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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah, which have been followed by an ongoing air campaign, signal a new phase in the conflict amid heightened regional tensions. The sophisticated remote pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah on 17–18 September were followed by an intensive Israeli air campaign against the militant group, which is ongoing. These events were hailed by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant as a new phase in the country’s conflict with Hezbollah and a shift of gravity in Israel’s conflict from south to north. These actions, driven by intelligence breakthroughs and rapid decision-making, mark a critical moment in the ongoing conflict in the region and could have far-reaching implications for regional stability and Israel's political landscape. Israel’s ‘Use it or Lose it’ Moment The sensational events of last week were, arguably, a suboptimal military outcome for Israel. Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility for either attack, though the capability and intelligence from allies point to its involvement. The pager and then the walkie-talkie attacks were originally designed to be the opening salvo in a coordinated and total attack against Hezbollah. This would undoubtedly have been devastating, rendering communications obsolete for Hezbollah while being prepared to simultaneously hit hard with drone and missile strikes, maybe even alongside a ground incursion. Despite this careful planning, US sources have reported that Israel’s leaders were forced to either act instantly or risk losing this asset. This was a ‘use it or lose it’ moment, and has ultimately led Israel to ramp up its pressure on the north to follow what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah fairly identified as a ‘declaration of war’.  After the activation of the pager attack was forced upon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel followed up with the movement of the 98th Division, a paratrooper division, from Gaza to the northern border on 18 September. In addition to this, Gallant visited aircraft bases on the northern border in the immediate aftermath of the pager attack. Israel then activated another of its assets in the walkie-talkie attack, another ‘use it or lose it moment’ as reeling Hezbollah security officials (as well as embedded Iranian officers) began to look for other infiltrations. Israel has since begun a brutal missile campaign against Hezbollah with strikes in Southern Lebanon as well as in Beirut, where Israel reported the successful assassination of Ibrahim Aqil, a senior Hezbollah commander. According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, these attacks killed almost 500 and wounded many more on 23 September alone. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to Israel’s demand to withdrawing its troops and missile silos to beyond the Litani River. After activating their pager asset, Israeli commanders were forced to activate their walkie-talkie asset before it was detected. The forced use of these two key assets led Netanyahu to believe that this was his best chance to push for a victory against Hezbollah with further missile strikes and assassinations. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to its demands What is clear is that throughout this last week Netanyahu has been led by events, and not the other way around. Despite this, he will be delighted that he is one step closer to reclaiming the ‘Mr Defence’ reputation that has seen him serve a record eight terms as prime minister. After the shock of 7 October and the hostages that Israel has not been able to bring home, this is a moment of victory for the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence services and Netanyahu himself in re-asserting the competence and superiority of Israeli capabilities.  Israel will ultimately hope that ramping up pressure on Hezbollah through its continuing assassination and missile campaign will force its troops back behind the Litani River (some 18 miles from the current border, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701). This would allow Israel to return 200,000 displaced refugees to cities and villages in the north and score a major political and legitimacy goal.  A Crushing Blow for Hezbollah For Hezbollah, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks represented the most significant failure for the organisation since the 2006 war. In three days, Israel’s intelligence services blatantly proved their ability to infiltrate and destroy Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures. This began with the remote detonation of several thousand pagers on Tuesday and was followed up by the remote detonation of thousands of walkie-talkies used by the terrorist group on Wednesday. For Hezbollah this is a serious blow that carries a number of serious implications for the group. Firstly, the successful outcome of the Israeli operation exposed  fundamental weaknesses in the group’s command-and-control mechanisms. Hezbollah already operates in an extremely difficult command-and-control environment due to extensive human intelligence and Pegasus spyware, where Israeli intelligence can compromise mobile phones simply by sending them a signal. This environment has forced Hezbollah to operate on a network of cells which rely on almost constant top-down delegation. The inevitable restructuring as well as the human capacity that Hezbollah has lost will hamper the group’s ability to effectively resist Israel’s attacks. Secondly, there has been an impact on Hezbollah’s legitimacy.  Israel’s attacks are a humiliation for the group, representing as they do a colossal security failure. Hezbollah’s inability to prevent the attacks and protect Lebanon (as it claims to do) makes its position extremely difficult. The severity of this legitimacy hit is demonstrated by Nasrallah being forced to admit that Hezbollah has suffered a major and unprecedented blow. Finally, Hezbollah’s position is made more difficult by its lack of credible options to respond. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion.  At the same time, however, Nasrallah has furious internal stakeholders demanding revenge. The only real pressure valve available to him in this extremely difficult position is being able to claim attacks by the Axis of Resistance as consequences for Israel’s actions. This axis is comprised of an aligned group in the region, led by Iran and including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and various militia groups, who claim to resist Israel and its allies. Wider Questions for the Axis of Resistance This is a major test for the Axis of Resistance. Iran has watched seemingly powerlessly as Hezbollah, its ally, has been pummelled again and again by Israel. The refugees streaming out of Southern Lebanon towards Beirut are another example of the pressure Israel is applying on Hezbollah. Iran is also yet to respond to Israel’s assassination of Ismayel Haniyeh in Tehran in July. Iranian leaders and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures will be increasingly frustrated that they have been unable to re-establish credible deterrence against Israel. This is a particularly sore point as it is fairly clear by now that their April missile and drone strikes against Israel were ineffective in achieving this. We can expect to see an evolving Iranian strategy that aims to place maximum diplomatic pressure on Israel through moves such as encouraging proxies to strike at Israel, as well as threatening regional stability and shipping lanes. We may also see Iran to make diplomatic overtures to the West to exert more diplomatic pressure. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion Something to be aware of is that there are multiple smaller militia groups and individual cells within Hezbollah that have the potential for escalation. Many of these smaller or splinter groups may feel that they must respond to Israel with an independent attack that pre-empts or goes beyond Hezbollah’s so far very measured response. This danger is illustrated by previous attacks on UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, such as the attack that resulted in the death of Private Sean Rooney in December 2022. If one of these smaller groups was to hit an Israeli population centre, either on purpose or by mistake, the tension could easily spill over into a larger-scale conflict. The US–Israel Relationship An interesting dynamic to note is that the pager attacks and subsequent missile campaign represent another case of Israel making aggressive decisions without first consulting the US. Prior examples of this include the decision to invade Rafah, rejecting any possibility of a future Palestinian state as part of negotiations, and missile campaigns on non-combat areas in Gaza. As the US is Israel’s main ally and security guarantor, this trend embodies the increasing risk appetite of the current Israeli government. This is likely due to an assessment of the strategic environment, particularly Iran’s reluctance to enter a full-scale conflict, but also represents a political calculation by Netanyahu. Once again, the only way for Netanyahu to safeguard his short-term survival is by taking decisions that ensure Israel remains in a state of conflict. Followers of Israeli politics will not need reminding that Netanyahu faces three criminal cases that will progress as soon as he loses the premiership. The escalation perhaps also reflects a weakness in the US’s security arrangements, as it has been unable to effectively dissuade and disincentivise its own allies from escalation. The US has made it very clear that its priority, especially approaching the presidential election, is for regional de-escalation. This is illustrated by the exhaustive diplomatic efforts made since 7 October to reach a settlement between Iran, Hezbollah and Israel in order to keep the border cool. When the new US administration takes office later this year, its first priority in terms of Middle East policy must be addressing the balance of power between Washington and the Israeli prime minister.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in early October 2023, many observers jumped to a grim conclusion that, from then onward, the Middle East was hurtling at an ever-increasing speed toward another major regional conflict. The military operation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip was to be followed by fierce hostilities in the West Bank, then by a large-scale border clash between Israel and Lebanon, and, finally, by an Israeli–Iranian war, which had been looming on the political horizon for years and was literally just a step away, with the likely involvement of several key regional and global actors, including the United States. Limits to escalation  But in the 11 months that have passed since the Hamas attack on Israel, no major war has broken out in the Middle East. Israel, as predicted, is stuck in Gaza for long. The death toll among Palestinian civilians has passed 40,000, with the number of wounded approaching 100,000, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons now in the seven figures. For the people of Gaza, everything happening there is not a targeted anti-terrorist operation, but an all-out war in every sense. While the neighboring West Bank also saw an escalation, it was much more limited—around 600 Palestinians and several dozen Israelis have died there over the past 11 months. This is still many times more than in previous years (28 people were killed there in 2020, 86 in 2021, and 146 in 2022), but it is clear now that the West Bank has not become a second Gaza today, nor is it likely to become one overnight. Along the line of confrontation between the IDF and Hezbollah forces on the Israeli–Lebanese border, nothing extraordinary has occurred so far either, except for a rocket strike at a soccer field in the town of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights on July 27, which killed 12 Druze teenagers. True, Hezbollah has fired an unprecedented number of missiles at Israel over the past 11 months, up to 6,000 according to some reports. Israel, in response, has launched massive retaliatory and even preemptive strikes on southern Lebanon. But the preliminary results of this duel were relatively minor: 21 civilian and 20 military deaths on the Israeli side, and around 375 fighters and civilians killed on Hezbollah’s side. Even the latest attack on Sunday, August 25, which was announced in advance and involved 340 rockets along with dozens of Hezbollah drones, seems to have caused no significant damage to Israel. In any case, nothing comparable to the IDF’s deep incursion into southern Lebanon in July 2006 (known as the Second Lebanon War) is happening now or is likely to happen soon. In recent months, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to escalate by conducting precision strikes on prominent figures of its adversaries. On April 1, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an Iranian embassy annex building in Damascus, killing 16 people, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, one of the top military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 30, senior Hezbollah operative Fuad Shukr was killed in a Beirut suburb, and on July 31, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran (Israel never claimed responsibility for his death). After each of these incidents, experts predicted a sharp increase in the risks of escalation. But the Iranian leadership’s response to these developments was surprisingly restrained (as was Tehran’s earlier response to the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani in early 2020 by the U.S. military in a Baghdad suburb). The leaders of most Arab states also showed restraint in their response to the events in Gaza. The highly emotional reaction of the Arab street did not translate into decisive actions comparable to the oil embargo imposed on Israel and its allies following the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Efforts to further promote the Abraham Accords between Israel and the conservative Arab monarchies continued, albeit fading from the public eye. The only consistent supporters of Palestine were the stubborn Yemeni Houthis, who have attacked foreign ships in the Red Sea. However, it was Egypt—not Israel—that suffered the most from these attacks, losing nearly half of its revenues from the Suez Canal. Reasons for restraint  Although the trigger of a major regional war was pulled almost a year ago, the bomb itself never exploded. This situation calls for an explanation, particularly to assess the risk that the bomb might eventually detonate in the foreseeable future, among other things. One explanation for the current situation around Palestine lies in the distinct nature of Hamas, which has an ambiguous reputation in the Arab world. Cairo does not hold it in high regard, and Egypt’s current military leadership, not without reason, draws parallels between Palestinian radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Russia) at home, which has been driven deep underground, but was, alongside Israel, among the founding fathers of Hamas. Damascus has not forgotten that at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the political opposition rather than President Bashar Assad. Opinions of Hamas are divided in the Gulf states—while the group can count on some patronage and even political support in Doha, Abu Dhabi is much more skeptical and doubtful of the former rulers of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, all regional actors are under pressure from the international community, which for various reasons does not want further escalation. The U.S. has no interest in a major regional war in the Middle East with an uncertain outcome, especially in the run-up to the presidential election in November. Thus, Washington is focused on maintaining the regional status quo. China has even less reason to welcome such a conflict, in the first place because it would immediately drive global hydrocarbon prices up and create many transportation and logistics issues for Beijing. Moscow could possibly count on some short-term gains from a major Middle East conflagration. The West would have to shift attention away from Ukraine for a while, while prices for Russian oil and gas would skyrocket. But the negative consequences of long-term destabilization in such an important region for Russia are so great that they undoubtedly outweigh any short-term gains. It is no coincidence that at his meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on August 13, President Vladimir Putin emphasized Moscow’s commitment to preventing further escalation and promoting a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It is also plausible that during the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Iran on August 5, Moscow urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to refrain from radical responses to Israel—not only to minimize possible civilian casualties but also to avoid provoking a direct conflict with the U.S. Postmodernity as inoculation against war  However, the core reasons lie not outside, but inside the region. It appears that key actors—from Egypt to Syria, and from Turkey to Iran—are unwilling to engage in a full-blown war. Middle Eastern leaders are reluctant to shoulder the numerous risks and costs associated with a major armed conflict in one way or another. True, the arms race in the Middle East region received a powerful new boost in October 2023 and is likely to accelerate later. Belligerent anti-Israeli rhetoric—not only in the Arab world but also in Iran and Turkey—will also persist. Isolated tragic incidents—both planned and accidental—will continue. Yet a major war is a different matter. This is not because all Middle Eastern leaders are exceptionally compassionate and peace-loving, but because almost none of them today can be fully confident in their own power and resilience. It is still possible to maintain a limited military presence near and far, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan does in Syria and Libya. But repeating the experience of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions wounded, is now a no-go: Middle Eastern societies have changed too much over the past 40 years, and the region has advanced too far down the path of postmodernity. It is hardly a coincidence that the strongest proponents of escalation are the Houthis, who are the least affected by the postmodern values and lifestyle in the Middle East. Perhaps even Tehran can no longer count on the unconditional loyalty of the new generation of Iranian citizens, who would have to pay with their own blood for the decisions of the political and military elite leading to a major regional war. In any case, the victory of the only “reformist” candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in the recent presidential election is a clear signal from society to the leadership of the Islamic Republic that people want peace, stability and economic development, rather than new military exploits or social and political upheavals that invariably accompany them. Even Israel—for all the outward determination of the current cabinet to see things through to the end—is no exception to this rule. The costs of the Gaza operation have already topped $60 billion, a staggering sum for a relatively small country, meaning inevitable budget deficits, tax hikes and cuts to social programs. Israel’s call-up of reservists has already drained the national economy, and its effects will be felt for a long time. Most importantly, as the Gaza offensive has once again shown, starting a war is easy, but ending it is very difficult. The prospect of a second Gaza in the West Bank or southern Lebanon is far from appealing, even for a politician as determined as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Armageddon is off the table? It is fair to assume that the current situation in the Middle East reflects the broader state of global politics. After February 24, 2022, many experts expressed a gloomy belief that “the world is entering a new era of big wars” and that the confrontation between Russia and the West would inevitably lead to a chain reaction of major armed conflicts all over the planet. They predicted an imminent U.S.–China military clash over Taiwan, an armed standoff between China and India in the Himalayas or between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, a rapid escalation on the Korean Peninsula and numerous new conflicts across Africa, among others. Fortunately, none of the above scenarios have so far come to pass. Many other ominous predictions have not come true either. ECOWAS member states opted out of a military intervention in Niger. The Libyan National Army’s threat of a border conflict with Algeria never materialized. Even Venezuela’s eccentric leader Nicolas Maduro seems to have changed his mind about going to war with neighboring Guyana over disputed territories. The number of conflicts in the world has not decreased, but the ongoing ones are predominantly low-intensity conflicts rather than conventional wars, after all. The international system, though shaken, has overall remained standing—for now. Of course, it is too early to sit back. The situation can explode at any moment and almost anywhere: there are more than enough flashpoints around the world, while the level of trust or even basic communication between the great powers has dropped to near zero. In today’s international environment, any negative scenarios are possible, down to the most apocalyptic ones. And this unsettling uncertainty is now very much felt in the Middle East as well. But for now, there is still hope that the unfolding transition to a new world order will be less destructive and less costly for humanity than many professional pessimists have imagined in recent years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  When the UN General Assembly passed the 1947 partition resolution on Palestine, Brazil was presiding over the meetings, and its delegate delayed the vote multiple times to secure the maximum number of votes in favor of the partition. From that point until 2002, Brazilian policy closely aligned with the US position on Israel. However, with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s election in 2002, Brazil’s stance became less aligned with Israel and shifted toward a more balanced and neutral approach between conflicting international poles. This shift, however, was not consistent and fluctuated, particularly during the 2019–2022 period under President Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government. After Lula da Silva’s return to the presidency in early 2023, Brazilian policy once again moved towards a less pro-Israel stance, particularly in response to the aftermath of the Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Brazil holds substantial qualitative significance in Latin America, encompassing around 47.8% of the continent’s area and accounting for nearly half of its population (214 million out of approximately 434 million). First: Determinants of Brazilian Foreign Policy on the Palestine Issue  Three key factors largely shape Brazil’s policy toward Palestine: 1. The Influence of the Brazilian Agricultural Lobby The trade relationship, particularly in the agri-food sector and related investments, is a key factor in Brazil’s policy towards the Middle East. Agri-food products account for 27% of Brazil’s agricultural trade, amounting to $18 billion with Arab countries, $2 billion with Iran, and $2 billion with Israel. In comparison, trade with the Palestinian Authority (PA) stands at approximately $30 million, making Israeli trade with Brazil 60 times larger than that with the PA. Furthermore, Israel was the first country outside South America to sign a trade agreement with Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, in 2007, where Brazil is the leading member. The agricultural sector wields significant influence within the government, with 300 members of the Brazilian legislature—two-thirds of the body—affiliated with its interests. This powerful lobbying presence allows them to block any policies that might negatively impact the agricultural sector. A notable example of their influence is the successful obstruction of Bolsonaro’s plan to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem. After receiving a warning from the LAS that such a move could harm trade relations between Brazil and Arab countries, the agricultural lobby’s pressure led Bolsonaro to instead open a commercial representation office in Jerusalem, rather than relocating the embassy. 2. The Growing Movement of Christian Zionism Studies in political sociology from Latin America indicate a growing shift from Catholicism to Evangelicalism, which may increase the potential for conversion to “Christian Zionism” within the Evangelical movement. Christian Zionism advocates for the establishment of a “Jewish state” in the Promised Land as a precursor to Christ’s return. Some estimates suggest that the proportion of Christian Zionists in Brazil could reach 40% within the next decade. The Pentecostal movement, which supports both Bolsonaro and Israel, plays a significant role in this trend. A concerning aspect of this movement is its deepening influence within political power structures, as it currently holds 25% of the seats in the parliament and 17% in the Senate. 3. Brazil-Israel Security Relations The 1970s marked the beginning of security relations between Brazil and Israel. Faced with intense leftist pressures, right-wing administrations in Latin America sought support from the US and other powers, including Israel. These security ties were formalized in 2008, and even during his second presidency (2007–2010), leftist leader Lula da Silva continued this policy by signing a security cooperation agreement with Israel to leverage its technological advancements. In 2014, Brazil engaged an Israeli security and defense systems company to manage and coordinate security for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, and the relationship has continued since. Second: The Impact of Brazilian-Israeli Relationship Determinants on Operation al-Aqsa Flood’s Ramifications  It is challenging to grasp Brazil’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood without considering the three preceding variables, which have led Brazilian scholars to describe the country’s approach as equidistant diplomacy. This approach avoids taking a clear side in the conflict, irrespective of the ruling political movement. This diplomatic stance is evident in the pro-Israeli right wing (the Liberal Party) retracting some of its previous positions of support for Israel, while the left wing (the current ruling Workers’ Party) has not supported the Palestinian side as strongly as expected. The following practices illustrate this relative equidistance: 1. The ruling left-wing government in Brazil has adopted the accusation that Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip (GS), describing it as a “Holocaust.” Brazil has backed South Africa’s initiative to bring the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), reflecting its alignment with the BRICS group, which includes both countries. Additionally, in May 2024, the Brazilian government blocked a deal to purchase Israeli weapons. It has continued to criticize the expansion of Israeli settlements, advocating for a two-state solution and the Palestinian right to self-determination. Brazil has also played a role in drafting and supporting resolutions at the UN General Assembly and Security Council calling for a ceasefire in GS. However, da Silva condemned the resistance attack on 7/10/2023 as an “act of terrorism,” while asserting that the Israeli response was “disproportionate to the Palestinian action.” Although da Silva recalled his ambassador from Israel, he did not sever diplomatic relations. The commercial office in Jerusalem continued its operations as usual. Security ties were not fully severed but were instead “suspended.” While trade in food between the two sides continued, Israel blocked the departure of some Brazilians from GS following the outbreak of hostilities, permitting their exit only after more than a month, whereas individuals of other nationalities were allowed to leave sooner. 2. The right-wing opposition, known for its strong alignment with Israel, has organized a series of meetings with the Israeli ambassador and has provided venues for him to screen films that claim to depict “terrorist activities” by resistance groups. A Brazilian state also awarded Benjamin Netanyahu the title of “honorary citizen,” and Bolsonaro’s wife cast her vote in recent elections while wearing a T-shirt depicting an the Israeli flag. This aligns with right-wing policies that mirrored those of US President Donald Trump, including recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, supporting the Abraham Accords between Arab countries and Israel, and denying the existence of Palestine. Additionally, Netanyahu was hosted as the first Israeli prime minister to visit Brazil. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro decided against moving the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem after receiving warnings from the agricultural lobby, as previously mentioned. Conclusion  The information above highlights Brazil’s significant qualitative influence, particularly in Latin America, and the presence of overlapping factors in decision-making. It also underscores the current favorable environment under President da Silva’s leadership to support the Palestine issue, driven by the severe Israeli actions and the war on GS. Thus, it is essential to intensify efforts to develop the relationship with Brazil both officially and publicly. This includes increasing activities and events in Portuguese, facilitating visits and engaging directly with Brazilian agricultural lobbies and through Arab diplomats. Additionally, Arab Christians, especially Palestinians living in Brazil, should actively engage with Brazilian Christian communities, particularly the Catholic sectors.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Following a massive bombardment of Lebanon, Israel has begun a land invasion of its northern neighbour. Troops have entered southern Lebanon in a bid to push Hezbollah back beyond the Litani River, 29 kilometres from the Israeli border. The stated goal is to facilitate the return of some 60,000 displaced Israelis to their homes in northern Israel. By killing Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and several of his commanders over the weekend, Israel has already struck a serious blow to the group. This has boosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s profile, despite a majority of Israelis wanting to see his departure. Israel is now set to repeat its Gaza operations in Lebanon, with a view to reordering the Middle East in its own interests. But has it bitten off more than it can chew? Unsuccessful track record  Israel has been here before. It invaded Lebanon as far as the capital Beirut in 1982, in an attempt to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was trying to extinguish the Palestinian resistance to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem that had existed since the 1967 Israeli–Arab War. 1982 was also the year Hezbollah was formed with the help of the recently established Islamic government in Iran. Israel empowered its Lebanese Christian allies to massacre hundreds of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut. It also forced the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to shift its headquarters from Beirut to Tunisia. Israel then carved out a security zone to the north of its border, but faced stiff resistance from Hezbollah. As Israeli casualties mounted, the then prime minister Ehud Barak made a unilateral withdrawal in 2000. The pullout amplified Hezbollah’s popularity and strength as a formidable political and paramilitary force against Israel and its allies. Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006 in a bid to wipe out Hezbollah. It failed to achieve its objective. After 34 days of bloody fighting and substantial costs for both sides, it accepted a United Nations Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, with Hezbollah emerging triumphant. Defiant warfare  Netanyahu feels confident of success this time. He also has the backing of his extremist ministers, especially those of national security, finance and defence. He depends on their support for his domestic political survival. Israel has more firepower than ever before. It has displayed it in the Gaza war while revenging Hamas’s killing of more than 1,000 Israelis and abducting some 240 Israeli and foreign nationals on October 7.   In scorched-earth operations, the Israel Defense Forces have flattened swathes of the Gaza Strip and killed more than 40,000 of its civilians – 35% of them were children – with two million more having been repeatedly displaced. In this, the Netanyahu leadership has ignored the norms of warfare, international humanitarian law, a UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, and the International Court of Justice’s warning against genocidal actions. Further, he has brazenly deflected widespread global condemnation of Israeli actions. Buttressing his defiant stance has been the United States’ “iron-clad” military, financial and economic support of Israel. Washington has just approved a further US$8.7 billion (about A$12.5 billion) aid package in support of Israel’s Lebanon campaign. Netanyahu has had no compelling reason even to be amiable to Washington’s calls for restraint or ceasefire. Will this time be different? Netanyahu’s confidence is reinforced still further by Israel’s nuclear capability. Although undeclared, Israel reportedly possesses many nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and military supremacy in the region. Netanyahu and his supporters have claimed their use of disproportionate force to be legitimate in self-defence against what it calls the terrorist tentacles (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah) of the Iranian octopus. With the US and several of its Western and regional Arab allies having shared his posture, Israel is now focused once more on the unfinished business of uprooting Hezbollah. Hezbollah forms a key element of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US. Netanyahu knows destroying the group would mean the breakup of Iran’s national and regional security system. He is not averse to risking a direct confrontation with Iran, while remaining assured of full US support in such an event. Tehran cannot be expected to abandon Hezbollah, but it also has other domestic and foreign policy priorities. Newly elected Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian has assumed power with promises to reduce theocratic political and social restrictions and improve living conditions for most Iranians. Pezeshkian is also committed to improving Iran’s regional and international relations, including reopening negotiations with the West (particularly the US) regarding Iran’s nuclear program, so as to end US-led sanctions. Pezeshkian appears to have the backing of the powerful Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has shown a willingness to be pragmatic when needed. His foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that Hezbollah is capable of defending itself. For now, Tehran’s approach is to let Israel be trapped in Lebanon, as on previous occasions. Hezbollah is not Hamas: it is damaged but still quite well armed and strategically placed. The group will be able to wage an endless resistance to Israeli occupation. This could come at high human and material costs for the Jewish state that could also prevent many Israelis from returning home to northern Israel. At this stage, it is important to remember two points. One is that after a year-long pernicious campaign, Israel still has not completely succeeded in extinguishing Hamas’s resistance. The job of taking on Hezbollah in a ground war could prove to be much harder and more hazardous. The other is that, like Netanyahu, former US president George W. Bush sought to reorder the Middle East according to US geopolitical preferences. He intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq under the guise of a war on terrorism and promoting democracy. But America’s actions further destabilised the region. Since World War II, the application of brute force has rarely served as a viable substitute for diplomacy in managing world problems.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  The historical legacy of the Israeli-South African relationship has contributed to the current ambiguity between the two parties. During the early stages, South Africa’s political landscape was divided between a regime that pursued racial discrimination and viewed Israel as an ally from 1948 to 1994. This relationship intensified after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and continued to develop rapidly until 1987, when international efforts to isolate South Africa’s apartheid regime began. Over these two decades, Israeli-South African relations expanded across various fields, including cooperation on the Israeli nuclear project. With the collapse of the apartheid regime and the victory of the nationalist forces led by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, South Africa’s relationship with Israel began to diverge without completely rescinding its recognition of Israel as a state. At that time, Israel maintained an embassy in Pretoria and a commercial office in Johannesburg, while South Africa had an embassy in Tel Aviv. There were also reciprocal visits between officials of the two countries. Notably, South Africa’s first president, Nelson Mandela, visited Israel in 1999, though he had previously hosted Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat in South Africa a year earlier. Current Nature of the Relationship  The Israeli-South African relationship is characterized by South Africa’s support for Palestinian statehood in the 1967 occupied territories, while still maintaining recognition of Israel despite occasional strains. These strains have included several notable events: the recall of the South African ambassador in 2010, the operation of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement in South Africa since 2012, the hosting of a Hamas delegation in 2015, the withdrawal of the South African ambassador and embassy staff from Israel in November 2023 following the first month of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and finally, South Africa’s filing of a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Israel of “genocide of the Palestinian people” in December 2023. Major Changes Following Operation al-Aqsa Flood  In the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa flood, the relationship between Israel and South Africa experienced two key developments that will shape the future of their relationship: 1. The results of the June 2024 elections in South Africa, which saw 52 parties contesting, with 18 parties securing seats in parliament. Notably, the outcome of these elections highlights: a. The ANC, which has been the strongest advocate for the Palestine issue, has diminished in influence. Comparing its seat count from the 2019 to the 2024 elections, the number decreased from 230 to 159 seats, representing a loss of 71 seats, or 31% of its total voting power. b. This outcome suggests that the ANC will no longer be able to unilaterally pass its decisions, particularly in foreign policy, as it has been able to since 1994, when it enjoyed a comfortable majority to advance its governmental decisions. c. To further complicate the situation, other political forces that, to varying extents, opposed the ANC’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood have made significant progress and are now part of a national unity government. These forces include: • The Democratic Alliance (DA), which primarily represents white communities and supports Israel, increased its seats from 84 to 87 between 2019 and 2024. • The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), representing Zulu communities, grew its representation from 14 to 17 seats. • The Patriotic Alliance, which declared its support for Israel following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, secured 8 seats. These election results have diminished the ANC’s ability to monopolize decision-making, placing it in a difficult position as it balances its commitment to Palestine with its interest in maintaining the government coalition. 2. A growing number of countries have joined South Africa in bringing the genocide case against Israel before the ICJ under Articles 62 and 63 of the Court’s Statute. The following countries have formally requested to join the case: Nicaragua (February 8), Belgium (March 11), Colombia (April 5), Turkey (May 1), and Libya (May 10). Additionally, several countries have expressed their intention to join, including Egypt (May 12), Maldives (May 13), Mexico (May 24), Ireland (May 28), Chile (June 2), Spain (June 6), not to mention Palestine (June 3), and Cuba (June 22). However, the court has not yet ruled on any of these requests. The growing number of accession requests strengthens the credibility of South Africa’s case, reflecting the increasing international criticism of Israel. Future Role  South Africa is a significant center of influence on the African continent, ranking sixth in terms of population. However, its internal situation will play a critical role in determining its ability to maintain its political stance on the Middle Eastern conflict. The structure of the coalition government—led by President Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC, with a deputy from the DA—complicates decision-making, as previously noted. Additionally, traditional power dynamics suggest a country with diminishing regional and international influence. Beyond South Africa’s moral authority, rooted in its history of overcoming apartheid, the country faces considerable challenges. It ranks first globally in the Gini index [Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution]. Furthermore, its score of –0.72 on the Political Stability Index, coupled with a 33.55% unemployment rate, undermine its capacity to exert influence. An essential facet of South Africa’s international diplomacy is its efforts to shape global rules, aiming to achieve a “soft balance” with dominant regional and international powers. South Africa has effectively leveraged its diplomatic resources to strengthen its ties to various international networks and to reshape the global framework to its advantage. This success is exemplified by its early membership in the BRICS group, its active role in conflict resolution in Africa—having contributed to the settlement of nine African conflicts—and its efforts to enhance the African Union’s role. Notably, South Africa outpaced many global powers in drafting resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly between 1994 and 2023. This achievement is reflected in South Africa’s rise on the political globalization index, moving from approximately 47 points to about 89 points between 1994 and 2022. Additionally, South Africa’s leadership in raising the issue of “genocide” against Israel and the influx of countries from all continents seeking to align with South Africa further underscores this diplomatic trend, which the Palestinian resistance should strategically leverage. Conclusion  South Africa will continue to support the Palestine issue in the foreseeable future, though this support may be less effective due to the recent election results. However, it is crucial to strengthen ties with the ruling ANC and leverage its alliance with Al Jama-Ah Islamic party (which holds two seats) and other pro-Palestine parties, especially in advising on managing relations with South Africa. Additionally, it is important to capitalize on South Africa’s moral standing and its advancements in political globalization indicators.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Qatar emerged as a key player during Operation al-Aqsa Flood conflict, solidifying its role as the leading mediator in the region’s crises and conflicts. Despite the potential challenges posed by the operation on 7/10/2023, given Qatar’s hosting of much of the Hamas leadership, it effectively transformed this challenge into an opportunity. This bolstered Qatar’s influence, strengthening its political standing on both regional and international fronts. First: Determinants of the Qatari Position The Qatari stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by several key factors, foremost among them: 1. Qatar’s unwavering commitment to the Palestine issue and its consistent support for Palestinians in both the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS). Alongside significant contributions to the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) budget, the Qatari grant, ongoing since 2018, has been a crucial financial resource in bolstering the resilience of the people of GS against the severe blockade imposed on them since 2007. 2. Qatar’s proactive policy and continuous ambition to enhance its regional and international presence and political influence have been evident through its strategy of serving as a mediator in various conflicts. Over the past years, this approach has solidified Qatar’s reputation as a trusted and preferred mediator, particularly by the US, as demonstrated in its mediation efforts between the US and the Taliban, Iran and Venezuela. Its recent attempts to mediate between Palestinian resistance movements and Israel represent the culmination of a sustained record of diplomatic successes. 3. Qatar’s openness to various Palestinian factions, its ability to maintain positive and balanced relations, and its hosting of Hamas’s political bureau since 2012 have significantly contributed to building strong ties with the movement. This, in turn, has bolstered Qatar’s role and influence in the Palestinian issue, establishing it as a preferred mediator for Hamas, which has openly expressed appreciation for Qatar’s efforts to support the Palestinian people and to manage constructive and neutral mediation during critical phases. 4. Qatar’s strategic relations with the US have enabled it to play significant roles in the Palestine issue, including hosting Hamas leadership under Qatari-US agreements. In 2022, US President Joe Biden designated Qatar as a major non-NATO ally. 5. Qatar possesses many elements and tools of influence and soft power in the diplomatic, media and economic fields, and its success in utilizing its soft power efficiently has contributed to many political achievements. Second: Aspects of Qatari Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood Although Qatar, like other political actors, was initially taken by surprise by Operation al-Aqsa Flood , it swiftly adapted to the evolving situation. Key aspects of Qatar’s response during Operation al-Aqsa Flood include: 1. Qatar condemned the Israeli war on GS, attributing the escalation and regional instability to Israeli policies. It also denounced the massacres and acts of genocide committed by the Israeli forces against the Palestinian people in both GS and WB. 2. Throughout Operation al-Aqsa Flood , Qatar consistently called for a ceasefire, de-escalation and the restoration of calm in the region. The country actively engaged in political and diplomatic efforts to halt the aggression against Gaza and played a prominent role in the joint extraordinary Arab and Islamic Summit held in Riyadh on 11/11/2023. Qatar also pushed for concrete actions to stop Israeli crimes. During his speech at the summit, the Emir of Qatar stated, “You all know the position and feelings of our people regarding what is happening…. we must take deterrent steps to stop the ongoing war crime, in a way that will also project the weight and leverage of Islamic states.” 3. Qatar addressed the political and media campaigns that sought to incite against it and blamed it for the 7/10/2023 attack due to its hosting of Hamas leadership and financial support for GS with calmness and resolve. On 13/10/2023, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani stressed that the “State of Qatar’s commitment to its role as a partner in peacemaking and a mediator in resolving conflicts should not be used to harm its reputation by leveling accusations that were proven to be false and the bad faith of its promoters exposed.” A statement from the Qatari Foreign Ministry on 16/10/2023 clarified that “Qatar is not a financial backer of Hamas. It provides aid to Gaza, and the destination of the money is crystal clear.” “Qatari aid to the Gaza Strip is fully coordinated with Israel, the United Nations and the United States.” 4. During the crisis, Qatar’s most notable official role was its active diplomacy and leadership in mediating a ceasefire and facilitating prisoner exchange deals between the Palestinian resistance and Israel, with direct US supervision and sponsorship. 5. The Qatari media played a pivotal and influential role during the war, effectively delivering detailed on-the-ground reports and covering political and popular movements both within and beyond Palestine. This represented a significant milestone in media coverage of the war’s developments. In response, on 5/5/2024, the Israeli government unanimously voted to shut down Al Jazeera’s operations in the occupied territories and confiscate its television equipment, citing allegations of incitement and threats to national security. Third: Projections Qatar’s numerous achievements in political mediation underscore the success of its strategy, which emphasizes building long-term relationships with diverse global actors. This approach has afforded Qatar significant leverage, enabling it to effectively mediate many crucial issues. Moving forward, Qatar is anticipated to continue its strategic and active mediation efforts, aiming to secure a ceasefire agreement in GS, despite the obstacles posed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s intransigence and his insistence on continuing aggression. The effect of possible regional escalation on Qatar’s mediation efforts is still unclear, especially if Israel ramps up its confrontation with Iran and Hizbullah in the wake of the recent assassinations of Hamas political bureau chief Isma‘il Haniyyah and Hizbullah military official Fuad Shukr. Additionally, the potential impact of a Donald Trump victory in the upcoming US presidential election on Qatar’s diplomatic and mediation roles in the Palestine issue remains uncertain.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Photo credit: Flickr/Sailing Nomad - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Farea Al-Muslimi, Lisa Boström and Veera Tuomala In recent months, the Red Sea has drawn global attention, particularly due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the deal between Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on access to the Gulf of Aden, which sparked a dispute with Somalia. The rising tensions and increasing military responses risk worsening conflicts in a highly volatile region. The renewed focus on the Red Sea, however, also provides an opportunity to redouble commitment to multilateralism and enhance the collective action needed to address threats facing the region. This blog post gives an overview of current issues in the region and possible ways to address them, building on the outcomes of a panel discussion at the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. Geopolitical competition in the Red Sea region The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint for global and regional contestation, with local, regional and global conflict dynamics deeply intertwined. Regional and global powers are constructing naval bases and military installations around the Red Sea to enhance their power projection, fuelling existing tensions and exacerbating ongoing conflicts. This has aggravated already dire humanitarian conditions, contributing to fragility across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. In Sudan, competition between Gulf states is widely considered a driving factor behind the civil war. In Somalia and Yemen, external influences have fuelled internal disputes and aggravated tensions, undermining state-building efforts and incurring particularly devastating consequences in Yemen. Climate change and a scramble for scarce natural resources and critical commodities, including water, agricultural land and food supplies, may reinforce this dynamic. Gulf states, in particular, have invested billions in agriculture and manufacturing in the Horn of Africa in recent years to secure food production and tap into the region’s burgeoning labour markets. Regional insecurity escalates Insecurity in the Red Sea region reached a critical point in early 2024 when the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in response to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, further threatening regional and international stability, upending trade and disrupting global markets. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out airstrikes against targets in Yemen, while the European Union took a more defensive approach with the launch of Operation ASPIDES to protect vessels. This escalation delayed peace negotiations in Yemen, weakening the fragile trust needed to agree on an extended ceasefire and a roadmap to peace. The Houthi attacks also further compounded humanitarian challenges, disrupting the flow of essential goods and humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region more widely, thus worsening shortages and human suffering. In Sudan around 26 million people, more than half the population, are suffering acute food insecurity. In Yemen, around 22 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, with about 17 million facing acute food insecurity. Instability on both coasts has also increased migration across the Red Sea. The number of migrants from the Horn of Africa arriving in Yemen has nearly tripled in recent years, with tens of thousands making the dangerous crossing annually in search of better economic opportunities. Additionally, the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia has exacerbated regional insecurity, with reports of coordination between the Houthis and the Al-Shabaab armed group in the Horn, increasing the risk of human trafficking and forced migration. Opportunities to strengthen multilateralism, cooperation and collective action The barriers to effective cooperation in the Red Sea region are significant but not insurmountable. Historical rivalries and political instability have eroded trust among countries in the region, and the diverse priorities and strategic interests of these countries complicate collaboration. Despite these challenges, the region holds immense potential for growth and development. The strategic location and resources of countries on both shores, if harnessed constructively and collectively, could spur economic prosperity and regional stability. However, the region can realize its potential and accelerate socio-economic development only through inclusive growth, innovation and addressing long-standing developmental challenges. In this regard, prioritizing economic and regional integration is critical to unlocking the region’s vast potential. Indeed, the geographical proximity between the Horn of Africa and Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has brought about initiatives such as the Bridge of the Horns, proposed in 2007 between Djibouti and Yemen, which represented a bold vision for a more integrated, peaceful and prosperous region. While the project did not materialize, it is symbolic of the potential for deep and mutually beneficial economic, cultural and political ties across the Red Sea. While there are currently no operational overarching mechanisms or forums for multilateral cooperation around the region, the establishment in 2020 of the Red Sea Council—formally the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—could fill this gap. Once operational, it could help to mitigate tensions and foster cooperation towards a shared vision for the region. Moving forward There are several areas where enhanced cooperation is achievable and could benefit the Red Sea region as a whole. For example, establishing joint coastal patrols and information-sharing mechanisms could significantly enhance maritime security and combat piracy, smuggling and terrorism along the vital maritime corridor. Developing regional trade agreements and infrastructure projects could boost economic growth and interdependence, reducing the likelihood of conflict. Collaborative efforts to address climate change, manage shared water resources and protect marine ecosystems could promote sustainability and reduce resource-related tensions. Coordinating humanitarian responses and development programmes could address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, food insecurity, and poor access to education and healthcare. Finally, establishing platforms for dialogue and mediation could help to resolve disputes peacefully, preventing the escalation of conflicts. By focusing on these areas, the countries of the Red Sea region could move towards a more cooperative, stable and prosperous future. Strengthening cooperation through robust multilateral frameworks is vital to addressing the factors that underpin regional insecurity as well as to promoting sustainable development. Regional solutions should be led by the region, rather than relying on external entities whose priorities and resources are currently focused elsewhere. Countries on both coasts of the Red Sea need to view each other as partners for common goals and stability, prioritizing cooperation to connect their needs and interests effectively. As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres notes in the New Agenda for Peace, rebuilding consensus around shared norms and developing new ways for states to act cooperatively is crucial to addressing collective challenges and meeting shared objectives. SIPRI is pleased to share a series of guest blog posts from partners of the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. This blog builds on a panel discussion at the Forum on the topic ‘Red Sea Security in a Time of Disorder’, which was organized by CMI–Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian politicians believed that rapprochement with the US could best be achieved through strengthening ties with Israel. Consequently, India quickly established diplomatic relations with Israel, leading to significant developments in various fields, particularly in security and military areas. As a result, the Palestine issue became a marginal concern for India. However, the relationship has gained significant attention in the Arab world with the onset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which this paper will explore. First: Key Aspects of India’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood In the early hours of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted a strong condemnation of the Palestinian side, echoing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric. It was later revealed that this statement was made without consulting the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, which released a more measured response the following day. This was followed by a series of actions aligned with the policies of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Notably, Indian authorities, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, imposed restrictions, including arrests, on demonstrators showing sympathy for Palestinians facing a genocidal war in the Gaza Strip (GS). Similar actions were observed in other states, including the capital, Delhi, suggesting that this was an Indian official policy. In contrast, Hindu right-wing extremists were permitted to express support for Israel’s war and accuse Palestinian sympathizers of being jihadists and unpatriotic, despite widespread sympathy for Palestinians on social media. At the media level, despite the reluctance of official authorities, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs, and their tendency to take ambiguous stances on the issue, mainstream media has generally maintained a professional and somewhat sympathetic tone towards the Palestinians. Second: Unrestricted Collaboration It was notable that India’s partnership with Israel remained unaffected despite Israel’s crimes against humanity against the Palestinians. In fact, this partnership, particularly in military manufacturing, appears to have a direct impact on Israel’s war efforts. Some drones used by Israeli forces were jointly manufactured with the Indian company Adani. Additionally, munitions originating from India were found in the field, with further discoveries made when Spanish authorities intercepted an Indian ship attempting to bypass the Houthi embargo in the Red Sea. India’s military cooperation with Israel is well-established, having previously participated in the Israeli Blue Flag exercises. Beyond military and security cooperation, India is also deeply involved in the economic sector. Following the withdrawal of Thai workers from Israel’s agricultural sector after 7/10/2023, which severely impacted the Israeli economy, India stepped in to address the labor shortage by sending 100 thousand workers to Israel, where work is already in progress, in an environment that is dangerous, to say the least. Third: Duality of Positions Regarding India’s performance in international organizations, it has generally aligned with the majority of global countries and adhered to the “two-state solution,” notably omitting any reference to East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. This represents a significant shift in India’s position. However, at the bilateral level, India continues to steadily develop its relationships across various fields. This is interpreted as a gesture of gratitude to Israel, which was the only country to supply India with weapons during the Kargil War with Pakistan. India has also sought to avoid antagonizing the US administration by not adopting a policy that contradicts the US stance on Ukraine and Palestine. It is noteworthy that some Arab positions, particularly those of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are in alignment with India’s stance. Fourth: The impact of the Recent General Elections on the Indian Government’s Stance on the Palestine Issue It seems that the decline in the ruling party’s performance in the Indian general elections held in May 2024 did not affect its stance on the Palestine issue. This can be attributed to the persistent determinants that have shaped this position from the outset. Key among these are India’s desire to strengthen its relationship with the US, particularly in the context of countering China through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), commonly known as the Quad, and its aim to enhance economic performance by attracting foreign investment. Additionally, there is ideological alignment between the ruling party and the Zionist movement. Most notably, the Arab push towards normalization and the establishment of relations with Israel has alleviated any pressure on India to reconsider its policies regarding Israel. Consequently, India finds itself in a favorable environment that aligns with its current position. Conclusion India’s policy has focused on strengthening ties with Israel at various levels, while maintaining formal and limited relations with the Palestinian Authority. Its approach to the Palestine issue has been through the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Unlike Russia and China, which have established relations with Hamas and hosted Palestinian delegations in the name of reconciliation, India has not taken this route. The Indian press often deliberately conflates Palestinian resistance with terrorism, despite the fact that India has not officially designated any Palestinian movements as terrorist organizations. A ceasefire that aligns with Israel’s acceptable conditions, which India views as a potential alleviation of the “Palestinian headache,” would be in line with the policy of the current Indian government. This administration appears receptive to any solution supported by the US and the Arab countries. Such a stance enables India to uphold its partnerships with Israel, the US and its Arab allies while avoiding ethical dilemmas related to the beliefs held by some Indian elites regarding India’s historical anti-colonial stance and its support for the Palestine issue. The possibility of India following the example of Russia and China by establishing open relations with Palestinian resistance movements seems unlikely. India’s entry into the Arab world has been facilitated through countries that hold negative attitudes towards these movements, and India may be cautious not to antagonize both the US and the Arab leaders who have normalized relations with Israel.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Major powers shape their foreign policy with a global view, positioning each region based on their opponents’ strategies there. Russia has recognized the need to develop its strategy in the Middle East to counter Western efforts to further disintegrate the Russian Federation after the Soviet Union’s collapse, particularly by fueling separatist inclinations within it. This is crucial for Russia, which includes 22 republics and 89 federal entities, with minorities making up 19% of its population. Russia recognized this trend through the following indicators: 1. The US call at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council Conference in Prague in 2003 to expand NATO’s work east and south, i.e., in an area extending from the Maghreb to Central Asia. 2. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, a practical implementation of NATO’s expansion. 3. In 2021, the Israeli army was shifted from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the Central Command (CENTCOM), whose work covers the area of NATO’s expansion. Russian Strategy in the Middle East The “core” of Russia’s strategy in the Middle East is security and defense, evidenced by its foreign interventions in regions where NATO competes, including Georgia, Crimea, Syria, Libya, Belarus, Ukraine and the Sahel, as affirmed in Shanghai Cooperation Organization discussions. This focus is underscored by 40–50% of Russia’s military sales being directed to the region, alongside efforts to establish military bases in Syria, Libya and Sudan. Additionally, the development of the Russian-Chinese-Iranian strategic triangle, consolidated in 2019 with joint naval maneuvers, has deepened following the war in Ukraine. The Russian Strategic Framework Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The above outlines Russia’s strategic approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on Gaza Strip (GS) as follows: 1. Russia perceives Iran from two perspectives: as its strongest ally in the region and as the central figure in the axis of resistance. Operation al-Aqsa Flood has tested the Russian-Iranian relationship regarding its consistency. The Russian reaction to Israeli attacks on Syria remains insufficient. However, this does underline how Israeli policies are widening the rift in Russian-Israeli relations and gradually nudging Russia towards aligning with the resistance axis, especially given Israel’s support for the Western side in the Ukraine conflict. 2. Russia has feared that the GS war would impact its social stability for the following reasons: a. Riots erupted in Muslim-majority Dagestan following the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Israel shortly after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. b. Many of the Jews who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union hail from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is concerned that differences among these countries could destabilize its internal situation. 3. Russia exploited Western social unrest on the streets, in universities and within institutions to highlight double standards in comparing Western attitudes toward Israel and Russia. Operation al-Aqsa Flood diverted attention from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 4. Operation al-Aqsa Flood redirected some US and Western aid from Ukraine to Israel, easing pressure on Russia. 5. The Israeli stance aligning with Ukraine prompted Russia to seek closer ties with Hamas. Russia utilized this approach to bolster its standing in Muslim countries and the developing world, bridging gaps with Islamic factions concerning its 2015 intervention in Syria. This was underscored by Russia hosting a Hamas delegation on 26/10/2023, resulting in the release of 3 out of 6 Russian captives, and another delegation on 24/6/2024. 6. The Ukrainian conflict compelled Israel to take a firm stance, publicly condemning Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, which subsequently strained Russia’s willingness to mend relations with Israel post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood. 7. If the Ukraine war has unified Western positions against Russia, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has created disparities that Russia is attempting to exploit, particularly following the stance of several European countries, spearheaded by Spain, on recognizing Palestine. 8. Russian public sentiment towards Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath is mirrored in the findings of a poll conducted by the Levada Center on 25/10/2023: • 88% of Russians are aware of the new escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in comparison with a poll regarding events in Ukraine, in which 86% stated they are closely following events. • 66% are not ready to support either side in the conflict. • 21% rather sympathize with the Palestinians, and 6% sympathize with Israel. • Older Russians are nearly four times more likely than younger people to express sympathy towards Palestine, a contrast to the prevailing sentiment in the West. • Only 46% of Russian Muslims sympathize with Palestine, mirroring the sentiment in Central Asian countries. • Respondents noted that the main responsibility for what is happening lies with the US and NATO countries (45%), while 12% place responsibility on Israel, and 8% of respondents place the blame on Hamas/Palestinian side. Russian diplomacy aligns closely with the Axis of Resistance in UN voting on international resolutions. However, regarding the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued rulings against Putin similar to those against the Israeli prime minister and defense minister, Russia does not adhere to the ICC’s rulings, as it is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the court. Concerning the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the genocide case involving Israel, Russia supports the court’s recognition of the principle of Palestinian genocide, emphasizing the urgency of halting violence. Russia’s General Attitudes Toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood Russia’s general stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on GS can be outlined as follows: 1. Endorsing a two-state resolution with a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem as its capital, with full UN membership for this Palestinian state; treating the West Bank (WB) and GS as a unified territory; calling for cessation of Israeli settlements and displacement of Palestinians; and upholding Hashemite guardianship over holy sites. 2. Choosing not to mediate between the resistance groups and Israel, deferring this role to the US, Qatar and Egypt. Nonetheless, Russian statements have reiterated the call for a lasting ceasefire in GS and the urgent release of captives without conditions. This stance was underscored in the April 2024 (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) BRICS statement. Russia has also implicitly criticized Ansar Allah’ activities in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, citing their impact on international maritime navigation freedom. Additionally, Russia has been unable to halt Israel’s ongoing airstrikes on Syrian targets. 3. Inviting delegations from the resistance to consult or assist Palestinians in resolving their internal political issues, seen by Israel as Russian recognition of the legitimacy of all resistance forces. 4. Enhancing Russia’s perception in the Arab public opinion, particularly within segments critical of Russia’s involvement in Syria since 2015. 5. Highlighting the double standards in the Western value system, particularly in how GS and Ukraine are positioned and compared. 6. Russia’s relatively advanced political stance contrasts sharply with its limited financial assistance to Palestine. 7. Between 2018 and 2023, Russia saw a 58.3% increase in exports to Israel and a 27.4% increase in imports. However, the Ukraine crisis and subsequent events have slowed down this growth.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.