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The democratic collapse of Nicaragua has created the ideal conditions for China to consolidate a model of cooperation based on political control, trade dependence, and resource extraction. Throughout 2025, Nicaragua’s co-presidency under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has accelerated the consolidation of an authoritarian family state. Constitutional reforms in January eliminated the separation of powers, subordinating the judicial, legislative, and electoral branches to the executive, while subsequent legislation extended political terms and enabled the regime to weaponize electoral institutions against political opponents. Since 2018, the Ortega-Murillo government has imprisoned, exiled, or stripped citizenship from hundreds of critics and dismantled thousands of civil society organizations, hollowing out independent checks on power. These legal and institutional changes have transformed Nicaragua from a weakened democracy into a closed authoritarian system, heightening the risk of systematic human rights abuses and creating permissive conditions for opaque foreign economic engagement — particularly China — in strategic commercial and mineral sectors. Starting December 2021, President Ortega broke ties with Taiwan, establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, marking this “new era” by opening a Chinese embassy in Managua the same month. This decision followed weeks of the Organization of American States (OAS), United States, and European Union (EU) condemning the 2021 elections as illegitimate due to the months of repression and incarceration of 39 people, including civil society leaders and presidential candidates by President Ortega. Beijing took the opportunity to enter Managua seeking to ease the sense of intensifying international isolation for Ortega’s regime. As of 2023, Managua’s total exports to Beijing were valued at an estimated $27.3 million yet increased by almost 300 percent in 2024 to $82.1 million. Also in 2024, Beijing was the second largest exporter to Nicaragua, making up 14 percent of total imports, at $1.65 billion. Recently Beijing and Nicaragua have held over $1 billion trade deficit, acting as a lifeline of the regime’s desperate survival strategy with China as a primary benefactor. As Western pressure builds, Beijing provides capital, infrastructure, trade, and opportunities for the Ortega-Murillo regime through the commercial and mineral sector. Nicaragua has directly aided in the expansion of China’s economic development in the region and passed multiple pieces of legislation to pave a simple road for Beijing. For example, on October 30th, 2025, Nicaragua’s National Assembly unanimously passed a Special Economic Zone (ZEE) directly tying China’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively boosting influence through infrastructure and trade. The ZEE includes many perks for Beijing operations in Nicaragua, such as full exemptions from income tax, dividends, import duties for up to a decade, targeted industrial sectors for manufacturing, agroindustry, tech, and exports. The head of the ZEEs will be President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo with a renewed promise of jobs, poverty alleviation, and technology transfers. The President’s son heading the ZEEs reflects Nicaragua’s foreign policy focus on becoming a Pacific-Caribbean trade bridge. Moreover, since 2021, the Ortega-Murillo regime has quietly granted an estimated 300,000 hectares of land, or almost 2.36 percent of Nicaragua’s national territory to four PRC affiliated mining companies: Zhon Fu Development, Nicaragua XinXin Linze Mineria Group, Thomas Metal, and Brother Metal. These companies do not contain a track record in Nicaragua, connected to a known Chinese entity, or even have a website. Yet, they are conveniently tailored by the Ortega-Murillo regime as Nicaragua allows opaque shell companies with no track record to operate in critical infrastructure sectors. To aid Beijing’s mineral campaign, the Ortega-Murillo regime has been revoking concession rights and granting those same stripped mining concessions to these opaque Chinese affiliated shell entities. In 2022, the Sandinista National Assembly reformed Law 387 to allow concession transfers without public bidding, weaken social oversight mechanisms, and concentrate decision-making for the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This “reform” allows Nicaragua exclusive control over flipping ownership on mining concessions without warning. Separate from mining, Beijing has been manipulating Nicaragua’s commercial sector reliant on Chinas exports to Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaraguan merchants claim to face “unfair competition” as their sales dwindle, due to the explosion of Chinese nationals operating in the region. Chinese businesses have frozen the Nicaraguan market through selling inexpensive products easily accessed by Chinese nationals under the low-tariff agreements between Ortega-Murillo and Beijing. Reports reflect that China’s strategy is to exploit import benefits provided by the Nicaraguan government, allowing Chinese nationals to sell goods at “rock-bottom prices”. This strategy has allowed Beijing to completely undermine Nicaraguan businesses and take over the market. In May 2024, the Confidential reported Chinese businesses have slashed 70 percent of local merchant sales. Moreover, this increase of Chinese businesses by Chinese nationals directly translates to the growth of imports from the PRC, influencing a further expansion of the already tremendous trade deficit. This inability to produce goods appealing to Beijing markets will perpetuate further trends of high imports and minimal exports by Nicaragua, granting the opportunity for Beijing to fully influence the export capacity under the Ortega-Murillo regime. Nicaragua has rapidly stepped forward to ban media by prohibiting Bibles, newspapers, magazines, books, drones, and cameras from entering the country. This came without an official decree by the government but has still been enforced by immigration and customs at border crossings. Since 2018, 61 media outlets have been closed or confiscated with over 2,300 recorded violations by journalists, forcing 300 journalists into exile from Nicaragua. Globally, the world must continue to investigate and report the egregious human rights violations conducted by this family dictatorship. Their goal of alienating their civil populace to generate wealth for themselves and Beijing through illicit and shadowy economic efforts must face legal hearings to benefit the people of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s corrupted government continuing to weaken the foundations of their democratic institutions to favor Chinese ownership of commercial and industrial zones will freeze Nicaraguan exports in favor of dependence on Chinese imports.

Rarely in the history of the European Union has it faced challenges comparable to the ones it faces today. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has been on the rise. Its membership has expanded quantitatively and qualitatively. Pan-European institutions and European law have been strengthened. Diplomacy and security policy have been taking shape. The EU has gradually become more like a confederation or a federation. However, it has lacked the centralized security structures to truly become a full-fledged state or even a super-state — primarily the armed forces. The EU has remained a junior partner of NATO and part of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, where the US has played a leading role. However, the question of the EU's strategic autonomy has gradually departed from purely theoretical considerations. While maintaining its role as an economic giant, Brussels has long remained a political dwarf. The Ukraine conflict has become a powerful political stimulus for expanding political opportunities, although the preconditions for such a dynamic existed earlier. Similar incentives are emerging in other areas as well. The European Union has been forced to provide immediate answers to the eternal question of "what to do," playing on several chessboards at once. What to do with the United States? A year ago, such a question would have rarely occurred to anyone. Brussels and Washington were closely aligned on the issue of containing Russia. There was also common ground on the issue of growing competition with China. The level of economic ties remained high. Military-political integration has been revived. NATO has welcomed two new EU members — Finland and Sweden. Surprises were expected from Donald Trump. But the experience of his first term still served as an indicator of their predictability. Moreover, the European allies themselves had been moving toward Trump's demands during his previous term — increased defense spending, energy purchases from the US, a rejection of Russian raw materials and so on. However, the US president has exceeded expectations, disconcerting the EU on several fronts. These include a special position on Ukraine, territorial ambitions for Greenland (formally part of Denmark, a member of the EU and NATO), a trade war affecting EU countries, criticism of the Old World in doctrinal documents and speeches by senior officials, as well as an overt policy of force. A close ally and key guarantor of security has transformed, in a matter of months, into a cold, calculating, and unpredictable player. The EU's actions regarding the American issue have so far revealed a wait-and-see tactic. In the medium term, the plan is to "outlast" Trump. His term will expire in three years. With that, a shift in foreign policy can be expected from the new administration. That is, if the Democrats come to power. In the short term, the plan is to avoid angering the American leader, to play on his personality traits (praising his achievements, avoiding criticism), to concede on certain issues, or to present as concessions what is inevitable. These include arms and energy purchases from the US and a trade balance adjustment in Washington's favour. The Greenland issue could be resolved using the same logic. The US military has de facto controlled the island for decades. Moreover, the United States formally remains an ally of Denmark and other EU countries. Why not concede? Especially if the procedure is carried out democratically. Of course, the Danish king or prime minister is unlikely to be kidnapped by American special forces, and they are unlikely to face charges in a US federal court. But Denmark risks being outvoted in the democratic process. The EU's perception of Donald Trump could be compared to the perception of the Russian Emperor Paul I among the Russian aristocracy and nobility. Paul was renowned for his eccentricity and was extremely unpopular. He fell victim to an inevitable conspiracy by his inner circle. But the expectation that problems with the United States will be resolved after a change of leadership, similar to the case in Russian history, rests on a fragile foundation. Unlike the Russian emperor, who became a lone figure on the throne, the American president is backed by a vibrant and young team, widespread support, and a consistent ideology. Donald Trump's departure is unlikely to resolve the EU's American problem. Moreover, his young successors could cling to their ally with an even tighter grip. What to do with Russia? In EU political rhetoric, Russia occupies the position of its most important and dangerous adversary. This approach took hold after February 2022, but had been brewing since the events in Crimea in 2014. Compared to the United States, maintaining a confrontational approach to Russia in a semantic sense is easier, as the identity structures of both sides already contain established, centuries-old patterns of mutual perception as a "significant other." (Neumann, I. (1999) Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation. University of Minnesota Press.) Regarding the United States, such patterns have either not yet been developed or have been lost. The EU's approach to Russia over the past four years has been characterized by a fairly active policy of containment. This includes the consistent severing of trade and economic ties, even at the cost of economic damage to itself; large-scale military and political support for Ukraine; remilitarization and the restoration of the military-industrial complex; and attempts to influence third countries in their trade with Russia, not to mention information and ideological warfare. The problem for the EU is that the results have largely been negative. Yes, Brussels is doing its part to keep Ukraine afloat. Yes, Russia has suffered economic damage. Yes, defense spending is rising and the military-industrial complex is slowly recovering. Yes, third countries are wary of secondary sanctions. Yes, the information machine is working. But Russia hasn't gone anywhere. Its economy has been reoriented towards other areas, and its market for EU companies has been lost. Hostilities with Ukraine continue. Russia's military-industrial complex has been deployed, and its nuclear potential makes any Yugoslavia – or Libya-style solutions futile. Russia has its own financial and informational network, which has become more difficult, or significantly more difficult to influence. The good news for the European Union is that Moscow is unlikely to be planning military expansion against the EU countries themselves. War with them makes neither political nor practical sense for Russia, although the issue of responding to hypothetical military aggression by NATO or individual member states against Russia is likely to be addressed. Moscow cannot harm the Union with trade wars, and it simply lacks the desire to seriously fight for public opinion support. Ultra-conservative forces may at first glance seem convenient for Russia. But experience shows that conservatives and populists in power are hardly helpful in close foreign policy circles. Poland is a paragon of traditional values, but it is at the forefront of Russia's adversaries. In other words, Russia is a convenient foe. It can be fought through Ukraine and pinned on it the answer to the question of "who is to blame?" But at the same time, doing all this is relatively safe for the Europeans. The tactic toward Russia is loud and wait-and-see. Loud in terms of rhetoric. Wait-and-see in the hope that the Russian side will not withstand and collapse. Fortunately, there are many who support the theory of Russia's imminent decline. The problem for the EU is that not only Donald Trump, but also Vladimir Putin differs from the aforementioned Emperor Paul I. While Brussels hopes for the fatal blow with the snuffbox, Russia lives its own life. Apparently, Washington was the first to realize this. What shall be done with Ukraine? The answer to the Ukraine question is also seemingly simple: support Kiev by all means possible. In the short term, the practical policy here is more or less clear: continue financial and military support for Ukraine in order to restore it and prevent military defeat. In the medium term, there is greater uncertainty. The key issue is resources. The confiscation of Russian sovereign assets is still theoretically possible. But even if Brussels bears the full costs of such confiscation, it will not fundamentally solve the problem. The EU faces the prospect of becoming the main donor to a large and warring state with a very specific political system. The benefits of its integration into the EU are ambiguous. Furthermore, the problem of security guarantees and the material backing of such guarantees remains. Unlike the US, the EU is unlikely to be able to demand that Kiev repay its debts through enslaving agreements and then quickly distance itself from the problem. Regarding the Ukrainian issue, the EU may try to leave things as they are, while simultaneously awaiting a change of power in the US and potential problems in Russia. Brussels apparently has sufficient resources to keep Kiev afloat for a couple of years. The EU is likely prepared to accept further material losses for the sake of political principles, just as it did when it severed economic ties with Russia. At the same time, an agreement on Ukraine would also be in the EU's interests. Yes, Kiev is losing territory, but Ukraine remains a fairly large state. It will inevitably remain within the EU's political and economic orbit. An end to hostilities with a ceasefire along the line of contact would likely be more acceptable to the EU than the large-scale, legally binding agreement Moscow is insisting on. If US policy changes and problems escalate in Russia, a ceasefire would be more convenient for a new round of the Ukraine conflict. However, experience shows that even such agreements can be violated, so a binding agreement in itself is not a major problem for Brussels. It is important for the EU that Ukrainian losses in the negotiations are minimized, and that security guarantees do not expose the EU to the threat of military escalation directly with Russia. In answering the question of what to do with Ukraine, the EU will likely have to acknowledge the "realities on the ground." If the US continues to distance itself from the Ukraine issue, and the Russian army continues to advance, delaying such recognition will increasingly devalue Brussels's course. However, a willingness to adhere to this course at any cost cannot be ruled out. What to do with China? Compared to the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, China hardly poses a pressing problem for the EU. China remains a major trading partner and market. Secondary sanctions against Chinese companies for their cooperation with Russia have not yet led to complications. On the Taiwan issue, the EU has avoided taking a leading role in anti-China mobilization. Attempts by individual member states (such as Lithuania) to assert themselves on the Taiwan issue have not found much support in Brussels, and Chinese sanctions have further dampened their efforts. The EU has generally supported the long-standing US policy of curbing China's global economic projects and Beijing's high-tech capabilities. But in reality, there is no rush to undermine the foundation of economic cooperation with China in the western part of Eurasia. Within China itself, there is a countermovement. They don't generalize the US and EU into a single West and, apparently, proceed from the idea that the interests of Washington and Brussels differ. This means that relations with the EU are not identical to relations with the US. The complexities of transatlantic relations are likely to contribute to a situational rapprochement between the EU and China. In the political sphere, this is unlikely to be excessive, but rivalry is still a long way off. Anti-Chinese voices in the EU are likely to become quieter in the near future, despite Beijing's active cooperation with Moscow. China, with its predictable political course in the current turbulent conditions, is becoming an attractive partner for the EU. There are no immediate threats from it, but the benefits are more than sufficient. It's possible that Donald Trump will pressure the EU to adopt a more coordinated course toward China. Brussels could use such demands as a trump card. However, EU diplomacy will be unable to influence Russian-Chinese relations, and the conflict with Russia will be secondary in answering the question "what to do with China." What to do with the EU? It appears that the issue of internal transformation, taking into account external challenges, remains paramount for the EU. The logic of relations with China allows for no changes for now. However, here too, the prospect of intense competition over technological security remains under the rug. This will likely require more stringent regulatory measures. Political consolidation was required in relations with Ukraine, and it has the potential to gain more ground if necessary, seeking additional reserves. In relations with Russia, even clearer demands for increased levels of control have come to the fore. The change in the procedure for applying sanctions against Russia's sovereign assets is symptomatic. Now, it will be more difficult for individual countries, such as Hungary or Slovakia, to use their veto power in EU Council votes with regards to this issue. Finally, the US maneuvers raise a fundamental question: how do Europeans ensure their own security? For now, NATO remains an ironclad structure. But NATO's mere existence is unlikely to block deeper defense cooperation within the EU. Brussels has incentives to play a more significant role in NATO, and in the long run, the alliance itself could become a US-EU pair, rather than a conglomerate of European allies centered on the US. Resolving security issues will inevitably require the EU to become increasingly centralized and directive in its decisions, and thus, to reduce the effective sovereignty of its member states. The big question is whether the EU itself and its member states are ready for such a scenario, especially given the disparity in their potential and capabilities. Could the Franco-German tandem, for example, serve as the framework for such centralization? Does Brussels have the resources and legitimacy to align member states around a unified and firm political line? Is Greece, for example, ready, and what is Estonia ready for? Will it be possible to controllingly package their approaches into a single policy line where defense and specific military risks, including the risk of a clash with a nuclear power, are at stake, not just in words but in deeds? To simplify the question even further, is the European Union ready to devolve from a confederation/federation into a de facto empire? The unification of disparate states for military-political purposes will sooner or later raise the question of an imperial component, despite the seeming impossibility of such a development, if judged through the eyes of the post-Cold War era. Moreover, beyond the US, Russia, Ukraine, and China, there are other areas of common policy. Such a structural evolution could have a far greater impact on relations with other centers of power than situational issues. "What to do with the EU" could become a fundamental question for other participants in international relations.

The United States has employed different geopolitical strategies to maintain its status as a dominant power vis-à-vis rival countries such as China and to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Since his return to the White House, President Donald Trump has announced tariff increases on 60 countries, issued ultimatums to Russia to end the War in Ukraine, and recently intervened in Venezuela by capturing Nicolás Maduro. In this way, a rise in the use of hard power by the United States can be observed, aimed at forcing other countries to behave in a particular manner in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. The foreign policy process of a state is the most important means through which it formulates and implements the policies that determine its interactions with other actors in the international system. Hans Morgenthau (1949) argued that self-preservation is the primary duty of a nation; in this regard, the choice of foreign policy objectives and means is predetermined in two ways: by the goals to be pursued and by the power available to achieve them. For his part, Joseph Nye (1999) argued that a state’s interests are not revealed solely through power or security considerations, since they also include economic concerns. Thus, countries also focus on economic relations, which may entail interdependence effects among states. Consequently, both national security and economic well-being are important to states’ interests. Within this framework, it is possible to discern the geopolitical landscape that the United States is developing through its foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that they would not allow the Western Hemisphere to become a base of operations for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States. “This is our hemisphere,” he affirmed, “and President Trump will not allow our security to be threatened” (The White House, 2026). This warning, together with the National Security Strategy and the recent intervention in Venezuela, represents a new form of the Monroe Doctrine. In his address to Congress in 1823, President James Monroe articulated the United States’ policy regarding the new political order that was developing in the Americas and Europe’s role in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe administration warned the European imperial powers not to interfere in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states. In this way, it sought to increase U.S. influence and trade throughout the southern region (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Likewise, the Trump administration’s geopolitical objective is to consolidate its hemisphere of influence in the face of rival powers, primarily China. Marco Rubio indicated that it is important to secure the national interest in the region and stated: “we have seen how our adversaries are exploiting and extracting resources from Africa. They are not going to do it in the Western Hemisphere” (The White House, 2026). In addition to Latin America, the United States has sought to increase its presence in Africa to counterbalance China. China’s main foreign policy strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the aim of strengthening global connectivity through infrastructure initiatives such as roads, ports, and railways. As a result, China’s economic and political influence expanded by linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. By early 2025, more than 150 countries had joined the BRI, representing approximately 75% of the world’s population and more than half of global GDP. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported that the cumulative value of BRI investments and construction contracts has exceeded one trillion dollars across all participating countries (Ulubel, 2025). In Africa, one example of Belt and Road infrastructure is the Mombasa–Nairobi railway in Kenya, which was financed by Chinese banks under the framework of the agreements. As a result, more than 2 million passengers and around 6 million tons of goods are transported annually, allowing transportation costs to be reduced by 40%. In addition, the expansion of the line toward Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan is planned, with the aim of integrating the economies of East Africa into a common railway system (Ulubel, 2025). Figure 1 illustrates the countries that have partnered with the Belt and Road Initiative, by year of accession. The geographic areas where China is consolidating its presence can be observed, especially on the African continent. Source: Lew et al., 2021, p. 14. The Belt and Road Initiative, with the support of state-owned banks and Chinese companies, is displacing U.S. exports and challenging American firms in BRI countries. Consequently, the United States has increasingly moved closer to African countries to counter China’s influence. Recently, the House of Representatives voted to continue trade programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which protect and strengthen U.S. strategic, economic, and national security interests, including access to critical minerals found outside the country. In this way, AGOA seeks to challenge the economic coercion and exploitation of African nations by China and Russia (Ways & Means, 2026). This approach has also been pursued during the foreign policy of former President Joe Biden. In 2022, the Secretary of State of the Biden administration, Antony Blinken, launched the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which reinforced the view that African countries are geostrategic actors and key partners on urgent issues, ranging from promoting an open and stable international system to shaping the technological and economic future (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In this context, Blinken stated: “Africa is a major geopolitical force. It has shaped our past, it is shaping our present, and it will shape our future” (US Africa Media Hub, 2022). In 2022, Blinken indicated that even as President Putin’s war continues, they remained focused on the most serious and long-term challenge to the international order: the People’s Republic of China. This is because it is the only country with both the intention to reshape the international order and has the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Consequently, Blinken stated: “China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition. It is the second-largest economy, with world-class cities and public transportation networks. It is home to some of the world’s largest technological companies and seeks to dominate the technologies and industries of the future. It has rapidly modernized its military and aims to become a top tier fighting force. And it has announced its ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power” (Blinken, 2022). Consequently, the United States has sought to consolidate its bilateral relations in regions where China has a greater presence. However, U.S. power in the international system relies on the strength of the dollar. The petrodollar system helps sustain the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. In 1974, Saudi Arabia and other regional oil suppliers agreed to accept only dollars for the sale of oil in exchange for military aid and equipment from the U.S. In addition, the Saudis invested the surpluses from that production in U.S. Treasury bonds, thereby financing U.S. spending (Wong, 2016). This process, commonly called “petrodollar recycling,” is beneficial for the parties involved: oil-producing countries have a reliable destination to invest the income from their exports, while the United States ensures a source of financing to cover its fiscal deficit. Consequently, countries seeking to purchase oil must do so using U.S. dollars, which drives demand for this currency in international markets (Grant, 2018). Since that time, the oil market has been trading in dollars, increasing demand for the currency. The predominance of the dollar as the world’s reference currency gives the United States enormous geopolitical influence, with the ability to impose sanctions on countries it considers adversaries, freeze dollar-denominated assets, or exclude a country from the international financial system, paralyzing its foreign trade or complicating the import of raw materials priced in that currency, such as oil. This mechanism represents one of the foundations of U.S. power and allows it to maintain its status as a hegemonic power. However, if oil trade were to begin taking place in another currency, it would affect the dominant position of the United States. Within this framework, the United States has prevented rival countries from attempting to displace the supremacy of the dollar, such as the members of BRICS. This bloc has sought to reduce dependence on the dollar by using local currencies for trade. One example is the BRICS Pay initiative, a cross-border digital payment system being developed by the BRICS countries. This means that trade among its members could be settled directly in reais, rubles, rupees, yuan, or rand, with the system managing conversion, clearing, and settlement without routing transactions through the U.S. dollar. The initiative is part of a broader strategic effort to reduce dollar dependence, strengthen financial sovereignty, and create alternative global payment infrastructures outside systems controlled by the West (BRICS, 2026). With the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank, there has been speculation that they could launch a common currency as a strategy for de-dollarization. Given this possibility, many market operators advocate for the currency to be digital, backed by gold or other resource assets. If the project materializes, the implications for the international monetary system and financial markets would be significant (Lissovolik, 2024). The United States was aware of this possibility. When the BRICS 2025 summit was held, Trump stated that the bloc is not a serious threat, but that they are attempting to destroy the dollar so that another country could take control. “If we lose the dollar as the global standard,” he declared, “it would be like losing a great world war; we would no longer be the same country. We will not allow that to happen” (Messerly et al., 2025). Later, on his Truth Social account, he wrote: “Any country that aligns with the BRICS’ anti-American policies will receive an additional 10% tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy” (Reuters, 2025). Although there is still no BRICS currency, the United States has anticipated its potential effects. Dollar supremacy also gives the U.S. the power to sanction or economically isolate certain countries, such as Russia in 2022. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom agreed to exclude several Russian banks from the international payment messaging system SWIFT. This decision was one of the most forceful sanctions within a set of measures aimed at economically isolating Russia and, consequently, weakening its financial system, with the goal of pressuring Vladimir Putin’s government to end its military operations in Ukraine (Pérez, 2022). Therefore, Russia has conducted its commercial transactions in another currency, such as the Chinese yuan. In this context, the growing weight of the Chinese currency in financial markets could erode the primacy of the dollar, a trend that began to concern Washington. In this scenario, Venezuela announced in 2017 that the country was prepared to sell oil to China and receive payments in yuan, thus making international agreements using a currency other than the dollar (Valladares & Medina, 2017). In 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (Pdvsa) announced that PetroChina International Corp purchased one million barrels of Venezuelan crude, a transaction carried out in digital yuan through the Shanghai International Energy Exchange. In this way, a trend is marked toward abandoning the dollar as the currency for transactions in the energy market (CIIP, 2023). When the United States intervened in Venezuela this year and captured Nicolás Maduro, it was not only seeking oil but also preventing the displacement of the petrodollar system. As a result, this operation directly affects China, since part of Venezuela’s oil exports to China is used to pay debts, estimated between 10 and 12 billion dollars. The U.S. intervention endangered the flow of discounted Venezuelan oil to China’s teapot refineries and will likely affect the role of Chinese oil companies in Venezuela’s upstream business. The Trump administration has declared that all Venezuelan oil will now flow through legitimate and authorized channels, in accordance with U.S. law and national security. This strategy seeks to prevent any influence over natural resources in the region. Consequently, the U.S. president’s approach of directing all oil flows from Venezuela will negatively impact China, Venezuela’s largest oil customer and a major creditor (Downs & Palacio, 2026). However, it is not only rival countries that have been affected by the U.S. attempt to maintain its hegemony; its allies and strategic partners have also been impacted. In January 2025, Trump posted an image of the map of Canada with the U.S. flag, hinting at a possible annexation. On other occasions, Trump referred to his neighbor as the 51st state. In February of that year, the White House announced an additional 25% tariff on Canadian imports and a 10% tariff on its energy resources (The White House, 2025). As a result, Prime Minister Mark Carney negotiated trade agreements with China, allowing for a mutual reduction of tariffs (Yousif, 2026). On the other hand, Trump generated tensions within NATO when he threatened to annex Greenland by force and warned those who did not support him of increased tariffs. He later declined both measures and assured that a framework agreement had been reached (Holland & Hunnicutt, 2026). Nevertheless, the political damage was already done. Trump’s plan for territorial expansion destroyed an important post-World War II norm: that borders cannot be redrawn by force of arms. Mark Carney stated at this year’s Davos Forum that “great powers have begun using economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, and financial infrastructure as coercion.” In this way, he indicated that the world order is “in the middle of a rupture, not a transition” (World Economic Forum, 2026). Consequently, the United States, as a hegemonic power, has acted unilaterally, disregarding the rule-based world order, and has even accelerated its breakdown. Therefore, from this background, it can be concluded that the United States has developed geopolitical strategies to remain a global power vis-à-vis rival countries, primarily China. Two strategies can be discerned. First, the U.S. emphasizes national security by securing the Western Hemisphere, reviving the Monroe Doctrine. Second, economic interdependence is intensified through the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, preventing financial alternatives. Moreover, the attention the United States has directed toward Africa responds to the intention to balance China’s growing influence in the region gained through the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, it can be observed that the Trump administration has set aside soft power (attraction and persuasion) and has relied on hard power mechanisms, such as military threats to annex Greenland, ultimatums to Russia, intervention in Venezuela, and economic sanctions and tariff increases on countries that do not comply with its directives. These measures demonstrate that the United States has lost its capacity for attraction and has had to resort to threats to influence the behavior of other states. In summary, the frequent use of hard power shows that the status of the United States as the leading power has begun to decline, and it is striving to maintain its global hegemony by force, regardless of the consequences for the international order. References Blinken, A. (2022). The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ BRICS. (2026). What Is BRICS Pay and How Does It Work?What Is BRICS Pay and How Does It Work? BRICS. https://infobrics.org/en/post/77791/ CIIP. (2023). Compra de petróleo venezolano en yuanes afianza desdolarización del mercado energético global. Centro Internacional de Inversión Productiva. https://www.ciip.com.ve/compra-de-petroleo-venezolano-en-yuanes-afianza-desdolarizacion-del-mercado-energetico-global/ Downs, E. y Palacio, L. (2026). US Action Threatens Venezuela-China Oil Flows, Debt Repayment, and Investments. Center on Global Energy Policy al Columbia SIPA. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/venezuela-china-oil-ties-severely-impacted-by-us-action/ Grant, J. (2018). The end of the petrodollar? American Foreign Policy Council. https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/the-end-of-the-petrodollar Holland, S. y Hunnicutt, T. (2026). Trump backs down on Greenland tariffs, says deal framework reached. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/davos/determined-seize-greenland-trump-faces-tough-reception-davos-2026-01-21/ Lew, J., Roughead, G., Hillman, J. y Sacks, D. (2021). Task Force Report N° 79: China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States. Council on Foreign Relations. Lissovolik, Y. (2024). Changing the Global Monetary and Financial Architecture: The Role of BRICS-Plus. BRICS Journal of Economics, 5(1). https://brics-econ.arphahub.com/issue/4634/ Messerly, M., Hawkins, A. and Bazail-Eimil, E. (2025). ‘The president is pissed’: Trump's Brazil tariff threat is part of a bigger geopolitical dispute. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/10/trumps-brics-fueled-anger-sparked-50-percent-tariff-threat-on-brazil-00447814 Morgenthau, H. (1949). The Primacy of the National Interest. The American Scholar, 18(2), 207–212. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41205156 Nye, J. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, 78(4), 22–35. https://doi.org/10.2307/20049361 Office of the Historian. (s. f.). Monroe Doctrine, 1823. Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe Pérez, C. (2022). What Does Russia’s Removal From SWIFT Mean For the Future of Global Commerce? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/swift-sanctions-ukraine-russia-nato-putin-war-global-finance/ Reuters. (2025). Trump says alignment with BRICS' 'anti-American policies' to invite additional 10% tariffs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-alignment-with-brics-anti-american-policies-invite-additional-10-2025-07-07/ The White House. (2025). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/ The White House. (2026). RUBIO: This Is Our Hemisphere — and President Trump Will Not Allow Our Security to be Threatened. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/rubio-this-is-our-hemisphere-and-president-trump-will-not-allow-our-security-to-be-threatened/ Ulubel, Y. (2025). 12 years, over 150 countries: Inside the Belt and Road Initiative's global legacy. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202509/17/WS68ca22caa3108622abca13d4.html US Africa Media Hub. (2022). [@USAfricaMediaHub]. X. https://x.com/AfricaMediaHub/status/1604782790029049858 U.S. Department of State. (2022). Travel to Cambodia, the Philippines, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, August 2-12, 2022. U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-travel/travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda-august-2-11-2022/ Valladares, D. y Medina, J. (2017). Venezuela venderá petróleo a China en yuanes. Ministerio del Poder Popular de Economía y Finanzas. https://www.mppef.gob.ve/venezuela-vendera-petroleo-a-china-en-yuanes/ Ways & Means (2026). House Advances America’s Strategic Interests in Africa and Haiti, Eliminates Payments to Dead People. United States House Comittee on Ways and Means. https://waysandmeans.house.gov/2026/01/12/house-advances-americas-strategic-interests-in-africa-and-haiti-eliminates-payments-to-dead-people/ Wong, A. (2016). The Untold Story Behind Saudi Arabia’s 41-Year U.S. Debt Secret. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-05-30/the-untold-story-behind-saudi-arabia-s-41-year-u-s-debt-secret World Economic Forum. (2026). Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/ Yousif, N. (2026). Canada's deal with China signals it is serious about shift from US. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm24k6kk1rko

The Israel-Hamas War has calmed down. The events that preceded it – including the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel and the taking of Israeli and other hostages – and that resulted from it will be remembered for decades to come, especially the dead and wounded, the trauma and pain, the destruction of dreams and property. If there is any lesson to be learnt, it is that better ways must be found to resolve conflict. There is deep concern now that the West Bank is increasingly reaching a critical point. The weak governing structure of the Palestinian Authority, the contraction of the Palestinian economy, settler violence, and much more are causing serious distress and instability. What is preventing conditions from spiraling out of control are Israel’s strict security measures and Palestinian fear that the West Bank will turn into Gaza, even though both regions are different. Years of diplomatic inertia have been counterproductive. The status quo is untenable. Much is at stake and indecision is costly for all concerned. Why continued conflict? Israelis and Palestinians have become victims of their own exclusive national narratives and are speaking past each other. Many on each side are unable to go beyond their zero-sum mentality. They selectively highlight the rightness of their own cause, accuse the other side of bad intentions or misconduct, and fail to realize how their own rhetoric and acts cause aggravating conditions. While the obstacles in the way of progress to peace are numerous and real – power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, one state reality with Israel dominant over the Palestinians, hardening of attitudes in Israel and Palestine, relative weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps, Israeli settler radicalization, Palestinian anti-normalization stance, terrorism – these must not delay or prevent the search for opportunities and positive outcomes. In this regard, simple facts present themselves. First, Israelis and Palestinians are neighbors forever. Their present and future are intertwined whether they choose this reality or not. Second, the longer Israelis and Palestinians wait to negotiate, the more complicated the issues become and the less room there will be for an agreeable peaceful solution. Third, the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians – borders, the separation wall, security, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, water – are well-known, thoroughly debated, and resolvable. The challenge is to initiate negotiations and negotiate in good faith. Fourth, Israelis and Palestinians have proved to be both incapable and unwilling to restart negotiations on their own. The United States thus must go beyond managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to taking the lead to resolve it. It is indispensable for the promotion and sustenance of peace negotiations, as was recently shown in the diplomatic intervention to stop the Israel-Hamas War. Fifth, the inclusion of regional and international actors becomes key as peace requires assurances, follow-up, and support to take root and grow. As Gershon Baskin argues, “Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and confidence require external mechanisms to verify implementation of the agreements, to ensure compliance, and to offer external dispute resolution” (Baskin, 2025). The prerequisites for peacemaking (e.g., context and timing, leadership and political will, societal strength and resilience, process, and content and creativity) are known (Kurtzer, 2020). US diplomacy must be credible, intentional, sustained, and transformative. This comprises not only making peace a priority, but also acting accordingly. The situation on the ground must change. A realistic plan and process of peacemaking must be prioritized. Israelis and Palestinians must be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The vital policies of Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords (especially United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) and others that mediated (that is, United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey) or attended the Gaza “peace conference” in October 2025 should impel them to motivate Palestinians to make hard decisions to end conflict and reach a peaceful settlement. Israel needs to reciprocate. Circumventing the Palestinian issue or wishing it away will not advance Israel’s strategic goals, especially in the long run. Initiating unilateral moves and thinking of the Palestinian issue as a security matter only without addressing its political and territorial dimensions will not enhance Israel’s defense. If anything, they will continue to rile the Palestinians, particularly the youth among them. The two-state solution, the official United States policy since 2002, has become increasingly less viable. This is at a time when 157 out of 193 Member States of the United Nations have already recognized the State of Palestine. On July 28-30, 2025, a High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution was held at the United Nations. The conference, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, committed “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but [also] to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution” (United Nations, 2025a). Follow-up work took place on September 22, and the commitment was made to continue the implementation of the conference’s outcomes. The US’s plan (Trump, 2025) to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and to reconstruct it for the benefit of its inhabitants is a good start, and the plan’s “Phase 2” was even endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025 (United Nations, 2025b). However, resolving all aspects of the Gaza issue will take years. Meantime, it is essential for the US to take a leading role in endorsing again the two-state solution, as it is in the best national interest of Israel, Palestine, and the US. Moreover, the US can facilitate the solution by urging Israel and the Palestinians to seriously consider the idea of confederation, which adjusts or introduces important modifications to the two-state solution. While there have been more than a dozen confederation models over the years – with some specific only to Israel and Palestine and others that encompass Jordan as well – a main goal of confederation, according to the proponents of the Holy Land Confederation (me included), is not to totally separate the Palestinians from the Israelis living in the Holy Land, i.e., “divorce,” but to empower them to “cohabitate” in the two respective sovereign states (Holy Land Confederation, 2025). This cohabitation would allow for greater cooperation and movement between them. “If properly implemented, confederation would enable Palestinians to advance their search for freedom, independence, and statehood without being anti-Israel, and it would enable Israelis to have their security and wellbeing without being anti-Palestinian” (Beilin and Sarsar, 2022). The Gaza crisis must be solved. However, the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian relations must be broken as well. If past negotiations are any indication, there is middle ground between the positions of Israel and Palestine. The US possesses the vital capabilities to move both parties to take the necessary political risks by compromising and engaging in unavoidable tradeoffs on the path to peace. References - Baskin, Gershon. (2025) “Monitoring agreements and verifying implementation.” October 18, https://gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/monitoring-agreements-and-verifying. - Beilin, Yossi and Sarsar, Saliba. (2022) “Israeli-Palestinian confederation is a way forward for peace.” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696830. - Holy Land Confederation. (2025) “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution.” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_hlc. - Kurtzer, Daniel C. (2020) “The Ingredients of Palestinian-Israeli Peacemaking.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring): 5-16. - Trump, Donald J. [@RapidResponse47]. (2025, September 29). “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” X. https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494. - United Nations. (2025a) “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” July 28-30, https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025/. - United Nations. (2025b) United Nations Security Council, November 17, https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

Make American shipbuilding great again (Masga) may sound like an effort by the US to bolster its economic strength and project power internationally, but Masga is not an American policy. It is a South Korean initiative that emerged following trade talks with the US in June. Rather than responding to the Trump administration’s tariff threats solely through trade negotiations, Korean officials saw an opportunity to show their American counterparts that South Korea deserved better treatment. They suggested that South Korea bring its shipbuilding prowess to the US. South Korea is perhaps most famous as an exporter of K-pop, cars and semiconductors. But it is also a global powerhouse in shipbuilding. The shipyard in the south-eastern Korean city of Ulsan alone produces roughly ten times more ships annually than the entire US shipbuilding industry. And as the US tries to counter China’s rapidly growing naval fleet, Korean assistance is something that is clearly needed. The US navy secretary, John Phelan, declared earlier in 2025 that US shipbuilding programmes “are a mess”. He added: “I think our best one is six months late and 57% over budget … That is the best one.” Masga was launched in August, with South Korean conglomerates HD Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries signing a US$150 billion (£112 billion) deal to modernise US shipbuilding capabilities. It is a clear example of a middle power, a term for countries that lack the dominance of great powers but matter because they possess distinctive industrial, resource or diplomatic capabilities, using economic statecraft to punch above its weight. Economic statecraft has largely been used to describe actions taken by great powers like the US and China to enable and restrict access to their consumer markets, investment coffers and production capabilities. The aim is to achieve foreign policy goals or national security objectives by inflicting damage on or beating the capabilities of a rival power. One classic example is the US government’s use of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine and Iran over its nuclear programme. The overt linking of economic tools like sanctions and tariffs to defence objectives in Washington’s recent national security strategy is another striking illustration of this. Middle powers have traditionally not actively pursued economic statecraft to achieve their objectives. They have instead looked to secure a seat at key tables through cooperative participation in regional and multilateral forums. But some of these countries are now asserting their power more explicitly, through preemptive moves like Masga. Using economic statecraft Taiwan is perhaps the most obvious case of a middle power engaging in economic statecraft. The country has used its critical role in global semiconductor supply chains as leverage to protect itself against Chinese invasion. Former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen referred to international reliance on the island’s chip industry as a “silicon shield” in 2021. Taipei imposes strict controls on tech sales and screens investment, particularly from China, to protect its position. And Taiwan’s industry-leading firms, such as TSMC, also invest heavily to maintain their technological edge. Vietnam offers another example. Consistent with its “bamboo diplomacy” foreign policy model, Hanoi hosts leaders from China, Russia and the US, seeking flexibility rather than rigid alignment. The aim is clear: to maximise Vietnam’s national interests pragmatically and with autonomy. With the world’s sixth-largest reserves of rare earths, Vietnam is now looking to use critical minerals as a tool of economic statecraft. The government voted to ban rare-earth exports on December 11, citing the need to reorient the sector towards domestic processing and higher-value manufacturing rather than merely the export of basic raw materials. Rare earths are essential components in numerous products that are central to our daily lives, including smartphones, semiconductors and electric vehicles. By restricting foreign access to these essential inputs, Vietnam is striving to secure its long-term position in the supply chains of highly in-demand resources. Together, these cases show how economic statecraft is not only the preserve of great powers. Middle power states are selectively granting and restricting access to their economic strengths to reshape markets and security relationships. Korea’s shipbuilding, Taiwan’s chip production and Vietnam’s rare earths illustrate this more assertive approach. They are no longer confined to reactive measures or behind-the-scenes diplomacy in regional forums or multilateral negotiations. These states are proposing economic and military partnerships, as seen in initiatives such as Masga and Tsai’s assertion that everyone needs to care about Taiwan, given how essential chips are to the world economy. Great powers are taking notice. In October, HD Hyundai and US defence contractor Huntington Ingalls Industries announced they are together building next-generation navy vessels. This marks the first time a South Korean firm will build a US navy ship. And Washington has also reportedly been courting Hanoi with elevated diplomatic status and promises of mining support. For other middle powers, the lesson is clear: identify and leverage the strategic economic strengths that other countries depend on.

China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. On December 10, 2025, US forces seized the oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela, carrying over a million barrels of crude. “Well, we keep [the oil],” President Trump told reporters. Venezuela’s foreign ministry called it “blatant theft and an act of international piracy,” adding: “The true reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been revealed. It has always been about our natural wealth, our oil.” That same day, on the other side of the world, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (the first since 2016) outlining a vision of partnership “without attaching any political conditions.” The timing captures the choice now facing Latin America. Two documents released within a week — Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 5 and China’s policy paper five days later — lay bare fundamentally different approaches to the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine returns Trump’s NSS makes no pretense of diplomatic subtlety. It declares a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting US opposition to “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in the hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere is now America’s “highest priority”, with three threats requiring military response: migration, drugs, and China. Countries seeking US assistance must demonstrate they are “winding down adversarial outside influence” — a demand that Latin American nations cut ties with Beijing. The strategy promises “targeted deployments” and “the use of lethal force” against cartels. It states that Washington will “reward and encourage the region’s governments … aligned with our principles and strategies.” Unsurprisingly, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rushed to congratulate Chile’s Trump-inspired extreme right wing candidate José Antonio Kast, who won the presidency with 58% of the vote (the most right-wing leader since Pinochet). The tanker seizure shows what this doctrine looks like in practice. Since September, US strikes on boats have killed 95 people. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group patrols the Caribbean. As Colombian President Gustavo Petro observed, Trump is “not thinking about the democratization of Venezuela, let alone the narco-trafficking” — only oil. After declaring that a new phase of attacks could include “land strikes on Venezuela”, Trump threatened the Colombian president that “he’ll be next” as well as invasion of Mexico. China’s alternative China’s policy paper operates from an entirely different premise. Opening by identifying China as “a developing country and member of the Global South,” it positions the relationship as South-South cooperation and solidarity rather than great power competition. The document proposes five programs: Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace, and People-to-People Connectivity. What distinguishes this paper from its 2008 and 2016 predecessors is its explicit call for “local currency pricing and settlement’ in energy trade to “reduce the impact of external economic and financial risks” — new language directly addressing the weaponization of the dollar. This trend has been underway, as highlighted by the R$157 billion (USD 28 billion) currency swap agreement between Brazil and China, signed during Brazilian president Lula’s visit to the Asian country in May this year. China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. And it contains a line clearly responding to Washington’s pressure: “The China-LAC relationship does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party.” The historical pattern Of course, the focus on the “China threat” to “US pre-eminence” in the region is not new. In August 1961, progressive Brazilian Vice President João Goulart visited China, the first high-ranking Latin American official to do so after the Chinese Revolution. At a mass rally in Beijing, he declared that China showed “how a people, looked down upon by others for past centuries, can emancipate themselves from the yoke of their exploiters.” The US response was swift. American media constructed a narrative linking Brazilian agrarian reform movements to a “communist threat from China.” On April 1, 1964 (less than three years after Goulart’s visit) a US-backed military coup overthrew him. Twenty-one years of dictatorship followed. The playbook remains the same. In the 1960s, the pretext was “communist threat”; today it’s “China threat.” And what’s at stake is Latin American sovereignty. What makes this moment different is economic weight. China-LAC trade reached a record US$518.47 billion in 2024, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. China’s share of trade with Mercosur countries has grown from 2% to 24% since 2000. At the May 2025 CELAC-China Forum, Xi Jinping announced a USD 9 billion investment credit line. In 1964, Latin America had few alternatives. Today, China presents another option. The question before the Latin American people The right-wing surge across the continent is undeniable — Kast in Chile, Milei in Argentina, the end of MAS rule in Bolivia. These victories reflect the limitations of progressive governments when addressing crime, migration, and economic stagnation. But they also reflect how US-generated crises become the terrain on which the right wins. The question is whether Latin American governments (including right-wing ones) want to be subordinates in what Trump’s strategy calls an “American-led world.” Even Western liberal analysts are alarmed. Brookings describes the NSS as “essentially assert[ing] a neo-imperialist presence in the region.” Chatham House notes that Trump uses “coercion instead of negotiation”, contrasted with China, “which has been providing investment and credit … without imposing conditions.” That being said, China’s presence in Latin America is not without contradictions. The structure of trade remains imbalanced — Latin America exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. Meanwhile, labor and environmental concerns linked to specific Chinese private enterprises cannot be ignored. Whether the relationship enables development or reproduces dependency depends on what Latin American governments demand: technology transfer, local production, industrial policy. This agenda for a sovereign national project must be pushed forward by the Latin American people and popular forces. At present, the differences between the two visions being presented of the “US-led world” and a “community with a shared future” have never been starker. This article was produced by Globetrotter. The original article is under a CC BY-SA license

Abstract This research article seeks to analyze the current geopolitical landscape, specifically the strategic confrontation between China and the United States and its impact on the international context. In this regard, the concept of the “World Order” refers to the hegemony that the United States held in the West following the end of the Cold War. Over the years, a new concept emerged, the “New World Order,” which defines the relationships that develop after a historical stage of international hegemony. The research begins by defining the variable “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order.” It then focuses on post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, which shaped the course of the West. This is followed by an analysis of China’s foreign policy in recent years, which has generated a shift in the international paradigm. Finally, the study aims to analyze the confrontation between both countries for global hegemony through various international policies and geopolitical strategies. In conclusion, the concept of the “New World Order” for the 21st century is based on the strategic rivalry between China and the United States within an increasingly multipolar system. Both countries have defined foreign policies: the United States seeks to maintain hegemony, while China aims to create an international environment in which all participants can benefit. The conflict itself defines the “New World Order.” Keywords: China, United States, New World Order, geopolitics, international economy. Introduction Currently, there is an ongoing struggle between two powerful states that influence the reality of other countries around the world: the United States and China. These economic and military powers are at an impasse. On one hand, the United States seeks to maintain its influence and hegemony in the West, setting the agenda in international organizations and resolving global conflicts according to its own rules. On the other hand, China, which has a historical rivalry with the U.S., has become the world’s second-largest economy due to its economic development and has joined powers such as Russia and India to counter the US ambitions. The old “World Order” is in decline, making it necessary to update this category of international relations and define what the “New World Order” is, what it consists of, why it emerges, and, above all, how it could be addressed. For this reason, this research article first defines what is understood by the “World Order.” It then analyzes the crisis of this “World Order” in the 21st century, which has led to the emergence of a “New World Order” spearheaded by China’s rise on the international stage. The study continues by examining the United States and the general actions it has taken to reach this critical point, followed by an analysis of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership, and finally, it explores how this confrontation impacts international reality. World Order To understand the concept of “World Order,” it is necessary to begin with a preliminary conceptual analysis of its underlying roots. “Hegemony” and “Power” are two key concepts for understanding the definition of “World Order.” “Hegemony” can be understood as the midpoint between the processes of influence and dominance in interstate relations, beyond its legal content in public or international law. The term has been used by Marxist and structuralist currents, but for general understanding, hegemony is predominantly the ability to lead or direct others. This can be understood from any perspective, whether international, social, or interpersonal. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981a) Hegemony cannot be understood without the exercise of power. In this context, power in the social sphere is the capacity of one person to influence another. A person becomes both agent and object simultaneously; the one who exercises power over another has the ability to influence decisions, activities, motivations, and more. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) The hegemonic process is explained through the exercise of power. “Power”, being the ability to influence an external agent, inherently requires being prepared to surpass this external agent in order to maintain a constant exercise of power and prevent, under any circumstances, the influenced agent from reacting and obstructing the full exercise of power. Consequently, it can be understood that the “World Order” is viewed from a hegemonic structural perspective, where the power exercised by one party — in this case, a country or countries — is largely consensual. This differs from a non-hegemonic order, where multiple actors coexist and compete for dominance over others. Even so, a notable distinction exists with respect to domination, which is the factual exercise of power. In other words, domination can exist without hegemony. (Cox, 2013) Naturally, under this definition, one might assume that the “World Order” follows a linear historical trajectory, with a clear beginning, middle, and end, along with defined actors and positions. This, however, is not the case. The “World Order” is a process marked by constant crises, emerging actors as they develop economically, socially, and militarily, specific interests seeking to influence others, and, above all, a continuous struggle for being the state at the top. (Schulz, 2023) Historically, the concept of “World Order” emerged after the Cold War. Another way to understand the term is through the hegemony of a political-economic model, materialized in the social and cultural expressions of countries. After the Cold War, a “neoliberal” model was established and adopted by most Western countries to perpetuate U.S. interests. Through “liberal” or “neoliberal” policies, a process of domination or hegemony is observed. (Duque-Vargas, 2021) Over the years, academia has reevaluated global events and defined categories through historical processes, which, due to circumstances, reemerge with new actors and in different geographic locations. Today, the concept of the “Cold War” is used as a framework to understand the struggle between powers. The so-called “New Cold War” refers to the confrontation between the U.S. and either Russia or China (Sanz Díaz & Sáenz-Rotko, 2022). It does not describe warfare in the same sense as from 1947 to 1991 but rather as a model of confrontation between powers, with the U.S. as a constant actor. From a political-philosophical perspective, liberalism has been and continues to be widely debated. To simplify — since defining this current is beyond the scope of this study — liberalism is politically expressed in liberal democracies and economically in the opening of markets to the international context and the development of capitalism as an economic model. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) Today, debate persists around the concept of “neoliberalism,” which emerges from liberalism, and no definitive canon has been established. Therefore, this term will not be defined to avoid straying from the focus of the study. Finally, the concept of “World Order” adopted for this study is a fusion of the concepts previously analyzed. The political-economic model in most Western countries over the past twenty-five years has been liberal democracy, imposed by the United States after the Cold War, expressed through culture, education, language, and other societal aspects, and continues to this day. (Dabat & Leal, 2019) In summary, the concept of “World Order” reflects the understanding that the United States maintained global hegemony over the past twenty-five years. This was due to its superior economic and military capacity, which shaped the political actions of other Western countries that adopted the pre-established model (liberal democracy). This allowed the U.S. to stimulate its market, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating its hegemony. Crisis of the 20th-Century “World Order” The World Order is affected by constant crises, as previously noted, but it is currently in a phase referred to as the “Interregnum.” This definition, noted by Gramsci, is understood as the midpoint where nothing is fully defined. It is a neutral moment, where there is neither progress nor regression, reached either because the dominant forces are unable to maintain their hegemony without detaching from coercive tools or, conversely, because the forces of change are insufficient to achieve their objectives. (Sanahuja Perales, 2022) This “stalemate” generates conflicts not only between countries but also within society itself. The post-capitalist economic model responds to this issue. Due to the technological rise of mass communication (social media) and the constant need to produce to sustain the model, problems of social identity emerge. As the identity of the “self” disappears, the identity of the “we” is eliminated; society itself disappears, leaving only a sum of undefined societies with shared problems such as anxiety and depression, which validate themselves through social media that consumes them. (Touraine & Guilpain Peuliard, 2016) The “World Order” after the Cold War established a globalizing mechanism that led to a paradigm of worldwide impoverishment, which is paradoxical to the intended outcome. This can be explained by the fact that the new production model adopted by large corporations sought to regress in social standards, promoting increased profits and reduced costs. This led major factories to relocate to countries where social policies were more easily circumvented, ignoring the regulations of their countries of origin, nullifying the consequences of their actions, and impoverishing the capacity of these populations to recover economically and socially. Consequently, this created not only a model of economic crisis but also a process of global social injustice with long-term consequences. (Chomsky, 2001) It is important to understand that the 20th-century “World Order” was not only afflicted by moral issues but also by global crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In this context, international organizations demonstrated their inability to prevent the very problems they were originally established to address. It is essential for international organizations to promote new guidelines that cover sensitive issues such as global health. Within this framework, the “New World Order” is characterized by a human-centered approach and common development objectives. (Caldera Ynfante, 2020) To address the challenge of identifying problems affecting the international community, CEPLAN developed a series of nine “megatrends,” which are: population aging, increased global urbanization, a poly-nodal world, growing social inequalities and persistent social conflicts, crises of liberalism and globalization, changes in disease patterns and health systems, scarcity of natural resources, climate change and environmental degradation, and accelerated technological innovation and development. While these megatrends focus on the Peruvian context, they were formulated considering international agendas such as the 2030 Agenda and prospective analyses. (Observatorio Nacional de Prospectiva, n.d.) Emergence of the “New World Order” Under these circumstances, it becomes necessary to renew definitions and ask: are we still in the post–Cold War era? The answer is no, and it is necessary to present updated sociological and international relations categories. For this reason, the term “New World Order” is used when analyzing factors such as deindustrialization, failures in multilateralism, and the emergence of new powers capable of determining and imposing new positions. (Ramírez Montañez & Sarmiento Suárez, 2021) A large amount of studies presents a central point: the United States is losing its hegemonic control. This can be explained by the policies adopted by different governments, the economic decline due to historical recessions such as that of 2008, the absence of a political model to replace the failed attempt at liberal democracy in the region, internal social crises caused by various factors, and the emergence of China as an antagonist to its objectives. (Lechuga Cardozo & Leyva Cordero, 2020) United States and Hard Power The foreign policy of the United States has been widely studied by international relations scholars. It is often the focus of imaginative interpretations that sometimes verge on the absurd. Naturally, it is necessary to study such an important country with historical and economic significance with objectivity. After the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers, U.S. foreign policy took on a singular purpose: to be the world’s foremost power. This entails determining the direction of global affairs, whether through diplomatic or coercive means — military or economic. The various tools used to achieve this purpose have included multilateralism (as seen during the Obama and Biden administrations) and the radical unilateralism presented by Trump. (Domínguez López, 2021) This doctrine, however, has a history that predates the Twin Towers. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the creation of international organizations, learning from the failures of those established after World War I. These new international organizations were intended to preserve peace and develop new mechanisms for political and economic cooperation. Naturally, as the victorious power of both World Wars, and in the absence of a figure of comparable stature, the U.S. determined the future of these organizations, their purposes, and their rules. (Barbé, 1995) It is therefore necessary to understand that U.S. domestic policy effectively became its foreign policy. In other words, every state seeks to maintain order within its territory, continuously develop, and achieve a peak that can be consistently surpassed. This was how the United States viewed the world: as its canvas. (Lascano, Vedia & Colotta, 2020) Theoretically, the U.S. has a clear distinction from other states regarding hard power. Hard power is defined as a country’s military capability at strategic points around the world. The United States maintains military bases in various parts of the globe, on islands and specific territories, to impose its authority. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This military power is accompanied by economic power derived from arms development. War serves as a mean to develop the American industry, whose involvement — necessary from a business standpoint, though not necessarily military — has become central to debates due to the close relationship between political power, state structure, and the military-industrial complex. (Lorden Zeddies, 2023) The US model has been vigorously copied by various political figures. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, a member of Brazil’s right-wing party, positioned himself as a “Latin American Trump.” (Rodrigues, 2019) This demonstrates the influence of American doctrine on Western countries. Bolsonaro is not the only figure in the region; others include Javier Milei and Nayib Bukele, while in Europe, Giorgia Meloni serves as a counterpart. In the most recent U.S. elections held on November 5, 2024, Donald Trump won the presidency of the White House again. This would be his second term, and his positions, rather than moderating, became increasingly radical. His slogan, “Make America Great Again,” calls for a historical revision of what the United States represented in the world, from a colonialist perspective. Additionally, his various speeches against Mexican immigrants have been characterized as xenophobic. (Bussaja, 2024) It is evident, then, that the U.S. stance continues to be one of maintaining dominance and hegemony. The New Giant: China Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the People’s Republic of China in 2013. His first objective was the creation of a “New Silk Road,” referencing the Silk Road of the 2nd century that connected Europe, Africa, and Asia. This new route was designed to connect China with the rest of the world, opening its markets and leaving behind its historically insular past. (Zhongguo, 2019) This initiative also reflects the early stages of Jinping’s domestic policy based on soft power. The theory of soft power defines a country’s influence through economic strategy. In other words, it involves intervening in international markets to the extent necessary — or even obligatory — for the countries involved in the global landscape. In most cases, this is manifested through the accumulation of ports in different countries, controlled or financed by a single nation, with priority given to these key points as essential for its development. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This strategy not only promotes the economic development of a state but also enables the formulation of new political relationships. In China’s case, we see outreach to Japan, India, and Russia. (Rosas, 2008) Naturally, China initially sought to engage with these countries due to geographic proximity, but over time, and with the growth of its industry, it sought relationships with more distant nations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, China has established various agreements on economic, political, and social cooperation. However, as can be inferred, these initiatives have limitations due to China’s cultural gaps; while China seeks to open its cultural world to Latin America — and vice versa — the result is not an intercultural process but rather a multicultural one. (Staiano, 2019) This approach poses a challenge for the United States. In Latin America, the U.S. has historically held strong influence, but its challenges in various areas have allowed China to enter Latin markets freely. Countries in the region are not indifferent to China’s initiatives. The Chinese market offers cheaper products, more technologically advanced goods, and cultural visibility for the general public. (Zapata & Martínez-Hernández, 2020) A clear example of China’s soft power in South America is the Chancay mega-port in Peru. This port opens multiple opportunities for the region and the world. Asian products cost less and take fewer days to arrive. It increases tariff revenue in Peru and promotes the development of economic corridors in the region. (Villagra, 2023) Finally, China’s strategy is historically grounded in the “Century of Humiliation,” a historical period that continues to affect the Chinese Communist Party’s self-perception. Since China’s opening to the international market, measures have been taken to achieve the overarching goal: to “cleanse” its history. Communication strategies such as the “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,” Peripheral Diplomacy, and its new international relations model based on win-win principles have made Xi Jinping one of the most recognized and lauded leaders when evaluated objectively in historical context. (Mazuelos Chávez, 2022) China vs. the United States The power dynamic between the U.S. and China has persisted over time. During his presidency, Obama made decisions that marked a rapprochement with China, but this paradigm shifted under Trump’s administration, which adopted a protectionist and nationalist policy line, culminating in a tariff war in 2018. China, on the other hand, maintained its party ideals, and under Xi Jinping, distanced itself from any hegemonic ambitions, promoting economic engagement with peripheral countries, respect for international organizations, and goodwill in international politics. (Barrera G et al., 2021) China’s stance is evident in the increase of exports to various countries. In multiple conferences, President Xi Jinping consolidated China’s economic openness, generating investment confidence in other countries by presenting a strong economic ally that does not interfere in domestic politics. Furthermore, economic exchanges benefit both parties. (Xu, 2021) Thus, on one hand, the U.S. seeks to protect its economy by radicalizing protectionist measures, triggering a tariff war, disturbing the international context, and increasing tensions with the Asian continent. Meanwhile, China’s economic model functions effectively as long as it opens itself to other countries, proposing alliances that mutually benefit both sides. Consequently, in the years leading up to the coronavirus pandemic, a confrontation between China and the U.S. was anticipated. By 2021, all signs pointed to an inevitable economic clash. Beyond tariff measures, questions arose as to whether China might repeat the same mistakes the U.S. made in managing hegemony, which have been analyzed over time and through unfolding events. (Gerig, 2021) Under these tensions, the U.S. emphasized that its intentions revolved more around physical warfare than economic conflict. Unlike China, the U.S. has allies that are more strategically positioned militarily but weaker economically. This is why a military agenda is promoted: in a hypothetical conflict, U.S. military capacity, combined with access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, its military bases, and its industrial complex, would tilt the balance of war in its favor. Strategically, China has greater capacity to influence peripheral markets, making it difficult for the U.S. to initiate a conflict, as it would lack long-term trading partners, discouraging its production chain. (Gerig, 2021) Eventually, both countries need each other to maintain economic and technological development. China has independently developed innovative technologies but requires a large market to justify its multi-million-dollar investments, while the U.S. keeps many of its factories in China due to low labor costs. Trump’s first-term policies were later moderated by Biden, who adopted a more conciliatory approach, opening diplomatic channels while still emphasizing the importance of maintaining U.S. hegemony. (Fernández Tabío, 2022) So, where did this confrontation materialize? By 2023, Latin America became the preferred arena for both countries. Both sides recognized its importance, and peripheral economies were the center of attention. The notable difference between the two was, once again, their engagement strategy. The U.S. took a coercive approach toward Panama, whereas China approached Peru through port investments, creating new maritime routes that benefit the entire southern continent. (Carbajal-Glass, 2023) By 2024, with Trump’s second administration, the U.S. strongly opposed the rise of Asia, returning to isolationism. China maintained its perspective of mutual cooperation, while the U.S. pursued a militaristic stance, attempting to obstruct China’s cooperative development with Latin America and India. Even so, U.S. efforts were insufficient to prevent Asia’s engagement with other Western countries. Currently, China holds significant influence in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. (Nascimento, 2024) Discussion After conducting this comprehensive analysis of the “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order,” it becomes clear that the struggle for hegemony occurs between China and the United States. This confrontation is primarily economic, although it has cultural, military, social, and political dimensions. It is not comparable to the Cold War, but the term is used as a representation of a past that seems to echo in the present. (Crivelaro Neto, 2024) The “New World Order” for the 21st century represents a context of economic, political, military, cultural, and social crisis. The confrontation between these two major powers defines the current trajectory of the world. Countries that lack the capacity to participate in this confrontation (peripheral economies) nevertheless become geostrategic points of contention. This is evident in the case of Latin America. The diplomatic and cooperative relationships that China has built in recent years have strengthened its ability to confront the United States. (Rosas, 2008) The geopolitical landscape is fraught with uncertainty generated by the development of the conflict itself, making it difficult to establish definitive guidelines or perspectives in the analysis. The U.S., through its foreign policy, seeks to maintain its hegemony. Donald Trump exemplifies this approach. The American perspective is to prevent any other country from determining what should be done. This approach is not only aimed at countering China, which has become its primary adversary, but also applies to other countries, including the European Union, which remains its ally. China presents itself as the leader of this “New World Order” through its alliances in Asia and Latin America because it possesses the greatest capacity to confront the U.S., withstand policies directed against it, and develop new strategies through economic and technological development, preventing the U.S. from achieving international stability. The global reality (New World Order) is, in any case, a multipolar system. Finally, the United States faces multiple challenges. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, several events have contributed to its weakening. Moreover, the Biden administration has left a significant debt to the American people, and the crisis of liberal democracies continues to deepen. Trump represents the American mindset, while Xi Jinping is its most important adversary. This confrontation will ultimately be resolved with a single winner in a zero-sum equation. Conclusions Addressing the main objective of this research, the “New World Order” projected for the 21st century is the conflict between China and the United States. This impasse, as discussed, represents a deadlock in the international arena. It is necessary to allow more time for events to unfold. In due course, a winner will emerge in this economic contest. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the United States remains at the forefront, and figures such as Donald Trump clearly exemplify the country’s continued hegemonic perspective. In the case of China, Xi Jinping’s government has marked a decisive shift in foreign policy, achieving what the reform and opening period did not: transforming China into an international market. Only time will determine whether it can withstand U.S. measures. 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1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. 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Following Russian-Indian talks, Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi made statements for the media. The statements were preceded by a ceremony for the exchange of signed documents. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi (retranslated): Your Excellency Vladimir Putin, my dear friend, Representatives of the two countries, and our friends from India, good afternoon. I am delighted to welcome President Putin to the 23rd Russia–India Annual Summit. President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is taking place at a time marked by several historical dates in our relations. President Putin laid the groundwork for our strategic cooperation 25 years ago, and 15 years ago, in 2010, we upgraded our partnership to the level of a special privileged strategic partnership. Over the past 25 years, President Putin has been relentless in promoting these relations by demonstrating his wise leadership and vision. Regardless of the circumstances, it is his leadership that has reinforced our mutual relations and enabled us to achieve new heights. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to President Putin for his friendship and for his unwavering commitment to working with India. Friends, The world has faced numerous ups and downs over the past 80 years, during which humankind has had to endure many crises and challenges. And throughout this time, the friendship between Russia and India has successfully weathered these storms. These relations are based on mutual respect and deep trust and have invariably stood the test of time. Today, we discussed our ties and cooperation in all their aspects with a view to creating an even more solid foundation. We want to reinforce our economic cooperation and elevate it to a new level. This is the objective we share and it is our shared priority. To make this a reality, we have agreed to implement a programme for economic cooperation until 2030. It will provide for diversifying our trade and investment, making them more balanced and sustainable. At the same time, it will help unlock new dimensions in our cooperation. Today, President Putin and I will be taking part in the Russia–India Business Forum. I am convinced that this platform will also help strengthen our business ties and open new doors for exports, joint manufacture and technical innovation. Both countries have been proactive in working on a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and our country. Our cooperation in agriculture and fertilizers is extremely important for our food security and the prosperity of our farmers. I am happy that our countries will work together to promote our mutual production of urea. Friends, Promoting connectivity between our countries is another priority for us. We will redouble our efforts regarding the discussions on the North-South International Transport Corridor and the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor. I am confident that we will effectively cooperate in the interests of promoting polar trade via local trade routes. We have offered an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation in the Arctic, which will create new jobs for Indian young people. At the same time, our deep cooperation in shipbuilding will help us boost our joint initiatives. This is yet another important example of our mutually beneficial cooperation, which is increasing the number of jobs and skills while strengthening regional connectivity. Energy security is another important pillar of partnership between Russia and India. Our cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, which is rooted in our history, has helped us uphold our commitment to providing clean energy, which is extremely important for both countries. I have no doubt that our mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of critical minerals will also be important for a safe and diversified provision of resources to the world. We also maintain our cooperation in such areas as clean energy, high technologies and modern industries. Friends, Our cultural relations and ties between individual representatives of our countries are of special importance for relations between Russia and India. Over the past decades, our peoples have demonstrated respect and admiration for each other’s cultures, and we have coordinated various measures to further strengthen this cooperation. The recent opening of two Indian consulates in Russia is a significant step forward, facilitating contacts for all our citizens and bringing our nations even closer together. This October, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims received blessings at the sacred relics of Buddha Shakyamuni in Kalmykia. I am confident that we will soon implement a 30-day visa-free regime for tourist groups, which will greatly enhance travel between our countries. This measure will not only bring our peoples closer but also invigorate our societies and unlock new opportunities. I am therefore pleased that today we were able to sign two key agreements to advance this initiative. Our collaboration will also deepen in education and professional development, including through increased student and academic exchanges. Friends, Today, we discussed a range of pressing regional and global issues. On Ukraine, India’s position has been consistent from the outset: we stand for peace. We welcome all initiatives and efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful, long-term resolution of this conflict. India has always been ready to support such efforts, and we will continue to do so. India and Russia have always supported one another and worked shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam and the cowardly atrocity at Crocus City Hall are connected by a common, hateful ideology. India firmly believes that terrorism constitutes a direct assault on universal human values. Our unity within the global community is the only effective way to combat this evil. We cooperate closely within the UN, the G20, the SCO, BRICS, and other multilateral forums. We will continue this essential dialogue and cooperation across all these platforms. Your Excellency, I am confident that our enduring friendship will provide the strength needed to address global challenges. Together, we can help lead the way towards a more prosperous future. Once again, I thank you and all members of your delegation for your visit to India. Thank you very much. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr. Prime Minister, dear friend, Ladies and gentlemen, My sincere thanks to the President of the Republic of India, Droupadi Murmu, to you, Mr Prime Minister, and to all our Indian colleagues for the exceptionally warm and cordial welcome extended to the Russian delegation. The discussions we have just concluded with our Indian colleagues, along with our highly productive one-on-one conversation last night – for which I thank you again, Mr Modi, for your generous hospitality – were held in a constructive and friendly spirit, reflecting the privileged partnership between Russia and India. I would note that the Prime Minister and I have established a close working and personal rapport. We have met at the SCO summit in September, we maintain regular contact by telephone and personally oversee the development of our strategic cooperation across all key areas, as well as the progress of major bilateral projects. Today, with the participation of our delegations, we conducted a thorough and comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of Russian-Indian cooperation. We also exchanged views on current international and regional issues. The joint statement we have adopted outlines clear priorities for advancing our ties in politics, security, trade, the economy, and cultural and humanitarian affairs. As you have seen, this was complemented by the signing of a substantial package of intergovernmental, interdepartmental, and corporate agreements. Many of these documents are aimed at expanding our economic partnership. This is only natural, as our nations are important partners in trade, investment, and technology. Last year, our bilateral trade grew by a further 12 percent, reaching a new record. While various estimates differ slightly, the consensus places the figure somewhere between US$64 and US$65 billion. We project trade will stand at a comparable level by year’s end. That said, we believe there is clear potential to increase this volume to US$100 billion. To realise this ambitious goal, we have now agreed upon a joint Programme for the Development of Russian-Indian Economic Cooperation until 2030. This comprehensive roadmap provides clear guidelines. Our intergovernmental commission and the relevant economic ministries and agencies are tasked with removing barriers to the flows of goods and capital, implementing joint industrial projects, and deepening our collaboration in technology and investment. Today, His Excellency the Prime Minister shared a comprehensive list of issues with us. It goes without saying that both Russia and India will be extremely diligent and responsive in reviewing them. Make no mistake, we will work on this matter. Of course, having India create a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union would help boost Russia-India business ties. The effort to draft an agreement to this effect is already in progress. I must express my satisfaction with the fact that the two countries have been consistent in their commitment to switching to national currencies in mutual transactions. Their share in business deals has already reached 96 percent. Our two countries have developed resilient interbank channels for lending and financial transactions. Russian economic actors have been making wider use of the rupees they generate from export contracts. Major joint projects receive their funding in Russian rubles. There has been positive momentum in our energy partnership. Russia is a reliable supplier of energy resources and everything India needs for developing its energy sector. We are ready to continue ensuring uninterrupted fuel supplies for the Indian economy to support its rapid expansion. Of course, our bilateral energy cooperation goes far beyond this horizon. The flagship project to build India’s biggest NPP, Kudankulam, is underway. Two out of six reactors have been connected to the power grid, while the other four are in the engineering and construction stages. Once this NPP reaches its full capacity, it will make a meaningful contribution to India’s energy mix, helping Indian companies and households access affordable and clean energy. We believe that building small modular reactors and floating NPPs could also be relevant, just as using nuclear technology for non-energy purposes, including in healthcare, agriculture and other sectors. We are also working with our Indian partners to create new effective international transport logistics routes. This includes a project to create the North-South corridor linking Russia and Belarus to the Indian Ocean. Infrastructure development along the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, including the Northern Sea Route as its main artery, offers ample opportunities for expanding bilateral trade. There are many other economic sectors in which Russia and India have built a positive track record. We are working on joint initiatives in manufacturing, machine building, digital technology, space exploration and other research-intensive domains. For example, a business agreement that was signed as part of the visit provides for building a major Russian-Indian pharmaceutical plant in the Kaluga Region for producing high-quality anticancer medicine using cutting-edge Indian technology. At the same time, Russian companies will start producing their goods as part of the Make in India programme, which is Prime Minister Modi’s flagship project. Prospects for strengthening interaction between Russian and Indian entrepreneurs and business communities are being discussed in detail at the business forum that is currently underway in New Delhi. Mr Prime Minister and I will attend its plenary session later today. Russian-Indian humanitarian cooperation is ongoing in many spheres. Our peoples have been sincerely interested in each other’s traditions, history and spiritual values for centuries. Our scientific and educational contacts, as well as youth and public exchanges are actively developing. The regular cross festivals of Russian and Indian films invariably enjoy success. Mutual tourist flows grow every year. The Russian RT channel will begin broadcasting to India today. This will certainly help the Indian audience learn more about Russia and Russians and acquire objective information about current developments in our country. Our discussions on key global and regional issues have reaffirmed the similarity of our countries’ positions. Russia and India pursue an independent and sovereign foreign policy. We are working together with our allies in BRICS, the SCO and other countries of the Global Majority to promote the shaping of a more just and democratic multipolar world order, and to protect the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. These include the right of every country to its own path of development, the preservation of its own cultural and civilisational identity, respect for sovereignty and a delicate balance of interests of all members of the international community. Russia and India, as the founding nations of BRICS, have done and continue to do a great deal to enhance the prestige of that organisation. As you know, India will assume the BRICS chairmanship next year. We will provide all-round assistance to our Indian friends in their work on the current BRICS agenda. Of course, I would also like to say that Russia and India have traditionally worked closely together in the military-technical sphere. Our country has been assisting the modernisation of the Indian army, including the air defence, air force and navy, for over 50 years. Overall, we are certainly satisfied with the results of our talks. Our plans include a meeting with President of India Droupadi Murmu. However, I can already express my confidence that this visit and the agreements reached will effectively promote the further strengthening of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership for the benefit of the people of India and Russia. Thank you.

The United States recently — and suddenly — announced a 28-point peace plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, seemingly jointly written with Russian delegates, and presented it to Ukraine. The leaked contents of the peace plan caused concerns for Ukrainian representatives, European leaders and some American politicians. Yet it has nonetheless led to “meaningful progress”, according to the White House, on a revised peace proposal drafted by Ukrainian and American delegates in Geneva. Ukraine has reportedly agreed to the deal, with minor tweaks, while Russia says it’s premature to say a resolution is close, even as Russian representatives met with U.S. delegates in Abu Dhabi to discuss the revised plan. What was in the first plan? The leaked initial 28-point plan was criticized for asserting many Russian demands that date back to the initial peace negotiations of March and April 2022: • It placed a limit of 600,000 troops on Ukraine’s military; • It prevented Ukraine from having long-range missiles; • It placed a permanent ban on Ukrainian membership in NATO; • It included protections of Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It also explicitly gave the entire Donbas region of eastern Ukraine to Russia, and called on the international community to recognize full Russian control of the Donbas and Crimea and control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia on the front lines. In return, there would be “reliable security guarantees” envisioned by U.S. President Donald Trump: a NATO-style “Article 5” for Ukraine. This would mean if Ukraine was purposefully attacked by Russia in the future, the U.S. and other parties involved would come to Ukraine’s defence through sanctions, diplomatic pressure and military support, if necessary. In many of the economic and security arrangements that could emerge from the agreement, Russia and the United States would manage them together under the terms of the 28-point plan. The original plan also offered amnesty to all parties for any crimes and atrocities committed during the war, meaning Russia would not be brought to justice for war crimes. It also called for Russia’s return to European and global affairs, ending its political isolation with the West by reforming the G8. In short, the agreement would essentially act as if the war in Ukraine never happened. Was this a joint U.S.-Russia plan? The origins of the peace plan have been widely debated. The stilted language in the English version has led some to speculate it was translated from Russian. American senators said U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, when briefing them, called the deal a “Russian wish list.” The draft reportedly came as a result of meetings held in Florida between Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, a noted Putin supporter. Rubio has insisted it was a U.S.-crafted document while Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia could accept the peace plan. The fact that the document tended to mirror many of Russia’s demands immediately put Ukraine, and Europe, on the defensive. Trump declared that Ukraine would have until American Thanksgiving — Thursday, Nov. 27 — to agree to the plan. He has since softened his stance. But he’s also lambasted Ukraine’s leadership for not showing sufficient “gratitude” for American efforts to bring peace to Ukraine. Details of Europe’s plan In response, European leaders offered their own peace plan. They largely removed some of Russia’s most egregious demands, keeping some of the 28 points, while placing sensitive issues like NATO membership as something to be determined by NATO members and Ukraine. But it also acceded to some Russian demands, including accepting a cap on Ukraine’s military and offering Russia re-entry into the G8. It included a provision for territorial swaps with negotiations starting from the current front lines instead of recognizing Russia’s annexations. European proposals include using frozen Russian assets as reparations for Russia’s aggression, eliminating any of the amnesty clauses and making the European Union and NATO the key players in any future political, economic and military security arrangements. The European deal also removes key qualifiers in the original 28-point plan that could be manipulated by Russian misinformation — namely that Ukraine would be forced to face Russia alone if it struck either St. Petersburg or Moscow with a missile or it failed to “de-Nazify”, a common and erroneous Russian line of attack against Ukraine. The Kremlin rejected the European counter-plan outright. Where does the deal stand now? Ukrainian and American officials recently met in Geneva to discuss the peace plan. Emerging from the meeting, European leaders were cautiously optimistic while insisting a lot more work needed to be done. Trump stated that “something good just may be happening.” So, what resulted from that meeting? Few details have been leaked. Sources have shared that the 28-point plan has now been pared down to 19. It has also been suggested that key issues like territorial swaps and NATO accession have been left for Trump and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy to discuss at a future meeting. Ukrainian officials have said the plan has been substantially revised and reflects Ukraine’s concerns. The Russian response has been cagey, to say the least. Since there’s been no formal presentation of any revised peace plan, they are electing to say nothing firm. But U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll recently met with Russian delegates in Abu Dhabi. Russian sources, meanwhile, have restated their preference for the original 28-point plan. Seeing is believing While this appears to be the most notable progress in the peace process in months, expectations should be tempered until there’s a presidential summit between Zelenskyy and Putin and until their signatures are on a treaty. Such momentum for peace has happened in the past. And it has often been scuttled by the key sticking points of both nations. Ukraine has continued to demand extensive security guarantees, justice for Russian war crimes, and has rejected territorial swaps. Russia has wanted a pliable Ukraine and one that could remain in its orbit politically and economically. Fundamentally, these positions haven’t changed. At this point, it appears the Ukrainians have managed to bring the Americans to their side in the latest peace talks, which reflects the importance Ukraine places on U.S. support in their fight against Russia. Russia has elected to say little, but if it was to agree to the revised deal, it would represent a seismic shift. For those reasons, believe in success in the peace process when you actually see it.