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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, paid a visit to Pyongyang this week and signed a defence pact with reclusive North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, as he looks for new allies who can help him increase Russia’s supply of munitions for the war in Ukraine. As part of this mutual aid deal, the two leaders promised that each country will come to the defence of the other if attacked. Kim also promised North Korea’s full support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. What’s interesting about the entire Russia-North Korea showy display of camaraderie is China’s response: silence. China has misgivings about how things are unfolding, which reports suggest prompted Chinese president Xi Jinping’s call to Putin to call off the latter’s visit to Pyongyang. Obviously, Putin didn’t heed Xi’s request. Why would Beijing be so rattled by the Russian-North Korea defence treaty? After all, China has its own defensive pact with North Korea, which was inked in 1961 and renewed in 2021. Beijing also has a “no limits” partnership with Russia. Logically, if China could sign its own defence treaty with North Korea, so can Russia. But the pact made by Putin and Kim severely threatens Chinese security. China was already worried that whatever control it has over North Korea was weakened when Pyongyang reportedly supplied almost 7,000 containers worth of weapons to Moscow. And this is why, in April, the Middle Kingdom sent its third most senior leader within the Chinese Communist party hierarchy, Zhao Leji, to assure the North Korean strongman that Beijing was still a strong ally. Now the defensive pact that draws Moscow and Pyongyang closer threatens to further diminish China’s influence over Kim. The Kremlin knows that one of Beijing’s greatest fears is that a renegade North Korea may one day point its weapons at China. And this is a key reason behind Putin’s peace treaty with Pyongyang. China and North Korea’s turbulent past For decades, China had tried to maintain its influence over Pyongyang by being the mediator between North Korea and the rest of the world. This included attempting to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Beijing does so to safeguard its own safety and survival, and probably believes that as long as North Korea remains dependent on China, it wouldn’t bite the hand that feeds it. China also remains North Korea’s biggest trade partner. This all sounds awfully bizarre, since China’s mutual defence pact with North Korea suggests that both nations are close allies. But North Korea has a tradition of defying China, and this deal with Russia might embolden it further – and that will be worrying Beijing. In 2017, for instance, Kim Jong-un, in clear defiance of China, ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, in Malaysia. And when China retaliated by halting all coal imports from North Korea into China, North Korea not only condemned Beijing for “dancing to the tune of the United States”, but also vented its anger by firing missiles in the direction of Japan. But where the missiles originated from in North Korea and the distance that it covered towards the direction of Japan provided China with a rather grim check on reality: North Korea’s weapon capabilities extend to major Chinese cities. The Sino-Korean animosity dates back centuries and took shape when Korea was a vassal state of imperial China. Unfortunately, this animosity extended to modern times when Mao Zedong decided to station Chinese troops in North Korea even after the conclusion of the Korean war, and when Beijing did not aid Pyongyang in its nuclear ambitions. It didn’t help either that the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, was suspected of espionage and was nearly executed by the Chinese Communist party in the 1930s. All this history plays a part in what decisions and alliances are being made today, and why. It would be a serious mistake to think that the Russians, even in desperation, would believe that making North Korea an ally would turn the tide of the Ukrainian-Russian war in Russia’s favour. But this move, and his recent trip to Vietnam, shows Putin’s desperation. Even if Pyongyang continues to supply Russia with much-needed ammunition and weapons, Moscow will need greater technology and firepower to win against a Ukraine that uses weapons supplied by the US and Europe. Putin’s agenda This fact is not lost to Putin, and he knows that for Russia to stand a winning chance in the war that he started in 2022, requires its partner of “no limits” to stand firmly by Russia’s side. But beyond supplying Russia with the dual-use technology (which could be used for civilian or military purposes) to fuel Russia’s industrial war complex, China appears to have fallen short of supplying actual weapons to Russia. Even if China wanted to provide weapons to Russia it can’t. This is because it fears further antagonising the west, and triggering economic sanctions would prove lethal for an already ailing Chinese economy. China knows that it needs a strong Russia so that the west doesn’t consolidate its resources to deal with the perceived Chinese threat. But on the other hand, helping Moscow may prove too much for Beijing to stomach since that would harm China’s economy. So, Putin needs to force Beijing’s hand, and the peace treaty that he just signed with North Korea might just do the trick.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the popular imagination, the Caribbean is paradise, an exotic place to escape to. But behind the images of balmy beaches and lush hotel grounds lies a crisis, the likes of which its residents have never experienced. Caribbean islands are in a water crisis, and their governments have warned that water scarcity may become the new norm. Within the past five years, every island in the region has experienced some sort of water scarcity. For example, Trinidad is experiencing its worst drought in recent memory, and residents are under water restrictions through at least the end of June 2024, with fines for anyone who violates the rules. Dominica, considered the nature island of the Caribbean for its mountain rain forests, is seeing a significant decrease in freshwater resources and increasingly frequent water shortages. In Grenada, known as the spice isle, drought has affected water systems throughout the island. Jamaica is also facing water restrictions and has had to resort to water shutoffs in recent years, limiting water availability to a few hours per day in some areas. St. Vincent and St. Kitts have had to ration water. Barbados has experienced several water bans in recent years. In fact, recent data shows that the Caribbean is one of the most water-stressed regions in the world. I study the intersection of critical infrastructure and disasters, particularly in the Caribbean. Safe water is essential for all human activity and public health. That’s why it is important to understand the root causes of the water crises and to find effective, affordable ways to improve water supply systems. 3 reasons water demand is outstripping supply Changing precipitation patterns and droughts are straining Caribbean water supplies, but water demand has also been outstripping supply for a number of reasons. 1. Rapid urbanization and industrialization The Caribbean is one of the most rapidly urbanizing regions in the world. About three-quarters of its population lives in cities, and that percentage is rising, adding pressure on public water systems. At the same time, increased industrialization and commercialization of agriculture have degraded water quality and in some cases encroached on sensitive water catchment areas, affecting the soil’s capacity to retain water. This competing demand for limited fresh water has reduced stream flows and led to water being drawn down from sensitive sources. In Dennery North, a major farming community in St. Lucia, water shortages have left residents collecting water from rivers and other sources for their homes and farms. Unregulated extraction of groundwater can also worsen the problem. Many islands depend on groundwater. For example, 90% of water supply in Barbados comes from groundwater, while in Jamaica it is 84%. However, increasing demand and changes in annual rainfall patterns are affecting the ability of aquifers or groundwater to recharge. As a result, supply isn’t keeping up with demand. This is a huge problem for the island of Utila, located off the coast of Honduras, where the current rate of aquifer recharge is only 2.5% annually. For comparison, Barbados has a recharge rate of 15% to 30% of annual rainfall. 2. Water-intensive tourism industry It’s no secret that the Caribbean is a popular tourist destination, and tourist economies depend on vast quantities of water. Even during water rationing, water is diverted to hotels and other tourist-dependent sites first. That can leave local residents without water for hours or days at a time and facing fines if they violate use restrictions. Tourism not only increases the consumption of water but also the pollution of water resources. Building golf courses to attract more tourists further increases tourism’s water demand and runoff. 3. Weak water infrastructure governance Another problem water systems face is weak governance that leads to excessive loss of treated water before it even reaches the customer. A well-performing water utility will usually have water losses – known as nonrevenue water – below 30%. In the Caribbean, the average nonrevenue water is 46%, with some as high as 75%.   The reasons range from lack of appropriate management practices to metering inaccuracies, leaks and theft. Climate change and extreme weather worsen water insecurity These troubled water systems can struggle on good days. Worsening extreme weather, such as hurricanes and flooding, can damage infrastructure, leading to long outages and expensive repairs. The Caribbean is the second-most disaster-prone region in the world. The islands face frequent earthquakes, landslides, devastating hurricanes and other destructive storms. As global temperatures and sea levels rise, the risk of extreme weather and storm surge causing erosion, flooding and saltwater contamination increases.   Three months after Hurricane Maria hit in 2017, well over 14% of the Caribbean population was still without potable water. Hurricane Dorian in 2019 left Grand Bahama Utility Co. and the country’s Water and Sewerage Corp. with U$54 million in damages. A year after Dorian, WSC was “still working on restoring operations to pre-Hurricane Dorian levels.” How hybrid rainwater harvesting can help Improving water access in the Caribbean means working on all of those challenges. Better governance and investment can help reduce water loss from theft and leaks. Government and social pressure and educating tourists can help reduce waste at hotels and resorts. There are also ways to increase water supply. One involves being more strategic about how the islands use a practice the region has relied on for centuries: rainwater harvesting. Rainwater harvesting involves capturing rainwater, often from where it runs off rooftops, and storing it for future use. It can replace irrigation, or the water can be treated for household uses. Right now, rainwater harvesting is not managed as part of the islands’ centralized water management system. Instead, households bear the cost to finance, build and maintain their own systems. Finding technical support can be difficult, leaving households to contend with seasonal variations in water quantity and quality. That makes risks to drinking water safety difficult to identify. If rainwater harvesting were instead combined with central water systems in a managed hybrid water model, I believe that could help expand safe rainwater harvesting and address water issues in the region. It’s a relatively new concept, and integrating decentralized sources can be complex, including requiring separate pipes, but it has potential to reduce water stress. Decentralized sources, such as rainwater harvesting, groundwater or recycled gray water, could serve as backup water sources during shortages or provide water for nonpotable purposes, such as flushing toilets or irrigation, to reduce demand for treated water. Engineers in Australia are weighing the potential of hybrid water systems to help face the challenges of delivering secure, safe and sustainable water in the future. Fulfilling a human right in the islands The World Health Organization has declared that access to a sufficient, safe and reliable water supply is a fundamental human right, and that to accomplish this, water suppliers have a responsibility to provide adequate quantities of potable water. Hybrid water systems could help ensure water safety and security for island communities and improve the water systems’ resilience amid the human and environmental pressures facing the Caribbean.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском While the flurry over Vladimir Putin’s visit with Xi Jinping last May caused a gush among many media outlets, the public declarations of an enduring alliance is more of the same old bluster rather than a serious démarche. A longer view of Sino-Russo relations tells a far more serpentine story. Future historians will be amused by the irony of how quickly, in world historical time, China and Russia changed places. In 1949, China was the Soviet Russian empire’s vassal, a victorious Communist state that tried to emulate all things Soviet. By 2024, a mere 75 years later, Russia had become China’s vassal, a stale dictatorship hoping to survive a pointless war it had initiated a year before. Rising from the misery of World War II and its own civil war, China entered the succeeding era adrift. Its economy was in ruins, its military vulnerable. As leader of the Communist bloc, the USSR appeared as the natural strategic big brother. The mutual benefits were obvious. China was in desperate need of assistance. The USSR required access to Chinese rail links and ports in the Far East. Moscow felt it needed to defend its interests against potential armed attacks from Japan, while China was wheeling toward international isolation. Both countries feared the growing dominance of the United States. Since that time, relations between Soviet Union/Russia and China have undergone a unique push and pull. The interplay has shift from patron/client state to a formal military alliance (1950-59), schism (1960s), open conflict (1969), détente (1970s), rapprochement (1980s) and, normalisation (after the collapse of the Soviet Union). Now, the war in Ukraine has set loose a new politesse between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a “no limits” partnership. Or so the Russians would like to believe. The Chinese disagree: their EU ambassador Fu Cong characterised the partnership in 2023 as “nothing but rhetoric.” To be sure, Russia’s need of a market for its natural resource wealth and China’s energy intensive growth have certainly impelled them to seek a mutually beneficial arrangement. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have met 40 times since 2012. Both men share a similar family story as well as similar views about civilisational wars, the decline of the West, color revolutions, and the threat posed by the United States and NATO. However, despite these personal, philosophical, and trade complementarities, the PRC and Russia are moving on diverse tracks. Fu Cong’s dismissive attitude is on the mark. To start, the economic synergy is exaggerated. Russia is fourteenth among China’s largest trading partners. Its trade with Russia is relatively inconsequential. Each is more dependent on third countries than on the other. Russia needs the EU. China relies on other Asian countries and the United States. Further, despite its economic heft, China cannot match Europe’s potential as a driver of industrial and commercial modernisation for Russia. Secondly, due to its monopsonistic position, China forces Russia to sell oil, natural gas, and coal at heavily discounted prices. These discounts are so deep that Russian gas exports to China often do not cover the operational costs of their extraction and transportation. Additionally, the PRC makes payments to Russia in Chinese renminbi and uses these transactions to leverage its position over non-Russian suppliers. Unsurprisingly, direct Chinese investment in Russia has almost exclusively focused on the energy and other extraction industries. Sectors with the greatest potential for productivity gains, such as high-tech manufacturing, utilities, construction, financial services et al, go undeveloped. In addition to trade priorities, another reason for this neglect is that the Chinese have found that doing business in Russia is as daunting for them as it is for western investors. The infrastructure in Russia’s Far East is so underdeveloped that the PRC has had to make substantial investments to get access to the resources it wants. By all reports, these investments have underperformed. Further, the lack of rule of law and the absence of a business-friendly ecosystem leave even the Chinese frustrated and grumbling. Russia wants investments but not investors—a common refrain often directed at the PRC. The Russian economy has long been beset by structural problems: low diversification, a faltering industrial base, uncontrolled corruption, the absence of an entrepreneurial class and now, inflation. The mounting costs of the war in Ukraine exacerbates existing matters and will probably prolong the economic dysfunctionality far into the future. In short, Putin’s hunger to reconstitute the Soviet empire is “making Russia a smaller, worse-educated and poorer country.” China’s own economy has its challenges, too. Rising corporate debt, labour shortages and, poor investment efficiency are driving it into stagnation. In 2012, the PRC launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to link its economy with under-developed regions from Central Asia, Africa, and Europe. The dream was to provide its export-oriented economy with markets. There have been several major defaults, and recipients of Chinese loans are subject to falling into debt traps. In light of the current pressures on the economy, the risk is even more intense. By most analyses, the PRC will need cooperation from the West if the scheme has any hope of success. In Central Asia, a confrontation with Russia may be percolating. China’s Belt and Road could compete with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). From the beginning, the Eurasian Union was a token attempt at economic regionalism and a veiled instrument of Russian geopolitics. Many contend it survives as merely another façade to reconstitute the Soviet Union. While it offers little incentive in the way of any real political or market institutions, it represents Russia’s bid to bolster its influence in the region and beyond. Although its threat to the BRI is not significant, it has prompted one regional expert to conclude China may fear a Russian victory in Ukraine because it could strengthen Moscow’s influence in Central Asia. In a move that diminishes Russian energy policy as a source of political influence, Chinese companies have taken stakes in Central Asian oil and gas fields and have built a network of pipelines. Beijing also abandoned its interest in investing in the Power of Siberia II pipeline. Additionally, the China-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) froze lending to Russia and Belarus in 2023. As a vassal state, there is little Moscow can offer Beijing except for its agency as a counterbalance against the United States. The fundamental difference is that Xi wants to reform the global economy, while Putin wants to upend it. As one Chinese analyst puts it, “Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.” Russia’s war against Ukraine has troubled the Chinese. The global economy on which China depends so greatly is being disrupted. Indeed, Beijing may be preparing for a Russian defeat. A recent analysis by Beijing University’s Feng Yujun is worth quoting at length for what it surely reveals about the current Chinese leadership’s views of Moscow: “Russia’s eventual defeat [is] inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea…. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO. “The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr. Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, … Mr. Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.” At some point the Kremlin will become a liability for Beijing. Putin and his circle can bray at the moon about the constant state of siege between nations and societies, invoke other nuggets of Leninist doctrine, and even claim how Poland attacked Nazi Germany and, thus, began World War II. But when the time comes, Xi, rather than conjure up Lenin, will take counsel from another source – Sun Tzu: “There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare.” When that moment finally arrives is uncertain. However, the sway China holds over Russia and the tide of events suggest it is approaching.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Publication credits to AS/COA and Chase Harrison.Nicólas Maduro keeps stacking the deck to win come July 28, but polls favor opposition candidate Edmundo González. The big question for Venezuela’s July 28 elections may not be who voters prefer but whether their preference will be respected. The previous presidential election, which took place in 2018, was marked by irregularities. The reelection of Nicólas Maduro was considered illegitimate by the EU and countries around the world. Now, Maduro is seeking to extend his already decade-long reign with another six-year term. But will this race be free and fair? The fact that Venezuelans will even have the chance to go to the polls was not a given just a few months ago. The framework for this election was established in through the Barbados Accords, signed in October 2023 by the Maduro government and an alliance of opposition parties known as the Unitary Platform. The agreement set out conditions for the election, including that it must take place in the second half of this year, electoral reforms must be made, and international observation must be allowed. It also covered guarantees for the opposition’s participation and primary election process. The United States, which was not party to the accords, agreed to drop some sanctions to get Maduro to stick to his Barbados pledges. A few conditions have been met. The opposition did have its primary in October 2023. And, Maduro set the date for July 28—his deceased predecessor Hugo Chávez’s birthday, marking a date that is early but within the promised range. But other promises have been violated, with one key example being the January disqualification of presidential candidate Maria Corina Machado, who won the opposition primary with 93 percent of the vote. This prompted international outcry and the resumption of some sanctions. Now, the Unitary Platform has a new candidate, former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, and polls suggest he has a commanding lead of as much as 50 points over Maduro. What is González proposing? And how might Maduro undercut his rivals? AS/COA Online covers the electoral context and the candidates. Electoral context Venezuela’s election is being overseen by the country’s Electoral Council (CNE). While the body once included members seen as part of the opposition, in June 2023, the government-controlled constituent assembly replaced all 15 members to create an unanimously pro-Maduro council. So far, the CNE has undertaken several moves that watchdogs and foreign observers view as anti-democratic, such as the disqualification of opposition parties and candidates. Under the Barbados Accords, the CNE was tasked with updating the electoral registry. Currently, the roll includes about 21.6 million of Venezuela’s 28.8 million citizens. Of the about 8 million Venezuelans who live outside the country, only about 228,000 are registered abroad. That’s because the rules for absentee voting in Venezuela are onerous, requiring voters to be registered at a foreign address for at least three years and living in that place legally. Those seeking refugee or asylum status are banned from participating. Moreover, registered voters must go to a consulate to cast their ballots. But in many countries, such as the United States, Venezuelan government buildings have been shuttered, leaving no available voting sites. Meanwhile, the October 2023 opposition primary, which was independently organized and had more relaxed registration rules, attracted 2.4 million voters from abroad. Even for those living in the country, registration remains difficult, as it must be performed at official buildings in state capitals. In 2023, it was estimated that there are 3.5 million potential new voters who remain unregistered in the country. The CNE is also in charge of facilitating the participation of international electoral observers. Under the Barbados Accords, the Maduro regime promised that missions from bodies like the EU, the UN, the African Union, and the Carter Center would be able to observe the election. However, the regime revoked the EU’s invitation in May. Other groups, like the Carter Center and the African Union, are still slated to observe with small missions. Aside from the CNE, the Venezuelan military plays a role in overseeing the elections. Historically, the military has been loyal to Maduro, helping him stay in power. However, the military might be key to guaranteeing that the will of the voters is respected. “They will see and they will know if a major fraud is committed,” explained AS/COA Senior Director Guillermo Zubillaga. “The military will be the deciding factor.” Machado has already called for the military to guarantee a democratic transition. Nicólas Maduro, United Social Party of Venezuela Maduro took over the reins of the country after the death of his mentor, Chávez, in 2013 and he has overseen the acceleration of the country’s democratic and economic collapse ever since. From 2014 to 2021, Venezuela’s GDP shrank nearly three-quarters. The country has seen a small amount of growth since then, but it remains bogged down by hyperinflation, a debt load of $154 billion, mass emigration, and a crippled oil sector. His career grew in Chávez’s shadow. After working as a bus driver and trade unionist, he was elected to the National Assembly in 2000. From there, he served as minister of foreign affairs (2006-2012), vice president (2012-2013), and acting president once Chávez passed. He declared himself victorious in a 2013 presidential special election with 1.6 percent more of the vote than his closest rival. The opposition protested against vote-rigging and Maduro’s unfair use of state resources to campaign. As president, Maduro’s ideological commitment to Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution has seen him stack institutions with allies, advance economic policies that maximize state control, and pursue a foreign policy agenda in opposition to the United States. In turn, Venezuela has sunk to the bottom of global indexes focused on freedom and democracy amid shrinking checks and balances; chavistas control the country’s judiciary and electoral courts. The opposition did control the National Assembly after 2015 elections but, in 2017, the country’s top court dissolved the legislature. That same year, Maduro called for the election of a constituent assembly in a contest boycotted by the opposition. The constituent assembly has now usurped the National Assembly to become the de facto legislating body. Maduro has used his control of the courts and the legislature to tilt the playing field in his favor in this year’s elections. He’s jailed more than 270 dissenting voices, stacked the members of the electoral court, and disqualified presidential candidates. Despite these maneuvers, Maduro polls with as little as 8 percent of the vote in the July elections. How might he still win? He’s hoping the strong chavista party structure can aid his campaign. He also might leverage clientelist networks. Already, Maduro has increased public spending by 80 percent from January to May and raised the monthly income for public workers. But waning enthusiasm and state resources might hamper the chavistas’ electoral abilities. “In the past, they’ve been able to mobilize the party members and loyalists, before and on the day of the election. This year, that ability is in question,” said Zubillaga. Maduro maintains a prolific media presence in the country, appearing across television and radio. Opposition figures, meanwhile, are barred from appearing on most radio and TV stations. And, Maduro is tapping into Tik Tok, expanding his use of social media to portray himself as charismatic, to appeal to youth voters. Polling shows that this group continues to be the most supportive of the opposition. Edmundo González, Unitary Platform The 73-year-old former diplomat and academic did not intend to become the presidential hopeful for the Venezuelan opposition. Originally a placeholder, González was affirmed as the official nominee after substitutes for Machado, like academic Corina Yoris, were disqualified. But even if he was not so well known a few months ago, González now leads polls and, alongside Machado, headlines large rallies across the country. Pitching himself as a reconciliation candidate, his platform articulates a transition back to a pluralistic democracy, touching on themes of amnesty for the Maduro regime and rebuilding institutions. Outside of a focus on facilitating a democratic transition, González defers to the political program of Machado, noting that she, not him, was the primary voters’ choice. She has championed stabilizing the country’s macroeconomics by developing its energy reserves, as well as promoting nearshoring, and investment in infrastructure. González also references his long tenure in Venezuela’s foreign service to divorce himself from any particular political ideology. He highlights that he served successive administrations during posts in Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, El Salvador, and the United States. In an interview with El Pais, he described himself “as a democrat, a moderate person, far from extreme positions.” Still, even if González is voters’ top choice, worries persist that he will be disqualified before or, should he win, after the election. Four members of his team have already been detained on charges of instigating hate and conspiracy. Other candidates Eight other candidates will appear on the ballot for president. While there was potential for some of these candidates to split opposition votes, so far none of them poll above 2 percent in the May 2024 Meganalisis poll. Still, they are muddling an already confusing ballot. Candidates appear under each party they represent, meaning there are 38 headshots even though there are ten candidates. Maduro appears in 13* places; Gónzalez just three times. Many of the other candidates—such as evangelical pastor Javier Bertucci, lawyer Antonio Ecarri, and comedian Benjamin Rauseo—are trying to present themselves as a third way, rebuking chavismo but criticizing the Unitary Platform for either its strategy or its policies. *Editor's note: The original version of this article stated that Maduro appears 14 times on the electoral ballot.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Australia and Indonesia have long had an uneasy relationship, over issues ranging from Timor-Leste’s independence to asylum seekers and bans on live cattle export to the aftermath of the Bali bombings. While the politics have long been challenging, there’s reason to believe a change may be coming. One of the fastest-growing economies in the world, Indonesia has long been powered by coal. Now, it’s endeavouring to go green through renewables, grid modernisation, electric vehicles and geothermal. That’s where Australia comes in. In March this year, the two nations formalised a climate partnership, named KINETIK. Through the agreement, Indonesia will secure supplies of lithium for EV batteries, and Australia will gain more export markets for its critical minerals, as well as potential access to the batteries’ industry supply chain. Why has the relationship been rocky? Since winning independence from the Dutch, Indonesia has focused heavily on keeping its many islands and ethnic groups united. But Australia’s role has sometimes been destabilising. During the Cold War, Australian agencies backed the Indonesian army’s bloody purges of communists. Australia also backed the cause of East Timorese secession. In 1998, Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote to Indonesia’s President, B.J Habibie, pushing for East Timorese independence. A year later, over 5,500 Australian soldiers arrived as peacekeepers during a tense referendum over the region’s future. Many people in Indonesia saw Australia’s involvement as a threat to national unity and cohesion. Before Howard and Indonesia’s next president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, had time to restore the relationship, tensions ramped up again after the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali which killed 88 Australians. Four years later, the Australian decision to grant temporary protection visas to 43 asylum seekers from Papua, which has long sought independence from Indonesia, led Indonesia’s ambassador to Canberra to be recalled. This diplomatic incident bore positive fruit, resulting in improved dialogue and, the same year, the signing of the Lombok Treaty, in which both countries promised not to interfere with the sovereignty of the other. Since then, Australia has been diplomatically silent on other Indonesian territorial issues, such as the separatist movement in Papua. Despite these efforts, many differences remain. Experts have often warned the relationship is tenuous. In 2019, the two nations signed a new Comprehensive Economic Partnership after a tortuous negotiation period. With a focus on climate change and energy transition, this paved the way for this year’s announcement. In a broader context, this partnership also illustrates Australia’s approach as a middle power nation to counterbalance China’s increasing economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Could the green transition help the relationship? In 2022, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Indonesia, where he promised A$200 million to kickstart climate and infrastructure projects. Now we have a formalised partnership. This is an important step, which should improve the political relationship. The two nations already trade $18 billion of goods and services yearly, centred on Australian coal and beef and Indonesian fertilisers and petrol. But there is room for much more growth. Indonesia’s population is young and large, with almost 280 million people. By 2030, estimates suggest it could be the world’s fifth-largest economy. If the KINETIK partnership works, it will be because it offers both nations what they need – Australia gets a new export market for green minerals, technology and know-how, and Indonesia starts to shift away from coal. The agreement builds on a memorandum of understanding on electric vehicles and another between Export Finance Australia and Indonesia’s State-owned Electricity Company last year. What are we likely to see as tangible outcomes? Indonesia perches on the Pacific Ring of Fire, with a number of active volcanoes and frequent earthquakes. This also means the archipelago nation has huge geothermal resources, estimated at 40% of the world’s total. Many geothermal plants are already running. But making the most of the resource faces many technological challenges. The best underground heat resources tend to be located in mountains or in isolated areas. The KINETIK partnership could help through connecting Australian mining expertise to Indonesia’s deep heat resources. Australia’s expertise in using renewables to power isolated communities will be vital to make exploration easier. And Australian investors will be allowed to own a majority share of Indonesian geothermal plants. The partnerships are expected to align with Indonesia’s National Energy Policy, which aims in part to shift from exporting raw energy resources and critical minerals to exporting value-added energy products through downstream projects such as EV and battery industries. Australia is home to the world’s largest hard-rock lithium mine, Greenbushes. The new partnership will open up options for Indonesian battery manufacturers to access this key metal. Indonesia, in turn, is rich in nickel, which will be needed in great quantities for green technologies. In fact, cheaper Indonesian nickel has pushed some Australian producers out of the market. Indonesia has already secured commercial deals with EV and battery manufacturers such as Hyundai and LG from South Korea, as well as Foxconn from Taiwan. Will this be enough? Politically, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia has long been thorny. A new focus on mutual advantageous investment could help, especially given the deal has strong political backing on both sides. Developing electric vehicles in Indonesia was also a key campaign issue for the newly elected Indonesian president, Prabowo Subianto. From the Australian side, the agreement bolsters the Albanese government’s push to make the nation a green energy superpower. Of course, many agreements stay on paper and don’t shape the real world. But this one has a better chance, given the alignment between Indonesia’s efforts to make itself part of the electric vehicle supply chain, and Australia’s dream of becoming a green superpower. Bilateral agreements like these also show how the world is changing. More and more, middle power cooperation is emerging as a counterbalance against the intensifying Chinese-American rivalry. It’s also a positive sign Australia has realised the need to more actively build alliances across the Indo-Pacific region.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. In the wake of the helicopter crash that tragically claimed the lives of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran finds itself at a critical juncture, grappling with both internal and external challenges. Foremost among them is its relationship with the US. Iran is in the middle of a tense regional competition with Israel over the latter’s war in Gaza with Hamas. Washington is invariably drawn into what constitutes a historically contested triad shaping stability and instability in broader West Asia. Iran’s leadership crisis may have come at an important time for the US, amid an ongoing political slugfest at home in an election cycle and a litmus test for US relations with Israel. Two factors, however, are likely to dampen any US expectations from Iran. Iran’s topmost leadership remains intact under the aegis of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the next president will be expected to meet the benchmarks set by previous leaders. For the US, the Iran challenge is likely to remain complex, both due to the leadership transition inside Iran and the growing regional power and influence projected by Tehran. If the Biden administration, despite its initial will, couldn’t bind Iran within the constraints of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a possible Trump presidency would be even less likely to succeed. Regional anti-American sentiments in West Asia, especially among Iran and its proxy groups, seem further entrenched. However, the Biden administration has an opportunity to mitigate regional hostilities by fostering a Saudi-US détente, which remains on the table but is heavily dependent on how much influence Washington can wield with Israel’s highly conservative cabinet in restraining its behaviour in Gaza. Iran’s regional outlook and relations with the US may not be poised for significant shifts, given the predictability associated with the regime, yet the challenge of nurturing inter-generational leaders looms large for Iran. Leadership succession in Iran’s internal politics has always been meticulously planned and nurtured over the years, undergoing a rigorous process to ensure continuity. Internally, Iran faces a crucial test of its leadership amid a situation it has not encountered in decades. However, there is solace in the fact that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei remains alive, poised to select the most suitable candidate. Internally, the vacuum left by the untimely demise of two top leaders presents a crisis as well as an opportunity. However, the socio-cultural divergence with the West, exemplified by the Iranian leadership’s lingering reluctance to embrace any change, may continue to strain the relationship. The crisis in leadership compounds this internal struggle, as no state wishes to appear leaderless during times of uncertainty. Externally, the challenges for Iran are manifold, particularly in filling the leadership void that has been growing since the death of General Qasem Soleimani in 2020 after a US-targeted strike. The new leadership in Iran will be tested in how it continues to project its regional influence and maintain the momentum of clandestine efforts it has propagated across its axis. Internationally, the Iranian leadership’s challenge will primarily be in its tussle with the West on the one hand and maintaining poise in its relationships with varied actors such as China, Russia, and India, all while avoiding Western sanctions. Iran, which has been persistently characteristic in its distinct political stance even in the face of sanctions and regional tensions, has found an alternative axis of support, most notably through partnerships with China and Russia. Besides, Iran has fostered a network of regional support through proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and others. This solidarity axis is now bolstered by a shared commitment to the Palestinian cause. However, the post-October 7, 2023, landscape has seen a nuanced shift in perceptions, including those of regional Arab leaders. As such, the current period is particularly tumultuous in West Asiawith the unabating Israel-Hamas conflict. The loss of key figures in Iran’s leadership couldn’t have come at a worse time, especially as Iran finds itself at a crossroads, balancing unfinished conflicts and shifting regional loyalties. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is now enriching uranium to as much as 60% purity and possesses enough of this material that, if further enriched, could be sufficient for two nuclear weapons. Now that the ‘breakout’ time is close to zero, there are strong incentives for keeping Tehran engaged through the IAEA, if not bilaterally. Despite the seeming belligerence of Iran’s leadership, avoiding war and efforts towards regional peace and stability lie at the core of Tehran’s long-term regional vision. Just a week before the fatal crash, Iran’s foreign minister met with the IAEA chief, and Iran engaged with US officials through intermediaries in Oman on how to avoid the risks of a wider regional war. If anything, these efforts show that both the Biden administration and the Iranian leadership are still willing to sit at the table. That may not be bad inspiration for the next generation of leaders in Tehran to pick up from. This commentary originally appeared in Deccan Herald. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract This study investigates the academic discourse surrounding China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a multifaceted geopolitical project championed by the central government. Through a critical examination of BRI-related literature, primarily in political science and international relations published between 2015 and 2023, the analysis highlights a burgeoning field marked by both growing depth and intensifying critique. It further contends that despite a rise in scholarship, BRI's smaller players and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) call for further investigation. This nuanced approach fosters a comprehensive understanding of BRI's complexities and its evolving global impact. Keywords China- Maritime Silk Road Initiative- Silk Road Economic Belt- Belt and Road Initiative 1. Introduction Following the 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the ambitious undertaking has garnered significant attention from observers for its vast scope and projected economic and political implications.1 The BRI's potential impact on the global order, its member states, diverse regions, and all involved actors has raised a multitude of concerns. A huge body of literature on (BRI) aligns with China’s positive view of the initiative.2 However, a comprehensive review showed that previous research had limitations in scope and depth. Notably, repetitive investigations into established topics and examinations of prior inquiries are prevalent, which hinders the production of novel insights. Furthermore, the trend towards proliferation of topic areas, instead of deeper analysis within existing themes, impedes scholarly advancement. Additionally, many studies assign marginal roles to (BRI), disproportionately focusing on China's perspective. This results in imbalanced literature on China's initiative in terms of quality and nuanced interpretation. From the above mentioned, this study focuses on a key question that revolves around, what are the gaps and limitations in current understanding in BRI’s literatures in the study time period (2015-2023), and what are the challenges and opportunities for the initiative’s researchers and scholars? As focusing on these gaps serves as a catalyst towards more understanding of the dimensions of the initiative, and then contributes to providing a clearer vision for policy decision makers and scholars interested in the initiative. Given these deficiencies, this study aims to critically examine the existing (BRI) literature, drawing upon a diverse selection of academic research, primarily within international relations and political science, published between 2015 and 2023. More significantly, this overview would outline a framework for refining and renewing the discourse surrounding the initiative. This article aims for a deeper understanding of the participants, their plans and future developments. Research should move beyond broad overviews and engage in analyses of the Mari-time Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), focusing on specific regions and project development trajectories. This necessitates rigorous analyses and interpretations of data to lay forward local experiences and diverse future aspirations of (BRI) participants. Secondly, a closer examination of (MSRI) and (SREB) application is imperative. This entails meticulously evaluating the financial performance and sociopolitical implications of completed projects, with particular attention to both economic benefits and potential challenges like debt burdens. Furthermore, a thorough analysis of internal and external policy ramifications for participating countries is crucial, exploring how (BRI) projects align with or challenge existing national and regional frameworks. Thirdly, while existing studies have shed light on Chinese foreign policy through (BRI), further inquiries should expand beyond this singular perspective. Independent research conducted by scholars based in (BRI) recipient countries can offer invaluable insights into local needs, priorities, and concerns. Additionally, comparative studies across diverse regions can illustrate region-specific challenges and successes, enriching our understanding of participant experiences. Finally, it is essential to move beyond China-centric narratives and actively incorporate the perspectives of participating nations within BRI research, which necessitates prioritizing analyses that critically examine the role of Chinese soft power, encompassing cultural exchanges, media engagement, and educational initiatives, and their impact on shaping perceptions and fostering cooperation within the initiative. 2. China’s Initiative at Crossroads Since China's 2013 announcement of the (BRI), its purpose has sparked diverse interpretations among researchers, with ongoing debate focusing on the balance between economic and political motivations.3 While some researchers interpret (BRI) primarily as a domestic economic strategy aimed at market expansion, securing energy sources, and creating investment opportunities for Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs),4 others view it as a manifestation of China's global ambition to achieve dominance in the Eurasian region, and global order.5 A third group of scholars further argue that the BRI is a strategic tool for China to improve its diplomatic relationships with participating countries across Asia, Africa, and Europe. They suggest that by promoting economic cooperation and infrastructure development, the (BRI) can foster regional stability and reduce potential conflict.6 A fourth group of (BRI) studies focuses on the Chinese economy's structural vulnerabilities, arguing that they pose long-term risks to both economic growth and political stability. These vulnerabilities include rampant surplus industrial capacity, which threatens job security and social cohesion; overreliance on land-based energy import routes, potentially exposing China to geopolitical disruptions; and the economic stagnation of western regions, exacerbating regional disparities and social tensions. These studies further examine the extent to which the (BRI) can exacerbate or alleviate these challenges, particularly considering China's heavy reliance on investment, exports, and state-owned enterprises as economic drivers.7 Another area of research focuses on the evolving scope of international dispute resolution mechanisms within the (BRI) framework for projects between China and African countries. This study analyzes the strength and transparency of these new entities, considering factors like legal expertise, judicial independence, and efficient dispute resolution procedures. The study aims to contribute to a better understanding of how disputes relating to China-Africa cooperation will be addressed in the future.8 Adding to the complexity of understanding the BRI's aims, some studies analyze its role as a tool for China's soft power projection,9 They highlight how the initiative's focus on cultural exchange, infrastructure development, and media engagement fosters positive international perceptions of China and enhances its global influence. Others suggest that the (BRI) serves domestic political purposes, potentially serving as a means for Xi Jinping to solidify his leadership within the Chinese Communist Party and strengthen his legitimacy on the international stage.10 This diversity of interpretations underscores the complexity of the BRI's objectives, likely driven by a multitude of motives within China's vast political and economic system. While China emphasizes the collaborative nature of the initiative, portraying it as a 'symphony,' concerns remain about how individual participant interests align with China's own ambitions. Further research is crucial to understand how the BRI's complex motivations translate into tangible outcomes for all involved parties.11 Several studies assess the BRI's impact on both benefits and challenges by examining its relationship with past Chinese development initiatives.12 They argue that the (BRI) draws upon earlier programs like the southern and western campaigns, benefiting from existing infrastructure and communication networks in Central and South Asia. Given the multitude of perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative's objectives and potential consequences, a question arises: do existing research efforts sufficiently cater to the needs and concerns of participating countries? While studies provide valuable insights into aspects like soft power dynamics and geopolitical implications, a crucial factor often remains in the shadows - funding. Despite the BRI's reliance on vast financial resources, research rarely dives into the effectiveness of funding mechanisms, or their potential impact on participants' debt burdens and economic sustainability. To truly gauge the BRI's long-term success and ensure equitable benefits for all involved, future research must prioritize a deeper understanding of its financial dynamics and their consequences for diverse stakeholders. Despite the vast sums promised to the (BRI), a veil of ambiguity hangs over its true financial picture. While platforms like the (MSRI) and (SREB) lack explicit upper limits for project funding, details regarding specific project budgets remain shrouded in secrecy. This loose terminology surrounding "costs," "loans," and "investments" further obscures the potential debt burdens faced by participating countries. Although numerous financial entities, including banks like China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed willingness to participate, specific committed amounts remain elusive. This lack of transparency raises concerns about potential overestimations of the BRI's overall funding capacity and hinders a clear understanding of how financial resources are actually channeled into projects. Future research must prioritize unraveling this tangled web of finances to assess the BRI's true economic feasibility and its implications for all stakeholders involved. The financial picture of the (BRI) remains obscure despite estimations ranging from $400 billion to $8 trillion. This ambiguity stems partly from the lack of publicly disclosed budgetary allocations for specific projects under platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB).13 Further compounding the opaqueness is the loose terminology used by observers, who often conflate "costs," "loans," and "investments" without adequately differentiating their financial implications. Though numerous financial entities, including banks like the China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed interest in BRI projects, concrete commitments regarding specific funding amounts remain elusive.14 This lack of transparency impedes a clear understanding of the initiative's true financial capacity and raises concerns about potential overestimations of total funding. Unraveling this tangled web of financial ambiguity is crucial for future research to assess the BRI's economic feasibility and its implications for participating countries.15 Despite the increasing number of countries engaged in (BRI), its participant roster remains shrouded in a cloud of ambiguity. However, with the initiative's rapid expansion, accurately delineating participants has become increasingly complex. While some prominent nations like the United States, India, and Japan remain firmly outside the initiative, others, including Vietnam,16 Ethiopia,17 Myanmar, Nepal,18 Latin America,19 Africa,20 and numerous numbers of countries nearly 140 in the BRI,21 play significant roles. Estimates suggest the total number of BRI participants now approaches 140. This lack of readily accessible and transparent participant data poses a significant challenge for research and analysis. Accurately understanding the BRI's geographic scope, assessing its economic impact on diverse participants, and predicting its long-term geopolitical implications hinge upon a clear and comprehensive understanding of who stands as part of the initiative. Despite the multitude of studies analyzing (BRI), much remains opaque regarding the distinction between its "connectivity" and "non-connectivity" projects. This is surprising given the initiative's emphasis on hard infrastructure development, encompassing projects like railways, highways, bridges, airports, and seaports.22 However, beyond these tangible linkages lies a spectrum of critical "non-connectivity" projects vital for economic development. These include initiatives addressing areas such as bolstering economic growth, fostering diverse investment opportunities, facilitating mining development, establishing special economic zones, and even deploying satellite monitoring stations. Failing to delve into both connectivity and non-connectivity domains hinders a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's economic impact and broader geopolitical implications. Only by recognizing the intertwined roles of these project types can we fully grasp the initiative's complex landscape and its potential consequences for participating countries.23 While (BRI) draws extensive attention for its transformative hard infrastructure projects like railways, highways, and bridges, its success hinges on an equally crucial yet less visible layer: soft infrastructure. Bilateral investment treaties,24 and free trade agreements form the backbone of this soft infrastructure, establishing clear legal and regulatory frameworks that underpin cross-border investments, trade liberalization, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Recognizing the vital role of this soft infrastructure, alongside the hard connectivity projects, is essential for comprehending the BRI's full scope and assessing its potential impact on participating countries.25 To overcome the limitations identified, future research on (BRI) should shift its focus from broad analyses of the initiative as a whole to delving deeper into specific platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB). These platforms often lack transparency regarding project details, including participants, features, costs, and funding mechanisms. By conducting focused studies on these platforms, researchers can contribute substantially to demystifying the BRI's financial picture and identifying its true participants. 3. Problems Arising in Edited Volumes This section identifies limitations in existing edited volumes on (BRI) and proposes potential solutions, acknowledging varying degrees of implement ability. Remarkably, current volumes often prioritize specific aspects of the BRI, such as its geographical scope, key drivers, diverse stakeholder involvement (including private and public actors), and the participation of subnational and international organizations. However, this fragmented approach overlooks the initiative's broader implications for global governance, power dynamics, international trade flows, transportation infrastructure (including high-speed networks), social movements, and government accountability. Therefore, future edited volumes on the BRI require a more holistic analytical framework that transcends individual thematic strands and comprehensively examines the initiative's multifaceted impact across these interconnected dimensions.26 Another critical concern with a subset of edited volumes on (BRI) lies in the editors' failure to ensure consistent thematic engagement across chapters. This often leads to a lack of focus on empirical analysis, with some chapters delving into specific case studies or data-driven investigations, while others remain mired in theoretical discussions or abstract conceptualizations. This inconsistency undermines the potential for cross-fertilization between chapters and hinders the volume's ability to offer a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's multifaceted realities.27 The thematic inconsistencies between chapters in many edited volumes on (BRI) hinder the development of a comprehensive understanding of the initiative. To enhance the value of their work, (BRI) editors should prioritize thematic coherence and avoid redundancy by curating chapters that offer diverse perspectives and delve deeper into specific aspects of the initiative, rather than presenting overlapping analyses. Several edited volumes on (BRI) suffer from critical lacunae. A significant number lack robust introduction or conclusion, impeding the synthesis of key findings and the formulation of future research directions.28 While individual chapters may possess abstracts, these often fail to engage with overarching thematic threads, identify areas of divergence within the volume, or propose new avenues for inquiry. This fragmentation hinders the volumes' capacity to foster a holistic understanding of the BRI. Furthermore, some edited volumes suffer from outdated data, often relying on information presented at workshops or conferences years prior.29 This presents readers with potentially stale facts and hinders informed analysis. Additionally, a lack of consensus among contributors regarding key terms like "economic growth" and "global governance" can fragment the discussion. With varying definitions, contributors essentially discuss the (BRI) through different lenses, limiting the potential for cohesive analysis and knowledge accumulation. Building upon the identified weaknesses in edited volumes on the (BRI), this study has highlighted several challenges facing BRI research. However, it also offers invaluable groundwork and potential solutions for overcoming these limitations, paving the way for more robust and comprehensive future scholarship in this critical area. 4. BRI’s Operational Problems Operational challenges within (MSRI) and (SREB) projects necessitate a deeper understanding of the dynamic interplay between several factors. This includes the relationship between on-the-ground project realities and the expectations outlined in relevant treaties, as well as the internal and external political and economic forces that can facilitate or hinder project modifications. Such knowledge is crucial for informing sound decision-making. Furthermore, a granular understanding of these critical factors within specific states and regions holds the potential to significantly enhance research on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a whole. While a plethora of studies and analyses on (BRI) exist, many suffer from limitations that impede our understanding of (MSRI) and (SREB) projects. A significant portion focuses on a narrow range of cases, repeatedly analyzing the same treaties or memorandums of understanding. This repetitive approach overlooks the diverse factors and dynamics impacting (MSRI) and (SREB) development. Additionally, an overemphasis on specific, well-documented aspects like high-speed railways in certain Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, Laos, and Pakistan, obscures the broader picture of project complexities and variations across the BRI's vast geographical scope. To enhance the analysis of project execution within (MSRI) and (SREB), four key areas warrant further investigation. Firstly, robust, comprehensive data on project development is crucial. Analyzing actual progress before drawing conclusions about (MSRI/SREB) nature will yield more reliable and nuanced insights. Secondly, researchers must scrutinize the factors with the highest impact on project development. Identifying these critical drivers will enable a deeper understanding of project outcomes and trajectories. Thirdly, examining the dynamic interplay between initial expectations and evolving ground realities is vital. Unveiling the reasons for deviations from expected outcomes, whether positive or negative, will provide valuable knowledge for project management and adaptation. Finally, researchers should delve into the complex interplay between funding mechanisms, project requirements, and associated costs. Untangling these financial relationships is essential for assessing project feasibility and optimizing resource allocation.30 Finally, a comprehensive analysis of project execution necessitates thorough examination of the diverse actors involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This includes scrutinizing their domestic political landscapes, individual characteristics, and contextual operating environments. Understanding these multifaceted influences helps illuminate the motivations, capabilities, and potential limitations of various stakeholders, thereby enabling researchers to more accurately predict their behavior and its impact on project outcomes.31 5. Statement of the Problem It is crucial to examine the multifaceted factors directly or indirectly affecting (MSRI) and (SREB) project execution. This includes a nuanced understanding of the initiative's benefits and costs across various scales: universal, regional, sub-regional, national, and subnational. These benefits encompass a wide range of aspects, including economic development, trade growth, infrastructure improvement, industrial development, productivity enhancements, technology and experience transfer, energy availability and production development, job creation, poverty alleviation, transportation cost and time reduction, and regional economic integration. Investigating the distribution and realization of these benefits, alongside the associated costs, is essential for assessing the overall impact and sustainability of projects.32 While existing research delves into various economic aspects of (BRI), crucial areas warrant further attention. Concerns surrounding heightened domestic trade competition, potential de-industrialization, rising trade deficits, and FDI displacement require deeper investigation. Similarly, political issues related to potential sovereignty concerns and BRI's impact on domestic and foreign policy deserve thorough analysis. Finally, social issues like environmental degradation, pollution, and potential social disintegration demand urgent attention from researchers beyond economics.33 Beyond economists, development specialists, and trade and infrastructure experts, scholars in political science, international relations, and related fields must actively engage with these critical (BRI) dimensions. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of the initiative's impacts necessitates a concerted effort across diverse disciplines to ensure a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's potential consequences. Comprehensive data on the costs and benefits of (BRI) projects serves as a critical tool for enhanced decision-making. Several studies investigating (BRI) rely on broad-stroke statistical analyses and projected benefits without sufficient project-specific detail.34 This approach suffers from several limitations. Firstly, while (BRI) projects unfold over extended periods, these studies often base their conclusions on data from limited timeframes and utilize short-term analytical frameworks. This can paint an incomplete picture and lead to inaccurate predictions. Secondly, these studies often make optimistic assumptions about the guaranteed success, sustainability, and completion of all BRI projects. This overlooks potential challenges and complexities, hindering a balanced and nuanced understanding of the initiative's true potential and pitfalls. A common weakness is overlooking the ground realities of project implementation. While acknowledging potential tensions and rivalries among participating countries,35 these studies often fail to delve deeper into their impacts on project outcomes. Similarly, qualitative research on BRI benefits tends to provide fragmented views. While highlighting positive aspects like training, connectivity, technology transfer, and industrialization, these studies rarely conduct comprehensive analyses or compare benefit distribution across different parties. Additionally, the focus on specific sectors, regions, or countries in a limited number of studies,36 restricts our understanding of the initiative's broader implications. Furthermore, scarce research investigates the total costs of BRI projects in specific regions or their potential negative impacts, such as exacerbating trade deficits, hindering industrialization, or closing certain sectors. While some studies acknowledge the potential boost to China's global reputation and public approval in participating countries, this aspect needs further exploration.37 Likewise, existing research highlighting problems within (BRI) partner countries deserves deeper and more nuanced investigation.38 Elevating the quality of (BRI) research necessitates prioritizing three key areas. Firstly, rigorous studies exploring the proof of identity of (MSRI) and (SREB) are crucial. Secondly, quantitative research on (BRI) projects demands a shift towards realism. Moving beyond the ambitions and aspirations enshrined in official narratives, researchers must utilize robust data and meticulous analysis to assess project costs, benefits, and potential risks. Thirdly, both quantitative and qualitative research should dedicate greater focus to the distribution of (BRI) benefits. Lastly, it is important to focus on projects that affect the environment and society, represented by hydroelectric projects that are required to implement the BRI’s projects. In addition to the energy extraction projects, mining operations and power generation. Thus, it is important for both Finally, a critical research gap lies in analyzing the environmental and social impacts of infrastructure projects associated with the (BRI). This includes, but is not limited to, hydropower dams, energy extraction ventures, mining operations, and power generation facilities. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers must devote attention to assessing the environmental consequences of these projects, such as potential biodiversity loss, pollution, and resource depletion, evaluating their social impacts, including community displacement, cultural disruption, and potential violations of labor rights, and investigating the effectiveness of mitigation measures implemented to address these concerns. 6. Political Influence This section delves into the political ramifications of (BRI) projects for participating countries. It specifically examines the extent to which both internal and external Chinese policies influence the foreign policy characteristics of BRI partners. This includes analyzing the impact on: a) domestic foreign policy features, such as priorities, alliances, and voting alignments; and b) international positions, particularly voting behavior on China-related issues in international forums like the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While several studies have explored Beijing's foreign policy influence within the BRI framework, focusing on specific countries like Cambodia, Ethiopia, Greece, and Sri Lanka,39 a comprehensive understanding necessitates systematic comparative analysis across diverse (BRI) partners, in-depth investigation of both internal and external policy dynamics, and consideration of alternative explanations for shifts in foreign policy beyond solely attributing them to Chinese influence. Such a nuanced approach will ensure a deeper and more accurate understanding of the complex interplay between (BRI) projects, national interests, and the evolving foreign policy landscapes of participating countries. This section further explores the potential spillover effects of Beijing's domestic policies onto participating (BRI) countries. While some studies suggest that the attractiveness of (BRI) projects incentivizes compliance with Chinese regulations, this hypothesis requires closer scrutiny. More research is needed to systematically analyze the specific content and implementation of relevant Chinese policies and their potential impact on partner countries, investigate the mechanisms through which such influence might occur, beyond mere project incentives, and consider alternative explanations for policy changes in (BRI) partner states, such as domestic drivers, regional pressures, or global influences. By moving beyond simplistic assumptions and conducting rigorous empirical research, we can gain a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between internal Chinese policies, (BRI) projects, and the evolving legal and regulatory landscapes of participating countries. The interplay between economic incentives and the political behavior of countries holds substantial research potential. Several studies have highlighted a correlation between economic and commercial relationships and the behavior of actors within those relationships. This link often involves a nuanced interplay of both positive and negative incentives, suggesting that economic factors can influence political decisions and actions in complex ways. Further research in this area should delve deeper into the specific mechanisms through which economic incentives translate into political behavior, the conditions under which these incentives have the strongest impact, and the potential unintended consequences of using economic levers to influence political outcomes.40 While political and economic factors are critical considerations for policymakers, it is crucial to avoid oversimplification. Assuming a direct and uniform impact of economic and political costs and benefits arising from bilateral relations between (BRI) partners and China on project-level outcomes would be inaccurate. As previously discussed, believing that all (BRI) projects will be flawlessly executed, yield solely positive outcomes, and universally benefit all participants is unrealistic. A nuanced understanding requires distinguishing between bilateral and project-level dynamics based on an interplay of economic and political factors which may differ significantly in individual (BRI) projects compared to broader bilateral contexts. Then, acknowledging project heterogeneity as (BRI) projects encompass diverse goals, scales, and contexts, necessitating an analysis that recognizes their potential for varying degrees of success and varying impacts on different stakeholders. Finally, accounting for unforeseen challenges as project implementation can be affected by unforeseen complexities, political shifts, and external factors beyond purely economic and political considerations. Therefore, policymakers should adopt a comprehensive perspective that goes beyond simple cost-benefit calculations and considers the interplay of diverse factors across different levels of analysis.41 Numerous studies highlight the fallacy of assuming uniformity in (BRI) projects' outcomes and universally positive net benefits. This critique stems from the understanding that economic relationships involve a complex interplay of positive and negative incentives, with clear linkages between economic stimuli and political behavior. Therefore, emphasizing the influence of political factors alongside economic ones becomes crucial. While pro-China sentiments and economic incentives often act as prominent motivators for countries to join (BRI), deeper analysis reveals that political factors frequently play a more primary role. Internal political motives can be particularly influential. Next, foreign policy objectives as joining the BRI can help countries secure allies, gain international leverage, or advance specific diplomatic goals. Finally, domestic policy priorities as (BRI) projects can be leveraged to address internal challenges like infrastructure deficiencies, economic underdevelopment, or resource scarcity. It is crucial to recognize that these political motives can interact with, and even supersede, economic interests in driving a country's decision to join the (BRI). Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of (BRI) participation necessitates going beyond simplistic cost-benefit calculations and carefully considering the complex interplay of internal and external political factors.42 Moving beyond participation alone, research needs to delve deeper into the implementation and impacts of (BRI) projects within partner countries. This entails addressing crucial questions such as project completion and success, political and economic costs and benefits and unforeseen consequences. Understanding BRI’s success necessitates analyzing the role of third-party actors. While existing research often focuses on bilateral dynamics between China and (BRI) partner countries, neglecting third parties introduces blind spots. A critical research gap exists in understanding (BRI) ramifications for China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). While existing studies often delve into specific aspects like hardware acquisition or naval base plans, a more comprehensive understanding necessitates examining the initiative's broader impact on the PLA's military posture and engagement. This entails investigating, firstly, the potential alterations to the PLA's strategic capabilities, its strategic resources, logistical networks, or potential overseas deployment points. Secondly, research should illuminate the initiative's effects on China's strategic priorities. Thirdly, it is crucial to analyze the BRI's influence on inter-ministerial dynamics within China.43 Research on (BRI) requires careful consideration of China's internal institutional landscape. While existing studies often focus on external factors or aggregate dynamics, a critical gap lies in understanding the role of Chinese institutions in shaping and implementing the initiative. This necessitates investigation into both formal and informal structures.44 7. Understanding BRI from Different Lenses While existing research on (BRI) encompasses wide-ranging analyses, shifting the focus towards implementation, impact, and other enriching areas holds significant potential for advancing understanding of the initiative's outcomes. Examining the practical realities of project execution, assessing its tangible and intangible effects, and exploring complementary avenues can significantly improve the BRI's overall contribution. Future research on (BRI) should prioritize several understudied yet crucial areas. These include the role of non-state actors, the interplay with Chinese foreign policy, the efficacy of soft power, the impact on global governance and regional and infrastructural variations. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research, particularly understanding the diverse actors shaping its dynamics. Existing studies often focus solely on state-level interactions, neglecting the significant roles played by internal actors like Chinese ministries, think tanks, and subnational entities, as well as external actors like Chinese multinational companies and non-BRI regions. Such a comprehensive lens is crucial for appreciating the multifaceted dimensions of the initiative and the factors influencing its trajectory.45 While numerous studies dissect Chinese foreign policy, with detailed analyses of its key players, driving forces like ideology, culture, nationalism, internal factions, the military, and public opinion, a crucial research gap exists around (BRI). This lacuna lies in overlooking the internal and external actors who significantly shape the initiative's dynamics. Understanding the roles of Chinese internal actors, and non-BRI regions is essential for grasping the BRI's multifaceted dimensions and navigating its trajectory.46 The BRI's potential impact on Chinese soft power merits nuanced inquiry beyond simplistic assumptions. While the initiative positions China as a prominent economic sponsor, superpower, or development actor, its influence on international perceptions is likely multifaceted and context-dependent. Analyzing the soft power implications should move beyond mere project scale and "get-things-done" narratives. Crucial research avenues include deconstructing and activating soft power. By adopting this nuanced approach, research can move beyond simplistic claims about enhanced Chinese prestige and instead provide a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's complex soft power dynamics. This can inform more effective strategies for both China and partner countries in navigating the potential opportunities and challenges associated with the initiative's global engagement.47 A significant deficit within (BRI) research lies in its limited engagement with the issue of global governance. While existing studies often explore the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), their focus frequently remains narrowly confined to its creation, primary function as a (BRI) funding institution, and potential to challenge the established global economic order. This restricted lens obscures the broader ramifications of the BRI for global governance structures, norms, and practices.48 However, studies lack a deeper understanding of the BRI's interaction with and potential impact on global governance structures, norms, and practices. This includes international law and standards in various fields relevant to the initiative, such as trade, finance, environment, and development. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research: an overreliance on China-centric perspectives. While understandable given China's ownership and primary funding role, this viewpoint often leads to superficial analyses that neglect deeper examination of the initiative's multifaceted objectives. This results in a profusion of research that, despite focusing on the BRI, fails to adequately unpack its core aims and motivations.49 Beyond a solely China-centric lens, research on the (BRI) must delve deeper into regional variations, local-level impacts, and the complex interplay of international political and economic forces driving participation. Prioritizing the viewpoints of (BRI) partner countries is crucial for a more comprehensive understanding than can be achieved solely through analysis of Chinese perspectives. 8. Conclusion This study critically engages with the (BRI) research landscape with two guiding objectives. First, it systematically appraises existing scholarship, identifying gaps and limitations in current understanding. Second, it seeks to shape future (BRI) research by proposing avenues for more impactful and fruitful investigations. Through a comprehensive review of (BRI) related topics and analyses, the study reveals key shortcomings in current research including overreliance on China-centric perspectives, neglecting diverse viewpoints and local-level impacts. Surface analyses of (BRI) objectives and motivations, often overlooking complex political and economic driving forces. Inadequate exploration of implementation challenges and project outcomes across various regions and sectors. Limited engagement with translation issues, hindering accurate understanding of (BRI) dynamics in non-Western contexts. To address these limitations, the study proposes specific interventions for future research including prioritizing diverse perspectives of (BRI) partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, conducting in-depth case studies and comparative analyses through investigating implementation intricacies and project impacts across different contexts and leveraging translation as a research tool via employing multilingual approaches to gain deeper insights and overcome cultural biases. By actively addressing these critical gaps and adopting more nuanced research strategies, this study aims to significantly enhance the field of (BRI) scholarship and guide future investigations towards a more comprehensive and impactful understanding of this complex global initiative. This study's critical engagement with (BRI) scholarship holds profound implications for policymakers. By unveiling significant limitations in existing research, it demonstrates that overreliance on specific perspectives, superficial analyses of objectives, and inadequate exploration of implementation and impacts can mislead judgments. Decision-makers and policy analysts must therefore exercise caution when navigating the BRI research landscape. To avoid misinterpreting progress, political and economic ramifications, domestic/foreign influences, and broader implications, they should prioritize access to high-quality studies that address the identified shortcomings, critically evaluate all research: consider methodological rigor, bias, and the limitations outlined in this study and seek diverse perspectives: consider research beyond dominant viewpoints to gain a more comprehensive understanding. These steps are crucial for ensuring sound policy decisions informed by reliable and nuanced BRI scholarship. Similar caution applies to entrepreneurs engaging with BRI projects. Basing business, investment, and operational choices solely on analyses prone to the identified drawbacks can be reckless. They should either utilize analyses conducted with rigorous methodologies and awareness of existing research limitations or fully acknowledge the limitations of available research and factor them into their decision-making. By adopting these measures, entrepreneurs can mitigate potential risks and navigate BRI opportunities with greater prudence. For researchers and scholars, this study presents both challenges and opportunities. While the identified gaps indicate the need for considerable future research efforts, they also unlock exciting avenues for investigation. Scholars can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the BRI by conducting in-depth case studies that explore implementation intricacies and project impacts across diverse contexts, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, unpacking the interplay of domestic, regional, and global factors, prioritizing diverse perspectives, incorporating voices of partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars and addressing the limitations unveiled in this study is imperative for all stakeholders. Through rigorous and comprehensive research, we can navigate the complexities of the BRI with greater informedness and foresight, ultimately leading to more effective policymaking, informed entrepreneurial decisions, and a deeper scholarly understanding of this global initiative. Despite its continued, albeit bumpy, trajectory, the (BRI) faces growing research challenges that mirror its own complexities. A burgeoning volume of publications, propelled by an expanding pool of publishers, editors, and scholars, often overlooks methodological rigor and critical depth. Consequently, the full potential of BRI research remains unrealized. To unlock its true value, a shift towards more focused and nuanced investigations is imperative. This necessitates bolstering the infrastructure underpinning social science analysis through deeper engagement with diverse perspectives to incorporate voices from partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars beyond dominant viewpoints. Next, strengthened data collection and analysis which could employ rigorous methodologies and ensuring comprehensive project-level data across various regions. Additionally, enhanced communication and collaboration to foster interdisciplinary dialogue and knowledge sharing among analysts studying different BRI facets. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Iran, like other parties, was taken aback by the Hamas attack on 7/10/2023 in the Gaza Strip (GS) envelope. This occurred at a critical juncture for Iran, as it had recently finalized a prisoner exchange agreement with the United States (US), unlocking $6 billion of its frozen oil revenues in South Korea just two months prior. The attack coincided with Iran’s efforts to ease tensions in regional relations, exemplified by its landmark agreement with Saudi Arabia on 10/3/2024. This analysis delves into Iran’s response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood, examining the factors influencing its stance and actions. First: Determinants of the Iranian Position Iran has consistently backed the resistance since the war’s onset. However, its stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was marked by meticulous calculations and intricate balancing acts, aiming to safeguard and fortify gains while averting potential adverse repercussions. Key factors shaping Iran’s approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood include: 1. Reiterating the pivotal role of Palestine in Iranian foreign policy, particularly in supporting Palestinian resistance and rejecting recognition of the Israeli regime. 2. Geopolitical considerations and Iran’s aspiration to bolster its regional presence and influence as a pivotal force, safeguarding significant gains achieved in preceding years. 3. Iran aims to uphold its strategic alliances with affiliated forces and movements in the region, particularly those aligned with the resistance front. This entails bolstering the strength and influence of these movements while ensuring their continued relevance in the regional landscape. 4. Iran seeks to fortify its regional deterrence capabilities, with a specific focus on managing relations with Israel. Accumulating strength is regarded as a pivotal Iranian strategic imperative in this regard. 5. Iran’s desire to steer clear of entanglement in a widespread regional conflict or direct confrontation with the US is evident. The swift dispatch of US warships to the region serves as a clear message aimed at dissuading Iran from direct participation in the standoff. 6. The challenges confronting the Iranian economy amidst ongoing international sanctions, soaring inflation rates and the depreciation of the Iranian currency. 7. Iran’s immediate focus on de-escalation with the US and European countries, alongside sustained engagement with influential regional stakeholders. Second: Aspects of Iran’s Position The key aspects of the Iranian stance regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood are as follows: 1. From the outset, Iran has been eager to disassociate itself from the October 7 attack orchestrated by Hamas. It has stressed that the operation was an independent decision made by Palestinian resistance factions based on their own assessments and considerations. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly refuted any Iranian involvement, a position reaffirmed by the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (UN). This denial was also echoed by the US administration, with President Joe Biden telling 60 Minutes in an interview, on 15/10/2023, that “there is no clear evidence” implicating Iran in the Hamas attack. 2. The Iranian leadership across all branches (including the Supreme Leader, the Presidency, the government, the military, the Revolutionary Guards, legislative bodies and the media…) has provided robust political backing to the Resistance. They have hosted prominent delegations from Hamas and resistance factions, notably welcoming Isma‘il Haniyyah, the leader of Hamas, on two occasions. Iran has consistently adopted and defended the resistance and its objectives in both regional and international forums. 3. Iran has maintained its military and financial backing for the resistance as part of its longstanding policy, although specific details regarding the magnitude of this support and its delivery methods remain unclear. 4. While denying direct involvement in the October 7th attack, Iran has lauded the operation and reiterated its solidarity with the Palestinian resistance. This support was evident during Operation al-Aqsa Flood and in response to Israeli aggression in Gaza, where Iran endorsed the political and on-the-ground strategies pursued by the Palestinian resistance in managing the war. 5. Since the outset of the war, Iran has demonstrated a clear intention to swiftly conclude hostilities and secure a lasting ceasefire. Iranian diplomacy, spearheaded by Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, has diligently pursued this goal. 6. Despite its reluctance to engage directly in the war theater and to avert escalation into a broader regional conflict, Iran has encouraged its allied forces in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq to actively support the Palestinian resistance, tailoring its involvement to the specific circumstances of each theater. It is evident that Iran has played a significant yet undisclosed role in coordinating actions across the various theaters of the conflict. 7. When faced with the Israeli airstrike on its consulate in Damascus on 1/4/2024, Iran responded with meticulous caution and strategic calculations. Ensuring its retaliation on 13/4/2024 conveyed a powerful deterrent message to Israel. It carefully avoided escalating the conflict into a broader confrontation, when it intentionally announced its response beforehand, allowing Israel and its allies ample time to prepare for the launched rockets and drones. Furthermore, Iran selectively targeted military installations, refraining from unveiling any new strategic weaponry. According to Israeli military officials, “In the attack, 185 drones, 36 cruise missiles and 110 surface-to-surface missiles were fired toward Israel,” The New York Times newspaper reported. Regardless of the precise accuracy of these figures, the response was significant and expansive, serving as a demonstration of force and a bolstering of Iran’s regional standing. The objective seemed more focused on asserting deterrence rather than inflicting substantial damage. Following the Israeli response on 19/4/2024, which was notably restrained and targeted select Iranian sites without an official declaration, Iran demonstrated a commitment to crisis containment and a desire to prevent further escalation. 8. In terms of popular interaction, the Iranian street witnessed a wide mass movement in support of the resistance and the Palestinians in GS, similar to the ongoing state of popular sympathy in the Arab and Muslim world. Third: Ramifications and Projections: Iran’s stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood has yielded both positive and negative repercussions, among the most significant being: 1. A resurgence of tension in Iranian-Western relations ensued, evidenced by the US House of Representatives’ decision on 30/11/2023 to reinstate the freeze on the $6 billion previously lifted on 10/8/2023 and deposited into Qatari banks, before being accessed by Iran. Subsequent to Iran’s assault on Israel on 13/4/2024, the US, along with several European countries, imposed additional sanctions on Iran. 2. Iran’s reputation and standing suffered a blow due to its reserved and cautious stance at the onset of the conflict. This approach failed to meet the expectations of Palestinian, Arab and Islamic public, given the promises and positions expressed in previous years. Many within these circles perceived Iran’s response as falling short during a critical moment when robust support, beyond mere political and media endorsements, was direly needed. However, Iran’s image and status experienced a notable enhancement following Hizbullah’s significant involvement on the northern front during the months of the confrontation. Additionally, the escalating role of the Yemeni Ansar Allah group in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, particularly in actions against Israeli shipping and vessels bound for Israeli ports, further contributed to this improvement. Moreover, the participation of the Iraqi resistance also played a role in bolstering Iran’s reputation and standing. In a late March 2024 Jordanian elite opinion poll, it was revealed that Iran’s reputation and influence in the Arab world saw a 42% increase due to its stance on the GS war. Additionally, 45% of respondents stated that Iran and its allies’ position contributed to the reduction of sectarian divisions in the region. 3. Iran successfully navigated the initial challenge of applying the slogan of Unity of the Arenas among the parties within the Axis of Resistance. The increased involvement of its allied forces in the conflict marks a tangible step forward, offering potential for further advancement in realizing the slogan. 4. The conflict has significantly impacted Israel’s strategic standing in the region, tarnishing its reputation as a regional stabilizer and a bastion of Western influence. It has also hindered progress in normalization efforts and fueled increased backing from Arab, Muslim and international public for Hamas and the resistance factions. This dynamic bolsters Iran’s political stance, particularly given the perceived inadequacy of Arab official interaction with the resistance and responses to the brutal Israeli aggression on GS. *** In the forthcoming period, Iran is expected to persist in navigating a cautious and balanced strategy concerning Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Palestine issue. Within this framework, Iran aims to bolster its backing for the Palestinian resistance and its regional footprint while sustaining a trend of improved relations across the region. Additionally, Iran is likely to pursue efforts to defuse tensions in its dealings with the US and Western nations. Political Insights: A periodic series that provides brief and condensed political analyses and position assessments, issued by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of World & New World Journal.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Increasing geopolitical tensions and domestic political pressures have tested Fiji’s efforts to strike a balance in relations with its traditional partners and China. Its actions also illustrate that on questions of sovereignty, external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. When the Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka was sworn into power in Fiji on Christmas Eve 2022 it marked an historic moment: the beginning of a peaceful transition of power, uninterrupted by coups or civil disturbance. But international attention was preoccupied not with whether Fiji had finally ended the coup cycle, but with what the new Government’s stance would be towards China. As a recently aired documentary by the Australian television program 60 Minutes makes clear, that preoccupation has fanned claims in Western media about China as a disruptive – if not predatory – actor in Fiji and the wider region. It is little wonder that the Fijian prime minister (who is also foreign minister) has repeatedly described the Pacific as being “at the centre of geopolitical tensions.” Major powers were, in his view, seeking to “polarize the Pacific into their own camps,” compelling countries to choose sides and further militarising the region. Like a number of other Pacific island countries, Fiji has long held the position of “friends to all, enemies to none.” In the Pacific islands context, this posture has been interpreted to mean being free to choose who to partner with; and not being told by others who they can or cannot be friends with. It is a form of non-alignment that does not preclude security agreements but seeks to avoid or resist being confined to spheres of influence. As former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama declared in 2015: “We have no desire as a Pacific Small Island Developing State to be drawn into the conflicts of others.” This non-alignment principle has been qualified to some extent by the foreign policy orientation of the government of the day. During the early years of the Bainimarama era, there was a tilt towards China. This was primarily a response to the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed on the government by Western partners (including Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) after the coup of 2006, which had compelled Fiji to actively seek new friends and allies. After the return to elected government in 2014, relations were restored with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and some foreign policy equilibrium was achieved. But it was not long before the Western partners, led by Australia, began publicly asserting the existence of a Chinese strategic threat to the region. Soon thereafter, these states launched a new campaign of “strategic denial” and, inter alia, escalated their engagement with Fiji. When Bainimarama’s regime was ousted by a coalition of parties dominated by Rabuka’s People’s Alliance Party in the 2022 general election, it was expected that the new government would be less friendly towards China and realign itself more with its “traditional” Western partners. Some saw signs of such a shift in Rabuka’s cancellation of a meeting with the visiting Chinese foreign minister in April 2023, the March reinstatement of the Taiwanese mission’s name to Trade Mission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Fiji (after a 2018 downgrade), and promises of an end to Fiji’s longstanding police cooperation agreement with China. But Western optimism did not last. The diplomatic upgrade of the Taiwan Trade Office was reversed; Fiji withdrew its signature from the 51 country statement at the UN calling for an end to China’s persecution of its Uighur minority; and revised but did not terminate the policing agreement. Fiji also accepted a large Chinese grant for the construction of roads in Vanua Levu and, to great alarm among its Western partners, announced on the sidelines of APEC that China had agreed to help with port upgrades and with developing a shipbuilding industry. The Chinese government admitted that the quid pro quo for this infrastructure assistance to Fiji was that “China expects Fiji to continue providing firm support on issues concerning China’s core interests and major concerns.” The “core interests and major concerns” are the One China policy, China’s domestic sovereignty, and its rights in its territorial disputes with neighbouring states. Fiji’s governments are likely to continue to provide such support as long as there is no serious conflict with Fiji’s fundamental foreign policy interests. These include upholding the sanctity of the principles and rules embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, Fiji benefits from Chinese development assistance, and does not view China’s regional presence as strategically threatening as do its Western partners. Rabuka’s continued engagement with China has had the effect of provoking these Western partners into seeking to outbid or delegitimise Chinese initiatives, especially in the security sector where China is suspected of attempting to extend its strategic reach. But, while his government would have anticipated and welcomed the Australian offer to replace China as its partner in upgrading Fiji’s ports and shipbuilding industry, Australia’s attempt to delegitimise the policing arrangement with China by associating it with official Chinese transnational drug promotion was not appreciated. As the Fiji government’s reaction to the latter suggests, its concerns about the effects on its sovereignty of external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. That Western partners, and in particular Australia, have increasingly asserted their right to a say in regional and individual Pacific Island Countries foreign policy decisions has caused some dismay and discomfort. The Rabuka government may be attempting to maximise Fiji’s foreign policy independence, manoeuvrability, and leverage, or to strike a balance between its relations with its traditional partners and China. But it also may not yet have developed a settled foreign policy posture based on consultation and consensus within its foreign policy and security establishment. If there is some disagreement and a lack of direction and coordination, the recently initiated Foreign Policy White Paper drafting process should, if sufficiently inclusive, prove of great value. Sandra Tarte is Associate Professor and acting head, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of the South Pacific Pacific. Sandra specialises in the international politics of the Pacific Islands region with a particular interest in Fiji’s foreign policy. Nicola Baker lectures in the Diplomacy and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva. Her research interests encompass various aspects of the region’s geopolitics.