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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The global development initiative proposed by China aims to promote global sustainable development and has received support from many Latin American countries. At present, green cooperation between China and Latin America has achieved positive results in multiple fields such as clean energy, green agriculture, and green transportation. Latin American countries can become important partners for China to promote the Global Development Initiatives. However, in terms of green cooperation, China and Latin America also face some challenges. Both sides must strengthen consensus and achieve coordinated development in various fields. Sustainable Development and the Global Development Initiative The current international situation is turbulent and constantly changing, with a global economy that remains stagnant, while challenges such as geopolitical conflicts, climate change, and the food crisis are becoming increasingly intertwined and exacerbated. In this context, all countries around the world face the important task of promoting sustainable development and maintaining healthy economic and social growth. On September 21, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping officially launched the Global Development Initiative at the United Nations, outlining a path toward a new stage of global development that is balanced, coordinated, and inclusive (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2021). The Global Development Initiative is aligned with the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and places climate change and sustainable development as key areas of cooperation, emphasizing the idea of harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature. Its goal is to promote stronger, more sustainable, and healthier global development, and to build a global community for development. The 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are a fundamental part of the Global South and, in general, place great importance on sustainable development, which has allowed them to achieve notable successes in the field of sustainable cooperation. In a context of great power competition and ongoing regional conflicts, the strengthening of sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries presents numerous opportunities, creating ample space to jointly advance in sustainable development. The concept of a sustainable economy evolved from the idea of sustainable development, with harmony between humanity and nature at its core and the goal of achieving long-term sustainability. This approach maintains that economic growth is not an unlimited or uncontrolled process but rather must be conditioned by the ecological environment’s capacities and the resource carrying capacity. The concept of a sustainable economy emerged in the late 1980s when British environmental economist David Pearce introduced it in his work “Blueprint for a Green Economy”, published in 1989. However, it was not until the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, that the sustainable economy began to receive greater attention and became a central concept in global development strategies. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a sustainable economy is driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, improve energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. A sustainable economy has always promoted development goals that integrate economic, social, and environmental aspects. This respect for the environment and nature is closely linked to traditional Chinese worldviews. Since ancient times, the Chinese have developed ideas about following the laws of nature and protecting the ecological environment. In the classical text “Yi Zhou Shu Ju Pian”, it is recorded: "During the three months of spring, no axes are used in the mountains and forests, to allow plants to grow; during the three months of summer, no nets are placed in rivers and lakes." These ideas have been a fundamental part of the spiritual thought and culture of the Chinese people for over five thousand years, and through them, they have envisioned humanity and nature as an organic and indivisible whole. They represent the basic understanding of the relationship between humans and nature in ancient Chinese agricultural society, where coexistence and mutual promotion between people and the ecological environment reflected a dialectical relationship of unity. These ideas, full of deep wisdom, constitute an essential component of China’s rich cultural tradition. Consensus Base for Green Cooperation In 2021, the Global Development Initiative, aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, established eight key areas of cooperation: poverty reduction, food security, industrialization, connectivity, pandemic response, development financing, climate change, and the digital economy. It also proposed key principles such as “prioritizing development,” “people-centered focus,” “universal inclusion,” “innovation-driven efforts,” “harmony between humanity and nature,” and “action-oriented approaches.” Latin American countries also place great importance on sustainable development and share numerous points of consensus with China on these principles. Currently, several countries in the region, including Peru and Colombia, have joined the “Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative.” This shared commitment to sustainable development between China and Latin America provides an important foundation for advancing sustainable cooperation. Particularly, China and Latin American countries have broad consensus in the following areas: 1. Prioritizing national development. Both China and many Latin American countries are developing nations and consider the promotion of sustainable development a crucial goal. President Xi Jinping emphasized in the report presented at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC): “The fundamental fact that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism has not changed; our international status as the largest developing country in the world has not changed.” (Xi, 2017) China’s fundamental national situation determines that its main task is to advance along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and to focus its efforts on socialist construction. The Global Development Initiative also highlights “prioritizing development” as one of its core pillars. Latin America, for its part, faces the challenge of progressing in development. Although it was one of the regions in the Global South to achieve national independence and begin economic development relatively early, some Latin American countries have experienced stagnation in their economic transformation and have not managed to overcome the so-called “middle-income trap.” Affected by factors such as low global economic growth, fiscal constraints, and limited policy space, Latin America’s economy has shown a weak recovery in recent years, with some countries facing serious inflation and debt problems. Therefore, promoting sustainable development has become a top priority for governments in the region. In 2016, Latin American countries promoted the creation of the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, as a regional mechanism for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (ECLAC, 2016). By the end of 2023, six successful conferences had been held, and the Latin America and the Caribbean Sustainable Development Report had been published annually to assess the region’s progress in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 2. Addressing welfare issues as a central task Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Party’s central leadership, led by Xi Jinping, has promoted a people-centered development approach, insisting that everything should be done for the people and depend on the people, always placing them in the highest position. During the centennial celebration of the CPC’s founding, General Secretary Xi emphasized: “To learn from history and forge the future, we must unite and lead the Chinese people in a tireless struggle for a better life.” In contrast, Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world. The unequal distribution of wealth, along with gender and racial discrimination, are persistent issues that have been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic slowdown. According to data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2023 the region’s poverty rate was 29.1%, and extreme poverty was 11.4%, both slightly higher than in 2022 (29% and 11.2%, respectively) (France24, 2023). As a response, many Latin American governments — such as those in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Cuba — have incorporated attention to welfare issues and improving their citizens’ quality of life as key pillars in their public policy agendas. 3. Embracing inclusion and shared benefits as a guiding principle Following the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a trend toward multipolarity and continued economic globalization. However, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of protectionism in various forms, accompanied by a rise in unilateralism and hegemonic policies. These “deglobalization” practices not only fail to resolve internal problems, but also disrupt global supply chains, hinder healthy economic development, and harm the interests of countries. In response, developing nations such as China and Latin American countries advocate for multipolar development and oppose unilateralism and power politics. In December 2023, China’s Central Conference on Foreign Affairs Work emphasized the importance of inclusive and mutually beneficial economic globalization. Similarly, Latin America has maintained a diversified foreign policy and has worked toward building a new, fair, and equitable international political and economic order. Amid rising tensions among major powers, most Latin American countries have chosen not to take sides, maintaining a non-aligned policy. Moreover, countries in Latin America are increasingly focused on inclusive development both within their nations and across the region, striving to address internal development imbalances. In 2010, the Andean Development Corporation (predecessor to the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean) released the “Latin America Vision Plan 2040”, which highlighted the need to strengthen economic inclusion in order to achieve truly sustainable growth (CAF, 2010). In January 2023, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in Argentina approved the “Buenos Aires Declaration,” which stressed the importance of promoting inclusive development in the region and fostering inclusive dialogue with other regions (CELAC, 2023). 4. Embracing innovation as a key driver Marx pointed out that “science is also part of the productive forces” and that “the development of fixed capital shows the extent to which the general knowledge of society has become a direct productive force.” In 1988, at the National Science Conference, Deng Xiaoping declared, “science and technology are the primary productive forces.” Since the 18th CPC Congress, China has firmly pursued innovation-led development. It launched the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, issued the Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2021–2035), and rolled out the Technological Innovation Blueprint under the 14th Five-Year Plan. Thanks to this framework, China has made significant progress in accelerating emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, quantum communication, and blockchain. Latin American countries are also intensifying their focus on technological innovation. In 2023, CELAC’s Buenos Aires Declaration underscored the importance of innovation for enhancing regional competitiveness and job quality, while encouraging scientific exchanges among nations and subregional organizations. Furthermore, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, committed to increasing investment in technological development. To that end, he announced at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change an investment of approximately 21 billion reais (around 4.28 billion U.S. dollars) in sustainable economy, innovative technologies, and low-carbon economy. In the 2023 Global Innovation Index, Brazil ranked 49th out of 132 countries, improving by five positions compared to the previous year. The President of Chile, Gabriel Boric, pledged to increase public funding for research and to finance the work of universities and research institutions. In 2019, the Colombian government established the “International Mission of Wise People,” a body composed of 46 national and international academic experts to promote production diversification and automation, with the goal of doubling the share of manufacturing and agriculture in the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2030. The current president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, has committed to transforming the country into a “knowledge society” and to continuing this initiative. 5. Making harmony between humans and nature a central goal Developing countries — including China and Latin American nations — prioritize climate issues and actively contribute to global climate governance. Since ancient China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, philosophical schools such as Confucianism and Taoism had already proposed concepts about the “unity between Heaven and humankind.” Similarly, Indigenous cultures in Latin America also share related cultural traditions. The Quechua peoples of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia promote the concept of “’Buen Vivir’” (“Good Living”), which emphasizes harmony between human society and nature. The Aymara of Peru and Bolivia, the Guaraní of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia, the Shuar of Ecuador, and the Mapuche of Chile all have similar philosophical expressions. So far in the 21st century, China and Latin American countries have intensified their focus on sustainable development. In August 2005, during a visit to Anji in China’s Zhejiang Province, Xi Jinping, then Secretary of the Communist Party of China in Zhejiang, put forward the principle that “lucid waters and lush mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver,” highlighting the idea that economic growth should not be achieved at the expense of the environment. China’s Global Development Initiative includes climate change and sustainable development as key cooperation areas, aiming for stronger, healthier global progress. Simultaneously, Latin American countries value sustainability highly. Ten nations in the region have officially submitted carbon-neutrality timelines and developed emissions-reduction plans. Several governments have taken significant measures to accelerate energy transition, restore ecosystems, and enhance international cooperation. Notably, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have made substantial strides in renewable energy: in Q1 2023, more than 90 % of Brazil’s energy came from renewables — the highest level since 2011. Progress of Green Cooperation between China and Latin America 1. High-level design for sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries has been continuously strengthenedAs comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America progresses, sustainable collaboration has also become integrated into the strategic high-level planning. At the third Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in 2021, the "Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas between China and CELAC Member States (2022–2024)" was adopted. This plan emphasizes the continuation of cooperation in areas such as renewable energy, new energy, civil nuclear energy, energy technology equipment, electric vehicles and their components, as well as energy-related geological and mineral resources. It also outlines the expansion of cooperation in emerging industries related to clean energy resources, support for technology transfer between companies, and the respect and protection of the natural environment. Joint declarations between China and countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina on establishing and deepening comprehensive strategic partnerships mention strengthening cooperation in areas such as climate change and clean energy. During the sixth meeting of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation in May 2022, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Brazilian Ministry of Economy agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment Cooperation for Sustainable Development, aimed at promoting investment in clean and low-carbon technologies in both countries. In April 2023, during Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's visit to China, the two countries issued the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change” and signed several cooperation agreements related to the sustainable economy. For example, Article 3 mentions “expanding cooperation in new fields such as environmental protection, combating climate change, the low-carbon economy, and the digital economy,” while Article 10 notes the aim to “strengthen cooperation on environmental protection, climate change, and biodiversity loss, promote sustainable development, and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.” In the same month, the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change,” the “Memorandum of Understanding on Research and Innovation Cooperation between the Ministries of Science and Technology of China and Brazil,” and the “Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment and Industrial Cooperation between China and Brazil” identified key areas of future cooperation, including sustainable infrastructure, the development of sustainable industries, renewable energy, electric vehicles, sustainable technological innovation, and green financing. 2. Clean energy cooperation has deepened The development and use of clean energy are essential means for achieving green development. In recent years, clean energy cooperation between China and Latin America has shown the following main characteristics. The scope of clean energy cooperation is becoming increasingly broad. Currently, cooperation between China and Latin America in the fields of clean energy — such as hydropower, solar energy, wind power, nuclear energy, biomass energy, and lithium batteries — has reached a certain level of breadth and depth. At the same time, both sides have also initiated cooperation efforts in emerging areas such as green hydrogen and smart energy storage. China is constantly diversifying its target countries and modes of investment in clean energy in Latin America. In 2015, China began increasing its investment in the renewable energy sector in the region. Between 2005 and 2020, China’s main investment targets in renewable energy in Latin America included countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia. Investments in projects, mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investments have gone hand in hand. 3. Green cooperation in the transportation sector has yielded outstanding results. Chinese companies continue to cooperate with Latin American countries in the field of public transportation infrastructure and electric vehicles, promoting the low-carbon development of the transport sector in Latin America. First, cooperation in public transportation infrastructure is advancing. In recent years, Chinese companies have actively participated in the construction of public infrastructure such as railways, roads, and bridges in Latin American countries, aiming to promote interconnectivity and green travel across the region. Bogotá Metro Line 1, in the capital of Colombia, currently under construction with Chinese investment, is to date the largest public-private partnership (PPP) project in individual transportation infrastructure in Latin America. Second, trade in electric vehicles is developing rapidly. China’s electric vehicle industry has extensive experience in large-scale production and a relatively complete industrial supply chain, making it a new growth area in China–Latin America trade. Electric buses and cars from independent Chinese brands such as BYD, JAC, and Dongfeng are favored in Latin America due to their good quality and low price. Third, cooperation in battery and tram production is also improving. China and Latin America have also begun bold attempts in green capacity cooperation within the manufacturing sector. Currently, BYD is carrying out a range of production activities in Brazil, including the assembly of bus chassis and the production of photovoltaic modules and batteries. 4. Green agricultural cooperation is on the rise. Latin America has vast and fertile land, and agricultural cooperation is an important component of China–Latin America trade. In recent years, Chinese companies have paid increasing attention to using advanced technologies to strengthen environmental protection and actively promote the green transformation of agricultural cooperation. COFCO (‘China National Cereal, Oil & Foodstuff Corporation’) and its Brazilian partners conducted risk assessments of more than 1,700 soybean suppliers in the Amazon and Cerrado ecological zones, and mapped over 1.1 million hectares of soybean fields using remote sensing satellites, which has raised farmers' awareness of sustainable development. By the end of 2021, COFCO had achieved 100% traceability for all direct soybean purchases in Matopiba, a major soybean-producing region in Brazil. At the same time, China and several Latin American countries are promoting cooperation in green agricultural research and development. The Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Sciences has established cooperative relationships with nine Latin American countries, including Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, and Costa Rica. It has achieved progress in exchange and cooperation in areas such as the innovative use and protection of germplasm resources, efficient transformation and comprehensive utilization of biomass energy, green pest and disease prevention and control technologies, and efficient cultivation techniques. 5. Cooperation on green financing plays an important bridging role. The Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and the China-United Nations Peace and Development Fund are key financial platforms through which China supports project cooperation under the Global Development Initiative. In addition to the above-mentioned platforms, current green financial instruments between China and Latin America include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the China–Latin America Cooperation Fund, the China–Latin America Development Finance Cooperation Mechanism, and subsidies provided by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently, all three financing projects of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Brazil are related to the green economy. Challenges facing Sino–Latin American green cooperation Although green cooperation between China and Latin America has gradually achieved results and presents many development opportunities, the risks and challenges of cooperation should not be ignored. Most Latin Americans expect that foreign cooperation will promote social well-being, eliminate poverty, and reduce inequality in their countries. They place great importance on the social benefits of projects and pay close attention to the environmental impact of projects on local ecosystems. Currently, the process of extracting lithium from brine places high demands on water resources and carries the risk of air and water pollution. As a result, lithium mining has also faced opposition from Indigenous communities in some Latin American countries. In 2023, Indigenous peoples from Argentina’s Jujuy Province staged several protests against the exploitation of a lithium mine (Reventós, 2023). To reduce pollution in lithium extraction, further scientific and technological research is needed. The integration of Chinese companies into Latin America also faces many obstacles. The official languages of most Latin American countries are Spanish and Portuguese, which are deeply influenced by European and U.S. cultures. In addition to geographical distance, there is limited mutual understanding between the peoples of China and Latin America, and transportation and logistics costs are high. Most Chinese companies lack personnel fluent in Spanish or Portuguese and familiar with local laws and regulations. Currently, the U.S. government continues to view China as a strategic competitor. Latin America has also become a battleground for strategic competition between China and the United States. The U.S. has increasingly turned its attention to China’s cooperation with Latin American countries. In 2019, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs published an article stating that “China’s green investment in Latin America cannot offset local environmental damage” (Cote-Muñoz, 2019). In general, green cooperation between China and Latin America will face a more complex environment in the future. Final considerations In recent years, China has put forward the Global Development Initiative to promote international cooperation for sustainable development. Latin America, one of the regions with the most developing countries in the world, actively promotes the implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda and has a solid green economic foundation. In this sense, the region can be an important partner for China in achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda and building a shared future for humanity. China must continue to build consensus on development priorities with Latin American countries, plan key areas of cooperation according to their conditions and needs, promote connections between governments, businesses, universities, and media in China and Latin America, and jointly advance the green cooperation to a new level. China and Latin America have achieved multidisciplinary coverage in green cooperation. It is necessary to further improve the quality of cooperation in the future and achieve coordinated development across various sectors. For example, in the long term, the development of renewable energy will require greater energy storage capacity and wider electric grid coverage. Additionally, Chinese companies need to integrate more into local societies and generate greater social benefits while ensuring economic returns. They can strengthen cooperation with Latin American companies in order to quickly become familiar with local laws, regulations, and market conditions. Furthermore, more research — including environmental assessments and social consultations — should be conducted before launching projects. References CAF (2010). "Corporación Andina de Fomento, Visión para América Latina 2040 Hacia una sociedad más incluyente y próspera". https://scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/496/latinamerica_2040_summary_esp.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=yCELAC (2023). "Declaración de Buenos Aires". https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/prensa/declaracion_ de_buenos_aires_-_version_final.pdf CEPAL (2016). "El Foro de los Países de América Latina y el Caribe sobre el Desarrollo Sostenible y el Seguimiento Regional de la Agenda 2030". https://www.cepal.org/es/temas/agenda-2030-desarrollo-sostenible/ foro-paises-america-latina-caribe-desarrollo-sostenible-seguimiento-regional-la-agenda-2030Cote-Muñoz, N. (2019). "China's Green Investments Won't Undo Its Environmental Damage to Latin America". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-green-investments-wont-undo-its-environmental-damage-latin-americaFrance24 (2023). "Tasa de pobreza se mantiene en 29 % en América Latina en 2023". https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20231125-tasa-de-pobreza-se-mantiene-en-29-en-am%C3%A9rica-latina-en-2023-dice-cepalMinistry of Foreign Affairs of China (2021). "Global Development Initiative-Building on 2030 SDGs for Stronger, Greener and Healthier Global Development". https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/GDI_140002/wj/202406/ P020240606606193448267.pdfReventós, B. y N. Fabre (2023). "Los grupos indígenas en Argentina que se oponen a la extracción del litio". BBC. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cevzgv0elp9o Cuadernos de Nuestra América. No. 014 | Nueva Época 2025, Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI). Under CC BY-NC 4.0

International efforts, such as the Paris Agreement, aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But experts say countries aren’t doing enough to limit dangerous global warming. Summary Countries have debated how to combat climate change since the early 1990s. These negotiations have produced several important accords, including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Governments generally agree on the science behind climate change but have diverged on who is most responsible, how to track emissions-reduction goals, and whether to compensate harder-hit countries. The findings of the first global stocktake, discussed at the 2023 UN Climate Summit in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), concluded that governments need to do more to prevent the global average temperature from rising by 1.5°C. Introduction Over the last several decades, governments have collectively pledged to slow global warming. But despite intensified diplomacy, the world is already facing the consequences of climate change, and they are expected to get worse. Through the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere keeps rising, heating the Earth at an alarming rate. Scientists warn that if this warming continues unabated, it could bring environmental catastrophe to much of the world, including staggering sea-level rise, devastating wildfires, record-breaking droughts and floods, and widespread species loss. Since negotiating the Paris accord in 2015, many of the 195 countries that are party to the agreement have strengthened their climate commitments—to include pledges on curbing emissions and supporting countries in adapting to the effects of extreme weather—during the annual UN climate conferences known as the Conference of the Parties (COP). While experts note that clear progress has been made towards the clean energy transition, cutting current emissions has proven challenging for the world’s top emitters. The United States, for instance, could be poised to ramp up fossil fuel production linked to global warming under the Donald Trump administration, which has previously minimized the effects of climate change and has withdrawn twice from the Paris Agreement. What are the most important international agreements on climate change? Montreal Protocol, 1987. Though not intended to tackle climate change, the Montreal Protocol [PDF] was a historic environmental accord that became a model for future diplomacy on the issue. Every country in the world eventually ratified the treaty, which required them to stop producing substances that damage the ozone layer, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The protocol has succeeded in eliminating nearly 99 percent of these ozone-depleting substances. In 2016, parties agreed via the Kigali Amendment to also reduce their production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), powerful greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992. Ratified by 197 countries, including the United States, the landmark accord [PDF] was the first global treaty to explicitly address climate change. It established an annual forum, known as the Conference of the Parties, or COP, for international discussions aimed at stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These meetings produced the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Kyoto Protocol, 2005. The Kyoto Protocol [PDF], adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005, was the first legally binding climate treaty. It required developed countries to reduce emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels, and established a system to monitor countries’ progress. But the treaty did not compel developing countries, including major carbon emitters China and India, to take action. The United States signed the agreement in 1998 but never ratified it and later withdrew its signature.  Paris Agreement, 2015. The most significant global climate agreement to date, the Paris Agreement requires all countries to set emissions-reduction pledges. Governments set targets, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with the goals of preventing the global average temperature from rising 2°C (3.6°F) above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to keep it below 1.5°C (2.7°F). It also aims to reach global net-zero emissions, where the amount of greenhouse gases emitted equals the amount removed from the atmosphere, in the second half of the century. (This is also known as being climate neutral or carbon neutral.) The United States, the world’s second-largest emitter, is the only country to withdraw from the agreement, a move President Donald Trump made during his first administration in 2017. While former President Joe Biden reentered the agreement during his first day in office, Trump again withdrew the United States on the first day of his second administration in 2025. Three other countries have not formally approved the agreement: Iran, Libya, and Yemen. Is there a consensus on the science of climate change? Yes, there is a broad consensus among the scientific community, though some deny that climate change is a problem, including politicians in the United States. When negotiating teams meet for international climate talks, there is “less skepticism about the science and more disagreement about how to set priorities,” says David Victor, an international relations professor at the University of California, San Diego. The basic science is that:• the Earth’s average temperature is rising at an unprecedented rate; • human activities, namely the use of fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—are the primary drivers of this rapid warming and climate change; and,• continued warming is expected to have harmful effects worldwide. Data taken from ice cores shows that the Earth’s average temperature is rising more now than it has in eight hundred thousand years. Scientists say this is largely a result of human activities over the last 150 years, such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation. These activities have dramatically increased the amount of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere, causing the planet to warm. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN body established in 1988, regularly assesses the latest climate science and produces consensus-based reports for countries. Why are countries aiming to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C? Scientists have warned for years of catastrophic environmental consequences if global temperature continues to rise at the current pace. The Earth’s average temperature has already increased approximately 1.1°C above preindustrial levels, according to a 2023 assessment by the IPCC. The report, drafted by more than two hundred scientists from over sixty countries, predicts that the world will reach or exceed 1.5°C of warming within the next two decades even if nations drastically cut emissions immediately. (Several estimates report that global warming already surpassed that threshold in 2024.) An earlier, more comprehensive IPCC report summarized the severe effects expected to occur when the global temperature warms by 1.5°C: Heat waves. Many regions will suffer more hot days, with about 14 percent of people worldwide being exposed to periods of severe heat at least once every five years. Droughts and floods. Regions will be more susceptible to droughts and floods, making farming more difficult, lowering crop yields, and causing food shortages.  Rising seas. Tens of millions of people live in coastal regions that will be submerged in the coming decades. Small island nations are particularly vulnerable. Ocean changes. Up to 90 percent of coral reefs will be wiped out, and oceans will become more acidic. The world’s fisheries will become far less productive. Arctic ice thaws. At least once a century, the Arctic will experience a summer with no sea ice, which has not happened in at least two thousand years. Forty percent of the Arctic’s permafrost will thaw by the end of the century.  Species loss. More insects, plants, and vertebrates will be at risk of extinction.  The consequences will be far worse if the 2°C threshold is reached, scientists say. “We’re headed toward disaster if we can’t get our warming in check and we need to do this very quickly,” says Alice C. Hill, CFR senior fellow for energy and the environment. Which countries are responsible for climate change? The answer depends on who you ask and how you measure emissions. Ever since the first climate talks in the 1990s, officials have debated which countries—developed or developing—are more to blame for climate change and should therefore curb their emissions. Developing countries argue that developed countries have emitted more greenhouse gases over time. They say these developed countries should now carry more of the burden because they were able to grow their economies without restraint. Indeed, the United States has emitted the most of all time, followed by the European Union (EU).   However, China and India are now among the world’s top annual emitters, along with the United States. Developed countries have argued that those countries must do more now to address climate change.   In the context of this debate, major climate agreements have evolved in how they pursue emissions reductions. The Kyoto Protocol required only developed countries to reduce emissions, while the Paris Agreement recognized that climate change is a shared problem and called on all countries to set emissions targets. What progress have countries made since the Paris Agreement? Every five years, countries are supposed to assess their progress toward implementing the agreement through a process known as the global stocktake. The first of these reports, released in September 2023, warned governments that “the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.” That said, countries have made some breakthroughs during the annual UN climate summits, such as the landmark commitment to establish the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The fund aims to address the inequality of climate change by providing financial assistance to poorer countries, which are often least responsible for global emissions yet most vulnerable to climate disasters. At COP28, countries decided that the fund will be initially housed at the World Bank, with several wealthy countries, such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and EU members, initially pledging around $430 million combined. At COP29, developed countries committed to triple their finance commitments to developing countries, totalling $300 billion annually by 2035. Recently, there have been global efforts to cut methane emissions, which account for more than half of human-made warming today because of their higher potency and heat trapping ability within the first few decades of release. The United States and EU introduced a Global Methane Pledge at COP26, which aims to slash 30 percent of methane emissions levels between 2020 and 2030. At COP28, oil companies announced they would cut their methane emissions from wells and drilling by more than 80 percent by the end of the decade. However, pledges to phase out fossil fuels were not renewed the following year at COP29. Are the commitments made under the Paris Agreement enough? Most experts say that countries’ pledges are not ambitious enough and will not be enacted quickly enough to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. The policies of Paris signatories as of late 2022 could result in a 2.7°C (4.9°F) rise by 2100, according to the Climate Action Tracker compiled by Germany-based nonprofits Climate Analytics and the NewClimate Institute. “The Paris Agreement is not enough. Even at the time of negotiation, it was recognized as not being enough,” says CFR’s Hill. “It was only a first step, and the expectation was that as time went on, countries would return with greater ambition to cut their emissions.” Since 2015, dozens of countries—including the top emitters—have submitted stronger pledges. For example, President Biden announced in 2021 that the United States will aim to cut emissions by 50 to 52 percent compared to 2005 levels by 2030, doubling former President Barack Obama’s commitment. The following year, the U.S. Congress approved legislation that could get the country close to reaching that goal. Meanwhile, the EU pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030, and China said it aims to reach peak emissions before 2030. But the world’s average temperature will still rise more than 2°C (3.6°F) by 2100 even if countries fully implement their pledges for 2030 and beyond. If the more than one hundred countries that have set or are considering net-zero targets follow through, warming could be limited to 1.8˚C (3.2°F), according to the Climate Action Tracker.   What are the alternatives to the Paris Agreement? Some experts foresee the most meaningful climate action happening in other forums. Yale University economist William Nordhaus says that purely voluntary international accords like the Paris Agreement promote free-riding and are destined to fail. The best way to cut global emissions, he says, would be to have governments negotiate a universal carbon price rather than focus on country emissions limits. Others propose new agreements [PDF] that apply to specific emissions or sectors to complement the Paris Agreement.  In recent years, climate diplomacy has occurred increasingly through minilateral groupings. The Group of Twenty (G20), representing countries that are responsible for 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas pollution, has pledged to stop financing new coal-fired power plants abroad and agreed to triple renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade. However, G20 governments have thus far failed to set a deadline to phase out fossil fuels. In 2022, countries in the International Civil Aviation Organization set a goal of achieving net-zero emissions for commercial aviation by 2050. Meanwhile, cities around the world have made their own pledges. In the United States, more than six hundred local governments [PDF] have detailed climate action plans that include emissions-reduction targets. Industry is also a large source of carbon pollution, and many firms have said they will try to reduce their emissions or become carbon neutral or carbon negative, meaning they would remove more carbon from the atmosphere than they release. The Science Based Targets initiative, a UK-based company considered the “gold standard” in validating corporate net-zero plans, says it has certified the plans of  over three thousand firms, and aims to more than triple this total by 2025. Still, analysts say that many challenges remain, including questions over the accounting methods and a lack of transparency in supply chains. Recommended Resources This timeline tracks UN climate talks since 1992. CFR Education’s latest resources explain everything to know about climate change.  The Climate Action Tracker assesses countries’ updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement. CFR Senior Fellow Varun Sivaram discusses how the 2025 U.S. wildfires demonstrate the need to rethink climate diplomacy and adopt a pragmatic response to falling short of global climate goals. In this series on climate change and instability by the Center for Preventive Action, CFR Senior Fellow Michelle Gavin looks at the consequences for the Horn of Africa and the National Defense University’s Paul J. Angelo for Central America. This backgrounder by Clara Fong unpacks the global push for climate financing.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Nearly a fifth of the energy generated in the region never makes it to usage. Experts call for more energy planning, investment and control Latin America has made significant steps towards its energy transition. The region already generates 60% of its electricity from renewable sources, a figure that the International Energy Agency expects to continue to rise. However, there is one factor in this journey that receives limited attention – and is affecting the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from energy. Energy losses – the difference between the amount of electricity generated and the amount that is ultimately accounted for via consumer bills – averaged 17% per year in Latin America over the past three decades, according to a report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). It says this is three times higher than in developed countries. That represents between five and six million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per year, equivalent to the emissions of 1.3 million cars. Specialists have termed these as “compensatory emissions”, as more electricity generation is required to compensate for the losses. Countries with a higher share of fossil fuel generation, such as Argentina, Mexico and Colombia, are mainly responsible for these additional emissions. Energy losses affect all countries in the region and occur for both technical and non-technical reasons. The former refers to problems in transmission and distribution lines, mostly due to a lack of investment and infrastructure maintenance; the latter corresponds to energy delivered and not paid for by users, such as theft and energy fraud. “Energy losses have the potential to affect the fulfilment of the climate targets,” Ana Lía Rojas, executive director of the Chilean Association of Renewable Energy and Storage (Acera), tells Dialogue Earth. “Every unit of energy that is lost means more generation is needed to meet demand.” Energy losses Most electricity is produced in power plants and sent over long distances through high-voltage transmission lines. It then reaches consumers through the distribution network – the poles and wires that connect homes and businesses. This infrastructure can suffer from various problems that result in technical energy losses. For example, losses due to the resistance of the conductive material through which the energy flows, ageing infrastructure and malfunctioning transformers. While these are inherent problems in electricity transmission, experts agree that there is a general lack of investment in transmission and distribution networks across Latin America. “Decision-makers prioritise having energy, and the grid is left as a second priority. You have to invest in parallel in the grid and in generation – it’s about seeing the system as a whole,” Ramón Méndez, Uruguay’s former energy director, tells Dialogue Earth. “A deficient infrastructure can become a major economic and technical problem.” Between 2015 and 2021, investment in distribution and transmission infrastructure in the region fell by about 40%. Not only can this lead to energy losses, but it also leaves grids more exposed to extreme weather events and can lead to service problems, which particularly affect vulnerable populations. In Latin America, most electricity losses occur in the distribution system. This is mostly due to non-technical factors, such as energy theft, says Santiago López Cariboni. A professor of economics at the University of the Republic of Uruguay, he co-authored the IDB’s energy losses report. “It is energy that is produced and transported, but not consumed legally. People break or tamper with meters or run a cable straight from the grid to their homes or businesses,” López Cariboni tells Dialogue Earth. “Even if governments could cut off the power to all those homes, they wouldn’t do it – it would create a huge social and economic problem.” A user that steals energy consumes up to three times more than one that does not, estimates López Cariboni. By not paying a tariff, people have no incentive to consume less or to have low-consumption technology. According to the IDB report, irregular connections are related to the disorderly growth of Latin American cities in recent decades. The dumping of energy Although it does not generate emissions, renewable energy can also generate a problem of energy losses. This has happened recently in Chile. The share of solar and wind energy reached a record 40% of the country’s energy generation in 2024. However, as their weight in the mix increases, so do energy losses. This phenomenon, also known as curtailment, occurs because the development of renewable projects is progressing much faster than available transmission and storage capacity. In 2024, 5,900 gigawatt hours (GWh) of power were wasted in Chile, 148% more than in 2023. The figure represents 20% of the solar and wind energy generated by the country, estimates Lía Rojas. Jorge Leal Saldivia, a partner at the Chilean renewable energy company LAS Energy, says this wasting corresponds mainly to solar energy generated in the north of the country. “The transmission infrastructure is not in place to be able to bring that energy to central and southern Chile. The lines become congested, and the energy has to be dumped,” he tells Dialogue Earth. Rodrigo Palma, a researcher at the Energy Centre of the University of Chile, tells Dialogue Earth there have been delays in energy planning: “The entry into operation of solar and wind has not stopped, and the rate of entry is greater than the rate of capacity-building by the state. This may slow down the penetration of renewables into our energy system.” By 2040, all coal-fired power plants will have to cease operating in Chile. This is expected to be mostly compensated for by renewable energy. In April, the government announced a tender for eight new projects to upgrade the grid, adding to 12 projects launched last year. One of the biggest initiatives, the Kimal-Lo Aguirre transmission line, is now under review after complaints from social and environmental groups. Possible solutions Half of the 26 countries analysed in the IDB report have experienced greater energy losses in recent years, highlighting the urgent need for solutions. Honduras, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic lose more than 30% of their energy, followed by more than 20% in Jamaica, Paraguay and Guyana. The IDB also highlights how grids face increasing vulnerability and impacts due to climate change. Specialists consulted by Dialogue Earth highlight the need for comprehensive planning by governments to address losses. For technical losses, the incorporation of technology can help, such as smart meters and storage. For the non-technical ones, a social policy perspective needs to be added, says López Cariboni. “Societies justify energy theft by necessity; they see energy as a right,” he explains. “For those who can pay, you can work with sanctions and regulations. But for those who can’t, the state should formalise those losses and take it as part of their budget. It’s more public expenditure, but it’s an expenditure that is already being made.” Martin Dapelo, a member of the board of directors for the Argentine Chamber of Renewable Energies (Cader), questions the lack of progress in the region on smart metering. “It is the first big step. We are missing out on the possibility of measuring in real time,” he tells Dialogue Earth. In storage, Chile has so far been the only country in the region to take the first steps. Distributed generation – energy generated by consumers themselves in small-scale, localised systems – is also on the region’s solutions list. These arrangements place solar or wind farms at the site of consumption, for example among housing or industry. This removes the need for energy transportation, avoiding grid overload. “We have gotten used to the idea that planning has to be indicative, and that it is the market that decides which direction to take with the energy sector. The case of Chile, with an oversupply of solar, but without transmission grids, shows that this is not the case,” say Méndez. “The optimal system is one that looks at the whole and determines the best combination.” This article was originally published by Dialogue Earth under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском So far in the 21st century, we are witnessing the consolidation of an international division of labor in which the levers of economic, political, and technological power are increasingly decoupled from local capacities for the vast majority of nations and relocated to the international arena. The cooperative competition among oligopolistic forces vying for control of key assets to secure global hegemony—energy, finance, digital technology, logistics, military, and space—is one of the fundamental vectors of this framework. The constant expansion of these forces is rooted in the constitutive interaction between giant corporations in strategic sectors and the core states of the new poly-globalization—namely the United States and China—whose geopolitical rivalry is intrinsically linked to the success of the accumulation regime. The oligopolies and their centers of origin appropriate the market and innovation rents generated by the new productive map, accumulating a structural and relational power (in Susan Strange’s terms) that is quickly and markedly outpacing the rest. In this way, both companies and states outside these core zones are being pushed into increasingly dependent positions regarding the technologies, goods, and basic services produced by the winning oligopolies. They are, we might say, being shifted to the new extended periphery. How does this happen? What role does technology play, and where is Latin America in this story? GEOPOLITICS Today, the United States and China sit at the center, while the rest of the world occupies the periphery. UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebecca Grynspan (2023) describes the novel emergence of “centers within the periphery” as part of a process she calls poly-globalization: both China’s rise to the top ranks of global power and the consolidation of highly productive and commercial hubs in other parts of Asia challenge the sustainability of the post–Cold War unipolar world and the traditional North–South divide. Within this framework, historical peripheral dependency does not disappear, but rather changes in form and geography—especially considering that a growing number of developed countries are becoming productively and technologically dependent on countries like China, more so than the reverse (a case in point is Germany in the automotive industry; Zhang & Lustenberger, 2025). However, the periphery is not a homogeneous entity, and not all regions and countries have the same capacities or room for maneuver within this scheme, where starting points significantly shape long-term trajectories. Developed countries (formerly located at the center) remain better equipped than developing countries to face the challenges of their new condition. We can conceptualize the peripheral configuration as tiers or peripheral rings: there is no “semi-periphery”, but rather tiers or rings within the periphery. From this perspective, we might say that Western Europe constitutes a first peripheral ring (1st tier periphery), and industrialized Asia a second ring (2nd tier periphery). Latin America, in this framework, occupies a third ring: it possesses certain accumulated productive capabilities, but due to being more "distant" from the center in terms of the criticality of its production, it receives fewer benefits from integration into major global value chains in terms of investment and technological learning (as Evolutionary Economics and Latin American Development Theory have long pointed out, producing semiconductors, AI, or green hydrogen technology —as in Taiwan, India, or Germany, respectively— is not the same than assembling automobiles as in Mexico and Argentina). In this scenario, the Latin American region—historically subordinated to a single center (the North-Center)—is now subordinate to two. China has been rapidly tightening its economic ties with the region, primarily through trade and financial assistance (Dussel Peters, 2021; Ugarteche & De León, 2020; Villasenin, 2021). Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, rose from less than 1% of the region’s total FDI in 2012 to 10.8% in 2019 (although it still lags behind investment from the US and the European Union) (Dussel Peters, 2022). The Asian giant is already Brazil’s main trading partner, is rapidly deepening its ties with Mexico, and an increasing number of countries across the continent have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, including Argentina since 2022 (the other two major Latin American economies have not joined so far). However, the benefits of these relationships for the region remain ambivalent: on the one hand, they have reduced financial dependence on the US—a significant achievement—but they have not yet translated into higher value-added development such as export diversification or upgrading. On the contrary, they have tended to reinforce the trend toward re-commoditization of local economies (Wainer, 2023; Alami et al., 2025). DIGITAL ECONOMY The current dynamics of the tech industry are particularly illustrative of the broader landscape described above, and for that reason, we take it as a focal point of observation. Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei—the flagship tech giants of the US and China, commonly referred to as Big Tech (BT)—operate collectively as a global oligopoly. This formation increasingly relegates Latin America to the role of data provider and accelerates the shift of other industrial powers from technology innovators to adopters—that is, to a position of subsidiarity. To this picture we must add Nvidia, the Musk ecosystem, and DeepSeek, among other firms whose products and executives carry significant weight in the global chain of technological decision-making, beyond even their specific market shares. No country outside of the US and China has leading firms in AI, cloud computing, advanced chip knowledge, or 5G champions (with the exception of Ericsson in the latter sector, which remains Swedish. It’s worth noting that Nokia is not included here, as although its production and brand profile are still centered in Norway, the largest shareholding stake belongs to BlackRock). An example of an interesting yet ultimately failed challenge to Big Tech dominance in large-scale projects is the European federated cloud initiative Gaia-X (European Association for Data and Cloud AISBL, https://gaia-x.eu/about/). Originally promoted by the Ministers of economic affairs of Germany and France, Gaia-X is a non-profit international association that brings together companies, state agencies, and third-sector organizations involved in European industrial and technological development (such as SAP, Siemens, the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, or Luxembourg’s National Data Service, alongside hundreds of SMEs). Its aim is to pool capabilities in order to create a large shared cloud infrastructure that allows companies and public bodies to store and develop applications securely—that is, independent of servers located outside the continent that fail to meet European data protection standards. In short, the goal is to enable competition with US tech giants and ultimately establish a “gold standard” in data security that tends to exclude them—driven by European governments’ stated concern over the region’s digital sovereignty. The conceptually appealing strategy of combining the complementary capacities of local companies of different sizes on a single platform and offering joint products, initially acted as a carrot for the industry (over 300 members joined, up from 22 at the beginning). However, over time, even the governments most vocal about sovereignty declined to adopt Gaia-X as a primary provider: Germany, for instance, signed a €3 billion agreement with Oracle Cloud (a strategic partner of AWS, Microsoft, and Nvidia) to provide cloud services in 2024. To this day, US tech giants continue to control 70% of the European cloud market (Gooding, 2024). Gaia-X remains a valuable project with over five years of development, but with frankly limited real-world reach—also, it must be said, due in part to the tech giants’ own offensive, as they increasingly offer services aimed at the “territorialization” of data (e.g., https://www.oracle.com/cloud/sovereign-cloud/what-is-sovereign-cloud/). As things stand, the European industrial powers do not control the supply, circulation, or demand of digital technologies, and major Asian players—such as India or Taiwan—occupy intermediate links in the value chains of either the Western bloc or China, depending on the case. This kind of displacement is not so surprising when we consider the oligopolistic dynamics that currently govern the global economy, involving the leadership of core countries across all strategic sectors. Particularly in the digital economy. Oligopoly is a market structure in which a small number of firms control the supply of certain goods and/or services—that is, a large-scale market dominated by a few major sellers, who are often interconnected. Oligopolies are everywhere (in oil, automotive, telecommunications, and more), but in certain sectors, structural traits such as the hyper-scale at which production is viable and profitable, the pace of innovation required for sectoral expansion, or the relevance of brand reputation drive the formation of so-called natural oligopolies (NOs): markets in which open competition (several smaller actors producing the same and rotating their market shares over time) would tend to hinder efficient production. In these markets, the number of firms capable of minimizing total industry costs is “naturally” low, due to the high entry barriers that are established. Each NO actor holds considerable market power, allowing it to develop productive and technological capacities in a privileged way over long periods. As a result, the minimum threshold for joining the oligopoly becomes increasingly difficult for outsiders to overcome. This is the case in sectors such as the extraction of scarce and critical natural resources (like lithium), energy generation and supply (e.g., wind farms), large physical and cyber-physical infrastructure for logistics (commercial ports and oceanic bridges, 5G, or submarine internet cables), or transversal digital technologies (like AI, big data, or cloud computing). All of these require massive upfront investments, accumulated know-how, strong commercialization capacity, and the ability to retain rents—which includes “artificial” legal barriers such as intellectual property rights, trade secrets, and various mechanisms to capture innovation rents. It’s not the same to have oil reserves in your territory and develop or invite companies to exploit them (which several countries do, with companies of varying sizes) as it is to develop powerful AI models using 20 years of data from the entire public internet (which only OpenAI-Microsoft of the US originally achieved with ChatGPT, even though the data came from millions of people around the world). In fact, comparable AI capabilities have only been reached by Google’s Gemini and the open-source DeepSeek model recently developed in China following US sanctions on Nvidia chip acquisitions. In a technological oligopoly, the ability to invest and innovate at scale grants companies significant prospective power: they can pour enormous sums into R&D and start-up acquisitions to develop innovations that will pay off a decade later—after numerous failed attempts costing millions—thus shaping future markets in the process (Google, for example, has heavily invested in AI development since the 1990s and has, at times, acquired one start-up per week). Additionally, NO actors actively exclude potential competitors outside the oligopoly through more questionable mechanisms such as collusion or lobbying, among others (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). Today, given the broad productive and geographic scope of global value chains and the extreme concentration of investment capacity typical of financial capitalism, more and more markets are becoming structured as natural oligopolies. Especially in digital technologies. Only Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, and Google together dominate 75% of the global cloud computing market (with respective shares of 47.8%, 15.5%, 7.7%, and 4%, according to Gartner, 2024), a sector whose relevance is crucial for the development of technologies such as generative AI. In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft also became owners or lessees of more than half of the world’s submarine bandwidth capacity—a market historically controlled by states and large telecommunications companies like NEC, Alcatel, and Fujitsu, which still make up the backbone of global data traffic infrastructure (Business Research Insights, 2025). Huawei is the world’s largest supplier of telecommunications equipment, particularly for 5G networks and smartphones, holding a 28% share of the global market and over 4,000 patents (Merino et al., 2023). This helps explain Donald Trump’s insistence on making it both a material and symbolic target in the US-China trade war. The fact that Big Tech companies share technological and market domains—beyond specializing in particular niches—fuels an intense internal competitive race that, unlike monopolies, drives continuous innovation. This means that, in addition to competing to outdo one another, these firms also cooperate extensively to maintain their global leadership far ahead of the rest of the market: each company develops interoperability features to ensure their apps function properly on others’ platforms, and they share open source projects on GitHub (now owned by Microsoft), for instance. Microsoft has contributed significantly to the development of AI in China through its Microsoft Research Asia lab in Beijing and collaborations with Chinese institutions such as the National University of Defense Technology (Hung, 2025)—efforts that neither the US nor Chinese governments have blocked. Long before the current reloaded geopolitical confrontation emerged, core-country governments had already been promoting initiatives aimed at the expansion and globalization of their tech firms, such as China’s Digital Silk Road (Borrastero, 2024) or Silicon Valley itself in the US (it bears repeating just how much state R&D funding is packed inside an iPhone; Mazzucato, 2013). And what each state has done to strengthen its own technological base has ended up, in some way, benefiting the other. Consider, for example, that what China’s customs agency classifies as “foreign-invested enterprises” are mostly US-based companies, which control three-quarters of the country’s most advanced high-tech products. These include large-scale electronics exports that often involve importing key components from the US, assembling them in China via foreign companies like Foxconn (which builds Apple’s iPhones), and then exporting them. At the same time, private Chinese firms have also expanded their role in these core exports, going from virtually zero in the 1990s to over 20% today (Kenji Starrs, 2025). The offshoring of US tech production has helped the US continue leading by producing more cheaply, and has helped China learn how to lead too. As can be seen, the actors of a Global Technological Oligopoly (GTO) are deeply interdependent. To this picture, we must add the increasingly blatant symbiosis between dominant governments and individual stakeholders, as exemplified by the Trump-Musk case. We are no longer simply talking about "public-private complexes", "revolving doors" or "intimate relations". These notions describe very close ties, but between separate entities. What we are seeing now is a kind of fusion (or confusion) between a tiny handful of public and private actors who are able to govern strategic global value chains and set the rules of the game for the rest of the world. In China’s case, the country is characterized by what Weber and Qi (2022) describe as a “state-constituted market economy”: a strong state deeply intertwined with a fundamentally marketized economy, resulting in a political-economic balance that differs somewhat from Western models but still yields a global power that is difficult to challenge. In sum, we are witnessing a competition scheme designed for the very few, that generates a spiraling cycle of leveraged success in which core states play a crucial role. LATIN AMERICA A scheme like this reinforces Latin America's historic peripheral condition. GTO companies operate directly within the territory (setting up data centers, having subsidiaries, providing services, among other things), but they also rely on regional actors to amplify the generation of indigenous data, the large-scale paid consumption of BT’s technological infrastructures, and the global dissemination of their business models. The free domestic use of email applications or social networks enables data capture, but not the monetization of digital assets, whose massive volume comes from services provided to businesses and governments (as someone aptly put it, Amazon is famous for its store but rich from its servers; Lacort, 2021). In Latin America, there is a handful of large technology companies – the so-called 'tecnolatinas' – that replicate the e-marketplace, fintech, or cryptocurrency development models characteristic of the BT, managing to stand out as champions in the regional league far ahead of the rest. However, they continue to be dependent users of the fundamental technologies produced by the GTO. Mercado Libre, originally from Argentina, is the largest and most widely used digital platform on the continent, the one with the highest market value, and the first to be listed on Nasdaq. Modeled after Alibaba, it is a marketplace with an integrated online payments and credit system, technology development and service divisions, and an extensive ground-based logistics infrastructure. For its data storage and management, Mercado Libre is a client of Amazon Web Services (AWS): it processes over 40 purchases per second across 18 countries and has migrated more than 5,000 databases to Amazon DynamoDB (AWS, 2021). As of 2024, it was using nearly a dozen services from the tech giant with which it had signed an agreement to reduce its data computing costs by 13% (AWS, 2024). The other two regional champions, both Brazilian in origin, also maintain strong ties with the BTs: the marketplace Magazine Luiza runs on Google Cloud; and the fully digital bank Nubank (of Nu Holdings) is an AWS client, has received investments from Warren Buffett, Tencent Holdings and Sequoia Capital, and many of its executives have worked at Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Alibaba. The following chart illustrates the stark imbalance in market value and profits between the GTO firms, other global tech giants, and two of Latin America's top champions, in descending order: Source: Own elaboration based on data from Forbes Global 2000 (2024).* Originally in Borrastero & Juncos (2024).** Magazine Luiza is not publicly traded.  Regional firms, in turn, capture data from countless Latin American users, acquire local start-ups, participate in scientific research networks, and work with governments to access tax and especially regulatory benefits—mechanisms that enable their gradual “giantization” (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). In short, they are part of this kind of stratified oligopoly led by Big Tech, which tecnolatinas help sustain while securing their regional slice of the pie. Far from being a marginal arena, despite Latin America’s relatively low share in global cross-border data flows compared to Asia or Europe (UNCTAD, 2021), the region represents a key market to conquer. This includes sectors with crucial resources for Big Tech’s vertical integration strategies, such as lithium. For instance, Tesla is one of the main buyers of Arcadium Lithium, which operates in the salt flats of northern Argentina, and along with other tech moguls like Bill Gates, is planning new direct investments and investments in companies developing technologies related to extraction (such as Lake Resources, which works on reducing freshwater usage in lithium mining) (López King, 2025). Big Tech companies form true global ecosystems for resource capture and the monetization of informational assets, supported by states and firms across the globe. SYSTEMIC RISKS One of the main problems of the dynamics described so far is the deepening of the international division of learning which—already highly unequal—continues to grow at breakneck speed, while technological learning becomes increasingly fundamental to value creation, and peripheral states are less and less equipped to deal with ever-larger corporations. In this context, peripheral countries risk becoming mere providers of informational raw material for platforms developed in the global centers, and end up having to pay for the digital intelligence extracted from them. Meanwhile, industrial hyper-concentration makes it increasingly difficult for the market to address these structural issues on its own. Rent refers to income derived from control over a scarce and strategic asset. The oligopolistic control of such rent-generating assets by central countries drives an endogenous concentration of rent in the central regions, and the result, in terms of income distribution both between and within nations, is a deepening of inequality at all levels (UNCTAD, 2021; Milanovic, 2019; Torres and Ahumada, 2022). Another major issue stemming from the scale reached by dominant actors and the penetration of their digital infrastructures is how difficult it has become to reverse the technological path — in terms of how to generate and provide services in a different way, while maintaining the reach and quality. Just imagine, for example, trying to establish alternative global data traffic routes or to produce world-class AI for diagnosing and treating rare diseases, without at some point relying on the technological resources of the oligopoly. The key question is how societies across the globe can harness these accumulated technological capabilities for collective purposes, without depending so heavily on heteronormative political and market-driven decisions. The list of systemic risks is a long one, and there isn’t space here to delve into the broader political dimensions of the issue. But it is worth highlighting these two particular risks tied to the current techno-economic order, given their impact on the very possibility of building concrete alternatives. LOCAL INITIATIVE Latin America enjoys neither structural power (that is, the ability to shape the rules of the game in terms of production, finance, security, or the global control of knowledge and culture), nor relational power in relation to other regions with accumulated techno-productive capacities (the ability to influence other actors into doing something they otherwise wouldn’t, following Strange’s 1988 classification). This essay may lean more toward pessimism of the intellect than optimism of the will when it comes to the global order within which Latin America must forge a new place.  Yet it is clear that the continent holds bargaining potential, rooted in the fact that it remains a highly coveted region for all the reasons discussed above—and many more (including the fact that it is, for now, a territory free of military wars). In the context of a “divide and conquer” logic typical of today’s intensified inter-core battles, strategies of absolute alignment with any single power are far from the wisest. The global oligopolistic economy will only deepen Latin America’s peripheral status if countries in the region fail to adopt a solidary non-alignment—or poly-alignment—approach, one that allows them to consolidate minimum thresholds of technological sovereignty. From dependent adoption to sovereign adoption (deciding what and how to adopt in order to learn), and from there to emancipation (integrating and developing what is needed for the people’s well-being). In Brazil, multiple state-led projects are underway to develop a sovereign data economy in collaboration with small and medium-sized enterprises and the academic sector (Gonzalo & Borrastero, forthcoming), along with large-scale initiatives to build national tech and energy infrastructures by leveraging the techno-productive capabilities accumulated over decades by Petrobras, BNDES, the national research council, and public venture capital funds (Alami et al., 2025). Mexico and Colombia are currently undergoing political processes inspired by the ideals of a “common home” and the care of virtual lands, advocating for continental unity on the one hand and strict regulation of Big Tech on the other (BBC News Mundo, 2025; Forbes Central America, 2025; Government of Colombia, 2024; Colombian Presidency, 2025; Wired, 2025). Argentina has a range of digital development projects based on policy frameworks designed to autonomously leverage the productive capacity the country has accumulated since the 1940s (Gonzalo & Borrastero, 2023)—though these efforts have been obstructed by the pro-Trump government of Javier Milei. EPILOGUE As these lines are being written, stock markets around the globe are tumbling amid the tariff war unleashed by the United States, forcing everyone else to adjust. Even the “Magnificent Seven” (Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla) have lost billions in just a few days. This raises the question of whether we are witnessing the birth of a new international economic order. Whether this is a true turning point or merely another heightened episode in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry remains to be seen. What we can already observe, however, is that global control over strategic assets for development places the GTO and core economies in a structurally advantageous position to lead long-term value chains. At the same time, the polycrisis opens up opportunities for marginalized regions to seize the momentum and assert their own demands. In financial capitalism, not everything is determined in the marketplace, and amid widespread and persistent instability, self-determination remains, without a doubt, one of the most powerful antidotes. References Alami, I., DiCarlo, J., Rolf, S. & Schindler, S. (2025). The New Frontline. The US-China battle for control of global networks. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 2.AWS (2024). Mercado Libre acelera el time to market con servicios de la nube de AWS. Amazon Web Services. Recuperado de: https://aws.amazon.com/es/solutions/case-studies/mercado-libre-migration/.AWS (2021). Mercado Libre escala su negocio y mejora su fiabilidad al migrar 5000 bases de datos a Amazon DynamoDB. Recuperado de: https://aws.amazon.com/es/solutions/case-studies/mercado-libre-dynamodb/.BBC News Mundo (2025). Plan México: cómo es el ambicioso proyecto de Claudia Sheinbaum para colocar a su país entre las 10 principales economías del mundo. BBC News Mundo, 15 Enero 2025. Recuperado de: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cre8ze0dvdno.Borrastero, C. (2024). Estado, empresas y factores geopolíticos en el sendero de desarrollo de las redes 5G en Argentina. Estudios Sociales del Estado, 10(19), pp. 104-138.Borrastero, C. y Juncos, I. (2024). El Oligopolio Tecnológico Global, la periferia digital y América Latina. Desarrollo Económico, 64(243), pp. 110-136.Business Research Insights (2025). Submarine Cable Market Size, Share, Growth and Industry Analysis, By Type        (Impregnated Paper Insulated Cable, Oil-filled Cable), By Application (Shallow Sea, Deep Sea), and Regional Insight and Forecast to 2033). Retrieved from: https://www.businessresearchinsights.com/market-reports/submarine-cable-market-121770Dussel Peters, E. (2022). Capitalismo con características chinas. Conceptos y desa-rrollo en la tercera década del siglo XXI. El Trimestre Económico, 89(354).Dussel Peters, E. (2021). Monitor de la OFDI China en América Latina y el Caribe 2021. Recuperado de: https://www.redalc-china.org/monitor/images/pdfs/menuprincipal /DusselPeters_MonitorOFDI_2021_Esp.pdfForbes Centroamérica (2025). Petro aboga por la colaboración entre países ante tensión entre multilateralismo y soledad. Forbes Centroamérica, 9 Abril 2025. Recuperado de: https://forbescentroamerica.com/2025/04/09/petro-aboga-por-la-colaboracion-entre-paises-ante-tension-entre-multilateralismo-y-soledad.Gartner (2024). Gartner Says Worldwide IaaS Public Cloud Services Revenue Grew 16.2% in 2023. Retrieved from: https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2024-07-22-gartner-says-worldwide-iaas-public-cloud-services-revenue-grew-16-point-2-percent-in-2023Gonzalo, M. y Borrastero, C. (2025). América Latina y la “Economía de datos”: definiciones, temas de agenda e implicancias de política, en Lastres, H. y Cassiolato, J. Economia Política de Dados e Soberania Digital: conceitos, desafios e experiências no mundo, ContraCorrente, en prensa.Gonzalo, M. y Borrastero, C. (2023). Misión 7 “Profundizar el avance de la digitalización escalando la estructura productiva y empresarial nacional”. En Argentina Productiva 2030 - Plan para el Desarrollo Productivo, Industrial y Tecnológico. Ministerio de Economía de la Nación, Argentina.Gooding, M. (2024). Gaia-X: Has Europe's grand digital infrastructure project hit the buffers?. Data Center Dynamics, May 13th 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/gaia-x-has-europes-grand-digital-infrastructure-project-hit-the-buffers/Grynspan, R. (2023). Globalización dislocada: Prebisch, desbalances comerciales y el futuro de la economía global. Revista de la CEPAL, 141, 45-56.Gobierno de Colombia (2024). Estrategia Nacional Digital de Colombia 2023-2026. Recuperado de: https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/715/articles-334120_recurso_1.pdf.Hung, K. (2025). Beyond Big Tech Geopolitics. Moving Towards Local and People-Centred Artificial Intelligence. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 10.Kenji Starrs, S. (2025). Can China Challenge the US Empire?. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 6.Lacort, J. (2021). Así es como gana dinero Amazon: cada vez más nube y un futuro de producciones audiovisuals. Xataka, 3 Febrero 2021. Recuperado de: https://www.xataka.com/empresas-y-economia/asi-como-gana-dinero-amazon-cada-vez-nube-futuro-producciones-audiovisuales-1López King. E. (2025). Litio: Argentina pudo unir a Elon Musk y a Bill Gates en una inversión clave en la que ambos coinciden. Litio.com.ar. Recuperado de: https://litio.com.ar/litio-argentina-pudo-unir-a-elon-musk-y-a-bill-gates-en-una-inversion-clave-en-la-que-ambos-coinciden/Mazzucato, M. (2013). The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. London: Anthem Press.Merino, G., Bilmes, J. y Barrenegoa, A. (2023). Economía en el (des)orden mundial: Ascenso de China, estancamiento del norte global y nuevo paradigma tecno-económico en disputa. Instituto Tricontinental de Investigación Social, Cuaderno 5.Milanovic, B. (2019). Capitalism, Alone. The Future of the System That Rules the World. Harvard University Press.Presidencia de Colombia (2025). Intervención del Presidente Gustavo Petro Urrego durante la plenaria IX Cumbre de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC), Tegucigalpa, 9 de Abril de 2025. Recuperado de: https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1727297164867599Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets. An introduction to International Political Economy. Pinter Publishers, London.Torres, M. y Ahumada, J. M. (2022). Las relaciones centro-periferia en el siglo XXI. El Trimestre Económico, LXXXIX (1), 53, 151-195.Ugarteche, Ó. y De León, C. (2020). El financiamiento de China a América Latina. http://www.obela.org/analisis/el-financiamiento-de-china-a-ame¬rica-latina#:~:text=EnLatinoaméricaexisten4sucursales,en Brasil%2C Chile y PerúUNCTAD (2021). Digital Economy Report 2021. Cross-border data flows and development: For whom the data flow. Recuperado de https://unctad.org/publication/digital-economy-report-2021.Villasenin, L. (2021). Las oportunidades de América Latina en su relación con China en el siglo XXI. Interacción Sino-Iberoamericana / Sino-Iberoamerican Interaction, 1(1).Wainer, A. (2023). ¿Un puente al desarrollo? Cambios en el comercio de América Latina con Estados Unidos y China. Problemas del Desarrollo. Revista Latinoamericana de Economía, 54(213).Weber, I. & Qi, H. (2022). The state-constituted market economy: A conceptual framework for China’s state–market relations. Economics Department Working Paper Series, 319, University of Massachusetts Amherst.Wired (2025). Claudia Sheinbaum propone aumentar los impuestos a plataformas como Google, Netflix y Amazon en México. Wired.es, 17 Febrero 2025. Recuperado de: https://es.wired.com/articulos/claudia-sheinbaum-propone-aumentar-los-impuestos-a-plataformas-como-google-netflix-y-amazon-en-mexico.Zhang, Y. & Lustenberger, U. (2025). Balancing Protectionism and Innovation: The Future of the European Automotive Industry in the Age of Chinese Electric Vehicles. Singularity Academy Frontier Review, #20250219.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In the current global disorder, the countries that comprise Latin America are simultaneously emerging as key players in tipping the balance of global power and are courted by major powers seeking influence and access to their natural resources, infrastructure, and services. For a decade, China has been growing in importance in the region, driven by its interest in establishing itself there through the Belt and Road Initiative, loans, investment, and construction, challenging the United States for relevance on the continent as a preferred ally. Currently, another player of the magnitude of India is slowly but surely making inroads in Latin America in trade, financing, and political relations, and is being courted by many Latin American states as an alternative to the risks that staking everything on an alliance with China can entail. Brazil, the undisputed regional leader, maintains privileged relations with both Asian giants, and the three countries cooperate and share interests and forums, such as the BRICS+ and the G20+, where common projects are developed. Introduction: a relationship with historical background The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization led to growing regional competition in Asia, focused on both political influence and economic dominance. One of the most significant developments in the aftermath of these transformations has been the consolidation of China as a regional and, subsequently, global power. In the current context, China, India, and other nations are seeking to expand their alliances and redefine their strategies, including their relationship with Latin America, a region that has experienced multiple phases of engagement with external actors throughout its history. During the 19th and 20th centuries, interaction was centered on Europe and the United States; however, since the 21st century, the dynamics have diversified and taken on a multipolar character. Today, Latin American countries are the object of interest of various powers, from China and Japan to India and Iran. While China's presence in Latin America is evident and significant, India has traditionally maintained a more distant stance, except for Brazil.1 For decades, the limited interaction between India and Latin America was mainly attributed to factors such as geographical remoteness and lack of strategic opportunities. However, this perception has changed since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. In recent years, China has considerably expanded its influence in the region through various mechanisms, while India seeks first to integrate into this dynamic and, in the medium, to compete with China in certain areas. China has established itself as one of Latin America's main trading partners, as well as one of its largest global lenders and investors.2 Its influence does not currently compare with that of India, but rivals that of the United States, the only country that surpasses it in terms of exports and imports in the continent, and the European Union in multiple sectors. In the political and diplomatic sphere, China has made significant progress, such as persuading five Latin American countries - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama - to transfer their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China, although Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay are still doing so. It has also established alliances with countries sanctioned by the US - Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela - which it has supported with loans, military cooperation, and investment. However, in a context of global uncertainty, several Latin American countries are seeking to diversify their strategic alliances and reduce the risks of excessive dependence on a single power. In this scenario, India emerges as a relevant actor, with the potential to balance China's presence in the medium term in key sectors such as trade, infrastructure, supply chains, technology and defence, where India still has ample room for growth in the continent. China in Latin America: economic and strategic expansion China has indisputably been the most influential actor in Latin America between the two Asian powers, especially in the economic sphere, standing out for its participation in infrastructure projects in the Southern Cone as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Since the beginning of the 21st century, its presence in the region has grown rapidly, with Chinese state-owned companies consolidating themselves as key players in strategic sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology, surpassing in some areas even the United States, traditionally dominant in these areas. In addition, China has strengthened its influence through cultural and diplomatic mechanisms. The links between China and Latin America have historical roots dating back to the 16th century, when the Manila Galleon facilitated the exchange of goods such as porcelain, silk and spices between China and the Viceroyalty of New Spain. After the independence of Latin American countries in the 1840s, there was a major Chinese migration, with hundreds of thousands of workers employed on sugar plantations, in mines and as servants in countries such as Cuba and Peru, a phenomenon that persisted throughout the 19th century. Today, Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela are home to the largest Chinese communities on the continent. Initially, most Latin American countries did not recognize Mao's government after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949; however, following US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, most Latin American states established diplomatic relations with Beijing, thus initiating a period of cooperation in the cultural, economic and political spheres. On the economic front, China has established itself as a major player. In 2000, the Chinese market represented less than 2 % of Latin American and Caribbean exports, but its demand, especially for raw materials, has grown exponentially.3 By 2024, China would absorb 17% of these exports, with a value of more than 500 billion dollars.4 The main products exported by the region include soybeans and other vegetables, copper, oil and other raw materials, while imports from China consist mainly of manufactured goods. In countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, China has become the main trading partner.5 The strengthening of economic ties has been formalized through comprehensive strategic partnerships with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. China has also signed free trade agreements with Chile - the first country in the region to do so in 2005 - Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru, while negotiations with Uruguay remain stalled. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, twenty-two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have signed agreements with China, which have facilitated investments and loans amounting to more than USD 9 billion, equivalent to 6 % of China's total investment abroad. These investments, managed through the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank, have largely gone to energy and infrastructure projects, in many cases in exchange for oil. Venezuela has been the main recipient, doubling the amount received by Brazil, the second largest recipient.6 China's impact in Latin America is manifested in infrastructure development and the energy sector. Chinese investments have financed the construction of refineries and processing plants in countries with coal, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium deposits. In the case of copper, China is the main buyer of Chilean production, purchasing more than 40 % of the country's exports. China has also taken a special interest in lithium, with significant investments in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, countries that make up the so-called 'Lithium Triangle' and account for approximately half of global lithium reserves, although the development of these projects has raised environmental concerns.7 At the same time, China has promoted the financing of renewable energies, with outstanding initiatives such as the largest solar plant in Latin America in Jujuy, Argentina, and the Punta Sierra wind farm in Coquimbo, Chile. Since former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's historic thirteen-day tour of Latin America in 2001, high-level political exchanges have intensified. President Xi Jinping has visited the region five times since coming to power in 2013, most recently in November 2024, when he reaffirmed the construction of major projects, including the port of Chancay in Peru.8 China has financed various infrastructure projects in Latin America, including airports, roads, ports and rail networks. Chinese companies control more than a hundred ports around the world, of which at least a dozen are in Latin America and the Caribbean.9 In terms of technology and communications, China has promoted projects in artificial intelligence, smart cities and 5G networks, with the participation of companies such as Huawei. Likewise, cooperation in space has become relevant, with the installation of the largest Chinese space base abroad in Argentine Patagonia and the construction of satellite ground stations in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.10 China has also consolidated its presence in Latin America through soft power strategies, strengthening cultural and educational ties through the Confucius Institute, student scholarships and the expansion of Spanish-language media, such as CGTN and Xinhua. Furthermore, it has reinforced its image as a supportive actor at the international level, which was evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic with the supply of vaccines and medical equipment to governments in the region. In this context, China's influence in Latin America is projected as a long-term phenomenon, with implications that span the economic, political, and cultural spheres, in a scenario in which other powers, such as India, are also seeking a presence in the region. India's arrival and expansion in Latin America Historically, relations between India and Latin America have been limited due to geographical distance, the absence of common strategic interests and the lack of a consolidated bilateral agenda. Latin America occupied a marginal role in India's foreign policy, despite diplomatic visits such as Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's 1961 visit to Mexico and Indira Gandhi's 1968 visit to eight countries in the region. A significant change occurred in the 1990s, when India signed trade agreements with seven Latin American countries and promoted the FOCUS LAC program (1997), designed to strengthen economic relations with the region.The turning point in India's perception of Latin America came in 2014, when the newly appointed prime minister, Narendra Modi, participated in the BRICS Summit in Brazil. The expansion of the India-Mercosur Preferential Trade Agreement, initially signed in 2004, but extended in 2016,11 evidenced India's commitment to strengthening its ties with the region. Bilateral trade between India and Latin America currently stands at USD 43 billion, with Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia as its main trading partners. Like China, India finds in Latin America a key source of mineral resources, such as copper, lithium, and iron ore, essential for its growing industrial demand. An example of this was the strategic partnership agreement signed in 2023 between India's Altmin Private Limited and Bolivia's state-owned lithium company. The region has also become an important partner in the supply of oil: in recent years, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil have accounted for 30 % of crude oil exports to India. In return, India exports products from strategic sectors such as information technology and pharmaceuticals to Latin America. India is also involved in infrastructure development in the region, investing in railways, roads, and energy supply systems.12 In 2022, India's foreign policy gave a new signal of rapprochement with Latin America by bringing the Latin American members of the G20 (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) under the jurisdiction of the foreign minister, rather than a junior minister. In April 2023, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar made a historic visit to Guyana, Panama, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, marking the first time an Indian foreign minister had visited these countries. This tour reflected the growing importance of Latin America on India's diplomatic agenda as the region with the second highest number of projects spearheaded after Asia: India currently has 181 projects in Asia, thirty-two in Latin America and the Caribbean, and three in Central Asia and Oceania. These initiatives have expanded qualitatively in recent years, especially in terms of the size of the credit lines and the complexity of the projects.13 While on 3 August 2023 and on the sidelines of the ninth meeting of the Confederation of India-Latin America and Caribbean Industry in New Delhi, Jaishankar advocated deepening India-Latin America engagements, especially in the areas of agriculture, supply chain diversification and mutual resource sharing partnership. Thus, while China has captured greater political and diplomatic attention in the region, India's presence has raised expectations.14 Unlike China, India is a democracy and faces similar challenges to many Latin American countries, which has facilitated its rapprochement with the region. Its economic growth has sparked interest in Latin America, leading several governments to prioritize relations with India in their foreign policy strategies. Although its expansion in the region responds in part to the intention of countering China's influence, India seeks to consolidate itself as an actor with a vision of strategic autonomy and a stance aligned with non-alignment, promoting relations based on cooperation and the diversification of partners. However, its presence still faces structural limitations, such as the lack of effective regional integration and its limited participation in key Latin American blocs such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).15 At the G20 summit+, held in Rio de Janeiro on 18-19 November, Modi took the opportunity to hold bilateral meetings, apart from with Brazilian President Lula, with some of India's most important partners in the Latin American region, including Argentina and Chile, where a bilateral meeting with President Gabriel Boric marked the expansion of the India-Chile Preferential Trade Agreement, described by Chile as a genuine Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement on a par with those India has signed with the United Arab Emirates, South Korea or Japan, overcoming with Chile New Delhi's reluctance to corroborate these free trade agreements. India is aware that its influence in Latin America is minor compared to that of China, but it also recognizes its growth potential.16 One of its main resources to strengthen its presence in the region is soft power, especially through its cultural projection. Elements such as the Bollywood film industry, gastronomy, and traditional practices such as yoga have gained popularity in Latin America, facilitating the expansion of India's influence in the region and contributing to its positioning as an emerging global partner. Partners in BRICS+: China and India's influence on Brazil Both China and India have a special relationship with the Latin American giant, Brazil, as the three countries share several international forums, most notably BRICS+, of which Argentina - a candidate country and finally accepted as a member at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August 2023 - dropped out in early 2024, after Javier Milei's victory in the presidential elections. Brazil has been a key country in the expansion strategy of China, which has become the main trading partner and one of its main investors, and now of India in Latin America, especially due to the economic size, natural resources and regional leadership capacity of the Brazilian giant.17 All in all, China has a more dominant presence in the Brazilian economy, while India is gaining space in the technology, pharmaceutical and energy trade sectors. If the trend continues, India could strengthen its influence, but it is unlikely to overtake China in the short to medium term. Starting precisely with China, diplomatic relations with Brazil have evolved significantly in recent decades, consolidating into a strategic link in the commercial, investment and technological spheres, except during Jair Bolsonaro's term in office between 2019 and 2023, when even China expressed concern over the hostile statements of the then Brazilian president.18 During the last two years the relationship has been on the right track and even in 2024 the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of official relations was celebrated. In March 2023, Lula visited China with the aim of strengthening trade and political ties between the two nations, which had deteriorated during Bolsonaro's term in office. During the visit, an agreement was announced to trade in yuan instead of dollars, reducing dependence on the US financial system and strengthening Brazil's financial autonomy in the international arena.19 Apart from politics, and although Brazil has never joined the Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral Sino-Brazilian trade has grown steadily since the mid-2000s, dominated by the export of raw materials, especially oil, and attracting important Chinese state-owned companies such as China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec in its acronym) and China National Petroleum Corporation. Subsequently, Chinese investment diversified into strategic sectors such as power generation and distribution, with the presence of conglomerates such as State Grid and China Three Gorges, manufacturing, with the arrival of Chinese companies from various sectors, These include BYD, TCL, Gree, Midea and Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, the mining sector, and the agricultural sector, where Chinese firms such as COFCO and Long-Ping High-Tech have expanded their operations, from product marketing to the manufacture of chemical inputs for agribusiness. In infrastructure, Chinese participation has been significant with projects driven by China Communications Construction Company and China Merchants Port, which in 2018 acquired the Paranaguá Container Terminal. The future seems to point towards increased Chinese investment in new communications infrastructure, energy transition and technology. In 2021, despite Bolsonaro's criticism, Brazilian regulators reversed their decision to ban Huawei from developing the country's 5G networks, which came weeks after China provided Brazil with millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccine20 , while two years later, the two countries announced their participation in joint technological projects such as the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) for monitoring the Amazon.21 India has also had a strong influence on Brazil, at least culturally, since Gandhi's time, as his teachings on non-violence gave rise to social movements and partly shaped the two countries' non-aligned foreign policy. Economically, Brazil is one of India's most important partners in Latin America, being the largest importer (over 41 %) and exporter (over 29 %) to India, with significant investments in sectors such as information technology, energy, mining, and automobiles. Already in 2022, India's exports to Brazil exceeded those of Germany, Australia, South Korea, or Indonesia. Brazil is now among the top ten export destinations from India, spurred by a 295% increase in refined oil sales. India's imports from Brazil increased, driven by purchases of soybean oil. Relations between Brazil and India have never been particularly intense, but under Lula's third presidency this has also changed. In the political sphere, they share strategic objectives, such as the reform of the UN Security Council, where they aspire to obtain a permanent seat, as well as their collaboration in global initiatives, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the aforementioned BRICS+ and the G20+ of emerging economies. In 2020, the 'Brazil-India Defence Dialogue' was established for the first time and agreements were signed to expand technological collaboration in the military field. Brazilian companies such as Taurus have entered into partnerships with Indian companies, such as Jindal, for the joint production of armaments. In addition, Brazil is exploring the export of military technology, including cargo and training aircraft, armored vehicles and submarines, to which China, a traditional supplier of aircraft and equipment to several countries on the continent, including Brazil, responded in January 2025 by offering the Brazilian government the acquisition of the fourth-generation Chengdu-10 fighter.22 Finally, both states wish to diversify their external relations. India, concerned about its geopolitical rivalry with China, seeks a pragmatic balance between close relations with the US and other regional actors, such as in the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD), while maintaining its long-standing ties with Russia. Historically, Brazil has sought to mitigate US influence in South America, something that continues under President Lula's government. However, like other Latin American countries, it is also aware of its economic vulnerability stemming from its high dependence on commodity exports to China and its current dearth of foreign investment. Another forum shared by Brazil, China and India is the G20+. The rotating presidency in 2024 was held by Lula da Silva, who focused the organization’s objectives on three priorities, highlighted in the final declaration: social inclusion and the fight against hunger and poverty; sustainable development, with energy transition and the fight against climate change and, thirdly, the reform of global governance institutions, both from China and India not only ratified the declaration, but even Narendra Modi devoted special attention to Brazil's priorities, echoing New Delhi's common interests in renewable energy, the elimination of poverty and hunger, and focusing on nutrition and food security.23 Xi Jinping, also present at the summit and later on an official visit to Brasilia, expressed his support for President Lula's proposal to create the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, underlining China's commitment to inclusive and equitable development, while signing 37 bilateral agreements between Brazil and China in various fields, such as trade, finance, infrastructure and environmental protection.24 Conclusion: Still unequal competition China and India have adopted different strategies in their relations with Latin America, strategies that have been marked by time in terms of their interest in being present in the continent. While China has established itself as a dominant player in recent times and in terms of investment and project financing in the main Latin American countries, India has awakened in the last decade after a historical lack of interest in this area and is beginning to focus an increasing presence on matters such as technological cooperation and trade in strategic sectors, especially the supply of crude oil. In fact, both China and India have realized that the South American region is a key partner for the supply of raw materials to economies in continuous expansion and, in terms of international politics, the consolidation of new alliances in the so-called global south. India is a potential competitor in several economic niches, and in some of them it is even a major player, such as in information technology, the pharmaceutical sector, where Indian companies have maintained a leading position in exporting products to Latin America, and the automotive industry, where sales are fairly balanced. However, they are the exception that proves the rule, since in general terms, China maintains a substantial advantage in trade and investment figures in Latin America, operating on a completely different scale to India and the result of its interest for much longer. Another difference between the two Asian giants in terms of their influence in Latin America is their involvement in treaties, agreements, and deeper bilateral relations with Latin American countries. Indeed, one of the main challenges for India lies in the lack of a stable institutional framework through which to strengthen its relationship with Latin American countries, unlike China, which has long established trade agreements and strategic initiatives with various countries and regional blocs, starting with the Belt and Road Initiative itself. India has not yet developed comprehensive free trade agreements, cooperation mechanisms similar to China's, or bilateral agreements with supranational groupings such as SICA, CELAC, Mercosur or the Pacific Alliance, which constrains the growth of its trade. On the other hand, India has an advantage over China, such as the prestige of its traditional non-alignment and its historical representativeness of developing countries. In a region like Latin America whose countries recurrent structural obstacles, such as inflation, social and political instability and chronic infrastructure deficits, the geopolitical context and the ideological leanings of the different governments make China's presence, its network of trade agreements and its diversified investment strategy stable... until now, as this may change in the future. Diversifying risks and investments with options such as India represents a positive factor for Latin American countries, as well as a significant challenge for India. The relationship between India, China and Latin America is beneficial for Latin American countries, which are expanding their possibilities for bilateral cooperation on issues such as trade, climate change and security, while increasing competitiveness between the two Asian giants in a scenario that has traditionally been geographically and culturally distant, but which is currently of unquestionable interest to them. So far, China's predominance in the region seems to remain unchanged and it has even overtaken the United States as the main trading partner and source of investment in most South American countries. Competing in this division could take India several years, although the Chinese example itself shows that the arrival of agreements, treaties, cooperation, and investment from India could exponentially increase its influence in the continent in a few years' time. In recent times, Latin America has diversified its economic and diplomatic relations, reducing its dependence on a single strategic partner, be it China or the United States, another major player in this game of competition in the region. Although the decline in the role of the United States is notorious, precisely because of the irruption of the Chinese presence,25 especially in the economy, many countries have continued to move towards greater autonomy and diversification of their international ties, a trend that seems to be consolidating, regardless of the changes in US policy with the beginning of Trump's second term in office in the United States and his policy towards Latin America. Both the desire to diversify relations beyond the China option and the possible US disinterest in the region may benefit India's interests, although it is clear that China will continue to be the dominant actor in the region. References 1 GANGOPADHYAY, Aparajita. "India-China Competitions in Latin America: Some Observations", Global & Strategis, Th. 8, No. 1. January-June, 2014. Available at: http://irgu.unigoa.ac.in/drs/bitstream/handle/unigoa/4110/Jurnal_Global_dan_Strategis_8%281%29_2014_1-13.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 13/3/2025).2 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues?", The Diplomat. 19 May 2022. Available at: India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues? - The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/india-vs-china-in-latin-america-competing-actors-or-in-separate-leagues/ (accessed 13/3/2025)3 DADUSH, Uri. "China's Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 8 March 2012. Available at: China's Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2012/03/chinas-rise-and-latin-america-a-global-long-term-perspective?lang=en  (accessed 13/3/2025).4 "Chinese consumption growth boosts Latin American and Caribbean exports", Cobertura360. 8 March 2025. Available in: Chinese consumption growth boosts Latin American and Caribbean exports - Cobertura360 https://cobertura360.mx/2025/03/08/negocios/el-crecimiento-del-consumo-chino-impulsa-las-exportaciones-de-america-latina-y-el-caribe/ (accessed 13(3/2025).5 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC). Prospects for International Trade in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2024. LC/PUB.2024/16-P, Santiago, 2024. Available at: International Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2024 (accessed 13/3/2025).6 ROY, Diana. "China's Growing Influence in Latin America", Council of Foreign Relations. 10 January 2025. Available at: China's Growing Influence in Latin America | Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri (accessed 13/3/2025).7 RADWIN, Maxwell. "Chinese investment continues to hurt Latin American ecosystems, report says", Mongabay. 28 February 2023. Available at: Chinese investment continues to hurt Latin American ecosystems, report says https://news.mongabay.com/2023/02/chinese-investment-plagues-latin-american-ecosystems-report-says/ (accessed 13/3/2025).8 BAÑOS, Jordi Joan. "Xi returns to Latin America to win it over", La Vanguardia. 16 November 2024. Available in: Xi vuelve a América Latina para ganársela https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20241116/10111790/xi-vuelve-america-latina-ganarsela.html#foto-1 (accessed on 13/3/2025).9 LIU, Zongyuan Zoe. "Tracking China's Control of Overseas Ports", Council of Foreign Relations. 26 August 2024. Available at: Tracking China's Control of Overseas Ports | Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/tracker/china-overseas-ports (accessed 13//2025).10 EVAN ELLIS, R. et al. "How are the United States and China intersecting in Latin America?" Brookings. 25 September 2024. Available at: How are the United States and China intersecting in Latin America? https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-are-the-united-states-and-china-intersecting-in-latin-america/ (accessed 13/3/2025).11 "Mercosur-India talks expected to expand preferential trade agreement", mercopress.com. 15 August 2016. Available at: Mercosur-India talks expected to expand preferential trade agreement - MercoPress https://en.mercopress.com/2016/08/15/mercosur-india-talks-expected-to-expand-preferential-trade-agreement (accessed 13/3/2025).12 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Latin America's tryst with the other Asian giant, India", Wilson Center. May 2022. Available in: Microsoft Word - LAP PUB Template.docx (accessed 13/3/2025).13 JAISHANKAR, Subrahmanyam. The Indian way. Strategies for an uncertain world. Harper Collins India, 2020, pp. 107-108.14 "Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement', The Hindu. 3 August 2023. Available at: Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement - The Hindu https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-bats-for-deeper-india-latin-america-engagement/article67153329.ece (accessed 13/3/2025).15 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century," Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief no. 634. April 2023. Available at: Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century https://www.orfonline.org/research/redrawing-india-latin-america-relations-in-the-21st-century (accessed 13/3/2025).16 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America", Observer Research Foundation. 10 December 2024. Available at: The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-g20-turns-new-delhi-s-eyes-on-latin-america (accessed 13/3/2025).17 BLASCO, Emili J. "Brasil: la persistente ambición de un país que se imagina a sí mismo como continente", Middle Powers: Transitando hacia un orden multipolar. IEEE Strategy Notebook, 225. June 2024. Available at: Ch. 5. Strategy Notebook 225.pdf (accessed 13/3/2025).18 SPRING, Jake. "Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil", Reuters. 26 October 2018. Available at: Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil | Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/world/bolsonaros-anti-china-rants-have-beijing-nervous-about-brazil-idUSKCN1MZ0DR/ (accessed 13/3/2025).19 "Brazil and China agreed to trade in each other's currencies to bypass the dollar", Infobae. 30 March 2023. Available in: Brazil and China agreed to trade in their currencies to bypass the dollar - Infobae https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/03/29/brasil-y-china-acordaron-comerciar-en-sus-monedas-para-eludir-el-dolar/ (accessed 13/3/2025).20 RIVERA, Jhonnattan. "Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei", Techbro. 1 March 2021. Available at: Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei - TechBros https://somostechbros.com/2021/03/01/brasil-aprueba-reglas-de-subasta-del-espectro-5g-sin-prohibicion-a-huawei/ (accessed 13/3/2025).21 CARIELLO, Tulio. "50 years of Brazil-China relations: Solid foundations for a sustainable future", Red China & Latin America. 1 September 2024. Available at: 50 años de relaciones Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para un futuro sostenible / 50 anos de relações Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para um futuro sustentável - Red China y América Latina https://chinayamericalatina.com/50-anios-de-relaciones-brasil-china-bases-solidas-para-un-futuro-sostenible/ (accessed 13/3/2025).22 "China offers Brazil the Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap", Galaxia Militar. 9 January 2025. Available in: China offers Brazil Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap. - Galaxia Militar, https://galaxiamilitar.es/china-ofrece-a-brasil-el-chengdu-j-10-para-cubrir-la-brecha-de-aviones-de-combate/ (accessed 13/3/2025).23 "Prime Minister's Remarks at the G20 Session on "Social Inclusion and the Fight Against Hunger and Poverty", Prime Minister's Office. 18 November 2024. Available at: Press Release: Press Information Bureau, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2074413 (accessed 13/3/2025).24 VILELA, Pedro Rafael. "Brazil and China sign 37 bilateral agreements", Agencia Brasil. November 21, 2024. Available at: Brasil y China firman 37 acuerdos bilaterales | Agência Brasil, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/es/politica/noticia/2024-11/brasil-y-china-firman-37-acuerdos-bilaterales (accessed 13/3/2025).25 RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ, María. "Iberoamérica ¿prefiere a mamá China o a papá Estados Unidos?", bie3: Boletín IEEE (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies), 34. April-June, 2024, pp. 542-559. Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/ejemplar?codigo=672227&info=open_link_ejemplar (accessed 13/3/2025).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The question of migration occupies a central and divisive place in US politics. Yet critical questions are rarely asked about why migrants decide to leave their homes in the first place and what role US foreign policy might play in that decision. This oversight is especially glaring when it comes to one of the most common tools of US foreign policy: broad economic sanctions. There is overwhelming evidence (1) that migration1 is driven in large part by adverse economic conditions and (2) that sanctions can have severe, harmful economic and humanitarian consequences for civilians in targeted countries. The cases of Cuba and Venezuela demonstrate this relationship clearly: The imposition or tightening of sanctions by the US government have, in recent years, fueled economic crises that in turn have led to record migratory outflows. Addressing migration at its roots will require rethinking US sanctions policy as part of a broader research and policy agenda that considers the role of US foreign policy in fueling migratory push factors abroad. Economic Hardship Drives Migration The decision to emigrate — often involving leaving one’s home, family, and community to undertake a perilous journey to a new country with a different language and culture, without any guarantee of safety, accommodation, or employment — is not typically one that is taken lightly. Such a life-altering decision is rarely reducible to a single factor but is rather made in the context of multiple and interrelated push and pull factors. However, one of the most well-established sets of factors that impact migration are economic. There is broad consensus that economic conditions in the country of origin are a major determinant of the desire to migrate. A recent review of 72 peer-reviewed, survey-based analyses of migration aspirations found an overwhelming relationship between the desire to migrate and economic factors, including perception of national economic conditions, employment opportunities, household financial situation, food security, contentment with public services, and expectations of future economic conditions. A similar relationship holds true of realized migration. Many have hypothesized an inverted U-shaped relationship between development and migration, whereby higher GDP per capita is associated with increased migration as would-be migrants gain the means to do so, until a certain point — after which higher income is associated with decreased migration. However, recent research suggests that this U-shaped relationship, though observed in cross-sectional analyses, does not hold for a given country over time.2 Rather, the relationship is clearer: poor or deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions cause people to migrate from developing countries while growth and stability lead people to stay home. Sanctions Fuel Economic Hardship Over the past two decades, the number of US-imposed sanctions has grown nearly tenfold. The United States is by far the most prevalent user of sanctions, with one-third of all countries — and over 60 percent of low-income countries — facing US sanctions in some form. While many sanctions are narrowly targeted against particular individuals or entities, others target entire sectors or even the entire economy of a country. Such broad-based sanctions are indiscriminate and can have profound impacts on the economies, and therefore civilians, of targeted nations (and even purportedly targeted sanctions can have significant spillover effects). Broad-based sanctions can impede economic growth, potentially triggering or extending recessions and even depressions; restrict access to critical resources like medicine, food, and energy; disrupt humanitarian aid (despite nominal exemptions); and consequently exacerbate poverty, illness, and hunger. As a result, sanctions can lead to a significant number — in some cases tens of thousands — of preventable deaths. In a 2023 literature review for CEPR, economist Francisco Rodríguez determined that 94 percent of peer-reviewed econometric studies on the subject found substantial, statistically significant “negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality, and human rights” as a result of sanctions. One study associated sanctions with, on average, a 26 percent drop in GDP per capita — roughly the size of the Great Depression. Another tied sanctions to a 1.4-year decline in female life expectancy — comparable with the global impact of COVID-19. Yet another found a 2.5 percent increase in childhood HIV infection rates. While such indiscriminate impacts are often denied by the policymakers that impose sanctions, it is difficult to reconcile this denial with the fact that major macroeconomic factors such as growth rates, oil production, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of essential goods are widely used — often by these very same policymakers — as metrics of “success” of sanctions. That these macroeconomic factors would in turn impact civilians is all but undeniable. In fact, there are significant reasons to believe that the broad economic and humanitarian impacts of certain sanctions regimes are intentional — and therefore are not a matter of calibration, but are inherent to the policy itself. Sanctions Induce MigrationIf migration is driven in part by economic hardship and sanctions can cause great economic and humanitarian suffering, then it follows that sanctions can substantially contribute to migration. This is not just borne out logically, but can be seen in the data. In October 2024, the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization published what may be the first and only systematic cross-national empirical analysis of how such sanctions impact international migration. The findings are striking. Using data on migration flows from 157 countries over more than half a century, the authors find that Western multilateral sanctions3 have increased emigration from target countries by, on average, 22 to 24 percent. Notably, they also find that “migrant flows return to their pre-sanction level once sanctions are lifted.” In few cases is this relationship between sanctions and migration clearer than in the cases of Cuba and Venezuela. Trump-Biden Sanctions Spur Cuban Depopulation The US embargo against Cuba — referred to by many as a blockade due to its extraterritorial impacts — is the US’s oldest and most comprehensive sanctions regime. Beginning in 1960 with export prohibitions in response to the Castro government’s agrarian reforms and nationalizations, successive administrations soon escalated this embargo into a comprehensive ban on nearly all trade, travel, and financial transactions, with the goal of destabilizing and ultimately toppling the Cuban government. While these sanctions have been periodically tightened or relaxed over the years, this foundational, comprehensive embargo has remained intact for over six decades and has since been enshrined into law through the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. During his last two years in office, President Barack Obama took significant steps toward the normalization of bilateral relations with Cuba by, among other things, formally resuming diplomatic relations, loosening restrictions on travel and remittances, and removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SSOT) list, a measure that had effectively cut the island off from much of the global financial system. However, under the first Donald Trump administration, these policies were largely reversed, and the embargo was expanded to an unprecedented level. President Joe Biden, despite campaign promises to change the course of Cuban policy, maintained most of President Trump’s measures. Days before leaving office, Biden issued executive orders undoing Trump’s harshest sanctions measures only to see them predictably rescinded immediately following Trump’s return to the White House. In the case of both Trump and Biden, Cuban policy appears to have been driven in large part by electoral considerations in Florida, where hawkish Cuban American voters have long (and questionably) been seen as a key demographic in both parties’ efforts to win the state. The US embargo has long hindered Cuban economic growth and development, particularly since the late 1980s when the Soviet Union and its COMECON partners discontinued economic support for the island. In 2018, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean validated the Cuban government’s estimates that the six-decade embargo had cost the country $130 billion. By 2024, that estimate had grown to $164 billion. A recent econometric study on changes in US policy toward Cuba between 1990 and 2020 found a “substantial negative impact of sanctions policy shifts on Cuban economic growth.” Further, “this impact on GDP is concentrated in the component of household consumption” — in other words, Cuban citizens bear the highest burden. Over the last few years, Cuba’s economic situation has deteriorated further, in large part as a result of Trump-Biden policies. Measures such as returning Cuba to the SSOT list (despite no evidence of Cuban support for terrorism), restricting remittances, and prohibiting US citizens from doing business with dozens of “restricted entities” have greatly limited Cuba’s access to foreign exchange. This has, in turn, prevented Cuba from importing many essential goods (including critical pharmaceutical and agricultural inputs) and services (including maintenance services for Cuba’s ailing energy infrastructure), servicing its external debt, and perhaps most crucially, stabilizing the local currency following a major monetary reform in 2021. Another Trump measure — his decision to implement Title III of the LIBERTAD Act — has had a significant chilling effect on foreign investment in Cuba only a few years after the enactment of a reform opening up most sectors of the economy to foreign investors. This controversial provision, which allows for lawsuits against US or foreign persons doing business with Cuban entities that use or benefit from property expropriated at the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, had been waived by prior presidents and by Trump himself, until April 2019. The far-reaching negative impact of these and other Trump measures are part of the reason why Cuba’s economy has failed to significantly recover from the global economic downturn triggered by the COVID pandemic. Cuba has been plunged into the most serious economic and humanitarian crisis of its contemporary history, characterized by repeated blackouts, water shortages, fuel shortages, rising food costs, the deterioration of basic services such as garbage collection, and the spread of preventable diseases. Cuba’s fledgling private sector, which greatly expanded following Obama’s normalization measures and domestic liberalization measures in 2019 and 2021, is facing an uncertain future as a result of the crisis and new, stricter Cuban regulations designed in part to offset the effects of sanctions by capturing increasingly scarce foreign exchange. This economic crisis has in turn spurred a migration crisis. Data from the national statistics office of the government of Cuba shows skyrocketing net emigration following 2020 (see Figure 1). By August 2022, the outflow of migrants had surpassed that of the famous 1980 Mariel boatlift and the 1994 Balsero/Rafter crises combined.   Independent research — later confirmed by the Cuban government — estimates an even larger increase than those published by the national statistics office: the departure of over one million people, representing 10 percent of the country’s entire population, in 2022 and 2023 alone. As one researcher warned in 2022: “Cuba is depopulating.” While not all of these migrants ended up in the United States, the years 2022 and 2023 saw record-breaking numbers of encounters with Cuban migrants by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2022, the CBP encountered more Cubans than any other nationality except Mexicans. Cubans constituted more than 10 percent of all encounters.4 Given the Trump administration’s, and particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s, apparent commitment to maintaining the current policy toward Cuba — and perhaps even hardening it with yet more sanctions — we can expect out-migration from the island to continue at record levels for the foreseeable future. “Maximum Pressure” Sanctions Fueled Venezuelan Exodus While the US has maintained limited sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, the current sanctions regime is defined by the “maximum pressure” campaign initiated during the first Trump administration in an attempt to push President Nicolás Maduro out of office. In August 2017, Trump blocked the government of Venezuela, including the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), from accessing financial markets. In late 2018, Trump sanctioned the gold sector. Perhaps most significantly, the oil sector and PDVSA were designated as sanctioned entities in January 2019. Additional sanctions on the financial and defense sectors and the central bank soon followed, alongside the escalation of secondary sanctions against third parties. The US’s and many of its allies’ policy of nonrecognition of the Maduro government has also led to effective sanctions, such as the loss of access to roughly $2 billion in reserves held at the Bank of England and $5 billion in Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund. These “maximum pressure” policies were largely maintained under the Biden administration, with a few significant exceptions. Since November 2022, Chevron Corporation has been permitted to produce and export oil from Venezuela. In October 2023, Biden issued a General License temporarily lifting most oil sector and PDVSA sanctions but allowed the license to expire six months later (while leaving a wind-down period). Though Venezuela’s economic crisis — driven in part by both misguided economic policies and falling global oil prices — began prior to the imposition of sanctions, US sanctions have substantially contributed to the severity and longevity of the contraction. Sanctions impact the Venezuelan economy through numerous channels, but perhaps none more significantly than through oil. The Venezuelan economy is highly dependent on oil exports, historically relying on the sector — and its main actor, PDVSA — for 95 percent of its foreign exchange. From 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd) prior to the crisis, oil output hit a low of 0.4 million bpd in mid-2020 — an 83 percent collapse. Even with today’s Chevron license, output has yet to break 1 million bpd. A 2022 analysis by Francisco Rodríguez attributes 797,000 bpd of this decline to the 2017 sanctions alone. Other assessments point to similar figures, with some attributing more than half of the decline to sanctions. As Rodríguez points out, new sanctions are associated with marked downward inflection points in Venezuelan oil output (see Figure 2).   Ultimately, the Venezuelan crisis saw a 71 percent collapse in GDP per capita. As Rodríguez notes, this was the equivalent of three Great Depressions and the largest peacetime economic contraction in modern history. By Rodríguez’s assessments, more than half of this decline was attributable to sanctions and related political acts. Whatever claims policymakers may make about the targeted nature of sanctions, such broad macroeconomic effects inescapably and indiscriminately impact civilians. In addition to the general effects of economic contraction and the loss of foreign exchange with which to import essential goods such as food and medicine, sanctions have also inhibited shipments of COVID vaccines and other medical supplies; contributed to the degradation of the energy grid and frequency of electrical shortages; and otherwise furthered the deterioration of public health, education, and water services. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures reports that sanctions on Venezuela have “prevented the earning of revenues and use of resources to maintain and develop infrastructure and for social support programs, which has a devastating effect on the entire population of Venezuela, especially — but not only — those living in extreme poverty, women, children, medical workers, people with disabilities or life-threatening or chronic diseases, and the indigenous population.” According to one CEPR estimate, sanctions likely led to tens of thousands of excess deaths in one year alone. Unsurprisingly, such a dire humanitarian crisis has contributed to an unprecedented mass exodus. In the last decade, over seven million Venezuelans have left the country. In one of the few direct quantitative studies on the impacts of sanctions on migration, Francisco Rodríguez finds that over four million of these seven million left “as a result of the economic deterioration caused by sanctions and toxification effects.” Rodríguez further estimates that a return to “maximum pressure” policies would result in the emigration of an additional one million Venezuelans in the coming five years. While the vast majority of these Venezuelan migrants ended up in countries closer to home, such as Colombia and Peru, a growing number have made their way to the US border as well (see Figure 3).   In 2023 and 2024, CBP encountered more migrants from Venezuela than any other country except Mexico.5 According to survey data from the Migration Policy Institute, Venezuela is the single fastest growing country of birth of immigrants to the US since “maximum pressure” began in 2017 (alongside other sanctioned countries, such as Afghanistan — number 2 — and Nicaragua — number 7). The Trump administration was repeatedly warned that mass migration was a likely consequence of its sanctions policy, yet pursued it anyway. According to one senior US Department of State official: “This is the point I made at the time: I said the sanctions were going to grind the Venezuelan economy into dust and have huge human consequences, one of which would be out-migration.” To Address Migration, Lift Economic Sanctions Though migration has many causes, and it is difficult to precisely quantify the contribution of sanctions to overall emigration levels, the following are nonetheless clear: 1. Migration is driven in large part as a reaction to adverse economic conditions.2. Economic sanctions often have profound adverse economic impacts.3. Econometric evidence indicates that sanctions directly contribute to migratory flows.4. In Cuba and Venezuela, economic sanctions are associated with mass migration. While fearmongering and anti-migrant sentiment should be flatly rejected, it is plainly preferable that people in other nations not be forced into circumstances that compel their displacement. To achieve this goal, broad economic sanctions must be lifted. Recognition of the link between sanctions and migration has been growing among US policymakers. In May 2023, 21 members of Congress — led by members representing border states that have witnessed an influx of large numbers of migrants — sent a letter to President Biden urging the easing of sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela to mitigate push factors for migration. A separate letter from over 50 economists and other scholars shortly followed, corroborating the claim that lifting sanctions would help ease migration. Former Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whose country is also impacted by migratory flows, has said the same. An Alternative Approach to Migration Is Available This relationship between US economic sanctions and migration further suggests the need for a research and policy agenda that considers migration within the context of global inequalities and underdevelopment and critically considers the role of US foreign policy — including but not limited to sanctions — in reproducing and exacerbating migratory push factors. In other words, addressing migration at its root requires rethinking and rectifying the US’s approach to Latin America as well as other parts of the Global South. While the Biden administration proclaimed a “root-causes” strategy toward addressing migration from Central America, intending to address push factors in countries of origin, including corruption, crime, and economic insecurity, the strategy failed to consider how the US’s own policies might exacerbate these conditions. In contrast, the recently established Congressional Caucus to Address Global Migration and the Migration Stability Resolution introduced by its co-founder, Rep. Greg Casar (D-TX), take a more comprehensive approach, aiming to — in Rep. Casar’s words — “[change] the failed US policies that cause displacement abroad and force people to flee their home countries.” Tackling broad economic sanctions, anti-worker trade agreements, US security assistance for repressive governments, inequalities in the global financial system, and more, these efforts offer an alternative path toward addressing migration: a path that is both more humane and more effective. Footnotes 1. For the purposes of this article, “migration” is used to refer specifically to international migration.2. Moreover, as CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez explains, even if there were truth to the U-shaped hypothesis, it would be a story of the long-run structural and societal transformations that accompany development and would not contradict a thesis that short-run economic contractions — such as those that might result from the imposition of sanctions — fuel migration across income levels. Indeed, short-run fluctuations in growth and employment are observed to significantly impact migration.3. While this study assessed joint US-EU sanctions specifically, one can expect a similar relationship to hold in unilateral US sanctions, given the dominant role of the United States in the global financial system and given that EU sanctions policy often follows the lead of US policy.4. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.5. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Latin America has been a long-standing policy focus for the United States, aimed at keeping external influences out and maintaining stability in the region. This commitment began with the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary and continued through the Cold War. Under the current administration, there has been a renewed emphasis on Latin America due to rising Chinese influence, drug cartel activity, and immigration issues. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) states that no region impacts the United States more than the Western Hemisphere and emphasizes the need to “protect against external interference or coercion, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” However, the United States has not had a coherent strategy or policy toward Latin America in decades, leading to outcomes contrary to its stated goals. The PRC has been rapidly expanding its influence in the region. Since 2010, China has nearly tripled its trade with Latin America, with several nations signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Additionally, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to affect the United States through drug, weapon, and human trafficking, while also forcing migrants north due to unsafe living conditions in their home countries. Given this situation, the United States must develop a coherent two-pronged strategy toward Latin America. This strategy should involve expanding economic investments to counteract Chinese influence while also strengthening regional security to address the threats posed by TCOs. Recognizing that the PRC and TCOs are different from the Soviets and Marxist guerrillas, US policy during the Cold War provides valuable lessons on what this two-pronged approach could entail. US Cold War Policy in Latin America In the early days of the Cold War, the United States was concerned about the spread of communism in Latin America but initially failed to take meaningful action. It relied instead on outdated policies from the 1920s. This approach continued until the late 1950s, when significant changes occurred in the hemisphere. By then, ten of thirteen dictators had been replaced, economic challenges had intensified, and the prices of Latin American exports had plummeted. This social and political unrest carried over into the 1960s, as the region became “aflame” with Marxist revolutions. The CIA reported that twelve out of twenty-three nations in the southern hemisphere were at risk of falling to communism. This urgency prompted the United States to act, determined to prevent the region from succumbing to Soviet influence and instability. The Kennedy administration identified economic struggles and monetary insecurity as the principal vulnerabilities that could allow communism to take root. To address these issues, the administration launched the Alliance for Progress, a ten-year initiative where the United States would provide $20 billion in loans, grants, and investments, while Latin American governments aimed to generate $80 billion in funds and implement land reforms, tax systems, and other socio-political changes. In tandem with economic initiatives, the United States employed covert actions, counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, and military support to suppress Marxist revolutions. For instance, in Guatemala, US-backed military forces fought against Marxist revolutionaries with American military assistance. Similar operations took place in El Salvador, Chile, Paraguay, and Brazil. Although not executed flawlessly, this two-pronged strategy ultimately succeeded in keeping Soviet and communist influences largely at bay in the region. Economic assistance and support helped stabilize democracy in Venezuela, while land redistribution and reforms from the Alliance for Progress undermined financial support for Marxist guerrilla groups in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Despite being conducted with a certain level of negligence, US-backed COIN operations across the region weakened guerrilla movements, leading to factional splits and self-defeating behaviors. Notably, US-supported operations included the capture of Che Guevara by a US-trained Bolivian military unit in 1967. Applying a Cold War-like Policy Today Economic challenges are once again prevalent in Latin America, and China is seizing the opportunity. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has expanded its influence and bolstered regional ties. Twenty Latin American countries have signed onto the BRI, while Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru have established free trade agreements with the PRC. In 2010, trade between China and South America amounted to $180 billion, which surged to $450 billion by 2021. The United States needs to consider a strategy similar to the Alliance for Progress to effectively compete with the PRC and maintain its influence in the region, as it is currently falling short in this area. In 2023, China invested $9 billion in Latin America through its Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), while the United States contributed only $2 billion for the same year. As the new administration shapes its foreign policy, it is essential to allocate more economic investment to Latin America. This should involve a deliberate economic policy and investment plan that focuses on trade, port infrastructure, and technological development—all areas where the PRC is currently providing support. The bipartisan Americas Act of 2024 is a good starting point, but it is insufficient to counteract the PRC’s advances. While some might argue that boosting economic investment is too expensive, such efforts would enable the United States to compete with China while stabilizing the region and reducing northward immigration. In tandem with economic investment, the United States must advocate for stronger regional security to combat TCOs, thus fostering stability and improving living conditions. Specifically, the United States should collaborate with Latin American countries to enhance security institutions by expanding advisory and assistance operations with regional militaries, similar to COIN operations during the Cold War. In recent years, the United States military has maintained a significant presence in countries like Colombia, Panama, and Honduras to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations, aimed at preparing partner forces to effectively combat TCOs. FID and Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations should include US military support for other nations in the region, such as El Salvador, Bolivia, and Mexico. Historically, countries like Mexico have been hesitant or resistant to accepting US military support; however, this trend has recently shifted. In a positive development, the Mexican Senate has approved a small contingent of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to assist Mexican SOF personnel. In addition to expanding FID operations, the United States might explore granting broader authorities to allow US military forces to assist regional partners in targeting and operational planning against TCOs. While some may oppose this option, expanded authorities should not come as a surprise, given that the new administration has designated several TCOs as terrorist organizations. This designation opens the door for discussions on expanded authorities. Conclusion During the Cold War, Latin America was a primary focus of US policy. The United States worked diligently to maintain regional hegemony and prevent the spread of communist ideology in the Western Hemisphere. Today, Latin America and the southern border have again become focal points for the current US administration. With the rising influence of China in the region and the ongoing impact of TCOs on American life, the United States must develop deliberate policies and strategies to maintain its hegemonic influence while promoting stability. This strategy should consist of a two-pronged approach that emphasizes both economic investment and regional security. Such an approach could disrupt Chinese influence while fostering a safer and more stable region, ultimately reducing migration northward—a key objective for the current administration. Article, originally written by and published in Small Wars Journal under the title "Same But Different: Cold War Strategy in 21st Century Latin America." Consult here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/06/same-but-different-cold-war-strategy-in-21st-century-latin-america/. This translation is shared under the same Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Valued at over $3 trillion, Nvidia, the world’s largest market capitalisation, exemplifies the transformative power of the microprocessor sector, but Europe’s lagging position raises significant concerns about sovereignty and competitiveness. Some companies are stepping up, offering concrete responses to these challenges and heralding a new era for European innovation in microprocessors. European socio-economic stability depends on it. A new era is fast approaching, with the US authorities having decided to strike a major blow by making it very difficult to export certain semiconductors, even to allied countries, thereby depriving half of Europe’s countries of easy access to US technologies. The global microprocessor market is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by unprecedented technological advances and intensifying geopolitical competition. Once considered a niche industry, microprocessors have become the backbone of modern economies, enabling everything from smartphones to artificial intelligence systems, from IoT to cloud computing. The rise of Nvidia, a global leader in AI, underscores this changing ecosystem. The company is set to replace Intel in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), who stated that the update aims to ensure “a more representative exposure to the semiconductors industry and the materials sector, respectively”. This dominance of a few global players underscores the challenges faced by other regions. While companies like Nvidia, AMD, and TSMC have set the standard for innovation, others—including once-mighty Intel—have struggled to keep up. Intel’s recent difficulties highlight the dynamic nature of the industry, where size and legacy alone no longer guarantee success. Instead, the ability to innovate, adapt, and secure supply chains is paramount. And initiatives are flourishing all around the world. As Europe works to bolster its presence in the microprocessor market, Latin America is emerging as a potential partner in the global semiconductor ecosystem. While the region does not yet have major microprocessor manufacturers, countries like Mexico and Brazil are becoming increasingly important in the broader supply chain. The United States, through initiatives such as the CHIPS Act, has sought to deepen its partnerships in Latin America, recognising the region’s strategic value for diversifying production and securing critical resources.  This should put Europe on alert. Indeed, the United States is planning on pushing forward with the development of microprocessor production capabilities across three Latin American countries: Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica. This strategy was unveiled by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in July 2024 as the ‘Western Hemisphere Semiconductor Initiative.’ Indeed, Mexico is attracting billions in investments in its semiconductor and tech industries. Amazon, announced plans to invest $6 billion in the country by 2026, creating over 50,000 jobs. The Chinese government had identified semiconductors as a priority as early as 1956 and has already channeled an estimated $150 billion to its semiconductor industry. Latin America’s potential lies in its ability to complement the global microprocessor market with assembly, testing, and raw material processing capabilities. Though the region has yet to produce a major semiconductor design firm, its role in the supply chain could expand as global players look to reduce dependency on Asia. This creates opportunities for regional collaboration and investment in the sector while strengthening US access to semiconductors. Indeed, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated: “By improving the backbone of our supply chains, better infrastructure will help ensure that the goods our people rely on – semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, medical supplies – are more affordable, more secure, and made right here in the Americas.” Incoming President Donald Trump’s planned tariffs on foreign imports could however have a real effect on tech giants’ outsourcing of manufacturing to Latin America, though. Even the Biden administration, a few days before its term, has decided to raise the stakes on microprocessors by further tightening sanctions against China. This illustrates the great sensitivity of the subject on the other side of the Atlantic and the need for Europe to rearm itself on the industrial front. Europe’s position in the microprocessor market remains precarious, and without sufficient scope for nearshoring and the development of a robust EU-focused development ecosystem, it could find itself falling way behind global competitors. Historically reliant on foreign suppliers for semiconductors, the region has recognised these strategic risks of this dependency. For Europe, this means creating an ecosystem in which innovative startups and new, EU-based technological initiatives are allowed to flourish. That’s the objective of the European Union’s “Chips Act”, which aims to increase local production capacity and support the development of homegrown technology. However, achieving these goals requires more than policy—it demands the emergence of innovative companies capable of competing on a global scale. Europe already has some important technological “links”, but not yet the whole chain. Among those links of emerging players is SiPearl, a French company specialising in the design of high-performance microprocessors. While still small compared to global giants, SiPearl represents a concrete step toward reducing Europe’s technological dependency. Its processors, designed for use in data centres and supercomputing, align with Europe’s strategic goals for technological sovereignty and innovation. SiPearl’s reliance on Taiwanese manufacturing reflects the broader global interdependence of the microprocessor market, but its designs are uniquely European, tailored to meet the region’s regulatory and security standards. The choice of Taiwan seems obvious at present, given that the processes used in Europe do not meet the requirements. Alternative foundries may be needed, such as Samsung, which has production capacities in South Korea and the USA, or even Intel. Indeed, this Eurocentric approach is at the heart of the firm’s strategy for development. CEO Philippe Notton underscores how the Chips Act does not go far enough in supporting start-up firms like his own: “the European Chips Act is a good start. If we manage to mobilise more public funds in the semiconductor sector to get things moving again, as is being done in most countries, that will be a positive thing.” Notton, like many in the sector, believes that startups are, however, being left behind by this policy. Nonetheless, there are some positive initiatives to support the objectives of the European Chips Act, such as the $3.2 billion investment by Silicon Box to build a semiconductor plant in northern Italy. This announcement was made last March by the Italian Minister of Enterprises, who was happy to show that Italy can “attract the interest of global technology players”. Europe is focusing on fostering innovation and reducing dependency through public-private partnerships. SiPearl is a prime example, but it is not alone. Other European companies, such as Infineon Technologies (Germany) and STMicroelectronics (a Franco-Italian firm), are making significant contributions to the semiconductor industry. MELEXIS, another firm based in Belgium, plays a critical role in developing specialized chips for the automotive industry, supporting Europe’s push for technological sovereignty in key sectors. This approach has also supported the growth of companies such as ASML in the Netherlands, a global leader in lithography machines essential for microprocessor manufacturing, and GlobalFoundries in Germany, which operates one of Europe’s most advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities. CEO Dr. Thomas Caulfield, has a more positive outlook, and emphasised Europe’s strategic position in the semiconductor industry, particularly highlighting the continent’s leadership in lithography through companies like ASML. He stated:  “Europe shouldn’t worry over issues of technology leadership for two reasons. One: You can’t do anything in semiconductors without lithography and Europe has ASML the leader in lithography. Nobody can do anything in semiconductors without giving capex to ASML, so Europe has great control of the semiconductor industry.” This highlights the multilateral ecosystem many are trying to develop in Europe, because together, these firms demonstrate the continent’s potential to become a hub for advanced microprocessor design and production. The microprocessor market is at a crossroads, offering Europe distinct opportunities to redefine its role in the global technology ecosystem. Success, however, will depend on sustained investment, strategic partnerships, and bold innovation. By leveraging its strengths, Europe can be both a leading player in design and manufacture as it used to be just a few decades ago. The opportunities are massive, but so are the risks of falling behind. The rewards of such efforts are, however, substantial: enhanced economic growth, greater technological sovereignty, and a pivotal role in shaping the future of the global microprocessor industry. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump seems to be turning tariffs, which can serve as a legitimate tool to achieve the goals of fair trade and the protection of key national security interests, into an illegitimate tool of coercive statecraft. It is likely to undermine the global economic order and US soft-power influence across the world Since re-entering the Oval Office Donald Trump has already threatened dozens of nations with economic tariffs in relation to a vast array of issues, many of which are non-economic in nature. What, if any, is the legal basis for these tariffs in domestic and international law, and how are they different from or similar to the type of economic measures China applies to influence other sovereign nations’ choices in ways that benefit Beijing? In this article we address these questions. Trumps weaponisation of trade tariffs Trump 2.0 seems set on following China’s leadership in the practice of using trade relations for economic coercion against other states, in breach of international and bilateral trade agreements. This practice decouples tariffs from their legitimate World Trade Organization (WTO) purpose of offering protection against unfair trade practices. WTO rules allow protective tariffs in cases of anti-dumping—for instance where foreign firms sell exports below their cost of production—or as countervailing measures against subsidised imports that would otherwise unfairly undercut and thus harm domestic producers. Such tariffs are a lawful tool for economic defence. Furthermore, in a geo-economic world there may be other limited situations where a reasonable argument can be made for using tariffs in a national security context not covered by WTO rules, or against economies that do not play by WTO rules. Moving beyond this delimited use of tariffs inevitably results in the tool becoming an economic cudgel for achieving non-economic political objectives. Where these are based on highly questionable claims regarding the relationship to US national security, and without basis in WTO or bilateral free trade agreement rules, the likelihood that tariffs are naked coercion rather than a legitimate defensive measure grows. Making a wide array of economic and non-economic demands of countries—including Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Denmark, Panama, Taiwan, and the EU—President Trump clearly views tariffs as the medicine for every international ailment, real or imagined, impacting the United States. This is a radical break from the US-led post-war order of rules-based trade, and sends a message that the US is no longer a trusted partner. This shift was most vividly highlighted on 1 February 2025, when Trump’s administration threatened 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and imposed a 10 percent tariff on China, citing a national emergency due to illegal migration and drugs, and claiming the target states had failed to assist the US in countering this emergency. While the Canada and Mexico tariffs were suspended after both countries made concessions to Trump, their situation is most indicative of Trump’s radical approach to international relations. Both countries renegotiated the North American free trade agreement directly with Trump during his first term—an agreement Trump lavished with praise, while Canada is also one of America’s closest military allies, and has supported many US military operations since WWII. If Canada can be coerced, it is reasonable to believe any country can be coerced by Trump, including Australia. From a foreign policy perspective, Trump’s radical tariff coercion is likely to be one of the greatest acts of diplomatic self-harm, particularly as friends are forced to start looking at ways to mitigate American dependence. Who pays the price of tariffs?    If the foreign policy results of tariffs are to undermine US soft power, it is also true that tariffs will undermine the US economy. For example, Trump incorrectly believes that exporters will absorb the additional cost of tariffs—for instance, taxes on imports—by dropping their prices. Factors such as price elasticity (are goods necessary or discretionary), pricing power (i.e. brand power), and the size of profit margins influence who pays additional tariff costs. The latter is important when considering globally competitive traded goods. In competitive industries where profit margins are low, at or near the minimum rate of profit at which businesses will invest and operate, then, by definition, all additional costs must be passed on to the consumer to protect the business’s margin. Beyond that, protecting margins is the first choice of all businesses. Hence only where goods are highly discretionary and existing profit margins are high might one expect the exporter to incur the costs of tariffs. All things being equal, the American consumer will pay if Trump levies general tariff taxes on a vast array of goods coming from Mexico, Canada, and China, just as studies show that consumers paid for Trump’s 2018 tariffs. Job losses can also arise as a consequence of tariffs impacting supply chains by increasing the costs of inputs. Economists argue that, while the first Trump administration’s 25 percent steel import tariff created around 1,000 new jobs in steel production, the higher cost of steel hit downstream steel users, resulting in a loss of 75,000 manufacturing jobs. A tariff policy that is targeted and in response to breaches of WTO trade rules has their rightful place in the repertoire of a state’s national economic policies. But there are likely to be few long-term benefits to attacking allies and longstanding rule-abiding trade partners with universal tariffs per Trump’s Make America Great Again agenda. On the contrary Trump’s policies will lead to a Make America Expensive Again outcome, as ABC’s Matt Bevan put it. A Corrosion of US soft power? The weaponisation of everything has in recent times been attributed to China’s unrestricted warfare paradigm. Trump 2.0 seems to follow Beijing’s playbook without further consideration for alliances and partnerships—pivotal to US foreign policy. Working with allies and partners has been a key element of how the Biden administration countered the challenges posed by Russia, China, and Iran in the wider context of great power competition. Donald Trump’s threats of a trade war against Denmark, a NATO ally, over the status of Greenland; threats against Taiwan’s steel, pharmaceutical, and semiconductor industries; tariff threats against more NATO allies in the European Union; and tariff threats against the BRICS bloc resemble the unrestricted weaponising of trade by Beijing and mark a departure from Trump 1.0’s more targeted tariffs. The US is facing the clear and present danger of losing its soft-power acumen, and losing trust from its partners, with tragic consequences for the global rules-based order. In that respect, Trump might be playing directly into the Moscow–Beijing ambition to undermine the US and its allies across the military, economic, and diplomatic domains. The ambiguity of Trump’s “negotiation” strategy, which contains both national security and economic objections as raison d’être, adds to the challenge of maintaining trust and confidence among partners and allies, which would be both tragic and fatal for the US and its alliances.This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Indonesia’s inclusion in BRICS enhances the representation of the Global South and strengthens efforts to reform global governance institutions. This move positions the bloc as a stronger platform for collaboration among developing nations. On 7 January, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS grouping. In welcoming Indonesia, the Brazilian Government issued a statement, saying: “With the largest population and economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia shares with other members a commitment to reforming global governance institutions and contributes positively to deepening South-South cooperation.” With full membership, Indonesia has become the first country in Southeast Asia to join BRICS. Currently, Thailand and Malaysia are official partners, but not full members. Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement said the BRICS membership is “a strategic step to improve the collaborations and cooperation with other developing nations, based on the principle of equality, mutual respect, and sustainable development.” Economically, this could mean an increase of 0.3 percent growth to GDP, and the expansion of Indonesia’s access to BRICS markets. Geopolitically, it provides Indonesia a bargaining position in the global arena as well as a platform to voice the aspirations of the Global South. For BRICS, Indonesia’s membership adds another feather to its hat by bringing in greater representation of the Global South to its multipolar vision. This makes it imperative to assess the trajectory of the grouping. What started as an acronym “BRIC,” coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001 in the report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” the grouping was projected in the next decade to grow significantly. Founded in 2009 by the four countries—Brazil, Russia, China, and India—the bloc’s first expansion came in 2010 with the joining of South Africa. In the last 16 years, BRICS has graduated from being a popular buzz word in international politics to a significant platform of emerging economies representing the “Global South.” What is noteworthy is that BRICS is not yet a formal multilateral organisation like the United Nations, World Bank or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but increasingly there has been a greater demand among states (mostly developing countries) to join this club of emerging economies. Despite its informality, what made BRICS relevant in the international order was the 2008 financial crises, which raised scepticism and concerns over the dollar-dominated monetary system. This invariably challenged the effectiveness of the West-led Bretton Woods institutions given the suffering of the United States and Europe in the wake of the financial crisis. In contrast, the BRICS economies showed resilience. The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 2009, where the Joint Declaration put forward the desire of BRIC countries to develop “an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open, and transparent dialogue and cooperation” that is “conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” This was reaffirmed at the most recent 16th BRICS Summit held in October 2024 in Kazan. With the indicative expansion of its institutional framework and functionaries since 2009, the most significant outputs have been the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides developmental funds to countries; the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with a resource pool of US$100 billion, which provides a mutual support mechanism for short-term balance of payments pressures, enhancing the financial safety net of member countries; and the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 for effective integration of BRICS enterprises into global and regional value chains. A significant milestone was the call, during the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, for the expansion of BRICS by inviting new states to join. Another, in 2024, was the deliberation on the formation of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (also known as BRICS Pay), where BRICS countries would trade with each other without converting to US dollars by utilising blockchain technology and tokens to circumvent the SWIFT financial payment system. Although BRICS Pay is still only a concept, its development would seriously undermine the US dollar’s long-standing dominance. Today, the inter-governmental organisation boasts of 10 full members with the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025; and has nine official partner countries—Nigeria is the ninth partner country of BRICS (admitted on 17 January 2025), joining Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Statistically put, BRICS member countries comprise about 45 percent of the world’s population, 28 percent of the global economy, and collectively they produce more than a third of the world’s crude oil. And if Saudi Arabia joins the group (which it is yet to consider the BRICS invitation), the grouping would then produce some 43 percent of global crude oil. This growth among emerging nations is set to widen the gap between BRICS+ and the G7 nations. As IMF estimates suggest, BRICS+ will account for 37.6 percent of world GDP at purchasing power parity in 2027, compared with 28.2 percent for the G7. This will signify a shift in economic power towards emerging economies, enhance intra-BRICS trade and regional networks rather than relying on G7 markets, and also lead to the creation of alternate alliances and institutions. Apart from expanding its membership, BRICS has also broadened its agenda beyond economics to include global challenges. The two main pillars of BRICS are practical cooperation in various fields through meetings of Working Groups and Senior Officials, and consultation on matters of shared interests through meetings of Leaders and Ministers of Finance, Trade, Health, Science & Technology, Education, Agriculture, Communication, and Labour, among others. The intra-BRICS collaboration now includes social welfare, intellectual property, tourism, science & technology, culture, outer space, think tanks, and internet governance and security. With BRICS+, emerging economies are establishing new standards for order making. In other words, despite its informal existence, BRICS has emerged as a strong contestant for building an alternative discourse on global governance—one that is non-western. The expansion gives BRICS a greater economic and demographic weight as well as a stronger voice to the Global South, potentially reshaping discussions in institutions like the UN and WTO. However, the long-term success of an expanded BRICS will depend on its ability to balance diverse interests and act as a unified voice on the global stage. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source