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The democratic collapse of Nicaragua has created the ideal conditions for China to consolidate a model of cooperation based on political control, trade dependence, and resource extraction. Throughout 2025, Nicaragua’s co-presidency under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has accelerated the consolidation of an authoritarian family state. Constitutional reforms in January eliminated the separation of powers, subordinating the judicial, legislative, and electoral branches to the executive, while subsequent legislation extended political terms and enabled the regime to weaponize electoral institutions against political opponents. Since 2018, the Ortega-Murillo government has imprisoned, exiled, or stripped citizenship from hundreds of critics and dismantled thousands of civil society organizations, hollowing out independent checks on power. These legal and institutional changes have transformed Nicaragua from a weakened democracy into a closed authoritarian system, heightening the risk of systematic human rights abuses and creating permissive conditions for opaque foreign economic engagement — particularly China — in strategic commercial and mineral sectors. Starting December 2021, President Ortega broke ties with Taiwan, establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, marking this “new era” by opening a Chinese embassy in Managua the same month. This decision followed weeks of the Organization of American States (OAS), United States, and European Union (EU) condemning the 2021 elections as illegitimate due to the months of repression and incarceration of 39 people, including civil society leaders and presidential candidates by President Ortega. Beijing took the opportunity to enter Managua seeking to ease the sense of intensifying international isolation for Ortega’s regime. As of 2023, Managua’s total exports to Beijing were valued at an estimated $27.3 million yet increased by almost 300 percent in 2024 to $82.1 million. Also in 2024, Beijing was the second largest exporter to Nicaragua, making up 14 percent of total imports, at $1.65 billion. Recently Beijing and Nicaragua have held over $1 billion trade deficit, acting as a lifeline of the regime’s desperate survival strategy with China as a primary benefactor. As Western pressure builds, Beijing provides capital, infrastructure, trade, and opportunities for the Ortega-Murillo regime through the commercial and mineral sector. Nicaragua has directly aided in the expansion of China’s economic development in the region and passed multiple pieces of legislation to pave a simple road for Beijing. For example, on October 30th, 2025, Nicaragua’s National Assembly unanimously passed a Special Economic Zone (ZEE) directly tying China’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively boosting influence through infrastructure and trade. The ZEE includes many perks for Beijing operations in Nicaragua, such as full exemptions from income tax, dividends, import duties for up to a decade, targeted industrial sectors for manufacturing, agroindustry, tech, and exports. The head of the ZEEs will be President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo with a renewed promise of jobs, poverty alleviation, and technology transfers. The President’s son heading the ZEEs reflects Nicaragua’s foreign policy focus on becoming a Pacific-Caribbean trade bridge. Moreover, since 2021, the Ortega-Murillo regime has quietly granted an estimated 300,000 hectares of land, or almost 2.36 percent of Nicaragua’s national territory to four PRC affiliated mining companies: Zhon Fu Development, Nicaragua XinXin Linze Mineria Group, Thomas Metal, and Brother Metal. These companies do not contain a track record in Nicaragua, connected to a known Chinese entity, or even have a website. Yet, they are conveniently tailored by the Ortega-Murillo regime as Nicaragua allows opaque shell companies with no track record to operate in critical infrastructure sectors. To aid Beijing’s mineral campaign, the Ortega-Murillo regime has been revoking concession rights and granting those same stripped mining concessions to these opaque Chinese affiliated shell entities. In 2022, the Sandinista National Assembly reformed Law 387 to allow concession transfers without public bidding, weaken social oversight mechanisms, and concentrate decision-making for the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This “reform” allows Nicaragua exclusive control over flipping ownership on mining concessions without warning. Separate from mining, Beijing has been manipulating Nicaragua’s commercial sector reliant on Chinas exports to Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaraguan merchants claim to face “unfair competition” as their sales dwindle, due to the explosion of Chinese nationals operating in the region. Chinese businesses have frozen the Nicaraguan market through selling inexpensive products easily accessed by Chinese nationals under the low-tariff agreements between Ortega-Murillo and Beijing. Reports reflect that China’s strategy is to exploit import benefits provided by the Nicaraguan government, allowing Chinese nationals to sell goods at “rock-bottom prices”. This strategy has allowed Beijing to completely undermine Nicaraguan businesses and take over the market. In May 2024, the Confidential reported Chinese businesses have slashed 70 percent of local merchant sales. Moreover, this increase of Chinese businesses by Chinese nationals directly translates to the growth of imports from the PRC, influencing a further expansion of the already tremendous trade deficit. This inability to produce goods appealing to Beijing markets will perpetuate further trends of high imports and minimal exports by Nicaragua, granting the opportunity for Beijing to fully influence the export capacity under the Ortega-Murillo regime. Nicaragua has rapidly stepped forward to ban media by prohibiting Bibles, newspapers, magazines, books, drones, and cameras from entering the country. This came without an official decree by the government but has still been enforced by immigration and customs at border crossings. Since 2018, 61 media outlets have been closed or confiscated with over 2,300 recorded violations by journalists, forcing 300 journalists into exile from Nicaragua. Globally, the world must continue to investigate and report the egregious human rights violations conducted by this family dictatorship. Their goal of alienating their civil populace to generate wealth for themselves and Beijing through illicit and shadowy economic efforts must face legal hearings to benefit the people of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s corrupted government continuing to weaken the foundations of their democratic institutions to favor Chinese ownership of commercial and industrial zones will freeze Nicaraguan exports in favor of dependence on Chinese imports.

The United States has employed different geopolitical strategies to maintain its status as a dominant power vis-à-vis rival countries such as China and to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Since his return to the White House, President Donald Trump has announced tariff increases on 60 countries, issued ultimatums to Russia to end the War in Ukraine, and recently intervened in Venezuela by capturing Nicolás Maduro. In this way, a rise in the use of hard power by the United States can be observed, aimed at forcing other countries to behave in a particular manner in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. The foreign policy process of a state is the most important means through which it formulates and implements the policies that determine its interactions with other actors in the international system. Hans Morgenthau (1949) argued that self-preservation is the primary duty of a nation; in this regard, the choice of foreign policy objectives and means is predetermined in two ways: by the goals to be pursued and by the power available to achieve them. For his part, Joseph Nye (1999) argued that a state’s interests are not revealed solely through power or security considerations, since they also include economic concerns. Thus, countries also focus on economic relations, which may entail interdependence effects among states. Consequently, both national security and economic well-being are important to states’ interests. Within this framework, it is possible to discern the geopolitical landscape that the United States is developing through its foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that they would not allow the Western Hemisphere to become a base of operations for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States. “This is our hemisphere,” he affirmed, “and President Trump will not allow our security to be threatened” (The White House, 2026). This warning, together with the National Security Strategy and the recent intervention in Venezuela, represents a new form of the Monroe Doctrine. In his address to Congress in 1823, President James Monroe articulated the United States’ policy regarding the new political order that was developing in the Americas and Europe’s role in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe administration warned the European imperial powers not to interfere in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states. In this way, it sought to increase U.S. influence and trade throughout the southern region (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Likewise, the Trump administration’s geopolitical objective is to consolidate its hemisphere of influence in the face of rival powers, primarily China. Marco Rubio indicated that it is important to secure the national interest in the region and stated: “we have seen how our adversaries are exploiting and extracting resources from Africa. They are not going to do it in the Western Hemisphere” (The White House, 2026). In addition to Latin America, the United States has sought to increase its presence in Africa to counterbalance China. China’s main foreign policy strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the aim of strengthening global connectivity through infrastructure initiatives such as roads, ports, and railways. As a result, China’s economic and political influence expanded by linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. By early 2025, more than 150 countries had joined the BRI, representing approximately 75% of the world’s population and more than half of global GDP. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported that the cumulative value of BRI investments and construction contracts has exceeded one trillion dollars across all participating countries (Ulubel, 2025). In Africa, one example of Belt and Road infrastructure is the Mombasa–Nairobi railway in Kenya, which was financed by Chinese banks under the framework of the agreements. As a result, more than 2 million passengers and around 6 million tons of goods are transported annually, allowing transportation costs to be reduced by 40%. In addition, the expansion of the line toward Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan is planned, with the aim of integrating the economies of East Africa into a common railway system (Ulubel, 2025). Figure 1 illustrates the countries that have partnered with the Belt and Road Initiative, by year of accession. The geographic areas where China is consolidating its presence can be observed, especially on the African continent. Source: Lew et al., 2021, p. 14. The Belt and Road Initiative, with the support of state-owned banks and Chinese companies, is displacing U.S. exports and challenging American firms in BRI countries. Consequently, the United States has increasingly moved closer to African countries to counter China’s influence. Recently, the House of Representatives voted to continue trade programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which protect and strengthen U.S. strategic, economic, and national security interests, including access to critical minerals found outside the country. In this way, AGOA seeks to challenge the economic coercion and exploitation of African nations by China and Russia (Ways & Means, 2026). This approach has also been pursued during the foreign policy of former President Joe Biden. In 2022, the Secretary of State of the Biden administration, Antony Blinken, launched the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which reinforced the view that African countries are geostrategic actors and key partners on urgent issues, ranging from promoting an open and stable international system to shaping the technological and economic future (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In this context, Blinken stated: “Africa is a major geopolitical force. It has shaped our past, it is shaping our present, and it will shape our future” (US Africa Media Hub, 2022). In 2022, Blinken indicated that even as President Putin’s war continues, they remained focused on the most serious and long-term challenge to the international order: the People’s Republic of China. This is because it is the only country with both the intention to reshape the international order and has the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Consequently, Blinken stated: “China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition. It is the second-largest economy, with world-class cities and public transportation networks. It is home to some of the world’s largest technological companies and seeks to dominate the technologies and industries of the future. It has rapidly modernized its military and aims to become a top tier fighting force. And it has announced its ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power” (Blinken, 2022). Consequently, the United States has sought to consolidate its bilateral relations in regions where China has a greater presence. However, U.S. power in the international system relies on the strength of the dollar. The petrodollar system helps sustain the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. In 1974, Saudi Arabia and other regional oil suppliers agreed to accept only dollars for the sale of oil in exchange for military aid and equipment from the U.S. In addition, the Saudis invested the surpluses from that production in U.S. Treasury bonds, thereby financing U.S. spending (Wong, 2016). This process, commonly called “petrodollar recycling,” is beneficial for the parties involved: oil-producing countries have a reliable destination to invest the income from their exports, while the United States ensures a source of financing to cover its fiscal deficit. Consequently, countries seeking to purchase oil must do so using U.S. dollars, which drives demand for this currency in international markets (Grant, 2018). Since that time, the oil market has been trading in dollars, increasing demand for the currency. The predominance of the dollar as the world’s reference currency gives the United States enormous geopolitical influence, with the ability to impose sanctions on countries it considers adversaries, freeze dollar-denominated assets, or exclude a country from the international financial system, paralyzing its foreign trade or complicating the import of raw materials priced in that currency, such as oil. This mechanism represents one of the foundations of U.S. power and allows it to maintain its status as a hegemonic power. However, if oil trade were to begin taking place in another currency, it would affect the dominant position of the United States. Within this framework, the United States has prevented rival countries from attempting to displace the supremacy of the dollar, such as the members of BRICS. This bloc has sought to reduce dependence on the dollar by using local currencies for trade. One example is the BRICS Pay initiative, a cross-border digital payment system being developed by the BRICS countries. This means that trade among its members could be settled directly in reais, rubles, rupees, yuan, or rand, with the system managing conversion, clearing, and settlement without routing transactions through the U.S. dollar. The initiative is part of a broader strategic effort to reduce dollar dependence, strengthen financial sovereignty, and create alternative global payment infrastructures outside systems controlled by the West (BRICS, 2026). With the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank, there has been speculation that they could launch a common currency as a strategy for de-dollarization. Given this possibility, many market operators advocate for the currency to be digital, backed by gold or other resource assets. If the project materializes, the implications for the international monetary system and financial markets would be significant (Lissovolik, 2024). The United States was aware of this possibility. When the BRICS 2025 summit was held, Trump stated that the bloc is not a serious threat, but that they are attempting to destroy the dollar so that another country could take control. “If we lose the dollar as the global standard,” he declared, “it would be like losing a great world war; we would no longer be the same country. We will not allow that to happen” (Messerly et al., 2025). Later, on his Truth Social account, he wrote: “Any country that aligns with the BRICS’ anti-American policies will receive an additional 10% tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy” (Reuters, 2025). Although there is still no BRICS currency, the United States has anticipated its potential effects. Dollar supremacy also gives the U.S. the power to sanction or economically isolate certain countries, such as Russia in 2022. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom agreed to exclude several Russian banks from the international payment messaging system SWIFT. This decision was one of the most forceful sanctions within a set of measures aimed at economically isolating Russia and, consequently, weakening its financial system, with the goal of pressuring Vladimir Putin’s government to end its military operations in Ukraine (Pérez, 2022). Therefore, Russia has conducted its commercial transactions in another currency, such as the Chinese yuan. In this context, the growing weight of the Chinese currency in financial markets could erode the primacy of the dollar, a trend that began to concern Washington. In this scenario, Venezuela announced in 2017 that the country was prepared to sell oil to China and receive payments in yuan, thus making international agreements using a currency other than the dollar (Valladares & Medina, 2017). In 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (Pdvsa) announced that PetroChina International Corp purchased one million barrels of Venezuelan crude, a transaction carried out in digital yuan through the Shanghai International Energy Exchange. In this way, a trend is marked toward abandoning the dollar as the currency for transactions in the energy market (CIIP, 2023). When the United States intervened in Venezuela this year and captured Nicolás Maduro, it was not only seeking oil but also preventing the displacement of the petrodollar system. As a result, this operation directly affects China, since part of Venezuela’s oil exports to China is used to pay debts, estimated between 10 and 12 billion dollars. The U.S. intervention endangered the flow of discounted Venezuelan oil to China’s teapot refineries and will likely affect the role of Chinese oil companies in Venezuela’s upstream business. The Trump administration has declared that all Venezuelan oil will now flow through legitimate and authorized channels, in accordance with U.S. law and national security. This strategy seeks to prevent any influence over natural resources in the region. Consequently, the U.S. president’s approach of directing all oil flows from Venezuela will negatively impact China, Venezuela’s largest oil customer and a major creditor (Downs & Palacio, 2026). However, it is not only rival countries that have been affected by the U.S. attempt to maintain its hegemony; its allies and strategic partners have also been impacted. In January 2025, Trump posted an image of the map of Canada with the U.S. flag, hinting at a possible annexation. On other occasions, Trump referred to his neighbor as the 51st state. In February of that year, the White House announced an additional 25% tariff on Canadian imports and a 10% tariff on its energy resources (The White House, 2025). As a result, Prime Minister Mark Carney negotiated trade agreements with China, allowing for a mutual reduction of tariffs (Yousif, 2026). On the other hand, Trump generated tensions within NATO when he threatened to annex Greenland by force and warned those who did not support him of increased tariffs. He later declined both measures and assured that a framework agreement had been reached (Holland & Hunnicutt, 2026). Nevertheless, the political damage was already done. Trump’s plan for territorial expansion destroyed an important post-World War II norm: that borders cannot be redrawn by force of arms. Mark Carney stated at this year’s Davos Forum that “great powers have begun using economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, and financial infrastructure as coercion.” In this way, he indicated that the world order is “in the middle of a rupture, not a transition” (World Economic Forum, 2026). Consequently, the United States, as a hegemonic power, has acted unilaterally, disregarding the rule-based world order, and has even accelerated its breakdown. Therefore, from this background, it can be concluded that the United States has developed geopolitical strategies to remain a global power vis-à-vis rival countries, primarily China. Two strategies can be discerned. First, the U.S. emphasizes national security by securing the Western Hemisphere, reviving the Monroe Doctrine. Second, economic interdependence is intensified through the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, preventing financial alternatives. Moreover, the attention the United States has directed toward Africa responds to the intention to balance China’s growing influence in the region gained through the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, it can be observed that the Trump administration has set aside soft power (attraction and persuasion) and has relied on hard power mechanisms, such as military threats to annex Greenland, ultimatums to Russia, intervention in Venezuela, and economic sanctions and tariff increases on countries that do not comply with its directives. These measures demonstrate that the United States has lost its capacity for attraction and has had to resort to threats to influence the behavior of other states. In summary, the frequent use of hard power shows that the status of the United States as the leading power has begun to decline, and it is striving to maintain its global hegemony by force, regardless of the consequences for the international order. References Blinken, A. (2022). The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ BRICS. (2026). 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RUBIO: This Is Our Hemisphere — and President Trump Will Not Allow Our Security to be Threatened. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/rubio-this-is-our-hemisphere-and-president-trump-will-not-allow-our-security-to-be-threatened/ Ulubel, Y. (2025). 12 years, over 150 countries: Inside the Belt and Road Initiative's global legacy. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202509/17/WS68ca22caa3108622abca13d4.html US Africa Media Hub. (2022). [@USAfricaMediaHub]. X. https://x.com/AfricaMediaHub/status/1604782790029049858 U.S. Department of State. (2022). Travel to Cambodia, the Philippines, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, August 2-12, 2022. U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-travel/travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda-august-2-11-2022/ Valladares, D. y Medina, J. (2017). Venezuela venderá petróleo a China en yuanes. 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Bolivia, an Andean country, historically battered by economic, social, and political tensions, has experienced one of its most decisive moments in recent decades. The victory of Rodrigo Paz, the Christian Democratic Party candidate, has brought an end to a political cycle lasting nearly 20 years, initiated by Evo Morales, which resulted in the hegemony of the Movement for Socialism (MAS). Paz's victory has not only changed Bolivia's course but also opens a new phase, signaling a clear shift to the right, a rearrangement of its international relations, and a rethinking of its foreign policy in a volatile American context. The Decline of MAS and the Rise of Paz To understand the magnitude of this change, it is necessary to look back. Since Evo Morales came to power in 2006, MAS consolidated itself as the dominant force in Bolivia, promoting a nationalist, statist agenda and strong state intervention in strategic sectors such as hydrocarbons and natural resources. Furthermore, during the MAS period, an anti-imperialist discourse marked Bolivia's foreign policy. In this tone, Bolivia aligned itself with left-wing governments in Latin America, notably Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, within the ALBA framework, and distanced itself significantly from Washington. However, after two decades in power, internal divisions and power struggles within MAS caused deep wear within the party and its supporters. Bolivia's economy faced its worst crisis in decades: a recession marked by a decline in gas production — a key source of fiscal income and exports for the country — high inflation levels, and a shortage of foreign currency that limited the functioning of the state apparatus. Faced with this scenario, and with a frustrated citizenry over economic and social management, the Bolivian electorate opted for a radical change in October 2025. Rodrigo Paz, a centrist politician with a pragmatic message, secured a surprising 54.5% of the votes in the second round, ultimately defeating rival candidate Jorge Quiroga, marking the end of almost two decades of MAS governments. Although Paz was considered a less significant candidate by polls and analysts, he comes from a more orthodox and moderate political tradition, and his rhetoric has been seemingly conciliatory toward social sectors. His father, Jaime Paz Zamora, was president of the country, and Paz has a solid political career, making him no stranger to the responsibilities of leadership. His campaign slogan, loosely translated as "capitalism for all," aimed to inspire some economic openness while still addressing the social demands traditionally favored by MAS. A Shift to the Right... but with Nuances Although it is referred to as a “shift to the right,” Bolivia’s reality is not monolithic. It could be more accurately described as a shift toward a pragmatic center-right, seeking to balance economic openness with the protection of certain social programs. MAS was defeated not so much due to a complete rejection of its ideological proposals, but because of an economic crisis that weakened and divided its political base and its dominant discourse. This nuance is key. Paz's victory was not solely due to a traditional conservative vote but also to the mobilization of sectors disillusioned by MAS's unmet promises. In this sense, his proposal positioned itself as a hybrid fusion: a moderate economic liberalization, while maintaining a minimal social protection network. However, although MAS has become an almost irrelevant opposition — receiving very low support and reduced to a symbolic presence in the first round — Paz's new government inherits a fragmented internal political landscape, which will require negotiating alliances with various legislative blocs in order to govern. Relations with Neighbors: Rebuilding What Had Been Dismantled Bolivia's foreign policy over the past two decades was marked by its alignment with left-wing governments and regional movements such as ALBA, which included Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and other governments with anti-U.S. or at least skeptical stances toward Washington. Under Evo Morales, Bolivia strengthened ties with China, Iran, and Russia, diversifying alliances outside of the traditional Western bloc. With Paz’s victory, this framework seems to have been dismantled. The president-elect has been explicit in not inviting leaders from Cuba, Venezuela, or Nicaragua to his presidential inauguration, citing differences concerning democracy and governance. This gesture, although symbolic, signals a shift in foreign policy: moving away from pre-configured ideological positions and prioritizing relations based on democratic criteria and economic cooperation. Bolivia’s exit from the ALBA bloc and its suspension by the organization for “anti-Bolivarian and pro-imperialist behavior” reflects the diplomatic impact of this shift. Furthermore, the presence of leaders such as Javier Milei, president of Argentina, at Paz's inauguration ceremony consolidated Latin American representations more aligned with free-market economic policies and oriented toward cooperation with the United States and Europe. Another relevant factor is the relationship with traditional South American neighbors such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Although political orientation may vary regionally, there is consensus on the need to strengthen trade and cooperation in infrastructure and energy, especially considering Bolivia’s economic challenges. Paz himself mentioned that Bolivia’s “cooperation” with its “five borders” — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru — “will be essential” for his new administration. He has even already held meetings and encounters with Boric (Chile), Milei (Argentina), and Noboa (Ecuador). The Relaunch of Relations with the United States Perhaps the most symbolic and geopolitically significant element of Bolivia's new direction is the resumption of relations with the United States. Bilateral relations had been fractured since the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador in 2008 under Evo Morales’ presidency, following years of tensions over mutual accusations of interference and conspiracy. Paz's announcement to restore diplomatic ties and reopen the U.S. embassy in La Paz represents a drastic shift in approach. This reopening not only restores formal political dialogue but also opens opportunities for cooperation in trade, investment, and security — especially at a time when Bolivia faces currency problems, a fiscal deficit, and a fuel shortage. In addition, the United States and several Latin American countries issued a joint statement of support for Paz after the elections, emphasizing the willingness to collaborate in stabilizing the economy, strengthening democratic institutions, and boosting international investment. This relaunch is not without political conditions. Cooperation could focus on the fight against drug trafficking, corruption, and other transnational challenges, areas in which Washington has shown strategic interest. The involvement of agencies like the DEA and other security organizations could intensify once again. The DEA issue has been controversial, with both former presidents Evo Morales and Luis Arce expressing concerns, as they consider both the DEA and U.S. cooperation agencies to be conspirators, something the White House has always denied. The openness to cooperation with the United States may also have a tangible economic component: investment flows, access to international financing, and support for macroeconomic stabilization. Given the foreign currency crisis that has suffocated Bolivia, these relations could translate into crucial financial relief. The Stance on Venezuela and the New Regional Context Another geopolitical axis that has changed drastically with the rise of Paz is his stance on Venezuela and its political crisis. Under the MAS, Bolivia historically maintained close ties with Nicolás Maduro’s regime, aligning itself with anti-imperialist rhetoric and supporting governments considered ideological allies. However, Paz has adopted a critical stance toward the Venezuelan government, especially after recent events — including the capture of Maduro by U.S. forces in January 2026. In his public statements, the Bolivian president has emphasized that the way out for Venezuela is to "respect the vote and democracy," positioning Bolivia alongside a narrative of democracy and institutionalism that contrasts with the country’s previous alignment with Chavismo. This approach places Bolivia on the opposite side of traditional left-wing governments in the region, such as Brazil under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, or Mexico under Claudia Sheinbaum, who have condemned the U.S. military intervention in Venezuela and called for peaceful solutions based on international law. In contrast, Paz has preferred to emphasize the importance of democracy as the guiding principle of Bolivia's foreign policy. The invitation to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado to the Bolivian inauguration also underscores this renewed focus on democracy and human rights, marking a clear break with La Paz's previous political ties to Caracas. Economic Implications and Future Prospects The new Bolivian phase faces enormous economic challenges. The transition to a more market-oriented model and the opportunities to attract foreign investment offer prospects for recovery, but they are not without risks. The country is dealing with high inflation, fuel shortages, a fiscal crisis, and an urgent need for foreign currency. In this context, the opening to the United States and international markets could boost key sectors like lithium, where Bolivia holds some of the world’s largest reserves. Bolivia's mining sector could also benefit from the country's opening. Cooperation with external investors, including Americans and European allies, could transform Bolivia’s productive capacity and position it as a strategic player in the global critical minerals supply chain. In fact, recently, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) visited Bolivia, and with a message to the nation, Paz announced “[…] 7 billion dollars for infrastructure works, employment, and labor, which we need so much in Bolivia.” At the same time, Paz’s government will need to carefully manage internal tensions. Social sectors traditionally aligned with MAS may feel displaced or fear the loss of social assistance programs, posing challenges for internal cohesion — a critical issue is the elimination of fuel subsidies. On the other hand, although the legislative situation is not as complicated, the need to form legislative alliances and engage in political dialogue will be crucial to avoid institutional conflicts that could weaken his ability to implement necessary economic reforms. Conclusion Rodrigo Paz’s victory not only symbolizes the end of MAS's dominance after nearly two decades, but it also represents a profound reconfiguration of Bolivia’s political, economic, and diplomatic course. This new chapter is characterized by pragmatism focused on the economy, a shift towards strategic relations with the United States and other Western partners, and a stance based on defending democracy in the face of regional crises such as the Venezuelan one. However, this path is not without internal tensions and structural challenges that could determine whether Bolivia manages to consolidate a sustainable development model or if social and political fractures reappear on the horizon. The country's contemporary history, in this sense, continues to be written with the uncertainty of whether this pragmatic center-right experiment will be a definitive solution or a prelude to new turns in the future. From a broader geopolitical perspective, Bolivia finds itself on a new hemispheric stage where the competition between the United States and China, as well as tensions between right-wing and left-wing governments in the region, shape the agenda. Paz's election can be seen as part of a broader trend in Latin America towards governments that prioritize macroeconomic stability, diplomatic pragmatism, and international cooperation beyond rigid ideological alignments. References Buenos Aires Times. (2025, November 11). Argentina's Javier Milei to attend new Bolivia president Rodigo Paz’s inauguration. Retrieved from Buenos Aires Times: https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/argentinas-javier-milei-to-attend-new-bolivia-president-rodigo-pazs-inauguration.phtml?utm_source=chatgpt.com CiberCuba Editorial Team. (2025, October 21). The elected president of Bolivia will not invite Díaz-Canel, Maduro, or Ortega to the inauguration: “They are not democratic.”. Retrieved from CiberCuba: https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-10-21-u1-e207888-s27061-nid313318-presidente-electo-bolivia-invitara-diaz-canel-maduro?utm_source=chatgpt.com#google_vignette Flores, F. (2025, Octubre 21). Bolivia: Los desafíos del próximo gobierno de Rodrigo Paz. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/bolivia-los-desafios-del-proximo-gobierno-de-rodrigo-paz/ Guevara Condore, M., & Pimentel Huerto, R. (2025, Octubre 27). Bolivia regresó a la derecha tras casi más de 20 años gobernado por el MAS y en medio de una crisis económica. Retrieved from La República: https://larepublica.pe/mundo/2025/10/19/bolivia-regreso-a-la-derecha-luego-de-mas-de-20-anos-gobernado-por-el-mas-y-en-medio-de-una-crisis-economica-1455609?utm_source=chatgpt.com Jara, R. (2025, Octubre 16). Segunda vuelta en Bolivia: País se prepara para dar un giro a la derecha tras dos décadas de dominio izquierdista. Retrieved from emol: https://www.emol.com/noticias/Internacional/2025/10/16/1180557/bolivia-segunda-vuelta-candidatos.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com Orlando Peralta, J. (2025, Noviembre 13). De lo ideológico a lo pragmático: se mueve el péndulo en Bolivia. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/de-lo-ideologico-a-lo-pragmatico-se-mueve-el-pendulo-en-bolivia/ Romero Ballivian, S. (2025, Noviembre 24). Fin de ciclo: el MAS cede el poder tras veinte años de hegemonía en Bolivia. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/fin-de-ciclo-el-mas-cede-el-poder-tras-veinte-anos-de-hegemonia-en-bolivia/ RTVE.es. (2025, Noviembre 09). Estados Unidos restablecerá las relaciones con Bolivia a nivel de embajadores, interrumpidas hace 17 años. Retrieved from RTVE.es: https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20251108/estados-unidos-restablecera-relaciones-con-bolivia-a-nivel-embajadores-interrumpidas-hace-17-anos/16807541.shtml#:~:text=Estados%20Unidos%20restablecer%C3%A1%20las%20relaciones%20a%20nivel%20de%20embajadores%20con,emb Stabroek News. (2025, October 20). Centrist Rodrigo Paz wins Bolivian presidency, ending nearly 20 years of leftist rule. Retrieved from Stabroek News: https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/10/20/news/regional/centrist-rodrigo-paz-wins-bolivian-presidency-ending-nearly-20-years-of-leftist-rule/?utm_source=chatgpt.com urgente.bo. (2026, Enero 03). Bolivia expresa respaldo a Venezuela en medio de ataques de EE.UU. Retrieved from urgente.bo: https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/bolivia-expresa-respaldo-venezuela-en-medio-de-ataques-de-eeuu urgente.bo. (2026, Enero 12). Rodrigo Paz recibe la visita más importante; el Presidente del BID trae respaldo financiero. Retrieved from urgente.bo: https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/rodrigo-paz-recibe-la-visita-m%C3%A1s-importante-el-presidente-del-bid-trae-respaldo-financiero Velasco-Guachalla, X., & Hummel, C. (2025, October). Why Bolivia Voted for Change—And Continuity. Retrieved from Journal of Democracy: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-bolivia-voted-for-change-and-continuity/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Visión 360. (2026, Enero 03). Bolvia apoya la ruta iniciada en Venezuela "para recuperar la democracia". Retrieved from Visión 360: https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/01/03/37852-bolivia-apoya-la-ruta-iniciada-en-venezuela-para-recuperar-la-democracia

In Part I of this article, a brief historical overview was presented, spanning from the Venezuelan presidential crisis of 2019 to the tensions in the Caribbean — between the United States and Venezuela — and the total economic blockade imposed on Venezuela. The article also left several questions open, which, considering recent events, have now been resolved, although at the same time new ones have emerged. U.S. Operation in Venezuela and the Capture of Maduro The situation between the United States and Venezuela ended in 2025 with a total U.S. economic blockade and the “seizure” of a Venezuelan oil tanker. However, the situation changed dramatically when, on January 3, 2026, Nicolás Maduro was captured in Caracas by U.S. forces. Preceded by threats and sustained military and economic pressure on Venezuela, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, carried out an operation to capture and remove Maduro and his wife from Venezuela. The operation was surgical — lasting approximately two hours — and although successful, it also resulted in human losses (80 fatalities according to The New York Times — an unofficial figure — including 32 Cuban combatants confirmed by Havana) and damage to military infrastructure in Caracas, as well as in Miranda, Aragua, and La Guaira. As was already known, the U.S. government had classified Maduro as a member or leader of the Cartel of the Suns. In addition, a reward of $50,000 had been offered for his capture, and since 2020 the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York had charged Maduro with drug trafficking and conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. In this context, Maduro’s capture was followed by his transfer to New York, where he will face trial. Venezuela: an uncertain present? Following Maduro’s detention, Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume the role of head of state due to Maduro’s “temporary” absence. After the U.S. attacks, Rodríguez spoke out strongly against what she called “foreign aggression,” describing Maduro’s capture as an “illegal and illegitimate kidnapping.” However, after being sworn in, she softened the tone of her statements and even invited the Trump administration to “work jointly on an agenda of cooperation, aimed at shared development, within the framework of international legality and to strengthen a lasting community coexistence.” Rodríguez likewise emphasized the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. All of this stems from the imperialist rhetoric of Trump and Rubio. Trump made it very clear that he will “govern” Venezuela “until we can achieve a safe, appropriate, and prudent transition.” Everything indicates that, although under the threat of “doing the right thing,” Trump plans to give Rodríguez an opportunity; if it does not work or if she fails to meet Trump’s expectations, the United States will intervene again. On the other hand, both Edmundo González — who on January 4 released a video declaring himself the “president of Venezuela” and calling for a “peaceful and clear” transition — and María Corina Machado have been practically sidelined by the U.S. government, citing a lack of internal support, referring to the fact that those who support them are “outside” Venezuela. On the social front, reactions have been mixed, ranging from celebrations over Maduro’s capture to demonstrations against U.S. interventionism. The current situation is very delicate: with Rodríguez’s appointment and no clear short-term roadmap — plus the threat of U.S. intervention and interference — and the snubbing of the opposition, Venezuela’s social reality appears not to have changed, nor is it likely to change much in the near future. However, Rodríguez’s stance — her invitation to the United States to work together, albeit under threat, practically placing oil and resources on a silver platter — could become the social fuel capable of generating real change in Venezuela in the near future. International reactions The events in Venezuela took many by surprise, and international reactions were quick to follow. South Africa issued a press release stating that the actions of the United States constituted “a violation of the United Nations Charter,” and called on the UN Security Council to urgently address the situation. Indonesia also underscored the importance of “respect for international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.” Similar statements were issued by Japan, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, New Zealand, and Australia. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise emphasized the violation of “Venezuelan sovereignty and the threat posed to peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.” It also called for the release of Maduro and his wife. With a stronger tone, Iran condemned the U.S. attacks and likewise appealed to the United Nations. In a very similar vein, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the U.S. attack, denouncing acts of U.S. hegemony and calling on the international community to recognize the “catastrophic” situation in Venezuela and to denounce the United States’ “habitual acts of violating the sovereignty of other countries.” On the other hand, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar, posted on X: “Israel praises the United States operation, led by President Trump. […] Israel stands with the freedom-loving Venezuelan people, who have suffered under Maduro’s illegal tyranny. Israel celebrates the removal of the dictator […].” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel supported the actions of the United States in Venezuela. In Europe, most countries supported the decision behind the actions of the United States, underscoring the illegitimacy of Maduro’s government and the importance of de-escalation and dialogue, always within the framework of international law. When asked about Maduro, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded that the United States “knows what to do now,” referring to dictators. Other countries such as Norway, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain also expanded their criticism of the U.S. military operation, arguing that it was not in accordance with international law. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Belarus and Russia, in varying tones, condemned the U.S. attacks, describing them as “direct threats” to international peace and security. For his part, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico strongly criticized U.S. actions and the UN, emphasizing that “international law is not applied, military force is used without the consent of the UN Security Council, and whoever is big and powerful will do whatever serves their interests…” In the Americas, Mexico condemned and rejected the U.S. military intervention and urged the United States to adhere to international law. Honduras did the same, describing the capture of Maduro as an act of kidnapping. Cuba condemned the “criminal act,” calling it “state terrorism against the brave Venezuelan people and against our America.” Nicaragua also condemned the U.S. intervention and expressed its support for Delcy Rodríguez. Argentine President Javier Milei posted, “Freedom advances, long live freedom, damn it!” celebrating the capture of Maduro and his wife. In Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz also referred to freedom, stating that “the only way out for Venezuela is respect for the vote.” Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa stated that “for all narco-Chavista criminals, their time has come. Their structure on the continent will completely collapse.” Paraguay and Peru also celebrated Maduro’s removal. In contrast, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva condemned the attacks and Maduro’s capture, describing them as “very serious […] and extremely dangerous as precedents for the international community.” Chilean President Gabriel Boric also criticized the attacks and called for a peaceful resolution under international law, while President-elect Antonio Kast said that Maduro’s capture “is good news for the region.” Colombian President Gustavo Petro also rejected the “aggression against the sovereignty of Venezuela and Latin America,” while calling for a meeting at the UN and the OAS. Finally, Uruguay’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and called for respect for the UN Charter. The UN, the OAS, and the EU also issued statements, using more cautious rhetoric and emphasizing respect for international law. The Don-roe Doctrine and the future of Venezuela In Part I of the article, Venezuela’s significance in terms of oil, biodiversity, water resources, rare earths, and more was presented. Based on this, and as mentioned earlier, the attack on alleged drug boats and the fight against drug trafficking became a pretext to promote the new Donald Trump–Monroe Doctrine, the “Don-roe Doctrine / Monroe Doctrine 2.0.” In December 2025, the United States published its new National Security Strategy, which emphasizes and promotes the United States as the sole actor or hegemon in the Americas, making any foreign presence outside of the United States unwelcome. The results of the application of this doctrine were immediate — and there is more. It is not only Venezuela: the Trump administration — particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio — has already set its sights on Cuba, in addition to repeatedly raising the possibility of carrying out military activities against drug trafficking in Mexico and Colombia, and more recently, engaging in a dispute with Denmark over strategically important Greenland. Discussion The implications for Venezuela stemming from these events are profound. First, there is a crisis of legitimacy: although Delcy Rodríguez has assumed the presidency, Edmundo González has also raised his voice, leading to both internal and external questioning. Likewise, there are institutional challenges. In the end, only the head of the regime was removed; Maduro’s inner circle remains in power. Therefore, regardless of the change at the top, a transition toward a more democratic or stable system appears distant given the current conditions. This is independent of the existing social discontent — once again, the regime retains control, making a drastic change unlikely in the near term. Regarding the U.S. side, the Trump administration has been clear — and consistent with its foreign policy — in always prioritizing its national interests over those of any other country. The example is clear: by acting unilaterally and without adherence to international law, the United States has once again undermined the sovereignty of a state. The U.S. government could justify its actions in legal terms — Maduro is accused in the United States of drug trafficking and conspiracy — on health and security grounds — the Venezuelan regime facilitates drug trafficking into the United States — or even on geopolitical grounds — weakening an administration perceived as allied with rival powers and holding interests contrary to those of the United States. However, the validity of these arguments must be examined. Moreover, as Robert Fico pointed out, there was an absence of authorization from the UN Security Council or even from the U.S. Congress itself, which, for experts in the field, renders the operation legally unlawful. Ultimately, the debate remains open. Countries’ positions are divided, and, more importantly, this could become a dangerous precedent for national sovereignty and for the conduct of great powers toward independent states. There are also the potential consequences for the region: the act alters the balance of power in Latin America and redefines the narrative surrounding U.S. influence in the region. On the other hand, there is oil and what its control represents as a long-term strategic factor. Finally, there is the global tension over control and influence in regions — one in which Russia and China are far from pleased. Finally, Fico’s statements and the following quote from Mexican lawyer José Mario de la Garza are worth analyzing in order to understand the importance of international law and why we must live in a rules-based world — even if several reforms may be needed to improve it: “Overthrowing a dictator sounds morally right. No one mourns a tyrant. But international law was not built to protect the good, but to restrain the powerful. That is why it prohibits the use of force almost without exception: not because it ignores justice, but because it knows that if every country decides whom to ‘liberate’ at gunpoint, the world returns to the law of the strongest.” References @josemariodelagarza. (04 de January de 2026). @josemariodelagarza. Obtenido de Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/DTDmcSNgPmK/?hl=en&img_index=1 Caro, I. (05 de January de 2026). "Vengo con dolor, pero también con honor": Delcy Rodríguez juramenta como presidenta encargada de Venezuela tras la captura de Maduro. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cd9exjjkvw8o Holcman, T. (05 de January de 2026). Maduro's rival in Venezuelan elections demands presidency, 'freedom to all political prisoners'. Obtenido de The Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/international/article-882323 Lozano, D. (05 de January de 2026). Delcy Rodríguez jura como presidenta de Venezuela "por Maduro y por Chávez". Obtenido de El Mundo: https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2026/01/05/695be102fc6c8323518b45a0.html Muggah, R. (03 de January de 2026). 5 scenarios for a post-Maduro Venezuela — and what they could signal to the wider region. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/5-scenarios-for-a-post-maduro-venezuela-and-what-they-could-signal-to-the-wider-region-272675 Página 12. (06 de Enero de 2026). Aseguran que son más de 80 los muertos tras el ataque de Estados Unidos a Venezuela. 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In a 2025 marked by punitive polls, fragmented systems, and democracies under pressure, Latin America confirmed that voting remains an instrument of change, but no longer a guarantee of stability or democratic strengthening. The year ends with a powerful image: a president, a president-elect, and a defeated candidate — with radically different ideas and political visions — showing respect for electoral results, the electoral authority, and one another in Chile. An act that should be ordinary in any democracy became something almost revolutionary. It may seem like a mere formality, but it is not. In a Latin America divided by hate speech and polarized politics, these gestures of institutional courtesy and democratic normality make a difference. An intense electoral cycle shaped 2025. Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras held presidential elections that, in one way or another, redefined the regional political landscape. These were accompanied by numerous legislative elections, local contests, and referendums. Mexico, meanwhile, experimented with the unprecedented popular election of judges and magistrates, a reform meant to democratize the justice system but which, in practice, represented setbacks in electoral governance conditions that once seemed resolved. Holding elections that meet integrity standards is no minor matter at a time when the region is undergoing processes of democratic erosion. The quality of these elections determines whether alternation in power is possible, whether democracy can persist, resist, and remain resilient when facing multiple challenges such as political-criminal violence, citizen fatigue, institutional co-optation, affective polarization, and ideological radicalization. The ballot speaks: five regional patterns An assessment of the 2025 elections reveals five patterns that transcend national borders and illustrate key features of today’s regional political dynamics. First: protest voting has consolidated. From the overwhelming victory of the far right over the left in Chile on December 14 — when José Antonio Kast won 58% of the vote — to President Daniel Noboa’s failed referendum in Ecuador, the dramatic collapse of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, and the governing Libre party’s third-place finish in Honduras, the message has been consistent: voters punish those in power, regardless of ideology. In Bolivia, MAS suffered a dramatic defeat after nearly two decades of dominance. The party of Evo Morales and Luis Arce, which won 75 of 130 seats in 2020, was reduced to just two in the August elections. For the first time, Bolivia held a presidential runoff on October 19, where Rodrigo Paz of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won with 54.5% of the vote. In Honduras, the ruling party’s candidate, Rixi Moncada, placed third, while conservative candidate Nasry “Tito” Asfura of the National Party became president-elect following a highly contentious race marked by external intervention, numerous episodes of political violence, and 24 days of uncertainty before results were finalized. Noboa suffered a devastating defeat in the November 16 referendum: “No” prevailed on all four questions, including rejecting the authorization of foreign military bases (60% voted NO) and rejecting the call for a Constituent Assembly (61% NO). This outcome surprised many, as it came just seven months after Noboa won the presidency with 55.6% of the vote. Interpretations are still developing, but it suggests that citizens are unwilling to grant “blank checks” to their leaders. Second: pragmatism is replacing ideology. Paz’s centrist message of “capitalism for all” in Bolivia, Noboa’s security-focused campaign in Ecuador, and the rejection of ruling parties across the region show that many Latin American voters in 2025 are moving beyond ideological alignment. Voters seem less interested in long-term transformative projects and more in immediate responses to pressing problems: insecurity, economic crises, and corruption. This trend has benefited conservative forces. In Chile, a far-right candidate — openly nostalgic for Pinochet — won for the first time, promising drastic public spending cuts, tough “law and order” policies, opposition to abortion and marriage equality, and aggressive measures against crime and irregular migration. Kast’s victory adds to right-wing governments like Javier Milei in Argentina, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Santiago Peña in Paraguay, and Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic. This new “blue wave” shapes the current political map, though with different tones and levels of radicalization. Third: party fragmentation, divided governments, and minority presidencies. Except in Ecuador, where polarization between correísmo and anticorreísmo shaped both the April presidential election and the November referendum, other countries experienced deep fragmentation. In Bolivia, seven competitive presidential candidacies contended in the first round. In Honduras, three candidates fiercely competed in one of the country’s most tightly contested elections. High fragmentation often produces minority presidents and divided governments. This year, Bolivia and Ecuador joined Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, where presidents govern with weak congressional support. By contrast, two countries have extremely powerful presidents with unified governments: Mexico and El Salvador, where ruling parties hold supermajorities capable of passing constitutional reforms without negotiating with the opposition. Fourth: the hollowing of the political center and the crisis of moderate parties and leaderships. As previously argued with María Esperanza Casullo, “center-and-something” parties (center-left and center-right) have long struggled to attract votes from the middle. Moderate politics seems to lack electoral appeal in Latin America. This declining representative capacity of the political center has created a vacuum often filled by outsiders or new parties claiming to embody fresh demands and alternatives from the margins. This vacuum feeds polarization strategies. Fifth: institutional credibility crisis. With the exception of Chile — where results were announced two hours after polls closed and immediately accepted — electoral processes in Honduras and Ecuador faced serious challenges from political actors who refused to recognize the results. In Ecuador, after the April runoff, Luisa González of the Citizens’ Revolution questioned transparency. In Bolivia, accusations of irregularities persisted throughout the August elections. In Honduras, more than two weeks after the November 30 vote, the presidential result remained undefined. Trust in electoral institutions — the cornerstone of democracy — shows troubling cracks that deepened throughout 2025. Many countries now face governance crises alongside fragmented systems, hate speech, interpersonal and institutional distrust, and extreme polarization. Three lessons for the future This electoral year leaves lessons that will shape regional politics in coming years. First: political-criminal violence conditions democracy. Several elections took place amid criminal violence. Honduras recorded six politically motivated homicides during the campaign, four targeting candidates from the ruling Libre party. The NGO Cristosal documented 67 political violence incidents between September 2024 and November 2025, including assassinations, attacks, threats, and harassment. Ecuador held its referendum under a State of Emergency due to “internal armed conflict,” declared in response to escalating drug-related violence and loss of state control over prisons. Mexico continues to hold elections in violent contexts, particularly at the local level. The “Voting Between Bullets” project by Data Cívica and México Evalúa has documented rising political-criminal violence since 2018, with 2024 being the most violent year yet, especially locally. Second: external influence is redefining electoral sovereignty. U.S. involvement in the Honduran presidential election, as well as in Argentina’s legislative elections weeks earlier, raised alarms about political autonomy in the region. In Ecuador, Noboa actively sought to establish U.S. military bases, a proposal rejected by 60% of voters. This level of foreign intervention — openly supporting candidates, conditioning economic aid, pressuring electoral decisions, or warning of retaliation — sets a dangerous precedent that reshapes the regional political game. External actors become potential “balancers” of competition, creating tilted playing fields. Third: polarization can demobilize voters. Ecuador showed that even amid extreme polarization, voter mobilization is not guaranteed. The moderate vote, which could have tipped the balance in the referendum, simply vanished or dissolved between the two radical positions. This suggests polarization may demobilize sectors that feel unrepresented by either extreme, paradoxically weakening democratic participation. Democracies at risk Despite difficulties, elections are still being held with reasonable levels of integrity. Power alternation occurred in several countries. Most losing candidates — even reluctantly — accepted results. This shows that electoral institutions still retain some strength. However, democratic erosion comes not from the absence of elections, but from those elected through them. It arises from leaders who challenge democracy’s pluralistic foundations. Today’s central dispute is over what “true democracy” means: a system prioritizing rights and institutional checks, or one concentrating power in the name of the “popular will.” This debate cuts across countries as different as Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico. In 2025, Latin American democracies faced multiple threats: low institutional trust, persistent violence, co-opted electoral authorities, vulnerability to external actors, and illiberal governments fostering polarization. Protest voting was one of the year’s most visible patterns, but part of something broader: extreme electoral volatility, where citizens reject governments of any ideology in search of immediate solutions. The challenge for 2026 — when countries like Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil (municipal elections) head to the polls — will be to safeguard electoral autonomy and professionalism, strengthen pluralism, depolarize public life, limit external interference, and continue reinforcing democratic institutions without yielding to narratives that promise order at the expense of hard-won rights.

China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. On December 10, 2025, US forces seized the oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela, carrying over a million barrels of crude. “Well, we keep [the oil],” President Trump told reporters. Venezuela’s foreign ministry called it “blatant theft and an act of international piracy,” adding: “The true reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been revealed. It has always been about our natural wealth, our oil.” That same day, on the other side of the world, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (the first since 2016) outlining a vision of partnership “without attaching any political conditions.” The timing captures the choice now facing Latin America. Two documents released within a week — Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 5 and China’s policy paper five days later — lay bare fundamentally different approaches to the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine returns Trump’s NSS makes no pretense of diplomatic subtlety. It declares a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting US opposition to “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in the hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere is now America’s “highest priority”, with three threats requiring military response: migration, drugs, and China. Countries seeking US assistance must demonstrate they are “winding down adversarial outside influence” — a demand that Latin American nations cut ties with Beijing. The strategy promises “targeted deployments” and “the use of lethal force” against cartels. It states that Washington will “reward and encourage the region’s governments … aligned with our principles and strategies.” Unsurprisingly, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rushed to congratulate Chile’s Trump-inspired extreme right wing candidate José Antonio Kast, who won the presidency with 58% of the vote (the most right-wing leader since Pinochet). The tanker seizure shows what this doctrine looks like in practice. Since September, US strikes on boats have killed 95 people. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group patrols the Caribbean. As Colombian President Gustavo Petro observed, Trump is “not thinking about the democratization of Venezuela, let alone the narco-trafficking” — only oil. After declaring that a new phase of attacks could include “land strikes on Venezuela”, Trump threatened the Colombian president that “he’ll be next” as well as invasion of Mexico. China’s alternative China’s policy paper operates from an entirely different premise. Opening by identifying China as “a developing country and member of the Global South,” it positions the relationship as South-South cooperation and solidarity rather than great power competition. The document proposes five programs: Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace, and People-to-People Connectivity. What distinguishes this paper from its 2008 and 2016 predecessors is its explicit call for “local currency pricing and settlement’ in energy trade to “reduce the impact of external economic and financial risks” — new language directly addressing the weaponization of the dollar. This trend has been underway, as highlighted by the R$157 billion (USD 28 billion) currency swap agreement between Brazil and China, signed during Brazilian president Lula’s visit to the Asian country in May this year. China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. And it contains a line clearly responding to Washington’s pressure: “The China-LAC relationship does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party.” The historical pattern Of course, the focus on the “China threat” to “US pre-eminence” in the region is not new. In August 1961, progressive Brazilian Vice President João Goulart visited China, the first high-ranking Latin American official to do so after the Chinese Revolution. At a mass rally in Beijing, he declared that China showed “how a people, looked down upon by others for past centuries, can emancipate themselves from the yoke of their exploiters.” The US response was swift. American media constructed a narrative linking Brazilian agrarian reform movements to a “communist threat from China.” On April 1, 1964 (less than three years after Goulart’s visit) a US-backed military coup overthrew him. Twenty-one years of dictatorship followed. The playbook remains the same. In the 1960s, the pretext was “communist threat”; today it’s “China threat.” And what’s at stake is Latin American sovereignty. What makes this moment different is economic weight. China-LAC trade reached a record US$518.47 billion in 2024, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. China’s share of trade with Mercosur countries has grown from 2% to 24% since 2000. At the May 2025 CELAC-China Forum, Xi Jinping announced a USD 9 billion investment credit line. In 1964, Latin America had few alternatives. Today, China presents another option. The question before the Latin American people The right-wing surge across the continent is undeniable — Kast in Chile, Milei in Argentina, the end of MAS rule in Bolivia. These victories reflect the limitations of progressive governments when addressing crime, migration, and economic stagnation. But they also reflect how US-generated crises become the terrain on which the right wins. The question is whether Latin American governments (including right-wing ones) want to be subordinates in what Trump’s strategy calls an “American-led world.” Even Western liberal analysts are alarmed. Brookings describes the NSS as “essentially assert[ing] a neo-imperialist presence in the region.” Chatham House notes that Trump uses “coercion instead of negotiation”, contrasted with China, “which has been providing investment and credit … without imposing conditions.” That being said, China’s presence in Latin America is not without contradictions. The structure of trade remains imbalanced — Latin America exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. Meanwhile, labor and environmental concerns linked to specific Chinese private enterprises cannot be ignored. Whether the relationship enables development or reproduces dependency depends on what Latin American governments demand: technology transfer, local production, industrial policy. This agenda for a sovereign national project must be pushed forward by the Latin American people and popular forces. At present, the differences between the two visions being presented of the “US-led world” and a “community with a shared future” have never been starker. This article was produced by Globetrotter. The original article is under a CC BY-SA license

Chileans have elected the most right-wing presidential candidate since the end of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship over three and a half decades ago. In a runoff held on Dec. 14, 2025, José Antonio Kast, a Republican Party ex-congressman and two-time former presidential candidate, won just over 58% of the vote, while his opponent, Jeannette Jara, the left-wing labor minister of current President Gabriel Boric, won nearly 42%. Approximately 15.6 million Chileans were eligible to vote in the first presidential election to take place with mandatory voting and automatic voter registration. As a result of those new election rules, which went into place in 2022, an estimated 5 million to 6 million new voters went to the polls. These voters – found to be largely younger, male and lower-middle class – are seen as lacking a strong ideological identity and rejecting politics altogether. The verdict delivered by Chile’s voters puts it in line with a broader right-wing regional shift – most recently in Bolivia – that has reversed the “pink tide” of left-leaning governments in the past two decades. But as a historian of modern Latin America and Chile, I believe Chile’s election also reflects the important local context of years of increasing disenchantment with the political system. Amid Chile’s expanded electorate, the primary issues of voter concern during this campaign were crime and immigration. An October 2025 poll specifically found delinquency to be the top issue, with immigration, unemployment and health care also marking high. Though Chile has one of the lowest crime rates in Latin America, high-profile cases of organized crime have shaken the nation in recent years. Homicides increased between 2018 and 2022 and have decreased slightly since then. Immigration has also risen significantly, with a large number of immigrants coming to Chile having fled economic and political crises in Venezuela, as well as in Peru, Haiti, Colombia and Bolivia. The foreign-born population in Chile rose from 4.4% in 2017 to 8.8% in 2024. The key constitutional context Many commentators have highlighted the stark polarization of this election, with a Communist Party labor minister campaigning against the arch-conservative Kast, who has lauded the Pinochet dictatorship under which his deceased older brother once served. But there is more to the story. Some observers have drawn comparisons between Kast and other far-right Latin American leaders like Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Javier Milei in Argentina and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. But Chile is not merely following the same far-right playbook of its neighbors. In the weeks leading up to the runoff in Chile, both candidates moved toward the center. Jara vowed to expand the prison system to combat rising crime, while Kast – who had previously threatened expulsion of undocumented migrants – softened his tone to say they would be “invited” to leave. Moreover, Kast learned from his previous failed attempts at the presidency by speaking less about his controversial or more socially conservative positions. For example, he played down opposition to abortion under any circumstances. Chilean voters, in contrast, overwhelmingly approve of the limited abortion rights that were passed by Congress in 2017. Yet beyond the campaign trail messaging, the results also reflect a structural fact of Chilean politics that mirror political realities of other parts of Latin America, and even globally. In every presidential election since 2006, Chileans have voted out the incumbency to swing to the opposing side of the political spectrum. With candidates barred from consecutive presidential terms, the pendulum has swung back and forth since the alternating presidencies of socialist Michelle Bachelet – 2006-2010 and 2014-2018 — and conservative Sebastián Piñera – 2010-2014 and 2018-2022. Boric, a former left-wing student leader, took office in 2022 following a wave of upheaval and popular protests over inequality in 2019-2020. In what was a historic moment, the country voted to begin a process of rewriting its Pinochet-era constitution, which entrenched neoliberal economic policies and limited the government’s capacity to confront inequality. The constitutional convention was made up of directly elected citizens, many of them from grassroots movements. Yet in a stunning reversal, the progressive constitution – which would have protected rights to nature, Indigenous rights and social rights – was roundly defeated in a plebiscite in 2022. Just over a year later, voters similarly rejected a second attempt to rewrite the constitution, albeit under a process that conservative parties helped shape. Boric’s approval ratings, already low, suffered from this failed constitutional process. More than the right-wing elections elsewhere in the region, this national context helps to explain Chile’s own conservative turn. The ever-present discontent of voters Even as the pendulum has swung back and forth in recent Chilean presidential elections, there are deeper continuities across the different Chilean governments in the 21st century. Important among them is generalized voter discontent with the political system. This has traditionally been expressed in popular protests, such as the student movements of 2006 and 2011 and the ‘Estallido Social’– or Social Uprising – of 2019-2020 that were the largest protests since the return to democracy in 1990 and helped propel Boric to power. Public discontent was also expressed in the overwhelming vote to rewrite the constitution, which passed with 78% of the vote in 2020. Even though the constitutional process was ultimately rejected by voters, this underlying discontent has not gone away. One of the recent signs of discontent with the political choices on offer was in the first round of voting on Nov. 16: The third-place candidate was not one of the veteran politicians on the right, but Franco Parisi, a populist economist who has not set foot in Chile in years and who called on his supporters to intentionally vote null – or “spoil” their votes. Discontent has taken many forms – outrage about inequality and neoliberalism in 2019-2020, or unease about economic precarity and crime in the current election. But it has persisted, even as Chile’s political system remains stable. Some observers have pointed out that, unlike in many places around the world, Chile’s democratic norms are holding strong. The fact that power continues to pass peacefully despite major ideological differences is significant, particularly in light of the long struggle for democracy during the Pinochet regime. Kast’s style, for what it’s worth, is not as bombastic as that of U.S. President Donald Trump or Argentina’s Milei. Still, his apparent politeness belies what many fear is a coming erosion of rights: the rights of women to bodily autonomy; the rights of individuals to due process; the rights of workers to dignified conditions. These may well be up for negotiation under the new administration. Kast, a staunch Catholic and father of nine, is opposed to abortion under any circumstances and has even attempted to ban the morning-after pill. He was a supporter of Pinochet up until the regime’s end, campaigning for the “yes” vote in 1988 that would have seen eight more years for the authoritarian leader after 15 years already in power. Kast has likewise vowed to slash public spending and deregulate the economy, a clear echo of the Pinochet years. Despite the momentous shift heralded by Kast’s election, though, it is unlikely to change one of the principal challenges of Chile’s democracy in the 21st century: voter discontent and disenchantment. There has been a consistent trend for the government in power to lose popular support and face strong headwinds in Congress from the opposition. For all the celebration happening right now for Kast and his supporters, it is hard to see that changing once the new government takes office in March 2026.

Introduction Soft-power dynamics have gained importance in the global arena. Moving from the classical cultural approach to the digital realm, soft power has now the ability to shift and transform geopolitics through technological influence. In the age of AI – where digital competitiveness across language blocs determines access to innovation, data, and influence – the emergence of a robust, multilingual digital ecosystem has become essential. Within this landscape, Spanish has become a key player. Spanish is a Romance language from the Indo-European language family that is spoken by around 636 million people worldwide. This number represents 7.6% of the global population and makes it the third most widely spoken mother tongue, after Mandarin and Hindi. Therefore, holding that position, Spanish has rapidly become one of the most influential languages in the digital sphere, this can be seen in the fact that Spanish ranks as the second most used language on the web, surpassed only by English. In fact, this digital presence is not a coincidence, it is part of a rapid digital reinvention driven by demographic strength, expanding connectivity, regional and local policies modernization, and a growing tech-savvy diaspora. Therefore, this transformation can be said to be reshaping Spanish-speaking economies, is enabling new digital ecosystems, and is positioning several Spanish-speaking countries as emerging innovation and digital hubs. As the transformations unfold, the digital reinvention of the Spanish-speaking world presents a powerful case of how linguistic, demographic, and technological forces converges to reshape geopolitical and economical power through digital soft-power. Figure 1: Spanish speaking countries. Source: Speak easy. The Acceleration Drivers For a better understanding, there are multiple forces that can explain why this shift is happening now. In economic terms, the demand for fintech, e-commerce, and mobile-based services has grown as Latin America’s expanding middle class accelerates the shift toward digital consumer habits. In demographic terms, with over 60% of the region’s population under 35 years old, it has one of the world’s youngest digital workforces. In addition, the large Spanish-speaking diaspora in the U.S. and Europe further amplifies cross-border entrepreneurship, remittances, and cultural-technological exchange. Moreover, global connectivity — expanded through fiber, 4G/5G networks, the widespread smartphone adoption and including digital transformation projects and financing — has enabled digital inclusion and remote-work globalization. While governments have also introduced strategic initiatives, such as digital identity programs, fintech sandboxes, and AI policies, helping structure the ecosystem. Key Regions Leading the Transformation Spain has become a European gateway for Spanish-speaking startups by providing access to EU-wide digital infrastructure, funding programs, and regulatory harmonization. For instance, Barcelona and Madrid – usually ranked among Europe’s top tech hubs –, and initiatives like ‘España Digital 2026’ or the AI Strategy 2020 have played an important role in supporting Spain in this regard. In addition, Spain is also home of one of the European Blockchain Service Infrastructure (EBSI) nodes and has hosted major innovation events like 4YFN or the Mobile World Congress, which help Latin American founders integrate into the EU market In the Americas, Argentina stands out for its strong AI talent pipeline and world-class developer community. The country produces one of the highest numbers of software engineers per capita in Latin America – just behind Brazil and Mexico –, and some Argentinian Universities – like the UBA and UTN – are constantly top-ranked in math and computer sciences in the region. In addition, Argentina is home to pioneering companies such as Auth0 or Mural, while its AI scene has also contributed to multilingual datasets and early experimentation with Large Language Models (LLM) fine-tuning tailored to Spanish and regional dialects. Argentina’s neighbor, Chile, has taken a leadership role in digital governance, cybersecurity, and regulatory modernization. In 2021, Chile became the first Latin American country to pass a National AI Policy, and it is among the first to establish a Fintech Law and regulatory sandbox, enabling companies like NotCo, Fintual, and Betterfly to scale with legal clarity. In terms of digital governance, Chile’s Digital Government Division is internationally recognized for its interoperability standards and cybersecurity strategy aligned with OECD recommendations. Colombia is another key player in the region as it is rapidly scaling its digital workforce and fintech ecosystem, becoming one of the fastest-growing digital economies in Latin America. For instance, companies such as Rappi, Addi, and Mercado Pago Colombia have turned the country into a logistics and payments innovation center. In addition, the Colombian government has boosted initiatives like Misión TIC 2022 – which objective was to train over 100,000 citizens in software development – or GovTech Colombia – aiming to accelerate digital procurement – to strength its young-tech talent base. Finally, Uruguay is known for having built one of the strongest digital infrastructures in the hemisphere. In this context, Uruguay – ranked among the top in digital connectivity worldwide – has a universal fiber-optic coverage and nearly 100% of households connected to high-speed internet through the public telecom company ANTEL. In addition, its digital ID system, Ceibal, and its national e-government platform, AGESIC, are considered global benchmarks for digital public infrastructure in the region. Figure 2: LATAM Fintech ecosystem growth. Source: Finn Summit. Data collected by Finnovista and the IDB within the framework of this report (2023) and historical data. The 2023 report considers 26 LAC countries, including The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. https://www.finnosummit.com/en/fintech-ecosystem-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-exceeds-3000-startups/ Where does innovation happen? As read in the previous section, innovation is happening already across different key sectors. For instance, AI and LLMs are rapidly being adapted to Spanish, Indigenous languages, and regional contexts. At the same time, the region’s fintech and digital banking sectors are expanding at remarkable speed, positioning Latin America as one of the world’s most dynamic fintech environments. On the other hand, smart cities and digital public infrastructure — such as digital IDs, online government portals, and interoperable public services — are being deployed across major urban areas. In parallel, the EdTech sector is training millions of new professionals and turning the region into an exporter of digital-skilled talent. Finally, e-commerce and logistics innovations are also undergoing transformation, they are evolving introducing blockchain and Web3 frameworks, enabling new forms of decentralized marketplaces and governance. Together, these developments reveal how the Spanish-speaking world is building a connected and technologically adaptive innovation landscape. Figure 3: Innovation competitiveness scores of certain Spanish-speaking countries. Source: ITIF. Latin American Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index 2.0 https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/22/latin-american-subnational-innovation-competitiveness-index-2/ Challenges However, despite the rapid progress shown, several issues continue to limit the digital transformation of the Spanish-speaking world. First, the digital divide remains a major challenge, particularly between urban centers with high-speed connectivity and rural or low-income areas where access to broadband, devices, and digital skills is still limited. Therefore, the resulting gap is visible in education, financial inclusion, and the ability of smaller communities to participate in the digital economy. The second challenge is the regulatory lag, which is also slowing the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI, cryptocurrency, and automation. This can be visible in the fact that many countries are still developing comprehensive frameworks for data protection, AI ethics, and digital asset oversight, usually leaving innovators operating in uncertain legal environments in the meantime. The third challenge is talent mobility. The region continues to experience significant brain drain as skilled workers tend to migrate to the U.S. and Europe. Even though there is an emerging countertrend of “brain return” thanks to remote-work global hiring, competitive salaries in tech, and new government incentives aimed at retaining or repatriating talent, still is not enough and is a challenge to be addressed. Finally, the fourth challenge is the cybersecurity risks, which have also become a big problem. Latin America has become one of the regions most targeted by ransomware and phishing attacks, vulnerabilities in public infrastructure, small businesses, and critical sectors have been highlighted in most of these attacks. In addition, the spread of misinformation and weak data-governance systems further threaten trust in digital services and democratic institutions. What Comes Next? Although significant challenges remain, addressing them requires aligning technological growth with stronger governance, skilled talent, sustained investment in human capital, and resilient digital infrastructure. Therefore, the next phase of digital reinvention will likely focus on region-wide AI standards, cross-border digital markets, and stronger public-private collaboration to scale infrastructure, talent pipelines, and cybersecurity. Thus, countries that successfully integrate education reforms, innovation incentives, and robust digital institutions will position themselves as global players in emerging technologies. Conclusion Spanish, as the third most spoken language in the world, provides a unique base for building a shared digital ecosystem that could connect people across continents – or the world. This linguistic advantage – combined with a young population, a growing connectivity, and a wave of technological innovation – has positioned the Spanish-speaking world at a pivotal moment of digital reinvention. Countries within the Spanish-speaking sphere are not only adapting new tools or technologies; they are building digital public infrastructure, developing and exporting tech talent, and contributing and participating in the global development of AI, fintech, and smart-city solutions. Still, innovation on its own is not enough. Consequently, closing the gap in the digital divide, strengthening cybersecurity, modernizing regulations, and finding ways to retain and reverse brain drain remain the main challenges. If governments and private actors succeed in building resilient digital institutions and harmonizing regional standards, the Spanish-speaking world could emerge as a major center of global technological influence. 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The accelerated authoritarian drift of the United States under the Trump administration poses serious risks to democracy and stability throughout Latin America. The United States is undergoing a rapid process of democratic erosion. Despite its limitations, until January 2025 it still had a democratic regime with relatively free and fair elections (though more so in some states than others), universal suffrage, no tutelary authorities, protection of political rights and civil liberties, and a series of checks and balances that restricted executive power. Today, that regime has changed substantially. Following the playbook of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, over the past ten months the administration has dismantled the federal bureaucracy, usurped legislative powers, used government agencies to attack, censor, and extort universities, media, and opponents, and violated due process for immigrants (and African American citizens). The shift has been so extreme that political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have declared that the United States is no longer a democracy but a competitive authoritarian regime. The implications of this autocratization process in the U.S. for Latin America are catastrophic. Empowered by a submissive Congress and Supreme Court — whose majorities are more concerned with ideological victories than with the rule of law or civil and political liberties — Trump has been able to operate with minimal constraints. Despite efforts by district, state, and federal courts to block executive orders and actions that violate the Constitution, the president has managed to find ways around adverse rulings or inconvenient requirements. This is particularly true in areas where the presidency has traditionally enjoyed great flexibility — especially those affecting Latin America — such as foreign aid, immigration, and drug enforcement. In one of his first acts, Trump suspended or eliminated U.S. international aid programs previously approved by Congress. The 2024 budget included, among other things, $90 million for democracy promotion in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua; $125 million to combat fentanyl flows in Mexico and cocaine trafficking in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Costa Rica; and $82.5 million for programs to prevent human trafficking and reduce violence against women in Central America. The dismantling of USAID and the State Department’s human rights programs has been accompanied by measures to end immigration from the Global South. Early in his term, Trump abruptly suspended the asylum and refugee programs and terminated temporary protection for more than 600,000 Haitian and Venezuelan immigrants. Worse still, since March, the administration has used Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain and deport immigrants without due process. By September 2025, ICE had detained more than 59,000 people — 71.5% of them without criminal records — and deported 234,210, many without judicial orders. The process has been so arbitrary that ICE raids have even captured 170 U.S. citizens. Those detained — citizens or not, with or without legal status — are subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment, often disappearing into the immigration detention system or being deported without contact with lawyers or family. For those of us who grew up in Latin America hearing about the human rights abuses of dictators like Rafael Videla or Augusto Pinochet, the images of masked ICE agents refusing to identify themselves or present warrants while loading people into unmarked cars are disturbingly familiar. The consequences of these immigration policies are especially severe for Latin America. They not only endanger our compatriots but also reduce the number of Latin Americans living and earning in dollars — whether through deportation or voluntary departure driven by fear. Over time, fewer migrants in the U.S. mean fewer remittances, closing a vital economic valve for fragile economies. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, remittances range from 0.1% of GDP in Argentina to 27.6% in Nicaragua. Countries like El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala derive around one-fifth of their income from remittances — 60% of which come from North America. The crackdown on migrants, the closure of legal entry routes, and the elimination of economic aid coincide with the U.S. government’s decision to use military force against Venezuela. Over the last three months, U.S. forces have attacked Venezuelan (and Colombian) vessels allegedly carrying drugs. These attacks violate international law and expose worrying changes in the rule of law within the U.S. In a liberal democracy, security forces cannot act as prosecutor, judge, and executioner. Even if evidence of drug trafficking existed — which is not entirely clear — due process requires that the ship be detained, evidence collected, and suspects tried in court. The administration’s warlike rhetoric, combined with increased military presence in the Caribbean and the authorization of covert intelligence operations in Venezuela, signals a dangerously inflammatory policy. Some senators fear that the president may even declare war unilaterally — an unprecedented and devastating step for the region. This brings a final reflection. U.S. support for democratic (or authoritarian) leaders and regimes has long been essential to the stability of democracy (or dictatorship) in the Americas. Over the last two decades, democracy has been threatened and weakened in several countries. Overthrowing dictatorships in Venezuela or El Salvador and protecting democracy in Argentina, Colombia, or Guatemala requires strong democratic allies capable of exerting pressure to complement pro-democracy movements. Trump’s erratic policy toward Venezuela, unconditional support for authoritarian-leaning leaders like Nayib Bukele or Javier Milei, and hostility toward populist figures such as Gustavo Petro all contribute to political polarization, impunity, and the growing influence of autocratic powers like China and Russia — undermining democratic actors and institutions across the region. It is difficult to predict how far the erosion of democracy in the U.S. will go. Despite important resistance, the administration’s authoritarian excesses are mobilizing domestic opposition. With some luck, this mobilization may curb its authoritarian impulses. But until that happens, it is hard to rely on the U.S. to defend democracy and human rights in the region. So far, the regional response has been fragmented and, in some cases, improvised. Latin America would do well to seek collective responses, strengthen democratic leadership, and prepare jointly for the repercussions of the Trump administration.

After ending two decades of MAS hegemony, Rodrigo Paz assumes the presidency of Bolivia with the legitimacy of change, but faces the enormous challenge of governing without a solid party structure.   The center-left candidate from the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Rodrigo Paz, secured victory with 54% of the votes, gaining nearly ten points over his rival, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga. This triumph not only puts an end to two decades of dominance by the Movement for Socialism (MAS), led by Evo Morales, but also grants strong legitimacy to the new administration. However, the political challenges facing the government of Paz, set to take office on November 9, are substantial.   The first major test for Paz will be consolidating his power base in the legislature. The main weakness lies in the fact that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) functioned as a “rented womb”—an instrumental vehicle lacking social or national roots to support the candidacy. Although Paz managed to attract votes from the MAS “hard core” in several regions, he did not inherit his predecessor’s party structure or mobilization capacity. This fragility within the party gives rise to two points of friction.   Within the PDC’s parliamentary bloc, multiple factions could emerge, each seeking its share of power. The tensions already visible between Paz and his running mate, Edman Lara, during the campaign could deepen, complicating executive governance and the management of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP).   At the same time, Paz will need to build consensus with other parties. Although he enjoys the explicit support of Samuel Doria Medina’s Unidad party—formalized during the runoff—the relationship with Quiroga’s party, LIBRE, is more strained. Despite sharing ideological affinities (market economy, openness to the world, respect for institutions), the aftermath of the aggressive campaign will make an alliance difficult. A simple majority in the ALP is secured through the PDC–Unidad alliance, but deeper reforms—such as a potential constitutional change—will require rapprochement and negotiation with LIBRE, which holds the key to the two-thirds majority.   A second crucial challenge will be the relationship with powerful and decisive social movements. While the support of these organizations for the PDC ticket was a determining factor in its victory, it does not guarantee unconditional loyalty. With a strong history of political empowerment, these groups will seek to safeguard their privileges and, if they feel sidelined, could resort to mobilizations that threaten social stability. Their backing will be essential to legitimize any economic or social adjustment. How the new government manages tensions with these sectors—and how it handles the legacy of “Masismo”—will be vital to maintaining national stability. In many ways, these are anti-system forces capable of obstructing Paz’s government.   The new administration’s ability to pursue any economic or social policy depends on overcoming these two political challenges: securing a legislature aligned with the executive and establishing effective coordination with social movements.   Once these political hurdles are addressed, the next major challenge will be economic. Paz inherits a country in crisis, facing a shortage of U.S. dollars, inflation, and dwindling international reserves. The removal of fuel subsidies—a crucial step for fiscal sustainability—could trigger serious social unrest. The precedent of 2010, when Evo Morales was forced to reverse a similar measure under pressure from social movements, underscores the delicacy of the situation.   October 19 not only marked the end of a political era but also opened a crucial question: Is Bolivia heading toward genuine transformation—or merely a continuation of the MAS model by other means?   The answer to this question will determine the country’s direction in the coming years. If Rodrigo Paz’s new government chooses the path of genuine transformation, it will be essential to undertake structural reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions. These reforms would include reducing presidentialism and establishing a justice system free from political influence.   If, on the other hand, the Paz administration focuses solely on addressing the most pressing economic issues—such as inflation and fuel shortages—while ignoring their deeper causes, the MAS model may well endure. That model is characterized by a narrow-based economy, lacking significant industrialization and stable job creation.   It is likely that MAS, now without a parliamentary majority, will initially grant the new administration some room to maneuver. However, the political landscape will not be fully defined until next year’s subnational elections. Only then will the new balance of power in the country become clearer. For now, Bolivia is taking its first steps beyond the hegemonic dominance of MAS and the shadow of Morales.