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Defense & Security
Bombings and war between Israel and Hamas

Israel has a history of unsuccessful invasions of Lebanon. Will this time be any different?

by Amin Saikal

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Following a massive bombardment of Lebanon, Israel has begun a land invasion of its northern neighbour. Troops have entered southern Lebanon in a bid to push Hezbollah back beyond the Litani River, 29 kilometres from the Israeli border. The stated goal is to facilitate the return of some 60,000 displaced Israelis to their homes in northern Israel. By killing Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and several of his commanders over the weekend, Israel has already struck a serious blow to the group. This has boosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s profile, despite a majority of Israelis wanting to see his departure. Israel is now set to repeat its Gaza operations in Lebanon, with a view to reordering the Middle East in its own interests. But has it bitten off more than it can chew? Unsuccessful track record  Israel has been here before. It invaded Lebanon as far as the capital Beirut in 1982, in an attempt to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was trying to extinguish the Palestinian resistance to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem that had existed since the 1967 Israeli–Arab War. 1982 was also the year Hezbollah was formed with the help of the recently established Islamic government in Iran. Israel empowered its Lebanese Christian allies to massacre hundreds of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut. It also forced the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to shift its headquarters from Beirut to Tunisia. Israel then carved out a security zone to the north of its border, but faced stiff resistance from Hezbollah. As Israeli casualties mounted, the then prime minister Ehud Barak made a unilateral withdrawal in 2000. The pullout amplified Hezbollah’s popularity and strength as a formidable political and paramilitary force against Israel and its allies. Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006 in a bid to wipe out Hezbollah. It failed to achieve its objective. After 34 days of bloody fighting and substantial costs for both sides, it accepted a United Nations Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, with Hezbollah emerging triumphant. Defiant warfare  Netanyahu feels confident of success this time. He also has the backing of his extremist ministers, especially those of national security, finance and defence. He depends on their support for his domestic political survival. Israel has more firepower than ever before. It has displayed it in the Gaza war while revenging Hamas’s killing of more than 1,000 Israelis and abducting some 240 Israeli and foreign nationals on October 7.   In scorched-earth operations, the Israel Defense Forces have flattened swathes of the Gaza Strip and killed more than 40,000 of its civilians – 35% of them were children – with two million more having been repeatedly displaced. In this, the Netanyahu leadership has ignored the norms of warfare, international humanitarian law, a UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, and the International Court of Justice’s warning against genocidal actions. Further, he has brazenly deflected widespread global condemnation of Israeli actions. Buttressing his defiant stance has been the United States’ “iron-clad” military, financial and economic support of Israel. Washington has just approved a further US$8.7 billion (about A$12.5 billion) aid package in support of Israel’s Lebanon campaign. Netanyahu has had no compelling reason even to be amiable to Washington’s calls for restraint or ceasefire. Will this time be different? Netanyahu’s confidence is reinforced still further by Israel’s nuclear capability. Although undeclared, Israel reportedly possesses many nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and military supremacy in the region. Netanyahu and his supporters have claimed their use of disproportionate force to be legitimate in self-defence against what it calls the terrorist tentacles (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah) of the Iranian octopus. With the US and several of its Western and regional Arab allies having shared his posture, Israel is now focused once more on the unfinished business of uprooting Hezbollah. Hezbollah forms a key element of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US. Netanyahu knows destroying the group would mean the breakup of Iran’s national and regional security system. He is not averse to risking a direct confrontation with Iran, while remaining assured of full US support in such an event. Tehran cannot be expected to abandon Hezbollah, but it also has other domestic and foreign policy priorities. Newly elected Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian has assumed power with promises to reduce theocratic political and social restrictions and improve living conditions for most Iranians. Pezeshkian is also committed to improving Iran’s regional and international relations, including reopening negotiations with the West (particularly the US) regarding Iran’s nuclear program, so as to end US-led sanctions. Pezeshkian appears to have the backing of the powerful Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has shown a willingness to be pragmatic when needed. His foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that Hezbollah is capable of defending itself. For now, Tehran’s approach is to let Israel be trapped in Lebanon, as on previous occasions. Hezbollah is not Hamas: it is damaged but still quite well armed and strategically placed. The group will be able to wage an endless resistance to Israeli occupation. This could come at high human and material costs for the Jewish state that could also prevent many Israelis from returning home to northern Israel. At this stage, it is important to remember two points. One is that after a year-long pernicious campaign, Israel still has not completely succeeded in extinguishing Hamas’s resistance. The job of taking on Hezbollah in a ground war could prove to be much harder and more hazardous. The other is that, like Netanyahu, former US president George W. Bush sought to reorder the Middle East according to US geopolitical preferences. He intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq under the guise of a war on terrorism and promoting democracy. But America’s actions further destabilised the region. Since World War II, the application of brute force has rarely served as a viable substitute for diplomacy in managing world problems.

Defense & Security
Cape Town, Western Cape, South Africa - December 10 2023: Pro- Palestinian murals in solidarity with Gaza murals in Bo Kaap district

Political Insights (12): South Africa’s Stance and the Impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  The historical legacy of the Israeli-South African relationship has contributed to the current ambiguity between the two parties. During the early stages, South Africa’s political landscape was divided between a regime that pursued racial discrimination and viewed Israel as an ally from 1948 to 1994. This relationship intensified after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and continued to develop rapidly until 1987, when international efforts to isolate South Africa’s apartheid regime began. Over these two decades, Israeli-South African relations expanded across various fields, including cooperation on the Israeli nuclear project. With the collapse of the apartheid regime and the victory of the nationalist forces led by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, South Africa’s relationship with Israel began to diverge without completely rescinding its recognition of Israel as a state. At that time, Israel maintained an embassy in Pretoria and a commercial office in Johannesburg, while South Africa had an embassy in Tel Aviv. There were also reciprocal visits between officials of the two countries. Notably, South Africa’s first president, Nelson Mandela, visited Israel in 1999, though he had previously hosted Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat in South Africa a year earlier. Current Nature of the Relationship  The Israeli-South African relationship is characterized by South Africa’s support for Palestinian statehood in the 1967 occupied territories, while still maintaining recognition of Israel despite occasional strains. These strains have included several notable events: the recall of the South African ambassador in 2010, the operation of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement in South Africa since 2012, the hosting of a Hamas delegation in 2015, the withdrawal of the South African ambassador and embassy staff from Israel in November 2023 following the first month of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and finally, South Africa’s filing of a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Israel of “genocide of the Palestinian people” in December 2023. Major Changes Following Operation al-Aqsa Flood  In the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa flood, the relationship between Israel and South Africa experienced two key developments that will shape the future of their relationship: 1. The results of the June 2024 elections in South Africa, which saw 52 parties contesting, with 18 parties securing seats in parliament. Notably, the outcome of these elections highlights: a. The ANC, which has been the strongest advocate for the Palestine issue, has diminished in influence. Comparing its seat count from the 2019 to the 2024 elections, the number decreased from 230 to 159 seats, representing a loss of 71 seats, or 31% of its total voting power. b. This outcome suggests that the ANC will no longer be able to unilaterally pass its decisions, particularly in foreign policy, as it has been able to since 1994, when it enjoyed a comfortable majority to advance its governmental decisions. c. To further complicate the situation, other political forces that, to varying extents, opposed the ANC’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood have made significant progress and are now part of a national unity government. These forces include: • The Democratic Alliance (DA), which primarily represents white communities and supports Israel, increased its seats from 84 to 87 between 2019 and 2024. • The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), representing Zulu communities, grew its representation from 14 to 17 seats. • The Patriotic Alliance, which declared its support for Israel following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, secured 8 seats. These election results have diminished the ANC’s ability to monopolize decision-making, placing it in a difficult position as it balances its commitment to Palestine with its interest in maintaining the government coalition. 2. A growing number of countries have joined South Africa in bringing the genocide case against Israel before the ICJ under Articles 62 and 63 of the Court’s Statute. The following countries have formally requested to join the case: Nicaragua (February 8), Belgium (March 11), Colombia (April 5), Turkey (May 1), and Libya (May 10). Additionally, several countries have expressed their intention to join, including Egypt (May 12), Maldives (May 13), Mexico (May 24), Ireland (May 28), Chile (June 2), Spain (June 6), not to mention Palestine (June 3), and Cuba (June 22). However, the court has not yet ruled on any of these requests. The growing number of accession requests strengthens the credibility of South Africa’s case, reflecting the increasing international criticism of Israel. Future Role  South Africa is a significant center of influence on the African continent, ranking sixth in terms of population. However, its internal situation will play a critical role in determining its ability to maintain its political stance on the Middle Eastern conflict. The structure of the coalition government—led by President Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC, with a deputy from the DA—complicates decision-making, as previously noted. Additionally, traditional power dynamics suggest a country with diminishing regional and international influence. Beyond South Africa’s moral authority, rooted in its history of overcoming apartheid, the country faces considerable challenges. It ranks first globally in the Gini index [Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution]. Furthermore, its score of –0.72 on the Political Stability Index, coupled with a 33.55% unemployment rate, undermine its capacity to exert influence. An essential facet of South Africa’s international diplomacy is its efforts to shape global rules, aiming to achieve a “soft balance” with dominant regional and international powers. South Africa has effectively leveraged its diplomatic resources to strengthen its ties to various international networks and to reshape the global framework to its advantage. This success is exemplified by its early membership in the BRICS group, its active role in conflict resolution in Africa—having contributed to the settlement of nine African conflicts—and its efforts to enhance the African Union’s role. Notably, South Africa outpaced many global powers in drafting resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly between 1994 and 2023. This achievement is reflected in South Africa’s rise on the political globalization index, moving from approximately 47 points to about 89 points between 1994 and 2022. Additionally, South Africa’s leadership in raising the issue of “genocide” against Israel and the influx of countries from all continents seeking to align with South Africa further underscores this diplomatic trend, which the Palestinian resistance should strategically leverage. Conclusion  South Africa will continue to support the Palestine issue in the foreseeable future, though this support may be less effective due to the recent election results. However, it is crucial to strengthen ties with the ruling ANC and leverage its alliance with Al Jama-Ah Islamic party (which holds two seats) and other pro-Palestine parties, especially in advising on managing relations with South Africa. Additionally, it is important to capitalize on South Africa’s moral standing and its advancements in political globalization indicators.

Defense & Security
Red Sea - IMG_0150.JPG

Navigating the Red Sea: Addressing threats and harnessing potential

by Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga , Farea Al-Muslimi , Lisa Boström , Veera Tuomala

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Photo credit: Flickr/Sailing Nomad - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Farea Al-Muslimi, Lisa Boström and Veera Tuomala In recent months, the Red Sea has drawn global attention, particularly due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the deal between Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on access to the Gulf of Aden, which sparked a dispute with Somalia. The rising tensions and increasing military responses risk worsening conflicts in a highly volatile region. The renewed focus on the Red Sea, however, also provides an opportunity to redouble commitment to multilateralism and enhance the collective action needed to address threats facing the region. This blog post gives an overview of current issues in the region and possible ways to address them, building on the outcomes of a panel discussion at the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. Geopolitical competition in the Red Sea region The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint for global and regional contestation, with local, regional and global conflict dynamics deeply intertwined. Regional and global powers are constructing naval bases and military installations around the Red Sea to enhance their power projection, fuelling existing tensions and exacerbating ongoing conflicts. This has aggravated already dire humanitarian conditions, contributing to fragility across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. In Sudan, competition between Gulf states is widely considered a driving factor behind the civil war. In Somalia and Yemen, external influences have fuelled internal disputes and aggravated tensions, undermining state-building efforts and incurring particularly devastating consequences in Yemen. Climate change and a scramble for scarce natural resources and critical commodities, including water, agricultural land and food supplies, may reinforce this dynamic. Gulf states, in particular, have invested billions in agriculture and manufacturing in the Horn of Africa in recent years to secure food production and tap into the region’s burgeoning labour markets. Regional insecurity escalates Insecurity in the Red Sea region reached a critical point in early 2024 when the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in response to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, further threatening regional and international stability, upending trade and disrupting global markets. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out airstrikes against targets in Yemen, while the European Union took a more defensive approach with the launch of Operation ASPIDES to protect vessels. This escalation delayed peace negotiations in Yemen, weakening the fragile trust needed to agree on an extended ceasefire and a roadmap to peace. The Houthi attacks also further compounded humanitarian challenges, disrupting the flow of essential goods and humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region more widely, thus worsening shortages and human suffering. In Sudan around 26 million people, more than half the population, are suffering acute food insecurity. In Yemen, around 22 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, with about 17 million facing acute food insecurity. Instability on both coasts has also increased migration across the Red Sea. The number of migrants from the Horn of Africa arriving in Yemen has nearly tripled in recent years, with tens of thousands making the dangerous crossing annually in search of better economic opportunities. Additionally, the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia has exacerbated regional insecurity, with reports of coordination between the Houthis and the Al-Shabaab armed group in the Horn, increasing the risk of human trafficking and forced migration. Opportunities to strengthen multilateralism, cooperation and collective action The barriers to effective cooperation in the Red Sea region are significant but not insurmountable. Historical rivalries and political instability have eroded trust among countries in the region, and the diverse priorities and strategic interests of these countries complicate collaboration. Despite these challenges, the region holds immense potential for growth and development. The strategic location and resources of countries on both shores, if harnessed constructively and collectively, could spur economic prosperity and regional stability. However, the region can realize its potential and accelerate socio-economic development only through inclusive growth, innovation and addressing long-standing developmental challenges. In this regard, prioritizing economic and regional integration is critical to unlocking the region’s vast potential. Indeed, the geographical proximity between the Horn of Africa and Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has brought about initiatives such as the Bridge of the Horns, proposed in 2007 between Djibouti and Yemen, which represented a bold vision for a more integrated, peaceful and prosperous region. While the project did not materialize, it is symbolic of the potential for deep and mutually beneficial economic, cultural and political ties across the Red Sea. While there are currently no operational overarching mechanisms or forums for multilateral cooperation around the region, the establishment in 2020 of the Red Sea Council—formally the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—could fill this gap. Once operational, it could help to mitigate tensions and foster cooperation towards a shared vision for the region. Moving forward There are several areas where enhanced cooperation is achievable and could benefit the Red Sea region as a whole. For example, establishing joint coastal patrols and information-sharing mechanisms could significantly enhance maritime security and combat piracy, smuggling and terrorism along the vital maritime corridor. Developing regional trade agreements and infrastructure projects could boost economic growth and interdependence, reducing the likelihood of conflict. Collaborative efforts to address climate change, manage shared water resources and protect marine ecosystems could promote sustainability and reduce resource-related tensions. Coordinating humanitarian responses and development programmes could address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, food insecurity, and poor access to education and healthcare. Finally, establishing platforms for dialogue and mediation could help to resolve disputes peacefully, preventing the escalation of conflicts. By focusing on these areas, the countries of the Red Sea region could move towards a more cooperative, stable and prosperous future. Strengthening cooperation through robust multilateral frameworks is vital to addressing the factors that underpin regional insecurity as well as to promoting sustainable development. Regional solutions should be led by the region, rather than relying on external entities whose priorities and resources are currently focused elsewhere. Countries on both coasts of the Red Sea need to view each other as partners for common goals and stability, prioritizing cooperation to connect their needs and interests effectively. As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres notes in the New Agenda for Peace, rebuilding consensus around shared norms and developing new ways for states to act cooperatively is crucial to addressing collective challenges and meeting shared objectives. SIPRI is pleased to share a series of guest blog posts from partners of the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. This blog builds on a panel discussion at the Forum on the topic ‘Red Sea Security in a Time of Disorder’, which was organized by CMI–Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation.

Defense & Security
Calcutta,West Bengal,India,14 September ,2023:Anti Israel rally of Indian Muslim with poster , banner and war photograph to support Palestine, demanding to stop war,save child and women and civilian

Political Insights (10): India’s Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Israeli War on Gaza Strip

by Dr. Mohammad Makram Balawi

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian politicians believed that rapprochement with the US could best be achieved through strengthening ties with Israel. Consequently, India quickly established diplomatic relations with Israel, leading to significant developments in various fields, particularly in security and military areas. As a result, the Palestine issue became a marginal concern for India. However, the relationship has gained significant attention in the Arab world with the onset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which this paper will explore. First: Key Aspects of India’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood In the early hours of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted a strong condemnation of the Palestinian side, echoing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric. It was later revealed that this statement was made without consulting the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, which released a more measured response the following day. This was followed by a series of actions aligned with the policies of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Notably, Indian authorities, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, imposed restrictions, including arrests, on demonstrators showing sympathy for Palestinians facing a genocidal war in the Gaza Strip (GS). Similar actions were observed in other states, including the capital, Delhi, suggesting that this was an Indian official policy. In contrast, Hindu right-wing extremists were permitted to express support for Israel’s war and accuse Palestinian sympathizers of being jihadists and unpatriotic, despite widespread sympathy for Palestinians on social media. At the media level, despite the reluctance of official authorities, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs, and their tendency to take ambiguous stances on the issue, mainstream media has generally maintained a professional and somewhat sympathetic tone towards the Palestinians. Second: Unrestricted Collaboration It was notable that India’s partnership with Israel remained unaffected despite Israel’s crimes against humanity against the Palestinians. In fact, this partnership, particularly in military manufacturing, appears to have a direct impact on Israel’s war efforts. Some drones used by Israeli forces were jointly manufactured with the Indian company Adani. Additionally, munitions originating from India were found in the field, with further discoveries made when Spanish authorities intercepted an Indian ship attempting to bypass the Houthi embargo in the Red Sea. India’s military cooperation with Israel is well-established, having previously participated in the Israeli Blue Flag exercises. Beyond military and security cooperation, India is also deeply involved in the economic sector. Following the withdrawal of Thai workers from Israel’s agricultural sector after 7/10/2023, which severely impacted the Israeli economy, India stepped in to address the labor shortage by sending 100 thousand workers to Israel, where work is already in progress, in an environment that is dangerous, to say the least. Third: Duality of Positions Regarding India’s performance in international organizations, it has generally aligned with the majority of global countries and adhered to the “two-state solution,” notably omitting any reference to East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. This represents a significant shift in India’s position. However, at the bilateral level, India continues to steadily develop its relationships across various fields. This is interpreted as a gesture of gratitude to Israel, which was the only country to supply India with weapons during the Kargil War with Pakistan. India has also sought to avoid antagonizing the US administration by not adopting a policy that contradicts the US stance on Ukraine and Palestine. It is noteworthy that some Arab positions, particularly those of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are in alignment with India’s stance. Fourth: The impact of the Recent General Elections on the Indian Government’s Stance on the Palestine Issue It seems that the decline in the ruling party’s performance in the Indian general elections held in May 2024 did not affect its stance on the Palestine issue. This can be attributed to the persistent determinants that have shaped this position from the outset. Key among these are India’s desire to strengthen its relationship with the US, particularly in the context of countering China through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), commonly known as the Quad, and its aim to enhance economic performance by attracting foreign investment. Additionally, there is ideological alignment between the ruling party and the Zionist movement. Most notably, the Arab push towards normalization and the establishment of relations with Israel has alleviated any pressure on India to reconsider its policies regarding Israel. Consequently, India finds itself in a favorable environment that aligns with its current position. Conclusion India’s policy has focused on strengthening ties with Israel at various levels, while maintaining formal and limited relations with the Palestinian Authority. Its approach to the Palestine issue has been through the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Unlike Russia and China, which have established relations with Hamas and hosted Palestinian delegations in the name of reconciliation, India has not taken this route. The Indian press often deliberately conflates Palestinian resistance with terrorism, despite the fact that India has not officially designated any Palestinian movements as terrorist organizations. A ceasefire that aligns with Israel’s acceptable conditions, which India views as a potential alleviation of the “Palestinian headache,” would be in line with the policy of the current Indian government. This administration appears receptive to any solution supported by the US and the Arab countries. Such a stance enables India to uphold its partnerships with Israel, the US and its Arab allies while avoiding ethical dilemmas related to the beliefs held by some Indian elites regarding India’s historical anti-colonial stance and its support for the Palestine issue. The possibility of India following the example of Russia and China by establishing open relations with Palestinian resistance movements seems unlikely. India’s entry into the Arab world has been facilitated through countries that hold negative attitudes towards these movements, and India may be cautious not to antagonize both the US and the Arab leaders who have normalized relations with Israel.

Defense & Security
Russia flag with the Palestine flag 3D rendering with blue sky background

Political Insights (9): Russia’s Strategy Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Israeli War on Gaza Strip

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Major powers shape their foreign policy with a global view, positioning each region based on their opponents’ strategies there. Russia has recognized the need to develop its strategy in the Middle East to counter Western efforts to further disintegrate the Russian Federation after the Soviet Union’s collapse, particularly by fueling separatist inclinations within it. This is crucial for Russia, which includes 22 republics and 89 federal entities, with minorities making up 19% of its population. Russia recognized this trend through the following indicators: 1. The US call at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council Conference in Prague in 2003 to expand NATO’s work east and south, i.e., in an area extending from the Maghreb to Central Asia. 2. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, a practical implementation of NATO’s expansion. 3. In 2021, the Israeli army was shifted from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the Central Command (CENTCOM), whose work covers the area of NATO’s expansion. Russian Strategy in the Middle East The “core” of Russia’s strategy in the Middle East is security and defense, evidenced by its foreign interventions in regions where NATO competes, including Georgia, Crimea, Syria, Libya, Belarus, Ukraine and the Sahel, as affirmed in Shanghai Cooperation Organization discussions. This focus is underscored by 40–50% of Russia’s military sales being directed to the region, alongside efforts to establish military bases in Syria, Libya and Sudan. Additionally, the development of the Russian-Chinese-Iranian strategic triangle, consolidated in 2019 with joint naval maneuvers, has deepened following the war in Ukraine. The Russian Strategic Framework Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The above outlines Russia’s strategic approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on Gaza Strip (GS) as follows: 1. Russia perceives Iran from two perspectives: as its strongest ally in the region and as the central figure in the axis of resistance. Operation al-Aqsa Flood has tested the Russian-Iranian relationship regarding its consistency. The Russian reaction to Israeli attacks on Syria remains insufficient. However, this does underline how Israeli policies are widening the rift in Russian-Israeli relations and gradually nudging Russia towards aligning with the resistance axis, especially given Israel’s support for the Western side in the Ukraine conflict. 2. Russia has feared that the GS war would impact its social stability for the following reasons: a. Riots erupted in Muslim-majority Dagestan following the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Israel shortly after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. b. Many of the Jews who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union hail from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is concerned that differences among these countries could destabilize its internal situation. 3. Russia exploited Western social unrest on the streets, in universities and within institutions to highlight double standards in comparing Western attitudes toward Israel and Russia. Operation al-Aqsa Flood diverted attention from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 4. Operation al-Aqsa Flood redirected some US and Western aid from Ukraine to Israel, easing pressure on Russia. 5. The Israeli stance aligning with Ukraine prompted Russia to seek closer ties with Hamas. Russia utilized this approach to bolster its standing in Muslim countries and the developing world, bridging gaps with Islamic factions concerning its 2015 intervention in Syria. This was underscored by Russia hosting a Hamas delegation on 26/10/2023, resulting in the release of 3 out of 6 Russian captives, and another delegation on 24/6/2024. 6. The Ukrainian conflict compelled Israel to take a firm stance, publicly condemning Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, which subsequently strained Russia’s willingness to mend relations with Israel post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood. 7. If the Ukraine war has unified Western positions against Russia, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has created disparities that Russia is attempting to exploit, particularly following the stance of several European countries, spearheaded by Spain, on recognizing Palestine. 8. Russian public sentiment towards Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath is mirrored in the findings of a poll conducted by the Levada Center on 25/10/2023: • 88% of Russians are aware of the new escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in comparison with a poll regarding events in Ukraine, in which 86% stated they are closely following events. • 66% are not ready to support either side in the conflict. • 21% rather sympathize with the Palestinians, and 6% sympathize with Israel. • Older Russians are nearly four times more likely than younger people to express sympathy towards Palestine, a contrast to the prevailing sentiment in the West. • Only 46% of Russian Muslims sympathize with Palestine, mirroring the sentiment in Central Asian countries. • Respondents noted that the main responsibility for what is happening lies with the US and NATO countries (45%), while 12% place responsibility on Israel, and 8% of respondents place the blame on Hamas/Palestinian side. Russian diplomacy aligns closely with the Axis of Resistance in UN voting on international resolutions. However, regarding the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued rulings against Putin similar to those against the Israeli prime minister and defense minister, Russia does not adhere to the ICC’s rulings, as it is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the court. Concerning the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the genocide case involving Israel, Russia supports the court’s recognition of the principle of Palestinian genocide, emphasizing the urgency of halting violence. Russia’s General Attitudes Toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood Russia’s general stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on GS can be outlined as follows: 1. Endorsing a two-state resolution with a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem as its capital, with full UN membership for this Palestinian state; treating the West Bank (WB) and GS as a unified territory; calling for cessation of Israeli settlements and displacement of Palestinians; and upholding Hashemite guardianship over holy sites. 2. Choosing not to mediate between the resistance groups and Israel, deferring this role to the US, Qatar and Egypt. Nonetheless, Russian statements have reiterated the call for a lasting ceasefire in GS and the urgent release of captives without conditions. This stance was underscored in the April 2024 (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) BRICS statement. Russia has also implicitly criticized Ansar Allah’ activities in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, citing their impact on international maritime navigation freedom. Additionally, Russia has been unable to halt Israel’s ongoing airstrikes on Syrian targets. 3. Inviting delegations from the resistance to consult or assist Palestinians in resolving their internal political issues, seen by Israel as Russian recognition of the legitimacy of all resistance forces. 4. Enhancing Russia’s perception in the Arab public opinion, particularly within segments critical of Russia’s involvement in Syria since 2015. 5. Highlighting the double standards in the Western value system, particularly in how GS and Ukraine are positioned and compared. 6. Russia’s relatively advanced political stance contrasts sharply with its limited financial assistance to Palestine. 7. Between 2018 and 2023, Russia saw a 58.3% increase in exports to Israel and a 27.4% increase in imports. However, the Ukraine crisis and subsequent events have slowed down this growth.

Defense & Security
Paris, France, Europe, May 01, 2024, pro-Palestinian demonstrator at the Paris procession on May 1

Political Insights (8): European Positions on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli War on Gaza Strip:

by Hossam Shaker

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.

Defense & Security
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant in Tel Aviv

The Primacy of Foreign Policy in Reverse: Israel’s War Aims After the Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh

by Benedict Moleta

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Whether or not Israel claims responsibility for the death of Ismail Haniyeh, his assassination abroad may not have improved Israel’s prospects at home. Bringing the war to a conclusion will require a credible correlation of ends and means. In diplomatic history, the “primacy of foreign policy”—with its emphasis on managing external threats, dealing with geography, and the uses of diplomacy—is a concept associated with nineteenth-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, and with the calculations by which Otto von Bismarck brought a Prussian-led Germany into existence. In twentieth-century historiography debates, Eckart Kehr was one figure who argued from the opposite corner, proposing that the primacy of domestic politics exerted its force on statecraft through economic interests, social conditions, and other factors shaping foreign policy from within. In the United States, interactions between domestic interests and foreign policy were analysed by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt in their 2006 paper “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.” The authors argued that their country’s Middle East policy was “due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the ‘Israel Lobby’.” Their paper, and subsequent book, have been both influential and contested—though of course the idea that such a lobby exists was not new. The 1961 memoirs of Sherman Adams (President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff) include remarks on the “many well-organized pro-Israel lobbies that were always effective and influential in the Capitol.” In the case of Israel itself, management of security at and within sovereign borders has been distinctively complicated since Israel’s declaration of statehood in 1948, which provoked five Arab states to send in their armies in contestation of the borders Israel had proclaimed. The status of these borders, and what constitutes Israel’s rightful contiguous territory inside them, have been the subject of ongoing contention and intermittent war ever since. With the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords) of 1993, it was thought by some that political, territorial, and institutional dimensions of a Palestinian state were now realities that could be brought into existence alongside Israel. Whether noble or credulous, such thoughts have not produced political realities during three subsequent decades of administrative activity overseen by the Palestinian Authority (PA)—an entity that has rested on an unpromising basis, especially since the Middle East Quartet disqualified Hamas from being its governing party, following Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006. Financially dependent on external beneficence and Israeli tax and banking, and cooperating with Israel in managing security in the West Bank, the PA since 2006 has also operated without obvious popular legitimacy. While Israel has not been threatened by the forcible establishment of a Palestinian state over these decades, managing Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and especially in Gaza has been an ongoing challenge for Israel’s government and security establishment. Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 ended what Tareq Baconi has described as the containment of Palestinian resistance in Gaza. Over the following ten months, Israel’s siege on Gaza and responses to volatility in the West Bank have had aims that could be called domestic policy; to eliminate Hamas militarily and kill its leaders, to rescue Israeli hostages in Gaza, and to restore domestic security in Israel by preventing a Hamas-led threat from ever confronting Israel again. As of August 2024, Israel’s war aims have yet to be achieved, although Hamas’ military capabilities have been reduced, senior figures have been killed, and a small number of hostages have been rescued. Meanwhile violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank, civil unrest in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and difficult domestic matters such as the drafting of haredi (ultra-orthodox) Jews into the Israeli Defense Forces have accompanied disunity in Israel’s government and divisions and disagreements between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Defense Minister and military Chief of Staff. With the domestic objectives of the war unachieved, and the restoration of post-war stability not yet within Israel’s grasp, the primacy of international factors has come more obdurately into view over the course of the year. This is not only a matter of international threats (arising from an incipient multi-front war), but also a matter of international progress toward a ceasefire—since internationally-mediated hostage diplomacy (via Qatar and Egypt) is the only mode in which limited negotiation between the adversaries has been possible, and was the only means through which, in November 2023, a large number of Israeli captives could be released. But while internal and external factors have neither merged into an Israeli victory, nor been resolved into separately successful domestic and foreign policies, the assassination of Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh on 31 July, and the subsequent appointment of Yahya Sinwar as head of Hamas on 6 August, have now brought domestic and international aspects of Israel’s war into newly fraught relations. The combination of volatility and stasis can be seen both abroad and in Gaza. Abroad, Israel has not claimed responsibility for the death of Haniyeh. But since the assassination happened in Iran (during Haniyeh’s visit to attend the swearing-in of new President Masoud Pezeshkian), Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has said it is Iran’s “duty” to “avenge the blood” of Haniyeh. The threats may not lead to significant Iranian action, considering the consequences that Iran might then face from an Israeli counter-attack. But regardless of the prospect of retaliation by Iran itself, regional tensions have only risen as a result of Haniyeh’s death—and this can only be a source of increased uncertainty for Israel. In Gaza, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh abroad has produced a condition for Israel that we could call the primacy of foreign policy in reverse. This condition pertains to headship of Yahya Sinwar, and to the internationally-mediated ceasefire and hostage talks through which Israel aims to save its citizens’ lives. Third-party mediators have played an essential role in the successes of hostage diplomacy thus far. But mediators—Qatari, Egyptian or others—can only mediate on the basis of demands made by the parties themselves, and those demands will necessarily be made by the senior decision makers on each side. Having eliminated a political chief who could operate independent of the siege on Gaza, it might be thought that Israel’s aim to dismantle Hamas is now coalescing in the prospect of killing one senior terrorist, contained in the coastal enclave. But such embodiment of war aims in one Hamas target is obviously spurious, and, as Khaled Hroub wrote a quarter of a century ago: “Even if the current organization is eliminated, it will reproduce itself once again in a new guise.” But the greater uncertainty following the assassination of Haniyeh pertains to the future of hostage negotiations with a Hamas now led by Sinwar. Assuming Sinwar is still located somewhere in Gaza, it does not seem likely that he will be any more accommodating as a hostage negotiator than he has been detectable as a target for assassination. Prime Minister Netanyahu may be drawn to accept US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recommendations for the talks’ next steps—but Blinken is expecting a lot by stating “It’s now incumbent on Hamas to do the same.” In these new conditions, the primacy of foreign policy in reverse consists in the fact that, having successfully eliminated a senior Hamas leader abroad, Israel may have reduced its chances of bringing its hostage citizens home alive.

Defense & Security
Displaced Palestinians set up their tents next to the Egyptian border. They fled to the city of Rafah on March 8, 2024 after the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip cities.

Rafah, between ceasefire announcements and the resumption of fighting: Israel’s strategic dilemma.

by Giuseppe Dentice

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the last 48 hours, a series of events and situations have significantly contributed to redefining the military and diplomatic scenario in Gaza. It all began on the night of May 5, when Hamas launched several rockets that hit Israel, causing some civilian casualties. At the same time, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded to the act with massive artillery bombardments against several Hamas positions in the al-Zahraa, al-Mughraqa, and Nuseirat camps (in the central-northern areas of the Gaza Strip) and took control of the Kerem Shalom crossing, which separates the enclave from Israeli territory. However, the IDF's actions went further with the announcement on May 6 of the expansion of the humanitarian area of al-Mawasi (in the coastal south of the Strip). This choice seems to be driven by the political will to regain control of the southern strip of Palestinian territory through the forced evacuation of Palestinian refugees from Rafah and Khan Younis towards al-Mawasi (where it is estimated that over 100,000 people will arrive shortly), also guaranteed by the Israeli resumption of the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing. All these actions seem to suggest a green light from the war cabinet for the launch of the repeatedly announced Israeli ground operation in the area. Simultaneously with the war preparations, just a few hours later, came the unexpected announcement from Hamas that it had accepted a proposal for a ceasefire in Gaza. The terms of the ceasefire – admittedly still very unclear given the often-unreliable media reports – were reportedly mediated by Egypt and Qatar, with U.S. approval, which reportedly infuriated representatives of Tel Aviv. Based on the details announced by Hamas officials, the proposal is expected to outline a three-phase plan. The first phase involves a 42-day ceasefire period during which Hamas would release 33 hostages in exchange for the release of some Palestinian militants detained in Israeli prisons. In the second phase, Tel Aviv would partially withdraw its troops from Gaza and allow the free movement of Palestinians from the south to the north of the Strip. After this preliminary phase, another 42-day period would be activated only if it clearly emerged that both parties were willing to restore a climate of "sustainable calm" in Gaza, which would also favor the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the area and the final release of the reservists and IDF soldiers held by Hamas. To crown this prolonged "silence of arms," the final step would be reached: the establishment of a true ceasefire and the start, among other things, of a reconstruction phase, including the end of the total Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, according to a plan supervised and shared by Qatar, Egypt, the USA, and the United Nations. Based on leaks and fragmented information, it is very difficult to make precise assessments, but it is plausible to imagine that if the terms of the agreement were as presented here, it would be very difficult – almost impossible – for Israel to accept the Egyptian-Qatari proposal. It would be much more satisfying for their expectations to continue with a military operation in Rafah. In the preceding days, the Israeli war cabinet had also explained the necessity of maintaining its action in Gaza unchanged, with or without an agreement with Hamas, as it was fundamental and strategic to achieve its primary objective: the destruction and eradication of the Islamist organization from the Palestinian enclave. Given this evidence, both the nature and complete terms of the diplomatic proposal accepted by Hamas, as well as the Israeli willingness to follow through on the agreement, are fundamental to creating a positive development in the current dynamics. However, no actor (regional or international) involved in the negotiations is under the illusion that a turning point has been reached, given both the opposing positions of the contenders and the operation in Rafah, which is now about to enter the heart of the action. This latter element is crucial to understanding the behavior and calculated risk taken by Hamas. In fact, at least until late afternoon on May 6, the organization had shown no interest in the Egyptian-Qatari proposal. The change of pace would suggest that the Islamist organization may have wanted to take advantage of the situation to put the ball back in the opponent's court, shifting all responsibility to Israel in the event of its refusal to follow through with the ceasefire, preferring instead military action in Rafah. In this regard, it could be argued that Hamas's twist of events was as clever as it was politically significant in contributing to weakening Tel Aviv's position. Not surprisingly, the movement led by Ismail Haniyeh understands that Israeli mediators cannot accept any negotiation that involves the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, the end of the total blockade of the enclave's borders, but above all, the continuation in power of the organization towards, which Benjamin Netanyahu himself has declared, their destruction as an undeniable objective. A position that, regardless of whether Israel accepts the agreement already approved by Hamas in whole or in part, as well as its rejection, would expose Israel to a difficult condition of internal contention and to some strategic considerations that the Islamist movement knows well and has already exploited precisely to launch that tremendous attack on the heart of the country on October 7, 2023. In the perspective of Tel Aviv, the acceptance or rejection of the proposal by Egypt and Qatar, as well as the start of the operation in Rafah, raise a series of questions on multiple fronts, in which Netanyahu plays his usual game of political survival. If his government were to follow through with the agreement and stop/postpone the operation in Rafah, it would undoubtedly benefit diplomatically, enjoying a resurgence of credit after the storms of recent months. However, this would also mean opening an internal front, especially within his government, with extremist ministers threatening the fall of the executive. Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have clearly stated that without the destruction of Hamas and the conquest of Rafah (and the entire Strip), the government would have no reason to exist. At the same time, even more moderate figures in the war cabinet, such as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant or Ministers Benny Gantz and Gady Eisenkot, have not taken a clear position, wavering between the possibility of a more contained humanitarian ceasefire and the wavering political opportunism on the military operation in Rafah in a challenge that seems more oriented towards the country's future and the conquest of the conservative electorate and the national right, the current Prime Minister's target audience. However, it is equally true that even in the face of a rejection of the international proposal, some clear repercussions would emerge: Israel would worsen its position and reputation, although it could keep that government in place that is now pushing relentlessly on Rafah. Such a situation would not avoid, either, domestic social protests by the families of the hostages, who demand guarantees from the government not to endanger the lives of their loved ones. In both cases, Tel Aviv would be called into question and would risk losing internal and external credibility, along with the political and security dilemma (mainly supported by the military establishment) linked to the failure to eradicate Hamas. Such a fluid and unpredictable scenario with potential repercussions even on different levels of the regional and international context. In fact, a resumption of hostilities in Rafah would have the opportunity to activate the Lebanese scenario in a different way than what has happened so far (where violent exchanges of fire have been occurring along the Blue Line border areas for days) and lead to a worsening of security conditions in the West Bank (especially in the triangle between Tulkarem-Nablus-Jenin, where IDF raids have become more pressing). A similar situation could open the door to external actions by other actors interested in instability, such as Iran, which would benefit from the role played by its proxies in Syria and Iraq, as well as the potential and renewed threat from the Yemeni Houthi militias to exert pressure on Israel, but also on other regional players involved in the ongoing dynamics - the thought in these cases essentially revolves around Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which for different reasons have so much, and perhaps even too much, to lose from an escalation of the Gaza scenario. No less decisive must be considered the international impact of Tel Aviv's rejection of the Egyptian-Qatari proposal, especially considering how the United States has been engaged in recent weeks in trying to convince its ally to reconsider its positions on Iran and advocate for particular attention to the humanitarian situation in Gaza. In this sense, Washington has clearly expressed its warning to its ally about the risks associated with a possible miscalculation that could open up various considerations. Not surprisingly, the White House can always leverage the issue of military supplies as a tool of pressure. Just last week, the United States suspended a shipment of ammunition to Israel without providing details on the reasons. It could have been a simple bureaucratic error or a signal, but it's evident that considering such a scenario would provide new space and considerations for both internal and external detractors of the Biden Administration. Conversely, such a development could give new impetus to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has never hidden his strained relationship with almost all US administrations he has collaborated with during his 15 years in office. With the sole exception of the Trump Administration, which in the post-election American context could see the New York tycoon returning as the new occupant of the White House and Israel's key partner in the Middle East. Therefore, the assessments remain complex and highly susceptible to changes due to the volatility of the local scenario. However, it is undeniable that from this initiative, Israel has much to lose, and the concrete risk is that Hamas has carefully assessed this "trap" with the intention of further weakening Tel Aviv. License under Creative Commons Attribution – ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0).

Defense & Security
Tehran Enghelab Iran - April 29, 2022: Al Quds day march against Israel in Iran

Iran Has Retaliated Against Israel for Its Killing of Several Quds Force Generals

by Michael Young

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Spot analysis from Carnegie scholars on events relating to the Middle East and North Africa. What Happened? On the night of April 13–14, Iran retaliated for the killing by Israel of senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, including Brig. Gen. Mohammed Zahedi, the commander for Syria and Lebanon, Gen. Hossein Aminullah, the chief of staff for Syria and Lebanon, and Maj. Gen. Mohammed Hadi Haj Rahimi, the commander for Palestine. The Iranians fired around 200 missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Israel, but Israeli military officials said most were shot down and the destruction was minor. The Iranian retaliation had been expected, with U.S. officials even predicting the exact time of the anticipated attack to news outlets. The considerable publicity before the event, Iranian assurances that the response would seek to avert a regional conflict, and the fact that Iran knew that Israel and the United States would be able to monitor the launches of the missiles and drones early on and shoot down a large number of them, suggest the Iranians may have been looking to achieve more of a psychological impact than cause major death and destruction. In this regard, few images were more powerful from the Iranian perspective than that of missiles flying over Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. This symbolized best Iranian ambitions to liberate one of Islam’s holiest sites from Israeli control, while personifying Israel’s vulnerabilities against the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. Why Is It Important? Israel has long assumed that it’s security can only be guaranteed by ensuring that the balance of military power with its enemies leans heavily in its favor. This harks back to the notion of the “iron wall,” first enunciated by the Revisionist Zionist thinker Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who argued in an essay in 1923 that Jewish colonization of Palestine had to proceed behind an “iron wall” of Zionist military superiority. The only way that Arabs would agree to the Jewish presence in Palestine, he wrote, “is the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure. In other words, the only way to reach an agreement in the future is to abandon all idea of seeking an agreement at present.” Today, that principle has been expanded by Israel to encompass the entire region. Though Jabotinsky was an enemy of the Labor Zionists who ultimately dominated Israeli political life for decades, his idea of an “iron wall” has been embraced by Israel’s leadership and military for some time. That is why the response to the October 7 Hamas attacks in Gaza has been so ferocious. It is also the reasoning behind the so-called “Dahiya Doctrine,” which was notably articulated by an Israeli general, Gazi Eisenkot, currently a government minister. The doctrine, which first emerged during Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, holds that Israel will engage in a disproportionate destruction of its foes’ civilian and military infrastructure in order to dissuade them from ever attacking Israel. However, when Israel bombed the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus on April 1, it crossed an Iranian red line. While the Iranians had more or less accepted the systematic Israeli killing of IRGC figures over the years in Syria, along with members of Hezbollah, this could be justified by the fact that Iran was successfully setting up a military infrastructure in southern Syria with which to bomb Israel and the occupied Golan. It made no sense to jeopardize that effort by entering into a major conflagration with the Israelis, and perhaps even the United States. The embassy compound attack was a different matter. Not only did it affirm Israel’s willingness to ignore diplomatic protection (even though Israel’s supporters argued that the building where the IRGC figures were killed was not, technically, a diplomatic facility), it took place in a broader context since October 7 in which Israel has sought to alter the rules of engagement in Syria and Lebanon to their advantage, narrowing Iran’s and Hezbollah’s margin of maneuver. In other words, it went to the heart of the rivalry between Israel and Iran over regional hegemony, and it was obvious that Iran would not allow this to happen. More worryingly, the embassy compound bombing could also have been an effort by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to drag the United States into a conflict with Iran. To decisively weaken the Iranians and their nuclear program are Israeli priorities, but Israel needs U.S. participation in any bombing campaign against the Islamic Republic for this to succeed, with the added hope that Iran’s leadership can be overthrown. Washington has repeatedly avoided this. According to NBC News, President Joe Biden expressed concern about Netanyahu’s intention to provoke a wider war, and he quickly moved to limit Israel’s options. What Are the Implications for the Future? For the immediate future, the main news item on the morning of April 14 was Biden’s conversation with Netanyahu in which he made two things clear: First, that Iran had failed to do much damage, so that Israel should consider this a success. “You got a win. Take the win,” Biden reportedly said. And second, in light of the Iranian failure, the United States saw no need to escalate the situation further and provoke a region-wide conflict. Therefore, if Israel decided to hit back against Iran, the Biden administration would not participate in any such operation. How Israel will react to this remains unclear. Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, said that the tensions with Iran “were not over,” after Netanyahu had stated, on the evening of April 13, that “Whoever harms us, we will harm them. We will defend ourselves against any threat and will do so level-headedly and with determination.” It’s conceivable that Netanyahu will chose to respond on his own, but if the aim is to reestablish an equitable deterrent, the prime minister cannot afford to allow such a response to come up short. All the signs are that Iran retains a wide array of means to harm Israel and wear it down through a thousand small cuts. Moreover, Netanyahu’s forces are still fighting in Gaza, so that escalating the conflict regionally would only further complicate the grinding battle against Hamas. More generally, for the first time in its history, Israel looks dangerously exposed. The country may not be facing an existential threat, but it is reaping the fruits of a cynical policy largely built on ignoring Palestinian and Arab rights, while blocking all avenues that might force Israel to surrender occupied land. The Iranians have exploited this well, and even if their latest attacks did not cause major devastation, subsequent strikes, particularly ones with less prior signaling, may be much bloodier. On its own, this is enough for Iran to say that it has reimposed a balance of deterrence, even if it remains to be seen whether further attacks against Iranian officials in Syria will invite similar retaliation from Iranian territory. It is this perception of helplessness that is stuck in the craw of Israeli leaders. Israel has long projected an image of strength. The Iranians have succeeded in scratching that image. It’s difficult to see how Netanyahu can go along with Biden’s suggestion that he “take a win,” when everything about Iran’s assault suggested less than that.

Defense & Security
Washington DC, USA - October 21, 2023: Pro-Palestine, anti-Israel protesters.

Gaza: a litmus test for the humanitarian sector’s commitment to decolonisation?

by Zainab Moallin , Nosheen Malik , Leen Fouad

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Despite shifts in governance, vast sums of international aid and various peace talks, the Occupied Palestinian Territories cannot escape perpetual crisis due to Israel’s decades-long occupation. Amidst the latest surge of violence in Gaza since 7 October, the world contends not only with a devastating civilian death toll but also a battle of narratives – with questions of how this violence is being framed, depicted and portrayed publicly, or the ‘stories’ that are shaping the public’s perception of the conflict. The limits of neutrality While much of the world has, quite rightly, focused on unpicking the narratives shaped by political figures and the media, as well as their consequences, much less attention has turned to narratives emanating from the humanitarian sector. Profound disagreements are rife between humanitarian leadership and staff, revealing concerns about the presence of ‘neutrality’ as staff highlight insufficient acknowledgement of longstanding Palestinian oppression and question the proximity of some United Nations agencies’ leadership to the United States government. The repeated refusal of the United Kingdom and the US governments to call for a ceasefire has been mirrored by some international organisations, and many of those who did used underwhelming language when talking about Palestinian rights and Israeli accountability. The New Humanitarian reports on a disconnect between aid workers from the Global South, where most humanitarian activity is situated, and the sector’s disproportionately Western decision-makers, raising the question: is the humanitarian principle of neutrality increasingly at odds with decolonisation? By promoting an objective, non-partisan approach, neutrality inadvertently aligns with ‘saviourism’, implying that international aid actors are the only ones capable of fair and neutral arbitration. This notion reflects disturbing racist underpinnings, as it appears to privilege international actors above community members. Ending the occupation For many international organisations, neutrality is seen to improve access to affected populations in conflict. However, if aid agencies are willing to trade access for truth and justice, what is the genuine purpose of humanitarianism? Many aid professionals are urging humanitarian organisations to step out from behind the long-held tones of measured neutrality to instead be ‘more representative of the Global South’. According to one aid worker, ‘It did not start with the war on Gaza. Our organisations know better. It is a bit shocking to see that some organisations are even reluctant to say, “end of occupation.”’ Prior to the Oslo Accords, most aid to Palestinians was ‘emergency’ in nature. However, following the agreement, the focus shifted towards supporting the establishment of a two-state solution – a goal that remains unachieved 30 years later. This shift has overlooked a critical issue: humanitarian efforts have not effectively confronted the root cause of the need for aid, which is effectively Israel's occupation. Across the Occupied Palestinian Territories, UNRWA’s presence has enabled Israel to maintain its system of control, without having to assume full responsibility for the livelihoods, essential services and basic rights of the occupied population. In other words, by not directly challenging the root causes of Palestinian suffering, humanitarian aid has placed Palestinians on life support for the last 75 years. The interplay between humanitarianism and decolonisation The enduring challenges faced by the humanitarian sector are not without precedent. The ‘first wave’ of global NGO expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, a period marked by widespread decolonisation, saw humanitarian efforts aiming to fundamentally alter the course of the newly independent nations. This reciprocal influence between a decolonising world and the evolving field of humanitarianism set the stage for both its achievements and its limitations. But nowhere were the moral hazards of humanitarianism during twentieth-century decolonisation more apparent than in relation to the forced resettlement of civilians. Forced resettlement, often undertaken in the guise of humanitarian intervention, laid bare the complex ethical dilemmas and unintended consequences that can arise when aid intersects with political agendas and colonial legacies. Today, over 80% of Gaza’s population has been internally displaced since October, and Israel’s military offensive has turned much of Gaza’s landscape into uninhabitable land as whole neighbourhoods and agricultural land have been erased. The Israeli government has not publicly confirmed any plan for Gaza’s population, but Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel suggested in December that an ‘option’ would be ‘to promote the voluntary resettlement of Palestinians in Gaza, for humanitarian reasons, outside of the Strip’. An active commitment to decolonisation In confronting Israel’s settler-colonial military tactics, the humanitarian sector must stay true to its decolonisation commitments. The sector can learn from the ways in which humanitarian need was framed during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. As the anti-apartheid movement developed into a global political discourse, it revealed how Black South Africans were not only victims of racial injustice, but of a system designed specifically for collective punishment. A humanitarian discourse against apartheid developed, highlighting it as a driver of crisis that must be dismantled. Global solidarity was paramount. Decolonisation is not an academic pursuit. It is not a metaphor, nor is it a box-checking exercise. The humanitarian sector’s commitment to decolonisation is more critical now than ever – it is essential when entire families are wiped out, countless Palestinian children are orphaned and hundreds of thousands of people are on the precipice of famine. It is vital when Western media continues to peddle age-old racist and Orientalist tropes of ‘violent’ and ‘savage’ Arab men to justify Palestinian suffering. Decolonisation means the humanitarian sector must amplify Palestinian narratives, highlighting the ways in which Palestinians have endured decades-long occupation and oppression. Humanitarians’ influence must be leveraged for long-term justice for Palestinians. Anything less will perpetuate the sector’s role as an ineffectual bandage to a 75-year-old wound.