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Energy & Economics
Mercosur and European Union agreement flag

Economic integration and convergence in globalization: An analysis of the relations between Mercosur, the Pacific Alliance and the European Union

by Giuseppe Ciccone , Davide Galletti

Abstract Globalization has posed significant challenges for Latin American countries, prompting them to rethink their economic integration models. Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, the two main regional blocs, have faced processes of economic and political convergence, albeit with different approaches: Mercosur, oriented towards protectionism, and the Pacific Alliance, which is committed to trade liberalization. In this context, the European Union emerges as a key player with which both blocs have sought to strengthen their economic relations, through strategic agreements such as the one signed in 2019, the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement. The article examines the dynamics of economic integration in Latin America, analyzing the structural divergences between the blocs and their capacity to face global challenges. In particular, it delves into the implications of the Mercosur-EU agreement, with special attention to economic impacts, sectoral cooperation opportunities and environmental challenges. The research also includes a case study on the implementation of the agreement and future prospects, complemented by an interview with the Consul of Uruguay to analyze the diplomatic position and prospects for the development of relations between Latin America and the European Union. The objective of this work is to explore how economic integration models can contribute to face global challenges, promote sustainable development and strengthen Latin America's competitiveness in the global scenario Introduction Global Context of Cooperation Between the European Union and Latin America Future cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the main Latin American trade blocs — Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance — is expected to focus on key areas such as sustainability, digitalization, and technological innovation. These sectors are essential for modernizing the involved economies and building a long-term partnership capable of addressing the economic, environmental, and geopolitical challenges of today’s global landscape. One of the main opportunities for cooperation lies in the circular economy. The EU promotes sustainable production and consumption models that aim to reduce waste and optimize resources. This approach paves the way for close collaboration with Latin American countries in waste management and reducing the environmental impact of industrial activities. The potential economic and labor impacts of this collaboration are significant, as it could create new opportunities for innovation and development in strategic sectors. At the same time, digitalization is emerging as a key pillar for the economic transformation of both regions. The EU’s Digital Alliance, for example, aims to strengthen Latin American economies by promoting connectivity, the development of digital skills, and the creation of new technological ecosystems. This effort also includes social inclusion initiatives, targeting vulnerable sectors such as informal workers and the elderly population, to reduce the digital divide and foster social inclusion. Another area of cooperation is maritime transport. The EU intends to invest in advanced and sustainable port infrastructure to improve operational efficiency and reduce the environmental impact of port activities. This initiative aligns with global sustainability goals and the EU’s broader strategy to promote environmentally responsible trade practices. However, cooperation between the EU and Latin American trade blocs also faces challenges. While the Pacific Alliance appears more inclined toward adopting advanced technologies, Mercosur faces significant structural reforms to close the technological gap among its members. Despite these hurdles, the EU is committed to supporting both regions, strengthening its role as an economic and political partner, and promoting a development model that integrates sustainability and inclusiveness. In this context, digitalization, economic modernization, and infrastructure diversification emerge as key elements to address global challenges. These factors are essential for promoting fair and inclusive development in both regions, creating a favorable environment for innovation and sustainable economic growth. The European Union considers Latin America as a strategic partner not only because of its natural resources but also due to shared values, such as the fight against climate change. Within this framework, the EU’s Green Deal and the environmental diplomacy play a crucial role in supporting ecological transition in the region, with a particular focus on renewable energy, the protection of the Amazon, and sustainable agricultural practices. Nevertheless, challenges remain, including the strong influence of traditional economic sectors like agribusiness and limited institutional capacity in some countries. Despite these issues, the EU is working to encourage the adoption of strict environmental standards through investments in sustainable projects and clean technologies, helping to reduce deforestation and improve biodiversity. The cooperation with the Pacific Alliance is particularly strong due to the region’s openness to sustainability, whereas Mercosur faces internal obstacles such as regulatory fragmentation and coordination difficulties among its members. Still, the EU continues to support initiatives in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and the bioeconomy, creating important economic opportunities for the region. Rising geopolitical competition, especially with China and the United States, is pushing the EU to strengthen its ties with Latin America by backing initiatives like the Global Gateway, which aims to promote sustainable and transparent infrastructure. Programs like “Horizon Europe” support scientific development in the region, while initiatives such as Erasmus+ encourage cultural exchange and the training of a new generation of professionals. The EU stands out for its integrated approach, aiming to promote a development model that combines economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection—seeking to overcome political and economic barriers and foster effective and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two regions. The main challenge remains translating these ambitions into concrete actions. The adoption of shared standards and the reduction of non-tariff barriers will be key elements in achieving fruitful cooperation. Despite the difficulties, EU–Latin America cooperation has the potential to lead the future toward sustainable and inclusive development, with positive effects on global policy, the ecological transition, and international trade. Methodology The methodology used in the preparation of this article combined extensive documentary research with the collection of primary data through direct interviews. First, documentary research served as the main foundation for analyzing the issues discussed, such as the environmental impacts and diplomatic challenges related to the Association Agreement between the European Union and Mercosur. To that end, official sources were consulted, including documents from the European Commission and reports from the European Parliament, which provide detailed data and analyses on the trade, environmental, and social aspects of the agreement. This phase of the research included a review of institutional reports, political resolutions, and other public documents available online, offering a comprehensive view of regulatory developments and the political positions adopted by European institutions and Mercosur countries. In addition to documentary research, a distinctive element of this work was an interview conducted with the General Consul of Uruguay in Spain, who provided a direct diplomatic perspective on the topic. The interview aimed to gather insights and information on the agreement negotiations from Mercosur’s point of view, exploring the political dynamics and diplomatic challenges associated with the understanding between the two blocs. The topics addressed during the interview focused on how Mercosur perceives the agreement in relation to its economic and environmental priorities, and on the measures being taken to balance development and sustainability within the framework of European policies. Finally, the research methodology was enhanced through the triangulation of information obtained by comparing data from official EU sources with the insights gathered from the interview. This approach enabled the development of a balanced and comprehensive view of the topics discussed. The combination of qualitative methods allowed for an in-depth analysis of the challenges and opportunities arising from the Mercosur–EU Agreement, as well as its social, economic, and environmental implications at the international level. Development Inside the Agreement The free trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union, signed in 2019 after more than twenty years of negotiations, stands as one of the most ambitious examples of interregional cooperation. This treaty, which aims to create one of the largest free trade areas in the world, involves nearly 770 million people and accounts for around 25% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The significance of the agreement is heightened by the current geopolitical context, marked by a rise in protectionist policies and the growing influence of China, making it crucial to strengthen ties between the two regional blocs (European Commission, 2019).   Trade relations across both sides of the Atlantic are substantial. In the previous year, European exports to the four Mercosur countries amounted to €55.7 billion, while imports of goods totaled €53.8 billion. The roots of cooperation between the European Union and Mercosur go back to the 1990s, when the EU initiated a structured dialogue with Mercosur aimed at promoting trade liberalization, political dialogue, and cooperation in various sectors. The agreement signed in 2019 can be interpreted as a strategic response to increasing global protectionist pressures. However, the ratification process has been hindered by political disagreements, economic asymmetries, and concerns over potential environmental impacts, such as deforestation and pesticide use (López, 2020). The agreement has received support from several EU countries, including Germany, Spain, and Portugal, while others — such as France, Poland, and Ireland — have opposed it due to fears related to unfair competition and food safety. Specifically, the treaty could lead to increased imports of meat and other agricultural products from Mercosur, which raises concern among EU agricultural sectors. At the same time, Mercosur views the agreement as an opportunity to strengthen its international competitiveness and reduce its economic dependence on China and the United States (Pereira, 2021). The path to ratification, still ongoing, requires a lengthy legal process involving approvals by various national parliaments. If ratified, the agreement will help reduce tariffs and simplify customs procedures, benefiting strategic sectors such as industry, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. However, ongoing disagreements among the involved countries continue to cast uncertainty over the future of the initiative (European Commission, 2019). The future of the free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur stands at a critical crossroads, facing the risk of a complete breakdown in negotiations or, alternatively, a "no-deal" scenario. However, between these two extreme outcomes, there are several intermediate solutions, which could include modifications to the treaty’s controversial points or even the possibility of granting a new mandate to the European Commission to renegotiate the agreement — either partially or entirely. Such modifications could lead to significant delays in the progress already made (Brito, 2021). The Portuguese presidency of the EU Council, which began on January 1, 2025, now faces a particularly complex situation as it attempts to steer the process toward a positive conclusion. Portuguese Foreign Minister Augusto Santos Silva has expressed his intent to accelerate the ratification process and promote the agreement’s entry into force. However, resistance from France, which fears negative impacts on its agricultural and livestock sectors, remains a major obstacle. Protests by French farmers, including demonstrations and road blockades, highlight internal difficulties within the European Union (Müller, 2020). Despite this opposition, the European Commission — backed by countries like Spain and Germany — continues to push for the agreement’s ratification, highlighting the enormous economic benefits for both parties. It is estimated that the agreement could result in a €15 billion increase in GDP for the European Union and €11.4 billion for the Mercosur countries. Moreover, the elimination of customs tariffs would boost European exports, particularly in sectors such as wine, alcoholic beverages, and dairy products. For the European Union, the agreement represents not only a strategic opportunity to expand trade with South America but also a mean to strengthen its economic security amid an unstable geopolitical context (European Commission, 2021). The deal is expected to create new commercial and employment opportunities with a positive impact on both regions’ economies. Particularly, it could attract sustainable investment into Mercosur, especially in high-tech sectors. Additionally, it would support the strengthening of supply chains and enhance the EU’s economic resilience, reinforcing strategic cooperation between the two regional blocs.   However, the success of the agreement will depend on both parties’ ability to overcome existing differences, address environmental and human rights concerns, and implement effective monitoring mechanisms. On Mercosur’s side, it will be necessary to undertake economic reforms to enhance competitiveness, stimulate innovation, and attract foreign investment. Meanwhile, the European Union will face the challenge of gradually reducing agricultural subsidies to ensure fair competition (Pereira, 2021). In summary, the free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur represents a significant opportunity to strengthen economic cooperation between two blocs with complementary economies: the EU, a global leader in the industrial sector, and Mercosur, one of the main exporters of agricultural raw materials. The agreement aims to increase bilateral trade and direct investment, particularly in the agricultural and industrial sectors, with important implications for the future of interregional cooperation and global trade. The Association Agreement between the EU and Mercosur has raised serious concerns of both environmental and diplomatic nature. While designed to strengthen economic and political ties between the two blocs, the agreement could have devastating environmental impacts, especially considering Mercosur’s heavy reliance on agricultural exports to the EU. Brazil, the leading exporter of products like soy, beef, and coffee, stands as a clear example of these issues. The demand for these products is directly linked to deforestation, with severe consequences for vital ecosystems such as the Amazon. Although deforestation in Brazil decreased by 50% in 2023 compared to the previous year, future projections remain worrisome. The access to European markets, guaranteed by the agreement, could accelerate land conversion and intensify pressure on natural resources. Some studies estimate that the agreement could lead to the conversion of between 560 and 1,730 km² of land — an impact that, although lower than the 13,235 km² of annual deforestation recorded in the Brazilian Amazon in 2021, remains significant (FAO, 2021). A crucial chapter of the agreement is the “Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter” (TSDC), which promotes cooperation between the EU and Mercosur on environmental issues and establishes a commitment to adhere to international climate agreements, such as the Paris Agreement. However, criticism of the TSDC focuses on the lack of binding enforcement mechanisms for environmental regulations and the absence of adequate sanctions, which limits the agreement’s ability to ensure compliance with environmental commitments. Despite the creation of a joint committee to monitor the implementation of the TSDC, its effectiveness is weakened by the lack of concrete punitive tools (European Commission, 2020). The European Commission also highlights the value that Mercosur can bring in terms of agricultural and fishery products to the European market. Some of these goods — such as soy, cocoa, and coffee — are items that EU member states cannot produce or only produce in minimal quantities. Others, such as beef, poultry, honey, and cheese, compete directly with European agricultural businesses. This has fueled rural anger, particularly among French, Polish, and Italian farmers, who accuse the EU of promoting unfair competition, given that South American producers are not subject to the same regulations as their European counterparts. Concerns about increasing deforestation and the weakening of environmental and social standards are among the primary fears expressed by environmental groups and certain EU member states. During Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019–2022), environmental policies were significantly rolled back, exacerbating these concerns. However, the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has raised new hopes for a renewed commitment to environmental protection, although economic priorities may complicate the negotiation process (Doyle, 2023). Despite the criticisms, the agreement presents an opportunity to promote the sustainable management of natural resources, enhance transparency in production chains, and strengthen the enforcement of environmental laws in Mercosur countries. To achieve a positive and lasting impact, however, concrete commitment from both governments and the private sector will be essential, supported by effective monitoring mechanisms and enforceable sanctions. An innovative aspect of the agreement is the inclusion of clauses that mandate the end of illegal deforestation by 2030, with a monitoring system designed to ensure compliance with these rules. Although this commitment represents an important step forward, doubts remain about its enforcement and effective oversight — particularly regarding Brazil’s compliance, given its central role in deforestation. Additionally, the agreement stipulates that only “deforestation-free” products — such as soy, beef, palm oil, and cocoa — will be allowed to enter the EU market (European Commission, 2022). Concerns related to food safety and public health are equally relevant. The importation of beef from countries where the use of antibiotics and hormones is less regulated could compromise food safety in Europe, as highlighted by an audit conducted by the European Commission. Some critics fear that the agreement may lower product quality standards and increase unfair competition for European farmers. Furthermore, there is concern that the deal could encourage industrial relocation to South America, resulting in job losses in Europe (OECD, 2021). Despite these challenges, the agreement represents a rare opportunity to strengthen interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur in the face of global challenges such as climate change and biodiversity protection. However, the success of the agreement will depend on the ability of both regions to effectively integrate economic interests with the need for social and environmental sustainability. It will be necessary to adopt strict measures to monitor the environmental and social impacts of the agreement, actively involve local communities in policymaking, and promote a development model that balances economic growth with sustainability. To further explore the issues affecting Mercosur and potential solutions for greater regional integration, we interviewed Ramiro Rodríguez Bausero, General Consul of Uruguay in Spain. During the conversation, Bausero shared his perspective on the economic and political challenges that face the bloc, as well as on the opportunities for cooperation with the Pacific Alliance and the policies needed to address emerging global problems such as climate change and food security. Below are some key excerpts from the interview, along with a commentary on how these insights contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing Mercosur in a global context. To better understand the issues influencing Mercosur, it is essential to examine the internal challenges and asymmetries among its members. According to Ramiro Rodríguez Bausero, General Consul of Uruguay in Spain, “Mercosur displays significant disparities in terms of size and level of development; there are evident inequalities between countries and regions, and these persist over time.” This observation highlights one of the core difficulties in achieving economic integration within the bloc: the economic disparities between its larger and smaller members. Resources and investments are unevenly distributed, and the inability to effectively manage these asymmetries hinders balanced growth, with larger countries often dominating the economic process. This concept is fundamental to understanding the structural limitations that constrain Mercosur’s development. Another crucial aspect is the influence of ideological orientation on the integration processes. Bausero notes that “within the bloc, different visions coexist, based on internal productive structures, and as governments change, their profiles evolve toward more or less protectionist/open policies, depending on the ideological orientation of each administration.” This phenomenon poses a major obstacle to strengthening Mercosur, as the swings between protectionist and open-market policies make it difficult to establish a coherent and long-term strategy. Ideological differences between governments further complicate the formation of a stable and strategic economic bloc. Nevertheless, despite internal challenges, there are significant opportunities for cooperation with other regional entities such as the Pacific Alliance. Bausero highlights that “strengthening ties between the two blocs presents several areas with the potential for cooperation, such as trade facilitation, reciprocal investment, physical integration, technological innovation, and the movement of people.” Although political divergences may hinder closer cooperation, these mutual areas of interest could reinforce regional integration, especially in fields like trade and technological innovation. On the environmental sustainability and climate change front, Bausero suggested that “Mercosur could implement more ambitious climate policies, promoting a transition to a low-carbon economy with measures that support renewable energy and encourage technological innovation in sustainable industries.” Adopting more advanced climate policies represents an opportunity for Mercosur to address global climate challenges. Given its significant influence over agricultural policies and natural resource management, the bloc could play a crucial role in driving the shift toward a green economy — responding to international pressure and improving its reputation as a responsible global actor. The trade potential of Mercosur, especially in the context of the agreement with the European Union, is another key issue. Bausero emphasized that “the benefits of the trade component of the Agreement show that many of the goods comprising Mercosur countries’ export offerings to the EU will receive preferential treatment in the European market.” This agreement could create new opportunities for economic growth among member countries, reducing their dependence on Asian markets — particularly China. However, internal challenges related to the agreement, especially concerning the agricultural sector, could hinder full implementation and require careful attention. Finally, reforming Mercosur has emerged as a relevant topic, with some countries, like Uruguay, advocating for a more flexible bloc. Bausero stated: “Some countries (such as Uruguay) have argued for the need to make the bloc more flexible, transforming it into a Free Trade Area (FTA), allowing each member to pursue its own international agenda, including negotiating agreements with third countries.” The proposal to transform Mercosur into a more flexible FTA reflects criticism of the bloc's rigidity. If implemented, such a reform could allow member states to adopt more individualized policies — but it also raises questions about the future of regional integration and the political and economic unity of the bloc. Another important area of development is digital cooperation and infrastructure. According to Bausero, “the so-called ‘Digital Mercosur’ is a cooperation project between the EU and Mercosur, aimed at reducing technological asymmetries and promoting common policies and strategies in the fields of the Information Society, e-commerce, and human resource training.” Digital cooperation could be one of the main drivers of growth for Mercosur, enabling member countries to overcome technological inequalities and access global markets. Digitalization and the integration of modern technologies are essential to enhancing regional competitiveness and developing an interconnected digital economy. Conclusions The free trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union, signed in 2019, represents a significant step toward greater interregional economic integration, with the ambitious goal of creating one of the largest free trade areas in the world. However, its future remains uncertain and depends on a series of interrelated factors, including internal political divergences within the EU, environmental challenges, and economic inequalities among Mercosur members. These elements raise numerous questions and opportunities for critical reflection that could be explored in future research. First and foremost, one of the main issues to address is the environmental impact of the treaty. The "Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter" (TSDC), while establishing a commitment to international climate agreements, does not provide sufficiently binding mechanisms to ensure effective environmental protection. What is the role of trade policy in a context of growing urgency for environmental sustainability? To what extent can the current provisions halt deforestation and guarantee the sustainable use of natural resources, especially in countries like Brazil, where agricultural expansion is directly linked to ecosystem destruction? These questions could pave the way for deeper research into the monitoring and effectiveness of environmental policies within trade agreements. Another relevant issue is the question of economic asymmetries within Mercosur. The disparities among member countries, in terms of size and development level, pose a challenge to genuine economic integration. How can smaller Mercosur countries compete on equal footing with larger ones without compromising their competitiveness? Furthermore, how can it be ensured that the benefits of the agreement are more equitably distributed among the bloc's members? Answering these questions is crucial for implementing policies that promote balanced and inclusive development. The geopolitical context also plays a fundamental role. In a scenario where protectionist trends are on the rise and China's influence continues to grow, how might the agreement between the EU and Mercosur redefine trade and geopolitical relations between the two blocs? Could this agreement represent the beginning of a reorganization in global economic balances, reducing dependence on Asian markets and strengthening ties between Europe and Latin America? These questions invite a deeper analysis of the geopolitical implications of the treaty and its influence on global trade dynamics. Additionally, the proposal to reform Mercosur — advocating for greater flexibility by transforming it into a Free Trade Area (FTA) — raises important questions. How would such a reform affect the bloc’s political and economic cohesion? Would flexibility be the right approach to addressing internal differences, or could it instead lead to the fragmentation of Mercosur and undermine its ability to act as a unified player on the international stage? Finally, digital cooperation, particularly the "Digital Mercosur" project, could become one of the most promising areas of development. How could digitalization and technological cooperation between the EU and Mercosur help reduce technological disparities and promote the competitiveness of the Latin American bloc? Strengthening digital infrastructure could accelerate Mercosur’s economic growth and open new trade opportunities, but what political and technological challenges will arise in this digitalization process? In conclusion, the free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur represents a significant opportunity, but it also poses a range of challenges that require ongoing attention. The questions raised by this agreement— from environmental concerns and economic asymmetries to geopolitical dynamics and structural reforms within Mercosur — offer numerous starting points for future research. 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Energy & Economics
To achieve sustainable environmental conservation, we must prioritize clean energy solutions to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and promote a sustainable future for future generations.

Harnessing nuclear power for sustainable electricity generation and achieving zero emissions

by Mohamed Khaleel , Ziyodulla Yusupov , Sassi Rekik , Heybet Kılıç , Yasser F. Nassar , Hala J. El-Khozondar , Abdussalam Ali Ahmed

Note: some parts of the article have been excluded, if you want to go deep in the article please check  https://doi.org/10.1177/01445987251314504 for the complete version. Abstract Nuclear power plays a pivotal role in sustainable electricity generation and global net zero emissions, contributing significantly to this secure pathway. Nuclear power capacity is expected to double, escalating from 413 gigawatts (GW) in early 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 within the net zero emissions (NZE) paradigm. The global energy landscape is undergoing significant transformation as nations strive to transition to more sustainable energy systems. Amidst this shift, nuclear power has emerged as a crucial component in the pursuit of a sustainable energy transition. This study examines nuclear power's multifaceted role in shaping sustainable energy transition. It delves into nuclear energy's contributions toward decarbonization efforts, highlighting its capacity to provide low-carbon electricity and its potential role in mitigating climate change. Furthermore, the study explores the challenges and opportunities associated with integrating nuclear power into energy transition strategies, addressing issues such as safety, waste management, and public perception. In conclusion, the global nuclear power capacity is anticipated to reach approximately 530 GW by 2050, representing a substantial shortfall of 35% compared with the trajectory outlined in the NZE pathway. Under the NZE scenario, nuclear power demonstrates exceptional expansion, nearly doubling from 413 GW in early 2022 to 812 GW by 2050. Concurrently, the trajectory highlights a transformative shift in renewable energy investments, with annual expenditures surging from an average of US$325 billion during 2016–2020 to an impressive US$1.3 trillion between 2031 and 2035. These projections underscore the critical role of nuclear and renewable energy investments in achieving global sustainability and emission reduction goals. Introduction Global warming and greenhouse gas emissions pose some of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. The combustion of fossil fuels for electricity generation is a major contributor to these issues, releasing billions of tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere annually (Abbasi et al., 2020; Nassar et al., 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024a). In this context, nuclear energy emerges as a critical component of the solution. Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear power generates electricity with minimal greenhouse gas emissions, offering a reliable and scalable alternative to bridge the gap between energy demand and decarbonization goals. It operates independently of weather conditions, providing consistent energy output and complementing the intermittency of renewable sources like wind and solar (Rekik and El Alimi, 2024b, 2024c). Furthermore, advancements in nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors (SMRs) and generation IV reactors, have addressed historical concerns related to safety, waste management, and cost-effectiveness (Lau and Tsai, 2023). In 2022, global investment in low-emission fuels will maintain a robust growth trajectory, reaching a sum of US$13 billion. A significant portion of this investment was allocated toward liquid biofuels, totaling US$9.4 billion, and biogas, amounting to US$2.7 billion. It is important to emphasize that liquid biofuels constituted approximately 80% of the overall investment surge observed in 2022, with investments in biogas contributing 4% of the total. The residual portion of the investment was directed toward low-emission hydrogen production, which attained a sum of US$1.2 billion in 2022, representing an almost fourfold increase compared to the figures recorded in 2021 (Khaleel et al., 2024).Nuclear power is a pivotal component of low-carbon energy, which significantly contributes to the realization of a low-carbon economy and establishment of a green energy grid (Arvanitidis et al., 2023; El Hafdaoui et al., 2024; Fragkos et al., 2021). According to current data, 442 nuclear power reactors are operational worldwide, collectively generating 393 gigawatts (GW) of electricity, thereby furnishing a consistent and dependable source of low-carbon power (Mathew, 2022). Nuclear electricity constitutes approximately 11% of the total global electricity generation, representing a substantial portion of the global low-carbon electricity production (Alam et al., 2019). Recent advancements have enhanced the affordability and appeal of nuclear power as an alternative source of energy. These advancements encompass progress in large reactor technologies, the emergence of novel approaches such as advanced fuel utilization and SMRs, engineering breakthroughs facilitating the extension of operational lifespans for existing reactors, and innovations in materials science and improved waste management practices (Kröger et al., 2020; Zhan et al., 2021). Fast breeder reactor technology has transitioned into a commercial realm, offering benefits beyond electricity generation by enabling the production of surplus fuel and enhancing the efficiency of nuclear waste incineration, surpassing the capabilities of existing commercial reactor technologies (Lau and Tsai, 2023). Nuclear power plays a substantial role within a secure global trajectory toward achieving net zero emissions (NZE) (Addo et al., 2023; Dafnomilis et al., 2023). Nuclear power capacity experiences a twofold increase, progressing from 413 GW at the outset of 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 within the NZE paradigm. It is apparent that the annual additions to nuclear capacity peaked at 27 GW per year during the 2030s, surpassing the levels observed in the preceding decade. Despite these advancements, the global proportion of nuclear power within the overall electricity generation portfolio has experienced a marginal decline, settling at 8% (Murphy et al., 2023; Ruhnau et al., 2023). Emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) substantially dominate global growth, constituting over 90% of the aggregate, with China poised to ascend as a preeminent nuclear power producer prior to 2030. Concurrently, advanced economies collectively witness a 10% augmentation in nuclear power capacity as retirements are counterbalanced by the commissioning of new facilities, predominantly observed in nations such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada (Bórawski et al., 2024). Furthermore, annual global investment in nuclear power has experienced a notable escalation, soaring from US$30 billion throughout the 2010s to surpass US$100 billion by 2030, maintaining a robust trajectory above US$80 billion by 2050 (IEA, 2022). In 2022, global nuclear power capacity experienced a modest increase of approximately 1.5 GW, reflecting a marginal year-on-year growth of 0.3%. This expansion was primarily driven by new capacity additions that surpassed the retirement of an over 6 GW of existing capacity (Fernández-Arias et al., 2023; Mendelevitch et al., 2018). EMDEs accounted for approximately 60% of the new capacity additions, underscoring their increasing significance in the global nuclear energy landscape. Conversely, more than half of the retirements were observed in advanced economies, including Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Table 1 shows the nuclear power capacity by region in the NZE from 2018 to 2030.   In alignment with the Net Zero Scenario, it is imperative for the global nuclear capacity to undergo an expansion averaging approximately 15 GW per annum, constituting a growth rate slightly exceeding 3% annually, until 2030. This strategic augmentation is crucial for sustaining the contribution of the nuclear sector to electricity generation, maintaining its share at approximately 10% (Liu et al., 2023). Such an expansion necessitates concerted efforts in both advanced economies and EMDEs. Furthermore, prioritizing the extension of operational lifetimes of existing nuclear facilities within G7 member states would not only fortify the existing low-emission infrastructure, but also facilitate the integration of new nuclear capacity, thereby augmenting the overall nuclear energy portfolio. [...] The significant contribution of nuclear power to sustainable energy transitions is underscored by its multifaceted role in addressing the pressing challenges of climate change and energy security (Asif et al., 2024). As nations worldwide endeavor to shift toward greener energy systems, nuclear power has emerged as a critical pillar of the decarbonization journey. Its ability to provide low-carbon electricity, mitigate climate change impacts by 2050, and enhance energy security highlights its pivotal importance in the broader context of sustainable energy transitions (Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; NEA, 2015). Thus, to fully realize its potential, challenges such as safety, waste management, and public perception must be addressed effectively. By leveraging robust policy frameworks, technological advancements, and international collaboration, nuclear power is poised to play a vital role in shaping the future of sustainable energy transitions on a global scale. Furthermore, the dynamic landscape of nuclear power development is evident in the significant influence exerted by EMDEs, particularly China, which is expected to emerge as a leading nuclear power producer by 2030 (Fälth et al., 2021; Nkosi and Dikgang, 2021). Concurrently, advanced economies are witnessing notable expansions in nuclear power capacity driven by the commissioning of new facilities to offset retirements (Budnitz et al., 2018). This trend is further reinforced by a notable surge in annual global investment in nuclear power, underscoring the sustained commitment to nuclear energy's pivotal role in sustainable energy transitions in the foreseeable future (IEA, 2019). The primary objective of this article is to explore the strategic role of nuclear power in advancing global sustainability goals and achieving zero emissions. The objective is structured around the following key agendas: •Nuclear power: prominence and green electricity source•Nuclear's role in achieving net zero by 2050•Nuclear power's significance in power system adequacySpecific technologies for sustainability in nuclear energy production•Investment in nuclear power•Addressing policy implications This comprehensive analysis aims to provide actionable insights into harnessing nuclear power for sustainable electricity generation and its pivotal role in achieving global zero-emission targets. Data and methodology This article conducts an in-depth analysis of the role of nuclear power in achieving sustainable electricity generation and supporting NZE targets. The article also addresses the potential of nuclear energy as a prominent and environmentally favorable electricity source, examining nuclear power's contribution toward the net zero by 2050 goal, its critical importance in ensuring power system adequacy, investment imperatives, and the broader policy implications.  [...] Nuclear power: prominence and green electricity source In 2020, nuclear power will constitute approximately 10% of the global electricity generation portfolio. This proportion, which had previously stood at 18% during the late 1990s, has experienced a decline; nonetheless, nuclear energy retains its status as the second-largest provider of low-emission electricity, trailing only hydroelectricity, and serves as the primary source within advanced economies. Despite the substantial proliferation of wind and solar PV technologies, nuclear electricity production in 2020 surpassed the aggregate output of these renewable sources. As of 2021, the global cumulative installed nuclear capacity has reached 413 GW, with 270 GW of this total being installed in advanced economies (Guidi et al., 2023; Halkos and Zisiadou, 2023; Pan et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2022). Nuclear power generation during this period amounted to 2653 TWh, positioning it as the second largest source of electricity generation after hydropower, which generated 4275 TWh, as depicted in Figure 1.   In addition to its significant role in power generation, nuclear energy plays a crucial role in mitigating carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Since the 1970s, nuclear power has helped avoid the global release of approximately 66 gigatons (Gt) of CO2 globally, as shown in Figure 2.   Without the contribution of nuclear power, cumulative emissions from electricity generation would have increased by approximately 20%, whereas total energy-related emissions would have increased by 6% over this period (Wagner, 2021). Advanced economies accounted for more than 85% of these avoided emissions, with the European Union accounting for 20 Gt and the United States for 24 Gt, representing over 40% and 25% of total electricity generation emissions, respectively. In the absence of nuclear power, Japan would have experienced an estimated 25% increase in emissions from electricity generation, whereas Korea and Canada would have seen an increase of approximately 50%. Nuclear's role in achieving net zero by 2050 Nuclear energy has emerged as a pivotal low-emission technology within the trajectory toward achieving NZE (Pioro et al., 2019). In addition, it serves as a complementary force, bolstering the accelerated expansion of renewables, thereby facilitating the reduction of emissions from the global electricity sector to net zero by 2040 (Krūmiņš and Kļaviņš, 2023; Islam et al., 2024). Beyond its intrinsic contribution to fostering a low-emission electricity supply, nuclear power is significant as a dispatchable generating asset, fortifying supply security through its provision of system adequacy and flexibility. Furthermore, it is instrumental in furnishing heat for district heating networks and in selecting industrial facilities. Despite this, the prospective role of nuclear energy hinges significantly on the deliberations and determinations of policymakers and industry stakeholders concerning the pace of new reactor construction initiatives and the continued operational lifespan of existing nuclear facilities (Li et al., 2016; Li et al., 2015).In terms of the NZE trajectory, the global nuclear power capacity exhibits a remarkable surge, nearly doubling from 413 GW at the onset of 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 (Price et al., 2023; Utami et al., 2022). This augmentation primarily stems from the vigorous initiation of new construction endeavors, which effectively counterbalance the gradual decommissioning of numerous extant plants. Such an escalation constitutes a pronounced acceleration in comparison to the preceding three decades, characterized by a mere 15% increment in capacity, equivalent to approximately 60 GW (Haneklaus et al., 2023; Obekpa and Alola, 2023; Sadiq et al., 2023). Figure 3 demonstrates the nuclear power capacity within each country/region under the NZE by 2050 scenario.   The expected growth in nuclear power capacity far exceeds the path outlined by the current policies and legal frameworks. According to the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), the nuclear capacity is projected to reach approximately 530 GW by 2050, which is 35% lower than that of the NZE pathway (Espín et al., 2023; Nicolau et al., 2023; Nnabuife et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023). Without a significant shift from recent nuclear power development trends, achieving NZE would require a limited reliance on a smaller range of low-emission technologies. This could compromise energy security and lead to higher total investment costs, resulting in increased electricity prices for consumers. Table 2 shows the average annual capacity addition for global nuclear power in NZE from 1981 to 2030.   In 2022, the global deployment of new nuclear power capacity witnessed a notable upsurge, with 7.9 GW added, representing a substantial 40% increase compared to the preceding year (Ho et al., 2019). It is worth bearing in mind that China spearheaded this expansion by completing the construction of two reactors, maintaining its streak for consecutive years as the leading contributor to global nuclear power capacity augmentation. It is noteworthy that the projects were successfully completed in various other nations, including Finland, Korea, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, significant strides were made in the initiation of new construction endeavors, with the commencement of construction activities on five reactors in China, two reactors in Egypt, and one reactor in Turkey (Hickey et al., 2021). Nuclear power's significance in power system adequacy Nuclear power facilities have persistently underpinned the dependability of power systems, thereby bolstering the adequacy of the system. Across diverse national contexts, nuclear power plants have historically maintained operational readiness, manifesting availability rates consistently exceeding 90%, thereby demonstrating their reliability in power generation. Given that a substantial proportion of nuclear power capacity directly contributes to system adequacy metrics, its significance in fortifying system reliability and adequacy significantly outweighs its proportional contribution to the total power capacity (Orikpete and Ewim, 2024; Frilingou et al., 2023; Raj, 2023; Ragosa et al., 2024). The contribution of nuclear power to system adequacy is demonstrated by the consistent trajectory of its share within the aggregate dispatchable power capacity, hovering at around 8% between 2021 and 2050 within the NZE framework (IEA, 2022; OIES, 2024). Dispatchable electricity sources have historically constituted the primary mechanism for ensuring system adequacy, a trend that endures within the NZE paradigm, especially as electricity systems undergo evolution marked by an escalating reliance on variable solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy sources (Marzouk, 2024; Moon et al., 2024; Wisnubroto et al., 2023). It is indisputable that unabated fossil fuel resources predominantly dominate dispatchable capacity; however, their prominence clearly diminishes, declining by a quarter by 2030 within the NZE framework and experiencing a precipitous decline thereafter. Unabated coal-fired power, currently the most substantial dispatchable source, anticipates a decline exceeding 40% in operational capacity by 2030 and approaches a state of negligible contribution by the early 2040s. Conversely, the unabated natural gas-fired power capacity exhibits a sustained level of stability until 2030, primarily driven by the necessity to offset the diminishing role of coal; nonetheless, it subsequently undergoes a rapid descent throughout the 2030s. Oil, constituting a comparatively minor contributor, experiences rapid phasing out across most regions, except for remote locales, within the delineated scenario (Makarov et al., 2023; Ren et al., 2024). Figure 4 highlights the global capacity of dispatchable power categorized by category in the scenario of achieving NZE by 2050.   In this context, fossil fuels equipped with Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS) technology have emerged as notable contributors to bolstering system adequacy. Yet, nuclear power remains a steady contributor to the power system flexibility. In advanced economies, the proportion of hour-to-hour flexibility is projected to increase from approximately 2% to 5% by 2050. Similarly, in EMDEs, this ratio is anticipated to increase from 1% to 3% over the same temporal span (Jenkins et al., 2018). It is worth highlighting that in France, where nuclear power fulfills the lion's share of electricity generation requisites, flexibility has been ingrained within reactor designs (Ho et al., 2019). This feature enables certain plants to swiftly modulate their output to align with the fluctuating electricity supply and demand, operating in a load-following mode (Chen, 2024; Jin and Bae, 2023; Kanugrahan and Hakam, 2023). Although many nations have not habitually engaged nuclear power in such operational dynamics, a considerable number of reactors are capable of performing load-following operations with minimal or no requisite technical adaptations (Caciuffo et al., 2020). Figure 5 demonstrates the hour-to-hour power system flexibility based on the source and regional grouping in the NZE by the 2050 scenario.   Innovation holds promise in enhancing the flexibility of nuclear power. Advanced technological advancements, such as SMRs, can facilitate nuclear reactors to adjust their electricity output with greater ease, as illustrated in Figure 6 (Ho et al., 2019; Lee, 2024; Wisnubroto et al., 2023). Moreover, these technologies offer the prospect of enabling reactors to transition toward generating heat or producing hydrogen either independently or concurrently with electricity generation. Initiatives are underway to disseminate information to policymakers and planners regarding the potential cost advantages associated with enhancing nuclear power flexibility.  Figure 6 demonstrates the nuclear system augmented by wind turbines for trigeneration.   Investment in nuclear power The renaissance of nuclear power within the NZE trajectory necessitates a substantial surge in investment in the coming decades. This surge is envisaged to encompass the construction of new nuclear reactors and extension of operational lifespans for existing facilities. Within this scenario, annual global investment in nuclear power is poised to escalate to exceed US$100 billion during the initial half of the 2030s within the NZE framework, surpassing the threefold average investment level of US$30 billion recorded during the 2010s (IEA, 2022). Subsequently, investment levels are expected to gradually decline as the imperative for dispatchable low emissions generating capacity diminishes, tapering to approximately US$70 billion by the latter half of the 2040s (Kharitonov and Semenova, 2023; Zimmermann and Keles, 2023). Over the period spanning from 2021 to 2050, the allocation of investment toward nuclear power constitutes a fraction representing less than 10% of the aggregate investment dedicated to low-emission sources of electricity (IEA, 2022). By comparison, within this framework, the annual investment in renewable energy experiences a notable escalation, escalating from an average of US$325 billion during the interval from 2016 to 2020 to US$1.3 trillion during the period 2031–2035 (EEDP, 2023; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024d). It is worth noting that the latter consideration elucidates the rationale behind the disproportionate allocation of investment toward advanced economies in later decades. China, for instance, requires an annual expenditure averaging close to US$20 billion on nuclear infrastructure by 2050, representing a nearly twofold increase compared to the average observed during the 2010s (Aghahosseini et al., 2023; Vujić et al., 2012). Conversely, other EMDEs witness a tripling of investment, reaching approximately US$25 billion per year, on average. In contrast to advanced economies, the imperative for investment in these nations is more pronounced in the period leading up to 2035 (Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Khaleel et al., 2024). Thus, nuclear energy, despite its advantages as a low-carbon energy source, faces notable challenges. High capital costs and long deployment timelines, driven by complex construction and regulatory requirements, often hinder its adoption. The management of radioactive waste remains a costly and contentious issue, while safety concerns, shaped by historical incidents, continue to influence public perception. Additionally, reliance on uranium, with its geographically concentrated supply, raises geopolitical and environmental concerns. Nuclear power also competes with the rapidly advancing and cost-effective renewable energy sector, while decommissioning aging plants poses long-term financial and logistical burdens. Addressing these limitations through advanced technologies, public engagement, and international collaboration is crucial for enhancing nuclear energy's role in sustainable energy transitions. Technologies for sustainability in nuclear energy production The pursuit of sustainability in nuclear energy production has been supported by advancements in innovative technologies that enhance efficiency, safety, and environmental compatibility (Aktekin et al., 2024; Ali et al., 2024; Zheng et al., 2024; Khan et al., 2017). These technologies are crucial for positioning nuclear power as a key contributor to clean and sustainable energy transitions. Below are some of the most impactful technologies in this domain: Advanced nuclear reactors: Small modular reactors (SMRs): SMRs are compact, scalable, and safer than traditional large-scale reactors. Their modular design allows for deployment in remote locations, making them suitable for decentralized energy systems. Generation IV reactors: These reactors incorporate advanced cooling systems and fuel cycles to improve efficiency, safety, and waste reduction. Examples include sodium-cooled fast reactors and gas-cooled fast reactors. Thorium-based reactors: Thorium fuel cycle reactors use thorium-232 as an alternative to uranium, offering a more abundant and sustainable fuel source. Thorium reactors produce less nuclear waste and have a lower risk of proliferation. Fusion energy: Although still in the experimental stage, nuclear fusion promises to be a game-changing technology. Fusion produces minimal radioactive waste and harnesses abundant fuel sources like deuterium and tritium, making it a virtually limitless and clean energy solution. Molten salt reactors (MSRs): MSRs use liquid fuels or coolants, such as molten salts, which operate at lower pressures and higher temperatures. These reactors are inherently safer and have the capability to utilize a variety of fuel types, including spent nuclear fuel and thorium. Reactor safety enhancements: Passive safety systems: These systems enhance reactor safety by using natural forces like gravity, natural convection, or condensation to cool the reactor core without human intervention. Digital twin technologies: Digital simulations and monitoring of reactor systems allow for predictive maintenance and real-time safety management. Nuclear waste management technologies Fast reactors: These reactors can recycle spent fuel, reducing the volume and radioactivity of nuclear waste. Deep geological repositories: Advances in geotechnical engineering have improved the safety of long-term waste storage in deep geological formations. Hybrid nuclear-renewable systems: Combining nuclear power with renewable energy sources like wind and solar can optimize energy production and grid stability. Hybrid systems leverage the reliability of nuclear energy with the intermittency of renewables for a balanced, low-carbon energy mix. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning: AI and machine learning technologies are being deployed to enhance reactor performance, optimize fuel usage, and improve operational safety. Predictive analytics also play a critical role in maintenance and risk assessment. Fuel advancements: High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU): HALEU fuels enable reactors to operate more efficiently and reduce waste. Accident-tolerant fuels (ATFs): These are designed to withstand extreme conditions, reducing the likelihood of core damage during accidents. Integrated energy systems: Nuclear reactors are increasingly being used for purposes beyond electricity generation, such as hydrogen production, district heating, and desalination. The integration of digital technologies, including AI and machine learning, coupled with fuel advancements like HALEU and accident-tolerant fuels, highlights the continuous evolution of the nuclear sector. These innovations not only enhance efficiency and safety but also expand the applications of nuclear energy beyond electricity generation to include hydrogen production, desalination, and district heating. Despite these technological advancements, the sustainable deployment of nuclear energy requires robust policy frameworks, increased investments, and public acceptance. Addressing these challenges is critical to unlocking the full potential of nuclear power in achieving global energy security and NZE by 2050. [...] Discussion and policy implications Nuclear power presents a compelling case as a sustainable energy source owing to its several key advantages. Its high-energy density allows for substantial electricity generation from minimal fuel, enabling continuous operation, unlike intermittent renewables, such as solar and wind (Rekik and El Alimi, 2023a, 2023b), thus contributing significantly to grid stability (Cramer et al., 2023). Furthermore, nuclear power is a crucial tool for emissions reduction, boasting virtually no greenhouse gas emissions during operation. Although lifecycle emissions associated with fuel processing and plant construction exist, they remain comparable to or lower than those of renewables. Several studies have reported on the energy production capabilities of nuclear power and its contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions compared to other energy sources. A key aspect of these analyses is quantifying the potential contribution of nuclear power to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving net zero targets. However, direct comparison of reported data can be challenging due to variations in model assumptions, geographic scope, and time horizons.  [...] From another perspective, radioactive waste generation poses a significant challenge to nuclear power because of its long-term hazardous nature. This necessitates meticulous management and disposal strategies to mitigate potential social impacts. These impacts arise from perceived or actual risks to human health and the environment, fueling public anxiety and opposition to nuclear power, which is often expressed through protests and legal action (Kyne and Bolin, 2016; Nilsuwankosit, 2017; Ram Mohan and Namboodhiry, 2020). Additionally, communities near waste sites can experience stigmatization, resulting in decreased property values and social isolation. The persistent nature of radioactive waste also raises intergenerational equity issues, burdening future generations with its management (Deng et al., 2020; Mason-Renton and Luginaah, 2019). Thus, transparent communication and stakeholder engagement are crucial for building public trust and ensuring responsible radioactive waste management (Dungan et al., 2021; Sančanin and Penjišević, 2023). There are various radioactive waste disposal pathways, each with unique social and technical considerations. Deep geological disposal, an internationally favored method for high-level waste disposal, involves burying waste deep underground for long-term isolation. Interim storage provides a secure temporary holding until a permanent solution is obtained (Chapman, 1992; Grambow, 2022). Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel recovers reusable materials, reducing high-level waste but creating lower-level waste. Advanced reactor technologies aim to minimize waste and improve safety, potentially converting long-lived isotopes into shorter-lived isotopes (Dixon et al., 2020; Englert and Pistner, 2023). Choosing a disposal pathway requires careful evaluation of factors, such as waste type and volume, geology, feasibility, cost, and public acceptance, often leading to a combined approach. Ongoing community engagement and addressing concerns are essential to safe and responsible waste management. Effective management and disposal of this waste require advanced technological solutions, robust regulatory frameworks, and long-term planning to ensure safety and sustainability (Abdelsalam et al., 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024a), Moreover, its relatively small land footprint compared to other energy sources, especially solar and wind farms, minimizes the ecosystem impact and makes it a sustainable option in densely populated areas (Poinssot et al., 2016; Sadiq et al., 2022). Nuclear power also enhances energy security by reducing reliance on fossil fuels, which is particularly valuable in countries with limited domestic resources (Cramer et al., 2023; Ichord Jr., 2022). Additionally, nuclear power exhibits synergy with other clean technologies, providing a stable baseload complementing variable renewables and facilitating hydrogen production for diverse energy applications (Abdelsalam et al., 2024; El-Emam and Subki, 2021; Salam and Khan, 2018; Rekik, 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024e). Finally, ongoing advancements in reactor design, such as SMRs, promise enhanced safety, reduced costs, and greater deployment flexibility, further solidifying the role of nuclear power in decarbonizing the electricity sector (Aunedi et al., 2023). Supportive policies and international cooperation are essential for fully realizing the potential of nuclear energy. Streamlined licensing and regulatory frameworks are crucial for reducing deployment time and costs and ensuring that safety standards are met efficiently (Gungor and Sari, 2022; Jewell et al., 2019). Furthermore, incentivizing investments through financial tools such as tax credits and loan guarantees can attract private capital and create a level-playing field for nuclear power (Decker and Rauhut, 2021; Nian and Hari, 2017; Zimmermann and Keles, 2023). Addressing public perception through education and engagement is equally important for building trust and acceptance. Moreover, international cooperation is vital in several respects. The disposal of radioactive waste remains a complex issue, requiring careful long-term management and securing geological repositories to prevent environmental contamination owing to the long half-life of some isotopes. Furthermore, while modern reactors incorporate advanced safety features, the potential for accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima remains a concern because of the potential for widespread radiation release and long-term health consequences (Denning and Mubayi, 2016; Högberg, 2013; Wheatley et al., 2016). Moreover, the high initial costs associated with design, construction, and licensing present significant barriers to new nuclear projects, particularly in developing countries. In addition, the risk of nuclear proliferation, in which technology intended for peaceful energy production is diverted for weapons development, necessitates stringent international safeguards, as highlighted by following reference. Public perception also plays a crucial role because negative opinions and concerns about safety and waste disposal can create opposition to new projects. Finally, the decommissioning of nuclear plants at the end of their operational life is a complex and costly process that requires substantial resources and expertise to dismantle reactors and manage radioactive materials. [...] Conclusion The role of nuclear power in sustainable energy transition is multifaceted and significant. As nations worldwide strive to transition toward more environmentally friendly energy systems, nuclear power has emerged as a crucial component of the decarbonization journey. Its capacity to provide low-carbon electricity, mitigate climate change, and contribute to energy security underscores its importance in the broader context of sustainable energy transitions. Despite this, challenges such as safety, waste management, and public perception must be addressed to fully harness the potential of nuclear power to achieve sustainability goals. By leveraging policy frameworks, technological innovations, and international cooperation, nuclear power can play a vital role in shaping the future of sustainable energy transition on a global scale. In this context, EMDEs exert a substantial influence on global growth, collectively accounting for over 90% of the aggregate, with China positioned to emerge as the foremost nuclear power producer before 2030. Concurrently, advanced economies have witnessed a notable 10% increase in their nuclear power capacity. This augmentation is attributed to the commissioning of new facilities, which offset retirements, manifestly observed in nations such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Furthermore, there is a marked escalation in annual global investment in nuclear power, surging from US$30 billion throughout the 2010s to surpass US$100 billion by 2030. This upward trajectory is robustly sustained, remaining above US$80 billion by 2050. In conclusion, the remarkable decline in the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for solar PV and wind power over the past decade has positioned renewable energy as a cost-competitive and viable alternative to fossil fuels in many regions. The over 80% reduction in LCOE for utility-scale solar PV from 2010 to 2022 exemplifies the economic feasibility of renewables. Concurrently, the steady growth in renewable energy capacity, spearheaded by solar and wind energy, underscores their critical role in the global energy transition. With renewable electricity capacity surpassing 3300 GW in 2023 and accounting for over one-third of the global power mix, renewable energy is undeniably at the forefront of efforts to achieve a sustainable, low-carbon energy future. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ORCID iDSassi Rekik https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5224-4152Supplemental materialSupplemental material for this article is available online.ReferencesAbbasi K, Jiao Z, Shahbaz M, et al. (2020) Asymmetric impact of renewable and non-renewable energy on economic growth in Pakistan: New evidence from a nonlinear analysis. Energy Exploration & Exploitation 38(5): 1946–1967. Crossref. Web of Science.Abdelsalam E, Almomani F, Azzam A, et al. 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Defense & Security
Ukraine and EU flags waving together outside building. A combined Ukraine and European Union flag waves in front of a modern office building, symbolizing political unity and support.

Can SAFE make Europe safe? The Integration of Ukraine into European Defence Cooperation Efforts: Challenges and Opportunities.

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

Abstract This analysis examines Ukraine’s integration into European defence cooperation through the SAFE fund, highlighting its unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO and EU membership is driven by security concerns, economic benefits, and cultural alignment with Europe, particularly in response to Russian aggression since 2014. NATO membership promises collective defence under Article 5, enhanced military capabilities, and political reforms, while EU accession offers economic integration, governance improvements, and strengthened defence capacities. Russia opposes Ukraine’s NATO aspirations due to security fears and the potential democratic contagion threatening its regime. Still, it is more accepting of Ukraine’s EU membership, viewing it as an economic rather than a military alliance. Historical assurances to the USSR against NATO expansion eastward fueled Russia’s objections. Ukraine’s integration into European structures symbolises a break from Russian influence but poses challenges of escalation and geopolitical tension. The SAFE fund’s inclusion of Ukraine reflects the evolving boundaries of EU defence cooperation amid the ongoing conflict. Key Words: SAFE, EU, Ukraine, Russia, Security Introduction In the first article on SAFE[EE1] , published once again in the World & New World Journal, the analysis concluded on a somewhat skeptical note: “It appears that despite some initial intentions to end the Ukrainian war as early as April 2022, it is the European elites, especially French, German and Polish, who stand for the prolongation, if not escalation, of the Ukrainian war, potentially at the expense of the security of the whole European continent and definitely at the expense of Ukrainians and their country”.[1] Moreover, the author, adopting a critical perspective, raised some questions about the consequences of the ongoing war. Firstly, the longer the war continues, the more destroyed Ukraine becomes and the greater the number of Ukrainians killed. Secondly, the longer the war continues, the greater the likelihood of escalation, which poses a threat to the entire European continent. Thirdly, despite mainstream media reports, the Russian Federation appears to have adapted to operating effectively despite the sanctions, which may strengthen its economy in the short to medium term and, more importantly, bring it closer to cooperating with China and North Korea. Finally, since every war serves as a testing ground for new technologies, the Russians, especially the North Koreans and the Chinese, are gaining invaluable insight into the nature of modern warfare, which is often referred to as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).The inclusion of Ukraine in the SAFE fund, despite its non-EU status, suggests a functional military alliance. This analysis will, therefore, explore how such an alliance redefines the line between EU and non-EU defence cooperation, specifically in the context of Ukraine as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP), and how this semi-integration is likely to influence Russia’s threat perception.  European Aspirations of Ukraine  Source: https://www.freeworldmaps.net/europe/political.html Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO and EU membership reflects a complex approach driven by security, economic, political, and cultural imperatives, particularly in the context of its ongoing conflict with Russia and its aspiration for a stable and prosperous future. Ukraine’s engagement with NATO began in the early 1990s, with formal steps toward membership marked by the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which decided that Ukraine would become a member.[2] This commitment was reaffirmed at the 2024 Washington Summit, emphasising Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO integration. For the EU, Ukraine applied for membership on February 28, 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion, highlighting the urgency driven by security concerns.[3]  The EU granted candidate status in June 2022, and accession negotiations opened in December 2023, reflecting strong political support. The primary rationale for NATO membership is security, particularly in response to Russia’s actions since 2014, including the annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion. Ukraine views NATO’s collective defence mechanism, especially Article 5, as a credible deterrent to further aggression. NATO has provided significant support, including EUR 50 billion in 2024, with nearly 60% of the funding coming from European Allies and Canada. The alliance has also established NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) at the 2024 Washington Summit.[4] EU membership, although not primarily a military-focused endeavour, enhances political stability by reducing vulnerability to external threats through economic and diplomatic ties. Recent developments in June 2025, such as NATO Defence Ministers agreeing on new capability targets and statements from Baltic states calling for concrete steps at the upcoming 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, underscore ongoing international backing.[5] However, challenges remain, with some ambiguity about explicit mentions in NATO communiques and concerns over U.S. political shifts, as noted by Estonian President Alar Karis on June 9, 2025.[6] EU membership is central to Ukraine’s economic aspirations, offering access to the European single market, financial aid, and investment crucial for post-war reconstruction. The EU has provided over €108 billion in financial, humanitarian, and military assistance since the war began, with the Ukraine Facility offering up to €50 billion from 2024 to 2027 for recovery and reforms.[7]  This support aligns with Ukraine’s goal of modernising its economy and institutions, including democratic governance and anti-corruption measures, as outlined in the EU’s 2022 Opinion and subsequent reports. NATO membership, while primarily security-focused, also implies a political alignment with Western democratic values, complementing European Union integration. Ukraine’s progress in aligning with NATO standards, as demonstrated by the removal of the need for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, reflects its commitment to reforms that enhance both security and political stability.[8] Ukraine frames its European aspirations as a return to its historical and cultural roots, emphasising shared democratic values, human rights, and a rejection of Russian influence. This narrative is reflected in strong public support, with polls showing over 80% favouring NATO membership and 85-90% supporting EU membership.[9] The 2014 Euromaidan protests, sparked by the rejection of an EU Association Agreement and Russia’s subsequent actions, have solidified this national consensus. Constitutional amendments in 2019 formalised NATO and EU membership as strategic objectives, underscoring cultural alignment with Europe. To sum up, both NATO and EU memberships, according to Ukrainian society, represent a definitive break from Russia’s sphere of influence, ensuring long-term independence and countering Russian attempts to control post-Soviet states. This geopolitical strategy is evident in Ukraine’s legislative commitments, such as the 2017 parliamentary decision making NATO membership a strategic objective and the 2022 reiteration of membership requests following Russia’s illegal annexations.  Recent EU-NATO cooperation, highlighted in a May 28, 2025, meeting focusing on Ukraine, reinforces this alignment and highlights international solidarity.[10] Russian views on Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership Russia's objections to Ukraine joining NATO are driven by security, geopolitical, and ideological fears, with a particular emphasis on military alliances and democratic contagion. In contrast, Russia accepts Ukraine's EU membership, viewing it as an economic union with fewer security implications. Russia views NATO's eastward expansion as a direct threat to its national security. The potential inclusion of Ukraine would bring NATO's military infrastructure, including troops and missile defence systems, closer to Russian borders. This is seen as a violation of Russia's perceived security interests, especially given NATO's history of collective defence under Article 5. For instance, NATO's response to Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion has intensified cooperation with Ukraine, further heightening tensions. [11] Ukraine's historical ties to Russia, rooted in shared Soviet and imperial pasts, make its potential NATO membership a significant loss for Russia's sphere of influence. The shift toward Western alignment is perceived as a strategic defeat, as it reduces Russia's ability to exert influence in Eastern Europe. This is evident in Russia's actions, such as the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas, which are seen as responses to Ukraine's NATO aspirations.[12] Russia specifically objects to the military aspects of NATO membership, fearing the deployment of foreign troops or advanced military systems near its borders. This concern is highlighted in statements from Kremlin officials, such as Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, who have emphasised that military alliances pose a different threat compared to economic unions. [13] Western experts often claim that Russia's real objection is the democratic implications of Ukraine's alignment with the West. A successful, democratic Ukraine could serve as a model for democratic movements within Russia, challenging the authoritarian stability of Putin's regime. This fear is evident in Russia's reactions to democratic breakthroughs, such as the Orange Revolution (2004) and EuroMaidan (2013–14), which were met with military actions like annexing Crimea and supporting separatist conflicts in Donbas, resulting in over 14,000 deaths over eight years.[14] NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard Russia often cites the alleged promise made during the fall of the Soviet Union that NATO would not expand eastward. This grievance is part of Russia's broader narrative of being encircled by Western institutions, fueling its opposition to Ukraine's NATO aspirations.  According to recently publicised documents, Western leaders gave Mikhail Gorbachev multiple assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 that NATO would not expand eastward, particularly in the context of German unification and the broader European security architecture.[15] James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, repeatedly assured Gorbachev in February 1990 that if Germany were to unify and remain in NATO, NATO's jurisdiction would not extend "one inch eastward" beyond its current position. Baker presented Gorbachev with a choice between a united Germany outside NATO or a united Germany in NATO with guarantees against eastward expansion. Gorbachev stated that any expansion of NATO would be unacceptable. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher publicly stated in January 1990 that NATO should rule out expansion eastward and proposed a special status for the former East German territory within NATO. This "Tutzing formula" became the basis of diplomatic discussions with Gorbachev, where the idea of no eastward expansion applied not only to East Germany but also to other Eastern European countries. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and Prime Minister John Major also conveyed to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials that NATO expansion was not being considered and that there was no plan to include Eastern European countries in NATO at that time. Major personally assured Gorbachev in March 1991 that strengthening or expansion of NATO was not planned. French President François Mitterrand expressed support for gradually dismantling military blocs and emphasised the need to create security conditions favourable to the Soviet Union. He promised to detail guarantees to Gorbachev regarding his country's security. Margaret Thatcher emphasised the transformation of NATO into a less militarily threatening alliance and the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as an inclusive forum that would incorporate the Soviet Union into discussions about Europe's future security. She stressed the importance of giving the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner told a Russian delegation in 1991 that the NATO Council and most member states were against NATO expansion and that isolating the USSR from the European community should be avoided. President George H.W. Bush assured Gorbachev on several occasions, including at the Malta summit in 1989 and the Washington summit in 1990, that the U.S. sought no unilateral advantage and that German unification within NATO would not be directed against the Soviet Union. He emphasised the significance of the CSCE process and the transformation of NATO in response to Soviet security concerns. Overall, these assurances created a "cascade" of promises emphasising that NATO would not expand eastward and that Soviet security interests would be respected as part of a new European security architecture. Gorbachev agreed to German unification in NATO based on these assurances and his belief in the potential for a "common European home" that would include the USSR. However, these assurances were mainly given in verbal form or memos rather than formal treaties, and subsequent NATO expansion in the late 1990s led to later Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled. In summary, the significance of these promises lies in their role in enabling German unification within NATO, shaping Soviet expectations of post-Cold War security, influencing European security architecture, and later contributing to disputes over NATO enlargement and Russia's perception of being misled by the West. EU Membership: A More Accepting Stance In contrast, Russia's stance on Ukraine's potential membership in the EU is markedly different. Official statements, such as those from Vladimir Putin, indicate that Russia has "nothing against" Ukraine joining the EU, viewing it as an economic union rather than a military alliance.  This acceptance is likely due to the EU's focus on economic integration, which does not pose the same security threat as NATO's military framework.[16] Dmitry Peskov's comments reinforce this distinction, noting that Russia "won't dictate" its approach to EU membership but has a different approach to military alliances. This reflects Russia's willingness to engage in economic partnerships while opposing military alliances. While Russia accepts EU membership, it remains wary of the broader implications, such as increased Western influence and potential democratic reforms in Ukraine. However, these concerns are secondary to its objections to NATO, as the EU does not involve military commitments. Public opinion in Ukraine, as noted in sociological surveys, shows strong support for NATO membership, with 64% in favour in January 2022, particularly in western Ukraine and Kyiv. This contrasts with Russia's position, highlighting the geopolitical divide. Additionally, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has cautioned against Ukraine joining NATO, suggesting that internal debates within the West may align with Russia's narrative that NATO expansion is premature. Ukraine - de facto NATO and EU member? – opportunities and challenges NATO Experts claim that Ukraine's membership in NATO would likely provide a strong security guarantee under Article 5, deterring Russian aggression by ensuring collective defence. This means that an attack on Ukraine would be treated as an attack on all NATO members, including major powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. This could potentially stabilise the region, reducing the risk of further conflict.[17] Ukraine's large and experienced military, with significant combat expertise, would also strengthen NATO's overall defence capabilities, particularly in modern warfare, such as drone and cyber operations. Membership in NATO would likely enhance Ukraine's military capabilities through the organisation's training programs and exercises, thereby improving interoperability with allied forces. Programs like the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), established in 2024, coordinate equipment and training with hubs in Eastern Europe. This would align Ukraine's forces with NATO standards, enhancing operational effectiveness, as demonstrated by past contributions to NATO-led missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.[18] It seems likely that NATO membership would attract more foreign investment, especially in defence, with Western companies already coproducing munitions in Ukraine. Financial support, such as the €40 billion pledged in 2024, would aid reconstruction and economic recovery, as outlined in the NATO Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance. Politically, it could drive reforms in governance and anti-corruption, with strong public support (75% in favour) ensuring commitment.[19] Finally, policy-makers in the West also hope that Ukraine’s NATO membership could curb or even end Russian imperial ambitions, sending a clear message that the subjugation of Ukraine is futile. However, it could also escalate tensions with Russia. “While there is widespread recognition that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape the future of international relations, […] the alliance appears to be deeply divided on the issue. Objections centre around the potential for a further dangerous escalation in the current confrontation with the Kremlin. Opponents argue that by inviting Ukraine to join, NATO could soon find itself at war with Russia. Meanwhile, many supporters of Ukrainian NATO membership believe keeping the country in geopolitical limbo is a mistake that only serves to embolden Moscow and prolong the war”. [20] The EU The alleged opportunities resulting from Ukraine’s already de facto EU membership are numerous. According to experts, Ukraine's potential EU membership would likely enhance economic integration by granting access to the EU's single market, facilitating the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. This could increase Ukraine's trade by 40% to 140% between 2030 and 2040, compared to the 2010-2019 averages, driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) and governance reforms.[21] The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which has been in force since 2017, would be further strengthened, thereby boosting economic ties with the EU.[22] The EU-Ukraine agreement improves the competitiveness of European businesses in the Ukrainian market and vice versa. Overall, for trade in goods, the agreement eliminated the majority of tariffs – 98.1% for the EU and 99.1% for Ukraine. For example, import duties on most agricultural goods imported into the EU were reduced to zero in 2016. Tariff rate quotas apply to the remaining farming goods that are not liberalised. The management of these quotas is done either on a first-come, first-served basis or via import licences. It seems likely that EU accession would drive reforms in governance, rule of law, and anti-corruption measures. Currently, Ukraine ranks poorly in governance metrics, performing worse than Russia and Belarus; however, EU conditionality could help elevate it to a well-governed state.  With 78% of Ukrainians supporting EU entry, there is strong public backing for these reforms.[23] Ukraine's membership is also likely to enhance EU security and defence capabilities. Ukraine's rapidly growing defence industry, including investments like Baykar's $100 million for drone production and a joint venture with Rheinmetall for artillery shells, would bolster the EU's defence ecosystem.[24]  With one of Europe's largest standing armies (around 1 million personnel) experienced in modern warfare, Ukraine could contribute valuable expertise.  The establishment of an EU Defence Innovation office in Kyiv further supports Ukraine's integration into European defence programs. There may be additional benefits in energy security, with Ukraine exporting low-carbon electricity and hydrogen to the EU, and technological advancements, particularly in drone and cyber capabilities, positioning Ukraine as a leader in tech R&D. Labour migration could help alleviate EU labour shortages, with projections of 3-6 million additional Ukrainian immigrants by 2029-2050. Conclusion In conclusion, Ukraine’s integration into European defence cooperation, particularly through NATO and the EU, represents a strategic shift that may strengthen European security and counter Russian influence. NATO membership offers Ukraine vital collective defence guarantees, enhances military capabilities, and could deter further Russian aggression, though it risks escalating tensions.  EU membership promises significant economic benefits, governance reforms, and deeper political alignment with Europe. Russia’s opposition centres mainly on NATO’s military threat, while it shows more acceptance of EU economic ties. Overall, Ukraine’s semi-integrated status in European defence frameworks exemplifies evolving security dynamics with profound implications for the regional security complex in Europe. References [1]  Sliwinski, K. (2025, July 7). Can SAFE make Europe safe? From civilian to military power Europe. World & New World Journal. https://worldandnewworld.com/safe-europe-military-power-3/[2] Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm[3] Ukraine. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine_en[4]  Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm[5] NATO Defence Ministers agree new capability targets to strengthen the Alliance. (2025, June 5). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_235900.htm[6] Estonian president: Ukraine’s NATO membership still possible despite Trump. (2025, June 9). European Pravda. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/9/7213345/[7] Ukraine. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine_en [8] Vilnius Summit Communiqué. (2023, July 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm[9] Imagine that a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU) is currently taking place. How would you vote? (2024, October 8). Statista. Https://Www.Statista.Com/Statistics/1284801/Ukraine-Opinion-on-Eu-Accession/. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm Also: Are you for or against Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? (2025, January 6). Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294468/public-opinion-on-ukraine-joining-nato/[10] NATO and the European Union unite for Ukraine at a NAC - PSC meeting. (2025, May 28). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_235693.htm[11] NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. (2025, February 17). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[12] Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022). What Putin Fears Most. Journal of Democracy, 33(2), 18–27. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/[13] Körömi, C. (2025, February 18). Russia: Ukraine has a ‘sovereign right’ to join EU — but not NATO. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/dmitrt-peskov-kremlin-ukraine-sovereign-right-join-eu-not-nato/[14] Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022). What Putin Fears Most. Journal of Democracy, 33(2), 18–27. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/[15] National Security Archive. (2017, December 12). NATO expansion: What Gorbachev heard. The George Washington University. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early[16] Putin says Russia has “nothing against” Ukraine joining EU. (2022, June 17). REUTERS. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/putin-says-russia-has-nothing-against-ukraine-joining-eu-idUSKBN2NY0NK/[17]  Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm[18] Sendak, C., & Timtchenko, I. (2025, January 16). Between Now and NATO: A Security Strategy for Ukraine. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/between-now-and-nato-a-security-strategy-for-ukraine/[19] Relations with Ukraine. (2025, March 11). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm  [20] Grod, P. (2024, July 11). Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/five-reasons-why-ukraine-should-be-invited-to-join-nato/[21] Darvas, Z., Dabrowski, M., Grabbe, H., Léry, L., Moffat, A., Sapir, G., & Zachmann, G. (2024, March 7). Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/ukraines-path-european-union-membership-and-its-long-term-implications[22] EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. (2024, March 7). European Commission. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-ukraine-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area[23] Darvas, Z., Dabrowski, M., Grabbe, H., Léry, L., Moffat, A., Sapir, G., & Zachmann, G. (2024, March 7). Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/ukraines-path-european-union-membership-and-its-long-term-implications [24] Khachatryan, A. et.al. (2024, June 19). The Benefits and Opportunities of Ukraine’s EU Accession. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/the-benefits-and-opportunities-of-ukraines-eu-accession

Energy & Economics
Commodity and alternative asset, gold bar and crypto currency Bitcoin on rising price graph as financial crisis or war safe haven, investment asset or wealth concept.

Assessing Bitcoin and Gold as Safe Havens Amid Global Uncertainties: A Rolling Window DCC-GARCH Analysis

by Anoop S Kumar , Meera Mohan , P. S. Niveditha

Abstract We examine the roles of Gold and Bitcoin as a hedge, a safe haven, and a diversifier against the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the Ukraine War. Using a rolling window estimation of the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-based regression, we present a novel approach to examine the time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier properties of Gold and Bitcoin for equities portfolios. This article uses daily returns of Gold, Bitcoin, S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. Our results show that Gold is a better safe haven than the two, while Bitcoin exhibits weak properties as safe haven. Bitcoin can, however, be used as a diversifier and hedge. This study offers policy suggestions to investors to diversify their holdings during uncertain times. Introduction Financial markets and the diversity of financial products have risen in both volume and value, creating financial risk and establishing the demand for a safe haven for investors. The global financial markets have faced several blows in recent years. From the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to the outbreak of the pandemic and uncertainty regarding economic policy measures of governments and central banks, the financial markets including equity markets around the world were faced with severe meltdowns. This similar behavior was observed in other markets including equity and commodity markets, resulting in overall uncertainty. In this scenario, the investors normally flock toward the safe-haven assets to protect their investment. In normal situations, investors seek to diversify or hedge their assets to protect their portfolios. However, the financial markets are negatively impacted when there are global uncertainties. Diversification and hedging methods fail to safeguard investors’ portfolios during instability because almost all sectors and assets are negatively affected (Hasan et al., 2021). As a result, investors typically look for safe-haven investments to safeguard their portfolios under extreme conditions (Ceylan, 2022). Baur and Lucey (2010) provide the following definitions of hedge, diversifier, and safe haven: Hedge: An asset that, on average, has no correlation or a negative correlation with another asset or portfolio. On average, a strict hedge has a (strictly) negative correlation with another asset or portfolio.Diversifier: An asset that, on average, has a positive correlation (but not perfect correlation) with another asset or portfolio. Safe haven: This is the asset that in times of market stress or volatility becomes uncorrelated or negatively associated with other assets or a portfolio. As was previously indicated, the significant market turbulence caused by a sharp decline in consumer spending, coupled with insufficient hedging opportunities, was a common feature of all markets during these times (Yousaf et al., 2022). Nakamoto (2008) suggested a remedy by introducing Bitcoin, a “digital currency,” as an alternative to traditional fiduciary currencies (Paule-Vianez et al., 2020). Bitcoin often described as “Digital Gold” has shown greater resilience during periods of crises and has highlighted the potential safe haven and hedging property against uncertainties (Mokni, 2021). According to Dyhrberg (2016), the GFC has eased the emergence of Bitcoin thereby strengthening its popularity. Bouri et al. (2017) in their study indicate that Bitcoin has been viewed as a shelter from global uncertainties caused by conventional banking and economic systems. Recent research has found that Bitcoin is a weak safe haven, particularly in periods of market uncertainty like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis (Conlon & McGee, 2020; Nagy & Benedek, 2021; Shahzad et al., 2019; Syuhada et al., 2022). In contrast to these findings, a study by Yan et al. (2022) indicates that it can function as a strong safe haven in favorable economic times and with low-risk aversion. Ustaoglu (2022) also supports the strong safe-haven characteristic of Bitcoin against most emerging stock market indices during the COVID-19 period. Umar et al. (2023) assert that Bitcoin and Gold are not reliable safe-havens. Singh et al. (2024) in their study reveal that Bitcoin is an effective hedge for investments in Nifty-50, Sensex, GBP–INR, and JPY–INR, at the same time a good diversifier for Gold. The study suggests that investors can incorporate Bitcoin in their portfolios as a good hedge against market volatility in equities and commodities markets. During the COVID-19 epidemic, Barbu et al. (2022) investigated if Ethereum and Bitcoin could serve as a short-term safe haven or diversifier against stock indices and bonds. The outcomes are consistent with the research conducted by Snene Manzli et al. (2024). Both act as hybrid roles for stock market returns, diversifiers for sustainable stock market indices, and safe havens for bond markets. Notably, Bhuiyan et al. (2023) found that Bitcoin provides relatively better diversification opportunities than Gold during times of crisis. To reduce risks, Bitcoin has demonstrated a strong potential to operate as a buffer against global uncertainty and may be a useful hedging tool in addition to Gold and similar assets (Baur & Lucey, 2010; Bouri et al., 2017; Capie et al., 2005; Dyhrberg, 2015). According to Huang et al. (2021), its independence from monetary policies and minimal association with conventional financial assets allow it to have a safe-haven quality. Bitcoins have a substantial speed advantage over other assets since they are traded at high and constant frequencies with no days when trading is closed (Selmi et al., 2018). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the average monthly volatility of Bitcoin is higher than that of Gold or a group of international currencies expressed in US dollars; nevertheless, the lowest monthly volatility of Bitcoin is lower than the maximum monthly volatility of Gold and other foreign currencies (Dwyer, 2015). Leverage effects are also evident in Bitcoin returns, which show lower volatilities in high return periods and higher volatilities in low return times (Bouri et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). According to recent research, Bitcoins can be used to hedge S&P 500 stocks, which increases the likelihood that institutional and retail investors will build secure portfolios (Okorie, 2020). Bitcoin demonstrates strong hedging capabilities and can complement Gold in minimizing specific market risks (Baur & Lucey, 2010). Its high-frequency and continuous trading further enrich the range of available hedging tools (Dyhrberg, 2016). Moreover, Bitcoin spot and futures markets exhibit similarities to traditional financial markets. In the post-COVID-19 period, Zhang et al. (2021) found that Bitcoin futures outperform Gold futures.Gold, silver, palladium, and platinum were among the most common precious metals utilized as safe-haven investments. Gold is one such asset that is used extensively (Salisu et al., 2021). Their study tested the safe-haven property of Gold against the downside risk of portfolios during the pandemic. Empirical results have also shown that Gold functions as a safe haven for only 15 trading days, meaning that holding Gold for longer than this period would result in losses to investors. This explains why investors buy Gold on days of negative returns and sell it when market prospects turn positive and volatility decreases (Baur & Lucey, 2010). In their study, Kumar et al. (2023) tried to analyse the trends in volume throughout futures contracts and investigate the connection between open interest, volume, and price for bullion and base metal futures in India. Liu et al. (2016) in their study found that there is no negative association between Gold and the US stock market during times of extremely low or high volatility. Because of this, it is not a strong safe haven for the US stock market (Hood & Malik, 2013). Post-COVID-19, studies have provided mixed evidence on the safe-haven properties of Gold (Bouri et al., 2020; Cheema et al., 2022; Ji et al., 2020). According to Kumar and Padakandla (2022), Gold continuously demonstrates safe-haven qualities for all markets, except the NSE, both in the short and long term. During the COVID-19 episode, Gold’s effectiveness as a hedge and safe-haven instrument has been impacted (Akhtaruzzaman et al., 2021). Al-Nassar (2024) conducted a study on the hedge effectiveness of Gold and found that it is a strong hedge in the long run. Bhattacharjee et al. (2023) in their paper examined the symmetrical and asymmetrical linkage between Gold price levels and the Indian stock market returns by employing linear autoregressive distributed lag and nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag models. The results exhibit that the Indian stock market returns and Gold prices are cointegrated. According to the most recent study by Kaczmarek et al. (2022), Gold has no potential as a safe haven, despite some studies on the COVID-19 pandemic showing contradictory results. The co-movements of Bitcoin and the Chinese stock market have also normalized as a result of this epidemic (Belhassine & Karamti, 2021). Widjaja and Havidz (2023) verified that Gold was a safe haven asset during the COVID-19 pandemic, confirming the Gold’s safe-haven characteristic. As previously pointed out, investors value safe-haven investments in times of risk. Investors panic at these times when asset prices fall and move from less liquid (risky) securities to more liquid (safe) ones, such as cash, Gold, and government bonds. An asset must be bought and sold rapidly, at a known price, and for a reasonably modest cost to be considered truly safe (Smales, 2019). Therefore, we need to properly re-examine the safe-haven qualities of Gold and Bitcoin due to the mixed evidences regarding their safe-haven qualities and the impact of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine on financial markets. This work contributes to and deviates from the body of existing literature in the following ways. We propose a novel approach in this work to evaluate an asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedge, and diversifier characteristics. This research examines the safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities of Gold and Bitcoin against the equity indices; S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50. Through the use of rolling window estimation, we extend the methodology of Ratner and Chiu (2013) by estimating the aforementioned properties of the assets. Comparing rolling window estimation to other conventional techniques, the former will provide a more accurate representation of an asset’s time-varying feature. This study explores the conventional asset Gold’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying qualities during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. We use Bitcoin, an unconventional safe-haven asset, for comparison. Data and Methodology We use the daily returns of three major equity indices; S&P500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 from January 3, 2018, to October 15, 2022. The equity indices were selected to represent three large and diverse markets namely the United States, France, and India in terms of geography and economic development. We assess safe-haven assets using the daily returns of Gold and Bitcoin over the same time. Equity data was collected from Yahoo Finance, Bitcoin data from coinmarketcap.com, and Gold data from the World Gold Council website. Engle (2002) developed the DCC (Dynamic Conditional Correlation)-GARCH model, which is frequently used to assess contagion amid pandemic uncertainty or crises. Time-varying variations in the conditional correlation of asset pairings can be captured using the DCC-GARCH model. Through employing this model, we can analyse the dynamic behavior of volatility spillovers. Engle’s (2002) DCC-GARCH model contains two phases; 1. Univariate GARCH model estimation2. Estimation of time-varying conditional correlation. For its explanation, mathematical characteristics, and theoretical development, see here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578] Results and Discussion The outcomes of the parameters under the DCC-GARCH model for each of the asset pairs selected for the investigation are shown in Table 1.   First, we look at the dynamical conditional correlation coefficient, ρ.The rho value is negative and insignificant for NSE 50/Gold, NSE 50 /BTC, S&P500/Gold, and S&P500/BTC indicating a negative and insignificant correlation between these asset pairs, showing Gold and Bitcoin as potential hedges and safe havens. The fact that ρ is negative and significant for CAC 40/Gold suggests that Gold can be a safe haven against CAC 40 swings. The asset pair CAC/BTC, on the other hand, has possible diversifier behavior with ρ being positive but statistically insignificant. Next, we examine the behavior of the DCC-GARCH parameters; α and β. We find that αDCC is statistically insignificant for all the asset pairs, while βDCC is statistically significant for all asset pairs. βDCC quantifies the persistence feature of the correlation and the extent of the impact of volatility spillover in a particular market’s volatility dynamics. A higher βDCC value implies that a major part of the volatility dynamics can be explained by the respective market’s own past volatility. For instance, the NSE 50/Gold’s βDCC value of 0.971 shows that there is a high degree of volatility spillover between these two assets, with about 97% of market volatility being explained by the assets’ own historical values and the remainder coming from spillover. Thus, we see that the volatility spillover is highly persistent (~0.8) for all the asset pairs except NSE 50/BTC. The results above show that the nature of the dynamic correlation between the stock markets, Bitcoin and Gold is largely negative, pointing toward the possibility of Gold and Bitcoin being hedge/safe haven. However, a detailed analysis is needed to confirm the same by employing rolling window analysis, and we present the results in the forthcoming section. We present the rolling window results for S&P500 first. We present the regression results for Gold in Figure 1 and Bitcoin in Figure 2   Figure 1. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Gold.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. In Figure 1, we examine the behavior of β0 (intercept term), β1, β2, and β3 (partial correlation coefficients). The intercept term β0 will give an idea about whether the asset is behaving as a diversifier or hedge. Here, the intercept term shows significance most of the time. However, during 2018, the intercept was negative and significant, showing that it could serve as a hedge during geopolitical tensions and volatilities in the global stock market. However, during the early stages of COVID-19, we show that the intercept is negative and showing statistical significance, suggesting that Gold could serve as a hedge during the initial shocks of the pandemic. These findings are contrary to the results in the study by Tarchella et al. (2024) where they found hold as a good diversifier. Later, we find the intercept to be positive and significant, indicating that Gold could act as a potential diversifier. But during the Russia-Ukraine War, Gold exhibited hedge ability again. Looking into the behavior of β1, which is the partial correlation coefficient for the tenth percentile of return distribution shows negative and insignificant during 2018. Later, it was again negative and significant during the initial phases of COVID-19, and then negative in the aftermath, indicating that Gold could act as a weak safe haven during the COVID-19 pandemic. Gold could serve as a strong safe haven for the SP500 against volatility in the markets brought on by the war in Ukraine, as we see the coefficient to be negative and large during this time. From β2 and β3, the partial correlation coefficients of the fifth and first percentile, respectively, show that Gold possesses weak safe haven properties during COVID-19 and strong safe haven behavior during the Ukraine crisis. Next, we examine the characteristics of Bitcoin as a hedge/diversifier/safe haven against the S&P500 returns. We present the results in Figure 2.   Figure 2. Rolling Window Regression Results for S&P500 and Bitcoin.Note: Areas shaded under factor 1 represent significant regression coefficients. Like in the previous case, we begin by analysing the behavior of the intercept coefficient, which is β0. As mentioned earlier the intercept term will give a clear picture of the asset’s hedging and diversifier property. In the period 2018–2019, the intercept term is positive but insignificant. This could be due to the large volatility in Bitcoin price movements during the period. It continues to be minimal (but positive) and insignificant during 2019–2020, indicating toward weak diversification possibility. Post-COVID-19 period, the coefficient shows the significance and positive value, displaying the diversification potential. We see that the coefficient remains positive throughout the analysis, confirming Bitcoin’s potential as a diversifier. Looking into the behavior of β1 (the partial correlation coefficient at tenth percentile), it is positive but insignificant during 2018. The coefficient is having negative sign and showing statistical significance in 2019, suggesting that Bitcoin could be a good safe haven in that year. This year was characterized by a long list of corporate scandals, uncertainties around Brexit, and tensions in global trade. We can observe that throughout the COVID-19 period, the coefficient is showing negative sign and negligible during the March 2020 market meltdown, suggesting inadequate safe-haven qualities. However, Bitcoin will regain its safe-haven property in the coming periods, as the coefficient is negative and significant in the coming months. The coefficient is negative and shows statistical significance during the Ukrainian crisis, suggesting strong safe-haven property. Only during the Ukrainian crisis could Bitcoin serve as a safe haven, according to the behavior of β2, which displays the partial correlation coefficient at the fifth percentile. Bitcoin was a weak safe haven during COVID-19 and the Ukrainian crisis, according to β3, the partial correlation coefficient for the first percentile (coefficient negative and insignificant). According to the overall findings, Gold is a stronger safe haven against the S&P 500’s swings. This result is consistent with the previous studies of Triki and Maatoug (2021), Shakil et al. (2018), Będowska-Sójka and Kliber (2021), Drake (2022), and Ghazali et al. (2020), etc. The same analysis was conducted for the CAC 40 and the NSE 50; the full analysis can be found here [insert the next link in “the word here” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09711023251322578]. However, it is important to highlight the respective results: In general, we may say that Gold has weak safe-haven properties considering CAC40. We can conclude that Bitcoin’s safe-haven qualities for CAC40 are weak. We can say that Gold showed weak safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis and good safe-haven characteristics for the NSE50 during COVID-19. We may say that Bitcoin exhibits weak safe haven, but strong hedging abilities to NSE50. Concluding Remarks In this study, we suggested a new method to evaluate an asset’s time-varying hedge, diversifier, and safe-haven characteristics. We propose a rolling window estimation of the DCC-based regression of Ratner and Chiu (2013). Based on this, we estimate the conventional asset’s time-varying safe haven, hedging, and diversifying properties during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. For comparison purposes, we include Bitcoin, a nonconventional safe-haven asset. We evaluate Gold and Bitcoin’s safe haven, hedging, and diversifier properties to the S&P 500, CAC 40, and NSE 50 variations. We use a rolling window of length 60 to estimate the regression. From the results, we find that Gold can be considered as a better safe haven against the fluctuations of the S&P 500. In the case of CAC 40, Gold and Bitcoin have weak safe-haven properties. While Bitcoin demonstrated strong safe-haven characteristics during the Ukraine crisis, Gold exhibited strong safe-haven characteristics during COVID-19 for the NSE 50. Overall, the findings indicate that Gold is the better safe haven. This outcome is consistent with earlier research (Będowska-Sójka & Kliber, 2021; Drake, 2022; Ghazali et al., 2020; Shakil et al., 2018; Triki & Maatoug, 2021). When it comes to Bitcoin, its safe-haven feature is weak. Bitcoin, however, works well as a diversifier and hedge. Therefore, from a policy perspective, investing in safe-haven instruments is crucial to lower the risks associated with asset ownership. Policymakers aiming to enhance the stability of financial portfolios might encourage institutional investors and other market players to incorporate Gold into their asset allocations. Gold’s strong safe-haven qualities, proven across various market conditions, make it a reliable choice. Gold’s performance during crises like COVID-19 highlights its potential to mitigate systemic risks effectively. Further, Bitcoin could also play a complementary role as a hedge and diversifier, especially during periods of significant volatility such as the Ukraine crisis. While Bitcoin’s safe-haven characteristics are relatively weaker, its inclusion in a diversified portfolio offers notable value and hence it should not be overlooked. Further, policymakers may consider how crucial it is to monitor dynamic correlations and periodically rebalance portfolios to account for shifts in the safe haven and hedging characteristics of certain assets. Such measures could help reduce the risks of over-reliance on a single asset type and create more resilient portfolios that can better withstand global economic shocks. For future research, studies can be conducted on the estimation of the rolling window with different widths. This is important to understand how the safe-haven property changes across different holding periods. Further, more equity markets would be included to account for the differences in market capitalization and index constituents. This study can be extended by testing these properties for multi-asset portfolios as well. We intend to take up this study in these directions in the future. Data Availability StatementNot applicable.Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ReferencesAkhtaruzzaman M., Boubaker S., Lucey B. M., & Sensoy A. (2021). Is gold a hedge or a safe-haven asset in the COVID-19 crisis? Economic Modelling, 102, 105588. Crossref. Web of Science.Al-Nassar N. S. (2024). Can gold hedge against inflation in the UAE? A nonlinear ARDL analysis in the presence of structural breaks. PSU Research Review, 8(1), 151–166. Crossref.Barbu T. C., Boitan I. A., & Cepoi C. O. (2022). Are cryptocurrencies safe havens during the COVID-19 pandemic? A threshold regression perspective with pandemic-related benchmarks. Economics and Business Review, 8(2), 29–49. 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Diplomacy
USA flag and EU flag print screen on two  pawn chess for battle.It is symbol of United States of America increase tariff tax barrier for import product from EU countries.-Image.

SAFE - Will the American Eagle be Replaced with the European Golden Eagle? Can the EU replace the US as a benign hegemon?

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

Abstract This paper examines whether the European Union (EU) can supplant the United States (US) as a benign hegemon in the contemporary international system. It discusses the concept of a benign hegemon, traditionally associated with the US, characterized by military and economic dominance exercised with liberal values, multilateralism, and the promotion of global security and prosperity.  The analysis highlights the limitations of US hegemony, including military overextension, economic challenges, and a decline in soft power, particularly in regions such as the Middle East. Conversely, the EU's global ambitions are examined, with a focus on its peace efforts, trade agreements, development aid, and multilateral engagement. However, the EU's internal divisions, lack of unified foreign and defense policy, and historical perceptions of coercion limit its ability to act as a benign hegemon. The analysis concludes with a proposition that the EU's unique nature and current constraints suggest it cannot fully assume the US's role, raising questions about the viability of benign hegemony in today's context. Key Words: SAFE, EU, US, Benign Hegemon, Geopolitics Introduction In the recent two pieces, we looked at Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and its potential consequences regarding the role and nature of the EU as a military power {link}, and Ukraine's integration into European defence cooperation, highlighting its unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. {link}, This article will examine the transatlantic relations and specifically address the question of whether the EU could replace the US as a benign hegemon. According to popular sources, a "benign hegemon" refers to a dominant power that exercises its influence in a manner that is generally considered beneficial. This notion is contemporary and is almost always used referring to the United States (US). Accordingly, the US has used its influence to provide global security and stability without being overly aggressive or coercive. The concept is rooted in hegemonic stability theory, which posits that a single dominant state is necessary to maintain the stability of the international system.[i] Scholars define a benign hegemon as one that provides the necessary power to uphold the international order. This involves advancing its interests while promoting global security and prosperity through multilateral treaties and international organizations, safeguarding national sovereignty via alliance networks and the UN Security Council, and fostering unrestricted market capitalism through trade deals and bodies such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund.[ii] Moreover, a benign hegemon is typically defined as a hegemonic power that, in addition to possessing overwhelming military and economic power, utilises its influence to promote more liberal principles within the international system. This includes pursuing liberal international values such as economic development, liberal and democratic political structures, and fostering a community of civilised states that resort to war only as a last resort and never against each other. The United States, as the hegemonic power after the Cold War, is often described as benign because its influence is broadly progressive, aiming to create a liberal world order based on free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unencumbered by the state. While the US maintains traditional geopolitical objectives, it also attempts to refashion the operational ground rules of the international system itself, promoting free trade, human rights, democratisation, and a global cultural infrastructure based on US technological companies. This combination of overwhelming power and a liberal agenda is what characterises a benign hegemon.[iii] Furthermore, experts often cite the US's "liberal grand strategy" as constructing a relatively benign and highly institutionalised multilateral system based on open markets, free trade, and the provision of public goods, such as collective security and an open international trading regime.[iv] This system is viewed as enabling other countries to prosper economically in a secure environment, with examples such as the rebuilding and subsequent success of Japan and Germany. However, the concept of benign hegemon is contested, with some arguing that the US lacks the resources to be a genuine global hegemon, as noted by John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye, who suggest it cannot achieve all security, political, and economic goals alone. This argument highlights the complexity of assessing whether the US's actions are truly benign, especially given its military and financial reach.[v] Historical Context The US's role as a potential benign hegemon has been prominent since the end of World War II, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when it occupied a hegemonic position within world politics Historical instances include its leadership in establishing the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and security alliances like NATO, which aimed to stabilise the global economy and provide collective defense. The US also played a key role in democratising post-war Europe and Japan, furthering its image as a stabilising force. On the positive side, the US led through consent, with high global approval ratings and multilateral actions, such as Bush Sr.'s Gulf War coalition and Obama's Libya UN action, which are claimed to be foundational to the liberal order since World War II. On the negative side, actions like the Iraq War, drone attacks, and government overthrows in Latin America and the Middle East are cited as evidence of coercion and imperialism, undermining the benign label. Scholars focusing on the Middle East note that despite its hegemonic role, the region has experienced significant violence and instability, with US interventions such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 Libya seen as sources of disorder rather than stability. This challenges the notion of benign hegemony, suggesting unipolarity (power dominance without ideological consensus) better explains US actions in the region.[vi] US hegemony and its limitations The concept of American hegemony has been a cornerstone of international relations since the end of World War II. However, in recent decades, the limitations of American hegemony have become increasingly apparent across military, economic, and cultural domains. Given the recent developments in the Middle East (war in Gaza and incursions between Israel and Iran), it seems logical to examine the limitations of US hegemony in the context of the region. Several factors contribute to the decline in American influence in the Middle East. Firstly, the failure of political reconstruction efforts in Iraq after the US-led invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein shifted America's position in the region from advantageous to disadvantaged and exposed the limits of American hegemony. Secondly, war-weariness within the United States affects the ability to sustain prolonged involvement and influence in the region. Thirdly, there is a relative neglect of the Arab-Israeli peace process, which undermines American credibility and effectiveness in the region. Fourthly, the impact of US regional policies on the influence of Iran, which has grown stronger partly as an unintended consequence of the Iraq war. Next, the emergence of a new regional power struggle between an Iranian-led bloc of mainly Shia actors and a Sunni bloc led by Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The rise of Islamist militias and political groups like Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, which were advantaged by early elections promoted by the US before adequate security and political institutions were in place. Next, the Bush administration's distancing from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process contributed to the rise of Hamas and further undermined moderate Palestinian leadership. Lastly, the diminished fear of American power by adversaries such as Iran, which refused negotiations and disregarded weak UN sanctions, and the uncertainty of America's Arab allies about the reliability of the US as a partner.[vii] Generally speaking, one of the most significant limitations of American military dominance is the issue of overextension. The US has maintained a global military presence, with bases and troops stationed across the world. However, this overextension has led to military fatigue and resource depletion. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, have strained the US military, leading to a decline in its ability to project power effectively.[viii] The rise of other military powers, particularly China, has also challenged the United States' military dominance. China's rapid military modernisation, including advancements in technology and naval capabilities, has narrowed the gap between the two superpowers. This has raised concerns about the US's ability to maintain its military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. [ix] Maintaining military dominance is costly, and the economic burden of sustaining a global military presence has taken a toll on the US economy. The high defence budget has led to trade imbalances and deindustrialisation, weakening the economic foundations of American hegemony.[x] The US economy has faced significant challenges, including deindustrialisation, financialisation, and rising competition from China. The shift of manufacturing activities to countries with lower labour costs has weakened the US industrial base, while the rise of China as a global economic powerhouse has challenged American economic influence.[xi] Globalisation has created a more interconnected world economy, reducing the US's ability to dictate economic policies unilaterally. The rise of emerging economies, particularly in Asia, has shifted the balance of economic power, making it difficult for the US to maintain its hegemony in global trade and finance.[xii] The dominance of the US dollar in the global financial system is facing challenges. The rise of alternative currencies and the increasing use of cryptocurrencies have threatened the dollar's hegemony. Additionally, countries like Russia and China are reducing their dependence on the dollar, further eroding its global dominance.[xiii] American cultural influence, once a cornerstone of its global hegemony, is facing resistance. The rise of non-Western cultural formations, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, has challenged the dominance of American media, entertainment, and values. This has led to a decline in the global appeal of American culture.[xiv] The US's soft power, which was once a key component of its hegemony, has declined in recent years. The country's unilateral policies, military interventions, and domestic challenges, such as racial tensions and economic inequality, have eroded its moral authority and global influence.[xv] What is the EU hoping to achieve as a global player? A thorough analysis of available up-to-date documents issued by the EU itself suggests several key areas of interest to the organisation as a key global player. First and foremost, the EU is committed to fostering peace, preventing conflicts, and strengthening international security. It supports a rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core, advocating for multilateralism and the rule of international law.[xvi] The EU has actively engaged in conflict resolution, such as promoting a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and supporting ceasefires in regions like Gaza.[xvii] It also invests significantly in the defence of Ukraine to counter Russian aggression, viewing this as critical to maintaining European and global stability.[xviii] As the world's largest trading power, the EU seeks to use its economic strength to boost prosperity, enhance its trading power, and foster mutually beneficial partnerships. The EU's economic influence is a key pillar of its global power strategy, as evidenced by recent agreements. In April 2025, the EU-Central Asia summit agreed on a strategic partnership aimed at strengthening economic ties between the EU and Central Asia.[xix] A month later (May 2025), the EU and Singapore signed a landmark Digital Trade Agreement, enhancing the EU's digital trade capabilities.[xx] Overall, the EU has over 40 trade agreements with 70 countries. These agreements fall into three distinct categories: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and Association Agreements (AAs). The EU also enters into non-preferential trade agreements, as part of broader deals such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs).[xxi] The EU provides significant development aid, which, when including the UK, is two-thirds greater than that of the US and is mainly supplied as grants rather than loans. According to the EU, this highlights its commitment to promoting human rights and sustainable development. The EU has built a dominant position in global development. It accounts for half of all aid worldwide, but the plethora of different programmes disguises its profile in this regard. [xxii] The EU aims to establish strong, well-managed partnerships with countries and regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood, particularly with middle powers (e.g., Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia) and pivotal regions (e.g., Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia). This is crucial for maintaining its influence in a multipolar world.[xxiii] In that respect, the EU is committed to reforming multilateral institutions, such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, to ensure more equitable representation and effectiveness. It also aims to play a leading role in shaping the future of global forums, such as the G-20. Initiatives such as the "Golden Gateway" (€300 billion by 2027, launched in late 2021) and "Team Europe" for post-COVID investments are part of the EU's strategy to counterbalance China's Belt and Road Initiative and engage more effectively with developing countries.[xxiv] The EU focuses on addressing global challenges, including climate action, migration, and economic development. It wants to ensure that its climate policies, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, do not hinder the development of Southern countries and offers compensation through initiatives like the Global Gateway and climate funds.[xxv] In 2021, the EU was the top partner for 80 countries and provided 43% of global official development assistance, underscoring its commitment.[xxvi] Migration reform is another priority, with the EU aiming to facilitate legal immigration pathways, including work visas, circular migration, and resettlement schemes, to address irregular entries and support global development.[xxvii] In this respect, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum in May 2024. According to the EU, "the asylum and migration pact will ensure a fairer and stronger migration system that makes a concrete difference on the ground. These new rules will enhance the effectiveness of the European asylum system and foster greater solidarity among member states. The European Union will also continue its close cooperation with third countries to tackle the root causes of irregular migration".[xxviii]   The EU aspires to be a more assertive player in global security, potentially reevaluating its role in NATO and taking on greater responsibility as a security guarantor, particularly in regions such as Africa. It recognises the need for a foreign policy that is both humble (acknowledging the need to do more to have an impact) and ambitious (aiming for strong partnerships to promote its interests and objectives). The EU faces challenges from disinformation campaigns by Russia and China, as well as historical resentment from centuries of European dominance. To address this, Brussels is scaling up its diplomatic engagement and communication efforts, including task forces for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and communication hubs like the one in Beirut (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives, citing EEAS Disinformation Speech). The EU aims to repair its image and rebuild trust abroad by positioning itself as a force for reform and a reliable partner for developing nations.[xxix] The EU finds itself squeezed between the United States and China, with its interests increasingly aligned with those of the US, yet also needing to assert its independence. The US's "pivot to Asia" has given the EU more freedom on specific international issues, but it also underscores the need for the EU to strengthen its global role.[xxx] The EU must also clarify its position vis-à-vis the Global South, ensuring that its policies are perceived as supportive and beneficial to developing nations, particularly in areas such as trade, climate, and security. Can the EU ever become a benign power? The answer to this question turns out to be negative, at least as long as we adhere to the criteria used so far. Below, the reader will find a list of reasons supporting the above-proposed statement. First, the EU is still not a unified entity, especially regarding its foreign, security, and, even more so, defence policy. It remains a collection of 27 semi-independent states, some, such as Germany, being more independent than others, notably the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Ultimately, the EU's ability to achieve its declared foreign and security objectives depends on the political dynamics and appetite for further integration among member states. For example, the latest proposed 18th package of Russian sanctions was blocked by Hungary and Slovakia, and Brussels has limited options for action, at least for now.[xxxi] The EU's vast asymmetry in power with its neighbors can lead to perceptions of dominance and coercion, even if the EU does not intend to be seen that way.[xxxii] One does not have to look far, but consider the latest (since 2015) waves of immigration. In northern Africa, as well as in some parts of the Middle East, South Asia, and South America, the EU member states are predominantly seen as former colonial powers. There appears to be a shared sense of entitlement towards the EU and its member states regarding its imperial past, which was often anything but benign. Importantly, this does not refer to central and Eastern European members of the EU.[xxxiii] While the EU remains an economic (albeit comparatively declining) and normative power (at least this is what it likes to self-identify), it lacks the military capacity to project its influence in the same way that traditional hegemons have. It is also doubtful that even if the SAFE instrument is fully realized in the next couple of years, the EU member states will have the industrial and human capacity to match the great powers, such as the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, or, most of all, China.  A quick juxtaposition of current defense spending, population numbers, population growth forecasts, and economic output forecasts tells us all we need to know in this regard. The answer is bitter for the EU; it is likely to matter less and less. On top of that, let's look at the notion of “benign”. What does it even mean? Perhaps the term is entirely false; maybe even the US does not now fulfill the “benign” requirements, at least not in the way it has been defined (as in the introduction). Perhaps, there has never really been a “benign hegemon,” and the EU should not even try to fill these shoes. As usual, there are more questions than answers. Whatever the EU becomes via SAFE, it will probably stand for, not the first time, as new and an “undefiable animal” – sui generis (of its kind) as the EU academics usually posit. The concept of the EU as a benign hegemon is complex and contested. While the EU does promote its values and norms through various means, the extent to which its influence is truly benign is debatable. The EU's internal divisions and its neighbors' perceptions of its power dynamics play a crucial role in shaping the reality of its regional role. Can the EU become a benign power in the future? The author of this analysis is rather negative. Especially, if the EU does not address the challenges as explored here: https://worldandnewworld.com/safe-europe-military-power-3/ and https://worldandnewworld.com/ukraine-european-defence-cooperation/   [1] Although not official, some discussions suggest animals like the Golden Eagle as potential symbols due to its historical significance in Europe, including its use in the Roman Empire and modern Germany.[i]   See more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory[ii]Keay, L. (2023). Surviving the End of US Hegemony. The International Spectator. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/c05/surviving-end-us-hegemony[iii]  Catley, B. (1997). Hegemonic America: The benign superpower? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 18(4), 377-399. ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798354[iv]   Catley, B. (1997). Hegemonic America: The Benign Superpower? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 18(4), 377–399. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798354[v]Mearsheimer, J. J. (2016). Benign Hegemony. International Studies Review, 1(3). https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Benign-Hegemony.pdf [vi] Gause, F. G. (2025). Hegemony, Unipolarity and American Failure in the Middle East. POMEPS Studies, 54, 41–47. https://pomeps.org/pomeps-studies-54-america-and-the-middle-east[vii] Wittes, T. C. (2007, March 22). American hegemony: Myth and reality. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/american-hegemony-myth-and-reality/[viii] Bello, W. (2024). Overextension and Globalization: The Dynamics of Hegemonic Decline. Critical Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205241266982[ix] Asuquo-Ekpo, B. (2024). China’s Economic, Military, Science and Technological Emergence in International Politics: Implications for United States’ Hegemony. World Journal Of Advanced Research and Reviews, 22(3), 804–814. https://doi.org/10.30574/wjarr.2024.22.3.1791[x]Lau, J. (2023). American Imperialism (pp. 185–194). Routledge eBooks. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003121800-20[xi] Rashid, A., & Khuhro, A. A. (2023). Historical Insights of Global Power Transitions: Implications on US-China Relations. Perennial Journal of History, 4(2), 68–87. https://doi.org/10.52700/pjh.v4i2.156[xii] Cartwright, M. (2024). Embedded hegemony and the evolution of the United States’ structural power. International Relations. https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178241268418[xiii] Sen, O. F. (2024). Challenges to the American dollar hegemony. https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/106100[xiv] Knauft, B. M. (2007). Provincializing America: Imperialism, Capitalism, and Counterhegemony in the Twenty-first Century. Current Anthropology, 48(6), 781–805. https://doi.org/10.1086/521415[xv] Nuridah, I., Aulia, T., Aulia Sahada, N., Rodiyah, Z., Ndruru, S., Simangunsong, W. H., Rila, E. S., & Tampubolon, Y. L. (2024). Amerika Serikat sebagai Negara Adikuasa: Pengaruh dan Dominasi dari Akhir Abad ke-20 hingga Awal Abad ke-21. 1(3), 157–161. https://doi.org/10.57251/polyscopia.v1i3.1368[xvi] A global Europe: leveraging our power and partnership. (n.d.). European Commission, A Global Europe. Retrieved June 30, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/priorities-2024-2029/global-europe_en[xvii] European Commission (2025, April 14). Commission announces multiannual programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience worth up to €1.6 billion. European Commission, Press Release. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055[xviii] European Union (n.d.). EU support for Ukraine. European Union. Retrieved June 30, 2025, from https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/eu-support-ukraine_en[xix] European Commission (2025, April 4). Joint press release on the EU-Central Asia Summit. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_983[xx] European Commission (2025, July 5). EU and Singapore sign landmark digital trade agreement. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1152[xxi] European Council, Council of the Union (2025, July 5). EU trade agreements. European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/trade-agreements/[xxii] Merritt, G. (2023, October 3). Global Europe 1: The EU’s path to super-power status. Friends of Europe. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-global-europe-1-the-eus-path-to-super-power-status/[xxiii] Lehne, S. (2024, March 21). The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/the-eu-and-the-global-battle-of-narratives?lang=en¢er=europe[xxiv] Merritt, G. (2023, October 3). Global Europe 1: The EU’s path to super-power status. Friends of Europe. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-global-europe-1-the-eus-path-to-super-power-status/[xxv] Lehne, S. (2024, March 21). The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/the-eu-and-the-global-battle-of-narratives?lang=en¢er=europe[xxvi] European Commission (2022, July 18). Team Europe’s Official Development Assistance reaches €70.2 billion in 2021. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4532[xxvii] European Council, Council of the Union (2025, June 30). EU migration and asylum policy. European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/[xxviii] European Council, Council of the Union (2024, May 14). The Council adopts the EU’s pact on migration and asylum. European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/14/the-council-adopts-the-eu-s-pact-on-migration-and-asylum/[xxix] The Diplomatic Service of the European Union (2024, January 23). Disinformation and Foreign Interference: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EEAS Conference. European Council, External Action. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/disinformation-and-foreign-interference-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-eeas_en[xxx] Merritt, G. (2023, October 3). Global Europe 1: The EU’s path to super-power status. Friends of Europe. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-global-europe-1-the-eus-path-to-super-power-status/[xxxi] Vysotska, T., & POHORILOV, S. (2025, June 30). 18th package of sanctions against Russia being blocked not only by Slovakia, but also by Hungary. Ukrainska Pravda 25. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/30/7519420/[xxxii] Zubek, M., & Gora, M. (2021, June). Revamping the EU Approach Towards the Neighbouring and Enlargement Countries. Differentiation and EU Foreign Policy. 10th Conference of the SGEU, Virtual Event, 10 - 12 June 2021. https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/49470[xxxiii] Gowayed, H. (2024, August 12). Borders and the Exchange of Humans for Debt. IN THESE TIMES. https://inthesetimes.com/article/borders-exchange-humans-debt-asylum-global-south

Defense & Security
Military bombs and ammunition in front of a waving European Union flag

A European way of war: Towards doctrine to defend against Russia, without the US

by Garvan Walshe

Abstract Recent changes in US foreign policy and strategic posture have forced Europe to think about meeting its security needs without US support. One issue that requires a particular focus is the question of how to deter and defend against Russia in a conventional war. This article attempts a high-level assessment of European military capability and considers whether existing military doctrine is adequate. It argues that Europe should maintain its focus on NATO’s manoeuvrist mode of war fighting and identifies key capability gaps that need to be filled for (a) a coalition of the willing and (b) Europe as a whole to be able to fight in this way. It cautions against an unduly defensive, attritional method of fighting, based on conscript armies, as playing to Russia’s strengths instead of our own. Introduction War has come back to Europe and so has the need to think about how to fight it. Between 24 February 2022 and 21 January 2024, we put the need to rethink our defence to one side, because the Biden administration allowed us the luxury of being able to repurpose Cold War institutions (most obviously NATO), deterrence and habits to support Ukraine and dissuade Russia from another overt attack. This was a mixed blessing, because while it saved us the need to put our societies and economies on a war footing, it also blinded us to the need to build something new. The old system was not the best to contend with Russia’s aggression. While the US had only half an eye on Europe—with the rest of its focus on China—Western Europeans continued to free-ride on American resources. Neither Germany’s Zeitenwende, nor the aspersion cast by Emanuel Macron that ‘NATO is brain-dead’ (Macron 2019) translated into larger defence budgets, increased orders for ammunition, the conversion of civilian manufacturing to military use or the running of plants in shifts to replenish stockpiles. Only the Nordics, Baltics and Poland really moved to a war footing, and even their restructuring suffered from a desire, exposed as wishful thinking by Trump’s victory in November 2024, to keep the US involved. Now, with the US being led by an unstable pro-Russian Donald Trump and an anti-European JD Vance, the choice has been made for us. Steps are already being taken to prepare Europe’s industrial base, whether it is the creation of a European defence commissioner, Germany’s removal of its debt brake or initiatives such as the EU’s proposed Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financing instrument. But our political elite also needs to educate itself beyond these industrial and economic matters. War has once again become an essential part of what every responsible political leader needs to know. As it had been until 1945, if not 1989, some understanding of the military arts has, unfortunately, again become indispensable for European statespeople. This article will start by outlining certain concepts to help inform our debate about how we defend ourselves against Russia. It will relate them to the state of our military equipment, and pose questions about how we should fight with what we have, and how we should make more of what we need to fight in the way that gives us the maximum advantage over Russia. It will ask what elements of the existing NATO way of war should be kept, and which ought to be replaced, as a new European way of war—a European ‘doctrine’—is developed. And it will identify the key gaps in capability that need to be filled to apply such a doctrine in two scenarios: one where most of Europe confronts Russia (excluding neutrals, such as Ireland or Austria; potentially hostile states, such as Hungary and Slovakia; and Greece and Turkey, which deploy military resources to deter a conflict between themselves), and another where the burden is taken up by a coalition of the willing. This coalition is drawn up narrowly to constitute the Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8),1 the UK, Poland and Ukraine. Other countries, for example, Czechia and the Netherlands, would currently be considered part of this coalition, but their contributions have, conservatively, been excluded for the purpose of this assessment. This article does not assume that the European military effort should replicate the American one (for the cost of replication, see Wolff 2025). Instead it seeks to assess how Europe would deter and defeat Russia in ways that exploit our advantages against the Russian military. We do not need to replace the Americans one-for-one, but nor should we replicate Russia’s relatively low-technology and low-skill warfare. That would be to give up the strongest advantages our free and technologically advanced societies provide. Centre of gravity The first concept we need to outline is the ‘centre of gravity’: the phrase, whose application to war we owe to Clausewitz (1918, 270), refers to that feature of a belligerent that will cause it to change its behaviour when subject to pressure. The aim of military strategy, he argued, was not necessarily the destruction of the enemy’s forces, still less their population, but the application of force to their centre of gravity in order to achieve your war aim. With this in view, the most important question for European military planners is, where is Putin’s, or Russia’s, centre of gravity? This question will occupy our strategists’ minds for the foreseeable future: its answer includes determining whether it is Putin, or some other group in the Russian elite, such as the military, energy producers or business oligarchs, on whom pressure should be applied, and if so what pressure is required. Under what conditions would Putin sue for peace, or be replaced by someone who would, if Russia extended its war to conventional military aggression against Europe? Only once these conditions have been identified, is it then relevant to ask how they might be brought about. This consideration of centre of gravity begs an important question: how is Russia to be deterred from attacking Europe? How can sufficiently severe consequences be imposed on Russia, bearing in mind that the loss of almost 400 aircraft (Minfin.com.ua 2025) and several thousand tanks, and close to a million men killed and wounded have not been enough to push Putin to retreat from Ukraine? It is, however, necessary to pose this question, because there is a temptation to avoid it by focusing on ‘deterrence by denial’. This idea would be to defend ourselves in the manner in which the Chinese are thought to defend themselves against the US: by preventing US forces from landing in China by attacking its large, expensive ships. This does not apply to the Russian case for two reasons: first, Russia is willing to sacrifice men and equipment in human-wave assaults; the only equipment it seems to have decided to preserve is its air force. Second, Russia has a land border with Europe, so it does not need to attack using small numbers of vulnerable ships. Denial is extremely difficult against human-wave attacks, as US forces found in Korea, and Iraqis found in the Iran–Iraq war when revolutionary Iran employed them. (See Meyer zum Felde 2024 for a deterrence by denial–focused approach.) Order of battle A second concept is the ‘order of battle’: what are the forces arranged on either side of a conflict and how do they measure up to each other? As well as military units, it is worthwhile also considering the broader elements of societal strength—economic, political and cultural—that each side has, and how these contribute to the war effort. For example, our open societies leave us more vulnerable to hybrid attacks and disinformation, but on the other hand supply great strength and flexibility. Democratic societies do not wait for the government to tell them what to do, but organise social defence in ways that dictatorships find more difficult; the market economy possesses enormous flexibility that centrally planned systems do not; and an entrepreneurial can-do culture can also produce superior military performance through the concept of ‘mission command’ (see below). But the first question is who would be fighting? Sometimes pieces are written as if it would only be Britain and France confronting Russia (Barker et al. 2025), but borders have shifted since the Cold War: Eastern Europe, including the highly capable Polish and Finnish militaries, as well, of course, as Europe’s strongest army, Ukraine’s, would be arrayed against Moscow, not operating under its orders. Europe’s total military-age population is considerably greater than Russia’s. If Austria, Hungary, Ireland and Slovakia are excluded for political reasons, and Greece and Turkey as well, because they will wish to preserve resources in case a conflict breaks out between them, ‘Europe’ has 89.5 million military-age men and 88 million military-age women, compared to Russia’s 31 million military-age men and 33 million military-age women.2 The question of how such forces are recruited and generated, particularly in the economically more successful parts of Europe, is of course relevant, but the sheer capacity to provide sufficient personnel is not in doubt. It is useful to consider the matter of mobilisation. Russia was in transition from a conscript to a professional army when it launched its attack on Ukraine. It still mobilises 160,000 men per year, mostly to fill rearguard positions and free up front-line deployment for professional troops. This is equivalent to 17% of the annual cohort of young men.3 Europe (as defined above) could generate similar forces without much difficulty. A one-year cohort of the European population includes 2.7 million men and 2.5 million women. Even if it limited itself to calling up men, it would only need to recruit 6% of the population. Such a number would be feasible with a voluntary reserve service programme, and would not require universal conscription. Considering the countries most at risk of Russian aggression, and most likely to need to defend against it, presents a starker picture. The NB8 plus Poland and the UK between them have an annual cohort of 7.7 million men and 7.3 million women. If the male population of these countries took part in military service at the same rate as Russians, this would generate 130,000 personnel, requiring an additional 30,000 female personnel to match Russian numbers. This would require a female reserve participation rate of 4%, which is an achievable figure. For example, at least 25% of Norway’s annual conscription quota comprises women. Despite a recent surge in calls to reintroduce universal military service in Europe, this is not necessarily advisable in all countries. Training a large cohort of conscripts takes resources away from exercises and advanced training for professional officers. While it may be justified for small nations on the front line, it is not the best use of resources for larger countries. The required manpower needs can in most cases be met by a selective reserve system. European stocks of platforms (as distinct from ammunition stocks, which are dangerously low) are also not outrageously out of balance with the requirement for a mission against Russia, though this is partly due to Ukraine’s destruction of Russian equipment since 2022. The following (table 1) compares stocks of fighter jets, main battle tanks and artillery pieces across several groups of European countries (some including Ukraine) versus Russia. This analysis is necessarily somewhat crude, as it excludes infantry fighting vehicles, mortars and other equipment. It also completely sets aside analysis of naval forces. Its fighter aircraft figures comprise fourth-generation fighters, old fighters (predating the fourth generation or the Warsaw Pact) and F35s.4 Finally, these figures do not take future production (either European or Russian) or the evolution of land and air drones into account (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024).   Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2024). Note: This table compares the main platforms (fighter jets, main battle tanks and artillery pieces, including rocket artillery) that various European countries have at their disposal. Countries are placed in different categories and then compared against Russia. Each category also appears in two variants: one including Ukraine, and one that does not include Ukrainian forces. The ‘NB8+ coalition’ is the NB8 plus the UK and Poland. Non-neutral Europe means EU members plus the UK and Norway, but minus Ireland, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia. Using this table one can see, for example, that the NB8+ coalition has 542 fewer fighter jets at its disposal than Russia but essentially the same number of main battle tanks. With the exception of the scenario in which only the NB8+ coalition and Ukraine face off against Russia, Europe currently has approximately the required numbers of platforms to resist a Russian attack (bearing in mind a deficit in artillery pieces if Ukraine is not included). This leads to the following conclusions: • Ukraine needs to be considered an integral part of European defence against Russia, and its defeat would allow Russia to focus its forces on EU territory.• The coalition faces a notable air-power shortage in confronting Russia. While it has enough planes to deter Russian use of its aerospace, it does not have sufficient equipment to attempt to establish air superiority.• At an overall European level the priority should not be buying new platforms. Platform acquisition should be part of any rearmament plan, but priorities should be determined by the specific needs of a campaign against Russia, with importance given to filling the key gaps needed to conduct such a campaign. Platforms, ammunition and network-centric warfare The analysis above is only a first approximation of military strength. It considers only equipment and mobilisation potential, rather than force generation, and concentrates on land and air forces, setting aside the navy because a Euro-Russian conventional war would largely be fought on land. (The air force calculations do include naval aviation equipment, however, as these could be brought to bear). It also deals only with the main ‘platforms’: main battle tanks, fighter planes and artillery pieces, ignoring armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, engineering and support equipment, and, most importantly, ammunition. Simply replicating Russian numbers of platforms without considering communications, software and unmanned systems risks equipping ourselves to fight the last war (Tallis 2025). The spectrum that runs between a platform, which serves to move weapons systems into a place where they can be fired, and a piece of ammunition, fired from a platform, is another dimension of analysis. For example, during the Second World War the distinction was clear: an artillery shell was ammunition; an artillery piece a platform. But how should one categorise a cruise missile, which could be launched from a plane (so it appears to be ammunition launched from a platform), or directly from land, in which case it could arguably be a platform on its own? What is the difference between a cruise missile and a long-range drone? The war in Ukraine has seen the rapid development of short-range single-use drones that behave, in some ways, like super-intelligent artillery shells; and actual shells have incorporated guidance systems, and even propulsion systems, so that they have become what are known as ‘loitering munitions’. The point here is that strength is not just measured by platforms, but by the things that can be delivered to the battlefield with them (or independently of them), and an assessment of military strength needs to include an understanding of stocks of ammunition, the ability to replenish it and to fire it at where it is needed. This brings us to the idea of networks. War has always given the advantage to the side that could bring force to bear in a coordinated fashion while itself avoiding being the target of a coordinated enemy attack. The latest iteration of this is known as ‘network-centric warfare’, which, in its ideal form, means that every participant in the battle, from planes and ships all the way down to individual soldiers and drones can observe the ‘battlespace’ and communicate information about it to the right layer of command. Using this information, commanders, assisted by artificial intelligence, can decide where ‘effect’ is to be concentrated to bring about maximum damage to the enemy, more quickly than it can cause damage. This capability is not necessarily confined to the most expensive high-tech armies. Ukraine has shown how off-the-shelf electronic components can be added to existing systems to improve them (for example, to allow its artillery to concentrate fire on a single target despite the artillery systems themselves being dispersed). Precision If in the popular imagination precision weapons are used mainly to reduce collateral damage (and this was indeed their main use during the campaigns against terrorist groups in the first two decades of this century), in high-intensity war their advantage is that they conserve resources and time. Even if an individual precision artillery shell is more expensive, it is more useful to be able to use one or two guided shells to hit a target than 30 or 40 unguided ones. Not only is less ammunition used, but fewer troops are needed to operate it, and the wear and tear on the artillery pieces is considerably less. Precision results in greater ‘effect’ from the inputs to the process. Though sometimes presented as its opposite, precision should be understood as a way of delivering ‘mass’; this concept, also from Clausewitz (1918, 98), refers to the quantity of force that can be brought to bear against an enemy at a particular time. It matters because fighting is not a continuous linear process where the amount of force one applies has an effect in proportion to its quantity—in war having more power at one place at the right time means you will win the battle and the enemy will be weaker for the next one. The slightly stronger force can often inflict damage on the weaker one in a way that is disproportionate to the difference in their strength. To take a simple example for the purposes of illustration, suppose we start with 100 tanks, and so do they. Thanks to our commander’s skill we are able to concentrate 50 of our tanks against 40 of theirs. We lose 10 tanks, they lose 35. Now we have 90 tanks, they have 65. In this example our ability to get those extra 10 tanks in the right place has given us an advantage that can be pressed further in the next battle. It is these facts that underpin the approach that NATO, and the West more broadly, has applied to fighting. Although Western democracies have been able, due to their superior economic systems and technological advantage, to outproduce their enemies, winning a war of attrition is not where they consider their advantage to come from. Instead they emphasise their speed of movement and thought, and their ability to confuse their enemies, tricking them into dividing or misdirecting their forces, and then pouncing at the right moment; this is the ‘manoeuvrist’ creed of war, in which we fight smart and overcome the enemy by more than brute force. It is important not to draw the distinction between attrition and manoeuvre too crudely. Manoeuvre warfare is easier when you have more and better kit, and your leaders are informed by better intelligence obtained through technological as well as human sources. It also takes advantage of the characteristics of free societies. Manoeuvre warfare is strengthened by ‘mission command’: the notion that subordinate officers are given the ability to decide exactly how to fulfil their orders. This gives Western militaries a flexibility that is absent from the armies of dictatorships, in which such freedom is rarely granted,5 but of course this depends on officers and soldiers being sufficiently well-trained, and possessing a good enough level of general education, to operate independently. It is the best way for us, as free and well-educated peoples, to fight—it is not necessarily the best for everyone. A manoeuvrist force, is, as the name suggests, on the move. It is constantly advancing, communicating its changing position, attempting to bypass and confuse the enemy. It operates at a high tempo in order to overwhelm the enemy mentally as well as physically, and the ability to sustain this type of fighting informs training, equipment command and intelligence: ‘the key to winning battles is to have greater forces at the key location than does the enemy. The trick is to outwit the enemy and thus out-concentrate him at the right time’ (Warden 1998, 79). This matters for learning the right lessons from Ukraine’s fight for survival. Ukraine has only been able to master some of the lessons of manoeuvrist warfare. It has been hampered by its limited capacity in the air, which slows it down and makes it hard to break Russian lines except with artillery and long-range fire (such as the famous HIMARS rockets). It is in transition from Soviet- to Western-style command. But it has also shown tremendous capacity to innovate, particularly in its use of drones to hold a defensive line. Ukraine’s tremendous first-person drone capacity allows it to stop Russian attacks while risking far fewer troops (drone operators work behind the lines, where they are at much lower risk than the men in the trenches) and even compensate for artillery.6 These principles feed into NATO’s existing doctrine (NATO 2022), which involves identifying the enemy’s centre of gravity, achieving air superiority to deliver firepower against its command and control nodes, and then overcoming its disoriented forces at speed. It relies on synthesising intelligence through networks of sensors and exploiting the information they provide to deploy massed precision against them. Such operations, however, require certain capabilities that depend on equipment and structures provided mostly by the US. The first of these is NATO’s command structure. NATO’s armies have a single command structure that conducts exercises together. At the top is the Supreme Allied Commander (American) and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (European). American units are integrated throughout the force structure. European forces will need to plan, exercise and be ready to fight without these American elements—it is not merely a matter of detaching them. The second is the intelligence and planning capability to carry out those war plans and adapt to the evolving battle. These integrate intelligence gathered from sensors, satellites and human sources, and artificial intelligence is increasingly involved in its processing as extremely large amounts of data must be handled quickly and secretly. As well as certain sensors (satellites and aircraft), the US’s processing software is also vital here, though Europeans have equivalent capabilities at reduced scale. Third are the sensors, software and missiles needed to suppress enemy air defences (SEAD). SEAD missions are a prerequisite for establishing air superiority against adversaries that possess sophisticated air defence systems, such as Russia. Indeed, the failure of Russia’s SEAD missions in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s ability to deter Russian aviation, may also indicate that an effective air defence is easier to mount than had been thought.7 Europe, however, currently lacks the ability to make the latest generation of anti-radiation missiles (which target enemy radar) essential to the success of SEAD. India’s poor performance against Pakistan, where it appears to have attempted to conduct deep strikes against its rival without conducting SEAD, underlines the importance of these capabilities (Economist 2025). It will take some years to develop them, and this needs to be prioritised. A full discussion of the requirements for successful SEAD against Russia can be found in Bronk and Watling (2025). Finally there is the question of Russia’s nuclear threats. Though the UK and France possess ‘strategic’ nuclear arsenals, these, because they threaten the complete destruction of the world, can only credibly deter the most extreme sort of attack. Russia and the US both have low-yield or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons, and Russia has regularly threatened to use them. These threats would significantly complicate elements of a European campaign to deter Russia, which might involve actions such as seizing Kaliningrad or advancing from Finland towards the environs of St Petersburg. Europe needs the ability to restrict Russia to conventional weapons in such circumstances. Though such deterrence does not have to be supplied using tactical nuclear weapons of our own (Hoffmann 2021), these would be the most straightforward instrument for this purpose. As the UK’s nuclear weapons systems are submarine launched (and use American missiles), France’s arsenal would have to be expanded to provide this capability, and be able to be deployed closer to the front as, for example, Donald Tusk has hinted.8 Conclusion and recommendations Fighting without the Americans does not necessarily mean we need to replace exactly what they used to supply. Instead we need to understand the mission required, which is to deter Russia by credibly showing how Russian forces would be defeated, in the field, should Putin attempt to attack us. In an ideal world this credible threat would cause the military to remove Putin should he attempt further adventurism against Europe, but we cannot rely on such an eventuality. This means that we have to think carefully about how we would fight and sustain political support for a major European war. The good news is that provided that the bulk of Europe is willing to contribute, we have the resources and equipment needed to defeat Russia. Upgrades, in particular in SEAD capability and tactical nuclear weapons, need to be made, but they are not out of reach. In addition, we have a solid basis in military doctrine that can be used to organise a campaign that takes advantage of our military cultures and technological lead. The less good news is that the countries that can be guaranteed to make up a ‘coalition of the willing’ (the NB8 plus Poland, the UK and Ukraine) would currently struggle to mount an offensive campaign on their own. They would, in particular, struggle to field a sufficiently large air force to win air superiority over Russia, though they have enough aircraft to deny Russia air superiority of its own. This would limit their ability to put manoeuvrist doctrine into practice, and, notwithstanding advances in drone warfare pioneered by the Ukrainians, could cause them to fall back to static defence and attritional warfare, as illustrated by the proposed Baltic Defence Line. Such an approach would stretch the human resources of a coalition of the willing extremely thin. It is perhaps ironic that Europe as a whole could win a war of attrition against Russia, but it also would not have to, as it could prosecute a campaign of manoeuvre against the Russian military and Putin’s state. Accordingly my recommendations are laid out below. Europe should focus on what it needs to defeat Russia, rather than what would be required to replace the American commitment to NATO. Nevertheless, it should not, as a whole, revert to using conscript-based armies designed to fight a war of attrition against Russia. These give up the greatest advantages of technologically advanced free societies and would leave us fighting the kind of war Russia would want us to fight. Certain small front-line states might need to make different calculations. Universal military service might be required so that they can, in extremis, mount a defensive campaign—for example, if Finland and the Baltic states were required to fight on their own without support from European allies. This highly extreme scenario is sufficiently unlikely that it should not form the basis of other countries’ military planning. The core ‘coalition of the willing’—the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, plus Poland, the UK and Ukraine—could defend themselves against Russia, and with some effort would be able to conduct an offensive campaign to bring about Russian defeat. They would need, however, to make important improvements to their defence. The coalition would require an integrated command structure and a programme of exercises. The expansion of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force and the UK’s command headquarters would be a suitable nucleus for such capability. The coalition would face a manpower deficit compared to Russia, and matching Russian mobilised reserve levels would be a challenge. The coalition could, however, match Russian mobilisation levels with a Swedish- or Norwegian-style selective military service programme for young men and women (it could achieve sufficient coverage for defensive purposes by recruiting 16% of men and 6% of women each year). The coalition is also severely short of aircraft with which to pursue an air superiority campaign against Russia. Though it would fare better than Ukraine on its own, increasing the size of the coalition’s air forces must be a priority, and the risk of over-dependence on the F35 needs to be considered. Though ‘kill switches’ are a myth, a sovereign spare parts supply chain (as Finland is creating) and sovereign intelligence software (as used by Israel) are required to reduce the risk of US unreliability. The coalition would also need to consider replacing the F35’s intelligence and command capabilities with replacements that could operate on European aircraft, such as the Gripen or Rafale. The lack of stealth capability would also hamper the coalition’s air forces until a sixth-generation fighter could be developed. Europe as a whole has forces of the necessary scale to conduct operations against Russia. Its shortfalls in ammunition production and inefficiencies due to the diversity of its equipment have been covered elsewhere. Some inefficiency is likely to persist as long as Europe remains a relatively decentralised continent, but it is likely to be better to bear the extra cost now, than waste time with the ambitious political integration projects required to eliminate it quickly. Europe as a whole would need to develop its own command structure. At this level it may be possible to repurpose NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) using the Berlin Plus process, though care would need to be taken to avoid a potentially hostile US, as well as unfriendly NATO members, such as Hungary, blocking operations. As urgent as ammunition production (a category that includes missiles as well as artillery) is the manufacture of equipment to conduct SEAD campaigns. Reviving European capacity to produce anti-radiation missiles and in intelligence capability to uncover targets for them should be a matter of the highest priority. The final priority area is the expansion of Europe’s tactical nuclear capability. Though the French and British strategic arsenals can provide the ultimate deterrence against Russia, tactical, or low-yield, weapons are needed to deter Russia from threatening European forces with its tactical nuclear weapons. As the British programme is not suitable, these would have to be based on the French programme, and questions related to how this expansion would be paid for, and how tactical nuclear use would be authorised, would need to be addressed. Footnotes1. Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.2. These estimates are based on Eurostat data for the EU member states, the Office for National Statistics population projections for the UK and the most recent available data for Russia, which is based on UN data not currently available but which have been reported on Wikipedia. The Russian data are from 2012, so these overestimate Russian demographic strength slightly. The military age calculation aggregates the standard five-year demographic groups between 20 and 49. Obviously a military may mobilise younger and older people as well, but the comparison remains valid.3. In this case, by taking the 10-year sample of 15–24-year-olds and dividing it by 10 to smooth out fluctuations. Again, because of declining Russian demographics (even without accounting for losses due to the war), this is likely to be an underestimate of the proportion mobilised (because the total number of 18-year-old men is lower than the statistics indicate).4. F35s are easily the most advanced fighter available, and the only one reliably able to penetrate Russian air defences before suppression of enemy air defence missions have been accomplished. The deterioration in relations with the US, however, poses questions about the ongoing reliability of the supply chain associated with them. Though ‘kill-switches’ are a myth, European countries will need to maintain their own spare parts supply and software upgrade path if they are to gain the most out of the aircraft in the long run. Finland, for example, is establishing its own sovereign spare parts supply, and Israel has a sovereign software intelligence solution on its F35s.5. An exception was the Wehrmacht, which inherited mission command from the Prussian Army; however, its generals found themselves micromanaged by Hitler, which (fortunately) affected their performance.6. These small drones are very different from those deployed in the early stages of the war such as the Bayraktar TB2 or Western drones such as the Reaper. They are much closer to ammunition than platforms, and (in good weather, at least) replace artillery or close air support.7. It could also indicate that Russian aviation is not as good as had been thought, but it would be dangerous to plan on that assumption.8. Author’s conversation with a Polish official who wished to remain anonymous.ReferencesBarker K., Smialek J., Erlanger S. (2025). Europe prepares to face Russia as Trump’s America steps back. New York Times, 24 February.Bronk J., Watling J. (2025). Rebalancing joint fires to deter Russia. Royal United Services Institute Occasional Paper. London, 15 April. https://static.rusi.org/rebalancing-european-joint-fires-to-deter-russia.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2025.Clausewitz K. von. (1918). On War. Trans. Graham J. J. (London: K. Paul Trench, Trubner & Co.)Dalaaker A. (2017). Statement by Norway on gender equality in the military – universal conscription. Organisation for Co-operation and Security in Europe. 8 March. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/9/304861.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2025.Economist. (2025). Chinese weapons gave Pakistan a new edge against India. 15 May. https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/05/15/chinese-weapons-gave-pakistan-a-new-edge-against-india. Accessed 16 May 2025.Hackett M., Nagl J. (2024). A long hard year. Russia–Ukraine war lessons learned 2023. Parameters, 54(3), 41–52.Hoffmann F. (2021). Strategic non-nuclear weapons and strategic stability – promoting trust through technical understanding. Fondation pour la recherche strategique. https://frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/Programme TNP - P5/2021/202103.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2025.International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2024). The military balance. London: Routledge.Meyer zum Felde R. (2024). Kann sich Europa konventionell gegen eine militärische Bedrohung durch Russland behaupten? Sirius, 8(3), 267–83.Minfin.com.ua. (2025). Casualties of the Russian troops in Ukraine. Updated daily. https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-invading/casualties/. Accessed 5 March 2025.Nagl J., Crombe K. (2024). A call to action: Lessons from Ukraine for the future force. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press.NATO. (2022). Allied joint doctrine. December. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/allied-joint-publication-ajp. Accessed 9 April 2025.Tallis B. (2025). Emerging defence: Offset and competitive strategies for Europe. Democratic Strategy Initiative. https://www.democratic-strategy.net/_files/ugd/dcfff6_ca54854b6dc7499e829a5fa4d7b01b74.pdf. Accessed 16 March 2025.Warden J. (1998). The air campaign: Planning for combat. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press.Wolff G., Burlikov A. (2025). Defending Europe without the US: First estimates of what is needed. Bruegel, 21 February. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed. Accessed 9 April 2025.

Diplomacy
Xi Jinping with Ursula von der Leyen and Antonio Costa (July 2025)

25th EU-China Summit in Beijing

by Johann C. Fuhrmann , Dr. Olaf Wientzek , Jonas Nitschke

A Sobering Anniversary Fifty years of diplomatic relations – and little to celebrate: The 25th EU-China Summit, held in Beijing on July 24, was overshadowed by deep disagreements. From trade disputes to China’s stance on Russia’s war in Ukraine, expectations on both sides were low. While there were symbolic gestures and limited agreements on climate and critical minerals, the meeting highlighted more divergence than convergence. Xi Jinping appeared self-assured; the EU delegation emphasized clarity and unity – but left without substantive concessions. Abstract: The 25th EU-China Summit marked a symbolic milestone – 50 years of diplomatic relations – yet took place in an atmosphere of growing mistrust and confrontation. Geopolitical tensions, an ever-growing trade imbalance, and China’s ongoing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine dominated the agenda. The EU delegation, led by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President António Costa, sought to recalibrate the relationship and push for concrete outcomes, particularly in trade and global security. Yet Beijing showed little willingness to make concessions. Although both sides agreed on a climate communiqué and a mechanism to address export restrictions on critical raw materials, progress remained limited. China framed the summit as a platform for global cooperation, while the EU left with a renewed sense of caution. Still, the in-person dialogue – the first since 2023 – was seen as diplomatically necessary. For Brussels, the message was clear: without a shift in China’s geopolitical posture, especially towards Russia, meaningful improvement in relations remains elusive. 1. Background The fundamental importance of the relationship was repeatedly emphasized in the run-up to the summit; the EU and China account for nearly 30 percent of global trade in goods and services. Even though there was a slight decline in 2024, bilateral trade still amounted to over 700 billion euros. China is the EU’s second-largest trading partner after the United States.[1] At the same time, discordant tones have increased in recent years: the flooding of the European market with subsidized goods from China, the resulting growing trade imbalance between the two sides, the limitation of market access for European goods, as well as export restrictions on rare earths, are causing dissatisfaction on the European side. While Brussels initially proclaimed at the start of the first von der Leyen Commission that China was—depending on the topic—a partner, competitor, or rival, in recent years the focus has increasingly shifted to competition and rivalry—also due to concerns about excessive dependence on Beijing. The EU’s decision to impose countervailing duties on electric vehicles, in turn, triggered corresponding reactions from China. Politically as well, China’s de facto support for Russia in the war of aggression against Ukraine has significantly changed the EU’s perception of China over the past three years—not to mention concerns about China’s actions toward Taiwan, its support for authoritarian regimes around the world, and its attempts to increasingly shape and shift the discourse in multilateral organizations in its own favor. The statement made in June by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that China could not afford a Russian defeat, as this would mean that the USA and its Western allies would then turn their attention to Asia[2], reinforced the conviction in Brussels that China supports Russia in the conflict not only in words but also in deeds. Just a few days before the summit, the EU imposed sanctions on Chinese banks for violations of sanctions against Russia, to which China responded with threats of retaliatory measures.[3] In the weeks leading up to the summit, little suggested a resolution to these points of contention. The tougher stance taken by Washington toward both sides in recent months also did not lead to a reduction in dissonance. At the same time, the EU finds itself increasingly under pressure to navigate a balancing act between the strategic interests of the USA and China. China is courting with investments in favor of more “strategic autonomy,” while the USA is pushing for a hard line against Beijing, for example through export controls on critical raw materials. At the G7 summit in Canada, President von der Leyen accused China of using its dominance in raw materials as a weapon against competitors.[4] Beijing rejected the criticism. In Brussels, the fight against climate change is seen as the only somewhat consensual topic, although in the field of green tech—such as electric vehicles or photovoltaics—China is a competitor that challenges the EU. As the controversial vote on tariffs for electric vehicles also showed, EU member states are not always united when it comes to China.[5] Some primarily view China as an important economic partner, others struggle with China’s punitive tariffs, still others see the country as an authoritarian center of gravity that, through support for Russia or through cyberattacks, threatens their own security. Most recently, alongside Hungary—which has been regarded for years as one of Beijing’s closest partners in the EU—the socialist government of Spain also stood out with a charm offensive toward China. The difficulties in the relationship with China have prompted the EU—especially in the new legislative term—to noticeably diversify its economic and political foreign relations: directly before the EU-China summit, closer cooperation was agreed with Japan—also with the goal of reducing strategic dependence on China.[6] 2. Expectations for the Summit On the Chinese side, expectations for the summit were limited from the outset—at least in terms of making their own concessions. In its official communications, Beijing adopted an unusually sharp tone in the lead-up. The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guo Jiakun, warned the EU not to harm the interests of Chinese companies. Otherwise, China would take measures to protect their rights. At the same time, Guo criticized the new EU sanctions against Russia, which also affect Chinese banks. The normal exchange between Chinese and Russian companies must not be disrupted. Beijing continues to reject the EU’s formula “partner, competitor, systemic rival”—as well as, from the Chinese perspective, unfounded accusations related to the war in Ukraine.[7] This clear defensive posture is also reflected in the public debate. In state-controlled social media, the summit was sometimes mockingly commented on in advance: the Europeans, it was said, would be begging for rare earths on their knees while a strong China benevolently dictated the rules of the game. This self-portrayal reflects a growing sense of self-confidence in Beijing—and at the same time sends a signal: China does not see itself as a supplicant, but as a shaper. Specifically, Beijing hopes for a withdrawal of the new EU import tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, for which, according to the Chinese side, they are in the final stages of “price negotiations.” From the perspective of European officials, however, the process has been stagnating for months. Further points of friction lie in China’s response to European sanctions—such as the recent imposition of punitive tariffs on French cognac and new restrictions on the procurement of medical equipment. The looming action against European milk and pork exports also fits into this pattern. At the same time, Beijing highlights the fruits of decades of cooperation: bilateral trade has grown from 2.4 billion to nearly 786 billion US dollars over the past 50 years, and mutual investments have reached nearly 260 billion. President Xi Jinping therefore called on the EU to maintain “open cooperation.” “Decoupling” or even “building walls” would only lead to isolation, he warned. China is therefore insisting on further market access in Europe—particularly in key areas such as automobile manufacturing, high-tech, and medical technology—and sees itself increasingly discriminated against by European protective measures. The preliminary reporting on the meeting in state media, however, was predictably conciliatory. The focus was primarily on powerful imagery, portraying China as a responsible actor on the global stage. In a report by the state news agency Xinhua shortly before the summit, it was stated that the meeting offered an opportunity to “consolidate the common interests of China and Europe in a time of global upheaval.” China Daily also struck a cooperative tone on July 24 and warned against endangering the relationship “through protectionist reflexes or foreign policy proxy conflicts.” Europe, the paper said literally, must decide whether it will “continue to make independent strategic decisions—or blindly follow Washington’s course.”[8] What remains unmentioned in China’s narrative is that many of these shared goals currently exist primarily on paper. Accusations regarding competition-distorting subsidies, China’s role in the war in Ukraine, or restrictions on European companies are at best dismissed as misunderstandings. From Beijing’s perspective, the summit appeared to be primarily a diplomatic showcase—rather than a venue for tangible rapprochement. 3. Expectations of the EU Whoever on the EU side may have expected major breakthroughs in light of the anniversary was likely disillusioned by early July at the latest: the reduction of the summit, originally scheduled for two days, to just a single day was an initial dampener; the statements from Chinese ministerial officials and top EU personnel in the weeks leading up to the summit did not suggest that anything fundamental would change regarding the divergences in foreign, economic, and trade policy. The EU is seeking a rebalancing of the relationship. According to Commission President von der Leyen ahead of the summit, the relationship had reached a turning point and now required concrete solutions. Among the EU’s top priorities in the economic sphere are: the rollback of China’s punitive tariffs, measures to reduce the massive trade deficit and counter the redirection of Chinese overcapacities toward the European market, the creation of a level playing field, and export licensing requirements for critical raw materials.[9] In the weeks prior to the summit, there were no signs of Chinese willingness to accommodate any of these demands. Expectations were equally low with regard to geopolitical conflicts, even though the EU’s High Representative had again clearly appealed to China in early July to end its support for Russia. Observers no longer expected a comprehensive joint communiqué ahead of the summit; at most, a joint statement on climate policy with regard to COP30 in Belém, Brazil, was still considered possible. The prevailing opinion: the primary goal was to contain the worsening of relations. Some observers still hoped for minor progress on economic issues. At least there were some diplomatic signals from Beijing in the run-up to the EU-China summit. For example, Mikko Huotari, Director of the German think tank Merics, was allowed to travel to China for the first time in four years. Merics had been subjected to a travel ban in 2021 as part of Chinese counter-sanctions against the EU over its human rights criticism regarding Xinjiang. The lifting of sanctions against individual (former) EU parliamentarians was also interpreted in Brussels as a positive political signal.[10] However, a full lifting of the sanctions is still pending, and travel currently remains possible only under certain conditions—such as by invitation from Chinese institutions, without a guarantee of academic freedom. Observers emphasized that these relaxations were “low-cost” concessions for China. 4. Outcomes of the Summit The low expectations ahead of the summit were at least not disappointed.[11] In their choice of words before and after the summit, both sides made efforts to maintain a respectful tone. Commission President von der Leyen and European Council President Costa did address the well-known critical issues (the need for concrete solutions to recalibrate trade relations, market access for European companies, an end to China’s material support for Russia’s war), but at the same time emphasized the immense importance of the relationship, the shared responsibility for a rules-based international order, and expressed respect for China’s tremendous achievements over the past years and decades.[12] Xi Jinping, on the other hand, did not directly address the divergences between the two sides at all, but instead highlighted the importance of mutual respect, the consolidation of cooperation, an open approach to differences of opinion, and collaboration at the multilateral level. Contrary to some particularly pessimistic forecasts, there were two reasonably concrete outcomes at the summit: First, a supply mechanism for rare earth exports is to be established in order to address supply issues faced by European companies. This would allow companies to contact the EU directly to clarify the causes of delayed exports of critical raw materials.[13] It remains unclear exactly what this mechanism will look like in practice. Second, both sides agreed on a communiqué on climate policy, in which both reaffirmed their cooperation in the climate sector, including on the reduction of greenhouse gases. The communiqué expresses support for the Paris Agreement and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Both sides commit to fair and effective implementation in line with national circumstances. The goal is to advance a just global climate transformation, to support Brazil at COP30, and to improve global access to green technology. By COP30, both sides agreed to present new climate targets for 2035 and to expand cooperation in areas such as the energy transition, methane reduction, and low-carbon technologies.[14] Small steps forward were also made toward closer cooperation in emissions trading, the circular economy, financial regulation, drug control, and geographical indications. A new roadmap for regional policy (2024–2029) was adopted. On the sidelines of the summit, a roundtable was also held with around sixty representatives of European and Chinese companies. In its post-summit remarks, the EU expressed concern about China’s opaque data protection rules and cyberattacks. It also voiced concern about the situation in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, as well as the persecution of human rights defenders. Furthermore, the EU expressed concern about tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas. It rejected any unilateral violent changes to the status quo and called for peaceful solutions in accordance with international law.[15] 5. Outlook Despite all divergences, the tone in public communication remained at least respectful. However, the summit yielded hardly any tangible progress—particularly in the trade issues central to Brussels. As expected, the EU departed without any concrete commitments. Whether the announced mechanism for rare earth exports will provide substantial added value remains to be seen. From the EU's perspective, the summit confirmed one thing above all: the increasingly skeptical—at times alarmed—view of China remains unchanged. Beijing showed no willingness to make substantial concessions. Instead, the Chinese leadership demonstrated confidence and conveyed the message that it need not act in advance toward a weakened Europe. At the same time, the EU succeeded in clearly articulating key concerns—particularly the expectation that Beijing should use its influence on Moscow to enable progress toward peace negotiations. The clear message: China’s relationship with Russia will play a decisive role in future EU-China relations. One positive aspect from Brussels’ point of view: the appearances of Commission President von der Leyen, Council President Costa, and Estonian Prime Minister Kallas came across as coherent and well-coordinated—an important signal of European unity in difficult times. In addition, according to von der Leyen, the Chinese leadership has begun to address domestic industrial overcapacities under the term “involution.” The latter was regarded as another positive development from a European perspective. Until now, Chinese representatives had consistently denied in talks that the massive overcapacities posed any problem, according to media reports from EU circles.[16] Now, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang have declared their intent to counteract this trend—against what they perceive as a destructive price war in sectors such as steel, electric mobility, and solar panels. The leadership uses the term “involution” to describe the increasingly intense competition caused by price dumping. Even though some observers hailed the joint climate communiqué as a success, from the EU’s perspective it should be clear: in the field of green tech, China causes massive market distortions through state subsidies and targeted industrial policy—with the goal of creating new global dependencies. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly important that the summit took place. One must assume that the political system in China—similar to Russia or the Trump administration—functions like an echo chamber; that Xi Jinping likely hears little internal criticism. “That’s why it’s important that the EU leadership tells him directly where the shoe pinches,” emphasized Jörg Wuttke, longtime president of the European Chamber of Commerce.[17] At the same time, it speaks volumes about the state of the relationship when even the mere act of speaking with the EU’s second most important trading partner is regarded as a success of the summit. References[1] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[2] Exclusive | China tells EU it does not want to see Russia lose its war in Ukraine: sources | South China Morning Post[3] Neue Russland-Sanktionen: China droht EU mit Gegenmaßnahmen | tagesschau.de[4] Präsidentin von der Leyen beim G7-Gipfel[5] https://www.kas.de/en/web/mned-bruessel/global-europe-illustrated/detail/-/content/global-europe-illustrated-eu-member-states-voting-on-tariffs-ev-china[6] AGENCE EUROPE - Faced with economic and security challenges, EU emphasises i...[7] Vgl. China.Table: EU-Gipfel: Pekinger Außenministerium schlägt härtere Töne an, 23.07.2025.[8] Link zu Chinadaily[9] Handelskonflikt: China verursacht Rohstoffkrise – Erste Firmen drosseln Produktion[10] Sanctioned German China expert visits Beijing in sign of easing restrictions | South China Morning Post[11] Andere Zusammenfassungen finden sich hier: https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13687/1 oder in diesem Thread: https://x.com/fbermingham/status/1948242830595391697[12] EU warns China to push Putin to end war as relations hit ‘inflection point’ – POLITICO, die Pressekonferenz ist auch hier zu finden: https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/permalink/264159 , https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/permalink/264160[13] EU-China-Gipfel: Probleme bei Seltenen Erden gelöst?[14] Joint EU-China press statement on climate[15] 25th EU-China summit - EU press release - Consilium[16] Vgl. China.Table: EU-China-Gipfel: Peking will gegen Überkapazitäten vorgehen, 25.07.2025.[17] Experte Wuttke über EU-China-Gipfel: "Xi will Europa dominieren"

Diplomacy
waving colorful flag of european union and flag of canada on a euro money banknotes background. finance concept. macro

The Europe–Canada Schicksalsgemeinschaft: Transatlantic interdependency in the new North Atlantic triangle

by Christian Leuprecht

Abstract Buffeted by the headwinds of US unilateralism, Europeans and Canadians are bound together in a community of fate. As the US departs the field, Europe and Canada need to cooperate more. To avoid being abandoned, they need to avail themselves of Atlanticist power for mutual benefit. Rather than merely protecting a liberal–democratic zone of peace across the Western hemisphere, Europe and Canada need to project the power of the transatlantic security community to deter Russia from using war to precipitate a multipolar world order in which it becomes a global player. This article draws on the metaphor of transatlantic relations as a triangle: with the US, Europe and Canada at its angles. Canada is in an existentially precarious position: a more autonomous Europe would make Canada even more dependent on the American hegemon, which would heighten Canada’s risk of being absorbed by the US. Although that outcome is not in Europe’s interest, Europe and Canada have been disengaging for decades. Reversing this trajectory would come at a significant military cost but would be a political gain that would be difficult to measure, resulting in cooperation on energy security, critical minerals, defence and defence in depth. Yet, to achieve this strategic counterbalance, Europe and Canada need to protect abiding security and political interests: to keep the US in Europe and to keep the Russians out. KeywordsCanada, Europe, EU, Euro-Atlantic community, US, NATO, Energy security, Defence, Defence in depth, Transatlantic relations, Structural realism Introduction ‘Europe and Canada are trusted friends and partners. Today this relationship is more critical than ever. I look forward to working with you to defend democracy, free and fair trade, and our shared values’ (von der Leyen 2025). The words of the president of the European Commission, on the swearing in of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, identify Europe’s common priorities with the ‘most European of non-European countries’. The words reinforce a reinvigorated Schicksalsgemeinschaft, a German term that denotes a community with a common fate. After decades of distraction by ‘Asia-Pacific’ imaginaries, Europe and Canada are rediscovering the inevitability of their common fate, in the Euro-Atlantic community. Traditionally, the North Atlantic triangle has comprised an Atlanticist Anglosphere: the UK, the US and Canada. This article instead draws on an age-old metaphor coined by celebrated Canadian historian John Bartlet Brebner (1966): a North Atlantic triangle that reflects transatlantic strategic and political cultures. The angles of this triangle consist of the US, Canada and Europe writ large, as manifest in but not limited to the EU. Europe and Canada share a common strategic fate that makes them interdependent. Both stand to benefit from cultivating their relationship, while both stand to lose should Canada become even more dependent on the US. Canada’s strategic amnesia is manifest in its having forgotten the lesson of leveraging Europe to hedge against the uncertainties of US unilateralism. This is reminiscent of what Brebner called the ‘bookkeeper’s puzzle’: how can Canada best manage relations with both the UK and the US so as (a) to be able to invoke the assistance of the former against the latter’s political (and perhaps military) pressure, while at same time (b) ensuring that the British desire for an Anglo-American rapprochement does not result in any ‘sacrifice’ of Canadian interests? Historically, Canada had managed relations with the easternmost angle of the triangle, the UK, to assure its assistance against political (and possibly existential military) pressure from the US. At the same time, in the interests of its sovereignty, Canada wanted to ensure that any rapprochement with the UK would not end up sacrificing Canadian interests. An offshoot of the bookkeeper’s puzzle applies to attempts by Canada to involve its allies from NATO in an expanded triangle to counterbalance the US politically and economically (Haglund 2025). The bookkeeper’s puzzle thus reflects a real fear of abandonment: in Canada of being abandoned by Europe, and in Europe of being abandoned by the US. The key to the puzzle is for Canada and Europe to retrench and harness their interdependence. But that is easier said than done, due in part to free trade with the US, which has reinforced the shift of Canada’s organisational focus from east–west to north–south. The new North Atlantic triangle Since the founding of NATO in 1949, European countries and Canada have come to depend disproportionately on the world’s largest defence and intelligence complex for their security and have had the world’s largest economy as their primary trading partner. The US shored up its Atlantic and Pacific rims by design: a favourable trading relationship with the US allowed Europe to prosper, while the US guaranteed and underwrote Europe’s security against the Soviet threat. With the end of the Cold War, however, European allies opted to reduce their defence posture significantly. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War, the US has invested US$500 billion per year more than Europe in defence (at today’s prices)—which comes to almost US$20 trillion more than Europe over 35 years. This explains why Europe depends on US capability—especially in cyber, space and intelligence. The US feels that this came at its expense: 64% of European defence is still underwritten by the US (NATO 2025), up from 52% over the past decade, nothingstanding NATO members’ 2014 Wales summit pledge to spend more on defence. Why are 340 million Americans defending 450 million Europeans? Moreover, the US perceives those allies as benefiting from asymmetric trade relations, which the Trump administration considers to be to the detriment of the US. That is, European allies have failed to heed the first purpose of NATO which, in the infamous words of its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, is ‘to keep the Americans in Europe’ (Rodman 1995). To keep ‘the Russians out’ of Europe is the second purpose Lord Ismay sets out for NATO (Rodman 1995). In line with Article 5 of NATO’s founding charter (North Atlantic Treaty 1949, art. 5), allies rely on the US as the guarantor to deter Russia from its ambition of becoming a global player in a multipolar world order, which Russia is prepared to bring about by force. France and the UK notwithstanding, only the US has the nuclear triad and second-strike capability to ensure credible extended nuclear deterrence. However, two world wars and the Cold War have shown that Europe needs Canada for defence in depth. The usual connotation of this military strategy is to contain a bad actor that has breached a layer of defence by providing a second layer of defence. In this case, it refers to Canadian territory as being a safe and like-minded industrial hinterland for resources and an industrial base for Europe to rely on in times of war, as it did during the world wars. During these, Canada provided surge capacity and defence in depth from day one, long before the US ultimately joined in. In both cases, Canada’s reliable contribution changed the outcome of the war: the Second World War might have turned out quite differently had Canada not helped the UK hold down the island fort. Along with prevailing historical, ethno-cultural, political and economic ties, Canada and Europe share geostrategic interests: in the Arctic with the Nordic countries, and in the Atlantic rim with the UK, France, Spain and Portugal. Although Canada is disproportionately exposed to the consequences of US unilateralism, for Canada, leveraging European power to counterbalance the US is controversial (Haglund 1999). Canada’s changing demographics and trade relationships have oriented Canada away from Europe as the obvious ally and partner in safeguarding Canadian sovereignty. Conversely, Europe has an interest in using its power to assure Canada’s independence so as to limit the latter’s potential overexposure to the hegemonic impulses of the American empire: given the size of Canada’s economy and population, US leverage over Canadian natural, economic and human resources would increase America’s structural leverage, over Europe and the world, by about 10% over today’s American power. Such a situation would ensure its unrivalled status as the premier global superpower, which China alone could not match. In theory then, Canadian sovereignty depends on counterbalancing the US using European power. In practice, since the Second World War, both Canada and Europe have been drafting behind the US, deepening their economic and military reliance on the US, and shifting their strategic gaze away from a Euro-Atlantic community that they have taken for granted. Fixated on the US, both parties have seemingly suffered from amnesia about their bilateral transatlantic geostrategic interdependency. As US geostrategic interests increasingly diverge from those of the EU and Canada, and the US becomes more consumed with domestic (electoral) priorities and structural shifts in geopolitical gravity towards the Indo-Pacific, the relationship between Canada and Europe stands at a cross-roads. To counterbalance the power politics of an emboldened US, Russia and China, Europe and Canada need one another to preserve and uphold the liberal–democratic rules-based international order. This is especially true since the US’s pivot in geopolitical orientation, priorities and resource allocation towards the Indo-Pacific to disrupt an expansionist China that is intent on upending the prevailing international order. The US response to China has been to secure control over critical resources and geostrategic approaches that could render it vulnerable, while ensuring that it remains the world’s largest economy. On the one hand, eyeing natural resources and critical minerals in its proximate vicinity, notably Canada and Greenland, puts the US on a confrontational course with Europe and European interests. On the other, the US is ‘rebalancing’ away from Europe, the European neighbourhood and the Euro-Atlantic community as its priorities, and resources, shift to the Indo-Pacific. As a result, the US is expecting Europe to take on (far) greater responsibility for securing its own political interests and military backyard. In response, some European leaders, notably France, have continued to advocate for greater ‘strategic autonomy’ for Europe—an approach that drew the ire of the first Trump administration and is likely to aggravate Euro-Atlantic tensions—while others, notably Germany, have favoured chequebook diplomacy. This term describes the use of economic aid and investment as a means of attraction as part of soft-power projection (Leuprecht and Hamilton 2020). As the least powerful of the G7, Canada has neither luxury. Without European allies by its side, Canada runs an extreme risk of being left out in the geostrategic cold, with deleterious consequences for both Canada and the EU (Nossal 2023). Within the Euro-Atlantic community, the EU and Canada have not just suffered from mutual benign neglect. In the post–Cold War era, and especially with the advent of the Global War on Terror, Europe’s value to Canada has been declining steadily. Canada’s primary strategic relationship is naturally with the US, with which it shares a continent: co-located with the world’s largest economy, which a free trade agreement has made it ever more dependent on, Canada’s economy and security have become overly reliant on the US. The EU and the vast majority of its member states are also highly—arguably overly—dependent on the security and economic umbrella of the US. The supposed ‘peace dividend’ after the Cold War made NATO members even more dependent on the US. With so great an emphasis on their strategic relationships with the US, the perpendicular Canada–EU edge of the new North Atlantic triangle has never received much attention. What was a sin of omission, is now a sin of commission, by both parties. Friends, without benefits Reorienting Canada–Europe relations—as desirable as it may be—is a tall order. However intellectually appealing and geopolitically necessary, there are many obstacles. First, political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have neither prioritised bilateral Euro–Canadian relations, nor really taken note of them, whether out of disinterest or because there was no pressing need: to date, 10 EU member countries still have not ratified the Canada–Europe Trade Agreement. In both the Old and the New World, long-term thinking in politics and society is a popular topic of discussion in the salons of the capital cities, but rarely reaches the offices of decision-makers and their advisers. In the end, the untapped potential for more vital, productive and politically successful relations between Canada and Europe is inversely proportional to the actual political will and capital that elites are willing to expend, especially relative to their interest in the US. Second, realignments in international relations require not only a strategic basis but also complementary apparatuses that are willing and able to action new strategic direction. This does not bode well for either Canada or the EU. The Canadian foreign service suffers from a vast backlog of reforms in terms of its structures, vision and mission, which is indicative of a broad decline in the efficiency, effectiveness and objectivity of the Canadian civil service (Savoie 2024) and the steady erosion of the ability of Canada’s federal government to manage civil society. Former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Senate Reform resulted in the worst of both worlds: it further aggravated the struggle between Ottawa and the provinces over power and resources, and failed to generate greater capacity and interest in foreign and security policy in Canada’s upper chamber. The senators he appointed were preoccupied with domestic policy, and ideologically disinclined towards provincial rights. Recent foreign policy has resulted in six Canadian foreign ministers over the course of a decade; poor preparation and engagement by ministers who tout Canada’s ‘convening power’ but have little actual legitimacy to convene, let alone deliver; and two failed candidacies for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The foreign services of the EU and its member states, too, seem more preoccupied with themselves—notably with identity politics—than with playing a measurable, active role in shaping bilateral and multilateral external relations. In both the EU and Canada, the visibility and political effectiveness of foreign affairs instruments underperform: spending is unstructured and not optimised for strategic effect. Yet, both sides share a dogmatically defiant adherence to the legacy of a liberal rules-based international order. Indications of upheaval in the transatlantic relationship date back at least to President Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia. Realists posit the international system as anarchic, with states competing against one another and striving for survival. That world of power and interest-driven politics stands in increasingly stark contrast to Europe’s and Canada’s liberal institutionalist and values-driven approaches to the world. Third, for a realignment of the Canadian–European relationship at the political level, the impetus must not only originate from their respective civil societies, but also be accepted and actively legitimated in societies whose demographic composition is undergoing rapid change. Yet, legitimation deficits loom large. The EU’s view of the North American subcontinent remains wedded to the bilateral relationship with the US. At the same time, due to the slow implementation of the Canada–EU Trade Agreement, the potential for economic cooperation with EU institutions and member states remains largely unrealised, despite the fact that it has long been far easier for Canada and European allies to work together than for either to work with the US. For example, the extremely low international mobility rate of Canadian students, which is in the single digits, and the relatively few EU students who study in Canada, foreshadow a lack of future bilateral networks for emerging young leaders to tap into (European Commission 2020). Overly rigid certification standards in Canada for European university degrees impede broader student exchanges, labour mobility and more extensive knowledge transfer. Nevertheless, academic networks, that is, joint projects by non-governmental organisations from the EU dedicated to political cooperation with and in Canada, such as that fostered by the local EU delegation in Ottawa, portend positive developments: for example, the Jean Monnet Chairs and a centre that parlays European interest in Canadian universities, and the Europe Canada Network (EUCAnet) which facilitates transatlantic knowledge sharing among experts. Similarly, in the private sector, Canadian chief executives are in short supply in the EU, and potential candidates more often than not prefer to stay in their home country, the US or the Anglosphere, rather than invest in a transatlantic management career and the associated bilateral networks. The fourth obstacle is a direct result of the meagre transatlantic civil society: the prevailing images Canada and Europe have of one another one the one hand, and the failure to ‘bridge’ the transatlantic imaginary on the other. On the one side is Canada, the cosmopolitan, tolerant and fun subcontinent with bears, lakes, mountains and maple syrup, which—post-colonial realities notwithstanding—is considered by most Europeans to be the better North America and which, with its playful lightness, often manages to escape the critical gaze, and not only that of Europeans. On the other side is ‘Fortress’ Europe, with its sprawling bureaucracy, and myriad unmanageable regulations and trade barriers, which seemingly only feigns openness. Perception could not be further from reality. Foreign policy is driven by national interest, yet despite a trajectory of convergence among Euro–Canadian interests, especially of late, for the EU and European countries, Canada remains a low priority: Canada ranks about sixtieth in terms of priority across European states, well behind all the EU member states, and behind many other large and mid-sized powers around the world. Fifth, despite the intent to build closer ties, fundamentally different economic gravitational pulls on both sides persist: owing to bilateral free-trade agreements and globalisation, over the past 30 years, Canada has gradually become more dependent on the US, while the integrative benefits of the EU’s common market have reduced incentives for member states to invest in bilateral relations with Canada. Sobering foreign trade figures for the EU and European states with Canada hold little prospect of change in the foreseeable future: Canada barely cracks the top 10 of European export markets, whereas the EU is actually Canada’s second most important trading partner—but at barely a tenth of Canada’s trade with the US. Finally, if bilateral EU–Canada cooperation is to deepen, parliaments on both sides need to be more proactive and deliberate in transforming the relationship: while political executives, the European Commission and Canada’s government of the day set the agenda, it is the legislatures that legitimate and sustain it. The European Parliament maintains a permanent liaison office in Washington, DC as well as a European Public Law Organization in London and in every member state, but not in Ottawa. The Canada–Europe Parliamentary Association needs to fashion new formats to invigorate and promote relevant political projects among the Canadian, European and national parliaments, perhaps modelled on the robust array of activities undertaken by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Strategic friends, with benefits Its position in the new North Atlantic triangle makes Canada an attractive partner for Europe. Rich in natural resources and critical minerals, Canada has the potential to rank among the world’s most prosperous countries. Canada’s three largest export industries are oil, natural gas and agriculture, along with vast resources in potash (for fertiliser) and uranium (nuclear power). Were Canada to build more pipeline capacity to export hydrocarbons, it would have the potential to make Europe (much) more energy and critical-minerals secure, more competitive and prosperous by contributing to lower European energy prices, and less reliant on the US, the Middle East and Russia, especially for liquified natural gas. Canada has the third-largest oil reserves in the world, produces some of the cleanest natural gas and ranks among the world’s top five exporters of agri-food. Yet, Canada’s pipeline infrastructure is overly reliant on the US, which means Canada has to sell the bulk of its oil to the US at a 25% discount on world market prices. Bringing down European energy prices is the most important contribution Canada could be making in standing with Ukraine: Canada’s failure to export hydrocarbons to Europe keeps European energy prices high, which effectively amounts to Canada subsidising Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Europe procures negligible amounts of Canadian oil via US facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, and Canada exports no liquified natural gas to Europe at all, despite Europe now procuring 120 billion cubic metres a year, about half of which comes from the US. Besides an abundance of natural resources and critical minerals, as well as cheap, clean electricity, Canada is also rich in human resources and other intangible assets: it has a concentration of data centres and artificial intelligence infrastructure, it is home to some of the best public universities in the world, it has a more diverse and younger demography than any European ally, and its immigration strategy has historically favoured high skillsets and education. As a result, Canada has long had the most tertiary-qualified workforce among OECD countries (OCED 2022). Although Canada shares common interests, institutions (such as the North American Aerospace Defence Command, NORAD), a continental identity and ideas with the US, as a Westminster parliamentary democracy, its values and political culture are closer to those of Europe than those of the US (Hataley and Leuprecht 2019). Moreover, as the only country that is a member of both the British Commonwealth and La Francophonie, Canada shares key cultural–linguistic attributes with both the UK and France: within the G7, Canada thus offers a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxon world. Europe also remains Canada’s second most important strategic partner, after the US. Owing to its experiences in the two world wars, Canada has a vested interest in Europe’s territorial integrity, political stability, economic prosperity and social harmony, with its like-minded European allies helping Canada to offset US unilateralist propensities. To that effect, NATO is a vital multilateral organisation for Canada; arguably, it is the most important, giving Canada a voice alongside 30 European allies and the US. Although it would be a mistake to equate counterbalancing the US with participation in NATO, Canada has a vested interest in sustaining and preserving NATO for the purpose of bandwagoning with European members to do just that (Jockel and Sokolsky 2021). For this reason, the Canadian Armed Forces has long been postured as an expeditionary organisation, with its primary orientation towards Europe. Via NATO’s external borders, Canada’s boundary with Russia stretches from its border with Alaska via a (disputed) Arctic maritime flank close to 1,000 km in length, to a 1,215 km land boundary in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe. Canada has thus sustained military commitments along much of the Russian flank. The pattern of Canada’s military deployments also shows that the country has vested interests in the Balkans, Europe’s southern flank, in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. However, in recent decades, Canada has let its military atrophy to the point where it struggles to meet basic commitments—to NATO, to NORAD and to defending its own northern interests—let alone make new ones. Yet, the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific has created an opportunity for Canada to support US and European interests by backfilling some US capacity across Europe’s central, eastern and southern flanks, thus shoring up NATO, which is of benefit and interest to all member states. Were the EU to become a more independent defence actor, this would pose a serious risk to Canadian sovereignty and Canada’s standing in the world. In theory, Europe has the industrial base and financial capacity to provide for its own defence, security and survival. This, however, comes at a cost, for which European allies have thus far proven unable to muster the political will, although the European Commission’s $800 billion ReArm Europe plan holds promise that political will may be changing. The lack of will is cause for concern in the US, since Europe’s NATO allies have been sourcing about 60% of their arms from the US market. When France tried to take the initiative to achieve greater strategic autonomy for Europe during the first Trump presidency, Trump’s then NATO ambassador promptly dispatched an aggressive cease-and-desist letter (Leuprecht and Hamilton 2020). Although the US has resisted getting entangled in alliances since its first president, George Washington, NATO offers the US important levers. Nowhere in the world does the US invest proportionately less in defence for a higher rate of return. Canada and Europe are better positioned to add value to US military, political and strategic interests, than to try to go it alone individually. As Keohane (1988) famously observed, for the US, NATO is a very efficient and effective collective decision-making mechanism, gathering 30 European countries plus Canada—including some of the world’s top spenders on defence—the UK, Germany and France. Combined, the non-US NATO members spend about US$600 billion on defence (as compared to the US$877 billion by the US). The importance of NATO as an information-sharing and coordination mechanism has grown substantially since the formulation of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which brought key partners in the Indo-Pacific into the fold, including Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. Together, these allies and partners spent roughly US$1.7 trillion of a total global defence expenditure of about US$2.44 trillion in 2023. Of course, aggregate expenditures are an inchoate measure of military capability and commitment. While the US can necessarily exert greater pressure on any one country bilaterally, the benefits of NATO decision-making and coordination far outweigh the transaction costs for the US to do so bilaterally across three dozen countries. The reason the US spends as much as it does on its military is to preserve its freedom of action. Ultimately, being able to act unilaterally means never having to rely on others. Nonetheless, even though dispensable, allies are convenient to have as they also bring soft power, money and moral legitimacy. Greater European strategic autonomy is of little interest to the US, outside the NATO framework. The US does, however, have an interest in greater complementarity, capability and effectiveness within the organisation: it wants allies to do more together, on their own, provided they deconflict with the US. As the only other non-European NATO member country, Canada necessarily shares the transatlantic orientation of the US. Canada’s defence relations with Europe thus offer the US a mechanism to fall back on should the EU strive for greater strategic autonomy without coordinating with NATO and, therefore, with US interests. The lesson that the US drew from the Second World War was that, as a superpower, it has global interests. To this end, US unilateralism took on the trappings of a more multilateral approach to global affairs. The US collaborated with European partners and Canada to build the foundations of the post-war security, trade and monetary infrastructure: NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Bretton Woods Accord (which laid the foundations for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). This strategic collaboration brought North America and (Western) Europe historically unprecedented security, prosperity and stability. Over time, however, both the European members of NATO and Canada have forgotten that, multilateral trappings aside, the arrangement was born primarily out of US interest. In the aftermath of the two world wars, the US learned that territorial integrity, political stability, collective prosperity and social harmony in and of Europe were in the best interests of its aspirations as a global superpower. The claim to superpower status depended on a degree of control over Europe. Russia has long understood this; the US came to this realisation in the twentieth century; and for a China with global ambitions, this is a relatively recent realisation. For the US, NATO and extended nuclear deterrence are the means to this end; which is why Russia is intent on upending NATO, as both Russia and China aspire to be global players in a multipolar world, rather than regional players under a Pax Americana. Although Canada does not have nuclear arms, its position in North America necessarily means it has a role in assuring extended nuclear deterrence. Russia’s strategic approaches to North America, by way of the Arctic, pass through Canadian airspace. Canada’s gradual commitment to and spending on Arctic security and defence, including NORAD, therefore, are not just about homeland defence, but are also an investment in NATO by means of continental defence writ large (Leuprecht et al. 2018). North American continental defence assures uncompromised latitude for sovereign decision-making in Washington as well as Ottawa. An adversary that can threaten North America with intercontinental ballistic missiles or hypersonic missiles, for instance, could effectively curtail sovereign decision-making that reflects the best interests and legitimate democratic will of Americans or Canadians. That is, an adversary could overtly threaten Ottawa or Washington with an attack if confronted with a political choice that runs counter to its interests. This matters all the more since North American continental security is the bedrock of credible extended nuclear deterrence. An adversary that is able to call the nuclear triad, and especially the second-strike capability, into question would effectively undermine the US security umbrella that spans the Atlantic and Pacific rims. The states that currently rely on US extended deterrence would thus have an incentive to resort to nuclear proliferation to ensure their own survival. Since nuclear proliferation runs counter to European and Canadian interests in regional and global stability, this is one more reason for them to be more strategic about coordinating their contribution to the triangle. Ostensibly, the US does not need Canada to provide North American continental defence: the US has the capacity, capabilities and resources to go it alone. However, cutting Canada out of North American strategic defence would significantly reduce NATO’s leverage over collective defence. Europe and European allies would be left to deal with the US alone; Canada’s currency on the continent and across the Atlantic would be greatly diminished. The coincidence of NATO’s pivot to North American Arctic defence and Obama’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific is no accident. Certainly, there is an operational requirement to coordinate with NORAD on an integrated all-domain layered Arctic defence along NATO’s entire frontier with Russia. But this change also highlighted that NATO is, first and foremost, a political—not a military—alliance. Obama’s pivot necessarily meant less US attention paid to, input and interest in NATO; thus, it was in NATO’s best interest to show the flag in America’s backyard. NATO has not one but three pillars: Europe, North America and the transatlantic area. How we imagine the third matters for how the US imagines NATO’s role in the Atlantic: either, as popularised by Walter Lippman (1917), as an ‘ocean highway’ that by geography, culture and necessity connects two continental ‘communities’; or, in a triumph of politics over geography, as theorised by Alan Henrikson (1980), as a ‘lake’ and ‘inland sea’ that unifies rather than divides. Within the North Atlantic triangle, Canada can bridge the divide of a vast ocean, making it into a much more manageable inland sea. Canada’s geographic continental co-location with the US gives Europe limited, but strategically indispensable, leverage beyond Washington through which to influence the second and third pillars of NATO, using defence and diplomacy to counter US unilateralist proclivities. Conclusion For Canada to become even more (over)dependent on the US than it already is runs fundamentally counter to European interests. The EU has a vested interest in Canada maintaining sovereign control over its resources, political decision-making and defence. Conversely, the prospect of greater European strategic autonomy in defence outside of the NATO framework poses a potentially existential risk to Canada, rendering it more dependent on the US, and thus reducing its value to allies and partners and, by extension, its standing in the world. If this were to happen, Canada would face much higher transaction costs more akin to those of its partners in the Indo-Pacific, having to invest a lot more in foreign policy and defence for greatly diminished returns. Canadian sovereignty is a Trump card that the US is now playing to maximise its power and range of unilateral action in a world where its hegemony is under threat. Europe and Canada used to be discretionary friends. Now is the time to realise mutual benefits for strategic effect. Canada can support Europe’s interests in energy security, critical minerals, defence and defence in depth. In return, the EU can bolster Canadian political and economic sovereignty. Partnering with the EU is also the most efficient and effective way for Canada to gain greater independence from the US in defence and defence-industrial capacity. Greater, more autonomous military-industrial capacity would enable both Canada and the EU to build sustainable capabilities and commit to collective defence. Such a strategy would have a dual signalling purpose: of military deterrence to Russia, and of political and economic deterrence to the US. Canada and the EU should not just protect but actually promote their military, political and economic interests. Failing to be strategic about collective transatlantic security and the Euro-Atlantic community within the new North American triangle increases the risk that Canada and Europe will be abandoned by the US. Lord Ismay had a premonition should Europe and Canada fail to shape their future: Russia in Europe, America out, under German leadership. ORCID iDChristian Leuprecht https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9498-4749ReferencesBrebner J. B. (1966). North Atlantic triangle: The interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.European Commission. (2020). 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Diplomacy
Classification of the countries according to the world-system analysis of I. Wallerstein: core, semi-periphery and periphery.

Reflections on the modern world-system from a decolonial perspective

by Larissa Salas Duarte

Abstract This paper analyzes, from Immanuel Wallerstein's Analysis of the World – System, an introduction, the emergence of the modern world – system, the permanence of the colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system from a decolonial approach. It examines how the center – periphery structure has determined the economic, political and epistemic dynamics at the global level. Through this approach we study how coloniality has influenced the construction of knowledge. It also analyzes the impact of this structure on the recognition of States and the negotiation of international treaties, showing how Western power has conditioned the legitimacy and autonomy of peripheral nations. It also addresses the persistence of the center-periphery logic in local relations, as well as in gender and racial inequality, highlighting the role of anti-systemic movements in the struggle against these structures. It concludes that, although colonial dynamics continue to operate through debt, extractivism and the imposition of political models, decolonial perspectives offer tools to make visible and resist them. Introduction This paper will analyze the dynamics of the current international system based on the work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System” by Immanuel Wallerstein. In it, Wallerstein (2005) argues that the modern capitalist world-system has structured the global order since the 16th century, consolidating a hierarchical division between the center and the periphery. This division has not only shaped economic and political dynamics but has also established patterns of domination and dependency that persist to this day. The colonial expansion of European powers not only guaranteed access to resources and markets but also legitimized a system of exploitation based on racism and the hierarchization of colonized peoples. The decolonial perspective of Walter Mignolo (2013) will be adopted, which posits that this is a political and epistemic project aimed at dismantling the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity. From this framework, the article will analyze how colonial logic continues to operate in the capitalist world-system through the economic and political subordination of the peripheries. It will also examine the impact of the colonial worldview on knowledge production during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as the reproduction of the center–periphery dynamic in the recognition of states during the 20th century and in the negotiation of international treaties during the 21st century. Likewise, it will address how this dynamic manifests not only internationally but also within local structures, perpetuating inequalities expressed in labor, gender, and racial relations today. This work seeks to provide a critical perspective on the persistence of colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system, emphasizing the need to rethink power structures from a decolonial perspective that makes visible and vindicates the subaltern voices that have been historically silenced. Development Colonial Logic in the Capitalist World-System In his work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System”, Wallerstein seeks to understand the structure and dynamics of the world-system, taking the 16th century as the starting point —a period when the conquests of the territories we now know as the Americas took place. The colonial period clearly illustrates the core–periphery dynamic (Wallerstein, 2005), as the Spanish, British, and Portuguese empires engaged in the extraction of resources from their colonies, while colonized peoples endured oppression and racism to which they would be condemned for centuries. This oppression brought significant benefits to the modern world-system, as it enabled massive capital accumulation — but exclusively in the core. This was because the colonial process built peripheral economies around the needs of the core, forcing them into subordination to the interests of the global market, generating dependency and underdevelopment. Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) argue that “[…] ethnicity was the inevitable cultural consequence of coloniality. It delineated the social boundaries corresponding to the division of labor” (p. 585). Due to the colonial period, the modern capitalist world-system laid its foundations and strengthened its market-based economic model through racism and hierarchization — circumstances that have legitimized the exploitation and domination of non-European peoples throughout history. Control over the resources of peripheral states by core states has endured to this day, along with the imposition of Western production and consumption models that perpetuate inequality. The colonial period’s greatest legacy remains systemic violence and subalternity. On this basis, it is important to analyze this work from a decolonial perspective. For Walter Mignolo (2013), “decoloniality is not a concept, but a practice and a political, epistemic, and ethical project aimed at disengaging from the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity” (p. 21). This perspective also draws on the notion of epistemic subalternity, which refers to the experiences and knowledge of colonized and subaltern peoples that are rendered invisible, devalued, or reduced to particular cases — without being considered an integral part of the world-system (Mora, 2008). Coloniality in the Construction of Knowledge At the end of the 18th century, the modern university emerged, dividing its studies into two faculties: sciences and humanities. In the 19th century, another division took place within the humanities, opening the space for the study of social sciences, which would later also be split — on one side, those leaning toward scientism, and on the other, toward the humanistic approach. This led to the creation of new disciplines: economics, political science, and sociology (Wallerstein, 2005). These new sciences built their worldview and knowledge construction from a Eurocentric and colonialist perspective, thus assigning labels to peoples different from their own. These new sciences categorized the study of the world’s peoples into three groups. First, civilized peoples — Western nations, considered as such because they believed their social and political organization systems were the most advanced. Second, the high civilizations — India, China, Persia, and the Arab world — classified in this way because they possessed writing, religion, language, and customs. They were regarded as civilized peoples but not modern, under the previously mentioned concept. This category gave rise to orientalist scholars, with a Eurocentric and exoticizing view. Finally, the so-called primitive peoples — those who, from the colonial perspective, lacked writing, religion, language, and customs. This perception of the “uncivilized other” was used to justify colonial processes in the periphery, which even today enable the reproduction of exploitative and racist practices. Segregation in the construction of knowledge, imbued with colonial and Eurocentric thought, is based on criticizing the behavior of these peoples and on what should be changed about them (Zapata, 2008). The Eurocentric conception asserts categorically that the modus vivendi of these peoples is not appropriate according to Western standards. Although this way of thinking has evolved over time, its essence remains the same and has led Western countries to grant themselves the power to change the way of life of these peoples through invasions, neocolonial processes, and violent interventions via military force or economic interference. The Center and the Periphery in the Recognition of States As previously mentioned, Europe established a correspondence between modernity and the West; this includes the institution of the nation-state as its derived product (Zapata, 2008). From the Eurocentric perspective, for civilizations to be considered nation-states, they must possess four characteristics: territory, population, government, and sovereignty. In Public International Law, sovereign states are the main subjects of international relations, and for a state to be recognized as such, it must be acknowledged by the majority of states that are part of the international system. The center–periphery concept operates both economically and politically, which can be observed when a new state seeks recognition from members of the international system. The recognition granted by a state from the center carries more weight than that from the periphery, since states in the center, with greater political and economic capacity, influence the decisions of their allies — both within the center and the periphery. This need for state recognition has been extremely beneficial for the modern capitalist world-system, as political and economic interdependence, along with the perpetuation of power in the countries of the center — particularly those belonging to the West — ensures that they act, whether in matters of state recognition, political agendas, or economic issues, entirely to their own advantage, disregarding the interests of “the other.” From a decolonial perspective, state recognition is a Western construct designed to maintain control over who meets the imposed criteria to belong to the Eurocentric international system. These criteria clearly do not align with the social organization of all non-Western civilizations but were conceived in such a way as to subordinate them to the needs of the world-system, which inevitably serves the interests of Western core states. This can be exemplified by the case of Taiwan. In 1971, the Kuomintang lost recognition from the government of mainland China, and starting in 1985, Taiwan’s government sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with states that already recognized it and to develop relations with those that did not, with the aim of obtaining their approval (Connelly, 2014). Despite the passage of time, recognition of Taiwan as a state by core countries seems inconvenient for them, likely due to the ongoing political dispute between Taiwan and China. As a result, only 14 peripheral states recognize it as such. Despite this, the Northeast Asian country maintains unofficial relations with 47 states and the European Union, for purely economic reasons. The Modern Capitalist World-System in International Treaties It is worth mentioning that the idea of the center–periphery permeates the negotiation of international agreements. As mentioned earlier, the so-called “primitive peoples” were civilizations that, from the Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, lacked writing, religion, languages, or customs. This idea persisted into the 20th century, as reflected in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which in Chapter II, Article 38, states that “the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: […] the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (UN, 1945). The Eurocentric conception of a civilized nation in the postwar period was based on the type of government existing in each state. Thus, countries without a democratic political system were not considered civilized nations. This conception forced nations not to determine their own system of government, but rather to adhere to the one imposed by the Western international system in order to be accepted, disregarding their customs and traditions. A more current example of the imposition of Eurocentric ideas on systems of government is the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Mexico in 2000. Ratification of the trade agreement was conditioned on what they called the “democratic clause.” The agreement was not ratified by the Italian government until July 3 of that year, when the presidential elections resulted in the victory of Vicente Fox (Villegas, 2001). On the same day, the European Commission’s spokesperson, Gunnar Wiegand, said in his press release: “A historic vote has taken place in Mexico. The Commission congratulates the Mexican people for exercising their democratic rights in such a mature and exemplary manner” (Caracol Radio, 2000). The spokesperson’s mention of the Mexican people’s maturity refers to the notion that, in the past, the exercise of democracy had not possessed this quality — an observation made from a paternalistic and Eurocentric perspective. Had the election results been different, Mexico could have faced the possibility of the European Union “imposing sanctions as a reaction to the verification of interruptions in democratic processes, which, in addition to affecting development, constitute a threat to international peace and security” (Cordero Galdós, 2002, p. 128). The criticism of the imposition of the “democratic clause” centers on the recurring practice of requiring peripheral states to adapt to the political ideologies and economic needs of the core. The Reproduction of the Center–Periphery Dynamic at the Local Level As mentioned in the development of this work, the effects of colonialism persist across all systems and subsystems through the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, the latter of which will be addressed later. This is manifested in global inequalities, the exploitation of natural resources in peripheral countries, and the persistence of racist and Eurocentric power structures. From Wallerstein’s perspective, the world-system is a historical structure which, although in constant transformation, reproduces power relations and inequalities over time through the domination of the core and the exploitation of the peripheries (Wallerstein, 2005). Thus, the world-system has evolved in several ways; one of these is the introduction of the term semi-periphery into the analysis. During the colonial period, there were only core and peripheral nations. Over the centuries, however, semi-peripheral states have emerged — nations that not only extract raw materials or engage in manufacturing but also have the capacity to produce cutting-edge technology (Wallerstein, 2005). This positions them in a more privileged place than peripheral countries in the international system. Yet, despite appearing to have overcome the systemic oppression that once kept them in the periphery, the colonial mindset within their institutions perpetuates their subordination to the core. Good examples of semi-peripheral states in Latin America are Mexico and Brazil. Both countries were victims of the exploitation and systemic violence of colonialism. This shaped the development of their societies and economies for centuries. Even after achieving independence and building productive and economic systems that placed them in the semi-periphery, their economic progress was built on a legacy of oppression and racism that continues to reproduce the abuses described. In this way, the concept of core and periphery permeates social and family subsystems. This can be observed in labor relations, where capitalists depend on the core–periphery or superior–subordinate relationship to sustain the production model. It is also evident in social relations, which Wallerstein refers to as anti-systemic movements. Society perpetuates the core–periphery principle by placing women and racialized communities in the periphery, while men — especially white men with power — occupy the core. Anti-systemic movements paved the way for the struggle against these inequalities, giving rise, for example, to feminist and Indigenous movements. These have led to the development of theoretical perspectives such as decolonial feminism, which adds analytical variables to the decolonial perspective. According to Yuderkys Espinosa, it emerges from “[…] a subaltern, non-hegemonic voice […] anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist. […] Its aim is to question and oppose an imperial and racist rationale” (Barroso, 2014, p. 2). Conclusions The modern capitalist world-system has managed to sustain and expand itself thanks to colonial structures that, far from disappearing with decolonization processes, have mutated and perpetuated dynamics of domination and dependence. As discussed, the core–periphery logic has been key to the organization of the international system, not only in economic terms but also in the construction of knowledge, the legitimization of states, the negotiation of international agreements, and the imposition of political and social models from Western hegemony. The colonial legacy remains in the structural subordination of peripheral economies to the interests of the core, the imposition of international norms that favor core countries, and the persistence of racialized and gender-based inequalities within peripheral states themselves. This scheme has not only ensured capital accumulation in the core but has also limited the self-determination of historically colonized peoples, while normalizing their exclusion from political, economic, and epistemic spheres. At the international level, neocolonialism operates through mechanisms such as external debt, unequal trade agreements, and political interference in the internal affairs of peripheral states. In addition, extractivism and territorial dispossession continue to reproduce colonial logics, affecting both peripheral countries and Indigenous communities as well as other historically marginalized groups. In this sense, the modern capitalist world-system not only perpetuates economic exploitation but also reinforces power structures based on racism, sexism, and subalternity. However, as decolonial perspectives point out, the coloniality of power is not an immutable phenomenon. This approach questions the structures of power and knowledge inherited from colonization, seeking to deconstruct Eurocentric discourses and make visible the voices and experiences of the subaltern. Anti-systemic movements have sought to challenge these structures, reclaiming the agency of subaltern peoples and promoting the construction of alternatives that confront the colonial matrix of power. Particularly, decolonial feminism has emerged as a key critique of the intersection between patriarchy and coloniality, showing how women — especially racialized women — have been relegated to the periphery of the system. Thus, analyzing the world-system from a decolonial perspective allows us not only to understand the continuity of structures of domination but also to recognize the spaces of resistance and contestation that emerge within it. In conclusion, the decolonial perspective enables us to rethink the modern world-system from a critical standpoint, recognizing structural inequalities and the need to transform the power dynamics that perpetuate the domination of the core over the periphery. Decolonialism makes it possible to redefine notions of progress, development, and modernity from a perspective free from colonial stereotypes and hierarchies, recognizing the diversity of knowledge and worldviews of Indigenous peoples. It seeks to decentralize power by rethinking and decolonizing power relations between the core and the periphery, between the state and local communities, aiming for a more equitable distribution of resources and benefits. It is essential to make visible and vindicate the subaltern voices that have been historically silenced, promoting an epistemic and political shift that dismantles the foundations of this system and paves the way for fairer and more inclusive models. References Andrade, V. M. (diciembre, 2019). La Teoría Crítica y el pensamiento decolonial: hacia un proyecto emancipatorio post–occidental. Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 65(238). https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.238.67363Barroso, M. (2014). Feminismo decolonial: crítica y propuesta. Revista Estudos Feministas, 22(1), 1–15.Caracol Radio. (3 de julio, 2000). Europa felicita a mexicano por votación ejemplar. Caracol Radio. https://caracol.com.co/radio/2000/07/03/nacional/0962604000_023535.htmlConnelly, M. (2014). Historia de Taiwán. El Colegio de México.Corderos Galdós, H. (agosto, 2002). La denominada cláusula democrática como modalidad de condicionamiento en los Programas de Ayuda al Desarrollo de la Unión Europea. Agenda Internacional, (16), 123–136. https://doi.org/10.18800/agenda.200201.007Donoso Miranda, P. V. (diciembre, 2014). Pensamiento decolonial en Walter Mignolo: América Latina: ¿transformación de la geopolítica del conocimiento? Temas de Nuestra América, 30(56), 45–56.Mignolo, W. D. (2013). Geopolítica de la sensibilidad y del conocimiento: Sobre (de)colonialidad, pensamiento fronterizo y desobediencia epistémica. Revista de Filosofía, 80(1), 7–23.Mora, M. (2008). Decolonizing politics: Zapatista indigenous autonomy in an era of neoliberal governance and low intensity warfare [Tesis doctoral, The University of Texas at Austin]. https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/68ba681a-a78b-4ddd-9441-32a92b0edf5c/contentOrganización de las Naciones Unidas (1945). Estatuto de la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Carta de las Naciones Unidas.Portal Académico CCH (2017). Historia de México 1, Unidad 4, Intervenciones extranjeras: Inglaterra. Portal Académico CCH. https://e1.portalacademico.cch.unam.mx/alumno/historiademexico1/unidad4/intervencionesextranjeras/inglaterra#:~:text=Razones%20suficientes%20para%20reconocer%20a,poner%20freno%20al%20expansionismo%20estadounidense.Quijano, A., & Wallerstein, I. (1992). La americanidad como concepto, o América en el moderno sistema mundial. Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales, XLIV(4), 583–592.Rojas, V. M. (2010). Capítulo séptimo. El reconocimiento internacional. En Rojas, V. M. Derecho internacional público (pp. 61–65). Nostras Ediciones. https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/7/3262/3.pdfRomero Losacco, J. (diciembre, 2020). El sistema-mundo más allá de 1492: modernidad, cristiandad y colonialidad: aproximación al giro historiográfico decolonial. Tabula Rasa, (36), 355–376. https://doi.org/10.25058/20112742.n36.14Ruiz, S. M. 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Energy & Economics
Los Angeles, CA USA - May 23 2025 : Donald Trump on Climate Change, Drill Baby Drill

The temporal logic of Trump II’s climate denialism

by Heikki Patomäki

In a landmark advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on 23 July 2025 that all UN member states have legal obligations under international law to address climate change, which the court described as an existential threat to life on Earth. Powerful countries too must be held responsible for their current emissions and past inaction. Possibly in anticipation of such a ruling, Chris Wright, the US Secretary of Energy and former chief executive of Liberty Energy (an oilfield services company), published an article in The Economist a week earlier, arguing that “climate change is a by-product of progress, not an existential crisis”. Whereas the ICJ relied primarily on the IPCC reports, “which participants agree constitute the best available science on the causes, nature and consequences of climate change”, Wright’s view is based on a particular temporal logic.  According to the IPCC reports, most greenhouse gases come from burning fossil fuels, with additional emissions from agriculture, deforestation, industry, and waste. They drive global warming, which is projected to reach 1.5°C between 2021 and 2040, with 2°C likely to follow. Even 1.5°C is not considered safe for most nations, communities, and ecosystems, and according to IPCC, only deep, rapid, and sustained emission cuts can slow warming and reduce the escalating risks and damages. The 2024 state of the climate report, published in BioScience, presents even more worrying assessments. Among other things, the report cites surveys indicating that nearly 80% of these scientists anticipate global temperatures increasing by at least 2.5°C above preindustrial levels by the end of the century, and nearly half of them foresee a rise of at least 3°C.  Wright’s article suggests that the issue of amplifying doubt about climate change may have little to do with engagement with science but rather reflects a deeper temporal logic. This logic is rooted in a Whiggish account of progress to date, a resistance to the reality of the future and the desire for nostalgic restoration. I will explain these elements one by one. The first tier: Whiggism Wright disagrees with most scientific anticipations. His views are likely representative not only of the Trump II administration but also of conservative right-wing populism more generally. It is difficult to understand their climate denialism without an analysis of their views on time and temporality. The most important question concerns the reality of the future. At the first level, Wright provides a kind of textbook example of Whig history, portraying progress as linear, inevitable, and driven by liberal values. Herbert Butterfield introduced the idea of Whig history in his influential 1931 book The Whig Interpretation of History as a critique of a specific way of writing history that he regarded as flawed and intellectually dishonest. Focusing on inevitable progress distorts historical analysis by promoting simplified cause-and-effect reasoning and selective storytelling, emphasising present-day evaluation (and glorification) over understanding the real causes of historical change. In a Whiggish manner, Wright claims that the last 200 years have seen two big changes to the human condition: “human liberty” and affordable energy. As a result of these two things, life expectancy has nearly doubled, and the percentage of people living in extreme poverty has dropped from 90% to 10%. However, Wright’s argumentation is based on non-contextual and, in that sense, timeless representations of the world, despite its “progressivism”.  For example, consider the claim that extreme poverty has dropped from 90% to 10%. It is based on using a fixed dollar threshold, such as USD 2 per day, to measure poverty over 200 years. This is misleading because most people in the 19th century lived in largely non-monetised economies where subsistence needs were met outside of market exchange, and monetary income was minimal or irrelevant. These metrics also obscure shifting and context-bound definitions of basic needs; rely on incomplete historical data; and ignore the role of colonial dispossession and structural inequality in shaping global poverty. While it is true that life expectancy has doubled, largely due to improvements in hygiene and healthcare, the idea that extreme poverty has plummeted from 90% to under 10% also ignores the fact that the global population has grown eightfold, affecting the entire Earth system with devastating ecological and geological consequences. It further ignores that the rise in life expectancy and poverty reduction has come not only from liberalism or economic growth more generally but from ethical and political struggles and public health interventions. Often, these struggles have been fought in the name of socialism and won despite capitalist incentives, market mechanisms, and related political forces. The second tier: blockism At a deeper level, Wright’s views seem to presuppose what Roy Bhaskar calls “blockism”: the postulation of a simultaneous conjunctive totality of all events. This may sound abstract, but it has been a common assumption among many 20th-century physicists and philosophers that the universe forms a static, closed totality. This view stems from an atomist ontology, where individuals are seen as abstract, events follow regular patterns, time is viewed as spatial, and laws that can be expressed mathematically are considered reversible.  In such a conception, time appears as just another “spatial” dimension. According to the block universe model, the past, present, and future all exist equally and tenselessly. The universe is imagined as a four-dimensional geometric object, like a “block” of spacetime. Time is not something that “flows” or “passes”; instead, all moments are spatially extended points in a timeless whole. Blockism suggests that change and becoming are not truly real but are simply parts of our subjective experience.  The real challenge is to reconcile Whiggism and blockism. Wright is not a theorist and might not need to worry about the coherence of his ideas, but the issue is that Whiggism assumes movement, direction, and a normatively positive evolution of change, whereas the block universe denies real temporality: there is no becoming, no novelty, no agency – only timeless existence. Some versions of the block universe attempt to preserve development by proposing that the block grows. The “block” expands as new events are added to reality, but in this view, the present defines the upper boundary of the block, and the future is not truly real. This appears to be consistent with what Wright says about climate change. Everything he has to say about global warming is limited to one short paragraph: We will treat climate change as what it is: not an existential crisis but a real, physical phenomenon that is a by-product of progress. Yes, atmospheric CO2 has increased over time – but so has life expectancy. Billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. Modern medicine, telecommunications and global transportation became possible. I am willing to take the modest negative trade-off for this legacy of human advancement. From the ICJ’s perspective, this interpretation is dreadful, as the current impacts of climate change are already at odds with the rights of many groups of people. It also exhibits basic injustice, as many of the groups that suffer the most from these impacts have done next to nothing to cause the problem. However, here I am mostly concerned with the temporality of Wright’s claims. This temporality is a combination of Whiggism and blockism: so far, history has exhibited progress, but time and processes stop here, in our present moment. The third tier: nostalgia Wright’s view of time is not limited to an ultimately incoherent combination of Whiggism and blockism. There is also more than a mere hint of nostalgia. This is evident in the appeal of a Golden Age at the outset of his article: I am honoured to advance President Donald Trump’s policy of bettering lives through unleashing a golden age of energy dominance – both at home and around the world. The appeal to the Golden Age somewhat contradicts Whiggism. From a nostalgic perspective, it seems that society has been on a downward trajectory instead of progressing. In other words, regression must be possible. Within an overall Whiggish narrative, one can blame certain actors, such as the Democrats in the US political context, for causing moral and political decline.  A nationalist narrative of a “golden age” and a return to a better past (“making us great again”) is essentially connected to the denial of planetary-scale problems, such as climate change, that would clearly require novel global responses. Climate change from a real-time perspective By merging Whiggism with a block-universe ontology (either static or growing), one ends up with a pseudo-historicism that speaks of “progress” while erasing real time. In a way, such a view “performs change” through a highly selective historical narrative, while denying the ontological preconditions of real change. Real change – emergence, transformation, causation – requires a temporal ontology, where the future is real though not yet fully determined. Thus, there is no mention of global emissions that have continued to rise, their delayed effects, feedback loops, or emergent risks given multiple processes of intertwined changes. Are the basic IPCC models based on real historical time? IPCC models often treat the climate system as a bounded system with internally consistent and deterministic dynamics. The IPCC relies on modelling and uses Bayesian methods to assess uncertainties in climate projections. Bayesian statistics involve updating the probability of a hypothesis as more evidence becomes available, based on prior knowledge (priors) and new data (likelihoods). Such an approach tends to be conservative (based on moving averages, for example) and assumes the quantifiability of uncertainty. It may also convey illusory precision, especially when the underlying models or data are uncertain or incomplete. The IPCC models nonetheless indicate – in contrast to Wright – that the future is real, though the future is approached in a somewhat cautious and deterministic manner. However, many climate scientists go beyond the IPCC consensus by assuming that global heating may reach 2.5 °C or even above 3 °C degree warming by the end of the century.  From a critical scientific realist viewpoint, even such anticipations may be too circumspect. Assuming exponential growth (involving cascading events etc.) and given that recent data shows a rise from 1.0°C to 1.5°C in just 15 years (actual data taken on an annual basis, not moving averages), and using this as a basis for anticipating the future, we seem likely to reach the 2 °C mark in the 2040s and the 3 °C mark in the 2060s.  The plausibility of anticipations depends significantly on how the real openness of the future is treated. Anticipations are reflexive and can shape the future. Real time and historical change involves human freedom and ethics. The evolving universe, where time is real, is stratified, processual, and open-ended. Time involves genuine processes, real possibilities, agency, and emergent structures. Such characteristics indicate that the future is not predetermined but can be shaped by transformative agency.  To sum up, from a real historical time perspective, Wright’s combination of Whiggism, blockism, and nostalgia is a recipe for reactionary politics. Glorifying the present, thinking in a timeless way, and longing for a golden age of the past can play a major role in bringing about a dystopian planetary future.