, it is even more difficult to obtain all the necessary information for projects abroad and therefore even less likely to choose the most cost-effective option. The targeted tariffs discussed here are intended to respond to dependencies on supplies from a specific country. They are therefore only imposed on imports from this country. Other imports are not affected. To stay with the example, the importer pays a surcharge on the imported rare earths. This makes his product, for which he processes rare earths, more expensive domestically. Manufacturers abroad who are not affected by the duty become more competitive in comparison.    If the tariff rate were set in the same way as above so that the competitive disadvantage for the most expensive option - metal processing in Germany - is compensated for in terms of price, the tariff rate on imports from China would be very high. However, consumers of rare earths in Germany would still have access to the significantly cheaper other options. Metal processing in Germany would therefore remain unprofitable, while imports - now no longer from China, but from country 2 - would continue to be significantly cheaper. However, the price difference to the cheapest processing variant in Germany, in the example (Figure 2) recycling, would no longer be so great, so that this variant would be easier to make economically viable by scaling up or using innovative technical solutions. In reality, the introduction of customs duties would not divert all procurement to a single country; there is no capacity for this anywhere. The result would be a mix of different suppliers, which would make it more worthwhile to drive innovation in Germany. Changes in the price structure between the different providers and processes over time can be tracked by customers in this model - the best process (or the second best, if the best is used in China) then prevails on the market. The welfare loss here arises from the fact that consumption or further processing of the imported products becomes more expensive by at least the difference to the second cheapest source of supply. However, the volume of the welfare loss is significantly lower than in the case of subsidies. It can be argued that tariffs make the prices of downstream products in the supply chain more expensive, whereas subsidies do not. While this is true, it overlooks the fact that the much larger group of companies and consumers who are not directly affected do not suffer any direct additional costs in the case of tariffs, but bear the costs of subsidies through their taxes. Political effects of tariffs and subsidies In terms of their political and structural consequences, subsidies are more harmful than targeted tariffs. This is simply due to the procedure at the end of which individual companies receive a subsidy decision. An "objective" allocation is hardly possible here. On the contrary: the procedure is susceptible to personal relationships, political influence and direct corruption. Furthermore, subsidies that are only granted in one country of the European Union jeopardize the integrity of the European Single Market. Similar problems can arise with customs duties. This happens when they are used to protect certain domestic industries. In the case of targeted, selective tariffs, which are based on clearly defined, objective categories, such as the degree of dependence on a product from a country, there is little scope for political influence once the criteria have been established. Tariffs cannot harm the European single market either, as they can only be imposed at European level anyway. WTO conformity The reduction of tariffs and subsidies within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the predecessor agreement GATT are a central reason for the reduction of global poverty in recent decades and one of the cornerstones of Germany's prosperity. It is therefore self-evident that tariffs and subsidies not only contradict the idea of the WTO. They also contradict its two basic principles: Subsidies for domestic production contradict the non-discrimination principle3, tariffs against individual countries violate the Most Favorite Nation Clause4. There are exceptions for both in the WTO rules. For example, WTO members must notify subsidies so that they can be examined and other countries can object to them if necessary. In principle, subsidies are only intended - and within a narrow framework - for developing countries, which still includes China. However, the notification of subsidies to the WTO hardly works any more. For example, 64 countries (around a third of members) have not even notified their subsidies for 20175. Nevertheless, some of China's subsidies may indeed be legal according to the letter of the WTO rules. But they are certainly not legitimate, as the aim of the WTO is to liberalize world trade and not to cement the opposite. And even if subsidies are known, the WTO cannot take legally binding action against them due to the dispute settlement mechanism blocked by the USA. Consequently, the USA has not reacted to the unresolved problem of China's subsidies within the WTO framework. Although tariffs have been imposed on some Chinese imports, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a huge subsidy program. If the dispute settlement mechanism were to work, the IRA would almost certainly have to be declared WTO-incompatible. However, as this path is blocked, many countries and regions of the world - including Germany and the EU at the forefront - are reacting with their own openly WTO-incompatible subsidy programs. The current subsidy race is constantly creating new reasons to impose subsidies in response to the subsidies of others. This will further damage the multilateral trading system, which has been very successful for Germany in particular. Targeted tariffs, on the other hand, which can be used to eliminate competitive disadvantages caused by subsidies and which are therefore only levied on goods from the subsidizing country, are in principle in line with the basic idea of the WTO. This is because it balances out a distortion of the world market created by subsidies. Therefore, tariffs are generally permitted as a reaction to dumping and subsidies6. A reaction to subsidies via tariffs within the strict WTO framework is currently hardly possible for the reasons mentioned above. In this situation, it should be actively communicated that in an unsatisfactory legal situation, the path of the least evil will be taken with tariffs. At the same time, serious efforts should be made to reform the WTO. Conclusion The argument: "We want to have the production of certain things in Germany because we believe that we would no longer be supplied with them in crisis situations" is not an economic argument. Production for strategic reasons is always a financially subsidized business. Because if there was money to be made, the private sector would do it. Politically, this line of argument is perfectly legitimate - as is the attempt to steer the economy directly in a politically acceptable direction through subsidies. However, this has nothing to do with a social market economy, but rather the opposite. However, if Germany and Europe are to remain committed to the social market economy and open multilateral trade, the only economically sensible response to problematic dependencies from abroad (if one has to respond at all) is to impose targeted, selective tariffs - but certainly not protective tariffs for domestic production sites. The German government should work within the EU to set a clear framework for this and at the same time work on a reform at WTO level to finally reduce the rampant subsidies. Because these - and not tariffs - are currently the biggest threat to the open global trading system that is so important to us. References 1 Vgl. etwa die Darstellung der Abhängigkeiten von für die Energiewende nötigen Metallen in Cernicky (2022): https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/16166715/Energiewende+und+Protektionismus+-+Wie+gehen+wir+pragmatisch+mit+China+um.pdf/442ba770-d504-43cc-25f1-eaf7d970dfc1, genaue Zahlen vgl. etwa die Auflistung des BDI: https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/analyse-bestehender-abhaengigkeiten-und-handlungsempfehlungen/ 2 Zum Versuch einer entsprechenden Bewertung vgl. etwa die von der KAS und dem Ifo-Institut durchgeführte Studie zu Abhängigkeiten in Lieferketten, Flach et al (2021): https://www.kas.de/de/analysen-und-argumente/detail/-/content/globale-wertschoepfungsketten 3 Art. III GATT 4 Art. I GATT/ WTO 5 WTO | 2023 News items - Members reiterate concerns on lack of transparency with subsidy notifications: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/scm_02may23_e.htm 6 GATT Art VI, Dumping und Ausgleichzölle Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2024, Berlin Design: yellow too, Pasiek Horntrich GbR Produced with the financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany. This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or election campaigners or helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de).