Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This paper focuses on the European Union as a military power. It starts with an introduction to SAFE – Security Action for Europe as a financial instrument designed to make the EU a formidable military power.The second part of the paper provides an account of debates regarding the nature of the EU (civilian, normative through ethical to military). Next, a brief historical account of European defence cooperation is presented.The central part of the analysis examines the key characteristics of the EU as a military power, which is marked by a gap between its declared motivations and the actual application of military and political means.The paper ends with the expression of scepticism regarding the role of SAFE in the future of European Security. Key Words: SAFE, Geopolitics, Security, Europe, Ukraine. Introduction SAFE (Security Action for Europe) is a financial instrument introduced by the European Commission to bolster defence capabilities across EU member states. Proposed in March 2025 as part of the broader ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, SAFE aims to provide up to €150 billion in loans by the end of the decade to support joint defence procurement and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).1 This initiative is driven by concerns over a potential Russian attack and growing uncertainty about long-term U.S. security commitments to Europe. To qualify for SAFE funding, 65% of a project’s value must originate from companies within the EU, the European Economic Area, or Ukraine.  Rationale behind SAFE The EU Council formally adopted SAFE on 27 May 2025. SAFE is part of the €800 billion ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, which also includes other pillars such as fiscal flexibility (national escape clauses), cohesion funds, and private capital mobilisation. It appears that several geopolitical and strategic factors drive the establishment of SAFE. Firstly, there is the case of ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine: The war, starting in February 2022, has exposed deficiencies in European defence capabilities and highlighted the need for rapid rearmament and increased self-reliance.2 The return of high-intensity warfare on European soil has prompted a reevaluation of defence priorities. Secondly, the shifting of the U.S. role. Concerns over reduced U.S. military support, particularly following political shifts in Washington.3 Thirdly, experts indicate the issue of capability gaps and industrial weaknesses. The EU has identified critical gaps in areas like air and missile defence, drones, and military mobility. The need to scale up production and reduce reliance on non-European suppliers has driven the creation of the SAFE initiative. Fourthly, support for Ukraine. SAFE includes provisions to integrate Ukraine’s defence industry, ensuring continued support for Kyiv amid uncertainties in global alliances.4 The evolving nature of EU power In recent history, it is Francois Duchene’s idea of “Civilian Power Europe” (CPE) that has dominated debates about the role of Europe and European institutions in the world.  Duchêne's concept of (CPE) refers to a particular role for Europe in the world that emphasises non-military means of influence and the promotion of international values. Duchêne's original idea, articulated in the early 1970s, suggested that Europe could play a distinctive role based on low politics, non-state actors, ideational influences, and international interdependence rather than traditional military power. The CPE concept highlights Europe's potential to exercise considerable non-military power, combining the power dimension akin to a "European Trading State" with a normative foreign policy perspective aimed at promoting values such as equality, justice, and concern for people with low incomes abroad.5 Fast forward to the 21st century, and Ian Manners proposes another equally influential concept – “normative power”. Ian Manners' main argument is that the European Union (EU) should be understood not only in terms of traditional conceptions of "civilian power" or "military power" but rather as a "normative power" in international relations. He contends that the EU's international role is fundamentally based on its ability to shape norms and define what is considered "normal" in world politics. This normative power stems from the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and constitutional basis, which predispose it to act normatively by promoting principles such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Manners argues that this normative dimension is crucial for understanding the EU's identity and influence internationally, as exemplified by the EU's active pursuit of the international abolition of the death penalty. He emphasises that the EU's power lies less in its military or economic capabilities and more in its capacity to diffuse norms and reshape international standards, making the concept of "normative power Europe" not a contradiction but a significant form of power in world politics.6  Shortly afterwards, Lisbeth Aggestam proposes yet another concept regarding the nature and role of the European Union in the world – “ethical power.” The concept of 'ethical power Europe' (EPE) in EU foreign policy represents a shift from focusing on what the EU 'is' to what it 'does. It articulates the EU's ambition to be a proactive global actor that not only serves as a positive role model but actively works to change the world in the direction of a "global common good." This involves the EU taking on new tasks in crisis management, peacekeeping, state-building, and reconstruction of failing states, complementing its existing roles in development aid and humanitarian assistance. The EU positions itself as a "force for good" and a peacebuilder in the world, justifying its acquisition of both civilian and military power capabilities in these terms.7 EPE encompasses both civilian and military power, as well as social and material power, thereby broadening the scope beyond earlier concepts, such as civilian power in Europe, as proposed by Duchene, and normative power, as emphasised by Manners, which primarily focused on civilian and normative influence. The EPE concept also reintroduces the international and national dimensions into the analysis of the EU's role, recognising the importance of member states' interests and acknowledging that material interests and ethical considerations often overlap. Importantly, EPE is not presented as an empirical reality but rather as a concept that opens new lines of critical reflection on the EU's role, motivations, and ethical dilemmas in foreign policy. It recognises the complexity of ethical foreign policy, given competing visions of order and justice in the world and the challenges of translating ethical ambitions into practice. The concept invites analysis of the ethical values the EU promotes, the relationship between ethics and interests, the just use of power (including military force), and the problems inherent in pursuing a consistent ethical foreign policy. Conversely, Karen Smith asserts that CPE is definitively dead, and the EU now finds itself somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power like most other international actors. Rather than debating whether the EU is a civilian power, the focus should be on critically analysing what the EU does and what it should do in international relations.8 According to Smith, the implications of the EU employing military means are significant and multifaceted.  Firstly, the EU's acquisition and use of military instruments challenge the notion that the EU remains a purely "civilian power." Clinging to the civilian power label stretches the term beyond its breaking point, as military means are fundamentally non-civilian in nature. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, often considered civilian activities, frequently involve military personnel and can evolve into military operations, thereby further blurring the distinction between civilian and military roles.  Secondly, by using military instruments—even as a "residual" tool to safeguard other means—the EU complicates the clear-cut distinction between civilian and military power. This leads to fuzzy interpretations about when the EU ceases to be a civilian power, making it difficult to establish a clear cut-off point or assess changes along the civilian-military spectrum.  Thirdly, employing military means signals a shift from a post-modern, law-based international identity toward a more traditional power politics approach. This militarization risks discrediting the EU's earlier vision of transforming international relations through law and civilian influence alone. The EU moves closer to a "Hobbesian" model where military force backs diplomacy, which may undermine its unique post-modern identity and soft power.  Fourthly, the use of military force raises complex questions about the EU’s ends and means, including the justifications for intervention, the legitimacy of coercion, and democratic control over foreign policy decisions.  Finally, the continued use of military means necessitates moving beyond simplistic categorisations of civilian power to a more nuanced analysis of what the EU does in international relations. The EU, like most actors, falls somewhere along a spectrum between civilian and military power, and its military capabilities must be critically assessed rather than dismissed or downplayed. With this in mind, let us look at the EU as a military actor. A brief history of European defence cooperation Signed on March 4, 1947, the Treaty of Dunkirk was a bilateral alliance between France and the United Kingdom, primarily aimed at preventing renewed German aggression following World War II. Effective from September 8, 1947, and set to expire in 1997, it was also seen as a pretext for defence against the USSR. It laid the foundation for formal European defence collaboration, emphasising mutual assistance and alliance.9 In 1948, the Treaty of Brussels expanded this framework, encompassing Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and established the Western Union. This alliance focused on defence, economic, cultural, and social collaboration. By 1955, following the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty, it evolved into the Western European Union (WEU), with Italy and West Germany joining, marking the establishment of a broader European defence structure. Parallel to these developments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established on April 4, 1949, by 12 countries, including the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations, to counter Soviet expansion. NATO's Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, has become a cornerstone of transatlantic security. During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against Soviet influence, with significant military and political cooperation among members. The WEU, while secondary to NATO, played a complementary role. In 1950, its defence structures were transferred to NATO, reducing its authority, but it remained active in fostering European defence collaboration. The WEU's social and cultural roles were transferred to the Council of Europe in 1960, with its focus shifting to security and defence.  The end of the Cold War in the 1990s prompted a shift towards greater European autonomy in defence. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), aiming to coordinate foreign policy and security. This was followed by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, which introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), enabling the EU to conduct military and civilian missions independently. The 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, prompted by the Kosovo War, endorsed a European security and defence policy, including the development of autonomous military forces. The 2002 Berlin Plus agreement allowed the EU access to NATO assets for peacekeeping, reflecting the close cooperation between the two organisations. The Petersberg Declaration of 1992, initially under the WEU, defined tasks such as humanitarian and rescue operations, which were later integrated into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 further strengthened EU defence capabilities, incorporating the WEU's mutual defence clause. This rendered the WEU superfluous, leading to its dissolution on 30 June 2011, with its functions being transferred to the EU. The European Union Institute for Security Studies and Satellite Centre, previously WEU entities, were integrated into the EU framework in 2002, marking a consolidation of defence.   *Generated with Grok and gamma.app (9 June, 2025). EU as a military actor As of mid-2025, the EU has approximately 3,500 military personnel and 1,300 civilian personnel deployed worldwide. Since the first CSDP missions and operations were launched in 2003, the EU has undertaken over 40 overseas operations, utilising both civilian and military missions in several countries across Europe, Africa, and Asia. As of today, there are 21 ongoing EU CSDP missions and operations, comprising 12 civilian, eight military, and one combined civilian and military initiative.10  According to the EU itself, “Their (Security and Defence Policy ((CSDP)) Missions) aim is to help prevent or resolve conflicts and crises, enhance the capacities of partner countries and, ultimately, protect the European Union and its citizens. EU decisions to deploy a mission or operation are typically made at the request of the partner country receiving assistance and/or based on a United Nations Security Council Resolution, always in full respect of international law. These decisions take into account the EU’s security interests, EU strategic efforts and regional engagement strategies. They are tailored to the local circumstances and to the tasks that need to be implemented”.11 Scholars researching the topic conclude that the political motivations behind EU military operations are complex, driven by a combination of national interests, strategic considerations, and internal EU dynamics. While the EU often justifies its operations with humanitarian rhetoric, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations. The influence of key member states, such as France and Germany, plays a significant role in shaping the EU's military agenda. However, the EU's ability to project influence is constrained by internal divisions and resource limitations. National Interests One of the most significant political motivations behind EU military operations is the pursuit of national interests by its member states. While the EU often presents a unified front, the decision to deploy military operations is heavily influenced by the interests of its most powerful members, particularly France and Germany. These states often use EU military operations as a means to advance their own strategic and economic interests while framing them as collective EU actions. For instance, France has been a key driver of several European Union (EU) military operations in Africa, such as the EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Critics argue that these operations were motivated by French geo-strategic and economic interests in the region rather than purely humanitarian concerns.12 Similarly, the EU's naval operation, Atalanta, off the coast of Somalia, was influenced by the interests of member states with significant maritime trade routes in the region.13  The dominance of national interests is further evident in the EU's decision-making process. Member states often prioritise their security and economic concerns over broader EU objectives, leading to inconsistencies in the deployment of military operations. For example, the EU's reluctance to intervene in the 2006 Lebanon war, despite initial plans for a military operation, was primarily due to divergent national interests among member states.14 Power Politics and Strategic Culture The EU's military operations are also shaped by power politics within the organisation. The distribution of power among member states plays a crucial role in determining the scope and nature of these operations. France, in particular, has historically played a key The EU often justifies its military operations with humanitarian rhetoric, emphasising the need to protect civilians, prevent human rights abuses, and promote stability in conflict zones. However, this rhetoric often masks more pragmatic strategic considerations. For instance, the EU's intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006 was officially framed as a humanitarian operation. However, it was also driven by the strategic interests of EU member states in the region's natural resources and political stability.15  Likewise, the EU's naval operation Sophia in the Mediterranean was initially justified as a humanitarian response to the migrant crisis. However, the operation also served strategic purposes, such as enhancing the EU's maritime security capabilities and addressing the political priorities of member states like Italy and France.16 The gap between humanitarian rhetoric and strategic reality is a recurring theme in European Union (EU) military operations. While humanitarian concerns may play a role in the initial justification for intervention, the sustained deployment of military forces is often driven by broader strategic and political considerations.17 Ukraine and EU’s Involvement Against Russia The EU has consistently condemned Russia's actions, viewing them as a violation of international law, and supports Ukraine's right to self-defence. This includes diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia and coordinate with partners like the US and NATO. Ukraine's EU candidacy, granted in June 2022, reflects long-term integration goals, though the process is expected to take years.18 So far, the EU has imposed 17 sanction packages by May 2025, targeting Russia's economy, military, and individuals, including measures against Belarus, Iran, and North Korea for supporting Russia. These aim to weaken Russia's war capabilities, with recent packages focusing on export bans and measures to prevent circumvention.19 The EU has committed €147.9 billion in aid, with €50.3 billion allocated for military support, €77 billion for financial and humanitarian assistance, and €17 billion for refugee support. This includes weapons, training, and emergency relief, as well as support for Ukrainian refugees under the Temporary Protection Mechanism. To counter the impacts of war, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from 40% in 2021 to 15% in 2023, thereby diversifying its energy sources. It also facilitates Ukrainian grain exports through solidarity lanes, addressing global food security.20 Now, as noble as it sounds and as much as it fits into the self-perception of Brussels’s elites (the EU being a force for good), the critics of the West's support of Ukraine make a couple of formidable points. Firstly, the longer the war continues, the more destroyed Ukraine becomes and the greater the number of Ukrainians killed. Secondly, the longer the war continues, the greater the likelihood of escalation, which poses a threat to the entire European continent. Thirdly, despite mainstream media reports, the Russian Federation appears to have adapted to operating effectively despite the sanctions, which may strengthen its economy in the short to medium term and, more importantly, bring it closer to cooperating with China and North Korea. Finally, since every war serves as a testing ground for new technologies, the Russians, especially the North Koreans and the Chinese, are gaining invaluable insight into the nature of modern warfare, which is often referred to as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  Conclusion To answer the question introduced at the beginning of this analysis, “Can SAFE make Europe safe?” the author of this piece remains sceptical, to say the least. It appears that despite some initial intentions to end the Ukrainian war as early as April 2022, it is the European elites, especially French, German and Polish, who stand for the prolongation, if not escalation, of the Ukrainian war, potentially at the expense of the security of the whole European continent and definitely at the expense of Ukrainians and their country.  References:  1. La Rocca, M. (2025, May 27). Defence, final go-ahead for the SAFE fund. Von der Leyen: “Exceptional measures for exceptional times.” Eunews. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/05/27/defence-final-go-ahead-for-the-safe-fund-von-der-leyen-exceptional-measures-for-exceptional-times/ 2. COUNCIL REGULATION establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of European defence industry Instrument. (2025, March 19). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0122&qid=1749479407767 3. Tidey, A. (2025, May 21). Everything you need to know about SAFE, the EU’s €150bn defence instrument. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/21/everything-you-need-to-know-about-safe-the-eus-150bn-defence-instrument/4. Scazzieri, L. (2025, March 26). One step forward for Europe’s defence. Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/insights/one-step-forward-europes-defence 5. Orbie, J. (2006). Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates. Cooperation and Conflict, 41(1), 123-128. Sage Publications, Ltd. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450844256. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258.7. Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical power Europe? International Affairs, 84(1), 1-11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/251447118. Smith, K. E. (2005). Beyond the civilian power EU debate. Politique européenne, (17), 63-82. L'Harmattan. https://www.jstor.org/stable/450177509. The road to European defence cooperation. (1947). European Defence Agency. https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html10. European Union External Action, (2025, January 30). Missions and Operations. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#87694E11. EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS. (2025, April). https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/EU-mission-and-operation_2025.pdf 12. See more at: Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781 and Olsen, G. R. (2009). The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe? International Peacekeeping, 16(2), 245–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685828 13. See more at: Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 and Riddervold, M. (2018). Why Not Fight Piracy Through NATO? Explaining the EU’s First Naval Mission: EU NAVFOR Atalanta (pp. 195–217). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66598-6_10 14. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg15. Engberg, K. (2013). The EU and Military Operations: A comparative analysis. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203381663/eu-military-operations-katarina-engberg 16. Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2019). The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia. Comparative European Politics, 17(6), 860–884. https://doi.org/10.1057/S41295-018-0131-4 17. Bono, G. (2011). The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541781   18. EU response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine-archive/19. Russia’s war against Ukraine. (n.d.). https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/topics/russia-s-war-against-ukraine/ 20. See more at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/where-does-the-eu-s-gas-come-from/

Abstract The Ukraine war has reshaped the global geopolitical landscape, positioning Europe, America, Russia and China as key players on a new global chessboard. Europe is grappling with the dual challenge of ensuring regional security and managing the economic fallout from the conflict. America’s evolving global relationships are marked by a burden-shift with Europe, diplomatic efforts to further deter Russian aggression and a strategic rivalry with China. For Russia, the invasion of Ukraine is a bid to reassert its influence, but it faces severe international sanctions and military setbacks, constraining its strategic ambitions. And China is navigating a complex balancing act between supporting Russia and maintaining its economic ties with the West. This complex interplay of alliances and rivalries underscores the shifting dynamics of global power and the urgent need for diplomatic solutions to ensure stability and peace. Introduction On 27 March 2025 a Summit on Peace and Security for Ukraine was organised by President Emmanuel Macron in cooperation with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. It was held in Paris. This summit was part of an ongoing series of political and operational meetings that the UK and France have been organising alternately over several weeks, aimed at contributing to a sustainable and just peace in Ukraine. This particular summit saw the participation of 31 countries, including non-EU nations such as the UK, Norway, Canada and Iceland, as well as high-profile figures such as the NATO secretary general, the president of the European Commission and the president of the European Council. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also attended. The increased frequency of meetings among this wide-ranging ‘coalition of the willing’ is recognition, in Europe’s eyes, of the immediate need to establish and permanently guarantee security and peace in the long term for Ukraine. It is evident that the unconditional ceasefire that Ukraine had declared its readiness to enter into on 11 March in Saudi Arabia has since evolved into a proposal for a limited ceasefire with additional conditions and demands from Russia. Moscow is employing delaying tactics, and there is a growing realisation, even within the US, that Russia is not genuinely interested in ending the war. Europe’s novel security approach: ‘Peace through strength’ This fear of a prolonged conflict in Ukraine, and the perceived risk of war between Europe and Russia, has pushed the European Commission to propose a way forward in its Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 (European Commission 2025), which can be encapsulated by the motto ‘peace through strength’. This approach entails rapidly increasing military support for Ukraine, including the provision of more ammunition, artillery, air defence systems, drones and training. Additionally, it involves enhancing the capabilities of European countries by them investing more in their own defence, simplifying administrative processes and fostering better industrial cooperation, including with the Ukrainian defence industry. The European Commission has also outlined the financial instruments that have been established in record time to address these specific challenges. The primary objective of these financial instruments is to bolster European defence spending, with the EU targeting a total of €800 billion. This includes €150 billion in loans available to member states through a new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and up to €650 billion from national defence budgets, corresponding to an expenditure of 1.5% of GDP that can be excluded from national budgets by activating the ‘national escape clause’ of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. Additionally, private financing and funds from the European Investment Bank will be mobilised for investments in priority capabilities. Furthermore, the EU has identified several priority capabilities for investment. In the short term, joint EU purchases should focus on missiles and artillery systems. In the medium term, the goal is to develop large-scale EU systems in integrated air and missile defence, military mobility and strategic enablers. NATO standards will continue to serve as the foundation, and it is crucial that these standards are shared with the EU. Finally, ‘peace through strength’ also includes the further European integration of Ukraine, with Brussels clearly considering Ukraine the EU’s first line of defence. The Commission’s Joint White Paper and a parallel initiative launched by High Representative Kaja Kallas both aim to bolster military support for Kyiv and stress the importance of defence procurement both with and within Ukraine. Despite the commendable pace and scope of the numerous recent initiatives undertaken by the EU, it is imperative to recognise that these commitments must still be translated into tangible actions. The European Commission remains hopeful that the proposals delineated in the Joint White Paper can be actualised during the Polish Presidency, with the aim of reaching concrete decisions by the European Council meeting scheduled for 26–7 June. However, considering the ongoing deterioration of the European security landscape, it could be argued that this deadline lacks the requisite sense of urgency needed to address the pressing challenges ahead. European peace through strength—but not without the US While Europe is building its rise as a security, defence and military actor, there is a consensus among most EU member states that these efforts should not happen to the detriment of NATO and that there is a need to maintain solid US involvement in European security. Strength is not merely a matter of political initiatives but also of demonstrating a clear readiness to engage militarily. There must be a deterrent effect from military power, particularly in anticipation of potential new Russian offensives once Moscow rebuilds its troops and supplies during a future ceasefire or peace deal. And military power is exactly where Europe—willing or not—will still need to rely on the transatlantic partnership for a foreseeable while, due to its current overreliance on strategic US military and intelligence assets. Moreover, the new administration in Washington has manoeuvred fast to have a clear say on the future of European security. It is the US—not Europe—that is leading the diplomacy on a ceasefire or peace deal in Ukraine. And while Europe, in reaction, is focusing on shaping future security guarantees for Ukraine—or even pushing for boots on the ground through a ‘coalition of the willing’—both of these European endeavours hinge, first, on the success of US diplomacy to reach a deal with Russia; and second, on US logistical and intelligence support for the proposed troops on the ground. Without these, most of the ‘willing nations’ may withdraw their commitments. The situation is further complicated by the shortage of operational European troops: for instance, the UK has an expeditionary force, but relies heavily on its air and naval power; France has some units, but in insufficient numbers; and Germany’s contribution remains uncertain. In this context, a European plan to help Ukraine win and maintain peace should not compromise NATO’s resilience and should therefore be developed in close coordination with the alliance, particularly in terms of planning and interoperability. And as Europe is now spending on defence, it should do so while ensuring that its expenditures align with NATO capability objectives. Moreover, military strength is not the only domain in which Europe should continue to keep an eye on the US. Europe notably believes that it is imperative to increase pressure on Russia through sanctions. The EU is unequivocally clear that there can be no consideration of easing sanctions; on the contrary, some member states even advocate for intensifying them. The challenge for Europe, however, remains to emphatically convey this message to the Americans, as any decision by the US to ease sanctions—as requested by Russia—would undermine the most critical form of pressure against Russia. Some EU member states have already raised concerns about the future of European sanctions policy, highlighting the need for new methods to enforce sanctions, particularly if certain EU member states more friendly to Russia decide to obstruct them in the future. Putin’s patient game of chess Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin has clearly asserted a degree of dominance in the ongoing diplomatic negotiations. He has set preliminary conditions for a ceasefire, made a limited commitment regarding energy infrastructure and subsequently undermined the credibility of his own commitment with new attacks on Ukraine. Despite this, Putin’s demands concerning Western military supplies and intelligence-sharing reveal that Ukrainian attacks on Russian critical infrastructure are causing significant damage and irking the Russian president. Putin’s demands, including the reduction of Ukraine’s military capabilities, the transfer of entire Ukrainian regions to Russian control and the replacement of President Zelensky, are, naturally, unacceptable to Ukraine. These demands also pose the most significant risk to the West: if Russia were to succeed in installing a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv and controlling the Ukrainian military, it would alter the entire power and military balance in Eastern Europe. Should President Trump agree to this, it would likely cause a further deterioration in US–EU relations too. Achieving a middle-ground in any US–Russia agreement for Ukraine currently still poses a formidable challenge. Moscow therefore perceives that it has the momentum in its favour, despite Russia’s inability to achieve any strategic breakthroughs in Ukraine. The financial and human costs of this conflict for Moscow are substantial, while it is making minimal territorial gains. However, while Ukraine has successfully liberated 50% of the territory that was previously occupied by Russia, the Kremlin nevertheless still occupies approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory. Moscow has also likely observed in the US a desire to shift towards finding a consensus and a willingness to negotiate in a transactional manner. Moreover, the recent suspension of US intelligence and military support has already had immediate repercussions on Ukraine’s strength. It has weakened Ukraine’s ability to bring this war to a conclusion and could potentially lead to a temporary ceasefire that would de facto result in the creation of a ‘frozen conflict’—an outcome which Russia would not necessarily view unfavourably. A friendly US visit to Europe . . . On 3 and 4 April 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio participated for the first time in a NATO foreign ministerial meeting. Rubio’s visit to NATO headquarters was notably smoother and more amicable than the visit of his colleague at the Department of Defense, Pete Hegseth, for the defence ministerial meeting in February 2025. Rubio, a seasoned diplomat, adroitly conveyed the message that European allies must significantly increase their defence spending, advocating for allocations of up to 5% of their GDP. He acknowledged the difficulty of this demand but emphasised that it could be achieved incrementally, provided the allies concerned showed a clear and consistent direction of progress. In a similar vein, Rubio addressed the situation in Ukraine, commending the resilience and fighting spirit of the Ukrainian people. He articulated President Trump’s recognition that a military solution in Ukraine is unattainable for both Ukraine and Russia, necessitating a negotiated settlement. Rubio underscored that peace negotiations inherently require compromises from all parties involved. He acknowledged that Ukraine has already made significant concessions, whereas Russia has yet to reciprocate. According to Rubio, Russia is testing President Trump’s resolve, but he also acknowledged that Putin faces severe consequences if he does not promptly agree to a ceasefire, indicating that the timeline for such an agreement is measured in weeks, not months. Rubio concluded by asserting that a peace agreement would be unattainable without European involvement. Rubio also expressed broad support for the EU’s defence initiatives, including the EU Joint White Paper and the ReArm programme. He praised the EU’s efforts to encourage its member states to meet their NATO commitments and to strengthen the industrial base, provided that the non-EU defence industry, particularly American firms, is not unduly excluded. Despite the positive reception of Rubio’s visit to Europe and NATO, there remains an underlying uncertainty about whether other influential figures within President Trump’s Make America Great Again movement share Rubio’s views. The path to achieving a cohesive and effective alliance strategy is fraught with challenges, and it remains uncertain whether NATO will navigate these obstacles successfully and emerge intact. . . . but Washington’s priority is the Asia–Pacific region Above all, the NATO foreign ministerial meeting of early April showed again that the US felt fundamentally displeased with the Western approach to China over the past several decades. The prevailing assumption—that a capitalist and economically prosperous China would inevitably evolve to resemble Western democratic nations—was a misguided and overly optimistic expectation. This erroneous belief has permitted Beijing to engage in deceptive trade and military practices for the past 30 years without facing significant repercussions. Today the US is clearly concerned about the way China has strategically weaponised its industrial capabilities by seamlessly integrating its civilian and military sectors through a dual-use strategy that is particularly evident in critical economic and high-tech domains, such as artificial intelligence. By blurring the lines between civilian and military applications, China has been able to enhance its technological and industrial base, thereby posing a multifaceted challenge to global security. Moreover, for the US, the presence of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine serves as a stark indicator of the interconnected nature of the threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific and European regions. For Washington, the collaborative efforts of adversarial states such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea in Ukraine and other geopolitical theatres necessitate a similarly unified and strategic approach from democratic like-minded nations to strengthening their alliances and enhancing their collective security measures in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. Interconnected theatres of confrontation China’s alleged support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine and the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, and Russia and Iran, clearly illustrate the interconnectedness of security dynamics between Europe, the Asia–Pacific region and the Middle East. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine represents a pivotal moment for the stability of the international system, impacting not only Europe but also other parts of the world. Contrary to the characterisation of the conflict in Ukraine as merely a ‘European war’ a few years ago, the war there is now considered by the West to be a globalised conflict with profound international implications. This perspective is widely accepted among the NATO allies, which recognise the growing interconnection between the three theatres of conflict. This attitude is also increasingly reflected in the enhanced dialogue between NATO and the Indo–Pacific Four partners—Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea. This cooperation is today seen by allies as mutually beneficial and necessary. Beyond exchanges of intelligence, particularly on the challenges posed by China, support for Ukraine dominates the partnership, alongside the joint battle against hybrid threats, progress on cybersecurity and the strengthening of maritime security. It is widely expected that NATO allies will seek to further strengthen this cooperation at the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague. Among NATO members there is, furthermore, a growing consensus on the need to be firm with China. Allies agree on the necessity of sending a stronger message and taking determined and united actions in terms of deterrence, including at the hybrid and cyber levels, as well as on imposing sanctions against Chinese economic operators involved in China–Russia cooperation in Ukraine. While Russia remains the primary long-term threat to the NATO realm, there is recognition that China poses a significant problem that must be addressed in its full magnitude, particularly in the context of China–Russia cooperation. It is essential to act firmly and in a united way to increase the costs of cooperation with Moscow for Beijing while keeping open the necessary avenues of engagement. Any dissonance between Europe and the US on this issue might otherwise become the root cause of the next big crisis of trust in the transatlantic relationship. China versus a Russian–American rapprochement Russia is not fighting its Ukraine war alone. It is receiving help from allies including China, Iran and North Korea. Moreover, the war in Ukraine is not just about Ukraine’s future. It is also part of a larger global struggle, with Russia seeking position alongside China in a reconfigured world order that is more multipolar and less centred on the US. In this respect, China may be inclined to silently assist Russia in opposing a proposed ceasefire or peace plan for Ukraine put forward by President Trump. Beijing likely recognises that by resolving the conflict in Ukraine and fostering better relations with Russia, Trump’s ultimate objective is to reallocate US diplomatic, military and economic resources to address the growing global influence of China and its impact on US national interests. In this respect Putin appears keen to keep President Xi Jinping informed about American attempts at rapprochement and ongoing negotiations concerning Ukraine. Historically, the ‘good relations’ between China and Russia are relatively recent; the stability of this relationship is attributed to the resolution of their border disputes, their complementary economies and their non-interference in each other’s ideological systems. But Moscow treads carefully as it knows it is the junior partner in the relationship. Moreover, the prospect of an American–Russian rapprochement is not viewed by either Moscow or Beijing with any real sense of threat. Ultimately Russia’s offerings to the US are limited; it has also been asserted that any rapprochement would not have an effect on Moscow–Beijing relations, as Sino-Russian ties are not dependent on any third party. Furthermore, regarding the Ukraine war, China maintains that it is ‘not a party’ to the conflict (DPA 2024). China upholds the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine while acknowledging Russia’s legitimate security concerns. In the eyes of Beijing, these principles must be reconciled to end the war. Additionally, China opposes unilateral sanctions on Russia but, due to its significant trade ties with the EU and the US, it accepts the Russian sanctions and their secondary effects on the Chinese economy. The ongoing negotiations on Ukraine are perceived by China as creating crucial momentum for achieving peace through dialogue, which should not be an opportunity missed. The American initiative is seen as a continuation of previous efforts, including the Chinese Peace Plan for Ukraine of 2023, the Ukraine Peace Summit 2024 in Switzerland and the Sino-Brazilian Six-Point Plan, also in 2024 (Gov.br 2024). China calls for non-escalation and direct negotiations, noting the signs of the exhaustion of manpower and resources on both the Russian and the Ukrainian sides. Despite China’s apparently laconic stance vis-à-vis the relationship, an American–Russian rapprochement could cause some concerns for Beijing. Economically, Moscow is less relevant to Beijing than Washington or Brussels. However, Russia holds fundamental strategic value due to its extensive land border with China. In the event of an American–Chinese rivalry escalating into direct conflict, Russia could become a lifeline for Beijing, especially if accompanied by a successful American blockade. These potential risks and scenarios, which seem increasingly likely over time, may serve as a significant incentive for China to obstruct the warming of relations between Moscow and Washington. References DPA (2024). China is not a party to Ukraine war, Xi tells Scholz in Beijing. aNews, 16 April. https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2024/04/16/china-is-not-a-party-to-ukraine-war-xi-tells-scholz-in-beijing. Accessed 15 April 2025. European Commission. (2025). Joint White Paper for European defence readiness 2030. JOIN (2025) 120 final (19 March). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0120. Accessed 15 April 2025. Gov.br. (2024). Brazil and China present joint proposal for peace negotiations with the participation of Russia and Ukraine. 23 May. https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-china-present-joint-proposal-for-peace-negotiations-with-the-participation-of-russia-and-ukraine. Accessed 15 April 2025. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May, ever larger Russian air strikes have been documented against Ukrainian cities with devastating consequences for civilians, including in the country’s capital, Kyiv. Amid small and costly but steady gains along the almost 1,000km long frontline, Russia reportedly took full control of the Ukrainian region of Luhansk, part of which it had already occupied before the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And according to Dutch and German intelligence reports, some of Russia’s gains on the battlefield are enabled by the widespread use of chemical weapons. It was therefore something of a relief that Nato’s summit in The Hague produced a short joint declaration on June 25 in which Russia was clearly named as a “long-term threat … to Euro-Atlantic security”. Member states restated “their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”. While the summit declaration made no mention of future Nato membership for Ukraine, the fact that US president Donald Trump agreed to these two statements was widely seen as a success. Yet, within a week of the summit, Washington paused the delivery of critical weapons to Ukraine, including Patriot air defence missiles and long-range precision-strike rockets. The move was ostensibly in response to depleting US stockpiles. This despite the Pentagon’s own analysis, which suggested that the shipment – authorised by the former US president Joe Biden last year – posed no risk to US ammunition supplies. This was bad news for Ukraine. The halt in supplies weakens Kyiv’s ability to protect its large population centres and critical infrastructure against intensifying Russian airstrikes. It also puts limits on Ukraine’s ability to target Russian supply lines and logistics hubs behind the frontlines that have been enabling ground advances. Despite protests from Ukraine and an offer from Germany to buy Patriot missiles from the US for Ukraine, Trump has been in no rush to reverse the decision by the Pentagon.   Another phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on July 3, failed to change Trump’s mind, even though he acknowledged his disappointment with the clear lack of willingness by the Kremlin to stop the fighting. What’s more, within hours of the call between the two presidents, Moscow launched the largest drone attack of the war against Kyiv. A day later, Trump spoke with Zelensky. And while the call between them was apparently productive, neither side gave any indication that US weapons shipments to Ukraine would resume quickly. Trump previously paused arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March, 2025 after his acrimonious encounter with Zelensky in the Oval Office. But the US president reversed course after certain concessions had been agreed – whether that was an agreement by Ukraine to an unconditional ceasefire or a deal on the country’s minerals. It is not clear with the current disruption whether Trump is after yet more concessions from Ukraine. The timing is ominous, coming after what had appeared to be a productive Nato summit with a unified stance on Russia’s war of aggression. And it preceded Trump’s call with Putin. This could be read as a signal that Trump was still keen to accommodate at least some of the Russian president’s demands in exchange for the necessary concessions from the Kremlin to agree, finally, the ceasefire that Trump had once envisaged he could achieve in 24 hours. If this is indeed the case, the fact that Trump continues to misread the Russian position is deeply worrying. The Kremlin has clearly drawn its red lines on what it is after in any peace deal with Ukraine. These demands – virtually unchanged since the beginning of the war – include a lifting of sanctions against Russia and no Nato membership for Ukraine, while also insisting that Kyiv must accept limits on its future military forces and recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the Ukrainian mainland. This will not change as a result of US concessions to Russia but only through pressure on Putin. And Trump has so far been unwilling to apply pressure in a concrete and meaningful way beyond the occasional hints to the press or on social media. Coalition of the willing It is equally clear that Russia’s maximalist demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. With little doubt that the US can no longer be relied upon to back the European and Ukrainian position, Kyiv and Europe need to accelerate their own defence efforts. A European coalition of the willing to do just that is slowly taking shape. It straddles the once more rigid boundaries of EU and Nato membership and non-membership, involving countries such as Moldova, Norway and the UK. and including non-European allies including Canada, Japan and South Korea. The European commission’s white paper on European defence is an obvious indication that the threat from Russia and the needs of Ukraine are being taken seriously and, crucially, acted upon. It mobilises some €800 billion (£690 billion) in defence spending and will enable deeper integration of the Ukrainian defence sector with that of the European Union. At the national level, key European allies, in particular Germany, have also committed to increased defence spending and stepped up their forward deployment of forces closer to the borders with Russia. US equivocation will not mean that Ukraine is now on the brink of losing the war against Russia. Nor will Europe discovering its spine on defence put Kyiv immediately in a position to defeat Moscow’s aggression. After decades of relying on the US and neglecting their own defence capabilities, these recent European efforts are a first step in the right direction. They will not turn Europe into a military heavyweight overnight. But they will buy time to do so.

Abstract The international system is currently undergoing a process of reconfiguration that is having an impact on all areas of global development. In this process of reordering power relations, there is a tendency to move towards multipolarity, leaving behind the unipolar coalition established after the Second World War. In this context, several emerging powers are gaining increasing international power, which has led to changes in the hierarchy of power on the international geopolitical chessboard. Such is the case of the People's Republic of China, which has established itself not only as a power of great impact and relevance in the Asian region, but also in the entire international system. Namely, the management of the government and the Party in terms of innovation, industrialization, informatization, productivity, expansion and internationalization of its economic model, positions this country as the most dynamic center of the international economy. Evidencing that alternative models to the capitalist system are possible and viable, which strengthens the trend towards a systemic transition and multipolarity in the International System Introduction In the last two decades, a set of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and conflicts have become evident, with significant implications extending throughout the International System. As a result, we are currently experiencing a convulsion of the established order, giving way to a process of new global reconfigurations. In this context, several researchers and academics such as Jorge Casals, Leyde Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián Schulz, among others, have noted that these conditions have led to a crisis and hegemonic transition process, with a trend toward multipolarity in which the Asia-Pacific region is gaining increasing relevance. This article, titled "The International Reconfiguration’s Process Towards Multipolarity: The Role of China as an Emerging Power," is dedicated to analyzing the position of this country within the current international reconfiguration of power. Accordingly, the first section will systematize some essential guidelines to understand the current crisis and the decline of the hegemonic order established in the post-World War II period. The second section will address China's positioning amid the international reconfiguration of power. In this regard, it is important to note that China's rapid rise highlights how development management aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals can lead to a shift in the paradigm of international relations, as well as power reconfigurations that challenge the current balance of forces. Thus, it can be affirmed that China's rise constitutes a decisive element within the current trend toward multipolarity. DevelopmentNew International Order: Approaches to the Multipolar Reconfiguration of the International System The current international context is marked by a process of crisis. This crisis reflects the fact that the world order no longer aligns with the correlation of forces that gave rise to it during the post-World War II period. It is not a circumstantial crisis, but rather the interlinking of various interconnected crises that span across all sectors of life. That is to say, the effects of one crisis often become the causes of another, involving economic, political, social, cultural, ethical, moral, technological, commercial, and environmental components. In other words, it is a structural and systemic crisis—one that cannot be resolved unless a similarly systemic transformation occurs. To gain greater clarity, it is important to consider that the consolidation of the capitalist system brought about the process of globalization. This, in turn, introduced large-scale production and technological development capable of increasing output. This process, along with other characteristics of the system, has exponentially accelerated social inequalities between developed and developing countries. It has also led to strategic tensions over the control of resources, raw materials, and inputs, resulting in geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, the capitalist system has imposed an extremely high environmental cost, demonstrating that it is exceeding both its own limits and those of the planet. Specifically, in its constant pursuit of profit and maximization of gains, negative environmental impacts are not factored into cost-benefit analyses, leading to widespread environmental degradation. Among other harms caused by the system, we observe a decline in investment rates, an increase in public debt, loss of autonomy in monetary policy, rising unemployment levels, reductions in real wages, and growing inequality, among others. In short, capitalism has become an unsustainable system whose primary concern is profit generation—something that is currently entirely incompatible with environmental preservation and the responsible use of natural resources. Therefore, it can be affirmed that some of its most alarming effects include: vast amounts of currency without backing, increasingly concentrated in fewer hands; acceleration of capital concentration in the West; rising military expenditures; and environmental pollution and destruction (Casals, J., 2023). On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify that, for a particular state to be considered hegemonic, it must not only exert its influence predominantly within the system of international relations; its hegemonic role must also be linked to the founding and establishment of a universally accepted concept of world order. That is, the majority of other states must recognize it as such and identify with the model promoted by the hegemon. Therefore, it is not merely a matter of a hierarchical order among states, but rather the adoption of a dominant model of production that involves those states. As a result, certain mechanisms or general rules of conduct are established for the participating states. For this reason, a hegemonic crisis involving the dominant actor in the system of international relations leads to a crisis in the social, economic, political, and institutional structures upon which that actor’s dominance was built. In light of these elements, we currently observe a set of powers within the International System that are vying to establish a new distribution of power—one that moves away from the unipolar coalition led by the United States following World War II. From this perspective, Juan Sebastián Schulz asserts: “A hegemonic crisis occurs when the existing hegemonic state lacks either the means or the will to continue steering the interstate system in a direction broadly perceived as favorable—not only for its own power, but also for the collective power of the dominant groups within the system.” (Schulz, J. S., 2022) As a result, strategic alliances have been formed and new power groups have emerged that influence international relations.These blocs are precisely what the new polarity is forming around, increasingly reinforcing the trend toward multipolarity. This is a system in which hegemonic influence is not determined by a single power, but by two, three, or more. In this regard, Juan Sebastián Schulz further notes that a process of insubordination is becoming evident, particularly in the Western peripheries. As a consequence, several countries have begun to criticize the configuration of the contemporary world order, initiating efforts to organize and propose alternative models (Schulz, J. S., 2022). This reveals the emergence of a new kind of power hierarchy, generating a global order in which a diversity of forces and actors prevails. In this context, China has experienced rapid growth, thereby contributing to the trend toward multipolarity. While this does not imply that the United States will cease to be one of the central powers in the system of international relations—given its considerable global influence—it is evident that there is a noticeable decline in the dominance it held during the unipolar era that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This process of intersystemic transition unfolds in various phases. First, there is an observable economic transition marked by a shift in the center of gravity of the global economy toward emerging and developing economies. This shift is accompanied by a necessary technological transition, characterized by a new struggle—this time to lead the technological revolution. These changes, in turn, must be supported by a political transition. Currently, countries from the Global South have gained increasing prominence on the international stage [1]. From this foundation, a geopolitical transition is also underway, where the center of gravity and decision-making—once concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon West—is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, a cultural or civilizational transition is taking place, wherein the previously dominant value system is giving way to the rise of a new worldview. Based on this, the phases of the transition process can be outlined as follows: Existence of a stable order that brings together the majority of nation-states in the International System. - A crisis of legitimacy begins to affect the established global order. - A deconcentration and delegitimization of power emerges, impacting the hegemonic power. - An arms race and formation of alliances ensue in an attempt to preserve the hierarchical order by any means. This leads to a widespread crisis and the rise and emergence of new actors. - A necessary resolution of the international crisis. - Renewal of the system. (Schulz, J. S., 2022) In light of the above, it can be stated that a “new international order” is taking shape. Its manifestations are multifaceted, such as: - The rise of movements and associations of states that serve as alternatives to the neoliberal order. - Emerging powers like China and Russia are gaining strength in various sectors of the international geopolitical arena. - Russia's confrontation with NATO in the context of the conflict with Ukraine. - Sanctions imposed by the United States on various NATO and European Union countries have strengthened the BRICS nations. - The incorporation of new members into BRICS can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the economic and political dominance of the United States and the European Union. - The expansion of anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal integration mechanisms that promote South-South cooperation, such as the G-77 + China group. - The financial sanctions imposed by the West on Russia in the context of the Ukraine conflict have sparked a debate about the viability of the international monetary system and the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. - China and Russia conduct transactions in yuan and sell oil in this currency to Iran, Venezuela, and Gulf countries. China has increased its economic and political influence in the world, which can be seen as a challenge to U.S. hegemony. Its leadership within BRICS and its growing role in the global economy may be indicators of a shift in the balance of power. All these developments reflect a growing awareness within the International System of States regarding the importance of international cooperation to address global challenges such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and food security. They also serve as indicators that a transformation is underway in the way countries interact with each other, resulting in a shift in the economic, political, and strategic center of gravity. In this context, the United States has unleashed a global hybrid war as a desperate attempt to defend and maintain its hegemonic position, which once appeared unshakable in the postwar world. To this end, it has targeted China, as the latter represents its main threat in the economic and scientific-technological order. From this perspective, tensions between the United States and China have significantly deteriorated since the Republican administration of President Donald Trump. Beginning in 2017, his policy took on an aggressive stance toward China, manifesting through a trade war and economic attacks aimed at preserving U.S. global hegemony. This demonstrates that, in response to a process of decline already underway, nationalist and protectionist efforts intensified in the U.S., with policies targeting some of the emerging pillars of the crisis-ridden world order—China being a primary example. Under the administration of Joseph Biden, the focus shifted toward competition, emphasizing the commitment to protect U.S. sovereignty from potential Chinese threats. A significant shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan became evident with the approval of arms sales to Taiwan in August 2023, which escalated tensions in the region (Collective of Authors). Furthermore, in recent years, the United States has increasingly worked to generate geopolitical and geoeconomic motivations aimed at fostering tensions between China and Russia, potentially sparking conflict between the two. It has strengthened alliances with neighboring countries of these powers—most notably Taiwan and Ukraine—which has triggered concerns and tensions in both nations. A containment policy has also been deployed, including the imposition of trade barriers and tariffs on Chinese products; restricting Chinese companies’ access to U.S. technology and markets; and promoting the diversification of supply chains to reduce dependence on China. Nevertheless, the ongoing sanctions and restrictions have only served to reaffirm the shared survival interests of both powers, strengthening corporate ties and relations between them. These actions also reflect the growing concern among U.S. power groups over the decline of their hegemonic dominance. The Emergence of China and Its Role in the Transition Toward Multipolarity In a previous article titled "The Synergy Between Economy and Environment in China Through the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals," (‘La sinergia entre economía y medio ambiente en China mediante la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible’) the process of socioeconomic transformations experienced in the People's Republic of China over the past decade was discussed. These transformations have been primarily aimed at revitalizing the nation in preparation for its centenary in 2049. This strategy is rooted in aligning the Centenary Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set for 2030, under the leadership of the Communist Party and the momentum driven by President Xi Jinping. The results of this strategy have had an impact not only on the Asian Giant itself—now a decisive actor in the Asian region—but also on the international order as a whole. As a result, China has emerged as a powerful rising power, with promising prospects for further elevating its development standards. This is backed by sustained GDP growth, averaging between 6% and 8% annually, indicating a robust economy. In addition, China holds vast foreign exchange reserves, granting it economic stability and the capacity to withstand potential external shocks. It also invests heavily in modern infrastructure and cutting-edge sectors such as artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and renewable energy—all of which enhance its competitiveness and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainable growth (Lagarde, CH). Nonetheless, China has also had to confront significant challenges in its gradual and progressive approach to the desired development model. Among these is the environmental cost associated with its rapid economic growth. For instance, China still experiences high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, along with air, water, and soil pollution. In response, measures have been implemented such as the establishment of a national monitoring network and the replacement of coal heating systems in Beijing. Efforts have also been made to purify water resources polluted by industrial processes, and imports of solid waste have been reduced to help decontaminate soils affected by industrial and agricultural activities (González, R., 2023). In general, the development of renewable energy and a circular economy model is being promoted to enable a gradual transition toward a green economy, grounded in the concept of an ecological civilization. For this reason, China’s new era is committed to scientific and technological innovation as a means of driving economic growth that is both sustainable and capable of ensuring a higher quality of life for its population. This, in turn, leads gradually toward a new model of political leadership and economic management. In this regard, Jin Keyu, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), has stated that “trillions of dollars of investment are needed for the global green transition, and China is going to play an essential role in that transformation” (Feingold, S., 2024). Based on the aforementioned elements, various authors such as Dr. C. Charles Pennaforte, Dr. C. Juan Sebastián Schulz, Dr. C. Eduardo Regalado Florido, among others, have indicated that the millenary nation represents a threat to the hegemony held by the United States since World War II. Consequently, it is recognized that a process of hegemonic crisis and transition is currently underway, with the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the center of gravity of the global power, thereby contributing to the multipolar transformation of the International System. The authors of “Is China Changing the World?” argue that “market socialism with “Chinese characteristics” must gradually and more clearly diverge from capitalism if it is to embody a genuinely alternative path for all of humanity.” In pursuit of this goal, China bases its policy of peaceful coexistence on five fundamental principles:Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, regardless of a country's size, power, or wealth. Mutual non-aggression Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, acknowledging that each nation has the right to freely choose its own social system and path of development. Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence. (Herrera, R.; Long, Z.; and Andréani, T., 2023) The rise of China as a major international power under these principles has been consolidating since 2012 under the leadership of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC), gaining particular momentum from 2020 to the present. Thus, China has not only become the leading power within the Asian regional balance but has also expanded its presence across Europe, Africa, and Latin America—primarily through loans, investments, and multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa and the China-CELAC Forum in Latin America. In addition, China has positioned itself as a leader in several sectors, and it is projected that its economy may surpass that of the United States, increasing its Gross Domestic Product (Rodríguez, L., 2022). It has also undergone a process of opening up, energizing both its international trade and its overall foreign relations, all under the control of the Government and the Party. This, combined with its rise and development initiatives, has made China a focal point of interest for many countries within the International System seeking to jointly advance projects based on cooperation, the principle of shared advantage, and multilateralism. In this regard, the white paper "China and the World in the New Era," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2019, states: “The world is moving rapidly toward multipolarity, diverse models of modern development, and collaboration in global governance. It is now impossible for a single country or bloc of countries to dominate world affairs. Stability, peace, and development have become the common aspirations of the international community.” (People’s Republic of China, 2019. Quoted in Schulz, J. S., 2022) Undoubtedly, this rise has become a source of concern for U.S. power groups, which have increasingly applied geostrategic pressure. Notably, the United States has strengthened military alliances with India, Japan, and Australia in an effort to encircle China and attempt to control or obstruct its maritime routes—this also being a manifestation of the intensification of the imperialist arms race. Nonetheless, China has maintained its development strategy and, as part of it, has strengthened its diplomatic network and its relations with multiple countries across all world regions. For all these reasons, China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. Notably, it went from representing 4% of global GDP in 1960 to 16% in 2020—undeniable evidence of rapid economic growth. Moreover, it has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and also the leading importer, establishing itself as a major industrial power. In this regard, United Nations data reveal that China leads global industrial production, accounting for 30% of the total. This figure surpasses other industrial powers such as the United States (16%), Japan (7%), Germany (5.7%), and South Korea (3.2%) (Schulz, J. S., 2022). In addition, China has remained the world’s leading manufacturing power for approximately 15 consecutive years, according to statements from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology at the beginning of this year. This sector alone has contributed over 40% to overall growth. Likewise, in 2024, China experienced a significant increase in foreign investment, reflecting its interest in strengthening international cooperation for development. Efforts are also underway for urban renewal in 2024, with around 60,000 projects being implemented across various cities. These initiatives are primarily aimed at transforming underdeveloped neighborhoods and creating smarter urban areas (Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in the People's Republic of China, 2025). In this regard, the following graphs illustrate the value of China’s international trade during the 2016–2024 period, highlighting a strong presence of exports compared to imports. A second chart shows China's global export share, where it holds a dominant position.   Thus, China has risen as a center of power in the international system, with leadership not only in the economic domain but also in science and technology. At the same time, it has promoted a series of investments and a process of internationalizing its national currency. Accordingly, the Asian Giant offers an alternative model of development—one that is more comprehensive and sustainable—allowing it to propel the new phase of Chinese development. This phase aims not only to fulfill the dream of national rejuvenation but also to ensure the survival of its unique political, economic, and social model. Nevertheless, the significant challenges of sustaining growth cannot be overlooked. From this perspective, experts believe that new avenues of growth will be necessary for China to maintain the trajectory it has been experiencing. Specifically, the country must continue expanding its industrial sector while strengthening areas such as artificial intelligence, digital financial services, and green technologies (Feingold, S., 2024). It is also important to highlight the projected continuity and leadership of the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping identified as a key figure in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in China, in conjunction with the socioeconomic transformation strategy toward the 2049 centenary. This has been pursued through the defense of multilateralism, economic openness, and international integration and cooperation in support of global development. Conclusions In light of the above, a decline in U.S. hegemony can be observed, even though this process is not linear—nor is it certain whether any single power or coalition has come to occupy a hegemonic position. What is clear, however, is the existence of a trend toward multipolarity, driven by emerging powers and the strategic ties they are establishing. This is giving rise to a non-hegemonic reconfiguration of power blocs, which are building a multilateral and multipolar institutional framework. It can also be affirmed that China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. This has been supported by its growth strategy focused on industrialization, digitalization, innovation, productivity, expansion, and internationalization of its development model—while maintaining a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability. A range of key initiatives and development projects have been implemented to support the country's rise, consolidating its role in the multipolar reconfiguration of the International System. All of this has been essential in driving China’s new phase of development and contributing to the broader process of multipolar transformation. Undoubtedly, China’s rapid ascent represents a significant challenge to the International System, as it reflects a shift in international relations and a transformation in the distribution and hierarchy of global power. Notes [1] It is important to clarify that the so-called Global South should not be equated with the Third World, as the distinction between the First and Third Worlds is primarily based on economic and technological differences, which do not align with the current circumstances of the International System of States. In contrast, the term Global South emerges from a new geopolitical perspective that arose in the post–Cold War context, driven by the need to promote South-South cooperation. Moreover, it does not refer to a geographically defined region, as it includes nations from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific.Revista Política Internacional | Volumen VII Nro. 2 abril-junio de 2025. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15103898This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). The opinions and contents of the published documents are solely the responsibility of their authors.ReferencesCasals, J. (2023). “El Nuevo orden global: amenazas y oportunidades”. Cuadernos de Nuestra América. Nueva época. No.5. RNPS: 2529.Colectivo de autores. “Crisis de hegemonía y ascenso de China. Seis tendencias para una transición”. Tricontinental. Instituto Tricontinental de Investigacion social. Buenoos Aires. Libro digital, PDF, Archivo Digital: descarga y online.Embajada de la República de Cuba en la República Popular China. (2025). Boletín informativo China-22 de enero de 2025. Oficina de Información y Análisis. Embajada de Cuba en República Popular China. Redacción y envío desde info3@embacuba.cn.Feingold, S. (2024). "¿Hacia dónde va la economía china?". World Economic Forum. Recuperado de: https://es.weforum.org/stories/2024/07/hacia-dondeva-la-economia-de-china/García-Herrero, A. (2024). "10 puntos y 18 gráficos sobre la política económica de Xi Jinping tras el tercer pleno". El Grand Continent. Recuperado de: https:// legrandcontinent.eu/es/2024/09/19/esta-china-estancada-10-puntos-y-18-graficos-sobre-la-politicaeconomica-de-xi-jinping-tras-el-tercer-pleno/González, R. (2023). " Medio ambiente en China: Impactos y respuestas del Partido y el Gobierno". CIPI. Recuperado de: www.cipi.cu/medio-ambiente- en-china-impactos-y-respuestas-del-partido-y-gobierno/Lagarde, CH. "Impulsar el crecimiento económico y adaptarse al cambio". Fondo Monetario Internacional. Discursos. Recuperado de: https://www.imf.org/ es/News/Articles/2016/09/27/AM16-SP09282016- Boosting-Growth-Adjusting-to-ChangePereira, CM (2022): “La reemergencia de China frente a la globalización neoliberal y el desafío de la conformación de un mundo multipolar”. Cuadernos de Nuestra America. Nueva Época. No. 05. RNPS: 2529.Schulz, J S. (2022). “Crisis sistémica del orden mundial, transición hegemónica y nuevos actores en el escenario global”. Cuadernos de Nuestra América. Nueva Época. No.03. RNPS: 2529. Bibliografía consultadaAmbrós, I. (2021). “ El Partido Comunista y los desafíos internos de China en el siglo XX”. Recuperado de: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/cuadernos/ CE_212/Cap_1_El_Partido_C omunista_y_los_desafios_internos.pdfBanco Mundial (BM). (2023). Recuperado de: https:// datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP. KD?locations=CNBBC News Mundo. (2021). "Cómo consiguió China erradicar la pobreza extrema (y las dudas que despierta ese triunfal anuncio del gobierno de Xi". Recuperado de: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-56205219Boy, M. (2020). “ Crisis económica y medio ambiente: ¿cómo promover un desarrollo sustentable?”. Recuperado de: https://culturacolectiva.com/opinion/crisis-economica-y-medio-ambiente- mariana-boy-columna-opinion/García, A. (2021). “La globalización neoliberal en crisis”. Recuperado de http://www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/2021/08/30/la-globalizacion-neoliberal-en- crisisGonzález, R. (2020). “El Quinto Pleno del XIX Comité Central del Partido Comunista abre una nueva etapa para China” en “Transiciones del Siglo XXI y China: China y perspectivas post pandemia II”. Libro digital.Herrera, R; Long, Z y Andréani, T. (2023). “¿Está China transformando el mundo?”. Revista Política Internacional. Volumen V. Nro. 1 enero-marzo de 2023.ISSN 2707-7330.Liu, X. y González G. (2021) “El XIV Plan Quinquenal 2021- 2025: reto para el nuevo modelo de desarrollo económico de China”. México y la Cuenca del Pacífico. Vol 10, núm. 30. Recuperado de https://www.scielo.org. mx/pdf/mcp/v10n30/2007-5308-mcp-10-30-57.pdfOtero, M (2022). “La prosperidad común y la circulación dual: el nuevo modelo de desarrollo de China”. Recuperado de: https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-prosperidad-comun-y-lacirculacion-dual-el-nuevo-modelo-de-desarrollo-de-china/Regalado, E. y Molina, E. (Coord.) (2021). “China y sus relaciones internacionales”. Asociación Venezolana de Estudios sobre China (AVECH) / CEAA / ULA – Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI, Cuba), Libro digital.Rodríguez, L. (2022). “Configuración multipolar del sistema internacional del siglo XXI”. Revista Política Internacional. Volumen IV Nro. 1 enero-marzo de 2022. ISSN 2707-7330.Weiss, A. (2024). "La frágil fortaleza económica de Estados Unidos". The Economist. Recuperado de: https:// www.lavanguardia.com/dinero/20240212/9516764/ economia-eeuu- fortaleza-fragil-ia-bolsa-mercados. htmlYang, W. (2015). "La Planificación y Recomendaciones del XIII Plan Quinquenal". Recuperado de: https:// politica-china.org/wp- content/uploads/6sei-yangweimin-ES.pdf .

Abstract The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order moving towards multipolarity. The return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine raises serious questions about US involvement in the transatlantic alliance. President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect both that his administration is unwilling to engage productively with the EU and that it distrusts multilateral forums, preferring bilateral, nation-to-nation contacts. This article seeks to bring clarity to the future US–EU relationship by identifying some of the points of contention and offering a perspective on how the transatlantic partnership can move forward constructively. KeywordsTransatlantic relations, EU–US relations, Trump administration, EU, Bilateral relations, Multipolar world order Introduction Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a new axis of power is taking form, led by Russia and China and supported by North Korea, Iran and Belarus. This shift brings a profound transformation within the global balance of power and is a direct threat to the liberal international world order. In the midst of this geopolitical recalibration, the return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine poses serious questions about US engagement with the transatlantic alliance. There are growing worries about the US’s willingness to continue to honour its Article 5 commitments within NATO and maintain an active role in the collective defence of Europe, but also about the role of the US as a supporter of Ukraine and the liberal multilateral rule-based system. State of play in the EU–US partnership During the first Trump administration, at the state funeral of former US president George H. W. Bush, the EU’s ambassador to the US, David O’Sullivan, was asked to stand at the back of the line-up to pay his respects, breaking diplomatic protocol (Knigge 2019). He politely acquiesced, but in the days that followed it came to light that during the first Trump administration, the US Department of State had downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU in the second half of 2018 without informing the EU Delegation in Washington (Smith 2019). Beyond the failure to communicate this important diplomatic status change, which was not well received in Brussels, and in addition to the protocol issue of having a long-serving foreign ambassador downgraded on the spot at a state funeral, this sent a clear message: the Trump administration does not respect the EU, and nor does it view the Union as an interlocutor. On many occasions during his first administration, Trump’s officials clashed with the EU. In a major foreign policy speech in Brussels, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly questioned the continued value of the EU and urged European countries to reassert their national sovereignty (Pompeo 2018). As the second Trump administration begins its work with unprecedented vigour, so far the EU has hardly featured as a consideration for the president or his top officials. At the time of writing, the nominated US ambassador to the EU, Andrew Puzder, has not yet testified (Singh and Jones 2025). In his early remarks as secretary of state, Marco Rubio has hardly mentioned the EU at all. On 29 January, the first call between High Representative Kaja Kallas and Rubio took place, alleviating some concerns about the distinct lack of US–EU dialogue taking place due to the change in administration (Liboreiro 2025). However, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, the new US administration went beyond the usual call for European allies to spend more on defence. Vice-President JD Vance drove home the seismic shift underway in the US commitment to European defence and upended decades of policy (Quinville 2025). Moreover, on the European side, the attempts by some members of the Trump administration to support far-right candidates in Europe (as done by Elon Musk and Vance in Germany and Romania) bring a new level of discomfort and mistrust, as it looks like parts of the administration and Trump’s brand of conservatism, colloquially known as ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA), want to export their domestic cultural wars to Europe, thus attacking the core shared value of the transatlantic partnership: liberal democracy. A divorce or just a rough patch in transatlantic relations? Over the past seven decades, successful cooperation between the US and European institutions has helped to build the liberal multilateral world order and to uphold the UN Charter by promoting global stability and prosperity. With a combined population of nearly 800 million people, the US and the EU have the most integrated economic cooperation in the world, accounting for 43% of global GDP and 30% of global trade in goods and services (European Council 2025). President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect the Trump administration’s unwillingness to engage productively with the EU and its distrust of multilateral forums, and hence its preference for bilateral, nation-to-nation contact. The administration’s growing distrust of the EU also reflects the changing public perception of the EU among segments of the American public, such that 29% of Republicans view the EU as ‘unfriendly’ or ‘hostile’, up from 17% last year, and negative perceptions of Europe among Democrats are also slowly rising (The Economist 2025). This represents an inward turn in American society as politics becomes increasingly polarised. On the other hand, favourable attitudes among Europeans towards the US have fallen below 50%, with only around a third of Germans (32%) and the French (34%) having a positive view of the current American administration, with the least favourable views being held in Denmark, where only 20% approve (Britton 2025). Less than 100 days into his second term, at the time of writing, Trump has already broken long-standing norms and practices in US–European relations. Vance’s critical discourse at the Munich Security Conference, which harshly attacked European values, brought a major departure from traditional diplomatic language. The US vote alongside Russia and North Korea, and against traditional allies, on a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and calling for the return of occupied territory to Kyiv further deepened concerns (Landale and Jackson 2025). Additional actions, such as the controversial Oval Office meeting between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the temporary suspension of intelligence and military assistance to Ukraine, the exclusion of Europeans from Ukrainian peace negotiations, and the disproportionate and unjustified tariffs on the EU have heightened European anxiety. These moves have raised fears of a possible end to the transatlantic partnership and a wider US retreat from global leadership. For most Europeans, the second Trump administration appears to be strategically prepared, driven not only by revenge in domestic politics, but also by a sense of retribution in foreign policy. But while distrust has never been higher, it would be a mistake to take the path of severing the relations between the US and the EU. The Euro-Atlantic partnership has suffered similar lows in the past, from vastly different perspectives on the US invasion of Iraq, the Obama administration’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. Points of tension and contentionTech On tech regulation, storm clouds are already gathering as Trump has lashed out at the EU for regulating big tech companies (Doan and Stolton 2025). During the transition, the new Trump administration has been noted for the active participation of several tech CEOs. This was most evidently on display during Trump’s inauguration, which saw the likes of Mark Zuckerberg (Meta), Jeff Bezos (Amazon) and Elon Musk (Tesla), as well as other billionaires from around the world (including TikTok’s CEO) gather to welcome in the new administration (Kelly 2025). These tech CEO supporters, not usually as prominently on display in American politics, are flocking to the new administration, which has pledged massive tax cuts for billionaires, the promotion and deregulation of cryptocurrencies, and the removal of restrictions on free speech and fact-checking (Samuel 2025). The EU’s attempts to regulate big tech companies under this new administration will be even more difficult, given their close proximity to and influence on the second Trump presidency. Energy Another likely area of divergence between the US and the EU is in their approaches to energy policy and climate policy. Trump has pledged to ‘drill baby drill’, promising to fund more fossil fuel extraction and curbing green and renewable projects. He has openly called climate change a hoax and ended US participation in the Paris Climate Agreement. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states continue to invest heavily in renewables, with clean energy sources accounting for 70% of the bloc’s electricity demand in 2024 (Vetter 2025). The US, already trailing in wind power and investment in renewables, now risks falling irrevocably behind most of the developing world in clean energy production. Trump might find less of a market for fossil fuels in the EU as a result of its heavy investment in renewables, instead having to turn to other markets. Trade and tariffs On the campaign trail, Trump vowed that as president he would impose tariffs on everyone from China to neighbours, Mexico and Canada, to allies such as the EU. Although the initial tariffs placed on Mexico and Canada were swiftly lifted, a new wave of tariffs of 25% on foreign steel and aluminium was announced on 11 February. This move mirrors that of his first administration (Wiseman 2025). The EU was swift to respond, announcing a slew of counter-measures targeting iconic US products such as jeans, bourbon, peanut butter, whiskey and motorcycles. European steel companies could see as much as 3.7 million tons of steel exports lost as a result of US-imposed tariffs. Together, as noted above, the US and the EU account for about 30% of global trade, with deeply intertwined production and supply chains. However, this does not appear to be part of the Trump administration’s reasoning behind its decision to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs of 20% on almost all other EU products as part of its Liberation Day plan. The proposed tariffs could affect around 70% of EU exports to the US, worth around €532 billion ($585 billion) in 2024, with potential tariffs on copper, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and timber still on the cards (Blenkinsop 2025). As the trade wars begin again, US–EU trade and economic relations will undoubtedly face difficult times over the next four years and risk undermining or limiting cooperation in other areas as a result. Responding to Trump’s announcement, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, astutely summed up: ‘The global economy will massively suffer. Uncertainty will spiral and trigger the rise of further protectionism. The consequences will be dire for millions of people around the globe’ (European Commission 2025). The EU, in addition to planning and implementing counter-measures to Trump’s tariffs, has to walk a difficult tightrope to maintain its investment ties (Casert 2025). The Arctic Trump’s approach to the Arctic in the days leading up to the transition and in his first three months, most notably his refusal to promise not to invade Greenland by force, if deemed necessary (Kayali 2025), sparked widespread condemnation from European leaders. Trump raised the idea of purchasing Greenland from Denmark in 2019 during his first term, and reasserted his intention to acquire the vast island, rich with rare earth minerals, on a fiery phone call with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. In response, the Danish premier garnered support among European heads of state. However, Trump’s focus on Greenland could have profound implications for the balance of power in the Arctic region. Although the Arctic is increasingly discussed in geopolitical terms, in part due to Russia’s and China’s interests in new shipping routes, it remains a zone of peace. The implications of potential NATO infighting over Greenland, and the possibility that this could accelerate Greenland’s independence, could work to China’s or Russia’s advantage and risk disrupting the balance of power in the Arctic region that has allowed peace to prevail. Defence spending The Trump administration’s renewed push for European NATO allies to spend at least 5% of their GDP on defence has reignited tensions over transatlantic burden-sharing. During his first visit to a NATO defence ministers’ meeting, US Secretary of Defense Hegseth made it clear that the US no longer sees an indefinite American presence in Europe as guaranteed (Erling 2025). While these pressures reflect Washington’s frustration over decades of unequal defence spending, they also risk undermining alliance cohesion by demanding an unrealistic increase in European defence budgets. Most European states have already significantly increased their military spending, jointly spending €326 billion on defence in 2024, an increase of 30% since 2021 (European Defence Agency 2024). And the European Commission’s recently launched ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 initiative proposes an additional €800 billion to help EU member states fill their defence gaps and increase their military production and capacity (Gomez 2025). However, calling for a sudden escalation to 5% of GDP overlooks the political, economic and social constraints within Europe and could provoke backlash rather than cooperation. A more realistic target of 3% to 3.5% of GDP offers a more balanced and politically realistic path, consistent with strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and could be discussed as a new NATO defence commitment at the upcoming Hague Summit this summer. EU defence market The EU is developing its European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in response to the challenging new security and geopolitical reality. A key focus within the plan is strengthening the European internal market for defence, which remains heavily underdeveloped and dependent on non-EU suppliers, notably the US, which accounts for more than half of the EU’s defence procurement. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, launched in 2024 by the European Commission, proposes some ambitious objectives: by 2030, at least 50% of member states’ defence acquisitions should go to the European defence industry, rising to 60% by 2035, and 40% of these procurements should be through collaborative projects (European Commission 2024). Nevertheless, this strategy is not without challenges, as some EU member states, particularly the Eastern European countries, still favour US suppliers and see buying American defence systems as a way to foster security ties with Washington. The return of Trump, along with signs of US disengagement from Europe, has led to a renewed debate within the EU about reducing reliance on American defence capabilities and investing more in equipment ‘Made in Europe’. At the same time, the evolving US position has complicated transatlantic defence industrial cooperation. While Rubio has recently stressed the importance of continued American participation in European defence procurement, the latest EU proposals to prioritise the European defence industry have raised concern in Washington (Cook and Croucher 2025). Any move to limit access for American defence companies might provoke a political backlash, even as European leaders become increasingly worried about the credibility of the US defence commitments. Recent events such as the politicisation of US military aid to Ukraine and the unpredictability of future armament deliverables have further shaken European confidence. But despite the growing uncertainty, EU countries should remain interested in cooperation with the US, not exclusion. The challenge now is to strike a balance: to build a more autonomous and resilient European defence market while maintaining a constructive and cooperative relationship with the US. Ukraine peace negotiations The peace negotiations for Ukraine are becoming a major point of divergence between the US administration under Trump and its European allies. Trump’s main goal is to quickly end the conflict in Ukraine and position himself as a successful deal maker on the global stage. So far, his administration has shown a willingness to make significant concessions to Russia, often unilaterally and without securing reciprocal commitments from Moscow. This approach might be part of a broader strategy that includes weakening Russia’s alliance with China, securing American access to Ukrainian rare earth resources and continuing a larger US strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific (Mills 2025). So far, this conciliatory ‘deal making’ has caused anxiety among European leaders, who fear that a hasty or unbalanced peace agreement might lead to a forced Ukrainian capitulation and would undermine long-term European security and stability. Therefore, European countries are insisting on being part of the discussions on defining what a just, long-standing and sustainable peace should look like, a peace that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty and deters further Russian aggression on the country or continent. In parallel, European countries are formulating their own vision for a lasting peace, independent of American leadership. Recent discussions and meetings led by the UK and France are proposing a ‘coalition of the willing’ that would send 10,000 to 30,000 troops to Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire (O’Sullivan and Khatsenkova 2025). But current plans face significant obstacles: disagreements among European states over troop commitments and mandate, fears of escalation in a direct conflict with Russia and a lack of critical defence enablers that only the US can provide. While countries such as the UK, France and Sweden are considering ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine, Eastern European states, notably Poland, remain reluctant, preferring to commit to logistical roles rather than direct engagement. Moreover, European allies are seeking explicit US backstop support (logistical, intelligence and political) to enhance the credibility of the deterrence of these peacekeeping forces against future Russian aggression. The way in which the Ukraine peace negotiations unfold could be a source of further tension between the US and European partners in the months and years to come. A way forward The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order migrating towards multipolarity. A possible way forward in Euro-Atlantic relations is to adopt a pragmatic approach that preserves cooperation where possible while accepting a more interest-based partnership. Paradoxically, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China’s global rise, this may offer a new avenue for transatlantic rapprochement. Both the US and the EU increasingly recognise the need to address China’s more assertive economic and geopolitical behaviour, and both see the growing socio-political and security threats from the rise of this axis of upheaval formed of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. For Europeans, navigating this increasingly unstable geopolitical landscape will require clarity, political maturity and a greater sense of strategic responsibility. The EU must continue to invest in its strategic autonomy—not to disengage from the US, but to become a more equal and reliable transatlantic partner. The coming months will be vital in charting a new course for transatlantic cooperation, one that emphasises increased European defence investment, a coordinated approach to the Russian and Chinese threats, the need for a deeper EU–NATO cooperation, a responsible resolution to the war in Ukraine, and a more balanced EU–US partnership. As such, European leaders will need to make a concerted effort to build bridges with the Trump administration by focusing on areas of convergence and mutual strategic interest. What lies ahead is a period of repositioning, a reordering of the transatlantic relationship from one rooted primarily in shared norms, values and principles towards a more pragmatic and transactional partnership based on common interests and careful management of differences. While challenging, this transformation could lead to a more resilient and mature transatlantic alliance, shaped by partners on an equal footing, capable of adapting to the demands of an unstable and unpredictable multipolar world order. ReferencesBlenkinsop P. (2025). EU seeks unity in first strike back at Trump tariffs. Reuters, 7 April. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-seeks-unity-first-strike-back-trump-tariffs-2025-04-06/. Accessed 7 April 2025.Britton H. (2025). European favourability of the USA falls following the return of Donald Trump. YouGov, 4 March. https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/51719-european-favourability-of-the-usa-falls-following-the-return-of-donald-trump. Accessed 8 March 2025.Casert R. (2025). EU vows countermeasures to US tariffs. Bourbon, jeans, peanut butter, motorcycles are easy targets. The Associated Press, 11 February. https://apnews.com/article/eu-us-tariffs-trump-trade-war-leyen-0b23d25d30428eb288b79bfda4fa25e9. Accessed 16 February 2025.Cook E., Croucher S. (2025). Europe’s plan to ditch US weapons spooks Trump administration: Report. Newsweek, 2 April. https://www.newsweek.com/europes-plan-ditch-us-weapons-spooks-pentagon-report-2054087. Accessed 2 April 2025.Doan L., Stolton S. (2025). Trump blasts EU regulators for targeting Apple, Google, Meta. Bloomberg, 23 January. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-23/trump-blasts-eu-regulators-for-targeting-apple-google-meta. Accessed 5 February 2025.Erling B. (2025). Hegseth tells Europe to spend on defence as US presence may not last forever. Reuters, 14 February. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hegseth-tells-europe-spend-defence-us-presence-continent-may-not-be-forever-2025-02-14/. Accessed 17 February 2025.European Commission. (2024). The European Defence Industrial Strategy at a glance. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en. Accessed 5 March 2025.European Commission. (2025). Statement by President von der Leyen on the announcement of universal tariffs by the US. 3 April. https://ec.europa.Eu/commission/presscorner/detail/mt/statement_25_964. Accessed 7 April 2025.European Council. (2025). EU relations with the United States. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/united-states/. Accessed 25 March 2025.European Defence Agency. (2024). EU defence spending hits new records in 2023, 2024. 4 December. https://eda.europa.Eu/news-and-events/news/2024/12/04/eu-defence-spending-hits-new-records-in-2023-2024#. Accessed 22 January 2025.Gomez J. (2025). Readiness 2030: How is Europe planning to rearm and can it afford it? Euronews, 26 March. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/26/readiness-2030-how-is-europe-planning-to-rearm-and-can-it-afford-it. Accessed 27 March 2025.Kayali L. (2025). Trump doesn’t rule out military intervention in Greenland—again. Politico Europe, 30 March. https://www.politico.eu/article/usa-donald-trump-military-intervention-greenland-again-denmark/. Accessed 30 March 2025.Kelly S. (2025). Trump’s inauguration billionaires, CEOs: Ambani, Zuckerberg, Bezos attend church, ceremony. Reuters, 21 January. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-inauguration-billionaires-ceos-ambani-zuckerberg-bezos-attend-church-2025-01-20/. Accessed 12 February 2025.Knigge M. (2019). Washington downgrades EU mission to US. Deutsche Welle, 1 August. https://www.dw.com/en/trump-administration-downgrades-eu-mission-to-us/a-46990608?maca=en-Twitter-sharing. Accessed 14 January 2025.Landale J., Jackson P. (2025). US sides with Russia in UN resolutions on Ukraine. BBC, 25 February. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7435pnle0go. Accessed 27 February 2025.Liboreiro J. (2025). In first call, Kaja Kallas and Marco Rubio agree to keep ‘maximum pressure’ on Russia. Euronews, 29 January. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/01/29/in-first-call-kaja-kallas-and-marco-rubio-agree-to-keep-maximum-pressure-on-russia. Accessed 3 February 2025.Mills C. (2025). Ukraine and Russia: A shift in US policy. House of Commons Library UK Parliament, 3 April. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10218/. Accessed 3 April 2025.O’Sullivan D., Khatsenkova S. (2025). French President Macron announces plan for ‘reassurance force’ in Ukraine. Euronews, 27 March. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/27/coalition-of-the-willing-meets-in-paris-to-strengthen-support-for-ukraine. Accessed 27 March 2025.Pompeo M. R. (2018). ‘Restoring the role of the nation-state in the liberal international order’. Speech made to the members of the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, 4 December 2018. U.S. Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/restoring-the-role-of-the-nation-state-in-the-liberal-international-order-2/. Accessed 20 January 2025.Quinville R. S. (2025). Making sense of the Munich Security Conference. Wilson Center, 18 February. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/making-sense-munich-security-conference. Accessed 22 February 2025.Samuel S. (2025). The broligarchs have a vision for the new Trump term. It’s darker than you think. Vox, 20 January. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/395646/trump-inauguration-broligarchs-musk-zuckerberg-bezos-thiel. Accessed 7 February 2025.Singh K., Jones R. P. (2025). Trump nominates former CKE Restaurants CEO Puzder as US ambassador to EU. Reuters, 23 January. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-nominates-former-cke-restaurants-ceo-puzder-us-ambassador-eu-2025-01-23/. Accessed 1 February 2025.Smith K. E. (2019). The Trump administration downgraded the E.U.’s diplomatic status in Washington. That’s going to hurt. The Washington Post, 8 January. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/08/the-trump-administration-is-downgrading-the-e-u-s-diplomatic-status-in-washington-thats-going-to-hurt/. Accessed 17 January 2025.The Economist. (2025). Schooled by Trump, Americans are learning to dislike their allies. 31 March. https://www.economist.Com/graphic-detail/2025/03/31/schooled-by-trump-americans-are-learning-to-dislike-their-allies. Accessed 1 April 2025.Vetter D. (2025). As Trump dumps clean energy, fossil fuels lose their grip on Europe. Forbes, 23 January. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrvetter/2025/01/23/as-trump-dumps-clean-energy-fossil-fuels-lose-their-grip-on-europe/. Accessed 13 February 2025.Wiseman P. (2025). Trump once again slaps taxes on foreign steel, aluminum, a move that proved costly in his first term. The Associated Press, 10 February. https://apnews.com/article/trump-tariffs-steel-aluminum-jobs-mexico-canada-89815eeb12ff28b83f5b855ca44f1820. Accessed 15 February 2025.Corresponding author(s):Ionela Maria Ciolan, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue du Commerce 20, 1000 Brussels Belgium. Email: iciolan@martenscentre.eu

Abstract This paper examines the evolving concept of European Union Strategic Autonomy (EU-SA) within the context of contemporary geopolitical challenges, with a particular focus on EU-Russia and EU-China relations. EU-SA reflects the EU's aspiration to act independently in foreign policy, security, defence, and economic affairs, moving from a rule-taker to a rule-maker in global politics. The study outlines the historical development of EU-SA from 2013 to the present, highlighting key milestones such as the Strategic Compass and the impact of the Ukraine War, which accelerated efforts toward defence collaboration, energy independence, and economic resilience. It explores the transatlantic dynamics, noting growing uncertainties in the U.S. commitment to NATO and the resulting push for a more autonomous European defence posture. Additionally, it addresses the complex EU-China relationship, marked by both cooperation and competition, as well as the strained EU-Russia ties amid ongoing conflict. The paper concludes by questioning the economic feasibility and political risks of deeper EU strategic autonomy, especially regarding security centralisation and Germany's leadership role. Key Words: EU, Strategic Autonomy, Security, Geopolitics, U.S, China, Russia Introduction At the 2025 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit in The Hague, member states (Allies) committed to investing 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually in core defence requirements and defence- and security-related spending by 2035. They will allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually, based on the agreed-upon definition of NATO defence expenditure, by 2035 to resource core defence requirements and meet the NATO Capability Targets. Allies agreed to submit annual plans that show a credible, incremental path to achieving this goal.[1] At the same time, Spain secured a special compromise, committing to meet core requirements with just 2.1% of GDP, making it the only exception to the broader 5% target. Previously, in 2014, NATO Heads of State and Government had agreed to commit 2% of their national GDP to defence spending, to help ensure the Alliance's continued military readiness. This decision was taken in response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, and amid broader instability in the Middle East. The 2014 Defence Investment Pledge was built on an earlier commitment to meeting this 2% of GDP guideline, agreed in 2006 by NATO Defence Ministers. In light of the increase in defence spending, given that 23 out of 32 NATO Allies are EU member states, the idea of European Union strategic autonomy (EU-SA) comes to mind. This paper will explore the issue of EU-SA with a specific reference to EU-Russia and EU-China relations.[2] A Brief History of EU Strategic Autonomy European Union strategic autonomy is an evolving concept that reflects its ambition to act independently in strategically important policy areas, including foreign policy, security, defence, and economic relations. Strong strategic autonomy, according to Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza and Volker Perthes, means being able to set, modify and enforce international rules, as opposed to (unwillingly) obeying rules set by others. The opposite of strategic autonomy is being a rule-taker, subject to strategic decisions made by others, such as the United States, China, or Russia.[3] The concept was first prominently discussed in the context of defence in 2013 and has since expanded to encompass a broader range of policy areas. Historically speaking, one can identify numerous phases during which EU-SA evolved. - 2013-2016: During this period, EU-SA focused on security and defence, with initiatives like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund, aiming to strengthen the EU's defence capabilities.[4]  - 2017-2019: During this period, the EU-SA shifted its focus to defending European interests in a hostile geopolitical environment, influenced by events such as Brexit, the Trump presidency, and China's growing assertiveness.- 2020: The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted economic vulnerabilities, prompting a focus on mitigating dependence on foreign supply chains, particularly in critical sectors like health and technology.- Since 2021: The scope widened to virtually all EU policy areas, including digital, energy, and values, with terminology evolving to include "open strategic autonomy," "strategic sovereignty," "capacity to act," and "resilience".- 2022: The Ukraine War and Accelerated Implementation. Russia's invasion of Ukraine catalysed concrete actions toward EU-SA, notably in defence, energy independence, and economic resilience. The European Council's Versailles Declaration (March 2022) expressed strong political will to increase EU-SA, calling for collaborative investments in defence, phasing out dependency on Russian energy, and reducing reliance on critical raw materials, semiconductors, health, digital technologies, and food imports.[5] - The Strategic Compass for security and defence policy (endorsed March 2022) outlines a roadmap to 2030, emphasising strengthened EU defence capacities. Among others, it includes: o   Establishment of a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises.o   Ready to deploy 200 fully equipped Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments.[6]o   Conducting regular live exercises on land and at sea.o   Enhanced military mobility.o   Reinforcement of the EU's civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process, acting more robustly and ensuring greater financial solidarity.o   Making full use of the European Peace Facility to support partners.[7] According to the EU itself, the EU-SA is not a zero-sum game, but rather a sliding scale between complete autonomy and full dependency, with different results for different policy areas. What is more, when compared to the famous Maslow's hierarchy of needs (European Parliament briefing's language), the EU is not only perceived as an economic power, but it is also seen as a normative power. Therefore, the EU is recognised for its core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Ultimately, Maslow's “self-actualisation” could mean the achievement of an EU in which citizens recognise their European identity and which has realised its full autonomous policy potential.[8]   As if this is not enough, the same source introduces the concept of the 360° strategic autonomy wheel, which reportedly illustrates policy areas in which the EU aims for greater strategic autonomy, as well as the connections between them. Mutual influence between policy areas can happen across the wheel, but is particularly strong in adjacent areas. Military action, for example, can cause migration, health is linked to food quality, energy policy influences the climate, and misinformation undermines democracy. The wheel can help to understand links, set priorities and view potential conflicts. More autonomy in the digital green economy will, for example, require vast quantities of “rare earth” materials, making the EU more (instead of less) dependent on imports. Reductions in energy consumption achieved through the digitalisation of the economy (for example, by reducing transport) will be partly offset by the increase in energy consumption by electronic devices and data centres.   Global Context The significance of EU-SA lies in ensuring the EU's political survival and global influence in a multipolar world where its relative power is diminishing. The EU's long-term economic outlook is bleak: its share of global GDP, now at 17% (at current prices), could nearly halve by 2050. According to the World Economic Forum, this economic backsliding not only threatens Europe's ability to fund its social model but also risks weighing on the bloc's global influence, leaving it even more dependent on the U.S. and China.[9] Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the conflictual nature of economic interdependence, as reliance on foreign supply chains for critical goods exposed vulnerabilities. Soft power has become an instrument of hard power, necessitating autonomy in trade, finance, and investment.  The U.S.'s strategic pivot to Asia, the exclusion of Europe in conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria (termed Astanisation[10], which favours Russia and Turkey), the sidelining of the EU in EU-Russia negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine, and China's state-led economic model have all pushed the EU towards the sidelines. Transatlantic divide Security is a critical dimension, with significant uncertainty surrounding the U.S. commitment to NATO under the Trump administration. Reports indicate Trump has questioned NATO's Article 5 guarantees, with actions like withdrawing military personnel from a Ukraine aid hub in Poland on April 8, 2025, and proposing to stand down 10,000 light infantry troops in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states by 2025.[11] This has led to fears of a "NATO-minus" scenario, where the EU must fill security gaps without full U.S. backing. In response, the EU is pushing for greater strategic autonomy in defence. Initiatives like ReArm EU are mentioned, with calls for the EU to develop a stand-alone, integrated military capacity to stabilise the global economy. As Jean-Pierre Maulny, Deputy Director of the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), adequately observes "The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe's conventional security, as U.S. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to provide security guarantees to Ukraine and risk completely discrediting themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have demonstrated that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe's security. Alternatively, they could provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the financial burden that would impact the European Union's long-term competitiveness. In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), Europeans should take on Europe's security fully. This would mean taking control of NATO. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation".[12] Economically, there are several issues that contemporary demand addresses, but the most pressing is, of course, the Tariffs. The U.S. and European Union are running out of time to strike a deal on trade tariffs. Negotiations have been slow since both the U.S. and EU temporarily cut duties on each other until July 9. If an agreement is not achieved by then, full reciprocal import tariffs of 50% on EU goods, and the bloc's wide-spanning countermeasures are set to come into effect.[13] According to Almut Möller, Director for European and Global Affairs and head of the Europe in the World programme (European Policy Centre), "for the first time in decades, Europeans can no longer rely on a benign partner on the other side of the Atlantic, leaving them dangerously exposed and acutely vulnerable, including on the very foundations of liberal democracy. Until recently, the U.S. dominated a world order that provided a favourable environment for the EU to extend its membership, further develop, and leverage its strengths, particularly as a trading power, without having to worry much about geopolitics. Suddenly, liberal Europe looks very lonely, and is struggling to keep up with a world of change".[14] Other problems arguably include digital regulation and data protection, antitrust policy and digital taxation, fiscal policy and social protection, geopolitical rivalries, China's rise, and competition and trade policy. EU–China conundrum Both the EU and the U.S. are concerned about China's growing economic and technological influence, but they have differing approaches to addressing this challenge. The EU has sought to maintain a balance between cooperation and competition with China, while the U.S. has adopted a more confrontational approach.[15] These differences have led to tensions in areas such as trade policy and technology regulation. For example, the EU has been critical of the U.S.'s unilateral approach to addressing China's trade practices, while the U.S. has accused the EU of being too lenient towards China. These disagreements have made it difficult to achieve a coordinated transatlantic response to China's rise.[16] According to German experts, the balance of power between China and the EU and its member states is developing increasingly asymmetrically to Europe's disadvantage. Only in trade policy – and partially in investment – can the EU maintain its position in a manner respected by China.[17] Europe holds significant importance for China across various dimensions: economically, as its top supplier and second-largest export destination; technologically, as a source of advanced technology; institutionally, as a model to emulate; politically, to advance its objectives concerning other nations, particularly the United States; and selectively, as a collaborator in areas like global health and regional stabilisation. Unlike Russia and the United States, China perceives a vital interest in the EU's continued existence and unity within a multipolar world; yet, it employs a "divide and rule" strategy. China selectively rewards or penalises individual EU countries based on their political and economic significance and their compliance with China's expectations on key issues. These issues include arms sales to Taiwan, meetings with the Tibetan Dalai Lama, and positions on the Uighurs, human rights in China, and the South China Sea. China engages with Europe on multiple levels — political, economic, technological, cultural, and academic — using various political channels (such as strategic partnerships with the EU and individual EU member states), dialogue formats (like the 16+1 format with sixteen Central and Eastern European countries), and high-level bilateral intergovernmental consultations with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. China's hopes that the European Union would emerge as an independent and comprehensive player in global politics, serving as a counterbalance to the United States, have diminished. However, China would be supportive of any European efforts towards achieving strategic autonomy, provided it does not translate into a confrontational approach towards China itself. In contrast, Europe's political priorities—such as ensuring peace and stability in East Asia, China's role in global stability, development, environmental issues, climate change, and non-proliferation, as well as improving human rights in China — are often considered secondary and are not actively pursued by all EU member states. Europe lacks a unified and assertive foreign policy stance regarding the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China for dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. There is also an absence of a clear position on China's authoritarian vision of order. Even in trade and investment disputes, Europe struggles to establish a unified approach to resolving these issues. The EU member states are too diverse in terms of size, profiles, and interests in their dealings with China: Economically, there is a divide between countries that are appealing industrial and technological partners for China and those that compete for favour in Beijing. Some nations have a clear interest in global governance. Additionally, the United Kingdom and France maintain their respective military presences in the Asia region. In this context, ReArm EU and its financial instrument SAFE (analysed here https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=5384 ) have the potential to provide the EU with meaningful strategic autonomy and invite genuine geopolitical actorness. EU–Russia conundrum Since Donald Trump took office as the U.S. president, the coordination of transatlantic policies regarding Russia has largely disintegrated. The White House's openness to a comprehensive "deal" with Russian President Vladimir Putin contrasts with Congress's attempts to limit Trump's foreign policy options with Russia, resulting in the marginalisation of coordination with European allies. This situation is further complicated by Washington's increasing reliance on extraterritorial sanctions, a trend that began before Trump's presidency. Consequently, according to European foreign and security experts, Europe must achieve greater strategic autonomy in its dealings with Russia. However, this relationship is particularly strained by significant conflicts of interest. Russia's invasion of Ukraine significantly disrupted the previously peaceful and liberal democratic relations among European nations. Putin's "special military operation" compelled the EU to introduce seventeen (so far) escalating economic sanction packages aimed at undermining the Russian economy and ultimately limiting Russia's capacity to continue the war. In a gesture of solidarity with Ukraine, the EU has also allocated billions of euros to both EU member states and Ukraine to avert a humanitarian disaster and ensure the provision of essential needs for Ukrainians fleeing the conflict.[18] After three and a half years from the outset of the war, Russia continues to pose a complex challenge that the EU and European nations cannot address independently in the foreseeable future. If the U.S. security guarantee weakens before Europe can bolster its own capabilities, the EU could face new vulnerabilities that Russia might exploit along its external borders, such as in the Baltic states, and elsewhere. Currently, the EU and its member states lack sufficient means to deter Russia from pursuing its interests aggressively and recklessly in the shared neighbourhood.[19] Critics, on the other hand, argue that calls for EU strategic autonomy, particularly the creation of a European Army and a significant increase in military spending, are a double-edged sword. First, the primary official rationale is that the EU must prepare itself for a possible attack on EU member states by Russia. The legacy media are full of European leaders claiming that Russia will sooner or later attack Europe.[20] Yet, this claim is not substantiated with much evidence. The proponents of the European army completely disregard numerous doubts surrounding the 2013/2014 "Euromaidan" and the role of the CIA in the events.[21] Second, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 's estimations, the total number of conflict-related casualties in Ukraine from April 14, 2014, to December 31, 2021, stood at 51,000 – 54,000. These numbers are broken down as follows: 14,200 - 14,400 killed (at least 3,404 civilians, estimated 4,400 Ukrainian forces, and estimated 6,500 members of armed groups), and 37,000 - 39,000 injured (7,000 – 9,000 civilians, 13,800 – 14,200 Ukrainian forces and 15,800 - 16,200 members of armed groups).[22] In short, the situation was chaotic, with many casualties among civilians. Third, it was allegedly Europeans who torpedoed a first chance of peace negotiations as early as April 2014 in Istanbul.[23] Fourth, many European leaders seem to be utterly oblivious to the fact that the prolongation of the war adds to the destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainian society, deaths and emigration. Last but not least, given the fact that it is Germany that calls for both the European Army and the federalisation of Europe (with some assistance from France), one should be extra careful given the role of Germans during the WWII and the fact that neither has there been any official peace treaty with Germany nor have they recompensated countries such as Poland. Conclusion Strategic autonomy may be a necessity for Europe, given the dynamics of transatlantic relationships. The questions, however, that have to be pondered (and it does not seem that anyone in the legacy media or mainstream academia is ready to ask them) are numerous. Who will pay for that? Can Europeans afford such expenses under the current economic circumstances, and even worse economic prospects? Is the centralisation of security and military a Pandora's box? Should Europeans allow Germany (of all EU member states) to take special responsibility for this project? Isn't the pro-war rhetoric of Western political leaders making relations with Russia even more tense and dangerous, in other words, leading to escalation? History has solemnly proven that when left to their own devices, the Europeans inevitably create disastrous conflicts that have lasting consequences for generations. The American pivot to Asia and the consequent withdrawal from Europe may therefore have tragic ramifications for the European continent. References[1] Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment. (2025, June 27). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm[2] NATO and the EU have 23 members in common: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. See more at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-nato-cooperation/#0[3] Lippert, B., von Ondarza, N., & Perthes, V. (2019, March). European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests. Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut für Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/ doi:10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e263[4] Damen, M. (2022, July). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity (EU Strategic Autonomy Monitor). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu[5] Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Versailles Declaration. (2022, March 10–11). Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut Fur Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf[6] See more at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en[7] See more at: https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en[8] Damen, M. (2022, July). EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity (EU Strategic Autonomy Monitor). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu[9] Open but Secure:  Europe’s Path to Strategic Interdependence. INSIGHT REPORT. (2025). World Economic Forum. https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Open_but_Secure_Europe%E2%80%99s_Path_to_Strategic_Interdependence_2025.pdf[10] In reference to the Astana format on Syria) which leads to the exclusion of Europe from the settlement of regional conflicts in favour of Russia and Turkey. See more: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en[11] Tilles, D. (2025, April 8). US to withdraw military from Ukraine aid hub in Poland. Notes from Poland. https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/04/08/us-to-withdraw-military-from-ukraine-aid-hub-in-poland/[12] Maulny, J.-P. (2025, February 13). United States – Europe: Our Paths Are Splitting. The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS). https://www.iris-france.org/en/united-states-europe-our-paths-are-splitting/[13] Kiderlin, S. (2025, June 18). These are the sticking points holding up a U.S.-EU trade deal. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/18/these-are-the-sticking-points-holding-up-a-us-eu-trade-deal.html#:~:text=The%20EU%20and%20US%20flags,Poland%20on%20March%206%2C%202025.&text=Afp%20%7C%20Getty%20Images-,The%20U.S.%20and%20European%20Union%20are%20running%20out%20of%20time,($1.93%20trillion)%20in%202024?[14] Möller, A. (2025, February 26). Europe in the World in 2025: Navigating a perilous world with realism and ambition. European Policy Centre. https://www.epc.eu/publication/Europe-in-the-World-in-2025-Navigating-a-perilous-world-with-realism-625da4/#:~:text=2025%20will%20be%20a%20year,with%20a%20world%20of%20change[15] Bradford, A. (2023). When Rights, Markets, and Security Collide (pp. 221–254). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197649268.003.0007[16] Portanskiy, A. (2023). UE - US: new barriers to trade. Современная Европа. https://doi.org/10.31857/s020170832304006x[17] Lippert, B., von Ondarza, N., & Perthes, V. (2019, March). European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests. Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut für Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/ doi:10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e263 [18] Klüver, L. (2025, April 18). Putin’s War on Ukraine: What can the EU actually do? European Careers Association. https://ecamaastricht.org/blueandyellow-knowyourunion/putins-war-on-ukraine-what-can-the-eu-actually-do#:~:text=Similarly%2C%20the%20Strategic%20Compass%2C%20the%20most%20recent,its%20interests%20and%20promote%20its%20values%20internationally.[19] Lippert, B., von Ondarza, N., & Perthes, V. (2019, March). European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests. Stiftung Wissenschaft Un Politic. Deutches Institut für Politik Und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/ doi:10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e263 [20] ochecová, K. (2025, February 11). Russia could start a major war in Europe within 5 years, Danish intelligence warns. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-war-threat-europe-within-5-years-danish-intelligence-ddis-warns/[21] Katchanovski, I. (2024). The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine The Mass Killing that Changed the World. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-67121-0[22] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, January 27). Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine: December 2021 update. United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. https://ohchr.org[23] Johnson, J. (2022, May 6). Boris Johnson Pressured Zelenskyy to Ditch Peace Talks With Russia: Ukrainian Paper. Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/05/06/boris-johnson-pressured-zelenskyy-ditch-peace-talks-russia-ukrainian-paper

Abstract This analysis examines Ukraine’s integration into European defence cooperation through the SAFE fund, highlighting its unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO and EU membership is driven by security concerns, economic benefits, and cultural alignment with Europe, particularly in response to Russian aggression since 2014. NATO membership promises collective defence under Article 5, enhanced military capabilities, and political reforms, while EU accession offers economic integration, governance improvements, and strengthened defence capacities. Russia opposes Ukraine’s NATO aspirations due to security fears and the potential democratic contagion threatening its regime. Still, it is more accepting of Ukraine’s EU membership, viewing it as an economic rather than a military alliance. Historical assurances to the USSR against NATO expansion eastward fueled Russia’s objections. Ukraine’s integration into European structures symbolises a break from Russian influence but poses challenges of escalation and geopolitical tension. The SAFE fund’s inclusion of Ukraine reflects the evolving boundaries of EU defence cooperation amid the ongoing conflict. Key Words: SAFE, EU, Ukraine, Russia, Security Introduction In the first article on SAFE[EE1] , published once again in the World & New World Journal, the analysis concluded on a somewhat skeptical note: “It appears that despite some initial intentions to end the Ukrainian war as early as April 2022, it is the European elites, especially French, German and Polish, who stand for the prolongation, if not escalation, of the Ukrainian war, potentially at the expense of the security of the whole European continent and definitely at the expense of Ukrainians and their country”.[1] Moreover, the author, adopting a critical perspective, raised some questions about the consequences of the ongoing war. Firstly, the longer the war continues, the more destroyed Ukraine becomes and the greater the number of Ukrainians killed. Secondly, the longer the war continues, the greater the likelihood of escalation, which poses a threat to the entire European continent. Thirdly, despite mainstream media reports, the Russian Federation appears to have adapted to operating effectively despite the sanctions, which may strengthen its economy in the short to medium term and, more importantly, bring it closer to cooperating with China and North Korea. Finally, since every war serves as a testing ground for new technologies, the Russians, especially the North Koreans and the Chinese, are gaining invaluable insight into the nature of modern warfare, which is often referred to as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).The inclusion of Ukraine in the SAFE fund, despite its non-EU status, suggests a functional military alliance. This analysis will, therefore, explore how such an alliance redefines the line between EU and non-EU defence cooperation, specifically in the context of Ukraine as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP), and how this semi-integration is likely to influence Russia’s threat perception.  European Aspirations of Ukraine  Source: https://www.freeworldmaps.net/europe/political.html Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO and EU membership reflects a complex approach driven by security, economic, political, and cultural imperatives, particularly in the context of its ongoing conflict with Russia and its aspiration for a stable and prosperous future. Ukraine’s engagement with NATO began in the early 1990s, with formal steps toward membership marked by the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which decided that Ukraine would become a member.[2] This commitment was reaffirmed at the 2024 Washington Summit, emphasising Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO integration. For the EU, Ukraine applied for membership on February 28, 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion, highlighting the urgency driven by security concerns.[3]  The EU granted candidate status in June 2022, and accession negotiations opened in December 2023, reflecting strong political support. The primary rationale for NATO membership is security, particularly in response to Russia’s actions since 2014, including the annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion. Ukraine views NATO’s collective defence mechanism, especially Article 5, as a credible deterrent to further aggression. NATO has provided significant support, including EUR 50 billion in 2024, with nearly 60% of the funding coming from European Allies and Canada. The alliance has also established NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) at the 2024 Washington Summit.[4] EU membership, although not primarily a military-focused endeavour, enhances political stability by reducing vulnerability to external threats through economic and diplomatic ties. Recent developments in June 2025, such as NATO Defence Ministers agreeing on new capability targets and statements from Baltic states calling for concrete steps at the upcoming 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, underscore ongoing international backing.[5] However, challenges remain, with some ambiguity about explicit mentions in NATO communiques and concerns over U.S. political shifts, as noted by Estonian President Alar Karis on June 9, 2025.[6] EU membership is central to Ukraine’s economic aspirations, offering access to the European single market, financial aid, and investment crucial for post-war reconstruction. The EU has provided over €108 billion in financial, humanitarian, and military assistance since the war began, with the Ukraine Facility offering up to €50 billion from 2024 to 2027 for recovery and reforms.[7]  This support aligns with Ukraine’s goal of modernising its economy and institutions, including democratic governance and anti-corruption measures, as outlined in the EU’s 2022 Opinion and subsequent reports. NATO membership, while primarily security-focused, also implies a political alignment with Western democratic values, complementing European Union integration. Ukraine’s progress in aligning with NATO standards, as demonstrated by the removal of the need for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, reflects its commitment to reforms that enhance both security and political stability.[8] Ukraine frames its European aspirations as a return to its historical and cultural roots, emphasising shared democratic values, human rights, and a rejection of Russian influence. This narrative is reflected in strong public support, with polls showing over 80% favouring NATO membership and 85-90% supporting EU membership.[9] The 2014 Euromaidan protests, sparked by the rejection of an EU Association Agreement and Russia’s subsequent actions, have solidified this national consensus. Constitutional amendments in 2019 formalised NATO and EU membership as strategic objectives, underscoring cultural alignment with Europe. To sum up, both NATO and EU memberships, according to Ukrainian society, represent a definitive break from Russia’s sphere of influence, ensuring long-term independence and countering Russian attempts to control post-Soviet states. This geopolitical strategy is evident in Ukraine’s legislative commitments, such as the 2017 parliamentary decision making NATO membership a strategic objective and the 2022 reiteration of membership requests following Russia’s illegal annexations.  Recent EU-NATO cooperation, highlighted in a May 28, 2025, meeting focusing on Ukraine, reinforces this alignment and highlights international solidarity.[10] Russian views on Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership Russia's objections to Ukraine joining NATO are driven by security, geopolitical, and ideological fears, with a particular emphasis on military alliances and democratic contagion. In contrast, Russia accepts Ukraine's EU membership, viewing it as an economic union with fewer security implications. Russia views NATO's eastward expansion as a direct threat to its national security. The potential inclusion of Ukraine would bring NATO's military infrastructure, including troops and missile defence systems, closer to Russian borders. This is seen as a violation of Russia's perceived security interests, especially given NATO's history of collective defence under Article 5. For instance, NATO's response to Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion has intensified cooperation with Ukraine, further heightening tensions. [11] Ukraine's historical ties to Russia, rooted in shared Soviet and imperial pasts, make its potential NATO membership a significant loss for Russia's sphere of influence. The shift toward Western alignment is perceived as a strategic defeat, as it reduces Russia's ability to exert influence in Eastern Europe. This is evident in Russia's actions, such as the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas, which are seen as responses to Ukraine's NATO aspirations.[12] Russia specifically objects to the military aspects of NATO membership, fearing the deployment of foreign troops or advanced military systems near its borders. This concern is highlighted in statements from Kremlin officials, such as Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, who have emphasised that military alliances pose a different threat compared to economic unions. [13] Western experts often claim that Russia's real objection is the democratic implications of Ukraine's alignment with the West. A successful, democratic Ukraine could serve as a model for democratic movements within Russia, challenging the authoritarian stability of Putin's regime. This fear is evident in Russia's reactions to democratic breakthroughs, such as the Orange Revolution (2004) and EuroMaidan (2013–14), which were met with military actions like annexing Crimea and supporting separatist conflicts in Donbas, resulting in over 14,000 deaths over eight years.[14] NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard Russia often cites the alleged promise made during the fall of the Soviet Union that NATO would not expand eastward. This grievance is part of Russia's broader narrative of being encircled by Western institutions, fueling its opposition to Ukraine's NATO aspirations.  According to recently publicised documents, Western leaders gave Mikhail Gorbachev multiple assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 that NATO would not expand eastward, particularly in the context of German unification and the broader European security architecture.[15] James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, repeatedly assured Gorbachev in February 1990 that if Germany were to unify and remain in NATO, NATO's jurisdiction would not extend "one inch eastward" beyond its current position. Baker presented Gorbachev with a choice between a united Germany outside NATO or a united Germany in NATO with guarantees against eastward expansion. Gorbachev stated that any expansion of NATO would be unacceptable. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher publicly stated in January 1990 that NATO should rule out expansion eastward and proposed a special status for the former East German territory within NATO. This "Tutzing formula" became the basis of diplomatic discussions with Gorbachev, where the idea of no eastward expansion applied not only to East Germany but also to other Eastern European countries. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and Prime Minister John Major also conveyed to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials that NATO expansion was not being considered and that there was no plan to include Eastern European countries in NATO at that time. Major personally assured Gorbachev in March 1991 that strengthening or expansion of NATO was not planned. French President François Mitterrand expressed support for gradually dismantling military blocs and emphasised the need to create security conditions favourable to the Soviet Union. He promised to detail guarantees to Gorbachev regarding his country's security. Margaret Thatcher emphasised the transformation of NATO into a less militarily threatening alliance and the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as an inclusive forum that would incorporate the Soviet Union into discussions about Europe's future security. She stressed the importance of giving the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner told a Russian delegation in 1991 that the NATO Council and most member states were against NATO expansion and that isolating the USSR from the European community should be avoided. President George H.W. Bush assured Gorbachev on several occasions, including at the Malta summit in 1989 and the Washington summit in 1990, that the U.S. sought no unilateral advantage and that German unification within NATO would not be directed against the Soviet Union. He emphasised the significance of the CSCE process and the transformation of NATO in response to Soviet security concerns. Overall, these assurances created a "cascade" of promises emphasising that NATO would not expand eastward and that Soviet security interests would be respected as part of a new European security architecture. Gorbachev agreed to German unification in NATO based on these assurances and his belief in the potential for a "common European home" that would include the USSR. However, these assurances were mainly given in verbal form or memos rather than formal treaties, and subsequent NATO expansion in the late 1990s led to later Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled. In summary, the significance of these promises lies in their role in enabling German unification within NATO, shaping Soviet expectations of post-Cold War security, influencing European security architecture, and later contributing to disputes over NATO enlargement and Russia's perception of being misled by the West. EU Membership: A More Accepting Stance In contrast, Russia's stance on Ukraine's potential membership in the EU is markedly different. Official statements, such as those from Vladimir Putin, indicate that Russia has "nothing against" Ukraine joining the EU, viewing it as an economic union rather than a military alliance.  This acceptance is likely due to the EU's focus on economic integration, which does not pose the same security threat as NATO's military framework.[16] Dmitry Peskov's comments reinforce this distinction, noting that Russia "won't dictate" its approach to EU membership but has a different approach to military alliances. This reflects Russia's willingness to engage in economic partnerships while opposing military alliances. While Russia accepts EU membership, it remains wary of the broader implications, such as increased Western influence and potential democratic reforms in Ukraine. However, these concerns are secondary to its objections to NATO, as the EU does not involve military commitments. Public opinion in Ukraine, as noted in sociological surveys, shows strong support for NATO membership, with 64% in favour in January 2022, particularly in western Ukraine and Kyiv. This contrasts with Russia's position, highlighting the geopolitical divide. Additionally, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has cautioned against Ukraine joining NATO, suggesting that internal debates within the West may align with Russia's narrative that NATO expansion is premature. Ukraine - de facto NATO and EU member? – opportunities and challenges NATO Experts claim that Ukraine's membership in NATO would likely provide a strong security guarantee under Article 5, deterring Russian aggression by ensuring collective defence. This means that an attack on Ukraine would be treated as an attack on all NATO members, including major powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. This could potentially stabilise the region, reducing the risk of further conflict.[17] Ukraine's large and experienced military, with significant combat expertise, would also strengthen NATO's overall defence capabilities, particularly in modern warfare, such as drone and cyber operations. Membership in NATO would likely enhance Ukraine's military capabilities through the organisation's training programs and exercises, thereby improving interoperability with allied forces. Programs like the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), established in 2024, coordinate equipment and training with hubs in Eastern Europe. This would align Ukraine's forces with NATO standards, enhancing operational effectiveness, as demonstrated by past contributions to NATO-led missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.[18] It seems likely that NATO membership would attract more foreign investment, especially in defence, with Western companies already coproducing munitions in Ukraine. Financial support, such as the €40 billion pledged in 2024, would aid reconstruction and economic recovery, as outlined in the NATO Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance. Politically, it could drive reforms in governance and anti-corruption, with strong public support (75% in favour) ensuring commitment.[19] Finally, policy-makers in the West also hope that Ukraine’s NATO membership could curb or even end Russian imperial ambitions, sending a clear message that the subjugation of Ukraine is futile. However, it could also escalate tensions with Russia. “While there is widespread recognition that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape the future of international relations, […] the alliance appears to be deeply divided on the issue. Objections centre around the potential for a further dangerous escalation in the current confrontation with the Kremlin. Opponents argue that by inviting Ukraine to join, NATO could soon find itself at war with Russia. Meanwhile, many supporters of Ukrainian NATO membership believe keeping the country in geopolitical limbo is a mistake that only serves to embolden Moscow and prolong the war”. [20] The EU The alleged opportunities resulting from Ukraine’s already de facto EU membership are numerous. According to experts, Ukraine's potential EU membership would likely enhance economic integration by granting access to the EU's single market, facilitating the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. This could increase Ukraine's trade by 40% to 140% between 2030 and 2040, compared to the 2010-2019 averages, driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) and governance reforms.[21] The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which has been in force since 2017, would be further strengthened, thereby boosting economic ties with the EU.[22] The EU-Ukraine agreement improves the competitiveness of European businesses in the Ukrainian market and vice versa. Overall, for trade in goods, the agreement eliminated the majority of tariffs – 98.1% for the EU and 99.1% for Ukraine. For example, import duties on most agricultural goods imported into the EU were reduced to zero in 2016. Tariff rate quotas apply to the remaining farming goods that are not liberalised. The management of these quotas is done either on a first-come, first-served basis or via import licences. It seems likely that EU accession would drive reforms in governance, rule of law, and anti-corruption measures. Currently, Ukraine ranks poorly in governance metrics, performing worse than Russia and Belarus; however, EU conditionality could help elevate it to a well-governed state.  With 78% of Ukrainians supporting EU entry, there is strong public backing for these reforms.[23] Ukraine's membership is also likely to enhance EU security and defence capabilities. Ukraine's rapidly growing defence industry, including investments like Baykar's $100 million for drone production and a joint venture with Rheinmetall for artillery shells, would bolster the EU's defence ecosystem.[24]  With one of Europe's largest standing armies (around 1 million personnel) experienced in modern warfare, Ukraine could contribute valuable expertise.  The establishment of an EU Defence Innovation office in Kyiv further supports Ukraine's integration into European defence programs. There may be additional benefits in energy security, with Ukraine exporting low-carbon electricity and hydrogen to the EU, and technological advancements, particularly in drone and cyber capabilities, positioning Ukraine as a leader in tech R&D. Labour migration could help alleviate EU labour shortages, with projections of 3-6 million additional Ukrainian immigrants by 2029-2050. Conclusion In conclusion, Ukraine’s integration into European defence cooperation, particularly through NATO and the EU, represents a strategic shift that may strengthen European security and counter Russian influence. NATO membership offers Ukraine vital collective defence guarantees, enhances military capabilities, and could deter further Russian aggression, though it risks escalating tensions.  EU membership promises significant economic benefits, governance reforms, and deeper political alignment with Europe. Russia’s opposition centres mainly on NATO’s military threat, while it shows more acceptance of EU economic ties. Overall, Ukraine’s semi-integrated status in European defence frameworks exemplifies evolving security dynamics with profound implications for the regional security complex in Europe. References [1]  Sliwinski, K. (2025, July 7). Can SAFE make Europe safe? From civilian to military power Europe. World & New World Journal. https://worldandnewworld.com/safe-europe-military-power-3/[2] Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm[3] Ukraine. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine_en[4]  Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm[5] NATO Defence Ministers agree new capability targets to strengthen the Alliance. (2025, June 5). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_235900.htm[6] Estonian president: Ukraine’s NATO membership still possible despite Trump. (2025, June 9). European Pravda. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/9/7213345/[7] Ukraine. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine_en [8] Vilnius Summit Communiqué. (2023, July 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm[9] Imagine that a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU) is currently taking place. How would you vote? (2024, October 8). Statista. Https://Www.Statista.Com/Statistics/1284801/Ukraine-Opinion-on-Eu-Accession/. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm Also: Are you for or against Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? (2025, January 6). Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294468/public-opinion-on-ukraine-joining-nato/[10] NATO and the European Union unite for Ukraine at a NAC - PSC meeting. (2025, May 28). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_235693.htm[11] NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. (2025, February 17). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[12] Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022). What Putin Fears Most. Journal of Democracy, 33(2), 18–27. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/[13] Körömi, C. (2025, February 18). Russia: Ukraine has a ‘sovereign right’ to join EU — but not NATO. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/dmitrt-peskov-kremlin-ukraine-sovereign-right-join-eu-not-nato/[14] Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022). What Putin Fears Most. Journal of Democracy, 33(2), 18–27. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/[15] National Security Archive. (2017, December 12). NATO expansion: What Gorbachev heard. The George Washington University. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early[16] Putin says Russia has “nothing against” Ukraine joining EU. (2022, June 17). REUTERS. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/putin-says-russia-has-nothing-against-ukraine-joining-eu-idUSKBN2NY0NK/[17]  Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm[18] Sendak, C., & Timtchenko, I. (2025, January 16). Between Now and NATO: A Security Strategy for Ukraine. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/between-now-and-nato-a-security-strategy-for-ukraine/[19] Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm  [20] Grod, P. (2024, July 11). Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/five-reasons-why-ukraine-should-be-invited-to-join-nato/[21] Darvas, Z., Dabrowski, M., Grabbe, H., Léry, L., Moffat, A., Sapir, G., & Zachmann, G. (2024, March 7). Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/ukraines-path-european-union-membership-and-its-long-term-implications[22] EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. (2024, March 7). European Commission. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-ukraine-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area[23] Darvas, Z., Dabrowski, M., Grabbe, H., Léry, L., Moffat, A., Sapir, G., & Zachmann, G. (2024, March 7). Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/ukraines-path-european-union-membership-and-its-long-term-implications [24] Khachatryan, A. et.al. (2024, June 19). The Benefits and Opportunities of Ukraine’s EU Accession. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/the-benefits-and-opportunities-of-ukraines-eu-accession

Abstract We examine the roles of Gold and Bitcoin as a hedge, a safe haven, and a diversifier against the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the Ukraine War. Using a rolling window estimation of the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-based regression, we present a novel approach to examine the time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier properties of Gold and Bitcoin for equities portfolios. This article uses daily returns of Gold, Bitcoin, S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. Our results show that Gold is a better safe haven than the two, while Bitcoin exhibits weak properties as safe haven. Bitcoin can, however, be used as a diversifier and hedge. This study offers policy suggestions to investors to diversify their holdings during uncertain times. Introduction Financial markets and the diversity of financial products have risen in both volume and value, creating financial risk and establishing the demand for a safe haven for investors. The global financial markets have faced several blows in recent years. From the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to the outbreak of the pandemic and uncertainty regarding economic policy measures of governments and central banks, the financial markets including equity markets around the world were faced with severe meltdowns. This similar behavior was observed in other markets including equity and commodity markets, resulting in overall uncertainty. In this scenario, the investors normally flock toward the safe-haven assets to protect their investment. In normal situations, investors seek to diversify or hedge their assets to protect their portfolios. However, the financial markets are negatively impacted when there are global uncertainties. Diversification and hedging methods fail to safeguard investors’ portfolios during instability because almost all sectors and assets are negatively affected (Hasan et al., 2021). As a result, investors typically look for safe-haven investments to safeguard their portfolios under extreme conditions (Ceylan, 2022). Baur and Lucey (2010) provide the following definitions of hedge, diversifier, and safe haven: Hedge: An asset that, on average, has no correlation or a negative correlation with another asset or portfolio. On average, a strict hedge has a (strictly) negative correlation with another asset or portfolio.Diversifier: An asset that, on average, has a positive correlation (but not perfect correlation) with another asset or portfolio. Safe haven: This is the asset that in times of market stress or volatility becomes uncorrelated or negatively associated with other assets or a portfolio. As was previously indicated, the significant market turbulence caused by a sharp decline in consumer spending, coupled with insufficient hedging opportunities, was a common feature of all markets during these times (Yousaf et al., 2022). Nakamoto (2008) suggested a remedy by introducing Bitcoin, a “digital currency,” as an alternative to traditional fiduciary currencies (Paule-Vianez et al., 2020). Bitcoin often described as “Digital Gold” has shown greater resilience during periods of crises and has highlighted the potential safe haven and hedging property against uncertainties (Mokni, 2021). According to Dyhrberg (2016), the GFC has eased the emergence of Bitcoin thereby strengthening its popularity. Bouri et al. (2017) in their study indicate that Bitcoin has been viewed as a shelter from global uncertainties caused by conventional banking and economic systems. Recent research has found that Bitcoin is a weak safe haven, particularly in periods of market uncertainty like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis (Conlon & McGee, 2020; Nagy & Benedek, 2021; Shahzad et al., 2019; Syuhada et al., 2022). In contrast to these findings, a study by Yan et al. (2022) indicates that it can function as a strong safe haven in favorable economic times and with low-risk aversion. Ustaoglu (2022) also supports the strong safe-haven characteristic of Bitcoin against most emerging stock market indices during the COVID-19 period. Umar et al. (2023) assert that Bitcoin and Gold are not reliable safe-havens. Singh et al. (2024) in their study reveal that Bitcoin is an effective hedge for investments in Nifty-50, Sensex, GBP–INR, and JPY–INR, at the same time a good diversifier for Gold. The study suggests that investors can incorporate Bitcoin in their portfolios as a good hedge against market volatility in equities and commodities markets. During the COVID-19 epidemic, Barbu et al. (2022) investigated if Ethereum and Bitcoin could serve as a short-term safe haven or diversifier against stock indices and bonds. The outcomes are consistent with the research conducted by Snene Manzli et al. (2024). Both act as hybrid roles for stock market returns, diversifiers for sustainable stock market indices, and safe havens for bond markets. Notably, Bhuiyan et al. (2023) found that Bitcoin provides relatively better diversification opportunities than Gold during times of crisis. To reduce risks, Bitcoin has demonstrated a strong potential to operate as a buffer against global uncertainty and may be a useful hedging tool in addition to Gold and similar assets (Baur & Lucey, 2010; Bouri et al., 2017; Capie et al., 2005; Dyhrberg, 2015). According to Huang et al. (2021), its independence from monetary policies and minimal association with conventional financial assets allow it to have a safe-haven quality. Bitcoins have a substantial speed advantage over other assets since they are traded at high and constant frequencies with no days when trading is closed (Selmi et al., 2018). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the average monthly volatility of Bitcoin is higher than that of Gold or a group of international currencies expressed in US dollars; nevertheless, the lowest monthly volatility of Bitcoin is lower than the maximum monthly volatility of Gold and other foreign currencies (Dwyer, 2015). Leverage effects are also evident in Bitcoin returns, which show lower volatilities in high return periods and higher volatilities in low return times (Bouri et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). According to recent research, Bitcoins can be used to hedge S&P 500 stocks, which increases the likelihood that institutional and retail investors will build secure portfolios (Okorie, 2020). Bitcoin demonstrates strong hedging capabilities and can complement Gold in minimizing specific market risks (Baur & Lucey, 2010). Its high-frequency and continuous trading further enrich the range of available hedging tools (Dyhrberg, 2016). Moreover, Bitcoin spot and futures markets exhibit similarities to traditional financial markets. In the post-COVID-19 period, Zhang et al. (2021) found that Bitcoin futures outperform Gold futures.Gold, silver, palladium, and platinum were among the most common precious metals utilized as safe-haven investments. Gold is one such asset that is used extensively (Salisu et al., 2021). Their study tested the safe-haven property of Gold against the downside risk of portfolios during the pandemic. Empirical results have also shown that Gold functions as a safe haven for only 15 trading days, meaning that holding Gold for longer than this period would result in losses to investors. This explains why investors buy Gold on days of negative returns and sell it when market prospects turn positive and volatility decreases (Baur & Lucey, 2010). In their study, Kumar et al. (2023) tried to analyse the trends in volume throughout futures contracts and investigate the connection between open interest, volume, and price for bullion and base metal futures in India. Liu et al. (2016) in their study found that there is no negative association between Gold and the US stock market during times of extremely low or high volatility. Because of this, it is not a strong safe haven for the US stock market (Hood & Malik, 2013). Post-COVID-19, studies have provided mixed evidence on the safe-haven properties of Gold (Bouri et al., 2020; Cheema et al., 2022; Ji et al., 2020). According to Kumar and Padakandla (2022), Gold continuously demonstrates safe-haven qualities for all markets, except the NSE, both in the short and long term. During the COVID-19 episode, Gold’s effectiveness as a hedge and safe-haven instrument has been impacted (Akhtaruzzaman et al., 2021). Al-Nassar (2024) conducted a study on the hedge effectiveness of Gold and found that it is a strong hedge in the long run. Bhattacharjee et al. (2023) in their paper examined the symmetrical and asymmetrical linkage between Gold price levels and the Indian stock market returns by employing linear autoregressive distributed lag and nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag models. The results exhibit that the Indian stock market returns and Gold prices are cointegrated. According to the most recent study by Kaczmarek et al. (2022), Gold has no potential as a safe haven, despite some studies on the COVID-19 pandemic showing contradictory results. The co-movements of Bitcoin and the Chinese stock market have also normalized as a result of this epidemic (Belhassine & Karamti, 2021). Widjaja and Havidz (2023) verified that Gold was a safe haven asset during the COVID-19 pandemic, confirming the Gold’s safe-haven characteristic. As previously pointed out, investors value safe-haven investments in times of risk. Investors panic at these times when asset prices fall and move from less liquid (risky) securities to more liquid (safe) ones, such as cash, Gold, and government bonds. An asset must be bought and sold rapidly, at a known price, and for a reasonably modest cost to be considered truly safe (Smales, 2019). Therefore, we need to properly re-examine the safe-haven qualities of Gold and Bitcoin due to the mixed evidences regarding their safe-haven qualities and the impact of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine on financial markets. This work contributes to and deviates from the body of existing literature in the following ways. We propose a novel approach in this work to evaluate an asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier characteristics. This research examines the safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities of Gold and Bitcoin against the equity indices; S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50. Through the use of rolling window estimation, we extend the methodology of Ratner and Chiu (2013) by estimating the aforementioned properties of the assets. Comparing rolling window estimation to other conventional techniques, the former will provide a more accurate representation of an asset’s time-varying feature. This study explores the conventional asset Gold’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. We use Bitcoin, an unconventional safe-haven asset, for comparison. Data and Methodology We use the daily returns of three major equity indices; S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. The equity indices were selected to represent three large and diverse markets namely the United States, France, and India in terms of geography and economic development. We assess safe-haven assets using the daily returns of Gold and Bitcoin over the same time. Equity data was collected from Yahoo Finance, Bitcoin data from coinmarketcap.com, and Gold data from the World Gold Council website. Engle (2002) developed the DCC (Dynamic Conditional Correlation)-GARCH model, which is frequently used to assess contagion amid pandemic uncertainty or crises. Time-varying variations in the conditional correlation of asset pairings can be captured using the DCC-GARCH model. Through employing this model, we can analyse the dynamic behavior of volatility spillovers. Engle’s (2002) DCC-GARCH model contains two phases; 1. Univariate GARCH model estimation2. Estimation of time-varying conditional correlation. For its explanation, mathematical characteristics, and theoretical development, see here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578] Results and Discussion The outcomes of the parameters under the DCC-GARCH model for each of the asset pairs selected for the investigation are shown in Table 1.   First, we look at the dynamical conditional correlation coefficient, ρ.The rho value is negative and insignificant for NSE 50/Gold, NSE 50 /BTC, S&P500/Gold, and S&P500/BTC indicating a negative and insignificant correlation between these asset pairs, showing Gold and Bitcoin as potential hedges and safe havens. The fact that ρ is negative and significant for CAC 40/Gold suggests that Gold can be a safe haven against CAC 40 swings. The asset pair CAC/BTC, on the other hand, has possible diversifier behavior with ρ being positive but statistically insignificant. Next, we examine the behavior of the DCC-GARCH parameters; α and β. We find that αDCC is statistically insignificant for all the asset pairs, while βDCC is statistically significant for all asset pairs. βDCC quantifies the persistence feature of the correlation and the extent of the impact of volatility spillover in a particular market’s volatility dynamics. A higher βDCC value implies that a major part of the volatility dynamics can be explained by the respective market’s own past volatility. For instance, the NSE 50/Gold’s βDCC value of 0.971 shows that there is a high degree of volatility spillover between these two assets, with about 97% of market volatility being explained by the assets’ own historical values and the remainder coming from spillover. Thus, we see that the volatility spillover is highly persistent (~0.8) for all the asset pairs except NSE 50/BTC. The results above show that the nature of the dynamic correlation between the stock markets, Bitcoin and Gold is largely negative, pointing toward the possibility of Gold and Bitcoin being hedge/safe haven. However, a detailed analysis is needed to confirm the same by employing rolling window analysis, and we present the results in the forthcoming section. We present the rolling window results for S&P500 first. We present the regression results for Gold in Figure 1 and Bitcoin in Figure 2   Figure 1. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Gold.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. In Figure 1, we examine the behavior of β0 (intercept term), β1, β2, and β3 (partial correlation coefficients). The intercept term β0 will give an idea about whether the asset is behaving as a diversifier or hedge. Here, the intercept term shows significance most of the time. However, during 2018, the intercept was negative and significant, showing that it could serve as a hedge during geopolitical tensions and volatilities in the global stock market. However, during the early stages of COVID-19, we show that the intercept is negative and showing statistical significance, suggesting that Gold could serve as a hedge during the initial shocks of the pandemic. These findings are contrary to the results in the study by Tarchella et al. (2024) where they found hold as a good diversifier. Later, we find the intercept to be positive and significant, indicating that Gold could act as a potential diversifier. But during the Russia-Ukraine War, Gold exhibited hedge ability again. Looking into the behavior of β1, which is the partial correlation coefficient for the tenth percentile of return distribution shows negative and insignificant during 2018. Later, it was again negative and significant during the initial phases of COVID-19, and then negative in the aftermath, indicating that Gold could act as a weak safe haven during the COVID-19 pandemic. Gold could serve as a strong safe haven for the SP500 against volatility in the markets brought on by the war in Ukraine, as we see the coefficient to be negative and large during this time. From β2 and β3, the partial correlation coefficients of the fifth and first percentile, respectively, show that Gold possesses weak safe haven properties during COVID-19 and strong safe haven behavior during the Ukraine crisis. Next, we examine the characteristics of Bitcoin as a hedge/diversifier/safe haven against the S&P500 returns. We present the results in Figure 2.   Figure 2. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Bitcoin.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. Like in the previous case, we begin by analysing the behavior of the intercept coefficient, which is β0. As mentioned earlier the intercept term will give a clear picture of the asset’s hedging and diversifier property. In the period 2018–2019, the intercept term is positive but insignificant. This could be due to the large volatility in Bitcoin price movements during the period. It continues to be minimal (but positive) and insignificant during 2019–2020, indicating toward weak diversification possibility. Post-COVID-19 period, the coefficient shows the significance and positive value, displaying the diversification potential. We see that the coefficient remains positive throughout the analysis, confirming Bitcoin’s potential as a diversifier. Looking into the behavior of β1 (the partial correlation coefficient at tenth percentile), it is positive but insignificant during 2018. The coefficient is having negative sign and showing statistical significance in 2019, suggesting that Bitcoin could be a good safe haven in that year. This year was characterized by a long list of corporate scandals, uncertainties around Brexit, and tensions in global trade. We can observe that throughout the COVID-19 period, the coefficient is showing negative sign and negligible during the March 2020 market meltdown, suggesting inadequate safe-haven qualities. However, Bitcoin will regain its safe-haven property in the coming periods, as the coefficient is negative and significant in the coming months. The coefficient is negative and shows statistical significance during the Ukrainian crisis, suggesting strong safe-haven property. Only during the Ukrainian crisis could Bitcoin serve as a safe haven, according to the behavior of β2, which displays the partial correlation coefficient at the fifth percentile. Bitcoin was a weak safe haven during COVID-19 and the Ukrainian crisis, according to β3, the partial correlation coefficient for the first percentile (coefficient negative and insignificant). According to the overall findings, Gold is a stronger safe haven against the S&P 500’s swings. This result is consistent with the previous studies of Triki and Maatoug (2021), Shakil et al. (2018), Będowska-Sójka and Kliber (2021), Drake (2022), and Ghazali et al. (2020), etc. The same analysis was conducted for the CAC 40 and the NSE 50; the full analysis can be found here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578]. However, it is important to highlight the respective results: In general, we may say that Gold has weak safe-haven properties considering CAC40. We can conclude that Bitcoin’s safe-haven qualities for CAC40 are weak. We can say that Gold showed weak safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis and good safe-haven characteristics for the NSE50 during COVID-19. We may say that Bitcoin exhibits weak safe haven, but strong hedging abilities to NSE50. Concluding Remarks In this study, we suggested a new method to evaluate an asset’s time-varying hedge, diversifier, and safe-haven characteristics. We propose a rolling window estimation of the DCC-based regression of Ratner and Chiu (2013). Based on this, we estimate the conventional asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying properties during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. For comparison purposes, we include Bitcoin, a nonconventional safe-haven asset. We evaluate Gold and Bitcoin’s safe haven, hedging, and diversifier properties to the S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 variations. We use a rolling window of length 60 to estimate the regression. From the results, we find that Gold can be considered as a better safe haven against the fluctuations of the S&P 500. In the case of CAC 40, Gold and Bitcoin have weak safe-haven properties. While Bitcoin demonstrated strong safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis, Gold exhibited strong safe-haven characteristics during COVID-19 for the NSE 50. Overall, the findings indicate that Gold is the better safe haven. This outcome is consistent with earlier research (Będowska-Sójka & Kliber, 2021; Drake, 2022; Ghazali et al., 2020; Shakil et al., 2018; Triki & Maatoug, 2021). When it comes to Bitcoin, its safe-haven feature is weak. Bitcoin, however, works well as a diversifier and hedge. Therefore, from a policy perspective, investing in safe-haven instruments is crucial to lower the risks associated with asset ownership. Policymakers aiming to enhance the stability of financial portfolios might encourage institutional investors and other market players to incorporate Gold into their asset allocations. Gold’s strong safe-haven qualities, proven across various market conditions, make it a reliable choice. Gold’s performance during crises like COVID-19 highlights its potential to mitigate systemic risks effectively. Further, Bitcoin could also play a complementary role as a hedge and diversifier, especially during periods of significant volatility such as the Ukraine crisis. While Bitcoin’s safe-haven characteristics are relatively weaker, its inclusion in a diversified portfolio offers notable value and hence it should not be overlooked. Further, policymakers may consider how crucial it is to monitor dynamic correlations and periodically rebalance portfolios to account for shifts in the safe haven and hedging characteristics of certain assets. Such measures could help reduce the risks of over-reliance on a single asset type and create more resilient portfolios that can better withstand global economic shocks. For future research, studies can be conducted on the estimation of the rolling window with different widths. This is important to understand how the safe-haven property changes across different holding periods. Further, more equity markets would be included to account for the differences in market capitalization and index constituents. This study can be extended by testing these properties for multi-asset portfolios as well. We intend to take up this study in these directions in the future. Data Availability StatementNot applicable.Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ReferencesAkhtaruzzaman M., Boubaker S., Lucey B. M., & Sensoy A. (2021). Is gold a hedge or a safe-haven asset in the COVID-19 crisis? Economic Modelling, 102, 105588. Crossref. Web of Science.Al-Nassar N. S. (2024). Can gold hedge against inflation in the UAE? A nonlinear ARDL analysis in the presence of structural breaks. PSU Research Review, 8(1), 151–166. Crossref.Barbu T. C., Boitan I. A., & Cepoi C. O. (2022). Are cryptocurrencies safe havens during the COVID-19 pandemic? A threshold regression perspective with pandemic-related benchmarks. Economics and Business Review, 8(2), 29–49. Crossref.Baur D. G., & Lucey B. M. (2010). Is gold a hedge or a safe haven? An analysis of stocks, bonds and gold. Financial Review, 45(2), 217–229. Crossref.Będowska-Sójka B., & Kliber A. (2021). Is there one safe-haven for various turbulences? The evidence from gold, Bitcoin and Ether. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, 56, 101390. Crossref.Belhassine O., & Karamti C. (2021). Contagion and portfolio management in times of COVID-19. Economic Analysis and Policy, 72, 73–86. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Bhattacharjee A., Das J., & Kumar S. (2023). Evaluating the symmetrical and asymmetrical linkage between gold price and Indian stock market in the presence of structural change. NMIMS Management Review, 31(4), 288–297. Crossref. Web of Science.Bhuiyan R. A., Husain A., & Zhang C. (2023). Diversification evidence of Bitcoin and Gold from wavelet analysis. Financial Innovation, 9(1), 100. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Bouri E., Azzi G., & Dyhrberg A. H. (2017). On the return-volatility relationship in the Bitcoin market around the price crash of 2013. Economics, 11(1), 2. Crossref.Bouri E., Gupta R., Tiwari A. K., & Roubaud D. (2017). Does Bitcoin hedge global uncertainty? Evidence from wavelet-based quantile-in-quantile regressions. Finance Research Letters, 23, 87–95. Crossref. Web of Science.Bouri E., Shahzad S. J. H., Roubaud D., Kristoufek L., & Lucey B. (2020). Bitcoin, gold, and commodities as safe havens for stocks: New insight through wavelet analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 77, 156–164. Crossref. Web of Science.Brenner M., & Galai D. (1989). New financial instruments for hedge changes in volatility. Financial Analysts Journal, 45(4), 61–65. Crossref.Capie F., Mills T. C., & Wood G. (2005). Gold as a hedge against the dollar. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 15(4), 343–352. Crossref.Ceylan Ö. (2022). Hedging Effectiveness of the VIX ETPs: An analysis of the time-varying performance of the VXX. In Handbook of research on new challenges and global outlooks in financial risk management (pp. 384–401). IGI Global. Crossref.Cheema M. A., Faff R., & Szulczyk K. R. (2022). The 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic: How safe are the safe haven assets? International Review of Financial Analysis, 83, 102316. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Conlon T., & McGee R. (2020). Safe haven or risky hazard? Bitcoin during the COVID-19 bear market. Finance Research Letters, 35, 101607. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Demir E., Gozgor G., Lau C. K. M., & Vigne S. A. (2018). Does economic policy uncertainty predict the Bitcoin returns? An empirical investigation. Finance Research Letters, 26, 145–149. Crossref. Web of Science.Drake P. P. (2022). The gold-stock market relationship during COVID-19. Finance Research Letters, 44, 102111. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Dwyer G. P. (2015). The economics of Bitcoin and similar private digital currencies. Journal of Financial Stability, 17, 81–91. Crossref. Web of Science.Dyhrberg A. H. (2015). Hedging capabilities of bitcoin. Is it the virtual gold? Finance Research Letters, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2015.10.025Dyhrberg A. H. (2016). Hedging capabilities of bitcoin. Is it the virtual gold? Finance Research Letters, 16, 139–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2015.10.025 Web of Science.Engle R. (2002). Dynamic conditional correlation: A simple class of multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20(3), 339–350. Crossref. Web of Science.Ghazali M. F., Lean H. H., & Bahari Z. (2020). Does gold investment offer protection against stock market losses? Evidence from five countries. The Singapore Economic Review, 65(02), 275–301. Crossref.Hasan M. B., Hassan M. K., Rashid M. M., & Alhenawi Y. (2021). Are safe haven assets really safe during the 2008 global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic? Global Finance Journal, 50, 100668. Crossref. PubMed.Hood M., & Malik F. (2013). Is gold the best hedge and a safe haven under changing stock market volatility? Review of Financial Economics, 22(2), 47–52. Crossref.Huang Y., Duan K., & Mishra T. (2021). Is Bitcoin really more than a diversifier? A pre-and post-COVID-19 analysis. Finance Research Letters, 43, 102016. Crossref.Ji Q., Zhang D., & Zhao Y. (2020). Searching for safe-haven assets during the COVID-19 pandemic. International Review of Financial Analysis, 71, 101526. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Kaczmarek T., Będowska-Sójka B., Grobelny P., & Perez K. (2022). False safe haven assets: Evidence from the target volatility strategy based on recurrent neural network. Research in International Business and Finance, 60, 101610. Crossref. Web of Science.Kumar A. S., & Padakandla S. R. (2022). Testing the safe-haven properties of gold and bitcoin in the backdrop of COVID-19: A wavelet quantile correlation approach. Finance Research Letters, 47, 102707. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Kumar M. A., Swathi J., Pallavi T. A., & Bavana S. (2023). Volume progression and price–volume relationship of commodity futures: Case of bullion and base metals. NMIMS Management Review, 31(4), 265–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/09711023241230463 Web of Science.Liu C. S., Chang M. S., Wu X., & Chui C. M. (2016). Hedges or safe havens—Revisit the role of gold and USD against stock: A multivariate extended skew-t copula approach. Quantitative Finance, 16(11), 1763–1789. Crossref.Liu R., Zhichao S., Wei G., & Wang W. (2017). GARCH model with fat-tailed distributions and Bitcoin exchange rate returns. Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, 1(1), 71–75. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3666106 Crossref.Mokni K. (2021). When, where, and how economic policy uncertainty predicts Bitcoin returns and volatility? A quantiles-based analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 80, 65–73. Crossref.Nagy B. Z., & Benedek B. (2021). Higher co-moments and adjusted Sharpe ratios for cryptocurrencies. Finance Research Letters, 39, 101543. Crossref. Web of Science.Nakamoto S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Bitcoin. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdfOkorie D. I. (2020). Could stock hedge Bitcoin risk(s) and vice versa? Digital Finance, 2(1), 117–136. Crossref.Paule-Vianez J., Prado-Román C., & Gómez-Martínez R. (2020). Economic policy uncertainty and Bitcoin. Is Bitcoin a safe-haven asset? European Journal of Management and Business Economics, 29(3), 347–363. Crossref.Ratner M., & Chiu C. C. J. (2013). Hedging stock sector risk with credit default swaps. International Review of Financial Analysis, 30, 18–25. Crossref. Web of Science.Salisu A. A., Raheem I. D., & Vo X. V. (2021). Assessing the safe haven property of the gold market during COVID-19 pandemic. International Review of Financial Analysis, 74, 101666. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Saxena S., & Villar A. (2008). Hedging instruments in emerging market economies. Financial globalisation and emerging market capital flows. BIS Papers, 44, 71–87.Selmi R., Mensi W., Hammoudeh S., & Bouoiyour J. (2018). Is Bitcoin a hedge, a safe haven or a diversifier for oil price movements? A comparison with gold. Energy Economics, 74, 787–801. Crossref. Web of Science.Shahzad S. J. H., Bouri E., Roubaud D., Kristoufek L., & Lucey B. (2019). Is Bitcoin a better safe-haven investment than gold and commodities? International Review of Financial Analysis, 63, 322–330. Crossref. Web of Science.Shakil M. H., Mustapha I. H. M., Tasnia M., & Saiti B. (2018). Is gold a hedge or a safe haven? An application of ARDL approach. Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science, 23(44), 60–76. Crossref.Singh V. V., Singh H., & Ansari A. (2024). Bitcoin as a distinct asset class for hedging and portfolio diversification: A DCC-GARCH model analysis. NMIMS Management Review, 32(1), 7–13. Crossref. Web of Science.Smales L. A. (2019). Bitcoin as a safe haven: Is it even worth considering? Finance Research Letters, 30, 385–393. Crossref. Web of Science.Snene Manzli Y., Alnafisah H., & Jeribi A. (2024). Safe haven ability of energy and agricultural commodities against G7 stock markets and banking indices during COVID-19, Russia–Ukraine War, and SVB collapse: Evidence from the wavelet coherence approach. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2024(1), 2587000. Crossref.Syuhada K., Suprijanto D., & Hakim A. (2022). Comparing gold’s and Bitcoin’s safe-haven roles against energy commodities during the COVID-19 outbreak: A vine copula approach. Finance Research Letters, 46, 102471. Crossref. PubMed. Web of Science.Tarchella S., Khalfaoui R., & Hammoudeh S. (2024). The safe haven, hedging, and diversification properties of oil, gold, and cryptocurrency for the G7 equity markets: Evidence from the pre-and post-COVID-19 periods. Research in International Business and Finance, 67, 102125. Crossref. Web of Science.Triki M. B., & Maatoug A. B. (2021). The GOLD market as a safe haven against the stock market uncertainty: Evidence from geopolitical risk. Resources Policy, 70, 101872. Crossref. Web of Science.Umar Z., Bossman A., Choi S. Y., & Teplova T. (2023). The relationship between global risk aversion and returns from safe-haven assets. Finance Research Letters, 51, 103444. Crossref. Web of Science.Ustaoglu E. (2022). Safe-haven properties and portfolio applications of cryptocurrencies: Evidence from the emerging markets. Finance Research Letters, 47, 102716. Crossref. Web of Science.Widjaja M., & Havidz S. A. H. (2023). Are gold and cryptocurrency a safe haven for stocks and bonds? Conventional vs Islamic markets during the COVID-19 pandemic. European Journal of Management and Business Economics (ahead-of-print).Yan Y., Lei Y., & Wang Y. (2022). Bitcoin is a safe-haven asset and a medium of exchange. Axioms, 11(8), 415. Crossref.Yousaf I., Plakandaras V., Bouri E., & Gupta R. (2022). Hedge and safe haven properties of gold, US Treasury, Bitcoin, and Dollar/CHF against the FAANA companies and S&P 500 (Department of Economics, Working Paper Series No. 2022–27). University of Pretoria.Zhang Y., Zhu P., & Xu Y. (2021). Has COVID-19 changed the hedge effectiveness of bitcoin? Frontiers in Public Health, 9. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2021.704900

Abstract Recent changes in US foreign policy and strategic posture have forced Europe to think about meeting its security needs without US support. One issue that requires a particular focus is the question of how to deter and defend against Russia in a conventional war. This article attempts a high-level assessment of European military capability and considers whether existing military doctrine is adequate. It argues that Europe should maintain its focus on NATO’s manoeuvrist mode of war fighting and identifies key capability gaps that need to be filled for (a) a coalition of the willing and (b) Europe as a whole to be able to fight in this way. It cautions against an unduly defensive, attritional method of fighting, based on conscript armies, as playing to Russia’s strengths instead of our own. Introduction War has come back to Europe and so has the need to think about how to fight it. Between 24 February 2022 and 21 January 2024, we put the need to rethink our defence to one side, because the Biden administration allowed us the luxury of being able to repurpose Cold War institutions (most obviously NATO), deterrence and habits to support Ukraine and dissuade Russia from another overt attack. This was a mixed blessing, because while it saved us the need to put our societies and economies on a war footing, it also blinded us to the need to build something new. The old system was not the best to contend with Russia’s aggression. While the US had only half an eye on Europe—with the rest of its focus on China—Western Europeans continued to free-ride on American resources. Neither Germany’s Zeitenwende, nor the aspersion cast by Emanuel Macron that ‘NATO is brain-dead’ (Macron 2019) translated into larger defence budgets, increased orders for ammunition, the conversion of civilian manufacturing to military use or the running of plants in shifts to replenish stockpiles. Only the Nordics, Baltics and Poland really moved to a war footing, and even their restructuring suffered from a desire, exposed as wishful thinking by Trump’s victory in November 2024, to keep the US involved. Now, with the US being led by an unstable pro-Russian Donald Trump and an anti-European JD Vance, the choice has been made for us. Steps are already being taken to prepare Europe’s industrial base, whether it is the creation of a European defence commissioner, Germany’s removal of its debt brake or initiatives such as the EU’s proposed Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financing instrument. But our political elite also needs to educate itself beyond these industrial and economic matters. War has once again become an essential part of what every responsible political leader needs to know. As it had been until 1945, if not 1989, some understanding of the military arts has, unfortunately, again become indispensable for European statespeople. This article will start by outlining certain concepts to help inform our debate about how we defend ourselves against Russia. It will relate them to the state of our military equipment, and pose questions about how we should fight with what we have, and how we should make more of what we need to fight in the way that gives us the maximum advantage over Russia. It will ask what elements of the existing NATO way of war should be kept, and which ought to be replaced, as a new European way of war—a European ‘doctrine’—is developed. And it will identify the key gaps in capability that need to be filled to apply such a doctrine in two scenarios: one where most of Europe confronts Russia (excluding neutrals, such as Ireland or Austria; potentially hostile states, such as Hungary and Slovakia; and Greece and Turkey, which deploy military resources to deter a conflict between themselves), and another where the burden is taken up by a coalition of the willing. This coalition is drawn up narrowly to constitute the Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8),1 the UK, Poland and Ukraine. Other countries, for example, Czechia and the Netherlands, would currently be considered part of this coalition, but their contributions have, conservatively, been excluded for the purpose of this assessment. This article does not assume that the European military effort should replicate the American one (for the cost of replication, see Wolff 2025). Instead it seeks to assess how Europe would deter and defeat Russia in ways that exploit our advantages against the Russian military. We do not need to replace the Americans one-for-one, but nor should we replicate Russia’s relatively low-technology and low-skill warfare. That would be to give up the strongest advantages our free and technologically advanced societies provide. Centre of gravity The first concept we need to outline is the ‘centre of gravity’: the phrase, whose application to war we owe to Clausewitz (1918, 270), refers to that feature of a belligerent that will cause it to change its behaviour when subject to pressure. The aim of military strategy, he argued, was not necessarily the destruction of the enemy’s forces, still less their population, but the application of force to their centre of gravity in order to achieve your war aim. With this in view, the most important question for European military planners is, where is Putin’s, or Russia’s, centre of gravity? This question will occupy our strategists’ minds for the foreseeable future: its answer includes determining whether it is Putin, or some other group in the Russian elite, such as the military, energy producers or business oligarchs, on whom pressure should be applied, and if so what pressure is required. Under what conditions would Putin sue for peace, or be replaced by someone who would, if Russia extended its war to conventional military aggression against Europe? Only once these conditions have been identified, is it then relevant to ask how they might be brought about. This consideration of centre of gravity begs an important question: how is Russia to be deterred from attacking Europe? How can sufficiently severe consequences be imposed on Russia, bearing in mind that the loss of almost 400 aircraft (Minfin.com.ua 2025) and several thousand tanks, and close to a million men killed and wounded have not been enough to push Putin to retreat from Ukraine? It is, however, necessary to pose this question, because there is a temptation to avoid it by focusing on ‘deterrence by denial’. This idea would be to defend ourselves in the manner in which the Chinese are thought to defend themselves against the US: by preventing US forces from landing in China by attacking its large, expensive ships. This does not apply to the Russian case for two reasons: first, Russia is willing to sacrifice men and equipment in human-wave assaults; the only equipment it seems to have decided to preserve is its air force. Second, Russia has a land border with Europe, so it does not need to attack using small numbers of vulnerable ships. Denial is extremely difficult against human-wave attacks, as US forces found in Korea, and Iraqis found in the Iran–Iraq war when revolutionary Iran employed them. (See Meyer zum Felde 2024 for a deterrence by denial–focused approach.) Order of battle A second concept is the ‘order of battle’: what are the forces arranged on either side of a conflict and how do they measure up to each other? As well as military units, it is worthwhile also considering the broader elements of societal strength—economic, political and cultural—that each side has, and how these contribute to the war effort. For example, our open societies leave us more vulnerable to hybrid attacks and disinformation, but on the other hand supply great strength and flexibility. Democratic societies do not wait for the government to tell them what to do, but organise social defence in ways that dictatorships find more difficult; the market economy possesses enormous flexibility that centrally planned systems do not; and an entrepreneurial can-do culture can also produce superior military performance through the concept of ‘mission command’ (see below). But the first question is who would be fighting? Sometimes pieces are written as if it would only be Britain and France confronting Russia (Barker et al. 2025), but borders have shifted since the Cold War: Eastern Europe, including the highly capable Polish and Finnish militaries, as well, of course, as Europe’s strongest army, Ukraine’s, would be arrayed against Moscow, not operating under its orders. Europe’s total military-age population is considerably greater than Russia’s. If Austria, Hungary, Ireland and Slovakia are excluded for political reasons, and Greece and Turkey as well, because they will wish to preserve resources in case a conflict breaks out between them, ‘Europe’ has 89.5 million military-age men and 88 million military-age women, compared to Russia’s 31 million military-age men and 33 million military-age women.2 The question of how such forces are recruited and generated, particularly in the economically more successful parts of Europe, is of course relevant, but the sheer capacity to provide sufficient personnel is not in doubt. It is useful to consider the matter of mobilisation. Russia was in transition from a conscript to a professional army when it launched its attack on Ukraine. It still mobilises 160,000 men per year, mostly to fill rearguard positions and free up front-line deployment for professional troops. This is equivalent to 17% of the annual cohort of young men.3 Europe (as defined above) could generate similar forces without much difficulty. A one-year cohort of the European population includes 2.7 million men and 2.5 million women. Even if it limited itself to calling up men, it would only need to recruit 6% of the population. Such a number would be feasible with a voluntary reserve service programme, and would not require universal conscription. Considering the countries most at risk of Russian aggression, and most likely to need to defend against it, presents a starker picture. The NB8 plus Poland and the UK between them have an annual cohort of 7.7 million men and 7.3 million women. If the male population of these countries took part in military service at the same rate as Russians, this would generate 130,000 personnel, requiring an additional 30,000 female personnel to match Russian numbers. This would require a female reserve participation rate of 4%, which is an achievable figure. For example, at least 25% of Norway’s annual conscription quota comprises women. Despite a recent surge in calls to reintroduce universal military service in Europe, this is not necessarily advisable in all countries. Training a large cohort of conscripts takes resources away from exercises and advanced training for professional officers. While it may be justified for small nations on the front line, it is not the best use of resources for larger countries. The required manpower needs can in most cases be met by a selective reserve system. European stocks of platforms (as distinct from ammunition stocks, which are dangerously low) are also not outrageously out of balance with the requirement for a mission against Russia, though this is partly due to Ukraine’s destruction of Russian equipment since 2022. The following (table 1) compares stocks of fighter jets, main battle tanks and artillery pieces across several groups of European countries (some including Ukraine) versus Russia. This analysis is necessarily somewhat crude, as it excludes infantry fighting vehicles, mortars and other equipment. It also completely sets aside analysis of naval forces. Its fighter aircraft figures comprise fourth-generation fighters, old fighters (predating the fourth generation or the Warsaw Pact) and F35s.4 Finally, these figures do not take future production (either European or Russian) or the evolution of land and air drones into account (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024).   Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2024). Note: This table compares the main platforms (fighter jets, main battle tanks and artillery pieces, including rocket artillery) that various European countries have at their disposal. Countries are placed in different categories and then compared against Russia. Each category also appears in two variants: one including Ukraine, and one that does not include Ukrainian forces. The ‘NB8+ coalition’ is the NB8 plus the UK and Poland. Non-neutral Europe means EU members plus the UK and Norway, but minus Ireland, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia. Using this table one can see, for example, that the NB8+ coalition has 542 fewer fighter jets at its disposal than Russia but essentially the same number of main battle tanks. With the exception of the scenario in which only the NB8+ coalition and Ukraine face off against Russia, Europe currently has approximately the required numbers of platforms to resist a Russian attack (bearing in mind a deficit in artillery pieces if Ukraine is not included). This leads to the following conclusions: • Ukraine needs to be considered an integral part of European defence against Russia, and its defeat would allow Russia to focus its forces on EU territory.• The coalition faces a notable air-power shortage in confronting Russia. While it has enough planes to deter Russian use of its aerospace, it does not have sufficient equipment to attempt to establish air superiority.• At an overall European level the priority should not be buying new platforms. Platform acquisition should be part of any rearmament plan, but priorities should be determined by the specific needs of a campaign against Russia, with importance given to filling the key gaps needed to conduct such a campaign. Platforms, ammunition and network-centric warfare The analysis above is only a first approximation of military strength. It considers only equipment and mobilisation potential, rather than force generation, and concentrates on land and air forces, setting aside the navy because a Euro-Russian conventional war would largely be fought on land. (The air force calculations do include naval aviation equipment, however, as these could be brought to bear). It also deals only with the main ‘platforms’: main battle tanks, fighter planes and artillery pieces, ignoring armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, engineering and support equipment, and, most importantly, ammunition. Simply replicating Russian numbers of platforms without considering communications, software and unmanned systems risks equipping ourselves to fight the last war (Tallis 2025). The spectrum that runs between a platform, which serves to move weapons systems into a place where they can be fired, and a piece of ammunition, fired from a platform, is another dimension of analysis. For example, during the Second World War the distinction was clear: an artillery shell was ammunition; an artillery piece a platform. But how should one categorise a cruise missile, which could be launched from a plane (so it appears to be ammunition launched from a platform), or directly from land, in which case it could arguably be a platform on its own? What is the difference between a cruise missile and a long-range drone? The war in Ukraine has seen the rapid development of short-range single-use drones that behave, in some ways, like super-intelligent artillery shells; and actual shells have incorporated guidance systems, and even propulsion systems, so that they have become what are known as ‘loitering munitions’. The point here is that strength is not just measured by platforms, but by the things that can be delivered to the battlefield with them (or independently of them), and an assessment of military strength needs to include an understanding of stocks of ammunition, the ability to replenish it and to fire it at where it is needed. This brings us to the idea of networks. War has always given the advantage to the side that could bring force to bear in a coordinated fashion while itself avoiding being the target of a coordinated enemy attack. The latest iteration of this is known as ‘network-centric warfare’, which, in its ideal form, means that every participant in the battle, from planes and ships all the way down to individual soldiers and drones can observe the ‘battlespace’ and communicate information about it to the right layer of command. Using this information, commanders, assisted by artificial intelligence, can decide where ‘effect’ is to be concentrated to bring about maximum damage to the enemy, more quickly than it can cause damage. This capability is not necessarily confined to the most expensive high-tech armies. Ukraine has shown how off-the-shelf electronic components can be added to existing systems to improve them (for example, to allow its artillery to concentrate fire on a single target despite the artillery systems themselves being dispersed). Precision If in the popular imagination precision weapons are used mainly to reduce collateral damage (and this was indeed their main use during the campaigns against terrorist groups in the first two decades of this century), in high-intensity war their advantage is that they conserve resources and time. Even if an individual precision artillery shell is more expensive, it is more useful to be able to use one or two guided shells to hit a target than 30 or 40 unguided ones. Not only is less ammunition used, but fewer troops are needed to operate it, and the wear and tear on the artillery pieces is considerably less. Precision results in greater ‘effect’ from the inputs to the process. Though sometimes presented as its opposite, precision should be understood as a way of delivering ‘mass’; this concept, also from Clausewitz (1918, 98), refers to the quantity of force that can be brought to bear against an enemy at a particular time. It matters because fighting is not a continuous linear process where the amount of force one applies has an effect in proportion to its quantity—in war having more power at one place at the right time means you will win the battle and the enemy will be weaker for the next one. The slightly stronger force can often inflict damage on the weaker one in a way that is disproportionate to the difference in their strength. To take a simple example for the purposes of illustration, suppose we start with 100 tanks, and so do they. Thanks to our commander’s skill we are able to concentrate 50 of our tanks against 40 of theirs. We lose 10 tanks, they lose 35. Now we have 90 tanks, they have 65. In this example our ability to get those extra 10 tanks in the right place has given us an advantage that can be pressed further in the next battle. It is these facts that underpin the approach that NATO, and the West more broadly, has applied to fighting. Although Western democracies have been able, due to their superior economic systems and technological advantage, to outproduce their enemies, winning a war of attrition is not where they consider their advantage to come from. Instead they emphasise their speed of movement and thought, and their ability to confuse their enemies, tricking them into dividing or misdirecting their forces, and then pouncing at the right moment; this is the ‘manoeuvrist’ creed of war, in which we fight smart and overcome the enemy by more than brute force. It is important not to draw the distinction between attrition and manoeuvre too crudely. Manoeuvre warfare is easier when you have more and better kit, and your leaders are informed by better intelligence obtained through technological as well as human sources. It also takes advantage of the characteristics of free societies. Manoeuvre warfare is strengthened by ‘mission command’: the notion that subordinate officers are given the ability to decide exactly how to fulfil their orders. This gives Western militaries a flexibility that is absent from the armies of dictatorships, in which such freedom is rarely granted,5 but of course this depends on officers and soldiers being sufficiently well-trained, and possessing a good enough level of general education, to operate independently. It is the best way for us, as free and well-educated peoples, to fight—it is not necessarily the best for everyone. A manoeuvrist force, is, as the name suggests, on the move. It is constantly advancing, communicating its changing position, attempting to bypass and confuse the enemy. It operates at a high tempo in order to overwhelm the enemy mentally as well as physically, and the ability to sustain this type of fighting informs training, equipment command and intelligence: ‘the key to winning battles is to have greater forces at the key location than does the enemy. The trick is to outwit the enemy and thus out-concentrate him at the right time’ (Warden 1998, 79). This matters for learning the right lessons from Ukraine’s fight for survival. Ukraine has only been able to master some of the lessons of manoeuvrist warfare. It has been hampered by its limited capacity in the air, which slows it down and makes it hard to break Russian lines except with artillery and long-range fire (such as the famous HIMARS rockets). It is in transition from Soviet- to Western-style command. But it has also shown tremendous capacity to innovate, particularly in its use of drones to hold a defensive line. Ukraine’s tremendous first-person drone capacity allows it to stop Russian attacks while risking far fewer troops (drone operators work behind the lines, where they are at much lower risk than the men in the trenches) and even compensate for artillery.6 These principles feed into NATO’s existing doctrine (NATO 2022), which involves identifying the enemy’s centre of gravity, achieving air superiority to deliver firepower against its command and control nodes, and then overcoming its disoriented forces at speed. It relies on synthesising intelligence through networks of sensors and exploiting the information they provide to deploy massed precision against them. Such operations, however, require certain capabilities that depend on equipment and structures provided mostly by the US. The first of these is NATO’s command structure. NATO’s armies have a single command structure that conducts exercises together. At the top is the Supreme Allied Commander (American) and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (European). American units are integrated throughout the force structure. European forces will need to plan, exercise and be ready to fight without these American elements—it is not merely a matter of detaching them. The second is the intelligence and planning capability to carry out those war plans and adapt to the evolving battle. These integrate intelligence gathered from sensors, satellites and human sources, and artificial intelligence is increasingly involved in its processing as extremely large amounts of data must be handled quickly and secretly. As well as certain sensors (satellites and aircraft), the US’s processing software is also vital here, though Europeans have equivalent capabilities at reduced scale. Third are the sensors, software and missiles needed to suppress enemy air defences (SEAD). SEAD missions are a prerequisite for establishing air superiority against adversaries that possess sophisticated air defence systems, such as Russia. Indeed, the failure of Russia’s SEAD missions in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s ability to deter Russian aviation, may also indicate that an effective air defence is easier to mount than had been thought.7 Europe, however, currently lacks the ability to make the latest generation of anti-radiation missiles (which target enemy radar) essential to the success of SEAD. India’s poor performance against Pakistan, where it appears to have attempted to conduct deep strikes against its rival without conducting SEAD, underlines the importance of these capabilities (Economist 2025). It will take some years to develop them, and this needs to be prioritised. A full discussion of the requirements for successful SEAD against Russia can be found in Bronk and Watling (2025). Finally there is the question of Russia’s nuclear threats. Though the UK and France possess ‘strategic’ nuclear arsenals, these, because they threaten the complete destruction of the world, can only credibly deter the most extreme sort of attack. Russia and the US both have low-yield or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons, and Russia has regularly threatened to use them. These threats would significantly complicate elements of a European campaign to deter Russia, which might involve actions such as seizing Kaliningrad or advancing from Finland towards the environs of St Petersburg. Europe needs the ability to restrict Russia to conventional weapons in such circumstances. Though such deterrence does not have to be supplied using tactical nuclear weapons of our own (Hoffmann 2021), these would be the most straightforward instrument for this purpose. As the UK’s nuclear weapons systems are submarine launched (and use American missiles), France’s arsenal would have to be expanded to provide this capability, and be able to be deployed closer to the front as, for example, Donald Tusk has hinted.8 Conclusion and recommendations Fighting without the Americans does not necessarily mean we need to replace exactly what they used to supply. Instead we need to understand the mission required, which is to deter Russia by credibly showing how Russian forces would be defeated, in the field, should Putin attempt to attack us. In an ideal world this credible threat would cause the military to remove Putin should he attempt further adventurism against Europe, but we cannot rely on such an eventuality. This means that we have to think carefully about how we would fight and sustain political support for a major European war. The good news is that provided that the bulk of Europe is willing to contribute, we have the resources and equipment needed to defeat Russia. Upgrades, in particular in SEAD capability and tactical nuclear weapons, need to be made, but they are not out of reach. In addition, we have a solid basis in military doctrine that can be used to organise a campaign that takes advantage of our military cultures and technological lead. The less good news is that the countries that can be guaranteed to make up a ‘coalition of the willing’ (the NB8 plus Poland, the UK and Ukraine) would currently struggle to mount an offensive campaign on their own. They would, in particular, struggle to field a sufficiently large air force to win air superiority over Russia, though they have enough aircraft to deny Russia air superiority of its own. This would limit their ability to put manoeuvrist doctrine into practice, and, notwithstanding advances in drone warfare pioneered by the Ukrainians, could cause them to fall back to static defence and attritional warfare, as illustrated by the proposed Baltic Defence Line. Such an approach would stretch the human resources of a coalition of the willing extremely thin. It is perhaps ironic that Europe as a whole could win a war of attrition against Russia, but it also would not have to, as it could prosecute a campaign of manoeuvre against the Russian military and Putin’s state. Accordingly my recommendations are laid out below. Europe should focus on what it needs to defeat Russia, rather than what would be required to replace the American commitment to NATO. Nevertheless, it should not, as a whole, revert to using conscript-based armies designed to fight a war of attrition against Russia. These give up the greatest advantages of technologically advanced free societies and would leave us fighting the kind of war Russia would want us to fight. Certain small front-line states might need to make different calculations. Universal military service might be required so that they can, in extremis, mount a defensive campaign—for example, if Finland and the Baltic states were required to fight on their own without support from European allies. This highly extreme scenario is sufficiently unlikely that it should not form the basis of other countries’ military planning. The core ‘coalition of the willing’—the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, plus Poland, the UK and Ukraine—could defend themselves against Russia, and with some effort would be able to conduct an offensive campaign to bring about Russian defeat. They would need, however, to make important improvements to their defence. The coalition would require an integrated command structure and a programme of exercises. The expansion of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force and the UK’s command headquarters would be a suitable nucleus for such capability. The coalition would face a manpower deficit compared to Russia, and matching Russian mobilised reserve levels would be a challenge. The coalition could, however, match Russian mobilisation levels with a Swedish- or Norwegian-style selective military service programme for young men and women (it could achieve sufficient coverage for defensive purposes by recruiting 16% of men and 6% of women each year). The coalition is also severely short of aircraft with which to pursue an air superiority campaign against Russia. Though it would fare better than Ukraine on its own, increasing the size of the coalition’s air forces must be a priority, and the risk of over-dependence on the F35 needs to be considered. Though ‘kill switches’ are a myth, a sovereign spare parts supply chain (as Finland is creating) and sovereign intelligence software (as used by Israel) are required to reduce the risk of US unreliability. The coalition would also need to consider replacing the F35’s intelligence and command capabilities with replacements that could operate on European aircraft, such as the Gripen or Rafale. The lack of stealth capability would also hamper the coalition’s air forces until a sixth-generation fighter could be developed. Europe as a whole has forces of the necessary scale to conduct operations against Russia. Its shortfalls in ammunition production and inefficiencies due to the diversity of its equipment have been covered elsewhere. Some inefficiency is likely to persist as long as Europe remains a relatively decentralised continent, but it is likely to be better to bear the extra cost now, than waste time with the ambitious political integration projects required to eliminate it quickly. Europe as a whole would need to develop its own command structure. At this level it may be possible to repurpose NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) using the Berlin Plus process, though care would need to be taken to avoid a potentially hostile US, as well as unfriendly NATO members, such as Hungary, blocking operations. As urgent as ammunition production (a category that includes missiles as well as artillery) is the manufacture of equipment to conduct SEAD campaigns. Reviving European capacity to produce anti-radiation missiles and in intelligence capability to uncover targets for them should be a matter of the highest priority. The final priority area is the expansion of Europe’s tactical nuclear capability. Though the French and British strategic arsenals can provide the ultimate deterrence against Russia, tactical, or low-yield, weapons are needed to deter Russia from threatening European forces with its tactical nuclear weapons. As the British programme is not suitable, these would have to be based on the French programme, and questions related to how this expansion would be paid for, and how tactical nuclear use would be authorised, would need to be addressed. Footnotes1. Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.2. These estimates are based on Eurostat data for the EU member states, the Office for National Statistics population projections for the UK and the most recent available data for Russia, which is based on UN data not currently available but which have been reported on Wikipedia. The Russian data are from 2012, so these overestimate Russian demographic strength slightly. The military age calculation aggregates the standard five-year demographic groups between 20 and 49. Obviously a military may mobilise younger and older people as well, but the comparison remains valid.3. In this case, by taking the 10-year sample of 15–24-year-olds and dividing it by 10 to smooth out fluctuations. Again, because of declining Russian demographics (even without accounting for losses due to the war), this is likely to be an underestimate of the proportion mobilised (because the total number of 18-year-old men is lower than the statistics indicate).4. F35s are easily the most advanced fighter available, and the only one reliably able to penetrate Russian air defences before suppression of enemy air defence missions have been accomplished. The deterioration in relations with the US, however, poses questions about the ongoing reliability of the supply chain associated with them. Though ‘kill-switches’ are a myth, European countries will need to maintain their own spare parts supply and software upgrade path if they are to gain the most out of the aircraft in the long run. Finland, for example, is establishing its own sovereign spare parts supply, and Israel has a sovereign software intelligence solution on its F35s.5. An exception was the Wehrmacht, which inherited mission command from the Prussian Army; however, its generals found themselves micromanaged by Hitler, which (fortunately) affected their performance.6. These small drones are very different from those deployed in the early stages of the war such as the Bayraktar TB2 or Western drones such as the Reaper. They are much closer to ammunition than platforms, and (in good weather, at least) replace artillery or close air support.7. It could also indicate that Russian aviation is not as good as had been thought, but it would be dangerous to plan on that assumption.8. Author’s conversation with a Polish official who wished to remain anonymous.ReferencesBarker K., Smialek J., Erlanger S. (2025). Europe prepares to face Russia as Trump’s America steps back. New York Times, 24 February.Bronk J., Watling J. (2025). Rebalancing joint fires to deter Russia. Royal United Services Institute Occasional Paper. London, 15 April. https://static.rusi.org/rebalancing-european-joint-fires-to-deter-russia.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2025.Clausewitz K. von. (1918). On War. Trans. Graham J. J. (London: K. Paul Trench, Trubner & Co.)Dalaaker A. (2017). Statement by Norway on gender equality in the military – universal conscription. Organisation for Co-operation and Security in Europe. 8 March. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/9/304861.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2025.Economist. (2025). Chinese weapons gave Pakistan a new edge against India. 15 May. https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/05/15/chinese-weapons-gave-pakistan-a-new-edge-against-india. Accessed 16 May 2025.Hackett M., Nagl J. (2024). A long hard year. Russia–Ukraine war lessons learned 2023. Parameters, 54(3), 41–52.Hoffmann F. (2021). Strategic non-nuclear weapons and strategic stability – promoting trust through technical understanding. Fondation pour la recherche strategique. https://frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/Programme TNP - P5/2021/202103.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2025.International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2024). The military balance. London: Routledge.Meyer zum Felde R. (2024). Kann sich Europa konventionell gegen eine militärische Bedrohung durch Russland behaupten? Sirius, 8(3), 267–83.Minfin.com.ua. (2025). Casualties of the Russian troops in Ukraine. Updated daily. https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-invading/casualties/. Accessed 5 March 2025.Nagl J., Crombe K. (2024). A call to action: Lessons from Ukraine for the future force. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press.NATO. (2022). Allied joint doctrine. December. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/allied-joint-publication-ajp. Accessed 9 April 2025.Tallis B. (2025). Emerging defence: Offset and competitive strategies for Europe. Democratic Strategy Initiative. https://www.democratic-strategy.net/_files/ugd/dcfff6_ca54854b6dc7499e829a5fa4d7b01b74.pdf. Accessed 16 March 2025.Warden J. (1998). The air campaign: Planning for combat. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press.Wolff G., Burlikov A. (2025). Defending Europe without the US: First estimates of what is needed. Bruegel, 21 February. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed. Accessed 9 April 2025.

At a high-stakes meeting at the White House on August 18, the US president, Donald Trump, and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, tried to hammer out the broad contours of a potential peace agreement with Russia. The tone of their encounter was in marked contrast to their last joint press conference in Washington back in February which ended with Zelensky’s humiliation by Trump and his vice president, J.D. Vance. The outcomes of the presidential get-together, and the subsequent, expanded meeting with leaders of the European coalition of the willing, were also a much more professional affair than Trump’s summit with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on August 15. The results of the meetings in the White House were still far from perfect. But they are a much better response to the reality in which Ukrainians have lived for the past more than three-and-a-half years than what transpired during and after the brief press conference held by the two leaders after their meeting in Alaska. This relatively positive outcome was not a foregone conclusion. Over the weekend, Trump had put out a statement on his Truth Social platform that: “President Zelenskyy (sic) of Ukraine can end the war with Russia almost immediately”. But this came with the proviso that Zelensky would need to accept Ukraine’s loss of Crimea to Russia and forego his country’s future Nato membership. This, and similar ideas of land swaps between Russia and Ukraine, have already been roundly rejected by the Ukrainian president. Importantly, Kyiv’s position has been fully backed by Ukraine’s European allies. Leaders of the coalition of the willing issued a joint statement on August 16 to the effect that any territorial concessions were Ukraine’s to make or refuse. On Nato membership, their statement was more equivocal. European leaders asserted that Russia should not be allowed to have a veto on Ukraine’s choices. But the coalition’s reiteration of the commitment that it is “ready to play an active role” in guaranteeing Ukraine’s future security opened up a pathway to Trump to “Article 5-like protections” for Ukraine against future Russian aggression and promising “a lot of help when it comes to security”. Nato’s Article 5 guarantees that an attack on one member is an attack on all and commits the alliance to collective defence. A possibly emerging deal – some territorial concessions by Ukraine in exchange for peace and joint US and European security guarantees – appeared to become more certain during the televised meeting between Trump and his visitors before their closed-door discussions. In different ways, each of the European guests acknowledged the progress that Trump had made towards a settlement and they all emphasised the importance of a joint approach to Russia to make sure that any agreement would bring a just and lasting peace. As an indication that his guests were unwilling to simply accept whatever deal he had brought back with him from his meeting with Putin in Alaska, the US president then interrupted the meeting to call the Russian president. Signals from Russia were far from promising with Moscow rejecting any Nato troop deployments to Ukraine and singling out the UK as allegedly seeking to undermine the US-Russia peace effort. Peace remains elusive When the meeting concluded and the different leaders offered their interpretations of what had been agreed, two things became clear. First, the Ukrainian side had not folded under pressure from the US, and European leaders, while going out of their way to flatter Trump, held their ground as well. Importantly, Trump had not walked away from the process either but appeared to want to remain engaged. Second, Russia had not given any ground, either. According to remarks by Putin’s foreign policy advisor, Yuri Ushakov, posted on the Kremlin’s official website, Russia would consider “the possibility of raising the level of representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian parties”. His statement falls short of, but does not rule out, the possibility of a Zelensky-Putin summit, which Trump announced as a major success after the White House meetings yesterday. Such a meeting was seen as the next logical step towards peace by all the participants of the White House meeting and would be followed, according to Trump, by what he called “a Trilat” of the Ukrainian, Russian and American presidents. The lack of clear confirmation by Russia that such meetings would indeed happen raises more doubts about the Kremlin’s sincerity. But the fact that a peace process – if it can be called that – remains somewhat intact is a far cry from an actual peace agreement. Little if anything was said in the aftermath of the White House meeting on territorial issues. Pressure on Russia only came up briefly in comments by European leaders, whose ambitions to become formally involved in actual peace negotiations remain a pipe dream for the time being. And, despite the initial optimism about security guarantees, no firm commitments were made with Zelensky only noting “the important signal from the United States regarding its readiness to support and be part of these guarantees”. Peace in Ukraine thus remains elusive, for now. The only tangible success is that whatever Trump imagines as the process to a peace agreement did not completely fall apart. But as this process unfolds, its progress, if any, happens at a snail’s pace. Meanwhile the Russian war machine deployed against Ukraine grinds forward. At the end of the day, yesterday’s events changed little. They merely confirmed that Putin keeps playing for time, that Trump is unwilling to put real pressure on him and that Ukraine and Europe have no effective leverage on either side. Trump boldly claimed ahead of his meetings with Zelensky and the leaders of the coalition of the willing that he knew exactly what he was doing. That may be true – but it may also not be enough without knowing and understanding what his counterpart in the Kremlin is doing.