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Energy & Economics
Chinese yuan on the map of South America. Trading between China and Latin American countries, economy and investment

China-Latin America Green Cooperation and the Global Development Initiative

by Cao Ting

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The global development initiative proposed by China aims to promote global sustainable development and has received support from many Latin American countries. At present, green cooperation between China and Latin America has achieved positive results in multiple fields such as clean energy, green agriculture, and green transportation. Latin American countries can become important partners for China to promote the Global Development Initiatives. However, in terms of green cooperation, China and Latin America also face some challenges. Both sides must strengthen consensus and achieve coordinated development in various fields. Sustainable Development and the Global Development Initiative The current international situation is turbulent and constantly changing, with a global economy that remains stagnant, while challenges such as geopolitical conflicts, climate change, and the food crisis are becoming increasingly intertwined and exacerbated. In this context, all countries around the world face the important task of promoting sustainable development and maintaining healthy economic and social growth. On September 21, 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping officially launched the Global Development Initiative at the United Nations, outlining a path toward a new stage of global development that is balanced, coordinated, and inclusive (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2021). The Global Development Initiative is aligned with the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and places climate change and sustainable development as key areas of cooperation, emphasizing the idea of harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature. Its goal is to promote stronger, more sustainable, and healthier global development, and to build a global community for development. The 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are a fundamental part of the Global South and, in general, place great importance on sustainable development, which has allowed them to achieve notable successes in the field of sustainable cooperation. In a context of great power competition and ongoing regional conflicts, the strengthening of sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries presents numerous opportunities, creating ample space to jointly advance in sustainable development. The concept of a sustainable economy evolved from the idea of sustainable development, with harmony between humanity and nature at its core and the goal of achieving long-term sustainability. This approach maintains that economic growth is not an unlimited or uncontrolled process but rather must be conditioned by the ecological environment’s capacities and the resource carrying capacity. The concept of a sustainable economy emerged in the late 1980s when British environmental economist David Pearce introduced it in his work “Blueprint for a Green Economy”, published in 1989. However, it was not until the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, that the sustainable economy began to receive greater attention and became a central concept in global development strategies. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a sustainable economy is driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, improve energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. A sustainable economy has always promoted development goals that integrate economic, social, and environmental aspects. This respect for the environment and nature is closely linked to traditional Chinese worldviews. Since ancient times, the Chinese have developed ideas about following the laws of nature and protecting the ecological environment. In the classical text “Yi Zhou Shu Ju Pian”, it is recorded: "During the three months of spring, no axes are used in the mountains and forests, to allow plants to grow; during the three months of summer, no nets are placed in rivers and lakes." These ideas have been a fundamental part of the spiritual thought and culture of the Chinese people for over five thousand years, and through them, they have envisioned humanity and nature as an organic and indivisible whole. They represent the basic understanding of the relationship between humans and nature in ancient Chinese agricultural society, where coexistence and mutual promotion between people and the ecological environment reflected a dialectical relationship of unity. These ideas, full of deep wisdom, constitute an essential component of China’s rich cultural tradition. Consensus Base for Green Cooperation In 2021, the Global Development Initiative, aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, established eight key areas of cooperation: poverty reduction, food security, industrialization, connectivity, pandemic response, development financing, climate change, and the digital economy. It also proposed key principles such as “prioritizing development,” “people-centered focus,” “universal inclusion,” “innovation-driven efforts,” “harmony between humanity and nature,” and “action-oriented approaches.” Latin American countries also place great importance on sustainable development and share numerous points of consensus with China on these principles. Currently, several countries in the region, including Peru and Colombia, have joined the “Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative.” This shared commitment to sustainable development between China and Latin America provides an important foundation for advancing sustainable cooperation. Particularly, China and Latin American countries have broad consensus in the following areas: 1. Prioritizing national development. Both China and many Latin American countries are developing nations and consider the promotion of sustainable development a crucial goal. President Xi Jinping emphasized in the report presented at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC): “The fundamental fact that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism has not changed; our international status as the largest developing country in the world has not changed.” (Xi, 2017) China’s fundamental national situation determines that its main task is to advance along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and to focus its efforts on socialist construction. The Global Development Initiative also highlights “prioritizing development” as one of its core pillars. Latin America, for its part, faces the challenge of progressing in development. Although it was one of the regions in the Global South to achieve national independence and begin economic development relatively early, some Latin American countries have experienced stagnation in their economic transformation and have not managed to overcome the so-called “middle-income trap.” Affected by factors such as low global economic growth, fiscal constraints, and limited policy space, Latin America’s economy has shown a weak recovery in recent years, with some countries facing serious inflation and debt problems. Therefore, promoting sustainable development has become a top priority for governments in the region. In 2016, Latin American countries promoted the creation of the Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, as a regional mechanism for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (ECLAC, 2016). By the end of 2023, six successful conferences had been held, and the Latin America and the Caribbean Sustainable Development Report had been published annually to assess the region’s progress in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 2. Addressing welfare issues as a central task Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Party’s central leadership, led by Xi Jinping, has promoted a people-centered development approach, insisting that everything should be done for the people and depend on the people, always placing them in the highest position. During the centennial celebration of the CPC’s founding, General Secretary Xi emphasized: “To learn from history and forge the future, we must unite and lead the Chinese people in a tireless struggle for a better life.” In contrast, Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world. The unequal distribution of wealth, along with gender and racial discrimination, are persistent issues that have been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic slowdown. According to data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2023 the region’s poverty rate was 29.1%, and extreme poverty was 11.4%, both slightly higher than in 2022 (29% and 11.2%, respectively) (France24, 2023). As a response, many Latin American governments — such as those in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Cuba — have incorporated attention to welfare issues and improving their citizens’ quality of life as key pillars in their public policy agendas. 3. Embracing inclusion and shared benefits as a guiding principle Following the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a trend toward multipolarity and continued economic globalization. However, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of protectionism in various forms, accompanied by a rise in unilateralism and hegemonic policies. These “deglobalization” practices not only fail to resolve internal problems, but also disrupt global supply chains, hinder healthy economic development, and harm the interests of countries. In response, developing nations such as China and Latin American countries advocate for multipolar development and oppose unilateralism and power politics. In December 2023, China’s Central Conference on Foreign Affairs Work emphasized the importance of inclusive and mutually beneficial economic globalization. Similarly, Latin America has maintained a diversified foreign policy and has worked toward building a new, fair, and equitable international political and economic order. Amid rising tensions among major powers, most Latin American countries have chosen not to take sides, maintaining a non-aligned policy. Moreover, countries in Latin America are increasingly focused on inclusive development both within their nations and across the region, striving to address internal development imbalances. In 2010, the Andean Development Corporation (predecessor to the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean) released the “Latin America Vision Plan 2040”, which highlighted the need to strengthen economic inclusion in order to achieve truly sustainable growth (CAF, 2010). In January 2023, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in Argentina approved the “Buenos Aires Declaration,” which stressed the importance of promoting inclusive development in the region and fostering inclusive dialogue with other regions (CELAC, 2023). 4. Embracing innovation as a key driver Marx pointed out that “science is also part of the productive forces” and that “the development of fixed capital shows the extent to which the general knowledge of society has become a direct productive force.” In 1988, at the National Science Conference, Deng Xiaoping declared, “science and technology are the primary productive forces.” Since the 18th CPC Congress, China has firmly pursued innovation-led development. It launched the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, issued the Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2021–2035), and rolled out the Technological Innovation Blueprint under the 14th Five-Year Plan. Thanks to this framework, China has made significant progress in accelerating emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, quantum communication, and blockchain. Latin American countries are also intensifying their focus on technological innovation. In 2023, CELAC’s Buenos Aires Declaration underscored the importance of innovation for enhancing regional competitiveness and job quality, while encouraging scientific exchanges among nations and subregional organizations. Furthermore, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, committed to increasing investment in technological development. To that end, he announced at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change an investment of approximately 21 billion reais (around 4.28 billion U.S. dollars) in sustainable economy, innovative technologies, and low-carbon economy. In the 2023 Global Innovation Index, Brazil ranked 49th out of 132 countries, improving by five positions compared to the previous year. The President of Chile, Gabriel Boric, pledged to increase public funding for research and to finance the work of universities and research institutions. In 2019, the Colombian government established the “International Mission of Wise People,” a body composed of 46 national and international academic experts to promote production diversification and automation, with the goal of doubling the share of manufacturing and agriculture in the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2030. The current president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, has committed to transforming the country into a “knowledge society” and to continuing this initiative. 5. Making harmony between humans and nature a central goal Developing countries — including China and Latin American nations — prioritize climate issues and actively contribute to global climate governance. Since ancient China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, philosophical schools such as Confucianism and Taoism had already proposed concepts about the “unity between Heaven and humankind.” Similarly, Indigenous cultures in Latin America also share related cultural traditions. The Quechua peoples of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia promote the concept of “’Buen Vivir’” (“Good Living”), which emphasizes harmony between human society and nature. The Aymara of Peru and Bolivia, the Guaraní of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia, the Shuar of Ecuador, and the Mapuche of Chile all have similar philosophical expressions. So far in the 21st century, China and Latin American countries have intensified their focus on sustainable development. In August 2005, during a visit to Anji in China’s Zhejiang Province, Xi Jinping, then Secretary of the Communist Party of China in Zhejiang, put forward the principle that “lucid waters and lush mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver,” highlighting the idea that economic growth should not be achieved at the expense of the environment. China’s Global Development Initiative includes climate change and sustainable development as key cooperation areas, aiming for stronger, healthier global progress. Simultaneously, Latin American countries value sustainability highly. Ten nations in the region have officially submitted carbon-neutrality timelines and developed emissions-reduction plans. Several governments have taken significant measures to accelerate energy transition, restore ecosystems, and enhance international cooperation. Notably, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have made substantial strides in renewable energy: in Q1 2023, more than 90 % of Brazil’s energy came from renewables — the highest level since 2011. Progress of Green Cooperation between China and Latin America 1. High-level design for sustainable cooperation between China and Latin American countries has been continuously strengthenedAs comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America progresses, sustainable collaboration has also become integrated into the strategic high-level planning. At the third Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in 2021, the "Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas between China and CELAC Member States (2022–2024)" was adopted. This plan emphasizes the continuation of cooperation in areas such as renewable energy, new energy, civil nuclear energy, energy technology equipment, electric vehicles and their components, as well as energy-related geological and mineral resources. It also outlines the expansion of cooperation in emerging industries related to clean energy resources, support for technology transfer between companies, and the respect and protection of the natural environment. Joint declarations between China and countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina on establishing and deepening comprehensive strategic partnerships mention strengthening cooperation in areas such as climate change and clean energy. During the sixth meeting of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation in May 2022, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Brazilian Ministry of Economy agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment Cooperation for Sustainable Development, aimed at promoting investment in clean and low-carbon technologies in both countries. In April 2023, during Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's visit to China, the two countries issued the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change” and signed several cooperation agreements related to the sustainable economy. For example, Article 3 mentions “expanding cooperation in new fields such as environmental protection, combating climate change, the low-carbon economy, and the digital economy,” while Article 10 notes the aim to “strengthen cooperation on environmental protection, climate change, and biodiversity loss, promote sustainable development, and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.” In the same month, the “China-Brazil Joint Declaration on Combating Climate Change,” the “Memorandum of Understanding on Research and Innovation Cooperation between the Ministries of Science and Technology of China and Brazil,” and the “Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Investment and Industrial Cooperation between China and Brazil” identified key areas of future cooperation, including sustainable infrastructure, the development of sustainable industries, renewable energy, electric vehicles, sustainable technological innovation, and green financing. 2. Clean energy cooperation has deepened The development and use of clean energy are essential means for achieving green development. In recent years, clean energy cooperation between China and Latin America has shown the following main characteristics. The scope of clean energy cooperation is becoming increasingly broad. Currently, cooperation between China and Latin America in the fields of clean energy — such as hydropower, solar energy, wind power, nuclear energy, biomass energy, and lithium batteries — has reached a certain level of breadth and depth. At the same time, both sides have also initiated cooperation efforts in emerging areas such as green hydrogen and smart energy storage. China is constantly diversifying its target countries and modes of investment in clean energy in Latin America. In 2015, China began increasing its investment in the renewable energy sector in the region. Between 2005 and 2020, China’s main investment targets in renewable energy in Latin America included countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia. Investments in projects, mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investments have gone hand in hand. 3. Green cooperation in the transportation sector has yielded outstanding results. Chinese companies continue to cooperate with Latin American countries in the field of public transportation infrastructure and electric vehicles, promoting the low-carbon development of the transport sector in Latin America. First, cooperation in public transportation infrastructure is advancing. In recent years, Chinese companies have actively participated in the construction of public infrastructure such as railways, roads, and bridges in Latin American countries, aiming to promote interconnectivity and green travel across the region. Bogotá Metro Line 1, in the capital of Colombia, currently under construction with Chinese investment, is to date the largest public-private partnership (PPP) project in individual transportation infrastructure in Latin America. Second, trade in electric vehicles is developing rapidly. China’s electric vehicle industry has extensive experience in large-scale production and a relatively complete industrial supply chain, making it a new growth area in China–Latin America trade. Electric buses and cars from independent Chinese brands such as BYD, JAC, and Dongfeng are favored in Latin America due to their good quality and low price. Third, cooperation in battery and tram production is also improving. China and Latin America have also begun bold attempts in green capacity cooperation within the manufacturing sector. Currently, BYD is carrying out a range of production activities in Brazil, including the assembly of bus chassis and the production of photovoltaic modules and batteries. 4. Green agricultural cooperation is on the rise. Latin America has vast and fertile land, and agricultural cooperation is an important component of China–Latin America trade. In recent years, Chinese companies have paid increasing attention to using advanced technologies to strengthen environmental protection and actively promote the green transformation of agricultural cooperation. COFCO (‘China National Cereal, Oil & Foodstuff Corporation’) and its Brazilian partners conducted risk assessments of more than 1,700 soybean suppliers in the Amazon and Cerrado ecological zones, and mapped over 1.1 million hectares of soybean fields using remote sensing satellites, which has raised farmers' awareness of sustainable development. By the end of 2021, COFCO had achieved 100% traceability for all direct soybean purchases in Matopiba, a major soybean-producing region in Brazil. At the same time, China and several Latin American countries are promoting cooperation in green agricultural research and development. The Chinese Academy of Tropical Agricultural Sciences has established cooperative relationships with nine Latin American countries, including Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, and Costa Rica. It has achieved progress in exchange and cooperation in areas such as the innovative use and protection of germplasm resources, efficient transformation and comprehensive utilization of biomass energy, green pest and disease prevention and control technologies, and efficient cultivation techniques. 5. Cooperation on green financing plays an important bridging role. The Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and the China-United Nations Peace and Development Fund are key financial platforms through which China supports project cooperation under the Global Development Initiative. In addition to the above-mentioned platforms, current green financial instruments between China and Latin America include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the China–Latin America Cooperation Fund, the China–Latin America Development Finance Cooperation Mechanism, and subsidies provided by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently, all three financing projects of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in Brazil are related to the green economy. Challenges facing Sino–Latin American green cooperation Although green cooperation between China and Latin America has gradually achieved results and presents many development opportunities, the risks and challenges of cooperation should not be ignored. Most Latin Americans expect that foreign cooperation will promote social well-being, eliminate poverty, and reduce inequality in their countries. They place great importance on the social benefits of projects and pay close attention to the environmental impact of projects on local ecosystems. Currently, the process of extracting lithium from brine places high demands on water resources and carries the risk of air and water pollution. As a result, lithium mining has also faced opposition from Indigenous communities in some Latin American countries. In 2023, Indigenous peoples from Argentina’s Jujuy Province staged several protests against the exploitation of a lithium mine (Reventós, 2023). To reduce pollution in lithium extraction, further scientific and technological research is needed. The integration of Chinese companies into Latin America also faces many obstacles. The official languages of most Latin American countries are Spanish and Portuguese, which are deeply influenced by European and U.S. cultures. In addition to geographical distance, there is limited mutual understanding between the peoples of China and Latin America, and transportation and logistics costs are high. Most Chinese companies lack personnel fluent in Spanish or Portuguese and familiar with local laws and regulations. Currently, the U.S. government continues to view China as a strategic competitor. Latin America has also become a battleground for strategic competition between China and the United States. The U.S. has increasingly turned its attention to China’s cooperation with Latin American countries. In 2019, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs published an article stating that “China’s green investment in Latin America cannot offset local environmental damage” (Cote-Muñoz, 2019). In general, green cooperation between China and Latin America will face a more complex environment in the future. Final considerations In recent years, China has put forward the Global Development Initiative to promote international cooperation for sustainable development. Latin America, one of the regions with the most developing countries in the world, actively promotes the implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda and has a solid green economic foundation. In this sense, the region can be an important partner for China in achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda and building a shared future for humanity. China must continue to build consensus on development priorities with Latin American countries, plan key areas of cooperation according to their conditions and needs, promote connections between governments, businesses, universities, and media in China and Latin America, and jointly advance the green cooperation to a new level. China and Latin America have achieved multidisciplinary coverage in green cooperation. It is necessary to further improve the quality of cooperation in the future and achieve coordinated development across various sectors. For example, in the long term, the development of renewable energy will require greater energy storage capacity and wider electric grid coverage. Additionally, Chinese companies need to integrate more into local societies and generate greater social benefits while ensuring economic returns. They can strengthen cooperation with Latin American companies in order to quickly become familiar with local laws, regulations, and market conditions. Furthermore, more research — including environmental assessments and social consultations — should be conducted before launching projects. References CAF (2010). "Corporación Andina de Fomento, Visión para América Latina 2040 Hacia una sociedad más incluyente y próspera". https://scioteca.caf.com/bitstream/handle/123456789/496/latinamerica_2040_summary_esp.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=yCELAC (2023). "Declaración de Buenos Aires". https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/prensa/declaracion_ de_buenos_aires_-_version_final.pdf CEPAL (2016). "El Foro de los Países de América Latina y el Caribe sobre el Desarrollo Sostenible y el Seguimiento Regional de la Agenda 2030". https://www.cepal.org/es/temas/agenda-2030-desarrollo-sostenible/ foro-paises-america-latina-caribe-desarrollo-sostenible-seguimiento-regional-la-agenda-2030Cote-Muñoz, N. (2019). "China's Green Investments Won't Undo Its Environmental Damage to Latin America". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-green-investments-wont-undo-its-environmental-damage-latin-americaFrance24 (2023). "Tasa de pobreza se mantiene en 29 % en América Latina en 2023". https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20231125-tasa-de-pobreza-se-mantiene-en-29-en-am%C3%A9rica-latina-en-2023-dice-cepalMinistry of Foreign Affairs of China (2021). "Global Development Initiative-Building on 2030 SDGs for Stronger, Greener and Healthier Global Development". https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/GDI_140002/wj/202406/ P020240606606193448267.pdfReventós, B. y N. Fabre (2023). "Los grupos indígenas en Argentina que se oponen a la extracción del litio". BBC. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cevzgv0elp9o Cuadernos de Nuestra América. No. 014 | Nueva Época 2025, Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI). Under CC BY-NC 4.0

Energy & Economics
 March 28, 2018, the US and Chinese flags and texts at a studio in Seoul, Korea. An illustrative editorial. trade war

International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road

by Joon Seok Oh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the international political economy of Korea and its effects due to geopolitical tension between China and the USA. Design/methodology/approach Economic war between China and the USA has prolonged longer than expected. Aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, reforming the supply chain has been the centre of economic tension between China and the USA. Quite recently, with the rapid expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms, distribution channels come upon a new economic tension between the two. And now is the time to pivot its pattern of conflict from competition into cooperation. In this end, economic diplomacy could be a useful means to give a signal of cooperation. From the view of economic diplomacy, this paper tries to analyse the projected transition of economic war between China and the USA with its implication on the trade policy of Korea. Findings As an implementation of economic diplomacy, China suggested the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing trade logistics among related countries to gain competitiveness. In 2023, the Biden administration suggested the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor as a counter to BRI, which will be a threshold for changing trade policy from economic war into economic diplomacy. As a result, it is expected China and the USA will expand their economic diplomacy in a way to promote economic cooperation among allied states, while the distribution channel war would continue to accelerate the economic tension between China and the USA. Korea has to prepare for and provide measures handling this geopolitical location in its trade policy or economic diplomacy. Originality/value This research contributes to the awareness and understanding of trade environments from the perspective of economic diplomacy. 1. Introduction The advent of globalisation has led to widespread economic integration, creating global production networks and markets. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a significant setback to this trend. In the wake of COVID-19, an economic war has arisen between China and the USA, centred on the restructuring of global supply chains following widespread disruptions. International political economy (IPE) examines the power dynamics between states and the structures of influence within regional economies. Consequently, economic diplomacy has gained unprecedented attention. Economic diplomacy focuses on government actions regarding international economic issues, distinct from political diplomacy through its market-oriented approach in foreign policy. Putnam (1988) categorises economic diplomacy into two levels: unilateralism and bilateralism. Unilateral economic diplomacy (or unilateralism) often relies on hard power, involving decisions on trade liberalisation or market protection without negotiation. Bilateral economic diplomacy (or bilateralism) or multilateral economic diplomacy (or multilateralism), by contrast, involves negotiation among trade partners, resulting in agreements such as regional or global free trade agreements (FTAs). A vast range of state or non-state actors engage in economic diplomacy, navigating the complex interplay between international and domestic factors. Defining economic diplomacy is extremely challenging, but one useful definition is “the broad concept of economic statecraft, where economic measures are taken in the pursuit of political goals, including punitive actions such as sanctions” (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008).  Figure 1 Recent trend of economic diplomacy To exert influence internationally, ministers and heads of government strive to demonstrate their capacity for national security through two primary approaches, as shown in Figure 1 (above): economic war (or competition) and economic diplomacy (or international cooperation). In the context of global supply chain restructuring, the economic conflict between China and the USA has intensified, marked by threats of supply chain disruptions. This has led to emerging strategies aimed at “crowding out” the USA from global supply chains (去美戰略) or excluding China through alliances such as the Allied Supply Chain and Chip 4. While economic war is inherently “temporary” due to its painstaking nature, economic diplomacy or international cooperation offer a more “long-term” approach because it is gains-taking. This paper analyses the factors contributing to the prolonged nature of this economic war and explores potential outcomes of the supply chain tensions between China and the USA from the perspectives of IPE or geo-economics. In conclusion, it highlights the importance of preparing for trade policy adjustments and strategic economic diplomacy. 2. International trade war and strategic items2.1 Supply chain The supply chain encompasses a network of interconnected suppliers involved in each stage of production, from raw materials and components to the finished goods or services. This network can include vendors, warehouses, retailers, freight stations and distribution centres. Effective supply chain management is a “crucial process because an optimised supply chain results in lower costs and a more efficient production cycle” [1]. Within the supply chain, a leading company typically holds governance power, enabling it to coordinate scheduling and exercise control across the interconnected suppliers, resulting in reduced costs and shorter production times (Gereffi et al., 2005) [2]. Since the 2000s, forward and backward integration have been key strategies for managing time, cost and uncertainty in supply chains. For example, Toyota’s Just-In-Time (JIT) system demonstrated the efficiency of locally concentrated supply chains until disruptions from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and the Thailand flood. Following supply chain shutdowns in 2020, many businesses shifted from local to global supply chains, utilising advancements of the information technology (IT) and transportation technologies to geographically diversify operations. As the need for a systematically functioning global supply chain has grown, a leading nation, much like a leading company, often assumes governance power in international trade and investment, as illustrated in Figure 2 (below), by aligning with the leadership of a dominant market competitiveness, which makes this leadership valuable.  Figure 2 Supply chain The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to the global supply chain, causing sudden lockdowns that led to widespread supply chain disruptions. To mitigate the risks of future global disruptions, supply chains have begun restructuring to operate on a more regionally segmented basis. In this shift toward regional supply chains, China and the USA are at the centre, drawing allied countries within their spheres of influence. This alignment helps explain why the economic war between China and the USA has lasted longer than anticipated. 2.2 Strategic items China has restricted exports of two rare metals, gallium and germanium, which are critical to semiconductor production. Kraljic (1983) highlighted the importance of managing “strategic items” within the framework of supply chain management, as shown in Figure 3. Kraljic emphasises the need to strengthen and diversify critical items. The Kraljic matrix provides a valuable tool for identifying essential items that require focused management within the supply chain.  Figure 3 Kraljic matrix Kraljic identified the importance of managing “bottleneck items” in strategic supply chain management – items that present high supply risk but have relatively low business value. Due to the potential costs associated with non-delivery or compromised quality of strategic items, these must be closely monitored and controlled. From a risk management perspective, establishing medium-term business relationships and collaboration with suppliers is essential. For example, South Korea imports over 90% of its urea for agricultural and industrial purposes from China [3]. Heavily dependent on China for urea supplies due to pricing factors, Korea faced challenges when China imposed export controls on urea, underscoring Korea’s vulnerability within China’s sphere of influence. The European Union (EU) also faces challenges with critical raw materials (CRMs). China remains the EU’s sole supplier of processed rare earth elements, while Chile supplies 79% of its lithium. In response, the EU introduced the CRM Act (CRMA) to support projects aimed at increasing “the EU’s capacity to extract, process, and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify supplies from the third countries” [4]. 2.3 Resilient supply chain alliance In contrast to China’s approach of leveraging supply disruptions to strengthen its influence, the Biden administration in the USA has adopted a cooperative approach focused on building resilient supply chains (Pillar 2) through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which includes 14 member countries [5]. The need for resilient supply chains has been further underscored by the Russia–Ukraine crisis. The IPEF aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities by fostering global efforts to reduce risks associated with concentrated, fragile supply chains [6].  Figure 4 Resilient supply chain alliance In Figure 4, the EU Commission presented the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) in September 2022, a crisis governance framework designed to ensure the availability of essential goods and services during future emergencies. The SMEI operates on three levels: contingency planning, vigilance and emergency. The contingency planning phase focuses on collaboration among member states to mitigate supply chain disruption and monitor incidents. The vigilance phase can be activated when a significant disruption is anticipated, enabling specific measures such as mapping and monitoring supply chains and production capacities. Finally, the emergency phase is activated in cases of severe disruption to the functioning of the single market [7]. Establishing a resilient supply chain through international cooperation may be appealing, yet the reality often falls short of the ambition. In South Korea, the IPEF took effect on 17 April 2024, after an extended negotiation process, marking the first multilateral agreement on supply chains. As a result, during non-crisis periods, the 14 member countries will collaborate to strengthen international trade, investment and trade logistics. In times of crisis, member countries will activate a “crisis response network”. Conversely, opportunities for negotiation with China, South Korea’s largest trading partner, are essential for building supply chain resilience [8]. China has pursued an industrial policy focused on enhancing its supply chain management capabilities. In the semiconductor sector, the decoupling between China and the USA has become increasingly evident. Contrary to expectations, China has adopted a policy of internalising its supply chains, returning to the integration strategies of the 2000s rather than furthering globalisation. A promising opportunity for transformation between the two countries has emerged recently. Since 2015, China and South Korea have maintained bilateral FTA, and with the second phase of FTA negotiations currently underway, there is an opportunity to strengthen trade and investment ties, fostering positive progress through international cooperation. 2.4 China manufacturing exodus During the COVID-19 pandemic, China imposed sudden lockdowns without prior notice or preparation, halting production and logistics cycles. This “zero COVID” policy may have triggered a shift towards “de-risking” China from supply chain disruptions. Although China still offers significant advantages as “the factory of the world,” with vast market potential, prolonged trade tensions with the USA, intensified during the Trump administration, have prompted global manufacturers with substantial USA market bases to relocate operations amid rising geopolitical uncertainties. For example, Nike and Adidas have shifted much of their footwear manufacturing to Vietnam, Apple has begun iPhone production at a Foxconn in Chennai, India, and AstraZeneca has contracted production with India’s Serum Institute. In the pre-globalised era, defining the Rule of Origin (ROO) was straightforward, as a product’s components were usually manufactured and assembled within a single country. However, with the complexity of global supply chains, particularly since 2012, determining ROO has become a time-consuming and subjective process. ROO are classified as either non-preferential or preferential. The USA applies non-preferential ROO to restrict imports from countries like Cuba, Iran and North Korea, while offering trade preference programmes for others. Preferential ROO are used to determine duty-free eligibility for imports from approved countries [9], whereas non-preferential ROO play a crucial role in “country of origin labelling, government procurement, enforcement of trade remedy actions, compilation of trade statistics, supply chain security issues.” [10] China manufacturing exodus may negatively impact capital inflows into Hong Kong, traditionally seen as the Gateway to China. In 2023, Hong Kong’s initial public offering volume fell to a 20-year low of $5.9bn [11]. While China-oriented business remains in Hong Kong, which returns fully to Chinese control in 2047, non-China-oriented businesses have migrated to Singapore. As the certainty of contract and ownership rights forms the foundation of capitalism, this capital flight from Hong Kong is likely to persist. 3. Trade logistics and economic corridors Globalisation has allowed supply chains to leverage interdependence and interconnectedness, maximising efficiency. However, while these efficiencies have been beneficial, they have also created a fertile ground for friction between trade partners due to a “survival of the fittest” mindset and the principle of “winner takes all.” This interdependence has also highlighted vulnerabilities; the global supply chain struggled to manage the disruptions caused by COVID-19, prompting a shift towards regional integration initiatives, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. As the global economy seeks stability, collaboration over competition has become increasingly essential, with economic diplomacy emerging as a priority. The prolonged economic war between China and the USA arguably needs to shift towards economic diplomacy. The global supply chain is restructuring into regional supply chains, building resilience by operating in regional segments that can withstand crises. Michael Porter introduced the concept of value chain as “a set of activities that a firm performs to deliver a valuable product or service to the market.” [12] Complex finished goods often depend on global value chains, traversing multiple countries. As shown in Figure 5, the value chain consists of supply chain and trade channel components. While the focus has traditionally been on which country holds lead status within a regional supply chain, the emphasis is now shifting to how these regional segments can be interconnected and relayed. In this context, the supply chain competition may evolve into a “channel war” in international trade, where trade logistics will centre on the internal flow of goods, standardising channel processes and establishing authority over these channels.  Figure 5 Supply chain v. trade channel 3.1 Trade logistics It is natural for governments to seek environments that enhance competitiveness within in their countries. In terms of trade, effective trade logistics are essential for maintaining competitive advantage. As a prerequisite, a strong IT management infrastructure is indispensable. As shown in Figure 6, trade logistics encompass the internal flow of goods to market, integrating physical infrastructure with operating software – such as transport hubs, warehouses, highways, ports, terminals, trains and shipping vessels. Key areas of conflict in trade logistics involve the standardisation of channel processes and determining who holds governance over operation of these logistics systems. This is equally relevant within the digital economy. Recently, Chinese e-commerce – often referred to as C-commerce – has aggressively sought to gain control over digital distribution channels, interconnected delivery networks and trade logistics via digital platforms. Chinese platforms such as Taobao, Temu and AliExpress are actively working to increase their monthly active users (MAUs), positing themselves as counterweights to USA-based platforms such as Amazon and eBay in digital trade [13].  Figure 6 Trade logistics When the agenda of establishing international trade logistics is introduced to relevant trade members across various countries, initial progress and effective responses are often achieved. However, efforts soon encounter obstacles related to standardising logistics processes and establishing operational governance. Greater reliance on international institutions could help resolve these issues (Bayne, 2017). Yet governments frequently prioritise domestic interests, and after prolonged negotiations, the risk of international agreements failing increases. Amid the economic war between China and the USA, China launched a trade logistics initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt One Road, in 2013. Often referred to as the New Silk Road, the BRI aims to establish economic corridors for trade logistics. The World Bank estimates that the BRI could boost trade flows by 4.1% and reduce trade costs by 1.1% [14]. In response, the Biden administration proposed the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in September 2023 to strengthen transport and communication links between Europe and Asia as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. IMEC has been well received by participating countries, with expectations of fostering economic growth, enhancing connectivity and potentially rebalancing trade and economic relations between the EU and China [15]. Both BRI and IMEC are ambitious projects aimed at boosting international trade through substantial investments in trade logistics infrastructure. Each seeks to assert governance over international trade channels, signalling that the supply chain war may soon evolve into a trade channel war between China and the USA. 3.2 Economic corridors Economic corridors are transport networks designed to support and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and information. These corridors often include integrated infrastructure, such as highways, railways and ports, linking cities or even countries (Octaviano and Trishia, 2014). They are typically established to connect manufacturing hubs, high-supply and high-demand areas, and producers of value-added goods. Economic corridors comprise both hard infrastructure – such as trade facilities – and soft infrastructure, including trade facilitation and capacity-building measures. The Asian Development Bank introduced the term “economic corridor” in 1998 to describe networks connecting various economic agents within a region [16]. Economic corridors are integrated trade logistics networks, providing essential infrastructure for connecting regional segments of supply chains. As supply chains increasingly operate in regional “chunks,” linking these segments becomes ever more important. Economic corridors typically include a network of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, terminals and ports. Initiatives like the BRI and IMEC use economic corridors as instruments of economic diplomacy, shifting strategies from hard power to soft power, as shown in Figure 7. Because less-developed or developing countries often lack sufficient funding to invest in trade logistics, they tend to welcome these initiatives from developed countries, which offer international collaboration and support. However, these initiatives usually come with the condition that participating countries must accept standardised trade processes and governance led by the sponsoring developed country.  Figure 7 Economic corridor initiatives as economic diplomacy To succeed, economic corridors must meet three key conditions [17]. First, government intervention is essential, as economic corridor initiatives primarily involve public infrastructure investments beyond the scope of the private sector. In realising these projects, governments must reconcile three tensions to ensure their policies are mutually supportive: tensions between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures and between governments and other stakeholders. Second, intermediate outcomes should be measured and demonstrated as results of economic corridors, allowing participants to experience tangible benefits throughout these longer-term projects. Finally, economic corridors should deliver broader benefits. Participants need incentives to utilise the infrastructure sustainably. These benefits may extend beyond economic welfare, such as wages and income, to include social inclusion, equity and environmental gains, which support the long-term viability of the infrastructure. 4. BRI vs IMEC4.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - Silk Road The BRI can be a modern-day realisation of the Silk Road concept, connecting Europe as a market base with China as a production base. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, which connected trade routes across Eurasia, the BRI poses potential challenges due to its extensive connectivity. Firstly, there are social and environmental externalities, such as increased congestion and accidents from concentrating traffic flows through limited links and nodes within trade networks. Secondly, while the connectivity may benefit the production and market bases at either end, regions situated between these hubs, through which highways and railways pass, may gain minimal advantage. Thirdly, there is often a mismatch between where costs and benefits are realised. Transit regions that facilitate network traffic often see fewer direct benefits compared to high-density nodes within the network. 4.2 India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) - The Spice Road The ancient Spice Roads once connected the Middle East and Northeast Africa with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods such as cinnamon, ginger, pepper and cassia, which, like silk, served as a form of currency. The IMEC proposes a modern route from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Greece. Since its announcement in September 2023, some regional experts have expressed reservations about its feasibility, particularly regarding the connection between the Middle East and Israel. The project has faced delays due to the Israel–Hamas war. Despite these challenges, IMEC holds potential to drive economic growth and strengthen connectivity, especially as countries like Vietnam and India emerge as alternative manufacturing bases for companies relocating from China. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, IMEC is not viewed as a challenge to China but rather as an opportunity to diversify their economies and solidify their roles within the Middle East region [18]. 5. Conclusion A new trade war between China and the USA has begun, with the Biden Administration’s introduction of IMEC as a counter to China’s BRI. This shift could soon transform the nature of economic war from a focus on supply chains to one on trade channels. The China manufacturing exodus was further accelerated by supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the economic tensions between China and the USA, the restructuring of global supply chains into regional networks has made significant progress. With China maintaining its stance on export controls for strategic items, South Korea must prepare for resilient supply chain management. In relation to China–Korea FTA, which is currently undergoing its second phase of negotiation, South Korea should seek clarity on the transparency of China’s strategic item controls. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) plays a key role in monitoring the quality of inbound investments; similarly, South Korea is experiencing increased inbound investment due to the manufacturing shift from China and should apply similar standards to evaluate investment quality. This emerging economic war between China and the USA is now marked by the competing initiatives of the BRI and IMEC. The BRI can be viewed as a modern Silk Road, linking China with Europe, while the IMEC seeks to establish a trade logistics corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Greece. The South Korean Government should take proactive steps to prepare for the evolving dynamics of the trade war between China and the USA. CitationOh, J.S. (2025), "International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-11. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-06-2024-0031  Notes 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp2. According to Gary Gereffi et al, 5 governance types of a lead company could be categorised as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.3. Korea imports urea from 12 countries including Qatar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in addition to China.4. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en5. IPEF was launched on May 23,2022 at Tokyo. 14 member countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA. 4 Pillar of IPEF are Trade (Pillar 1), Supply Chain (Pillar 2),Clean Economy (Pillar 3) and Fair Economy (Pillar 4).6. Critics say “lack of substantive actions and binding commitments, instead focusing on process-driven framework building.” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/its-time-ipef-countries-take-action-supply-chain-resilience7. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_54438. As of 2023, the first-largest trade partner of Korea is China (Trade volume of $267.66bn), the second is the US ($186.96bn) and the third is Vietnam ($79.43bn)9. As preferential ROO contain the labour value content requirement in the USMCA, it could increase compliance costs for importers. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3452410. USITC(1996), Country of Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations and Practices, USITC Publication 2975, July, pp. 2–411. https://www.barrons.com/articles/hong-kong-financial-center-china-46ba5d3612. Porter identifies a value chain broken in five primary activities: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and post-sale services. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/concepts_approaches_in_gvc_research_final_april_18.pdf13. MAU is a metric commonly used to identify the number of unique users who engage with apps and website. MAU is an important measurement to the level of platform competitiveness in the digital trade logistics or e-commerce industry.14. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/12/china-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-global-chemical-industry.html15. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2023/10/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-us-businesses16. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which first used the term in 1998, defines economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets. http://research.bworldonline.com/popular-economics/story.php?id=350&title=Economic-corridors-boost-markets,-living-conditions17. Legovini et al. (2020) comments traditional cross border agreements of transport investment focuses only on a narrow set of direct benefits and cost. However, economic corridors can entail much wider economic benefits and costs such as trade and economic activity, structural change, poverty reduction, pollution and deforestation.18. Arab Centre Washington D.C. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/ References Bayne, N. (2017), Challenge and Response in the New Economic Diplomacy, 4th ed., The New Economic Diplomacy, Routledge, London, p. 19.Blanchard, J.M.F. and Ripsman, N.M. (2008), “A political theory of economic statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 371-398, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The governance of value chain”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 78-104, doi: 10.1080/09692290500049805.Kraljic, P. (1983), “Purchasing must be supply management”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 61 No. 5, September.Legovini, A., Duhaut, A. and Bougna, T. (2020), “Economic corridors-transforming the growth potential of transport investments”, p. 10.Octaviano, B.Y. and Trishia, P. (2014), Economic Corridors Boost Markets, Living Conditions, Business World Research, Islamabad, October.United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1996), “Country of origin marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices”, USITC Publication, Vol. 2975, July, pp. 2-4.Further readingPorter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press.Putman, R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics; the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 427-600.USITC (2019), “Global value chain analysis: concepts and approaches”, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, April, pp. 1-29.

Energy & Economics
Comparison of Drought and flood metaphor for climate change and extreme weather.

Global Climate Agreements: Successes and Failures

by Clara Fong , Lindsay Maizland

International efforts, such as the Paris Agreement, aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But experts say countries aren’t doing enough to limit dangerous global warming. Summary Countries have debated how to combat climate change since the early 1990s. These negotiations have produced several important accords, including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Governments generally agree on the science behind climate change but have diverged on who is most responsible, how to track emissions-reduction goals, and whether to compensate harder-hit countries. The findings of the first global stocktake, discussed at the 2023 UN Climate Summit in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), concluded that governments need to do more to prevent the global average temperature from rising by 1.5°C. Introduction Over the last several decades, governments have collectively pledged to slow global warming. But despite intensified diplomacy, the world is already facing the consequences of climate change, and they are expected to get worse. Through the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere keeps rising, heating the Earth at an alarming rate. Scientists warn that if this warming continues unabated, it could bring environmental catastrophe to much of the world, including staggering sea-level rise, devastating wildfires, record-breaking droughts and floods, and widespread species loss. Since negotiating the Paris accord in 2015, many of the 195 countries that are party to the agreement have strengthened their climate commitments—to include pledges on curbing emissions and supporting countries in adapting to the effects of extreme weather—during the annual UN climate conferences known as the Conference of the Parties (COP). While experts note that clear progress has been made towards the clean energy transition, cutting current emissions has proven challenging for the world’s top emitters. The United States, for instance, could be poised to ramp up fossil fuel production linked to global warming under the Donald Trump administration, which has previously minimized the effects of climate change and has withdrawn twice from the Paris Agreement. What are the most important international agreements on climate change? Montreal Protocol, 1987. Though not intended to tackle climate change, the Montreal Protocol [PDF] was a historic environmental accord that became a model for future diplomacy on the issue. Every country in the world eventually ratified the treaty, which required them to stop producing substances that damage the ozone layer, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The protocol has succeeded in eliminating nearly 99 percent of these ozone-depleting substances. In 2016, parties agreed via the Kigali Amendment to also reduce their production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), powerful greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992. Ratified by 197 countries, including the United States, the landmark accord [PDF] was the first global treaty to explicitly address climate change. It established an annual forum, known as the Conference of the Parties, or COP, for international discussions aimed at stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These meetings produced the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Kyoto Protocol, 2005. The Kyoto Protocol [PDF], adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005, was the first legally binding climate treaty. It required developed countries to reduce emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels, and established a system to monitor countries’ progress. But the treaty did not compel developing countries, including major carbon emitters China and India, to take action. The United States signed the agreement in 1998 but never ratified it and later withdrew its signature.  Paris Agreement, 2015. The most significant global climate agreement to date, the Paris Agreement requires all countries to set emissions-reduction pledges. Governments set targets, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with the goals of preventing the global average temperature from rising 2°C (3.6°F) above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to keep it below 1.5°C (2.7°F). It also aims to reach global net-zero emissions, where the amount of greenhouse gases emitted equals the amount removed from the atmosphere, in the second half of the century. (This is also known as being climate neutral or carbon neutral.) The United States, the world’s second-largest emitter, is the only country to withdraw from the agreement, a move President Donald Trump made during his first administration in 2017. While former President Joe Biden reentered the agreement during his first day in office, Trump again withdrew the United States on the first day of his second administration in 2025. Three other countries have not formally approved the agreement: Iran, Libya, and Yemen. Is there a consensus on the science of climate change? Yes, there is a broad consensus among the scientific community, though some deny that climate change is a problem, including politicians in the United States. When negotiating teams meet for international climate talks, there is “less skepticism about the science and more disagreement about how to set priorities,” says David Victor, an international relations professor at the University of California, San Diego. The basic science is that:• the Earth’s average temperature is rising at an unprecedented rate; • human activities, namely the use of fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—are the primary drivers of this rapid warming and climate change; and,• continued warming is expected to have harmful effects worldwide. Data taken from ice cores shows that the Earth’s average temperature is rising more now than it has in eight hundred thousand years. Scientists say this is largely a result of human activities over the last 150 years, such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation. These activities have dramatically increased the amount of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere, causing the planet to warm. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN body established in 1988, regularly assesses the latest climate science and produces consensus-based reports for countries. Why are countries aiming to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C? Scientists have warned for years of catastrophic environmental consequences if global temperature continues to rise at the current pace. The Earth’s average temperature has already increased approximately 1.1°C above preindustrial levels, according to a 2023 assessment by the IPCC. The report, drafted by more than two hundred scientists from over sixty countries, predicts that the world will reach or exceed 1.5°C of warming within the next two decades even if nations drastically cut emissions immediately. (Several estimates report that global warming already surpassed that threshold in 2024.) An earlier, more comprehensive IPCC report summarized the severe effects expected to occur when the global temperature warms by 1.5°C: Heat waves. Many regions will suffer more hot days, with about 14 percent of people worldwide being exposed to periods of severe heat at least once every five years. Droughts and floods. Regions will be more susceptible to droughts and floods, making farming more difficult, lowering crop yields, and causing food shortages.  Rising seas. Tens of millions of people live in coastal regions that will be submerged in the coming decades. Small island nations are particularly vulnerable. Ocean changes. Up to 90 percent of coral reefs will be wiped out, and oceans will become more acidic. The world’s fisheries will become far less productive. Arctic ice thaws. At least once a century, the Arctic will experience a summer with no sea ice, which has not happened in at least two thousand years. Forty percent of the Arctic’s permafrost will thaw by the end of the century.  Species loss. More insects, plants, and vertebrates will be at risk of extinction.  The consequences will be far worse if the 2°C threshold is reached, scientists say. “We’re headed toward disaster if we can’t get our warming in check and we need to do this very quickly,” says Alice C. Hill, CFR senior fellow for energy and the environment. Which countries are responsible for climate change? The answer depends on who you ask and how you measure emissions. Ever since the first climate talks in the 1990s, officials have debated which countries—developed or developing—are more to blame for climate change and should therefore curb their emissions. Developing countries argue that developed countries have emitted more greenhouse gases over time. They say these developed countries should now carry more of the burden because they were able to grow their economies without restraint. Indeed, the United States has emitted the most of all time, followed by the European Union (EU).   However, China and India are now among the world’s top annual emitters, along with the United States. Developed countries have argued that those countries must do more now to address climate change.   In the context of this debate, major climate agreements have evolved in how they pursue emissions reductions. The Kyoto Protocol required only developed countries to reduce emissions, while the Paris Agreement recognized that climate change is a shared problem and called on all countries to set emissions targets. What progress have countries made since the Paris Agreement? Every five years, countries are supposed to assess their progress toward implementing the agreement through a process known as the global stocktake. The first of these reports, released in September 2023, warned governments that “the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.” That said, countries have made some breakthroughs during the annual UN climate summits, such as the landmark commitment to establish the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The fund aims to address the inequality of climate change by providing financial assistance to poorer countries, which are often least responsible for global emissions yet most vulnerable to climate disasters. At COP28, countries decided that the fund will be initially housed at the World Bank, with several wealthy countries, such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and EU members, initially pledging around $430 million combined. At COP29, developed countries committed to triple their finance commitments to developing countries, totalling $300 billion annually by 2035. Recently, there have been global efforts to cut methane emissions, which account for more than half of human-made warming today because of their higher potency and heat trapping ability within the first few decades of release. The United States and EU introduced a Global Methane Pledge at COP26, which aims to slash 30 percent of methane emissions levels between 2020 and 2030. At COP28, oil companies announced they would cut their methane emissions from wells and drilling by more than 80 percent by the end of the decade. However, pledges to phase out fossil fuels were not renewed the following year at COP29. Are the commitments made under the Paris Agreement enough? Most experts say that countries’ pledges are not ambitious enough and will not be enacted quickly enough to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. The policies of Paris signatories as of late 2022 could result in a 2.7°C (4.9°F) rise by 2100, according to the Climate Action Tracker compiled by Germany-based nonprofits Climate Analytics and the NewClimate Institute. “The Paris Agreement is not enough. Even at the time of negotiation, it was recognized as not being enough,” says CFR’s Hill. “It was only a first step, and the expectation was that as time went on, countries would return with greater ambition to cut their emissions.” Since 2015, dozens of countries—including the top emitters—have submitted stronger pledges. For example, President Biden announced in 2021 that the United States will aim to cut emissions by 50 to 52 percent compared to 2005 levels by 2030, doubling former President Barack Obama’s commitment. The following year, the U.S. Congress approved legislation that could get the country close to reaching that goal. Meanwhile, the EU pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030, and China said it aims to reach peak emissions before 2030. But the world’s average temperature will still rise more than 2°C (3.6°F) by 2100 even if countries fully implement their pledges for 2030 and beyond. If the more than one hundred countries that have set or are considering net-zero targets follow through, warming could be limited to 1.8˚C (3.2°F), according to the Climate Action Tracker.   What are the alternatives to the Paris Agreement? Some experts foresee the most meaningful climate action happening in other forums. Yale University economist William Nordhaus says that purely voluntary international accords like the Paris Agreement promote free-riding and are destined to fail. The best way to cut global emissions, he says, would be to have governments negotiate a universal carbon price rather than focus on country emissions limits. Others propose new agreements [PDF] that apply to specific emissions or sectors to complement the Paris Agreement.  In recent years, climate diplomacy has occurred increasingly through minilateral groupings. The Group of Twenty (G20), representing countries that are responsible for 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas pollution, has pledged to stop financing new coal-fired power plants abroad and agreed to triple renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade. However, G20 governments have thus far failed to set a deadline to phase out fossil fuels. In 2022, countries in the International Civil Aviation Organization set a goal of achieving net-zero emissions for commercial aviation by 2050. Meanwhile, cities around the world have made their own pledges. In the United States, more than six hundred local governments [PDF] have detailed climate action plans that include emissions-reduction targets. Industry is also a large source of carbon pollution, and many firms have said they will try to reduce their emissions or become carbon neutral or carbon negative, meaning they would remove more carbon from the atmosphere than they release. The Science Based Targets initiative, a UK-based company considered the “gold standard” in validating corporate net-zero plans, says it has certified the plans of  over three thousand firms, and aims to more than triple this total by 2025. Still, analysts say that many challenges remain, including questions over the accounting methods and a lack of transparency in supply chains. Recommended Resources This timeline tracks UN climate talks since 1992. CFR Education’s latest resources explain everything to know about climate change.  The Climate Action Tracker assesses countries’ updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement. CFR Senior Fellow Varun Sivaram discusses how the 2025 U.S. wildfires demonstrate the need to rethink climate diplomacy and adopt a pragmatic response to falling short of global climate goals. In this series on climate change and instability by the Center for Preventive Action, CFR Senior Fellow Michelle Gavin looks at the consequences for the Horn of Africa and the National Defense University’s Paul J. Angelo for Central America. This backgrounder by Clara Fong unpacks the global push for climate financing.

Energy & Economics
Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping before the beginning of the BRICS Leaders' meeting.

Bridges or bargains? Examining India and China’s infrastructure expansion in South Asia

by Bharadaz Uday Hazarika

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском India races to match China’s growing influence in South Asia In recent decades, South Asian nations have emerged as pivotal destination points for major infrastructure investments from both India and China. Stretching from the shores of the Indian Ocean to the Himalayan foothills, the growing footprint of these two regional powers is reshaping the landscape of development. While many projects share similar outcomes, they have also raised concerns about their impact on local economies and everyday life. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Initiation and controversy   Credits: Proposed Belt and Road Initiative. Illustrated in 2017 by Lommes, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0. First initiated in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is considered one of the most ambitious international infrastructure endeavours in recent history. Spanning more than 150 nations and involving over USD 1 trillion in investments, the BRI has supported the development of ports, railroads, highways, and energy networks throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As per the Green Finance and Development Center, there has been a revival in BRI financing after the COVID-19 pandemic, largely driven by Chinese policy banks and state-owned companies. In Sri Lanka, however, the BRI has become a cautionary example. The Hambantota Port, built with loans from the Export-Import Bank of China, failed to generate the expected revenue. In 2017, the Sri Lankan government granted a 99-year lease to China Merchants Port Holdings, raising concerns over sovereignty and economic vulnerability. Critics, particularly in Western media, have pointed to this as evidence of what they describe as China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” — a claim that Chinese officials strongly deny. However, some scholars argue that the term “debt-trap diplomacy” is misleading. Deborah Brautigam of Johns Hopkins University argues in her 2020 article “A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: the rise of a meme” argued that debt crises in countries such as Sri Lanka are mainly caused by domestic mismanagement, aggressive infrastructure spending, and global economic pressures — rather than coercion by China. In Bangladesh, foreign initiatives have significantly influenced the country's infrastructure and energy landscape. A key example is the Payra Power Plant, a USD 2.48 billion coal-fired project constructed under the BRI framework with Chinese funding and technical expertise. The plant, operational since 2020, has helped alleviate chronic energy shortages but has been criticized for its environmental footprint and reliance on imported coal. Moreover, concerns have emerged regarding its long-term sustainability and alignment with Bangladesh’s climate commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement. Another flagship BRI project is the Dhaka Elevated Expressway, a 20-kilometer-long project linking the capital’s airport to major industrial areas. Executed by the China Major Bridge Engineering Company, the project was structured as a public-private partnership under a 25-year build-own-transfer model. While it is expected to ease traffic congestion and boost logistics efficiency, experts have flagged the lack of competitive bidding and limited transparency in financial arrangements. In March 2025, during an official visit to China, Bangladesh's Chief Adviser, Muhammad Yunus, successfully secured a pledge of a total of USD 2.1 billion in investments, loans, and grants for Bangladesh, marking a significant step in strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries. In the Maldives, Chinese loans under the BRI supported major housing projects and the Sinamalé Bridge, an important link between Malé and Hulhulé Island. In 2018, reports indicated that the Maldives’ total public debt rose to 72 percent of its GDP, reaching around USD 3.8 billion. By early 2024, worries have resurfaced as the Maldives’ total debt rose to approximately USD 8.2 billion — 116.5 percent of its GDP in the first quarter, up from 110.4 percent during the same period the previous year. About half of that is external debt, with a big portion owed to China, which has extended loans totalling USD 1.37 billion to the country. The growing debt burden has sparked concerns regarding autonomy and repayment conditions. However, Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu has described China as “one of the Maldives’ closest allies and development partners.” He has pledged to deepen cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with a focus on infrastructure development. In January 2025, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) signed a deal with the Maldivian Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Infrastructure to build major infrastructure on Gulhifalhu Island in the Malé Atoll, further expanding China’s footprint in the country. India’s rise: Neighbourhood First and Act East India, long seen as a regional power, is increasingly using infrastructure as a tool of foreign diplomacy. However, with the exception of Bhutan, most of India’s South Asian neighbors have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), leading to a significant rise in Chinese investments across the region. Since 2018, China has invested more than USD 150 billion in the economies of Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. China’s expanding influence has raised concerns in India, and in response, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has strengthened India’s regional outreach through the “Neighbourhood First” policy, aimed at deepening ties between South Asian countries. Complementing this is the “Act East” policy, which focuses on building closer partnerships with Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. Unlike China’s debt-driven mega-projects, India’s approach emphasizes three core principles: transparency, respect for sovereignty, and people-centric development. India’s infrastructure engagement in Sri Lanka has largely focused on strategic support, including over USD 4 billion in credit lines during the country’s 2022 economic crisis. This assistance covered essential imports such as fuel and food and played a key role in stabilizing the Sri Lankan economy. India has also contributed to energy cooperation, particularly through projects like the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm and renewable energy initiatives in the north. However, these efforts have drawn criticism regarding transparency and local impact. For instance, a USD 442 million wind energy project awarded to India’s Adani Group without a competitive bidding process sparked concerns over environmental oversight and national sovereignty. India’s flagship initiative in the Maldives — the USD 500 million Greater Malé Connectivity Project (GMCP) — faced backlash from the “India Out” movement, led by opposition figures in 2022 who claimed the project threatened national sovereignty and enabled a foreign military presence. The protest underscored the fragile balance between development and concerns over external influence. In an effort to rebuild trust, India launched a USD 110 million sanitation project in 2024, covering 28 Maldivian islands. Construction on the GMCP resumed in February 2025 following diplomatic negotiations. As a goodwill gesture, India introduced visa-free travel for Maldivian citizens in March 2025 to help repair bilateral ties. The Maitree Super Thermal Power Project, a joint venture between India and Bangladesh with equal stakes, currently provides 1,320 MW to Bangladesh’s grid through its coal-fired facility in Rampal, Khulna, financed under India’s special financing program. A number of projects, such as the Bangladesh-India Friendship Pipeline, have been indefinitely suspended due to the August 2024 change of government in Bangladesh. On April 4, 2025, Modi met with Muhammad Yunus on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok, holding talks for the first time since 2024. The meeting opened up opportunities for reconciliation and restarting the paused projects. The road ahead Despite a history of tension, China and India are key players in South Asia, each with different strategies. China focuses on large-scale BRI projects, while India prioritizes connectivity and capacity building. However, there are areas where India’s and China’s interests overlap, which creates room for cooperation. With South Asia’s infrastructure needs reaching into the trillions, both countries’ initiatives are complementing each other, expanding their influence through trade and investment. While India gains from improved connectivity and trade with its neighbors, it will need to strengthen its economic diplomacy to keep pace with China’s growing influence in today’s geopolitical landscape.

Energy & Economics
The image displays mineral rocks alongside US currency and flags of Ukraine and the USA, highlighting the complex relationship involving economics, power, and resources.

Why Zelensky – not Trump – may have ‘won’ the US-Ukraine minerals deal

by Eve Warburton , Olga Boichak

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Last week, the Trump administration signed a deal with Ukraine that gives it privileged access to Ukraine’s natural resources. Some news outlets described the deal as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “caving” to US President Donald Trump’s demands. But we see the agreement as the result of clever bargaining on the part of Ukraine’s war-time president. So, what does the deal mean for Ukraine? And will this help strengthen America’s mineral supply chains? Ukraine’s natural resource wealth Ukraine is home to 5% of the world’s critical mineral wealth, including 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as vital for defence, construction and high-tech manufacturing. However, there’s a big difference between resources (what’s in the ground) and reserves (what can be commercially exploited). Ukraine’s proven mineral reserves are limited. Further, Ukraine has an estimated mineral wealth of around US$14.8 trillion (A$23 trillion), but more than half of this is in territories currently occupied by Russia. What does the new deal mean for Ukraine? American support for overseas conflict is usually about securing US economic interests — often in the form of resource exploitation. From the Middle East to Asia, US interventions abroad have enabled access for American firms to other countries’ oil, gas and minerals. But the first iteration of the Ukraine mineral deal, which Zelensky rejected in February, had been an especially brazen resource grab by Trump’s government. It required Ukraine to cede sovereignty over its land and resources to one country (the US), in order to defend itself from attacks by another (Russia). These terms were highly exploitative of a country fighting against a years-long military occupation. In addition, they violated Ukraine’s constitution, which puts the ownership of Ukraine’s natural resources in the hands of the Ukrainian people. Were Zelensky to accept this, he would have faced a tremendous backlash from the public. In comparison, the new deal sounds like a strategic and (potentially) commercial win for Ukraine. First, this agreement is more just, and it’s aligned with Ukraine’s short- and medium-term interests. Zelenksy describes it as an “equal partnership” that will modernise Ukraine. Under the terms, Ukraine will set up a United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund for foreign investments into the country’s economy, which will be jointly governed by both countries. Ukraine will contribute 50% of the income from royalties and licenses to develop critical minerals, oil and gas reserves, while the US can make its contributions in-kind, such as through military assistance or technology transfers. Ukraine maintains ownership over its natural resources and state enterprises. And the licensing agreements will not require substantial changes to the country’s laws, or disrupt its future integration with Europe. Importantly, there is no mention of retroactive debts for the US military assistance already received by Ukraine. This would have created a dangerous precedent, allowing other nations to seek to claim similar debts from Ukraine. Finally, the deal also signals the Trump administration’s commitment to “a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine” – albeit, still without any security guarantees. Profits may be a long time coming Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration and conservative media in the US are framing the deal as a win. For too long, Trump argues, Ukraine has enjoyed US taxpayer-funded military assistance, and such assistance now has a price tag. The administration has described the deal to Americans as a profit-making endeavour that can recoup monies spent defending Ukrainian interests. But in reality, profits are a long way off. The terms of the agreement clearly state the fund’s investment will be directed at new resource projects. Existing operations and state-owned projects will fall outside the terms of the agreement. Mining projects typically work within long time frames. The move from exploration to production is a slow, high-risk and enormously expensive process. It can often take over a decade. Add to this complexity the fact that some experts are sceptical Ukraine even has enormously valuable reserves. And to bring any promising deposits to market will require major investments. What’s perhaps more important It’s possible, however, that profits are a secondary calculation for the US. Boxing out China is likely to be as – if not more – important. Like other Western nations, the US is desperate to diversify its critical mineral supply chains. China controls not just a large proportion of the world’s known rare earths deposits, it also has a monopoly on the processing of most critical minerals used in green energy and defence technologies. The US fears China will weaponise its market dominance against strategic rivals. This is why Western governments increasingly make mineral supply chain resilience central to their foreign policy and defence strategies. Given Beijing’s closeness to Moscow and their deepening cooperation on natural resources, the US-Ukraine deal may prevent Russia — and, by extension, China — from accessing Ukrainian minerals. The terms of the agreement are explicit: “states and persons who have acted adversely towards Ukraine must not benefit from its reconstruction”. Finally, the performance of “the deal” matters just as much to Trump. Getting Zelensky to sign on the dotted line is progress in itself, plays well to Trump’s base at home, and puts pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table. So, the deal is a win for Zelensky because it gives the US a stake in an independent Ukraine. But even if Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves turn out to be less valuable than expected, it may not matter to Trump.

Energy & Economics
Flags of America and China atand on table during talks between diplomats and businessmen. American and Chinese representatives sit opposite each other to discuss relations between countries.

China and US agree to cut tariffs imposed in April

by Abdul Rahman

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The agreement was an acknowledgment of the significance of their trade for mutual economic development and the health of the global economy, the joint statement says. China and the US agreed to roll back high tariffs imposed on one another last month for a period of 90 days. The agreement was announced in a joint statement issued on Monday, May 12. The agreement was a result of a high-level meeting on trade and economic affairs held between Chinese and US delegations in Geneva, Switzerland over the weekend. As described in a press conference on Monday by the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent who was part of the US delegation, both sides have agreed to reduce the tariffs by 115%. That would mean that the US will reduce its tariffs on China to 30% from its present 145% while the Chinese will lower their tariffs to 10% from its present 125%. These new tariff rates would be effective from Wednesday for the next 90 days. Both the countries also agreed to explore a more stable arrangement in the interim period. China also agreed to reverse additional measures imposed in response to US President Donald Trump’s tariff war, such as putting various US companies on the sanctions list and placing export controls on rare earth minerals. The parties committed to taking these measures as an acknowledgment of the mutual significance of their bilateral trade and its importance for the global economy and for “moving forward in the spirit of mutual opening, continued communication, cooperation and mutual respect,” a joint statement says. The 30% US tariff includes a 10% baseline tariff imposed on all imports by Trump in April after suspending his reciprocal tariff regime for 90 days, and a 20% tariff imposed by the Trump administration before April in the name of stopping the illegal flow of the drug fentanyl. Answering a question on the cooperation between both the countries over fentanyl, the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Lin Jian criticized “the wrongly slapped tariffs on Chinese imports” by citing the issue and claiming that “if the US truly wants to cooperate with China, it should stop vilifying and shifting the blame.” Jian also advised the US “to seek dialogue with China based on equality, respect and mutual benefit.” Relief for the global economy  Trump announced a reciprocal tariff regime on April 2 against all those countries which had a trade surplus with the US, including China. After global backlash, Trump later postponed the implementation of the regime for 90 days, inviting countries to seek bilateral agreements to avoid high tariffs while imposing a 10% common tariff. The Trump administration had claimed that reciprocal tariffs were required in order to lower the US trade deficit, which is over a trillion dollars. China, the third largest trade partner of the US, faced the highest tariff rates under Trump’s tariff war and chose to retaliate. It also called the policy a violation of international law and an attempt by the US to weaponize trade. On Tuesday, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated his country’s position that there are no winners in trade and tariff wars, claiming bullying and hegemony will only result in self-isolation. He was addressing the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) forum in Beijing. The tariff war between the world’s leading economies was seen as a disaster for the global economy and trade. A large number of US businesses had also opposed Trump’s tariff war. They had claimed high tariffs may lead to a rise in prices which harm both the consumer and domestic production. Several businesses filed lawsuits in the US claiming Trump’s reciprocal tariff regime was illegal and harmful for their ability to do business. US trade representative Jamieson Greer, who was part of the negotiating team in Geneva, claimed that the talks with various countries, including China, is the first step to reducing the US trade deficit and ending the national emergency declared by Trump to authorize the reciprocal tariff decrees, South China Morning Post reported. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also hailed the agreement as “substantive progress” for mutual economic development. It expressed hope that “the US side will build on the meeting, continue to work with China in the same direction, completely rectify its wrong practices of unilateral tariff hikes, and keep strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation.” Acknowledging that “high levels of tariffs were equivalent to an embargo and neither side wanted that,” Bessent declared on Monday that the US wants a trade relationship with China, though a balanced one. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also hoped that the US would pursue the matter much more seriously and “inject more certainty and stability into the world economy.” Both the countries have agreed to establish “a joint mechanism” to continue their trade and economic negotiations in future. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

Energy & Economics
US President Donald Trump and Benjamin Franklin's portrait on the back of the $100 bill. Trump imposes additional tariffs on many countries. New York. U.S. 20.04.2025

Tariffs: Zero-sum game or an own goal?

by Ottón Solís

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском By assuming that trade relations are a zero-sum game in which one party must lose for the other to win, and that a trade deficit represents a loss while a surplus represents a win, President Trump reveals a simplistic view far removed from the dynamics of international trade. Let’s imagine that the global economy is Central America, that Costa Rica imports more goods than it exports, and that other countries accept paper printed by its Central Bank — bills in colones — as payment for their exports. Furthermore, let’s assume that a good portion of their trade surpluses are used to buy Costa Rican government bonds and make deposits in its banks, accepting — due to confidence in the strength of its economy — lower interest rates than they might obtain in other markets, and that those debts can be paid with the same printed paper. Trade deficits arise because a significant share of Costa Rican consumers and investors prefer to source final, intermediate, and capital goods from other Central American countries where prices are lower than at home. In other words, those deficits are the result of a national choice to enjoy a higher quality of life and greater productivity than what its economy would otherwise allow. Under these circumstances, Costa Rica, far from being a victim of other countries’ policies, would actually be enjoying levels of consumption above its means and economic growth beyond what its productivity would justify. The willingness of those countries to hold the colones derived from their trade surpluses in Costa Rican government bonds and bank deposits results in lower interest rates in Costa Rica. This enables a higher sustainable level of public debt, greater investment at low cost to improve infrastructure and service quality, and lower interest rates for private investment — all of which contribute to a higher rate of economic growth without endangering macroeconomic stability. In such a scenario, making imports more expensive through tariffs to boost local production competitiveness and eliminate trade deficits would, one by one, remove these advantages — amounting to nothing more than an own goal. This remains true even if Central American countries did not retaliate by restoring relative competitiveness to its starting point, and even if Costa Rican investors were not left uncertain about whether a future government might remove the tariffs. The U.S. economy faces the world in a situation identical to that hypothetical scenario of Costa Rica. It takes advantage of the fact that with paper printed by its central bank — the dollar — can pay for the real production of other countries, allowing it to live far beyond its means. Far from being “cheated” by other nations, as Trump claims, the United States enjoys a standard of living well above its capacity precisely because of this. That does not mean the U.S. is cheating anyone, since it is thanks to its economic strength that the rest of the world accepts that paper as a means of payment and trusts in its government bonds and banking system. Thus, by assuming that trade relations are a “zero-sum game” — where one must lose for the other to win — and that a trade deficit signals losing while a surplus signals winning, President Trump ignores these realities. He reveals a board-game level of simplification, detached from the complex chessboard that defines international trade dynamics. It is nothing less than a massive own goal. Trade deficits are an economic problem for countries like Costa Rica, which must pay for their imports using foreign currency, often requiring them to take on debt and/or attract foreign investment through subsidies and tax exemptions. This combination of factors permanently threatens macroeconomic stability and forces governments to limit spending on infrastructure and social services to free up resources to cover interest payments and the growing fiscal costs of structuring an economy based on incentives to foreign companies. Adding to the absurdity of Trump’s proposals, his goal is to achieve trade surpluses with every country in the world. However, the United States does not produce coffee or cocoa; thus, with some of the countries that export these products, running trade deficits is not only inevitable but also beneficial for the U.S. Many countries in the region, even without the advantages the United States enjoys, are unlikely to avoid trade deficits — for example, with oil-producing countries or those manufacturing goods that incorporate cutting-edge technologies. In such cases, raising tariffs could severely damage their economies. Trump boasts that the countries affected by the tariffs are lining up to renegotiate, claiming that this was his goal. If so, it marks the beginning of an uncertain period, contaminated by threats and blackmail, with China standing by to benefit from the resentment against the United States. This scenario will severely affect private sector investment plans, employment, and economic growth — not only in the United States but around the world. Far from "Making America Great Again" (MAGA), Trump is diminishing both his country and the world while violating every rule of international trade, both global ones under the WTO framework and those contained in free trade agreements like CAFTA-DR. This, of course, validates the concerns of those of us who argued that such treaties did not guarantee protected access to the U.S. market against political or geopolitical shifts. In international relations, the historical rule has been that decisions are not based on any moral or legal absolutes but rather on the exercise of power from unequal positions ("might is right"). This is why we always doubted that a free trade agreement with weaker countries would truly guide the behavior of the United States. But Trump's overwhelming violations of international law (surprisingly and disappointingly supported by more than half of his country’s political establishment) strip the United States of any moral authority to criticize countries that do not act according to the rules. This imposing attitude, reaffirmed by Trump when he paraphrases emperors and tyrants — enemies of any democratic principle — who claimed that "those who save their country violate no law," leads us to a world where anything is permitted for those who hold power. From the perspective of the definition of civilization, a world where anything goes loses its value. It takes us back to the law of the jungle — the rule of the strongest, of violence and war, or of peace imposed by one over others, not through harmony and goodwill. This is not a new “Washington Consensus”, now guided by the mercantilism typical of the 18th and 19th centuries, because in this case neither multilateral organizations like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund nor other Western powers share Trump’s decisions. Far from consensus, today the most frequently heard word in those circles is “retaliation”. Latin America will be affected by the potential decline in global GDP growth, the tariffs imposed on our exports, and the rise in interest rates resulting from inflation that could be triggered by higher import taxes in the United States. However, the region could benefit from the U.S. confrontation with its developed-world allies by strengthening economic ties with Europe, China, Japan, India, and other powers of the Global South — without, of course, abandoning the U.S. market. To achieve this, our governments must stop meekly following Trump’s directives, such as preventing Huawei from competing to sell us 5G technology, participating in a shameful deportation policy that violates fundamental human rights, or undermining Panama’s absolute sovereignty over the Canal. What is needed is to build and implement a foreign policy with dignity, one that best serves the interests of each of our countries — not the whims of a single power.

Energy & Economics
USA and China trade war. China and United States of America trade, duty, tariffs, customs war

The economic effects of US-China trade wars

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском I. Introduction U.S. trade with China has significantly grown in recent decades and is crucial for both countries. Today, China is one of the largest export markets for U.S. goods and services (second to Mexico), and the United States is the top export market for China. As Figure 1 shows, this trade—much of which increased after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001—has brought lower prices to U.S. consumers and higher profits for American companies. But it also comes with costs, notably the loss of American jobs because of import competition, automation, and multinational companies moving manufacturing overseas.   Figure 1: US-China Trade over the 20 years Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. After President Donald Trump began a so-called trade war with China in 2018, economic tensions between China and the U.S. have been on the rise. Chinese officials have warned that there are “no winners” in a trade war, but the second Trump administration embarked on a new and more aggressive tariff policy. In the first months of his second administration, Trump has threatened tariffs as high as 145 percent on all Chinese goods, while China’s latest retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports are as high as 125 percent. The Trump administration claims the levies attempt to punish China for unfair trade practices, including Chinese subsidies that hurt U.S. workers and the long-standing accusation that China pressures American companies to hand over their technology and intellectual property, as well as China’s role in illicit fentanyl trafficking. Some economists doubt, however, that Trump’s aggressive approach will achieve its desired goals and raise concerns that tariffs will drive up inflation and the costs of goods, hurting American consumers and exports. This paper attempts to examine the economic effects of the U.S.-China trade war. It first shows the economic effects of the U.S.-China trade war under the first Trump administration and then forecasts for the second Trump administration. II. Trade War between the U.S. and China As Figure 2 shows, the US trade deficit with China has increased as trade between both countries expanded. Therefore, the first Trump administration started the trade war by imposing higher tariffs on Chinese goods. Figure 2: US-China Goods Trade (2001-2024) Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 4 show U.S. and Chinese tariff rates for each other’s goods. As Figure 3-1 shows, the US tariffs on Chinese goods were less than 5 per cent when the first Trump administration began on January 20, 2018. Then the tariff continued to rise. As Figure 3-2 shows, the average US tariffs on China goods were 20.8 percent when the second Trump administration began on January 20, 2025. As Figure 4 shows, after the second Trump administration took office, US tariffs of 10 percent were imposed on all imports from China under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) on February 1, 2025. Then the Trump administration increased tariffs on Chinese goods to 20 percent on March 3 and to 34 percent on April 2. US tariffs of 10 percent were imposed on nearly all countries under IEEPA, but with some sector carve-outs on April 5. China retaliated against US tariffs by increasing tariffs on U.S. products to 34 percent on April 4 and to 84 percent on April 10. US tariffs ranging from 1 percent to 74 percent were imposed on nearly all countries with a trade surplus with the US, including China (74 percent). US tariff on Chinese goods included an additional 50 percent tariff as counter-retaliation for China’s retaliation announcement on April 10. Then again China faced an additional 41 percent tariff increase under IEEPA (to 125 percent total). However, Trump instituted a broad 90-day pause on steep Liberation Day tariffs, aiming to give time for negotiators to work out new deals. But Trump has not provided a pause for China. In response, China has raised its duties on imports of US goods to 125 percent from 84 percent on April 12, while US tariffs on Chinese imports have increased to 145 percent by adding a 20 percent tariff in relation to the fentanyl. Figure 3-1: US–China tariff rates toward each other and the rest of the world (ROW) before 2025 Source: MacroMicro. https://en.macromicro.me/charts/130548/china-us-tariff-rates  Figure 3-2: US–China tariff rates toward each other and rest of world, 2018-2025  Figure 4: US–China tariff rates toward each other in 2025 Source: Reuters, April 11, 2025. III. Economic Effects of the Trade War between the U.S. and China A.  The first Trump administration Chad Bowen (2023) at the Peterson Institute for International Economics raised a question “was the trade war between U.S. and China worth it for US exporters”? And his answer so far is no. In the middle of the trade war, the United States and China signed a historic trade agreement on a ‘Phase One trade deal’ on January 15, 2020. Bowen supposes that in 2018–21, US goods exports to China of phase one products had grown at the same pace as China’s imports of those products from the world and that US services exports to China had grown at the rate of US services exports to the world. Cumulative US goods and services exports to China in 2018–21 were about 19 percent lower with the trade war and phase one agreement between the two countries (see Figure 5). His estimates suggest that the United States would have avoided export losses of $24 billion (16 percent) in 2018 and $30 billion (20 percent) in 2019 resulting from the trade war. Exports would also have been $27 billion (18 percent) higher in 2020 and $40 billion (23 percent) higher in 2021 than under phase one agreement.   Figure 5: US exports to China would be higher with no trade war. i. US manufacturing exports suffered in the trade war and did not recover. As Figure 6 shows, China purchased only 59 percent of the full commitment of US manufactured products in 2020–21 under Phase One trade deal. Manufacturing was the most economically significant part of the trade deal, making up 44 percent of covered US exports in 2017. Autos and aircraft dominated US exports before the trade war. Both did poorly during the period of 2020–2021. US auto exports reached only 39 percent of the target over 2020–21. The sector’s suffering is a trade war warning. In July 2018, Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports included auto parts; China’s tariff retaliation hit US car exports. US car exports decreased sharply in 2018, as car makers like Tesla and BMW reacted to the higher costs by moving production destined for the Chinese market out of the United States. (Ford, another major car exporter, including through its Lincoln brand, complained in 2018 that Trump’s separate steel and aluminum tariffs raised the cost of its US-based manufacturing by $1 billion.) Even when China lifted the retaliatory tariffs in early 2019, US exports did not recover. Sales of US aircraft, engines, and parts to China did even worse, reaching just 18 percent of the 2020–21 target. Though the industry was less directly impacted by trade war tariffs, US sales to China plummeted in 2019 after the two crashes of the Boeing 737 MAX. Between March 2019 and late 2020, the airplane model was grounded, with Boeing shutting down production in early 2020. China cancelled orders in April 2020, and though the legal text allows credit for aircraft “orders and deliveries”, additional orders had not been publicly announced by the end of 2021, despite complaints by the Biden administration that China's trade policy was holding back sales. (Exports of the 737 MAX might eventually resume, as Chinese regulators instructed airlines in December 2021 to implement the changes needed to allow the model to fly again in China.) Not all manufactured exports performed poorly during the period of 2020–21. Medical supplies needed to treat Covid-19 significantly increased. US exports of semiconductors and manufacturing equipment also boomed – thanks to a combination of stockpiling by Chinese companies as US export controls in 2019-20 threatened to cut off Chinese firms like SMIC and Huawei as well as increased demand for chips needed for consumer electronics and data servers brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic shift to remote work, schooling, and leisure.  Figure 6: US-China war battered hard US manufacturing exports to China ii.  US agricultural exports suffered in the trade war, received subsidies, and then recovered. To the Trump administration, agriculture was a very politically important part of the trade deal in 2020, despite accounting for only 14 percent of covered exports. As Figure 7-1 shows, when China's retaliatory tariffs hurt US farm exports during the period of 2018–19, the Trump administration awarded the sector tens of billions of dollars in federal subsidies. In the days leading up to the 2020 presidential election, the Trump administration released a report that touted resuming farm sales to China—ignoring the continued troubles facing US manufacturing, energy, and service exports. US farm exports did get back to 2017 pre-trade war levels and ultimately reached 83 percent of the 2020–21 commitment under Phase One deal (see Figure 7-1 & 7-2).  Figure 7-1: US agricultural exports to China Soybeans made up approximately 60 percent of US agricultural exports to China in 2017. As Figure 7-2 shows, exports of US soybeans to China were devastated by the trade war, falling from $12 billion to $3 billion in 2018, because China imposed retaliatory tariffs. Though soybean exports managed to reach their pre-trade war levels during the period of 2020–21, they still fell over 30 percent short of their target under Phase One deal. Products like pork, corn, wheat, and sorghum exceeded expectations, though not necessarily because of the trade deal in January 2020. The outbreak of African swine fever led China to increase pork imports from the U.S. in 2019 before the deal was agreed. (In 2020–21, China's pigmeat imports from the rest of the world also averaged five times 2017 levels.) Wheat and corn imports increased after China began to comply with a 2019 WTO dispute settlement ruling against its unfilled tariff rate quotas. (Compared with 2017, China's imports from the rest of the world in 2020–21 were about 200 percent higher for wheat and 350 percent higher for corn.) Some farm exports also benefitted less from the Chinese purchase commitments under the trade deal in January 2020. Seafood and farm products did not rebound from the effects of the trade war. After being hit with Chinese tariffs, US lobster exports re-achieved about half of their target in 2020–21. US exports of raw hides and skins ended up at less than one-third (see Figure 7-2).  Figure 7-2: US agricultural exports to China (sub-category) iii. U.S. Imports from China: Total US imports from China were down with the beginning of the trade war. For 15 months beginning in July 2018, the Trump administration imposed higher tariffs on Chinese products. The Trump administration began the trade war by imposing tariffs of 25 percent on products covering roughly $34 billion of US imports from China in July 2018 (List 1) and on $16 billion of imports in August (List 2). When China retaliated against the U.S., the trade war continued with Trump imposing 10 percent tariffs on an additional $200 billion of imports in September 2018 (List 3), increasing the tariff rate of those duties to 25 percent in June 2019. In September 2019, Trump hit another $102 billion of imports (List 4A) with 15 percent tariffs, later reducing them to 7.5 percent upon implementation of the US-China Phase One trade agreement in February 2020. (The administration identified another set of products covering most of the rest of US imports from China of more than $160 billion—List 4B—for which it scheduled tariffs to take effect on December 15, 2019 but was cancelled on December 13, 2019.) As a result, as Figure 8-1 & 8-2 show, overall, the trade war reduced US imports from China. Then US imports recovered only slowly, starting in mid-2020. In January 2022, when the term of the first Trump administration ended, US imports from China (red line) remained well below the pre-trade war trend (dashed line), while US imports from the rest of the world (blue line) returned to pre-trade war levels of June 2018. China was the source of only 18 percent of total US goods imports in 2022, down from 22 percent at the beginning of the trade war.  Figure 8-1: Value of US goods imports from China and the rest of the world, 2016–2022 (June 2018 = 100)  Figure 8-2: Value of US imports from China and the rest of the world by trade war tariff list, 2018–2022 (June 2018 = 100) B.  The second Trump administration As of April 12, 2025, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods are 145 percent, but this tariff rate is not sustainable over a long period of time because it is way too high and because U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping want to negotiate. In fact, Trump signalled on April 23 that he would cut his 145 percent tariff on Chinese goods substantially. Therefore, it is not reasonable to explore the effects of Trump’s tariffs of 145 percent. Last year, McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) examined the impact of now-President Trump’s proposed tariffs based on Trump’s campaign promises that would impose 60 percent additional tariffs on imports from China. They explored the impacts of a 60 percent additional tariff on China with and without other countries’ retaliating in kind by imposing steeper tariffs on imports from the United States. Figures 9 through 14 show the results from their analyses. Figure 9 shows that China experiences the most significant GDP losses (0.9% below baseline by 2026), while the U.S. also experiences a negative GDP growth rate (0.2% below baseline by 2027).  Figure 9: Projected change in real GDP of selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 Figure 10 shows that the direct impact of the U.S. tariff of 60 percent on Chinese employment is initially negative (-2.25% in 2025), but a gradual decline in Chinese real wages eventually restores employment to the baseline after a decade. US employment will fall 0.23% below baseline by 2027.  Figure 10: Projected change in employment (hours worked) in selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 Figure 11 shows that US inflation rises by 0.4% in 2025, with the higher cost of imports due to tariffs not offset by the stronger US dollar lowering prices of imports from other countries. The tariffs on US imports from China are mildly deflationary in other countries (see Figure 11).  Figure 11: Projected change in inflation in selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 The slowdown in the Chinese economy causes capital to flow out of China and into other economies. This is initially a financial capital flow responding to a fall in financial rates of return in China and a rise in expected profits in countries like Canada and Mexico. That financial inflow becomes physical investment over time, which increases production capacity in these economies. Countries that receive the capital experience a trade deficit (see figure 12). This additional production enables the rise in exports to the US economy. While the US trade deficit with China shrinks, the overall US trade deficit increases (figure 12) as the partial relocation of production back into the US economy causes the dollar to appreciate.  Figure 12: Projected change in the trade balance of selected economies from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, 2025-40 So far, figures have focused on the unilateral imposition of US tariffs on Chinese products. In figure 13, McKibbin, Hogan, and Noland compare projected changes in US GDP from the unilateral imposition of tariffs with a scenario where China retaliates by imposing a 60% tariff on US goods and services. By 2026, US GDP losses from Trump’s tariff policy more than double if China retaliates against the US (see Figure 13). The impact on US inflation in 2025 yields a similar result (see Figure 14). With Chinese retaliation, US inflation rises 0.7% above baseline compared with 0.4% without retaliation.  Figure 13: Projected change in US GDP from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, with and without retaliation by China, 2025-40  Figure 14: Projected change in US inflation from an additional 60 percent increase in US tariffs on imports of goods from China, with and without retaliation by China, 2025-40 IV. Conclusion This paper showed that U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods imposed by the first Trump administration mainly had negative impacts on U.S. exports, although they reduced U.S. imports from China over a short period of time. The analysis by McKibbin, Hogan, Noland (2024) for the second Trump administration also shows that U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will have negative impacts on US GDP, inflation, employment, and trade balance. This paper also showed that U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods will have larger negative impacts on U.S. GDP and inflation if China retaliates. Then a question arises: “Why does Trump attempt to impose extremely high tariffs on products from China?” Larisa Kapustina,  Ľudmila Lipková, Yakov Silin and Andrei Drevalev (2020) identify four main reasons that led the U.S. to the greatest trade war between the U.S. and China: a) to reduce the U.S. deficit of bilateral trade and increase the number of U.S. jobs; b) to limit access of Chinese companies to American technologies and prevent digital modernisation of the industry in China; c) to prevent the growth of China’s military strength; and d) to reduce the U.S. federal budget deficit. References Bown, Chad, “China bought none of the extra $200 billion of US exports in Trump's trade deal.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper. July 19, 2022.Bown, Chad, “Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper. October 20, 2022.Bown, Chad, “US imports from China are both decoupling and reaching new highs. Here's how.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper. March 31, 2023. Kapustina, Larisa, Ľudmila Lipková, Yakov Silin and Andrei Drevalev, “US-China Trade War: Causes and Consequences.” SHS Web Conference. Volume 73, 2020: 1-13.McKibbin, W., M. Hogan and M. Noland (2024), “The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 24-20. 

Energy & Economics
Nottinghamshire, UK 03 April 2025 : Attitudes of UK broadsheet newspaper after Trump unleashes Liberation Day Tariff announcement

The EU at the Crossroads of Global Geopolitics

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This study examines the short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications of recent "tariff wars" on the European Union (EU). The imposition of tariffs by the United States, particularly the "Liberation Day" tariffs announced by President Trump on April 2, 2025, led to significant disruptions in global supply chains, negatively impacted GDP growth, increased financial market volatility, and exacerbated geopolitical tensions. The EU faces challenges in navigating this shifting geopolitical landscape while maintaining its economic interests and influence. However, the EU has opportunities to leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market, foster international cooperation, and emerge as a more resilient global actor. The paper concludes by discussing the potential end of transatlanticism, the future of the EU, and the implications for globalisation in light of the current "tariff chaos." Keywords: Tariffs, Geopolitics, European Union, Trade Wars Introduction Before we examine the topic of tariffs, let us recall that the terms "tariff war" or "trade war" are not strictly academic. International Security scholars generally believe that the notion of war is reserved for military conflicts (both domestic and international) that involve at least a thousand casualties in any given year.[1] One of the most prominent sources in this regard is the Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, published by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, and the International Peace Research Institute at Uppsala University in Uppsala.[2] Therefore, "tariff war" or "tariff wars" are more journalistic and hyperbolic. Hence, they are used in this study with quotation marks. Journalists and commentators from various backgrounds often use inflated language to impress their readers. On the other hand, wars are cataclysmic events that have game-changing consequences. In this sense, some tools that state leaders use to achieve political and economic goals, such as tariffs, may have short- and long-term outcomes. Nonetheless, scholars who tend to be precise in their explanations will mainly discuss economic competition rather than "economic war" or "wars." This study investigates the short-, medium-, and possible long-term implications of "tariff wars" on the European Union. These implications appear multifaceted and encompass stability, political relationships, and a broader international order."Liberation Day" On April 2, US President Trump announced new tariffs under the banner of "Liberation Day" – a minimum baseline of 10 per cent tariffs on goods imported from all foreign countries and higher, reciprocal tariffs on nations that impose tariffs on US exports.[3]  Crucially, the White House claims that the new tariffs are reciprocal: "It is the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 per cent, and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated".[4] We did not have to wait for strong reactions to occur worldwide. China vowed to retaliate against the 34 per cent tariffs imposed by the US on Wednesday (April 2 2025) and protect its national interests while condemning the move as "an act of bullying".[5] Doubling down, a few days later, Trump threatened a 50 per cent tariff on China on top of previous reciprocal duties,[6] to which Chinese President Xi Jinping already replied hawkishly.[7] In an equally hawkish response, the Trump administration declared that Chinese goods would be subject to a 145 per cent tariff.[8] In a twist of events, on April 9, the US  declared a 90-day-long pause for previously declared tariffs covering the whole world (keeping a minimum of 10 per cent, though) except against China.[9] The next couple of weeks will show whether the world will enter the "tariff arms race" or we will enter some "tariff détente". Importantly, as one can surmise, "Xi has sold himself domestically and internationally as the guy standing up to America, and people that want to stand up to America should get in line behind Chairman Xi".[10] For the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described US universal tariffs as a significant blow to the world economy and claimed that the European Union was prepared to respond with countermeasures if talks with Washington failed. Accordingly, the EU was already finalising a first package of tariffs on up to 26 billion Euro ($28.4 billion) of US goods for mid-April in response to US steel and aluminium tariffs that took effect on March 12.[11] Consequently, on April 7, 2025, a meeting was organised in Luxembourg[12] regarding the EU's response to US tariffs on steel and aluminium and the preparation of countermeasures, which included a proposal to impose 25 per cent tariffs on US goods. Interestingly, the "Liberation Day" tariffs do not include Russia. According to numerous commentators, this indicates Moscow's importance as a future trade partner once the Ukrainian war is over. However, the official explanation issued by the White House suggests that the existing sanctions against Russia "preclude any meaningful trade."[13] Tariff imposition: short, medium and long-term consequences Several observable phenomena can be identified regarding their economic ramifications: First, the imposition of tariffs can lead to significant disruptions in global supply chains, thereby affecting industries that rely heavily on international trade. This disruption can lead to increased costs and reduced competitiveness for EU businesses, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.[14] While national measures may yield political and economic benefits in the short term, it is essential to note that global prosperity cannot be sustained without cooperative and stable international trade policies. Second, the Gross Domestic Product is likely to be impacted. The imposition of tariffs has been shown to negatively affect GDP growth. For instance, the US-China "trade war" decreased the GDP of both countries, which could similarly affect the EU if it becomes embroiled in similar conflicts.[15] Third, we examine volatility in the financial markets. "Tariff wars" contribute to financial market volatility, which can cause a ripple effect on EU economic stability. This volatility can deter investment and slow economic growth.[16] Fourth, political targeting and retaliation. "Tariff wars" often involve politically targeted retaliations, as seen in the US-China trade conflict. The EU has been adept at minimising economic damage while maximising political targeting, which could influence its future trade strategies and political alliances.[17] Fifth, global alliances are shifting. The EU may need to reconsider its trade alliances and partnerships in response to these shifting dynamics. This could involve forming new trade agreements or strengthening existing ones to mitigate the impact of "tariff wars."[18] Next, increased geopolitical competition and economic nationalism can exacerbate tensions between major powers, potentially leading to a crisis in globalization. As an aspiring global player, the EU must navigate these tensions carefully to maintain its influence and economic interests.[19] Social impacts should also be considered. "Trade wars" can lead to changes in employment and consumer prices, thus affecting the EU's social equity and economic stability. These changes necessitate policies that enhance social resilience and protect vulnerable populations.[20] Does Team Trump have a plan? The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration appear to be part of a broader strategy that Trump describes as a declaration of economic independence for the US, notably heralding them as part of the national emergency. The long-term effects of this strategy depend on how effectively the US can transition to domestic production without facing significant retaliation or trade barriers from other nations. Notably, the US dollar's status as the world's primary reserve currency has been supported by military power since the introduction of the Bretton Woods system. The US military, especially the US Navy, has helped secure trade routes, enforce economic policies, and establish a framework for international trade, favouring the US. dollar. The countries that subscribed to the system also gained access to the US consumer market. Importantly, what is explained by the Triffin Dilemma, back in the 1960s, the US had a choice: to either increase the supply of the US Dollar,  sought after by the whole world as a reserve currency and international trade currency and that way to upkeep global economic growth, which was pivotal for the US economy or to end the gold standard. In 1971, the US finished its Bretton Woods system. What followed was a new system primarily dictated by neoliberalism based on low tariffs, free capital movement, flexible exchange rates and US security guarantees.[21] Under that neoliberal system, reserve demand for American assets has pushed up the dollar, leading it to levels far in excess of what would balance international trade over the long run.[22] This made manufacturing in the US very expensive, and consequently, the deindustrialisation of the US followed. Therefore, it appears that Trump wants to keep the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and reindustrialise the US. According to Stephen Miran, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (a United States agency within the Executive Office of the President), two key elements to achieve this goal are tariffs and addressing currency undervaluation of other nations.[23] The second element in that duo is also known as the Mar-a-Lago Accord.[24] Scott Bessent, 79th US Secretary of the Treasury, picked up this argument.[25] In a nutshell, the current "tariff chaos" is arguably only temporary, and in the long term, it is designed to provide an advantage for the US economy.A readjustment of sorts fundamentally reshapes the existing international political economy. Whether or not this plan works and achieves its goals is entirely different. As market analysts observe, "For the past two decades, the US has focused on high-tech services like Amazon and Google services, which have added to a service surplus. However, the real sustainable wealth comes from the manufacturing of goods, which, for the US, went from 17 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in 2023 of GDP. The entire process of building goods creates many mini ecosystems of production/capital value that stay in a country for many decades. […] Initially, the Chinese started in low-tech and low-cost labour manufacturing before 2001, but shifted towards becoming major manufacturers of high-tech products like robotics and EV automobiles. […] For President Trump to levy high tariffs on the Chinese in the current moment, he is doing everything that he can to resuscitate US manufacturing".[26] EU's options The EU and the US share the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with 2024 data showing EU exports to the US at 531.6 billion euros and imports at 333.4 billion euros, resulting in a 198.2 billion Euro trade surplus for the EU.[27] While the EU faces significant challenges due to "tariff wars," there are potential opportunities for positive outcomes. The EU can leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market and enhance its role in global trade. By adopting proactive trade policies and fostering international cooperation, the EU can mitigate the negative impacts of "tariff wars" and potentially emerge as a more resilient and influential global actor. However, this requires careful navigation of the complex geopolitical landscape and a commitment to maintaining open and cooperative trade relations. It seems likely that the EU can leverage recent US tariffs to strengthen ties with China and India, potentially reducing its dependency on US trade. China is the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade at 739 billion euros in 2023, though a large deficit favouring China (292 billion euros in 2023).[28] The EU's strategy is to de-risk, not decouple, focusing on reciprocity and reducing dependencies; however, competition and systemic rivalry complicate deeper ties. Meanwhile, India's trade with the EU was 124 billion euros in goods in 2023, and ongoing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, expected to conclude by 2025, could yield short-term economic gains of 4.4 billion euros for both.[29] India's fast-growing economy and shared interest in technology make it a potentially promising partner. EU and China: Opportunities and Challenges Economically, there are more opportunities than challenges. China remains the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching 739 billion euros in 2023, down 14 per cent from 2022 due to global economic shifts.[30] The trade balance shows a significant deficit of 292 billion euros in 2023, driven by imports of telecommunications equipment and machinery, whereas EU exports include motor cars and medicaments. The EU's strategy, outlined in its 2019 strategic outlook and reaffirmed in 2023, positions China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, focusing on de-risking rather than decoupling. Recent actions, such as anti-dumping duties on Chinese glass fibre yarns in March 2025, highlight tensions over unfair trade practices. Despite these challenges, China's market size offers opportunities, especially if the EU can negotiate for better access. However, geopolitical rivalry complicates deeper ties, including EU probes, in Chinese subsidies. Politically, the EU and China differ significantly in this regard. Regarding human rights policies, the EU consistently raises concerns about human rights issues in China.[31] These concerns often lead to friction, with the European Parliament blocking trade agreements and imposing sanctions on them. Moreover, China's stance on the war in Ukraine has created tension, with the EU viewing Russia as a major threat, and China's support of Russia is a significant concern.[32] China is often perceived in Western European capitals as not making concessions on issues vital to European interests.[33] The understanding of the war's root causes, the assessment of implications, risks or potential solutions - in all these areas, the Chinese leadership on the one hand and the European governments and the EU Commission in Brussels on the other hand have expressed very different, at times even contrary, positions.[34] Finally, China's political model demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, challenging Western emphasis on democracy and human rights.[35] EU and India: Growing Partnership and FTA Prospects and Political Challenges Economically, it seems that there are more opportunities than challenges. India, ranked as the EU's ninth-largest trading partner, accounted for 124 billion euros in goods trade in 2023, representing 2.2 per cent of the EU's total trade, with growth of around 90 per cent over the past decade.[36] Services trade reached nearly 60 billion euros in 2023, almost doubling since 2020, with a third being digital services.[37] The EU is India's largest trading partner, and ongoing negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA), investment protection, and geographical indications, initiated in 2007 and resuming in 2022, aim for conclusion by 2025.[38] A 2008 trade impact assessment suggests positive real income effects, with short-term gains of 3–4.4 billion euros for both parties. The EU seeks to lower Indian tariffs on cars, wine, and whiskey. Simultaneously, India has pushed for market access to pharmaceuticals and easier work visas for IT professionals. However, concerns remain regarding the impact of EU border carbon taxes and farm subsidies on Indian farmers. Politically, challenges to EU-India relations stem from several sources. Trade has been a persistent friction point, with negotiations for a free trade agreement facing roadblocks (Malaponti, 2024). Despite the EU being a significant trading partner for India,[39] differing approaches to trade liberalization have hindered progress. India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[40] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[41] Finally, while the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper, more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[42] Conclusions "What does Trump want? This question is on the minds of policymakers and experts worldwide. Perhaps we are witnessing the opening salvo of a decisive phase of the US-China economic conflict - the most serious conflict since 1989. It is likely the beginning of the end of the ideology of Globalism and the processes of globalisation. It is arguably aggressive "decoupling" at its worst and the fragmentation of the world economy. For the EU, this is a new situation which dictates new challenges. Someday, probably sooner than later, European political elites will have to make a choice. To loosen or perhaps even end the transatlantic community and go against the US. Perhaps in tandem with some of the BRICS countries, such as India and China, or swallow the bitter pill, redefine its current economic model, and once again gamble with Washington, this time against the BRICS. It seems that the EU and its member states are at a crossroads, and their next choice of action will have to be very careful. In a likely new "Cold War" between the US and this time, China, the EU might not be allowed to play the third party, neutral status. One should also remember that Trump, like Putin or Xi, likes to talk to EU member states' representatives directly, bypassing Brussels and unelected "Eureaucrats' like Ursula Von der Leyen. In other words, he tends to leverage his position against the unity of the EU, which should not be surprising given the internal EU conflicts. More often than not, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, or Nordic members of the EU clash on numerous Issues with Berlin, Paris and most importantly, Brussels. (I write more about it here: Will the EU even survive? Vital external and internal challenges ahead of the EU in the newly emerging world order. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4577).   References [1] See more at:  For detailed information, consult one of the most comprehensive databases on conflicts run by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme at: https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia[2] Pettersson, Therese. 2019. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 19.1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-191.pdf[3] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/[4] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify… op. cit.[5] Hanin Bochen, and Ziwen Zhao. "China vows to retaliate after 'bullying' US imposes 34% reciprocal tariffs". South China Morning Post. April 3 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/us/diplomacy/article/3304971/trump-announced-34-reciprocal-tariffs-chinese-goods-part-liberation-day-package[6] Megerian, Chris and Boak, Josh. "Trump threatens new 50% tariff on China on top of 'reciprocal' duties". Global News. April 7, 2025. https://globalnews.ca/news/11119347/trump-added-50-percent-tariff-china/[7] Tan Yvette, Liang Annabelle and Ng Kelly. "China is not backing down from Trump's tariff war. What next?". BBC, April 8 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg51yw700lo[8] Wong, Olga. “Trump further raises tariffs to 120% on small parcels from mainland, Hong Kong”. South China Morning Post, 11 April 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3306069/trump-further-raises-tariffs-120-small-parcels-mainland-hong-kong?utm_source=feedly_feed[9] Chu, Ben. “ What does Trump's tariff pause mean for global trade?”, BBC, 10 April, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz95589ey9yo[10] Wu, Terri. "Why US Has Upper Hand Over Beijing in Tariff Standoff". The Epoch Times April 7, 2025. https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/why-us-has-upper-hand-over-beijing-in-tariff-standoff-5838158?utm_source=epochHG&utm_campaign=jj  [11] Blenkinsop, Philip, and Van Overstraeten, Benoit. "EU plans countermeasures to new US tariffs, says EU chief." April 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-prepare-countermeasures-us-reciprocal-tariffs-says-eu-chief-2025-04-03/[12] Payne, Julia. The EU Commission proposes 25% counter-tariffs on some US imports, document shows". Reuters, April 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/eu-commission-proposes-25-counter-tariffs-some-us-imports-document-shows-2025-04-07/  [13] Bennett, Ivor. "US seems content to cosy up to Russia instead of imposing tariffs." Sky News, April 4, 2025. https://news.sky.com/story/us-seems-content-to-cosy-up-to-russia-instead-of-coerce-it-with-tariffs-13341300[14] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research, 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[15] Ilhomjonov, Ibrohim, and Akbarali Yakubov. "THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USA ON THE WORLD ECONOMY," June 16, 2024. https://interoncof.com/index.php/USA/article/view/2112[16] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[17] Fetzer, Thiemo, and Schwarz Carlo. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." Economic Journal 131: no. 636 (May 2021): 1717–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa122[18] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship …op. cit.[19] Mihaylov, Valentin Todorov, and Sławomir Sitek. 2021. "Trade Wars and the Changing International Order: A Crisis of Globalisation?" Miscellanea Geographica 25: 99–109. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051[20] Wheatley, Mary Christine. "Global Trade Wars: Economic and Social Impacts." PREMIER JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, November 5, 2024. https://premierscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/pjbm-24-368.pdf[21] Money & Macro, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ts5wJ6OfzA&t=572s[22] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System." November 2024. Hudson Bay Capital. https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf[23] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System"... op.cit.[24] Zongyuan Zoe Liu, "Why the Proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord May Not be the Magic Wand That Trump Is Hoping For", 9  April 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-proposed-mar-lago-accord-may-not-be-magic-wand-trump-hoping  [25] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent Breaks Down Trump's Tariff Plan and Its Impact on the Middle Class. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLnX1SQfgJI[26] Park, Thomas. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7316122202846765056/[27] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250311-1[28] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[29] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know." World Economic Forum. March 7 2025. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/eu-india-free-trade-agreement/[30] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[31] "The paradoxical relationship between the EU and China'. Eastminster: a global politics & policy blog, University of East Anglia. http://www.ueapolitics.org/2022/03/29/the-paradoxical-relationship-between-the-eu-and-china/[32] Vasselier, Abigaël. "Relations between the EU and China: what to watch for in 2024". January 25 2025. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/relations-between-eu-and-china-what-watch-2024 [33] Benner, Thorsten. "Europe Is Disastrously Split on China." Foreign Policy, April 12 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/12/europe-china-policy-brussels-macron-xi-jinping-von-der-leyen-sanchez/[34] Chen, D., N. Godehardt, M., Mayer, X., Zhang. 2022. 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Energy & Economics
Workers install an electric power windmill during the construction of a wind farm by the Kazakh company Samruk-Energo in cooperation with China's PowerChina Corporation. Kazakhstan, April 7, 2022.

Why is China investing in renewable energy in Kazakhstan?

by Nurbek Bekmurzaev , Brian Hioe

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском China is simultaneously the world's biggest polluter and the global leader in renewables This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice Fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Kazakhstan’s transition to renewable energy (RE) has seen a significant surge in recent years. This rapidly growing green transition has allowed the country to meet its interim RE targets. By 2030, the country aims to generate 15 percent of its total energy output through renewables and increase this share to 50 percent by 2050. Moreover, Kazakhstan has committed to reaching carbon neutrality by 2060.  The biggest partner in this endeavor has been China, whose role in the RE transition has grown and diversified over the years. For Kazakhstan, the benefits of this partnership are clear: industrialization of its economy and, more importantly, decreasing carbon emissions and improving air quality and public health. For China, the benefits go beyond mere lucrative investments and exporting its RE technology and include gaining soft power and offsetting its environmentally destructive footprint in Kazakhstan.  Harnessing renewable energy to combat air pollution In addition to rich oil and gas resources, Kazakhstan has vast renewable energy potential, thanks to its large territory and abundance of wind and sunny days. It is the ninth largest country by area and holds 77 percent of Central Asia’s solar potential and 90 percent of the regional wind potential.   The presence of wind corridors in vast Kazakh steppes with wind speeds of more than five miles per second, which is present in all regions, makes Kazakhstan ideal for the operation of wind turbines. Additionally, at least 50 percent of Kazakhstan's territory is suitable for installing solar panels.  Most of the RE potential remains untapped, with Kazakhstan still relying on Soviet-era energy infrastructure built to utilize fossil fuels. In 2024, 66 percent of the country’s electricity was generated through coal, 21 percent via natural gas, 6.6 percent from hydroelectricity, and only 6.4 percent from renewables.  Air pollution is a nationwide problem in Kazakhstan. In 2025, 35 cities spread across the country faced significant air pollution, according to the National Hydrometeorological Service of Kazakhstan. A major source of this pollution pandemic is coal burned by thermal power plants, industrial complexes, and households.  The list of adverse effects of air pollution is long. According to Kazakhstani doctor Denis Vinnikov, who has researched air pollution’s effects on health, long-term exposure to polluted air increases the risk of developing cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, such as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). In addition, air pollution increases the likelihood of almost all types of cancer and tumors. One of the most polluted cities in Kazakhstan, Almaty, is one of the national leaders with the highest cases of COPD.  Kazakhstan’s recognition of the adverse effects of its coal-intensive energy sector on the environment and public health has pushed the government to ramp up renewable energy production in the last decade. China’s multiple roles in renewables The Kazakh-Chinese green energy endeavors are part of China's wider bilateral cooperation, covering energy, agriculture, machinery, and mining, among other areas. China is one of Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partners. In 2022, the countries signed a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership. Between 2005 and 2023, China invested over USD 25 billion in Kazakhstan.  The two sides also work closely within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global connectivity project focusing on energy, trade, and transport infrastructure in global majority states. Between 2013 and 2020, China invested USD 18.5 billion in Kazakhstan within the BRI framework. China has participated in Kazakhstan’s green transition from the very beginning. In an interview with Global Voices, Yunis Sharifli, a non-resident fellow at the China Global South Project, described China as the “first-comer” to Kazakhstan’s RE sector. Yana Zabanova, a research associate at the Research Institute for Sustainability, said in an interview with Global Voices: China has been the main technology supplier to Kazakhstan's renewable energy sector, both in the solar PV and increasingly in the wind sector, and Chinese companies have also served as important investors and EPC [engineering, procurement, and constuction] contractors for renewable energy projects in the country. China’s role grew exponentially starting in 2018 when the government launched renewable energy auctions, which gifted government contracts to the lowest bidder. Since 2018, a single private Chinese company, Universal Energy, has built 10 RE plants, three solar and seven wind, with a total capacity of 630 Megawatts by winning government tenders.   Additionally, state-owned Chinese companies have secured contracts via intergovernmental negotiations. There are several examples of this, such as the Zhanatas and Shelek wind power plants (WPP), which are already operational, and five more RE plants in the development stage with a total capacity of 2.6 GW.   In an interview with Global Voices, Ainur Sospanova, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Qazaq Green RES Association, provided her expert assessment of China’s share in Kazakhstan’s RE sector: In the solar energy sector, it is almost 100 percent because it is impossible to compete against Chinese solar panels. In the wind energy sector, it is at least 70 percent and continues to grow. Thus, since 2018, China has expanded its role to project developer and financier through loans issued by Chinese banks and equity financing.  China's share in Kazakhstan’s renewable projects is set to grow even more upon the completion of two Chinese plants that will localize the production of energy storage systems and components for WPP. Gaining soft power and improving its image Paradoxically, China is simultaneously the biggest polluter in the world and the global leader in renewables. While China is constructing two-thirds of the world's wind and solar projects, 93 percent of global construction from coal power took place in China in 2024. This paradox is also present in BRI projects, including those in Kazakhstan.  China frequently touts its solar and wind energy projects as part of the BRI. At the same time, one-fourth of coal-fired power generation in the world is financed through the BRI. Though China Power International Holding and Kazakhstani Samruk Energy have agreed on solar and wind projects to develop renewables, deals are also inked to develop oil, gas, coal, cement, and steel industries in Kazakhstan, which adversely affect the environment and the well-being of local communities. Sharifli explained: When we look at the global discontent with China’s presence, we see two worries: debt trap and environmental pollution. So renewable energy is very important in this context. China’s investments in renewables are aimed at tackling these worries by gaining soft power and improving its reputation. This benefits not only China but also the BRI. Chinese companies that have invested in RE in Kazakhstan, such as Risen Energy, Universal Energy, and Power China, put the BRI at the heart of how they frame their companies. Chinese think tanks also suggest that the Chinese government welcome RE development overseas despite concerns.   In contrast to the Chinese-built oil processing, steel, and cement plants in Kazakhstan, RE projects have thus caused no controversy and helped China improve its reputation in Central Asia. Sharifli noted that since 2021, public attitudes towards China in Kazakhstan have started becoming more positive, partially due to Chinese investments in RE, according to a survey conducted by the Central Asia Barometer.  “Renewable energy plants are usually located in the steppe, far away from the settlements, they don’t interfere with the daily lives of people and look idyllic. There is no trash, there is no pollution, there is no dirty water or soil,” said Zabanova, who has visited multiple RE plants in Kazakhstan as part of her research.  China’s investments in renewables in Kazakhstan serve as an example of how solar and wind energy projects are used in diplomacy. They not only allow Chinese companies to export their excess capacities to profitable foreign markets but also help China mask its environmental damage and create a favorable perception abroad.