Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기	Leer en español	In Deutsch lesen
Gap
اقرأ بالعربية	Lire en français	Читать на русском

Six months have passed since the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group [1], led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani (now known as Ahmad al-Sharaa), took power in Syria. Shortly before that, on the other side of the world, Donald Trump won the presidential election in the United States, and the whole world turned its attention to what the foreign policy of the new resident of the White House would actually look like. The new Syrian authorities watched him more attentively than others, fully understanding that Trump’s policy toward their country would largely determine their own future and the future of Syria.

At the same time, after six months in power, despite certain efforts, the new Syrian leadership has so far failed to fundamentally resolve key socio-economic problems in the country, the issues of disarmament and the integration of armed groups into a unified army, restore effective control over borders and weapons, ensure internal security for all—including minorities—and launch a truly inclusive transitional political process. Of course, achieving all of this is extremely difficult given that external actors play one of the key roles in these matters. Therefore, the events of recent weeks—especially actions by the United States—are very important for Syria and the region. Let us examine what consequences the easing of U.S. sanctions might have for Damascus, the Middle Eastern region, and Russia.

The Easing of American Sanctions

On May 13, during his Middle East tour, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intention to initiate the process of lifting all sanctions on Syria, which was a rather unexpected move, as even within the president's own administration there was no consensus on the matter. For Damascus and other regional players, this statement became a long-awaited step from Washington.

Later, on May 23, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License (GL) 25 for Syria, which launched the process of easing sanctions in accordance with Trump’s statement. In particular, all transactions with Syria and the Syrian government that were prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations were authorized, effectively loosening existing restrictions. It is worth noting that since January 6, 2025, General License 24 had already been in effect for six months, authorizing certain previously prohibited transactions with the Syrian government and Central Bank. Essentially, GL 25 expanded the sanctions relief that had been initiated at the end of the Biden administration. In addition to GL 25, the U.S. State Department suspended the sanctions stipulated by the Caesar Act for 180 days, which, according to Washington's plan, is intended to encourage foreign partners, U.S. allies, and regional players to begin economic and financial engagement with Syria’s new authorities. However, their temporary suspension for six months indicates a gradual approach to lifting restrictions.

At the same time, the easing of sanctions is not so simple or unambiguous.

First, since 1979, numerous sanctions have been imposed on Syria, including both presidential executive orders and laws approved by Congress. This makes a full repeal of sanctions a complex and slow process, as some of them will require congressional approval.

Second, not all restrictions have been lifted. Furthermore, the Trump administration can rather easily and quickly reinstate them. Instead of completely repealing the fundamental sanctions laws, OFAC issued a General License. This means that if the new Syrian authorities don’t succeed in removing foreign fighters, fighting terrorism, and protecting religious and ethnic minorities, OFAC can just cancel GL 25 and bring back the previous restrictions. Similarly, the State Department may choose not to extend the 180-day suspension of the Caesar Act. Clearly, the U.S. will monitor the situation in Syria and the progress of the new authorities. Thus, GL 25 and the suspension of the Caesar Act should be seen not merely as a gift from Trump, but as a leverage tool for the U.S. over Syria’s new government.

Third, in exchange for lifting sanctions, Trump expects rather problematic steps from the new Syrian authorities. During an unexpected meeting with Syria’s new president on May 14, the White House leader urged him to normalize relations with Israel (potentially through joining the Abraham Accords or striking a new deal). This is a highly difficult step, as it is likely to provoke a negative reaction from radicals within HTS, as well as from ordinary citizens, which may ultimately trigger new escalation in Syria.

Trump also called for the cleansing of foreign fighters and terrorists from the ranks of the Syrian military. This request is also problematic, as Julani still relies on them and continues to promote them into positions within the new army. Moreover, removing foreign fighters and radicals may also spark discontent and retaliatory actions against Julani and his supporters. In this regard, the new Syrian authorities find themselves in a very ambiguous situation. Having come to power as radical Islamists and terrorists, they have begun to use different tools to ensure their political survival — namely, the lifting of U.S. sanctions and the acquisition of external financial and economic aid. To achieve this, they must get rid of those through whom they gained power in Syria, and solving this problem is only a matter of time.

What Does Sanctions Relief Mean for Syria?

Trump’s Plan to Lift Sanctions on Syria Could Mean the Following:

First, the easing of sanctions will lend greater legitimacy to the new Syrian authorities and increase their public support. Syrians have been waiting for the lifting of sanctions for many years. They are hoping for improvements in the humanitarian and socio-economic situation, which has only worsened since 2020, and for the start of full-scale reconstruction of the country. Trump’s decision gives them hope, which in turn increases support for the new Syrian authorities.

Second, radical Islamist forces in Syria view Ash-Sharaa’s engagement with the West as a threat to their prospects in Syria and beyond. In their view, he has begun to betray “revolutionary” and “Islamist” values and “sell them out” in exchange for political and economic benefits from the West. It is important to note that in a recent fatwa, one of the Salafi ideologues, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, declared Syria’s interim president Ahmad Ash-Sharaa (and his supporters) an unbeliever for “abandoning Islamic law in favor of man-made laws.” Additionally, ISIS recently called on HTS militants dissatisfied with the policies of the new Syrian government to defect. The main threat to such forces lies in the possibility that Ash-Sharaa may ultimately ban and physically eliminate them in exchange for full recognition and economic support from the West.

At the same time, the growing internal “jihadist opposition” in Syria could affect the country’s stability, since the government still doesn’t control all of the territory and doesn’t have full control over weapons and the use of force. As mentioned earlier, a possible normalization between Syria and Israel is also a strong argument used against Ash-Sharaa and a source of tension for hardliners in the country, which creates a challenge for the authorities.

Third, Julani is at the same time strengthening his position even further. The meeting with the U.S. president on May 14 improved his image both in the region and around the world. Support from the U.S., shown by that meeting, gives him a way to act against his most radical colleagues and slowly get rid of them. Financial, economic, and military aid from Western and Gulf countries — which Damascus will likely get soon — will let him act more confidently and strictly against his most radical opponents, including Islamist extremists, without being afraid of losing public support. In other words, more international recognition gives Ash-Sharaa more support at home, which lets him weaken the radicals’ claims about his illegitimacy and stop depending on them as a way to control the country.

Fourth, Trump’s statement will stimulate economic aid and investments from Gulf states and the EU into Syria. After the U.S. published GL 25 on May 23, the EU followed suit, deciding on May 28 to lift its economic sanctions on Syria. It is worth noting that the EU will also monitor the human rights situation in the country and developments related to the March events on the country’s coast. All potential donors and investors will closely observe the situation and are unlikely to rush with major financial inflows. A step-by-step approach is more likely.

Fifth, the gradual improvement of the humanitarian and economic situation will ultimately lead to the mass return of Syrian refugees (according to UN data, about 4.5 million Syrian refugees remain abroad, and around 7.5 million internally displaced persons reside within Syria). On one hand, this will increase the socio-economic burden on the Syrian state, which could create a favorable environment for opposition and radical ideas. On the other hand, it may enable the authorities to increase their public support and gain more potential manpower for rebuilding the country and its economy. At the same time, according to a recent UN report on Syria, “social cohesion in the country remains fragile due to deeply rooted ethnic divisions, prolonged displacement/deportation, and the complex dynamics of IDP and refugee returns.” The conflict has exacerbated divisions between ethnic and sectarian groups, and recent changes in the political landscape have intensified discontent over political representation and inclusiveness, land ownership, access to resources, and control over security. Therefore, it is crucial for the Syrian authorities to promptly secure sufficient resources and tools to create sustainable conditions for the country’s recovery.

What Lies Ahead for the Region?

First, the GCC countries, especially Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, will become more active in Syria. Saudi Arabia and the UAE will try to balance Turkish and Qatari influence in Syria through increased investments, economic projects, and support for the current authorities. It is quite likely that regional economic projects aimed at connecting the countries of the region will be discussed and implemented again. For example, the resumption of the Arab Gas Pipeline, stretching from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon, could improve the electricity supply situation in Syria and Lebanon.

Second, the mass return of Syrian refugees to their homeland will reduce the socio-economic burden on regional countries—primarily Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan—on whose territories they are still located.

Third, Syria will receive more investments from the EU, which will help accelerate its recovery and allow the European Union to restore its economic positions in Syria. Syria’s economic recovery, in turn, will have a positive effect on Lebanon as well.

Fourth, there is a possibility of potential Syrian-Israeli negotiations on normalizing relations. In recent weeks, both sides have already established direct contacts and are discussing security issues. However, it is worth mentioning that indirect contacts between the new Syrian authorities and Israel began back in December 2024. The issue here lies in how potential opponents of Julani will exploit this and whether Syrian-Israeli normalization (or even talks about it) will have a destabilizing effect on Syria and the region.

What Prospects Open for Russia?

First, Moscow has not had major economic interests or assets in Syria. At the same time, it is important to note that General License 25 prohibits transactions beneficial to Russia, Iran, or North Korea (or involving the transfer or provision of goods, technology, software, funds, financing, or services to or from these countries), which limits Moscow’s ability to provide economic assistance to Syria. Hypothetically, if the U.S. were to fully lift all restrictions on Syria’s relations with Russia, Moscow would be able to conclude deals with Damascus in the defense sector (including maintenance of Soviet/Russian military equipment), in the field of industrial restoration (of Soviet/Russian infrastructure facilities), in agriculture, and in education.

Second, it is also important to note that since neither Trump’s plan to lift sanctions on Syria nor the EU plan includes a condition for the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Syria (at least not publicly), Moscow retains a greater chance of negotiating more favorable terms for maintaining its military facilities in the country. 

***

Thus, one can say that the sanction relief measures by the U.S. and EU are primarily aimed at helping the new Syrian authorities cope with the challenges facing them—severe socio-economic conditions, energy supply issues, reform and restructuring of the armed forces, infrastructure restoration, combating radical Islamists, foreign militants and ISIS, and regaining control over the entire territory of the country. Secondly, they are meant to help strengthen the political position of Damascus and specifically al-Sharaa within the country in order to carry out, as much as possible, a democratic transitional process over the coming years. Thirdly, they signal clearly that sanctions can be lifted if the "right people" come to power and if they act in a certain direction. Fourthly, these sanctions relief measures are essentially tools of influence and pressure, and explicitly tie the easing or removal of sanctions to the behavior of the target.

The process of lifting restrictions on Syria will first and foremost open a financial and economic pathway into the country for regional actors who have long been directly interested in stabilizing the situation. As for the U.S. and the EU, it appears that neither is ready to go all in on Syria, preferring a gradual approach while waiting to see how the new authorities in Damascus perform in the coming months. This reflects both the West’s waning interest in the region and the growing agency and role of regional actors.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the amount of Western or Gulf investment in Syria is unlikely to affect the quality of internal governance, reform implementation, or the inclusiveness of the transition period. Naturally, by gradually lifting sanctions, the West is trying to create conditions in which it retains leverage over today’s authorities in Damascus. But will the West be ready for the possibility that, over time, this leverage may stop working? 

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is a terrorist organization banned in Russia.

ISIS is a terrorist organization banned in the territory of Russia.