Subscribe to our weekly newsletters for free

Subscribe to an email

If you want to subscribe to World & New World Newsletter, please enter
your e-mail

Energy & Economics
Hydropower plant in Dubossary, Moldova

Energising eastern Europe: How the EU can enhance energy sovereignty through cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova

by Szymon Kardaś

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Summary • Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has made strengthening energy sovereignty – its own and that of its eastern neighbours – a strategic priority. • Along with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU has created an elaborate legal and institutional framework that provides a platform for energy cooperation. • Through this framework and other measures, the EU and member states have helped significantly strengthen the energy sovereignty of Moldova and Ukraine, in particular helping them to diversify away from Russian fossil fuels and synchronising their electricity grids with that of the EU. • But when it comes to the cleanness and efficiency of their energy, Moldova and Ukraine are still underperforming, despite their potential for green energy generation. Improving the cleanness of their energy would also help strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty, increasing the mutual benefits of closer energy cooperation. • Ukraine’s vast gas reserves and extensive gas infrastructure, along with its potential for green hydrogen production and the significant development of renewable energy sources in both countries offer opportunities for cooperation with the EU, which could enhance both its energy security and decarbonisation efforts. Introduction Since the beginning of Russia’s war on Ukraine, strengthening energy sovereignty has become one of the most strategic foreign policy goals of the European Union, its member states, and many other countries. Before the war, Russia was the EU’s largest source of imports of crude oil and petroleum products and in 2021 the state-owned energy corporation Gazprom accounted for 41 per cent of the EU’s gas imports. In the aftermath of the invasion, the EU and member states scrambled to reduce their dependency on Moscow for energy supplies, diversifying their suppliers of oil and gas. In 2023, Gazprom’s share of the EU’s gas imports fell to just 8 per cent. But the EU also has a clear interest in strengthening the energy sovereignty of its neighbouring countries, especially of Ukraine and Moldova on its eastern border. The stable functioning of the energy systems of neighbouring countries is one of the cornerstones of their security, and therefore the stability and security of the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. The European Commission has thus identified supporting Ukraine and other countries that are directly or indirectly affected by Russian aggression through long-term international partnerships as among the most important objectives of the EU’s external energy policy. Energy cooperation is also a powerful tool for integration. Energy sovereignty should not be equated with state energy autonomy or autarky; international cooperation within alliances or integration relationships such as the EU is an important component. Political allies can be reliable and secure suppliers of energy resources to import-dependent countries – the United States and Norway, for example, play such a role for many EU countries. The development of energy infrastructure links for gas or electricity between partner states, such as the EU and its eastern neighbours, would enable them to provide mutual support in times of crisis. The EU’s desire to strengthen energy sovereignty throughout its neighbourhood is first and foremost related to the need to reduce dependency on Russia and aid the integration of its neighbours. But strengthening energy sovereignty will also require a reduction in fossil fuel consumption, and is therefore closely linked to achieving one of the EU’s other major strategic goals of climate neutrality by 2050. The diversification of fossil fuel supply sources, while important, is not a long-term solution to the problem of energy sovereignty. Amid the current geopolitical uncertainties and the growing threat of climate change, decision-makers in the EU and in neighbouring countries need to now consider green energy and efficient energy use for a comprehensive approach to energy sovereignty. By strengthening its and its eastern neighbours’ renewable energy potential and optimising energy consumption, the EU can reduce the overall dependence on external suppliers of fossil fuels. The commission’s external energy policy combines these two goals, stating that the EU’s actions should be oriented towards meeting both short-term needs and long-term goals regarding the implementation of the European Green Deal. For this reason, I propose a broader approach to assessing energy sovereignty, which goes beyond the typical prism of security of supply to encompass four elements: • The level of dependence on energy imports, both fossil fuels and electricity; • The cleanness of the energy sector, determined by the importance of renewable energy in a country’s energy mix and the level of decarbonisation of the energy sector; • The level of energy efficiency; • The energy sovereignty narrative used by the state authorities in policy documents, which reflects the strategic direction of the state’s energy sector. This policy brief uses these criteria to analyse the progress that the EU and its eastern neighbours have made towards strengthening each other’s energy sovereignty so far, and sets out the next steps that they should take. It finds that, to date, the EU and its member states have played an important role in strengthening the energy sovereignty of its eastern neighbours by increasing their energy independence, but that Ukraine and Moldova still underperform when it comes to cleanness and efficiency, despite the direction implied by the states’ energy narratives – in part due to setbacks related to the war. Strategic cooperation formats between the EU and its eastern neighbours Over the last decade, the EU has developed a legal framework for cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine, which enables closer cooperation in various spheres, including energy. This approach fits into the EU’s so-called Team Europe external action policy for the two countries, which means that both EU and member state structures and European financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are involved in the process. In total, the EBRD has committed to investing $3 billion in 2022 and 2023 to address the Ukrainian economy’s challenges following Russia’s invasion. Both countries are also associated states of the EU, and their bilateral relations with the bloc, including on energy, are governed by the association agreements, which came into force in July 2016 for Moldova and in September 2017 for Ukraine. The European Council’s decision in 2023 to grant both countries EU candidate status and start accession negotiations has further strengthened the relationship. The EU also invited Moldova and Ukraine to join the Energy Community in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The Energy Community’s main objective is to extend the principles and rules of the EU’s internal energy market to the countries of eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Western Balkans, effectively integrating these countries into the EU’s energy market. Members of the Energy Community are obliged to implement EU energy regulations into their own national legal systems and to strengthen energy cooperation with EU countries. Both Moldova and Ukraine have already adopted several important pieces of legislation on the functioning of the gas and electricity markets. Ukraine has successfully implemented regulations liberalising its energy markets, including certifying independent system operators in the gas and electricity markets, and an independent gas storage operator. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2024, the country’s certified electricity operator Ukrenergo joined the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Meanwhile Moldova completed the certification of its electricity transmission system operator Moldelectrica as an independent system operator in July 2023 and has taken steps to certify the independent system operator of its gas market. Both Ukraine and Moldova have also adopted the EU’s Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency, which prohibits insider trading and the abuse of market power. In December 2023, Moldova also amended the Law on Natural Gas to help strengthen security of gas supply and storage, further aligning it with the EU’s energy acquis. Towards energy independence The deepening of Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration with the EU has helped to strengthen their energy sovereignty, helping them in particular to reduce their dependency on Russia. Ukraine and, to an even greater extent, Moldova are dependent on energy imports. In April 2020, Ukraine was able to meet about 65 per cent of its energy needs on its own, while Moldova could only meet about 20 per cent. Although Moldova’s situation has not changed significantly in recent years, Ukraine’s dependence on energy imports fell to 23 per cent in 2022 as a consequence of the decline in the country’s energy consumption due to the war.  Gas Both Moldova and Ukraine have significantly strengthened their energy independence in the gas sector, including through cooperation with the EU and member states. This is particularly the case for Ukraine, whose own gas production now accounts for more than 90 per cent of domestic demand. (As recently as 2010, Kyiv’s dependence on gas imports was over 70 per cent, amounting to 34 billion cubic metres (bcm), which it imported almost entirely from Russia.) According to the 2023 annual data, Ukraine’s gas consumption has fallen by 30 per cent since the start of the war and it now imports gas mainly through Slovakia, but also Hungary, Poland, and Romania (transiting through Moldova). Ukraine’s journey towards independence from Russian gas supplies was, on the one hand, a consequence of political decisions taken by the new authorities in Kyiv, which came to power in 2014 after former president Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown and, in autumn 2015, stopped buying Russian gas. On the other hand, it was made possible by the support provided by EU member states and European financial institutions, which became particularly important following Russia’s full-scale invasion. In the summer of 2022, for example, the EBRD opened a $300m credit line to Ukraine’s national oil and gas company Naftogaz for emergency gas purchases. It also began to cooperate with the Energy Community to provide regular support to Ukraine, including an agreement in June 2023 to guarantee €600m in support for Ukrainian companies operating in the gas, electricity, and hydropower sectors. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova does not produce gas, has no gas storage facilities, and has only trace reserves of its own gas (about 1 bcm as of 31 December 2022), making it completely dependent on gas imports. Chisinau’s success in strengthening its energy sovereignty has nonetheless been impressive: it has significantly diversified its supply sources and achieved complete independence from gas purchases from Russia in December 2022. The EU, European financial institutions, and select member states have played an important role in this regard. The EIB has been financially supporting projects in Moldova since 2008, including those to strengthen energy sovereignty, such as the construction of the Ungheni-Chisinau gas interconnector. But in view of the energy crisis occurring in Europe from 2021 onwards, the EU initiated anti-crisis formats with Moldova as well. For example, the EU-Moldova High Level Energy Dialogue was set up to provide support to Moldova to guarantee the supply of energy resources (especially natural gas) and electricity during the energy crisis, but also to implement long-term energy projects. So far, five rounds of consultations have taken place between the EU and Moldova under this format, through which the partners have discussed crisis support, energy sector reforms, and long-term projects. In October 2021, Poland began supplying gas to Moldova, marking Moldova’s first imports of non-Russian gas in history. In addition to imports from Poland, Moldova managed to launch reverse gas supplies from Slovakia, as well as via the Trans-Balkan pipeline from Romania, and gained access to Ukrainian gas storage facilities, where it could store about 200m cubic metres (m3) of gas. Chisinau’s diversification efforts are continuing, as illustrated by its gas supply agreements with the Greek company DEPA in 2023. Financial support from European institutions, including the EBRD, and member states has also helped to facilitate these diversification efforts by enabling Moldova to finance purchases of gas or electricity from alternative suppliers. In 2022, the EBRD offered a loan of €300m to Moldova, and in October 2023 an agreement was reached for it to provide a further €165m in gas support to the country in the form of loans, with Norway promising an additional €34m gas grant. In addition, in November 2022, the Energy Community Secretariat launched the Energy Community Rescue Scheme initiative to ensure that donors’ financial assistance for Moldova was channelled towards helping the country face the harsh winter ahead. Meanwhile, the Energy Vulnerability Fund, which was established in 2022 by the Moldovan government with support from the EU, Slovakia, and the United Nations Development Programme, played an important role in neutralising the effects of rising gas, electricity, and heating bills in Moldova. Support for Moldova under this mechanism was provided by several European countries including the Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland. Finally, in 2022 the EU created the energy platform for member states and countries such as Moldova and Ukraine, which is supposed to combine demand, coordinate the use of infrastructure, and facilitate negotiations with international partners for joint purchases of gas and hydrogen. Through this initiative, Ukraine and Moldova have taken part in tenders organised by the European Commission and received 100 per cent and 80 per cent respectively of the volumes requested after the first round of purchases. Oil When it comes to oil, both Moldova and Ukraine are highly dependent on imports, but EU countries have gradually replaced Belarus and Russia as their main suppliers since February 2022, thereby helping to strengthen their energy sovereignty. Moldova is 100 per cent dependent on imports of oil and petroleum products from third countries, with Romania now mainly supplying it with oil products. As a result of the war and Russia’s continued attacks on critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including storage facilities for petroleum products and oil, Ukraine has not been able to produce petroleum products on its own – its last operating refinery was closed in April 2022. These products are particularly sensitive for Ukraine, not just for civilian use, but for military needs. Despite its consumption of petrol, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas falling by 25 per cent, 30 per cent, and 40 per cent respectively from 2021 to 2022, Ukraine has become more dependent on imports – 93 per cent dependent in 2022 compared with 77 per cent in 2021.[1] In 2021, Belarus accounted for about 43 per cent of Ukraine’s gasoline imports, and Belarus and Russia together accounted for about 62 per cent of its diesel imports.[2] In 2022, Ukraine significantly reduced imports from Belarus and Russia, and increased those from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria (these three countries covered 51 per cent of Ukraine’s diesel import needs in 2022), Turkey, Lithuania, Moldova, Greece, Hungary, and several other countries.[3] In 2023, Ukraine did not import petroleum products from either Belarus or Russia.[4]   Electricity Although Moldova and Ukraine are in completely different positions in their efforts to ensure a secure electricity supply, the synchronisation of the two countries’ power grids with the EU system in March 2022 significantly increased their energy sovereignty in this area. This was particularly important for Moldova, where 80 per cent of electricity needs are met by the Russian-owned Inter RAO gas-fired power plant located in the separatist region of Transnistria. In October 2022, following Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Kyiv halted electricity exports to Moldova, leading to some blackouts. Electricity supplies from Transnistria were then completely terminated at the beginning of November. Moldova’s synchronisation with the EU grid allowed it to import electricity from Romania, which in November 2022, met 90 per cent of Moldova’s electricity demand. In June 2023, ENTSO-E increased the capacity of interconnectors connecting the EU with Moldova and Ukraine from 1050 to 1200 megawatts (MW). During the 2022-2023 heating season, around 900,000 households also received subsidies for their electricity bills through the Energy Vulnerability Fund. Although Moldova currently once more imports 70-80 per cent of its electricity from Transnistria, it does so mainly because it is cheaper than electricity from Romania or Ukraine. But the synchronisation of its grid ensures access to alternative sources of supply, minimising the risk of energy blackmail from Russia. In the long term, support from European financial institutions will be important in strengthening Moldova’s security of electricity supply. From 2023 to 2028, the priority of the EBRD’s financial support to Moldova will be fostering energy resilience, including funds for the modernisation of electricity grids. Although Ukraine is essentially self-sufficient in electricity supply, synchronisation with the EU grid has proven important for Kyiv too, enabling it to import electricity from EU countries in crisis situations related to Russian attacks. This has been especially helpful given that in March 2022 Russia captured the important Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, which was responsible for 44 per cent of Ukraine’s total generating capacity from nuclear power plants. In 2023, Ukraine also completed the modernisation of a power interconnector with Poland. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism, established back in 2001, proved to be an important crisis mechanism in the context of meeting Ukraine’s short-term energy needs, especially for electricity. As of 31 January 2024, more than 5,900 power generators have been sent to Ukraine via the mechanism, including 2,347 from the EU’s own rescEU reserve stockpiles. In addition to generators, the EU has been delivering other vital energy supplies to Ukraine including transformers, autotransformers, high-voltage equipment, and LED light bulbs. The EIB – which has supported various energy projects in Ukraine since 2007 – has played an important role since the outbreak of the war, funding energy grid projects and repairing the damage inflicted by Russia to energy infrastructure. In December 2023, for example, it provided €133m to enhance the reliability of hydroelectric power plants. Within the Energy Community, the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and the Ukraine Support Task Force have proven to be extremely important in ensuring Ukraine’s energy security during the war, with the Ukraine Energy Support Fund alone providing over €400m in support by December 2023. Under the Ukraine Support Task Force, as of October 2023, 22 EU countries had made nearly 100 deliveries to Ukraine, including power transformers, cables, generators, transportation vehicles, and other equipment crucial for supporting the electricity sector. The Energy Community has also launched the Ukraine Energy Market Observatory, which will closely follow and review all developments related to the broader energy market and corporate governance in Ukraine. Finally, in March 2023, the Energy Community Secretariat signed two memorandums of understanding with the Ukrainian authorities: one on increased cooperation in rebuilding Ukraine’s energy sector and another on the coordination of activities in the area of humanitarian aid for the district heating, water supply, and buildings sector of Ukraine. Green credentials With the help of the EU, member states, and financial institutions, Ukraine and Moldova have been able to dramatically strengthen their energy sovereignty in terms of energy independence. However, their progress towards energy cleanness and efficiency – two other important components of energy sovereignty – has been less impressive. Cleanness Both countries, but especially Moldova, perform poorly when it comes to the share of renewables in their electricity generation. In 2022, renewables accounted for only 15.8 per cent of Ukraine’s electricity generation and 7.1 per cent of Moldova’s electricity – far below the EU and world average of 38.4 per cent and around 30 per cent respectively in 2022. The share of renewables in Moldova and Ukraine also includes the production of electricity from large hydroelectric power plants, whose operation is not fully carbon neutral. However, the development of the renewable energy sources (RES) sector in Ukraine was beginning to gain momentum before the outbreak of the war. At the beginning of 2022, the total installed RES capacity (connected to the grid) reached 9.5 gigawatts (GW) – excluding 0.6GW of RES capacity located in the territories temporarily occupied by Russia before 24 February 2022. About $12 billion was invested in the Ukrainian RES sector between 2009 and 2021 from a variety of sources, including the EBRD, the Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development, and the American International Development Finance Corporation. But, during the first six months of the war, Russia destroyed between 80 and 90 per cent of the generating capacity of wind power plants and around 30 per cent of the capacity of solar power plants in the country, as well as around half of the transmission lines and facilities for the production of electricity in Ukraine. Ongoing military activities, including Russia’s continued attacks on energy infrastructure, are significantly hampering Ukraine’s ability to rebuild these capacities. In an attempt to address this, the G7+ Coordination Group – established in November 2022 and including the Energy Community as well as the EU and its member states – has established a Clean Energy Partnership with the Ukrainian government to support the sustainable recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, which was officially inaugurated at COP28 in December 2023. Its aim is to support the creation of a modern, secure, decentralised, and cleaner energy system in line with Net Zero in Ukraine and to better integrate the country into the EU. The parties are to support Ukraine in attracting private investors to develop projects to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on fossil fuels, in line with the EU’s energy and climate policy goals. In Moldova, the low share of RES in the energy mix results from a historic lack of interest in projects in this sphere on the part of the authorities. Under the pro-European government led by the Party of Action and Solidarity, which came to power in 2021, this situation has begun to change. The government has expressed interest in accelerating Moldova’s energy transition through the development of renewable projects and is gearing up to initiate the inaugural renewables auctions in the country (between April and June 2024), through which it aims to acquire 105MW of wind power and 60MW of solar projects.  When it comes to the levels of carbon in its electricity, Ukraine boasts much better results. In 2022 the carbon intensity of electricity generated in Ukraine was 271.4 grams of carbon dioxide-equivalents per kilowatt-hour of electricity (gCO2e per kWh), below the EU and global averages of 291.9 gCO2e per kWh and 490.1 gCO2e per kWh respectively. After two years of war, the carbon intensity in Ukraine has dropped further to 194.4 gCO2e per kWh. The large share of nuclear energy in Ukraine’s energy mix (60.5 per cent in 2023) – one of the largest shares globally – primarily accounts for the low carbon footprint of its energy sector. Moldova’s electricity has a much higher carbon intensity, 871.7 gCO2e per kWh in 2022, well above the EU and global averages. Moreover, the energy intensity (the amount of energy required to produce one unit of GDP) in Moldova is 3.4 times higher than the average in EU countries. Buildings account for 58 per cent of the total final energy consumption in Moldova, of which non-residential buildings account for 17 per cent. This makes improving energy efficiency in this sector of crucial importance.  Energy efficiency Both countries also face challenges to improve their energy efficiency, although Ukraine is doing much better than Moldova in this field. According to Energy Community reports, Ukraine’s primary energy consumption and final energy consumption in 2020 were below the targets set for 2030. In the case of Moldova, on the other hand, the 2021 statistics show that both primary and final energy consumption were just over 10 per cent above the 2030 targets. Ukraine’s good performance is largely a consequence of the war and the subsequent drop in electricity consumption of around one-third. Nonetheless, Ukraine is still struggling with high energy intensity in some sectors, notably related to residential buildings, 85 per cent of which date from the Soviet era. Before the invasion, the average level of energy consumption in households was two to three times higher than that in the EU. On top of this, gas plays a significant role in the heating sector, with around 80 per cent of households in Ukraine relying on heat supplies from gas-fired power stations. While the war makes it difficult for Ukraine to implement systemic measures to improve energy efficiency, Ukrainian authorities had integrated this aim into their energy strategy even before Russia’s invasion. In 2018, they established the Energy Efficiency Fund, in close cooperation with the EU and Germany. Since 2014, the EU has also allocated grants under the European Neighbourhood Instrument to support reforms in Ukraine, including those aimed at improving energy efficiency. Ukraine has made significant progress in fulfilling its obligations under the association agreement with the EU regarding the adoption of European energy efficiency legislation. For example, it has developed and enacted a legislative framework to support energy efficiency, including to establish energy-efficient practices across various sectors and reduce energy consumption in buildings. Ukraine is also aligning with European standards by promoting “nearly zero-energy buildings” through the adoption of the Concept and National Plan, which outlines the gradual implementation of regulations over the next five years, followed by new construction requirements after 2025. Moldova adopted an amendment to the energy efficiency law in May 2023, establishing a legal framework for comprehensive planning via the National Energy and Climate Plan. However, it is yet to implement energy efficiency measures, especially according to standards prepared by international institutions. For example, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has prepared a special guide for the implementation of energy efficiency measures and the valorisation of renewable energy sources for public sector buildings. The Energy Community Secretariat has played an important role in the creation of further instruments for energy cooperation between EU member states and the EU’s neighbours which encompass energy efficiency. For instance, EU4Energy – an initiative created jointly with the Council of European Energy Regulators and the International Energy Agency and launched in 2016 – is focusing on Moldova and Ukraine, alongside Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia, in the current second phase of the programme (2021-2025). The initiative is designed to support the aspirations of focus countries to implement sustainable energy policies and foster cooperative regional development of the energy sector. The European Commission’s Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, which aims to bring together European local and regional authorities to voluntarily contribute to increasing energy efficiency and the use of RES, includes many cities and municipalities from Ukraine and Moldova. The EU and member states have also provided support within the framework of the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership fund, a programme set up on Sweden’s initiative in 2009. Of the total budget (€1,355m), €982m was allocated to 25 projects in Ukraine and €114m to seven projects in Moldova. Funds disbursed under the initiative are used, among other purposes, to improve the energy efficiency of healthcare buildings and other public facilities. Energy narratives The current authorities in both countries have shaped a dominant narrative around strengthening energy sovereignty. In March-April 2023, the European Council on Foreign Relations’ network of associate researchers conducted a survey in all EU member states and Ukraine and Moldova on decision-makers’ approach to energy sovereignty following the outbreak of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Questions included the conceptualisation of energy sovereignty, the main challenges and threats in this area, and the measures taken and planned to strengthen it. Our researchers found that the issue of energy sovereignty gained prominence in political circles and public discourse in both countries after the outbreak of the war. The authorities of both countries are taking a comprehensive and innovative approach to energy sovereignty, viewing it not only through the prism of security of supply of raw materials, but also energy efficiency and climate goals. According to statements made by the Ukrainian government, Ukraine plans to become a leading green energy hub in Europe, integrating energy production with green technology development. Ukraine’s minister of energy has underscored the role of renewable energy in enhancing energy security, citing Ukraine’s experience during the war and its contribution to European stability through the synchronisation of power systems. Although the Moldovan authorities have placed special emphasis on the need to find alternative sources of supply due to their longstanding heavy dependence on energy resources from Russia, in the long term they also see energy transition issues as an important component of strengthening energy sovereignty. The government plans to significantly increase the pace of RES projects, aiming to increase their share to 30 per cent of electricity consumption in Moldova by 2030. The elites of both countries also seem to see cooperation with third countries, including the EU and member states, as an important means of strengthening energy sovereignty, not just responding to crisis situations. This is evident in their long-term plans to cooperate with the EU and member states on further projects to strengthen their energy sovereignty. (This applies in particular to the expansion of infrastructure connections.) Moldova is currently focusing primarily on the construction of a high-voltage line from Vulcanesti to Chisinau. This connection is expected to allow the import of electricity from Romania to Moldova on the right bank of the river Dniester within the next few years. (The completion of the line is scheduled for 2025.) Moldova is also interested in the development of joint power generation projects with Romania and in increasing the capacity of the Ungheni-Chisinau gas interconnector. Ukraine is focused on establishing a hydrogen corridor connecting it with Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Germany. The corridor would enhance Ukraine’s energy security and integrate it into the European energy network, as well as stimulate the growth of Ukraine’s hydrogen industry and enable Ukrainian-produced hydrogen to seamlessly enter the European energy market. Furthermore, in 2024 both countries (along with Slovakia) joined the Vertical Corridor European gas transportation scheme, which brings together the gas transmission system operators of Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, and aims to enhance energy security and diversification by upgrading their networks to facilitate gas transport from south to north and vice versa. The mutual benefits of cooperation So far, the eastern neighbourhood countries have mainly benefited from the EU’s and member states’ actions in the context of strengthening their own energy sovereignty. However, they both – and especially Ukraine – have the potential to help strengthen the energy sovereignty of the EU and its member states, thanks to their raw materials, RES development, and infrastructure. Ukraine has great potential in the gas sector. Firstly, Ukraine is home to some of the largest proven natural gas reserves in Europe (after Norway), estimated at up to 1.1 trillion m3 in December 2020 (within the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine, that is, including Crimea and other areas occupied by Russia). Ukraine’s gas production is also the second-largest in Europe after Norway and, despite the war, remains at a relatively high level (18.5 bcm in 2022 and 18.7 bcm in 2023). Secondly, Ukraine hosts gas infrastructure that could be useful for the EU as it diversifies its sources of supply. Ukraine’s extensive gas network, which has already enabled the transit of Russian gas for European consumers, could transport gas from the Black Sea or Caspian region via the Trans-Balkan pipeline. This would especially be the case after the construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast – which has been under consideration for over a decade. Ukraine could also help Europe to store gas – the country has the largest gas storage system (30 bcm) in Europe and the third-largest by capacity in the world – behind only the US and Russia. This capacity not only ensures Ukraine’s energy security but could also potentially be used by European customers. Some EU companies are already doing this – at the beginning of 2024, around 2 bcm of gas in Ukrainian storage belonged to EU companies, but the potential for exploitation is much greater. Cooperation with Ukraine on hydrogen could further strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty. According to Ukrainian researchers, with the appropriate development of wind power, Ukraine could produce up to 19.5m tonnes of green hydrogen per year, which would be twice as much as the EU’s annual production plans by 2030. The EU already considers Ukraine one of the three main potential green hydrogen import corridors (along with the North Sea region and the Mediterranean Sea), and in February 2023 signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine on a strategic partnership on biomethane, hydrogen, and other synthetic gases. Hydrogen projects that meet the EU’s safety standards can obtain the status of projects of mutual interest under the EU’s Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation framework. The European Commission’s first list of projects of mutual interest published in November 2023 includes a generic corridor project aiming to transmit hydrogen from Ukraine to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Germany. Both countries, and especially Ukraine, also have high potential for RES development, which could allow the production of clean energy not only for domestic consumption, but in the case of Ukraine also for export to the EU. Theoretically, Ukraine has the greatest RES potential among south-east European countries, although estimates vary. The Ukrainian government assesses the potential for wind energy development in Ukraine off the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov coasts to be 140GW. Ukrainian scholars, meanwhile, calculate that renewable energy sources in Ukraine could provide up to 874GW in total, including solar (83GW), onshore wind (438GW), and offshore wind (250GW). At a conference on the reconstruction of Ukraine organised in June 2023 in London, the Ukrainian ministry for energy presented plans for investments in the energy sector, showing that by 2050 Ukraine wants to have 230GW of solar and wind generation capacity, 38GW of energy storage capacity, and 69GW of electrolyser capacity to produce green hydrogen. Regardless of which of the above estimates is more realistic, it is clear that Ukraine has the ability to produce large amounts of clean energy. According to the UNECE, bioenergy, hydro, solar, and wind generation could account for almost 80 per cent of Ukraine’s total energy generation by 2050. Moldova also has some potential for the development of RES projects, although significantly less than Ukraine. According to a 2017 report from the International Renewable Energy Agency, Moldova could expand its wind power to 21GW and total RES generation capacity to 27GW. From the perspective of the EU, while Moldova will not become a source of clean energy imports like Ukraine, the development of RES projects in Moldova would nonetheless be beneficial, reducing Moldova’s consumption of fossil fuels and thus also relieving the burden on the EU and member states of providing support to maintain Moldova’s gas supply during crises. Ukraine could also develop biomethane projects. According to the Ukrainian National Committee for Energy Regulation, the country could produce 22 bcm of biomethane per year, some of which could be exported to the EU. Indeed, Ukraine already has the necessary resources and infrastructure, including adequate transmission networks that would not require additional upgrades to transmit biomethane. Ukraine also has large feedstock resources and large areas of arable land to develop the potential for agricultural biomethane production. The EU plans to produce 35 bcm of biomethane per year by 2030 and it is estimated that Ukraine could meet up to 20 per cent of this demand. The EU could also benefit from access to Ukraine’s critical raw materials (CRMs), which are important for the EU’s own energy transition. Ukraine holds resources of most of the raw materials on the EU’s latest list of CRMs, including some that the EU recognises as CRMs of strategic importance. For example, Ukraine has the largest reserves of lithium in Europe, used, amongst other things in the production of batteries for electric cars. In 2021, Ukraine also accounted for around 7 per cent of global titanium production and was the world’s seventh-largest exporter of titanium ore. Titanium dioxide is a valuable chemical that can help to improve the efficiency of batteries by extending both their energy-storing capacity and their lifetime, and – alongside lithium – is one of the CRMs that the EU considers to be strategic. Moreover, Ukraine has some of Europe’s largest reserves of graphite, which is used in energy storage technologies like lithium-ion batteries, as well as deposits of nickel and cobalt, which are important in battery production. Its significant potential for green energy production and its status as the country with the largest nuclear generating capacity in Europe mean that Ukraine could also be a source of low-carbon electricity imports for EU member states. Over the last three decades, Ukraine has exported electricity, and continued to export small amounts to Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary even in the first year of the war. Due to Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Kyiv was forced to suspend electricity exports in October 2022, but resumed exports of small amounts of electricity to Moldova and EU countries in April 2023. In the long term, especially when the war ends, the EU expects to be able to import clean electricity from Ukraine as part of its REPowerEU initiative. Finally, Ukraine can provide important insights into protecting energy infrastructure across Europe based on its experiences of Russian attacks, which could further strengthen the EU’s energy sovereignty. The security of the EU’s energy infrastructure has become an area of concern, particularly after the damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, the Baltic interconnector, and the cyber-attacks on Danish energy infrastructure. Hurdles ahead Several factors clearly favour closer energy cooperation between the EU and member states and their eastern neighbours, which would strengthen the energy sovereignty of all parties involved. Both the societies and the current authorities in Moldova and Ukraine are unequivocally in favour of the closest possible integration into Western structures, including the EU. In Ukraine, this has been the case since the victory of the “Revolution of Dignity” against the government’s growing ties to Russia and the ensuing fall of the Yanukovych administration in 2014, while Moldova began to take an unequivocally pro-European course in 2021. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and aggressive policy towards Moldova have further embedded this trend and mean it will likely continue in the long term. The EU has also re-evaluated its strategic thinking, prompting a new focus on its own energy sovereignty and that of its eastern neighbourhood. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU worked rapidly to reduce its dependency on Russian energy supplies and to help its eastern neighbours do the same. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine is hampering the intensification of long-term energy cooperation. In the case of Ukraine, the key issue is the scale of the war damage and the estimated amount of money needed to rebuild Ukraine. The World Bank estimates the total cost of reconstruction at almost $486 billion, which is more than two times the size of Ukraine’s pre-war economy. According to the UN, rebuilding Ukraine’s energy sector alone, which has been seriously damaged by constant shelling, will require an outlay of approximately $47 billion. The EU has announced an additional €50 billion in support between 2024 and 2027 through a new financing instrument, the Ukraine Facility. However, these funds relate to investments in all spheres of state functioning, and it is unclear how much, if any, of this sum will be allocated to energy. Considering Kyiv’s plans regarding investments in green energy (RES and hydrogen) and the development of other sectors, including nuclear and gas, the Ukrainian authorities estimate that the country’s investment needs will reach $400 billion by 2050. Yet Moldova and Ukraine have relatively weak investment climates. Before the war, regulatory instability in Ukraine, including changes in taxation rules for the gas extraction sector, among other factors, made it difficult to attract investors. Moldova also finds it difficult to attract investment, particularly from private actors. And, although positive developments are taking place in Ukraine even during the war (for example, a law adopted in Ukraine introducing favourable conditions for investment in the biogas and biomethane sector, including exemption from income tax for five years, land tax, and VAT and customs duties when importing new equipment and components), it remains unclear how easy it will be to introduce and apply legal regulations after the war. Progress in the implementation of energy and climate policy will also be one of the fundamental challenges in the context of Ukraine’s integration with the EU. In addition to this, specific sectors face further challenges. Despite having great potential for hydrogen production, for example, Ukraine so far has neither a hydrogen strategy, nor a legal framework for the development of hydrogen projects, nor adequate infrastructure. The next steps To achieve the greatest possible synergy in the efforts of the EU and its eastern neighbours to mutually reinforce energy sovereignty, both sides will need to continue taking strategic steps in the coming years. For eastern neighbours Adopt a progressive approach to energy sovereignty Ukraine and Moldova need to translate their narratives about energy sovereignty into a determination to implement them in reality. The eastern neighbourhood countries should permanently change their approach to energy sovereignty and think of it not only in terms of security of supply – energy independence from Russia and diversification of supply sources – but also in terms of clean energy and energy efficiency. This applies especially to Moldova, which should aim to finally and permanently sever its energy relations with Russia not only in the electricity sector, but also in the gas sector, in particular by removing Gazprom from the ownership structure of its largest gas company Moldovagaz (in which Gazprom still holds 51 per cent of the shares). The EU and its eastern neighbours should make the improvement of energy efficiency one of their common strategic goals. Moldova and Ukraine should use the funds made available through the EIB and EBRD to implement steps to improve energy efficiency. In particular, they should exploit and expand the opportunities for projects under the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership. They should also strengthen bilateral cooperation with selected EU member states that have declared their willingness to share their experience in this field. On a bilateral level, France, Germany, Poland, and Sweden are implementing or planning cooperation with their eastern neighbours to improve energy efficiency. Meet Energy Community regulations Ukraine and Moldova should continue to implement reforms in the energy sector, including those stemming from their membership in the Energy Community or related to the process of deepening their integration with the EU. Following the end of the war in Ukraine, it will be important that the two countries take measures against the monopolisation of markets by fully liberalising the electricity and gas markets, ensuring OECD-appropriate governance standards for state-owned energy companies, and making further progress in tariff reforms and subsidy provision by phasing out public service obligations and replacing them with social support for vulnerable energy consumers. These measures will serve to deepen the integration of Moldova and Ukraine with the EU and, consequently, help to increase the resilience of their energy systems. Make infrastructure flexible Both Moldova and Ukraine should prepare for new uses of their transmission infrastructure under the new geopolitical conditions. This is particularly important for Ukraine, which for a decade has acted as a transit country for EU countries’ gas and oil imports from Russia. In December 2024, the transit agreements between Russia and Ukraine will expire, and Ukraine will need to find a new use for its significant gas pipeline network in order to maintain it. The Ukrainian gas pipeline network could be used to export Ukraine’s surplus gas production or to transit gas from other sources. For example, Azerbaijani gas exported via the Trans-Balkan pipeline could travel via Moldova and Ukraine to Slovakia or other EU countries. The Ukrainian government was already considering using it to transport imported gas via a potential LNG terminal on the Ukrainian Black Sea coast before the war. Ukraine and Moldova also need to modernise and expand their electricity grids. In the case of Ukraine, this is necessary due to the continuing destruction associated with Russia’s aggression. However, Moldova also needs grid investments, especially if it is to expand its RES potential in the future. Indeed, the expansion of RES potential requires a sufficiently developed grid capable of absorbing electricity produced by wind or photovoltaic installations into the system. Make use of international cooperation formats Given the multiplicity of cooperation formats in which the eastern neighbourhood countries are involved, it is important to build synergies between them. In addition to the formats already in use in relations with the EU, Kyiv and Chisinau should make use of other, supra-regional cooperation formats that have emerged in central and eastern Europe in the last decade, within which some countries have placed a very strong emphasis on strengthening sovereignty. An example of this is the Three Seas Initiative, a project initiated in 2015 by the presidents of Poland and Croatia that brings together 13 central European countries with the strategic aim of preserving and strengthening the unity of the EU and the Euro-Atlantic space through three pillars: transport, energy, and digital. Poland and Romania have already declared their interest and political will to cooperate with countries such as Moldova and Ukraine under the initiative. For this purpose, Ukraine and Moldova could also make use of the European Political Community, to which 47 European countries belong, including non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom and Turkey. For the EU Ensure comprehensive support to Moldova and Ukraine prior to accession In the dynamic geopolitical situation related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU should be determined not only to pursue the EU integration process of Moldova and Ukraine consistently, but also to strengthen its own capacities to respond to Russia’s attempts to destabilise these eastern neighbours. Only the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the EU can create a sustainable foundation for strengthening cooperation and using the full potential of all parties to strengthen energy sovereignty. The EU therefore needs to demonstrate its determination to meet this political commitment to Moldova and Ukraine. It should use all existing multilateral formats available to it to tighten political and economic (including energy) cooperation with its eastern neighbours. Individual member states should also look to strengthen their bilateral cooperation with their eastern neighbours. Poland can play a special role in this respect, above all because it is Ukraine’s largest neighbour and is interested in participating in the reconstruction of Ukraine and particularly committed to supporting Moldova’s reform. The new pro-European government formed in December 2023 could also build a coalition for energy cooperation with its eastern neighbours together with Germany or perhaps more broadly with Germany and France as part of the recently reactivated Weimer Triangle. Initiate joint energy projects The EU should plan further joint energy projects with its eastern neighbours. It is a major weakness that, apart from the hydrogen corridor with Ukraine, the list of projects of common and mutual interest published by the EU in November 2023 does not include others concerning the enhancement of infrastructure links between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. These are notably lacking in the electricity sector. The implementation of these projects will be important for electricity trade between the EU and neighbouring countries, which could strengthen the energy sovereignty of both the EU and its eastern neighbours. At the same time, it is in the interest of the EU and member states that progressive integration, for example in the sphere of electricity markets, is carried out under fair competition conditions between EU players and companies from Ukraine and Moldova. Contribute to security of energy supply Although the EU’s own raw material potential is limited, some countries have resources that could be used to meet part of the needs of the eastern neighbourhood countries. Romania, which has among the most energy resources in Europe, could play a particularly important role in this context. Its gas resources on the Black Sea shelf are estimated at 80-200 billion m3, which would allow it to secure its own needs for about 20 years or, in the medium term, act as an alternative to Russian supplies to other countries in the region, such as Moldova. When it comes to electricity production, Romania boasts a diversified energy mix and a well-developed network of interconnections with neighbouring countries that can operate in two directions (for import and export purposes). Due to its location, Romania could also play the role of a transit country for the transmission of energy resources (for example, gas via the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline) or electricity from third countries. EU member states should support Ukraine in continuing to diversify its nuclear fuel supply sources. Those that have nuclear power in their own energy mixes, including Bulgaria, France, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden, can provide logistical support for the transport of nuclear fuel from alternative sources, and be partners for enhancing cooperation in the nuclear sphere after the end of the war. The so-called nuclear alliance that has emerged in the EU under the informal leadership of France could be useful in this regard, supporting partnerships with Ukraine to implement joint nuclear projects. Improve eastern neighbours’ energy efficiency In its external energy policy strategy, the EU calls for energy saving and energy efficiency to become priorities on a global scale. It should therefore support neighbouring countries to improve energy efficiency. As postulated, among others, by participants in the Green Deal Ukraine project, the EU and its member states should help their eastern neighbours to develop robust standards for energy efficiency and building materials for both new and renovated buildings, spanning residential and non-residential sectors and the entire construction process. These standards should include monitoring energy efficiency for components and the building process to align with evolving EU efficiency regulations, promoting sustainable practices and long-term decarbonisation goals. Increase investments in the region Energy should become one of the key areas of cooperation to strengthen Moldova’s and Ukraine’s sovereignty and thus their resistance to aggressive, destabilising actions by Russia. Although the EU has so far provided significant financial assistance to Ukraine and Moldova, both directly and in cooperation with European financial institutions, the scale of the needs (especially in Ukraine) requires further efforts in this area. Investment either directly by the EU or by companies from EU countries in Ukraine’s RES sector, the hydrogen corridor, or Ukraine’s gas infrastructure could strengthen EU energy sovereignty by ensuring a secure supply of clean electricity or gas supplies, which will still be needed by EU countries over at least the next decade. To this end, the EU should make use of and provide organisational and expert support for recently created instruments such as AidEnergy – an electronic platform established in March 2023, whereby the EBRD in partnership with other donors and international financial institutions and the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy create a centralised list of energy sector needs. The platform is intended not only to identify the current needs of the Ukrainian energy sector, but also more long-term needs. Considering the long-term investment needs of Ukraine’s energy sector, the EU could also provide support through financial guarantees for the most strategic projects. EU member states and institutions should also continue efforts to confiscate frozen Russian assets, which could be used for the reconstruction of Ukraine, including investments in the energy sector. The law adopted by the EU in February 2024 to set aside windfall profits made on frozen Russian central bank assets is a move in a right direction in this regard. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank experts and people working in the energy sector in institutions and companies in Poland, but also in Ukraine, Slovakia, and Germany, for discussions on the topic covered in this policy brief. Special thanks are also due to those who provided comments on the first version of the text, in particular Susi Dennison. The author would particularly like to thank Flora Bell for her pleasant and fruitful collaboration in editing the final version of the text, especially for her very valuable suggestions, questions, and comments. Thanks are also due to Nastassia Zenovich for the beautiful graphics included in the text. References [1] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref1 Argus Eurasia Energy (https://www.argusmedia.com/en), weekly report, by subscription, 23 February 2023. [2] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref2 Ibid. [3] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref3 Ibid. [4] https://ecfr.eu/publication/energising-eastern-europe-how-the-eu-can-enhance-energy-sovereignty-through-cooperation-with-ukraine-and-moldova/#_ftnref4 Argus Eurasia Energy (https://www.argusmedia.com/en), weekly report, by subscription, 22 January 2024. This policy brief was first published on 11 March by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

Diplomacy
Pedro Sánchez

Spain recognizes the Palestinian state and reaffirms its friendship with Israel despite genocide in Gaza

by Redacción El Salto

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Although the gesture from Spain, Ireland, and Norway has been welcomed by Palestinian authorities, the past week has highlighted the Zionist determination to obliterate any possibility of a genuine Palestinian state. Pedro Sánchez announced early this morning what has been awaited since it was announced almost a week ago: the recognition of the Palestinian State, which, in the words of the Prime Minister, "must be a viable state, with the West Bank and Gaza connected by a corridor, with East Jerusalem as its capital, unified under the Government of the Palestinian National Authority," he stated. The president also sought to appease Zionist opposition and dispel accusations of supporting Hamas: "This is a decision that is not against anyone, least of all against Israel, a friendly people whom we respect and appreciate, and with whom we want to have the best possible relationship. This decision reflects our outright rejection of Hamas." The announcement of the recognition of the State of Palestine will be made, as the president communicated in the press conference, after it is approved today by the Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, the coalition government partner, ‘Sumar’, has welcomed this step, reminding that other actions are still necessary. "Arms embargo, suspension of diplomatic relations, supporting ICJ measures, and supporting the South African denunciation," have been enumerated in its X account. Today, May 28, 2024, was the date that Spain, Norway, and Ireland had marked on the agenda to take this diplomatic step in support of the Palestinian people. Ireland, for its part, will proceed with the recognition of the State of Palestine following a parliamentary debate to be held during the day. The decision taken by these three European countries, made public last Wednesday, May 22nd, joins them with the 144 countries that already recognized the State of Palestine within its 1967 borders, following the commitment to the coexistence of two sovereign states that can peacefully coexist, a principle underlying the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993, and which, however, three decades later, seem unrealistic given Israeli policies of colonization of the West Bank, isolation of Gaza, and appropriation of East Jerusalem, the territories that should compose an already disjointed Palestinian state. The Spanish recognition of Palestine as a state — a recurring commitment made by the PSOE that has taken time to materialize — coordinated with Ireland and Norway, implies that European countries, traditional allies of Israel, are joining what the Global South and colonized peoples had largely done decades ago. In Europe, Sweden took that step in 2014, many years after several countries in Eastern Europe recognized the Palestinian state in 1988, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The former Czechoslovakia is a striking case; while the Czech Republic considers this recognition no longer valid, Slovakia reaffirms the decision made in the 1980s. Currently, Belgium, Malta, and Slovenia are other European states that have expressed their intention to recognize the Palestinian state, without specifying a specific date. For Israel, it is important that this trend does not spread. Zionist Foreign Minister, Israel Khan, wasted no time in attacking the Spanish government (again) on social media for its decision, accusing the prime minister of being complicit in "inciting the murder of the Jewish people and war crimes." The decision of the heads of government of Ireland, Norway, and Spain came after the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution for the recognition of the Palestinian State, calling on the Security Council to accept Palestine as a full member after the US veto. The gesture of these three European countries has been welcomed by the Palestinian authorities, it responds to a historical demand, and contributes to put pressure on those countries that claim to advocate for the two-state solution but have not yet recognized Palestine as such. But beyond its symbolic value, for now, it doesn't seem likely to change the reality of the Palestinian people in Gaza, the West Bank, or East Jerusalem. In fact, Israel has punished Palestinians precisely after the decision of the three European countries: for example, by prohibiting the Spanish consulate in Jerusalem from assisting Palestinian individuals. On the other hand, the fact that most states recognize a Palestinian state has not translated into anything resembling its materialization: many of these states are also important allies of Israel, as emphasized by Sánchez himself this morning, recalling their closeness to the Zionist state. However, Israel, with its foreign minister at the forefront, has not ceased its attacks on Spain, Ireland, and Norway in the last week: in addition to recalling their ambassadors for consultations in the European states, there has been a constant response on social media, with videos accusing the three states of collaborating with Hamas. Meanwhile, violence against Gaza and the West Bank has intensified. Last Sunday, Israel attacked refugee camps in Rafah, leaving around fifty Palestinians dead and causing global outrage at the images of people burned alive, including children. It seems that in response to the symbolic gesture of recognizing Palestine, Israel continues with its plan to make a real Palestinian state impossible. In yesterday’s report (May 27th), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) pointed out that one million people have been forced to flee again, following Israel's ground invasion of Rafah on May 6th. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health in Gaza has already reported over 36,000 deaths and more than 80,000 injuries, which, along with the missing persons, would account for 5% of the Strip's population. The United Nations has warned that it will take at least 80 years to rebuild Gaza. The fact that Israel is ravaging Palestine doesn't seem to concern the opposition as much as the worsening of bilateral relations with the Zionist state. While the leader of the opposition, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, stated yesterday that the government's decision "empowers" Hamas, Isabel Díaz Ayuso echoed a similar sentiment, saying, "They are calling for the extermination of Israel and are justifying what Hamas terrorism intends against that state. The offenses from the Government are continuous (...) The State [of Israel] will not respond with flowers," said the president of the Community of Madrid yesterday after the publication of a video released by Israel in which, with flamenco music in the background, it was reiterated that Hamas appreciates Spain's decision. But the recognition of the Palestinian state is not the only open front against the Zionist state: following the ICJ's order to halt the offensive against Gaza, the EU convened a meeting with Israel for the first time yesterday, and mentioned a tool that the EU has had from the beginning, the review of the preferential agreement between Brussels and the Zionist state. Meanwhile, civil society expands its mobilizations; yesterday, demonstrations condemning the bombings in Rafah took place worldwide, overflowing in cities like Paris. Meanwhile, the momentum continues from the encampments, which, as seen in yesterday's action at the Polytechnic University of Madrid, are bringing to light all the ties with Israel, achieving concrete victories, and exposing the extent of the economic interests and networks of influence that Israel has deployed in the university sphere. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

Diplomacy
Vladimir Putin: Answers to questions from journalists following a visit to China

Vladimir Putin: Answers to questions from journalists following a visit to China

by Vladimir Putin

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Vladimir Putin replied to questions from Russian media representatives on the outcomes of his two-day state visit to the People’s Republic of China. Question: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole world watched your visit here, as evidenced by a spate of news reports and publications. It is clear that the future of the rapidly changing world largely depends on the positions of Russia and China. Following your talks in China, we would like to know whether Moscow and Beijing have a shared understanding of how the future system of international security and politics should evolve. Vladimir Putin: First of all, I would like to thank President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping and the leadership of China for this invitation and for creating a very favourable and warm atmosphere for our joint work. On the whole, the talks were very meaningful and very substantive. This was an official state visit, but it was also very much a working trip. From morning until evening, we spent virtually the entire day with the President of China and his colleagues. We raised multiple issues for discussion. You said that the future depends on Russia and China, but this is only partly true. The future of humankind depends on the whole of humanity. Certainly, Russia and China are important components of modern civilisation. We have our own views on how we should develop. Certainly, our advancement will influence the advancement of all partners on the planet. We believe that development should be constructive and peaceful, no doubt about it. Apart from our interests, it should heed the interests of all parties to international interaction. Of course, it is necessary to strengthen the emerging multipolar world. There is absolutely no doubt that a new world is taking shape before our eyes and becoming multipolar. I believe all the people are aware of this. It is important that those who are trying to maintain their monopoly on making decisions on all issues globally should realise this (I believe that they do realise it perfectly well). Understanding this, they should do everything possible to facilitate this natural process. I repeat, this process should be peaceful and conflict-free, with the opinions of all parties to the international process fully considered. All of us should seek compromises while making the difficult decisions that lie ahead. We are committed to this approach and to precisely this kind of work. I have discussed this repeatedly, and the President of China has also emphasised this: our interaction, cooperation and strategic partnership with China, Russia-China partnership, is not directed against anyone. Our aim is solely to create better conditions for the development of our countries to improve the well-being of the peoples of China and the Russian Federation. Question: How did your informal meeting with Xi Jinping go? Your aide said it took place in a super-narrow format but was attended by Defence Minister Andrei Belousov and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. Did you discuss Ukraine? What would you personally consider convincing evidence of Ukraine’s readiness for talks? Earlier both you and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov repeatedly said that the Western partners could no longer be trusted. Vladimir Putin: Yes, this meeting took place in the narrow format. We really discussed many issues that are important for bilateral relations. We discussed the issue of settling the Ukrainian crisis. The President of the PRC told me the main theses of what he discussed during his recent visit to Europe. He set forth his position linked with Chinese peace initiatives. We have said more than once that we believe that China is sincerely striving to settle this problem. It offers different options and is very flexible. I believe it is sincerely striving to resolve this problem. We discussed this at some length. As for our counter partners, let’s say in this case these are Ukrainian leaders and their European and overseas bosses. Well, we have spoken about this many times. When our troops stood near Kiev, our Western partners told us: it is impossible to sign documents when the other side puts a gun to your temple. “What should be done?” we asked. “It is necessary to withdraw troops from Kiev.” We did this. On the following day, they threw all our agreements into the dustbin and said: “Now we will fight to the end.” Their Western curators occupied the position that is now known to the whole world – to defeat Russia on the battlefield, to inflict a strategic defeat on it. It wasn’t us who behaved in this way. These were our partners. Ukrainian officials confirmed this, in particular, the head of the Ukrainian delegation at the talks in Minsk and later in Istanbul, said this. The then Prime Minister [of Great Britain] Mr Johnson came to Kiev and advised Ukraine to continue hostilities. Mr Arakhamia, the head of the Ukrainian delegation, who now leads the ruling parliamentary party in Ukrainian parliament, said that otherwise all hostilities would have been ended a year and a half ago. He said this in public, I believe, at his meeting with journalists. Nobody actually had doubts about this. So, let’s sum up this part of my answer to your question – we were cheated again. Now we need to understand whom and how we should deal with, whom we should trust and to what extent. Of course, we are analysing now everything that is taking place in this regard. Of course, we are looking at what is happening around the universally announced meeting in Switzerland, in Geneva. I believe this is the venue of the meeting. We are certainly not going to discuss any formulas about which we know absolutely nothing. But as distinct from Ukraine, we have never rejected talks. It is they who have quit the negotiating process. They announced that they are going to inflict a strategic defeat on us. It is they who said they were “going to fight to the end,” actually not to the end but to the last Ukrainian. They did everything with their own hands. We have a foundation for the negotiating process – what we agreed on in Istanbul and a signature of the head of the Ukrainian delegation under an excerpt from this large document. He initialed it. We have this document with his signature on it. What are these other additional terms about which we have never heard and know nothing? The goal of this event is clear. They want to gather as many countries as possible, declare that everything has been agreed upon with everyone and then present it to Russia as a resolved issue, as an ultimatum. This will never happen. Question: Keeping with the theme of Ukraine… Yesterday, Vladimir Zelensky visited Kharkov and held a general headquarters meeting there. At the same time, we are involved in heavy fighting near Kharkov and our troops seem to be gaining success. Vladimir Putin: The word “seem” is wrong. They are gaining success. Each day, they advance in strict conformity with the plan. Question: What is the plan all about? Are we going to seize Kharkov? Or does our objective consist in creating a sanitary zone, as you said earlier? Thank you. Vladimir Putin: I do not know what the head of the Ukrainian state was saying. The only thing I know is that in the final analysis, they are to blame for what is happening. The origin of the current Kiev authorities is the coup d’etat [that occurred in 2014]. This is the source of the present-day authority in Ukraine. This is my first point. Second, [Kiev’s] Western sponsors allowed the coup to happen by facilitating and orchestrating it. They created the conditions for a smoldering conflict to grow into an armed conflict. They are to blame for this. They are attempting to lay the blame on someone else and make Russia responsible for the current tragic developments. But this is the result of their own policies. As far as the developments in the Kharkov sector are concerned, they are also to blame for these, because they shelled and, regrettably, continue to shell residential areas in border territories [of Russia], including Belgorod. Civilians are dying there, it’s clear for everyone. They fire missiles right at the city centre, at residential areas. I said publicly that if this continues, we will be forced to create a security zone, a sanitary zone. And this is what we are doing today. As for [the seizure of] Kharkov, there are no such plans for now. Question: It has recently been reported that Chinese banks stopped accepting payment transfers from Russian banks. Did you discuss this issue with the Chinese leader? If so, have you reached an agreement? Have you coordinated a potential scheme of settlements that would be immune from Western sanctions? Thank you. Vladimir Putin: Sanctions imposed on third countries engaged in economic activities are doubly or triply illegitimate because sanctions are absolutely illegitimate when adopted without the approval of the UN Security Council. This goes beyond common sense when it comes to third countries. Incidentally, the Americans or Europeans are even using such sanctions against their own allies. Europeans are not using them against the Americans, but the Americans apply such sanctions against European economic operators and often follow them through not only with regard to Russia but also against other countries in other situation. It is a common practice, and Europeans bear with this, proving yet again their vassal dependence on the sovereign over the sea. Well, whatever! As for such decisions, they certainly do direct damage to the global economy, not just to the countries they are adopted against or their economic operators, but also to the global economy as a whole, including energy and other spheres of economic operation, and primarily the issues of settlements that are discussed by the economic operators. Solutions are possible, and there are such solutions. Of course, they should be supported at the level of governments, and I hope that this is how it will be. The reasons behind the behaviour of large financial institutions are understandable: nobody wants to sustain losses because of US actions, even if they are illegal. However, I would like to repeat what I said before: it is silly and a huge mistake of the American political elites because they are inflicting big harm on themselves by undermining trust in the US dollar. They are gradually undermining the status of the dollar as a global settlement and reserve currency, even though they are deriving huge profits from this now. First, they adopted the Bretton Woods system. Then they abandoned the gold standard of the dollar and [formalised a floating exchange rate system under] the Jamaica Agreement. What is it based on? It fully depends on the money printing press, or putting it more gallantly, on the might and quality of the American economy. Yes, this is exactly how things stand. All countries in the world trust the American economy, its might and stability, which is why they accept the dollars. This gives a huge and seemingly inexplicable advantage to the American economy and financial system. However, it can be presented in figures. According to our economists, it amounts to over 10 trillion dollars that have not been earned but are a gift from heaven that comes from the use of the dollar as a global reserve currency. Overall, the obligations of the US financial system to the rest of the world have been estimated at $53.4 trillion. However, by undermining trust in the dollar for political reasons, the US authorities are weakening the main and the most powerful and important instrument of their might – the dollar itself. They are doing irreparable damage to themselves. Using one of popular sayings, they are quarrelling with their own bread and butter. This is thoughtless, but they seem unable to stop doing it. The disadvantage of this for us is that we have to look for other solutions. However, there are also advantages, because it is unacceptable when one side is using financial and economic instruments to force its will on the rest of the world, including on the political stage. I assure you that all countries are aware of this; you only have to look at how fast their dollar-denominated reserves are diminishing. The world is responding. I believe that the [de-dollarisation] process is inevitable. We have started doing this, and it is a correct process. It entails certain shortcomings and problems, but it is correct in general, when we speak about making settlements in national currencies or creating other settlement instruments jointly with other countries. The process is underway; it has begun, and it cannot be stopped. Question: Mr President, let me return to the subject of Ukraine and certain Western initiatives. You have mentioned yesterday’s lengthy discussion with Xi Jinping on this issue. Could you please tell us whether you touched upon Macron’s initiative to declare an “Olympic truce”? Do you believe an Olympic truce is possible now? Or is this another attempt by the West to lure Russia into a trap, especially amid its military successes? Thank you. Vladimir Putin: Yes, President Xi Jinping mentioned this, and we did discuss this issue briefly. What I think is, first, the principles of Olympism, including the Olympic truce concept, are very sound principles. There is a reason the international community has spent centuries working them out. True, few countries ever invoked this particular principle, with the exception of Ancient Greece, but in general, the idea itself is good and constructive. The issue lies elsewhere. It has to do with the current international sports officials themselves violating the principles of the Olympic Charter. They are politicising sport, which is absolutely unacceptable, because the purpose of sport is to serve as a platform for communication between people and for negotiating compromises on other issues, including political ones. They are violating their own rules, now with regard to Russia, by excluding our athletes from the Olympic Games, not allowing them to display their flag, anthem, or national colours. They are violating the rules with regard to us, but they want us to comply with the rules that they dictate to us. Has anyone given this a thought? Is this in line with the elementary norms of justice? No. They are violating the rules but they demand that we comply with them. Well, friends, this is not getting us anywhere. No one has ever reached agreement like this. Before demanding anything or expecting others to do something, one needs to follow these rules. Overall though, sports are certainly progressing, and this progress will continue. I don’t know how the Olympic movement will fare now, with such officials. If they put money first, if money is the only thing that motivates or drives them, if sport becomes a commercial enterprise solely aimed at making a profit, I cannot see a bright future for the Olympic movement. Look, sport has actually transformed into a for-profit corporation. What is their top priority? To raise money from sponsors and to have large information companies pay for broadcasting. This is just a big business profiting from sporting events. But the principle of Olympism is something else – it is about humanitarian values. Question: This week, the US imposed duties on a number of Chinese goods – chips, semi-conductors, metals and solar batteries. Most important, it raised the duty on Chinese electric cars, I believe, four times, up to 100 percent. Can these moves be considered sanctions against China? Is Russia-China cooperation helping counter such attacks? Vladimir Putin: Of course, on the surface, they look like sanctions but these are already elements of an economic war to a certain extent. This is not the first time they have been used. Incidentally, I can assure you that politics, the character of Russia-China relations and the situation in Ukraine have nothing to do with this. These are just elements of unfair competition. We were making an MS-21 aircraft. We agreed on purchasing certain components that we had to put into its wings. These components have nothing to do with military production. They simply denied them to us by including them into a sanctions list. Indicatively, this list was linked with military production whereas the components we wanted had nothing to do with it whatsoever. Yes, we lost time and this production was pushed back by about a year and a half. But eventually, we made these components, these aircraft wing carbon fibre tows. We made them and they are even better than the American ones in quality and durability. The result will be the same in this case. I have just explained at the meeting with students why such restrictions were introduced against the Chinese auto industry, against electric cars. Just because they have become better and cheaper than European or American ones. That’s it. They are simply killing competitors, in this case, the Chinese rival and do not let it into their market. This is a prohibitive duty. The same is taking place in Europe, of course. As soon as some country, a global development centre, as we often put it, is developing and becoming more competitive, they stop it and put it down, they try to make it happen. Can Russia-China cooperation counter this in some way? To prevent this from happening, they are creating problems in financial items because we could purchase more. But we are restricted in purchasing these products because of money transfer problems. Is it possible to do something about this? Yes, it is. We will develop joint productions. This requires time, just as it was with aircraft components when we had to delay their production by half a year. This is the same case. We will go for joint production. This is the most erroneous and stupid way of building an international economic system. The correct idea is that the market decides everything and they were drumming it into our heads for decades, if I may put it this way – pardon the fancy language. But the market will still push them down. Do you understand what the point is? They are creating this problem for themselves with their own hands. What will this lead to? They have introduced sanctions against various goods. What will it lead to? Inflation in the US. This is what they will get. Because they will try to make these products themselves, at their own sites, paying wages to their own workers, paying for their expensive metal and their expensive energy. This is the result – the German economy in Europe is already operating nearly in the red while the French economy is teetering on the brink of recession. If the German economy starts coughing and feels bad, the entire European economy will not feel quite well, putting it mildly. This is the result of such decisions. These are not market decisions. They are completely stupid and have no prospects whatsoever. Question: Please, tell us at what conditions you would attend a peace conference on Ukraine in Switzerland if you should receive such an invitation. Thank you. Vladimir Putin: Well, politics does not know the subjunctive mood: “if only.” We will not continue. You know what would have happened there in other cases. But there are no “ifs.” They do not invite us. Moreover, they say they cannot imagine us being there. So what will we be [talking] about? “If you do this” looks like we are trying to get invited. “But if you do this, and if this is the case, then we would make these decisions.” Well, if they cannot imagine us being there, so much the better. This is first. The second, very important thing, is that we are not going to discuss right away what we do not know. As I said, we had been holding painstaking talks for a long time, almost a month and a half; first in Minsk, then in Istanbul, and reached certain compromises. The Ukrainian side signed an abstract of these documents. The package alone is so thick, but the summary with the fundamental issues outlined there were initialed by the Ukrainian side. So, we worked on it. Now there are some formulas but what are they based on? Based on some wishes and not on the real situation. Well, it is impossible to discuss. However, we are ready for discussion. We never refused. I have just said that, and this is not a joke, I did not make it up. As soon as the troops withdrew, the Westerners immediately told Ukraine: “Do not sign anything. Fight.” They snapped a salute and are following out. While we were immediately told, “Now we will fight to the last man.” This is what we were told. There will be no more talks. Now they see that they cannot succeed. Perhaps they will be able to fight to the last man but they cannot inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, and they can see that. Now they are beginning to squeak . “Let us urgently convene a conference.” – “Sure.” – “Will Russia participate?” “We are ready to participate in peace talks.” “But we will not invite you.” Here you are, Good Lord, there we go. And Russia is being accused of being reluctant to take part. But we have not been invited. You are asking: on what conditions? Why should I be proposing terms and asking to let me come where we are not wanted? And what is it that they want to do? Gather as many countries as possible, convince everyone that the terms proposed by the Ukrainian side are the best offer, and then present this to us as an ultimatum, saying, “You see, the whole world thinks so. Thus you must agree.” Is this a way to conduct substantive and serious talks? Of course, not. This is an attempt to impose. There was an attempt to inflict a strategic defeat, but it failed. The attempt to impose will end the same way. Remark: But still, as I see it, your condition is that the agreements reached must be in force. Vladimir Putin: Of course. This is the basic condition. They initialed it, but the document was not fully signed. It includes very serious issues related to ensuring Ukraine’s security. They are worded in such a way that requires subsequent consideration. But overall, this is the basis. They have been initialed by the Ukrainian side. I think, not least, probably, if not under the diktat, then with the consent of their Western sponsors. But everything is rigorously worded there regarding their interests. There is also something that has been taken into account concerning Russia’s security interests. There are a lot of questions there, which I do not want to go into right now. I remember if not all of them but all the main provisions. We are ready to discuss this. But then they dumped it because they wanted to gain an advantage on the battlefield and achieve a strategic position, which did not work out; so now they are handing out their terms. Have they gone nuts? Why on earth? Of course, we will proceed from the realities on the ground. This goes without saying. Question: My question isabout China and supplies of our hydrocarbons to it. Has an agreement in principle been reached on the Power of Siberia 2 project? When will construction start: this year or next year? Have there been any talks about a possible increase in supplies? Vladimir Putin: Yes. I am not ready to speak about technical details now, but both sides have confirmed their interest in implementing these projects. Since the Chinese economy is growing, it requires, accordingly, more energy resources needed to maintain this growth. Nothing is more reliable (I think this is clear) than supplies from Russia. We have a huge common border, and no one will interfere here: neither sanctions against the tanker fleet, nor even sanctions against financial institutions. We will buy and sell everything in national currencies. Therefore, the interest on both sides has been reaffirmed. On the one hand, there is interest in receiving additional volumes, on the other hand, there is interest in selling on the Chinese market. This is always a complicated process, involving the question of prices, the question of who will earn and how much. However, strategically we are absolutely interested, both the countries, in implementing these projects, and we will move forward with them. Gazprom and our oil companies will certainly come to terms. There are different routes. One of them runs via Mongolia, and both gas and oil pipelines can be laid in the same corridor. Specialists will have to decide how best to proceed. It is possible to use the Northern Sea Route. We can buy extra tankers and set up supplies via the Northern Sea Route, which is almost the same as the pipeline. All these alternatives are possible. They are all acceptable and economically expedient. It is necessary to choose the best ones. I am confident that this work will be completed as well. Question: My question is also about Ukraine, if I may. Vladimir Zelensky’s term of office is about to end, it expires on May 20. Will Russia no longer consider him a legitimate president after that date? And would it matter to you, will you be ready to talk to him afterwards? Vladimir Putin: We used to talk with him; we were in constant contact with him before the conflict entered the extreme phase of armed struggle. As for legitimacy, this question must first of all be resolved by the political and legal systems of Ukraine itself. There are all sorts of options in their Constitution. This is a question of assessment. This assessment, of course, should be primarily made by the Constitutional Court and in general, by the political system of Ukraine. But for us, of course, it matters, because if it comes to signing some documents, we certainly will have to sign documents in such a crucial area with the legitimate authorities, this is an obvious fact. But, I reiterate, this question must be answered by the political and legal (juridical) systems of Ukraine itself. Thank you very much. Question: Did you discuss with President Xi Jinping the fact that China had been invited to this international conference? Vladimir Putin: We discussed this issue as part of the package. Thank you very much for your attention. Question: Mr Putin, what about the French army in Ukraine? Vladimir Putin: I am not the president of France. Why are you asking me this? I am not the one to make this decision. Question: Mr Macron has repeatedly conveyed that he was ready to send troops there. If regular French troops move to Ukraine, will it mean a direct conflict, a war with the French? Vladimir Putin: First, you should have him answer your question about the French troops in Ukraine. Once you get the answer, we will start considering the consequences of this step. Question: Mr Putin, may I ask about the figure of [Defence Minister Andrei] Belousov? Excuse me, please, this is my last question. Why was Belousov appointed the Defence Minister? We are now at a critical juncture of the special military operation. Vladimir Putin: I covered that already. Mr Peskov covered that, too, because I asked him to do so. I will go over it again. This year, the level of defence spending for the Defence Ministry alone amounted to 6.7 percent of GDP. If you combine that with the amounts spent on law enforcement and security agencies, the total amount will slightly exceed 8 percent. The Defence Ministry accounts for the bulk of the spending meaning that the amount of spending of law enforcement and security agencies depends on how much the Defence Ministry spends. The Defence Ministry is the first to make purchases followed by law enforcement and security agencies. Their choices depend on the Defence Ministry’s choices. In addition, the Defence Ministry is charged with building the national defence system which is does with the enlistment of other security agencies. Their spending depends on that, too. So, with the Defence Ministry spending 6.7 percent, and the total defence and security spending coming at slightly over 8 percent, this amount of spending is not critical. Defence spending in the Soviet Union in 1985–1986 stood at 13 percent. Taking into account the state of the economy, macroeconomic indicators, and budget revenue forecasts, combined defence and security spending at slightly 8 percent is not critical and is absolutely safe. Experts are even saying it could be larger since the budget is robust enough to handle that. But this level of spending is what we currently have. As you are aware, Mr Belousov served as the Minister of Economy. He is considered a good economist, one of the best in the country. He was my aide on economic matters. He also served as the First Deputy Prime Minister. In this sense, he is, without a doubt, able to coordinate the Defence Ministry’s work with other ministries and agencies, as well as the regions. This is important as well. I am talking not only about the border regions, but other regions as well, because they, too, to a certain extent, are economic agents. This is my first point. My second point covers his mission. He must open the Defence Ministry to constructive interaction with the research centres and economic agents in the broad sense of the word, the manufacturers of the military-technical products and components that are needed for the production of military equipment. His job is to open the Defence Ministry to innovation. Indeed, Mr Shoigu has taken the initial steps towards this end. However, I believe that given his job functions in the recent past, the former Deputy Prime Minister will find it easier to accomplish this. These were the motives behind appointing him to this position. You all saw Mr Shoigu – it was widely covered – often visit and tour enterprises. He is fully aware of what is going on. He knows what the Armed Forces need in the medium and short term, and knows our industrial capabilities. To a certain extent, he was involved in the contacts with our foreign defence cooperation partners, because the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation was under the Defence Ministry, and he oversaw it. Considering this, he will have an enormous layer of work to deal with. It is all combined now. If you paid attention, I supported the idea of appointing Mr Manturov First Deputy Prime Minister precisely because we plan to focus the administrative resources on achieving the main objective facing the country today which is gaining the special military operation results that we need. Thank you very much.

Defense & Security
Angry bear against the background of the Russian flag

Boil the bear: The risky path in the face of Russian aggression

by Enrico Tomaselli

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском According to the EU, Russia had set several red lines, but then allowed them to be crossed without reacting. Therefore, gradually increasing the temperature can be a good strategy... Whereas, throughout the first two years of NATO's war against Russia in Ukraine, the record of warmongering was almost equally shared between the US and the UK, more recently it has been attributed to Macron. The reasons are diverse, ranging from the great difficulty France is currently facing to the illusion of being able to take advantage of the German crisis to assume European leadership, including the political dwarfism of its president. But the underlying reason is that European leaders, almost unanimously, have essentially resigned themselves to carrying out the task left by the US: taking on the burden of the conflict in the East, supporting Kiev even beyond the last Ukrainian, if necessary. Also in this case, the reasons why Europeans have convinced themselves that they cannot escape this task are multiple. What matters is understanding how they believe they will do it, when they believe they will do it, and, obviously, if they really believe they can do it. Judging by how interventionist statements are intensifying, it seems that the timeline is not so distant; probably, in the European offices, they envision initiating an operational phase at least after the US elections, also to have a clearer idea of the White House's orientations and the timing of their public announcements. At the same time, the evolution on the battlefield does not seem very compatible with these optimistic forecasts: the arrival of good weather has already revitalized the Russian initiative along the entire front line, and the structural deficiencies of the Ukrainian army are evident. Events, therefore, could accelerate. Regarding the how, it seems quite clear that the idea is to boil the Russian bear like the proverbial frog. Step by step, counting on Moscow wanting to avoid an escalation, they will end up letting things happen without a strong response. In conclusion, it is believed that Russia had set several red lines, but then allowed them to be crossed without reacting. Therefore, gradually increasing the temperature can be a good strategy. Furthermore, the public discourse (the narrative used to prepare public opinion) is a mix of nonsense and half-truths, but reading them carefully, the design becomes clear. Macron puffs up his chest and makes aggressive statements, but then between Ukrainian requests and European readiness, the scheme emerges: start by training the Ukrainians in Ukraine (150,000 men...) so they are closer (and prepared) to the front [1]. After all, NATO countries have been training them for years, only the location changes... One imagines that such a debut would be more acceptable to European citizens, and that after all Moscow would not react beyond "strong protests." Then we'll see from there. Clearly, the weak point is the actual possibility of creating the design according to your own scheme. Firstly, the premise is that Russia behaves exactly as expected in Brussels, which, however, is not at all a fact. As always, caught up in their autism, European leaders do not listen, and even if they do, they do not understand. Here, in fact, we are beyond the light statements of Medvedev; when a diplomat like Lavrov clearly says that if Europeans want war they are prepared, it should not be taken lightly. Moreover, when Monti in turn says that "to build Europe" blood must be shed, he is simply more sincere and pragmatic than Macron. The problem, of course, is that a small-step scheme simply runs the risk of resulting in a series of useless steps. The critical problems of the Ukrainian army are basically three: lack of artillery ammunition, lack of personnel, lack of anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems. For the first one, Europeans are unable to remedy it. Even if the Russian industrial relative production did not grow (as it is happening) and remained at current levels, Europeans would take years and years to match it. As for the second one, the difficulties to solve it would be at least the same. Sending even 20-30,000 men would not have a decisive impact. Firstly, we would be talking about men with no real combat experience, let alone in a war of attrition like the one being fought. The logistic support would be very complicated, as the rear would have to be located in Poland and/or Romania, a thousand kilometers from the front. And anyway, even such a figure would amount to 5,000-6,000 men in combat. Irrelevant. It would be necessary to send at least 200 or 300 thousand men, practically the entire European NATO force, to have any impact. The Europeans could transfer almost all of their missile/anti-aircraft defense systems, leaving their respective countries almost defenseless, but this would also have a limited impact over time: the Russians would exploit the large quantities they have to saturate the defenses and destroy the batteries one after another (as Iran did with Israel). The only thing that could introduce an element of discontinuity would be the intervention of the air force. European fighter-bombers taking off from airfields outside of Ukraine, striking Russian rear areas. But this would inevitably bring the war to European soil, as it is clear that at that point the Russians would strike the departure air bases with their ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The same would happen if missile defense batteries from neighboring countries were used. Furthermore, if this level of intervention were to create problems for the Russian armed forces, it is virtually certain that at that point Moscow would resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Because for Russia, the risk of defeat in this war equates to an existential threat. And here Macron comes into play again, boldly promising the coverage of the French nuclear umbrella, the 'force de frappe'. Unfortunately, the comparison with the Russian Federation is ruthless, and the quantity of French nuclear weapons (as well as the aircraft carriers to deliver them to the target) is ridiculously smaller: At most, France can offer the shelter of a cocktail umbrella, and Moscow would turn Paris into a milkshake. Therefore, the European strategy of boiling the Russian bear slowly – though as stupid as a frog - cannot work. Gradualness simply runs the risk of exacting a very high price (in terms of casualties, wounded, destroyed weapon systems, etc.) without achieving any noteworthy result. On the other hand, an acceleration, by promptly engaging a significant force in combat, is practically equivalent to plunging Europe into a prolonged conflict, without equally managing to change the terms of the equation. Without direct intervention from the US, European countries alone are absolutely incapable of significantly engaging Russia [2]. But direct engagement is exactly what Washington shies away from, and they are very aware that once you put boots on the ground, there's no turning back, and the logic of war drags you deeper and deeper. Something they learned well from Vietnam, and they have never forgotten. Therefore, combat continues to present itself as a gamble. It's like having far fewer chips than your opponent and still betting everything without even holding a pair of twos in your hand. In all of this, of course, we have not taken into account at all the fact that there is no unified point of view - beyond the facade - among the different European capitals. Likely, there are countries - not only Hungary, or Slovakia, but also Germany and Italy... - that secretly hope for an immediate collapse of the Ukrainian army, to render any hypothesis of deploying their own forces useless. Although the scenario briefly described is very realistic, it is clear that there are those who believe that Europeans would have an excellent opportunity in a confrontation with Russia. That this is believed possible among political leaders, although dangerously disheartening, is also plausible; much worse is when it is supported by senior NATO military commanders, whose opinion cannot fail to influence political decisions. And quite a few generals, French, German, and from other countries, seem convinced that they can win the game (or perhaps just dream of a moment of glory, after a lifetime behind a desk or playing war games). [3] Certainly, what happens on the European chessboard also depends on what happens elsewhere, because this is a global game where everything is interconnected. The problem is that European leaders not only lack decision-making power, not even marginally, regarding this dimension, but they also completely lack global vision. The real one, of course, not the one that appears in the news. The coming months, therefore, will be full of consequences for the Europeans, but they will also be largely played as pawns, with their movements directed largely from outside, while the effects will be almost entirely at our expense. And it is clear that the interest of the US is to push the Europeans, but not NATO, to assume the risks and burdens of the conflict, which Washington would like to prolong indefinitely. [4] The inadequacy of leadership is another risk factor, in addition to the objectives. In this context, as we see, these leaders tend to curl up like a hedgehog; aware of their own weakness, both against the enemy they are confronting and their own citizens who do not wish to die for Kiev (not even for Washington), they are increasingly moving towards the militarization of public space, the restriction of democratic spaces, and an authoritarian shift. They wage war on the dissent of their citizens today so that they can wage war on Russia tomorrow. And if the European peoples lose this war, they will be dragged into another one, in which defeat could coincide with the extinction of European civilization as we have known it. Notes [1] According to The New York Times, due to the shortage of troops, the Kiev government has asked the US and NATO to "contribute to the training of 150,000 new recruits" within Ukraine so that they can be deployed to the front lines quicker. Obviously, this is a gigantic absurdity. However, these training camps should be located as far away from the front lines as possible to minimize the risk of being targeted (large troop concentrations are obviously an attractive target), and they would require adequate protection against air attacks; the risks and logistical efforts would far outweigh the minimal benefit of having recruits in training a little closer to the battle line. This is blatantly a ploy to bring NATO military personnel onto the ground. [2] A research done by the British newspaper 'The Daily Mail' established that in the event of an open conflict between NATO and Russia, NATO forces would not be sufficient. Although the strength of the Atlantic Alliance appears superior in numerical terms, this superiority is essentially due to the armed forces of the US, without which it significantly deteriorates. Additionally, the research does not consider, even marginally, factors such as industrial production, experience, combat capability, etc. [3] According to the commander of the combined armed forces of the Alliance in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli (USA), the Russian armed forces "lack the skills and capabilities to operate on the scale necessary to exploit any advances to gain a strategic advantage." [4] In this regard, a reputable American magazine like 'Foreign Affairs' has explicitly indicated this direction, and certainly not by chance. According to the FA, which is obviously closely aligned with the State Department, "European countries must do more [...] They should seriously consider deploying troops in Ukraine to provide logistical support and training, to protect Ukraine's borders and critical infrastructure, or even to defend Ukrainian cities. They must make it clear to Russia that Europe is willing to protect Ukraine's territorial sovereignty". After dismissing the idea that this could lead to World War III, the authors cunningly suggest that "a strictly non-combat mission would be easier to sell in most European capitals". However, they immediately stress that "Europe should consider a direct combat mission to help protect Ukrainian territory". In fact, "since European forces would operate outside the framework and territory of NATO, any losses would not trigger a response under Article 5 and would not involve the United States". And to reassure European leaders - to whom the message is clearly directed - they add: "At a certain point, European leaders must ignore Putin's threats, as they are nothing more than propaganda." The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

Energy & Economics
SHENZHEN, CHINA - CIRCA NOVEMBER 2019: ZTE room at the High-Tech Fair China 2019 at Shenzhen Convention & Exhibition Center.

What should Europeans do about the U.S.-China Rivalry in key strategic technologies?

by Roberta Haar , Hengyi Yang

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In October 2023, the EU Commission identified four technology fields as critical: advanced semiconductors; artificial intelligence (AI); quantum, and; biotechnologies.[1] All four areas are greatly impacted by the U.S.-China rivalry in technology, making it essential for Europeans to understand the Sino-American competition. This article examines this rivalry from the Chinese and U.S. perspectives. It recounts their prevailing attitudes, which are shaped by recent events, and that, in turn, mold Chinese and American strategic approaches. From the Chinese policymakers’ perspective, its geo-technological competition with the U.S. is novel and passively learned. During Xi Jinping’s first term, the Chinese government still positioned technology under the economic-oriented strategy of innovation-driven development. This stance followed the idea that ‘science and technology constitute a primary productive force’ and the ‘peaceful development’ principles set during Deng Xiaoping’s era. However, around 2018, two sanctions incidents that targeted Chinese telecommunications giants shifted Chinese leaders’ understanding of tech strategy into the geopolitical context. The first sanction incident involved ZTE, China’s second-largest communications equipment manufacturer. In 2016, the Barack Obama administration accused ZTE of selling telecom equipment containing American chip technology to Iran, which violated U.S. sanctions. In 2017, ZTE pleaded guilty and paid a fine of $1.2 billion. However, in 2018, Trump’s government stated that ZTE did not comply with the settlement agreement, coupling previous sanctions with export controls on ZTE in April 2018. The second incident involved Meng Wanzhou, then Vice-Chairwoman and CFO of the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, who was arrested in Vancouver, Canada, during a layover in December 2018. Her detention was at the extradition request of the Trump administration, which levied charges related to alleged violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran. These included bank and wire fraud and outright violations of U.S. sanctions via a subsidiary called Skycom Tech, which allegedly concealed Huawei’s activities in Iran. The necessity of a strategic adjustment These two incidents caused an uproar in the Chinese media, followed by a surge in public patriotic sentiment. However, for the Chinese government, the impact and significance of the two cases were quite different. The essence of the ZTE case was commercial sanctions, which meant that ZTE violated business norms and deserved economic punishment. The official Chinese government stance was that ‘this is just an individual case of corporate violation.’ Despite this position, the fact that the government was actively involved nonetheless politicized the incident within China. It was Xi Jinping himself who negotiated with Trump to save ZTE from bankruptcy after which ZTE became a state-owned enterprise with absolute state control—a move that ultimately resulted in ZTE gaining a greater domestic market share than Huawei. At the international level, the top-level nature of negotiations prevented the ZTE incident from overly politicizing then-ongoing trade frictions between the U.S. and China. While the ZTE episode was resolved with little rancor, Chinese senior officials became concerned about the impact that the U.S. might have on China’s strategic technology companies.[2] In November 2018, Tan Tieniu, then Deputy Secretary-General of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, reported to China’s top leaders that they should learn from the ZTE incident. They should avoid overreliance on imports of core electronic components and chips, and they should not repeat mistakes made by ZTE. In the same month, Xi Jinping mentioned in a speech that ‘internationally, advanced technology and key technology is more and more difficult to obtain… forcing us to travel the road of self-reliance.’ Terms like technological security, technology ‘chokepoints’ (卡脖子), and core technologies in key fields (关键核心技术) began to appear frequently in Chinese official discourse. These reflected Chinese leadership’s views about the ZTE incident that were in turn shaping strategic thoughts on the geopolitical technology competition with the United States. It was the Meng Wanzhou incident at the end of 2018 that for Chinese leaders confirmed the necessity of a strategic adjustment. As in the ZTE case, Huawei was involved in a business violation that from the Chinese perspective should have resulted in corporate punishment. Instead, a personal arrest warrant was issued for Meng, thereby escalating a commercial sanction into a political and diplomatic incident. Le Yucheng, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, urgently summoned the U.S. and Canadian ambassadors to China and issued a stern protest. The Chinese government also arrested two Canadian citizens in China, sentencing one to 11 years in prison. The Chinese Ambassador to Canada wrote that the Meng Wanzhou case was a ‘premeditated political act in which the United States wields its regime power to hunt a Chinese high-tech company out of political consideration.’ Chinese Defensive Deterrence These two episodes shaped and reinforced Chinese leaders’ strategic thinking about its geopolitical technology competition with the U.S. The 14th Five-Year Plan issued by the CCP in 2020 proposed ‘making technological self-reliance’ a strategic goal. Soon all official documents established a new tone for China’s technology strategy based on self-reliance. Previously, China pursued a reassurance strategy, a strategy that showed goodwill towards the U.S. and the system it led. Thus, in theory, China had two strategic options: reassurance and/or deterrence. The former strategy involves showing friendliness towards the U.S. and its allies, thereby releasing tension, and maybe re-joining the U.S.-led system. A reassurance strategy allowed China more time for stable development—the logic of ‘keeping a low profile’ of the Deng Xiaoping era. The Xi Jinping government picked the second option, deterrence, which is to show strength or use countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of further U.S. trade or coercive action. To make a deterrence strategy work, however, Xi further believed China needed to gain strong capacity in key tech fields. Therefore, Xi first mobilized domestic R&D resources and tried to acquire advanced technologies before using diplomatic countermeasures. The core logic underlying this geopolitical technology strategy is one of ‘defensive deterrence.’ A typical example of this strategy in play concerns the semiconductor industry. Facing export controls on semiconductor equipment from the U.S., the Netherlands, and Japan, the Chinese government first increased R&D investment in the sector, trying to overcome ‘chokepoint’ technologies. As a result, China’s investment in semiconductor R&D grew from $10 billion in 2018 to $25 billion in 2022, an increase of 150%. At the same time, the Chinese government increased investment in the production of key raw materials (silicon, gallium nitride, etc.) and semiconductor production bases. It also guided industries upstream while also pushing for downstream integration through policies to improve and strengthen supply-chain security. Chinese policy also moved to increase international supply-chain dependence on China through its comparative advantages in the semiconductor industry (and even other industries) in a hedging move against the U.S. and its allies. For example, in the automotive chip sector, in the supply of vital raw materials, and in the semiconductor equipment markets, China sought to utilize its significant comparative advantages. In August 2023, the Chinese government announced export controls on gallium and germanium, two key materials for manufacturing semiconductors. China Seeking More Regulatory Power But in addition to responding to what was perceived as U.S. containment policies in the area of technology, China’s strategic use of technology followed another approach, one led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). This third approach sought more regulatory power, for example, in the areas of civilian AI where China has huge potential.[3] Starting in 2018, the Chinese government showed a strong determination to introduce and study AI ethics and technical standards.[4] Based on these domestic framework policies, various diplomatic initiatives, and standards proposals, the MFA and MIIT expanded China’s regulatory influence in the field of AI. For example, the MFA proposed the ‘Global Data Security Initiative’ in 2020 and the ‘Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative’ in 2023. Minister Wang Yi explicitly stated ‘We hope to provide a blueprint for related international discussions and rule-making.’ The China Electronics Standardization Institute, affiliated with the MIIT, also actively participates in the formulation of international new technology standards. Selectively decoupling: U.S. Attitudes and Strategies When it comes to strategic technologies, the Joe Biden administration has generally maintained a stance toward China that aligns closely with the previous administration led by Donald J. Trump. This is especially the case concerning competitive technologies such as 5G/6G, the specialized processors designed to handle the computational demands of AI, quantum computing, and electric vehicles (EVs). Taking a page from U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s Cold War playbook of outspending the Soviet Union, president Biden initiated a $2.25 trillion infrastructure plan. This plan, not unlike China’s policy to increase domestic innovation and strength, allocated funds for sectors such as transportation, manufacturing, renewable energy, clean water, and high-speed broadband for both wired and wireless technologies. The justification for these investments, part of the Build Back Better Act (BBB) policy and later incorporated into the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act, was that they were a response to Xi Jinping’s ambitious goals of doubling China’s economy by 2035, intending to establish China as a global leader in biotechnology, green energy, and AI. In addition to a spending strategy to boost U.S. competitiveness in strategic technologies, the Biden administration continued with some of Trump’s punitive measures. For example, Biden maintained tariffs amounting to approximately $300 billion. He also continued action against Huawei, which has the potential to outcompete in 5G/6G mobile network technology. The Trump administration used the Bureau of Industry and Security to exclude Huawei from global semiconductor supply chains and it placed the company on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, thus requiring U.S. companies to obtain a license before exporting to Huawei. As discussed above, Trump’s executive branch also brought fraud allegations against Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng. While Biden kept in place Trump-era prohibitions on sales of U.S. goods to companies like Huawei, as well as maintaining restrictions on exports of U.S. critical technology, he did quickly resolve the dispute over Meng. Within hours of the deal for her release, the two men caught up in the game of hostage diplomacy left China on a flight back to Canada. Highlighting the political nature of the incident, when Meng returned to China, senior local officials at the airport met her. Encourage Multilateralism to meet Global Challenges Along with strident measures, the Biden administration also sought a more nuanced stance. Indications that suggest a less hawkish approach to China include emphasizing a collaborative approach toward global challenges like climate change and future pandemics. Biden further pushed for engagement in high-level meetings with, for example, Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, who held talks with their Chinese counterparts, Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi, in Anchorage, Alaska, in March 2021. These talks were frostier than U.S. officials would have preferred but they got the two sides to engage in some dialogue. Similarly, Biden sought to engage with China in multilateral forums and organizations where both countries are members, such as the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that Biden hosted in November 2023. Even the choice of San Francisco as the venue was designed to be conciliatory as it has historic ties to Asia as well as a central role in global technology as the home of Silicon Valley. Still, one must keep in mind that in deciding on a strategy towards China, Biden must also contend with a Congress and public opinion that are growing increasingly skeptical of doing business with China, which they believe steals good jobs and sends balloons over American territory to spy on U.S. critical infrastructure. One primary shaper of U.S. attitudes towards China are the leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, Republican Representative Mike Gallagher and Democratic Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi, who lead one of the last bastions of functioning bipartisanship in Washington, D.C. With their many investigations, subpoenas, and policy recommendations, the House China Committee has become the ‘beating heart’ of U.S. Congressional policy, which, with regards to technology, argues for selectively decoupling from China for national security reasons.[5] A way forward Faced with the U.S.’ decoupling or blunting strategies and China’s defensive deterrence strategy, what steps might European nations take to navigate through the choppy, contentious waters of strategic technologies? Are there also steps that Europeans can take to mitigate the impact on their own strategic technology vulnerability? First, recognizing the pivotal role of technology in the rapidly digitizing global economy, Europeans need to stress that it is in the collective interest of everyone to establish institutions, norms, and policies for effective global governance. Rather than engaging in reactive geopolitical maneuvers resembling a chess game, these institutions could concentrate on constructing a more cooperative foundation for crucial technology sectors. Second, along with this recognition, efforts could be directed toward the development of future institutions, policies, and norms that set standards for next-generation and sensitive technologies. Such efforts should take into account initiatives already made by the Chinese and the Americans. Such efforts could also coincide with a third approach of encouraging the Biden administration to adopt a comprehensive multilateral approach. The U.S. needs to push for collaboration beyond issues such as climate change and economic inequality to encompass the intensely competitive areas in technology like those discussed in this article. For one, Europeans could point out that U.S. blunting strategies are simply not working and may even be backfiring by accelerating Chinese technological advances. In September 2023, Huawei released the Mate 60 Pro smartphone equipped with a 7nm domestic chip, revealing that China has overcome some hurdles that U.S. bans were designed to stymie.[6] Since no one knows how long China’s defensive deterrence strategy will hold (and shift to what Chinese leaders believe is a more offensive deterrence), nor whether Trump or someone as equally anti-multilateral as Trump will be (re)elected, Europeans have many incentives to encourage a softer engagement between China and the U.S. Changing the narrative is a fourth important recommendation. It is essential to recognize that the essence of the Sino-American technology competition is more about narrative construction than a description of the current situation. One indication of this is that both sides believe that the other side started what has been described as the ‘new Cold War.’[7] It does not help that both sides have engaged in behavior that supports the other side’s narrative with some hawkish actors employing similar bash-the-other tactics to gain political advantage.[8] Typically, the factual basis for technological competition is grounded in industrial competition, corporate rivalry, or intellectual property disputes. However, the high-tech relationship between China and the United States has been one of complementarity as well as rivalry. Both China and the United States, as well as European stakeholders, need to be careful of the narratives they espouse, lest they become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This work has been funded by the REMIT project, funded from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101094228 Footnotes [1] EU Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States. [2] Gregory C. Allen. 2023. ‘China’s New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War.’ csis.org, May 3. [3] Jing Cheng and Jinghan Zeng. 2023. ‘Shaping AI’s Future? China in Global AI Governance.’ Journal of Contemporary China 32(143): 794-810. [4] See White Paper on AI Standardization, a Guide to the Building of a National Standard Framework for New Generation AI, a report on Ethical Norms for New Generation AI, a White Paper on Trustworthy AI as well as other regulatory documents. [5] Robbie Gramer. 2023. ‘The Masterminds: Washington wants to get tough on China, and the leaders of the House China Committee are in the driver’s seat.’ foreignpolicy.com, November 27. [6] Weiwen Wang. (2023). ‘China Breaks Through 7nm Chip Technology, Has the China-U.S. Tech War Entered Phase 2.0?’ (中国突破7纳米芯片技术 中美科技战进入2.0阶段?). Lianhe Zaobao (联合早报), September 17. Retrieved from https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20230917-1433739 [7] Patricia M. Kim, Matthew Turpin, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Jessica Chen Weiss, Eun A Jo, Ryan Hass, and Emilie Kimball. 2023. ‘Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?’ Brookings.edu, September 1. [8] Roberta N. Haar. 2020. ‘Will China replace the U.S. as the world’s predominant power?’ Atlantisch Perspectief 44(3):9-13.

Diplomacy
PARIS, FRANCE - February 8, 2023: French President Emmanuel Macron welcomes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the Elysée Palace

The Impact of the War in Ukraine on the European Union

by Tomasz G. Grosse

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском French and German credibility has reached new lows on the Ukraine issue, risking European security as each seeks to sure up political and geopolitical influence. Solidarity is weak, and arms corporations have proven influential in national decisions for EU integration on security matters. In the numerous crises that hit the European Union (EU) in the 21st century – the role of the so-called “integration engine,” as the French-German duopoly is called – was crucial. However, after Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, both integration leaders from Western Europe receded into the background. The leaders of aid for fighting Ukraine were mainly the countries of NATO’s eastern flank, led by Poland and the Baltic states. Germany and France defended themselves against too radical sanctions imposed on Moscow, did not support Kiev, and did not want, among other things, either Ukraine’s accession to the EU nor to NATO. Why did Paris and Berlin distance themselves from Russian aggression in 2022, which violated European values and human rights and also threatened the EU itself? In short, the war hit various economic interests that France and Germany conducted with Vladimir Putin’s regime. An example of this was the expansion of Nord Stream, a gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, after Putin’s first military aggression against eastern Ukraine in 2014. It is worth recalling that the entire climate transformation in the EU in its initial phase was based on cheap Russian gas. Economic ties were not the only reason for the strange behavior of Berlin and Paris in the face of Moscow’s aggression. Geopolitical considerations were even more important. The elites of Western Europe have traditionally, with minor interruptions, cooperated with Russia and considered it an important economic and political partner. The geopolitical goal of both Western European countries was to seek strategic autonomy from Washington and rapprochement with Moscow and Beijing. Historically, Central Eastern Europe has been treated as an area of influence of Berlin and Moscow, which they share or (less frequently) compete for. Before 2022, for Berlin, this sphere of influence included the Central European countries and the Baltic states; for Moscow, this included Belarus and Ukraine. This is why, among other things, Western Europe distanced itself from Moscow’s aggression in 2022. It did not want to spoil relations with Moscow. It also did not want to provoke even greater Russian aggression, fearing a full-scale war with NATO. Western Europe wanted to reach an agreement with Putin as quickly as possible and return to the previous economic and geopolitical arrangement. However, in 2024, there was a clear change in Western Europe’s position towards the war in Ukraine. First, Germany increased its financial and military assistance, although it continued to block the delivery to Kiev of the most modern weapons requested by President Volodymyr Zelensky. France and Germany increased the scope of sanctions imposed on Moscow, although they were still full of loopholes that allowed the Kremlin to avoid them. Meanwhile, Berlin and Paris unblocked their veto on Ukraine’s accession to the EU, nevertheless they continued to maintain their opposition to Kiev’s membership in NATO. Under the influence of both Western European countries, the EU’s financial and military assistance to Kiev increased. It was still too small in relation to Ukraine’s needs, and Brussels faced great problems and delays in fulfilling aid declarations. The most radicalized person was President Emmanuel Macron who announced in 2024 that he would send troops to Ukraine. In the same year, German politicians proposed that NATO troops should protect the sky over western Ukraine from the territory of Romania and Poland. What caused this radical turn in Berlin and Paris? First of all, it turned out that both countries were losing credibility in NATO and the EU, and thus political influence in Central Europe and Ukraine. What was no less dangerous – especially for German politicians – was the growing dissatisfaction with their attitude in the US. The Germans feared that Washington would lose trust in Berlin and focus on NATO’s eastern flank, mainly Warsaw. Furthermore, Germany and France believed less and less in renewing good relations with Moscow. They also had little hope that their “neutral attitude” could protect Europe from further aggression by Putin, including his attack on NATO and EU countries. At this point, both Western European countries launched a diplomatic offensive to introduce changes in the European Union. It was primarily about revising EU treaties to strengthen the political influence of the two largest countries in Western Europe. Therefore, it was proposed, among others, the abolition of voting based on unanimity in foreign and defense policy, which gave a decision-making advantage to the countries with the greatest voting power (Germany and France). In addition, efforts were made to strengthen the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The main goal was to increase the production of ammunition and weapons from EU funds. Typically, such actions were aimed at strengthening the potential of arms corporations in Western Europe, as well as limiting arms exports from outside the EU, including from the US and South Korea. It goes without saying that in the event of a real threat from the East, the EU should not limit the transportation of weapons from non-European allies, because Europe itself produces too little ammunition and weapons. Nevertheless, subsequent actions of the European Commission after 2022 clearly rewarded aid for German and French corporations, as well as restricting access to arms imports from outside the EU. These attempts to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the EU against Washington are short-sighted in the face of a real threat on the EU and NATO. Moreover, instead of primarily supporting coordination within NATO, France and Germany have sought to duplicate the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, focusing on the expansion of EU’s rapid reaction forces (rather than NATO’s rapid reaction forces), which were much more modest in terms of numbers and equipment. In other words, their goals were political, not real defense. The idea was to strengthen Franco-German leadership in Europe, and this was to be achieved by supporting the development of EU structures in the area of security. All these aspirations to expand the CSDP could encounter serious obstacles in implementation. First, Germany and France often disagree on EU security considerations, particularly when it comes to their own national interests. For example, the French were disappointed with Germany’s decision to purchase the American F-35 multi-role fighter capable of carrying nuclear warheads. This affected plans to build a sixth-generation aircraft in cooperation between German, French, and Spanish corporations. Moreover, Berlin was developing its own anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense project in the EU (European Sky Shield Initiative), to which it did not invite the French, and even competed with their own European defense program (La défense aérienne du continent). Therefore, Macron criticized the German shield initiative, which he considered hasty and incomplete. Instead, he promoted a truly “European initiative,” where the French arms industry is the dominant force. Secondly, the actions of France and Germany in the field of defense have been delayed and ineffective. More than two years after the announcement of the famous Zeitenwende, the modernisation of the Bundeswehr, the federal government in Berlin managed to order only eighteen Leopard 2 tanks and twelve Panzerhaubitz 2000. Thirdly, it became increasingly clear early on that Germany and France were not ready to defend NATO’s eastern flank in solidarity, wanting rather to show initiative and leadership in order to maintain geopolitical influence in Europe. In terms of real security, their subsequent ideas were controversial. They were certainly beneficial to their arms corporations. For all these reasons, the credibility of Germany and France has been trending downwards on eastern EU security considerations. For the time being, it is difficult to predict whether the plans of Paris and Berlin will ultimately be implemented and whether cooperation within the CSDP will be strengthened. However, if this does not happen, it will paradoxically be a good solution for the security of the eastern flank. Efforts to defend it will be focused within NATO and, above all, located in the countries most at risk from Moscow’s aggression. This analysis is based on a recent article published by the Journal of International Affairs.

Defense & Security
Troop carrier and tank with Ukrainian flag, Ukraine

The War in Ukraine among contemporary Armed Conflicts

by Anton Bebler

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract The war in Ukraine is the biggest, bloodiest and longest war in Europe since 1945. Its initial stage holds similarities with several other armed conflicts and wars in the last 50 years on Cyprus and in the territories of the former Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Among the cases in ex-Yugoslavia the greatest similarity is seen with the war in Croatia (1991–1995). These conflicts stemmed from almost simultaneous breakdowns of two multinational ‘socialist federations’ and their communist regimes. The dissimilarity of the second stage of the war in Ukraine and the war in Croatia is primarily due to the processes of NATO and EU enlargement coupled with the USA’s policy of using NATO enlargement and Ukraine as tools to harm and weaken Russia. The conflict about Ukraine developed into an indirect war between Russia and the US-led West, where Ukraine is the West’s proxy and the main victim. The final outcome of the war in Ukraine will be decided on the battlefield and not around a diplomatic table. Still, it will be very different from that in Croatia. Responsibility for the war in Ukraine and its consequences must be shared between the two direct belligerents, the co-responsible USA and other NATO members. Introduction Among about four dozen contemporary wars, the armed conflict in Ukraine since 2014 stands out as an exceptional event. It involves in its second stage four nuclear powers –one as a direct belligerent and three as providers of many-sided assistance to the second belligerent, with the presence of military personnel of all four nuclear powers on the territory of Ukraine. The war has been the biggest, bloodiest and longest war in Europe since 1945. It has also produced a strong impact on Europe and the broader international community. According to two measures (at least), the war in Ukraine has been exceeded by a number of other wars since 1945, namely those occurring in Asia and Africa. In terms of mortality, it has been exceeded by the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Iraq. In terms of duration, it is unlikely to be longer than the wars in Vietnam, Algeria, Sudan and Afghanistan. Among all these armed conflicts, the war in Ukraine may be sharply distinguished by the reverse ratio between military and civilian mortality. In the European framework, the central trigger of the first stage of the war in Ukraine was similar to what caused the armed conflicts and outright wars occurring between 1974 and 1999 on Cyprus, in Moldova, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan as well as on the territory of the SFRY. Among the former, the first stage of the war in Ukraine most resembled the war in Croatia (1991–1995). The war in Croatia, which started prior to its international recognition, and the war in Ukraine 22 years after its recognition as an independent state, display a number of similarities that not accidental. The second stage of the war in Ukraine has had several similarities with the war in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999) which ended up with forceful separation of Kosovo from Serbia. The similarities The wars in Croatia and Ukraine involved two adversary pairs of neighboring and partly overlapping Slavic nations. These wars unfolded in the territories of two defunct ‘socialist federations’ – the SFRY and the USSR. The causes of both wars were closely related to the almost simultaneous breakdowns of these two federations in 1991 and the demise of their communist regimes that had preceded and caused the breakdowns. The institutional structure of the SFRY was modelled after and closely resembled the structure of the older ‘socialist federation’, the USSR. Shared features of the two included the division of each federation into full-fledged republics and autonomies. Most or all of these federal units were ethnically designated. The minorities of the biggest ethnic groups (Serbs and Russians) were not accorded autonomy within other republics. In both cases, war followed the declarations of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’ and referenda organized by some members of the Serbian community in southwest Croatia and some members of the Russian and Russian-speaking community living in Eastern Ukraine. In each case, the central governments refused to negotiate with the insurgents and decided to suppress them militarily. The armed conflicts in Croatia and Ukraine developed into partly different combinations of civil and interstate wars. The civil war component referred to an armed conflict between the ultranationalist regime in the former second-most populous republic on one hand, and part of the biggest national minority related to the largest ethnic group in the former federation, on the other. The civil war deepened the divisions based on loyalty within both the Serbian community in Croatia and the Russian community in Ukraine. Each war was fought almost exclusively on the territory of the former second-most populous republic, which suffered the most. In both wars, the two sides were responsible for gross violations of international humanitarian law. International sanctions were applied in these two wars. The causes of each war were tangibly related to profound geopolitical changes underway in Europe about 35 years ago. These changes entailed the slackening and termination of the Cold War between two military-political blocs and the wave of liberal-democratic transformation of political systems in Eastern Europe. Over the span of 3 years, about 30 different state entities declared their sovereignty in the area of 3 ‘socialist federations’ (Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia). Of these, 23 entities survived and soon gained universal recognition as sovereign states, including Croatia and Ukraine. The specificity of the war in Ukraine Ancestors of today’s Russians and Ukrainians shared in the distant past close to 400 years of common history in Kievan Rus. In the XIII century this large state formation was destroyed by the invasion of Tatars-Mongols. The subsequent centuries-long domination of Lithuanian and Polish feudal rulers over the ancestors of today’s Ukrainians contributed greatly to their cultural and language distancing from the Russians. In 1648, the Cossack ancestors of some of today’s Ukrainians rebelled against Polish feudal rule, in 1654 begged for protection and voluntarily submitted themselves to Moscow Tsardom. For two and a half centuries, until 1917 they remained as part of the Russian empire, named Ruthenia and later Malorossiya. In 1918, an independent state was proclaimed under the new name Ukrainian People’s Republic. The name Ukraine remained under the Bolsheviks and in 1922 Soviet Ukraine became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. Over several decades, the territory of Soviet Ukraine was more than doubled by Moscow in several successive stages in 1920–1922, 1939–1940, 1945–1947 and 1954. This was accomplished by including into it the lands of Novorossiya, with millions of Russian and Russian-speaking people in the East and South, as well as annexed parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and part of Moldova in the West. In all of these cases, this was done without their population’s consent. In 1992, all these territorial gains became parts of independent Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, whereas the collective rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population were left unprotected. From 1945 for more than four and a half decades Ukraine enjoyed Moscow’s symbolic gift – the status of a UN founding member although it had been a constituing part of another UN founding member (USSR). When Ukraine, at Moscow’s initiative attained independence it did not have to apply for UN membership which from then on it deserved. Divergent political and economic developments in the two independent states exposed a number of different interests and of problems unresolved at the time of separation. These issues, in somewhat different combinations during the two stages of the war contributed to three groups of conflictual relations: (1) between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, (2) inside Ukraine and (3) between the Russian Federation and the West, primarily USA. The non-recognition of collective minority rights by the Ukrainian authorities became a growing political problem with the rise of Ukrainian ultranationalism. Combined with divergent attitudes in Western and Eastern parts of the country concerning Ukraine’s relations with Russia, EU and NATO, language-related problems contributed tangibly to political explosions in Ukraine in February/March 2014. Since 1991, two processes have altered the geopolitical map of Europe. These are the Eastward expansion of the US-dominated NATO along with the closely intertwined enlargement of the European Union. The first stage of these two processes in 1990–1991 – the absorption of Eastern Germany into both organizations – had no impact on the internal crisis in Yugoslavia, including the conflict in Croatia. Two decades later, however, the process of NATO expansion had already reached the borders of both Ukraine and Russia, thereby adding a very real extra-regional component to the conflict in and about Ukraine. For over two decades, one of the USA’s geostrategic goals has been by fostering ‘color revolutions’ to bring about regime change in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine and also Russia. By using Ukraine as a tool, the USA has endeavored to harm and weaken Russia. Under US pressure and notwithstanding German and French objections, at the NATO summit held in Bucharest in April 2008 Ukraine was promised membership in the alliance, yet without stating a date. Openly and strongly opposed by Russia, this decision unleashed a chain of events, 6 years later leading to a war in Ukraine. The European Union and its policy of Eastern neighborhood negatively contributed to these developments. The prospect of an association agreement with the EU deepened the internal political conflict in Ukraine and motivated a mass protest movement that was exploited in February 2014 to stage a US-guided coup d’état in Kyiv. The combination of Ukraine’s promised membership in NATO and the new regime in Kyiv fully dependent on the USA foretold that Russia would certainly lose its old naval base in Sevastopol, for which it had paid high rent since 1992. Moreover, as a NATO naval and air base, Sevastopol would pose a direct threat to Russia and its geopolitical position in the Black Sea and Mediterranean area. To thwart this threat, lightly armed detachments of Russian marines, already legally stationed on Crimea, were ordered to move in unmarked uniforms to take control of the entire peninsula. They did so without facing any resistance, on Kyiv’s strict orders, from the about 22,000 Ukrainian troops or inflicting any casualties. The Ukrainian officialdom then simply vacated Crimea. This takeover was soon followed by a successful referendum accompanied by international observers on approving Crimea’s legal separation from Ukraine and it rejoining Russia. Moscow thus took back Nikita Khrushchev’s present to Ukraine on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of its unification with Russia. First stage of the war in Ukraine Closely related to the dramatic developments in Kyiv, there were uprisings in several Ukrainian cities and proclamations of ‘‘sovereignty’’ and ‘‘autonomy’’ in Lugansk and Donetsk. These uprisings largely featured protests against the discriminatory measures adopted by the new authorities against the Russian and Russian-speaking population. The ultranationalist regime in Kyiv responded on 13 April 2014 by branding the protesters ‘‘terrorists’’, declaring a “wide anti-terrorist operation” and entrusting the Ukrainian Army to carry it out. This military operation launched the first stage of the war in Ukraine. In its attacks on the Donbas autonomists, the Ukrainian Army employed bombers, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery while battalions of Ukrainian ultranationalist volunteers with neo-Nazi leanings and financed by Ukrainian oligarchs used artillery and light weapons. On the defending side, there were about 35,000 members of the territorial people’s militias of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics as well as Russian and other (including Serbian) volunteers. The Russian Federation offered multi-sided support to the two besieged republics, encompassing financial, material, humanitarian and military assistance. Russian professional military personnel were integrated into the local militias and did not operate as separate and regular units of the Russian Army. At the same time, the US and British armed forces offered very sizeable material and other military assistance to the Ukrainian Army, also involving thousands of advisors and instructors. In numbers, they were comparable to the Russian military personnel on the other side of the frontline. By February 2022, this armed conflict had led to 14,000 to 20,000 dead. Two armistice agreements, Minsk 1 and Minsk 2, did not halt the Ukrainian shelling of Ukrainian territory, which was responsible for thousands of casualties among the civilian population of the two self-proclaimed republics. These attacks continued for more than 9 years, accompanied by gross violations of international humanitarian law. In February 2015, Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine signed the Minsk 2 agreement. It was co-signed by the leaders of Germany, France and Russia and unanimously adopted as a resolution by the UN Security Council, thereby becoming part of international law. The Minsk 2 agreement provided for peaceful resolution of the conflict in Donbas. Nonetheless, Petro Poroshenko and his successor Volodimir Zelenski refused to implement most of Ukraine’s 12 obligations, including the key provisions under which Ukraine was to grant constitutionally guaranteed autonomy to the Russian and Russian-speaking population in Donbas. In addition, Zelenski reneged on his pre-election promise that saw him win the election in 2019 and did not stop the war. Second stage of the war in Ukraine On 21 March 2021, Zelenski blatantly violated the Minsk 2 agreement and international law by ordering the Ukrainian Army to liberate the territories of the two republics and Crimea. The bulk of the Ukrainian Army was then relocated to their vicinity, clearly visible by Russian satellites. Instead of peaceful resolution of the conflict, Zelenski, no doubt with the USA’s full approval, thus decided on full-scale military suppression of the Donbas autonomists and on reconquering Crimea, well aware that it would provoke a strong reaction from Russia. On 16 February 2022, upon his order the Ukrainian Army initiated the second and much more violent stage of the war. From that date on, the intensity of Ukrainian shelling started to grow from several tens to 1,500 explosions daily. Combined with movements of Ukrainian troops, this strongly indicated that a massive attack was coming as part of implementation of the March 2021 order. It was very similar to the Georgian offensive against the self-proclaimed Republic of Southern Ossetia on 7 August 2008. This escalation was no doubt coordinated with US President Joe Biden, who publicly predicted that Russia would invade on 16 February 2022. Ukraine’s stepping up the level of violence successfully provoked a predictable Russian response. On the political and legal levels, this entailed the Russian Federation’s recognition of the two republics as independent states, signing two agreements on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, accepting their pleas for assistance and protection in line with Art. 51 of the UN Charter and invoking the Responsibility for Protect. In the latter the Russian Federation used a very similar justification as did NATO in 1999 for its aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the military level, Putin was faced with the real prospect of Ukraine quashing the two client Russian-speaking parastates. This would have submitted their discriminated Russian and Russian-speaking majority population to retribution by the Ukrainian ultranationalist and assimilationist regime, causing it to flee en masse across the border. He later explained that moral duty is higher than legality. Putin could not, also for domestic reasons, afford a humiliating political defeat similar to that suffered by Slobodan Milosevic in Croatia in August 1995. Unlike in August 2008 in Georgia, he did not wait for an all-out Ukrainian attack. Putin knew full well that stronger Western sanctions than those currently in place would follow, even if Russia’s response to the Ukrainian offensive were only moderate. Probably on the basis of a faulty assessment of both Ukraine’s capacity and determination to resist and the West’s response, he precipitously and knowingly in violation of international law ordered a ‘special military operation’ with an invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, by a limited contingent of Russian land forces. This move was combined with extensive destruction of the Ukrainian air force, the air defense system, and other military infrastructure. Ignoring an axiom of military science, an invading force of some 90,000 Russian land troops was sent against the Ukrainian Army thrice superior in numbers. It was also grossly insufficient and unprepared to accomplish the officially declared task of “demilitarizing” and “denazifying” entire Ukraine. In spite of its shortcomings, this force managed to swiftly occupy additional 15% or so of Ukrainian territory (some as a diversion and only temporarily) and effectively protected the two republics. It additionally established and secured a land bridge between Crimea and Donbas, made the Azov Sea part of Russia’s internal waters, took control of the largest European nuclear power station at Zaporizhie, and deprived Ukraine of its stocks of plutonium and uranium. These stocks would have been sufficient to make Ukraine the world’s fourth-strongest nuclear power. The latter was an effective response to Zelenski’s earlier declaration that Ukraine was intending to again acquire nuclear weapons. Preventing this dangerous prospect certainly served as an additional and important incentive for Putin’s decision. For USA, the by far most frequent transgressor of international law, provoking Russia into an act of aggression fitted nicely with the their strategic goal. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided a perfect occasion for demonizing and isolating it internationally and for uniting the West under USA’s guidance on imposing on Russia an unprecedented array of drastic economic and other sanctions. These punitive measures were expected to quickly ruin the Russian economy, hopefully bring down Vladimir Putin’s regime, defeat Russia militarily without losing American lives, and cause the fragmentation of Russia into several states (as elaborated earlier publicly by Zbigniew Brzezinski and the RAND Corporation). However, these hopes have not materialized. Moreover, the effects of the Western sanctions proved to be more harmful to the EU economies than to Russia while in no way helping Ukraine. The two wars compared Still officially undeclared by both direct belligerents, the war in Ukraine is already twice as long as the war in Croatia, and is still ongoing. There are also other important differences caused by the mismatch between Croatia and Ukraine in the size of their population and territory (approximately 1:10), and by the different configuration and extent of the theatres of war. Further, there are differences in the size and structure of the armed forces involved, in the disparities between Serbia’s and Russia’s military capabilities compared to the respective capabilities of Croatia and Ukraine. The war in Ukraine in its second stage is also unlike the war in Croatia due to the massive use of particular weapons systems (notably drones and missiles). Vast differences also exist in the direct involvement of international organizations and other external actors in the two wars. In the autumn of 1991, the European Economic Community (EEC) sent Croatia its first mission of white-clad and unarmed observers who as impartial intermediaries tried unsuccessfully to stop the armed clashes between the Croatian police and Serbian insurgents. The United Nations established UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) in February 1992, operating from Zagreb. It was followed by UNCRO (UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia) in 1995–1998, UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Croatia) in 1996–1998, and UNMOP (UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka) in 1996–1997. For several years, the UN-supported International Conference on Former Yugoslavia was active operating from Geneva. In comparison, there have been no UN or EU peacekeeping or observer missions in Ukraine. The UN General assembly has adopted a number of resolutions related to the war in Ukraine. In several resolutions it deplored and condemned Russia’s invasion with huge majorities for and only five votes against. The OSCE had no observer missions in Croatia, but deployed two such missions in Ukraine, notably the sizeable OSCE Special Monitoring Mission from 2015 until March 2022. In addition, the OSCE played an active role in facilitating the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 ceasefire agreements. Extra-regional states were not openly involved in the war in Croatia. In 1991–1992, the Croatian forces included 456 foreign fighters (British, French, German et.al.), accompanied by about 2,000 private American military instructors. On the other hand, Ukraine has received huge support from several dozen foreign states, in particular the USA, as well as other NATO and EU members in the form of heavy arms, ammunition, training, intelligence, economic and humanitarian assistance. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, since 2022, 13.387 foreign fighters, mercenaries and volunteers joined the Ukrainian Army of whom 5.962 lost their lives. Polish citizens have been most numerous in both categories – 2.960 enlisted and 1.497 dead. They are followed by Americans and others. This strong external involvement transformed the local war into an extra-regional armed conflict between Russia and the US-led collective West, with Ukraine acting and sacrificing its soldiers and itself as the West’s proxy. The war in Croatia and its outcome were closely linked with the war in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, while there has been no similar regional linkage of the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has also had by far a bigger international political and economic impact on other countries, not only in Europe, than the war in Croatia. Most importantly, there are enormous differences between the two wars in the number of dead (at least 1:25), number of refugees and displaced persons (approximately 1:25), and extent of destruction and amount of economic damage (at least 1:20). The war has inflicted considerably greater damage on Ukraine as a state and on Ukrainian society than the war did on Croatia. Since 2014, the population under Kyiv’s control has so far been reduced by at least one-third and the territory by close to one-fifth. It is estimated that the Ukrainian Army, National Guard and volunteers have suffered well over 400,000 deaths. Ukraine has also lost a good deal of its industrial capacity, agriculture, energy generation and critical infrastructure. The war’s continuation suits the USA’s geostrategic, chiefly anti-Russian objectives, whereas Ukraine is paying a horrible price for them. The dragging on war of attrition is sapping Ukraine’s ability to sustain itself, at least in its already rump shape. It increases the probability of Ukraine becoming (again) a landlocked country on less than a half of its territory internationally recognized since 1992. The first stage of the war in Ukraine and the war in Croatia revealed substantial similarities as far as their causes and destructive consequences were concerned. On the other hand the second stage of the war in Ukraine strongly differs by being predominantly an interstate war and the first interstate armed conflict in Europe caused by NATO enlargement. As a result, the war in Ukraine is sharply distinguished by its magnitude, destructive outcomes, violations of international humanitarian law, international impact, and the involvement of great powers. At the beginning of the second stage of the war in Ukraine, the Russian Army pre-empted the anticipated Ukrainian version of an offensive akin to the Croatian operations “Flash” and “Storm”. It not only prevented the possibility of Volodimir Zelenski’s triumphant entrance in Donetsk like Franjo Tudjman’s entrance in Knin. The Russian Federation also annexed four Ukrainian provinces with Russian and Russian-speaking majorities in their populations and the Russian Army occupied a good share of them. In 2014 and 2022, Moscow thus took back a considerable part of former Novorossiya given to Soviet Ukraine in 1920 and 1954. Unlike in Croatia, but like in Kosovo (1999) the war in Ukraine has extended the list of the more than three dozen new or de facto changed borders between European states since 1945. Responsibility for the war in Ukraine In a speech given at the UN General Assembly, US President Joe Biden ascribed Russia with full responsibility for the war in Ukraine. Yet, in fact, a number of states are directly responsible or co-responsible for its outbreak and continuation, including notably USA. First, the war was initiated by the Ukrainian Army in April 2014 according to orders of the Ukrainian interim Presidency. Under two subsequent Presidents Poroshenko and Zelenski, Ukraine violated two armistice agreements and sabotaged realization of the Minsk 2 agreement on peaceful resolution of the Donbas conflict. President Zelenski failed to fulfil his pre-election pledge to end the war, a pledge that had seen him win the election in 2019. On 21 March 2021, he ordered the Ukrainian Army to attack Donbas and Crimea in direct violation of both the Minsk 2 agreement and of international law. The Ukrainian leadership’s orders to steeply increase the artillery shelling of Donetsk from February 16, 2022 on, together with the movement of troops provoked an invasion by the Russian army. This led to the armed conflict transforming from an internal to largely an interstate war. In April 2022, President Zelenski reneged on an initialed agreement with the Russian Federation on resolving the conflict, as forged with assistance from the leaders of Israel and Turkey as intermediaries. Ukraine is responsible for the casualties and damage caused by its forces in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the Russian Federation has grossly violated the UN Charter, the Helsinki principles, and a dozen international treaties and agreements by which it guaranteed Ukraine’s security and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders. In February 2014, it committed an act of aggression by occupying and annexing Crimea. On 24 February 2022, it committed a second act of aggression by invading, occupying and annexing four Ukrainian provinces. The Russian Federation is responsible for the casualties and huge damage the Russian armed forces have caused on Ukrainian territory. The leading NATO members are co-responsible for the outbreak and continuation of the interstate conflict and war in and over Ukraine. This primarily applies to the USA, which knowingly unleashed a chain reaction in the conflictual relations between NATO and Russia. The USA used NATO to embroil EU in this conflict, even though that contradicts the objective economic and other interests of many EU members, notably Germany. This chain reaction led to the political conflict deteriorating into a war in which the USA is using Ukraine as a tool to harm and weaken Russia. Germany and France with their swindling signatures under the Minsk 2 agreement and with subsequent policies for 7 years allowed Ukraine’s sabotaging of peaceful solution of the Donbas conflict. As leaders in the European Union’s collective foreign policy, they encouraged and supported Ukraine’s active preparations for a war with Russia. The Western powers became co-responsible for the transformation from a relatively limited internal war in Ukraine into a wider, much more lethal, bloody and destructive, predominantly interstate war. In April 2022, the USA and Great Britain prevented the conclusion of an initialed Russian-Ukrainian agreement on resolving the conflict. The members of NATO and EU by politically encouraging and by providing arms and funds to Ukraine have been enabling the continuation of this war. Without this intrusion, the war in Ukraine would already be over and very probably on better terms for Ukraine than there will actually be. The NATO and EU members will certainly fail to achieve their main declared goal – Ukraine’s victory and hence Russia’s military and political defeat. This applies chiefly to the leader of the West. After that in Afghanistan, the USA will suffer one more political defeat. On the other hand, the USA has this time been rather successful in realizing several related goals. The USA has solidified its hegemony in the Western camp and in most of Europe, reactivated NATO, attracted two new members Finland and Sweden, bolstered its dominant role in the alliance, subordinated even further and simultaneously economically and politically weakened the European Union, for quite some time poisoned Germany’s and the EU’s relations with Russia, and inflicted very considerable economic and political damage on Russia. Conclusion Ukraine is today much farther away from accomplishing its cardinal strategic goal – to re-establish its sovereignty on the entire internationally recognized territory – than it was in February 2022, let alone in February 2014. Moreover, another goal remains unattained. It was stated in Zelenski’s decree as a condition for lifting the prohibition on any negotiations with the Russian Federation – to remove Putin from the position of President. However, with his mandate expired in May 2024 Zelenski himself will certainly be out of his presidential office much sooner than Putin will be from his. On the other hand, the Russian Federation has achieved some of its strategic goals, albeit not the two declared principal ones – Ukraine’s permanent “neutralization” and “demilitarization”. Due to the two sides’ mutually excluding objectives, the final outcome of the war in Ukraine will not be decided around a diplomatic table as a compromise. Like what happened in Croatia in August 1995 and very recently in September 2023 with the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, it will be decided on the battlefield. Still, the outcome will be very different from both cases mentioned above and certainly will not be viewed as just by both belligerents. Just like how almost all wars end. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Baud, Jacques (2023): Ukraine entre Guerre et Paix. Paris, Max Milo. Bebler, Anton (ed.). (2015): ‘Frozen conflicts’ in Europe. Opladen, Barbara Budrich. Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997): Geostrategy for Eurasia. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 56–68. Goldstein, Ivo (2008): Hrvaška zgodovina. Ljubljana, Društvo Slovenska Matica. Larrabee, F. Stephen, Peter A. Wilson and John Gordon (2015): The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation. Maver, Aleš (2023): Ukrajina: Od Igre Prestolov do Vojne za Samostojnost. Celje, Celjska Mohorjeva Družba. Pleiner, H. (2023): Der Konflict um die Ukraine. ÖMZ 5: 571–583. Wien. Plokhy, Serhii (2022): Vrata Evrope: zgodovina Ukrajine. Ljubljana, UMCO.

Energy & Economics
Chinese Yuan on the map of South America. Trade between China and Latin American countries, economy and investment

Ahead of the curve: Why the EU and US risk falling behind China in Latin America

by Ángel Melguizo , Margaret Myers

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Beijing’s investment approach to Latin America focuses on industries of strategic importance, the EU and US will need to contend with growing Chinese competition China is pouring less foreign direct investment (FDI) into Latin America. But while this may seem like a sign of Beijing’s disinterest in the region, data suggests that Chinese companies are simply recalibrating, not retreating. In doing so, they are becoming important players in sectors key to Western interests: critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy. While the European Union and the United States have long been top investors in Latin America, increased competition with Chinese investment now jeopardises their interests in the Latin American industries that will become most crucial to the digital and green transitions. The number of Chinese projects in Latin America grew by 33 per cent from 2018-2023, compared with the previous five-year period of 2013-2017, even as the total value declined. In other words, Chinese companies are making more investments in the region but are pursuing smaller-scale projects on average. These investments are also more focused on what China calls “new infrastructure“ (新基建), a term which encompasses telecommunications, fintech, renewable energy, and other innovation-related industries. In 2022, 60 per cent of China’s investments were in these frontier sectors, a key economic priority for the country. Beijing also views smaller projects in these industries as incurring less operational and reputational risk, especially compared to some of the large-scale infrastructure investment projects often associated with the Belt and Road initiative. Like China, the investment priorities of the G7 grouping – particularly the US and the EU – are centring on critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy as they aim to grow and reinforce existing economic and political partnerships in Latin America. However, both the US and the EU risk falling short of China’s investment strategy in the region. The US has signalled want for greater economic engagement with the region, especially in sectors of strategic interest. However, to date, US efforts to compete with China remain largely focused on building US domestic capacity in these strategic sectors, even as some US companies, such as Intel, are increasingly focused on including regional partners in their supply chains. Some see opportunity for Latin America in Joe Biden’s landmark legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which is aimed at incentivising the energy transition while also de-risking critical supply chains. For example, certain countries in the region may benefit from preferential market access for their lithium or other key inputs to new energy and technology supply chains. However, the reach of the IRA – which remains a largely domestic policy – does not stretch as far as China’s current investment reshuffle. The Americas Act, announced by members of Congress in March could generate promising new investment opportunities for the region, as it encourages US companies and others to move their operations out of China, to which Latin America stands as a promising replacement. But Americas Act reshoring would primarily incentivise textiles and potentially medical equipment manufacturing, with less overall focus on the range of “new infrastructure” industries that China is prioritising. Chinese interests in information and communication technologies reveal a similar story. While the US has focused its policy on 5G equipment sales, China is undertaking a process of vertical integration in Latin American tech sectors that will dramatically boost its competitiveness. For instance, Chinese company Huawei is rapidly expanding its focus to include data centres, cloud computing, cybersecurity, and other services, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. (Computing accounted for a sizable 41 per cent of total Chinese information technology investment in the region between 2018 and the first half of 2023.) At the same time, Global Gateway, the EU’s proposal for a global investment initiative is yet to reach its potential in the region. Brussels is looking to be Latin America’s partner of choice by building local capacity for making batteries and final products like electric vehicles, as European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen noted last year. Yet even as the EU signals renewed commitment, China is becoming increasingly dominant in the electric vehicle market in Latin America and other regions. China surpassed the US in electric vehicle sales in 2023, with Chinese companies accounting for 45 per cent of total global sales and three times that of Germany’s. What is more, China has invested $11 billion in lithium extraction in the region since 2018, as part of a bid to control a third of global lithium-mine production capacity. Meanwhile the EU has secured some access to lithium as part of trade deals with Chile, alongside other nations, but this pales in comparison to what will be required to fuel the future of EU battery production. Latin America as a whole accounts for an estimated 60 per cent of the world’s lithium reserves. Based on its current levels of engagement in the region, the EU risks falling short of lithium, stalling its battery production and subsequently, its electric vehicle sales, just as China advances in this field. The window is closing for the EU, the US, and other partners looking to both maintain market share and compete with China in these Latin American industries, despite still-high rates of US and EU investment in and trade with the region. Indeed, US automakers increasingly see Chinese competition across the globe as an “extinction-level event.” Ensuring competitiveness in “new infrastructure” and related sectors will require a continuous commitment by partners to building and supporting project pipelines, and to delivering products and services at price points that can compete with China’s subsidised offerings. Both the EU and the US remain critical economic partners for Latin America and are contributing in ways that China is not. Still, complacency risks allowing China to take the lead in emerging industries in the region, some of which weigh heavily in the EU’s green and digital transformation. To protect their own future industries, the EU and the US need to first take a longer look at Latin America’s – especially as China vies for a dominant position.

Defense & Security
USA und Nordkorea. Concept fight, War, Business Competition, Summit

Collapse of the Security Council Panel of Experts and the United States' persecutory obsession with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

by Jesús Aise Sotolongo

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Regarding Linda Thomas-Greenfield's visit to the Republic of Korea. At the end of last March (March 28th), due to Russia's veto and China's abstention in the UN Security Council, it did not extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee overseeing the implementation of punitive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This joint action by two of the global powers in the multilateral body has destabilized Washington, which angrily seeks an alternative that allows it to maintain its persecutory actions. Panel of Experts It is pertinent to detail that 18 years ago, under Resolution 1718 (2006), the Security Council established the Experts Group or Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee to oversee penalties imposed on the DPRK, which is comprised of eight specialists. In compliance with Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017), the Experts Group has, among other functions: 1. Assist the Sanctions Committee in executing its mandate, as outlined in paragraph 12 of Resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 25 of Resolution 1874 (2009); ● Gather, examine, and analyze information provided by Member States, relevant United Nations bodies, and other stakeholders regarding the implementation of measures, particularly focusing on instances of non-compliance; ● Formulate recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, or Member States could consider in order to enhance the implementation of measures; ● Submit a midterm report to the Committee and, following deliberations with it, present such report to the Security Council; ● Assist Member States in preparing and submitting national reports on the implementation of specific measures they have adopted to effectively implement the provisions of relevant resolutions; ● Support the Committee's efforts in further developing, improving, and drafting guidance notes for the implementation of resolutions. The members of the Panel of Experts are appointed by the General Secretary of the United Nations, upon the proposal of the referred Sanctions Committee. Members of the Panel of Experts have specialized expertise in areas such as nuclear issues, control of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, customs and export controls, non-proliferation policy, trade, finance and economics, air and maritime transportation, and missile and related technologies. The Security Council has urged all States to fully cooperate with the Panel of Experts, particularly by providing any information they possess regarding the implementation of measures. States are encouraged to respond to all requests promptly and comprehensively for information and to invite the Panel of Experts to conduct visits and investigate alleged violations of the sanction’s regime, including inspecting assets seized by national authorities. Its current mandate will expire on April 30, 2024, in compliance with paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 2680 (2023). Russia’s veto Moscow defended its veto in the Security Council against the renewal of international sanctions monitoring on Pyongyang, stating that it reflects "its current interests." Russia, with its veto, and China, with its abstention, blocked the renewal of the Panel of Experts, and while the sanctions will remain in effect, these actions paralyze the scrutiny of the experts. Russia's so-called "current interests" sparked varied responses ranging from vehement criticism to concerns and speculation. Criticism focuses on Moscow's position undermining multilateral efforts to monitor measures implemented by Pyongyang that circumvent sanctions aimed at blocking its missile-nuclear development, which, according to critics, has implications for international security. Meanwhile, concerns are directed towards the alleged support that the DPRK receives from its regional allies, (Russia and China) for its missile-nuclear development, countries with marked ideological differences and high levels of conflict with the United States. Meanwhile, speculations refer to Moscow's motivations being linked to the support that Russia receives from Pyongyang in arms and ammunition needed for its military operation in Ukraine. Regardless of criticisms, concerns, and speculations, the reality is that we are witnessing the culmination of a gamble that Russia and China have been making in the Security Council for a long time, proposing various initiatives to ease rather than strengthen the sanctions regime and relax its implementation. Meanwhile, their respective governments have issued official statements blaming US hostility and its allies as the fundamental cause for the DPRK choosing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as the basis of its national defense and continuing to expand and perfect them. Russia's veto and China's abstention have led to the collapse of a structure that has long been in question for a long time, because it could not prevent violations of sanctions by an increasing number of UN Member States. Additionally, it represents a significant victory for the DPRK, which harbored deep animosity towards the Panel of Experts. Furthermore, it confirms the current state of Russo-North Korean and Sino-North Korean political-diplomatic relations in a context of various armed conflicts, both real and potential, that have been shaking the planet. Opposing positions in the General Assembly On April 12th, 2024, the UN General Assembly discussed Russia's veto. Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vassily Nebenzia, argued that his country exercised the veto because UN sanctions against the DPRK have had no significant effect and have only caused a humanitarian crisis for the North Korean people. Meanwhile, China's alternate representative, Geng Shuang, stated that the Korean War has long ended, but the Cold War is still persisting. He reiterated his country's position that "there will be no resolution of the problems if the security concerns of all parties, including the DPRK, remain unaddressed," calling on all actors to work together to adopt a path to peace. He said that tensions are hindering these efforts, and that dialogue is needed, and the Security Council must play an active role. Using a typically Chinese allegory, he stated that "sanctions should not be carved in stone" and added that "harsh sanctions" against the DPRK have had a negative effect on the humanitarian situation in the country. Regarding Russia's new proposal, he expressed hope that Council members will work productively to extend the mandate of the panel of experts, a phrase that justifies China's abstention rather than a veto. The representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN, Hwang Joon Kook, condemned Russia's veto and criticized the military collaboration between Moscow and Pyongyang. He argued that it was vetoed because "Russia did not want the watchtower, the panel, to light its dark spot." He asserted that the Panel had included in its recent report that it had been investigating reports of the arms agreement between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, which constitute a clear violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile, Robert Wood, alternate representative of the United States, said: "...we need to uphold our obligations." He stated that, as the sponsor of the resolution to extend the work of the Panel of Experts, his delegation had sought a broad compromise and that China and Russia had had ample opportunities to discuss sanctions reform in the council. Instead, Russia gave to the Council members an ultimatum that sought one of two outcomes: to avoid sanctions against the DPRK or to silence the panel's investigations, including Moscow's acquisition of arms from Pyongyang for its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russia's veto undermines the architecture of peace and security and deprives action on one of the Council's most pressing issues, that of peace on the Korean Peninsula. "Russia is already threatening to end the mandate of the UN Sanctions Committee that helps the Security Council monitor and take actions to deter threats to international peace and security (...) that is why it is crucial for all of us to raise our voices today in support of the non-proliferation regime, and opposition to the attempts to silence the information, we need to uphold our obligations." Meanwhile, the DPRK ambassador to the UN, Kim Song, said: "The DPRK greatly appreciates the veto by the Russian Federation..." and argued that the Council's sanctions on his country are a product of U.S. hostile policy. "If the DPRK's position of possessing nuclear weapons for self-defense is a threat to international peace and security, as claimed by the United States and its followers, we should first properly discuss why the United States is not considered a threat to international peace and security, even though it is the only country in the world to have used a nuclear weapon..." As can be seen, the contrasts in statements reflect the adversarial positions of the parties most directly involved in the issue. United States seeks for alternatives As expected, Washington immediately began plotting countermeasures in the face of the imminent dissolution of the Group that it had controlled for years. The United States representative to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, during her recent visit to the Republic of Korea, was tasked with addressing this issue, although no concrete proposals were heard. The agenda crafted for the U.S. Ambassador to the UN included several meetings, even with North Korean defectors, and culminated in a visit to the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, a moment she deemed opportune to express her concern that the DPRK could freely develop missiles without the oversight of the sanctions monitoring body. She stated that Washington is considering "out-of-the-box" options to monitor Pyongyang's compliance with sanctions. "All possibilities are on the table," and her government is "working closely with South Korea and Japan to seek creative and original ways to move forward" in this regard. At the same time, she urged Russia and China to reverse course, to stop rewarding the "misbehavior of the DPRK," and to protect it from sanctions, which allow it to carry out activities on its weapons programs. The diplomat called on Moscow and Beijing to reverse course and urge Pyongyang to choose diplomacy, come to the negotiating table, and engage in constructive dialogue. Considering all possibilities, she stated that it could be within the UN General Assembly, "entities outside of it." We see that Washington is exploring alternative ways to the Group of Experts to continue investigating Pyongyang's sanction violations. During the press conference, Ms. Thomas-Greenfield said, "I look forward to collaborating with both the Republic of Korea and Japan, but also with like-minded countries, to try to develop options both within and outside of the UN. The point here is that we cannot allow the work that the panel of experts was doing to lapse." The U.S. representative to the UN added that Russia and China, which abstained from voting in favor of the extension, will continue to try to block international efforts to maintain monitoring of UN sanctions against the DPRK. She criticized Russia for violating these sanctions with its purchases of North Korean arms and, also China for shielding the North, stating, "I don't expect them to cooperate or agree with any effort we make to find another path, but that won't stop us from finding that path in the future." Recently, Marcus Noland, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an expert on Korean affairs, has proposed: ● That the UN General Assembly plays a more significant role in maintaining pressure on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. This proposal emerged amid the debate over Russia's veto of a resolution to extend the mandate of the panel of experts monitoring sanctions on the DPRK. ● The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched on May 31st, 2003, during the George W. Bush era, represents a coalition outside the UN framework, composed of 112 members so far. It aims to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern. This initiative is part of the foundations of the global regime against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has maintained strong support as a presidential priority in each of the US’s administrations since its inception. It is known that Washington, in its attempt to ensure the diversification of tools to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, apparently, foreseeing the eventual deactivation of the Panel of Experts, is seeking to strengthen and expand the PSI. Its active role in this direction involves contributing with experts, diplomats, financiers, military personnel, customs officials, and police; organizing meetings, workshops, and exercises with other States supporting the PSI; and working with specific partner States to enhance their capacity to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ● Following the example of the United States and South Korea, who recently launched an Enhanced Disruption Working Group and jointly sanctioned six individuals and two entities based in Russia, China, and the United Arab Emirates for supporting the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction programs. According to the expert, in the absence of the Panel of Experts, these sanction’s activities can be expanded and could involve countries allied with the United States. ● Utilization of the Egmont Group, a state-led network of financial intelligence units with 174 members that shares information and collaborates on illicit financial activities. It does not have a mandate in the sanctions area, but that does not mean it cannot be granted one, and if so, the Group could assume an intensified role in monitoring North Korea's sanctions evasion in the financial sphere. The pronouncements of the US Ambassador to the UN at the DMZ suggest that the US State Department is paying attention to Marcus Noland's proposals, which, so far, are identified as the most precise ones that have emerged. However, for now, except for the UN General Assembly, which, due to its plurality, is not likely to be able to assume supervisory functions, the rest of the alternatives lack the authority of the UN as the Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee had. Some considerations As the DPRK strengthened its missile and nuclear capabilities, casting doubt on the effectiveness of the sanction’s regime and the performance of the Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts, this monitoring instrument of the Security Council appeared increasingly biased and uncompromising. Despite Washington and its top allies were intensifying their demands on the State Members to comply with the measures included in the resolutions, many governments avoided implementing the sanctions or did so only partially, in addition, they often failed to submit their reports. The calls from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee for all Member States to submit their national reports on the implementation of the resolutions comprising the sanction's regime were becoming more frequent, with representatives being reminded that these reports are mandatory. Of all the UN Member States, fewer and fewer delegations were submitting their reports, and some never did. To mitigate the apathy, the Committee held meetings with Regional Groups to ascertain the technical assistance and training needs of Member States for the effective implementation of Security Council resolutions at the national level. It became evident that the most determined to challenge the Panel of Experts were Russia and China, which in the multilateral arena deployed various initiatives to ease the sanctions regime and vetoed new resolutions, while at the same time, they relativized their application bilaterally. Everything seems to indicate that Moscow and Beijing were gauging the "loophole" through which to penetrate and cause the implosion of the Panel of Experts and saw the opportunity by vetoing its extension, which will take effect on April 30. We are witnessing exasperated actions from Washington and its top allies to at least attempt to maintain oversight to contain the nuclearization of the DPRK when they have been unable to do so through other means. However, at the same time, it is observed that the main powers in conflict with the United States are aligned with Pyongyang on various fronts, including the multilateral space, something that is strategically very favorable for all three parties. References Agustín Menéndez. Matando al mensajero: sobre Corea del Norte y las Naciones Unidas – Reporte Asia. Disponible en: https://reporteasia.com/opinion/2024/04/16/matando-mensajero-corea-del-norte-naciones-unidas/ Marcus Noland. Hobbling sanctions on North Korea: Russia and the demise of the UN’s Panel of Experts. Disponible en: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/hobbling-sanctions-north-korea-russia-and-demise-uns-panel-experts Chad O´Carroll. UN General Assembly could monitor North Korea Sanctions, Countries Suggest. Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/un-general-assembly-could-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-countries-suggest/ KBS WORLD. S. Korea Envoy: Russia Vetoed UN Panel Extension to Hide it´s ´Dark Spot´. Disponible en: https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=184836 UN News General Assembly debates Russia´s veto of DPR Korea sanction Panel. Disponible en: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431 Newsroom Infobae. La embajadora de EEUU ante la ONU visita la Zona Desmilitarizada entre las dos Coreas. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/04/16/la-embajadora-de-eeuu-ante-la-onu-visita-la-zona-desmilitarizada-entre-las-dos-coreas/ Ifang Bremer. US exploring alternatives to North Korea sanction panel in and out of UN: Envoy. Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/us-exploring-alternatives-to-north-korea-sanctions-panel-in-and-out-of-un-envoy/ Kim Tong Hyung. Envoy says US determined to monitor North Korea nukes, through UN or otherwise. Disponible en:https://apnews.com/article/us-north-korea-un-sanctions-monitoring-panel-experts-2064dd5d479a672711945f2c6aa6f1 United States Mission to the United Nations. Readout of Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield´s Meeting with Young North Korean Escapees in the-Republic-of-Korea. Disponible en: https://usun.usmission.gov/readout-of-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfields-meeting-with-young-north-korean-escapees-in-the-republic-of-korea/ Korea Times. US to seek ways to continue sanction monitoring on NK despite uncooperative Russia, China: Envoy. Disponible en: https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=372893 United Nations. Security Council Fail to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanction Committee on Democratic People´s Republic of Korea. Disponible en: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE. Proliferation Security Initiative. About the Proliferation Security Initiative. Disponible en: http://www.state.gov/proliferation-security-initiative EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS. Disponible en: https://egmontgroup.org/

Defense & Security
Solomon Islands

Russia and China co-ordinate on disinformation in Solomon Islands elections

by Albert Zhang , Adam Ziogas

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Moscow and Beijing likely worked together to sow disinformation globally that was propagated locally by political parties in the lead-up to Solomon Islands’ national and provincial elections on 17 April 2024. Both countries’ propaganda systems accused the United States, without evidence, of using its foreign aid and networks across the country to interfere in voting and of preparing to foment riots and orchestrate regime change in response to an unsatisfactory election result. This campaign adds to a growing body of evidence showing that China’s and Russia’s ‘no limits’ partnership extends to coordinating their disinformation campaigns in the Indo-Pacific. The narratives haven’t gained widespread attention or media coverage in Solomon Islands. Australia, the United States and other Pacific partners should nonetheless be concerned, as Russia and China can be expected to learn from this campaign and will likely use the lessons to further improve their influence operations in the region. Individually, China and Russia are adept and expert at pushing disinformation to disrupt other nations but, by coordinating their efforts, they have a force-multiplier effect. The campaign consisted of an alleged ‘leaked’ letter, articles published on authoritarian state-controlled media outlets and a fringe journal publication, which were then shared and amplified on social media platforms. A fortnight before election day, an unknown author by the name of Richard Anderson published an explosive article in CovertAction Magazine alleging that the US was seeking regime change in Solomon Islands. The US-based magazine was co-founded in 1978 by the late Philip Agee, a former CIA officer who after his retirement became a vocal critic of the agency and of US policy and had reported links with Soviet and Cuban intelligence. The magazine was set up ‘on the initiative of the KGB’, the Soviet Union’s main intelligence agency, according to a book by KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin and British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew. Anderson had no previous history of writing for CovertAction Magazine. A week after that article was published, Russian state-controlled media agency Sputnik further fuelled the allegations, writing that the US was ‘plotting [an] electoral coup’. This article cited an anonymous source who had ‘intimate familiarity’ with the activities of USAID, the main United States foreign aid and international development agency. This mirrored how Anderson is described in his CovertAction Magazine bio, though Sputnik’s article did not explicitly mention him or his article. Sputnik’s claims were amplified four days later by the Chinese state-controlled tabloid newspaper the Global Times, which did directly reference Anderson’s article and has the potential to legitimise these narratives to an audience the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is actively targeting. During the same period, a poorly fabricated letter from an unconfirmed (and potentially non-existent) IFES project consultant was circulated among Solomon Islanders by an unknown source claiming that the US was seeking a ‘democratic transition by violent means in necessary circumstances.’ The text in this letter mirrored language used by Sputnik’s alleged anonymous source. Figure 1: Paragraph from Sputnik article (top) and a screenshot of the alleged IFES letter (bottom).     To be clear, there is no evidence that the US, or any other country, is supporting violent riots or interfering in Solomon Islands. Ann Marie Yastishock, US Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, has strongly refuted these allegations. This is not the first time the CCP-controlled media has spread disinformation in Solomon Islands or accused the US of seeking to instigate riots in the country. Following the 2021 Honiara riots, the CCP falsely accused Australia, the US and Taiwan of organising the riots, fomenting unrest and discrediting the relationship between Solomon Islands and China. In contrast, Russian media outlets also covered the 2021 Honiara riots but didn’t promote any explicit accusations of US or foreign interference. This time, China and Russia have been in lockstep. In the lead-up to the April elections, Russian state media was more direct and damning in its reporting with the release of Sputnik’s original article and in the subsequent coordination and dissemination of false narratives alongside Chinese state media. While Sputnik published only one follow-up article to the initial investigation, China’s Global Times was more prolific and varied, with six articles alleging US meddling in Solomon Islands. Of these six articles, four explicitly referenced Sputnik’s claims and two referenced US influence operations in more general terms. The indications of Russia-China propaganda coordination in this campaign were further supported by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) post on 19 April 2024 titled ‘The Hypocrisy and Facts of the United States Foreign Aid’. The post on their website claims the US is giving aid to Solomon Islands, among other countries, only because it sees it as a political threat. This was the first article ever published by the MFA to smear USAID. Moscow, however, has consistently campaigned against USAID since it ejected the US agency from Russia in 2012 for ‘meddling in politics’. Russian media has pushed a consistent narrative that the organisation is a US imperialist tool of regime change, accusing it of fomenting civil unrest and coup attempts as far afield as Belarus, Cuba, Georgia and Mexico. However, this latest attack against USAID appears to be the first where Russia’s narratives are working to the benefit of CCP interests. It’s been clear since at least 2018 that Russian and Chinese state media are converging on media narratives that serve their governments’ strategic and political interests. According to leaked documents from Russian state broadcaster VGTRK, Russian and Chinese propaganda entities also signed an agreement to ‘further cooperate in the field of information exchange, promoting objective, comprehensive and accurate coverage of the most important world events’. While previous ASPI research has demonstrated Russian and Chinese state-coordinated narratives on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the repeated re-airing of Sputnik’s conspiratorial claims of interference in Solomon Islands’ elections in Global Times articles indicates this propaganda cooperation is now a global initiative. There was also some evidence of amplification by inauthentic accounts on social media of these narratives, but they were limited and it is unclear whether they were state linked. For example, one X account with the handle @jv79628 shared the original Sputnik investigation. The account posts links almost exclusively from Sputnik, Global Times, Australian website Pearls and Irritations and videos with artificial intelligence-generated voices from the pro-CCP YouTube channel Chinese Revival, which may be linked to the Shadow Play network previously uncovered by ASPI. Other accounts sharing the original Sputnik report, such as @de22580171, pose as pro-Russian US citizens. They share articles mostly from Sputnik or Russia Today. At the time of publication of this report, Russia’s and China’s state media articles, and the accusations contained in them, have had minimal reach into online Pacific communities. In the public Solomon Islands Facebook groups ASPI viewed, online discourse remains more focussed on the emergence of new coalitions and the election of a new Prime Minister than on discussion of foreign influence or interference. According to Meta’s social monitoring tool, CrowdTangle, none of the articles from the Global Times have been shared in open and public Solomon Islands Facebook groups. However, Sputnik’s first article may have been more successful in reinforcing anti-Western sentiments in outgoing Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s O.U.R. Party, who are strong contenders to be part of the coalition that forms the next government. That article was posted on the O.U.R. Party Solomon Islands Facebook page, which is run by the party, on 10 April. It was reshared to several public Facebook groups in Solomon Islands, including news aggregation sites and local island forum pages. This is significant because it is the first time a news article has been posted on the O.U.R. Party Solomon Islands Facebook page, which typically shares positive images of the party’s activities and political campaigns. As of 1 May 2024, the post (below) has had over 180 interactions, which is higher than the average number of interactions a typical post has on this page. Figure 2: Screenshot of Sputnik article posted in O.U.R Party Solomon Islands Facebook page.     Sogavare, a founding member of the O.U.R. Party, has made similar remarks about ‘foreign forces’ previously. According to an article published in the Solomon Star, when US Ambassador Yastishock visited Solomon Islands in late March to present her letter of credentials to Governor-General John Oti, Sogavare claimed foreign forces were ‘intervening in the national general election’ and ‘may fund some political parties and plan to stage another riot during the election to disrupt the electoral process and undermine social stability’. Despite the low online interaction so far, the barrage of US regime change allegations lays the foundation for future narratives that may resurface if Solomon Islands experiences future unrest. Beijing and Moscow can be expected to learn from these disinformation efforts, leaving the US, Australia and their Pacific partners no room for complacency about the threat the regimes pose, nor the need for effective strategic communication. The Russian and Chinese governments are seeking to destabilise the Pacific’s information environment by using disinformation campaigns and influence operations to undermine traditional partnerships. In this digital age, leaders of governments and civil society across the region need to consistently confront and counter baseless lies pushed by authoritarian state media, such as accusations that the governments of Australia and the US are instigating riots. If they fail to do so, partnerships with, and trust in, democratic countries are at risk of deteriorating, which can reduce the development benefits provided to Pacific Island Countries by Western partners. Australia, the US, and other close Pacific partners, such as Japan, New Zealand and the European Union, must take a stronger stance against false and misleading information that is starting to circulate in the region as a result of authoritarian state-backed disinformation campaigns. These nations must also better support and encourage local media and governments to take further steps to identify and combat false information online. This includes providing more training packages and opportunities for dialogue on media-government communication procedures to tackle disinformation and misinformation. Countering the effects of disinformation requires ongoing efforts to call out false statements, educate the public, and build country-wide resilience in the information environment. Greater transparency and public awareness campaigns from the region’s partners can also help to ‘prebunk’—or anticipate and delegitimise—disinformation and alleviate concerns about malign activity.