Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The impact of a government is not only measured by its institutional performance, but also by its ability to transform the mental habits of politicians, officials, and citizens. Political action must offer collectively desirable futures. Retrospectively, however, many future projects are like lottery tickets that have already been played: records of unfulfilled illusions. The case of Petro’s government is no exception—but that doesn’t mean everything remains the same in Colombia. Change came and didn’t come. In some respects, the “government of change” has, in reality, remained stationary. This is the case, to begin with, regarding corruption. From campaign financing to suspicions of gifts offered to congress members in exchange for approving reforms, and including the various scandals involving the president’s son, the administration has been embroiled in numerous controversies. In Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Colombia dropped several positions, although it still ranks similarly to Brazil or Argentina, and at levels consistent with those seen under President Duque during most of his term. On matters of peace and security, and despite a shift in strategy, the government’s results are just as poor as its predecessor’s. The opposition’s narrative—that Petro’s arrival has brought the country to the brink of collapse in terms of security—is unsustainable. Red zones like Catatumbo have a long and complex history, and the Gulf Clan wasn’t invented yesterday. Nonetheless, the “Total Peace” policy is unlikely to be more than a grandiose slogan, with tangible results limited to a few local successes—such as the demobilization of one ELN dissidence group in Nariño and a temporary truce among the main gangs in Buenaventura. The protection of social leaders has not substantially improved (174 assassinations in 2024), the homicide rate, though slightly reduced, remains very high (25.4 per 100,000), crimes such as extortion have increased (18% rise between 2023 and 2024), and by April 2025, 21 police officers had been killed—four times more than during the same period the previous year. At the macroeconomic level, this government has not been the disaster predicted by the opposition, but broadly speaking, it also fits within the country’s stationary movement. President Petro has boasted, for example, about inflation rates (5%) and the unemployment rate (8.2%). However, inflation control is partly the result of measures taken by the Central Bank, and although Petro inherited the highest inflation in 23 years (13.1%), the average inflation rate during the Uribe, Santos, and Duque administrations was 4.88%. Petro’s unemployment figures are positive, but for much of Santos’s second term they were similarly favorable. Multidimensional poverty has continued its uninterrupted 14-year decline and, nationally, stands at 11.5% for 2024 (0.6% lower than the previous year). Economic growth under Petro has been rather modest (1.7% in 2024). Under Duque, average annual growth was 3%, and both previous administrations had higher averages. Growth expectations for 2025 don’t exceed 3%. In short, there’s been neither collapse nor spectacular takeoff. A constant, inertial movement is not change. So where is the change, then? In terms of public policy and governance practices, first, there has been a rethinking of the executive’s relationship with big business and the military leadership. Colombian capitalism has not mostly been built by heroic, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who innovate and take risks, but rather by a kind of “crony capitalism” based on reciprocal favors between economic and political elites—and, as shown emblematicly in the Odebrecht case, their capacity to cover for one another. Petro’s bitter relationship with Sarmiento Angulo is part of this. That Petro is branded by the opposition as an “enemy of business” and labeled a “communist” is a natural reaction to a disruption in the usual dynamics between the presidency and large corporate conglomerates. The same can be said, secondly, about criticisms regarding the alleged weakening and “demoralization” of the Armed Forces. As proven by the initial appointment of Iván Velásquez as Minister of Defense, Petro has emphasized the need to reject the criminalization of social protest and human rights violations that, for decades, were legitimized by the counterinsurgency discourse of the “internal enemy.” The purging of generals has been part of this aim. Opposition marches have been aggressive, but there hasn’t been a hint of police brutality. The contrast—especially with the right-wing governments of Uribe and Duque, marked by extrajudicial executions and repression of the Social Uprising—could not be more stark. Naturally, the right links Petro’s civilian approach with poor security outcomes. Duque, however, is his opposite, and the results were no better. Thirdly, Petro has pursued an ambitious social policy, and as the failed health reform illustrates—derailed by the convergence of pharmaceutical managers, traditional politicians, and health service providers—he has shown a willingness to challenge powerful groups. This framework also includes the pension reform approved in Congress, which will benefit 2.8 million elderly Colombians. Likewise, there has been a strengthening of rural communities through the creation of 13 new peasant reserve zones and the acquisition and formalization of land at volumes far surpassing those of the previous two governments. In the same vein, there’s the labor reform (blocked in Congress), which will be submitted to a public referendum. The reform aims to restore workers’ rights eroded over the past 20 years and coincides with a historic 9.5% increase in the minimum wage. Also worth mentioning are the development of 300 energy communities and the guarantee of free higher education in public institutions. Seniors, rural workers, formal laborers, ethnic communities, and youth are the direct beneficiaries of these policies—groups that have not typically been at the center of recent Colombian governments. Beyond concrete practices or policies, however, the greatest transformation brought by the “Government of Change” is cognitive openness. Petro has sparked controversies that have de-naturalized hegemonic ideas. The virulent reactions against him are partly due to his break from the establishment’s common sense on many issues—that is, he has turned into public problems, requiring justification and debate, what was previously accepted as obvious, generalized consensus. It has been a pleasure to see politicians and journalists forced to react to discussions on “degrowth,” the “energy transition,” or the “extractivist model”; compelled to justify the mantra that better labor conditions mean higher unemployment; to reflect on whether illegal crops are effectively fought with glyphosate spraying; or to ask, in disbelief, whether habitual submission to the United States is truly desirable, or whether a “pragmatic” foreign policy allows one to speak, with Petro’s moral clarity, about the genocide in Gaza. Not everything the president has said on these topics has been accurate, of course, but the point is how the generation of these debates contributes to the development of a more plural, reflective, and democratic political culture in Colombia. The impact of a government cannot be measured solely in terms of institutional performance, but also in terms of changes in the mental habits of professional politicians, public officials, and citizens. In that sense—more than in any other—the Government of Change has indeed lived up to its name.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Nearly a fifth of the energy generated in the region never makes it to usage. Experts call for more energy planning, investment and control Latin America has made significant steps towards its energy transition. The region already generates 60% of its electricity from renewable sources, a figure that the International Energy Agency expects to continue to rise. However, there is one factor in this journey that receives limited attention – and is affecting the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from energy. Energy losses – the difference between the amount of electricity generated and the amount that is ultimately accounted for via consumer bills – averaged 17% per year in Latin America over the past three decades, according to a report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). It says this is three times higher than in developed countries. That represents between five and six million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per year, equivalent to the emissions of 1.3 million cars. Specialists have termed these as “compensatory emissions”, as more electricity generation is required to compensate for the losses. Countries with a higher share of fossil fuel generation, such as Argentina, Mexico and Colombia, are mainly responsible for these additional emissions. Energy losses affect all countries in the region and occur for both technical and non-technical reasons. The former refers to problems in transmission and distribution lines, mostly due to a lack of investment and infrastructure maintenance; the latter corresponds to energy delivered and not paid for by users, such as theft and energy fraud. “Energy losses have the potential to affect the fulfilment of the climate targets,” Ana Lía Rojas, executive director of the Chilean Association of Renewable Energy and Storage (Acera), tells Dialogue Earth. “Every unit of energy that is lost means more generation is needed to meet demand.” Energy losses Most electricity is produced in power plants and sent over long distances through high-voltage transmission lines. It then reaches consumers through the distribution network – the poles and wires that connect homes and businesses. This infrastructure can suffer from various problems that result in technical energy losses. For example, losses due to the resistance of the conductive material through which the energy flows, ageing infrastructure and malfunctioning transformers. While these are inherent problems in electricity transmission, experts agree that there is a general lack of investment in transmission and distribution networks across Latin America. “Decision-makers prioritise having energy, and the grid is left as a second priority. You have to invest in parallel in the grid and in generation – it’s about seeing the system as a whole,” Ramón Méndez, Uruguay’s former energy director, tells Dialogue Earth. “A deficient infrastructure can become a major economic and technical problem.” Between 2015 and 2021, investment in distribution and transmission infrastructure in the region fell by about 40%. Not only can this lead to energy losses, but it also leaves grids more exposed to extreme weather events and can lead to service problems, which particularly affect vulnerable populations. In Latin America, most electricity losses occur in the distribution system. This is mostly due to non-technical factors, such as energy theft, says Santiago López Cariboni. A professor of economics at the University of the Republic of Uruguay, he co-authored the IDB’s energy losses report. “It is energy that is produced and transported, but not consumed legally. People break or tamper with meters or run a cable straight from the grid to their homes or businesses,” López Cariboni tells Dialogue Earth. “Even if governments could cut off the power to all those homes, they wouldn’t do it – it would create a huge social and economic problem.” A user that steals energy consumes up to three times more than one that does not, estimates López Cariboni. By not paying a tariff, people have no incentive to consume less or to have low-consumption technology. According to the IDB report, irregular connections are related to the disorderly growth of Latin American cities in recent decades. The dumping of energy Although it does not generate emissions, renewable energy can also generate a problem of energy losses. This has happened recently in Chile. The share of solar and wind energy reached a record 40% of the country’s energy generation in 2024. However, as their weight in the mix increases, so do energy losses. This phenomenon, also known as curtailment, occurs because the development of renewable projects is progressing much faster than available transmission and storage capacity. In 2024, 5,900 gigawatt hours (GWh) of power were wasted in Chile, 148% more than in 2023. The figure represents 20% of the solar and wind energy generated by the country, estimates Lía Rojas. Jorge Leal Saldivia, a partner at the Chilean renewable energy company LAS Energy, says this wasting corresponds mainly to solar energy generated in the north of the country. “The transmission infrastructure is not in place to be able to bring that energy to central and southern Chile. The lines become congested, and the energy has to be dumped,” he tells Dialogue Earth. Rodrigo Palma, a researcher at the Energy Centre of the University of Chile, tells Dialogue Earth there have been delays in energy planning: “The entry into operation of solar and wind has not stopped, and the rate of entry is greater than the rate of capacity-building by the state. This may slow down the penetration of renewables into our energy system.” By 2040, all coal-fired power plants will have to cease operating in Chile. This is expected to be mostly compensated for by renewable energy. In April, the government announced a tender for eight new projects to upgrade the grid, adding to 12 projects launched last year. One of the biggest initiatives, the Kimal-Lo Aguirre transmission line, is now under review after complaints from social and environmental groups. Possible solutions Half of the 26 countries analysed in the IDB report have experienced greater energy losses in recent years, highlighting the urgent need for solutions. Honduras, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic lose more than 30% of their energy, followed by more than 20% in Jamaica, Paraguay and Guyana. The IDB also highlights how grids face increasing vulnerability and impacts due to climate change. Specialists consulted by Dialogue Earth highlight the need for comprehensive planning by governments to address losses. For technical losses, the incorporation of technology can help, such as smart meters and storage. For the non-technical ones, a social policy perspective needs to be added, says López Cariboni. “Societies justify energy theft by necessity; they see energy as a right,” he explains. “For those who can pay, you can work with sanctions and regulations. But for those who can’t, the state should formalise those losses and take it as part of their budget. It’s more public expenditure, but it’s an expenditure that is already being made.” Martin Dapelo, a member of the board of directors for the Argentine Chamber of Renewable Energies (Cader), questions the lack of progress in the region on smart metering. “It is the first big step. We are missing out on the possibility of measuring in real time,” he tells Dialogue Earth. In storage, Chile has so far been the only country in the region to take the first steps. Distributed generation – energy generated by consumers themselves in small-scale, localised systems – is also on the region’s solutions list. These arrangements place solar or wind farms at the site of consumption, for example among housing or industry. This removes the need for energy transportation, avoiding grid overload. “We have gotten used to the idea that planning has to be indicative, and that it is the market that decides which direction to take with the energy sector. The case of Chile, with an oversupply of solar, but without transmission grids, shows that this is not the case,” say Méndez. “The optimal system is one that looks at the whole and determines the best combination.” This article was originally published by Dialogue Earth under the Creative Commons BY NC ND licence

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The pressure exerted by Trump on Mexico has prompted a shift in the López Obrador government's anti-drug strategy, which now operates under the logic of negotiation imposed by Trumpism. In the Obradorist ideology, it was unthinkable to launch a new war against the narcos—partly because there is now suspicion that deals were made with organized crime, and partly because opposition to such a war was one of the key narratives that propelled former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to power. He consistently and harshly criticized the confrontation initiated by President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012). The “hugs, not bullets” policy of the former Mexican president empowered the drug cartels, and its effects spilled onto the streets of the United States, where designer drugs (fentanyl, methamphetamines) proliferated like never before. However, the electoral campaign and Donald Trump’s return to the White House spotlighted the drug trafficking issue, highlighting that it was costing 100,000 American lives a year. That surely struck a chord with the average American and hurt the Democratic Party’s candidate. “Donald Trump embodies what I want for my country,” said a white woman from the Midwest—a sentiment echoed by many who witnessed the destructive effects of these drugs in neighborhoods in Chicago, Philadelphia, or Los Angeles. This segment of the population turned out en masse to vote for Trump, joining millions of others who, for ideological, political, or economic reasons, gave the New York politician a sweeping victory. That resounding win shook the status quo—just look at the turmoil in global stock markets—but it also generated Trump’s own agenda with his trade partners. One key item: declaring war on the Mexican cartels, which he elevated to the status of “terrorist organizations” that must be destroyed. It was a powerful message for President Claudia Sheinbaum, who had not made the direct confrontation with the cartels a priority. She likely saw them as part of the structure López Obrador had built for the first stage of the so-called Fourth Transformation, and believed it best not to disturb them beyond occasional arrests and seizures. Sheinbaum had been inclined to continue that routine agenda in dealings with her main trading partner. However, Trump’s victory and his increasingly aggressive rhetoric against the cartels led to a direct confrontation with criminal organizations. Trump increased the pressure by deploying spy ships in Pacific waters off the Baja California coast. Mexican skies saw surveillance aircraft capable of capturing images of homes in the Golden Triangle—the border region between the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango, traditionally a haven for drug lords. Additionally, the U.S. security agency presence in Mexico was reinforced. Thus, the indulgent and criminal “hugs, not bullets” policy began to fade, leaving cartel leaders stunned. They have responded with a forward-escape strategy, creating an atmosphere of persecution and violence across different regions of the country—costing thousands of Mexican lives and pushing the public’s fear perception beyond 61%, according to INEGI. The myth López Obrador promoted—that “fentanyl is not produced in Mexico”—collapsed when Omar García Harfuch, the Public Security Secretary, recently stated that more than 800 laboratories have been destroyed. The problem, however, isn’t just the cartels and their capacity to produce and distribute drugs on American streets. It also includes the entire political scaffolding that enables the business to function efficiently—something it could not have achieved without the complicity of politicians with drug lords or intermediaries. And while one might think Trump would be pleased with the results of his pressure, that’s not the case. He bluntly stated that the Mexican government merely wants to make him “happy”—by sealing the northern border, making arrests and deporting drug lords, destroying labs, and even allowing U.S. agents to collaborate with Mexico’s national security system. They’ve even permitted spy flights and menacing naval patrols in Pacific waters. But even with these surprising results, the pressure continues—both publicly and diplomatically. Kristi Noem, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, recently met with President Sheinbaum at the National Palace. Beyond the formal courtesies, the headline came when Noem, upon returning to the U.S., revealed that she had handed Sheinbaum a list of requests to continue strengthening the good relationship between the two countries. President Sheinbaum was stunned when tariffs became a reality. Although Mexico and Canada weren’t mentioned in Trump’s public list of targeted countries, that was because the tariffs had already been decided before the press conference: a 25% tariff would apply to imports of steel and aluminum, as well as to products not covered by the USMCA—representing roughly 50% of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. In short, Trump’s pressure on Mexico has altered the policy upheld by Obradorism and now operates under the logic of Trump-style hard negotiation: “If the adversary yields at the first push, you can keep pressuring and gain more.” Some say that the list handed over through diplomatic channels includes the names of many currently serving politicians. That’s the reality, amid an anti-crisis narrative that tries to sell the idea that defeats are victories and losses are gains. And now, the time has come to find out where President Sheinbaum draws her red line.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском H.E. President of the Republic, Gabriel Boric Font, together with the Minister of Economy, Development, and Tourism of Chile, Nicolás Grau, and the Minister of Planning of Brazil, Simone Tebet, leads the inauguration of the Roundtable: Business and Investment Opportunities on the Bioceanic Corridor, Brasília 2025. Thank you very much, Nicolás, Minister Tebet, and everyone present. First of all, I apologize for the 15-minute delay. We were previously attending a preparatory forum for the COP in Belém do Pará, convened by President Lula with several world leaders, including the presidents of China, France, Spain, Vietnam, and South Korea. That delayed us a bit, so my apologies. That said, it is truly an honor for me to be here because it represents something that resonates with me on two distinct yet complementary dimensions. The first is South American integration. One of the things that Pepe Mujica has repeated to me countless times whenever I visit him — and something President Lula has also emphasized on every occasion we have met — is that Latin American integration, and particularly South American integration, must necessarily go beyond rhetoric, beyond adjectives, and beyond summit photographs. It must be about result-oriented actions, concrete actions that materialize, that our people and communities can see and feel in their daily lives. I believe that the Bioceanic Corridor is one of the best examples of this serious approach to integration. Beyond, I insist, adjectives and rhetoric. And secondly, because it is integration with decentralization. This is no small matter. Brazil is a federal state, while Chile is a unitary state — which is an elegant way of saying "centralized." Although we have gradually advanced in granting greater power and resources to the regions — for example, by electing governors, who used to be appointed by the President of the Republic — we still have a long way to go. It is enough to see that more than 40% of Chile’s population, out of 20 million inhabitants, lives in the capital, Santiago. This is partly due to cultural inertia, but also to a lack of opportunities and development in the other regions. I come from an extreme region — from Chilean Patagonia, from the southernmost part of the world. I was a deputy for eight years representing Magallanes and the Chilean Antarctic. Therefore, I am fully aware that from places like Planalto in Brazil or La Moneda in Chile, the daily reality of the regions — especially the most remote ones — is not always fully perceived. That is why I am very pleased that, in the case of Chile, this initiative is being carried out by empowering the north of the country with local authorities. That is why today we are joined by Ricardo Díaz, Governor of the Antofagasta Region, and José Miguel Carvajal, Governor of the Tarapacá Region, which provide a significant portion of Chile’s wealth. However, this wealth is not necessarily reflected in the quality of life within those regions, despite their tremendous potential. Therefore, I believe this project is very positive in both dimensions. The Bioceanic Road Corridor aims to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through an extensive network of road and port infrastructure. I have shared this anecdote before, but since there are people here I hadn’t met previously, I’ll tell it again. The former President of Chile, Ricardo Lagos — who, if I remember correctly, served during the same period as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the first term of President Lula — once told me, thinking about the future, that the Mediterranean was the center of the civilized world, at least from a European perspective, for much of history. After World War II, the center of the world shifted to the North Atlantic. But today, the future of the world lies in the South, particularly in the Pacific, in the Pacific Ocean. Chile is part of several treaties, including the CPTPP 11, and various free trade agreements with ASEAN countries, particularly with China, and we are also working on others. These agreements grant us, I would say, privileged access to sectors that are among the fastest growing in the world today. As Minister Grau mentioned, we are also working on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India, the world’s most populous country with 1.4 billion people. The Bioceanic Corridor will be at the heart of South America. The Mayor of Iquique showed me a world map and pointed out, "Iquique is the center of the world." Mayors, governors, and leaders everywhere always praise their own regions, but I find that a beautiful idea. Now we are talking about the Bioceanic Corridor, not about a particular city or a particular country. We are speaking about more than 2,400 kilometers that will significantly reduce cargo transport times from the interior regions of Brazil and Paraguay to the markets of the Asia-Pacific. Instead of crossing the Panama Canal — which, as we know, is currently facing significant congestion due to the climate crisis and water shortages — we will create a new route. And what will this lead to? We will link the Pantanal with the Atacama Desert, two ecosystems that are unique on the planet — and this is not just about trade. I really liked what Minister Tebet said: "This is also about tourism." We discussed it yesterday during the business forum we attended, where President Lula also participated: how tourism is not only one of the few non-polluting industries, but also how tourists often become the best ambassadors for our countries and the best promoters of the destinations they visit. In 2024, we had a record number of Brazilian tourists visiting Chile. This happened because the tourists who came in previous years had a good experience and shared it with their families, friends, and colleagues. The same is true for Chileans traveling to Brazil — and not just to Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, but also to Bahia, Fortaleza, Mato Grosso, and the Amazon. Thus, we have opportunities in many areas. We have taken this very seriously, and from Chile, we created a high-level commission to drive this project forward in a coordinated manner. One of the greatest challenges for states is achieving coordination and collaboration among different public agencies to move projects forward more quickly. That’s why what Nicolás mentioned is so important regarding the input we need from the private sector to more rapidly identify and resolve bottlenecks and obstacles together. In this high-level commission, we have brought together various ministries, regional governments, and local actors because we have learned from experience that without involving organized communities, these initiatives do not work well. We want to ensure that this project brings direct benefits to our people — to the families of Tocopilla, Antofagasta, and Iquique, as well as to the provinces of Santa Fe, Jujuy, Salta, and Mato Grosso do Sul. However, we still face significant challenges. One of the main concerns of our populations — and I am sure this is true in Brazil as well, but I will speak specifically about Chile — is security. While we have made significant progress in infrastructure — Nicolás outlined the improvements we have achieved and the ones we will continue to make, as infrastructure is a long-term investment — we must also address the challenge of security. Today, we see that crime, delinquency, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms trafficking are no longer purely local issues; they are transnational. The case of the Tren de Aragua is perhaps the most well-known in recent times in Latin America, at least in the Pacific region. But this issue deeply concerns our people, and therefore, opening new routes must go hand in hand with providing security for those traveling along them. All trucks must be guaranteed safety, as well as dignified conditions for rest, meals, and repair services in case of vehicle breakdowns — and of course, security for all people. Whether through scanners, police presence, artificial intelligence, or other mechanisms, we must ensure that everyone can feel safe. Because ultimately, when crime spirals out of control and we are unable to contain it, it effectively becomes a new kind of tax — an undeclared tax — because it forces increased spending. And in the end, it is the consumers who bear that cost. Therefore, we must be extremely careful and put great effort into addressing this issue. Another positive aspect is the very clear complementarity between our countries. Brazil is a first-rate industrial and agri-food powerhouse. Chile enjoys privileged access to the Pacific and Asian markets and has increasingly positioned itself as a technological hub. Argentina and Paraguay contribute with critical transport routes and productive capacities. If all of this is properly coordinated, it can transform South America into a global integration platform with sovereignty, without external tutelage, promoting free trade in times of uncertainty for the benefit of our peoples. Here we are also talking about strengthening many SMEs — small and medium-sized enterprises — in addition to large companies. If we do this well, it will generate benefits, circulation, and a dynamic that will positively impact many people. Achieving this, however, is primarily the responsibility of the states, but certainly also in close partnership with the private sector. At this moment, global integration is being called into question. The United States has unleashed a trade war marked by volatility and great uncertainty. And the best way to respond to this trade war is not through loud declarations. From Chile’s point of view, and considering the position we hold in the world as a medium-sized country, we will not respond with retaliation. We will respond with more integration. We will respond through the CEPA agreement with India, through the initiatives we are advancing with the United Arab Emirates. We will also push and engage in dialogue with countries like France to expedite the approval of the agreement between the European Union and Mercosur. And we will continue integrating regionally within South America, working together with our regions. That is why we must continue working diligently to facilitate customs processes, promote cross-border investments, and improve logistics throughout the entire supply chain. And I ask, particularly of the private sector, that you intensify these business alliances. I assure you that you can trust the Chilean state to provide guarantees for long-term investment. We have a development path that is environmentally conscious and understands that to better distribute wealth, first we must grow more. There is a balance to be struck: generating more wealth to distribute it better, not merely accumulating it in the hands of a few. But this is a cycle — to distribute wealth better, we must first create it. We cannot be satisfied with what we already have. Trade is one of the main drivers of this, along with strengthening our own industries — an area where Brazil is ahead of us, and which Minister Grau has also strongly promoted within Chile. Minister Tebet lamented how long it has taken us to advance this integration. President Lula mentioned yesterday that during his first term, the first bridge with Peru was built — if I recall correctly — after so many years of being neighbors. What I want to tell you is that it is never too late, and that today it is up to our generation to make this integration a reality. This is a unique opportunity, and we have no right to waste it. We cannot let this opportunity slip away. The Bioceanic Road Corridor will be much more than a transport route; it will be a path for human development, a bridge between peoples, and a symbol of what South America can achieve when it stands united. Thank you very much.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Bukele appears to have the green light from the United States to deepen his authoritarian project with the help of Beijing. Recently, the ruling Salvadoran party, Nuevas Ideas, inaugurated a political training school in Nuevo Cuscatlán. The event was headlined by Félix Ulloa, Vice President of the Central American country, and China’s ambassador to El Salvador, Zhang Yanhui. According to the Central American news portal Expediente Público, the institute was reportedly sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), following a previous visit to Beijing by Ulloa and Xavier Zablah Bukele – leader of Nuevas Ideas and cousin of the Salvadoran president – during which several interparty cooperation agreements were finalized. This event highlights the diversified strategies China employs to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere. While public attention toward the Asian giant typically focuses on intergovernmental diplomacy, trade relations, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), less consideration is given to the forms of cooperation carried out by various international outreach bodies tied to the CCP in Latin America. The Czech think tank Sinopsis, which specializes in Chinese studies, notes: “Unlike many other countries, China’s foreign affairs extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and transcend official state-to-state diplomacy […] This system consists of various bodies and operates under the overarching concept of total diplomacy.” The CCP behind the scenes According to Central American and Chinese-language media, Zablah Bukele and Félix Ulloa held a meeting in April 2024 with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the CCP. On that occasion, representatives of bukelismo signed an agreement with the CCP’s cadre school, securing Chinese sponsorship for the newly inaugurated Political Training Institute of Nuevas Ideas. The ILD was established in 1951 to promote ties between the CCP and other communist parties across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the organization turned its focus to cultivating relationships with leftist groups of all kinds, from European social democrats to liberation movements in the Global South. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, the ILD began adopting a pragmatic approach, fostering good relations with both left- and right-wing parties. For instance, center-right organizations like Argentina’s Republican Proposal (PRO) have maintained ties with the CCP since 2009. Xi Jinping, while maintaining this approach, has made the ILD’s operations more assertive, turning it into a key instrument of Chinese foreign influence. Various think tanks and scholars of Chinese foreign policy have noted the quiet diplomacy exercised by the Asian giant through the ILD and other bodies. These include the United Front Work Department and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which function as parallel bureaucracies to the MoFA and are characterized by opaque activities and a purported autonomy from Beijing. However, these organizations aim to connect various sectors of foreign politics and civil society with the CCP. In particular, the ILD builds influence networks by training foreign politicians. Beyond offering training courses funded in China, the department has promoted the construction of training centers in countries such as Tanzania. In this way, the ILD seeks to forge close ties with foreign elites who, in addition to promoting Chinese soft power narratives – such as the superiority of the one-party model or the primacy of development over democracy and civil liberties – can lobby on Beijing’s behalf in agencies, cabinets, and parliaments. In this sense, Chinese support for Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute marks a significant step forward in cooperation between the CCP and El Salvador’s ruling party. The ILD’s training programs have also become spaces for transmitting authoritarian know-how. Researchers such as Lina Benabdallah and Christine Hackenesch point out that the CCP promotes the Chinese governance model to foreign elites – a model based on mass surveillance technologies, personal data storage, and internet censorship, typically provided by state-owned enterprises like Huawei. These practices are presented as alternatives for strengthening public security and internal stability, but in practice, they reinforce state control and restrict civil liberties in adopting countries. The paradoxes of Bukelismo The link between Nuevas Ideas and the CCP raises questions about the ideological leanings of Nayib Bukele. Just a few weeks ago, the Salvadoran president hosted U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in San Salvador to seal, in Rubio’s words, “a historic agreement, the most extraordinary in the world” on migration. Suppose this event signaled El Salvador’s intent to become one of the United States’ most important regional partners. How should we now interpret the growing political cooperation with China, the U.S.’s main strategic rival? On one hand, it is understandable that El Salvador’s ruling party seeks alignment with the CCP. The inauguration of Nuevas Ideas’ Political Training Institute, with ILD’s blessing, is another episode of authoritarian cooperation in Latin America, where a regime well-versed in repression and control transfers knowledge and resources to another with similar aims. Similar patterns have been observed in the region with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, which collaborate among themselves and with extra-regional autocracies like Russia, Iran, and China itself. Given this, it is not surprising that a self-proclaimed socialist regime and another linked to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) would cooperate beyond ideological differences. In fact, this has been the ILD’s hallmark in the 21st century: pragmatism in engaging with parties across the spectrum, ensuring long-term ties with various governments. This phenomenon reflects a central feature of our times: the erosion of the left-right divide in favor of a new tension between democracies and autocracies. On the other hand, the indoctrination of Nuevas Ideas’ cadres might even be tolerable to Trump, given that some CCP perspectives align with his political agenda. The pursuit of a multipolar order that secures spheres of influence for major powers – such as the South China Sea or Greenland – as well as the promotion of illiberal models of democracy – like China’s “whole-process democracy” or the unitary executive without checks and balances – are not foreign concepts to Make America Great Again. Based on this, Bukele may seem to have the green light to deepen his authoritarian project with Beijing’s help. As long as the PRC does not interfere with U.S. strategic interests in El Salvador – such as migration management or control of critical infrastructure – the 47th American president might remain content, regardless of China’s growing soft power in the hemisphere.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ecuador shows the red card to a possible return of the Correísmo. Daniel Noboa remains president of Ecuador. The young head of state won the run-off election for the highest state office against his left-wing populist challenger Luisa González by a surprisingly clear margin of over eleven percent. The refusal of the loser to acknowledge her defeat once again demonstrates the great polarization in the country. After a peaceful election, this division into two camps is one of the biggest challenges facing the winner of the election, alongside curbing organized crime and the complicated economic situation. When the National Electoral Council announced an "incontrovertible trend" in favor of President Daniel Noboa just a few hours after the polling stations closed on 13 April, his supporters erupted in jubilation. This was particularly great, as the victory of 55.65% to 44.35% after more than 99% of the votes had been counted was much clearer than all the polls had predicted. The expected close election result had given rise to general concern that the election could have unpleasant repercussions in the form of electoral disputes, which would be detrimental to Ecuadorian democracy. The strong result for incumbent Daniel Noboa is beyond question but should not be read as total approval of Noboa's policies by the electorate. Rather, it clearly shows that, despite all the criticism of the government, Ecuadorians do not want to return to the "socialism of the XXI century" and its Ecuadorian figurehead Rafael Correa, from whose all-consuming shadow the defeated presidential candidate Luisa González was unable to emerge. Correismo's resistance to recognizing the election result on election night seems more than questionable given Noboa's clear lead of more than one million votes. The election campaign While Noboa was clearly committed to retaining the dollar as a means of payment, a further opening towards the USA and a relentless fight against organized crime in the run-up to the run-off election, González stood for a completely different course. She questioned the dollarization of Ecuador, proposed recognition of the Maduro regime in Venezuela with the resumption of diplomatic relations and, with regard to the fight against drug-related crime, wanted to follow the example of former Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, whose policy of "abrazos, no balazos" ("hugs, no bullets") was more of a sham pacification and a modus vivendi with the drug gangs than a real approach to the issue. Businessman's son Daniel Noboa, who has only been in power since November 2023 thanks to an extraordinary election following the end of former President Guillermo Lasso's government, has been characterized by a pragmatic approach in his brief time in office since November 2023. His government prioritized concrete and high-profile measures, particularly in the fight against crime, over ideological discourse. However, due to his short time in office, many of his actions were characterized more by campaign tactics than strategy. In contrast, Luisa González attempted to link her program to the legacy of former President Rafael Correa but made certain nuances and strategic distancing. In particular, she was critical of the Communications Law (also known as the "muzzle law"), which had been used as the basis for the persecution of journalists and the media during Rafael Correa's time in office (2007-2017). In the weeks leading up to the run-off, the focus of the election campaign was on the economy, security, and organized crime. There was no shortage of mutual accusations and all too often polemics took precedence over arguments. In view of the continuing catastrophic security situation, in which people are losing their lives in violence every hour and kidnapping rates in the country have risen by 73.9% between 2023 and 2024,[i] concepts are urgently needed. Clever marketing After the young electorate between the ages of 18 and 29 voted for the 37-year-old Noboa in the first round of voting, this time the older population groups also appear to have voted for the president. The general voter turnout was 83.76%, around two percentage points higher than in the first round of voting. In a country where many people have lost confidence in politics and its representatives, Noboa still seems to represent their hopes of overcoming the grievances, the outdated elites and the Correísmo. With his presence in the social media and a renewed self-presentation with giant papier-mâché figures distributed throughout the country, he once again managed to achieve a strong public presence. People of all ages and social classes could be seen roaming the streets of the capital Quito, for example, taking selfies with the papier-mâché Noboas, which were then shared millions of times on social networks. With such marketing tricks, his determined and youthful appearance and the fear of large parts of Ecuador of a return of the Correísmo, Noboa was able to extend his lead compared to the virtually undecided first round of elections on February 9 and win five provinces that had previously gone to Luisa González - El Oro, Guayas, Imbabura, Orellana and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas. Major construction sites For Ecuador and its old and new president, however, Noboa's election victory means only a brief respite in a situation that remains tense. The challenges remain enormous. The new National Assembly elected in February is divided into two large blocs that support Noboa and González (or Correa). There are also a number of smaller blocs and individual deputies, on whose support Noboa will be dependent due to the lack of a majority of his own. Noboa will have to demonstrate his ability to act and make convincing political proposals in order to achieve governance that serves the common good. The future of the country will depend on how well it manages to identify points of consensus and tackle the structural challenges. In this context, technical and non-partisan initiatives that manage to bundle the country's national priorities offer an opportunity. A national deficit of more than five billion US dollars, high foreign debt, and too few sustainable sources of revenue for the state will make governing difficult. Debt repayments and difficult renegotiations with the International Monetary Fund regarding the granting of further loans are also on the cards. The new government must therefore also aim to create jobs and get people into regular employment. Around 70 percent of the population still lives from the informal sector. In other words, only around 30 percent of the population work in the context of a formal employment relationship and pay taxes regularly. The president must also develop a coherent strategy for restructuring the energy system in order to avoid the hours-long power cuts that plagued the country last year. A supply system that is dependent on hydropower, dilapidated infrastructure, and a lack of diversification in the energy mix hang like a sword of Damocles over the president and could soon earn him the displeasure of the population. Last but not least, the Noboa government must get to grips with the enormous security problem associated with organized crime and various forms of illegal economic activity. The support of the USA and international cooperation in general will play a significant role in this. However, a clear and sustainable strategy for anti-mafia legislation on the part of the government is also needed. Concrete proposals are also needed to remove criminal elements from organs of the partly infiltrated state security apparatus. Outlook For Europe and Germany, Noboa's victory and the associated four-year term of office represent a fantastic opportunity to tackle the phenomenon of organized crime in a structured and targeted manner through coordinated cooperation with international allies. Noboa wants to bring his agenda closer to the USA, particularly in the areas of security and trade. As far as the European Union is concerned, strengthening cooperation and investment in areas such as the environment and energy could also be crucial for his government's future positive multilateral orientation. One sign of hope is Noboa's clear support for the port security initiative launched by EUROPOL as well as EU projects to promote comprehensive prison reform and the fight against the mafia. Cooperation on trade, economic and security issues could make Ecuador a stable partner in the Andean region in the face of left-wing authoritarian systems such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This is particularly important in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, especially in view of the fact that over 70 percent of all cocaine exports reach Europe via Ecuadorian ports. However, without a clear ethical awareness among Europeans of the drama and the effects of drug trafficking in Ecuador and Latin America, the situation in the Andean country will not improve, but rather worsen due to the demand effect, with all the social and violent consequences for the population. A litmus test for Daniel Noboa's ability to act could be his promise to start a new constitutional process. Ecuadorian institutions are still hampered by the authoritarian legacy of Rafael Correa's constitution, which is still in force. A transparent process with the participation of civil society could give Noboa legitimacy and help the country to leave the Correa legacy behind for good.  References [i] Un asesinato por hora desde el 1 de enero: Ecuador vive el inicio de año más violento desde que hay registros.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском So far in the 21st century, we are witnessing the consolidation of an international division of labor in which the levers of economic, political, and technological power are increasingly decoupled from local capacities for the vast majority of nations and relocated to the international arena. The cooperative competition among oligopolistic forces vying for control of key assets to secure global hegemony—energy, finance, digital technology, logistics, military, and space—is one of the fundamental vectors of this framework. The constant expansion of these forces is rooted in the constitutive interaction between giant corporations in strategic sectors and the core states of the new poly-globalization—namely the United States and China—whose geopolitical rivalry is intrinsically linked to the success of the accumulation regime. The oligopolies and their centers of origin appropriate the market and innovation rents generated by the new productive map, accumulating a structural and relational power (in Susan Strange’s terms) that is quickly and markedly outpacing the rest. In this way, both companies and states outside these core zones are being pushed into increasingly dependent positions regarding the technologies, goods, and basic services produced by the winning oligopolies. They are, we might say, being shifted to the new extended periphery. How does this happen? What role does technology play, and where is Latin America in this story? GEOPOLITICS Today, the United States and China sit at the center, while the rest of the world occupies the periphery. UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebecca Grynspan (2023) describes the novel emergence of “centers within the periphery” as part of a process she calls poly-globalization: both China’s rise to the top ranks of global power and the consolidation of highly productive and commercial hubs in other parts of Asia challenge the sustainability of the post–Cold War unipolar world and the traditional North–South divide. Within this framework, historical peripheral dependency does not disappear, but rather changes in form and geography—especially considering that a growing number of developed countries are becoming productively and technologically dependent on countries like China, more so than the reverse (a case in point is Germany in the automotive industry; Zhang & Lustenberger, 2025). However, the periphery is not a homogeneous entity, and not all regions and countries have the same capacities or room for maneuver within this scheme, where starting points significantly shape long-term trajectories. Developed countries (formerly located at the center) remain better equipped than developing countries to face the challenges of their new condition. We can conceptualize the peripheral configuration as tiers or peripheral rings: there is no “semi-periphery”, but rather tiers or rings within the periphery. From this perspective, we might say that Western Europe constitutes a first peripheral ring (1st tier periphery), and industrialized Asia a second ring (2nd tier periphery). Latin America, in this framework, occupies a third ring: it possesses certain accumulated productive capabilities, but due to being more "distant" from the center in terms of the criticality of its production, it receives fewer benefits from integration into major global value chains in terms of investment and technological learning (as Evolutionary Economics and Latin American Development Theory have long pointed out, producing semiconductors, AI, or green hydrogen technology —as in Taiwan, India, or Germany, respectively— is not the same than assembling automobiles as in Mexico and Argentina). In this scenario, the Latin American region—historically subordinated to a single center (the North-Center)—is now subordinate to two. China has been rapidly tightening its economic ties with the region, primarily through trade and financial assistance (Dussel Peters, 2021; Ugarteche & De León, 2020; Villasenin, 2021). Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, rose from less than 1% of the region’s total FDI in 2012 to 10.8% in 2019 (although it still lags behind investment from the US and the European Union) (Dussel Peters, 2022). The Asian giant is already Brazil’s main trading partner, is rapidly deepening its ties with Mexico, and an increasing number of countries across the continent have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, including Argentina since 2022 (the other two major Latin American economies have not joined so far). However, the benefits of these relationships for the region remain ambivalent: on the one hand, they have reduced financial dependence on the US—a significant achievement—but they have not yet translated into higher value-added development such as export diversification or upgrading. On the contrary, they have tended to reinforce the trend toward re-commoditization of local economies (Wainer, 2023; Alami et al., 2025). DIGITAL ECONOMY The current dynamics of the tech industry are particularly illustrative of the broader landscape described above, and for that reason, we take it as a focal point of observation. Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei—the flagship tech giants of the US and China, commonly referred to as Big Tech (BT)—operate collectively as a global oligopoly. This formation increasingly relegates Latin America to the role of data provider and accelerates the shift of other industrial powers from technology innovators to adopters—that is, to a position of subsidiarity. To this picture we must add Nvidia, the Musk ecosystem, and DeepSeek, among other firms whose products and executives carry significant weight in the global chain of technological decision-making, beyond even their specific market shares. No country outside of the US and China has leading firms in AI, cloud computing, advanced chip knowledge, or 5G champions (with the exception of Ericsson in the latter sector, which remains Swedish. It’s worth noting that Nokia is not included here, as although its production and brand profile are still centered in Norway, the largest shareholding stake belongs to BlackRock). An example of an interesting yet ultimately failed challenge to Big Tech dominance in large-scale projects is the European federated cloud initiative Gaia-X (European Association for Data and Cloud AISBL, https://gaia-x.eu/about/). Originally promoted by the Ministers of economic affairs of Germany and France, Gaia-X is a non-profit international association that brings together companies, state agencies, and third-sector organizations involved in European industrial and technological development (such as SAP, Siemens, the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, or Luxembourg’s National Data Service, alongside hundreds of SMEs). Its aim is to pool capabilities in order to create a large shared cloud infrastructure that allows companies and public bodies to store and develop applications securely—that is, independent of servers located outside the continent that fail to meet European data protection standards. In short, the goal is to enable competition with US tech giants and ultimately establish a “gold standard” in data security that tends to exclude them—driven by European governments’ stated concern over the region’s digital sovereignty. The conceptually appealing strategy of combining the complementary capacities of local companies of different sizes on a single platform and offering joint products, initially acted as a carrot for the industry (over 300 members joined, up from 22 at the beginning). However, over time, even the governments most vocal about sovereignty declined to adopt Gaia-X as a primary provider: Germany, for instance, signed a €3 billion agreement with Oracle Cloud (a strategic partner of AWS, Microsoft, and Nvidia) to provide cloud services in 2024. To this day, US tech giants continue to control 70% of the European cloud market (Gooding, 2024). Gaia-X remains a valuable project with over five years of development, but with frankly limited real-world reach—also, it must be said, due in part to the tech giants’ own offensive, as they increasingly offer services aimed at the “territorialization” of data (e.g., https://www.oracle.com/cloud/sovereign-cloud/what-is-sovereign-cloud/). As things stand, the European industrial powers do not control the supply, circulation, or demand of digital technologies, and major Asian players—such as India or Taiwan—occupy intermediate links in the value chains of either the Western bloc or China, depending on the case. This kind of displacement is not so surprising when we consider the oligopolistic dynamics that currently govern the global economy, involving the leadership of core countries across all strategic sectors. Particularly in the digital economy. Oligopoly is a market structure in which a small number of firms control the supply of certain goods and/or services—that is, a large-scale market dominated by a few major sellers, who are often interconnected. Oligopolies are everywhere (in oil, automotive, telecommunications, and more), but in certain sectors, structural traits such as the hyper-scale at which production is viable and profitable, the pace of innovation required for sectoral expansion, or the relevance of brand reputation drive the formation of so-called natural oligopolies (NOs): markets in which open competition (several smaller actors producing the same and rotating their market shares over time) would tend to hinder efficient production. In these markets, the number of firms capable of minimizing total industry costs is “naturally” low, due to the high entry barriers that are established. Each NO actor holds considerable market power, allowing it to develop productive and technological capacities in a privileged way over long periods. As a result, the minimum threshold for joining the oligopoly becomes increasingly difficult for outsiders to overcome. This is the case in sectors such as the extraction of scarce and critical natural resources (like lithium), energy generation and supply (e.g., wind farms), large physical and cyber-physical infrastructure for logistics (commercial ports and oceanic bridges, 5G, or submarine internet cables), or transversal digital technologies (like AI, big data, or cloud computing). All of these require massive upfront investments, accumulated know-how, strong commercialization capacity, and the ability to retain rents—which includes “artificial” legal barriers such as intellectual property rights, trade secrets, and various mechanisms to capture innovation rents. It’s not the same to have oil reserves in your territory and develop or invite companies to exploit them (which several countries do, with companies of varying sizes) as it is to develop powerful AI models using 20 years of data from the entire public internet (which only OpenAI-Microsoft of the US originally achieved with ChatGPT, even though the data came from millions of people around the world). In fact, comparable AI capabilities have only been reached by Google’s Gemini and the open-source DeepSeek model recently developed in China following US sanctions on Nvidia chip acquisitions. In a technological oligopoly, the ability to invest and innovate at scale grants companies significant prospective power: they can pour enormous sums into R&D and start-up acquisitions to develop innovations that will pay off a decade later—after numerous failed attempts costing millions—thus shaping future markets in the process (Google, for example, has heavily invested in AI development since the 1990s and has, at times, acquired one start-up per week). Additionally, NO actors actively exclude potential competitors outside the oligopoly through more questionable mechanisms such as collusion or lobbying, among others (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). Today, given the broad productive and geographic scope of global value chains and the extreme concentration of investment capacity typical of financial capitalism, more and more markets are becoming structured as natural oligopolies. Especially in digital technologies. Only Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, and Google together dominate 75% of the global cloud computing market (with respective shares of 47.8%, 15.5%, 7.7%, and 4%, according to Gartner, 2024), a sector whose relevance is crucial for the development of technologies such as generative AI. In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft also became owners or lessees of more than half of the world’s submarine bandwidth capacity—a market historically controlled by states and large telecommunications companies like NEC, Alcatel, and Fujitsu, which still make up the backbone of global data traffic infrastructure (Business Research Insights, 2025). Huawei is the world’s largest supplier of telecommunications equipment, particularly for 5G networks and smartphones, holding a 28% share of the global market and over 4,000 patents (Merino et al., 2023). This helps explain Donald Trump’s insistence on making it both a material and symbolic target in the US-China trade war. The fact that Big Tech companies share technological and market domains—beyond specializing in particular niches—fuels an intense internal competitive race that, unlike monopolies, drives continuous innovation. This means that, in addition to competing to outdo one another, these firms also cooperate extensively to maintain their global leadership far ahead of the rest of the market: each company develops interoperability features to ensure their apps function properly on others’ platforms, and they share open source projects on GitHub (now owned by Microsoft), for instance. Microsoft has contributed significantly to the development of AI in China through its Microsoft Research Asia lab in Beijing and collaborations with Chinese institutions such as the National University of Defense Technology (Hung, 2025)—efforts that neither the US nor Chinese governments have blocked. Long before the current reloaded geopolitical confrontation emerged, core-country governments had already been promoting initiatives aimed at the expansion and globalization of their tech firms, such as China’s Digital Silk Road (Borrastero, 2024) or Silicon Valley itself in the US (it bears repeating just how much state R&D funding is packed inside an iPhone; Mazzucato, 2013). And what each state has done to strengthen its own technological base has ended up, in some way, benefiting the other. Consider, for example, that what China’s customs agency classifies as “foreign-invested enterprises” are mostly US-based companies, which control three-quarters of the country’s most advanced high-tech products. These include large-scale electronics exports that often involve importing key components from the US, assembling them in China via foreign companies like Foxconn (which builds Apple’s iPhones), and then exporting them. At the same time, private Chinese firms have also expanded their role in these core exports, going from virtually zero in the 1990s to over 20% today (Kenji Starrs, 2025). The offshoring of US tech production has helped the US continue leading by producing more cheaply, and has helped China learn how to lead too. As can be seen, the actors of a Global Technological Oligopoly (GTO) are deeply interdependent. To this picture, we must add the increasingly blatant symbiosis between dominant governments and individual stakeholders, as exemplified by the Trump-Musk case. We are no longer simply talking about "public-private complexes", "revolving doors" or "intimate relations". These notions describe very close ties, but between separate entities. What we are seeing now is a kind of fusion (or confusion) between a tiny handful of public and private actors who are able to govern strategic global value chains and set the rules of the game for the rest of the world. In China’s case, the country is characterized by what Weber and Qi (2022) describe as a “state-constituted market economy”: a strong state deeply intertwined with a fundamentally marketized economy, resulting in a political-economic balance that differs somewhat from Western models but still yields a global power that is difficult to challenge. In sum, we are witnessing a competition scheme designed for the very few, that generates a spiraling cycle of leveraged success in which core states play a crucial role. LATIN AMERICA A scheme like this reinforces Latin America's historic peripheral condition. GTO companies operate directly within the territory (setting up data centers, having subsidiaries, providing services, among other things), but they also rely on regional actors to amplify the generation of indigenous data, the large-scale paid consumption of BT’s technological infrastructures, and the global dissemination of their business models. The free domestic use of email applications or social networks enables data capture, but not the monetization of digital assets, whose massive volume comes from services provided to businesses and governments (as someone aptly put it, Amazon is famous for its store but rich from its servers; Lacort, 2021). In Latin America, there is a handful of large technology companies – the so-called 'tecnolatinas' – that replicate the e-marketplace, fintech, or cryptocurrency development models characteristic of the BT, managing to stand out as champions in the regional league far ahead of the rest. However, they continue to be dependent users of the fundamental technologies produced by the GTO. Mercado Libre, originally from Argentina, is the largest and most widely used digital platform on the continent, the one with the highest market value, and the first to be listed on Nasdaq. Modeled after Alibaba, it is a marketplace with an integrated online payments and credit system, technology development and service divisions, and an extensive ground-based logistics infrastructure. For its data storage and management, Mercado Libre is a client of Amazon Web Services (AWS): it processes over 40 purchases per second across 18 countries and has migrated more than 5,000 databases to Amazon DynamoDB (AWS, 2021). As of 2024, it was using nearly a dozen services from the tech giant with which it had signed an agreement to reduce its data computing costs by 13% (AWS, 2024). The other two regional champions, both Brazilian in origin, also maintain strong ties with the BTs: the marketplace Magazine Luiza runs on Google Cloud; and the fully digital bank Nubank (of Nu Holdings) is an AWS client, has received investments from Warren Buffett, Tencent Holdings and Sequoia Capital, and many of its executives have worked at Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Alibaba. The following chart illustrates the stark imbalance in market value and profits between the GTO firms, other global tech giants, and two of Latin America's top champions, in descending order: Source: Own elaboration based on data from Forbes Global 2000 (2024).* Originally in Borrastero & Juncos (2024).** Magazine Luiza is not publicly traded.  Regional firms, in turn, capture data from countless Latin American users, acquire local start-ups, participate in scientific research networks, and work with governments to access tax and especially regulatory benefits—mechanisms that enable their gradual “giantization” (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). In short, they are part of this kind of stratified oligopoly led by Big Tech, which tecnolatinas help sustain while securing their regional slice of the pie. Far from being a marginal arena, despite Latin America’s relatively low share in global cross-border data flows compared to Asia or Europe (UNCTAD, 2021), the region represents a key market to conquer. This includes sectors with crucial resources for Big Tech’s vertical integration strategies, such as lithium. For instance, Tesla is one of the main buyers of Arcadium Lithium, which operates in the salt flats of northern Argentina, and along with other tech moguls like Bill Gates, is planning new direct investments and investments in companies developing technologies related to extraction (such as Lake Resources, which works on reducing freshwater usage in lithium mining) (López King, 2025). Big Tech companies form true global ecosystems for resource capture and the monetization of informational assets, supported by states and firms across the globe. SYSTEMIC RISKS One of the main problems of the dynamics described so far is the deepening of the international division of learning which—already highly unequal—continues to grow at breakneck speed, while technological learning becomes increasingly fundamental to value creation, and peripheral states are less and less equipped to deal with ever-larger corporations. In this context, peripheral countries risk becoming mere providers of informational raw material for platforms developed in the global centers, and end up having to pay for the digital intelligence extracted from them. Meanwhile, industrial hyper-concentration makes it increasingly difficult for the market to address these structural issues on its own. Rent refers to income derived from control over a scarce and strategic asset. The oligopolistic control of such rent-generating assets by central countries drives an endogenous concentration of rent in the central regions, and the result, in terms of income distribution both between and within nations, is a deepening of inequality at all levels (UNCTAD, 2021; Milanovic, 2019; Torres and Ahumada, 2022). Another major issue stemming from the scale reached by dominant actors and the penetration of their digital infrastructures is how difficult it has become to reverse the technological path — in terms of how to generate and provide services in a different way, while maintaining the reach and quality. Just imagine, for example, trying to establish alternative global data traffic routes or to produce world-class AI for diagnosing and treating rare diseases, without at some point relying on the technological resources of the oligopoly. The key question is how societies across the globe can harness these accumulated technological capabilities for collective purposes, without depending so heavily on heteronormative political and market-driven decisions. The list of systemic risks is a long one, and there isn’t space here to delve into the broader political dimensions of the issue. But it is worth highlighting these two particular risks tied to the current techno-economic order, given their impact on the very possibility of building concrete alternatives. LOCAL INITIATIVE Latin America enjoys neither structural power (that is, the ability to shape the rules of the game in terms of production, finance, security, or the global control of knowledge and culture), nor relational power in relation to other regions with accumulated techno-productive capacities (the ability to influence other actors into doing something they otherwise wouldn’t, following Strange’s 1988 classification). This essay may lean more toward pessimism of the intellect than optimism of the will when it comes to the global order within which Latin America must forge a new place.  Yet it is clear that the continent holds bargaining potential, rooted in the fact that it remains a highly coveted region for all the reasons discussed above—and many more (including the fact that it is, for now, a territory free of military wars). In the context of a “divide and conquer” logic typical of today’s intensified inter-core battles, strategies of absolute alignment with any single power are far from the wisest. The global oligopolistic economy will only deepen Latin America’s peripheral status if countries in the region fail to adopt a solidary non-alignment—or poly-alignment—approach, one that allows them to consolidate minimum thresholds of technological sovereignty. From dependent adoption to sovereign adoption (deciding what and how to adopt in order to learn), and from there to emancipation (integrating and developing what is needed for the people’s well-being). In Brazil, multiple state-led projects are underway to develop a sovereign data economy in collaboration with small and medium-sized enterprises and the academic sector (Gonzalo & Borrastero, forthcoming), along with large-scale initiatives to build national tech and energy infrastructures by leveraging the techno-productive capabilities accumulated over decades by Petrobras, BNDES, the national research council, and public venture capital funds (Alami et al., 2025). Mexico and Colombia are currently undergoing political processes inspired by the ideals of a “common home” and the care of virtual lands, advocating for continental unity on the one hand and strict regulation of Big Tech on the other (BBC News Mundo, 2025; Forbes Central America, 2025; Government of Colombia, 2024; Colombian Presidency, 2025; Wired, 2025). Argentina has a range of digital development projects based on policy frameworks designed to autonomously leverage the productive capacity the country has accumulated since the 1940s (Gonzalo & Borrastero, 2023)—though these efforts have been obstructed by the pro-Trump government of Javier Milei. EPILOGUE As these lines are being written, stock markets around the globe are tumbling amid the tariff war unleashed by the United States, forcing everyone else to adjust. Even the “Magnificent Seven” (Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla) have lost billions in just a few days. This raises the question of whether we are witnessing the birth of a new international economic order. Whether this is a true turning point or merely another heightened episode in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry remains to be seen. What we can already observe, however, is that global control over strategic assets for development places the GTO and core economies in a structurally advantageous position to lead long-term value chains. At the same time, the polycrisis opens up opportunities for marginalized regions to seize the momentum and assert their own demands. In financial capitalism, not everything is determined in the marketplace, and amid widespread and persistent instability, self-determination remains, without a doubt, one of the most powerful antidotes. References Alami, I., DiCarlo, J., Rolf, S. & Schindler, S. (2025). The New Frontline. The US-China battle for control of global networks. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 2.AWS (2024). Mercado Libre acelera el time to market con servicios de la nube de AWS. Amazon Web Services. Recuperado de: https://aws.amazon.com/es/solutions/case-studies/mercado-libre-migration/.AWS (2021). Mercado Libre escala su negocio y mejora su fiabilidad al migrar 5000 bases de datos a Amazon DynamoDB. Recuperado de: https://aws.amazon.com/es/solutions/case-studies/mercado-libre-dynamodb/.BBC News Mundo (2025). Plan México: cómo es el ambicioso proyecto de Claudia Sheinbaum para colocar a su país entre las 10 principales economías del mundo. BBC News Mundo, 15 Enero 2025. Recuperado de: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cre8ze0dvdno.Borrastero, C. (2024). Estado, empresas y factores geopolíticos en el sendero de desarrollo de las redes 5G en Argentina. Estudios Sociales del Estado, 10(19), pp. 104-138.Borrastero, C. y Juncos, I. (2024). El Oligopolio Tecnológico Global, la periferia digital y América Latina. Desarrollo Económico, 64(243), pp. 110-136.Business Research Insights (2025). Submarine Cable Market Size, Share, Growth and Industry Analysis, By Type        (Impregnated Paper Insulated Cable, Oil-filled Cable), By Application (Shallow Sea, Deep Sea), and Regional Insight and Forecast to 2033). Retrieved from: https://www.businessresearchinsights.com/market-reports/submarine-cable-market-121770Dussel Peters, E. (2022). Capitalismo con características chinas. Conceptos y desa-rrollo en la tercera década del siglo XXI. El Trimestre Económico, 89(354).Dussel Peters, E. (2021). Monitor de la OFDI China en América Latina y el Caribe 2021. Recuperado de: https://www.redalc-china.org/monitor/images/pdfs/menuprincipal /DusselPeters_MonitorOFDI_2021_Esp.pdfForbes Centroamérica (2025). Petro aboga por la colaboración entre países ante tensión entre multilateralismo y soledad. Forbes Centroamérica, 9 Abril 2025. Recuperado de: https://forbescentroamerica.com/2025/04/09/petro-aboga-por-la-colaboracion-entre-paises-ante-tension-entre-multilateralismo-y-soledad.Gartner (2024). Gartner Says Worldwide IaaS Public Cloud Services Revenue Grew 16.2% in 2023. Retrieved from: https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2024-07-22-gartner-says-worldwide-iaas-public-cloud-services-revenue-grew-16-point-2-percent-in-2023Gonzalo, M. y Borrastero, C. (2025). América Latina y la “Economía de datos”: definiciones, temas de agenda e implicancias de política, en Lastres, H. y Cassiolato, J. Economia Política de Dados e Soberania Digital: conceitos, desafios e experiências no mundo, ContraCorrente, en prensa.Gonzalo, M. y Borrastero, C. (2023). Misión 7 “Profundizar el avance de la digitalización escalando la estructura productiva y empresarial nacional”. En Argentina Productiva 2030 - Plan para el Desarrollo Productivo, Industrial y Tecnológico. Ministerio de Economía de la Nación, Argentina.Gooding, M. (2024). Gaia-X: Has Europe's grand digital infrastructure project hit the buffers?. Data Center Dynamics, May 13th 2024. Retrieved from: https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/gaia-x-has-europes-grand-digital-infrastructure-project-hit-the-buffers/Grynspan, R. (2023). Globalización dislocada: Prebisch, desbalances comerciales y el futuro de la economía global. Revista de la CEPAL, 141, 45-56.Gobierno de Colombia (2024). Estrategia Nacional Digital de Colombia 2023-2026. Recuperado de: https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/715/articles-334120_recurso_1.pdf.Hung, K. (2025). Beyond Big Tech Geopolitics. Moving Towards Local and People-Centred Artificial Intelligence. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 10.Kenji Starrs, S. (2025). Can China Challenge the US Empire?. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. Geopolitics of Capitalism, Ch. 6.Lacort, J. (2021). Así es como gana dinero Amazon: cada vez más nube y un futuro de producciones audiovisuals. Xataka, 3 Febrero 2021. Recuperado de: https://www.xataka.com/empresas-y-economia/asi-como-gana-dinero-amazon-cada-vez-nube-futuro-producciones-audiovisuales-1López King. E. (2025). Litio: Argentina pudo unir a Elon Musk y a Bill Gates en una inversión clave en la que ambos coinciden. Litio.com.ar. Recuperado de: https://litio.com.ar/litio-argentina-pudo-unir-a-elon-musk-y-a-bill-gates-en-una-inversion-clave-en-la-que-ambos-coinciden/Mazzucato, M. (2013). The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. London: Anthem Press.Merino, G., Bilmes, J. y Barrenegoa, A. (2023). Economía en el (des)orden mundial: Ascenso de China, estancamiento del norte global y nuevo paradigma tecno-económico en disputa. Instituto Tricontinental de Investigación Social, Cuaderno 5.Milanovic, B. (2019). Capitalism, Alone. The Future of the System That Rules the World. Harvard University Press.Presidencia de Colombia (2025). Intervención del Presidente Gustavo Petro Urrego durante la plenaria IX Cumbre de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC), Tegucigalpa, 9 de Abril de 2025. Recuperado de: https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1727297164867599Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets. An introduction to International Political Economy. Pinter Publishers, London.Torres, M. y Ahumada, J. M. (2022). Las relaciones centro-periferia en el siglo XXI. El Trimestre Económico, LXXXIX (1), 53, 151-195.Ugarteche, Ó. y De León, C. (2020). El financiamiento de China a América Latina. http://www.obela.org/analisis/el-financiamiento-de-china-a-ame¬rica-latina#:~:text=EnLatinoaméricaexisten4sucursales,en Brasil%2C Chile y PerúUNCTAD (2021). Digital Economy Report 2021. Cross-border data flows and development: For whom the data flow. Recuperado de https://unctad.org/publication/digital-economy-report-2021.Villasenin, L. (2021). Las oportunidades de América Latina en su relación con China en el siglo XXI. Interacción Sino-Iberoamericana / Sino-Iberoamerican Interaction, 1(1).Wainer, A. (2023). ¿Un puente al desarrollo? Cambios en el comercio de América Latina con Estados Unidos y China. Problemas del Desarrollo. Revista Latinoamericana de Economía, 54(213).Weber, I. & Qi, H. (2022). The state-constituted market economy: A conceptual framework for China’s state–market relations. Economics Department Working Paper Series, 319, University of Massachusetts Amherst.Wired (2025). Claudia Sheinbaum propone aumentar los impuestos a plataformas como Google, Netflix y Amazon en México. Wired.es, 17 Febrero 2025. Recuperado de: https://es.wired.com/articulos/claudia-sheinbaum-propone-aumentar-los-impuestos-a-plataformas-como-google-netflix-y-amazon-en-mexico.Zhang, Y. & Lustenberger, U. (2025). Balancing Protectionism and Innovation: The Future of the European Automotive Industry in the Age of Chinese Electric Vehicles. Singularity Academy Frontier Review, #20250219.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Good morning, everyone. Forty-three years after the beginning of the Malvinas War, we gather once again as a nation to commemorate our veterans and those who fell in combat, under the proud gaze of their families, to whom I also extend this tribute. Today, we remember those Heroes who gave their lives for the Homeland, who are part of the pantheon of those who forged our history through their sacrifice. Today, we honor them by reaffirming, with genuine determination, Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, as well as the surrounding maritime areas. Unfortunately, in recent decades, our sovereign claim over the islands has been directly or indirectly harmed by the economic and diplomatic decisions of the political caste. No one can take seriously the claim of a nation whose leadership is known worldwide for its corruption and incompetence, and for dragging Argentina into the arms of the world’s scum. A country that systematically impoverishes its land and sides with dictators and petty tyrants enters any diplomatic negotiation from a position of weakness. And if we add the disarmament and deliberate demonization of the Armed Forces, we had the perfect recipe for the Malvinas Islands to remain forever in foreign hands. The first step we must take, then, is to rise as a country in every sense — both materially and spiritually — and to reclaim the place in the international community that we should never have lost. And there is no other way to achieve this than by applying the ideas of liberty, both within our borders and beyond, by opening ourselves to international trade and adopting a foreign policy aligned with the free nations of the world. This is the first government in a long time that understands that a sovereign country must, first and foremost, be a prosperous country. Only then can we take the second step: to dignify our Armed Forces through the necessary investments that only a prosperous nation can afford. Growth is in vain if public spending is not reorganized, strengthening those areas in which the State should be involved and eliminating those that are unnecessary, because when the State assumes responsibilities that do not belong to it, it is always to the detriment of essential functions. Despite the political caste’s decades-long effort to convince us otherwise, Argentina needs a strong Armed Forces. They are essential to defend our vast territory from potential threats in a global context of growing uncertainty. They are also indispensable in any diplomatic discussion. In this regard, history is unforgiving: a strong country is a respected country. This does not mean that might makes right, but foreign policy cannot be conducted from a naïve and childish idealism either. For us, the Armed Forces are a source of pride. The time when they were undervalued has come to an end. Proof of this is that, on July 9 of last year, for the first time, more than 2,000 of our veterans led the military parade during the Independence Day celebrations, before a proud and grateful crowd for their actions in defense of the Homeland. That is also why we have just enacted a decree instructing the Ministry of Defense to grant the rank of Reserve Second Lieutenant to those Reserve Officer Candidate Soldiers who are veterans of the Malvinas War. This rank would have been granted to them upon completion of their military service, but it was left unfulfilled as they were discharged directly after the war ended. This is, simply put, about settling a debt with these Heroes — a debt that has been ignored for 43 years by successive governments and that we now intend to correct once and for all. Without all the above, any notion of sovereignty loses its meaning. Sovereignty is not about the State owning many companies, nor about financing the film industry, or second-rate concerts, or similar things. Believing that more State means more sovereignty is an Orwellian concept under which politics has historically tried to conceal its dirty dealings — resulting in a poor people enslaved by an omnipresent State. We, on the other hand, have come to reclaim that word, which until recently had been hijacked, and to restore the meaning it truly deserves. A sovereign people is a flourishing, vigorous, respectable people — and above all, a people proud of its Armed Forces. A nation like the one built by the generation of the 1880s, which, after a century of humiliation, we are rebuilding. As I’ve said on other occasions, we are not here to apply extravagant formulas, but rather to return to those strategies that once made us successful. And when it comes to sovereignty over the Malvinas, we have always made it clear that the most important vote is the one cast with feet. We hope that one day the people of the Malvinas will choose to vote with their feet — for us. That is why we seek to make Argentina such a powerful nation that they will prefer to be Argentine, and persuasion or deterrence won’t even be necessary to achieve it. That is why we have embarked on the path of liberation we are now walking — so that Argentina becomes the freest country in the world, once again has the highest GDP per capita on the planet, and inspires people around the world to dream of the Argentine dream. That is what this government understands by sovereignty. It is the standard by which we measure ourselves, and we will not settle for anything less. To conclude, on this second April 2nd that I experience as President, I want to once again reaffirm our unwavering claim over the Malvinas Islands, reinforcing our commitment to exhaust all diplomatic means within our reach so that they may return to Argentine hands. Finally, to the veterans, to their families, and to all those who wear the uniform in defense of the Homeland, I extend my eternal gratitude on behalf of all Argentines. May God bless the Argentine Republic, may the forces of heaven be with us! Long live freedom, damn it! Thank you very much! Long live the Homeland!

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In the current global disorder, the countries that comprise Latin America are simultaneously emerging as key players in tipping the balance of global power and are courted by major powers seeking influence and access to their natural resources, infrastructure, and services. For a decade, China has been growing in importance in the region, driven by its interest in establishing itself there through the Belt and Road Initiative, loans, investment, and construction, challenging the United States for relevance on the continent as a preferred ally. Currently, another player of the magnitude of India is slowly but surely making inroads in Latin America in trade, financing, and political relations, and is being courted by many Latin American states as an alternative to the risks that staking everything on an alliance with China can entail. Brazil, the undisputed regional leader, maintains privileged relations with both Asian giants, and the three countries cooperate and share interests and forums, such as the BRICS+ and the G20+, where common projects are developed. Introduction: a relationship with historical background The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization led to growing regional competition in Asia, focused on both political influence and economic dominance. One of the most significant developments in the aftermath of these transformations has been the consolidation of China as a regional and, subsequently, global power. In the current context, China, India, and other nations are seeking to expand their alliances and redefine their strategies, including their relationship with Latin America, a region that has experienced multiple phases of engagement with external actors throughout its history. During the 19th and 20th centuries, interaction was centered on Europe and the United States; however, since the 21st century, the dynamics have diversified and taken on a multipolar character. Today, Latin American countries are the object of interest of various powers, from China and Japan to India and Iran. While China's presence in Latin America is evident and significant, India has traditionally maintained a more distant stance, except for Brazil.1 For decades, the limited interaction between India and Latin America was mainly attributed to factors such as geographical remoteness and lack of strategic opportunities. However, this perception has changed since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. In recent years, China has considerably expanded its influence in the region through various mechanisms, while India seeks first to integrate into this dynamic and, in the medium, to compete with China in certain areas. China has established itself as one of Latin America's main trading partners, as well as one of its largest global lenders and investors.2 Its influence does not currently compare with that of India, but rivals that of the United States, the only country that surpasses it in terms of exports and imports in the continent, and the European Union in multiple sectors. In the political and diplomatic sphere, China has made significant progress, such as persuading five Latin American countries - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama - to transfer their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China, although Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay are still doing so. It has also established alliances with countries sanctioned by the US - Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela - which it has supported with loans, military cooperation, and investment. However, in a context of global uncertainty, several Latin American countries are seeking to diversify their strategic alliances and reduce the risks of excessive dependence on a single power. In this scenario, India emerges as a relevant actor, with the potential to balance China's presence in the medium term in key sectors such as trade, infrastructure, supply chains, technology and defence, where India still has ample room for growth in the continent. China in Latin America: economic and strategic expansion China has indisputably been the most influential actor in Latin America between the two Asian powers, especially in the economic sphere, standing out for its participation in infrastructure projects in the Southern Cone as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Since the beginning of the 21st century, its presence in the region has grown rapidly, with Chinese state-owned companies consolidating themselves as key players in strategic sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology, surpassing in some areas even the United States, traditionally dominant in these areas. In addition, China has strengthened its influence through cultural and diplomatic mechanisms. The links between China and Latin America have historical roots dating back to the 16th century, when the Manila Galleon facilitated the exchange of goods such as porcelain, silk and spices between China and the Viceroyalty of New Spain. After the independence of Latin American countries in the 1840s, there was a major Chinese migration, with hundreds of thousands of workers employed on sugar plantations, in mines and as servants in countries such as Cuba and Peru, a phenomenon that persisted throughout the 19th century. Today, Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela are home to the largest Chinese communities on the continent. Initially, most Latin American countries did not recognize Mao's government after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949; however, following US President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, most Latin American states established diplomatic relations with Beijing, thus initiating a period of cooperation in the cultural, economic and political spheres. On the economic front, China has established itself as a major player. In 2000, the Chinese market represented less than 2 % of Latin American and Caribbean exports, but its demand, especially for raw materials, has grown exponentially.3 By 2024, China would absorb 17% of these exports, with a value of more than 500 billion dollars.4 The main products exported by the region include soybeans and other vegetables, copper, oil and other raw materials, while imports from China consist mainly of manufactured goods. In countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, China has become the main trading partner.5 The strengthening of economic ties has been formalized through comprehensive strategic partnerships with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. China has also signed free trade agreements with Chile - the first country in the region to do so in 2005 - Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru, while negotiations with Uruguay remain stalled. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, twenty-two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have signed agreements with China, which have facilitated investments and loans amounting to more than USD 9 billion, equivalent to 6 % of China's total investment abroad. These investments, managed through the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank, have largely gone to energy and infrastructure projects, in many cases in exchange for oil. Venezuela has been the main recipient, doubling the amount received by Brazil, the second largest recipient.6 China's impact in Latin America is manifested in infrastructure development and the energy sector. Chinese investments have financed the construction of refineries and processing plants in countries with coal, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium deposits. In the case of copper, China is the main buyer of Chilean production, purchasing more than 40 % of the country's exports. China has also taken a special interest in lithium, with significant investments in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, countries that make up the so-called 'Lithium Triangle' and account for approximately half of global lithium reserves, although the development of these projects has raised environmental concerns.7 At the same time, China has promoted the financing of renewable energies, with outstanding initiatives such as the largest solar plant in Latin America in Jujuy, Argentina, and the Punta Sierra wind farm in Coquimbo, Chile. Since former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's historic thirteen-day tour of Latin America in 2001, high-level political exchanges have intensified. President Xi Jinping has visited the region five times since coming to power in 2013, most recently in November 2024, when he reaffirmed the construction of major projects, including the port of Chancay in Peru.8 China has financed various infrastructure projects in Latin America, including airports, roads, ports and rail networks. Chinese companies control more than a hundred ports around the world, of which at least a dozen are in Latin America and the Caribbean.9 In terms of technology and communications, China has promoted projects in artificial intelligence, smart cities and 5G networks, with the participation of companies such as Huawei. Likewise, cooperation in space has become relevant, with the installation of the largest Chinese space base abroad in Argentine Patagonia and the construction of satellite ground stations in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.10 China has also consolidated its presence in Latin America through soft power strategies, strengthening cultural and educational ties through the Confucius Institute, student scholarships and the expansion of Spanish-language media, such as CGTN and Xinhua. Furthermore, it has reinforced its image as a supportive actor at the international level, which was evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic with the supply of vaccines and medical equipment to governments in the region. In this context, China's influence in Latin America is projected as a long-term phenomenon, with implications that span the economic, political, and cultural spheres, in a scenario in which other powers, such as India, are also seeking a presence in the region. India's arrival and expansion in Latin America Historically, relations between India and Latin America have been limited due to geographical distance, the absence of common strategic interests and the lack of a consolidated bilateral agenda. Latin America occupied a marginal role in India's foreign policy, despite diplomatic visits such as Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's 1961 visit to Mexico and Indira Gandhi's 1968 visit to eight countries in the region. A significant change occurred in the 1990s, when India signed trade agreements with seven Latin American countries and promoted the FOCUS LAC program (1997), designed to strengthen economic relations with the region.The turning point in India's perception of Latin America came in 2014, when the newly appointed prime minister, Narendra Modi, participated in the BRICS Summit in Brazil. The expansion of the India-Mercosur Preferential Trade Agreement, initially signed in 2004, but extended in 2016,11 evidenced India's commitment to strengthening its ties with the region. Bilateral trade between India and Latin America currently stands at USD 43 billion, with Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia as its main trading partners. Like China, India finds in Latin America a key source of mineral resources, such as copper, lithium, and iron ore, essential for its growing industrial demand. An example of this was the strategic partnership agreement signed in 2023 between India's Altmin Private Limited and Bolivia's state-owned lithium company. The region has also become an important partner in the supply of oil: in recent years, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil have accounted for 30 % of crude oil exports to India. In return, India exports products from strategic sectors such as information technology and pharmaceuticals to Latin America. India is also involved in infrastructure development in the region, investing in railways, roads, and energy supply systems.12 In 2022, India's foreign policy gave a new signal of rapprochement with Latin America by bringing the Latin American members of the G20 (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) under the jurisdiction of the foreign minister, rather than a junior minister. In April 2023, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar made a historic visit to Guyana, Panama, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, marking the first time an Indian foreign minister had visited these countries. This tour reflected the growing importance of Latin America on India's diplomatic agenda as the region with the second highest number of projects spearheaded after Asia: India currently has 181 projects in Asia, thirty-two in Latin America and the Caribbean, and three in Central Asia and Oceania. These initiatives have expanded qualitatively in recent years, especially in terms of the size of the credit lines and the complexity of the projects.13 While on 3 August 2023 and on the sidelines of the ninth meeting of the Confederation of India-Latin America and Caribbean Industry in New Delhi, Jaishankar advocated deepening India-Latin America engagements, especially in the areas of agriculture, supply chain diversification and mutual resource sharing partnership. Thus, while China has captured greater political and diplomatic attention in the region, India's presence has raised expectations.14 Unlike China, India is a democracy and faces similar challenges to many Latin American countries, which has facilitated its rapprochement with the region. Its economic growth has sparked interest in Latin America, leading several governments to prioritize relations with India in their foreign policy strategies. Although its expansion in the region responds in part to the intention of countering China's influence, India seeks to consolidate itself as an actor with a vision of strategic autonomy and a stance aligned with non-alignment, promoting relations based on cooperation and the diversification of partners. However, its presence still faces structural limitations, such as the lack of effective regional integration and its limited participation in key Latin American blocs such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).15 At the G20 summit+, held in Rio de Janeiro on 18-19 November, Modi took the opportunity to hold bilateral meetings, apart from with Brazilian President Lula, with some of India's most important partners in the Latin American region, including Argentina and Chile, where a bilateral meeting with President Gabriel Boric marked the expansion of the India-Chile Preferential Trade Agreement, described by Chile as a genuine Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement on a par with those India has signed with the United Arab Emirates, South Korea or Japan, overcoming with Chile New Delhi's reluctance to corroborate these free trade agreements. India is aware that its influence in Latin America is minor compared to that of China, but it also recognizes its growth potential.16 One of its main resources to strengthen its presence in the region is soft power, especially through its cultural projection. Elements such as the Bollywood film industry, gastronomy, and traditional practices such as yoga have gained popularity in Latin America, facilitating the expansion of India's influence in the region and contributing to its positioning as an emerging global partner. Partners in BRICS+: China and India's influence on Brazil Both China and India have a special relationship with the Latin American giant, Brazil, as the three countries share several international forums, most notably BRICS+, of which Argentina - a candidate country and finally accepted as a member at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August 2023 - dropped out in early 2024, after Javier Milei's victory in the presidential elections. Brazil has been a key country in the expansion strategy of China, which has become the main trading partner and one of its main investors, and now of India in Latin America, especially due to the economic size, natural resources and regional leadership capacity of the Brazilian giant.17 All in all, China has a more dominant presence in the Brazilian economy, while India is gaining space in the technology, pharmaceutical and energy trade sectors. If the trend continues, India could strengthen its influence, but it is unlikely to overtake China in the short to medium term. Starting precisely with China, diplomatic relations with Brazil have evolved significantly in recent decades, consolidating into a strategic link in the commercial, investment and technological spheres, except during Jair Bolsonaro's term in office between 2019 and 2023, when even China expressed concern over the hostile statements of the then Brazilian president.18 During the last two years the relationship has been on the right track and even in 2024 the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of official relations was celebrated. In March 2023, Lula visited China with the aim of strengthening trade and political ties between the two nations, which had deteriorated during Bolsonaro's term in office. During the visit, an agreement was announced to trade in yuan instead of dollars, reducing dependence on the US financial system and strengthening Brazil's financial autonomy in the international arena.19 Apart from politics, and although Brazil has never joined the Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral Sino-Brazilian trade has grown steadily since the mid-2000s, dominated by the export of raw materials, especially oil, and attracting important Chinese state-owned companies such as China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec in its acronym) and China National Petroleum Corporation. Subsequently, Chinese investment diversified into strategic sectors such as power generation and distribution, with the presence of conglomerates such as State Grid and China Three Gorges, manufacturing, with the arrival of Chinese companies from various sectors, These include BYD, TCL, Gree, Midea and Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, the mining sector, and the agricultural sector, where Chinese firms such as COFCO and Long-Ping High-Tech have expanded their operations, from product marketing to the manufacture of chemical inputs for agribusiness. In infrastructure, Chinese participation has been significant with projects driven by China Communications Construction Company and China Merchants Port, which in 2018 acquired the Paranaguá Container Terminal. The future seems to point towards increased Chinese investment in new communications infrastructure, energy transition and technology. In 2021, despite Bolsonaro's criticism, Brazilian regulators reversed their decision to ban Huawei from developing the country's 5G networks, which came weeks after China provided Brazil with millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccine20 , while two years later, the two countries announced their participation in joint technological projects such as the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) for monitoring the Amazon.21 India has also had a strong influence on Brazil, at least culturally, since Gandhi's time, as his teachings on non-violence gave rise to social movements and partly shaped the two countries' non-aligned foreign policy. Economically, Brazil is one of India's most important partners in Latin America, being the largest importer (over 41 %) and exporter (over 29 %) to India, with significant investments in sectors such as information technology, energy, mining, and automobiles. Already in 2022, India's exports to Brazil exceeded those of Germany, Australia, South Korea, or Indonesia. Brazil is now among the top ten export destinations from India, spurred by a 295% increase in refined oil sales. India's imports from Brazil increased, driven by purchases of soybean oil. Relations between Brazil and India have never been particularly intense, but under Lula's third presidency this has also changed. In the political sphere, they share strategic objectives, such as the reform of the UN Security Council, where they aspire to obtain a permanent seat, as well as their collaboration in global initiatives, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the aforementioned BRICS+ and the G20+ of emerging economies. In 2020, the 'Brazil-India Defence Dialogue' was established for the first time and agreements were signed to expand technological collaboration in the military field. Brazilian companies such as Taurus have entered into partnerships with Indian companies, such as Jindal, for the joint production of armaments. In addition, Brazil is exploring the export of military technology, including cargo and training aircraft, armored vehicles and submarines, to which China, a traditional supplier of aircraft and equipment to several countries on the continent, including Brazil, responded in January 2025 by offering the Brazilian government the acquisition of the fourth-generation Chengdu-10 fighter.22 Finally, both states wish to diversify their external relations. India, concerned about its geopolitical rivalry with China, seeks a pragmatic balance between close relations with the US and other regional actors, such as in the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD), while maintaining its long-standing ties with Russia. Historically, Brazil has sought to mitigate US influence in South America, something that continues under President Lula's government. However, like other Latin American countries, it is also aware of its economic vulnerability stemming from its high dependence on commodity exports to China and its current dearth of foreign investment. Another forum shared by Brazil, China and India is the G20+. The rotating presidency in 2024 was held by Lula da Silva, who focused the organization’s objectives on three priorities, highlighted in the final declaration: social inclusion and the fight against hunger and poverty; sustainable development, with energy transition and the fight against climate change and, thirdly, the reform of global governance institutions, both from China and India not only ratified the declaration, but even Narendra Modi devoted special attention to Brazil's priorities, echoing New Delhi's common interests in renewable energy, the elimination of poverty and hunger, and focusing on nutrition and food security.23 Xi Jinping, also present at the summit and later on an official visit to Brasilia, expressed his support for President Lula's proposal to create the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, underlining China's commitment to inclusive and equitable development, while signing 37 bilateral agreements between Brazil and China in various fields, such as trade, finance, infrastructure and environmental protection.24 Conclusion: Still unequal competition China and India have adopted different strategies in their relations with Latin America, strategies that have been marked by time in terms of their interest in being present in the continent. While China has established itself as a dominant player in recent times and in terms of investment and project financing in the main Latin American countries, India has awakened in the last decade after a historical lack of interest in this area and is beginning to focus an increasing presence on matters such as technological cooperation and trade in strategic sectors, especially the supply of crude oil. In fact, both China and India have realized that the South American region is a key partner for the supply of raw materials to economies in continuous expansion and, in terms of international politics, the consolidation of new alliances in the so-called global south. India is a potential competitor in several economic niches, and in some of them it is even a major player, such as in information technology, the pharmaceutical sector, where Indian companies have maintained a leading position in exporting products to Latin America, and the automotive industry, where sales are fairly balanced. However, they are the exception that proves the rule, since in general terms, China maintains a substantial advantage in trade and investment figures in Latin America, operating on a completely different scale to India and the result of its interest for much longer. Another difference between the two Asian giants in terms of their influence in Latin America is their involvement in treaties, agreements, and deeper bilateral relations with Latin American countries. Indeed, one of the main challenges for India lies in the lack of a stable institutional framework through which to strengthen its relationship with Latin American countries, unlike China, which has long established trade agreements and strategic initiatives with various countries and regional blocs, starting with the Belt and Road Initiative itself. India has not yet developed comprehensive free trade agreements, cooperation mechanisms similar to China's, or bilateral agreements with supranational groupings such as SICA, CELAC, Mercosur or the Pacific Alliance, which constrains the growth of its trade. On the other hand, India has an advantage over China, such as the prestige of its traditional non-alignment and its historical representativeness of developing countries. In a region like Latin America whose countries recurrent structural obstacles, such as inflation, social and political instability and chronic infrastructure deficits, the geopolitical context and the ideological leanings of the different governments make China's presence, its network of trade agreements and its diversified investment strategy stable... until now, as this may change in the future. Diversifying risks and investments with options such as India represents a positive factor for Latin American countries, as well as a significant challenge for India. The relationship between India, China and Latin America is beneficial for Latin American countries, which are expanding their possibilities for bilateral cooperation on issues such as trade, climate change and security, while increasing competitiveness between the two Asian giants in a scenario that has traditionally been geographically and culturally distant, but which is currently of unquestionable interest to them. So far, China's predominance in the region seems to remain unchanged and it has even overtaken the United States as the main trading partner and source of investment in most South American countries. Competing in this division could take India several years, although the Chinese example itself shows that the arrival of agreements, treaties, cooperation, and investment from India could exponentially increase its influence in the continent in a few years' time. In recent times, Latin America has diversified its economic and diplomatic relations, reducing its dependence on a single strategic partner, be it China or the United States, another major player in this game of competition in the region. Although the decline in the role of the United States is notorious, precisely because of the irruption of the Chinese presence,25 especially in the economy, many countries have continued to move towards greater autonomy and diversification of their international ties, a trend that seems to be consolidating, regardless of the changes in US policy with the beginning of Trump's second term in office in the United States and his policy towards Latin America. Both the desire to diversify relations beyond the China option and the possible US disinterest in the region may benefit India's interests, although it is clear that China will continue to be the dominant actor in the region. References 1 GANGOPADHYAY, Aparajita. "India-China Competitions in Latin America: Some Observations", Global & Strategis, Th. 8, No. 1. January-June, 2014. Available at: http://irgu.unigoa.ac.in/drs/bitstream/handle/unigoa/4110/Jurnal_Global_dan_Strategis_8%281%29_2014_1-13.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 13/3/2025).2 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues?", The Diplomat. 19 May 2022. Available at: India vs. China in Latin America: Competing Actors or in Separate Leagues? - The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/india-vs-china-in-latin-america-competing-actors-or-in-separate-leagues/ (accessed 13/3/2025)3 DADUSH, Uri. "China's Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 8 March 2012. Available at: China's Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2012/03/chinas-rise-and-latin-america-a-global-long-term-perspective?lang=en  (accessed 13/3/2025).4 "Chinese consumption growth boosts Latin American and Caribbean exports", Cobertura360. 8 March 2025. Available in: Chinese consumption growth boosts Latin American and Caribbean exports - Cobertura360 https://cobertura360.mx/2025/03/08/negocios/el-crecimiento-del-consumo-chino-impulsa-las-exportaciones-de-america-latina-y-el-caribe/ (accessed 13(3/2025).5 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC). Prospects for International Trade in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2024. LC/PUB.2024/16-P, Santiago, 2024. Available at: International Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2024 (accessed 13/3/2025).6 ROY, Diana. "China's Growing Influence in Latin America", Council of Foreign Relations. 10 January 2025. Available at: China's Growing Influence in Latin America | Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri (accessed 13/3/2025).7 RADWIN, Maxwell. "Chinese investment continues to hurt Latin American ecosystems, report says", Mongabay. 28 February 2023. Available at: Chinese investment continues to hurt Latin American ecosystems, report says https://news.mongabay.com/2023/02/chinese-investment-plagues-latin-american-ecosystems-report-says/ (accessed 13/3/2025).8 BAÑOS, Jordi Joan. "Xi returns to Latin America to win it over", La Vanguardia. 16 November 2024. Available in: Xi vuelve a América Latina para ganársela https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20241116/10111790/xi-vuelve-america-latina-ganarsela.html#foto-1 (accessed on 13/3/2025).9 LIU, Zongyuan Zoe. "Tracking China's Control of Overseas Ports", Council of Foreign Relations. 26 August 2024. Available at: Tracking China's Control of Overseas Ports | Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/tracker/china-overseas-ports (accessed 13//2025).10 EVAN ELLIS, R. et al. "How are the United States and China intersecting in Latin America?" Brookings. 25 September 2024. Available at: How are the United States and China intersecting in Latin America? https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-are-the-united-states-and-china-intersecting-in-latin-america/ (accessed 13/3/2025).11 "Mercosur-India talks expected to expand preferential trade agreement", mercopress.com. 15 August 2016. Available at: Mercosur-India talks expected to expand preferential trade agreement - MercoPress https://en.mercopress.com/2016/08/15/mercosur-india-talks-expected-to-expand-preferential-trade-agreement (accessed 13/3/2025).12 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Latin America's tryst with the other Asian giant, India", Wilson Center. May 2022. Available in: Microsoft Word - LAP PUB Template.docx (accessed 13/3/2025).13 JAISHANKAR, Subrahmanyam. The Indian way. Strategies for an uncertain world. Harper Collins India, 2020, pp. 107-108.14 "Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement', The Hindu. 3 August 2023. Available at: Jaishankar bats for deeper India-Latin America engagement - The Hindu https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-bats-for-deeper-india-latin-america-engagement/article67153329.ece (accessed 13/3/2025).15 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century," Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief no. 634. April 2023. Available at: Redrawing India-Latin America Relations in the 21st Century https://www.orfonline.org/research/redrawing-india-latin-america-relations-in-the-21st-century (accessed 13/3/2025).16 SESHASAYEE, Hari. "The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America", Observer Research Foundation. 10 December 2024. Available at: The G20 turns New Delhi's eyes on Latin America https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-g20-turns-new-delhi-s-eyes-on-latin-america (accessed 13/3/2025).17 BLASCO, Emili J. "Brasil: la persistente ambición de un país que se imagina a sí mismo como continente", Middle Powers: Transitando hacia un orden multipolar. IEEE Strategy Notebook, 225. June 2024. Available at: Ch. 5. Strategy Notebook 225.pdf (accessed 13/3/2025).18 SPRING, Jake. "Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil", Reuters. 26 October 2018. Available at: Bolsonaro's anti-China rants have Beijing nervous about Brazil | Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/world/bolsonaros-anti-china-rants-have-beijing-nervous-about-brazil-idUSKCN1MZ0DR/ (accessed 13/3/2025).19 "Brazil and China agreed to trade in each other's currencies to bypass the dollar", Infobae. 30 March 2023. Available in: Brazil and China agreed to trade in their currencies to bypass the dollar - Infobae https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/03/29/brasil-y-china-acordaron-comerciar-en-sus-monedas-para-eludir-el-dolar/ (accessed 13/3/2025).20 RIVERA, Jhonnattan. "Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei", Techbro. 1 March 2021. Available at: Brazil approves 5G spectrum auction rules, no ban on Huawei - TechBros https://somostechbros.com/2021/03/01/brasil-aprueba-reglas-de-subasta-del-espectro-5g-sin-prohibicion-a-huawei/ (accessed 13/3/2025).21 CARIELLO, Tulio. "50 years of Brazil-China relations: Solid foundations for a sustainable future", Red China & Latin America. 1 September 2024. Available at: 50 años de relaciones Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para un futuro sostenible / 50 anos de relações Brasil-China: Bases sólidas para um futuro sustentável - Red China y América Latina https://chinayamericalatina.com/50-anios-de-relaciones-brasil-china-bases-solidas-para-un-futuro-sostenible/ (accessed 13/3/2025).22 "China offers Brazil the Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap", Galaxia Militar. 9 January 2025. Available in: China offers Brazil Chengdu J-10 to fill fighter gap. - Galaxia Militar, https://galaxiamilitar.es/china-ofrece-a-brasil-el-chengdu-j-10-para-cubrir-la-brecha-de-aviones-de-combate/ (accessed 13/3/2025).23 "Prime Minister's Remarks at the G20 Session on "Social Inclusion and the Fight Against Hunger and Poverty", Prime Minister's Office. 18 November 2024. Available at: Press Release: Press Information Bureau, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2074413 (accessed 13/3/2025).24 VILELA, Pedro Rafael. "Brazil and China sign 37 bilateral agreements", Agencia Brasil. November 21, 2024. Available at: Brasil y China firman 37 acuerdos bilaterales | Agência Brasil, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/es/politica/noticia/2024-11/brasil-y-china-firman-37-acuerdos-bilaterales (accessed 13/3/2025).25 RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ, María. "Iberoamérica ¿prefiere a mamá China o a papá Estados Unidos?", bie3: Boletín IEEE (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies), 34. April-June, 2024, pp. 542-559. Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/ejemplar?codigo=672227&info=open_link_ejemplar (accessed 13/3/2025).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The question of migration occupies a central and divisive place in US politics. Yet critical questions are rarely asked about why migrants decide to leave their homes in the first place and what role US foreign policy might play in that decision. This oversight is especially glaring when it comes to one of the most common tools of US foreign policy: broad economic sanctions. There is overwhelming evidence (1) that migration1 is driven in large part by adverse economic conditions and (2) that sanctions can have severe, harmful economic and humanitarian consequences for civilians in targeted countries. The cases of Cuba and Venezuela demonstrate this relationship clearly: The imposition or tightening of sanctions by the US government have, in recent years, fueled economic crises that in turn have led to record migratory outflows. Addressing migration at its roots will require rethinking US sanctions policy as part of a broader research and policy agenda that considers the role of US foreign policy in fueling migratory push factors abroad. Economic Hardship Drives Migration The decision to emigrate — often involving leaving one’s home, family, and community to undertake a perilous journey to a new country with a different language and culture, without any guarantee of safety, accommodation, or employment — is not typically one that is taken lightly. Such a life-altering decision is rarely reducible to a single factor but is rather made in the context of multiple and interrelated push and pull factors. However, one of the most well-established sets of factors that impact migration are economic. There is broad consensus that economic conditions in the country of origin are a major determinant of the desire to migrate. A recent review of 72 peer-reviewed, survey-based analyses of migration aspirations found an overwhelming relationship between the desire to migrate and economic factors, including perception of national economic conditions, employment opportunities, household financial situation, food security, contentment with public services, and expectations of future economic conditions. A similar relationship holds true of realized migration. Many have hypothesized an inverted U-shaped relationship between development and migration, whereby higher GDP per capita is associated with increased migration as would-be migrants gain the means to do so, until a certain point — after which higher income is associated with decreased migration. However, recent research suggests that this U-shaped relationship, though observed in cross-sectional analyses, does not hold for a given country over time.2 Rather, the relationship is clearer: poor or deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions cause people to migrate from developing countries while growth and stability lead people to stay home. Sanctions Fuel Economic Hardship Over the past two decades, the number of US-imposed sanctions has grown nearly tenfold. The United States is by far the most prevalent user of sanctions, with one-third of all countries — and over 60 percent of low-income countries — facing US sanctions in some form. While many sanctions are narrowly targeted against particular individuals or entities, others target entire sectors or even the entire economy of a country. Such broad-based sanctions are indiscriminate and can have profound impacts on the economies, and therefore civilians, of targeted nations (and even purportedly targeted sanctions can have significant spillover effects). Broad-based sanctions can impede economic growth, potentially triggering or extending recessions and even depressions; restrict access to critical resources like medicine, food, and energy; disrupt humanitarian aid (despite nominal exemptions); and consequently exacerbate poverty, illness, and hunger. As a result, sanctions can lead to a significant number — in some cases tens of thousands — of preventable deaths. In a 2023 literature review for CEPR, economist Francisco Rodríguez determined that 94 percent of peer-reviewed econometric studies on the subject found substantial, statistically significant “negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality, and human rights” as a result of sanctions. One study associated sanctions with, on average, a 26 percent drop in GDP per capita — roughly the size of the Great Depression. Another tied sanctions to a 1.4-year decline in female life expectancy — comparable with the global impact of COVID-19. Yet another found a 2.5 percent increase in childhood HIV infection rates. While such indiscriminate impacts are often denied by the policymakers that impose sanctions, it is difficult to reconcile this denial with the fact that major macroeconomic factors such as growth rates, oil production, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of essential goods are widely used — often by these very same policymakers — as metrics of “success” of sanctions. That these macroeconomic factors would in turn impact civilians is all but undeniable. In fact, there are significant reasons to believe that the broad economic and humanitarian impacts of certain sanctions regimes are intentional — and therefore are not a matter of calibration, but are inherent to the policy itself. Sanctions Induce MigrationIf migration is driven in part by economic hardship and sanctions can cause great economic and humanitarian suffering, then it follows that sanctions can substantially contribute to migration. This is not just borne out logically, but can be seen in the data. In October 2024, the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization published what may be the first and only systematic cross-national empirical analysis of how such sanctions impact international migration. The findings are striking. Using data on migration flows from 157 countries over more than half a century, the authors find that Western multilateral sanctions3 have increased emigration from target countries by, on average, 22 to 24 percent. Notably, they also find that “migrant flows return to their pre-sanction level once sanctions are lifted.” In few cases is this relationship between sanctions and migration clearer than in the cases of Cuba and Venezuela. Trump-Biden Sanctions Spur Cuban Depopulation The US embargo against Cuba — referred to by many as a blockade due to its extraterritorial impacts — is the US’s oldest and most comprehensive sanctions regime. Beginning in 1960 with export prohibitions in response to the Castro government’s agrarian reforms and nationalizations, successive administrations soon escalated this embargo into a comprehensive ban on nearly all trade, travel, and financial transactions, with the goal of destabilizing and ultimately toppling the Cuban government. While these sanctions have been periodically tightened or relaxed over the years, this foundational, comprehensive embargo has remained intact for over six decades and has since been enshrined into law through the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. During his last two years in office, President Barack Obama took significant steps toward the normalization of bilateral relations with Cuba by, among other things, formally resuming diplomatic relations, loosening restrictions on travel and remittances, and removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SSOT) list, a measure that had effectively cut the island off from much of the global financial system. However, under the first Donald Trump administration, these policies were largely reversed, and the embargo was expanded to an unprecedented level. President Joe Biden, despite campaign promises to change the course of Cuban policy, maintained most of President Trump’s measures. Days before leaving office, Biden issued executive orders undoing Trump’s harshest sanctions measures only to see them predictably rescinded immediately following Trump’s return to the White House. In the case of both Trump and Biden, Cuban policy appears to have been driven in large part by electoral considerations in Florida, where hawkish Cuban American voters have long (and questionably) been seen as a key demographic in both parties’ efforts to win the state. The US embargo has long hindered Cuban economic growth and development, particularly since the late 1980s when the Soviet Union and its COMECON partners discontinued economic support for the island. In 2018, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean validated the Cuban government’s estimates that the six-decade embargo had cost the country $130 billion. By 2024, that estimate had grown to $164 billion. A recent econometric study on changes in US policy toward Cuba between 1990 and 2020 found a “substantial negative impact of sanctions policy shifts on Cuban economic growth.” Further, “this impact on GDP is concentrated in the component of household consumption” — in other words, Cuban citizens bear the highest burden. Over the last few years, Cuba’s economic situation has deteriorated further, in large part as a result of Trump-Biden policies. Measures such as returning Cuba to the SSOT list (despite no evidence of Cuban support for terrorism), restricting remittances, and prohibiting US citizens from doing business with dozens of “restricted entities” have greatly limited Cuba’s access to foreign exchange. This has, in turn, prevented Cuba from importing many essential goods (including critical pharmaceutical and agricultural inputs) and services (including maintenance services for Cuba’s ailing energy infrastructure), servicing its external debt, and perhaps most crucially, stabilizing the local currency following a major monetary reform in 2021. Another Trump measure — his decision to implement Title III of the LIBERTAD Act — has had a significant chilling effect on foreign investment in Cuba only a few years after the enactment of a reform opening up most sectors of the economy to foreign investors. This controversial provision, which allows for lawsuits against US or foreign persons doing business with Cuban entities that use or benefit from property expropriated at the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, had been waived by prior presidents and by Trump himself, until April 2019. The far-reaching negative impact of these and other Trump measures are part of the reason why Cuba’s economy has failed to significantly recover from the global economic downturn triggered by the COVID pandemic. Cuba has been plunged into the most serious economic and humanitarian crisis of its contemporary history, characterized by repeated blackouts, water shortages, fuel shortages, rising food costs, the deterioration of basic services such as garbage collection, and the spread of preventable diseases. Cuba’s fledgling private sector, which greatly expanded following Obama’s normalization measures and domestic liberalization measures in 2019 and 2021, is facing an uncertain future as a result of the crisis and new, stricter Cuban regulations designed in part to offset the effects of sanctions by capturing increasingly scarce foreign exchange. This economic crisis has in turn spurred a migration crisis. Data from the national statistics office of the government of Cuba shows skyrocketing net emigration following 2020 (see Figure 1). By August 2022, the outflow of migrants had surpassed that of the famous 1980 Mariel boatlift and the 1994 Balsero/Rafter crises combined.   Independent research — later confirmed by the Cuban government — estimates an even larger increase than those published by the national statistics office: the departure of over one million people, representing 10 percent of the country’s entire population, in 2022 and 2023 alone. As one researcher warned in 2022: “Cuba is depopulating.” While not all of these migrants ended up in the United States, the years 2022 and 2023 saw record-breaking numbers of encounters with Cuban migrants by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2022, the CBP encountered more Cubans than any other nationality except Mexicans. Cubans constituted more than 10 percent of all encounters.4 Given the Trump administration’s, and particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s, apparent commitment to maintaining the current policy toward Cuba — and perhaps even hardening it with yet more sanctions — we can expect out-migration from the island to continue at record levels for the foreseeable future. “Maximum Pressure” Sanctions Fueled Venezuelan Exodus While the US has maintained limited sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, the current sanctions regime is defined by the “maximum pressure” campaign initiated during the first Trump administration in an attempt to push President Nicolás Maduro out of office. In August 2017, Trump blocked the government of Venezuela, including the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), from accessing financial markets. In late 2018, Trump sanctioned the gold sector. Perhaps most significantly, the oil sector and PDVSA were designated as sanctioned entities in January 2019. Additional sanctions on the financial and defense sectors and the central bank soon followed, alongside the escalation of secondary sanctions against third parties. The US’s and many of its allies’ policy of nonrecognition of the Maduro government has also led to effective sanctions, such as the loss of access to roughly $2 billion in reserves held at the Bank of England and $5 billion in Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund. These “maximum pressure” policies were largely maintained under the Biden administration, with a few significant exceptions. Since November 2022, Chevron Corporation has been permitted to produce and export oil from Venezuela. In October 2023, Biden issued a General License temporarily lifting most oil sector and PDVSA sanctions but allowed the license to expire six months later (while leaving a wind-down period). Though Venezuela’s economic crisis — driven in part by both misguided economic policies and falling global oil prices — began prior to the imposition of sanctions, US sanctions have substantially contributed to the severity and longevity of the contraction. Sanctions impact the Venezuelan economy through numerous channels, but perhaps none more significantly than through oil. The Venezuelan economy is highly dependent on oil exports, historically relying on the sector — and its main actor, PDVSA — for 95 percent of its foreign exchange. From 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd) prior to the crisis, oil output hit a low of 0.4 million bpd in mid-2020 — an 83 percent collapse. Even with today’s Chevron license, output has yet to break 1 million bpd. A 2022 analysis by Francisco Rodríguez attributes 797,000 bpd of this decline to the 2017 sanctions alone. Other assessments point to similar figures, with some attributing more than half of the decline to sanctions. As Rodríguez points out, new sanctions are associated with marked downward inflection points in Venezuelan oil output (see Figure 2).   Ultimately, the Venezuelan crisis saw a 71 percent collapse in GDP per capita. As Rodríguez notes, this was the equivalent of three Great Depressions and the largest peacetime economic contraction in modern history. By Rodríguez’s assessments, more than half of this decline was attributable to sanctions and related political acts. Whatever claims policymakers may make about the targeted nature of sanctions, such broad macroeconomic effects inescapably and indiscriminately impact civilians. In addition to the general effects of economic contraction and the loss of foreign exchange with which to import essential goods such as food and medicine, sanctions have also inhibited shipments of COVID vaccines and other medical supplies; contributed to the degradation of the energy grid and frequency of electrical shortages; and otherwise furthered the deterioration of public health, education, and water services. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures reports that sanctions on Venezuela have “prevented the earning of revenues and use of resources to maintain and develop infrastructure and for social support programs, which has a devastating effect on the entire population of Venezuela, especially — but not only — those living in extreme poverty, women, children, medical workers, people with disabilities or life-threatening or chronic diseases, and the indigenous population.” According to one CEPR estimate, sanctions likely led to tens of thousands of excess deaths in one year alone. Unsurprisingly, such a dire humanitarian crisis has contributed to an unprecedented mass exodus. In the last decade, over seven million Venezuelans have left the country. In one of the few direct quantitative studies on the impacts of sanctions on migration, Francisco Rodríguez finds that over four million of these seven million left “as a result of the economic deterioration caused by sanctions and toxification effects.” Rodríguez further estimates that a return to “maximum pressure” policies would result in the emigration of an additional one million Venezuelans in the coming five years. While the vast majority of these Venezuelan migrants ended up in countries closer to home, such as Colombia and Peru, a growing number have made their way to the US border as well (see Figure 3).   In 2023 and 2024, CBP encountered more migrants from Venezuela than any other country except Mexico.5 According to survey data from the Migration Policy Institute, Venezuela is the single fastest growing country of birth of immigrants to the US since “maximum pressure” began in 2017 (alongside other sanctioned countries, such as Afghanistan — number 2 — and Nicaragua — number 7). The Trump administration was repeatedly warned that mass migration was a likely consequence of its sanctions policy, yet pursued it anyway. According to one senior US Department of State official: “This is the point I made at the time: I said the sanctions were going to grind the Venezuelan economy into dust and have huge human consequences, one of which would be out-migration.” To Address Migration, Lift Economic Sanctions Though migration has many causes, and it is difficult to precisely quantify the contribution of sanctions to overall emigration levels, the following are nonetheless clear: 1. Migration is driven in large part as a reaction to adverse economic conditions.2. Economic sanctions often have profound adverse economic impacts.3. Econometric evidence indicates that sanctions directly contribute to migratory flows.4. In Cuba and Venezuela, economic sanctions are associated with mass migration. While fearmongering and anti-migrant sentiment should be flatly rejected, it is plainly preferable that people in other nations not be forced into circumstances that compel their displacement. To achieve this goal, broad economic sanctions must be lifted. Recognition of the link between sanctions and migration has been growing among US policymakers. In May 2023, 21 members of Congress — led by members representing border states that have witnessed an influx of large numbers of migrants — sent a letter to President Biden urging the easing of sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela to mitigate push factors for migration. A separate letter from over 50 economists and other scholars shortly followed, corroborating the claim that lifting sanctions would help ease migration. Former Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whose country is also impacted by migratory flows, has said the same. An Alternative Approach to Migration Is Available This relationship between US economic sanctions and migration further suggests the need for a research and policy agenda that considers migration within the context of global inequalities and underdevelopment and critically considers the role of US foreign policy — including but not limited to sanctions — in reproducing and exacerbating migratory push factors. In other words, addressing migration at its root requires rethinking and rectifying the US’s approach to Latin America as well as other parts of the Global South. While the Biden administration proclaimed a “root-causes” strategy toward addressing migration from Central America, intending to address push factors in countries of origin, including corruption, crime, and economic insecurity, the strategy failed to consider how the US’s own policies might exacerbate these conditions. In contrast, the recently established Congressional Caucus to Address Global Migration and the Migration Stability Resolution introduced by its co-founder, Rep. Greg Casar (D-TX), take a more comprehensive approach, aiming to — in Rep. Casar’s words — “[change] the failed US policies that cause displacement abroad and force people to flee their home countries.” Tackling broad economic sanctions, anti-worker trade agreements, US security assistance for repressive governments, inequalities in the global financial system, and more, these efforts offer an alternative path toward addressing migration: a path that is both more humane and more effective. Footnotes 1. For the purposes of this article, “migration” is used to refer specifically to international migration.2. Moreover, as CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez explains, even if there were truth to the U-shaped hypothesis, it would be a story of the long-run structural and societal transformations that accompany development and would not contradict a thesis that short-run economic contractions — such as those that might result from the imposition of sanctions — fuel migration across income levels. Indeed, short-run fluctuations in growth and employment are observed to significantly impact migration.3. While this study assessed joint US-EU sanctions specifically, one can expect a similar relationship to hold in unilateral US sanctions, given the dominant role of the United States in the global financial system and given that EU sanctions policy often follows the lead of US policy.4. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.5. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.