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Diplomacy
President Donald Trump poses for a photo with Amir of Qatar Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad Al Thani in Lusail Palace before an official State Dinner, Wednesday, May 14, 2025, in Doha, Qatar. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Trump signed plenty of contracts in the Middle East, but he’s no closer to the two ‘deals’ he really wants

by Shahram Akbarzadeh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском US President Donald Trump’s visit to Arab states in the Middle East this week generated plenty of multibillion-dollar deals. He said more than US$1 trillion (A$1.5 trillion) worth of deals had been signed with Saudi Arabia alone, though the real total is likely much lower than that. Qatar also placed an order for 210 Boeing aircraft, a deal worth a reported US$96 billion (A$149 billion). Trump will no doubt present these transactions as a major success for US industry. The trip also helped counter concerns about US disengagement from the Middle East. For more than a decade, local elites have viewed Washington’s attention as shifting away from the region. This trip was a reaffirmation of the importance of the Middle East – in particular the Gulf region – to US foreign policy. This is an important signal to send to Middle Eastern leaders who are dealing with competing interests from China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. And from a political standpoint, Trump’s lifting of sanctions on Syria and meeting with the former rebel, now president, Ahmed al-Sharaa was very significant – both symbolically and practically. Until recently, al-Sharaa was listed by the United States as a terrorist with a US$10 million (A$15 million) bounty on his head. However, when his forces removed dictator Bashar al-Assad from power in December, he was cautiously welcomed by many in the international community. The US had invested considerable resources in removing Assad from power, so his fall was cause for celebration, even if it came at the hands of forces the US had deemed terrorists. This rapid turn-around is dizzying. In practice, the removal of sanctions on Syria opens the doors to foreign investment in the reconstruction of the country following a long civil war. It also offers an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as Turkey, to expand their influence in Syria at the expense of Iran. For a leader who styles himself a deal-maker, these can all be considered successful outcomes from a three-day trip. However, Trump avoided wading into the far more delicate diplomatic and political negotiations needed to end Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and find common ground with Iran on its nuclear program. No solution in sight for the Palestinians Trump skirted the ongoing tragedy in Gaza and offered no plans for a diplomatic solution to the war, which drags on with no end in sight. The president did note his desire to see a normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel, without acknowledging the key stumbling block. While Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have no love for Hamas, the Gaza war and the misery inflicted on the Palestinians have made it impossible for them to overlook the issue. They cannot simply leapfrog Gaza to normalise relations with Israel. In his first term, Trump hoped the Palestinian issue could be pushed aside to achieve normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel. This was partially achieved with the Abraham Accords, which saw the UAE and three other Muslim-majority nations normalise relations with Israel. Trump no doubt believed the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreed to just before his inauguration would stick – he promised as much during the US election campaign. But after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire in March, vowing to press on with its indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, he’s learned the hard way the Palestinian question cannot easily be solved or brushed under the carpet. The Palestinian aspiration for statehood needs to be addressed as an indispensable step towards a lasting peace and regional stability. It was telling that Trump did not stop in Israel this week. One former Israeli diplomat says it’s a sign Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lost his leverage with Trump. There’s nothing that Netanyahu has that Trump wants, needs or [that he] can give him, as opposed to, say, the Saudis, the Qataris, [or] the Emiratis. More harsh rhetoric for Iran Trump also had no new details or initiatives to announce on the Iran nuclear talks, beyond his desire to “make a deal” and his repeat of past threats. At least four rounds of talks have been held between Iran and the United States since early April. While both sides are positive about the prospects, the US administration seems divided on the intended outcome. The US Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called for the complete dismantling of Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium as a sure safeguard against the potential weaponisation of the nuclear program. Trump himself, however, has been less categorical. Though he has called for the “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program, he has also said he’s undecided if Iran should be allowed to continue a civilian enrichment program. Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium, albeit under international monitoring, is a red line for the authorities in Tehran – they won’t give this up. The gap between Iran and the US appears to have widened this week following Trump’s attack on Iran as the “most destructive force” in the Middle East. The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi called Trump’s remarks “pure deception”, and pointed to US support for Israel as the source of instability in the region. None of this has advanced the prospects of a nuclear deal. And though his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE was marked by pomp and ceremony, he’ll leave no closer to solving two protracted challenges than when he arrived.

Defense & Security
A distressed person behind barbed wire, with an airplane symbol above on a blue background. Concept of immigration deportation and removal policy

From Promised Land to Forced Exodus: Faces of Deportation in Latin America and the Caribbean

by Rocío de los Reyes Ramírez

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract: Migration policies in Latin America and the Caribbean have adopted a more restrictive and punitive approach, influenced by external pressures, especially from the United States. Deportations, detentions and dissuasive measures have intensified, in a context of increasing criminalisation of migrants. Cases such as El Salvador and the Dominican Republic reflect the use of severe control strategies, which have been criticised for possible human rights violations. These practices, although justified on security grounds, generate regional tensions and deepen the vulnerability of displaced populations. Keywords:Latin America, migration, Donald Trump, Ibero-America, deportations, forced returns. Introduction Deportations in Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone significant changes in recent years, reflecting both migration dynamics and international policies. The region has witnessed an increase in migratory movements, driven by economic crises, political conflicts and natural disasters. Latin American population movement configurations have been immersed in a dynamic whose magnitude and urgency have intensified since the beginning of 2025: that of forced returns and mass deportations, driven by changes in the migration policies of receiving countries such as the United States and Mexico. The re-election of Donald Trump has marked a tightening of immigration control measures, with an increase in raids and expulsions of undocumented migrants. But this is not a new phenomenon: mass deportations and forced returns in Latin America have deep roots in the region's history, with moments of particular intensity in different periods. It is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it exclusive to contemporary dynamics. Throughout its history, the region has been the scene of multiple processes of expulsion, forced return and internal displacement, intimately linked to contexts of political violence, economic change, structural racism and state strategies of population control. Already during the 19th century, the consolidation of nation states brought with it policies of exclusion that sought to shape national identity to the detriment of certain groups. In Mexico, after the 1910 Revolution, the Chinese community was persecuted and expelled in an episode that combined racism, economic crisis and exacerbated nationalism.1 In Argentina, during the 1880s, the military campaigns known as the "Conquest of the Desert" provoked massive forced displacements of indigenous peoples to marginal areas, marking a pattern of invisibilisation and internal expulsion.2 In the Caribbean, the dynamics of deportation were also marked by racial and economic conflicts. The Dominican Republic, under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in the 1930s, carried out the so-called “Parsley Massacre” (1937), where thousands of Haitians were killed or forcibly expelled in order to 'whiten' the border and reaffirm Dominican national identity³. And in Cuba, after the triumph of the 1959 Revolution, the flow of political exiles to the United States intensified, generating waves of departures that, in some cases, were accompanied by pressure and coercion from the Castro regime. Central America in the second half of the 20th century was marked by civil wars and authoritarian regimes. El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua experienced profound humanitarian crises that provoked a massive flight of their citizens. Many of these refugees were received in Mexico, Costa Rica or the United States, but after the Peace Accords of the 1990s, forced return policies emerged that did not always provide adequate conditions for reintegration. The case of Guatemala is emblematic: the return of refugees from Mexico, coordinated in part by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was fraught with difficulties, as many of the returnees were returning to territories still without security guarantees.3 The United States played a key role in contemporary deportation processes. The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 was a paradigm shift, facilitating the deportation of immigrants convicted of minor crimes, which particularly affected Latin American communities.4 Honduras and El Salvador were particularly hard hit by these policies. Many of the young deportees had lived most of their lives on US soil and, upon their return to contexts of poverty and violence, found in gangs, such as MS-13 and Barrio 18, a means of survival and even a sense of belonging.5 Similarly, in South America, the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s also resorted to exile and deportation as mechanisms of political control. In Chile, following the 1973 coup d'état, tens of thousands of people were forced into exile, and opponents captured abroad were often smuggled into the country under the coordination of Operation Condor. Argentina replicated these patterns, using illegal deportations and forced disappearances as systematic tools of political repression. More recently, in the insular Caribbean, contemporary dynamics also reveal patterns of selective deportation. In the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, deportations of Haitian and Venezuelan migrants in an irregular situation have intensified in recent years, often in conditions of human rights violations, reproducing old logics of racial and socio-economic exclusion. These examples show that deportations in Latin America and the Caribbean are not isolated or temporary events: they are part of structural patterns that have accompanied state-building processes, the dynamics of internal violence and international population control strategies. Today, in a scenario of growing migratory pressure and increasingly restrictive policies in the main receiving countries, the region is once again facing old challenges in new forms. The echoes of history resound in the new faces of forced exodus, marking a present in which mass expulsions once again occupy a central place on the regional agenda. The United States and the tightening of immigration policy The arrival of Donald Trump for a second presidential term in January 2025 marked an even more severe shift in US immigration policy. While his first administration (2017-2021) had already been marked by restrictive measures, his return to power brought with it not only the restoration of old border control programmes, but also their radicalisation, in a context of growing domestic pressure and political polarisation. Trump has not only taken up policies such as the "Remain in Mexico" policy or the limitation of access to asylum: he has also expanded the margins of action of immigration agencies, hardening the official rhetoric against migrants -especially Latin Americans- and rescuing old legal instruments to justify new practices of accelerated deportation. This new phase is characterised by a combination of administrative, legal and operational measures that seek to deter irregular migration through the restriction of rights, the intensive use of detention and deportation, and the strengthening of pressure mechanisms on countries of origin and transit.   One of the first symbolic and practical steps of this new policy was the reinstatement of the programme officially known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), more popularly known as “Remain in Mexico”. It had originally been implemented in 2019, during his first term, and partially suspended during Joe Biden's administration from 20216. However, after his re-election, Trump not only reactivated it, but also tightened it, broadening its scope and further reducing the possibilities for asylum seekers to await processing on US soil. On 20 January 2025, the US president signed the executive order to reinstate this programme, which obliges asylum seekers to wait in Mexican territory while their cases are resolved in US courts.7 This has led to diplomatic tensions between the two countries. The president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, has expressed her rejection of this policy, describing it as a unilateral decision that affects national sovereignty and the human rights of migrants. The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, reiterated that Mexico is not obliged to accept this measure and that mechanisms will be sought to protect the migrants affected.8 While in its initial version the programme had already forced tens of thousands of asylum seekers to stay in Mexican border cities - leading to the formation of makeshift camps in places such as Matamoros and Tijuana - the reinstatement in 2025 accentuated this phenomenon. More categories of applicants, including minors and persons in vulnerable situations, are now susceptible to refoulement, increasing the pressure on border areas characterised by insecurity, poverty and criminal violence.9 Thus, the camps, which already existed precariously since the first implementation of the programme, have expanded and degraded throughout 2025, creating even more severe humanitarian emergencies. International organisations and human rights organisations have warned that the reactivation and tightening of the MPP violates essential principles of international law, such as non-refoulement, and exposes applicants to serious risks of violence, kidnapping and human trafficking.10 The Mexican government, for its part, has implemented some measures to support migrants, such as the "ConsulApp" application and the "Mexico te abraza" plan (Mexico hugs you), but challenges remain in ensuring their safety and well-being.11 Ultimately, this would tie in with the implementation of 'safe third country' agreements, as some analysts have interpreted it. And although Mexico has not signed any protocols, in practice, these current policies de facto position it in this role. This is because during Donald Trump's first term in office, the US signed agreements with several Central American countries to designate them as “safe third countries”.12 These include Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. These agreements required asylum seekers passing through these countries to seek protection there before arriving in the US. It was a controversial move that generated criticism of conditions in these countries and their capacity to handle the flow of migrants. Although formally presented as instruments to share the burden of international protection, in practice these protocols served to divert and contain asylum seekers in nations that did not have the material and legal conditions to guarantee their safety and basic rights. Particularly in the case of Guatemala, which was the only one to actually implement them in 2019, reports documented how migrants transferred from the US faced a total absence of effective asylum procedures, lack of humanitarian protection, and direct exposure to extreme violence and poverty.13 During the Biden administration (2021-2024), these agreements were formally suspended, however, it appears that the door is now being reopened. The new administration has signalled its intention to renegotiate and expand these instruments. In this way, they are once again at the centre of a more aggressive migration containment strategy, de facto limiting access to asylum in the US and increasing the vulnerability of thousands of migrants expelled to unsafe territories. El Salvador, for its part, has emerged in 2025 as the first Latin American country to formalise an agreement that, without officially naming itself as a "safe third country", operates de facto as such. The agreement, announced by President Nayib Bukele himself as "unprecedented", establishes that El Salvador will accept migrants deported from the United States - including those considered highly dangerous - coming not only from the Central American Northern Triangle, but also from other regions of the continent and the Caribbean.14 Unlike the Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACAs) signed in 2019 and suspended in 2021, this new pact is not limited to the processing of asylum applications but directly assumes the reception and custody of deported persons, with no guarantee that they will be able to restart a regular migration process. Various sources agree that this is an advanced form of border externalisation: the northern giant transfers not only the management of flows, but also the custody of people considered undesirable or dangerous.15 Although the agreement has not been accompanied by specific legal reforms in the US, it has been consolidated through bilateral negotiations that contemplate financial compensation for El Salvador. Human rights organisations have warned that this strategy could be replicated with other governments receptive to these cooperation formulas in exchange for financial incentives. In this context, negotiation attempts have already begun with Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Colombia,16 countries that are being considered to host regional asylum processing centres. Although these mechanisms have not been formalised as "safe third country agreements" in the strict sense, several organisations have warned that they operate under a similar logic: the transfer of migratory responsibilities to nations with limited institutional capacity and contexts of violence or political crisis.17 The "pact" with El Salvador also contemplates the use of national penitentiary centres to detain a large part of these deportees, without a detailed analysis of their legal situation. Although mention has been made of the sending of some profiles considered to be at risk to the Terrorism Confinement Centre (Spanish: Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo, abbreviated CECOT), the implications of this prison model deserve specific treatment, which will be addressed in the following section. Along with the reinstatement of this programme, the new US administration has pushed through a series of measures that further restrict access to the right to asylum for those seeking to enter the US from Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the main changes has been the reintroduction of stricter standards for the initial submission of asylum applications. Migrants must now demonstrate from the outset a "credible fear" of persecution with strong documentary evidence,18 a much higher standard of proof than in previous years. This policy has drastically reduced the percentage of applicants who make it through the first asylum interview. Similarly, as part of the tightening of these immigration policies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has experienced a significant expansion of its powers. This expansion has translated into both an increase in its budget and greater operational discretion to carry out detentions and deportations. During 2025, the budget allocated to ICE increased by 15% over the previous year, reaching record amounts to fund detention centres, internal patrol operations and tracking technology for undocumented immigrants.19 This budget boost has allowed for increased detention operations in places considered "sensitive", such as hospitals, schools and churches, which were previously relatively protected under more restrictive guidelines. But ICE's expansion has not been limited to issues of operational volume, but also of legal scope. The use of internal administrative warrants (without judicial intervention) for the detention of immigrants suspected of minor immigration infractions has been reactivated.20 This measure has been widely criticised by human rights organisations, which point to the weakening of procedural safeguards for detainees and the risk of arbitrary detention. ICE has also strengthened its cooperation with state and local police forces through programmes such as 287(g), which allow police officers to act as immigration agents.21  This collaboration has been particularly controversial in states such as Texas and Florida, where racial profiling and civil rights violations have been reported. The tightening of detention practices has had a direct impact on Latin America and the Caribbean, with a significant proportion of those deported in 2025 coming from countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and, to an increasing extent, Venezuela and Haiti. Thus, the expansion of ICE's power has not only transformed the internal migration landscape in the US but has also intensified the dynamics of forced return throughout the region. However, the shift towards a more punitive approach is not limited to contemporary operational frameworks: the current government has also begun to recover legal tools from the past, such as the Alien Enemies Act, to legitimise new forms of exclusion, detention and deportation. This is a 1798 law that allows the executive to detain and deport citizens of countries considered enemies in times of war. Although historically this law has been applied in wartime contexts, such as during the Second World War, its invocation in a period of peace has generated intense legal and political controversy.22 On 14 March 2025, Trump signed a presidential proclamation designating the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang as a national security threat, calling their presence in the US an "irregular invasion". Under this justification, it authorised the immediate detention and deportation of Venezuelan citizens suspected of links to the organisation, without the need for warrants or conventional legal processes. The president later denied having signed it, attributing the responsibility to his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.23 The implementation of this measure resulted in the accelerated deportation of hundreds of Venezuelans to El Salvador, many of whom had no criminal record and some of whom had legal immigration status in the US, including Temporary Protected Status (TPS).24 Civil rights organisations, such as the ACLU, filed lawsuits alleging that the application of the law violated due process and constitutional protections. 25In response, several federal judges issued orders temporarily halting deportations and requiring judicial hearings before any deportations. But despite the judicial restrictions, the administration continued with the deportations, arguing that the orders did not apply to flights already underway or over international waters. This stance was criticised for defying judicial authority and for using a wartime law for contemporary immigration policy purposes.26 The reactivation of the Alien Enemies Act in 2025 has sparked a national debate on the limits of executive power and the protection of immigrant rights, highlighting the tension between national security and civil liberties in US immigration policy. Not only that: all these measures have generated a wave of mass deportations that have not only overwhelmed the capacity of reception systems in Latin American countries, but have also had a direct impact on the structure of separated families and local communities, often lacking the resources to provide adequate reintegration processes. In Mexican border cities such as Ciudad Juárez, Matamoros and Tijuana, makeshift camps have multiplied, where thousands of people who have been deported or are awaiting a migration resolution live in extremely precarious conditions, as mentioned above. In Central America and the Caribbean, the forced return of migrants - some of them with weak links to their countries of origin or with criminal records - has reactivated dynamics of exclusion, stigmatisation and, in some cases, violence. Taken together, these actions reflect a regional trend towards the externalisation and criminalisation of migration, where migration responsibilities are shifted to countries in the global south and managed through punitive rather than humanitarian strategies. The consequences of these measures are not only individual but also reshape the social and political fabric of the entire region. Detention centres and new deportation dynamics Recent transformations in US immigration policy have not only translated into regulatory and diplomatic tightening: they have also reconfigured places of confinement and removal processes. Mass deportationsalready being pushed since 202327 , have now coincided with a renewed detention architecture, in which confinement and surveillance are not limited to US territory but projected beyond its borders. This phenomenon has given rise to new dynamics of migration management, in which detention centres play a central role. In addition to ICE detention centres on US soil, there is now a network of prison and surveillance facilities located in countries receiving deportees, frequently promoted or supported by Washington under the bilateral security cooperation agreements we have been discussing. The most visible case is that of the CECOT (Terrorism Confinement Center) in El Salvador which, although initially conceived as a tool against local gangs, has begun to receive Salvadoran citizens deported from the US with criminal records.28 The use of this type of facility marks a worrying twist: the systematic criminalisation of deportees and their immediate insertion into highly restrictive prison circuits. The policy of automatic association between migration and criminality has led many deportees to be considered not as citizens to be reintegrated, but as threats to be neutralised. This logic is reinforced by the Salvadoran government's narrative, which has actively promoted CECOT's image of success before the international community, using figures on homicide reduction and territorial control as arguments of legitimacy, albeit with a strong questioning of judicial opacity and arbitrary detentions.29 This transnational prison model has profound human rights, social reintegration and regional security implications. Far from offering sustainable solutions, it reinforces the stigmatisation of returned migrants and multiplies barriers to their inclusion in communities of origin. In turn, it turns countries such as El Salvador into functional extensions of the US immigration and penal system, fuelling political and social tensions.30 When in March 2025, the US deported 238 Venezuelan nationals to CECOT on charges of belonging to the Tren de Aragua criminal group, the move was widely criticised by human rights organisations and international governments as a violation of due process and the fundamental rights of migrants. The Salvadoran government, for its part, defended the action, claiming that the deportees were "proven criminals" and that their incarceration in this centre was part of a strategy to combat transnational organised crime.31 However, relatives of the detainees and humanitarian organisations have denounced that many were identified as members of the Tren de Aragua based solely on tattoos or physical characteristics, without concrete evidence. The situation has generated diplomatic tensions, especially with Venezuela, whose government has requested the intervention of international bodies to protect its citizens and has described the deportations as a "crime against humanity".32 To date, there is no record of similar agreements between the US and other Latin American countries, such as Guatemala or Honduras, to receive deported migrants in high-security prisons. Although these countries have announced plans to build mega-prisons, there is no public evidence that they are being used to house deportees from the US. In parallel, the so-called policy of self-deportation has gained momentum: an increasingly documented phenomenon in which thousands of migrants voluntarily choose to return to their countries of origin in fear of being arrested, separated from their families or detained in inhumane conditions. This practice, indirectly promoted by the tightening of the legal and police environment, represents a form of covert expulsion, in which the state does not need to apply force: it is enough to install fear. 33 The Trump administration has intensified this strategy through various measures. These include the implementation of the CBP Home app, which allows undocumented immigrants to manage their voluntary departure from the country. In addition, "incentivised self-deportation" programmes have been announced, offering financial assistance and coverage of transportation costs to those who decide to return to their countries of origin. These initiatives have been presented as humanitarian solutions, although they have been criticised by human rights organisations as coercive and discriminatory. The government has also imposed economic sanctions on immigrants with active deportation orders, such as daily fines of up to a thousand dollars, with the aim of pressuring them to leave the country voluntarily. These policies have been accompanied by media campaigns displaying images of immigrants arrested and charged with serious crimes, seeking to reinforce the perception of threat and justify the measures adopted. These actions have generated a climate of fear and uncertainty among migrant communities, leading many to opt for self-deportation as the only alternative to avoid detention and family separation. However, experts warn that this decision may have long-term legal consequences, such as the impossibility of applying for visas or re-entering the country for several years.34 It has come to the point, last week, of arresting Hannah Dugan, a Miilwaukee County judge by the FBI, allegedly accused of assisting a documented immigrant who was to be detained.35 In this context, the self-deportation policy is yet another tool in the Trump administration's restrictive and punitive approach to migration, prioritising deterrence and control over the protection of human rights and the search for comprehensive solutions to the migration phenomenon. The proliferation of self-deportations and increasing allegations of human rights violations soon escalated into the judicial arena. As claims of arbitrary detention, inhumane conditions of confinement and family separation increased, various courts began to examine the legal limits of these policies. The climax came in April 2025 with the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. J. G. G. G.36 , which assessed the constitutionality of certain expedited deportation practices applied to Venezuelan and Central American asylum seekers. Although the Court did not completely invalidate the executive measures, it did set important limits: it recognised the right to a pre-removal hearing in cases where there is a credible risk of persecution and called on Congress to urgently review the immigration legal framework.37 In addition, the court ruled that legal challenges must be brought in the district where the detainees are located, in this case, Texas, and not in Washington D.C. This Supreme Court ruling marks a turning point. While it does not dismantle the mass deportation apparatus, it introduces legal brakes that could slow down or modulate its application. Congress, under pressure from the ruling, now faces the challenge of reforming a dysfunctional, polarised and increasingly judicialised immigration system. In the short term, federal agencies such as ICE and CBP will have to adjust their operational protocols to avoid litigation, which could generate internal tensions and new immigration outsourcing strategies. Ultimately, this decision opens a new scenario in which immigration policies will have to face not only social and international scrutiny, but also the limits imposed by constitutional law and the US judicial system. Expulsions in the Caribbean: the case of the Dominican Republic In the context of a regional tightening of migration policies, the Dominican Republic has significantly intensified its efforts to control irregular immigration, especially from Haiti. Under the administration of President Luis Abinader, a policy of mass deportations has been implemented, which has raised concerns both domestically and internationally. The deportations have taken place against a backdrop of growing social fear of cross-border crime and the infiltration of armed actors from the neighbouring country. In this context, the government has reinforced border control with a combination of military presence, surveillance technology and migration deterrence measures. Between January and December 2024, the Dominican authorities deported more than 276,000 foreigners in an irregular migratory situation, the majority of whom were Haitian nationals38 . This figure represents a significant increase compared to previous years and reflects a systematic and sustained deportation policy.39 Precisely in October 2024, the government announced a plan to deport up to 10,000 Haitians per week, which intensified operations across the country. These operations include raids in neighbourhoods, arrests in hospitals and the demolition of informal settlements inhabited by Haitians. One of the most controversial practices has been the deportation of pregnant and lactating Haitian women directly from public hospitals. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and UN experts have condemned these actions as inhumane and discriminatory. Cases have been documented of women being deported while in labour , putting their health and that of their children at risk.40 The Dominican government defends these policies as necessary to maintain order and national security, arguing that they are carried out in accordance with the law. However, international criticism has mounted, with allegations that these mass deportations violate fundamental human rights and aggravate the humanitarian crisis in Haiti. The situation has generated diplomatic tensions between the two countries and has been the subject of concern from the international community, which is urging the Dominican Republic to review its migration policies and ensure respect migrants' rights. This case exemplifies the challenges faced by Latin American and Caribbean countries in managing migration flows, especially when humanitarian crises, security policies and bilateral tensions are combined. Ultimately, the Dominican response - although framed by legitimate sovereignty concerns - also raises profound questions about the proportionality of measures, respect for due process and regional co-responsibility in the face of the Haitian collapse. Conclusion The Latin American and Caribbean region is going through a critical moment in terms of migration. Recent waves of mass deportations, forced returns - direct or induced - and new border control strategies have deepened a regional crisis that has been brewing for years. These dynamics, far from being isolated phenomena, are part of a systematic strategy of migration containment promoted by the US, where political discourse and practice have turned migrants into scapegoats for all national ills. Donald Trump has been the most visible - and aggressive - face of this policy. His obsession with migrants, especially those from Latin America and the Caribbean, has resulted in an institutional architecture designed to curb mobility at any cost. Under his leadership, not only have physical and legal walls on the southern border been reinforced, but programmes such as "Remain in Mexico", safe third country agreements and, more recently, the controversial use of regulations such as the Alien Enemies Act have been promoted. At the core of this strategy is a profoundly punitive vision that identifies the migrant as a threat, a potential enemy or an invader, thus legitimising policies of mass exclusion and systematic expulsion. The impact of these policies in Latin America and the Caribbean is profound. Beyond the numbers, what is at stake is the stability of societies already marked by inequality, violence and institutional fragility. Mass deportations - affecting not only border crossers but also those who had already put down roots in the US - are overwhelming the capacities of receiving states. Every week, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic receive contingents of returnees who must be reintegrated in contexts of structural precariousness. In this context, the arrival of thousands of deported or self-deported Venezuelans in places such as CECOT in El Salvador illustrates a new phase: the direct criminalisation of migrants. The use of mega-prisons as a migration management tool represents a worrying drift, where security replaces integration and fear replaces law. Alongside this, the policy of self-deportations has gained strength, a form of covert expulsion in which the state does not need to apply force: it is enough to install fear. Families choose to return voluntarily for fear of being detained, separated or held in inhumane conditions. In recent months, this practice has even been economically incentivised, with programmes promoted by the Trump Administration offering to pay for the return ticket, as if it were a favour, when in reality it is a forced flight disguised as a personal choice. This has generated a far-reaching reconfiguration of migration. The fracturing of family networks, the interruption of the flow of remittances and the uncertainty over the legal status of millions of people have altered not only regional mobility, but also the economic models that depend on exile as a source of income. Remittances, which represent a significant percentage of GDP in countries such as Honduras and El Salvador, are threatened by these return policies, directly affecting consumption, community investment and the ability to sustain millions of households. Moreover, the legal and judicial system now faces its own limits. The intervention of the US Supreme Court has highlighted the constitutional challenges to these measures, opening a space for legal dispute over how far the executive can go in its crusade against migration. However, the effects are already underway. The reality is that many Latin American and Caribbean countries are assuming, voluntarily or forcibly, the role of advanced border of the global North. The overall balance is bleak: a utilitarian vision of human mobility is imposed, whose fate depends more on electoral cycles in the north than on their fundamental rights. However, resistance is also emerging: from the courts to the streets, through grassroots organisations, solidarity networks and proposals for fairer regional policies. The future of mass deportations is not set in stone. It will be decided in multiple scenarios: in presidential speeches in Washington, but also in the legal decisions of the courts; in public policies in Bogotá, San Salvador or Santo Domingo, but also in the mobilisation capacity of the societies affected. Latin America and the Caribbean have an opportunity and a responsibility: not to resign themselves to the role of passive recipients of an imposed policy, but to build a regional strategy for mobility, rights and dignity. References 1 CHAO ROMERO, Robert. The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940. University of Arizona Press, 2010.2 VIÑAS, David. Indians, army and frontier. Siglo XXI Editores, 1982.3 FERRER ,Ada. Cuba: An American History. Scribner, 2021.4 AMERICAS ALLIANCE. 28 years of IIRIRA: a horrible legacy of a white supremacist and deeply xenophobic immigration law. 30/9/24. Available at: htt p s://w w w.alianzaamericas..Note: All hyperlinks are active as of 3 May 2025.5 AMBROSIUS, Christian. Deportations and the Roots of Gang Violence in Central America. School of Business & Economics. Discussion Paper, Berlin, 12/2018. Available at: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/fub188/22554/discpa p er2018_12.6 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL. A Guide to the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), update 2025. Available at: https://www.am e ricanimmigrationcouncil.7 MARÍN, Rossana. "El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de EE. UU. restableció el programa migratorio 'Quédate en México'", INFOBAE. 22/1/2025. Available at: https://www.infobae.com/estados-unidos/2025/01/21/el-departamento-de-seguridad-nacional-de-eeuu-restablecio-el-prog r8 RIVERA, Fernanda. "México se opone al regreso del programa 'Quédate en México'", Meganoticias. 20/1/25. Available at: https://www.m e ganoticias.mx/cdmx/noticia/mexico-se-opone-al-regreso-del-programa-quedate-en-mexico/587032.9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. The 'Migrant Protection Protocols' and Human Rights Violations in Mexico. Special Report, 2020. Available at: https:// w w w.hrw.10 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Precautionary Measures on the "Stay in Mexico" Programme. 2025. Available at: https://www . oas.org/en /11 CAMHAJI, Elías. "México aguarda con preocupación la avalancha de decretos migratorios de Trump", El País. 20/1/25. Available at: https:// e lp ais.com/mexico/2025-01-20/mexico-aguarda-con-preocupacion-la-avalancha-de-decretos-migratorios-de-trump.12 The concept of a "safe third country" originates from the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1951. According to this convention, when a person applies for asylum in one country, that country can refer him or her to another country that offers the same guarantees of protection. However, goodwill is not enough; the receiving country must meet certain requirements to be considered "safe".13 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL. Deportation with stopover: Failure of the protection measures established by the Cooperation Agreement on Asylum signed between the United States and Guatemala. 10/6/20. Available at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/report s -briefs/deportacion-con-escala-fracaso-de-las14 EL MUNDO NEWSPAPER. US and El Salvador finalise 'unprecedented' asylum agreement: Bukele". 3/2/2025. Available at: https://diario.elmundo.sv/politica/eeuu-y-el-sa l15 BBC NEWS MUNDO. "Bukele agrees with US to accept deportees of other nationalities, including 'dangerous criminals' in prison". 4/2/25. Available at: https://ww w .bbc.com/mundo/ a16 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL. Migration outsourcing: new agreements under analysis with Haiti, Dominican Republic and Colombia. Special report, March 2025.17 RANRUN.ES. "International civil society denounces that externalising the US border will not stop migrants".11/4/25. Available at: https://run r un.es/noticias/501342/sociedad-civil-civil-sociedad-civil-internacional-denuncian-que-externalizar-la-frontera-ee –18 U. S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. Credible Fear Screening and Interview Process, update 2025. Available at: http s ://www.usci s .19 GILBERTO BOSQUES CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. "La política migratoria de EE. UU. y su impacto en América Latina", Informe Especial. April 2025. Available at: https:/ / www.gob.mx/sre/acciones-y-programas/centro-de-estudios-internacionales-gilberto-bosques20 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. "The United States: A Migration System that Criminalises. Report 2025. Available at: https://www.amnesty . o rg/en/latest21 ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union). Police-ICE collaboration under the 287(g) program. Analysis paper updated in 2025. Available at: https:// w ww.a c lu.22 PIEMONTESE, Antonio. "'Alien Enemies Act', what the 1798 law invoked by Trump to repatriate alleged Venezuelan gang members says". WIRED. 10/3/25. Available at: htt p s://en.wired. dice-la-ley-de-1798-invocada-por-trump-para-repatriar-a-supuestos-pandilleros-venezolanos.23 THE REPUBLIC. "Trump denies signing proclamation invoking the Alien Enemies Act to deport Venezuelan migrants". 22/3/25. Available at: https://larepublica.pe/mundo/2025/03/22/donald-trump-niega-haber-firmado-la-proclamacion-invocando-la-ley-de-enem i24 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a US humanitarian programme that grants protection to nationals of countries affected by armed conflict, natural disasters or other extraordinary circumstances.25 INFOBAE. "US civil organisations question the deportation of Venezuelans". 17/3/25. Available at: https://www.infobae.com/america/agenc i.26 CNN. "Several federal judges issued orders to temporarily halt the deportations and require judicial hearings before any removals. But despite the judicial restraints, the Administration continued the deportations." 9/4/25. Available at: https://cnnesp a nol.cnn.com/2025/04/09/eeuu/judges-block-deportations-some-people-read-foreign-enemies e27 TELEMUNDO. The U.S. quintuples its deportations this year and considers more and more migrants as inadmissible". 17/9/23. Available at: www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/inmigracion/estados-unidos-ha-deportado-a-mas-de-380000-personas-en-los-ultimos - si-rc n28 EL PAÍS. "Bukele opens the CECOT mega-prison to deportations from the USA". 7/2/25. Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2025-02-07/bu k ele-abre-el-mega p risiones-del-cecot-a-deportados-de-eeuu..29 EL PAÍS. "Bukele's mega-prison, symbol of his war against the gangs, arouses international alarm". 23/3/23. Available at: https://elpais .30 MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Satellite States: The Prison Externalisation of Migration in Central America, n.º 54. 2025, pp. 45-63.31 LAS AMÉRICAS NEWSPAPER. "El Salvador defends the deportation of Venezuelans from the USA and links them to organised crime". 19/3/25. Available in: http s :32 NEWSWEEK, El Salvador. "Venezuela says sending US migrants to Salvadoran jail is "crime against humanity"". 18/3/25. Available at: https://newsweekespanol.com/elsalvador/2025/03/18/v e nezuela-dice-que-envio-de-migrantes –33 EL PAÍS. "Trump fills the White House gardens with photos of arrested immigrants to celebrate his first 100 days". 29/4/25. Available at: https://elp a is.com/us/immigracion/2025-04-28/trump-llena-los-jardines-de-la-casa-blanca-de-fotos-de-inmigrantes-arrestados-para-c e lebrar-sus-primeros-100-dias..34 COLOMÉ, Carla Gloria. "El gobierno de Trump celebra el aumento de las autodeportaciones: "Estamos viendo niveles altísimos de migración inversa", El País. 2/4/25. Available at: https://elpais.com/us/migracion/2025-04-02/el-gobierno-de-trump-celebra-el-aumento-de-las-autodeportaciones-e s tam o s-viendo-niveles-altisimos-de-migracion-inversa.html.35 COL, Devan. "Indictment against Wiscosin judge underscores Trump administration's aggressive approach to immigration enforcement", CNN USA 25/4/25. Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/04/25/eeuu / indictment-j u eza-wisconsin-aggressive-approach-trump-immigration-trax-law.36 Trump v. J.G.G. is the tentative name used by some media and legal documents to refer to a recent and significant court case before the U.S. Supreme Court in April 2025. The case pits the federal government, led by the Donald Trump Administration, against a migrant identified by his initials J.G.G., in protection of his identity, as is customary in immigration and human rights proceedings.37 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Trump v. J.G.G. Opinion of the Court, April 2025. Available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20 2 5/tr ump_ v _jgg.html (accessed 28 April 2025).38 CNN EN ESPAÑOL. "La República Dominicana deportó en 2024 a 276.000 haitianos". 2/1/25. Available at: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/01/02/latinoame r ic a39 TELEMUNDO NOTICIAS. "Dominican Republic intensifies deportations of Haitians: 10,000 per week". 12/12/2024. Available at: https://www.telemundo.com/noticias/noticias-telemundo/internacional/republica-dominicana-deportaciones-masivas- h aitianos-10000-una-semana-r40 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. "Deportations of pregnant women in the Dominican Republic". November 2024. Available at: https: / /www.a m nesty.org/en/documents/amr27/8597/2024/en/ "Statement on mass deportations in the Dominican Republic". November 2024. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/es/documents/amr27/8597/2024 /

Diplomacy
Concept image of USA - Vietnam trade war, Economy conflict, US tariffs on exports, Trade frictions

Opinion – The US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in its Second Year

by Julian McBride

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The United States and Vietnam, former adversaries but now significant trading partners, are in their second year of the comprehensive strategic partnership, further improving their ties. In 2025, the comprehensive strategic partnership makes a major two-year milestone as both America and Vietnam are thirty years into normalization, as five decades ago, both countries were intertwined in one of the most deadly wars in modern history. The comprehensive strategic partnership is a significant counterbalance in international relations in the Indo-Pacific region against China’s rising soft power and naval force projection into the South China Sea. In its second year, questions remain: Will the partnership hold up, and is there still room to grow between Washington and Hanoi? On September 10th, 2023, then-U.S. President Joe Biden and the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong of Vietnam signed the comprehensive strategic partnership, which is a major turning point in Southeast Asia. The elevation of relations between Hanoi and Washington puts America along the same bilateral status as Russia and China in Vietnam’s hierarchy, signifying a major diplomatic breakthrough between the former two countries. Under the upgraded relations, Vietnam and the United States will further strengthen cooperation in trade, investments, science, technology, and climate action, with more opportunities in other sectors. Southeast Asia is an emerging global supply chain hub for not just the United States but the entire world, and Hanoi is a top ten major trading partner of Washington. The opportunity to grow supply chains in the Indochina region with Vietnam as a starting point would be an essential step toward digressing from the People’s Republic of China, which the United States government looks to do, especially as the latter two superpowers now compete for global hegemonic status. The United States and Vietnam share the ideals of growing their technological and economic sectors. The growth of semiconductors in Eastern Asia continues to grow not only in Taiwan, China, Japan, and South Korea but also in Vietnam. Amkor, an American firm, is opening a $1.6 billion firm in Vietnam for this endeavor. Furthermore, Reuters reported in January 2024 that fifteen American firms are vying to invest $8 billion in semiconductors in Vietnam. American companies and business owners currently heavily invest in Vietnam, such as Intel, Apple, Nike, Amkor, Marvell, and First Solar, and the list can continue to grow in the comprehensive strategic partnership. Simultaneously, Vietnamese companies such as VinFast and VGN Corporation are increasing investments in the United States. VinFast’s growth in North Carolina is helping the local economy by creating more manufacturing opportunities. Though Vietnam and the United States have reached new peaks in upgraded relations, it is vital to mention that the comprehensive strategic partnership is not a mutual defense accord including direct military assistance. During the joint signing, neither Washington nor Hanoi mentioned ‘containment’ of Beijing’s ambitions, even though the South China Sea continues to grow into a potential regional powder keg. Vietnam’s upgraded partnership with the United States correlates with India’s current strategy of not fully aligning to one side to trigger ire or retaliation from the People’s Republic of China but strategically keeping full diplomatic cohesion with all regional powers while maintaining its sovereignty. Vietnam is also a close ally of Russia as the United States ignored the original requests for their self-determination post-WWII. Though they do not supply the Russian military’s illegal aggression in Ukraine, it is tantamount for the U.S. government not to push or strong-arm Hanoi closer to Moscow. Nevertheless, in the future, the U.S. and Vietnamese Armed Forces could establish backchannels to warn each other of any potential military threat by the People’s Liberation naval movements around the South China Sea without openly engaging in military cooperation that could draw strong actions from China and Russia. Hanoi looks to advance its interests amidst rising economic and technological competition in the Indo-Pacific and growing American investments will only push Vietnam’s marketing further. Simultaneously, Washington gains a growing economic and diplomatic presence in Southeast Asia. To promote a growing relationship, the United States can also further reconciliation efforts in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, as many of Vietnam’s demographic majority and elderly still remember the American aggression in the Indochina conflicts. In its second year, Hanoi and Washington continue to grow ties through several key sectors that advance both country’s national interests and further open opportunities between the East and West. Rebuilding and rewriting the wrongs of the past, the United States reached out to Vietnam to solidify a comprehensive strategic partnership, which is decades in the making and a landmark agreement long envisioned by Ho Chi Minh. With opportunities to expand into the technology, economic, and trade sectors, Hanoi and Washington continue to grow bilateral ties in year two of the partnership. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license

Defense & Security
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem meets with the President of Mexico Claudia Sheinbaum at the Palacio Nacional in Mexico City, Mexico, March 28, 2025

Mexico: The New War on Drugs

by Alberto Hernández Hernández

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The pressure exerted by Trump on Mexico has prompted a shift in the López Obrador government's anti-drug strategy, which now operates under the logic of negotiation imposed by Trumpism. In the Obradorist ideology, it was unthinkable to launch a new war against the narcos—partly because there is now suspicion that deals were made with organized crime, and partly because opposition to such a war was one of the key narratives that propelled former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to power. He consistently and harshly criticized the confrontation initiated by President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012). The “hugs, not bullets” policy of the former Mexican president empowered the drug cartels, and its effects spilled onto the streets of the United States, where designer drugs (fentanyl, methamphetamines) proliferated like never before. However, the electoral campaign and Donald Trump’s return to the White House spotlighted the drug trafficking issue, highlighting that it was costing 100,000 American lives a year. That surely struck a chord with the average American and hurt the Democratic Party’s candidate. “Donald Trump embodies what I want for my country,” said a white woman from the Midwest—a sentiment echoed by many who witnessed the destructive effects of these drugs in neighborhoods in Chicago, Philadelphia, or Los Angeles. This segment of the population turned out en masse to vote for Trump, joining millions of others who, for ideological, political, or economic reasons, gave the New York politician a sweeping victory. That resounding win shook the status quo—just look at the turmoil in global stock markets—but it also generated Trump’s own agenda with his trade partners. One key item: declaring war on the Mexican cartels, which he elevated to the status of “terrorist organizations” that must be destroyed. It was a powerful message for President Claudia Sheinbaum, who had not made the direct confrontation with the cartels a priority. She likely saw them as part of the structure López Obrador had built for the first stage of the so-called Fourth Transformation, and believed it best not to disturb them beyond occasional arrests and seizures. Sheinbaum had been inclined to continue that routine agenda in dealings with her main trading partner. However, Trump’s victory and his increasingly aggressive rhetoric against the cartels led to a direct confrontation with criminal organizations. Trump increased the pressure by deploying spy ships in Pacific waters off the Baja California coast. Mexican skies saw surveillance aircraft capable of capturing images of homes in the Golden Triangle—the border region between the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango, traditionally a haven for drug lords. Additionally, the U.S. security agency presence in Mexico was reinforced. Thus, the indulgent and criminal “hugs, not bullets” policy began to fade, leaving cartel leaders stunned. They have responded with a forward-escape strategy, creating an atmosphere of persecution and violence across different regions of the country—costing thousands of Mexican lives and pushing the public’s fear perception beyond 61%, according to INEGI. The myth López Obrador promoted—that “fentanyl is not produced in Mexico”—collapsed when Omar García Harfuch, the Public Security Secretary, recently stated that more than 800 laboratories have been destroyed. The problem, however, isn’t just the cartels and their capacity to produce and distribute drugs on American streets. It also includes the entire political scaffolding that enables the business to function efficiently—something it could not have achieved without the complicity of politicians with drug lords or intermediaries. And while one might think Trump would be pleased with the results of his pressure, that’s not the case. He bluntly stated that the Mexican government merely wants to make him “happy”—by sealing the northern border, making arrests and deporting drug lords, destroying labs, and even allowing U.S. agents to collaborate with Mexico’s national security system. They’ve even permitted spy flights and menacing naval patrols in Pacific waters. But even with these surprising results, the pressure continues—both publicly and diplomatically. Kristi Noem, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, recently met with President Sheinbaum at the National Palace. Beyond the formal courtesies, the headline came when Noem, upon returning to the U.S., revealed that she had handed Sheinbaum a list of requests to continue strengthening the good relationship between the two countries. President Sheinbaum was stunned when tariffs became a reality. Although Mexico and Canada weren’t mentioned in Trump’s public list of targeted countries, that was because the tariffs had already been decided before the press conference: a 25% tariff would apply to imports of steel and aluminum, as well as to products not covered by the USMCA—representing roughly 50% of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. In short, Trump’s pressure on Mexico has altered the policy upheld by Obradorism and now operates under the logic of Trump-style hard negotiation: “If the adversary yields at the first push, you can keep pressuring and gain more.” Some say that the list handed over through diplomatic channels includes the names of many currently serving politicians. That’s the reality, amid an anti-crisis narrative that tries to sell the idea that defeats are victories and losses are gains. And now, the time has come to find out where President Sheinbaum draws her red line.

Energy & Economics
The image displays mineral rocks alongside US currency and flags of Ukraine and the USA, highlighting the complex relationship involving economics, power, and resources.

Why Zelensky – not Trump – may have ‘won’ the US-Ukraine minerals deal

by Eve Warburton , Olga Boichak

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Last week, the Trump administration signed a deal with Ukraine that gives it privileged access to Ukraine’s natural resources. Some news outlets described the deal as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “caving” to US President Donald Trump’s demands. But we see the agreement as the result of clever bargaining on the part of Ukraine’s war-time president. So, what does the deal mean for Ukraine? And will this help strengthen America’s mineral supply chains? Ukraine’s natural resource wealth Ukraine is home to 5% of the world’s critical mineral wealth, including 22 of the 34 minerals identified by the European Union as vital for defence, construction and high-tech manufacturing. However, there’s a big difference between resources (what’s in the ground) and reserves (what can be commercially exploited). Ukraine’s proven mineral reserves are limited. Further, Ukraine has an estimated mineral wealth of around US$14.8 trillion (A$23 trillion), but more than half of this is in territories currently occupied by Russia. What does the new deal mean for Ukraine? American support for overseas conflict is usually about securing US economic interests — often in the form of resource exploitation. From the Middle East to Asia, US interventions abroad have enabled access for American firms to other countries’ oil, gas and minerals. But the first iteration of the Ukraine mineral deal, which Zelensky rejected in February, had been an especially brazen resource grab by Trump’s government. It required Ukraine to cede sovereignty over its land and resources to one country (the US), in order to defend itself from attacks by another (Russia). These terms were highly exploitative of a country fighting against a years-long military occupation. In addition, they violated Ukraine’s constitution, which puts the ownership of Ukraine’s natural resources in the hands of the Ukrainian people. Were Zelensky to accept this, he would have faced a tremendous backlash from the public. In comparison, the new deal sounds like a strategic and (potentially) commercial win for Ukraine. First, this agreement is more just, and it’s aligned with Ukraine’s short- and medium-term interests. Zelenksy describes it as an “equal partnership” that will modernise Ukraine. Under the terms, Ukraine will set up a United States–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund for foreign investments into the country’s economy, which will be jointly governed by both countries. Ukraine will contribute 50% of the income from royalties and licenses to develop critical minerals, oil and gas reserves, while the US can make its contributions in-kind, such as through military assistance or technology transfers. Ukraine maintains ownership over its natural resources and state enterprises. And the licensing agreements will not require substantial changes to the country’s laws, or disrupt its future integration with Europe. Importantly, there is no mention of retroactive debts for the US military assistance already received by Ukraine. This would have created a dangerous precedent, allowing other nations to seek to claim similar debts from Ukraine. Finally, the deal also signals the Trump administration’s commitment to “a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine” – albeit, still without any security guarantees. Profits may be a long time coming Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration and conservative media in the US are framing the deal as a win. For too long, Trump argues, Ukraine has enjoyed US taxpayer-funded military assistance, and such assistance now has a price tag. The administration has described the deal to Americans as a profit-making endeavour that can recoup monies spent defending Ukrainian interests. But in reality, profits are a long way off. The terms of the agreement clearly state the fund’s investment will be directed at new resource projects. Existing operations and state-owned projects will fall outside the terms of the agreement. Mining projects typically work within long time frames. The move from exploration to production is a slow, high-risk and enormously expensive process. It can often take over a decade. Add to this complexity the fact that some experts are sceptical Ukraine even has enormously valuable reserves. And to bring any promising deposits to market will require major investments. What’s perhaps more important It’s possible, however, that profits are a secondary calculation for the US. Boxing out China is likely to be as – if not more – important. Like other Western nations, the US is desperate to diversify its critical mineral supply chains. China controls not just a large proportion of the world’s known rare earths deposits, it also has a monopoly on the processing of most critical minerals used in green energy and defence technologies. The US fears China will weaponise its market dominance against strategic rivals. This is why Western governments increasingly make mineral supply chain resilience central to their foreign policy and defence strategies. Given Beijing’s closeness to Moscow and their deepening cooperation on natural resources, the US-Ukraine deal may prevent Russia — and, by extension, China — from accessing Ukrainian minerals. The terms of the agreement are explicit: “states and persons who have acted adversely towards Ukraine must not benefit from its reconstruction”. Finally, the performance of “the deal” matters just as much to Trump. Getting Zelensky to sign on the dotted line is progress in itself, plays well to Trump’s base at home, and puts pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the table. So, the deal is a win for Zelensky because it gives the US a stake in an independent Ukraine. But even if Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves turn out to be less valuable than expected, it may not matter to Trump.

Diplomacy
HAJJAH , YEMEN – October 26, 2020:Tribal mobilization to support government forces in northwest Yemen

Yemen’s Ansar Allah reaches ceasefire deal with US that excludes strikes on Israel

by Aseel Saleh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While Trump declared the truce agreement a US victory, Ansar Allah said that Washington contacted them in order to “avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement reached a ceasefire deal with the United States on Wednesday, May 7, according to Oman, which mediated the negotiations. The deal stipulates the halt of Ansar Allah’s attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an end to US aggression on Yemen. However, it does not prevent the Yemeni movement from launching attacks on Israel.  “Following recent discussions and contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman with the United States and the relevant authorities in Sana’a, in the Republic of Yemen, with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides,” Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, wrote on X. “In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” the minister added. Peoples Dispatch spoke to a member of the Communist Party of Jordan, Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh, to discuss the ceasefire, which he described as a “sudden development in the war in the Red Sea.” Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh indicated that “both the US and Oman didn’t comment on Ansar Allah’s missiles targeting Israel, especially that this agreement was reached shortly after a Yemeni missile reached Ben Gurion airport, near the occupied city of Lydda (also known as Lod).” As per Al-Hatabeh’s analysis, “important questions about this agreement are left without answers. Taking into consideration the Omani role in the American – Iranian negotiations, is the ceasefire in the Red Sea part of the deal? Another question will arise from this assumption, did America give up some of Israel’s interests in order to reach an agreement with Iran? Where does this agreement leave Netanyahu’s government, especially after Ansar Allah’s spokesman told Reuters that the agreement doesn’t include Israel.” Ansar Allah says the US contacted them seeking a truce One day before Oman announced that the deal was sealed, US President Donald Trump alluded that a ceasefire agreement was about to be reached, claiming that Ansar Allah agreed to stop the fight with the US because they “capitulated”.  “They just don’t want to fight, and we will honor that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated,” Trump said from the White House on Tuesday, May 6. “They will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that’s what the purpose of what we were doing. So that’s just news. We just found out about that. So I think that’s very, very positive,” he added. Although Trump bragged about the deal, presenting it as a US victory, analysts suggest that it was Ansar Allah that forced the world’s greatest military superpower to the negotiating table, after paralyzing US naval traffic off the Yemeni coast.  Ansar Allah’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, confirmed during an interview with Almasirah TV channel, that the movement “did not make any request to the Americans to hold ceasefire talks”. Abdulsalam asserted that, on the contrary, the movement recently received US requests and messages seeking a truce, via the Sultanate of Oman. The Yemeni official pointed out that US endeavors to reach a ceasefire with Ansar Allah were a great disappointment to Israel. “The Israelis have endured great disappointment after the stance of the US, which tried to walk away and avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen,” he said. However, Abdulsalam clarified that Ansar Allah is still “assessing this US position so that the facts on the ground do not contradict its statements”. He further warned that in the event that the US “would not abide by the agreement in any way”, the movement “will respond”. Abdulsalam considered the deal “a success to be added to Yemen’s credit, as it enhances a situation that would leave the “usurper entity” [Israel] in a situation of loneliness, in confrontation with the great popular and military stance led by Yemen on behalf of the Arab and Islamic nation.” The ceasefire was announced two months after Trump ordered a large-scale aerial campaign against Yemen on the pretext of protecting US shipping, air, and naval assets and to restore “navigation freedom” from Ansar Allah’s attacks. Trump’s order followed Ansar Allah’s decision to resume a ban on Israeli ships due to Israel’s continuous blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yemen threatens Israel with a devastating and painful response for attacking Sana’a airport  While Ansar Allah agreed to a truce with the US, it vowed to escalate its operations against Israel as long as its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza is not lifted.  In response to Israel’s aggression on Sana’a International Airport on Tuesday, that destroyed terminal buildings and caused USD 500 million in damage, Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Chairman, Mahdi al-Mashat, threatened that “Sanaa’s response will be devastating, painful, and beyond what the Israeli enemy can endure.” “From this moment onward, stay in your shelters or leave for your homelands immediately. Your failed government will no longer be able to protect you,” Al-Mashat warned Israeli people.  Moreover, the Yemeni senior official reaffirmed that no aggression will deter Yemen from its “rightful decision” to support the people of Palestine “until the genocide ends and the siege on Gaza is lifted.” The Yemeni Armed Forces’ spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, also confirmed in a televised statement late Wednesday, that the movement will continue its ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, alongside the comprehensive aerial blockade on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

Energy & Economics
Flags of America and China atand on table during talks between diplomats and businessmen. American and Chinese representatives sit opposite each other to discuss relations between countries.

China and US agree to cut tariffs imposed in April

by Abdul Rahman

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The agreement was an acknowledgment of the significance of their trade for mutual economic development and the health of the global economy, the joint statement says. China and the US agreed to roll back high tariffs imposed on one another last month for a period of 90 days. The agreement was announced in a joint statement issued on Monday, May 12. The agreement was a result of a high-level meeting on trade and economic affairs held between Chinese and US delegations in Geneva, Switzerland over the weekend. As described in a press conference on Monday by the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent who was part of the US delegation, both sides have agreed to reduce the tariffs by 115%. That would mean that the US will reduce its tariffs on China to 30% from its present 145% while the Chinese will lower their tariffs to 10% from its present 125%. These new tariff rates would be effective from Wednesday for the next 90 days. Both the countries also agreed to explore a more stable arrangement in the interim period. China also agreed to reverse additional measures imposed in response to US President Donald Trump’s tariff war, such as putting various US companies on the sanctions list and placing export controls on rare earth minerals. The parties committed to taking these measures as an acknowledgment of the mutual significance of their bilateral trade and its importance for the global economy and for “moving forward in the spirit of mutual opening, continued communication, cooperation and mutual respect,” a joint statement says. The 30% US tariff includes a 10% baseline tariff imposed on all imports by Trump in April after suspending his reciprocal tariff regime for 90 days, and a 20% tariff imposed by the Trump administration before April in the name of stopping the illegal flow of the drug fentanyl. Answering a question on the cooperation between both the countries over fentanyl, the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Lin Jian criticized “the wrongly slapped tariffs on Chinese imports” by citing the issue and claiming that “if the US truly wants to cooperate with China, it should stop vilifying and shifting the blame.” Jian also advised the US “to seek dialogue with China based on equality, respect and mutual benefit.” Relief for the global economy  Trump announced a reciprocal tariff regime on April 2 against all those countries which had a trade surplus with the US, including China. After global backlash, Trump later postponed the implementation of the regime for 90 days, inviting countries to seek bilateral agreements to avoid high tariffs while imposing a 10% common tariff. The Trump administration had claimed that reciprocal tariffs were required in order to lower the US trade deficit, which is over a trillion dollars. China, the third largest trade partner of the US, faced the highest tariff rates under Trump’s tariff war and chose to retaliate. It also called the policy a violation of international law and an attempt by the US to weaponize trade. On Tuesday, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated his country’s position that there are no winners in trade and tariff wars, claiming bullying and hegemony will only result in self-isolation. He was addressing the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) forum in Beijing. The tariff war between the world’s leading economies was seen as a disaster for the global economy and trade. A large number of US businesses had also opposed Trump’s tariff war. They had claimed high tariffs may lead to a rise in prices which harm both the consumer and domestic production. Several businesses filed lawsuits in the US claiming Trump’s reciprocal tariff regime was illegal and harmful for their ability to do business. US trade representative Jamieson Greer, who was part of the negotiating team in Geneva, claimed that the talks with various countries, including China, is the first step to reducing the US trade deficit and ending the national emergency declared by Trump to authorize the reciprocal tariff decrees, South China Morning Post reported. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also hailed the agreement as “substantive progress” for mutual economic development. It expressed hope that “the US side will build on the meeting, continue to work with China in the same direction, completely rectify its wrong practices of unilateral tariff hikes, and keep strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation.” Acknowledging that “high levels of tariffs were equivalent to an embargo and neither side wanted that,” Bessent declared on Monday that the US wants a trade relationship with China, though a balanced one. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce also hoped that the US would pursue the matter much more seriously and “inject more certainty and stability into the world economy.” Both the countries have agreed to establish “a joint mechanism” to continue their trade and economic negotiations in future. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

Diplomacy
KYIV, UKRAINE - May 1, 2022. Flags of Finland and NATO.

Finland: Two Years in NATO

by Sergey Andreev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском April 2025 marks the second anniversary of Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the prospect of joining the alliance began to be seriously considered after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, a final decision was repeatedly postponed due to the unclear advantages of this move and insufficient public support. Despite close economic ties with Russia and a tradition of cautious diplomacy known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen line” (often criticized as “Finlandization”), the 2022 international crisis pushed Finland to join NATO. Since then, the once-neutral country has shifted its foreign policy, increased defense spending, and expanded its arms exports. Government and Military Perspectives In December 2024, the Finnish government presented a new Defense Report in Helsinki, replacing the previous strategy issued in September 2021. Back in 2021, Finland had highlighted the growing military activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, along with the increased interest of major powers in the natural resources of the North and the Northern Sea Route. Notably, the country didn’t name any specific enemy, choosing to keep its message broad and carefulThe 2024 document takes a much more serious tone. It clearly names Russia as the main source of global instability and describes China as a growing power that challenges the U.S. and its allies. Terrorism is mentioned too, but much less often. Some of the main points about global security include the following - The return of a "large-scale, protracted war" to the European continent;- The Special Military Operation (SMO) is interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008;- An increase in hybrid attacks and incidents involving critical infrastructure;- Growing Chinese influence on Finland and its neighboring countries;- An unpredictable and unstable defense and international security environment, with a clear tendency toward further deterioration;- The largest NATO military buildup on the eastern flank since the end of the Cold War;- Accession to NATO is described as “the most significant transformation in Finland’s defense policy since World War II”;- Ongoing integration of Finland’s armed forces into NATO’s structures and joint defense planning;- Finland is now planning its defense together with NATO, focusing not just on its own territory but also on the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In the section on shifts in global power, Russia is named as the main cause of instability. It is described as “the most significant and immediate threat to the Allies, to security, and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Other claims include: a long-standing effort to weaken the European Union, a push to restore its great power status, and an attempt to divide Europe into spheres of influence using military force. Russia is also accused of using hybrid tactics—such as spreading fear, influencing public opinion, stirring political divisions, and blocking decisions—to target European countries and their people. Its Special Military Operation is seen as the beginning of a broader, more direct, and unpredictable conflict with the West. China is characterized as a less aggressive player. It is noted that Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, has intensified intelligence activities in the United States and Europe, and has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia, the development of which will determine Moscow’s ability to exert influence over Europe. At the same time, Finnish strategists place greater emphasis on the ongoing competition between China and the United States for global political, military, economic, and technological dominance. In matters concerning NATO’s role in defense, it is noted that the Alliance has intensified its cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, increased its military presence on the eastern flank and the number of military exercises, and is continually updating both general and regional defense plans in the event of a large-scale conflict. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO has become geographically closer to strategically important areas for Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Belarus, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, ensuring the security of maritime transport routes and the modernization of military infrastructure in Northern European countries is viewed as a key condition for the potential reinforcement of troops from North America. The role of the European Union is described as complementary to NATO, while it is also noted that the EU is increasing defense spending and expanding technological cooperation. The report was published after the election victory of Republican U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his isolationist views, which is partially reflected in the document through emphasis on European independence in security matters and the need for further military expenditures. On intra-European regional issues, the report focuses on cooperation with the member states of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic States, and the United Kingdom, as well as on Germany’s shift in security policy, France’s increased defense spending, and Poland’s growing purchases of military equipment. In military and technology matters, the document highlights the growing role of unmanned systems (both remote-controlled and autonomous), artificial intelligence, and advanced human capabilities like improved thinking and synthetic biology. It stresses the need to use the latest scientific and tech innovations in developing weapons — a step that could help make up for fewer soldiers on the battlefield. Cyberspace and outer space are seen as new areas of military and technological competition. This view is based on several factors: the rapid growth of space technologies (driven by private companies), easier access to space, and heavy reliance on cyber tools and satellites for both military and civilian use. Information warfare is also becoming more influential alongside traditional combat. The document notes that small countries can benefit in such conflicts by using innovations smartly and managing resources well. Still, Helsinki does not rely only on high-tech solutions. A key part of Finland’s military strategy is preparing both its army and population for long-term, grinding conflicts. This includes signing long-term arms supply contracts, building strategic reserves, keeping supply chains strong, and staying ready to protect their way of life. Among the main conclusions, the authors of the report present the following: - Finland and Europe are facing a significant decline in security, with no short-term improvement expected.- Russia poses and will continue to pose a constant security threat to Europe and Finland;- Finland will provide military assistance to Ukraine for as long as necessary;- Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region, and the High North have formed a unified geostrategic space; the Baltic Sea region holds strategic importance for Finland;- Finland’s defense will rely on maintaining conscription, strengthening the training of its military reserve, a strong public will to defend the country, and support from NATO membership.- Commitment to total defense — a combination of all national and international military and civilian measures that ensure the protection of the country under any circumstances (seven components are listed: government administration, international relations, defense capability, internal security, economy, functional capabilities of the population, and psychological resilience of people); There is a need to improve working conditions in the defense industry, increase production, and secure steady, reliable supply chains. A gradual increase in Finland’s military spending. - The development of the EU’s defense potential, and movement toward greater independence of the European Union both in policy and in the development of military technologies and defense supplies;- NATO’s readiness to provide the full spectrum of forces necessary for large-scale, high-intensity combat operations; Finland, in turn, must also create all the necessary conditions for the presence of allied troops on its territory. Similar assessments are presented in the Military Intelligence Review of Finland — 2025 (previous publications date back to 2021 and 2023), prepared by the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces. Russia is also named as the main threat there, which “seeks to reduce Western influence, secure its sphere of influence,” “views security policy as a zero-sum great power game in which NATO expansion strengthens the position of the United States and thereby weakens Russia’s security,” and “the interests or security of neighboring countries are not an important factor in Moscow’s calculations.” In addition, Russia is accused of seeking to turn the Global South against Western countries, in particular, there is a reference to “an attempt to present the BRICS group as part of an anti-Western ‘global majority’” . As for the Northern European direction, the Finnish General Staff notes the buildup of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic region, attributes to Moscow attempts to gain unrestricted access to the Northern Sea Route and to weaken the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO structures. Helsinki predicts that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s priority will be the accelerated buildup and modernization of forces in the reestablished Leningrad Military District, bordering Scandinavia. Finnish military officials do not believe in a quick settlement of the situation in Ukraine and forecast a deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West in the coming years, a struggle by Russia for shipping in the Baltic Sea “by any means,” continued attacks on underwater infrastructure in the Baltic (a reference to damage to undersea cables, although no exact culprit is named), escalation of the race between the West, Russia and China for the resources of the High North, and increased intelligence and sabotage activities by Russian special services in Finland. China is not viewed in an entirely negative light; instead, there is recognition of Beijing's ambition to become a political, economic, military, and technological leader by 2049, marking the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China's growing influence over countries of the Global South is also noted. Russia–China relations are seen as a "lifeline" for the Russian economy and a means of circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing is not seen as an equal partner, but as someone benefiting from Russia’s growing isolation. This makes Russia more dependent on China. The war in Ukraine is seen as helping China, since it distracts the West from China's global rise. At the regional level, Helsinki plans to enhance cooperation and update the foundational NORDEFCO agreement during its presidency of the organization in 2025. This push for renewal is driven by the evolving security environment and Finland’s recent accession to NATO alongside Sweden. Back in April 2024, the defense ministers of the member states signed a memorandum outlining a new vision for NORDEFCO. According to the document, by 2030 the countries plan to improve joint military planning and operations, make it easier to move troops across borders, boost cooperation and intelligence sharing, both directly and through NATO and the EU, and keep strengthening the defense industries of the Nordic countries. NORDEFCO is not officially seen as a mutual defense agreement or a command system like NATO; however, in recent years, it has started to show features usually found in a defense alliance, mostly because of the actions of some of its members. In 2021, the defense ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden signed a deal to strengthen cooperation, allowing for "joint action in times of peace, crisis, or conflict." In 2022, they gave each other permission to use their airspace and military bases. That same year, the defense ministers of Finland, Norway, and Sweden updated their three-way agreement, further growing their military cooperation. After Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway made a joint promise to fully support them if either country were attacked. While NORDEFCO has not yet become an organization like NATO, the current level of defense cooperation between the Nordic countries at the regional level — and repeated promises to help each other in case of conflict — suggest that in the coming years, this effort might start to look like a smaller version of NATO in Northern Europe. This kind of setup would likely be less full of red tape, quicker at making decisions, and made up of countries that share similar views and speak with one voice. It would also have a lower risk of going backward — unlike some NATO members who, in recent years, have threatened to block decisions, added extra demands for new members, or even talked about leaving the Alliance. Defense and Military-Industrial Complex Expenditures Threats identified by Finnish politicians and the military automatically require growing expenditures and an acceleration of the defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2014 to 2020, Finland’s military spending remained annually at the level of 1.5% of GDP, while in absolute terms it gradually increased — from $3.57 billion to $3.9 billion. Amid the pandemic in 2021, the figure dropped to $3.65 billion, but by the end of 2022 it amounted to $4.47 billion, and in 2023 — to $6.85 billion, or 2.4% of GDP. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides similar estimates: growth from $3.72 billion in 2014 to $6.89 billion in 2024, with the budget for 2025 estimated at $7.47 billion. Helsinki does not intend to stop there — on April 1, 2025, following recommendations from the Ministry of Defense, the government began preparations for a phased increase of the military budget to at least 3% of GDP by 2029. Over four years, it plans to raise allocations by €3.7 billion, expand the state defense order, and develop new rearmament programs for the 2030s. Helsinki also views the prospects of its domestic defense industry with optimism — according to the Finnish think tank SaferGlobe (which, according to its website, is “engaged in the study and development of tools to promote sustainable peace and security”), in 2023 arms exports reached €333 million (of which €141 million accounted for weapons intended for civilian use in self-defense, sports, and hunting) — a record since record-keeping began in 2002. About 85% of military exports were distributed within Europe. The largest importing countries by value were Sweden (€51 million), Latvia (€34 million), and Lithuania (€19 million) — together, these three countries accounted for more than half of all military product exports. In value terms, the largest share of exported military products (32%) consisted of land vehicles and their components. The next largest export categories were ammunition (17%), as well as explosives and charges (15%). The largest exports of civilian weapons were to the United States (€52 million), Canada (€15 million), and Australia (€9 million). The year 2023 also set a record for issued export licenses for military products — €667 million. The largest recipient countries of export licenses were Slovakia (€201 million), Japan (€154 million), and Ukraine (€88 million). Similar conclusions were reached by the state investment company Finnish Industry Investment (Tesi), which in autumn 2024 surveyed 368 domestic defense companies: 144 of them were identified as “fast-growing startups and growth companies,” while the rest were described as “more established players with a long history, mainly providing consulting services to the Finnish Defence Forces.” The highest growth rates were shown by producers of dual-use goods, whose net profit has increased annually by 30–40% since 2022. At the same time, companies engaged exclusively in the military sector faced difficulties in attracting investment. 50% of defense companies were located in the capital region of Uusimaa, where the leaders were Helsinki (74 companies) and its satellite city Espoo (65); another 16% were based in the Pirkanmaa region centered around Tampere (40). Rounding out the top five were the high-tech “capital” Oulu (21) and another satellite of Helsinki, Vantaa (14). By type of activity, the majority of companies (246) operated in the support and logistics sector; 70 were engaged in the design of combat command and control systems (C4I — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence); 20 firms cooperated with the land forces, 13 with the navy, 10 with the air force, five worked in joint operations, and the remaining four were involved in space technologies. A New Strategy — A New President Finland’s entry into NATO happened during the second and final term of President Sauli Niinistö. While he followed the West’s general approach on the war in Ukraine and supported anti-Russian sanctions, he still tried to keep some level of political dialogue with Russia. After February 2022, this became almost impossible, and Finland officially ended its nearly 80-year policy of staying neutral. In the two-round election held in January and February 2024, Finnish voters chose Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party as their new president. Stubb studied in the United States and France, and previously worked as a Member of the European Parliament, as well as Finland’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Back in 2014, when Finland still followed the "Paasikivi–Kekkonen line" of cautious foreign policy, Stubb was one of the only top officials who openly supported joining NATO. On the topic of relations with Russia, he said that “Russia’s integration with the West was an illusion.” This view may be influenced by his family history. Stubb’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Käkisalmi — a town that was given to the Soviet Union after the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, renamed first as Kexholm (in Swedish), and later as Priozersk. On his father's side, Stubb’s grandparents came from Vyborg, which also became part of the Soviet Union after the war. However, the family had already moved to Helsinki before the conflict started. In his inaugural speech on March 1, 2024, Alexander Stubb uncompromisingly stated to the citizens of Finland that “the post–Cold War era is over” (placing the blame on Russia), “the instruments of cooperation have been turned into weapons,” “the world is in a transitional state,” and “the creation of a new world order takes time.” He added that Finns “will have to respond quickly to changing circumstances, as was the case with NATO membership,” and that “when times become difficult, I too will be ready to make tough decisions to ensure the security of our country.” In addition to his campaign promises, the newly elected president confirmed his commitment to the previously introduced “value-based realism” (arvopohjainen realismi), which he pledged to be guided by in the conduct of foreign policy if elected. Later, this was officially included in the government’s report on foreign and security policy in June 2024. Among other ideas, the report especially highlighted the following: commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, international law, and human rights; strengthening the country’s defense; staying out of military conflicts; and being open to dialogue with countries that do not share these values. The election of A. Stubb as president strengthened the pro-Western trends in Finland’s foreign policy. On September 1, 2024, the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States entered into force, under which Finland opens 15 of its military facilities for possible use by U.S. forces, while Helsinki will not charge rent for premises or land made available to the United States. On September 27 of the same year, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced the placement of NATO headquarters on Finnish territory — in Mikkeli in the southwest of the country, 140 km from the border with the Russian Federation, and in the northern region of Lapland. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish authorities announced preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines (a similar step had previously been taken by the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia), stating that this is “a cost-effective way to supplement the capabilities of the armed forces,” but adding that the country would remain “committed to the humanitarian goals of the convention” even after a possible withdrawal. On April 15, 2025, a Finnish servicemember took part for the first time in a flight aboard a NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during Ramstein Alloy 2025 exercises in the Baltic region. The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) includes personnel from 17 countries, in addition to which Canada, France, Finland, and Lithuania also contribute their staff. NATO noted that the E-3A is the first multinational flying unit created by the Alliance. Statements regarding Russia, despite initial uncompromising tone, began to soften after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, who held a different view of the Ukrainian conflict compared to the strongly pro-Ukrainian administration of Joe Biden. As early as April 2024, Alexander Stubb stated that there was no need to conduct political dialogue with Russia, and considered military action the only path to peace in the context of Ukraine. Under the new Washington administration, the Finnish president approved of the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian leaders, but again repeated the Ukrainian position on the need for a “just peace” and Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. During his March 2025 visit to Florida, Stubb attempted to dissuade Donald Trump from cooperating with Russia and also called for tougher sanctions against Moscow. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish president admitted that European countries had started talking about renewing contact with Russia. He said that Finland must "morally prepare" for rebuilding political ties with Russia, since "nothing changes the fact that Russia exists and will always be a neighbor." However, he did not give any timeline for when relations might be restored. The situation around the war in Ukraine is made more difficult by the Trump administration’s growing isolationism, along with threats to pull out of talks and a trade war that Washington has launched against almost the entire world (though some parts of it have been paused). This raises fears of a new “Great Depression.” The European Union’s success at the negotiating table will depend on how united its member states are, since they have different geopolitical interests. Although Finland supports calls for a ceasefire, it does not plan to stop its military support for Ukraine or oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Alexander Stubb, on at least two occasions (in November 2024 and March 2025), publicly warned Ukraine against following a “Finnish scenario.” This would mean giving up on NATO membership and possibly giving up territory—similar to what Finland did after World War II, when it accepted neutrality and lost 11% of its land. In a comment on efforts to resolve the conflict in 2025, Stubb criticized Finland’s past policy of “good neighborliness” with the Soviet Union. He said that while Finland kept its independence in 1944, it lost land, part of its sovereignty, and the ability to make its own decisions freely.

Energy & Economics
US President Donald Trump and Benjamin Franklin's portrait on the back of the $100 bill. Trump imposes additional tariffs on many countries. New York. U.S. 20.04.2025

Tariffs: Zero-sum game or an own goal?

by Ottón Solís

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском By assuming that trade relations are a zero-sum game in which one party must lose for the other to win, and that a trade deficit represents a loss while a surplus represents a win, President Trump reveals a simplistic view far removed from the dynamics of international trade. Let’s imagine that the global economy is Central America, that Costa Rica imports more goods than it exports, and that other countries accept paper printed by its Central Bank — bills in colones — as payment for their exports. Furthermore, let’s assume that a good portion of their trade surpluses are used to buy Costa Rican government bonds and make deposits in its banks, accepting — due to confidence in the strength of its economy — lower interest rates than they might obtain in other markets, and that those debts can be paid with the same printed paper. Trade deficits arise because a significant share of Costa Rican consumers and investors prefer to source final, intermediate, and capital goods from other Central American countries where prices are lower than at home. In other words, those deficits are the result of a national choice to enjoy a higher quality of life and greater productivity than what its economy would otherwise allow. Under these circumstances, Costa Rica, far from being a victim of other countries’ policies, would actually be enjoying levels of consumption above its means and economic growth beyond what its productivity would justify. The willingness of those countries to hold the colones derived from their trade surpluses in Costa Rican government bonds and bank deposits results in lower interest rates in Costa Rica. This enables a higher sustainable level of public debt, greater investment at low cost to improve infrastructure and service quality, and lower interest rates for private investment — all of which contribute to a higher rate of economic growth without endangering macroeconomic stability. In such a scenario, making imports more expensive through tariffs to boost local production competitiveness and eliminate trade deficits would, one by one, remove these advantages — amounting to nothing more than an own goal. This remains true even if Central American countries did not retaliate by restoring relative competitiveness to its starting point, and even if Costa Rican investors were not left uncertain about whether a future government might remove the tariffs. The U.S. economy faces the world in a situation identical to that hypothetical scenario of Costa Rica. It takes advantage of the fact that with paper printed by its central bank — the dollar — can pay for the real production of other countries, allowing it to live far beyond its means. Far from being “cheated” by other nations, as Trump claims, the United States enjoys a standard of living well above its capacity precisely because of this. That does not mean the U.S. is cheating anyone, since it is thanks to its economic strength that the rest of the world accepts that paper as a means of payment and trusts in its government bonds and banking system. Thus, by assuming that trade relations are a “zero-sum game” — where one must lose for the other to win — and that a trade deficit signals losing while a surplus signals winning, President Trump ignores these realities. He reveals a board-game level of simplification, detached from the complex chessboard that defines international trade dynamics. It is nothing less than a massive own goal. Trade deficits are an economic problem for countries like Costa Rica, which must pay for their imports using foreign currency, often requiring them to take on debt and/or attract foreign investment through subsidies and tax exemptions. This combination of factors permanently threatens macroeconomic stability and forces governments to limit spending on infrastructure and social services to free up resources to cover interest payments and the growing fiscal costs of structuring an economy based on incentives to foreign companies. Adding to the absurdity of Trump’s proposals, his goal is to achieve trade surpluses with every country in the world. However, the United States does not produce coffee or cocoa; thus, with some of the countries that export these products, running trade deficits is not only inevitable but also beneficial for the U.S. Many countries in the region, even without the advantages the United States enjoys, are unlikely to avoid trade deficits — for example, with oil-producing countries or those manufacturing goods that incorporate cutting-edge technologies. In such cases, raising tariffs could severely damage their economies. Trump boasts that the countries affected by the tariffs are lining up to renegotiate, claiming that this was his goal. If so, it marks the beginning of an uncertain period, contaminated by threats and blackmail, with China standing by to benefit from the resentment against the United States. This scenario will severely affect private sector investment plans, employment, and economic growth — not only in the United States but around the world. Far from "Making America Great Again" (MAGA), Trump is diminishing both his country and the world while violating every rule of international trade, both global ones under the WTO framework and those contained in free trade agreements like CAFTA-DR. This, of course, validates the concerns of those of us who argued that such treaties did not guarantee protected access to the U.S. market against political or geopolitical shifts. In international relations, the historical rule has been that decisions are not based on any moral or legal absolutes but rather on the exercise of power from unequal positions ("might is right"). This is why we always doubted that a free trade agreement with weaker countries would truly guide the behavior of the United States. But Trump's overwhelming violations of international law (surprisingly and disappointingly supported by more than half of his country’s political establishment) strip the United States of any moral authority to criticize countries that do not act according to the rules. This imposing attitude, reaffirmed by Trump when he paraphrases emperors and tyrants — enemies of any democratic principle — who claimed that "those who save their country violate no law," leads us to a world where anything is permitted for those who hold power. From the perspective of the definition of civilization, a world where anything goes loses its value. It takes us back to the law of the jungle — the rule of the strongest, of violence and war, or of peace imposed by one over others, not through harmony and goodwill. This is not a new “Washington Consensus”, now guided by the mercantilism typical of the 18th and 19th centuries, because in this case neither multilateral organizations like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund nor other Western powers share Trump’s decisions. Far from consensus, today the most frequently heard word in those circles is “retaliation”. Latin America will be affected by the potential decline in global GDP growth, the tariffs imposed on our exports, and the rise in interest rates resulting from inflation that could be triggered by higher import taxes in the United States. However, the region could benefit from the U.S. confrontation with its developed-world allies by strengthening economic ties with Europe, China, Japan, India, and other powers of the Global South — without, of course, abandoning the U.S. market. To achieve this, our governments must stop meekly following Trump’s directives, such as preventing Huawei from competing to sell us 5G technology, participating in a shameful deportation policy that violates fundamental human rights, or undermining Panama’s absolute sovereignty over the Canal. What is needed is to build and implement a foreign policy with dignity, one that best serves the interests of each of our countries — not the whims of a single power.

Diplomacy
US of America and Iran relations. USA and Iranian flags wrecking balls swinging on blue cloudy sky background. 3d illustration

Iran-U.S. Relations: From Escalation to Dialogue?

by Lana Rawandi-Fadai

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From war threats to negotiations In the early months of 2025, Iran and the United States stood on the brink of open military conflict. The escalation was driven by several factors that coincided in time, heightening the effect of instability. It was one of the most dangerous periods in the history of their relations. Until very recently, Iran lived under a cloud of anxious expectation: would war erupt, or could the situation be contained? The first reason behind the sharp escalation is, without doubt, Donald Trump’s return to office. It is well known that during his first presidency in 2018, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), reinstated prior sanctions and introduced new, extremely severe ones against Tehran. Trump took a hardline stance toward the Islamic regime, viewing it as a threat to human rights and regional stability. By early February of this year, he had already issued strict demands to Iran: to drastically scale back—or possibly entirely dismantle—its nuclear program, relinquish nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cease support for allied groups in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias). He threatened large-scale bombings if Tehran disagreed, but also left room for negotiations. It is worth recalling that Trump personally authorized the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), accusing Shiite militias under Soleimani’s leadership of alleged mass killings of civilians in Syria. In contrast, Iranians see Soleimani as a noble warrior and a professional soldier, who saved the peoples of Syria and Iraq from terrorist atrocities, and were outraged by his extrajudicial killing. From an economic perspective, it was during Trump’s first term that Iranian oil exports plummeted nearly tenfold, from over 2.5 million barrels per day in April 2018 to 300,000 barrels per day in June 2019. Although sanctions remained in place under President Joe Biden, their enforcement became more lenient. As a result, by 2024, Iran had begun rapidly rebuilding its oil exports, which rose to 1.9 million barrels per day by the summer of last year. This sparked hopes for a gradual economic recovery. However, Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 meant a new wave of threats. In his first month back in office, Trump gave Iran a two-month deadline to make concessions or face a firm response. The second reason is Israel’s aggressive and expansionist policy. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, long described Israel as a colonial-settler project created by the West, inherently driven to expand by seizing territory from neighboring Muslim countries and committing crimes against their Muslim populations, all with the ultimate goal of forcibly establishing “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates. In reality, there have been some differences between Israeli governments: under left-wing leadership, Israel tends to act more peacefully and moderately, while right-wing administrations pursue more aggressive and harsh policies. In recent years, however, Israel’s actions toward its neighbors have become especially aggressive—exactly as Khomeini had described—after the rise to power of the most radical ultra-right forces. The devastation that this government has brought upon the Gaza Strip, razing it to the ground, speaks for itself. After the fall of Bashar Assad’s strong leadership in Syria, Israel immediately seized the opportunity to destroy all of Syria’s heavy weaponry, effectively disarming the country. Israel then moved to capture more Syrian land beyond the annexed Golan Heights and committed new violations there. The Iran policy of the current Israeli government is focused on overthrowing the regime and installing puppet authorities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, known for his uncompromising hostility toward the regime in Iran, has spoken openly of his desire to see its end. There were rumors in Iran’s media space suggesting that Israel might be considering Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, as a symbolic leader for a future “secular Iran.” Within Iran, perceptions of the Pahlavi dynasty are overwhelmingly negative: it is seen as a pro-Western dynasty detached from traditional Islamic roots, which exploited national resources and oppressed Muslims and the Islamic clergy. Nonetheless, a portion of Iranian youth and some opposition commentators in the country hold radical views, harbor hostility toward Islam and Arabs, and support Trump, Netanyahu and the Pahlavi dynasty. This group would likely side with the enemy if hostilities broke out. Furthermore, Iran began to lose its regional influence. Israel carried out a series of successful operations against Iranian allies, primarily targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Syria. Key Hezbollah commanders and several IRGC officers were killed, and arms depots were destroyed. It is remarkable that some Syrian Islamists, who had previously been hostile to Israel, welcomed this development as a form of revenge for Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime and thus became temporary tactical allies of Israel. Following the December 2024 coup that brought anti-Iranian Islamists to power, Syria—once a strategic ally of Iran—is now increasingly taking a negative stance toward Tehran. By the start of this year, a sense of pessimism had settled over Iran. Feelings of confusion, anxiety and the realization of diminished influence in the Middle East became widespread among many Iranians, especially conservative ones. At the same time, a different sentiment was growing in Tehran among Iranian patriots and supporters of the Islamic regime: if the U.S., Israel or both launched a military attack, Iran’s response would be as harsh as possible. IRGC officials and prominent religious figures have made this clear. A change within: tracing Iran’s path to negotiations After a long period of tough rhetoric, Iran has made a strategic shift in its foreign policy in recent weeks. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had firmly banned any negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear program, suddenly changed course. What drove this decision? It is important to recognize that this shift resulted not only from an external threat but also from a deep internal reassessment, one that was rational, compelled by the circumstances, yet conscious. Until recently, Iran stuck to the principle of “no concessions under pressure.” Khamenei pointed to the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, which the U.S. exited during Trump’s presidency in 2018. From Khamenei’s perspective, new talks would be meaningless and dangerous because “the Americans will deceive again.” However, by April 2025, the situation had changed so much that Iran’s political and military elites began convincing the supreme leader of the need for dialogue. Reformist circles—especially the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian—played the leading role in this process. He insisted that without negotiations, Iran faced the risk of catastrophe: a major war, domestic unrest and even the fall of the regime. Reports from Tehran suggest he emerged as the main negotiator within the political establishment, persuading Khamenei to invoke the concept of maslahat (expediency)—a religiously sanctioned method for setting aside principles in order to save the Islamic regime. This decision was informed by several factors: - Economic crisis: according to official data, inflation between March 21 and April 20, 2025, reached 39%, while youth unemployment in the last quarter of 2024 stood at 20%. While Iran has seen worse in its recent past, these figures are nonetheless troubling. Furthermore, reserve funds were significantly depleted last year, investments have all but disappeared due to sanctions, and foreign currency reserves have declined. The country has also been hit by an energy crisis.- Erosion of ideology: satellite channels broadcasting from the U.S. and the UK have significantly expanded their reach. Outlets like Manoto, BBC Persian and Iran International have long championed secular, pro-Western views while criticizing the Islamic regime. What has particularly alarmed the authorities is the promotion of the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty: despite its brutal rule and fight against traditional Iranian and Islamic values—still remembered by the older generation—some youths have begun to see the Pahlavis as a possible “alternative” to the ruling clerical establishment.- Risks in domestic politics: political analysts, military officials and intelligence agencies warned the leadership about the risk of a “nationwide uprising” that could be sparked by an external attack. The concern was not just about protests but the potential for pro-Western groups to cooperate with foreign aggressors. The Iranian Interior Ministry said that these elements had become more active amid the 2022 protests and were receiving support from abroad. All these signals from the army, the clergy, the administration and the intelligence agencies compelled the Iranian leadership to adopt a political survival strategy. Drawing on the experience from the Iran–Iraq War, Khamenei reasoned that “continued confrontation would lead to catastrophe.” This is why he allowed the talks to begin while keeping control over their scope and substance. The nuclear program: compromise is possible, surrender is not One of the key issues in the Iran–U.S. negotiations remains the future of the Iranian nuclear program. Despite years of mutual accusations and broken trust, Tehran appears open to tactical compromises but not to surrender. According to sources within Iranian political circles, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has agreed to discussions on all parameters of the nuclear program, including uranium enrichment levels and the terms for international inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities. However, a complete dismantling of the nuclear program is widely seen as out of the question, as it would be perceived as a national humiliation within Iranian political culture. Khamenei and top IRGC officials—guardians of the regime’s ideological foundations—have repeatedly reinforced this position in their public statements. The scenario under consideration in Tehran includes these possible concessions: - a temporary halt to uranium enrichment beyond 60%,- a reduction in the stockpile of highly enriched uranium,- broader IAEA access to selected nuclear sites,- a declaration affirming the peaceful purposes of the nuclear program with legal guarantees. In return, Iran will push for major sanctions relief—not only in the financial sector but also in technology, including the lifting of the ban on investments in the oil and gas industry. These restrictions, in force since the late 1990s, have been particularly damaging: former Iranian official Hossein Selahvarzi put the total economic loss to Iran since 2012 at over USD 1 trillion. Iran’s missile program remains a separate and highly sensitive issue. It is regarded as an untouchable symbol of national pride and strategic autonomy. The supreme leader has made it clear that Iran’s nuclear capabilities “ensure the country’s security” in the face of potential isolation or attack. As a result, Tehran is likely to reject any proposals for reducing its missile potential. All this means that negotiations are possible, but their scope is quite limited. The outcomes of the two latest rounds of indirect talks in Oman and Rome offer some optimism. Flexing muscles: a show of force as a negotiating tool The prospect of talks between Iran and the U.S. does not preclude military tensions. On the contrary, this year both countries carried out a series of shows of force to send a message: “We are approaching negotiations from a position of strength.” Iran, on the one hand, has stepped up military activity along its external borders. In April 2025, Tehran for the first time supplied its allies in Iraq with long-range ballistic missiles and drones, including the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6. These moves were seen both as acts of support for Shiite militias and as a signal of Iran’s readiness to launch strikes in the event of major conflict. The military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz took on special significance, as Iran’s navy conducted a series of maneuvers with missile boats, mines and underwater drones. Up to 20% of the world’s sea-traded oil, or about 18 million barrels per day, passes through the strait. Its possible blockade was considered a measure of last resort to pressure international markets if another round of sanctions was imposed. In addition, Iran has increased its military footprint in the southern provinces, expanding bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Hormozgan. This builds operational depth in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack and reinforces the internal narrative that “Iran will not surrender but stands ready to defend itself.” The U.S., in turn, responded by deploying six B-2 Spirit strategic bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, within striking range of key targets in Iran. These warplanes can carry both nuclear and precision-guided conventional weapons. The U.S. also sent a carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf and reinforced air defense systems at its bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq. Thus, the military buildup in the region is not just preparation for a possible conflict but part of the diplomatic game. Tehran is demonstrating that it can deliver a firm response and that any concessions it makes are not a sign of surrender but a pragmatic step toward stability. Meanwhile, Washington is signaling its readiness for a military scenario in order to gain leverage in the talks. Russia as a mediator: interest in stability and strategic partnership Amid rising tensions between Iran and the U.S., Russia is emerging more clearly as a potential mediator and stabilizing force. Its role is shaped not only by current political dynamics but also by the deep structural ties built between Moscow and Tehran over the past years. In April, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow to discuss preliminary outcomes of consultations on a new nuclear deal with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Beyond nuclear diplomacy, the parties addressed a broad range of regional issues, including Syria, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This meeting was more than a diplomatic gesture; it reflects the genuine interests of both countries. Moscow is interested in the continuity of Iran’s current regime as a source of stability and a partner in the emerging multipolar world. Tehran, for its part, refrains from anti-Russian rhetoric, does not endorse resolutions against Russia at international platforms and shows respect for Moscow’s interests in the region. Russian–Iranian ties are strengthening not only politically but also infrastructurally. In 2023, both countries made significant progress in advancing the International North–South Transport Corridor, a project designed to link St. Petersburg with the Indian port of Mumbai via Iran. This initiative, backed by both Russia and Iran, offers an alternative to Western-centric logistics routes, and its success depends on the stability of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Moscow has already shown itself to be an effective broker in regional conflicts. In 2023, Russian diplomats helped revive dialogue between Iran and Azerbaijan after a long period of hostility fueled by disputes over borders, religious matters and relations with Israel. This experience could be leveraged in the context of Iran–U.S. negotiations, especially given the deep mistrust and the lack of direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Russia’s position is clear: Moscow is opposed to any destabilization of Iran, as it threatens to undermine regional balance, strengthen Western influence and jeopardize the partnership with Iran. As Sergey Lavrov has emphasized, Russia will support any steps aimed at de-escalation and the lifting of sanctions from Iran, as long as sovereignty and international law are respected. Thus, Russia is more than just an ally of Iran; it is one of the few actors that maintains channels of trust-based communication with both Tehran and several Western nations. This makes Moscow a potentially successful mediator, especially at a time when the U.S. has limited options for direct dialogue with Iran, and European brokers have lost much of their former influence. Possible scenarios and a window of opportunity The situation around Iran has reached a critical juncture. Amid a deep internal crisis, sanctions pressure and rising external tensions, Tehran must choose between a limited deal with the West that preserves its strategic assets or a drawn-out standoff that risks plunging the region into broader instability. First scenario: moderate de-escalation If the U.S. and Iran reached a compromise on the nuclear dossier, even in a limited format, it would create a short-term opportunity for stabilization. Iran would benefit from partial sanctions relief, increased oil export capacity and attract investment in critical sectors. In return, Tehran would commit to transparency, lower uranium enrichment levels and IAEA oversight. This scenario could also partially ease tensions around Israel, reducing the risk of direct conflict. However, even this scenario does not remove several fault lines: - The ideological hostility between Iran and Israel,- Tehran’s unwavering position on the missile program,- U.S. military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.This “frozen détente” could last for one to three years, assuming both sides show political will and avoid provocations. Second scenario: a new wave of escalation If the negotiations reach a deadlock—whether due to Washington’s excessive demands, Iran’s refusal to compromise on sensitive issues or outside interference—the situation could quickly spin out of control. In that case, possible outcomes include: - Direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities (by Israel or the U.S.),- Retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Qatar,- Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,- More active operations by Shiite militias in the region. Inside Iran, this could trigger another major wave of protests, especially if the economy takes another hit from stricter sanctions. There is also a risk that some radical opposition groups could try to take advantage of the unrest to start an uprising with high casualties—something Iran’s counterintelligence has already warned about.