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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

Introduction Qatar emerged as a key player during Operation al-Aqsa Flood conflict, solidifying its role as the leading mediator in the region’s crises and conflicts. Despite the potential challenges posed by the operation on 7/10/2023, given Qatar’s hosting of much of the Hamas leadership, it effectively transformed this challenge into an opportunity. This bolstered Qatar’s influence, strengthening its political standing on both regional and international fronts. First: Determinants of the Qatari Position The Qatari stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by several key factors, foremost among them: 1. Qatar’s unwavering commitment to the Palestine issue and its consistent support for Palestinians in both the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS). Alongside significant contributions to the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) budget, the Qatari grant, ongoing since 2018, has been a crucial financial resource in bolstering the resilience of the people of GS against the severe blockade imposed on them since 2007. 2. Qatar’s proactive policy and continuous ambition to enhance its regional and international presence and political influence have been evident through its strategy of serving as a mediator in various conflicts. Over the past years, this approach has solidified Qatar’s reputation as a trusted and preferred mediator, particularly by the US, as demonstrated in its mediation efforts between the US and the Taliban, Iran and Venezuela. Its recent attempts to mediate between Palestinian resistance movements and Israel represent the culmination of a sustained record of diplomatic successes. 3. Qatar’s openness to various Palestinian factions, its ability to maintain positive and balanced relations, and its hosting of Hamas’s political bureau since 2012 have significantly contributed to building strong ties with the movement. This, in turn, has bolstered Qatar’s role and influence in the Palestinian issue, establishing it as a preferred mediator for Hamas, which has openly expressed appreciation for Qatar’s efforts to support the Palestinian people and to manage constructive and neutral mediation during critical phases. 4. Qatar’s strategic relations with the US have enabled it to play significant roles in the Palestine issue, including hosting Hamas leadership under Qatari-US agreements. In 2022, US President Joe Biden designated Qatar as a major non-NATO ally. 5. Qatar possesses many elements and tools of influence and soft power in the diplomatic, media and economic fields, and its success in utilizing its soft power efficiently has contributed to many political achievements. Second: Aspects of Qatari Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood Although Qatar, like other political actors, was initially taken by surprise by Operation al-Aqsa Flood, it swiftly adapted to the evolving situation. Key aspects of Qatar’s response during Operation al-Aqsa Flood include: 1. Qatar condemned the Israeli war on GS, attributing the escalation and regional instability to Israeli policies. It also denounced the massacres and acts of genocide committed by the Israeli forces against the Palestinian people in both GS and WB. 2. Throughout Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Qatar consistently called for a ceasefire, de-escalation and the restoration of calm in the region. The country actively engaged in political and diplomatic efforts to halt the aggression against Gaza and played a prominent role in the joint extraordinary Arab and Islamic Summit held in Riyadh on 11/11/2023. Qatar also pushed for concrete actions to stop Israeli crimes. During his speech at the summit, the Emir of Qatar stated, “You all know the position and feelings of our people regarding what is happening…. we must take deterrent steps to stop the ongoing war crime, in a way that will also project the weight and leverage of Islamic states.” 3. Qatar addressed the political and media campaigns that sought to incite against it and blamed it for the 7/10/2023 attack due to its hosting of Hamas leadership and financial support for GS with calmness and resolve. On 13/10/2023, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani stressed that the “State of Qatar’s commitment to its role as a partner in peacemaking and a mediator in resolving conflicts should not be used to harm its reputation by leveling accusations that were proven to be false and the bad faith of its promoters exposed.” A statement from the Qatari Foreign Ministry on 16/10/2023 clarified that “Qatar is not a financial backer of Hamas. It provides aid to Gaza, and the destination of the money is crystal clear.” “Qatari aid to the Gaza Strip is fully coordinated with Israel, the United Nations and the United States.” 4. During the crisis, Qatar’s most notable official role was its active diplomacy and leadership in mediating a ceasefire and facilitating prisoner exchange deals between the Palestinian resistance and Israel, with direct US supervision and sponsorship. 5. The Qatari media played a pivotal and influential role during the war, effectively delivering detailed on-the-ground reports and covering political and popular movements both within and beyond Palestine. This represented a significant milestone in media coverage of the war’s developments. In response, on 5/5/2024, the Israeli government unanimously voted to shut down Al Jazeera’s operations in the occupied territories and confiscate its television equipment, citing allegations of incitement and threats to national security. Third: Projections Qatar’s numerous achievements in political mediation underscore the success of its strategy, which emphasizes building long-term relationships with diverse global actors. This approach has afforded Qatar significant leverage, enabling it to effectively mediate many crucial issues. Moving forward, Qatar is anticipated to continue its strategic and active mediation efforts, aiming to secure a ceasefire agreement in GS, despite the obstacles posed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s intransigence and his insistence on continuing aggression. The effect of possible regional escalation on Qatar’s mediation efforts is still unclear, especially if Israel ramps up its confrontation with Iran and Hizbullah in the wake of the recent assassinations of Hamas political bureau chief Isma‘il Haniyyah and Hizbullah military official Fuad Shukr. Additionally, the potential impact of a Donald Trump victory in the upcoming US presidential election on Qatar’s diplomatic and mediation roles in the Palestine issue remains uncertain. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In response to its recent retaliatory tariffs on US energy imports, a delegation of major Chinese energy firms visited Kazakhstan in February 2025 to explore new trade opportunities. It was led by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), which focused on diversifying supply chains and reducing dependence on western markets. The visit highlights Beijing’s commitment to deepening economic ties in Central Asia through trade, infrastructure investment, and energy cooperation amidst the escalating tensions between China and the West. Traditionally, Russia exerted a dominant influence in Central Asian countries due to its Soviet-era legacy and security ties. However, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and expanding economic partnerships with Central Asian nations have established Beijing as a key player in the region. As US presence has diminished, and Russia remains preoccupied with its conflict in Ukraine, China has leveraged economic partnerships, infrastructure projects, and strategic diplomacy. China has emerged as Central Asia’s primary trade partner, even surpassing Russia in economic influence. In 2023, trade between China and Central Asia reached $89.4 billion, reflecting a 27% increase from the previous year. This surge highlights China’s efforts to solidify its economic presence through investments, trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. Kazakhstan remains Beijing’s most significant economic ally in the region, with trade reaching $43.8 billion by the end of 2024, a 9% rise from 2023. Likewise, Uzbekistan has upgraded its ties with China to an “all-weather” comprehensive strategic partnership, aiming to boost trade from $14 billion to $20 billion. Chinese investments in Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sector have grown fivefold, underscoring Beijing’s focus on sustainable development. Infrastructure development is a cornerstone of China’s engagement in Central Asia. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway is a flagship project designed to provide China with a direct access route into the region, reducing dependence on Russian transit networks. China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement that will carry out the project in June 2024. This aligns with Beijing’s broader goal of diversifying trade routes, particularly amid global disruptions such as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. China has expanded its influence and investments in the energy industry, extending its reach beyond transportation infrastructure. The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, spanning Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China, is crucial to Beijing’s energy security strategy. This infrastructure ensures a steady supply of natural gas while providing Central Asian states with an alternative to Russian-controlled routes. In October 2023, KazMunayGas (KMG) and China National Chemical Engineering Group Corporation (CNCEC) agreed to construct a gas turbine power plant at the Atyrau oil refinery. This facility aims to enhance power supply reliability and support the energy needs of the Atyrau region.Similarly QazaqGaz and Geo-Jade Petroleum Corporation are set to develop the Pridorozhnoye gas field in Turkistan Region. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is implementing four oil and gas projects in collaboration with Kazakhstan’s Samruk-Kazyna. On a regional scale, PetroChina plans to resume construction of Line D of the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline in 2025, pending the finalization of a gas supply contract with Turkmenistan, further strengthening China’s energy ties with the region. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Beijing plays a dominant role in the extraction of essential minerals, while its economic ties with Kazakhstan continue to strengthen. China’s molybdenum imports from Kazakhstan increased to around $19.6 million in 2022, demonstrating the country’s reliance on Kazakh resources. Meanwhile, 1.5% of Tajikistan’s total exports to China were zinc, and 17.5% were copper, demonstrating China’s rising influence over Central Asia’s minerals and the potential for raw material exploitation in Central Asian countries. Despite China’s growing economic footprint, Central Asian states remain cautious about excessive dependence and actively seek to diversify their partnerships, including engagement with the United States. Beijing has heavily invested in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, financing essential infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, hospitals, and government buildings. These investments reflect China’s broader strategy of fostering economic development as a means to ensure regional stability. By funding key projects, Beijing not only stimulates economic growth but also deepens its political influence by cultivating relationships with local elites. Chinese direct investments in Kyrgyzstan reached $220.8 million in 2023. Specifically, China has been involved in the construction of roads and infrastructure, and Bishkek, China provides grants for the construction of interchanges to solve traffic jams. China and Kyrgyzstan have extended their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation until 2026, aligning the infrastructure project with Kyrgyzstan’s national development strategy. China has been the largest national contributor to Tajikistan’s expanding transport infrastructure, accounting for 26 percent of the total value, or $570.2 million. Of this, $37 million has been provided in grants, while the remaining $533.2 million were loans. China has committed $230 million in funding to Tajikistan for the construction of a new parliament  building. The 2023 China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an marked a turning point in Beijing’s regional strategy. Historically, China engaged with Central Asian states through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where Russia played a significant role. However, the establishment of an independent China-Central Asia summit signals Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the region and a strategic shift toward reducing Russia’s traditional influence. In May 2023, President Xi Jinping hosted leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan for the inaugural  China Central Asia summit, which took place in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province. China announced during the summit that it would upgrade bilateral investment agreements, introduce more trade facilitation initiatives, speed up the construction of the D-line of the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, and give Central Asian countries 26 billion in financing support and non-reimbursable assistance. Kazakhstan will host the next summit in 2025–2026. At the summit, China pledged substantial development aid, expanded energy partnerships, and strengthened security cooperation, reflecting its broader commitment to regional stability and economic integration. Although China’s engagement in Central Asia remains primarily economic, it is increasingly asserting itself on political matters as well. Beijing has taken diplomatic stances that occasionally diverge from Moscow’s interests. For instance, China has openly supported Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity in response to Russian nationalist rhetoric, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared during his September 14, 2022 visit to Kazakhstan that his country backs Kazakhstan’s independence and territorial integrity and is against any meddling in its domestic affairs. However, despite these political maneuvers, China remains cautious about direct security involvement in the region. While Beijing maintains a military presence in Tajikistan and deploys private security firms to protect its investments, it continues to operate within Russia’s established security framework rather than attempting to supplant it. This cautious approach was particularly evident in China’s limited response to border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, signalling its reluctance to assume a direct security guarantor role in the region. Meanwhile, Russia’s traditional dominance in Central Asia has weakened due to its ongoing war in Ukraine. Central Asian governments are distancing themselves from Moscow, with Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev openly rejecting Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine. Moreover , the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Moscow’s regional economic bloc, has struggled to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which provides more substantial investments and infrastructure development. As a result, China’s influence in Central Asia continues to expand, filling the gaps left by Russia’s declining geopolitical leverage. While China’s engagement in Central Asia has traditionally focused on economic investments, its security presence is steadily expanding. Beijing has increased arms sales, military cooperation, and counterterrorism efforts. Chinese military exports accounted for only 1.5% of Central Asia’s total arms imports, between 2010 and 2014,  but by 2019, this figure had surged to 18%. In a significant development, in 2021, Tajikistan approved the construction of a new base after an agreement between the country’s Interior Ministry and China’s Public Security Ministry or police force. The fact that the Public Security Ministry, not the Chinese military, signed the agreement indicates that counterterrorism is a priority in the face of growing concerns about instability in neighbouring Afghanistan. This facility enhances Beijing’s security footprint near Afghanistan, a region of strategic concern due to potential instability affecting Xinjiang. Unlike Russia, which maintains a direct military presence, China takes a different approach to security cooperation. Rather than deploying conventional troops, Beijing relies on Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) to safeguard its economic interests and infrastructure projects. These contractors, often led by former Chinese military personnel, protect Chinese investments across Central Asia. While negotiating its non-interference policy’s limitations, these PMSCs handle security concerns ranging from terrorism to local unrest impacting Chinese workers and projects by offering a variety of services such as armed protection, intelligence collection, and military training. In line with its security diplomacy and larger Global Security Initiative, China uses PMSCs to strengthen security cooperation and increase its influence in the region. Companies such as Zhongjun Junhong Group and China Security and Protection Group have established branches in nations like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China launched the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022, reinforcing its commitment to regional security. The GSI prioritizes sovereignty, noninterference, and counterterrorism collaboration, aligning with the security priorities of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which face domestic stability challenges. Beyond military engagement, China has intensified law enforcement cooperation with Central Asian states. Beijing has established intelligence-sharing agreements, police training programs, and cybersecurity initiatives aimed at combating organized crime and terrorism. These efforts serve China’s broader goal of maintaining regional stability while protecting its economic interests. Despite China’s growing economic and security ties with Central Asia, local resistance poses a significant challenge. Public opposition to Chinese investments has been fuelled by concerns over debt dependency, land acquisitions, job displacement, and environmental impact. In 2016, proposed land reforms in Kazakhstan sparked widespread protests across the country, as many citizens feared that the changes would allow Chinese investors to buy large tracts of Kazakh land. The government had introduced amendments to the Land Code, which included provisions for leasing agricultural land to foreign investors for up to 25 years. This led to public concerns about the potential for Chinese ownership of Kazakh land, given China’s increasing economic influence in the region. Demonstrations took place in major cities like Almaty, Atyrau, and Aktobe, drawing thousands of people. The scale of the protests forced the Kazakh government to suspend the reforms and impose a moratorium on land sales to foreigners, highlighting the deep-seated anxieties over national sovereignty and economic dependency on China. Protests occurred in several cities in 2019 including Astana, Almaty, and Zhanaozen in Kazakhstan. Demonstrators opposed Chinese industrial projects, fearing environmental harm and long-term economic dependence on China. There was also widespread suspicion that Chinese investments would lead to land leases or permanent settlements by Chinese workers, further fueling public discontent. In Naryn, Kyrgyzstan, violent protests erupted against a planned $280 million Chinese logistics and industrial project. Protesters were concerned about potential environmental damage, the loss of land to foreign companies, and a perceived lack of economic benefits for local communities. The unrest led to the cancellation of some Chinese-backed projects. China’s treatment of ethnic minorities of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz in Xinjiang has further complicated its relations with Central Asian populations. Protests against the mass detentions have mainly occurred in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. From 2018 to 2019, the activist group Atajurt Eriktileri organized frequent demonstrations in Almaty and Nur-Sultan (Astana), demanding the release of detained ethnic Kazakhs. Since January 2021, relatives of detainees have held weekly protests outside the Chinese Consulate in Almaty. In Kyrgyzstan, smaller protests took place in Bishkek in February and December 2019, where activists urged the government to act against China’s repression. China’s growing trade, security, and political influence in Central Asia is a key testing ground for its broader geopolitical ambitions. The future of this engagement will depend on China’s ability to balance its economic interests with local concerns, ensuring that its expanding role contributes to stability rather than fostering tensions. Beijing’s influence in Central Asia is steadily increasing, making it a dominant economic and security partner. Through initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the China-Central Asia (C+C5) mechanism, China has deepened its presence by offering financial investments, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement. This approach has been well-received by Central Asian governments, which seek economic growth and stability. Although Russia remains a major geopolitical actor in the region, its influence is diminishing as China’s economic power continues to rise. Beijing’s emphasis on respecting sovereignty and promoting development has helped solidify its relationships with Central Asian states. However, challenges such as local resistance to Chinese investments and potential geopolitical tensions with Russia persist. The long-term success of China’s regional strategy will depend on its ability to manage these complexities while maintaining its strategic foothold. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The commitment to free trade is based on the competitive advantage that nations gain from possessing certain material and human resources that are scarce in other countries. The exchange of goods under the umbrella of free trade results in a global benefit, as it fosters economic growth, improves the quality of goods, and diversifies supply. The free trade doctrine, which has governed international trade in recent decades, is opposed by protectionism, which seeks to favor domestic producers over foreign competition. Above All, Protectionism Trump's campaign to win votes from the U.S. automotive and agricultural sectors was based on extreme protectionism – which we could call the ‘Trump Doctrine’ – centered on the promise of raising tariffs on products from competing countries. The increase in tariffs to boost domestic production in non-competitive sectors clashes with the rules of the World Trade Organization and the already established trade relations with exporting countries. On the other hand, those who silently suffer from Trump's protectionist measures are American consumers, who will have to pay higher prices for imported products that are currently cheaper. The need to reorganize international trade flows had already been raised due to the existence of ecological, social, or economic dumping. In response to violations of competition rules and the presence of discriminatory situations, agricultural groups have demanded mirror clauses to ensure that imported products comply with the same regulations as domestic ones. However, all these proposals have been made within a negotiating framework and not in a disruptive and unilateral manner, as the Trump Doctrine does. Tariff Increases Specifically, the U.S. has formalized a 25% tariff on steel and aluminum from other countries, set to take effect on March 4. This impacts the Spanish industrial sector, which exports aluminum worth 500 million to the U.S. market. There are still no details on which Spanish agri-food products (such as wine, olive oil, meat, and dairy) may be affected and to what extent by the Trump Doctrine. Latin American countries are also at risk: in 2021, 86% of their agri-food exports were destined for three regions — the U.S. (23%), the EU (18%), and China (13%). The EU and Latin American countries belonging to Mercosur have the advantage of having signed an agreement in December 2024, which will allow them to strengthen their trade relations and potentially offset losses in the U.S. market. In response to these tariff attacks, countries have reacted by attempting to reach agreements among the affected nations. The European Union and Canada have met to design a joint strategy against the Trump Doctrine, and China is also considering reorganizing its trade flows, which could provide some relief for its exports. However, the damage caused by tariffs is global and does not only affect exporting countries. In the United States, there will be negative impacts on consumers and businesses in the form of higher prices and even shortages or the disappearance of some imported products. United States-Europe Trade Relations There is no free trade agreement between Europe and the United States, although an attempt was made, without success, to establish the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). However, progress has been made in harmonizing food safety regulations, quality standards, and data privacy rules. Nevertheless, Trump accuses Europe of "treating the United States very badly" and has warned that they must balance the "$350 billion" trade deficit. In Europe, the most exposed sectors to the threat of U.S. protectionism are aerospace, automotive, and agri-food. The countries at the highest risk include Germany (automotive), France (aerospace), the Netherlands (petrochemical), Italy (pharmaceutical), Ireland (technology), and Spain (agri-food), as they have the most open economies to foreign trade. On the other hand, the United States exports high-tech products, machinery, chemicals, and agricultural goods (corn, soy, meat) to Europe. In the digital sector, major U.S. companies (Amazon, Google, Apple, Meta) are well-positioned in the Old Continent, often engaging in market dominance abuses that the EU has attempted to curb through fines and legislative changes. Spanish exports to the United States focus on automobiles, machinery, and pharmaceutical and agri-food products (wine, olive oil, meat, dairy, and horticultural products). U.S. imports into the Spanish market primarily consist of machinery, electronic products, pharmaceuticals, financial services, and agricultural goods. The U.S. has invested in Spain in the automotive, technology, energy, distribution, and finance sectors. In turn, Spain has a presence in the North American market in the distribution sector (Inditex, Mango), renewable energy (Iberdrola, Acciona, Naturgy), communications, and infrastructure (Ferrovial, ACS, Sacyr). The Technological Battle A fierce competition is emerging in the development of space travel, military technology, and integrated artificial intelligence. In the geopolitical landscape, development cooperation, armed conflicts, climate change, and environmental sustainability are key issues to consider. We have just witnessed how restrictions on the supply of microprocessors stimulated China's creativity in the tech sector. China welcomed the new year with DeepSeek, its own AI model — with similar capabilities to ChatGPT but significantly lower costs — which has shaken the U.S. tech industry and triggered a stock market upheaval. Meanwhile, the EU is now trying to shake off its role as a mere spectator in the development of these new technologies and has just announced a €200 billion investment in the development of European AI. It is important to remember that Europe has been a pioneer in AI legislation, with the Artificial Intelligence Act approved by its Parliament at the end of 2023.  Outlook and Solutions The impact of trade wars depends, on one hand, on the measures imposed (tariff, fiscal, or regulatory) and the volume of existing trade flows. However, the characteristics of the regions, economic sectors, and affected social groups also play a crucial role. In the final countdown, before the implementation of the new tariffs, the United States reached a preliminary agreement with Mexico and Canada, granting a one-month pause before enforcing the announced tariffs. In the case of China, its response to the U.S. threat was to announce similar tariff increases on American products. Among European countries, there are different strategic approaches to the Trump Doctrine. The positions of the Paris-Berlin axis — ready to respond to U.S. tariff threats — and the Rome-Budapest axis are opposed. It remains to be seen whether Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who attended Trump's inauguration on January 20, will act as a mediator between the EU and the U.S. or if she will focus solely on securing a favorable position for Italy. Volatility, Uncertainty, Fluctuations A trade war affects foreign investments and creates volatility in financial markets due to the uncertainty it generates. Additionally, it reduces trade exchanges (imports-exports) and causes fluctuations in currency markets. The dilemma of “restructuring or rejection” posed by the Trump Doctrine involves the option of readjusting the existing order or entering into direct competition. For now, tensions remain high, and The Wall Street Journal, one of the major U.S. media outlets, describes the trade war as “absurd,” “unnecessary,” and “stupid.” The reality is that an atmosphere of international insecurity has been created regarding future investments, and stock markets have suffered losses. Meanwhile, the threatened countries insist they will enforce countermeasures, to which Trump responds by threatening to raise tariffs even further.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia President Vladimir Putin sent a guarded message of congratulations to Donald Trump on inauguration day, but then held a long direct call with his “dear friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping. From Putin’s perspective, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from energy sales to China and technology from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, mostly sanctions and suspicion. Moscow is hoping for a more positive relationship with the current White House occupant, who has made his desire for a “deal” to end the Ukraine war well known. But talk of exit scenarios from this 3-year-old conflict should not mask the fact that since the invasion began, Putin has overseen one of the worst periods in Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Transatlantic unity The war in Ukraine has foreclosed on options and blunted Russian action around the world. Unlike the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2022 invasion produced an unprecedented level of transatlantic unity, including the expansion of NATO and sanctions on Russian trade and finance. In the past year, both the U.S. and the European Union expanded their sanction packages. And for the first time, the EU banned the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas and ended support for a Russian LNG project in the Arctic. EU-Russian trade, including European imports of energy, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the war.   The two Nordstrom pipelines, designed to bring Russian gas to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unused. Revenues from energy sales are roughly one-half of what they were two years ago.   At the same time, the West has sent billions in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, enabling a level of resilience for which Russia was unprepared. Meanwhile, global companies and technical experts and intellectuals have fled Russia in droves. While Russia has evaded some restrictions with its “shadow fleet” – an aging group of tankers sailing under various administrative and technical evasions – the country’s main savior is now China. Trade between China and Russia has grown by nearly two-thirds since the end of 2021, and the U.S. cites Beijing as the main source of Russia’s “dual use” and other technologies needed to pursue its war. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods trade relationship with the West to one of vassalage with China, as one Russia analyst termed it. Hosting an October meeting of the BRICS countries – now counting 11 members, including the five original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – is unlikely to compensate for geopolitical losses elsewhere. Problems at home... The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40% of the budget and 25% of all spending. The government now needs the equivalent of US$20 billion annually in order to pay for new recruits. Russian leaders must find a way to keep at least some of the population satisfied, but persistent inflation and reserve currency shortages flowing directly from the war have made this task more difficult. On the battlefield, the war itself has killed or wounded more than 600,000 Russian soldiers. Operations during 2024 were particularly deadly, producing more than 1,500 Russian casualties a day. The leader who expected Kyiv’s capitulation in days now finds Russian territory around Kursk occupied, its naval forces in the Black Sea destroyed and withdrawn, and one of its own generals assassinated in Moscow. But probably the greatest humiliation is that this putative great power with a population of 144 million must resort to importing North Korean troops to help liberate its own land. ...and in its backyard Moscow’s dedication to the war has affected its ability to influence events elsewhere, even in its own neighborhood. In the Caucasus, for example, Russia had long sided with Armenia in its running battle with Azerbaijan over boundaries and population after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow has brokered ceasefires at various points. But intermittent attacks and territorial gains for Azerbaijan continued despite the presence of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers sent to protect the remaining Armenian population in parts of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s forces abruptly took control of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 100,000 Armenians fled in the largest ethnic cleansing episode since the end of the Balkan Wars. The peacekeepers did not intervene and later withdrew. The Russian military, absorbed in the bloody campaigns in Ukraine, could not back up or reinforce them. The Azeris’ diplomatic and economic position has gained in recent years, aided by demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s and support from NATO member Turkey. Feeling betrayed by Russia, the Armenian government has for the first time extended feelers toward the West — which is happy to entertain such overtures. Losing influence and friends Russia’s loss in the Caucasus has been dwarfed by the damage to its military position and influence in the Middle East. Russia supported the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad against the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 and saved it with direct military intervention beginning in 2015. Yet in December 2024, Assad was unexpectedly swept away by a mélange of rebel groups. The refuge extended to Assad by Moscow was the most it could provide with the war in Ukraine having drained Russia’s capacity to do more. Russia’s possible withdrawal from the Syrian naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim would remove assets that allowed it to cooperate with Iran, its key strategic partner in the region. More recently, Russia’s reliability as an ally and reputation as an armory has been damaged by Israeli attacks not only on Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Syria, but on Iran itself. Russia’s position in Africa would also be damaged by the loss of the Syrian bases, which are key launch points for extending Russian power, and by Moscow’s evident inability to make a difference on the ground across the Sahel region in north-central Africa. Dirty tricks, diminishing returns Stalemate in Ukraine and Russian strategic losses in Syria and elsewhere have prompted Moscow to rely increasingly on a variety of other means to try to gain influence. Disinformation, election meddling and varied threats are not new and are part of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. But recent efforts in East Europe have not been very productive. Massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania, for example, helped produce a narrow victory for an anti-NATO presidential candidate in December 2024, but the Romanian government moved quickly to expose these actions and the election was annulled. Nearby Moldova has long been subject to Russian propaganda and threats, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a “European course” in the constitution. The tiny country moved to reduce its dependency on Russian gas but remains territorially fragmented by the breakaway region of Transnistria that, until recently, provided most of the country’s electricity. Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming. When Moldova thumbs its nose at you, it’s fair to say your power ranking has fallen. Wounded but still dangerous Not all recent developments have been negative for Moscow. State control of the economy has allowed for rapid rebuilding of a depleted military and support for its technology industry in the short term. With Chinese help and evasion of sanctions, sufficient machinery and energy allow the war in Ukraine to continue. And the inauguration of Donald Trump is likely to favor Putin, despite some mixed signals. The U.S. president has threatened tariffs and more sanctions but also disbanded a Biden-era task force aimed a punishing Russian oligarchs who help Russia evade sanctions. In the White House now is someone who has openly admired Putin, expressed skepticism over U.S. support for Ukraine and rushed to bully America’s closest allies in Latin America, Canada and Europe. Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory.” The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous; it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin watchers argue that a more economically isolated Russia is less vulnerable to American economic pressure. A retreating Russia and an embattled Putin could also opt for even more reckless threats and actions – for example, on nuclear weapons – especially if reversing course in Ukraine would jeopardize his position. It is, after all, Putin’s war. All observers would be wise to note that the famous dictum “Russia is never as strong as she looks … nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself: “Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be.”

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Finally, after many leaks, hints, intimations and procrastinations, US President Donald Trump might have come up with something a bit more specific than his initial general promises to put an end to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours. For the first time a draft of his peace plan is on the table. The plan was revealed by various Ukrainian and European media last week and though it has never been officially confirmed by the White House or the State Department, there are reasons to believe that we indeed observe a gradual shaping of the new Administration’s position on arguably the most destructive and dangerous military conflict of our times. However, the devil is always in details. Let us have a closer look at what Trump has or may have in mind. Ceasefire According to the plan, the peace process should start with Presidents Putin and Zelensky having an urgent phone call followed by a face-to-face meeting no later than in the end of February or in the beginning of March. A complete ceasefire along the present line of contact should be in place by the day of 2025 Christian Easter (April 20) and European peacekeeping units will be asked to police a demilitarized zone separating the two sides (American troops will not have their boots on the ground). Shortly after that, by the time of the 80-year anniversary of the V-day in Europe (May 9), a comprehensive peace agreement should be signed and, if needed, ratified by the parties to the conflict. This is an exceptionally bold and ambitious time-table, but is it nonetheless realistic? First, it would be quite a challenge even to make Putin and Zelensky directly talk to each other. In fall of 2022, the Ukrainian President signed a special executive order forbidding himself engaging in any direct negotiations with his Russian counterpart. On the Russian side, there are serious doubts about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader since his term in power already expired in May of 2024 and no national elections have been held after that. More importantly, it would be very hard to enforce the ceasefire, if and when such a ceasefire is reached. The experience of the Minsk Agreement implementation and international monitoring is not very reassuring, and the line of contact today is much longer than it was back in 2015. To put together a well-trained and properly equipped international monitoring mission of tens of thousands uniformed men and women would be next to impossible, at least within the time framework suggested by the US Administration. Needless to say, Russia would hardly accept a EU/NATO peacekeeping mission on its territory. Territorial compromises Trump apparently suggests that both sides should stick to the territories that they now have under their control. This idea logically implies a demand for Kyiv to accept Russian sovereignty on the parts of the four former Ukrainian regions as well as on the Crimean Peninsula that was reunited with the Russian Federation eleven years ago after the referendum of March, 2014. The Ukrainian side should also withdraw from the Russian territories in the Kursk region that it currently occupies. In exchange Russia should stop its ongoing offensive in Donbass and limit its territorial acquisitions to what it already has in its possession. This proposal is clearly not exactly what either Kyiv or Moscow would like to see as the final peace settlement. In Ukraine, they still hope that at some point thy will be in a position to restore the territorial integrity of the country including what they lost back in 2014—namely, parts of Eastern Donbass and Crimea. The Russian leadership, in its turn, intends to capture at least all the remaining territories of the four regions that it does not fully control now (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye) and maybe even to advance further West. (Kharkov, Odessa and so on). To reach a compromise between these two positions would be truly a formidable task. Future status of Ukraine According to Donald Trump, Ukraine should not become a NATO member—at least, in the foreseeable future. He remains skeptical about a possible Ukrainian contribution to the Alliance security, he does not want to enlarge the NATO’s zone of responsibility, and he does not want to cross Moscow’s red line on this very issue. However, Ukraine may still aspire to join the European Union before too long, and the United States is ready to assist Kyiv in meeting its European aspirations. A neutral status for Ukraine is something that many in Kyiv would lament and consider a serious setback, while many in Moscow would definitely appreciate and support. However, how can this neutrality be secured in the long term? After all, Ukraine has already been neutral; this status was explicitly stated in the very first declaration on Ukrainian sovereignty approved by the Ukrainian Parliament even before the Soviet disintegration and later on incorporated into the Ukrainian Constitution. And yet, since at least 2008 Kyiv was contentiously drifting away from this initial position; finally, the national Constitution was revised and the pro-Western Ukrainian political leadership started actively seeking membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. What would prevent future Ukraine from changing its mind once again in five or ten or twenty years from now, when neither Trump, nor Putin is around to stop it from moving in the NATO membership direction? Security guarantees Instead of offering Kyiv prompt NATO membership, Trump is ready to provide US security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for getting for the US business a preferential access to valuable Ukrainian mineral resources—including natural gas, lithium, titanium and graphite. The United States will continue to assist Ukraine with military hardware deliveries till at least 2030, but these deliveries will no longer take form of charity—they should generate appropriate profits for the US defence sector and create jobs for American workers. This part of Trump‘s proposals remains highly ambiguous and unclear. What kind of security guarantees is the United States willing to offer Ukraine? Are we going to see US military bases on the Ukrainian soil or any other manifestations of the US military presence there? Is Trump ready to turn Ukraine into another Israel or another Japan? If this is the case, then does such an arrangement really differ a lot from a Ukrainian membership to NATO? Would Moscow easily accept a not-so-symbolic US military presence so close to its borders? The proposed US access to Ukraine’s natural resources also raises many questions. Ukraine indeed has repositories of valuable minerals (arguably amounting to USD 15 trillion of total value), but most of these repositories are located on the territories that are now controlled by Russia. Sanctions As an additional incentive for Moscow to demonstrate the needed flexibility, Trump offers Russia to lift economic sanctions as a part of the overall peace arrangement. He argues that the Western sanctions have a profound negative impact on the Russian economy, slow down Russia’s modernization and prevent the country from taking its rightful place within the international economic system. The prospect of lifting sanctions should therefore motivate the Kremlin to go for a reasonable compromise in order to put an end to the fratricidal conflict. This idea sounds great, but it seems that Trump offers more than he can deliver. First, Russia suffers more from the EU sanctions than from the US sanctions; the Russia-EU trade has always been significantly larger than the Russia-US trade. No US President can simply ‘order’ the European allies of the United States to completely reverse their current policy towards Moscow, even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is miraculously stopped. The odds are that the EU sanctions imposed on Moscow will be in place for a long time, even if the US sanctions are lifted. Second, even on the US sanctions lifting, Donald Trump is not that omnipotent. Some of these sanctions have been approved by the US Congress and have become national laws. To recall or even to ease them, one should pass an appropriate legislative decision on the Capitol Hill, which might turn out to be extremely complicated and protracted. Reconstruction of Ukraine Like in many other cases, Trump has absolutely no intention to spend large amounts of US taxpayer’s money on reconstructing such a distant land as Ukraine. Instead, the US President would like to impose this heavy burden on the European Union (exactly like he intends to impose the financial burden of Gaza reconstruction on the Arab Gulf states). The price tag of Ukraine’s reconstruction might amount to USD 500 billion, and EU should be prepared to annually allocate up to USD 50 billion for ten years. A part of the funding, however, can come from special duties imposed on Russia’s energy exports in exchange for lifting Western sanctions on the Russian hydrocarbons production. This part of Trump’s proposals is based on a number of arbitrary assumptions, which are hard to assess at this point. Nobody really knows how much the Ukrainian reconstruction will ultimately cost and how long time it will take. The actual financial capabilities of the European Union might turn out to be more modest than Trump apparently expects, especially given the fact that the US Administration’s wish list for Europe is not limited to supporting Ukraine only, but also includes more generous contributions to NATO, multiple trade concessions, more economic engagement in the Middle East and so on. Ukraine’s absorption capacity might turn out to be limited as well, given the present state of economic and administrative reforms, rampant corruption and the exodus of a large part of the county’s population to Europe. Finally, it is hard to imagine how Trump will convince Putin to pay duties on Russia’s energy exports, particularly when Trump remains committed to bringing the global energy prices down to the extent possible. European security So far, the Trump Administration has not been very prolific on how the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict should affect a more general problem of the European security. Still, this dimension of a potential agreement has to be kept in mind, if the idea is to provide for a lasting peace in the Euroatlantic space. Russian officials have stated more than once that the ongoing conflict is not just a clash between Russia and Ukraine, but rather a standstill between Russia and the ‘collective West’. That implies that any settlement should include a broader range of arrangements on the future European security architecture, such as multilateral confidence building measures, mil-to-mil contacts at various levels and even some forms of conventional arms control in Europe. The problem is that Trump has never been particularly interested in any meaningful forms of multilateralism including multilateral arms control or confidence building measures. Moreover, he has always been skeptical of any arms control, bilateral including, regarding it as an unnecessary and potentially even harmful way to limit the US abilities to outspend and to outperform all its adversaries and rivals. This is why during his first term in power Trump decided to abandon the US-Soviet INF Treaty, was not eager to extend the New START Agreement and decided to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. It is not clear how with such an attitude Donald Trump is planning to ensure that there will be no other dangerous crisis in Europe soon after a settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is reached. To sum up, it is definitely good news that Donald Trump has finally come with some kind of a peace plane for Ukraine. To have something to consider and to discuss is undoubtedly better than to have nothing and to speculate about what the White House may or may not offer. Still, the Trump plan in its current form is only half-baked. It might be the right first step, not much more than the very first step. A lot will now depend on the US Administration commitment, stamina, patience and its attention span. Peace talks are different from business negotiations that Trump is so used to. In business negotiation, you can accept failures to reach a good deal and you can move on to other opportunities, which you will always find around in plenty. In peace talks, failure is not an acceptable outcome. First published in the Guacha.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Security dialog among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was founded in 2007 by the USA, Japan, Australia, and India to promote a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, secure freedom of navigation and balance the growing influence of China. After a temporary dissolution, QUAD was revived in 2017. Since then, there have been regular meetings of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, which have led to concrete working groups in areas such as maritime security, modern technologies, infrastructure, climate change, health, space, and cyber security. QUAD has made considerable progress, including the provision of COVID-19 vaccines, decarbonization initiatives, the promotion of renewable energy and programs to improve maritime surveillance and digital infrastructure. QUAD is not a formal alliance, but an informal forum without a mutual defense commitment. Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common goals such as maritime security, infrastructure development and climate protection and offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Will QUAD change the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific? Founded in 2007 as an informal alliance by the USA, Japan, Australia and India, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) has proven its worth as a platform for regional security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, despite difficulties and interim dissolution. The original motivation for QUAD was the increasing concern about China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and the challenges to the rules-based order in the region. In recent years, cooperation in the QUAD has deepened and includes issues such as maritime security, maintaining free shipping lanes, the fight against terrorism and the promotion of sustainable economic development. Securing a free and open Indo-Pacific - in which all countries can act sovereignly and free from coercion - is a central concern of QUAD. The beginnings of cooperation between the four countries can be traced back to 20041. In response to the devastating Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, which killed over 230,000 people2, the USA, Australia, India, and Japan spontaneously formed an ad hoc grouping to pool and coordinate their resources and capacities for emergency relief in the disaster areas. The grouping disbanded after the end of the reconstruction aid in January 2005, but the positive outcome of the cooperation proved to be viable for the future and opened the way for further initiatives towards closer cooperation between the four Indo-Pacific states.3 First foundation and dissolution of QUAD It was the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who, as part of his new foreign and defense policy, called for a value-based dialogue between Japan, India, Australia, the USA, and other like-minded countries on common interests in the Indo-Pacific at the end of 2006. On May 25, 2007, representatives of the four countries met officially for the first time at an informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila.4 In September 2007, the maritime military exercise "Malabar" in the Indian Ocean, which had previously only been held bilaterally between the USA and India, was expanded to include participants from Japan, Australia and Singapore. This led to strong reactions from China, which sent official protest notes to the governments of the participating countries. Beijing portrayed QUAD as an anti-China initiative, while critics described the grouping as the nucleus of a future "Asian NATO "5. China's harsh criticism of the QUAD initiative and political changes in some of the four participating countries led to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue being dissolved after a brief time. Australia, where there was a change of government in December 2007, wanted to avoid a confrontation with its most important trading partner China and therefore announced its withdrawal from QUAD in February 2008. In Japan, the most important promoter of QUAD, Shinzo Abe, was forced to resign as Prime Minister at the end of 2007 after losing the elections. There was also increasing criticism of the purpose of QUAD in India and the USA, so that in 2008 the four countries ceased their activities in the direction of quadrilateral security cooperation.6 However, taking China into consideration did not lead to the hoped-for easing of tensions. On the contrary: China's massive military build-up, its territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, its threatening gestures towards Taiwan and the use of economic pressure to achieve foreign policy goals7 have further increased geopolitical tensions in the region. In the meantime, contacts and cooperation between the four QUAD states have continued and intensified at bilateral and minilateral level. In 2011, the first meeting at the level of state secretaries took place between the governments of Japan, India, and the USA. A similar trilateral cooperation meeting was established in 2015 between Japan, India, and Australia. India and the United States signed a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2015 and a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016.8 These agreements are a prerequisite for the interoperability of the armed forces of both countries. Since October 2015, Japan has been a regular participant in the annual naval exercise "Malabar" alongside India and the USA. And in 2017, Indian armed forces took part in the Australian naval exercise AUSINDEX for the first time, and two years later also in the air force exercise Pitch Black. Australia has been involved in the Malabar exercises again since 2020.9 Revival of the QUAD Shinzo Abe, who returned to the office of Japanese Prime Minister in 2012, put the concept of a quadrilateral security alliance (Democratic Security Diamond) in the Indo-Pacific back on the political agenda. He succeeded in convincing the new US President Donald Trump of the idea, leading to the first meeting of high-ranking representatives from the USA, Japan, India, and Australia on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in the Philippines in November 2017. The QUAD was revived.10 In June 2018, representatives of the four countries met on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Singapore and again in November of the same year at the East Asia Summit, also in Singapore. On May 31, 2018, the first official meeting of the foreign ministers of the four QUAD states finally took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Since then, the four foreign ministers have met once a year to discuss regional strategic challenges and priorities.11 The Biden administration has upgraded the Quadrilateral Dialogue to an important instrument for the implementation of its Indo-Pacific policy. On March 12, 2021, the first summit of QUAD heads of state and government took place, still in virtual form due to the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the summit, a joint final declaration, The Spirit of the QUAD,12 was published, which lists the key objectives and principles of the quadripartite dialog. On September 24, 2021, the QUAD heads of government met in person for the first time in Washington. Six permanent working groups were formed to deal with the policy areas of health, climate change and clean energy, critical and modern technologies, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity.13 On March 4, 2022, the four heads of government of the QUAD states convened for a virtual summit to discuss the impact of Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and to reaffirm the commitment of the four dialog partners to the Indo-Pacific region. The fourth QUAD Leaders’ Summit took place in Tokyo on May 24, 2022. The follow-up meeting planned for May 2023 in Sydney was canceled as US President Biden had to remain in Washington due to the domestic budget crisis. Instead, the heads of state and government met on May 20, 2023, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Prior to this, the foreign ministers of the QUAD met in India in March, where it was decided to establish a working group on combating terrorism.14 In 2024, there was one meeting at foreign minister level (July 29 in Tokyo, Japan) and one summit meeting of QUAD leaders (September 21, 2024, in Wilmington, USA). On September 20, 2024, one day before the summit in Wilmington, a bipartisan group of representatives and senators, the QUAD Caucus, was formed in the US Congress to promote cooperation between the USA and the other QUAD members (Japan, India, and Australia). In doing so, Congress is underlining the bipartisan recognition of the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific for the USA and strengthening the institutional anchoring of the QUAD partnership in the US political system.15 What concrete results has QUAD achieved since its revival in 2017? The six QUAD working groups established in 2021 cover the most important policy areas of quadrilateral cooperation: 1. Health Security Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the QUAD Group committed to producing one billion vaccine doses by the end of 2022 and making them available to countries in the Indo-Pacific. The USA, Japan and Australia supported the expansion of production capacities for coronavirus vaccines in India. Together, the four QUAD members donated over 400 million vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific countries in 2021 and 2022 and almost 800 million worldwide. In addition, the group of four supported the COVAX initiative with 5.6 billion US dollars. In September 2024, the "QUAD Cancer Moonshot" initiative was announced, which aims to reduce the number of cancer deaths in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through measures to prevent and treat uterine cancer16. 2. Climate Change The countries of the Indo-Pacific are particularly affected by climate change. The QUAD agenda aims to accelerate decarbonization, promote renewable energy and protect the maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the expansion of clean hydrogen technologies, climate information services and early warning systems as well as the diversification of supply chains. 3 Critical and Emerging Technologies The QUAD countries are committed to the responsible and safe use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G. Specifically, for example, the establishment of an Open Radio Access Network (RAN) in Palau, Micronesia, is being promoted, which will later be extended to other Pacific island states. 4. Space All four QUAD nations have their own space programs, which are linked by a large number of bilateral and minilateral cooperation projects. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, launched in 2022, aims to strengthen maritime security and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. It will provide countries in the region with real-time maritime surveillance information, primarily data from satellites, sensors, and other surveillance technologies. This will enable small and medium-sized coastal states in the Indo-Pacific to gain a better overview of maritime activities in their exclusive economic zones, such as illegal fishing, smuggling and piracy. 5. Cyber Security In 2022, the QUAD Cybersecurity Partnership was established to combat threats from cybercrime and state-sponsored attacks. The partnership is divided into four sectors, with each member of QUAD taking the lead in one sector to address cyber vulnerabilities. The sectors include critical infrastructure protection, supply chain resilience, skills training, and software security standards.17 6. Infrastructure QUAD countries are promoting the development of sustainable port infrastructure and announcing major investments in submarine cable projects to improve digital connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the goal was set to invest up to USD 50 billion in infrastructure projects in the region within five years. Launched in 2023, the QUAD Infrastructure Fellowship will provide over 1,800 fellowships, exchanges and other program opportunities for government officials and infrastructure professionals in the region to share best practices in infrastructure management. Outside of these six main themes, the QUAD group also collaborates in other areas: The QUAD Fellowship Program provides scholarships for master's and doctoral students in the fields of mathematics, computer science, natural sciences and technology (STEM) in the US, and since 2024, applicants from the ten ASEAN countries have also been admitted18. The Counterterrorism Working Group was founded in 2023. Other areas of cooperation mentioned in the QUAD plans are sustainable, transparent, and fair lending and financing practices, nuclear stability, and critical minerals. Conclusion The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QUAD has proven to be a stable and effective security policy dialog platform in recent years. QUAD has the potential to transform the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific by creating a strategic balance in the face of challenges such as China's rising power and territorial expansion. The QUAD promotes cooperation between the US, India, Japan, and Australia, the four most influential democracies in the region. Cooperation is based on shared values such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and adherence to international rules. QUAD is not a formal security alliance, there is no mutual defense commitment. It is a flexible, informal coalition forum that focuses on a wide range of issues, including broader security, the economy, infrastructure, technology, and climate change. QUAD has no institutional structures. There are annual summits of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, and the decisions of the summits are implemented by the state apparatuses of the member countries. The naval exercise "Malabar" is not an official part of QUAD but serves as a platform to strengthen military interoperability and is seen as an operational extension of QUAD's security objectives, particularly in the maritime domain. India plays a special role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It contributes not only its geographical and geopolitical importance in the Indo-Pacific, but also a perspective characterized by strategic autonomy and multipolar diplomacy. India is regarded as an important representative of the so-called Global South and is seen as a counterweight to China in this group of states.19 On the other hand, India avoids presenting QUAD as an explicitly anti-Chinese alliance in order to avoid putting too much strain on its own sensitive relationship with China. The EU and Germany should adopt a strategically balanced position towards QUAD that considers both the geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific and their own economic and security interests. The EU and Germany share with the QUAD states the goal of preserving a rules-based order, particularly regarding international maritime law (UNCLOS). To exert greater influence on the region, Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common interests such as infrastructure development, new and critical technologies, climate protection and maritime security. Joint infrastructure development projects in the Indo-Pacific could offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Information This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or by campaigners or campaign helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state, and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/2 Earthquake in the Indian Ocean 2004, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdbeben_im_Indischen_Ozean_2004  3 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ 4 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue5 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/  6 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 7 Feigenbaum, Eva A., „Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?”, MarcoPolo, Paulson Institute, 25. Juli 2017, https://macropolo.org/analysis/is-coercion-the-new-normal-in-chinas-economic-statecraft/?rp=m  8 Panda, Jagannath, „India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue”, 12. June 2020, RUSI, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/india-and-quad-plus-dialogue 9 Parker, Jennifer, „Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging”, 10. August 2023, The Strategist, ASPI, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-another-naval-exercise-malabars-vital-messaging/ 10 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 11 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024,  https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/  12 The White House, 12. March 2021, Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: „The Spirit of the QUAD”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/ 13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, „The QUAD”, last visit 02.12.2024, in https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad 14 Ebd. 15 U.S. Representative Ami Bera, M.D. (D-CA), Press Release, 20. September 2024, https://bera.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400409 16 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/ 17 Ebd. 18 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Kooperation international, „QUAD-Fellowship-Programm auf ASEAN-Staaten ausgeweitet“, zuletzt gelesen am 02.12.2024 in https://www.kooperation-international.de/aktuelles/nachrichten/detail/info/quad-fellowship-programm-auf-asean-staaten-ausgeweitet  19 Heiduk, Felix; Wirth, Christian: „The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the USA “, SWP-Aktuell, Nr. 35, June 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023A35/ 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump seems to be turning tariffs, which can serve as a legitimate tool to achieve the goals of fair trade and the protection of key national security interests, into an illegitimate tool of coercive statecraft. It is likely to undermine the global economic order and US soft-power influence across the world Since re-entering the Oval Office Donald Trump has already threatened dozens of nations with economic tariffs in relation to a vast array of issues, many of which are non-economic in nature. What, if any, is the legal basis for these tariffs in domestic and international law, and how are they different from or similar to the type of economic measures China applies to influence other sovereign nations’ choices in ways that benefit Beijing? In this article we address these questions. Trumps weaponisation of trade tariffs Trump 2.0 seems set on following China’s leadership in the practice of using trade relations for economic coercion against other states, in breach of international and bilateral trade agreements. This practice decouples tariffs from their legitimate World Trade Organization (WTO) purpose of offering protection against unfair trade practices. WTO rules allow protective tariffs in cases of anti-dumping—for instance where foreign firms sell exports below their cost of production—or as countervailing measures against subsidised imports that would otherwise unfairly undercut and thus harm domestic producers. Such tariffs are a lawful tool for economic defence. Furthermore, in a geo-economic world there may be other limited situations where a reasonable argument can be made for using tariffs in a national security context not covered by WTO rules, or against economies that do not play by WTO rules. Moving beyond this delimited use of tariffs inevitably results in the tool becoming an economic cudgel for achieving non-economic political objectives. Where these are based on highly questionable claims regarding the relationship to US national security, and without basis in WTO or bilateral free trade agreement rules, the likelihood that tariffs are naked coercion rather than a legitimate defensive measure grows. Making a wide array of economic and non-economic demands of countries—including Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Denmark, Panama, Taiwan, and the EU—President Trump clearly views tariffs as the medicine for every international ailment, real or imagined, impacting the United States. This is a radical break from the US-led post-war order of rules-based trade, and sends a message that the US is no longer a trusted partner. This shift was most vividly highlighted on 1 February 2025, when Trump’s administration threatened 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and imposed a 10 percent tariff on China, citing a national emergency due to illegal migration and drugs, and claiming the target states had failed to assist the US in countering this emergency. While the Canada and Mexico tariffs were suspended after both countries made concessions to Trump, their situation is most indicative of Trump’s radical approach to international relations. Both countries renegotiated the North American free trade agreement directly with Trump during his first term—an agreement Trump lavished with praise, while Canada is also one of America’s closest military allies, and has supported many US military operations since WWII. If Canada can be coerced, it is reasonable to believe any country can be coerced by Trump, including Australia. From a foreign policy perspective, Trump’s radical tariff coercion is likely to be one of the greatest acts of diplomatic self-harm, particularly as friends are forced to start looking at ways to mitigate American dependence. Who pays the price of tariffs?    If the foreign policy results of tariffs are to undermine US soft power, it is also true that tariffs will undermine the US economy. For example, Trump incorrectly believes that exporters will absorb the additional cost of tariffs—for instance, taxes on imports—by dropping their prices. Factors such as price elasticity (are goods necessary or discretionary), pricing power (i.e. brand power), and the size of profit margins influence who pays additional tariff costs. The latter is important when considering globally competitive traded goods. In competitive industries where profit margins are low, at or near the minimum rate of profit at which businesses will invest and operate, then, by definition, all additional costs must be passed on to the consumer to protect the business’s margin. Beyond that, protecting margins is the first choice of all businesses. Hence only where goods are highly discretionary and existing profit margins are high might one expect the exporter to incur the costs of tariffs. All things being equal, the American consumer will pay if Trump levies general tariff taxes on a vast array of goods coming from Mexico, Canada, and China, just as studies show that consumers paid for Trump’s 2018 tariffs. Job losses can also arise as a consequence of tariffs impacting supply chains by increasing the costs of inputs. Economists argue that, while the first Trump administration’s 25 percent steel import tariff created around 1,000 new jobs in steel production, the higher cost of steel hit downstream steel users, resulting in a loss of 75,000 manufacturing jobs. A tariff policy that is targeted and in response to breaches of WTO trade rules has their rightful place in the repertoire of a state’s national economic policies. But there are likely to be few long-term benefits to attacking allies and longstanding rule-abiding trade partners with universal tariffs per Trump’s Make America Great Again agenda. On the contrary Trump’s policies will lead to a Make America Expensive Again outcome, as ABC’s Matt Bevan put it. A Corrosion of US soft power? The weaponisation of everything has in recent times been attributed to China’s unrestricted warfare paradigm. Trump 2.0 seems to follow Beijing’s playbook without further consideration for alliances and partnerships—pivotal to US foreign policy. Working with allies and partners has been a key element of how the Biden administration countered the challenges posed by Russia, China, and Iran in the wider context of great power competition. Donald Trump’s threats of a trade war against Denmark, a NATO ally, over the status of Greenland; threats against Taiwan’s steel, pharmaceutical, and semiconductor industries; tariff threats against more NATO allies in the European Union; and tariff threats against the BRICS bloc resemble the unrestricted weaponising of trade by Beijing and mark a departure from Trump 1.0’s more targeted tariffs. The US is facing the clear and present danger of losing its soft-power acumen, and losing trust from its partners, with tragic consequences for the global rules-based order. In that respect, Trump might be playing directly into the Moscow–Beijing ambition to undermine the US and its allies across the military, economic, and diplomatic domains. The ambiguity of Trump’s “negotiation” strategy, which contains both national security and economic objections as raison d’être, adds to the challenge of maintaining trust and confidence among partners and allies, which would be both tragic and fatal for the US and its alliances.This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском China has been gaining ground in the technological and trade war against the United States through strategic planning, massive investment in innovation, and control over supply chains. It has developed significant infrastructure and policies that have allowed it to advance in key sectors such as artificial intelligence, telecommunications, and semiconductor manufacturing. The bans imposed by the United States on China, far from slowing its technological progress, have acted as a catalyst for self-sufficiency and the accelerated growth of China's tech sector. Although the sanctions aimed to limit China's access to key technologies, in practice, they have driven investment in domestic development and strengthened the Asian country's determination to reduce its dependence on the West. The launch of DeepSeek represents a crucial step in China’s technological independence, particularly in the fields of artificial intelligence and advanced computing. Its design competes with processors from Nvidia and AMD, enhancing China’s capabilities in AI, big data, and supercomputing. Its development demonstrates that U.S. sanctions have not halted Chinese innovation; rather, they have accelerated self-sufficiency. DeepSeek could reduce China’s reliance on foreign technologies for advanced applications, strengthening its tech industry. Additionally, it boosts the ecosystem of startups and AI companies in the country, providing local alternatives to high-performance computing models. Its global impact could lead to a reconfiguration of the semiconductor market, challenging the dominance of Western companies. It also strengthens China’s position in the AI race, giving it advantages in strategic sectors. DeepSeek marks a turning point in the tech war and could change the dynamics of the global industry. Perhaps the clearest sign of DeepSeek’s impact on the West, beyond the stock market turmoil of American tech companies, is the news from El País, which biasedly headlines: “DeepSeek is no game: the threat to privacy from China's new AI. The massive downloads of the Asian country’s application expand the potential to control, disinform, and erode democratic principles.” This strategy is nothing new, just what the West has accustomed us to: “let’s cover up the defeat by smearing and defaming China to divert the debate”. The United States' Technological War Against China The United States' measures against China in the technological war have included sanctions and trade restrictions to halt its progress in strategic sectors. One of the main actions was the ban on exporting advanced chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to Chinese companies such as Huawei and SMIC. Additionally, the U.S. has pressured countries like the Netherlands and Japan to limit the sale of advanced lithography machines, essential for producing cutting-edge chips. The U.S. has also blacklisted several Chinese companies, restricting their access to American technology. In telecommunications, it prohibited Huawei's involvement in the U.S. 5G infrastructure and encouraged its allies to do the same. In artificial intelligence, it imposed restrictions on the export of chips from Nvidia and AMD, which are essential for training advanced AI models. Washington has also restricted American investments in high-tech Chinese companies. Furthermore, it has pushed for the relocation of chip factories from Taiwan and South Korea to the U.S. to reduce dependence on China. Despite these measures, China has accelerated its self-sufficiency in key sectors, showcasing its ability to overcome these restrictions. The Background of China's Technological Breakthroughs Prior to DeepSeek Before the launch of DeepSeek, China's major technological breakthrough in the mobile device semiconductor industry was Huawei's Kirin 9000S chip. This processor surprised the world in 2023 when it was included in the Huawei Mate 60 Pro, marking a milestone in China's technological self-sufficiency. The Kirin 9000S, manufactured by SMIC (Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation), became a symbol of resistance against the sanctions imposed by the United States. Huawei had been severely affected by restrictions on access to advanced chips from manufacturers like TSMC and Qualcomm, which seemed to limit its ability to compete in the high-end smartphone sector. However, the launch of the Mate 60 Pro demonstrated that China could produce advanced chips without relying on Western technology. This processor was manufactured using a 5-nanometer process, an impressive feat given that the United States had prohibited the export of advanced lithography equipment, such as those from the Dutch company ASML, which are essential to produce next-generation chips. The success of the Kirin 9000S alarmed the United States, as it showed that sanctions had not stopped China’s technological development. Washington began to tighten its restrictions even further, pressuring allied countries like the Netherlands and Japan to limit the export of semiconductor manufacturing technology to China. However, it has not succeeded in halting the progress of Huawei and SMIC, who continue to develop new versions of their chips. DeepSeek is just the tip of the iceberg DeepSeek is just the tip of the iceberg in the technological war between China and the United States, marking the beginning of a new era of self-sufficiency and innovation in semiconductors and artificial intelligence. Although it represents a significant advancement in advanced computing and AI models, it is just one piece of a much broader picture. China has been investing billions in the development of its own semiconductor industry, driving projects in advanced chips, supercomputers, and AI software that compete with giants like Nvidia, AMD, and Intel. The progress in semiconductors, reflected in the manufacturing of the Kirin 9000S and other high-performance chips, proves that China is becoming independent from Western technology. Additionally, the country is betting on quantum computing, advanced robotics, and the expansion of 6G networks, which could redefine global connectivity in the next decade. U.S. sanctions have accelerated this transformation, forcing China to develop domestic alternatives in key sectors such as software, operating systems, and AI infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Chinese government continues to drive the growth of local companies, strengthening its innovation ecosystem and reducing its reliance on foreign technology. On this path, China has developed a solid and rapidly expanding artificial intelligence ecosystem, with multiple companies competing globally. In addition to DeepSeek, several Chinese companies are leading the development of AI models, specialized chips, and advanced applications. Here are some of the most important ones: BaiduBaidu is one of China's tech giants with a strong focus on artificial intelligence. Its ERNIE Bot 4.0 model is China's response to ChatGPT and has been integrated into multiple applications, from search engines to virtual assistants. Baidu also leads in autonomous vehicles and in the development of AI chips like the Kunlun AI chip. Alibaba Cloud (DAMO Academy)Alibaba, through its DAMO Academy division, has developed the Qwen 2.5-Max model, its own generative AI that competes with OpenAI. Alibaba has also created AI hardware and provides cloud services that support the development of Chinese AI startups. Tencent AI LabTencent, the giant in video games and social networks, is investing in AI for gaming, chatbots, and language models. Its AI is used in platforms like WeChat and in data analysis for entertainment and advertising. ByteDanceThe Doubao 1.5 Pro model from TikTok's parent company competes with ChatGPT-4 in knowledge retention, programming, reasoning, and processing. IFLYTEK, SenseTime, Megvii, 4Paradigm, Cambricon, Horizon Robotics, Zhipu AI, and others are leading companies competing in the Chinese AI market. In summary, U.S. sanctions against China in the tech war have failed to stop the country's progress. Instead of weakening its companies, the restrictions have accelerated China's self-sufficiency in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and telecommunications. Huawei shocked the world with the launch of the Kirin 9000S, while companies like DeepSeek, Baidu, Alibaba, and SenseTime have created competitive AI models. Manufacturers like Cambricon and Horizon Robotics have grown rapidly, all driving China's global influence in 5G, AI, and electric vehicles. China's Key: It Seeks Only the Progress of Humanity, Not Political Dominance China's success in technology and the global economy has been built on a strategy of sustainable development, innovation, and self-sufficiency, focusing on the progress of humanity rather than the pursuit of absolute dominance. Unlike the sanctions and restrictions policy that has characterized the U.S. strategy, China has chosen to invest in infrastructure, education, and technology to drive the growth of its country and contribute to global advancement. DeepSeek's open-source code is an example of China's commitment to collaborative development in artificial intelligence, allowing global researchers and companies to access its technology. By making its architecture public, China fosters innovation and reduces reliance on closed models like those of OpenAI and Google. This strategy strengthens the AI ecosystem and promotes more equitable development worldwide. While some powers seek to maintain their leadership through sanctions and restrictions, China has demonstrated that development based on investment, innovation, and international cooperation is more effective. Its success is not the result of a race for dominance, but a strategy focused on work, research, and development, which in the long-term benefits both its own population and the global community.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction For some international analysts, the invasion by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, into the Republic of Ukraine, led by Volodymyr Zelensky, on February 24, 2022, was a surprise. This offensive was meant to conquer Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and Kharkiv, the second-largest city in the country. However, the war that was expected to be quick and low-cost in terms of human lives, with an aura of liberation from the "neo-Nazi government" and the "Ukrainian oligarchy," turned into a much slower and bloodier conflict than the Kremlin anticipated. It is important to clarify that in 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula, which was part of the territory of Ukraine. Shortly after, pro-Russian rebels from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, supported by Moscow, began a popular uprising, leading to a civil war against Ukrainian troops. In 2019, when pro-Western President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, clashes between both sides intensified. In February, before the invasion, Putin signed decrees recognizing the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine as independent states, accusing the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of expanding eastward into Europe, pushing Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and threatening Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. During the first week of the war, the Ukrainian president ordered a general military mobilization to defend Ukrainian territory from the Russian advance, while both the U.S. and its European Union (EU) allies announced political and economic sanctions (energy, transport, finance) against the Russian Federation and the expulsion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, which includes over 11,000 financial institutions from over 200 countries. This system, based in Brussels, Belgium, was created to facilitate fast and secure cross-border payments and relies on confidentiality, validity, and accessibility of information from participating members. Western multinationals sold their assets in Russia and canceled any partnerships with Russian firms. These measures took Putin by surprise, although thanks to his alliance with China for the sale of gas and oil, he was able to navigate the blockade. Price hikes hurt Russian workers, who saw their income decrease due to rising prices for essential goods. As stalled negotiations continued between the Russians and Ukrainians, Russian troops halted due to Ukrainian resistance, which received weapons and supplies from NATO. This work provides a brief description and analysis of the factors that led to the Russian Federation’s invasion of the Republic of Ukraine and its economic and political consequences for both countries, as well as the role of the U.S. and NATO in the conflict. This invasion is simply a continuation of the longstanding conflict between both countries, especially since the first decade of the 21st century due to territorial and geopolitical issues involving NATO, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Ukraine. In this regard, NATO expanded eastward after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), despite Putin’s warnings. 1. A crisis that began before 2022 In March 2014, a referendum against the opinion of Kyiv was held in Crimea and the autonomous city of Sevastopol, in which pro-Russian inhabitants, who were the majority, decided to join the Russian Federation. This referendum was not accepted by Ukraine, the U.S., and the EU, thus, Moscow incorporated Crimea into its territory, claiming that the peninsula had always been part of Russia. Meanwhile, in April, pro-Russian paramilitary groups took the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which are adjacent to Russia, with supplies and weapons from Moscow. By May, referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk declared the regions as independent republics, although they did not want to join the Russian Federation. The Minsk I Agreement, signed in 2014 between Russia and Ukraine under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established a roadmap to end the civil conflict and normalize the status of both regions. It aimed for a permanent ceasefire, decentralization of power, the release of hostages, border monitoring with Russia, elections, improved health conditions, and the withdrawal of foreign fighters. The Minsk II agreement, signed in 2015, called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from both sides, pension payments to residents, the establishment of a sanitary zone, elections, prisoner exchanges, and the granting of autonomy to the region, allowing Ukraine to recover the border areas with Russia. Both agreements failed, and fighting resumed. Putin consistently claimed that Ukraine had no intention of implementing the agreements and had only signed them due to military losses, while for the U.S. and its allies, Putin always intended to recognize the independence of both regions, betting on the failure of the negotiations. 2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine: The war between both countries Putin had warned months earlier that Western powers, led by the United States, should negotiate with him over the expansion of NATO eastward, which was affecting Russia’s security. Putin demanded that Ukraine not be forced to join NATO, arguing that such a move would not provide any security guarantees for Russia. However, the invasion was not unexpected, as weeks before there had been satellite images showing the deployment of Russian troops and armored vehicles: "Russia had also announced, albeit inconsistently and unclearly, that it would adopt ‘technical-military’ measures against Ukraine if its demands for security guarantees and neutrality regarding the Atlantic Alliance were not accepted" (Sanahuja, 2022, 42). Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO would mean that biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons could be stationed there, something the Russians deemed unjustified since the Warsaw Pact had disappeared in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR. What the Russian Federation sought, as the world’s second-largest military power, was to prevent missiles from pointing at its territory from Ukraine due to NATO’s expansion and U.S. militaristic intentions. The Russian Federation, as one of the key international actors, even as a state strategically involved across multiple continents, felt cornered and overwhelmed in its strategic interests. The Russians sought NATO guarantees to prevent further expansion and desired security at the old geopolitical style for their borders: "On other economic and strategic issues, the Russian state continues to control its vital areas. Corporations controlling hydrocarbons, aerospace, and infrastructure, among others, are state-owned" (Zamora, 2022). On the other hand, Russian nationalism, which considered Ukraine and Russia to be sister nations, has served as a justification for the invasion. Early in the century, Putin was closer to Western positions, but after seeing that his concerns about NATO’s expansion were ignored, he turned to Russian nationalism, seeking to create a ‘hinterland’ in the old Tsarist style, denying Ukraine’s status as an independent state and instead treating it as a historical product allied with Russia. Another reason for Putin to invade Ukraine was to defend the two “people's republics” in the Donbas region: Donetsk and Luhansk. The Russian Federation recognized both regions as "sovereign states" because they had never been granted autonomy. From Putin’s perspective, the invasion was based on the United Nations Charter, which stated that a country under a "genocide" by its government should receive help, as was happening in the two “sovereign states.” According to his view, the measures taken by the Russian Federation were related to Ukraine’s political indecision in controlling the paramilitary militias that were attacking the two independent republics. Due to the failure of the Minsk agreements, Russia was forced to intervene. Following this reasoning, before the Russian intervention, the U.S. and its allies had begun providing significant amounts of modern weapons, not only to rearm the Ukrainian military forces but also to give them the ability to invade Donbas. The Ukrainian army, along with intelligence services trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), constituted a risk for the pro-Russian population in Donbas, so despite Western warnings, the Russian Federation was compelled to intervene. To summarize, in the first phase, Moscow's objectives were to overthrow the “neo-Nazi” government of Kyiv (although this objective was sidelined later due to Ukrainian resistance and Western sanctions), prevent Ukraine from joining NATO to avoid missiles close to its borders, defend the pro-Russian population of Donbas, secure recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and finally declare the independence of the republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, or, as happened later, hold referendums to annex these regions to the Russian Federation. However, the United Nations General Assembly thought differently from the Russian leader and approved in March the resolution 2022, A/RES/ES-11/1, for humanitarian aid in Ukraine, condemning “in the strongest terms the aggression committed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” (article 2), demanding “that the Russian Federation immediately cease the use of force against Ukraine” (article 3), and calling for “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” (article 4). At the same time, while reinforcing the military front, the Russian Federation economically cut gas supplies to Western European countries. What the war demonstrated was the adaptability of the Ukrainian military to fight under unfavorable conditions, using elastic attacks in different places with help from terrain knowledge, spies, and satellite images and drones provided by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. aid approved by the government of Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. until 2023 reached 40 billion dollars through the Lend-Lease Act for the Defense of Democracy in Ukraine. (Sanahuja, 2022). On the contrary, on the Russian side, the underestimation of the resistance of Ukrainian armed forces, the "Special Military Operation," was compounded by the underestimation of Ukrainian national sentiment, combined with planning problems, tactical issues, supply and logistics challenges, and the low morale of soldiers who did not want to fight against Ukrainians, despite the Kremlin’s calls to battle the "oligarch and neo-Nazi cliques" running Kyiv’s government. Furthermore, ignoring the warnings from the West and Kyiv, Putin announced the annexation of the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, after the results of the referendums showed over 95% support for annexation to the Russian Federation. In response to the annexation, Ukrainian President Zelensky officially requested Ukraine's membership in NATO. This confirmed the definitive cutoff of gas supplies to Europe, causing concern in industries across various countries, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises. 3. The United States, NATO, and China Currently, China and India are the leading buyers of Russian gas, even more so than all of Europe, with discounts granted by the Russians. This demonstrates that the world is no longer unipolar, but multipolar, with the decline of Europe and the economic rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India. While the U.S. leads militarily and is economically stronger than Russia, it is less powerful than the PRC. Therefore, attacking a Chinese ally with nuclear weapons is weakening the PRC, which does not possess many nuclear weapons itself. The U.S. helped the disintegration of the USSR, and now it also seeks the disintegration of the Russian Federation, or at least a regime change, distancing Putin from power and ensuring that the new government is more friendly with the West. This is despite the initial intention of Putin during his first term to join NATO, a request that was denied, and the Russian help (accepting the installation of U.S. bases in Central Asian countries) that the U.S. received when it invaded Afghanistan, when both countries had the same enemies (the Taliban and Al-Qaeda). Although the Russian Federation has not been able to freely use its dollar reserves, as part of them were held in Western countries, it has also benefited from the rise in gas and oil prices, which it continued to export, particularly to the PRC, which has not joined the sanctions. These price hikes not only disrupted the global economy, generating inflation in NATO countries but also increased the prices of minerals and energy, harming capitalist countries and, paradoxically, benefiting the Russians as they sell these commodities. The Russian economy has resisted more than expected, and the ruble, which depreciated at the beginning of the conflict, has recovered. Those who suffered the consequences of the sanctions were the Europeans who import gas and oil. For the U.S. and its allies, the next enemy to defeat is China, as, according to them, global problems require global solutions. Additionally, China has been criticized for not sanctioning and condemning the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is considered a threat to peace by NATO because it seeks, through coercion and annexation, to establish a sphere of influence and direct control with conventional and cyber means, destabilizing Eastern and Southern European countries. If there was any semblance of autonomy by European countries towards the U.S., the crisis has shattered those efforts. Before the crisis, the U.S. complained that Europeans were not doing enough to maintain the alliance, specifically by increasing the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dedicated to defense. The Ukrainian situation has placed them under the U.S. wing, and that autonomy has vanished for the time being. With the election of Donald Trump as president, the situation in Ukraine enters a new phase. Although the Ukrainian president has stated that technical teams have been formed to address the issue of the war with the Russians, there is still no set date for a meeting. Trump also pointed out that Putin is destroying Russia after years of war, generating inflation and economic problems due to the lack of an agreement to end the conflict, although he did not provide specifics on a potential meeting with the Russian president. Trump has encountered a war whose resolution is clearly more complicated than he initially believed. However, from the Russian side, President Putin stated, “we listen to your statements about the need to do everything possible to avoid a Third World War. Of course, we welcome that spirit and congratulate the elected president of the U.S. on his inauguration,” which could be interpreted as an approach to the new administration (Infobae, 2025). The U.S. president, during his presidential campaign had announced that he would end the war in 24 hours, but then the deadline was extended to 100 days. However, now he is seeking a meeting with his Russian counterpart in the coming months, which has proven that the solution to the Russo-Ukrainian war is more complicated than it seemed. Trump has also threatened new sanctions on the Russian Federation if it does not sit at the negotiation table. He has also mentioned that he expects Chinese help to pressure Moscow to seek an end to the conflict. In summary, the U.S. president is more interested in solving internal issues like Latin American migration at the Mexican border than in addressing a war that has lasted almost three years. Final Comments The Republic of Ukraine has been used by Western powers to curb the anti-unipolar stance of the Russian Federation. To maintain Western predominance, the U.S. and allied countries have launched a struggle against the Russians, but through Ukraine, cooperating militarily, politically, and economically. The security policy developed by the U.S. in recent years has shown, on one hand, the growing military power with the maintenance of bases worldwide, from which they can attack or at least influence various countries to defend their interests. On the other hand, the use of this policy has led to the decline of the U.S. economy in the face of competition with the PRC, which has not only increased its GDP but also its productivity, foreign investments, and technological development. In other words, today, Russia is the main opponent, an ally of China, and later, it will be China. The U.S. foreign policy, which sought Ukraine’s membership in NATO, has led Putin to intervene militarily in an invasion in which he believed he would be received as a liberator but encountered fierce nationalist resistance, despite calling the Ukrainian leaders "neo-Nazis." The Russian response to NATO’s eastward expansion is related to security concerns. But they also point to the injustice committed by Western countries. According to the Russians, while they were sanctioned for the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. was not sanctioned when it invaded Iraq, nor was NATO when it intervened in Libya. The U.S. considered the invasion as an attack on the international order and on American supremacy in the European continent, which is why they are intervening in Ukraine — to attack an invading power that seeks to recover its geopolitical role at both the regional and global levels, as it had during the USSR era. The outcome of the war remains uncertain, as the Ukrainians have invaded and occupied a large part of the Russian region of Kursk, where they have taken towns and prisoners to use as bargaining chips in future negotiations with Russia, while the destruction of infrastructure and the death toll continue to rise. References 1. -Infobae. (2022). Putin vuelve a jugar la carta nuclear y llama a falsos referendos para anexionar cuatro provincias de Ucrania. Buenos Aires. 21 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/21/putin-vuelve-a-jugar-la-carta-nuclear-y-llama-a-falsos-referendos-para-anexionar-cuatro-provincias-de-ucrania/2. -Infobae. (2022). Vladimir Putin anunció la anexión de las regiones ucranianas de Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson y Zaporizhzhia. Buenos Aires. 30 de septiembre. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2022/09/30/vladimir-putin-anuncio-la-anexion-de-las-regiones-ucranianas-donetsk-luhansk-kherson-y-zaporizhzhia/3. -Infobae. (2025). Trump dijo que Vladimir Putin está “destruyendo a Rusia” por no buscar un acuerdo de paz con Ucrania. Buenos Aires, 21 de enero. https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/trump-dijo-que-vladimir-putin-esta-destruyendo-a-rusia-por-no-buscar-un-acuerdo-de-paz-con-ucrania/4. -Luchetti, J. (2022). El papel de la Federación Rusa y Estados Unidos en la guerra ruso-ucraniana. 2° Congreso Regional de Relaciones Internacionales “(Re) Pensar las Relaciones Internacionales en un mundo en transformación”. Tandil. 28, 29 y 30 de Septiembre.5. -Luchetti, J. (2022). Rusia y la OTAN en Ucrania: la lucha por la supremacía en un país del viejo continente. XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia “¿Hacia un nuevo escenario internacional? Redistribución del poder, territorios y ciberespacio en disputa en un mundo inestable”. En, C. Pinillos (comp.). Memorias del XV Congreso Nacional y VIII Internacional sobre Democracia. Rosario. Universidad Nacional del Rosario, Facultad de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, pp. 1098-1127. https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/handle/2133/260936. -Naciones Unidas. (2022). Asamblea General. Resolución A/RES/ES-11/1. Agresión contra Ucrania. New York. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/293/40/pdf/n2229340.pdf7. -Sanahuja, J. (2022). Guerras del interregno: la invasión rusa de Ucrania y el cambio de época europeo y global. Anuario CEIPAZ 2021-2022 Cambio de época y coyuntura crítica en la sociedad global. Madrid. Centro de Educación e Investigación para la paz, pp. 41-71. https://ceipaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/3.JoseAntonioSanahuja.pdf8. -Zamora, A. (2022). La multipolaridad contra el Imperialismo y la izquierda extraviada. Buenos Aires. Abril. https://observatoriocrisis.com/2022/04/23/la-multipolaridad-contra-el-imperialismo-y-al-izquierda-extraviada/