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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Latin America has been a long-standing policy focus for the United States, aimed at keeping external influences out and maintaining stability in the region. This commitment began with the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary and continued through the Cold War. Under the current administration, there has been a renewed emphasis on Latin America due to rising Chinese influence, drug cartel activity, and immigration issues. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) states that no region impacts the United States more than the Western Hemisphere and emphasizes the need to “protect against external interference or coercion, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” However, the United States has not had a coherent strategy or policy toward Latin America in decades, leading to outcomes contrary to its stated goals. The PRC has been rapidly expanding its influence in the region. Since 2010, China has nearly tripled its trade with Latin America, with several nations signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Additionally, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to affect the United States through drug, weapon, and human trafficking, while also forcing migrants north due to unsafe living conditions in their home countries. Given this situation, the United States must develop a coherent two-pronged strategy toward Latin America. This strategy should involve expanding economic investments to counteract Chinese influence while also strengthening regional security to address the threats posed by TCOs. Recognizing that the PRC and TCOs are different from the Soviets and Marxist guerrillas, US policy during the Cold War provides valuable lessons on what this two-pronged approach could entail. US Cold War Policy in Latin America In the early days of the Cold War, the United States was concerned about the spread of communism in Latin America but initially failed to take meaningful action. It relied instead on outdated policies from the 1920s. This approach continued until the late 1950s, when significant changes occurred in the hemisphere. By then, ten of thirteen dictators had been replaced, economic challenges had intensified, and the prices of Latin American exports had plummeted. This social and political unrest carried over into the 1960s, as the region became “aflame” with Marxist revolutions. The CIA reported that twelve out of twenty-three nations in the southern hemisphere were at risk of falling to communism. This urgency prompted the United States to act, determined to prevent the region from succumbing to Soviet influence and instability. The Kennedy administration identified economic struggles and monetary insecurity as the principal vulnerabilities that could allow communism to take root. To address these issues, the administration launched the Alliance for Progress, a ten-year initiative where the United States would provide $20 billion in loans, grants, and investments, while Latin American governments aimed to generate $80 billion in funds and implement land reforms, tax systems, and other socio-political changes. In tandem with economic initiatives, the United States employed covert actions, counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, and military support to suppress Marxist revolutions. For instance, in Guatemala, US-backed military forces fought against Marxist revolutionaries with American military assistance. Similar operations took place in El Salvador, Chile, Paraguay, and Brazil. Although not executed flawlessly, this two-pronged strategy ultimately succeeded in keeping Soviet and communist influences largely at bay in the region. Economic assistance and support helped stabilize democracy in Venezuela, while land redistribution and reforms from the Alliance for Progress undermined financial support for Marxist guerrilla groups in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Despite being conducted with a certain level of negligence, US-backed COIN operations across the region weakened guerrilla movements, leading to factional splits and self-defeating behaviors. Notably, US-supported operations included the capture of Che Guevara by a US-trained Bolivian military unit in 1967. Applying a Cold War-like Policy Today Economic challenges are once again prevalent in Latin America, and China is seizing the opportunity. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has expanded its influence and bolstered regional ties. Twenty Latin American countries have signed onto the BRI, while Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru have established free trade agreements with the PRC. In 2010, trade between China and South America amounted to $180 billion, which surged to $450 billion by 2021. The United States needs to consider a strategy similar to the Alliance for Progress to effectively compete with the PRC and maintain its influence in the region, as it is currently falling short in this area. In 2023, China invested $9 billion in Latin America through its Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), while the United States contributed only $2 billion for the same year. As the new administration shapes its foreign policy, it is essential to allocate more economic investment to Latin America. This should involve a deliberate economic policy and investment plan that focuses on trade, port infrastructure, and technological development—all areas where the PRC is currently providing support. The bipartisan Americas Act of 2024 is a good starting point, but it is insufficient to counteract the PRC’s advances. While some might argue that boosting economic investment is too expensive, such efforts would enable the United States to compete with China while stabilizing the region and reducing northward immigration. In tandem with economic investment, the United States must advocate for stronger regional security to combat TCOs, thus fostering stability and improving living conditions. Specifically, the United States should collaborate with Latin American countries to enhance security institutions by expanding advisory and assistance operations with regional militaries, similar to COIN operations during the Cold War. In recent years, the United States military has maintained a significant presence in countries like Colombia, Panama, and Honduras to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations, aimed at preparing partner forces to effectively combat TCOs. FID and Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations should include US military support for other nations in the region, such as El Salvador, Bolivia, and Mexico. Historically, countries like Mexico have been hesitant or resistant to accepting US military support; however, this trend has recently shifted. In a positive development, the Mexican Senate has approved a small contingent of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to assist Mexican SOF personnel. In addition to expanding FID operations, the United States might explore granting broader authorities to allow US military forces to assist regional partners in targeting and operational planning against TCOs. While some may oppose this option, expanded authorities should not come as a surprise, given that the new administration has designated several TCOs as terrorist organizations. This designation opens the door for discussions on expanded authorities. Conclusion During the Cold War, Latin America was a primary focus of US policy. The United States worked diligently to maintain regional hegemony and prevent the spread of communist ideology in the Western Hemisphere. Today, Latin America and the southern border have again become focal points for the current US administration. With the rising influence of China in the region and the ongoing impact of TCOs on American life, the United States must develop deliberate policies and strategies to maintain its hegemonic influence while promoting stability. This strategy should consist of a two-pronged approach that emphasizes both economic investment and regional security. Such an approach could disrupt Chinese influence while fostering a safer and more stable region, ultimately reducing migration northward—a key objective for the current administration. Article, originally written by and published in Small Wars Journal under the title "Same But Different: Cold War Strategy in 21st Century Latin America." Consult here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/06/same-but-different-cold-war-strategy-in-21st-century-latin-america/. This translation is shared under the same Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the return to power of the center-left coalition "Broad Front" (Frente Amplio, FA) in 2025, Uruguay has entered a new political cycle. Although Uruguay is a very stable country by Latin American standards, various forecasts about possible changes in the country's foreign policy under the new president, Yamandú Orsi, have already started appearing in the media. Most expectations focus on the regional dimension, which is logical for several reasons. Firstly, the regional subsystem of international relations plays a crucial role in Uruguay's participation in global politics, particularly in advancing key foreign policy priorities that are important to all ideological camps in the country, such as conflict mediation, development assistance, support for international law, and human rights. Secondly, a critical stance toward Latin American integration structures became a hallmark of the outgoing conservative government of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), which left office on March 1, 2025. His presidency was marked by debates over the direction of regional integration, including discussions on the potential revival of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), strengthening the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in response to crises in energy, healthcare, and food security during the 2020s, and overcoming the stagnation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Uruguay consistently positioned itself as a staunch and vocal skeptic on all these matters. According to one of Uruguay’s leading international relations experts, Nastasja Barceló, this stance has harmed national interests by contributing to the "isolation of Uruguay and a break with the country’s traditional foreign policy approaches".  Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that the team of the newly elected president openly emphasizes the priority of the regional dimension. A key figure in Yamandú Orsi’s team is Álvaro Padrón, his advisor on international political affairs, who, in an interview, outlined the concept of "concentric circles" in Uruguay's foreign policy: "The first circle consists of bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil… the second is MERCOSUR… the third is South America". According to Padrón, aligning positions on various international issues with South American and Latin American neighbors should serve as the foundation for advancing Uruguay's interests on global platforms. Orsi’s allies also highlight that his government aims to leverage regional opportunities to facilitate Uruguay’s integration into the evolving multipolar world order. Thus, the election of Yamandú Orsi has raised hopes that Uruguay will significantly strengthen its presence in regional integration groups. At the very least, this is expected to apply to CELAC, UNASUR, and MERCOSUR, which are frequently mentioned in the rhetoric of the future president, Vice President Carolina Cosse, Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin, advisor Álvaro Padrón, as well as in the still-limited assessments of international affairs experts. Naturally, questions arise about the specific opportunities and challenges on this path: what tools and strategies can Uruguay use to "revitalize" the regional framework? How will the new government's Latin American agenda align with its global policy? While it is difficult to provide definitive answers before Orsi officially takes office, contradictions are already apparent that may weaken the positive impact of the change in power on regional integration. Challenges to Regional Integration and Uruguay's Approach In a conceptual sense, projects like CELAC and UNASUR are associated with the so-called idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", which rose on the wave of the "left turn" of the 2000s - early 2010s. One of the brightest supporters of this philosophy was the popular Uruguayan President (2010-2015) José Mujica, who still exerts a significant influence on the balance of power in the "Broad Front". His support for the candidacy of Yamandú Orsi in the last elections was so obvious that the future president was literally nicknamed the "heir" of J. Mujica. In light of the close ties between the two politicians, it seems logical that J. Orsi will also promote the idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", defending the consolidation of his region on the international arena in the face of major powers that have their own interests in Latin America. In the speeches of J. Orsi and A. Padrón, there are indeed calls to strengthen CELAC so that Latin America can have more weight in international affairs, or to structure leadership in South America, but in real life there are challenges to the implementation of such plans. One of them is the reactive position of Iain Orsi's team on the Venezuelan issue. Over the past decade, discussions about the right of Nicolás Maduro to remain in power have polarized Latin America and prevented the development of unifying initiatives. The administration of L. Lacalle Pou has solidified its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of N. Maduro's government, which limits the possibilities of cooperation with the Chavistas. Although Iain Orsi has stated in connection with the Venezuelan issue that the importance of dialogue with states is higher than judgments about political regimes, his team has not made any special changes on the Venezuelan vector. After N. Maduro was re-elected to his post once again in the summer of 2024, Iain Orsi said that there is a “dictatorship” in the Caribbean country, and none of the key figures of the CF went to N. Maduro's inauguration in January. At one time, Jose Mujica offered his good services to Colombia, where the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC took the difficult path of reconciliation, and one might expect that the moderate leftist J. Orsi would try himself in the role of mediator of the internal political crisis in the Bolivarian Republic. But for agreements and mediation, Caracas and Montevideo need at least to restore normal diplomatic interaction, which was frozen after the elections in Venezuela in July 2024. As noted in the media, the prospect of "defrosting" is absolutely unclear. The second challenge is doubts that Uruguay under J. Orsi will be able to contribute to the consolidated and independent positioning of Latin America in the current geopolitical conditions. As far as can be judged now, the team of the elected leader is distinguished by an extremely evasive position on the crises around Ukraine and Gaza, combining emphasized official neutrality, non-participation in sanctions and diplomatic demarches, but also a certain sympathy for the Western point of view. This is hinted at, for example, by J. Orsi's positive attitude to sending a Uruguayan delegation to the summit on Ukraine in Bürgenstock in June 2024 and his statements about Russia in the spirit that "perhaps other points should have been included" in the program of principles of the "Broad Front", condemning US and NATO imperialism. In the Middle East drama, J. Orsi, like his vice-president K. Kosse, while agreeing with the Palestinians' right to claim statehood, does not condemn Israel's actions. This differs from the position of many other left-wing leaders in the region, which some critical experts have already noted. When analyzing the roots of these approaches, two key points emerge. First, it is likely that under this president the liberal attitudes characteristic of the mainstream of Uruguayan elites will be preserved. They may also be relevant for the moderate left within the “Broad Front”, to which Yamandú Orsi belongs, who defines himself as a “pragmatist” and “non-Marxist.” The consequence of adherence to such a political philosophy usually becomes a loyal attitude to the course of the Euro-Atlantic powers and their closest allies, so it is unlikely that Uruguay under Yamandú Orsi will oppose the Western-centric world order. Secondly, the involvement of major powers in geopolitical contradictions, the adoption of obligations or parties in this regard, including the unambiguous label of “non-alignment”, does not fit into Montevideo’s line of behavior on the global stage at all. The positioning of this small South American state in the context of the formation of a multipolar world, as built in the discourse of political elites, presupposes an economic-centric strategy and “free hands”. The key idea is to interact with various actors, especially for the implementation of the goals of trade and investment diversification, and to promote a positive image of Uruguay as a neutral and peace-loving state focused on socio-economic development. The U.S. dimension deserves special mention, as distancing from Washington and challenging its dominance has traditionally been a defining feature of proponents of Latin American patriotic unity. Uruguay has maintained relatively stable relations with the United States, though previous administrations under the "Broad Front" encountered certain areas of disagreement. One key issue has been hemispheric security and the functioning of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), which the "Broad Front" views as repressive and outdated. This stance was evident under the last left-wing government led by Tabaré Vázquez (2015–2020), which initiated Uruguay’s withdrawal from the treaty. However, the administration of Luis Lacalle Pou reversed this decision, leaving Montevideo’s future participation in the Rio Pact uncertain as of the 2024 elections. The program of principles of the "Broad Front" for 2025-2030, which the coalition formulated on the eve of the elections, stated that Uruguay should secure the support of the region and finally withdraw from the controversial treaty - "a legacy of the Cold War" and "a symbol of Latin America's status as the backyard of the United States." Moreover, as one of the "main experiments" of regionalism, it mentions the South American Defense Council (SADC). It operated under the auspices of UNASUR and was focused on developing common South American solutions in matters of military security and peacekeeping, excluding the influence of external powers. In Orsi's entourage, nothing has been said about Uruguay's attitude to either the Rio Pact or the SADC. On the other hand, shortly after his electoral triumph, Orsi met with US Ambassador Heidi Fulton, who confirmed that Washington and Montevideo have common views, including on security issues. In light of this, it currently appears that the Uruguayan leader is not interested in being at the forefront of critics of US influence in Latin and South America. The emergence of Donald Trump at the helm of the US, who in the first weeks of his presidency has already managed to enter into a rhetorical conflict with the heads of Mexico, Colombia and Central American states, may further encourage J. Orsi to behave cautiously. Especially considering that Uruguay is one of the few countries in the region under leftist rule that has not received its share of criticism from D. Trump and his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a “hawk in Latin American affairs”. The desire to maintain a calm, positive interaction with Washington, which the outgoing administration of L. Lacalle Pou achieved, can also be perceived as a consequence of J. Orsi’s pragmatism and moderation, despite his leftist orientation. It certainly cannot be considered a resource for uniting the regional neighbourhood with the idea of fighting against the “North American dictate”. Thus, at this stage, the new president’s approach to international affairs appears too passive and cautious to actively support any bloc identity in Latin America. Therefore, if strengthening CELAC and restoring UNASUR remain priorities for the new government, its focus will likely be on the inclusivity and representativeness of these platforms rather than their sovereigntist positioning. Nevertheless, although J. Orsi does not seem to be a figure who will strengthen political integration in the spirit of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", he may well increase the overall regional presence of Montevideo. The politician has repeatedly emphasized that in the Latin American field, the development of multilateralism and presidential diplomacy are important to him. Under his leadership, Uruguay will be able to show itself in individual initiatives and working groups under the auspices of CELAC or UNASUR on environmental issues, human rights, and sustainable development. For example, in December 2024, J. Orsi already discussed plans to promote a "regional alliance" on clean energy and joint efforts to preserve the Amazon with his Colombian counterpart Gustavo Petro. A New Phase for MERCOSUR? Regarding MERCOSUR, the "Broad Front" (FA) has a clear stance—to strengthen and expand it. This position is shared by the new president's team, and it seems to be more than just rhetoric. Even before the end of 2024, Yamandú Orsi met with all the bloc’s neighboring presidents except Javier Milei—Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Paraguay’s Santiago Peña, and Bolivia’s Luis Arce. During these meetings, the Uruguayan leader emphasized regional unity and expressed his commitment to developing MERCOSUR. Relations with Brazil are of decisive importance and have become a strategic priority for J. Orsi. Under L. Lacalle Pou, interaction with the northern neighbor was pragmatic. Lula da Silva's ambitions to turn MERCOSUR into a tool for promoting Brazil on the international stage irritated the Uruguayan president. Now, however, completely different assessments have begun to be heard from the Uruguayan side: A. Padron calls Brazil a regional "heavyweight", stating that, by increasing its own global role, Uruguay must "accompany Brazil's leadership". In his view, such "accompaniment" presupposes support for multilateral groups led by the northern neighbor, among which MERCOSUR plays a key role as the oldest organization. At the same time, the circle of J. Orsi is characterized by the established ideas in the political elites of Uruguay that MERCOSUR still requires reforms and should follow the path of open regionalism. On the one hand, this assumes that the economy remains a priority area of cooperation in the bloc, the improvement of the common market requires the growth of the organization's importance among all economic entities in the member states, the correlation of its work with the tasks of technological and innovative development of its participants. On the other hand, MERCOSUR must adhere to the principles of free trade and build up external relations in order to strengthen the positions of its participants in the international division of labor. At the same time, today the association finds itself in conditions where globalization is slowing down, the struggle for strategic resources is intensifying, and supply chains are being restructured. Given these circumstances, several areas can be identified that may be of interest to the government of J. Orsi, both from the point of view of revealing Uruguay’s competitive advantages in MERCOSUR and from the point of view of modernizing the bloc.  Firstly, this is an emphasis on the integration of production chains with neighbors, the promotion of "friendshoring" in MERCOSUR. This is supported by the fact that Uruguay's industrial supplies are primarily focused on the bloc's members. The electric transport industry, pharmaceuticals and the production of organic food products are growth points for the industrial and innovative potential of the Uruguayan national economy and at the same time create a field for complementarity of economies in MERCOSUR. For example, Uruguay is the record holder in South America for the prevalence of electric vehicles, and it also has the most extensive network of charging stations for them in the unification zone. However, the country's own production of cars and batteries has not been established and remains an important task for the future, as noted in a report prepared in 2023 by the Technological University, the National Institute of Employment and Vocational Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Uruguay. Resources to solve this problem can be found within MERCOSUR. The bloc now includes Bolivia, which is aiming to industrialize its vast lithium sector and has national expertise in producing electric cars. Secondly, Uruguay has traditionally been distinguished by its special attention to the concept of sustainable development, which is consistent with the concept of building bioeconomy in the South American Common Market. Recently, it has been discussed by scientists as an alternative to import-substituting industrialization, which guided the bloc until the 2010s and began to stall after the onset of the 2014–2015 crisis. According to IDB estimates, Uruguay has some of the highest standards in Latin America for the implementation of renewable energy sources, environmental awareness practices in organizational, managerial and production activities. Such competencies increase its importance for MERCOSUR if the bloc decides to focus on the energy transition and promote the formation of circular economies. For now, these plans seem hypothetical, but the appearance of an association agreement with the European Union on the horizon will make them relevant. Given that MERCOSUR not only reached a trade agreement with the EU in December 2024, but is also considering the formation of FTAs with China, Korea and Singapore, another important area for Uruguayan diplomacy will clearly be building the bloc's relations with external powers. The rhetoric of J. Orsi and K. Cosse, as well as A. Padron, shows that the Uruguayan side expects to combine all these areas and rely on its neighbors in order to strengthen its position in negotiations and reduce the asymmetry in interactions with larger global players. It was in this vein that the decision was made for J. Orsi to abandon a separate FTA agreement with China, which the outgoing government of L. Lacalle Pou sought. The beginning of the widespread protectionist offensive of the United States under D. Trump really creates an opportunity for MERCOSUR to open its doors to European and Pacific partners. Uruguay, which champions free trade principles, can take advantage of this. At the same time, the options related to the bloc leave their unspoken. The most obvious of them is the coordination of interests with Argentina, which, as mentioned, will be included in the “first circle” of the foreign policy strategy of the new government. Although J. Orsi optimistically declared that he would reach a consensus with Javier Miley, this has not yet been possible. Plans to hold talks with this eccentric leader at the MERCOSUR summit in Montevideo in early December 2024 have failed. The lack of mutual understanding with the far-right J. Miley remains a problem, because without the political consent of its members, the association is in principle unable to evolve. Argentina also plays an important role in the industrial and infrastructural potential of MERCOSUR, without its participation it is difficult to imagine initiatives to promote economic complementarity in the bloc. Another issue is the compatibility of plans to modernize the organization and accelerate cooperation with external actors. Thus, from the point of view of the prospects of the agreement already reached with the EU, the MERCOSUR zone attracts it primarily as a pool of strategic natural resources and food, which is especially true for Uruguay. In turn, the automotive, textile, pharmaceutical and chemical industries are viewed by Europe as niches for the expansion of its goods and services and its presence in South America. Such a view cannot but affect investment preferences, including plans for new models of MERCOSUR development. In one form or another, these layouts can be repeated in the interaction of the bloc with China and other highly industrialized players. Therefore, for Uruguay and its neighbors, no matter which option for increasing the global competitiveness of the association through openness they choose, the strategic problem will remain the preservation of industrial sovereignty and limiting the reprimarization of their economies. It is worth adding that similar warnings were already voiced at a meeting between Yamandú Orsi and representatives of the scientific and business communities in June 2024. What is the bottom line?  It is safe to say that the new Uruguayan government will increase its attention to regional integration. If Luis Lacalle Pou called MERCOSUR a "suffocating corset" that can and should be gotten rid of, then with the election of Yamandú Orsi, the integration platforms, on the contrary, emphasize the useful function of supporting national interests. Although calls to reform multilateral groups so that they better correspond to specific policy objectives and the spirit of the times have not gone away. In Latin American political science thought, participation in integration groups is often presented as a way to achieve autonomy or, as one of the leading Argentine international theorists, Juan Carlos Puig, put it, “the ability to independently make foreign policy decisions, taking into account the objective conditions of the real world.” The autonomist course is usually associated with left-wing forces, but it does not necessarily imply the creation of blocs like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which directly challenge the West. Pragmatic diversification of ties with major powers, support for regional leaders, neutrality and non-interference can also be reflections of such a course. If we look at the rhetoric and first steps of I. Orsi’s team from this angle, we can link his attitude to regional structures with the search for autonomy in the international arena. Of course, with an adjustment for the traditional principles and limitations of Uruguayan diplomacy. At the same time, a significant shift or revitalization of Latin American regionalism is unlikely to result from Uruguay's leadership change. This is not only due to Uruguay's relatively small geopolitical weight but also because the new president does not seem inclined to challenge the regional status quo, forge a distinct identity, or promote it on the global stage. Uruguayan political analyst Daniel Buquet, reflecting on how Yamandú Orsi's victory might impact the leftist forces supporting integration, used a chess metaphor: “It’s like winning a pawn, but not a bishop”—a rather fitting analogy.  This article was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 23-78-01030, within the project "Latin America and the Concept of a Multipolar World: Key Approaches, Impact on Foreign Policy, and Relations with Russia".

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The integration of Artificial Intelligence into military frameworks by India and Pakistan is reshaping regional security dynamics, fueling a doctrinal shift with profound implications for strategic stability. As AI-driven systems enhance military capabilities, the accompanying risks of miscalculation, escalation, and ethical dilemmas demand urgent dialogue and regulatory measures to mitigate potential conflict. The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a transformative technology has reshaped global dynamics across various domains, including national security. As states increasingly incorporate AI into military frameworks, the implications for strategic stability, particularly in nuclear-armed regions like South Asia, are profound. The militarisation of AI by India and Pakistan, underpinned by their historical rivalry, is catalysing a doctrinal evolution with both opportunities and risks for regional security. AI is becoming a cornerstone of military innovation in South Asia with capabilities of autonomous weapons systems, surveillance technologies, and decision-making frameworks becoming increasingly relevant. The development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, often termed “killer robots,” epitomises the dual-use nature of AI—it offers strategic advantages but also raises concerns about malfunction, miscalculation, and escalation. These concerns are amplified when AI technologies are integrated into nuclear and conventional military frameworks, especially in volatile regions like South Asia. India’s AI-driven military modernisation India has positioned AI as a central element of its strategic ambitions, supported by initiatives such as the Defense AI Council and the establishment of the Centre for AI and Robotics (CAIR) under its Defense Research and Development Organization. The country’s AI-focused projects include developing multi-agent robotic frameworks, advanced surveillance systems, and AI-powered drones. Additionally, HAL Tejas, a multi role combat aircraft, has been modernised by CAIR to assists in maintaining Indian Air Force systems. Meanwhile, the acquisition of over five thousand drones in 2016 have come into action in defence frameworks.  The multi-agent robotic drones work in groups by forming teams for swarms. Collaborative efforts with international partners, including Israel and Japan, have further bolstered India’s AI capabilities, including in teaming initiatives. The integration of disruptive technologies has come along way, evolving with doctrinal changes, particularly with the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces (2017) and the Land Warfare Doctrine (2018). While both included the potential for AI capabilities, the LWD placed specific emphasis on multi-front environmental frameworks, hybrid warfare, and the incorporation of disruptive technologies in the military domain to secure strategic edge. The deployment of AI-enabled systems along sensitive borders, such as its northwestern frontier with Pakistan, underscores an intent to enhance both offensive and defensive operations. Pakistan’s Response to AI Militarisation Pakistan has also begun integrating AI into its military strategies, albeit this has taken place at an earlier stage. Initiatives such as the establishment of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing and the Army Centre of Emerging Technologies highlight Pakistan’s focus on leveraging AI for defense and cybersecurity. Pakistan’s collaborations with China, a global leader in AI, have facilitated the development of unmanned systems and other AI-enabled technologies. For instance, a joint venture with Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Company is helping to develop unmanned aerial vehicles. Meanwhile, Pakistan has purchased from China Cai Hong drones (Rainbow4/CH-4) that can be effectively deployed for strike missions and reconnaissance. Evolving Nuclear Doctrines India’s nuclear doctrine, historically anchored in a no-first-use (NFU) policy, has evolved to reflect greater flexibility and ambiguity. Statements by Indian officials, coupled with advancements in AI and surveillance technologies, indicate a potential shift toward counterforce strategies. This can be assessed from the statements by national security officials, including 2010 national security advisor Shivshankar Menon, who remarked that “India’s NFU doctrine applied to non-nuclear weapons states, implying that the NFU would not apply to Pakistan.” Rajnath Sing, tthe current Indian defense minister, hinted at flexibility of NFU by saying that “India has strictly adhered to this doctrine. What happens in future depends on the circumstances.” Doctrinal transformations, such as the Land Warfare Doctrine further highlights India’s focus on leveraging AI to enhance its strategic edge. These changes, coupled with the deployment of AI-enabled surveillance systems along borders, signals India’s intent to strengthen its deterrence posture while maintaining the flexibility to adapt to emerging threats. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has evolved from a first-use policy to a more nuanced approach encapsulated in the Full Spectrum Deterrence and Quid Pro Quo Plus strategies. The policies of quid pro quo plus and full spectrum deterrence conveys that Pakistan would respond to any kind of cross border military adventure from India in more than a tit-for-tat, a clear message that the response would be a notch higher on the escalation ladder while still posturing the threat of nuclear retaliation at every step of the escalation ladder. These frameworks aim to counter India’s conventional and nuclear superiority by maintaining credible deterrence across the escalation spectrum. These include the development of tactical nuclear weapons and advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Challenges and Risks The militarisation of AI in South Asia introduces several challenges, including the erosion of strategic stability, the lowering of the nuclear threshold, and the risk of accidental escalation. AI-driven systems, while efficient, lack the nuanced judgment of human operators. This increases the risk of unintended escalation during crises. Additionally, the integration of AI into nuclear command-and-control systems could compress decision-making timelines, heightening the risk of hasty or ill-informed actions. The proliferation of AI technologies also raises concerns about their acquisition by non-state actors, who could exploit these systems for malicious purposes. Finally, the deployment of autonomous weapons systems poses ethical dilemmas and challenges existing frameworks of international humanitarian law. To address these challenges, it is imperative for South Asian states to adopt regulatory frameworks and confidence-building measures. Potential steps include bilateral and multilateral dialogues. For instance, India and Pakistan could engage in dialogue to establish norms and protocols for the use of AI in military operations. Additionally, transparency initiatives, such as data-sharing mechanisms and joint exercises, can help reduce mistrust and prevent miscalculation. Prioritising AI applications for defensive purposes, such as enhanced surveillance and early warning systems, can also mitigate risks while strengthening deterrence. Conclusion The militarisation of AI is reshaping the strategic landscape of South Asia, driving doctrinal evolution, and altering the balance of power. The integration of AI in the military domain is leading India and Pakistan towards a potentially deepening security dilemma. This demonstrates that South Asia, in the age of AI militarisation, will be dominated by feelings of mistrust and erosion of strategic stability. By fostering dialogue and adopting regulatory measures, South Asian states can ensure that AI serves as a tool for stability rather than a catalyst for conflict. In an era of rapid technological advancement, the imperative to manage AI’s military applications responsibly has never been greater. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Valued at over $3 trillion, Nvidia, the world’s largest market capitalisation, exemplifies the transformative power of the microprocessor sector, but Europe’s lagging position raises significant concerns about sovereignty and competitiveness. Some companies are stepping up, offering concrete responses to these challenges and heralding a new era for European innovation in microprocessors. European socio-economic stability depends on it. A new era is fast approaching, with the US authorities having decided to strike a major blow by making it very difficult to export certain semiconductors, even to allied countries, thereby depriving half of Europe’s countries of easy access to US technologies. The global microprocessor market is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by unprecedented technological advances and intensifying geopolitical competition. Once considered a niche industry, microprocessors have become the backbone of modern economies, enabling everything from smartphones to artificial intelligence systems, from IoT to cloud computing. The rise of Nvidia, a global leader in AI, underscores this changing ecosystem. The company is set to replace Intel in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), who stated that the update aims to ensure “a more representative exposure to the semiconductors industry and the materials sector, respectively”. This dominance of a few global players underscores the challenges faced by other regions. While companies like Nvidia, AMD, and TSMC have set the standard for innovation, others—including once-mighty Intel—have struggled to keep up. Intel’s recent difficulties highlight the dynamic nature of the industry, where size and legacy alone no longer guarantee success. Instead, the ability to innovate, adapt, and secure supply chains is paramount. And initiatives are flourishing all around the world. As Europe works to bolster its presence in the microprocessor market, Latin America is emerging as a potential partner in the global semiconductor ecosystem. While the region does not yet have major microprocessor manufacturers, countries like Mexico and Brazil are becoming increasingly important in the broader supply chain. The United States, through initiatives such as the CHIPS Act, has sought to deepen its partnerships in Latin America, recognising the region’s strategic value for diversifying production and securing critical resources.  This should put Europe on alert. Indeed, the United States is planning on pushing forward with the development of microprocessor production capabilities across three Latin American countries: Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica. This strategy was unveiled by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in July 2024 as the ‘Western Hemisphere Semiconductor Initiative.’ Indeed, Mexico is attracting billions in investments in its semiconductor and tech industries. Amazon, announced plans to invest $6 billion in the country by 2026, creating over 50,000 jobs. The Chinese government had identified semiconductors as a priority as early as 1956 and has already channeled an estimated $150 billion to its semiconductor industry. Latin America’s potential lies in its ability to complement the global microprocessor market with assembly, testing, and raw material processing capabilities. Though the region has yet to produce a major semiconductor design firm, its role in the supply chain could expand as global players look to reduce dependency on Asia. This creates opportunities for regional collaboration and investment in the sector while strengthening US access to semiconductors. Indeed, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated: “By improving the backbone of our supply chains, better infrastructure will help ensure that the goods our people rely on – semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, medical supplies – are more affordable, more secure, and made right here in the Americas.” Incoming President Donald Trump’s planned tariffs on foreign imports could however have a real effect on tech giants’ outsourcing of manufacturing to Latin America, though. Even the Biden administration, a few days before its term, has decided to raise the stakes on microprocessors by further tightening sanctions against China. This illustrates the great sensitivity of the subject on the other side of the Atlantic and the need for Europe to rearm itself on the industrial front. Europe’s position in the microprocessor market remains precarious, and without sufficient scope for nearshoring and the development of a robust EU-focused development ecosystem, it could find itself falling way behind global competitors. Historically reliant on foreign suppliers for semiconductors, the region has recognised these strategic risks of this dependency. For Europe, this means creating an ecosystem in which innovative startups and new, EU-based technological initiatives are allowed to flourish. That’s the objective of the European Union’s “Chips Act”, which aims to increase local production capacity and support the development of homegrown technology. However, achieving these goals requires more than policy—it demands the emergence of innovative companies capable of competing on a global scale. Europe already has some important technological “links”, but not yet the whole chain. Among those links of emerging players is SiPearl, a French company specialising in the design of high-performance microprocessors. While still small compared to global giants, SiPearl represents a concrete step toward reducing Europe’s technological dependency. Its processors, designed for use in data centres and supercomputing, align with Europe’s strategic goals for technological sovereignty and innovation. SiPearl’s reliance on Taiwanese manufacturing reflects the broader global interdependence of the microprocessor market, but its designs are uniquely European, tailored to meet the region’s regulatory and security standards. The choice of Taiwan seems obvious at present, given that the processes used in Europe do not meet the requirements. Alternative foundries may be needed, such as Samsung, which has production capacities in South Korea and the USA, or even Intel. Indeed, this Eurocentric approach is at the heart of the firm’s strategy for development. CEO Philippe Notton underscores how the Chips Act does not go far enough in supporting start-up firms like his own: “the European Chips Act is a good start. If we manage to mobilise more public funds in the semiconductor sector to get things moving again, as is being done in most countries, that will be a positive thing.” Notton, like many in the sector, believes that startups are, however, being left behind by this policy. Nonetheless, there are some positive initiatives to support the objectives of the European Chips Act, such as the $3.2 billion investment by Silicon Box to build a semiconductor plant in northern Italy. This announcement was made last March by the Italian Minister of Enterprises, who was happy to show that Italy can “attract the interest of global technology players”. Europe is focusing on fostering innovation and reducing dependency through public-private partnerships. SiPearl is a prime example, but it is not alone. Other European companies, such as Infineon Technologies (Germany) and STMicroelectronics (a Franco-Italian firm), are making significant contributions to the semiconductor industry. MELEXIS, another firm based in Belgium, plays a critical role in developing specialized chips for the automotive industry, supporting Europe’s push for technological sovereignty in key sectors. This approach has also supported the growth of companies such as ASML in the Netherlands, a global leader in lithography machines essential for microprocessor manufacturing, and GlobalFoundries in Germany, which operates one of Europe’s most advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities. CEO Dr. Thomas Caulfield, has a more positive outlook, and emphasised Europe’s strategic position in the semiconductor industry, particularly highlighting the continent’s leadership in lithography through companies like ASML. He stated:  “Europe shouldn’t worry over issues of technology leadership for two reasons. One: You can’t do anything in semiconductors without lithography and Europe has ASML the leader in lithography. Nobody can do anything in semiconductors without giving capex to ASML, so Europe has great control of the semiconductor industry.” This highlights the multilateral ecosystem many are trying to develop in Europe, because together, these firms demonstrate the continent’s potential to become a hub for advanced microprocessor design and production. The microprocessor market is at a crossroads, offering Europe distinct opportunities to redefine its role in the global technology ecosystem. Success, however, will depend on sustained investment, strategic partnerships, and bold innovation. By leveraging its strengths, Europe can be both a leading player in design and manufacture as it used to be just a few decades ago. The opportunities are massive, but so are the risks of falling behind. The rewards of such efforts are, however, substantial: enhanced economic growth, greater technological sovereignty, and a pivotal role in shaping the future of the global microprocessor industry. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump seems to be turning tariffs, which can serve as a legitimate tool to achieve the goals of fair trade and the protection of key national security interests, into an illegitimate tool of coercive statecraft. It is likely to undermine the global economic order and US soft-power influence across the world Since re-entering the Oval Office Donald Trump has already threatened dozens of nations with economic tariffs in relation to a vast array of issues, many of which are non-economic in nature. What, if any, is the legal basis for these tariffs in domestic and international law, and how are they different from or similar to the type of economic measures China applies to influence other sovereign nations’ choices in ways that benefit Beijing? In this article we address these questions. Trumps weaponisation of trade tariffs Trump 2.0 seems set on following China’s leadership in the practice of using trade relations for economic coercion against other states, in breach of international and bilateral trade agreements. This practice decouples tariffs from their legitimate World Trade Organization (WTO) purpose of offering protection against unfair trade practices. WTO rules allow protective tariffs in cases of anti-dumping—for instance where foreign firms sell exports below their cost of production—or as countervailing measures against subsidised imports that would otherwise unfairly undercut and thus harm domestic producers. Such tariffs are a lawful tool for economic defence. Furthermore, in a geo-economic world there may be other limited situations where a reasonable argument can be made for using tariffs in a national security context not covered by WTO rules, or against economies that do not play by WTO rules. Moving beyond this delimited use of tariffs inevitably results in the tool becoming an economic cudgel for achieving non-economic political objectives. Where these are based on highly questionable claims regarding the relationship to US national security, and without basis in WTO or bilateral free trade agreement rules, the likelihood that tariffs are naked coercion rather than a legitimate defensive measure grows. Making a wide array of economic and non-economic demands of countries—including Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Denmark, Panama, Taiwan, and the EU—President Trump clearly views tariffs as the medicine for every international ailment, real or imagined, impacting the United States. This is a radical break from the US-led post-war order of rules-based trade, and sends a message that the US is no longer a trusted partner. This shift was most vividly highlighted on 1 February 2025, when Trump’s administration threatened 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico, and imposed a 10 percent tariff on China, citing a national emergency due to illegal migration and drugs, and claiming the target states had failed to assist the US in countering this emergency. While the Canada and Mexico tariffs were suspended after both countries made concessions to Trump, their situation is most indicative of Trump’s radical approach to international relations. Both countries renegotiated the North American free trade agreement directly with Trump during his first term—an agreement Trump lavished with praise, while Canada is also one of America’s closest military allies, and has supported many US military operations since WWII. If Canada can be coerced, it is reasonable to believe any country can be coerced by Trump, including Australia. From a foreign policy perspective, Trump’s radical tariff coercion is likely to be one of the greatest acts of diplomatic self-harm, particularly as friends are forced to start looking at ways to mitigate American dependence. Who pays the price of tariffs?    If the foreign policy results of tariffs are to undermine US soft power, it is also true that tariffs will undermine the US economy. For example, Trump incorrectly believes that exporters will absorb the additional cost of tariffs—for instance, taxes on imports—by dropping their prices. Factors such as price elasticity (are goods necessary or discretionary), pricing power (i.e. brand power), and the size of profit margins influence who pays additional tariff costs. The latter is important when considering globally competitive traded goods. In competitive industries where profit margins are low, at or near the minimum rate of profit at which businesses will invest and operate, then, by definition, all additional costs must be passed on to the consumer to protect the business’s margin. Beyond that, protecting margins is the first choice of all businesses. Hence only where goods are highly discretionary and existing profit margins are high might one expect the exporter to incur the costs of tariffs. All things being equal, the American consumer will pay if Trump levies general tariff taxes on a vast array of goods coming from Mexico, Canada, and China, just as studies show that consumers paid for Trump’s 2018 tariffs. Job losses can also arise as a consequence of tariffs impacting supply chains by increasing the costs of inputs. Economists argue that, while the first Trump administration’s 25 percent steel import tariff created around 1,000 new jobs in steel production, the higher cost of steel hit downstream steel users, resulting in a loss of 75,000 manufacturing jobs. A tariff policy that is targeted and in response to breaches of WTO trade rules has their rightful place in the repertoire of a state’s national economic policies. But there are likely to be few long-term benefits to attacking allies and longstanding rule-abiding trade partners with universal tariffs per Trump’s Make America Great Again agenda. On the contrary Trump’s policies will lead to a Make America Expensive Again outcome, as ABC’s Matt Bevan put it. A Corrosion of US soft power? The weaponisation of everything has in recent times been attributed to China’s unrestricted warfare paradigm. Trump 2.0 seems to follow Beijing’s playbook without further consideration for alliances and partnerships—pivotal to US foreign policy. Working with allies and partners has been a key element of how the Biden administration countered the challenges posed by Russia, China, and Iran in the wider context of great power competition. Donald Trump’s threats of a trade war against Denmark, a NATO ally, over the status of Greenland; threats against Taiwan’s steel, pharmaceutical, and semiconductor industries; tariff threats against more NATO allies in the European Union; and tariff threats against the BRICS bloc resemble the unrestricted weaponising of trade by Beijing and mark a departure from Trump 1.0’s more targeted tariffs. The US is facing the clear and present danger of losing its soft-power acumen, and losing trust from its partners, with tragic consequences for the global rules-based order. In that respect, Trump might be playing directly into the Moscow–Beijing ambition to undermine the US and its allies across the military, economic, and diplomatic domains. The ambiguity of Trump’s “negotiation” strategy, which contains both national security and economic objections as raison d’être, adds to the challenge of maintaining trust and confidence among partners and allies, which would be both tragic and fatal for the US and its alliances.This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Indonesia’s inclusion in BRICS enhances the representation of the Global South and strengthens efforts to reform global governance institutions. This move positions the bloc as a stronger platform for collaboration among developing nations. On 7 January, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS grouping. In welcoming Indonesia, the Brazilian Government issued a statement, saying: “With the largest population and economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia shares with other members a commitment to reforming global governance institutions and contributes positively to deepening South-South cooperation.” With full membership, Indonesia has become the first country in Southeast Asia to join BRICS. Currently, Thailand and Malaysia are official partners, but not full members. Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement said the BRICS membership is “a strategic step to improve the collaborations and cooperation with other developing nations, based on the principle of equality, mutual respect, and sustainable development.” Economically, this could mean an increase of 0.3 percent growth to GDP, and the expansion of Indonesia’s access to BRICS markets. Geopolitically, it provides Indonesia a bargaining position in the global arena as well as a platform to voice the aspirations of the Global South. For BRICS, Indonesia’s membership adds another feather to its hat by bringing in greater representation of the Global South to its multipolar vision. This makes it imperative to assess the trajectory of the grouping. What started as an acronym “BRIC,” coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001 in the report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” the grouping was projected in the next decade to grow significantly. Founded in 2009 by the four countries—Brazil, Russia, China, and India—the bloc’s first expansion came in 2010 with the joining of South Africa. In the last 16 years, BRICS has graduated from being a popular buzz word in international politics to a significant platform of emerging economies representing the “Global South.” What is noteworthy is that BRICS is not yet a formal multilateral organisation like the United Nations, World Bank or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but increasingly there has been a greater demand among states (mostly developing countries) to join this club of emerging economies. Despite its informality, what made BRICS relevant in the international order was the 2008 financial crises, which raised scepticism and concerns over the dollar-dominated monetary system. This invariably challenged the effectiveness of the West-led Bretton Woods institutions given the suffering of the United States and Europe in the wake of the financial crisis. In contrast, the BRICS economies showed resilience. The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 2009, where the Joint Declaration put forward the desire of BRIC countries to develop “an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open, and transparent dialogue and cooperation” that is “conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” This was reaffirmed at the most recent 16th BRICS Summit held in October 2024 in Kazan. With the indicative expansion of its institutional framework and functionaries since 2009, the most significant outputs have been the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides developmental funds to countries; the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with a resource pool of US$100 billion, which provides a mutual support mechanism for short-term balance of payments pressures, enhancing the financial safety net of member countries; and the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 for effective integration of BRICS enterprises into global and regional value chains. A significant milestone was the call, during the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, for the expansion of BRICS by inviting new states to join. Another, in 2024, was the deliberation on the formation of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (also known as BRICS Pay), where BRICS countries would trade with each other without converting to US dollars by utilising blockchain technology and tokens to circumvent the SWIFT financial payment system. Although BRICS Pay is still only a concept, its development would seriously undermine the US dollar’s long-standing dominance. Today, the inter-governmental organisation boasts of 10 full members with the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025; and has nine official partner countries—Nigeria is the ninth partner country of BRICS (admitted on 17 January 2025), joining Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Statistically put, BRICS member countries comprise about 45 percent of the world’s population, 28 percent of the global economy, and collectively they produce more than a third of the world’s crude oil. And if Saudi Arabia joins the group (which it is yet to consider the BRICS invitation), the grouping would then produce some 43 percent of global crude oil. This growth among emerging nations is set to widen the gap between BRICS+ and the G7 nations. As IMF estimates suggest, BRICS+ will account for 37.6 percent of world GDP at purchasing power parity in 2027, compared with 28.2 percent for the G7. This will signify a shift in economic power towards emerging economies, enhance intra-BRICS trade and regional networks rather than relying on G7 markets, and also lead to the creation of alternate alliances and institutions. Apart from expanding its membership, BRICS has also broadened its agenda beyond economics to include global challenges. The two main pillars of BRICS are practical cooperation in various fields through meetings of Working Groups and Senior Officials, and consultation on matters of shared interests through meetings of Leaders and Ministers of Finance, Trade, Health, Science & Technology, Education, Agriculture, Communication, and Labour, among others. The intra-BRICS collaboration now includes social welfare, intellectual property, tourism, science & technology, culture, outer space, think tanks, and internet governance and security. With BRICS+, emerging economies are establishing new standards for order making. In other words, despite its informal existence, BRICS has emerged as a strong contestant for building an alternative discourse on global governance—one that is non-western. The expansion gives BRICS a greater economic and demographic weight as well as a stronger voice to the Global South, potentially reshaping discussions in institutions like the UN and WTO. However, the long-term success of an expanded BRICS will depend on its ability to balance diverse interests and act as a unified voice on the global stage. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From January 20 to 24, 2025, the traditional World Economic Forum (WEF) took place in Davos. The organizers registered approximately 2,000 participants from over 130 countries, including around 1,600 executives from major corporations, among them 900 CEOs. The political agenda of the WEF was supported by more than 50 heads of state and government. As part of the official program, about 300 sessions were held, 200 of which were broadcast live. Press accreditation was granted to 76 media companies. For official events, 28,043 square meters of space were allocated, accommodating 117 meeting rooms and 23 lounge areas. Additionally, several participating companies (such as HSBC, EY, and Cognizant) rented additional venues separately for their own events. WEF President Børge Brende, announcing this meeting, emphasized that in 2025, due to geopolitical conflicts, ongoing economic fragmentation, and the acceleration of climate change, the forum would be held under conditions of exceptionally high global uncertainty for the first time in decades. The theme of the Forum was “Cooperation in the Age of Intelligence”. On January, WEF experts presented four reports. The first one, a traditional report and the 20th edition, analyzed the most significant global risks and threats facing the international community. The study is based on a survey of over 900 experts from various fields and covers short-term (2025), medium-term (until 2027), and long-term (until 2035) perspectives. The key risks identified for these periods include the following:- in 2025 the most serious threat for most respondents is interstate armed conflicts, followed by extreme weather events and geoeconomic conflicts, including sanctions and trade measures;- by 2027 key risks include disinformation and fake news, which undermine trust in institutions and intensify social polarization, tension, and instability, as well as an increase in cyberattacks and espionage cases;- by 2035 environmental threats are a major concern, including extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, ecosystem destruction, critical changes in Earth's systems, and natural resource shortages. Additionally, technological risks such as the negative consequences of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies are highlighted.The authors emphasize the need to strengthen international cooperation and increase resilience to global threats. According to them, rising geopolitical tensions, climate challenges, and other risks require coordinated global action to prevent the escalation of existing issues and the emergence of new crises. The second report presents the perspectives of leading experts on the global economic outlook for 2025. They predict moderate economic slowdown, driven by geoeconomic fragmentation and protectionist measures. The most resilient economic growth is expected in the United States and South Asian countries, while Europe, China, and Latin America may face significant challenges. Inflation is projected to rise in most countries, primarily due to increased government spending and shifts in global supply chains. Most experts consider a further escalation of the U.S.-China trade war likely, along with continued regionalization of global trade, leading to the formation of more isolated economic blocs and reduced global interdependence. While experts acknowledge the high potential of artificial intelligence (AI), they emphasize the need for greater investment in infrastructure and human capital to fully leverage its benefits. The third study provides a comprehensive analysis of employment issues. The main conclusion is that ongoing changes, global trends and new technologies will cause 92 million people to leave the labor market worldwide by 2030, but will also create 170 million new jobs. One of the challenges in this regard is the need to improve skills and train for new specialties. The fourth report assesses the state of global cooperation across five key areas: trade and capital, innovation and technology, climate and natural capital, health and well-being, and peace and security. After analyzing more than 40 indicators, the authors conclude that due to heightened geopolitical tensions and instability, overall cooperation remains at the same level. However, positive trends are observed in areas such as climate, innovation, technology, and health. Davos as a Symbolic Benchmark of Switzerland Despite existing criticism, the Davos Forum remains a key platform for the annual interaction of leading figures in global politics, business, and the expert community. Without Switzerland's neutral status, the Davos Forum likely would not exist. However, it was Klaus Schwab, who founded the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 24, 1971, who played a crucial role in transforming this event and its host location into one of Switzerland’s comparative advantages in political and economic terms. Despite his advanced age, Schwab continues to be an active ideologue and architect of Davos, moderating key discussions while fine-tuning his creation and addressing annual criticism. Yet, he has his own limitations—despite Switzerland’s neutrality and his personal reputation for impartiality, Schwab once again refrained from inviting Russian representatives, even at the level of individual entrepreneurs and experts. Such a move, rather than formal attempts to broaden participation and accessibility, could have enhanced the forum’s status. The participation of a Russian delegation would have been particularly relevant in this critical year for global politics, marked by the unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump, which is set to shape most geopolitical and geo-economic processes worldwide. Including Russian representatives could have strengthened the WEF’s competitive standing, but once again, it did not happen. The Swiss leadership highly values the opportunities that the Davos platform provides, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and, most notably, foreign economic relations. In September 2024, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament—the Council of States (the smaller chamber) and the National Council (the larger chamber)—decided to continue state support for the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and allocated budget funding for the period 2025–2027. During the discussions, lawmakers emphasized that the event strengthens Switzerland’s role as a global hub for international dialogue, while also having a positive economic impact on the Graubünden region. As the host country of the forum, Switzerland actively leverages it to advance its own interests. This year, six out of the seven members of the Swiss Federal Council (Cabinet of Ministers) attended the WEF. As part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Swiss Economy Minister Guy Parmelin signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Kosovo and Thailand, bringing Switzerland’s total number of FTAs to 37. There are also plans to adapt and update the existing FTA with China. One of Bern’s key priorities remains securing an FTA with the MERCOSUR bloc. As a result, a focal point of this year’s WEF was Argentine President Javier Milei, who, during an “exceptionally warm bilateral meeting,” invited Swiss President Karin Keller-Sutter to visit Buenos Aires in 2025. The Trump Factor The opening of the current WEF coincided with the inauguration of Donald Trump, who, in recent months, has made numerous provocative statements and promises, swiftly beginning their implementation upon taking office on January 20. The U.S. president signed nearly 100 executive orders, including the repeal of 78 regulations enacted by his predecessor, Joe Biden. Among these were directives for all federal agencies and departments to address rising living costs and to end government-imposed censorship of free speech. The most significant orders included the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization, as well as the declaration of a state of emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border to enforce strict immigration controls. In one way or another, the presence of the “new-old” president was felt across nearly all discussion platforms at the forum. On January 23, Donald Trump addressed the participants of the Davos Forum via video conference, outlining the following agenda:- NATO defense spending: Member states should increase their defense budgets from 2% to 5% of GDP to ensure a more equitable distribution of financial burdens within the alliance.- Trade tensions with the EU: The EU and its member states treat economic relations with the U.S. unfairly. European business regulations, including tax policies, disadvantage American companies, particularly in the tech sector, prompting Trump’s call for tariffs on European imports.- Criticism of the EU’s Green Deal: Labeling it as a “new green scam”, Trump emphasized that the U.S. would ramp up oil and gas production and expand power plant construction to become the “capital of artificial intelligence and cryptography”.- Oil prices and the Ukraine conflict: Trump suggested that lower oil prices from Saudi Arabia could help resolve the Ukraine conflict and urged Saudi leadership to take necessary steps, emphasizing their responsibility in the matter.- Tariffs on companies outsourcing production: Countries whose companies manufacture outside the U.S. will face tariffs to incentivize production relocation to American soil.- China's role in Ukraine: Trump called on China to support ending the Ukraine conflict, while stating his own efforts to mediate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.- U.S. domestic policy shift: A large-scale deregulation program is underway in the U.S., including tax cuts and potential elimination of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which Trump views as discriminatory.Trump’s speech elicited mixed reactions among forum participants. His focus on protectionist policies and sharp criticism of international partners raised concerns about potential consequences for the global economy, particularly among European attendees. Additionally, his stance signaled an escalation in the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is expected to play out through potential trade conflicts, tensions in the South and East China Seas, continued arms sales to Taiwan, and other geopolitical developments. The Europe Factor   At Davos, Europe is traditionally represented by the European Union, with the United States as its primary political and economic partner. Ursula von der Leyen, re-elected as President of the European Commission and beginning her new term on December 1, 2024, addressed the forum on January 21. Her speech largely responded to challenges outlined by Donald Trump before the WEF began, setting out the EU’s key priorities for the coming years: overcoming economic stagnation, enhancing competitiveness, and further integrating the single market across all 27 member states. A central theme of her address was the “Competitiveness Compass” initiative, first introduced in late 2024. This strategy, shaped by recommendations from Mario Draghi’s influential report, aims to drive economic reform and growth within the EU. The European Commission planned to unveil the full document by the end of January. At Davos, Ursula von der Leyen effectively introduced the concept of “Europe United” as a counterbalance to “America First” and cautioned the U.S. against igniting a trade war with the European Union. She emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue on shared interests, stating: “Our priority will be to initiate discussions as early as possible, focusing on common interests and readiness for negotiations. We will be pragmatic, but we will always adhere to our principles. Protecting our interests and defending our values is the European way”. At the same time, the European Commission president highlighted the high level of interdependence between the European and American economic models. She underscored that the era of global cooperation has given way to intense geostrategic competition, stating: “The world's largest economies are competing for access to raw materials, new technologies, and global trade routes—from artificial intelligence to clean technologies, from quantum computing to space, from the Arctic to the South China Sea. The race is on”. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) emphasized that Brussels must be prepared for U.S. trade tariffs which are expected to be more “selective and targeted”, especially given the “existential crisis” facing the EU economy. She also noted that the ECB is not overly concerned about the impact of inflation from other countries, including the U.S., on the eurozone. The UK was also represented at Davos, with its delegation led by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves. She used the trip primarily to promote Britain’s economic landscape, focusing on the country’s political and economic stability, its business-friendly environment, and recent government efforts to reduce regulatory barriers—all under the central message: “Now is the time to invest in Britain”. However, the extent to which this narrative aligns with reality remained beyond the scope of the Forum. The true assessment was left to the executives of major corporations with whom Reeves held meetings, including JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs, discussing investment opportunities in the UK's infrastructure and green projects. Additionally, the UK delegation engaged in negotiations aimed at restoring and strengthening ties with sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the U.S. and the Gulf states. The Ukraine Factor Due to the ongoing Ukraine conflict, Davos once again served as a prelude to the Munich Security Conference, which traditionally takes place in early February in Bavaria. While the war and Donald Trump’s influence shaped many discussions, Ukraine was not the central focus of the forum, resulting in a somewhat reduced emphasis compared to previous years. Ukraine’s interests at the World Economic Forum (WEF) were primarily represented by V.Zelensky, who took it upon himself to “educate” European politicians and “interpret” the signals previously sent by Donald Trump. His focus was on defense spending, emphasizing that a significant portion should go toward supporting the Kyiv regime, the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, and the need for “real security guarantees”. In the first days after taking office, the U.S. president made several key clarifications regarding his previously stated 24-hour timeline for resolving the Ukraine conflict — this period has now been significantly extended. The reason lies in the fact that, regardless of the revocation of Zelensky’s well-known decree, Ukraine must have a head of state authorized to negotiate and officially confirm any agreements or their outcomes. As of late January, no such figure was present in Kyiv, and Washington is aware of this reality. Switzerland, while emphasizing its neutral status (despite being designated by Russia as an “unfriendly state”), consistently maintains that it provides Ukraine only humanitarian aid and diplomatic support at Kyiv’s request. At the 2024 WEF, the well-known Bürgenstock Conference was announced, which later took place in the summer. However, in 2025, no similarly large-scale initiatives were introduced. Nevertheless, discussions at the Forum once again touched on the possibility of granting Switzerland the right to represent Kyiv’s interests on the international stage. Additionally, it was reported that a Swiss-Ukrainian memorandum was signed, with Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko representing Kyiv. The agreement focuses on the participation of Swiss private businesses in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. V.Zelensky used Davos as an opportunity to meet with world leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who had recently blocked additional aid to Ukraine. However, his main competitor in Germany’s upcoming snap Bundestag elections, Friedrich Merz, was more open to the idea of support, and Zelensky also held a discussion with him. Both meetings were held behind closed doors, and no details were disclosed. Meanwhile, German Green Party leader Robert Habeck managed to avoid an impromptu conversation with Zelensky, who had attempted to engage with him on the spot. At a January 23 briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova commented on V.Zelensky’s speeches at Davos 2025, describing them, among other things, as “narcotic madness”. The Germany Factor Germany, still holding its position as the political and economic leader of the European Union, was represented at Davos by key political heavyweights: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Economy and Climate Protection Minister (and Vice-Chancellor) Robert Habeck, and CDU/CSU Chairman Friedrich Merz. All three have been selected by their respective parties as key candidates for chancellor in Germany’s snap Bundestag elections scheduled for February 23, 2025. Given this, it was no surprise that they used the Swiss platform as part of their election campaigns. The current head of the German government had an objective advantage: he delivered a keynote speech on behalf of Germany, in which he focused on the presence of traditional standard factors (the largest economy in the EU; efficient small, medium and large businesses; government support for investments; low level of government debt), which should help to overcome the crisis. Regarding the United States, he declared his interest in maintaining close relations with the new administration, but “without false fawning and servility”. D. Trump and his team, according to him, will keep the whole world on edge in the coming years, but the German leadership will be able to cope with this. O. Scholz's main message is that constructive European-American interaction “is of decisive importance for security throughout the world and is the engine of successful economic development”. It is noteworthy that there were many empty seats in the hall and after the Chancellor's speech there were no questions for him for a long time, which greatly surprised the moderator of the session, K. Schwab. O. Scholz's closest associate, Finance Minister J.Kukis, who was appointed to this position to replace K. Lindner, who was dismissed in early November 2024, was participating in the Forum. He was unable to provide any special pre-election support to his boss during the Forum, and did not distinguish himself in any special way. Incidentally, K. Lindner himself preferred to remain in Germany and continue to fight there for the votes of voters, which are extremely necessary for the liberals to overcome the five percent barrier and get into the Bundestag. F.Merz, who is very likely the future head of the German Cabinet, and his possible future deputy R. Habeck also sought to prove their chances of winning the elections during their speeches. O. Scholz and F.Merz organized meetings with leading representatives of German business, trying to show which of them understood their problems better and was ready to solve them constructively. Despite all their differences, they were united on one issue - the need to soften the provision on the “debt brake” enshrined in the Basic Law (Constitution) and increase support for entrepreneurs. External observers considered that F.Merz was more convincing, including regarding the transatlantic economic vector. R.Habeck unexpectedly engaged in self-criticism during the podium discussion, stating that he initially believed that the difficult economic situation in the country was due to a short-term cyclical crisis, but it turned out that this was a consequence of a long-term structural crisis. Such “self-education” of the minister cost Germany dearly. During the Forum (January 22) in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, an Afghan refugee subject to deportation committed a crime, killing a child and an adult who was protecting him. This event pushed the issue of migration regulation to the top of the election campaign agenda. Unexpectedly, F.Merz found himself in a sticky situation, when his parliamentary request as the leading representative of the opposition in the current Bundestag for stricter controls at the external borders of the FRG could only count on success with the support of the unpopular Alternative for Germany and the center-left Sahra Wagenknecht Union. From Davos, Olaf Scholz traveled to Paris for a meeting with Emmanuel Macron. The French president was unable to attend the Forum due to domestic political circumstances and the need to manage the situation on the ground. The two leaders discussed the prospects for cooperation between their countries in strengthening their economic and political frameworks, as well as the European Union as a whole. None of the three key chancellor candidates managed to present a clear vision for Germany’s economic and political future, one that would be based on creativity, radical progress, technological breakthroughs, and prosperity—transforming the country into an innovation powerhouse not only for Europe but for the collective West as a whole. This means that Germany risks falling behind, failing to establish itself as an economic model capable of competing on equal terms with Donald Trump’s transforming North American economic space.Under Friedrich Merz, Olaf Scholz, and Robert Habeck, Germany faces the danger of remaining trapped in the past, relying too heavily on its post-war economic miracle—Made in Germany—which was achieved through the brilliance of ordoliberal economists and engineers. Davos 2025 made it clear that leaning solely on past achievements is no longer enough to drive a radical leap toward the future. If the German political elite, represented by the “handshake” established parties, remains in such reactionary positions in relation to the need for qualitative changes in economic policy, then the German standard will have no chance to take a leading place among the world's innovation locations. Here we will briefly indicate that, according to the estimates of the authors of the global risks report, the main ones for Germany are (in descending order): a shortage of highly qualified labor, recession / stagnation of the economy, illegal migration, disinformation, and a shortage of energy resources. They are the ones that largely determine the content of the current election campaign for the German parliament. The China Factor Among the political heavyweights representing the countries of the Global South at Davos 2025, the participation of the Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Ding Xuexiang, stands out. In his keynote speech, he emphasized Beijing's commitment to economic globalization, which is “not a zero-sum game, but a process of mutual benefit and common progress” and declared that protectionism does not lead to success, and trade wars have no winners. Among the key messages were that China is economically attractive, does not seek a trade surplus, is ready to import more competitive and high-quality goods and services to achieve balanced trade, is open to investment from foreign companies, and is ready to solve problems faced by both domestic and foreign firms. While condemning protectionism, he emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the role of the UN. While mildly critical of the “new-old” US president, he never mentioned him by name. Ding repeatedly referred to Xi Jinping, including his initiatives on global development and security. As part of the Forum, Ding Xuexiang hosted a private luncheon with top global financiers and business leaders, including the CEOs of BlackRock, Bridgewater Associates, JPMorgan, Blackstone, and Visa. Discussions centered on China’s ongoing economic reforms, efforts to stabilize the real estate market, stimulate domestic demand, and attract foreign investment. Experts noted that global business leaders responded positively to Ding Xuexiang’s statements, signaling growing confidence in China’s economic direction. In general, he fulfilled the standard mission assigned to him: to increase the international community's confidence in China's economic policy and confirm its role as a key player in the global economy. At the same time, the Forum participants remained concerned about a slowdown in China's economic growth, especially in the context of a possible increase in tariffs by the United States. The Artificial Intelligence Factor One of the leitmotifs of the forum, along with rethinking economic growth, industrial development prospects, climate and restoring trust, were discussions on the rapid development of AI, its impact on the labor market, prospects and challenges associated with the integration of this technology into various sectors of the economy. Experts identified a few trends that will emerge by 2030. AI and automation will increase the demand of enterprises for specialists in the field of AI, big data analysis, digital marketing, and cybersecurity. About half of the current skills of such employees in these areas may become obsolete, which suggests the need for timely adaptation of secondary and higher education to such a challenge. Employees whose professions will become unclaimed due to automation, especially in traditional sectors, will have to undergo advanced training programs. Special attention in the expert sessions was given to the ethical aspects of AI application and the related problems of developing the necessary standards. Issues of international cooperation took an important place, including in the context of ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits of AI application, as well as minimizing the potential risks it generates for society (for example, possible discrimination and bias in algorithms, as well as the protection of users' personal data). In terms of geopolitical rivalry in the field of AI, the global race for leadership in this area, which has already begun between the United States, China and several EU countries, was discussed. Experts pointed out the concerns of the leaders of the latter regarding the need to strengthen the positions of European companies in this area. Strategies for government stimulation of innovation and support for businesses developing AI were discussed. In addition, the participants in the discussions considered the possibilities of using artificial intelligence technologies to achieve sustainable development goals, including combating climate change, improving healthcare and increasing resource efficiency. Examples of using AI to monitor the environment, optimize energy consumption, develop new methods of treating diseases, and improve various aspects of life were of interest. *** The World Economic Forum 2025 in Davos was predictably held under the sign of global challenges, the Ukraine conflict, and increased economic competition, set against the backdrop of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes. Børge Brende, summarizing the event, accurately noted that the current time is “a moment of serious consequences and uncertainties”. This is largely linked to the return of Donald Trump to the White House. At the Forum, the United States’ priorities in strengthening national interests were outlined, including the goal of reducing import flows. This move drew criticism from the European Union and other participants, who expressed growing concerns about the escalation of trade conflicts and the fragmentation of the global economy. The President of the European Commission highlighted the prospects for strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and increasing its independence, considering the intensifying rivalry between the American and Chinese economic spheres. In this regard, representatives of China advocated for reducing trade tensions and strengthening regional alliances, while Germany emphasized the current risks facing its economic standard, outlining the difficulties of finding ways to minimize them. The Ukrainian conflict once again became one of the central topics, but with the formal support of the leaders of the collective West, delegations from the global South showed a restrained reaction to V.Zelensky's speech and messages. Discussions about AI became quite meaningful. Overall, Davos 2025 and its participants confirmed the important role of the WEF as a platform for discussing global challenges and finding constructive answers to them. The need for collective efforts to solve the most pressing issues was noted. One of B. Borge's final messages: the only way to achieve progress in solving global problems is to work together and “find solutions that will make the world a better place”. It is evident that Russia could have significantly contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of this approach.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It’s official. On February 1, US President Donald Trump will introduce a sweeping set of new 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico. China will also face new tariffs of 10%. During the presidential campaign, Trump threatened tariffs against all three countries, claiming they weren’t doing enough to prevent an influx of “drugs, in particular fentanyl” into the US, while also accusing Canada and Mexico of not doing enough to stop “illegal aliens”. There will be some nuance. On Friday, Trump said tariffs on oil and gas would come into effect later, on February 18, and that Canadian oil would likely face a lower tariff of 10%. This may only be the first move against China. Trump has previously threatened the country with 60% tariffs, asserting this will bring jobs back to America. But the US’ move against its neighbours will have an almost immediate impact on the three countries involved and the landscape of North American trade. It marks the beginning of what could be a radical reshaping of international trade and political governance around the world. What Trump wants from Canada and Mexico While border security and drug trade concerns are the official rationale for this move, Trump’s tariffs have broader motivations. The first one is protectionist. In all his presidential campaigning, Trump portrayed himself as a champion of US workers. Back in October, he said tariff was “the most beautiful word in the dictionary”. This reflects the ongoing scepticism toward international trade that Trump – and politicians more generally on both ends of the political spectrum in the US – have held for some time. It’s a significant shift in the close trade links between these neighbours. The US, Mexico and Canada are parties to the successor of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Trump has not hidden his willingness to use tariffs as a weapon to pressure other countries to achieve unrelated geopolitical goals. This is the epitome of what a research project team I co-lead calls “Weaponised Trade”. This was on full display in late January. When the president of Colombia prohibited US military airplanes carrying Colombian nationals deported from the US to land, Trump successfully used the threat of tariffs to force Colombia to reverse course. The economic stakes The volume of trade between the US, Canada, and Mexico is enormous, encompassing a wide range of goods and services. Some of the biggest sectors are automotive manufacturing, energy, agriculture, and consumer goods. In 2022, the value of all goods and services traded between the US and Canada came to about US$909 billion (A$1.46 trillion). Between the US and Mexico that same year, it came to more than US$855 billion (A$1.37 trillion). One of the hardest hit industries will be the automotive industry, which depends on cross-border trade. A car assembled in Canada, Mexico or the US relies heavily on a supply of parts from throughout North America. Tariffs will raise costs throughout this supply chain, which could lead to higher prices for consumers and make US-based manufacturers less competitive. There could also be ripple effects for agriculture. The US exports billions of dollars in corn, soybeans, and meat to Canada and Mexico, while importing fresh produce such as avocados and tomatoes from Mexico. Tariffs may provoke retaliatory measures, putting farmers and food suppliers in all three countries at risk. Trump’s decision to delay and reduce tariffs on oil was somewhat predictable. US imports of Canadian oil have increased steadily over recent decades, meaning tariffs would immediately bite US consumers at the fuel pump. We’ve been here before This isn’t the first time the world has dealt with Trump’s tariff-heavy approach to trade policy. Looking back to his first term may provide some clues about what we might expect. In 2018, the US levied duties on steel and aluminium. Both Canada and Mexico are major exporters of steel to the US. Canada and Mexico imposed retaliatory tariffs. Ultimately, all countries removed tariffs on steel and aluminium in the process of finalising the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Notably, though, many of Trump’s trade policies remained in place even after President Joe Biden took office. This signalled a bipartisan scepticism of unfettered trade and a shift toward on-shoring or re-shoring in US policy circles. The options for Canada and Mexico This time, Canada and Mexico’s have again responded with threats of retaliatory tariffs. But they’ve also made attempts to mollify Trump – such as Canada launching a “crackdown” on fentanyl trade. Generally speaking, responses to these tariffs could range from measured diplomacy to aggressive retaliation. Canada and Mexico may target politically sensitive industries such as agriculture or gasoline, where Trump’s base could feel the pinch. There are legal options, too. Canada and Mexico could pursue legal action through the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement’s dispute resolution mechanisms or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both venues provide pathways for challenging unfair trade practices. But these practices can be slow-moving, uncertain in their outcomes and are susceptible to being ignored. A more long-term option for businesses in Canada and Mexico is to diversify their trade relationships to reduce reliance on the US market. However, the facts of geography, and the large base of consumers in the US mean that’s easier said than done. The looming threat of a global trade war Trump’s latest tariffs underscore a broader trend: the widening of the so-called “Overton window” to achieve unrelated geopolitical goals. The Overton Window refers to the range of policy options politicians have because they are accepted among the general public. Arguments for bringing critical industries back to the US, protecting domestic jobs, and reducing reliance on foreign supply chains gained traction after the ascent of China as a geopolitical and geoeconomic rival. These arguments picked up steam during the COVID-19 pandemic and have increasingly been turned into actual policy. The potential for a broader trade war looms large. Trump’s short-term goal may be to leverage tariffs as a tool to secure concessions from other jurisdictions. Trump’s threats against Denmark – in his quest to obtain control over Greenland – are a prime example. The European Union (EU), a far more potent economic player, has pledged its support for Denmark. A North American trade war – foreshadowed by the Canadian and Mexican governments – might then only be harbinger of things to come: significant economic harm, the erosion of trust among trading partners, and increased volatility in global markets.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Paris Agreement will be ten years old in 2025. It is a good opportunity, then, to reassess the feasibility of its long-term goals and understand what they mean for the current and for the next generations. In a very optimistic scenario, if the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved, the climate crisis will have been solved by the end of the 21st century. In the meantime, though, the crisis will worsen, as temperature overshoot is very likely to occur by the middle of the century. During the overshoot period, our planet’s average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, which is the threshold proposed by the Paris Agreement. At the end of the overshoot period, which could last from one to several decades, the temperature will begin to fall until it eventually stabilises at 1.5°C at the turn of the century (IPCC 2023, 1810). Expectedly, the success of the Paris Agreement would greatly benefit the “post-overshoot generation”, namely the generation that will live in the first half of the 22nd century. But to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement, the generation that will live in the overshoot period – the “overshoot generation” – will have to remove an enormous amount of GHG (Greenhouse Gases) from the atmosphere. For now, though, it is unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies will be available at a scale that might enable the overshoot generation to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. To aggravate the problem, the overshoot generation will also probably have to rely on as-yet untested geoengineering technologies to promote their own survival. As we can see, conflicting interests of three different generations are at stake here, namely: (1) the interests of the current generation, (2) those of the overshoot generation, and (3) the interests of the post-overshoot generation. Given the unequal distribution of power across generations (Gardiner 2011, 36), it is likely that the current generation will tend to further their own interest to the detriment of the overshoot generation, even if, in the end, the climate policies enforced by the current generation do indeed fulfil the interests of the post-overshoot generation. The best possible world is one in which the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved. Yet, depending on the choices that we make today, the best possible world could also mean the worst possible world that human beings will ever have met on our planet. That will be the fate of the overshoot generation, squeezed between the self-serving policies of the current generation and the climate hopes of the post-overshoot generation. The implications for international relations are momentous, as we intend to show in this article. Possible pathways The Paris Agreement did not establish a concrete deadline for the achievement of the goals set out in Article 2, namely: Maintain the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and make efforts to limit this temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. The scientific community generally understands that the Paris Agreement aims at climate stabilization at the end of the 21st century. There are two main reasons for this. The first is a constraint imposed by our planet’s climate system. The second is a constraint imposed by agreed upon principles of justice. As for the first reason, we have to bear in mind that an immediate reduction of GHG emissions would not be followed by an immediate decline of global temperature (Dessler 2016, 91). Even if all countries decided to eliminate their respective emissions today, the global temperature would continue to rise for several decades, until it begins to recede and stabilises at the turn of the century. As for the second reason, the Paris Agreement assumed that developing countries could not immediately reduce their own emissions without compromising their own development and the prospect of eradicating poverty. Thus, the Paris Agreement also established in Article 4 that each country could continue to emit GHG until their respective emissions peaked as soon as possible. After peaking, emissions should be rapidly reduced. Thus, the attempt to achieve the goals set out in Article 2 well before the end of the 21st century might turn out to prove inconsistent with the reality of our planet’s climate system and unfair towards developing countries. The problem, however, is that the Paris Agreement did not establish a specific pathway for the achievement of its long-term goals (Figure 1). There is, indeed, a multitude of pathways, but many (if not most) of them involve an overshoot period (Geden and Löschel 2017, 881; Schleussner et al. 2016). And as there are “different interpretations for limiting global warming to 1.5°C”, there emerges the question, then, as to which interpretation could do justice to the conflicting claims of the three different generations considered as a whole, namely the claims of the current generation, those of the overshoot generation, and the claims of the post-overshoot generation (Figure 2). There has been much discussion now on the concept of a “just transition”. But this debate has focused entirely on the claims that the members of the current generation can raise against each other, and not on claims that could be raised – or presumed – across the three generations referred to above. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Glossary from 2023, for instance, contains a specific entry on this topic: “Just transitions. A set of principles, processes and practices that aim to ensure that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind in the transition from a high-carbon to a low carbon economy” (IPCC 2023, 1806). The IPCC entry ends with some considerations regarding past generations: “Just transitions may embody the redressing of past harms and perceived injustices”. Interestingly, though, the entry says nothing about the normative implications of a just transition for future generations. A 2023 United Nations document defines the concept of just transition along similar lines (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 3, 12–13). But, again, it understands “just transition” in terms of claims that stakeholders within the current generation, whether at national or international level, can raise against each other. As for the international level, the United Nations document makes the following statement concerning the concept of just transition as applied to international relations: “As countries pick up the pace of their climate change mitigation strategies, it is critical that developed countries do not transfer the burden of the transition onto developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 8). The problem, however, is that, as a matter of justice, it is equally critical that the current generation does not transfer the burden of the transition onto the overshoot generation, even if that burden, in the end, turns out to benefit the post-overshoot generation. Such an unequal distribution of burdens across three generations would certainly conflict with the requirements of intergenerational justice (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70; Meyer 2021). Overshoot generation and retroactive mitigation One might perhaps argue that no extra burden is being imposed on the overshoot generation, for the current generation is already having to face challenges that the overshoot generation, supposedly, will not have to face. The overshoot generation, one might suggest, will inherit from the current generation all the benefits resulting from the energy transition, but without having to bear the costs that the transition imposes on the current generation. The idea here is that by the middle of this century global emissions will have already peaked and will be declining at an accelerated pace, towards stabilisation at 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level at the end of this century. Thus, the overshoot generation can arguably reap the benefits of green energy, as long as the current generation remains free, at least for the time being, to emit GHG further, which is necessary to finance the human and technological development that the overshoot generation will need later. This claim, however, overlooks a crucial fact about the climate crisis – a fact that has not been given due attention in the public debate on climate policies. In a very optimistic scenario, the overshoot generation will not have the burden of reducing their own emissions because they will be able to rely on carbon-free energy. The problem, however, is that the overshoot generation will still have to retroactively mitigate the emissions of previous generations – including, of course, the emissions of the current generation. We call this process “retroactive mitigation”, for what is at stake here is not reduction and phasing out of one’s own emissions, but the removal of massive amounts of GHG, which previous generations failed to mitigate in the past. In a 2014 report, the IPCC realised that simply reducing GHG emissions would no longer be enough to preclude irreversible climate change. Removal of GHG would also be necessary (IPCC 2014, 12). The IPCC called attention to yet another problem: it was unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies, including DAC (Direct Air Capture), could be deployed on a global scale in time to avoid a climate disaster. In a 2018 report, the IPCC was even less confident about the future development and scaling-up of CCS technologies (IPCC 2018, 136). To make matters worse, two further factors must be taken into consideration. (1) Recent studies show that there are practically no pathways left for the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals without the massive deployment of CCS (Smith et al. 2023). And (2) it has become increasingly probable that the overshoot generation will also have to deploy geoengineering technologies to cope with ever more frequent heatwaves (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70). It could perhaps be argued that afforestation and preservation of existing forests could be used instead of CCS technologies. However, the amount of land and water that would be necessary for the creation of new forests is probably larger than the amount of land and water available. Moreover, the attempt to create new forests on such a large scale might compromise the water and food security that the overshoot generation will need to promote their own climate adaptation (Shue 2017, 205). It is also necessary to take into account the amount of time new forests need to grow, not to mention the risk of fire. In this case, forests stop absorbing GHG and become GHG emitters themselves (Gatti et al. 2021). Implications for international relations In the aftermath of the Second World War, human being’s capacity to trigger catastrophic events at a global scale became increasingly apparent. As Garrett Hardin aptly put the problem in 1974: “No generation has viewed the problem of the survival of the human species as seriously as we have” (Hardin 1974b, 561). But while even realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and John Herz argued for international cooperation in the face of global threats, Hardin himself advanced what he called the “lifeboat ethics”. According to Hardin, instead of engaging in international cooperation, richer states should behave like lifeboats and resist the temptation to help individuals from poorer states to cope with environmental disasters or famines. This, he argued, might undermine richer states’ capacity to secure their own survival (Hardin 1974a; 1974b). In his The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival from 1977, Hardin resumes his criticism of international cooperation to alleviate the plight of poorer states: We will do little good in the international sphere until we recognize that the greatest need of a poor country is not material: call it psychological, moral, spiritual, or what you will. The basic issue is starkly raised in a story of personal heroism that unfolded in South America a few years ago (Hardin 1977, 64). Hardin goes on to recall the 1972 Andes plane crash, turned into a feature film in 2023. Hardin suggests that the passengers who had survived the crash would not have taken the initiative to save their own lives had they not heard on the radio that the search efforts to rescue them had been called off. Hardin’s conclusion is this: “This true story, I submit, bears a close resemblance to the moral situation of poor countries. The greatest gift we can give them is the knowledge that they are on their own” (Hardin 1977, 65). Hardin, of course, does not take into consideration the extent to which richer states themselves may be responsible for the plight of poorer states. Hardin’s self-help approach to international relations is in line with political realism. But when major realist thinkers themselves addressed the question of human survival, around the same time Hardin advocated his lifeboat ethics, they came to entirely different conclusions. Authors such as Morgenthau and Herz realized that nation-states had become unable to protect their own citizens in the face of global catastrophes triggered by the depletion of the environment or the outbreak of a nuclear war. As Morgenthau put the problem in 1966: “No nation state is capable of protecting its citizens and their way of life against an all-out atomic attack. Its safety rests solely in preventing such an attack from taking place” (Morgenthau 1966, 9). In a 1976 article on the emergence of the atomic age, Herz made a similar point: “Nuclear penetrability had rendered the traditional nation-state obsolete because it could no longer fulfill its primary function, that of protection” (Herz 1976a, 101). Both Morgenthau and Herz argued for international cooperation – or perhaps even the dissolution of the system of states (Morgenthau 1978, 539) – as the better strategy to avert global catastrophic risks (Herz 1976a, 110; 1976b, 47). Herz later also theorized about the concept of “ecological threat” and argued for the development of a new interdisciplinary field, which he aptly named “survival studies” (Herz 2003; Seidel 2003; Laszlo and Seidel 2006, 2–3; Graham 2008; Stevens 2020). During the overshoot period, as heatwaves and other climate-related extreme events become more severe and frequent, people in poorer countries are likely to suffer the most. Mass migrations are likely to occur on an unprecedented scale (Vince 2022). Given the current popularity of anti-migration measures both in the United States and Europe, it is imaginable, then, that the lifeboat ethics will strike a chord with future conservative governments. That would be an error, for the assumption that governments will be protecting their own citizens by way of making their borders impenetrable to climate migrants is misleading. The “ecological threat” cannot be held back by higher walls. Lifeboat ethics will make everyone worse-off. Back in the 1960s, Martin Luther King may not have had climate change or mass migration in mind, but his words strike us as even more poignant now: “We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now” (as quoted by former American President Barack Obama). There is only one boat, carrying three generations of hopeful passengers with equal legitimate claims to a better climate. It is a long journey. Let us not allow our only boat to go down. Final remarks The scenario in which the overshoot generation will have to live is not an encouraging one, but it is even less inhospitable than the scenario that the post-overshoot generation will have to face if the goals of the Paris Agreement are not met. It is up to the current generation to make sure that the overshoot period is as short as possible, and that the overshoot generation will not only be in a position to adapt to unprecedented climate scenarios in the history of human civilization, but also fulfil hopes of the post-overshoot generation. Figures Figure 1: Pathways compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement (IPCC 2018, 62). FIGURE01  Figure 2: Pathways that would limit global warming to 1.5°C (IPCC 2018, 160).   Acknowledgements Marcelo de Araujo thanks Prof. Darrel Moellendorf for the invitation and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for the financial support. Support for this research has also been provided by the CNPq (The National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and FAPERJ (Carlos Chagas Filho Research Support Foundation). 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has made clear his intent to supercharge his “America First” approach to foreign policy in his second term – and Mexico looks set to be at the tip of the spear. While many of Trump’s predecessors have also followed a “realist” strategy – that is, one where relative power is at the forefront of international relations, while diplomatic success is viewed through how it benefits one’s own nation – the incoming president has displayed an apparent unwillingness to consider the pain that his plans would inflict on targeted countries or the responses this will engender. Trump’s proposed policies threaten Mexico in three key ways: First, his goal of deporting millions of migrants would put tremendous pressure on Mexico’s economy and society as the country tried to absorb the influx. This would be exacerbated by his second threat, a sharp increase in tariffs, which could devastate the critical export sector of Mexico’s economy. And third, Trump has floated the idea of using U.S. military power to confront narcotraffickers within Mexico, which would directly impinge on Mexico’s sovereignty and could generate more violence on both sides of the border. But as a scholar of Latin American politics and U.S.-Latin American relations, I see several options that Mexico could use to push back on Trump by imposing high costs on U.S. interests. Indeed, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already signaled how she may counter Trump’s policies. The most obvious tools are ending cooperation on drugs and immigration and imposing tariffs of her own. She could also revoke some of the decades-old tax and labor privileges that have benefited U.S. businesses operating within Mexico. And finally, she could play the “China card” – that is, in the face of worsening U.S.-Mexico ties, Mexico could turn to Washington’s biggest economic rival at a time when Beijing is seeking to assert more influence across Latin America. From conciliation to confrontration Of course, a worsening relationship is not inevitable. During Trump’s first term, Mexico’s then-president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, maintained a constructive relationship with the U.S. administration. In fact, Lopez Obrador was surprisingly cooperative given Trump’s at times hostile rhetoric toward Mexico. For example, he helped facilitate the Trump administration’s “Remain in Mexico” program for those seeking asylum in the U.S. and also accepted Trump’s demands to renegotiate NAFTA and give it a title reflecting U.S. leadership: the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. Sheinbaum, who took office on Oct. 1, 2024, started with a cautious approach to her relationship with Trump. She congratulated Trump on his victory and urged dialogue with the incoming U.S. president. “There will be good relations with the United States. I’m convinced of that,” she told reporters on Nov. 7, 2024. But Trump hasn’t been conciliatory. In addition to talk about dumping millions of immigrants across the border, he announced on social media on Nov. 24 that he would impose a 25% tariff on Mexican and Canadian goods – a move that would effectively abrogate the USMCA. That post seemingly ended Sheinbaum’s cautious approach. In a strongly worded response, the Mexican president cautioned that she would respond in kind. A trade war, she noted, would harm the economies of both countries; progress on immigration and drug trafficking required cooperation, not threats, she added. The impact of tariffs Sheinbaum has said she wants to avoid a trade war, but Trump’s threats have led her nonetheless to talk about how a trade war would begin. This trade war, plus other costs Sheinbaum could impose on U.S. investors, would also likely foment a coalition of opposition within the U.S. business community – a group that has been a key ally of Trump. Trump’s stated goal of putting high tariffs on goods coming from Mexico is to encourage businesses that currently exploit lower employment costs in Mexico to relocate to the northern side of the border. But that approach ignores the impact that retaliatory tariffs and investment controls would have on U.S.-based companies that rely on the Mexican market. It would have several negative effects. First, a tit-for-tat tariff war would generate inflation for U.S. and Mexican consumers. Second, it would disrupt the integration of markets across North America. As a result of the elimination of tariffs – a key component of both NAFTA and the Trump-era USMCA – markets and the production of goods across North America have become highly interconnected. The trade treaties severely reduced barriers to investment in Mexico, allowing significant American investment in sectors such as agriculture and energy – where U.S. companies were formerly prohibited. Further, manufacturers now rely on processes in which, for example, the average car crosses the border multiple times during production. Similarly, agribusiness has developed symbiotic practices, such that grains, apples and pears are predominantly grown in the United States, while tomatoes, strawberries and avocados are grown in Mexico. Given these processes, the U.S. now exports over US$300 billion of goods and services per year to Mexico, and the stock of U.S. investments in Mexico reached $144 billion in 2023. If Trump abrogates the trade deals and imposes tariffs, he might convince investors to spend their next dollars in the U.S. But if Mexico imposes tariffs, business taxes or investment restrictions, what would happen to investors’ farms and factories already in Mexico? Past experience suggests that any disruption to supply chains or U.S. export markets would awaken strong business opposition, as analysts and business groups have already recognized. Trump is not immune to pressure from U.S. businesses. During his first administration, companies successfully opposed Trump’s attempt to close the border, arguing that slowing the flow of immigrants also meant slowing trucks full of goods. Security and immigration On the issue of the border and immigration, while Trump has issued threats, Sheinbaum has stressed the importance of cooperation. Currently, the Mexican government expends significant resources to patrol its own southern border, not to mention dealing with the many potential migrants who gather in its northern cities. Mexico could demand more support from the U.S. in exchange for this work, plus the costs associated with welcoming back the estimated 4 million Mexicans who are currently in the U.S. without proper documentation. The deportation of undocumented immigrants that Trump has repeatedly promised will require other types of cooperation, such as processing border crossings, and Mexico could slow-walk this process. Mexico has already signaled that it will withhold processing of non-Mexicans. The two countries have a history of collaboration in addressing the illegal drugs trade – but here too there have also been tensions. Toward the end of Trump’s first term, for example, a Mexican general was arrested in the U.S. on drug charges. After a diplomatic uproar, he was returned to Mexico and released. In late November, Sheinbaum noted that she and Trump had discussed security cooperation “within the framework of our sovereignty.” But Trump’s campaign rheotric seemed less concerned with Mexico’s sovereignty, floating the idea of sending troops to the border or even deploying them within Mexico to counter narcotraffickers. That would clearly enrage Mexico, with consequences that would extend far beyond a willingness to cooperate on the issues of drug trafficking. A chance for China? One country that stands to benefit should U.S.-Mexican relations deteriorate is China – an issue that Mexico could exploit. China is now the first or second trading partner with nearly every country in Latin America, including Mexico. The value of U.S.-Mexico trade is over $100 billion a year, but the growth of Chinese imports into Mexico has been limited somewhat by rules-of-origin provisions in NAFTA and the USMCA. A U.S.-Mexican trade war could weaken or end any incentive to keep Chinese goods out. Further, if the doors to the United States are narrowed through tariffs and hostile rhetoric, China’s car parts and financial services would clearly become even more attractive to Mexican businesses. A U.S.-Mexican trade war, in short, would augment Beijing’s access to a market on the U.S. border. A coalition of the concerned? In sum, if Trump goes through with his threats, the result will be costs to consumers and businesses, plus a new opportunity for China. This is likely to foment a coalition of industries, investors, consumers and foreign policy experts concerned with China – many parts of which supported Trump’s campaign.