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Geopolitical tensions have intensified across the Middle East, amplifying the Iran-Israel standoff and reshaping regional power dynamics. Israel, deeply impacted by recent events, has adopted a more aggressive security stance, intensifying efforts to neutralise perceived threats from Iran’s regional network of proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shiite militias.

Far from being minor, these dramatic developments reshape the strategic balance between Iran and Israel while considerably limiting Tehran’s options moving forward. 

Strengths and Constraints of Iran’s Asymmetric Strategy 

Hezbollah remains the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East, meticulously armed and funded for nearly 40 years to indirectly challenge Israel and the US. With around 150,000 missiles and 80,000 fighters, this Lebanese Shiite militia serves as one of Iran’s main spearheads against Israel, providing a strategic foothold in southern Lebanon, and exerting pressure on Israel’s northern border. However, the destruction of nearly half of Hezbollah’s military capabilities over the past year, as reported by Israeli sources, along with the loss of key military and political leaders, is severely altering the balance between Israel and Iran. While Hezbollah has historically been a strategic shield for Iran, it is now fully reliant on the actions—or inactions—of the Iranian leadership. 

The dismantling of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities and the disruption of its decision-making apparatus come alongside the crippling of Hamas—another long-time ally of Tehran in its struggle against Israel. After nearly a year of conflict with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas is facing existential challenges, and its leaders, including figures like Yahya Sinwar, have had their ability to act severely weakened.  

It would be premature to consider an end to Hamas and Hezbollah. Both groups remain key players in the conflict with Israel despite heavy airstrikes on their command-and-control centers. Despite recent setbacks, they continue receiving support from Iran and other allies, while their actions in Gaza and the Galilee persist. But, although these two organisations remain active, and their ability to recover shouldn’t be underestimated, their operational strength and impact on the balance of power with Israel have been significantly weakened. This, in turn, reduces the short-term influence of their Iranian sponsor in the Levant.  

The limits of ballistic deterrence and the nuclear temptation 

The neutralisation of Hezbollah and Hamas has significantly reduced the Islamic Republic of Iran’s room for maneuver, and its leaders are faced with choices that, as many analysts observe, all carry major disadvantages. 

The ballistic confrontation between Iran and Israel has clearly highlighted the limitations of conventional military capabilities for Tehran. On 13-14 April, Iran launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for the destruction of an annex of its embassy in Damascus. On 1 October, Tehran launched a new salvo of missiles in what it called Operation True Promise Two, in response to the elimination of key Iranian-backed leaders like Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah.  

In both cases, the Iranian attacks were aimed at conveying resolve to Israel, reestablishing deterrence, and reassuring the various components of the “Axis of Resistance,” increasingly concerned about Iran’s relative idleness. Each time, however, Israel’s air defence system, supported by its American ally, intercepted the vast majority of Iranian projectiles. During the April exchange of fire, the IDF responded by targeting an airbase in Isfahan tasked with safeguarding the Natanz nuclear facility, highlighting Iran’s vulnerabilities and limitations in its ballistic missile defences. 

Given the limitations of its ballistic shield and the diminished potential of its proxy network, Iranian political and military leaders are increasingly aware that these resources are not enough for protecting the Islamic regime. Confronted with Israel’s strategy to contain Iran by dismantling its asymmetric warfare capabilities, they recognise a significant decline in terms of strategic depth. Acknowledging this mounting pressure, they are prompted to seek alternative solutions to compensate for these losses. Consequently, they are rationally driven to fortify the security of their Iranian stronghold by enhancing their nuclear deterrent capabilities. 

Since 7 October 2023, the Islamic regime has significantly accelerated its nuclear activities, enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels. By the end of 2023, Iran was producing about nine kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent monthly, raising concerns due to its rapid potential for further enrichment. Despite earlier pauses in production, the rate has surged in response to heightened geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the US, and allies have criticised this acceleration. This summer, Kamal Kharrazi, a close aide to Iran’s Supreme Leader, raised international concerns by mentioning a potential “change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine.” 

The Eastern Pivot and Its Drawbacks 

However, with no indication that Iran will be able to acquire an effective nuclear umbrella in the short term, the mullahs and the Guardians are compelled to consider alternative solutions. On the diplomatic front, Iranian leaders are faced with two equally unsatisfactory options due to their negative implications for Iranian sovereignty. The first possibility would be to seek a reconciliation with the West. Tasked with embodying this scenario, President Massoud Pezechkian recently expressed Tehran’s desire to renew ties with liberal democracies and reopen negotiations over their nuclear dispute. However, significant mistrust and numerous obstacles still hinder the warming of relations, especially if a new Republican administration takes office in Washington. 

The alternative path, already widely explored by Tehran, is to move forward with the so-called “Look East” doctrine. In fact, Tehran has continuously sought to strengthen its ties with Beijing and Moscow in recent years. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a comprehensive economic and security agreement, marking a significant step towards deeper cooperation. In September 2021, Iran began its accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional bloc led by Russia and China. Since February 2022, Iran has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has even provided logistical and military support to Moscow.  

At the September 2022 SCO summit, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping welcomed the Islamic Republic, highlighting the regime’s growing ties within a bloc opposing Western influence. In January 2023, Iran became a full BRICS member, and, recently, Tehran and Moscow have enhanced their military collaboration, raising concerns about potential nuclear cooperation. Nonetheless, this pivot toward the Eastern bloc could threaten Iranian sovereignty by tying the regime’s future more closely to that of Russia and China, undermining Iranian nationalism and the aspiration to preserve independence. 

The Islamic regime teetering on the brink of profound transformation 

Faced with a drastic reduction in its international geopolitical room for maneuver, the Islamic Republic is also going through a serious economic crisis while facing a growing questioning of its internal political legitimacy. In all respects, the regime is at a crossroads; a decisive turning point that could go so far as to destabilise its political foundations.  

In the past, showing extraordinary resilience, Tehran has always managed to get out of trouble by maintaining the course of its multifaceted policy conducted on all fronts and by all available means. Placed in a position of military and economic inferiority, the Iranian outsider has adopted an asymmetrical approach with considerable success by striving to avoid frontal combat and by striking blows where it was not expected. In this, the Iran of the mullahs and the guardians has managed, to borrow Henry Kissinger’s words, to “win by not losing.” 

The capacity of Islamist leaders to navigate significant challenges and uphold their once unchallenged grip on the country now seems to be wavering. Increasing threats, coupled with a narrowing of strategic options, have placed the regime in a precarious position. The tactics and remedies that previously aided in maintaining the system’s stability no longer appear adequate to ensure the longevity of the political and ideological regime established in 1979.