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Diplomacy
flags of Palestine and Israel against sky and old Jerusalem. Two States for two peoples. Two-state solution concept. Separate ownership of Jerusalem. The division of the city between two peoples.

A two-state solution is gaining momentum again for Israel and the Palestinians. Does it have a chance of success?

by Andrew Thomas

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Israel’s devastating war in Gaza has ground on, the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was thought to be “dead”. Now, it is showing signs of life again. French President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly pressing other European nations to jointly recognise a Palestinian state at a UN conference in mid-June, focused on achieving a two-state solution. Macron called such recognition a “political necessity”. Countries outside Europe are feeling the pressure, too. Australia has reaffirmed its view that recognition of Palestine should be a “way of building momentum towards a two-state solution”. During Macron’s visit to Indonesia in late May, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto made a surprising pledge to recognise Israel if it allowed for a Palestinian state. Indonesia is one of about 28 nations that don’t currently recognise Israel. France, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea are among the approximately 46 nations that don’t recognise a Palestinian state.   The UN conference on June 17–20, co-sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, wants to go “beyond reaffirming principles” and “achieve concrete results” towards a two-state solution. Most countries, including the US, have supported the two-state solution in principle for decades. However, the political will from all parties has faded in recent years. So, why is the policy gaining traction again now? And does it have a greater chance of success? What is the two-state solution? Put simply, the two-state solution is a proposed peace plan that would create a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state. There have been several failed attempts to enact the policy over recent decades, the most famous of which was the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s. In recent years, the two-state solution was looking less likely by the day. The Trump administration’s decision in 2017 to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the US embassy there signalled the US was moving away from its role as mediator. Then, several Arab states agreed to normalise relations with Israel in the the Abraham Accords, without Israeli promises to move towards a two-state solution. The Hamas attacks on Israel – and subsequent Israeli war on Gaza – have had a somewhat contradictory effect on the overarching debate. On the one hand, the brutality of Hamas’ actions substantially set back the legitimacy of the Palestinian self-determination movement in some quarters on the world stage. On the other, it’s also become clear the status quo – the continued Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank following the end of a brutal war – is not tenable for either Israeli security or Palestinian human rights. And the breakdown of the most recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the return of heavy Israeli ground operations in May and reports of mass Palestinian starvation have only served to further isolate the Israeli government in the eyes of its peers. Once-steadfast supporters of Israel’s actions have become increasingly frustrated by a lack of clear strategic goals in Gaza. And many now seem prepared to ignore Israeli wishes and pursue Palestinian recognition. For these governments, the hope is recognition of a Palestinian state would rebuild political will – both globally and in the Middle East – towards a two-state solution. Huge obstacles remain But how likely is this in reality? There is certainly more political will than there was before, but also several important roadblocks. First and foremost is the war in Gaza. It’s obvious this will need to end, with both sides agreeing to an enduring ceasefire. Beyond that, the political authority in both Gaza and Israel remains an issue. The countries now considering Palestinian recognition, such France and Australia, have expressly said Hamas cannot play any role in governing a future Palestinian state. Though anti-Hamas sentiment is becoming more vocal among residents in Gaza, Hamas has been violently cracking down on this dissent and is attempting to consolidate its power. However, polling shows the popularity of Fatah – the party leading the Palestinian National Authority – is even lower than Hamas at an average of 21%. Less than half of Gazans support the enclave returning to Palestinian Authority control. This means a future Palestinian state would likely require new leadership. There is almost no political will in Israel for a two-state solution, either. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not been shy about his opposition to a Palestinian state. His cabinet members have mostly been on the same page. This has also been reflected in policy action. In early May, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a plan for Israel to indefinitely occupy parts of Gaza. The government also just approved its largest expansion of settlements in the West Bank in decades. These settlements remain a major problem for a two-state solution. The total population of Israeli settlers is more than 700,000 in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. And it’s been increasing at a faster rate since the election of the right-wing, pro-settler Netanyahu government in 2022. Settlement is enshrined in Israeli Basic Law, with the state defining it as “national value” and actively encouraging its “establishment and consolidation”. The more settlement that occurs, the more complicated the boundaries of a future Palestinian state become. Then there’s the problem of public support. Recent polling shows neither Israelis nor Palestinians view the two-state solution favourably. Just 40% of Palestinians support it, while only 26% of Israelis believe a Palestinian state can “coexist peacefully” alongside Israel. However, none of these challenges makes the policy impossible. The unpopularity of the two-state solution locally is more a reflection of previous failures than it is of future negotiations. A power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland was similarly unpopular in the 1990s, but peace was achieved through bold political leadership involving the US and European Union. In other words, we won’t know what’s possible until negotiations begin. Red lines will need to be drawn and compromises made. It’s not clear what effect growing external pressure will have, but the international community does appear to be reaching a political tipping point on the two-state solution. Momentum could start building again.

Diplomacy
President Donald Trump poses for a photo with Amir of Qatar Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad Al Thani in Lusail Palace before an official State Dinner, Wednesday, May 14, 2025, in Doha, Qatar. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Trump signed plenty of contracts in the Middle East, but he’s no closer to the two ‘deals’ he really wants

by Shahram Akbarzadeh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском US President Donald Trump’s visit to Arab states in the Middle East this week generated plenty of multibillion-dollar deals. He said more than US$1 trillion (A$1.5 trillion) worth of deals had been signed with Saudi Arabia alone, though the real total is likely much lower than that. Qatar also placed an order for 210 Boeing aircraft, a deal worth a reported US$96 billion (A$149 billion). Trump will no doubt present these transactions as a major success for US industry. The trip also helped counter concerns about US disengagement from the Middle East. For more than a decade, local elites have viewed Washington’s attention as shifting away from the region. This trip was a reaffirmation of the importance of the Middle East – in particular the Gulf region – to US foreign policy. This is an important signal to send to Middle Eastern leaders who are dealing with competing interests from China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. And from a political standpoint, Trump’s lifting of sanctions on Syria and meeting with the former rebel, now president, Ahmed al-Sharaa was very significant – both symbolically and practically. Until recently, al-Sharaa was listed by the United States as a terrorist with a US$10 million (A$15 million) bounty on his head. However, when his forces removed dictator Bashar al-Assad from power in December, he was cautiously welcomed by many in the international community. The US had invested considerable resources in removing Assad from power, so his fall was cause for celebration, even if it came at the hands of forces the US had deemed terrorists. This rapid turn-around is dizzying. In practice, the removal of sanctions on Syria opens the doors to foreign investment in the reconstruction of the country following a long civil war. It also offers an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as Turkey, to expand their influence in Syria at the expense of Iran. For a leader who styles himself a deal-maker, these can all be considered successful outcomes from a three-day trip. However, Trump avoided wading into the far more delicate diplomatic and political negotiations needed to end Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and find common ground with Iran on its nuclear program. No solution in sight for the Palestinians Trump skirted the ongoing tragedy in Gaza and offered no plans for a diplomatic solution to the war, which drags on with no end in sight. The president did note his desire to see a normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel, without acknowledging the key stumbling block. While Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have no love for Hamas, the Gaza war and the misery inflicted on the Palestinians have made it impossible for them to overlook the issue. They cannot simply leapfrog Gaza to normalise relations with Israel. In his first term, Trump hoped the Palestinian issue could be pushed aside to achieve normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel. This was partially achieved with the Abraham Accords, which saw the UAE and three other Muslim-majority nations normalise relations with Israel. Trump no doubt believed the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreed to just before his inauguration would stick – he promised as much during the US election campaign. But after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire in March, vowing to press on with its indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, he’s learned the hard way the Palestinian question cannot easily be solved or brushed under the carpet. The Palestinian aspiration for statehood needs to be addressed as an indispensable step towards a lasting peace and regional stability. It was telling that Trump did not stop in Israel this week. One former Israeli diplomat says it’s a sign Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lost his leverage with Trump. There’s nothing that Netanyahu has that Trump wants, needs or [that he] can give him, as opposed to, say, the Saudis, the Qataris, [or] the Emiratis. More harsh rhetoric for Iran Trump also had no new details or initiatives to announce on the Iran nuclear talks, beyond his desire to “make a deal” and his repeat of past threats. At least four rounds of talks have been held between Iran and the United States since early April. While both sides are positive about the prospects, the US administration seems divided on the intended outcome. The US Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called for the complete dismantling of Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium as a sure safeguard against the potential weaponisation of the nuclear program. Trump himself, however, has been less categorical. Though he has called for the “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program, he has also said he’s undecided if Iran should be allowed to continue a civilian enrichment program. Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium, albeit under international monitoring, is a red line for the authorities in Tehran – they won’t give this up. The gap between Iran and the US appears to have widened this week following Trump’s attack on Iran as the “most destructive force” in the Middle East. The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi called Trump’s remarks “pure deception”, and pointed to US support for Israel as the source of instability in the region. None of this has advanced the prospects of a nuclear deal. And though his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE was marked by pomp and ceremony, he’ll leave no closer to solving two protracted challenges than when he arrived.

Diplomacy
HAJJAH , YEMEN – October 26, 2020:Tribal mobilization to support government forces in northwest Yemen

Yemen’s Ansar Allah reaches ceasefire deal with US that excludes strikes on Israel

by Aseel Saleh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While Trump declared the truce agreement a US victory, Ansar Allah said that Washington contacted them in order to “avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement reached a ceasefire deal with the United States on Wednesday, May 7, according to Oman, which mediated the negotiations. The deal stipulates the halt of Ansar Allah’s attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an end to US aggression on Yemen. However, it does not prevent the Yemeni movement from launching attacks on Israel.  “Following recent discussions and contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman with the United States and the relevant authorities in Sana’a, in the Republic of Yemen, with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides,” Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, wrote on X. “In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” the minister added. Peoples Dispatch spoke to a member of the Communist Party of Jordan, Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh, to discuss the ceasefire, which he described as a “sudden development in the war in the Red Sea.” Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh indicated that “both the US and Oman didn’t comment on Ansar Allah’s missiles targeting Israel, especially that this agreement was reached shortly after a Yemeni missile reached Ben Gurion airport, near the occupied city of Lydda (also known as Lod).” As per Al-Hatabeh’s analysis, “important questions about this agreement are left without answers. Taking into consideration the Omani role in the American – Iranian negotiations, is the ceasefire in the Red Sea part of the deal? Another question will arise from this assumption, did America give up some of Israel’s interests in order to reach an agreement with Iran? Where does this agreement leave Netanyahu’s government, especially after Ansar Allah’s spokesman told Reuters that the agreement doesn’t include Israel.” Ansar Allah says the US contacted them seeking a truce One day before Oman announced that the deal was sealed, US President Donald Trump alluded that a ceasefire agreement was about to be reached, claiming that Ansar Allah agreed to stop the fight with the US because they “capitulated”.  “They just don’t want to fight, and we will honor that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated,” Trump said from the White House on Tuesday, May 6. “They will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that’s what the purpose of what we were doing. So that’s just news. We just found out about that. So I think that’s very, very positive,” he added. Although Trump bragged about the deal, presenting it as a US victory, analysts suggest that it was Ansar Allah that forced the world’s greatest military superpower to the negotiating table, after paralyzing US naval traffic off the Yemeni coast.  Ansar Allah’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, confirmed during an interview with Almasirah TV channel, that the movement “did not make any request to the Americans to hold ceasefire talks”. Abdulsalam asserted that, on the contrary, the movement recently received US requests and messages seeking a truce, via the Sultanate of Oman. The Yemeni official pointed out that US endeavors to reach a ceasefire with Ansar Allah were a great disappointment to Israel. “The Israelis have endured great disappointment after the stance of the US, which tried to walk away and avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen,” he said. However, Abdulsalam clarified that Ansar Allah is still “assessing this US position so that the facts on the ground do not contradict its statements”. He further warned that in the event that the US “would not abide by the agreement in any way”, the movement “will respond”. Abdulsalam considered the deal “a success to be added to Yemen’s credit, as it enhances a situation that would leave the “usurper entity” [Israel] in a situation of loneliness, in confrontation with the great popular and military stance led by Yemen on behalf of the Arab and Islamic nation.” The ceasefire was announced two months after Trump ordered a large-scale aerial campaign against Yemen on the pretext of protecting US shipping, air, and naval assets and to restore “navigation freedom” from Ansar Allah’s attacks. Trump’s order followed Ansar Allah’s decision to resume a ban on Israeli ships due to Israel’s continuous blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yemen threatens Israel with a devastating and painful response for attacking Sana’a airport  While Ansar Allah agreed to a truce with the US, it vowed to escalate its operations against Israel as long as its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza is not lifted.  In response to Israel’s aggression on Sana’a International Airport on Tuesday, that destroyed terminal buildings and caused USD 500 million in damage, Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Chairman, Mahdi al-Mashat, threatened that “Sanaa’s response will be devastating, painful, and beyond what the Israeli enemy can endure.” “From this moment onward, stay in your shelters or leave for your homelands immediately. Your failed government will no longer be able to protect you,” Al-Mashat warned Israeli people.  Moreover, the Yemeni senior official reaffirmed that no aggression will deter Yemen from its “rightful decision” to support the people of Palestine “until the genocide ends and the siege on Gaza is lifted.” The Yemeni Armed Forces’ spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, also confirmed in a televised statement late Wednesday, that the movement will continue its ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, alongside the comprehensive aerial blockade on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

Diplomacy
US of America and Iran relations. USA and Iranian flags wrecking balls swinging on blue cloudy sky background. 3d illustration

Iran-U.S. Relations: From Escalation to Dialogue?

by Lana Rawandi-Fadai

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From war threats to negotiations In the early months of 2025, Iran and the United States stood on the brink of open military conflict. The escalation was driven by several factors that coincided in time, heightening the effect of instability. It was one of the most dangerous periods in the history of their relations. Until very recently, Iran lived under a cloud of anxious expectation: would war erupt, or could the situation be contained? The first reason behind the sharp escalation is, without doubt, Donald Trump’s return to office. It is well known that during his first presidency in 2018, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), reinstated prior sanctions and introduced new, extremely severe ones against Tehran. Trump took a hardline stance toward the Islamic regime, viewing it as a threat to human rights and regional stability. By early February of this year, he had already issued strict demands to Iran: to drastically scale back—or possibly entirely dismantle—its nuclear program, relinquish nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cease support for allied groups in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias). He threatened large-scale bombings if Tehran disagreed, but also left room for negotiations. It is worth recalling that Trump personally authorized the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), accusing Shiite militias under Soleimani’s leadership of alleged mass killings of civilians in Syria. In contrast, Iranians see Soleimani as a noble warrior and a professional soldier, who saved the peoples of Syria and Iraq from terrorist atrocities, and were outraged by his extrajudicial killing. From an economic perspective, it was during Trump’s first term that Iranian oil exports plummeted nearly tenfold, from over 2.5 million barrels per day in April 2018 to 300,000 barrels per day in June 2019. Although sanctions remained in place under President Joe Biden, their enforcement became more lenient. As a result, by 2024, Iran had begun rapidly rebuilding its oil exports, which rose to 1.9 million barrels per day by the summer of last year. This sparked hopes for a gradual economic recovery. However, Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 meant a new wave of threats. In his first month back in office, Trump gave Iran a two-month deadline to make concessions or face a firm response. The second reason is Israel’s aggressive and expansionist policy. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, long described Israel as a colonial-settler project created by the West, inherently driven to expand by seizing territory from neighboring Muslim countries and committing crimes against their Muslim populations, all with the ultimate goal of forcibly establishing “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates. In reality, there have been some differences between Israeli governments: under left-wing leadership, Israel tends to act more peacefully and moderately, while right-wing administrations pursue more aggressive and harsh policies. In recent years, however, Israel’s actions toward its neighbors have become especially aggressive—exactly as Khomeini had described—after the rise to power of the most radical ultra-right forces. The devastation that this government has brought upon the Gaza Strip, razing it to the ground, speaks for itself. After the fall of Bashar Assad’s strong leadership in Syria, Israel immediately seized the opportunity to destroy all of Syria’s heavy weaponry, effectively disarming the country. Israel then moved to capture more Syrian land beyond the annexed Golan Heights and committed new violations there. The Iran policy of the current Israeli government is focused on overthrowing the regime and installing puppet authorities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, known for his uncompromising hostility toward the regime in Iran, has spoken openly of his desire to see its end. There were rumors in Iran’s media space suggesting that Israel might be considering Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, as a symbolic leader for a future “secular Iran.” Within Iran, perceptions of the Pahlavi dynasty are overwhelmingly negative: it is seen as a pro-Western dynasty detached from traditional Islamic roots, which exploited national resources and oppressed Muslims and the Islamic clergy. Nonetheless, a portion of Iranian youth and some opposition commentators in the country hold radical views, harbor hostility toward Islam and Arabs, and support Trump, Netanyahu and the Pahlavi dynasty. This group would likely side with the enemy if hostilities broke out. Furthermore, Iran began to lose its regional influence. Israel carried out a series of successful operations against Iranian allies, primarily targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Syria. Key Hezbollah commanders and several IRGC officers were killed, and arms depots were destroyed. It is remarkable that some Syrian Islamists, who had previously been hostile to Israel, welcomed this development as a form of revenge for Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime and thus became temporary tactical allies of Israel. Following the December 2024 coup that brought anti-Iranian Islamists to power, Syria—once a strategic ally of Iran—is now increasingly taking a negative stance toward Tehran. By the start of this year, a sense of pessimism had settled over Iran. Feelings of confusion, anxiety and the realization of diminished influence in the Middle East became widespread among many Iranians, especially conservative ones. At the same time, a different sentiment was growing in Tehran among Iranian patriots and supporters of the Islamic regime: if the U.S., Israel or both launched a military attack, Iran’s response would be as harsh as possible. IRGC officials and prominent religious figures have made this clear. A change within: tracing Iran’s path to negotiations After a long period of tough rhetoric, Iran has made a strategic shift in its foreign policy in recent weeks. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had firmly banned any negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear program, suddenly changed course. What drove this decision? It is important to recognize that this shift resulted not only from an external threat but also from a deep internal reassessment, one that was rational, compelled by the circumstances, yet conscious. Until recently, Iran stuck to the principle of “no concessions under pressure.” Khamenei pointed to the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, which the U.S. exited during Trump’s presidency in 2018. From Khamenei’s perspective, new talks would be meaningless and dangerous because “the Americans will deceive again.” However, by April 2025, the situation had changed so much that Iran’s political and military elites began convincing the supreme leader of the need for dialogue. Reformist circles—especially the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian—played the leading role in this process. He insisted that without negotiations, Iran faced the risk of catastrophe: a major war, domestic unrest and even the fall of the regime. Reports from Tehran suggest he emerged as the main negotiator within the political establishment, persuading Khamenei to invoke the concept of maslahat (expediency)—a religiously sanctioned method for setting aside principles in order to save the Islamic regime. This decision was informed by several factors: - Economic crisis: according to official data, inflation between March 21 and April 20, 2025, reached 39%, while youth unemployment in the last quarter of 2024 stood at 20%. While Iran has seen worse in its recent past, these figures are nonetheless troubling. Furthermore, reserve funds were significantly depleted last year, investments have all but disappeared due to sanctions, and foreign currency reserves have declined. The country has also been hit by an energy crisis.- Erosion of ideology: satellite channels broadcasting from the U.S. and the UK have significantly expanded their reach. Outlets like Manoto, BBC Persian and Iran International have long championed secular, pro-Western views while criticizing the Islamic regime. What has particularly alarmed the authorities is the promotion of the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty: despite its brutal rule and fight against traditional Iranian and Islamic values—still remembered by the older generation—some youths have begun to see the Pahlavis as a possible “alternative” to the ruling clerical establishment.- Risks in domestic politics: political analysts, military officials and intelligence agencies warned the leadership about the risk of a “nationwide uprising” that could be sparked by an external attack. The concern was not just about protests but the potential for pro-Western groups to cooperate with foreign aggressors. The Iranian Interior Ministry said that these elements had become more active amid the 2022 protests and were receiving support from abroad. All these signals from the army, the clergy, the administration and the intelligence agencies compelled the Iranian leadership to adopt a political survival strategy. Drawing on the experience from the Iran–Iraq War, Khamenei reasoned that “continued confrontation would lead to catastrophe.” This is why he allowed the talks to begin while keeping control over their scope and substance. The nuclear program: compromise is possible, surrender is not One of the key issues in the Iran–U.S. negotiations remains the future of the Iranian nuclear program. Despite years of mutual accusations and broken trust, Tehran appears open to tactical compromises but not to surrender. According to sources within Iranian political circles, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has agreed to discussions on all parameters of the nuclear program, including uranium enrichment levels and the terms for international inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities. However, a complete dismantling of the nuclear program is widely seen as out of the question, as it would be perceived as a national humiliation within Iranian political culture. Khamenei and top IRGC officials—guardians of the regime’s ideological foundations—have repeatedly reinforced this position in their public statements. The scenario under consideration in Tehran includes these possible concessions: - a temporary halt to uranium enrichment beyond 60%,- a reduction in the stockpile of highly enriched uranium,- broader IAEA access to selected nuclear sites,- a declaration affirming the peaceful purposes of the nuclear program with legal guarantees. In return, Iran will push for major sanctions relief—not only in the financial sector but also in technology, including the lifting of the ban on investments in the oil and gas industry. These restrictions, in force since the late 1990s, have been particularly damaging: former Iranian official Hossein Selahvarzi put the total economic loss to Iran since 2012 at over USD 1 trillion. Iran’s missile program remains a separate and highly sensitive issue. It is regarded as an untouchable symbol of national pride and strategic autonomy. The supreme leader has made it clear that Iran’s nuclear capabilities “ensure the country’s security” in the face of potential isolation or attack. As a result, Tehran is likely to reject any proposals for reducing its missile potential. All this means that negotiations are possible, but their scope is quite limited. The outcomes of the two latest rounds of indirect talks in Oman and Rome offer some optimism. Flexing muscles: a show of force as a negotiating tool The prospect of talks between Iran and the U.S. does not preclude military tensions. On the contrary, this year both countries carried out a series of shows of force to send a message: “We are approaching negotiations from a position of strength.” Iran, on the one hand, has stepped up military activity along its external borders. In April 2025, Tehran for the first time supplied its allies in Iraq with long-range ballistic missiles and drones, including the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6. These moves were seen both as acts of support for Shiite militias and as a signal of Iran’s readiness to launch strikes in the event of major conflict. The military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz took on special significance, as Iran’s navy conducted a series of maneuvers with missile boats, mines and underwater drones. Up to 20% of the world’s sea-traded oil, or about 18 million barrels per day, passes through the strait. Its possible blockade was considered a measure of last resort to pressure international markets if another round of sanctions was imposed. In addition, Iran has increased its military footprint in the southern provinces, expanding bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Hormozgan. This builds operational depth in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack and reinforces the internal narrative that “Iran will not surrender but stands ready to defend itself.” The U.S., in turn, responded by deploying six B-2 Spirit strategic bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, within striking range of key targets in Iran. These warplanes can carry both nuclear and precision-guided conventional weapons. The U.S. also sent a carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf and reinforced air defense systems at its bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq. Thus, the military buildup in the region is not just preparation for a possible conflict but part of the diplomatic game. Tehran is demonstrating that it can deliver a firm response and that any concessions it makes are not a sign of surrender but a pragmatic step toward stability. Meanwhile, Washington is signaling its readiness for a military scenario in order to gain leverage in the talks. Russia as a mediator: interest in stability and strategic partnership Amid rising tensions between Iran and the U.S., Russia is emerging more clearly as a potential mediator and stabilizing force. Its role is shaped not only by current political dynamics but also by the deep structural ties built between Moscow and Tehran over the past years. In April, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow to discuss preliminary outcomes of consultations on a new nuclear deal with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Beyond nuclear diplomacy, the parties addressed a broad range of regional issues, including Syria, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This meeting was more than a diplomatic gesture; it reflects the genuine interests of both countries. Moscow is interested in the continuity of Iran’s current regime as a source of stability and a partner in the emerging multipolar world. Tehran, for its part, refrains from anti-Russian rhetoric, does not endorse resolutions against Russia at international platforms and shows respect for Moscow’s interests in the region. Russian–Iranian ties are strengthening not only politically but also infrastructurally. In 2023, both countries made significant progress in advancing the International North–South Transport Corridor, a project designed to link St. Petersburg with the Indian port of Mumbai via Iran. This initiative, backed by both Russia and Iran, offers an alternative to Western-centric logistics routes, and its success depends on the stability of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Moscow has already shown itself to be an effective broker in regional conflicts. In 2023, Russian diplomats helped revive dialogue between Iran and Azerbaijan after a long period of hostility fueled by disputes over borders, religious matters and relations with Israel. This experience could be leveraged in the context of Iran–U.S. negotiations, especially given the deep mistrust and the lack of direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Russia’s position is clear: Moscow is opposed to any destabilization of Iran, as it threatens to undermine regional balance, strengthen Western influence and jeopardize the partnership with Iran. As Sergey Lavrov has emphasized, Russia will support any steps aimed at de-escalation and the lifting of sanctions from Iran, as long as sovereignty and international law are respected. Thus, Russia is more than just an ally of Iran; it is one of the few actors that maintains channels of trust-based communication with both Tehran and several Western nations. This makes Moscow a potentially successful mediator, especially at a time when the U.S. has limited options for direct dialogue with Iran, and European brokers have lost much of their former influence. Possible scenarios and a window of opportunity The situation around Iran has reached a critical juncture. Amid a deep internal crisis, sanctions pressure and rising external tensions, Tehran must choose between a limited deal with the West that preserves its strategic assets or a drawn-out standoff that risks plunging the region into broader instability. First scenario: moderate de-escalation If the U.S. and Iran reached a compromise on the nuclear dossier, even in a limited format, it would create a short-term opportunity for stabilization. Iran would benefit from partial sanctions relief, increased oil export capacity and attract investment in critical sectors. In return, Tehran would commit to transparency, lower uranium enrichment levels and IAEA oversight. This scenario could also partially ease tensions around Israel, reducing the risk of direct conflict. However, even this scenario does not remove several fault lines: - The ideological hostility between Iran and Israel,- Tehran’s unwavering position on the missile program,- U.S. military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.This “frozen détente” could last for one to three years, assuming both sides show political will and avoid provocations. Second scenario: a new wave of escalation If the negotiations reach a deadlock—whether due to Washington’s excessive demands, Iran’s refusal to compromise on sensitive issues or outside interference—the situation could quickly spin out of control. In that case, possible outcomes include: - Direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities (by Israel or the U.S.),- Retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Qatar,- Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,- More active operations by Shiite militias in the region. Inside Iran, this could trigger another major wave of protests, especially if the economy takes another hit from stricter sanctions. There is also a risk that some radical opposition groups could try to take advantage of the unrest to start an uprising with high casualties—something Iran’s counterintelligence has already warned about.

Diplomacy
Zipper separates or connects US and Iranian flags with radiation symbol

Does the Muscat Round Pave the Way for a Potential Deal Between Washington and Tehran?

by Sherif Haridy

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the Muscat Round Pave the Way for a Potential Deal Between Washington and Tehran? The US-Iranian talks held in Muscat concluded on Saturday, April 12, 2025, successfully addressing contentious issues between the two nations, particularly the Iranian nuclear program crisis. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi led the Iranian delegation, while Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff headed the US team, with Oman serving as mediator throughout the proceedings. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the prevailing atmosphere during the discussions. President Donald Trump characterized the talks as "progressing very well," while Witkoff described the Oman negotiations as "very positive and constructive." According to Araqchi, all parties demonstrated their commitment to advancing discussions until reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Upon conclusion of these productive negotiations, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced a second round of indirect talks would be held on Saturday, April 19, again in Muscat with Omani mediation. Round One The US-Iran talks in Muscat hold significant importance as they represent the first diplomatic engagement since negotiations ceased between April 2021 and September 2022, which had occurred in a 4+1 format with indirect US participation. Notably, these Muscat discussions mark the first diplomatic exchange under both Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump. Several key implications emerge from these talks: 1- A face-saving negotiation format for both sides: Following the announcement of planned discussions, Washington consistently pressed for direct talks to expedite the process and quickly reach an agreement. Tehran, conversely, insisted on indirect engagement, at least initially, to build confidence in American sincerity. According to published reports, the American and Iranian delegations occupied separate rooms in Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi's residence, exchanging written messages through Omani mediators—satisfying Iran's requirement for indirect negotiations. Reports also indicate that after the approximately two-and-a-half-hour session concluded, Araghchi met briefly with Uytkov, conversing for several minutes in the Omani Foreign Minister's presence before departing—thereby fulfilling Washington's desire for direct engagement. Beyond these procedural arrangements for the initial round, such compromises demonstrate both sides' willingness to overcome obstacles impeding an agreement, potentially foreshadowing solutions to other challenges expected during future negotiation rounds. 2- Disagreement over the framework for negotiations: A disagreement over the scope of negotiations has persisted between the two sides since the initial round of talks. Iran adamantly maintains that discussions should focus exclusively on nuclear matters, leaving out both the missile program and regional role concerns. Supporting this position, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei stated on April 13 that an agreement had been reached to limit negotiations to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, confirming these topics would constitute the agenda for upcoming talks. Meanwhile, Washington remains adamant about including additional issues in negotiations with Tehran, particularly arms programs, with the missile program at the forefront. Witkoff stated that any diplomatic agreement with Iran would depend on verification of its uranium enrichment programs and, ultimately, confirmation of the missile arsenal Iran has developed over the years. Tehran has repeatedly declared openness to measures verifying it does not possess nuclear weapons, often citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's fatwa prohibiting such weapons. Such declarations may indicate willingness to reduce its nuclear program and potentially return to the 3.67% enrichment levels stipulated in the 2015 agreement—significantly lower than current levels exceeding 60%. However, Iran has firmly rejected completely dismantling its nuclear program (like the "Libyan model") or transferring highly enriched uranium to third countries, citing distrust of Washington and concerns about another withdrawal from agreements as occurred during Trump's presidency in 2018. Regarding the missile program, Revolutionary Guards spokesman Ali Mohammad Naeini responded to Witkoff's statement about including the missile arsenal in negotiations by declaring that Iran's military capabilities, including its missile program, represent a "red line" that remains non-negotiable under any circumstances. 3- Potential Iranian economic incentives: Some sources indicate that, in response to Trump's letter, Iran offered "economic benefits" that could advantage American companies if an agreement was reached between the two sides. These sources estimated potential benefits at $1 trillion or more. The proposal aligns with President Pezeshkian's April 9 statement that Supreme Leader Khamenei would not object to American investments entering Iran, "but without conspiring against Iran." Araghchi confirmed this position in his Washington Post article published that same day, calling on the United States to prefer diplomatic options when dealing with Iran and describing the Iranian economy as a "trillion-dollar opportunity" for American companies and businessmen. Tehran's attempts reveal a desire to motivate the Trump administration, which prioritizes trade and investment as key determinants of political engagement. One reason Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement was Washington's lack of benefit from investment deals allowed by the opening to Iran, while Europeans gained advantages, particularly in oil and petrochemical sectors. Consequently, Tehran is strategically focusing on economic opportunities, potentially driving Iran toward diplomatic approaches with Washington and an agreement that would lift the burden of sanctions imposed on the country. 4- European exclusion: No European party participated in the Muscat negotiations, and Washington likely held no consultations with the "European Troika" (Britain, France, and Germany) that participated with Iran in the 2015 agreement. Sources indicate that the meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of the three European countries, on the sidelines of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on April 3, failed to produce any joint plan addressing contentious issues with Iran. The exclusion reflects tense relations between Washington and its European allies, stemming from numerous disagreements—most notably the current US administration's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war and the tariffs imposed on most countries, including European ones. Moreover, it highlights Trump's desire to engage with Iran unbound by other parties' interests. Europeans prefer a diplomatic approach to dealing with Tehran, an approach Trump does not see as entirely reliable. Instead, he considers the military option a viable alternative should negotiations fail or not yield an agreement with Tehran. Nevertheless, the "European Troika" maintains significant leverage over Tehran through the so-called "trigger mechanism." The mechanism enables automatic reinstatement of UN sanctions imposed on Iran prior to the 2015 agreement if any of these countries complains to the Security Council about Iran's violation of the agreement. Such leverage perhaps explains why the Iranian delegation in Muscat requested its American counterpart ensure Washington assumes responsibility for preventing activation of the "trigger mechanism" against Tehran. Consequently, the "European Troika" countries will remain parties to negotiations between the United States and Iran, regardless of their format. Potential Effects Following the initial US-Iran discussions in Muscat, several potential repercussions can be anticipated: 1- Postponing the military option: The positive atmosphere during the Muscat talks, coupled with the announcement of future rounds of discussions, suggests Washington may delay military action regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Initially, the Trump administration advocated for military intervention as a pressure tactic to compel Tehran back to negotiations and secure a swift agreement on its nuclear program. Nevertheless, with ongoing dialogue between both parties, any military options might remain on hold until the results of these diplomatic exchanges become clearer. The escalating costs of military conflict may compel both sides to favor diplomatic negotiations and concessions. Tehran recognizes that American strikes on its nuclear facilities—whether conducted unilaterally or with Israeli cooperation—would present an overwhelming challenge to counter and manage. Similarly, Washington acknowledges that bombing Iran's nuclear installations could expose American forces and bases throughout the region to retaliatory attacks from Tehran or its armed proxies, while potentially disrupting vital maritime traffic. Given these high-stakes calculations, both nations may increasingly prioritize diplomatic solutions to resolve their differences, with Washington maintaining military action only as a final option should negotiations fail. 2- Supporting the chances of signing an agreement: Unlike previous negotiations during the Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi administrations, realistic data suggests Tehran faces severe time constraints. Trump has imposed a temporary deadline for Iran to resolve its nuclear program, with military action serving as the alternative. The military option has gained momentum as Tehran lost substantial capabilities among its regional proxies, which would have increased the cost of any attack against it. Moreover, according to Israeli and American accounts, the Israeli strike on October 26, 2024, successfully destroyed critical defense systems within Iranian territory. The approaching October 18 expiration date of the 2015 nuclear agreement intensifies pressure on Iran. Urgency mounts as the nation seeks a solution before the European Troika countries activate the "trigger mechanism" prior to that deadline. Unlike negotiations during the Rouhani and Raisi administrations, current talks will likely proceed more rapidly. Trump's April 13 statement that he expects "a decision on Iran will be made very quickly" further suggests the possibility of an expedited agreement with Iran. 3- Internal Iranian opposition: The move to hold negotiations with Washington may face opposition from some hardline fundamentalist groups. Despite Tehran's negotiations with Washington receiving approval from Khamenei and influential institutions rather than originating from Pezeshkian's government, resistance to these discussions remains possible. Statements from hardline Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) member Hamid Rasaei suggest underlying opposition when he claimed "the current negotiations were conducted with the Supreme Leader's approval to prove their failure, and for some optimistic officials to discover once again that the Americans are not committed and that it is irrational to rely on them." Additionally, any potential deal allowing American investments into the Iranian market might trigger objections based on constitutional restrictions. Articles 81 and 153 specifically prohibit granting concessions to foreign companies and foreign control of resources. From this perspective, such diplomatic moves could encounter resistance from institutions controlling key economic sectors, including the Revolutionary Guard and the bazaar. Some hardliners may interpret these developments as "Westernization of the economy," viewing them as concerning repetitions of historical scenarios embedded in Iranian collective memory. 4- Strengthening the role of the Iranian Foreign Ministry: The information that preceded the Muscat round of talks claimed three figures had been appointed to represent the Iranian delegation: Ali Larijani, advisor to the Supreme Leader; Mohammad Foruzandeh, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council; and Mohammad Javad Zarif, former assistant to the Iranian president for strategic affairs. However, the actual Iranian delegation to Oman was headed by Foreign Minister Araghchi, and included his aides for political affairs, Takht-e Ravanchi; Kazem Gharibabadi, for legal and international affairs; and Ismail Baghaei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, along with other negotiators and technical experts. The composition aligned with Araghchi's earlier assertion that responsibility for the negotiations would fall to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such prioritization indicates the regime's desire to send diplomatic messages, similar to events following former Iranian President Rouhani's election in 2013, which ultimately led to the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement. The diplomatic approach contrasted with periods when Tehran leaned toward hardline positions, during which broad powers were granted to the National Security Council to manage the nuclear issue, as seen during the terms of former presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Raisi. The regime's strategy appears inseparable from other domestic preparations made in anticipation of signing an agreement with the West. Notable examples include moving toward approval of conditions necessary for joining the Financial Action Task Force on Terrorism and Money Laundering (FATF), which would help Iranian banks access services provided by the SWIFT international financial transfer system. Some analysts attribute additional internal measures to this effort, including revisions to the strict provisions of the "chastity and hijab" law, the release of individuals under house arrest such as prominent reformist figure Mehdi Karroubi, and the easing of certain restrictions on internet use. 5- Russian and Chinese discontent: Negotiations between the United States and Iran may provoke discontent from Russia and China, fellow parties to the 2015 nuclear agreement. Both nations fear Tehran might forge an agreement with Washington that would undermine the coordination among Russia, China, and Iran. These concerns intensify amid severely strained Washington-Beijing relations following the announcement of historically high mutual tariffs between the two countries. Adding to the tension is Trump's apparent indifference resulting from Russian President Putin's delay regarding the US peace plan for Ukraine. Accordingly, Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi's visit to Moscow was announced ahead of the second round of talks scheduled for April 19 to brief the Russian side on the progress of the talks with Washington. Additionally, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Vasilievich Vershinin, during a meeting of supporters of the UN Charter in Moscow. The diplomatic efforts represent an attempt to allay Russian concerns and send a message to Washington that Tehran has other international alternatives if the current negotiations fail. In conclusion, the Muscat negotiations served as an exploratory round for both American and Iranian delegations, allowing each side to clarify intentions and demonstrate commitment before proceeding to subsequent steps. Complex and difficult differences persist between the parties, yet both clearly favor diplomatic solutions, at least temporarily, with success hinging upon American demands and potential Iranian concessions. Future rounds will likely experience heightened tension, leaving all possibilities open regarding the ultimate outcome of these diplomatic efforts.

Diplomacy
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at G20 meeting Bali, Indonesia 15.11.2022

Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy: Strategy Without Doctrine

by M. Hakan Yavuz

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise to power in 2002, one might ask whether we can speak of an Erdoğan Doctrine in Turkish foreign policy. The answer is no. Unlike classical doctrines that follow a consistent ideological or strategic framework, Erdoğan’s approach to both domestic and international politics is marked by pragmatic opportunism, transactional maneuvering, and tactical adaptability. His foreign policy does not stem from a fixed set of principles but rather from a fluid, recalibrated strategy designed to ensure political survival, power consolidation, and economic self-preservation. Yet, despite this adaptability, Erdoğan has consistently instrumentalized Islamism, Ottoman nostalgia, and Turkish nationalism as mobilizing forces, shaping both Turkey’s domestic landscape and its global positioning. These ideological currents serve not as doctrinal foundations but as strategic tools, deployed selectively to consolidate power and justify an increasingly interventionist and authoritarian foreign policy. Rather than an Erdoğan Doctrine, what we observe is a dynamic political strategy, one that shifts according to regional and global realities, balancing ideological rhetoric with realpolitik pragmatism. Erdoğan’s political trajectory has been characterized by extreme opportunism. Early in his tenure, he presented himself as a pro-Western democrat, championing Turkey’s EU membership and economic liberalization. However, as his grip on power consolidated, he shifted towards authoritarian populism, discrediting Western institutions and embracing an anti-Western, neo-Ottomanist discourse. His ability to manipulate ideological positions for strategic gain suggests that Erdoğan’s doctrine is less about consistent principles and more about sustaining power through ideological fluidity. This transactional nature extends to foreign policy, where Erdoğan has engaged in contradictory alliances. Turkey has simultaneously sought stronger ties with Russia while maintaining a position in NATO, balancing relations with Iran while confronting it in Syria, and denouncing Western imperialism while leveraging economic ties with the EU. The 2016 failed coup attempt marked a pivotal moment, after which Erdoğan’s rhetoric became deeply anti-Western, securitizing foreign policy as an extension of domestic political struggles. One of the defining characteristics of the Erdoğan strategy is the obliteration of the traditional boundary between domestic and foreign policy. In Erdoğan’s Turkey, foreign policy decisions are primarily driven by domestic political calculations rather than long-term strategic considerations. Military operations in Syria and Libya were framed as nationalist victories, consolidating Erdoğan’s support base while deflecting attention from economic crises. Political rivals and dissidents are routinely accused of being Western puppets or linked to foreign conspiracies, reinforcing anti-Western nationalism. Erdoğan actively uses the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a political tool, portraying himself as the protector of Muslims abroad and positioning Turkey as the leader of a global Islamic movement. This lack of distinction between internal and external affairs means that every foreign policy move is designed for domestic legitimacy. Military interventions, diplomatic crises, and economic policies are all packaged for domestic consumption to maintain Erdoğan’s image as a leader defying Western hegemony. Erdoğan has strategically invoked Islamist rhetoric and Ottoman nostalgia to mask domestic corruption, repression, and economic mismanagement. His use of Islamism is highly pragmatic rather than ideological. While Erdoğan once promoted a pro-business, moderate Islamist stance, he has increasingly aligned with more radical Islamic groups to rally conservative voters. Neo-Ottomanist narratives have been used to justify interventions in the Middle East and Africa, portraying Turkey as the rightful heir to regional leadership. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has become an ideological tool for Erdoğan, framing his rule as divinely sanctioned while attacking secular and Western influences. Erdoğan’s economic policies reflect the same transactional nature. He has oscillated between free-market policies to attract Western investment and state-led crony capitalism to consolidate his own economic elite. However, his militarization of foreign policy has created deep economic vulnerabilities. Erdoğan’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 missiles resulted in U.S. sanctions and exclusion from the F-35 program, exacerbating Turkey’s economic downturn.  Aggressive gas exploration efforts isolated Turkey from the EU and regional actors, worsening trade relations. While Erdoğan has relied on Qatari financial support, recent Gulf rapprochements have left Turkey geopolitically and economically vulnerable. Turkey’s economic dependence on Western markets and capital contradicts Erdoğan’s anti-Western rhetoric, further proving that his doctrine is driven by short-term political survival rather than a coherent strategic vision. Rather than a structured geopolitical vision, the Erdoğan strategy is best understood as a political survival mechanism that combines: Extreme pragmatism and transactionalism, shifting alliances and ideological positions as needed; the fusion of domestic and foreign policy, where foreign affairs are a continuation of domestic power struggles; the instrumentalization of Islamism and Ottoman nostalgia, masking authoritarianism and economic decline; short-term opportunism at the cost of long-term strategy, leading to Turkey’s increasing diplomatic and economic isolation. Erdoğan’s rule has been marked by ad-hoc decisions, contradictions, and reactive policies that serve his immediate political needs rather than a grand vision for Turkey’s future. This transactional-opportunism makes the Erdoğan Doctrine an impossibility—while he projects an image of Islamic, nationalist leadership, his foreign policy is dictated by opportunism, insecurity, and personal political survival. The consequences of this approach are a weakened economy, diplomatic isolation, and an increasingly authoritarian state, making the long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s model highly uncertain.  Another major characteristic of Erdoğan’s strategy is the securitization of domestic and foreign policy. Since Erdoğan ascended to the presidency in 2014, and particularly after the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant transformations. These changes are marked by a growing reliance on securitization—the framing of domestic and international challenges as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures. Erdoğan’s approach has been shaped by three key factors: Islamist ideology, Ottoman nostalgia, and the deep-seated trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres. These factors have driven Turkey into high-risk foreign policy ventures, many of which have backfired, leading to strategic isolation, economic instability, and declining influence on the global stage. Erdoğan’s political strategy has been centered on constructing an image of perpetual threat to the Turkish state and nation. This approach is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of betrayal and encirclement—most prominently symbolized by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which sought to partition Anatolia and subject it to foreign control. This “Sèvres Syndrome” has been instrumentalized to justify an aggressive foreign policy, military interventions, and an increasingly authoritarian domestic stance.  Erdoğan has fused Turkish nationalism with political Islam, portraying Turkey as both the heir to the Ottoman Empire and the champion of Sunni Muslims. This synthesis has fueled a revisionist foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. However, these ambitions have often led Turkey into conflicts with former allies and regional powers, undermining its strategic position. Erdoğan’s foreign policy, shaped by securitization, Islamist nostalgia, and historical trauma, has backfired spectacularly in multiple arenas. While he has sought to redefine Turkey as a great power, his tactics have instead led to growing regional isolation, economic instability, and internal discontent. The failure to balance nationalist rhetoric with pragmatic diplomacy has left Turkey more vulnerable than ever—caught between Western skepticism, Russian opportunism, and Middle Eastern volatility. Unless Erdoğan recalibrates his approach, Turkey risks further decline in both regional and global affairs. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdoğan came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation, shifting from a Western-oriented, EU-focused trajectory to a more assertive, independent, and, increasingly, anti-Western stance. While initially adopting a “thin populist” approach that emphasized regional engagement, neo-Ottomanist rhetoric, and Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and West, the AKP’s foreign policy has evolved into a “thick populist” approach dominated by a strong anti-Western narrative. This transformation was solidified after the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and, even more so, after the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, which the Turkish government blamed on the West-backed Gülen Movement. The growing securitization of Western powers and the increasing emphasis on Turkey’s Islamic and civilizational identity have led to an overt de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Erdoğan’s securitization of foreign policy has manifested in several high-risk ventures that have largely failed to achieve their intended objectives: Turkey’s military interventions in Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring) were aimed at eradicating the Kurdish YPG, which Ankara views as an extension of the PKK.  However, this policy has led to severe tensions with the United States, which has supported the YPG as a key ally against ISIS. The result is a diplomatic impasse that has weakened Turkey’s influence in Syria while increasing its military entanglements. Turkey’s intervention in Libya, backing the Government of National Accord (GNA) against Khalifa Haftar, was an extension of Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. While it temporarily secured Turkish energy and maritime interests, it alienated Egypt, the UAE, France, and Greece, leading to counteralliances that have restricted Turkish maneuverability.  Erdoğan’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system was framed as a move for strategic autonomy but resulted in sanctions from the United States and exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet program. While this was meant to demonstrate Turkey’s independence, it has made the country increasingly reliant on Moscow, further complicating relations with NATO. Erdoğan’s aggressive posture has damaged Turkey’s relations with Western allies, leading to economic consequences, loss of diplomatic leverage, and isolation in Europe. Erdoğan’s confrontational approach—such as threatening to flood Europe with refugees—has eroded trust and reinforced perceptions of Turkey as an unpredictable and transactional partner. Erdoğan’s security-driven foreign policy has had dire economic consequences. The Turkish lira has suffered dramatic depreciation, foreign investment has declined, and inflation has soared. The Turkish public, initially supportive of Erdoğan’s assertiveness, is increasingly disillusioned as economic hardship worsens. Erdoğan’s securitization of policy has created short-term political gains but long-term strategic vulnerabilities. No one takes Turkey as a credible ally. His nationalist-Islamist rhetoric has been effective in consolidating domestic support, especially among conservative and nationalist voters, but it has also deepened Turkey’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Finally, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has been anti-Western.  A key driver of Erdoğan’s anti-Western foreign policy has been the gradual populist transformation of the AKP and consolidation of his power by purging other prominent personalities within the party.  Initially, under the leadership of Erdoğan, the party adopted a moderate, reformist discourse that prioritized EU membership, economic liberalization, and cooperation with Western allies. However, over time, populist tendencies became dominant, with Erdoğan increasingly portraying himself as the true representative of the “real” Turkish people against both domestic and international elites. Populist foreign policy, as seen in Turkey and elsewhere, follows a binary logic that pits “the virtuous people” against “the corrupt elite.” In the Turkish context, this binary has been extended to the international arena, with the West—Europe and the United States—constructed as the foreign equivalent of the corrupt elite, standing in opposition to Turkey’s rightful role as a global power.  The early years of AKP rule were marked by a pragmatic approach that balanced Turkey’s Western orientation with a regionalist vision. This period saw active engagement with the EU, NATO, and the U.S., while at the same time expanding relations with the Middle East, Balkans, and Africa under Ahmet Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” doctrine. During this era, anti-Western rhetoric was limited, and Turkey’s regional activism was framed as complementary to, rather than a rejection of, its Western ties. Following the Gezi Park protests and, more dramatically, the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan’s rhetoric became openly hostile toward the West. Western governments were accused of plotting against Turkey, harboring terrorists, and undermining Turkey’s sovereignty. Erdoğan framed his leadership as a struggle against an imperialist West determined to prevent Turkey’s rise. As he declared in 2019, “Turkey is now a country whose agenda is not determined [by others] but who determines her own agenda.” Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy became an extension of Erdoğan’s domestic populist struggle, where anti-Westernism served as both an ideological tool and a strategy for political survival. Another major factor behind Turkey’s anti-Western turn is the fusion of Islamist and nationalist discourses, which have become the defining ideological pillars of Erdoğan’s foreign policy. This ideological shift is best understood through the contrast between Kemalism and Neo-Ottomanism. Traditionally, Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by Westernization, secularism, and nationalism. The country’s founding ideology sought integration with Europe, NATO membership, and alignment with the U.S. in the Cold War. However, Kemalist elites were also skeptical of foreign entanglements, leading to a cautious and isolationist diplomacy. Neo-Ottomanism and the “New Turkey” Vision of Erdoğan is anti-Western, Islamists, and serves for Erdoğan’s regime survival rather than national interest of the country. Under Erdoğan, a revisionist historical narrative emerged, portraying the Ottoman Empire as a great civilization that was undermined by Western colonialism and internal betrayals. In this vision, modern Turkey is the rightful heir of the Ottoman legacy and should reclaim its leadership role in the Islamic world. Erdoğan has repeatedly invoked the trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920)—which proposed partitioning Turkey—as evidence that the West continues to conspire against Turkish sovereignty.  This ideological framework has shaped Turkey’s new foreign policy identity, positioning it as a leader of the Muslim world rather than a subordinate member of the Western alliance. As Erdoğan’s government became more authoritarian and Islamist, relations with the EU steadily deteriorated. The post-2016 crackdown on opposition figures, journalists, and academics led to increasing criticism from European leaders, reinforcing Erdoğan’s narrative that the EU is hypocritical, biased, and Islamophobic. While Turkey officially remains an EU candidate country, Erdoğan has openly questioned the sincerity of European leaders, arguing that the EU is a “Christian club” that will never accept a Muslim-majority country.  Erdoğan’s government has rejected Western liberal values, reversing democratic reforms and undermining the independence of judicial institutions, the media, and civil society. As a result, Turkey has moved closer to authoritarian models seen in Russia, China, and the Gulf states. Erdoğan’s anti-Western and de-Europeanized foreign policy is not just a reaction to specific diplomatic disputes—it is a structural transformation rooted in populism, ideology, and strategic recalibration. By casting the West as Turkey’s primary “other,” Erdoğan has crafted a nationalist-Islamist narrative that legitimizes his power, mobilizes his base, and redefines Turkey’s role in the world.  While this approach has granted Turkey short-term strategic flexibility, it has also left it increasingly isolated, economically vulnerable, and diplomatically constrained. The long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s foreign policy remains uncertain, especially as domestic economic troubles and shifting global dynamics continue to reshape Turkey’s geopolitical landscape. One of the key arguments in understanding Turkey’s foreign policy shift is the interaction between domestic authoritarianism and international behavior. Unlike traditional middle powers, which pursue stability, Turkey’s domestic political dynamics—specifically Erdoğan’s populist authoritarian rule—have fueled its unusual, risk-prone foreign policy choices. Erdoğan has increasingly used foreign policy as a tool for domestic political survival, framing Turkey as a besieged nation fighting Western imperialists. Opposition parties are often accused of being aligned with “foreign agents” or Western powers, further deepening polarization. Nationalist rhetoric has been amplified during military operations, boosting public support for interventions in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

Diplomacy
Border between Israel, Lebanon and Jordan on map, Isreal, October 10, 2023

Academic Paper: Contradictions in the Pyramidal Segmentary Theory of Israel’s Regional Policy

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

Diplomacy
Foreign Minister Schallenberg on a trip to the Middle East, 27-29/02/2024 - 40

Lebanon enters new creative era

by Viktor Mikhin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The election of General Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon marks the beginning of a new era of hope for a country that has been mired in crisis for decades. The election and General Aoun’s position This election is not just a step towards ending a protracted constitutional crisis, but the beginning of a critical period of challenges and opportunities that require wise leadership and a clear vision to achieve Lebanon’s security and prosperity. From the outset, General Aoun has shown himself to be a leader committed to transparency and clarity. His words after taking the oath of office were devoid of the usual diplomatic platitudes and reflected his honest character and deep love for his country. He has a clear vision and firm goals that prioritise restoring security and rebuilding Lebanon’s institutions on a solid foundation that serves its people and ensures justice. In his speech, Aoun stressed the importance of restoring the authority of the state and strengthening its sovereignty – essential foundations for building a secure future. His speech on institutional reform underlined his desire to strengthen the state and restore public confidence. He also stressed the importance of national unity and the vital role of youth in driving change, expressing his hope for Lebanon’s rebirth with the participation of all its citizens. Lebanon today faces many challenges, but these challenges can be the starting point for reconstruction and its rise. Restoring trust between the state and its people will require concrete steps to fight corruption and increase transparency, principles that Aoun stressed: “Lebanon will rise only thanks to its loyal citizens”. Moreover, fulfilling international commitments such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, which call for, among other things, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah, will be crucial to establishing stability and removing Lebanon from regional power struggles. Aoun’s firm stance that Lebanon “will not become a battleground for settling scores” offers hope for a sovereign and independent future for the country, free from regional tensions. At this critical juncture in Lebanon’s history, the appointment of a competent prime minister is an urgent task. This person must have both economic experience and integrity, be able to lead economic reforms and attract investment to restore confidence in state institutions. Such an appointment will lay the groundwork for the successful implementation of the plan to return Lebanon to a path of growth and stability, politically, economically and spiritually. Lebanon has always been a beacon of culture, diversity and tolerance and now, with the election of a new president, the Lebanese hope that the country will regain its rightful place among other nations of the world. Aoun recognizes the important role of the Gulf countries in supporting Lebanon’s renaissance and calls on them to return and invest in rebuilding the country’s economy. This call is not only economic: it is an expression of gratitude and appreciation for the vital role that the Gulf monarchies have historically played in Lebanon’s development. Position of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement In the second round of voting, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement decided to support the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president, ending a two-year presidential deadlock. The resounding statement by the ‘Shiite duo’ was that the crucial decision on the numerical and political quorum was largely up to the resistance movement and that the president could not be elected without it. Reluctantly, the ‘Shiite duo’ gave in to unprecedented foreign pressure, while still claiming a powerful presence in the Lebanese political arena. In fact, the ‘duo’ put Lebanon’s best interests and national harmony first. Mohammed Raad, head of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, paid tribute to the “martyrs of the resistance who defended the country so that a meeting uld be held, and national harmony could be achieved in this difficult period. By postponing the election of the president, we wanted to send the message that we are the guarantors of national harmony”. A consensus was reached before the second round during a meeting between Mohammad Raad and Ali Hassan Khalil and Joseph Aoun, who allayed the Shia duo’s fears about the military, security and politics. The meeting focused on the responsibilities of the new era, particularly in terms of reconstruction, forming a national government and preserving the achievements of the resistance movement. Joseph Aoun promised to rebuild what the Israeli enemy had destroyed, saying: “Our dead are the spirit of our determination, and our prisoners are the pillars of our strength”. Moscow welcomes Aoun’s election as Lebanese president This opens up prospects for strengthening Lebanon’s domestic political stability and improving the country’s difficult socio-economic situation, the Russian Foreign Ministry said. Moscow welcomes the resolution of the presidential crisis, which has lasted since October 2022. This opens up prospects for strengthening internal political stability in Lebanon and rectifying the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, the Foreign Ministry said. It said: “Russia believes that the restoration of a broad national consensus is the key to ensuring unity and civil peace in multi-confessional Lebanon. The Russian Federation reaffirms its unwavering position in support of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the friendly Republic of Lebanon. It is determined to further develop Russian-Lebanese relations and closely coordinate efforts in the interests of ensuring peace and security in the Middle East region, which is going through a period of military and political turbulence,” the ministry added. Aoun’s election is a milestone in Lebanon’s history. His honest leadership and transparent approach inspire hope for a bright future. But realising that hope will require collective effort and serious action. Lebanon deserves the best, and with strong leadership and the support of its people and allies, a country worthy of its history and status can be rebuilt. Let this new era be a great opportunity for a fresh start, and let us always remember that hope is built on action and commitment.

Diplomacy
Syrians celebrate after Assad regime toppled, war in the middle east, rebels and islamists, Porta Nigra in Trier, Germany, 08.12.2024

Syria: Living Under the Roof of a Unified State

by Yuriy Zinin

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A wave of comments and reports has flooded the media landscape and social networks of the Middle East following the coup in Syria and the rise to power of new forces. These reactions reflect a diverse mosaic of opinions and perspectives on the reasons behind these events. Amid the general chorus of views, there is a noticeable trend celebrating the “victory of the Syrian people, oppressed for decades”. At the same time, the commentators’ euphoria over the regime’s unexpected fall is tempered by fears of uncertainty and the unpredictability of the country’s future. Headlines such as “Syria: No Victor!”, “Syria Is Further Away From Its Resurrection”, and “Today’s Syria in the Shadows of Internal Division” encapsulate these sentiments. Regional analysts predict conflicting scenarios for the country’s future: one envisioning a peaceful and bloodless transition to a new system of governance, and the other foreseeing a descent into chaos and civil strife. What Ash-Sharaa Proclaims Many writers focus their attention on the biography, actions, and statements of the head of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham*” (HTS), Al-Jolani – the unofficial leader of the conglomerate of forces now in power after the coup. They suggest that his public image is undergoing a transformation. Al-Jolani fought under the banner of “Al-Qaeda*” in Iraq, spent five years in an American prison there, and recently replaced his nom de guerre with his real name, Ash-Sharaa. According to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, his public appearances and interviews are designed for external audiences. These include the West first and foremost, followed by the Gulf states, Israel, neighboring countries, and influential actors in Syria such as Iran and Russia. Everything Ash-Sharaa communicates serves the purpose of projecting the message that he is no longer the man many once knew. He expresses a desire for good relations with the global community. In Damascus, doors have been opened to delegations from several European countries as well as the United States. The aim of these visits was to establish communication channels with Syria’s new rulers. In recent days, the new leadership has laid out the red carpet for visiting diplomats from Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar. Qatar has offered to provide technical assistance to resume commercial flights and has expressed interest in investing in various sectors of Syria, including energy. Jordan has voiced its “readiness to support Syria in areas such as trade, border security, electricity supply, and more”. It also seems that the Arab delegations visiting Damascus are unwilling to leave the field open for Turkey’s active involvement in Syria or allow it to impose its agenda on the Syrian people. Western countries are trying to determine their approach to relations with Syria’s new administration. They are waiting to assess its policies and actions before considering lifting the sanctions imposed on Damascus. Following a meeting with Ash-Sharaa, a U.S. representative announced the cancellation of the previously offered $10 million financial reward for information leading to his capture. Despite this, HTS* remains on the U.S. list of officially recognized terrorist organizations. Positive Signals from the New Syrian Authorities The new Syrian authorities appear eager to send positive signals emphasizing “social justice and equality among all religious and ethnic components”. These efforts aim to reassure the international community, gain recognition, and pave the way for official cooperation. Experts and political analysts find these signals encouraging. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, described statements about national unity and HTS’s promises not to impose its ideas on all Syrians as “reasonable and rational”. However, he expressed concerns about the nature of the new forces and their historical ties to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood* and Al-Qaeda*. Prominent Saudi researcher on political Islam and extremism, Yousef al-Dini, analyzed tweets from jihadist figures, including statements by Ash-Sharaa. He concluded that the primary issue HTS faces lies with the “remnants” of foreign fighters and mercenaries within their ranks. These individuals have struggled to adapt, lacking the pragmatism demonstrated by their leaders, he noted. The media across the Middle East highlight the atmosphere of caution and anticipation currently permeating Syrian society. The sudden upheavals have caught many off guard, disrupted established perceptions, and presented scenarios that do not rule out turbulent events. As Arab sociologists remind us, Syria is home to sixteen racial and ethnic groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Druze, Shiites, Alawites, Christians, Yazidis, and others. The history of the Syrian people has destined them to live intertwined within a shared social fabric, preserving the cultural heritage of the ancient Levant. The new regime in Syria faces a daunting challenge. To survive and sustain itself, it must transform its rhetoric into the reality of a lawful national state that embraces coexistence under one roof for all components of its diverse society. *Organisations banned in the territory of the Russian Federation

Diplomacy
ceasefire word in a dictionary. ceasefire concept

Ceasefire in Gaza: Seeking through peace what war couldn’t achieve

by Ignacio Gutiérrez de Terán Gómez-Benita

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel has a unique ability to secure favorable outcomes in agreements, especially in how they are implemented, achieving what it has not accomplished in its military campaigns. On November 27, started the truce between Hezbollah and Israel, images of jubilant Lebanese civilians returning to the villages they had been expelled from after more than two months of relentless Israeli bombings were abundant. The leaders of the "Party of God," who had confronted the occupation forces and managed to halt their advance into Lebanese territory, were speaking of (another) divine victory, akin to that of 2006. Many people, both inside and outside the country, aligned with the so-called axis of anti-Zionist resistance, praised the fighting capacity of the Lebanese combatants despite their setbacks, including the assassination of their general leader, Hasan Nasrallah, in September 2024. However, the developments during the weeks of the truce so far have once again demonstrated that Israeli governments have a unique ability to secure favorable terms in agreements, especially in how they implement them — achieving what they have not in their (devastating) military campaigns. Because, as always, the devil is in the details. The text approved for the truce in Lebanon — after 4,068 deaths, 16,670 injuries, and nearly a million and a half-displaced people — was so "vague" in certain aspects and, in others, left such a wide margin for Israeli leaders' particular interpretations that it could well be considered a "trap truce." And this is how it has unfolded: the occupying soldiers have expanded, during peacetime, into areas they had not reached during the war. They have continued destroying houses, warehouses, and factories where, they claim, enemy arsenals or "strategic sites" were located. They have set up checkpoints and access controls on certain roads and, worst of all, have killed dozens of Lebanese citizens returning to their homes or, according to Israeli military propaganda, engaging in suspicious activities, such as transporting bundles (which they claimed were weapons) in private vehicles or simply approaching "in a potentially dangerous manner" to the areas where the occupying detachments were stationed. None of these actions — expanding their presence, shooting at civilians, or destroying buildings — fell within the occupying force's powers. The wording of the agreement – "the parties reserve the right to intervene if the other violates the terms" — as mentioned, left ample room for interpretation. Why Hezbollah, and especially the Lebanese state, as a party involved in negotiating and enforcing the truce, accepted these terms and have not pressured the supervisory bodies or the so-called international community to curb Israeli abuses deserves a chapter of its own. If Hezbollah was already weakened by late 2024 due to the fall of the Syrian regime and developments in Lebanon, including the appointment of a president and prime minister entirely at odds with its vision of resistance, the circumstances surrounding the truce have further undermined its position. Gazans should pay close attention to what is happening in Lebanon. Tel Aviv has been using understandings, truces, and peace agreements for decades to reinforce its military victories or compensate for its battlefield defeats. You will never see them lose at the negotiating table. And when an agreement no longer suits them, they simply stop honoring it. Just ask the Syrians about the unilateral nullification of the 1974 agreement that marked the demarcation line between occupied Palestine and the Golan Heights. According to the Tel Aviv regime, the fall of the Assad government in December 2024 invalidated those stipulations. Taking advantage of the political chaos, they have advanced dozens of kilometers into Syrian territory. More space for their military bases and, if permitted, new settlements. Although, as in southern Lebanon two months ago, the people of Gaza took to what remains of the streets and squares in the Strip on Sunday, January 19, to celebrate the ceasefire, they would do well to remain cautious. Not only because the three announced stages — especially the third — are, as usual, vague, but also because, once again, the international guarantors are clearly aligned with the interests of Israel’s deceitful and indecent political and military ruling class. In Lebanon, the supervisors — a high-ranking U.S. military official and international forces — turned a blind eye to the continuous (but justifiable, in their opinion) Israeli violations. In Gaza, it will be Qatar, the United States, and Egypt who will be responsible for intervening in case of breaches. Wolves guarding the lambs, especially Washington, whose leaders have unequivocally aligned themselves with their close ally, Israel. However, the third stage will be the most ambiguous and dangerous of all, as it includes plans to reshape Gaza's government, excluding Hamas, of course. To achieve this, the plan would rely on other Palestinian entities — though no one knows who they are — and third-party countries. One of these is the United Arab Emirates, a behind-the-scenes collaborator in the neo-Zionist strategy in Palestine, and not at all inclined to sympathize with the Palestinian cause: Abu Dhabi and Dubai, for instance, prohibit the display of keffiyehs (Palestinian scarves) and flags, let alone the publication of messages supporting the Gazan resistance. Hours after the ceasefire began, Hamas, just in case, deployed hundreds of armed men into the streets to demonstrate who remains the predominant force in Gaza. Given this situation, it remains unclear how a new government will be imposed in the territory during this third phase without first sidelining the Palestinian militias. Israeli negotiators are skilled at creating temporary factors and phased timelines that ultimately yield favorable outcomes for them. They have been doing this since the Camp David Accords, signed in 1978 between Egypt and Israel. At that time, the evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula, taken from the Egyptians during the 1967 war, was carried out according to a phased timeline and based on four geographic areas where the Israelis defined security responsibilities along the demarcation lines. That treaty established a prototypical approach to negotiations with Arab rivals: the demilitarization of adjacent territories and control over border crossings. A maneuver aimed at establishing demilitarized and, as much as possible, depopulated areas. Thanks to Camp David, the Egyptian army is prohibited from setting up air bases or large-scale ground troop concentrations that could facilitate a hypothetical occupation of Israeli territory. This is not the case on the other side, where military installations are justified for security reasons (one of the propagandist perversions of Zionism is making much of the world believe that others wish to invade their territories; reality proves otherwise). As we have seen during these fifteen months of the campaign against Gaza, Egyptians cannot unilaterally decide who enters or exits through the Rafah crossing (in southern Gaza). For this reason, they must coordinate security arrangements with the other side, just as they do along the rest of the border perimeter. Worse still, the Israeli army ended up exclusively assuming jurisdiction over the so-called Salah al-Din Road or Philadelphia Corridor, which originally belonged to the Egyptians on the southern side, to more "efficiently" prevent arms shipments to Hamas and other armed militias. Later, after the Wadi Araba agreements in the 1990s, something similar was done with the Jordanians. Or, during the same decade, the (disastrous) Oslo Accords, which created the Palestinian National Authority and the A, B, and C territories where the Tel Aviv regime, as always, interprets areas of influence and settlement supervision in its own sui generis way, including control over access between them. The idea of intermediate demilitarized zones with barely any population is now being pushed again in southern Lebanon, where several Israeli representatives have already threatened that "they are not going to leave completely." They intend to replicate this in Gaza. The implementation of this ceasefire certifies the failure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Apart from devastating a 360-square-kilometer territory, killing, injuring, or expelling one-tenth of its population, and displacing the rest across the confines of the Strip, they have not achieved much. Of course, for the overarching plans of “brute-force” Zionism that the Palestinians are suffering from — in Gaza and also in the West Bank—breaking down Palestinian society and gaining new territories for their expansion projects represents an achievement. But they wanted more. They aimed to recolonize Gaza, impose a puppet government — just as submissive but more effective and aggressive than the Palestinian National Authority — publicize the release of prisoners held by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others, film the destruction of all tunnels excavated by Palestinian militias, and prove that their army is still the alpha male of the Middle East... But they have not succeeded. Little matters — this is what truces, and their interpretations are for, especially when international guarantors are sympathetic to the priorities of the Tel Aviv regime. To hint at what may lie ahead, consider that the Israeli army killed ten Palestinians in the hours following the agreement's implementation because Hamas had not submitted the list of names of the first three Israeli female prisoners to be released. The agreement did not state that this submission was a ‘sine qua non’ condition or that one side could resume bombing in such a case. What was agreed upon, however, establishes that the displaced — hundreds of thousands — may return to their ruined homes over the coming weeks. Yet, the agreement does not stipulate an immediate withdrawal of occupying troops, who may remain on the roads and corridors where they are stationed and block access for supposed security reasons. A similar situation is occurring in Lebanon, where occupying troops have up to sixty days to withdraw from their positions. Until they leave, their mere presence prevents residents from returning to their homes. The Greeks (Danaans) could not conquer Troy through war and instead relied on negotiation and gifts. Hence the famous line by Horace, spoken by the visionary priest Laocoön: "’Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes’" ("I fear the Greeks, even when they bring gifts"). The Zionist command is not as subtle but equally effective. No gifts, but when military solutions fail, they resort to negotiation, which always leaves something behind. Fear them, for they will find a way to twist the agreement, likely in the so-called second phase, and seek a formula to violate it in whole or in part. They are aided by a new U.S. president, a specialist in "creatively" rewriting agreements. For now, he has already forced them to negotiate, despite opposition from the ultra-Orthodox factions. He knows more than the recalcitrant sector of neo-Zionism: the goal is to achieve the same objective by other means. Here, everyone — or almost everyone — is conspiring against the Palestinians. They have long grown accustomed to resisting alone against the predators. This content is published under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Spain (CC BY-SA 3.0 ES) license. More information at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/es/.