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The threat of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine is “real” and “absolutely irresponsible”, according to the US president, Joe Biden. He was reacting to questioning from journalists as to whether he believed Belarus had been taking delivery of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. If true, it’s the first time Russia has deployed nuclear warheads outside its borders since the end of the cold war. This does not immediately mean a nuclear escalation with Nato, since Russian nuclear missiles stationed in the Kaliningrad region already put Poland and the Baltic states within range. Experts are sceptical about Russia’s intentions to use these weapons in Ukraine. But the presence of tactical nuclear arms in Belarus has, nevertheless, important implications for European security. It would change the nature of the relationship between Russia and Belarus and bring Belarus deeper under Russian control. The two countries are already in what is known as a “union state” after longtime Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin signed a series of treaties in the mid-1990s. These made for “deeper economic integration” and the “formation of a single economic space” as well as the coordination of foreign policy and military activities between the two countries. The “union” was relatively loose until the 2020 mass protests in Belarus pushed the desperate Lukashenko to agree to a much closer economic and military integration with Russia. The real target Noting that this is “not an escalation from Putin’s prior nuclear weapons rhetoric”, the Institute for the Study of War says this is more about increasing Moscow’s military grip over Belarus: “The Kremlin likely intends to use these requirements to further subordinate the Belarusian security sphere under Russia.” The warheads will be under Russian control. Storage facilities are reported to be under construction for completion in early July. This will require a significant Russian military presence and permanent military bases in Belarus. Belarusians do not want to have Russian nuclear weapons on their soil. Researchers from Chatham House who regularly conduct surveys in Belarus have found that 74% of respondents in their March 2023 survey objected to deployment. The rejection of nukes is even more dramatic when analysed by which media the respondents are consuming. Belarus state media beats a relentlessly pro-Moscow drum. Among those who do not consume state media between 97% and 98% are opposed. The prospect of Russian military bases is hardly more popular, with only 24% of respondents supporting it in an earlier Chatham House survey in June 2022. The idea of a single foreign policy and army with Russia was backed by a mere 9% in the March 2023 survey. This is yet another indicator of the chasm between the regime and the people, which was made evident by the 2020 protests, the largest in recent Belarusian history. Belarusians are traditionally wary of having to choose sides when it comes to political alliances. And, despite a “vote” ratifying an amendment to the country’s constitution to allow Russia to station nuclear weapons on its soil, the country is increasingly divided between those who look to Russia and those who are in favour of closer relations with western Europe. After Russia went into Ukraine, a Chatham House survey found that 47% were against the invasion, while only 33% were in favour. Another poll found 93% would not support Belarus entering the war. Fallout from Chornobyl And Belarusians also have a good reason to be strongly opposed to nuclear weapons. The memory of the Chornobyl disaster in 1986. About 70% of the radioactive fallout landed on its territory, and there is evidence that Moscow deliberately seeded clouds so that radioactive rain fell over Belarus rather than drift towards Moscow. The political fallout was slower but no less significant: over the years, Chornobyl commemorations have become an annual rallying point for anti-Lukashenko opposition. It also helped ensure that independent Belarus was the first among post-Soviet nations to abandon its Soviet nuclear arsenal. These points seem lost on Lukashenko, who has publicly declared that he will not consider the opinion of the Belarusian people about using nuclear weapons. Opposition opinions are dangerous in Belarus, and state terror against all criticism of the regime has only intensified since Russia invaded Ukraine. The number of those arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison terms has been steadily growing. As of June 21, Belarus had 1,492 political prisoners. This is just the tip of the iceberg of repression. Not only opposition activists, NGO workers, and independent journalists, but anyone who can be linked to the 2020 protests or who ever spoke out against the regime on social media is at risk of arrest. The recent UN Human Rights Office report decried “the unacceptable picture of impunity and the near-total destruction of civic space and fundamental freedoms in Belarus”, including the systematic use of unlawful detention, violence and torture. Consequences for Belarus and beyond Lukashenko is playing a dangerous game. Belarus’s economic dependence on Moscow, already heavy, has been deepened further by western sanctions and the war in Ukraine. Russia’s share in Belarus’ trade grew from 49% in 2021 to 60% in late 2022. Recently, a joint tax agreement with Russia, previously resisted by Minsk, reduced Belarusian control over taxation. According to the independent Belarusian monitoring organisation, the Hajun Project, there is no evidence that any warheads have arrived. But deploying Russian nuclear warheads would lead to Moscow’s permanent military presence. It would mean further loss of authority for Lukashenko and his generals. And worse, if Putin did decide to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, it would be an easier decision to launch them from Belarus and let them reap the whirlwind of retaliation. Consolidating his control over Belarus would be a significant strategic victory for Putin’s imperial ambitions. Preoccupied with fighting in Ukraine and lacking a clear and decisive policy on Belarus, the west has no obvious immediate response. But if Moscow follows through with its threat it would be a dangerous moment – not just for Belarus but for Europe as a whole.

Other countries see arms exports as a strategic instrument. Germany should do the same. Arms cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation has been the country's security policy foundation since India's independence. The friendship between the two states is primarily a deep dependence of New Delhi on Moscow. A dependence from which the Indian government wants and needs to break free, as the descent of the second largest arms exporter is just shifting the strategic tectonics in large parts of the global South. Cancellations, overdue payments, and delivery problems Already last year, astonishment arose after T-90 main battle tanks were photographed in Ukraine, which, according to some journalists, were a version used only by India. At the same time, some of these models were in the custody of the Russian state-owned Uralvagonzavod for modernisation. However, the theft of the Indian battle tanks could never be proven beyond doubt. Whether New Delhi could be informed about the whereabouts of its tanks has not been made public. In a report to the Indian parliament as early as 2022, it was stated that the Russian Federation would retain weapons systems produced for India. The type and scope were not specified. In short, the Kremlin declared its own requirements. In April 2022, New Delhi cancelled an order for 48 Mi-17 helicopters, followed in May 2022 by India's unilateral suspension of negotiations for Kamov Ka-31 naval helicopters. In addition to the considerable order volume of more than USD 500 million for the order cancelled in May alone, the Russian defence industry also lost reputation, as it now became public that the most important buyer of Russian defence equipment doubted the timely implementation of the order. The most recent conflict in Russian-Indian arms cooperation was a problem triggered by the sanctions in the payment processing of air defence systems, as Russia continued to press for payments in US dollars. A proposal by the Indian government that Moscow could invest the rupees gained from arms deals in Indian capital markets was rejected by the Russian side.  In New Delhi, the displeasure was directed less against the sanctions themselves, which prevented the transaction in US dollars, but against Russia's lack of goodwill: after all, the Russian Federation had provoked the foreseeable US sanctions in the first place through its invasion and now showed no accommodation in processing the payment. The Indian government is nevertheless displeased with "the West", as its dependence on the Russian Federation is a result of its lack of access to Western weapons systems and it is now being criticised for this very dependence. This criticism of Western criticism can hardly be dismissed out of hand. Russia dominates the low-price segment The Russian Federation plays a significant role in security policy, especially for the so-called "Global South". Russia was the second largest arms exporter in 2021, whereby this refers to the value of the exported weapons systems. In the lower price segment, the Russian Federation was the most significant exporter. In the 21st century, the Kremlin continues the role of the Soviet Union and for decades hardly needed to fear competition from comparably priced suppliers. Technical dependence in weapons systems is of course the more relevant factor. This affects the supply of spare parts: In combat aircraft, various components are subjected to extreme stress, which is why an aircraft has to be overhauled and wear parts replaced at fixed intervals. The operation of aircraft in particular requires a constant supply of spare parts. The supply of ammunition is also decisive: the delivery problems with ammunition for the Gepard anti-aircraft tank were an illustrative example, but the production of artillery ammunition is more decisive in Ukraine war. In air defence, too, the crucial question is whether one can muster more missiles than the attacking enemy. Shortages of ammunition can be decisive for the war. It is also widespread practice for most complex weapon systems to be overhauled, maintained and in some cases modernised at regular intervals. In the process, not only wear parts are replaced, but also technically advanced and new systems are integrated. For example, the Leopard 2A0 main battle tank, which went into series production in 1979, is technically extremely different from the Leopard 2A8, which will be delivered to the Bundeswehr from 2025. New versions of a weapon system are sometimes produced, but usually manufacturers try to upgrade existing systems. If this regular upgrading fails to take place, the weapon system will be overtaken by technological developments. The "Trophy Active Protection System" of the new generation Leopard 2 covers the vehicle with a 360-degree radar and fires a highly automated projectile-forming charge at approaching projectiles. In the early 1980s, there was nowhere near the computing power required for such technology. Today, it is essential for modern tank weaponry, as illustrated by the first weeks of the invasion of Ukraine, when technologically obsolete Russian tanks were shot down in rows. This practice is also common in ships. The Brandenburg-class frigates, in service since 1994, are comparatively new and yet radar and missile technology in particular has advanced. Among other things, the frigates of this class have been retrofitted with the MASS decoy system, which has only been in production since 2004. These two quite different weapon systems exemplify how weapon systems have been upgraded against the technically latest generation of projectiles. In the absence of such upgrades in an arms cooperation, the outdated models are easy to combat on the battlefield. The dependency between arms exporter and arms importer thus exists far beyond mere procurement. Especially when a state has opted for a long-lived weapon system, upgrades and spare parts create a massive dependency relationship. Arms cooperation has strong political implications This dependence on the Russian Federation has an enormous influence on Indian foreign policy. India's voting behaviour on Russia's war of aggression in the UN General Assembly has been making negative headlines since March 2022. The fact that India is one of the few democratic states to have abstained in all relevant votes so far is causing disgruntlement in the Western world. In India, it is openly communicated that the voting behaviour is primarily due to dependence on Russian weapons systems. Numerous attempts by Western diplomats and politicians to argue that India should side with them have accordingly come to nothing. India's government may share the arguments for a rules-based international order, but that does not change the fact that its own security interests have priority. India cannot afford any sign of military weakness - for this, arms cooperation with Moscow is indispensable in the medium term. India's security challenges often fly under the radar of the European public. Clashes like the one in Ladakh in 2020 are described as "skirmishes" in the press. A term that probably no journalist would choose if 20 German soldiers had been killed in an incident. That New Delhi feels threatened is by no means unfounded. The conflict with the nuclear power Pakistan, which has been going on since India became a state, is increasingly taking a back seat, but is still very present and linked to the rivalry with China. The People's Republic of China, Pakistan's most important arms supplier, is the second nuclear power with a direct border with India and claims parts of India's territory as "southern Tibet". The overarching level of the Indo-Chinese rivalry is China's aspiration to become a hegemonic power, which goes hand in hand with containing India's sphere of influence on the Asian continent. Chinese territorial claims in the Indian Himalayas, the Northeast and Bhutan are serious threats to India. In particular, there is concern in New Delhi that China may try to conquer the so-called "Siliguri Corridor", also known as the "Chicken's Neck of India". The Siliguri Corridor is a strip of land only twenty kilometres wide around the city of Siliguri in the Indian state of West Bengal and the only point of connection for the eight states of northeast India with the rest of the country. China also poses a threat at sea. For India, a possible military use of the Belt and Road projects is tantamount to complete maritime encirclement by China. If the ports in Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar were used as Chinese naval bases, they would effectively cover the maritime area around India. A destroyer can reach any point within India's 200-mile zone in less than 24 hours from these ports and have access to shipping in the Arabian Sea, the Laccadive Sea, the Gulf of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Chinese naval bases in Djibouti, the Strait of Malacca and the west coast of Africa form a second ring around India. Given the territorial claims China is aggressively pursuing in the region and also on Indian territory, Beijing can be clearly identified as the aggressor in the Indo-Chinese conflict. Moreover, in 2022 China had a defence budget 210 billion USD larger than India's and is clearly superior in terms of defence technology. The threat situation could hardly be more tangible. India's diversification is a marathon, not a sprint In recent years, India has been the largest buyer of Russian weapons, albeit with a declining trend. The use of Russian weapon systems is pronounced in all three branches of the armed forces. The majority of the tank force is equipped with T-90s (1,200 tanks in active service) and T-72s (2,400 tanks in active service). Only a few units use the Arjun main battle tank, which is produced in-house. In combination with the main battle tanks, the Indian Army can draw on around 1,800 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and 800 BTR-80s. The armoured force is completed by a good 700 BMD and BRDM-2 airborne and reconnaissance tanks. A total of about 7,000 tanks from Russian production (or Indian licensed production) make up India's land forces. This gigantic number, combined with the age of most of the vehicles, only gives an idea of how huge the need for spare parts and upgrades must be. Although the Indian Air Force has implemented two solid future projects with the French Rafale multi-role fighter (36 aircraft in active service) and the indigenously produced HAL Tejas (30 aircraft in active service), Russian MiG-29 (68) and Su-30MKI (263) fighters form the backbone of the air force. The navy has 42 more MiG-29s, which also form the main armament of the aircraft carriers. Away from air combat, around 250 Russian helicopters of different variants ensure the flexibility of the Indian armed forces. The navy, with a recently commissioned aircraft carrier of its own production and the Kolkata-class destroyers, has less dependence on Russian technology. However, the Indian Navy's older aircraft carrier, as well as the nuclear submarines and the majority of the frigates are of Soviet and Russian production, respectively. The various classes of frigates, all of which have Indian names, are Russian technology. Exemplary is the newly launched Talwar class, which is a modified version of the Soviet Krivak class. The seven ships were built in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. The Indian military is just one of many examples of armed forces that have a heavy dependence on Russian weapons systems. Algeria, for example, has purchased over 300 T-90 main battle tanks and 46 Su-30MK fighter aircraft from Moscow since 2005 alone. Malaysia and Vietnam have recently received 18 and 12 Su-30s, respectively. Venezuela has purchased $15 billion worth of Russian aircraft, helicopters, and missile systems since 2000. Azerbaijan and Armenia have equally received extensive Russian arms imports ranging from tanks to helicopters in recent years. Uganda has amassed a Soviet-Russian tank fleet of around three hundred vehicles over many decades. The examples could be continued. India stands out merely because of its size, but the dependence on Russian weapons systems is glaring in many states of the global South. These states are now facing the "Russian arms question". States of the Global South are looking for an alternative It is obvious that the Russian arms industry will lose its position in the global security architecture. This does not necessarily mean that it will no longer have a prominent position, but it will lose market share regardless of the outcome of the war. There are four reasons for this: (1) In the coming years, the Russian defence industry will have little capacity to take on larger orders, as it will have to compensate for its own losses from the war. (2) It has become apparent that production is dependent on numerous foreign components, the availability of which is limited for the near future due to the sanction. (3) Furthermore, the acquisition of new Russian weapons systems is associated with possible political consequences for the purchasing state or at least with a loss of reputation in the West. (4) The most serious reason is the performance of Russian weapon systems in Ukraine. For example, technical defects in missiles were unexpectedly high; Russia was unable to gain air superiority even after more than a year; there is no footage of Russian tanks firing while moving and hitting targets with pinpoint accuracy; Russian artillery is surprisingly inaccurate in its aiming; and pictures of broken-down vehicles have gone around the world. Russian troops have had to procure drones from Iran and prestige projects such as the A-14 main battle tank or the Uran-9 unmanned tank have not yet been seen on the battlefield. The hypersonic missile "Kinschal", which was staged as unstoppable, was shot down many times by Western air defence systems. The sinking of the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet completed the bad image. The "Russian arms question" therefore becomes quite urgent. Since building an effective arms industry is unrealistic in the vast majority of states, few options remain. One can wait for the regeneration of the Russian arms industry or switch to the Chinese alternatives. India, even more than other states, is looking for a third way, as the Chinese alternative is not an option. From India's point of view, weapons systems from NATO countries or from Israel are the only chance for diversification. The Indian government is pushing joint ventures or production in India, not so much to strengthen its own economy, but rather to lower the cost of defence equipment. The question of cost is, of course, even more decisive for states that would also have access to Chinese armaments. Already in the past, some states opted for Soviet and later Russian products, either because they did not have access to other weapon systems for political reasons or because they were simply cheaper. A Leopard 2 main battle tank already costs 15 million euros in the A7 version. The Russian T-90 costs about 3.5 million euros. The example is not optimally chosen because the Leopard 2 has a different technical level and weighs about 20 t more. However, this would be the alternative from the point of view of a state that would want to switch from a Russian to a German battle tank. The price factor is still an important variable today. Should the arms industries of the NATO countries be economically unable or not politically mandated to fill the Russian vacuum, China will most likely take over this role. In South Asia, this development has already progressed, as Pakistan was dependent on an alternative to Russian arms imports due to good Indo-Russian relations. Pakistan has been the largest importer of Chinese arms from 2010 to 2020, far behind Bangladesh and Myanmar. In this sector, 38 per cent of all Chinese exports from 2006 to 2020 went to Pakistan. China's defence sector would in all likelihood be prepared for increased arms exports, as the industry grew precisely in the years when there was no reason for high arms spending in Europe. Comparing 2003 to 2007 and 2008 to 2012, China's arms exports grew by 162 per cent. China is ready. Germany should see its arms industry as a strategic tool Not only Russia and China, but also the USA, Israel and France see their powerful arms industry as a strategic instrument of their foreign policy. In Germany, the debate about domestic arms production has turned 180 degrees. The Bundestag debates on the acquisition of weaponised drones from 2008 onwards seem naïve today, the blanket opposition to arms exports is hardly represented in public discourse anymore, and the image of arms companies has also changed fundamentally. The IRIS-T air defence system protects the lives of civilians in Ukraine. Sentences such as "Armament research has no value for society" or "One can assist other countries in other ways than with howitzers" in German leading media seem out of date. In 2022, Germany has moved from an ivory tower discourse of ethics to an ethics of responsibility that recognises the new geopolitical reality. After this first step, it is important to initiate a strategic debate. It is in Germany's interest that states do not move away from their dependence on Russia into China's orbit. It is also a direct European security interest to minimise Russian arms exports. The Russian arms industry employs 2 to 3 million people, which corresponds to about 20 per cent of total industrial jobs. No other economy is so dependent on its arms industry. Since it is a majority state-owned industry, a decline in exports would directly affect the state budget. On the one hand, a decline in exports would result in a lack of revenue; on the other hand, procurement costs for the country's own armed forces would rise considerably. Moreover, the monopolised structure entails the risk that the failure of a single Russian company would result in the loss of far-reaching military capabilities or necessitate costly state support. By denying the Russian defence industry sales markets, Russia's military capabilities are weakened in the long term and, at the same time, its economy as a whole. The type and volume of arms exports are undoubtedly an indicator of friendship between states. Many Russian customers from Venezuela to Syria are not strategic partners of Europe. Possible competition with the Russian or Chinese arms industry must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Arming Cuba, North Korea or Iran with German technology is obviously not in the strategic interest, but in other cases, such as Saudi Arabia - which is by no means a value partner - the German government has already decided in favour of arms exports for overriding strategic reasons. India's arms build-up is minimal risk and of critical strategic importance. The foreign and security policy institutions as well as the party landscape in India are very stable, which is why a change of policy is not likely. There is a great willingness to break away from dependence on Moscow. India is a stability factor in the Indian Ocean and stands for free sea routes. With a defence budget of over 80 billion USD per year, the country would be a major customer for the German defence industry. France and the USA have already been playing a significant role in the modernisation of the Indian armed forces for years and are taking a very proactive and accommodating approach. India-NATO relations have already been mapped out by these two NATO partners. From a German perspective, one can now at least follow this line retrospectively or decide not to play a security role in South Asia. With its more than 3,000 km long border with China and a kind of "Cold War" in the Indian Ocean, India is one of the states with which China could soon have a major military confrontation. Due to its sheer size and long land border, India is, from the US perspective, the most important potential partner in a possible escalation with China, along with Japan and Australia. India is therefore likely to be given privileged access to US weapons systems and will itself seek US security proximity. In the event of a conflict, India, for all its self-confidence, will not be able to stand up to China alone, as it is inferior to China in terms of defence technology. The Russian defence industry is still decisive for India's military planners - but many things are now being recalibrated here. For India - as for many other states - Germany must answer the question of how "the expansion of security and defence cooperation" is implemented. The Indo-Pacific Guidelines mention participation in forums, exercises, and evacuation planning as well as the deployment of liaison officers and "various forms of maritime presence". The states in the region are well aware that the German Navy is not a security factor in the region. The arms policy approach in Germany's guidelines is expressed in the thirteen mentions of arms control. If this is the Indo-Pacific strategy of the German government, it currently has no serious security policy dimension. In short, if Germany does not use its powerful arms industry as an instrument of security policy, then the toolbox is empty. Armament cooperation is a common and effective instrument of foreign policy for France or the USA, for example, but also for the Russian Federation and China. Especially for a nation that seeks to avoid military engagement, it is the only realpolitik option for action apart from "soft power". Germany should understand its arms industry as a strategic instrument.

Public support for Ukraine is holding up in allied countries, but preparations should be made for scenarios in which support ebbs away. As the war in Ukraine drags on, the direct economic cost to Europe and other countries is rising. Through unprecedently high and now long-lasting inflation, the war has increased financial fragility in households across the European Union and risks eroding public support for Ukraine. But the evidence shows that public opinion stands firm. EU countries and institutions have committed financial, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, totalling €62 billion as of 24 February 2023, exactly one year on from Russia’s invasion. The total is estimated to be around €70 billion as of 23 May 2023.  Source: Bruegel based on Trebesch et al (2023). Bilateral commitments from EU member states had reached €26.18 billion by 24 February 2023, with most of this figure consisting of military aid (€16.02 billion). Commitments from European institutions hit €35.53 billion in February 2023. The biggest chunk of this was an €18 billion package to support Ukraine’s immediate needs and maintain macroeconomic stability throughout 2023 – one example being the gaping hole in Ukraine’s finances, the budget deficit currently at a quarter of Ukraine’s GDP.  The European Investment Bank has pledged €668 million in liquidity assistance, while a series of €500 million tranches contributed by the EU to the European Peace Facility (EPF)  for military purposes now amounts to €3.6 billion committed. This support is relatively small and sustainable. The €70 billion, encapsulating financial, humanitarian, military, emergency budget and resources for those fleeing the war, is only 0.44 percent of EU GDP. The European economy has also been affected by high energy prices. The European Commission predicted in its spring 2023 inflation forecasts that euro-area inflation will be 5.8 percent this year. This is a little higher than anticipated during the winter. According to the European Central Bank, euro-area food prices were 15 percent higher in April 2023 than in April 2022. With euro-area inflation at 8.4 percent in 2022 (European Commission, 2023), €100 in 2021 is only worth €86 in 2023. It is understandable that the public is impatient with the level of costs it faces every day and adapting energy consumption in the face of energy scarcity. Figure 2 shows the proportion of Europeans who changed their habits to save on energy or dipped into savings due to inflation.  Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2022). Interviews conducted between 18 October and 4 December 2022 with a representative sample of citizens, aged 18 and over, in each EU country. Figure 2 shows that 71 percent of EU citizens changed habits at home to save on energy. In only one country, Slovenia, did less than half of citizens change habits (49 percent). Furthermore, 37 percent of EU citizens had to take money from their savings as a direct consequence of inflation, ranging from 58 percent in Greece to 16 percent in Croatia. European public opinion: remarkably stable The more expensive the war becomes, the more one might expect European public support to decrease. Indeed, there has been an overall decline in support for measures backing Ukraine. Figure 3 shows a pattern of slow overall decline across France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland. The proportion of those in favour of sending arms or of economic and financial sanctions has fallen.  Source: Bruegel based on Ifop (2023). Despite this decline, as of February 2023, support for sanctions and direct assistance to Ukraine remained solid, above 50 percent in all but one case. EU-wide persistent public support signals that European citizens understand that the outcome of the war is of critical importance to their own futures. Eight months into the war, the average approval rate amongst the EU27 for EU support for Ukraine was an astonishing 73 percent (European Parliament, 2022). Only four countries – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia and Greece – reported approval ratings of less than 50 percent. Furthermore, an average of 59 percent of citizens in eight Central and Eastern EU countries believe that sanctions against Russia should remain in place according to a poll conducted in March 2023 (Hajdu et al., 2023). Meanwhile, a poll from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February 2023 showed that 87 percent of Ukrainians said that under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territory, even if the war lasts longer. This is an increase from 82 percent in May 2022 . The different blocs There are some significant disparities in popular support in different EU countries. Krastev and Leonard (2023) noted that three different blocs of public opinion have emerged: the northern and eastern hawks (Estonia, Poland, Denmark and the United Kingdom), the ambiguous west (France, Germany, Spain, Portugal) and the southern weak links (Italy and Romania). Figure 2 shows persistent support in countries from each of these groups. Amongst even the least supportive member states, some interesting results are observed. When individuals were asked to choose between two opposing statements on whether sanctions were worth higher prices or not, Hungary was the only one out of nine EU countries surveyed where the majority believed that sanctions were not worth it (Figure 4).  Source: Bruegel based on Ipsos (2023). Surprisingly, the number of those who believe that the most important thing is stopping the war as soon as possible, even if Ukraine had to forfeit territory to Russia, actually declined almost across the board according to January 2023 polling reported by Krastev and Leonard (2023). Notable declines were seen in Romania and Italy – those characterised as the ‘southern weak links’. This may be due to citizens becoming more willing to support Ukraine for the long run.  Source: Bruegel based on Krastev & Leonard (2023). The United States US aid to Ukraine in the first year amounted to 0.37 percent of US GDP (Trebesch et al, 2023). The willingness in the US to bear costs for supporting Ukraine has followed a similar pattern to the EU of slow decline across the political spectrum.  Source: Based on Figure 5, Telhami (2023). This decline may signal ‘impatience’ with the war in Ukraine (especially amongst Republicans), but there are also signs of persistent support. The current level of US military expenditure to support Ukraine was either too little or about the right level according to 42 percent of respondents, as opposed to 33 percent who said it is too much. Interestingly, there is a strong preference for support staying on course for one to two years (46 percent of respondents) versus only 38 percent who would accept providing support to Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’ (Telhami, 2023). Whilst there is a clear division along party lines, there is reduced support amongst Democrats and Republicans. This means that the future of American support for Ukraine may change even before the 2024 elections. Lower support across the political spectrum during the upcoming electoral season could result in reduced backing from the Biden administration or in Congress, as both sides vie for votes. This is before a potential Republican victory, which under certain scenarios, may stop or dramatically limit support from the US. Conclusion   An erosion in public support for Ukraine might have been expected as the cost and economic consequences of the war began to impact EU households through inflation. But support for Ukraine has remained strong, suggesting that the public understands fully the wider implications for European security of the outcome of the war. The public sides overwhelmingly with the Ukrainians, which are clearly perceived as the victims of an aggression. This is consistent with the growing support for maintaining or increasing defence spending. Most NATO citizens (74 percent in 2022 versus 70 percent in 2021; NATO, 2023) think that defence spending should either be maintained at current levels or increased (with some significant differences from 85 percent to 52 percent, but always with a majority supporting). Just 12 percent think less should be spent on defence.   Public support could decline more in the future. If news from the battlefield suggests a protracted conflict in which neither side can prevail militarily, then time and the potential decline in US support may affect EU public opinion. A successful Ukrainian counter-offensive would play an important role in the continuance of Western support for the war. In the absence of progress on the battlefield, voices calling for a peace settlement, even on unfavourable terms to Ukraine, might gain traction in the public debate. In upcoming elections, this could benefit political parties less favourable to supporting Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’. European leaders must therefore prepare for several scenarios. Significant Ukrainian successes in the battlefield in the near future could pave the way for a positive settlement and the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty and its reconstruction. The EU must also prepare for the more complex outcome of a protracted war, which would require sustained efforts to support Ukraine militarily (Grand, 2023) and economically. This would require further and constant political efforts to keep public opinion on board, preserving European and Western unity in a potentially degraded economic and political environment.

The humanitarian and ecological challenges caused by the breaching of the Nova Kakhovka dam present massive challenges for Ukraine, as it launches its long-awaited offensive. Mounting operations to assist and evacuate civilians from affected areas will deplete manpower and resources when the conflict is at a critical juncture. This is to Russia’s advantage. While Ukraine has already deployed an emergency response, there is little indication that Russia has either the capacity or inclination to assist in the humanitarian effort. Thousands are expected to have to leave their homes as waters flood dozens of villages. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has already called on the international community to offer immediate aid. Kyiv and Moscow have both accused each other of bombing people being evacuated. The circumstances surrounding the destruction of the dam on the Dnipro River remain difficult to determine. But the incident is being discussed as a possible war crime and an act of terror, with Russia indicated as the likely perpetrator. While it will be some time before all the details are clear, the event is certainly going to influence events on the battlefield. An attack of this nature can form part of a military strategy. After all, the destruction of Irpin dam in February 2022 played an important role in checking Russian advances earlier in the conflict. In this case, however, the relatively modest military benefit in no way justifies the massive and far-reaching destruction unleashed by the floodwaters. The rising water levels caused by the damage will, of course, have some implications for the campaign. Downstream any crossing of the river will become difficult for the foreseeable future, with the surging waters damaging any remaining infrastructure. The flooded ground may struggle to bear the weight of tanks and artillery as well, limiting the potential routes south for an attacking force. The scale of the disaster introduces many human factors to the battlefield, with displaced civilians further complicating any operations in the region. The result is that a significant portion of the frontline is now difficult to access, leaving Russia with less space to actively defend. While these are significant considerations and will complicate the nature of the battlefield from the Ukrainian perspective, the fundamental balance of power in the region remains unchanged. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their adaptability from the outset in this conflict, and this will serve them well in the next phases. Having taken the time to integrate the training and equipment received from western partners, the forces compromising the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be able to effectively adapt to events of this nature. Current operations show that Ukrainian land forces are effectively probing for Russian weaknesses  in the south and east. These smaller advances – so called shaping operations – which provide intelligence and fix Russian forces in place, are taking place across a wide front. Ukrainian leadership remain quiet on specifics, but when its more heavily equipped brigades do move forward, they will benefit from these earlier efforts to shape the battlefield in their favour. Russian troops overstretched The Nova Kakhovka dam’s breach will do nothing to improve the status of Russian forces. While in the short term, there is now perhaps less frontline to defend, their troops are still overstretched. The fractured Russian leadership will struggle to effectively respond to any setbacks, and the equipment and human resources they currently have available remain of poor quality. If Nova Kakhovka was an attempt to replicate earlier events, in which Ukraine submerged the Irpin floodplain to interfere with the Russian advance to Kyiv, then it has not been successful. If it was the eve of a Russian offensive, an event of this nature might have been disastrous for them, with their rigid command structures and traumatised land forces incapable of adapting on the fly. This is not Russia’s moment, however. For the Ukrainian side, this is a setback that can be overcome. As well as growing disparities in training and equipment, the incident highlights the profound difference in the mindset and ability to adapt between the respective sides. Unfortunately, we may see more attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure as the offensive presses on. The Russian state clearly prefers to break what it cannot control. While attacks on civilian infrastructure may have little impact on how the conflict plays out, the Russian strategy is now about inflicting pain on the Ukrainian side by any available means. This could indicate that Moscow no longer views these areas as future Russian assets that can be assimilated relatively intact, but instead as areas it can devastate to harm the interests of the rightful owner.

The Russian financial sector has taken a double hit from sanctions – both in infrastructure (affecting financial transactions) and in technology (affecting the hardware and software). Infrastructural sanctions imposed by Western countries in reponse to the war on Ukraine (de-SWIFTing, overcompliance, and breaking of correspondent relationships) affected their operational activity. Moreover, the Russian government banned the use of foreign software and equipment imports, which has been a drag on business development. The financial sector was able to withstand the first shock. However, the most recent restrictions on access to advanced technologies, especially from the US and the EU, will lead to import substitution based on technologies of yesterday.  - Since the war began, every second Russian company has lost tech support and access to cutting-edge technology. - Import substitution leaves tech companies scrambling for what they can get, not what they actually want or need, and stunts business development. - The financial sector is shifting from creating innovations to ensuring technological security and supporting current operations. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a coalition of Western countries led by the European Union and the United States imposed a large array of sanctions. Since then, the Russian financial sector has taken a double hit, namely sanctions on the infrastructure, affecting financial transactions, and on the technology, like software and hardware, it needs to operate. Infrastructure sanctions restrict banks’ ability to make payments (disconnection from the SWIFT global payments system and overcompliance). Technology sanctions create hindrances to technical upgrades and innovation. Before the war in Ukraine, the Russian financial sector was a world leader: it was third in financial technology penetration, in the top 10 in digital banking development, and fourth in the transition to cashless payments during the pandemic. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions in 2022, it has lost this competitive position.   The sanctions against Russia’s financial sector have largely isolated Russia from access to the global financial system. Inside Russia, however, only a small fraction of Russians have felt these restrictions. Russian payment infrastructure was and remains resilient primarily due to the financial messaging system (SPFS), the Russian equivalent of SWIFT, which was developed in 2014 and through which banks are required to exchange data within Russia. In 2022, traffic in the system increased by 22 percent. There are currently 469 participants, including 115 non-Russian banks from 14 countries. Among the foreign countries, banks in Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Switzerland are connected to the system. Due to the risk of new sanctions, Russia’s central bank does not disclose detailed statistics. Direct messaging channels allow for direct international transactions with those banks connected to the SPFS, including those bypassing SWIFT. Minimizing the damage of sanctions that target Russia’s financial sector infrastructure is considerably more difficult. Former partners, even in friendly jurisdictions like some post-Soviet countries, have been slow to help Russia with system-level transactions. It will take considerable time to build new payment infrastructure channels, as the technological constraints are much more difficult. The lack of access to modern technology keeps banks’ IT systems in their current state and impedes fintech development and innovation. Pain and Risk About 85 percent of software used in the Russian financial sector is produced abroad. For hardware, the situation is even worse. Only large-scale assembly takes place in Russia. For this reason, the departure of companies that ensure the viability of the financial sector has been particularly painful for the financial sector - companies like Oracle, SAP, Cisco, IBM, Intel, AMD, Diebold Nixdorf and NCR (ATMs). Every second Russian company was left without technical support after the war began. For Russian banks, it was impossible to quickly switch to domestic solutions, as the right quality and scale were simply not available on the market. Virtually all operations of a modern financial institution, from client services to internal operations, are heavily dependent on the smooth operation of software and equipment. This makes the financial system particularly vulnerable on the technological side. Banks and non-financial institutions may face operational risks due to the lack of servers and software. This could make systems more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, raise the risk of technical failures due to a shortage of equipment and maintenance specialists, and require failing equipment to be replaced with either used Western-made products or Chinese analogues. The Bank of Russia, which supervises the financial sector, pointed out these risks for the first time almost a year after the invasion. Import Substitution Software The withdrawal of foreign companies has left the Russian financial sector with a huge gap in software and services. Also, in October 2022, the government banned Russian banks from using foreign software, a rule that applies even if there are no domestic equivalents. This has forced critical information infrastructure facilities to urgently seek domestic solutions. The combination of these two factors has given a boost to software development in Russia. Thus, according to Ilya Sivtsev, CEO of Astra (developer of operating systems and PostgreSQL database management system (DBMS) based on open source code), the company’s revenue in 2022 doubled to over RUB 6.5 billion (USD 65 million) and the share of its revenues from the financial sector increased from 4 to 22 percent. Astra’s outlook for 2023 is for double-digit growth.  Astra’s figures generally reflect the situation in the Russian IT market in 2022: there was rapid growth due to the departure of foreign competitors. As Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, who oversees the industry, reported, IT firms in 2022 grew revenues by 35 percent and earned RUB 2.38 trillion (USD 27 billion). Despite the reduced presence of foreign companies, turnover in the Russian IT market has grown. Switching to Russian software instead of foreign software may not be the most significant challenge, but it is an expense that businesses could have invested in furthering business growth. With all the advantages of the Russian DBMS, migration from the US-made Oracle software may lead to performance degradation of 30-50 percent. This is a serious limitation for the financial sector, whose mission-critical core system (processing, the core of an automated banking system) requires high-speed interaction with databases. The banking applications must also be transferred to the new DBMS. In addition, information security risks that could jeopardize the stability of the financial system have increased. The massive migration to new IT solutions reduces the cybersecurity of the entire system. The growth of the Russian software market is limited by two factors: the Russian government’s permission for companies to use unlicensed foreign software and the country’s own borders. Before the war, Russian IT companies were rather active on the markets of neighboring countries, providing various services (e.g. 1, 2, 3 )–from the integration of IT systems and products to the provision of services to companies and private customers. Russian solutions were often cheaper and technical support in Russian was an important advantage in the regional Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) market. And while Russian companies were also looking to expand abroad before the war, they will now have to compete there with Western companies that have left the Russian market and whose technological development is not restricted by sanctions. The relationship between customers and integrators running programs to implement products from different vendors has also changed. The customers say, “I want it like SAP, but faster and better,” while the integrators say, “My offer is limited, so take what I have or you will run out too.” In other words, customers have to accept a downgrade in software and hardware capacity for certain technologies. Import Substitution and Hardware Because it was not profitable, the equipment needed for  assembly in Russia is not produced in the country. Until 2022, only large-scale assembly from imported components was carried out in Russia. And the financial sector is not the only one waiting for servers, storage systems, controllers and components – industry, the public sector and retailers are also in line. In their search for equipment, Russian companies have turned to parallel imports, obtaining what they need from countries that have not imposed sanctions. They have also acquiesced to lower requirements for equipment quality and delivery deadlines. However, there are no systemic solutions or supply lines yet. Right at the beginning of the conflict, the US applied the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) mechanism to Russia. The FDPR prohibits exports to sanctioned countries of equipment that US companies were involved in developing or manufacturing – thus it affects companies outside the US in so-called third countries. This mechanism is primarily aimed at keeping the defense industry from importing technology. However, civilian products that can be classified as “dual-use” (military and civilian) are also largely subject to the restrictions – including the kinds of equipment needed by the financial sector. That has made systematic and large-scale purchases much more difficult. Third countries are willing to restrict technology exports to Russia, and the US is constantly updating its sanctions lists to include intermediaries. Nevertheless, loopholes in sanctions frameworks and delays in sanctions decisions allow Russia more room to adjust, finding new partners in Asia or new ways to bring hardware to Russia. Chinese partners, for example, support Russian companies not only with equipment but also with chips. Shipments of microchips and other semiconductors from China to Russia  are 2.5 times higher than than pre-war level; China now accounts for more than 50 percent of semiconductor imports to Russia. By the end of 2022, China supplied 40 percent of Russia’s imports and purchased 30 percent of its exports, and the RMB had become the only (albeit less convenient due to its incomplete convertibility) alternative to the euro and dollar for Russia’s international payments. In 2022, trade turnover between the two countries reached an astronomical USD190 billion, and it is quite likely that within these imports are sanctioned goods that Russia desperately needs. Reports that China is helping Russia circumvent sanctions, especially in the technology sector, are mounting. The Russian IT sector’s focus on Chinese suppliers and their products – from servers and data center equipment to bulk purchases of consumer electronics – reflects Moscow’s growing and asymmetrical dependence on Beijing. For second- and third-tier Chinese companies, this opens up opportunities to enter the Russian market. For example, Sber, Russia’s largest bank, is testing its own custom-made laptops. Sber’s partner, the Chinese company Shanghai IP3 Information Technology, is a contract manufacturer that takes orders for electronic devices and commissions them from Chinese production facilities. Whereas before the war Russian companies were free to choose their equipment and electronics suppliers, taking advantage of the wide supply on the market to obtain favorable prices, the choice has now narrowed to Chinese manufacturers. The lack of alternatives also forces them to accept less attractive terms. Innovation Inhibited The sanctions bottleneck in both hardware and software is shifting the focus of IT specialists in the Russian financial sector from creating innovations to ensuring technological security and supporting current operations. The most prominent example is the introduction of payment stickers for Russians who can no longer make contactless payments with their smartphones. A payment sticker has an embedded near-field communications (NFC) chip that exchanges data with a payment device. In other words, it is a bank card chip stuck onto an iPhone, as iPhone owners are considered to be the highest-paying target group, and banks have a vested interest in maintaining the usual number and volume of card transactions. Android smartphone owners will still have the option of making contactless payments via a MirPay wallet linked to their domestic payment system card. Frank RG, the Russian financial information publication, estimates that 12 of Russia’s 25 largest banks already offer stickers to their customers. Tinkoff, the leader in innovative banking, plans to issue over 1 million stickers by July 2023. At state-owned Sberbank, over 100 000 people applied for stickers within three hours of their offering. Issuing stickers is more expensive for the bank than standard payment card issuance, bankers acknowledge. Russian financial institutions have become so similar to IT companies that they are almost indistinguishable. Sberbank alone employs 38,000 IT specialists, Sberbank President Herman Gref reported to Vladimir Putin in March 2023. Besides the purely financial challenges, such as ensuring the sustainability of the payment infrastructure, the financial sector needs to work with the IT industry on providing non-sanctioned hardware and software, finding indigenous solutions to replace Western ones, and localizing instead of scaling up. An important but not decisive obstacle to innovation is the mass exodus of IT professionals. Competition for the remaining specialists is fierce and will only increase. The government is making gigantic efforts to keep the remaining skilled workers in the country. The slowness in changing the taxation of departing Russians seems partly related to the fear that most foreign IT professionals who continue to work in Russia will no longer do so. Prospects for the Financial Sector The Russian financial sector’s resilience to sanctions on its financial infrastructure has been limited to Russian territory. The sanctions have largely isolated Russia from the international financial infrastructure. Russia’s demand to allow banks to use SWIFT (e.g. under the Grains Agreement) is a clear indication of this. Technological restrictions and the withdrawal of Western companies from the Russian market may seem less painful at first glance, but this is not the case. Their impact is longer-term: declining quality of hardware and software, forced investment at IT, cybersecurity, and operational risks. And while infrastructural constraints have had only a temporary impact on the ability of the financial sector to operate smoothly, technological constraints have significantly limited its potential for growth and development. The Russian financial sector’s dependence on foreign, especially Western, software and hardware manufacturers is high. This poses a significant risk to Russia’s financial stability, especially if Western countries tighten sanctions against the Russian IT sector.

The war in Ukraine accelerated a global energy crisis just as the world was beginning to recover from the Covid-19 pandemic. Venezuela has the largest crude oil and the eighth largest gas reserves in the world and can therefore offer an alternative for Europe to replace its fossil fuels imports from Russia. The problem is, of course, that EU–Venezuela relations have been in a sorry state since the EU denounced President Nicolás Maduro’s re-election in 2018 as neither free nor fair. Since then, the EU has adopted targeted sanctions against the Venezuelan government, thus adding to the maximum economic pressure that former US President Donald Trump imposed on Caracas in an attempt to fatally weaken Maduro. This approach has yielded no result in that respect, and the war in Ukraine, and its energy security implications for the EU, creates the occasion for a revision of EU and US strategies. The hope is that a “more carrots, less sticks” approach could convince Maduro to engage in meaningful dialogue with the opposition. The EU must seize this opportunity of rapprochement and readiness and push forward the recommendations put forth in its electoral observation mission’s report of 2021, reconcile internal disputes to focus on the big picture, give momentum to dialogue efforts, consolidate support among regional allies and rekindle its efforts towards humanitarian relief.A failed pressure strategyVenezuela used to be among the most prosperous countries in Latin America, but is now home to one of the largest external displacement crises in the world next to Syria and Ukraine, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. When he came into power in 2013, President Maduro inherited from his predecessor Hugo Chávez a country in economic turmoil, high in debt and on an increasingly authoritarian track. The slump in oil prices in 2014 added fuel to the fire, prompting a wave of unrest to which Maduro responded with repression. He then tried to replace the democratically elected National Assembly, which had an opposition majority, with a loyalist Constituent Assembly in 2017. But it was after the 2018 presidential election, when Maduro secured a second term in what are widely considered rigged elections, that Venezuela descended into a full-blown political crisis. Juan Guaidó, speaker of the National Assembly, used a constitutional clause to declare himself interim president until new elections could be held, backed by more than 60 countries worldwide. In the following years, various negotiations attempts between Maduro and the opposition failed to solve the country’s political dispute, prompting fatigue in the opposition ranks while eventually consolidating Maduro’s authoritarian grip. As the political crisis unfolded, the EU and the United States responded with sanctions against the Maduro regime, although with different goals. The Trump administration pursued regime change through a maximum pressure strategy. Instead, the EU combined targeted restrictive measures with humanitarian aid and support for dialogue and mediation efforts. EU efforts have been hampered by: internal divergences, especially on the recognition of Guaidó as interim president; multipolar competition and the perceived excessive proximity with the United States; and regional fragmentation and polarisation. Sanctions have failed to produce substantial change as Russia and China, and to some degree Iran and Turkey, have continued trade (including in oil) and strengthened economic ties with the Maduro regimeHow has the EU mitigated constraining factors on its policy?There have been two issues over which the EU struggled, even failed, to reach consensus. The first was the recognition of Guaidó as interim president. While most member states eventually did so, Italy and Cyprus dragged their feet, until the issue became irrelevant in early 2021 when the term of the National Assembly of which Guaidó was speaker expired. EU divergences stemmed from the political composition of member state governments and their view of the EU’s role in the world. Left-leaning governments in the EU tended to frame the recognition of Guaidó as a US-led, “interventionist” initiative, while right-leaning governments advocated a confrontational approach to Maduro, including through the recognition of Guaidó. It was a missed opportunity to show EU unity and put the spotlight on the EU’s difficulty to reach agreement over its foreign policy. Second, internal disagreements within EU institutions and member states revolved around the opportunity to send an electoral observation mission to local and regional elections in November 2021, out of fear that this could whitewash the Maduro regime. The mission eventually garnered enough support to be deployed and was later largely perceived as a success by EU member states. The EU electoral observation mission (EOM) produced a report with recommendations that have become the benchmark for the conditions for a free and fair election in the agenda of the Mexico-based talks between the government and the opposition. The region’s fragmented and polarised approach to the Venezuelan crisis has been another factor hampering EU efforts. Trump’s push for regime change, embraced by most Latin American countries led by right-wing governments in 2019–20 (crystallised by the creation of the so-called Lima Group) exacerbated geopolitical tensions in the region. The EU-backed creation of the International Contact Group (ICG) in 2019, which aimed to promote dialogue but did not bear fruit because it coincided with the recognition of Guaidó and the EU's rapprochement with the Lima Group. Regional polarisation was epitomised by the appointment of a Guaidó representative in the Organization of American States, despite Maduro’s decision to withdraw from the pan-American body, and the prolonged stalemate in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (CELAC). The EU was dragged into a polarisation spiral where its policies were associated with those of the Trump administration, even though they had different objectives. Besides, Trump’s policy of maximum pressure as an instrument for democratisation proven ineffective in a context of geopolitical competition with China and Russia. Their support for the Maduro regime allowed it to survive, even though at the cost of the country’s descent into economic disaster. Russia in particular also invested political capital by participating in the Mexico talks as the government’s accompanying country.A changed scenario, a new strategy?President Biden’s election and Latin America’s shift towards the left created openings for a more constructive international engagement with Venezuela, which have further widened after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, providing the EU with a new set of foreign policy options. The EU and the US, together with Canada and the United Kingdom, have signalled a willingness to agree to conditional sanctions relief. The Biden administration has permitted American oil company Chevron to resume limited oil operations in Venezuela in exchange for an agreement by Maduro and the opposition to continue dialogue after a year of stalemate. The talks have made no progress other than an agreement to turn up to 3 billion US dollars of frozen government fund into aid to be distributed by the UN and the International Red Cross to alleviate the domestic humanitarian predicament. Although a more concessions-based foreign policy towards Venezuela may not lead to the regime change some have hoped for, it could still make Maduro willing to allow for fairly free and democratic elections in 2024, when his second term comes to an end. However, it is clear that the humanitarian crisis will not be over shortly, and the implementation of the 2022 agreement between government and opposition is proceeding slowly. Increased EU humanitarian aid could help promote goodwill in Venezuela and in the region, and thus is not solely to be considered an altruistic gift, but an important part of the EU’s foreign policy arsenal. Finally, Venezuela and the broader region of Latin America and the Caribbean is not only important due to its natural resources, but an important political partner for the EU in its bid to defend a rule-based global order. This has become ever more evident since the war on Ukraine, which has seen some Latin American countries refusing to pick sides. Over the last few years the political landscape in Latin America changed with the election of leftist presidents in almost all countries in the region, with interest in seeking a negotiated response to the crisis in Venezuela. The International Conference on Venezuela convened by Colombian President Gustavo Petro in Bogotá in April 2023 is an illustration of the region’s renewed engagement on the issue. The upcoming EU–CELAC summit in July, the first in eight years, is an opportunity to engage with regional partners to foster political cooperation on global and regional issues, including Venezuela. The EU’s pragmatic rapprochement with Venezuela offers the prospect for some progress in the negotiations between government and opposition, but it should not be perceived as a relegation of EU’s commitment to democratic norms. The EU should not waste the opportunity to step up its diplomatic engagement with the region and coordination with the US and like-minded countries to ensure that Maduro concedes a real level playing field for the 2024 elections while at the same time pursuing its strategic goal of diversifying energy supplies. This article is brief published under JOINT, a project which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 959143.

If the Global Gateway is to compete with the Belt and Road Initiative, it must go big, green, digital, and ethical. And it can prove it in Latin America  The European Union launched its Global Gateway initiative in December 2021, but its results have not yet matched the expectations it raised. If it is to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Gateway must be bold, green, digital, and ethical. The digital alliance that the EU is setting up in Latin America and the Caribbean provides an opportunity for the EU to put its money where its mouth is.  On 14 March, the executive vice-president of the European Commission, Margrethe Vestager, and several ICT ministers from Latin America and the Caribbean established the EU – Latin America and Caribbean (EU-LAC) Digital Alliance – one of the European Commission’s initiatives launched in the framework of the Global Gateway programme. The alliance will focus on three pillars: investments in connectivity, aimed at closing the gap in internet access between the region and the EU, and within and between the countries of the region; cybersecurity, where despite the great progress made by the region, significant gaps remain that threaten citizens, businesses, and sovereign states alike; and digital rights, a field of enormous potential, as both regions share a human-centric approach to digital transformation. The project is of major strategic importance and potential for the EU. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given new prominence to the EU’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean. The region comprises 33 countries which are key to sustaining a rules-based multilateral order and whose votes China and Russia have courted in the United Nations General Assembly. There are also massive investment opportunities in the green and digital sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean, making it an important region in the EU’s search for strategic autonomy. However, relations between the two regions have gone through numerous ups and downs since leaders first spoke of a “strategic association” at an EU-LAC summit in Rio in 1999. In recent years, the EU financial crisis, the United States’ lack of interest in the region, and the covid-19 pandemic have allowed China and, to a lesser extent, Russia to expand their presence in the region: while EU trade with the region doubled between 2008 and 2018, China’s trade multiplied tenfold thanks to its strategic approach through the BRI, which has added to China’s already significant foreign direct investment flows and loans to the region. The EU is seeking to revitalise this relationship. But for the EU-LAC partnership to be successful, it is essential that these political agreements and declarations are accompanied by a meaningful investment agenda and package, as well as a clear roadmap for implementation. So far, the EU’s approach to the region has focused on programmes such as the Bella submarine cable connecting Europe and the region and the Copernicus Earth observation satellite system, which lack the scale to change perceptions of the EU. For its part, the Global Gateway programme is far from mobilising the €300 billion in investments initially announced, and the €3.5 billion  earmarked for investment in Latin America is insufficient to alter the strategic balance in a region where the required investment just for connectivity is estimated at $51 billion. The digital transition that the EU and the countries of the region want to promote could be the catalyst for a change of step in relations The digital transition that the EU and the countries of the region want to promote could be the catalyst for a change of step in relations. But for this to be feasible, certain conditions must be met. Firstly, if the Global Gateway is to be attractive for the region and effectively compete with the BRI, it must rebalance its geographical focus to pay more attention to the region. At present, 60 per cent of projects are focused on sub-Saharan Africa, while only 20 per cent are devoted to Latin America, and another 20 per cent to Asia. It should then focus more efforts on digital initiatives: currently, energy and green transition initiatives make up 80 per cent of projects, while digital initiatives account for 15 per cent and social initiatives for 5 per cent. The projects identified in the digital field are almost exclusively focused on connectivity issues, such as financing fibre, cable, satellite, and 5G investments. Closing connectivity gaps is urgent. Currently, over 35 per cent of Latin Americans still do not have access to a fixed broadband internet connection, and 20 per cent do not have mobile broadband access  – twice the average for OECD countries – concentrated in the lowest income quintile and rural and remote areas. However, the digital agenda in 2023 must be one of transformation, not just connectivity. It should therefore include issues such as cybersecurity, the digitisation of public administrations and services (including health, migration, justice, and taxation), training and education in key skills, the regulation of artificial intelligence, and data governance. Alongside the deployment of 5G and investment in digital, technical, and soft skills, this would bring the financing requirements for the region closer to $300 billion, which is 3 per cent of regional GDP. To address these geographical and thematic imbalances, the region therefore requires a more intensive European investment plan. The Global Gateway envisages mobilising private financial resources by setting up co-financing mechanisms from development banks, in particular the European Investment Bank, the CAF bank, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Despite the current meagre projections, it should be possible to mobilise the funding. After all, the EU is the leading foreign direct investor in Latin America, its telecom companies are global players, it plays a pioneering role in digitalisation in banking, insurance, infrastructure, energy, public services, industry, agriculture, and mining, and it holds first-class cybersecurity and hybrid threats capabilities. The launch of the digital alliance is expected to be accompanied by a business meeting of key Euro-Latin American companies, which, if confirmed at high-level, is a promising sign.   The EU’s digital agenda is attractive to third parties compared to China’s BRI because it includes green, social, and ethical components, making it an ally of the green transition, not a competitor. Many of its initiatives contribute to both digital and green goals, including the development of the ‘internet of things’ for the design of smart cities, the use of big data and cloud data to monitor the temperature of the oceans, and artificial intelligence applied to the protection of biodiversity. Europe’s rights-based, human-centric approach to digitalisation should also appeal to Latin America and the Caribbean. The region is seeking to align its approach with that of the EU, with a special focus on social, gender, and territorial inequalities and inclusiveness, which are not Chinese priorities. The cost of these inequalities is huge: achieving full gender parity in Latin America would expand the region’s GDP by $2.6 trillion – the equivalent of Brazil’s economy. Closing the internet access gap and investing in skills will help reduce these inequalities in the region, especially among women and in rural areas, and help younger generations. The Global Gateway has been criticised for over-promising and under-delivering. The EU-LAC Digital Alliance offers an opportunity for the EU to show the worth of the Global Gateway and demonstrate that it can offer an alternative to the Chinese Digital Silk Road.

In this article we will talk about Russia's goals in 2014 and 2015, it will be analyzed from the categories of diplomacy, economy, and military directions. Throughout various periods in history, the leaders of the Russian state have consistently exhibited a profound fascination with the Black Sea region, particularly the Crimean peninsula and its strategically vital port of Sevastopol. Following Russia's defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, when it was compelled to comply with conditions imposed by France and England, including the relinquishment of its military base in Sevastopol, Russia has persistently pursued routes to gain control over Crimea and exploit its potential for dominating the Black Sea region. This pursuit remains ongoing to this day. During the era of Catherine the Great, Russia seized this strategically significant territory. However, in a later period, Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Social Republic, transferred this region to the Socialist Republic of Ukraine, where it remained under Ukrainian control even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Notably, for official Moscow, the port of Sevastopol retained immense importance for its geopolitical interests, as it was controlled through an agreement signed with Ukraine in 1997. This port plays a crucial role in supporting Russia's Black Sea Fleet, enabling it to project power in the region. Its significance was underscored during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, as well as earlier conflicts like the Abkhazia war, during which Russia deployed its armed forces from the port of Sevastopol. On the Crimean Peninsula before its annexation, there were two separate armies representing Ukraine and Russia respectively. Both sides were perceived as legitimate by the local population, and there was no doubt regarding their legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, in the 20th century, Khrushchev transferred the Crimean Peninsula to the Ukrainian Socialist Republic. However, since both territories were integral parts of the Soviet Socialist Republic, the transfer held more symbolic significance than strategic implications. At that time, nobody foresaw the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent struggle for a new balance of power in the region. Given the substantial Russian population residing in Crimea, fostering active cooperation with the Russian Federation held great importance. Exploiting this situation, Russia employed covert operations, including the infiltration of Kremlin operatives disguised as local militia personnel, to gather information and influence the local climate. Furthermore, the Kremlin carried out a propaganda campaign aimed at stoking skepticism towards both local and central authorities, thereby making the population more receptive to the Kremlin's policies. Undoubtedly, the Russian military played a substantial role in the annexation of Crimea. However, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant impact of Russian propaganda and agitation mentioned earlier. The events of 2014 served as a stark reminder that Russia's relations and attitudes towards the Western world and post-Soviet countries are not isolated or independent matters. Simultaneously, the expansion of the European Union and NATO towards the eastern borders, nearing Russia's vicinity, was perceived by the Kremlin as both a challenge and a threat, seen as encroaching upon Russian interests. Throughout history, Russia has consistently viewed Ukraine as an intrinsic part of the Slavic world, particularly the Russian sphere of influence. It has regarded Ukraine's role as that of a buffer state positioned between Europe and Russia. To impede Ukraine's inclination towards the West, Russia made considerable efforts to redirect its trajectory away from the European Union, utilizing figures like Viktor Yanukovych. Subsequently, following the notable events of the Maidan Revolution in 2014, Russia initiated an active military campaign. These actions underscored Ukraine's pivotal position within the Kremlin's interests, highlighting its significance to Russian geopolitical objectives. The events that unfolded in the heart of Kyiv in 2013, along with the preceding wave of protests, were sparked by the pro-Russian leader Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign Ukraine's Association Agreement with the European Union. These incidents escalated into violent clashes between protesters and state security forces, serving as a stark reminder of Russia's unwavering determination to extend its influence over the country. Consequently, by "recruiting" Ukraine into its fold, Russia aimed to establish an axis of absolute power within its leadership, leveraging the collaboration between the two states. Indeed, events unfolded in a manner that resulted in Russia experiencing a significant geopolitical setback. However, this setback did not deter Russia from pursuing its goals. Instead, it deliberately executed a two-fold campaign. The first objective was the annexation of Crimea, while the second involved fomenting a series of protests in eastern Ukraine, which eventually escalated into a full-fledged rebellion. By adopting this approach, Russia aimed to assert its control over Crimea and fuel unrest in eastern Ukraine, furthering its strategic interests in the region. All this was very easy for Russia and it achieved its goals practically without resistance because, at the local level, the local population received the Russian military forces as friendly and considered them saviors. While Putin's actions may appear contradictory to the goal of restoring the Soviet Union, it is evident that his primary objective is to maintain the current political system under his leadership. The ongoing events in Ukraine serve as a demonstration of how crucial internal stability is, particularly for Russian-speaking communities. Preserving his power and leadership within the existing political framework is of utmost importance to Putin. It is worth noting that the Russian economy has faced degradation in recent years, particularly following the 2008 financial crisis. Previously, Putin enjoyed an 80 percent popularity rating with the country experiencing a seven percent annual economic growth. However, the current situation has seen a slight decline in his popularity, now standing at around 60 percent. This decline coincided with a slowdown in economic growth, with the economy shrinking to 1.4 percent per year in 2013. Consequently, Russia, and specifically Putin, feared that this economic stagnation would not be temporary but rather become a systemic and irreversible issue. Russia feels threatened by the West. It is particularly unacceptable for it to expand the European Union, and especially NATO, closer to its borders. The Ukraine crisis has turned into a zero-sum game where the winner gets everything and the loser gets nothing. In 2010, Ukrainian President Yanukovych and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the Kharkiv Agreement, which entailed a lease agreement for Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. This agreement extended from 2017 to 2042 and included provisions such as discounted gas imports worth around 40 billion dollars for Ukraine. The primary objective of this strategic move was to safeguard the sovereignty of the Russian fleet in the region, particularly if Ukraine aligned itself with the Western world. However, it is important to note that Russia's motivations in the Ukrainian and Crimean conflicts were not solely focused on stabilization and de-escalation. Rather, it aimed to secure its naval power in the Black Sea region and maintain dominance over the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. This was done to mitigate potential threats that could undermine Russia's influence in the region. The Black Sea region holds significant economic influence for Russia, serving as a crucial transit route for its energy exports to Europe. Before the 2022 war, Russia accounted for over 25 percent of Europe's total oil exports, with approximately one-third being transported via oil tankers through the Black Sea. Moreover, the region acts as a gateway to the Middle East, facilitating partnerships between Russia and numerous countries. Consequently, the Black Sea region represents a vital economic asset for Russia. By annexing Crimea, Russia was able to secure its naval power and dominance in the area. It had further plans to develop Novorossiysk, one of its largest and most important shipping ports. Additionally, Russia had ambitious aspirations for the renewal of its Navy, which would be considered one of the most significant developments in the future. The implementation of these plans would bolster Russia's provision of navigation and enhance its control of sea lines and communication in the Black Sea. Russia would also increase its military and political exercises to exert control and prevent potential internal conflicts that could pose a threat. By safeguarding its economic and security interests in the Mediterranean, Russia aimed to improve economic dynamics and protect its economy. Overall, these actions aimed to strengthen Russia's position and influence in the Black Sea region. Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia gained the ability to construct and upgrade its bases in the Black Sea region, thereby bolstering its military power without interference from the West or Ukraine. The reconstruction of the Black Sea Fleet enables Russia to maintain sovereignty over Sevastopol and the broader Black Sea region. This provides an opportunity for Russia to enhance and modernize its military equipment, including coastal missiles, ground forces, aircraft, and transit routes. While the annexation of Crimea has granted Russia certain advantages, it has also created new risks of tensions and confrontations in the Black Sea region. Regional and external actors have mobilized against Russia in response to these developments, posing challenges and potential conflicts in the area. It is important to recognize that the annexation of Crimea has not only altered the geopolitical landscape but has also sparked concerns and opposition from various stakeholders in the region. The annexation of Crimea indeed served to bolster Russia's sovereignty and strengthen its control over the Black Sea Fleet, particularly in Sevastopol, as outlined in the Kharkiv Agreement. By gaining control over Crimea, Russia was able to secure and enhance its transit routes for energy exports to both Europe and Asia. Moreover, the inclusion of Crimea within the Russian Federation has reduced the pressure and influence exerted by external actors, most notably the United States and NATO. This has allowed Russia to exert greater control and diminish the influence of these external forces in the region. It is indeed possible to argue that Russia's involvement and motivations in Ukraine and Crimea were not primarily driven by a desire to reduce unrest or protect the pro-Russian population within Ukraine. Instead, the situation with pro-Russians provided a convenient justification for Putin to intervene. By portraying itself as the protector of the pro-Russian population and defending them against perceived Western forces, Putin was able to boost his popularity among the Russian population. Simultaneously, Russia aimed to establish itself as a dominant state in the diplomatic arena, showcasing its ability to assert its interests and challenge Western influence. Therefore, Putin's Russia seemed to have pursued dual objectives, leveraging the situation to both consolidate domestic support and enhance its position on the global stage. It is accurate to recognize that great powers strive to secure wealth and resources, as a strong economy leads to enhanced military power and defense capabilities. In this context, Russia's approach to the Black Sea region can be attributed to its pursuit of rich natural resources and strategic dominance, as well as the potential for profitable transit routes to Europe and Central Asia. The annexation of Crimea has presented opportunities for Russia to strengthen its economy and expand its influence in the region. One of Russia's key economic goals in the Black Sea region is to control important transit routes and energy exports to Europe, given its significant contribution to Europe's oil consumption, accounting for over 25 percent. Additionally, Ukraine plays a notable role in the global grain market, ranking seventh in grain exports in 2014-2015, with 37.9 million tons of wheat. By gaining control over these resources, Russia could secure substantial profits from the wheat trade, exert influence over market prices, and leverage this resource as a mechanism for influencing other states. The economic considerations associated with the Black Sea region align with Russia's aim to strengthen its economy, expand its market reach, and exert greater geopolitical influence. These factors highlight the economic motivations behind Russia's approach and engagement in the Black Sea region. Considering that Crimea now belongs to Russia, it becomes clear that one of the reasons why the annexation of the peninsula was carried out; Economic benefits and a window of opportunity that involves adjusting the role of the main player in the Black Sea region and excluding Western influences. Great powers also seek to gain land power through military means, as this is the best possible way to gain maximum control over the region. This means that the most important military assets for states are land forces, reinforced by strong air and naval forces. In other words, states try to strengthen their military potential to compete with the rest of the world, which consists of territorial hegemons. Before and during the Cold War era, the Black Sea region practically belonged to Russia, but after the collapse of the USSR, it became a more or less vulnerable region. However, in recent years, the actions of the United States and the West have forced Russia to strengthen its power in the region in order not to lose control and influence. In addition, another advantage of the Black Sea region from the Russian perspective is that this area is the way to the Middle East, where Russia has partnerships with many countries. Therefore, the Black Sea is a very important economic asset for Russia. Crimea, especially Sevastopol, plays a very important role for Russia since the Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed there. After Ukraine's independence, it became Russia's goal to maintain its navy and bases in Crimea. However, the problem, arising in the context of the Ukraine crisis, was the fear that if Ukraine were to be admitted to the EU under the 2013 agreement, it would affect Russia's influence and dominance in the Black Sea in the long term. The Kharkiv agreement would have given Russia the opportunity until 2042 to modernize and expand the Black Sea fleet. The annexation of Crimea, as well as the agreement signed in Kharkiv, increased the presence of the Russian fleet in the region and allowed it to begin the development of the Black Sea Fleet, which is assessed as one of the most ambitious military naval reforms in the region. This would further increase Russia's naval power in the long run. In conclusion, Russia has managed to secure the region for its good and thereby created a wider and better coastline for itself, which will strengthen Russia's military power in the future and thus reduce the influence of external actors on the Black Sea. Russia can improve the provision of navigation and maritime communication lines in the Black Sea. This will further increase military, economic, and political influence and prevent domestic conflicts, as well as eliminate the possibility of external pressures that could undermine Russia's security. Therefore, it can be argued from a futuristic perspective that if Russia's actions like this continue successfully, it will be able to protect its economy as well as its security interests in the Mediterranean.

A single European Union cleantech manufacturing capacity target should be based on an understanding of the situation in each cleantech sector. Securing a competitive edge in cleantech manufacturing has increasingly come to be seen as a priority for Europe. China’s dominance of this sector and the subsidies offered under the United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) (Kleimann et al, 2023), compelled the European Commission in February 2023 to publish a Green Deal Industrial Plan with the goal of boosting the European cleantech sector and speeding up the transition towards climate neutrality (European Commission, 2023a). The industrial plan’s regulatory pillar is the draft Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which includes a target for the European Union by 2030 to have the capacity to manufacture at least 40 percent of its cleantech deployment needs (European Commission, 2023b). Assessing Europe’s cleantech manufacturing capacity Meanwhile, basic facts on the status of cleantech manufacturing in Europe are missing from the discussion, which has so far been mainly about global shares of cleantech manufacturing capacity (Figure 1). When looked at from a high-level perspective, China is dominant but this perspective does not allow the situation in Europe to be captured fully. Figure 1: Regional shares of manufacturing capacity of selected clean technologies, 2021  To address this, we provide an overview of Europe’s current cleantech manufacturing capacity and compare it to current cleantech deployment levels. This assessment is useful for two reasons. First, it allows for a better appreciation of the scale of the EU’s manufacturing capacities. Second, it shows that adopting a one-size-fits-all 40 percent manufacturing target, as proposed under the NZIA, may make little sense considering the very different situations of different clean technologies. A caveat is here important. A significant share of European cleantech production is currently destined for export and not the EU domestic market. We ignore this trade dimension and compare only domestic cleantech manufacturing capacities to deployment levels, thus taking an approach that is similar to the NZIA and its 40 percent headline target. Our analysis covers the manufacturing and deployment levels of five technologies pinpointed by the NZIA: solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, wind turbines (onshore and offshore), electric vehicle batteries, heat pumps and electrolysers (Figure 2). A variable picture Figure 2 shows the limited scale of the EU solar PV industry. EU countries installed 41.4 GW of new solar PV capacity in 2022, while EU manufacturers only produced 1.7 GW of wafers, 1.37 GW of cells and 9.22 GW of modules (SolarPower Europe, 2023). In other words, EU solar manufacturers, had all their output been deployed in the EU, would have met only 4 percent, 3 percent, and 22 percent of solar deployment needs, respectively. For wind turbines, however, Europe is well placed. In 2022, EU countries installed 19.2 GW of new wind power capacity in 2022: 16.7 GW onshore and 2.5 GW offshore (Wind Europe, 2023). In 2021, for onshore wind capacity, EU manufacturers produced 17 GW worth of turbine blades, and more than 11 GW of nacelles and towers (Wind Europe, 2023), equivalent to 102 percent and 71 percent of the deployment needs of the following year. For offshore capacity, they produced blades, nacelles, and towers equivalent to 2.9 GW, 6.7 GW and 7 GW respectively (IEA, 2023), or the equivalent of 116 percent and 286 percent of the deployment needs of the following year. Meanwhile, over 90 percent of clean energy transition-related additions to battery capacity in the EU in 2021 were related to electric vehicles (Bielewski et al, 2022). European electric vehicle sales in 2021 amounted to 2.3 million units, roughly equivalent to a battery capacity of 156 GWh. But domestic battery manufacturing capacity hovered around 60 GWh, or the equivalent of about 38 percent of the domestic deployment needs (but currently representing only about 7 percent of global manufacturing capacity) (IEA, 2022). Heat pumps produced in Europe mostly serve the domestic market. In 2021, global heat pump production capacity (excluding air conditioners) was 120 GW. The EU contributed about 19 GW and accounted for 68 percent (Lyons et al, 2022) of Europe’s 2.18 million newly installed heat pumps. China supplies most compressors for air-air pumps, while Europe remains the main source for air-water and ground-source pumps. Finally, water electrolyser manufacturing capacity in Europe stands currently between 2 GW and 3.3 GW per year (Hydrogen Europe, 2022), many times more than the current installed capacity, which is equal to 0.16 GW (European Commission, 2023c). The wide disparity between the current manufacturing capacity and deployment is explained by delays between investment decisions and operational deployment, lack of hydrogen demand compared to supply capacity, and regulatory bottlenecks. It is noteworthy that EU electrolyser manufacturing capacity is still far from the 17.5 GW/year target set for 2030. Too easy for some, too hard for others One implication of this analysis is that applying the same 40 percent manufacturing target to each cleantech sector as set out in the NZIA proposal, may make little sense considering the very different situations of different clean technologies. For solar panels, reaching this target would be very challenging and likely very costly, while it would be much easier (and even too conservative) for other technologies, including wind turbines and batteries. It is also unclear to what extent the target would apply to the components and materials used in the identified clean technologies. This is a crucial issue, because access to these components is often a major bottleneck for domestic manufacturing in Europe (Le Mouel and Poitiers, 2023). Instead of setting cleantech production targets, the EU would better focus on facilitating private sector investment in cleantech by providing the right enabling framework conditions. That is the only course of action that might ultimately secure Europe a competitive edge in cleantech manufacturing.

In the given article, the focus will be on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a defining organization of collective security policy, representing the Western Hemisphere in the Black Sea region. The article will discuss the objectives and strategies of the organization, taking into account the role of Russia as one of the most significant actors in the region.  After the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, NATO began expanding eastward. Countries such as Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became members of the organization. During the time of the Cold War and the conflict with the USSR, some new members joined the NATO alliance, such as the Warsaw Pact countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland) and other post-Soviet states, including the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). These actions irritated Russia, especially when the NATO enlargement process continued in the Baltic region. Accordingly, to these events, excitement has followed the representatives of Russia’s Duma. The officials demanded the deployment of troops to ensure security and to enforce the idea of adding additional forces to the region in line with established parameters. However, one important detail is that despite the deployment of troops, several aerial and special operations were carried out in the region of the Baltic Sea, which included disrupting the line of command in the region and affecting the established procedures. An interesting thing that happened in 2009, during NATO expansion in 2009, the Kremlin did not go against the accession of Albania and Croatia, there were indirect statements from officials that the enlargement of NATO on the European continent is disturbing and undermines the security of the continent.  Accordingly, taking into account that each stage of NATO's expansion was exciting for Russia, and this stemmed from the fact that the very idea of this expansion was the formation of a united and strong Europe, which was also a prerequisite for the elimination of Russian influences, official Russia did not take pro-aggressive steps to exclude its proximity to the organization.  Despite Russia's warning that NATO should not expand to the East, this process continued. In 2008, NATO announced (at the Bucharest summit) that Ukraine and Georgia would become members, which Russia saw as a strategic threat, especially when Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Republic, was promised that NATO would not go East. The main reason why Russia reacted so strongly to the expansion was due to the geopolitical aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, which it believed would affect the country's security and strategic interests.  The Black Sea region has always been of great interest to NATO, this basin is a connecting link between the Caspian, Mediterranean, and Aegean seas, it is at the same time a very strategic corridor to connect with the Middle East, which doubled the interests of the great powers in the region, among them NATO. After the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region is in the interest of the USA and there were 3 specific reasons for this; The spread of democracy, cooperation in the field of security, and third and most important for the US, the diversification of energy resources. On the other hand, the democratic development of the independent states represented in this region and the convergence with the standards of the West and NATO turned out to be critically incompatible with the interests of Russia. It was also unacceptable for Moscow to develop energy projects on the European continent using the Black Sea region without him. Therefore, Russia, in order to prevent the countries of the region from achieving their goals and hindering their Euro-Atlantic integration, created and/or maintained control over the conflict centers in the region, which it then used for manipulation and coercion. In short, regardless of the variety of conflicts in the Black Sea region, each of them was and is being managed under Russian interests, be it the conflicts of Karabakh, Abkhazia-Tskhinvali, or Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  There are several reasons for the tension between Russia and NATO in the Black Sea region, the first of which is the concentration of a large number of Russian military forces in the region and the resulting conflicts. Second, the region is a kind of springboard where Russian and NATO military forces have to interact closely, which is also a source of constant tension.  On the other hand, It is rather interesting that despite the fact that in many cases NATO member states are driven by common interests, it happens that they have formed different visions for developing tactics to deal with existing challenges. One of the reasons why NATO is not properly represented in the Black Sea is Turkey and its recent policy. For example, in 2001, a multinational military-naval organization named "Blackseafor" was created on the initiative of Turkey. (BlackSeafor(2001). The member states of the organization were; Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. By creating this model, Turkey tried to increase its role by weakening NATO's representation in the Black Sea region, it even worked at some level, and one of the reasons why NATO's flank is currently the weakest in the Seven Sea region is the above-mentioned event. However, Turkey has a tense situation with Syria and it needs NATO defense systems, so it has to find a balance in the direction of cooperation between Russia and NATO in order to ensure the security of the region.  However, it should be noted that after joining NATO, Romania becomes an important springboard for the organization. At the Warsaw summit, it was Romania that came up with the initiative to create the NATO Black Sea Fleet, which received positive evaluations both in Berlin and in the NATO headquarters and Washington. Bulgaria used to be more restrained in the Black Sea, thus avoiding provoking Russia too much. But after the war between Ukraine and Russia, the policy has changed, since 2021, Bulgaria has been the head of the NATO naval training operations in the Black Sea, the name of the operation is "Breeze" and it was last held in July 2022, where 24 combat and support boats, 5 military aircraft, 4 helicopters, and up to 1400 soldiers participated. There were several goals and reasons for conducting these exercises, one of which was stated above to increase the alliance's interests in the Black Sea region, and the other was to at least weaken Russia's dominance and maritime monopoly.  The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the events taking place in the Black Sea are directly connected and affect the European security system. It should be noted that before the Warsaw Summit, NATO did not have a proactive plan regarding its role in the Black Sea region (2016). An agreement was reached at the Warsaw Summit, thus highlighting that improving the defense capabilities of partner countries is in direct interest with NATO's interests, which will ultimately strengthen European security. That is why the strengthening of Ukraine's military potential is considered to strengthen the eastern flank of the organization. But until the war is raging and the future/outcome of this conflict is still uncertain, it is rather impossible to speak clearly about the very future of the organization.