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Abstract This paper analyzes, from Immanuel Wallerstein's Analysis of the World – System, an introduction, the emergence of the modern world – system, the permanence of the colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system from a decolonial approach. It examines how the center – periphery structure has determined the economic, political and epistemic dynamics at the global level. Through this approach we study how coloniality has influenced the construction of knowledge. It also analyzes the impact of this structure on the recognition of States and the negotiation of international treaties, showing how Western power has conditioned the legitimacy and autonomy of peripheral nations. It also addresses the persistence of the center-periphery logic in local relations, as well as in gender and racial inequality, highlighting the role of anti-systemic movements in the struggle against these structures. It concludes that, although colonial dynamics continue to operate through debt, extractivism and the imposition of political models, decolonial perspectives offer tools to make visible and resist them. Introduction This paper will analyze the dynamics of the current international system based on the work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System” by Immanuel Wallerstein. In it, Wallerstein (2005) argues that the modern capitalist world-system has structured the global order since the 16th century, consolidating a hierarchical division between the center and the periphery. This division has not only shaped economic and political dynamics but has also established patterns of domination and dependency that persist to this day. The colonial expansion of European powers not only guaranteed access to resources and markets but also legitimized a system of exploitation based on racism and the hierarchization of colonized peoples. The decolonial perspective of Walter Mignolo (2013) will be adopted, which posits that this is a political and epistemic project aimed at dismantling the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity. From this framework, the article will analyze how colonial logic continues to operate in the capitalist world-system through the economic and political subordination of the peripheries. It will also examine the impact of the colonial worldview on knowledge production during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as the reproduction of the center–periphery dynamic in the recognition of states during the 20th century and in the negotiation of international treaties during the 21st century. Likewise, it will address how this dynamic manifests not only internationally but also within local structures, perpetuating inequalities expressed in labor, gender, and racial relations today. This work seeks to provide a critical perspective on the persistence of colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system, emphasizing the need to rethink power structures from a decolonial perspective that makes visible and vindicates the subaltern voices that have been historically silenced. Development Colonial Logic in the Capitalist World-System In his work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System”, Wallerstein seeks to understand the structure and dynamics of the world-system, taking the 16th century as the starting point —a period when the conquests of the territories we now know as the Americas took place. The colonial period clearly illustrates the core–periphery dynamic (Wallerstein, 2005), as the Spanish, British, and Portuguese empires engaged in the extraction of resources from their colonies, while colonized peoples endured oppression and racism to which they would be condemned for centuries. This oppression brought significant benefits to the modern world-system, as it enabled massive capital accumulation — but exclusively in the core. This was because the colonial process built peripheral economies around the needs of the core, forcing them into subordination to the interests of the global market, generating dependency and underdevelopment. Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) argue that “[…] ethnicity was the inevitable cultural consequence of coloniality. It delineated the social boundaries corresponding to the division of labor” (p. 585). Due to the colonial period, the modern capitalist world-system laid its foundations and strengthened its market-based economic model through racism and hierarchization — circumstances that have legitimized the exploitation and domination of non-European peoples throughout history. Control over the resources of peripheral states by core states has endured to this day, along with the imposition of Western production and consumption models that perpetuate inequality. The colonial period’s greatest legacy remains systemic violence and subalternity. On this basis, it is important to analyze this work from a decolonial perspective. For Walter Mignolo (2013), “decoloniality is not a concept, but a practice and a political, epistemic, and ethical project aimed at disengaging from the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity” (p. 21). This perspective also draws on the notion of epistemic subalternity, which refers to the experiences and knowledge of colonized and subaltern peoples that are rendered invisible, devalued, or reduced to particular cases — without being considered an integral part of the world-system (Mora, 2008). Coloniality in the Construction of Knowledge At the end of the 18th century, the modern university emerged, dividing its studies into two faculties: sciences and humanities. In the 19th century, another division took place within the humanities, opening the space for the study of social sciences, which would later also be split — on one side, those leaning toward scientism, and on the other, toward the humanistic approach. This led to the creation of new disciplines: economics, political science, and sociology (Wallerstein, 2005). These new sciences built their worldview and knowledge construction from a Eurocentric and colonialist perspective, thus assigning labels to peoples different from their own. These new sciences categorized the study of the world’s peoples into three groups. First, civilized peoples — Western nations, considered as such because they believed their social and political organization systems were the most advanced. Second, the high civilizations — India, China, Persia, and the Arab world — classified in this way because they possessed writing, religion, language, and customs. They were regarded as civilized peoples but not modern, under the previously mentioned concept. This category gave rise to orientalist scholars, with a Eurocentric and exoticizing view. Finally, the so-called primitive peoples — those who, from the colonial perspective, lacked writing, religion, language, and customs. This perception of the “uncivilized other” was used to justify colonial processes in the periphery, which even today enable the reproduction of exploitative and racist practices. Segregation in the construction of knowledge, imbued with colonial and Eurocentric thought, is based on criticizing the behavior of these peoples and on what should be changed about them (Zapata, 2008). The Eurocentric conception asserts categorically that the modus vivendi of these peoples is not appropriate according to Western standards. Although this way of thinking has evolved over time, its essence remains the same and has led Western countries to grant themselves the power to change the way of life of these peoples through invasions, neocolonial processes, and violent interventions via military force or economic interference. The Center and the Periphery in the Recognition of States As previously mentioned, Europe established a correspondence between modernity and the West; this includes the institution of the nation-state as its derived product (Zapata, 2008). From the Eurocentric perspective, for civilizations to be considered nation-states, they must possess four characteristics: territory, population, government, and sovereignty. In Public International Law, sovereign states are the main subjects of international relations, and for a state to be recognized as such, it must be acknowledged by the majority of states that are part of the international system. The center–periphery concept operates both economically and politically, which can be observed when a new state seeks recognition from members of the international system. The recognition granted by a state from the center carries more weight than that from the periphery, since states in the center, with greater political and economic capacity, influence the decisions of their allies — both within the center and the periphery. This need for state recognition has been extremely beneficial for the modern capitalist world-system, as political and economic interdependence, along with the perpetuation of power in the countries of the center — particularly those belonging to the West — ensures that they act, whether in matters of state recognition, political agendas, or economic issues, entirely to their own advantage, disregarding the interests of “the other.” From a decolonial perspective, state recognition is a Western construct designed to maintain control over who meets the imposed criteria to belong to the Eurocentric international system. These criteria clearly do not align with the social organization of all non-Western civilizations but were conceived in such a way as to subordinate them to the needs of the world-system, which inevitably serves the interests of Western core states. This can be exemplified by the case of Taiwan. In 1971, the Kuomintang lost recognition from the government of mainland China, and starting in 1985, Taiwan’s government sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with states that already recognized it and to develop relations with those that did not, with the aim of obtaining their approval (Connelly, 2014). Despite the passage of time, recognition of Taiwan as a state by core countries seems inconvenient for them, likely due to the ongoing political dispute between Taiwan and China. As a result, only 14 peripheral states recognize it as such. Despite this, the Northeast Asian country maintains unofficial relations with 47 states and the European Union, for purely economic reasons. The Modern Capitalist World-System in International Treaties It is worth mentioning that the idea of the center–periphery permeates the negotiation of international agreements. As mentioned earlier, the so-called “primitive peoples” were civilizations that, from the Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, lacked writing, religion, languages, or customs. This idea persisted into the 20th century, as reflected in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which in Chapter II, Article 38, states that “the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: […] the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (UN, 1945). The Eurocentric conception of a civilized nation in the postwar period was based on the type of government existing in each state. Thus, countries without a democratic political system were not considered civilized nations. This conception forced nations not to determine their own system of government, but rather to adhere to the one imposed by the Western international system in order to be accepted, disregarding their customs and traditions. A more current example of the imposition of Eurocentric ideas on systems of government is the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Mexico in 2000. Ratification of the trade agreement was conditioned on what they called the “democratic clause.” The agreement was not ratified by the Italian government until July 3 of that year, when the presidential elections resulted in the victory of Vicente Fox (Villegas, 2001). On the same day, the European Commission’s spokesperson, Gunnar Wiegand, said in his press release: “A historic vote has taken place in Mexico. The Commission congratulates the Mexican people for exercising their democratic rights in such a mature and exemplary manner” (Caracol Radio, 2000). The spokesperson’s mention of the Mexican people’s maturity refers to the notion that, in the past, the exercise of democracy had not possessed this quality — an observation made from a paternalistic and Eurocentric perspective. Had the election results been different, Mexico could have faced the possibility of the European Union “imposing sanctions as a reaction to the verification of interruptions in democratic processes, which, in addition to affecting development, constitute a threat to international peace and security” (Cordero Galdós, 2002, p. 128). The criticism of the imposition of the “democratic clause” centers on the recurring practice of requiring peripheral states to adapt to the political ideologies and economic needs of the core. The Reproduction of the Center–Periphery Dynamic at the Local Level As mentioned in the development of this work, the effects of colonialism persist across all systems and subsystems through the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, the latter of which will be addressed later. This is manifested in global inequalities, the exploitation of natural resources in peripheral countries, and the persistence of racist and Eurocentric power structures. From Wallerstein’s perspective, the world-system is a historical structure which, although in constant transformation, reproduces power relations and inequalities over time through the domination of the core and the exploitation of the peripheries (Wallerstein, 2005). Thus, the world-system has evolved in several ways; one of these is the introduction of the term semi-periphery into the analysis. During the colonial period, there were only core and peripheral nations. Over the centuries, however, semi-peripheral states have emerged — nations that not only extract raw materials or engage in manufacturing but also have the capacity to produce cutting-edge technology (Wallerstein, 2005). This positions them in a more privileged place than peripheral countries in the international system. Yet, despite appearing to have overcome the systemic oppression that once kept them in the periphery, the colonial mindset within their institutions perpetuates their subordination to the core. Good examples of semi-peripheral states in Latin America are Mexico and Brazil. Both countries were victims of the exploitation and systemic violence of colonialism. This shaped the development of their societies and economies for centuries. Even after achieving independence and building productive and economic systems that placed them in the semi-periphery, their economic progress was built on a legacy of oppression and racism that continues to reproduce the abuses described. In this way, the concept of core and periphery permeates social and family subsystems. This can be observed in labor relations, where capitalists depend on the core–periphery or superior–subordinate relationship to sustain the production model. It is also evident in social relations, which Wallerstein refers to as anti-systemic movements. Society perpetuates the core–periphery principle by placing women and racialized communities in the periphery, while men — especially white men with power — occupy the core. Anti-systemic movements paved the way for the struggle against these inequalities, giving rise, for example, to feminist and Indigenous movements. These have led to the development of theoretical perspectives such as decolonial feminism, which adds analytical variables to the decolonial perspective. According to Yuderkys Espinosa, it emerges from “[…] a subaltern, non-hegemonic voice […] anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist. […] Its aim is to question and oppose an imperial and racist rationale” (Barroso, 2014, p. 2). Conclusions The modern capitalist world-system has managed to sustain and expand itself thanks to colonial structures that, far from disappearing with decolonization processes, have mutated and perpetuated dynamics of domination and dependence. As discussed, the core–periphery logic has been key to the organization of the international system, not only in economic terms but also in the construction of knowledge, the legitimization of states, the negotiation of international agreements, and the imposition of political and social models from Western hegemony. The colonial legacy remains in the structural subordination of peripheral economies to the interests of the core, the imposition of international norms that favor core countries, and the persistence of racialized and gender-based inequalities within peripheral states themselves. This scheme has not only ensured capital accumulation in the core but has also limited the self-determination of historically colonized peoples, while normalizing their exclusion from political, economic, and epistemic spheres. At the international level, neocolonialism operates through mechanisms such as external debt, unequal trade agreements, and political interference in the internal affairs of peripheral states. In addition, extractivism and territorial dispossession continue to reproduce colonial logics, affecting both peripheral countries and Indigenous communities as well as other historically marginalized groups. In this sense, the modern capitalist world-system not only perpetuates economic exploitation but also reinforces power structures based on racism, sexism, and subalternity. However, as decolonial perspectives point out, the coloniality of power is not an immutable phenomenon. This approach questions the structures of power and knowledge inherited from colonization, seeking to deconstruct Eurocentric discourses and make visible the voices and experiences of the subaltern. Anti-systemic movements have sought to challenge these structures, reclaiming the agency of subaltern peoples and promoting the construction of alternatives that confront the colonial matrix of power. Particularly, decolonial feminism has emerged as a key critique of the intersection between patriarchy and coloniality, showing how women — especially racialized women — have been relegated to the periphery of the system. Thus, analyzing the world-system from a decolonial perspective allows us not only to understand the continuity of structures of domination but also to recognize the spaces of resistance and contestation that emerge within it. In conclusion, the decolonial perspective enables us to rethink the modern world-system from a critical standpoint, recognizing structural inequalities and the need to transform the power dynamics that perpetuate the domination of the core over the periphery. Decolonialism makes it possible to redefine notions of progress, development, and modernity from a perspective free from colonial stereotypes and hierarchies, recognizing the diversity of knowledge and worldviews of Indigenous peoples. It seeks to decentralize power by rethinking and decolonizing power relations between the core and the periphery, between the state and local communities, aiming for a more equitable distribution of resources and benefits. 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In August 2021 the world watched as thousands of people, both Americans and Afghans, crowded onto airplanes at the Kabul airport to escape the return of the Taliban. By the end of August 2021, the United States had evacuated over 200,000 people. On August 15, 2021, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and the Taliban seized control of Kabul calling themselves the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The collapse of the Islamic Republic was predicated on the United States-Taliban deal that was signed in February of 2020. Most people assumed the Taliban would be unable to govern Afghanistan and that their government would not last. After all they were rural tribal people with a fundamental belief in a primitive version of Islam, and their control of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 was in many ways a disaster. But, the Taliban have now led the country for four years, with no end in sight. Arguing that they are following basic Islamic law regarding the proper place for women in society, the Taliban have severely restricted the rights of women, restrictions more severe than in any other Islamic country. The treatment of women is the major reason the Taliban has not been recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by many nations (Drury, 2025). The Taliban have also been denied a seat in the United Nations, again largely because of their treatment of women (Lederer, 2025). Recently the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for two Taliban leaders, Haibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader of Afghanistan, and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, the chief Justice in the Afghan supreme court, for their treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan (Ayre, 2025). Not only are women not allowed to attend school beyond six grade, but they are not allowed to travel outside of their homes without a male companion. Women traveling outside the home must wear a veil that covers their full body. The Gender Inequality Index, a metric developed by the United Nations Development Program as a composite measure of a women’s place in society, is based on three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation. It ranks Afghanistan one of the lowest the world in terms of the treatment of women in government, education, health and political participation (UNDP, Gender Inequality Index, 2025). Gender based violence has also increased. Afghan women experience a high rate of harassment when they leave their homes. Incidents of stoning and verbal harassment have been widely reported. This harassment and abuse is condoned by the Taliban’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a Taliban government agency that, among other things, dictates where women can go or not go, what women must wear, and how they must behave. Women who do not follow the rules of this Ministry are chastised, harassed, and often beaten. When women are arrested, they often face verbal abuse and torture (Ahmadi, 2023). Afghan women also often have no say in who they marry and many of these forced marriages are a result of poverty which drives fathers to marry off their daughters, often at a young age (Nariman, 2025). There are very few female doctors or nurses in Afghanistan. Because men are prohibited from treating women, let alone seeing them without their veil, women are often unable to access basic medical services. Maternal mortality rates are high compared to other countries. With poor medical help available for pregnant women, it is estimated that approximately 24 women die each day in Afghanistan due to pregnancy related causes. Most of these deaths are the results of complications during childbirth (Gluck, 2023). Because of the lack of medical support, the infant mortality rate for Afghanistan is 62 deaths per 100,000 live births, one of the highest in the world (CIA, 2024). Afghanistan has always been a poor country with high levels of poverty. Since the Taliban takeover poverty has drastically increased, particularly in the rural areas. It is estimated that over 90 percent of the population of Afghanistan is facing poverty and food insecurity (Programme W. F., 2024). The United Nations Development Project estimates that approximately 85 percent of the Afghan population live on less than one dollar per day (UNDP, 2024). The increase in poverty is in part because donors who had previously supported Afghanistan have halted their support. By 2025, Afghanistan had lost about 26 percent of its gross domestic product as many of these international development projects closed, pushing many Afghans out of work and into poverty (Smith, 2024). With the return of President Trump in 2025, the United States stopped all aid to Afghanistan, worsening the situation. Food scarcity falls most heavily on girls, as poor families make the hard choice of feeding boys before the girls. The mortality rate among girls is 90 percent higher than among boys (Bank, 2023). The increasing level of poverty is exacerbated by the large number of Afghan refugees who are being forcefully repatriated from the countries where they had sought exile, mostly from Pakistan and Iran, but also in some cases from European countries and other countries where they sought refuge. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimates that over 96,000 Afghans were forcefully deported back to Afghanistan in April of this year alone, and that over 3.4 million Afghan refugees have been deported from Iran and Pakistan since 2023 (UNHCR, 2025). Most of these returning refugees have no home or job to return to. Although the UNHCR sometimes gives returning refugees a small amount of money as they return, most return to poverty and in many cases without homes. These returning refugees most often settle in areas around major cities, especially Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat, creating a large population of unemployed and impoverished families. The returning refugee problem has been exacerbated by the decision by Iran to expel all Afghans. This is apparently a result of the growing Iranian conflict with Israel (Haqiqatyar, 2025). It is not clear why Iran is expelling Afghans, many of whom had been in Iran for decades. It has been suggested that Iran felt that the Afghan’s were sympathetic to Israel and/or the United States and were acting as spies, although there is no evidence of this. It is estimated that over 6 million Afghans had been living in Iran. The United Nations High Commission of Refugees reports that this year over 1.4 million Afghans have returned from Iran (UNHCR, 2025). Many former Afghan government officials have fled Afghanistan or have been killed as political dissent is not allowed and political parties or ideologies that do not support the Taliban are forbidden. Those who have stayed have largely been quiet. The media is controlled by the Ministry of Information and Culture. This includes the control of newspapers, radio, and television. Most reporters and journalists have fled and female journalists are not allowed (Mercier, 2025). Although there is some opposition to the Taliban government, especially by the National Resistance Front, they have accomplished little and do not pose a serious threat to the Taliban (Bowes, 2024). Other groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, while present in Afghanistan do not pose a serious threat to the Taliban. These shifts have resulted in a marked drop in fighting, which has brought a form of security to the country. Even though the US travel advisory for Afghanistan remains at ‘level four: do not travel’, in fact tourism, although limited, is beginning. The Taliban government encourages tourism because it brings in much needed foreign currency. The Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture, which oversees tourism, reports that there are at least 350 tourism companies operating in Afghanistan (Lateef, 2025). Humanitarian agencies working in rural areas report that it is now possible to travel into remote areas of Afghanistan, areas that were previously either too dangerous to travel to or too remote. This is in part because the Taliban have embraced the Afghan rural population, and while there still areas that may be dangerous to travel to, much of the anti-government sentiment in the rural area is gone (Smith, 2024). Travel outside of Kabul has also improved as roadblocks have been dismantled, bridges repaired, and roads repaved. While there have been reports of petty corruption at the local level in Afghanistan, corruption under Taliban rule has dramatically reduced. Pre 2021, numerous Afghan government officials, as well as American contractors, made fortunes by funnelling off billions of dollars earmarked for public projects. The corruption took place at all levels so that anything one wanted to do involved a bribe. Corruption was especially found in customs and border checkpoints. It is estimated that during the Republic over 1.4 billion dollars were illegally collected at border checkpoints annually (SIGAR, 2016). Much of this corruption has been eliminated under Taliban rule. Finally, before the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan was the world’s top producer of opium which is used to make Heroin. The Taliban imposed a ban on growing opium in the spring of 2022, with the exception that farmers were allowed to harvest their standing crop. It is estimated that in 2024 about 12,800 hectares of poppies were grown, down from before the ban when farmers planted over 233,000 hectares (Mishra, 2024). However, largely because of economic difficulties, farmers are beginning to grow opium again, even if it is forbidden by the government in Kabul (Mishra, 2024). In sum, despite dire predictions of many the Tailban have managed to stay in power for four years and now seem to exercise firm control of Afghanistan. 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Note: some parts of the article have been excluded, if you want to go deep in the article please check  https://doi.org/10.1177/01445987251314504 for the complete version. Abstract Nuclear power plays a pivotal role in sustainable electricity generation and global net zero emissions, contributing significantly to this secure pathway. Nuclear power capacity is expected to double, escalating from 413 gigawatts (GW) in early 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 within the net zero emissions (NZE) paradigm. The global energy landscape is undergoing significant transformation as nations strive to transition to more sustainable energy systems. Amidst this shift, nuclear power has emerged as a crucial component in the pursuit of a sustainable energy transition. This study examines nuclear power's multifaceted role in shaping sustainable energy transition. It delves into nuclear energy's contributions toward decarbonization efforts, highlighting its capacity to provide low-carbon electricity and its potential role in mitigating climate change. Furthermore, the study explores the challenges and opportunities associated with integrating nuclear power into energy transition strategies, addressing issues such as safety, waste management, and public perception. In conclusion, the global nuclear power capacity is anticipated to reach approximately 530 GW by 2050, representing a substantial shortfall of 35% compared with the trajectory outlined in the NZE pathway. Under the NZE scenario, nuclear power demonstrates exceptional expansion, nearly doubling from 413 GW in early 2022 to 812 GW by 2050. Concurrently, the trajectory highlights a transformative shift in renewable energy investments, with annual expenditures surging from an average of US$325 billion during 2016–2020 to an impressive US$1.3 trillion between 2031 and 2035. These projections underscore the critical role of nuclear and renewable energy investments in achieving global sustainability and emission reduction goals. Introduction Global warming and greenhouse gas emissions pose some of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. The combustion of fossil fuels for electricity generation is a major contributor to these issues, releasing billions of tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere annually (Abbasi et al., 2020; Nassar et al., 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024a). In this context, nuclear energy emerges as a critical component of the solution. Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear power generates electricity with minimal greenhouse gas emissions, offering a reliable and scalable alternative to bridge the gap between energy demand and decarbonization goals. It operates independently of weather conditions, providing consistent energy output and complementing the intermittency of renewable sources like wind and solar (Rekik and El Alimi, 2024b, 2024c). Furthermore, advancements in nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors (SMRs) and generation IV reactors, have addressed historical concerns related to safety, waste management, and cost-effectiveness (Lau and Tsai, 2023). In 2022, global investment in low-emission fuels will maintain a robust growth trajectory, reaching a sum of US$13 billion. A significant portion of this investment was allocated toward liquid biofuels, totaling US$9.4 billion, and biogas, amounting to US$2.7 billion. It is important to emphasize that liquid biofuels constituted approximately 80% of the overall investment surge observed in 2022, with investments in biogas contributing 4% of the total. The residual portion of the investment was directed toward low-emission hydrogen production, which attained a sum of US$1.2 billion in 2022, representing an almost fourfold increase compared to the figures recorded in 2021 (Khaleel et al., 2024).Nuclear power is a pivotal component of low-carbon energy, which significantly contributes to the realization of a low-carbon economy and establishment of a green energy grid (Arvanitidis et al., 2023; El Hafdaoui et al., 2024; Fragkos et al., 2021). According to current data, 442 nuclear power reactors are operational worldwide, collectively generating 393 gigawatts (GW) of electricity, thereby furnishing a consistent and dependable source of low-carbon power (Mathew, 2022). Nuclear electricity constitutes approximately 11% of the total global electricity generation, representing a substantial portion of the global low-carbon electricity production (Alam et al., 2019). Recent advancements have enhanced the affordability and appeal of nuclear power as an alternative source of energy. These advancements encompass progress in large reactor technologies, the emergence of novel approaches such as advanced fuel utilization and SMRs, engineering breakthroughs facilitating the extension of operational lifespans for existing reactors, and innovations in materials science and improved waste management practices (Kröger et al., 2020; Zhan et al., 2021). Fast breeder reactor technology has transitioned into a commercial realm, offering benefits beyond electricity generation by enabling the production of surplus fuel and enhancing the efficiency of nuclear waste incineration, surpassing the capabilities of existing commercial reactor technologies (Lau and Tsai, 2023). Nuclear power plays a substantial role within a secure global trajectory toward achieving net zero emissions (NZE) (Addo et al., 2023; Dafnomilis et al., 2023). Nuclear power capacity experiences a twofold increase, progressing from 413 GW at the outset of 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 within the NZE paradigm. It is apparent that the annual additions to nuclear capacity peaked at 27 GW per year during the 2030s, surpassing the levels observed in the preceding decade. Despite these advancements, the global proportion of nuclear power within the overall electricity generation portfolio has experienced a marginal decline, settling at 8% (Murphy et al., 2023; Ruhnau et al., 2023). Emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) substantially dominate global growth, constituting over 90% of the aggregate, with China poised to ascend as a preeminent nuclear power producer prior to 2030. Concurrently, advanced economies collectively witness a 10% augmentation in nuclear power capacity as retirements are counterbalanced by the commissioning of new facilities, predominantly observed in nations such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada (Bórawski et al., 2024). Furthermore, annual global investment in nuclear power has experienced a notable escalation, soaring from US$30 billion throughout the 2010s to surpass US$100 billion by 2030, maintaining a robust trajectory above US$80 billion by 2050 (IEA, 2022). In 2022, global nuclear power capacity experienced a modest increase of approximately 1.5 GW, reflecting a marginal year-on-year growth of 0.3%. This expansion was primarily driven by new capacity additions that surpassed the retirement of an over 6 GW of existing capacity (Fernández-Arias et al., 2023; Mendelevitch et al., 2018). EMDEs accounted for approximately 60% of the new capacity additions, underscoring their increasing significance in the global nuclear energy landscape. Conversely, more than half of the retirements were observed in advanced economies, including Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Table 1 shows the nuclear power capacity by region in the NZE from 2018 to 2030.   In alignment with the Net Zero Scenario, it is imperative for the global nuclear capacity to undergo an expansion averaging approximately 15 GW per annum, constituting a growth rate slightly exceeding 3% annually, until 2030. This strategic augmentation is crucial for sustaining the contribution of the nuclear sector to electricity generation, maintaining its share at approximately 10% (Liu et al., 2023). Such an expansion necessitates concerted efforts in both advanced economies and EMDEs. Furthermore, prioritizing the extension of operational lifetimes of existing nuclear facilities within G7 member states would not only fortify the existing low-emission infrastructure, but also facilitate the integration of new nuclear capacity, thereby augmenting the overall nuclear energy portfolio. [...] The significant contribution of nuclear power to sustainable energy transitions is underscored by its multifaceted role in addressing the pressing challenges of climate change and energy security (Asif et al., 2024). As nations worldwide endeavor to shift toward greener energy systems, nuclear power has emerged as a critical pillar of the decarbonization journey. Its ability to provide low-carbon electricity, mitigate climate change impacts by 2050, and enhance energy security highlights its pivotal importance in the broader context of sustainable energy transitions (Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; NEA, 2015). Thus, to fully realize its potential, challenges such as safety, waste management, and public perception must be addressed effectively. By leveraging robust policy frameworks, technological advancements, and international collaboration, nuclear power is poised to play a vital role in shaping the future of sustainable energy transitions on a global scale. Furthermore, the dynamic landscape of nuclear power development is evident in the significant influence exerted by EMDEs, particularly China, which is expected to emerge as a leading nuclear power producer by 2030 (Fälth et al., 2021; Nkosi and Dikgang, 2021). Concurrently, advanced economies are witnessing notable expansions in nuclear power capacity driven by the commissioning of new facilities to offset retirements (Budnitz et al., 2018). This trend is further reinforced by a notable surge in annual global investment in nuclear power, underscoring the sustained commitment to nuclear energy's pivotal role in sustainable energy transitions in the foreseeable future (IEA, 2019). The primary objective of this article is to explore the strategic role of nuclear power in advancing global sustainability goals and achieving zero emissions. The objective is structured around the following key agendas: •Nuclear power: prominence and green electricity source•Nuclear's role in achieving net zero by 2050•Nuclear power's significance in power system adequacySpecific technologies for sustainability in nuclear energy production•Investment in nuclear power•Addressing policy implications This comprehensive analysis aims to provide actionable insights into harnessing nuclear power for sustainable electricity generation and its pivotal role in achieving global zero-emission targets. Data and methodology This article conducts an in-depth analysis of the role of nuclear power in achieving sustainable electricity generation and supporting NZE targets. The article also addresses the potential of nuclear energy as a prominent and environmentally favorable electricity source, examining nuclear power's contribution toward the net zero by 2050 goal, its critical importance in ensuring power system adequacy, investment imperatives, and the broader policy implications.  [...] Nuclear power: prominence and green electricity source In 2020, nuclear power will constitute approximately 10% of the global electricity generation portfolio. This proportion, which had previously stood at 18% during the late 1990s, has experienced a decline; nonetheless, nuclear energy retains its status as the second-largest provider of low-emission electricity, trailing only hydroelectricity, and serves as the primary source within advanced economies. Despite the substantial proliferation of wind and solar PV technologies, nuclear electricity production in 2020 surpassed the aggregate output of these renewable sources. As of 2021, the global cumulative installed nuclear capacity has reached 413 GW, with 270 GW of this total being installed in advanced economies (Guidi et al., 2023; Halkos and Zisiadou, 2023; Pan et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2022). Nuclear power generation during this period amounted to 2653 TWh, positioning it as the second largest source of electricity generation after hydropower, which generated 4275 TWh, as depicted in Figure 1.   In addition to its significant role in power generation, nuclear energy plays a crucial role in mitigating carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Since the 1970s, nuclear power has helped avoid the global release of approximately 66 gigatons (Gt) of CO2 globally, as shown in Figure 2.   Without the contribution of nuclear power, cumulative emissions from electricity generation would have increased by approximately 20%, whereas total energy-related emissions would have increased by 6% over this period (Wagner, 2021). Advanced economies accounted for more than 85% of these avoided emissions, with the European Union accounting for 20 Gt and the United States for 24 Gt, representing over 40% and 25% of total electricity generation emissions, respectively. In the absence of nuclear power, Japan would have experienced an estimated 25% increase in emissions from electricity generation, whereas Korea and Canada would have seen an increase of approximately 50%. Nuclear's role in achieving net zero by 2050 Nuclear energy has emerged as a pivotal low-emission technology within the trajectory toward achieving NZE (Pioro et al., 2019). In addition, it serves as a complementary force, bolstering the accelerated expansion of renewables, thereby facilitating the reduction of emissions from the global electricity sector to net zero by 2040 (Krūmiņš and Kļaviņš, 2023; Islam et al., 2024). Beyond its intrinsic contribution to fostering a low-emission electricity supply, nuclear power is significant as a dispatchable generating asset, fortifying supply security through its provision of system adequacy and flexibility. Furthermore, it is instrumental in furnishing heat for district heating networks and in selecting industrial facilities. Despite this, the prospective role of nuclear energy hinges significantly on the deliberations and determinations of policymakers and industry stakeholders concerning the pace of new reactor construction initiatives and the continued operational lifespan of existing nuclear facilities (Li et al., 2016; Li et al., 2015).In terms of the NZE trajectory, the global nuclear power capacity exhibits a remarkable surge, nearly doubling from 413 GW at the onset of 2022 to 812 GW by 2050 (Price et al., 2023; Utami et al., 2022). This augmentation primarily stems from the vigorous initiation of new construction endeavors, which effectively counterbalance the gradual decommissioning of numerous extant plants. Such an escalation constitutes a pronounced acceleration in comparison to the preceding three decades, characterized by a mere 15% increment in capacity, equivalent to approximately 60 GW (Haneklaus et al., 2023; Obekpa and Alola, 2023; Sadiq et al., 2023). Figure 3 demonstrates the nuclear power capacity within each country/region under the NZE by 2050 scenario.   The expected growth in nuclear power capacity far exceeds the path outlined by the current policies and legal frameworks. According to the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), the nuclear capacity is projected to reach approximately 530 GW by 2050, which is 35% lower than that of the NZE pathway (Espín et al., 2023; Nicolau et al., 2023; Nnabuife et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023). Without a significant shift from recent nuclear power development trends, achieving NZE would require a limited reliance on a smaller range of low-emission technologies. This could compromise energy security and lead to higher total investment costs, resulting in increased electricity prices for consumers. Table 2 shows the average annual capacity addition for global nuclear power in NZE from 1981 to 2030.   In 2022, the global deployment of new nuclear power capacity witnessed a notable upsurge, with 7.9 GW added, representing a substantial 40% increase compared to the preceding year (Ho et al., 2019). It is worth bearing in mind that China spearheaded this expansion by completing the construction of two reactors, maintaining its streak for consecutive years as the leading contributor to global nuclear power capacity augmentation. It is noteworthy that the projects were successfully completed in various other nations, including Finland, Korea, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, significant strides were made in the initiation of new construction endeavors, with the commencement of construction activities on five reactors in China, two reactors in Egypt, and one reactor in Turkey (Hickey et al., 2021). Nuclear power's significance in power system adequacy Nuclear power facilities have persistently underpinned the dependability of power systems, thereby bolstering the adequacy of the system. Across diverse national contexts, nuclear power plants have historically maintained operational readiness, manifesting availability rates consistently exceeding 90%, thereby demonstrating their reliability in power generation. Given that a substantial proportion of nuclear power capacity directly contributes to system adequacy metrics, its significance in fortifying system reliability and adequacy significantly outweighs its proportional contribution to the total power capacity (Orikpete and Ewim, 2024; Frilingou et al., 2023; Raj, 2023; Ragosa et al., 2024). The contribution of nuclear power to system adequacy is demonstrated by the consistent trajectory of its share within the aggregate dispatchable power capacity, hovering at around 8% between 2021 and 2050 within the NZE framework (IEA, 2022; OIES, 2024). Dispatchable electricity sources have historically constituted the primary mechanism for ensuring system adequacy, a trend that endures within the NZE paradigm, especially as electricity systems undergo evolution marked by an escalating reliance on variable solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy sources (Marzouk, 2024; Moon et al., 2024; Wisnubroto et al., 2023). It is indisputable that unabated fossil fuel resources predominantly dominate dispatchable capacity; however, their prominence clearly diminishes, declining by a quarter by 2030 within the NZE framework and experiencing a precipitous decline thereafter. Unabated coal-fired power, currently the most substantial dispatchable source, anticipates a decline exceeding 40% in operational capacity by 2030 and approaches a state of negligible contribution by the early 2040s. Conversely, the unabated natural gas-fired power capacity exhibits a sustained level of stability until 2030, primarily driven by the necessity to offset the diminishing role of coal; nonetheless, it subsequently undergoes a rapid descent throughout the 2030s. Oil, constituting a comparatively minor contributor, experiences rapid phasing out across most regions, except for remote locales, within the delineated scenario (Makarov et al., 2023; Ren et al., 2024). Figure 4 highlights the global capacity of dispatchable power categorized by category in the scenario of achieving NZE by 2050.   In this context, fossil fuels equipped with Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS) technology have emerged as notable contributors to bolstering system adequacy. Yet, nuclear power remains a steady contributor to the power system flexibility. In advanced economies, the proportion of hour-to-hour flexibility is projected to increase from approximately 2% to 5% by 2050. Similarly, in EMDEs, this ratio is anticipated to increase from 1% to 3% over the same temporal span (Jenkins et al., 2018). It is worth highlighting that in France, where nuclear power fulfills the lion's share of electricity generation requisites, flexibility has been ingrained within reactor designs (Ho et al., 2019). This feature enables certain plants to swiftly modulate their output to align with the fluctuating electricity supply and demand, operating in a load-following mode (Chen, 2024; Jin and Bae, 2023; Kanugrahan and Hakam, 2023). Although many nations have not habitually engaged nuclear power in such operational dynamics, a considerable number of reactors are capable of performing load-following operations with minimal or no requisite technical adaptations (Caciuffo et al., 2020). Figure 5 demonstrates the hour-to-hour power system flexibility based on the source and regional grouping in the NZE by the 2050 scenario.   Innovation holds promise in enhancing the flexibility of nuclear power. Advanced technological advancements, such as SMRs, can facilitate nuclear reactors to adjust their electricity output with greater ease, as illustrated in Figure 6 (Ho et al., 2019; Lee, 2024; Wisnubroto et al., 2023). Moreover, these technologies offer the prospect of enabling reactors to transition toward generating heat or producing hydrogen either independently or concurrently with electricity generation. Initiatives are underway to disseminate information to policymakers and planners regarding the potential cost advantages associated with enhancing nuclear power flexibility.  Figure 6 demonstrates the nuclear system augmented by wind turbines for trigeneration.   Investment in nuclear power The renaissance of nuclear power within the NZE trajectory necessitates a substantial surge in investment in the coming decades. This surge is envisaged to encompass the construction of new nuclear reactors and extension of operational lifespans for existing facilities. Within this scenario, annual global investment in nuclear power is poised to escalate to exceed US$100 billion during the initial half of the 2030s within the NZE framework, surpassing the threefold average investment level of US$30 billion recorded during the 2010s (IEA, 2022). Subsequently, investment levels are expected to gradually decline as the imperative for dispatchable low emissions generating capacity diminishes, tapering to approximately US$70 billion by the latter half of the 2040s (Kharitonov and Semenova, 2023; Zimmermann and Keles, 2023). Over the period spanning from 2021 to 2050, the allocation of investment toward nuclear power constitutes a fraction representing less than 10% of the aggregate investment dedicated to low-emission sources of electricity (IEA, 2022). By comparison, within this framework, the annual investment in renewable energy experiences a notable escalation, escalating from an average of US$325 billion during the interval from 2016 to 2020 to US$1.3 trillion during the period 2031–2035 (EEDP, 2023; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024d). It is worth noting that the latter consideration elucidates the rationale behind the disproportionate allocation of investment toward advanced economies in later decades. China, for instance, requires an annual expenditure averaging close to US$20 billion on nuclear infrastructure by 2050, representing a nearly twofold increase compared to the average observed during the 2010s (Aghahosseini et al., 2023; Vujić et al., 2012). Conversely, other EMDEs witness a tripling of investment, reaching approximately US$25 billion per year, on average. In contrast to advanced economies, the imperative for investment in these nations is more pronounced in the period leading up to 2035 (Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Khaleel et al., 2024). Thus, nuclear energy, despite its advantages as a low-carbon energy source, faces notable challenges. High capital costs and long deployment timelines, driven by complex construction and regulatory requirements, often hinder its adoption. The management of radioactive waste remains a costly and contentious issue, while safety concerns, shaped by historical incidents, continue to influence public perception. Additionally, reliance on uranium, with its geographically concentrated supply, raises geopolitical and environmental concerns. Nuclear power also competes with the rapidly advancing and cost-effective renewable energy sector, while decommissioning aging plants poses long-term financial and logistical burdens. Addressing these limitations through advanced technologies, public engagement, and international collaboration is crucial for enhancing nuclear energy's role in sustainable energy transitions. Technologies for sustainability in nuclear energy production The pursuit of sustainability in nuclear energy production has been supported by advancements in innovative technologies that enhance efficiency, safety, and environmental compatibility (Aktekin et al., 2024; Ali et al., 2024; Zheng et al., 2024; Khan et al., 2017). These technologies are crucial for positioning nuclear power as a key contributor to clean and sustainable energy transitions. Below are some of the most impactful technologies in this domain: Advanced nuclear reactors: Small modular reactors (SMRs): SMRs are compact, scalable, and safer than traditional large-scale reactors. Their modular design allows for deployment in remote locations, making them suitable for decentralized energy systems. Generation IV reactors: These reactors incorporate advanced cooling systems and fuel cycles to improve efficiency, safety, and waste reduction. Examples include sodium-cooled fast reactors and gas-cooled fast reactors. Thorium-based reactors: Thorium fuel cycle reactors use thorium-232 as an alternative to uranium, offering a more abundant and sustainable fuel source. Thorium reactors produce less nuclear waste and have a lower risk of proliferation. Fusion energy: Although still in the experimental stage, nuclear fusion promises to be a game-changing technology. Fusion produces minimal radioactive waste and harnesses abundant fuel sources like deuterium and tritium, making it a virtually limitless and clean energy solution. Molten salt reactors (MSRs): MSRs use liquid fuels or coolants, such as molten salts, which operate at lower pressures and higher temperatures. These reactors are inherently safer and have the capability to utilize a variety of fuel types, including spent nuclear fuel and thorium. Reactor safety enhancements: Passive safety systems: These systems enhance reactor safety by using natural forces like gravity, natural convection, or condensation to cool the reactor core without human intervention. Digital twin technologies: Digital simulations and monitoring of reactor systems allow for predictive maintenance and real-time safety management. Nuclear waste management technologies Fast reactors: These reactors can recycle spent fuel, reducing the volume and radioactivity of nuclear waste. Deep geological repositories: Advances in geotechnical engineering have improved the safety of long-term waste storage in deep geological formations. Hybrid nuclear-renewable systems: Combining nuclear power with renewable energy sources like wind and solar can optimize energy production and grid stability. Hybrid systems leverage the reliability of nuclear energy with the intermittency of renewables for a balanced, low-carbon energy mix. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning: AI and machine learning technologies are being deployed to enhance reactor performance, optimize fuel usage, and improve operational safety. Predictive analytics also play a critical role in maintenance and risk assessment. Fuel advancements: High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU): HALEU fuels enable reactors to operate more efficiently and reduce waste. Accident-tolerant fuels (ATFs): These are designed to withstand extreme conditions, reducing the likelihood of core damage during accidents. Integrated energy systems: Nuclear reactors are increasingly being used for purposes beyond electricity generation, such as hydrogen production, district heating, and desalination. The integration of digital technologies, including AI and machine learning, coupled with fuel advancements like HALEU and accident-tolerant fuels, highlights the continuous evolution of the nuclear sector. These innovations not only enhance efficiency and safety but also expand the applications of nuclear energy beyond electricity generation to include hydrogen production, desalination, and district heating. Despite these technological advancements, the sustainable deployment of nuclear energy requires robust policy frameworks, increased investments, and public acceptance. Addressing these challenges is critical to unlocking the full potential of nuclear power in achieving global energy security and NZE by 2050. [...] Discussion and policy implications Nuclear power presents a compelling case as a sustainable energy source owing to its several key advantages. Its high-energy density allows for substantial electricity generation from minimal fuel, enabling continuous operation, unlike intermittent renewables, such as solar and wind (Rekik and El Alimi, 2023a, 2023b), thus contributing significantly to grid stability (Cramer et al., 2023). Furthermore, nuclear power is a crucial tool for emissions reduction, boasting virtually no greenhouse gas emissions during operation. Although lifecycle emissions associated with fuel processing and plant construction exist, they remain comparable to or lower than those of renewables. Several studies have reported on the energy production capabilities of nuclear power and its contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions compared to other energy sources. A key aspect of these analyses is quantifying the potential contribution of nuclear power to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving net zero targets. However, direct comparison of reported data can be challenging due to variations in model assumptions, geographic scope, and time horizons.  [...] From another perspective, radioactive waste generation poses a significant challenge to nuclear power because of its long-term hazardous nature. This necessitates meticulous management and disposal strategies to mitigate potential social impacts. These impacts arise from perceived or actual risks to human health and the environment, fueling public anxiety and opposition to nuclear power, which is often expressed through protests and legal action (Kyne and Bolin, 2016; Nilsuwankosit, 2017; Ram Mohan and Namboodhiry, 2020). Additionally, communities near waste sites can experience stigmatization, resulting in decreased property values and social isolation. The persistent nature of radioactive waste also raises intergenerational equity issues, burdening future generations with its management (Deng et al., 2020; Mason-Renton and Luginaah, 2019). Thus, transparent communication and stakeholder engagement are crucial for building public trust and ensuring responsible radioactive waste management (Dungan et al., 2021; Sančanin and Penjišević, 2023). There are various radioactive waste disposal pathways, each with unique social and technical considerations. Deep geological disposal, an internationally favored method for high-level waste disposal, involves burying waste deep underground for long-term isolation. Interim storage provides a secure temporary holding until a permanent solution is obtained (Chapman, 1992; Grambow, 2022). Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel recovers reusable materials, reducing high-level waste but creating lower-level waste. Advanced reactor technologies aim to minimize waste and improve safety, potentially converting long-lived isotopes into shorter-lived isotopes (Dixon et al., 2020; Englert and Pistner, 2023). Choosing a disposal pathway requires careful evaluation of factors, such as waste type and volume, geology, feasibility, cost, and public acceptance, often leading to a combined approach. Ongoing community engagement and addressing concerns are essential to safe and responsible waste management. Effective management and disposal of this waste require advanced technological solutions, robust regulatory frameworks, and long-term planning to ensure safety and sustainability (Abdelsalam et al., 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024a), Moreover, its relatively small land footprint compared to other energy sources, especially solar and wind farms, minimizes the ecosystem impact and makes it a sustainable option in densely populated areas (Poinssot et al., 2016; Sadiq et al., 2022). Nuclear power also enhances energy security by reducing reliance on fossil fuels, which is particularly valuable in countries with limited domestic resources (Cramer et al., 2023; Ichord Jr., 2022). Additionally, nuclear power exhibits synergy with other clean technologies, providing a stable baseload complementing variable renewables and facilitating hydrogen production for diverse energy applications (Abdelsalam et al., 2024; El-Emam and Subki, 2021; Salam and Khan, 2018; Rekik, 2024; Rekik and El Alimi, 2024e). Finally, ongoing advancements in reactor design, such as SMRs, promise enhanced safety, reduced costs, and greater deployment flexibility, further solidifying the role of nuclear power in decarbonizing the electricity sector (Aunedi et al., 2023). Supportive policies and international cooperation are essential for fully realizing the potential of nuclear energy. Streamlined licensing and regulatory frameworks are crucial for reducing deployment time and costs and ensuring that safety standards are met efficiently (Gungor and Sari, 2022; Jewell et al., 2019). Furthermore, incentivizing investments through financial tools such as tax credits and loan guarantees can attract private capital and create a level-playing field for nuclear power (Decker and Rauhut, 2021; Nian and Hari, 2017; Zimmermann and Keles, 2023). Addressing public perception through education and engagement is equally important for building trust and acceptance. Moreover, international cooperation is vital in several respects. The disposal of radioactive waste remains a complex issue, requiring careful long-term management and securing geological repositories to prevent environmental contamination owing to the long half-life of some isotopes. Furthermore, while modern reactors incorporate advanced safety features, the potential for accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima remains a concern because of the potential for widespread radiation release and long-term health consequences (Denning and Mubayi, 2016; Högberg, 2013; Wheatley et al., 2016). Moreover, the high initial costs associated with design, construction, and licensing present significant barriers to new nuclear projects, particularly in developing countries. In addition, the risk of nuclear proliferation, in which technology intended for peaceful energy production is diverted for weapons development, necessitates stringent international safeguards, as highlighted by following reference. Public perception also plays a crucial role because negative opinions and concerns about safety and waste disposal can create opposition to new projects. Finally, the decommissioning of nuclear plants at the end of their operational life is a complex and costly process that requires substantial resources and expertise to dismantle reactors and manage radioactive materials. [...] Conclusion The role of nuclear power in sustainable energy transition is multifaceted and significant. As nations worldwide strive to transition toward more environmentally friendly energy systems, nuclear power has emerged as a crucial component of the decarbonization journey. Its capacity to provide low-carbon electricity, mitigate climate change, and contribute to energy security underscores its importance in the broader context of sustainable energy transitions. Despite this, challenges such as safety, waste management, and public perception must be addressed to fully harness the potential of nuclear power to achieve sustainability goals. By leveraging policy frameworks, technological innovations, and international cooperation, nuclear power can play a vital role in shaping the future of sustainable energy transition on a global scale. In this context, EMDEs exert a substantial influence on global growth, collectively accounting for over 90% of the aggregate, with China positioned to emerge as the foremost nuclear power producer before 2030. Concurrently, advanced economies have witnessed a notable 10% increase in their nuclear power capacity. This augmentation is attributed to the commissioning of new facilities, which offset retirements, manifestly observed in nations such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Furthermore, there is a marked escalation in annual global investment in nuclear power, surging from US$30 billion throughout the 2010s to surpass US$100 billion by 2030. This upward trajectory is robustly sustained, remaining above US$80 billion by 2050. In conclusion, the remarkable decline in the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for solar PV and wind power over the past decade has positioned renewable energy as a cost-competitive and viable alternative to fossil fuels in many regions. The over 80% reduction in LCOE for utility-scale solar PV from 2010 to 2022 exemplifies the economic feasibility of renewables. Concurrently, the steady growth in renewable energy capacity, spearheaded by solar and wind energy, underscores their critical role in the global energy transition. With renewable electricity capacity surpassing 3300 GW in 2023 and accounting for over one-third of the global power mix, renewable energy is undeniably at the forefront of efforts to achieve a sustainable, low-carbon energy future. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.ORCID iDSassi Rekik https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5224-4152Supplemental materialSupplemental material for this article is available online.ReferencesAbbasi K, Jiao Z, Shahbaz M, et al. (2020) Asymmetric impact of renewable and non-renewable energy on economic growth in Pakistan: New evidence from a nonlinear analysis. Energy Exploration & Exploitation 38(5): 1946–1967. Crossref. Web of Science.Abdelsalam E, Almomani F, Azzam A, et al. 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Abstract The international system is currently undergoing a process of reconfiguration that is having an impact on all areas of global development. In this process of reordering power relations, there is a tendency to move towards multipolarity, leaving behind the unipolar coalition established after the Second World War. In this context, several emerging powers are gaining increasing international power, which has led to changes in the hierarchy of power on the international geopolitical chessboard. Such is the case of the People's Republic of China, which has established itself not only as a power of great impact and relevance in the Asian region, but also in the entire international system. Namely, the management of the government and the Party in terms of innovation, industrialization, informatization, productivity, expansion and internationalization of its economic model, positions this country as the most dynamic center of the international economy. Evidencing that alternative models to the capitalist system are possible and viable, which strengthens the trend towards a systemic transition and multipolarity in the International System Introduction In the last two decades, a set of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and conflicts have become evident, with significant implications extending throughout the International System. As a result, we are currently experiencing a convulsion of the established order, giving way to a process of new global reconfigurations. In this context, several researchers and academics such as Jorge Casals, Leyde Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián Schulz, among others, have noted that these conditions have led to a crisis and hegemonic transition process, with a trend toward multipolarity in which the Asia-Pacific region is gaining increasing relevance. This article, titled "The International Reconfiguration’s Process Towards Multipolarity: The Role of China as an Emerging Power," is dedicated to analyzing the position of this country within the current international reconfiguration of power. Accordingly, the first section will systematize some essential guidelines to understand the current crisis and the decline of the hegemonic order established in the post-World War II period. The second section will address China's positioning amid the international reconfiguration of power. In this regard, it is important to note that China's rapid rise highlights how development management aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals can lead to a shift in the paradigm of international relations, as well as power reconfigurations that challenge the current balance of forces. Thus, it can be affirmed that China's rise constitutes a decisive element within the current trend toward multipolarity. DevelopmentNew International Order: Approaches to the Multipolar Reconfiguration of the International System The current international context is marked by a process of crisis. This crisis reflects the fact that the world order no longer aligns with the correlation of forces that gave rise to it during the post-World War II period. It is not a circumstantial crisis, but rather the interlinking of various interconnected crises that span across all sectors of life. That is to say, the effects of one crisis often become the causes of another, involving economic, political, social, cultural, ethical, moral, technological, commercial, and environmental components. In other words, it is a structural and systemic crisis—one that cannot be resolved unless a similarly systemic transformation occurs. To gain greater clarity, it is important to consider that the consolidation of the capitalist system brought about the process of globalization. This, in turn, introduced large-scale production and technological development capable of increasing output. This process, along with other characteristics of the system, has exponentially accelerated social inequalities between developed and developing countries. It has also led to strategic tensions over the control of resources, raw materials, and inputs, resulting in geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, the capitalist system has imposed an extremely high environmental cost, demonstrating that it is exceeding both its own limits and those of the planet. Specifically, in its constant pursuit of profit and maximization of gains, negative environmental impacts are not factored into cost-benefit analyses, leading to widespread environmental degradation. Among other harms caused by the system, we observe a decline in investment rates, an increase in public debt, loss of autonomy in monetary policy, rising unemployment levels, reductions in real wages, and growing inequality, among others. In short, capitalism has become an unsustainable system whose primary concern is profit generation—something that is currently entirely incompatible with environmental preservation and the responsible use of natural resources. Therefore, it can be affirmed that some of its most alarming effects include: vast amounts of currency without backing, increasingly concentrated in fewer hands; acceleration of capital concentration in the West; rising military expenditures; and environmental pollution and destruction (Casals, J., 2023). On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify that, for a particular state to be considered hegemonic, it must not only exert its influence predominantly within the system of international relations; its hegemonic role must also be linked to the founding and establishment of a universally accepted concept of world order. That is, the majority of other states must recognize it as such and identify with the model promoted by the hegemon. Therefore, it is not merely a matter of a hierarchical order among states, but rather the adoption of a dominant model of production that involves those states. As a result, certain mechanisms or general rules of conduct are established for the participating states. For this reason, a hegemonic crisis involving the dominant actor in the system of international relations leads to a crisis in the social, economic, political, and institutional structures upon which that actor’s dominance was built. In light of these elements, we currently observe a set of powers within the International System that are vying to establish a new distribution of power—one that moves away from the unipolar coalition led by the United States following World War II. From this perspective, Juan Sebastián Schulz asserts: “A hegemonic crisis occurs when the existing hegemonic state lacks either the means or the will to continue steering the interstate system in a direction broadly perceived as favorable—not only for its own power, but also for the collective power of the dominant groups within the system.” (Schulz, J. S., 2022) As a result, strategic alliances have been formed and new power groups have emerged that influence international relations.These blocs are precisely what the new polarity is forming around, increasingly reinforcing the trend toward multipolarity. This is a system in which hegemonic influence is not determined by a single power, but by two, three, or more. In this regard, Juan Sebastián Schulz further notes that a process of insubordination is becoming evident, particularly in the Western peripheries. As a consequence, several countries have begun to criticize the configuration of the contemporary world order, initiating efforts to organize and propose alternative models (Schulz, J. S., 2022). This reveals the emergence of a new kind of power hierarchy, generating a global order in which a diversity of forces and actors prevails. In this context, China has experienced rapid growth, thereby contributing to the trend toward multipolarity. While this does not imply that the United States will cease to be one of the central powers in the system of international relations—given its considerable global influence—it is evident that there is a noticeable decline in the dominance it held during the unipolar era that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This process of intersystemic transition unfolds in various phases. First, there is an observable economic transition marked by a shift in the center of gravity of the global economy toward emerging and developing economies. This shift is accompanied by a necessary technological transition, characterized by a new struggle—this time to lead the technological revolution. These changes, in turn, must be supported by a political transition. Currently, countries from the Global South have gained increasing prominence on the international stage [1]. From this foundation, a geopolitical transition is also underway, where the center of gravity and decision-making—once concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon West—is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, a cultural or civilizational transition is taking place, wherein the previously dominant value system is giving way to the rise of a new worldview. Based on this, the phases of the transition process can be outlined as follows: Existence of a stable order that brings together the majority of nation-states in the International System. - A crisis of legitimacy begins to affect the established global order. - A deconcentration and delegitimization of power emerges, impacting the hegemonic power. - An arms race and formation of alliances ensue in an attempt to preserve the hierarchical order by any means. This leads to a widespread crisis and the rise and emergence of new actors. - A necessary resolution of the international crisis. - Renewal of the system. (Schulz, J. S., 2022) In light of the above, it can be stated that a “new international order” is taking shape. Its manifestations are multifaceted, such as: - The rise of movements and associations of states that serve as alternatives to the neoliberal order. - Emerging powers like China and Russia are gaining strength in various sectors of the international geopolitical arena. - Russia's confrontation with NATO in the context of the conflict with Ukraine. - Sanctions imposed by the United States on various NATO and European Union countries have strengthened the BRICS nations. - The incorporation of new members into BRICS can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the economic and political dominance of the United States and the European Union. - The expansion of anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal integration mechanisms that promote South-South cooperation, such as the G-77 + China group. - The financial sanctions imposed by the West on Russia in the context of the Ukraine conflict have sparked a debate about the viability of the international monetary system and the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. - China and Russia conduct transactions in yuan and sell oil in this currency to Iran, Venezuela, and Gulf countries. China has increased its economic and political influence in the world, which can be seen as a challenge to U.S. hegemony. Its leadership within BRICS and its growing role in the global economy may be indicators of a shift in the balance of power. All these developments reflect a growing awareness within the International System of States regarding the importance of international cooperation to address global challenges such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and food security. They also serve as indicators that a transformation is underway in the way countries interact with each other, resulting in a shift in the economic, political, and strategic center of gravity. In this context, the United States has unleashed a global hybrid war as a desperate attempt to defend and maintain its hegemonic position, which once appeared unshakable in the postwar world. To this end, it has targeted China, as the latter represents its main threat in the economic and scientific-technological order. From this perspective, tensions between the United States and China have significantly deteriorated since the Republican administration of President Donald Trump. Beginning in 2017, his policy took on an aggressive stance toward China, manifesting through a trade war and economic attacks aimed at preserving U.S. global hegemony. This demonstrates that, in response to a process of decline already underway, nationalist and protectionist efforts intensified in the U.S., with policies targeting some of the emerging pillars of the crisis-ridden world order—China being a primary example. Under the administration of Joseph Biden, the focus shifted toward competition, emphasizing the commitment to protect U.S. sovereignty from potential Chinese threats. A significant shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan became evident with the approval of arms sales to Taiwan in August 2023, which escalated tensions in the region (Collective of Authors). Furthermore, in recent years, the United States has increasingly worked to generate geopolitical and geoeconomic motivations aimed at fostering tensions between China and Russia, potentially sparking conflict between the two. It has strengthened alliances with neighboring countries of these powers—most notably Taiwan and Ukraine—which has triggered concerns and tensions in both nations. A containment policy has also been deployed, including the imposition of trade barriers and tariffs on Chinese products; restricting Chinese companies’ access to U.S. technology and markets; and promoting the diversification of supply chains to reduce dependence on China. Nevertheless, the ongoing sanctions and restrictions have only served to reaffirm the shared survival interests of both powers, strengthening corporate ties and relations between them. These actions also reflect the growing concern among U.S. power groups over the decline of their hegemonic dominance. The Emergence of China and Its Role in the Transition Toward Multipolarity In a previous article titled "The Synergy Between Economy and Environment in China Through the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals," (‘La sinergia entre economía y medio ambiente en China mediante la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible’) the process of socioeconomic transformations experienced in the People's Republic of China over the past decade was discussed. These transformations have been primarily aimed at revitalizing the nation in preparation for its centenary in 2049. This strategy is rooted in aligning the Centenary Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set for 2030, under the leadership of the Communist Party and the momentum driven by President Xi Jinping. The results of this strategy have had an impact not only on the Asian Giant itself—now a decisive actor in the Asian region—but also on the international order as a whole. As a result, China has emerged as a powerful rising power, with promising prospects for further elevating its development standards. This is backed by sustained GDP growth, averaging between 6% and 8% annually, indicating a robust economy. In addition, China holds vast foreign exchange reserves, granting it economic stability and the capacity to withstand potential external shocks. It also invests heavily in modern infrastructure and cutting-edge sectors such as artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and renewable energy—all of which enhance its competitiveness and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainable growth (Lagarde, CH). Nonetheless, China has also had to confront significant challenges in its gradual and progressive approach to the desired development model. Among these is the environmental cost associated with its rapid economic growth. For instance, China still experiences high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, along with air, water, and soil pollution. In response, measures have been implemented such as the establishment of a national monitoring network and the replacement of coal heating systems in Beijing. Efforts have also been made to purify water resources polluted by industrial processes, and imports of solid waste have been reduced to help decontaminate soils affected by industrial and agricultural activities (González, R., 2023). In general, the development of renewable energy and a circular economy model is being promoted to enable a gradual transition toward a green economy, grounded in the concept of an ecological civilization. For this reason, China’s new era is committed to scientific and technological innovation as a means of driving economic growth that is both sustainable and capable of ensuring a higher quality of life for its population. This, in turn, leads gradually toward a new model of political leadership and economic management. In this regard, Jin Keyu, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), has stated that “trillions of dollars of investment are needed for the global green transition, and China is going to play an essential role in that transformation” (Feingold, S., 2024). Based on the aforementioned elements, various authors such as Dr. C. Charles Pennaforte, Dr. C. Juan Sebastián Schulz, Dr. C. Eduardo Regalado Florido, among others, have indicated that the millenary nation represents a threat to the hegemony held by the United States since World War II. Consequently, it is recognized that a process of hegemonic crisis and transition is currently underway, with the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the center of gravity of the global power, thereby contributing to the multipolar transformation of the International System. The authors of “Is China Changing the World?” argue that “market socialism with “Chinese characteristics” must gradually and more clearly diverge from capitalism if it is to embody a genuinely alternative path for all of humanity.” In pursuit of this goal, China bases its policy of peaceful coexistence on five fundamental principles:Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, regardless of a country's size, power, or wealth. Mutual non-aggression Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, acknowledging that each nation has the right to freely choose its own social system and path of development. Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence. (Herrera, R.; Long, Z.; and Andréani, T., 2023) The rise of China as a major international power under these principles has been consolidating since 2012 under the leadership of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC), gaining particular momentum from 2020 to the present. Thus, China has not only become the leading power within the Asian regional balance but has also expanded its presence across Europe, Africa, and Latin America—primarily through loans, investments, and multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa and the China-CELAC Forum in Latin America. In addition, China has positioned itself as a leader in several sectors, and it is projected that its economy may surpass that of the United States, increasing its Gross Domestic Product (Rodríguez, L., 2022). It has also undergone a process of opening up, energizing both its international trade and its overall foreign relations, all under the control of the Government and the Party. This, combined with its rise and development initiatives, has made China a focal point of interest for many countries within the International System seeking to jointly advance projects based on cooperation, the principle of shared advantage, and multilateralism. In this regard, the white paper "China and the World in the New Era," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2019, states: “The world is moving rapidly toward multipolarity, diverse models of modern development, and collaboration in global governance. It is now impossible for a single country or bloc of countries to dominate world affairs. Stability, peace, and development have become the common aspirations of the international community.” (People’s Republic of China, 2019. Quoted in Schulz, J. S., 2022) Undoubtedly, this rise has become a source of concern for U.S. power groups, which have increasingly applied geostrategic pressure. Notably, the United States has strengthened military alliances with India, Japan, and Australia in an effort to encircle China and attempt to control or obstruct its maritime routes—this also being a manifestation of the intensification of the imperialist arms race. Nonetheless, China has maintained its development strategy and, as part of it, has strengthened its diplomatic network and its relations with multiple countries across all world regions. For all these reasons, China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. Notably, it went from representing 4% of global GDP in 1960 to 16% in 2020—undeniable evidence of rapid economic growth. Moreover, it has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and also the leading importer, establishing itself as a major industrial power. In this regard, United Nations data reveal that China leads global industrial production, accounting for 30% of the total. This figure surpasses other industrial powers such as the United States (16%), Japan (7%), Germany (5.7%), and South Korea (3.2%) (Schulz, J. S., 2022). In addition, China has remained the world’s leading manufacturing power for approximately 15 consecutive years, according to statements from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology at the beginning of this year. This sector alone has contributed over 40% to overall growth. Likewise, in 2024, China experienced a significant increase in foreign investment, reflecting its interest in strengthening international cooperation for development. Efforts are also underway for urban renewal in 2024, with around 60,000 projects being implemented across various cities. These initiatives are primarily aimed at transforming underdeveloped neighborhoods and creating smarter urban areas (Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in the People's Republic of China, 2025). In this regard, the following graphs illustrate the value of China’s international trade during the 2016–2024 period, highlighting a strong presence of exports compared to imports. A second chart shows China's global export share, where it holds a dominant position.   Thus, China has risen as a center of power in the international system, with leadership not only in the economic domain but also in science and technology. At the same time, it has promoted a series of investments and a process of internationalizing its national currency. Accordingly, the Asian Giant offers an alternative model of development—one that is more comprehensive and sustainable—allowing it to propel the new phase of Chinese development. This phase aims not only to fulfill the dream of national rejuvenation but also to ensure the survival of its unique political, economic, and social model. Nevertheless, the significant challenges of sustaining growth cannot be overlooked. From this perspective, experts believe that new avenues of growth will be necessary for China to maintain the trajectory it has been experiencing. Specifically, the country must continue expanding its industrial sector while strengthening areas such as artificial intelligence, digital financial services, and green technologies (Feingold, S., 2024). It is also important to highlight the projected continuity and leadership of the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping identified as a key figure in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in China, in conjunction with the socioeconomic transformation strategy toward the 2049 centenary. This has been pursued through the defense of multilateralism, economic openness, and international integration and cooperation in support of global development. Conclusions In light of the above, a decline in U.S. hegemony can be observed, even though this process is not linear—nor is it certain whether any single power or coalition has come to occupy a hegemonic position. What is clear, however, is the existence of a trend toward multipolarity, driven by emerging powers and the strategic ties they are establishing. This is giving rise to a non-hegemonic reconfiguration of power blocs, which are building a multilateral and multipolar institutional framework. It can also be affirmed that China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. This has been supported by its growth strategy focused on industrialization, digitalization, innovation, productivity, expansion, and internationalization of its development model—while maintaining a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability. A range of key initiatives and development projects have been implemented to support the country's rise, consolidating its role in the multipolar reconfiguration of the International System. All of this has been essential in driving China’s new phase of development and contributing to the broader process of multipolar transformation. Undoubtedly, China’s rapid ascent represents a significant challenge to the International System, as it reflects a shift in international relations and a transformation in the distribution and hierarchy of global power. Notes [1] It is important to clarify that the so-called Global South should not be equated with the Third World, as the distinction between the First and Third Worlds is primarily based on economic and technological differences, which do not align with the current circumstances of the International System of States. In contrast, the term Global South emerges from a new geopolitical perspective that arose in the post–Cold War context, driven by the need to promote South-South cooperation. 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Abstract Climate change is considered to be one of the biggest problems acknowledged globally today. Therefore, the causes of climate change and solutions to this problem are frequently investigated. For this reason, the purpose of this study is to empirically examine whether the ‘Climate Change Performance Index’ (CCPI) is successful in increasing environmental investments for E-7 countries with the data for the period of 2008–2023. To achieve this aim, the Parks-Kmenta estimator was used as the econometric method in the study. The study findings provide strong evidence that increases in the climate change performance support environmental investments. High climate change performance directs governments and investors toward investing in this area; therefore, environmental investments tend to increase. The study also examined the effects of population growth, real GDP and inflation on environmental investments. Accordingly, it has been concluded that population growth and inflation negatively affect environmental investments, while GDP positively affects environmental investments. 1. Introduction There is a broad consensus that the main cause of climate change is human-based greenhouse gas emissions from non-renewable (i.e., fossil) fuels and improper land use. Accordingly, climate change may have serious negative consequences as well as significant macroeconomic outcomes. For example, an upward trend of temperatures, the rising sea levels, and extreme weather conditions can seriously disrupt the output and productivity (IMF, 2008a; Eyraud et al., 2013). Due to the global climate change, many countries today see environmental investments, especially renewable energy investments, as an important part of their growth strategies. Until recent years, the most important priority of many countries was an improvement in the economic growth figures. Still, the global climate change and the emergence of many related problems are now directing countries toward implementing policies which would be more sensitive to the environment and would ensure sustainable growth rather than just increase the growth figures. (Baştürk, 2024: 327). The orientation of various countries to these policies has led to an increase in environmental investments on a global scale. A relative rise of the share of environmental investments worldwide is not only a medium-term climate goal. It also brings many new concepts to the agenda, such as an increasing energy security, reduction of the negative impact of air pollution on health, and the possibility of finding new growth resources (Accenture, 2011; McKinsey, 2009; (OECD), 2011; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Eyraud et al., 2013). Today, environmental investments have a significant share in energy and electricity production. According to the World Energy Outlook (2023), investments in environmentally friendly energies have increased by approximately 40% since 2020. The effort to reduce emissions is the key reason for this increase, but it is not the only reason. Economic reasons are also quite strong in preferring environmental energy technologies. For example, energy security is also fundamentally important in the increase in environmental investments. Especially in fuel-importing countries, industrial plans and the necessity to spread clean (i.e., renewable) energy jobs throughout the country are important factors (IEA WEO, 2023).  In economic literature, environmental investments are generally represented by renewable energy investments. Accordingly, Figure 1 below presents global renewable energy electricity production for 2000–2020. According to the data obtained from IRENA (2024) and Figure 1, the total electricity production has increased by approximately 2.4% since 2011, with renewable energy sources contributing 6.1% to this rate, while non-renewable energy sources contributed 1.3%. In 2022 alone, renewable electricity grew by 7.2% compared to 2021. Solar and wind energy provided the largest growth in renewable electricity since 2010, which reached 11.7% of the global electricity mix in 2022.   Figure 2 below presents renewable energy investments by technology between 2013 and 2022. As shown in Figure 2, photovoltaic solar. and terrestrial wind categories are dominating, accounting for 46% and 32% of the global renewable energy investment, respectively, during 2013–2022.   Economic growth supported by environmental investments is impacted by the type and number of energy used to increase the national output. Thus, both the environmental friendliness of the energy used and the rise in energy efficiency is bound to reduce carbon emissions related to energy use and encourage economic growth (Hussain and Dogan, 2021). In this context, in order to minimize emissions and ensure sustainable economic growth, renewable energy sources should be used instead of fossil resources in energy use. Increasing environmental investments on a global scale, especially a boost in renewable energy investments, is seen as a more comprehensive solution to the current global growth-development and environmental degradation balance. In this context, as a result of the latest Conference of the Parties held in Paris, namely, COP21, it was envisaged to make an agreement covering the processes after 2020, which is accepted as the end year of the Kyoto Protocol. On December 12, 2015, the Paris Agreement was adopted unanimously by the countries that are parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kaya, 2020). As a result of the Paris Agreement and the reports delivered by the Intergovernmental Climate Change Panels, international efforts to adapt to the action to combat climate change and global warming have increased, and awareness has been raised in this area (Irfan et al., 2021; Feng et al., 2022; Anser et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2021; Huang et al., 2021; Fang, 2023). The rise in the demand for low-carbon energy sources in economies has been caused by environmental investments such as renewable energy investments. The countries that are party to the Paris Agreement, commit to the way to achieve efficient energy systems through the spread of renewable energy technologies throughout the country (Bashir et al., 2021; Fang, 2023). This study empirically examines the impact of the climate change performance on increasing environmental investments for E-7 countries. The climate change performance is expressed by the ‘Climate Change Performance Index’ (CCPI) developed by the German environmental and developmental organization Germanwatch. The index evaluates the climate protection performance of 63 developed and developing countries and the EU annually, and compares the data. Within this framework, CCPI seeks to increase clarity in international climate policies and practices, and enables a comparison of the progress achieved by various countries in their climate protection struggle. CCPI evaluates the performance of each country in four main categories: GHG Emissions (40% overall ranking), Renewable Energy (20%), Energy Use (20%), and Climate Policy (20%). In calculating this index, each category of GHG emissions, renewable energy, and energy use is measured by using four indicators. These are the Current Level, the Past Trend, the Current Level Well Below 2°C Compliance, and the Countries’ Well Below 2°C Compliance with the 2030 Target. The climate policy category is evaluated annually with a comprehensive survey in two ways: as the National Climate Policy and the International Climate Policy (https://ccpi.org/methodology/).  Figure 3 below shows the world map presenting the total results of the countries evaluated in CCPI 2025 and their overall performance, including the four main categories outlined above.   As it can be seen from Figure 3, no country appears strong enough to receive a ‘very high’ score across all categories. Moreover, although Denmark continues to be the highest-ranking country in the index, but it still does not perform well enough to receive a ‘very high’ score overall. On the other hand, India, Germany, the EU, and the G20 countries/regions will be among the highest-performing countries/regions in the 2024 index. When we look at Canada, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia, they are the worst-performing countries in the G20. On the other hand, it can be said that Türkiye, Poland, the USA, and Japan are the worst-performing countries in the overall ranking. The climate change performance index is an important criterion because it indicates whether the change and progress in combating climate change is occurring across all countries at an important level. The index is important in answering various questions for countries under discussion. These questions are expressed below:  • In which stage are the countries in the categories in which the index is calculated?• What policies should countries follow after seeing the stages in which they are in each category? • Which countries are setting an example by truly combating climate change? These questions also constitute the motivation for this study. The sample group for the study was selected as E-7 countries, which are called the Emerging Economies; this list consists of Türkiye, China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia. The reason for selecting these particular countries is that they are undergoing a rapid development and transformation process, and are also believed to be influential in the future with their increasing share in the world trade volume, huge populations, and advances in technology. Besides that, when the relevant literature has been examined, studies that empirically address the relative ranking of the climate change performance appear to be quite limited. In particular, there are almost no studies evaluating the climate change performance index for the sample group considered. Therefore, it is thought that this study will be of great importance in filling this gap in the literature. The following section of the study, which aims to empirically examine whether the climate change performance is effective in developing environmental investments in E-7 countries, includes national and international selected literature review on the subject. Then, the model of the study and the variables chosen in this model are introduced. Then, the findings obtained in the study are shared, and the study ends with discussion and policy proposal. 2. Literature Review 2.1. Studies on environmental investment  The excessive use of fossil-based energy sources, considered non-renewable and dirty energy, along with industrialization, constitutes a large part of carbon emissions and is regarded as the main reason of climate change. Thus, countries have turned to renewable energy investments with the objective to minimize the reaction of climate change and global warming, by introducing technologies which are considered more environmentally friendly and cleaner. Global energy investments are estimated to exceed 3 trillion US dollars by the end of 2024, and 2 trillion US dollars of this amount will go to clean and environmentally friendly energy base technologies and infrastructure. Investment in environmentally friendly energy has been gaining speed since 2020, and the total expense on renewable energy, networks, and storage now represents a higher figure than the total spending on oil, gas, and coal (IEA, 2024). When the energy economics literature is examined, since environmental investments are mostly represented by renewable energy investments, renewable energy investments studies and studies in related fields shall be discussed in this study section. One of the important studies in this field is the work of Eyraud et al. (2013). In the study, the authors analyzed the determinants of environmental and green (clean) investments for 35 developed and developing countries. Accordingly, they stated in the study that environmental investment has become the main driving force of the energy sector, and China has generally driven its rapid growth in recent years. In addition, in terms of the econometric results of the study, it has been found that environmental investments are supported by economic growth, a solid financial system suitable for lower interest rates, and higher fuel prices. Fang (2023) examined the relationship between investments in the renewable energy sector, the economic complexity index, green technological innovation, industrial structure growth, and carbon emissions in 32 provinces in China for the period of 2005–2019 by using the GMM method. Based on the study results, the economic complexity index causes an increase in China’s carbon dioxide levels. On the contrary, all of the following – the square of the economic complexity index, investments in clean energy, green technical innovation, and the industrial structure – were found to help decrease carbon dioxide emissions. Another important study in this field is the work of Masini and Menichetti (2013). The authors examined the non-financial sources of renewable energy investments in their study. Accordingly, the study results show that knowledge and confidence in technological competence positively impact renewable energy investments. In addition, trust in policy measures only impacts PV (Photovoltaic) and hydropower investments, whereas institutional pressure negatively impacts renewable energy investments. Finally, the study stated that experienced investors are more likely to fund innovations in renewable energy. One of the important studies on renewable energy investments is the work of Ozorhon et al. (2018). To support and facilitate the decision-making process in renewable energy investments, the authors determined the main criteria affecting investors’ decisions by reviewing the literature and examining sector-level practices. According to the findings, economic criteria, like policies and regulations, funds availability, and investment costs were the most important factors in the decision-making process for renewable energy investments. Xu et al. (2024) examined the relationship between the renewable energy investments and the renewable energy development with a threshold value analysis for China. According to the results, impact of the clean (renewable) energy investment on renewable energy development has a significant threshold value, and the general relation between them is a ‘V’ type non-linear relation. At this point, the study suggests that the state should keep spending in the segment of investments in clean energy, increase the financial proficiency, and ensure an efficient financial infrastructure for clean energy in China. 2.2. Studies on Climate Change and their Impact on Economic Variables  The widespread use of fossil-based energy sources, considered dirty energy, continues to create a negative externality in carbon emissions despite the globally implemented policies like the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (Rezai et al., 2021). The economic literature on climate change focuses particularly on the adverse effect of climate change on the economy. One of the important studies in this field is the study of Fan et al. (2019). In their study, the authors focused on the impact of climate change on the energy sector for 30 provinces in China and conducted their research with the help of a fixed-effect regression feedback model. As a result of the study, it was found that hot and low-temperature days positively affected the electricity demand. On the other hand, Singh et al. (2022) examined the effects of climate change on agricultural sustainability in India with data from 1990–2017. On the grounds of the study, it was found that India’s agricultural sector was negatively impacted by the climate change. In this regard, it is stated that India needs to take powerful climate policy action so that to reduce the adverse effect of the climate change and increase its sustainable agricultural development. One of the important studies in this field is the study of Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2013). This study investigated how the climate change affects the financial performance with a sample of 855 international companies operating in sectors with high greenhouse gas/ CO2 emissions from 2006–2009. The results reveal that the relationship between the environmental and financial performance is higher in times of economic crisis triggered by climate crisis. In other words, these results show that companies should continue investing in sustainable projects in order to achieve higher profits. Kahn et al. (2021) examined the long-term macroeconomic impact of the climate change by using a panel data set consisting of 174 countries between 1960 and 2014. According to the findings, the amount of output per capita is negatively affected by temperature changes, but no statistically significant effect is observed for changes in precipitation. In addition, according to the study’s results, the main effects of temperature shocks also vary across income groups. Alagidede et al. (2015) examined the effect of climate change on sustainable economic growth in the Sub-Saharan Africa region in their study. The study stated that the relationship between the real GDP and the climate change is not linear. In addition, Milliner and Dietz (2011) investigated the long-term economic consequences of the climate change. Accordingly, as the economy develops over time, and as progress is achieved, this situation will automatically be less affected by the adverse impact of the climate change. Structural changes made with economic development will make sectors more sensitive to the climate change, such as the agricultural sector, which would become stronger and less dependent. Dell et al. (2008) examined the effect of climate change on economic activity. The study’s main results are as follows: an increase of temperatures significantly decreases economic growth in low-income countries. Furthermore, increasing temperature does not affect economic growth in high-income countries. On the other hand, when examining the effects of climate change on the economy, the study of Zhou et al. (2023) is also fundamentally important. Zhou et al. (2023) examined the literature on the effects of climate change risks on the financial sector. In the studies examined, it is generally understood that natural disasters and climate change reduce bank stability, credit supply, stock and bond market returns, and foreign direct investment inflows. In their study for Sri Lanka, Abeysekara et al. (2023) created a study using the general equilibrium model ORANI-G-SL with the objective to investigate the economic impacts of the climate change on agricultural production. The study findings suggest that reductions in the production of many agricultural products will lead to increases in consumer prices for these agricultural commodities, resulting in a decrease in the overall household consumption. The projected decrease in crop production and increases in food prices will increase the potential for food insecurity Another important document in this field is the study by Caruso et al. (2024) examining the relationship between the climate change and human capital. The study findings reveal a two-way result regarding the effects of the climate change damages and the effects of climate change mitigation and adaptation on the human capital. Accordingly, the climate change has direct effects on health, nutrition and welfare, while changes in markets and damage to the infrastructure are expressed as indirect effects. In addition to these studies, the uncertainty of the climate change policies also exerts an impact on economic factors. Studies conducted in this context in recent years have also enriched the literature on the climate change. For example, Çelik and Özarslan Doğan (2024) examined the effects of uncertainty of the climate change policies on economic growth for the USA by using the ARDL bounds test. Their results confirmed the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between the climate policy uncertainty and economic growth in the USA. 3. Model Specification  This study empirically examines whether the climate change performance index successfully develops environmental investments in E-7 countries. For further details related to the mathematical model check https://doi.org/10.15388/Ekon.2025.104.2.6 4. Conclusion and Policy Implications  Today, many national and international initiatives are within the scope of combating global warming and climate change. In addition, many developed and developing countries are differentiating their growth and development policies with the objective to prevent these disasters. Although they vary from country to country, as well as from region to region, these policies mostly represent those policies which reduce carbon emissions and ensure energy efficiency. At this point, the key factor is renewable energy investments, which represent environmentally friendly investments. However, according to Abban and Hasan (2021), the amount of environmentally friendly investments is not the same in every country. This is because the determinants of environmentally friendly investments vary from country to country. While financial and economic factors are more encouraging in increasing these investments in some countries, international sanctions are the driving force in this regard in some other countries as well. This study aims to empirically examine whether CCPI is effective in the success of environmental investments in the E-7 countries in the period of 2008–2023 with the help of the Parks-Kmenta estimator. In this direction, the study’s dependent variable is environmental investments, represented by renewable energy investments. On the other hand, the climate change performance is represented by the ‘Climate Change Performance Index’ calculated by Germanwatch, which constitutes the main independent variable of the study. Other control variables considered in the study are the population growth, the real GDP per capita, and inflation. The study findings provide strong evidence that increases in the climate change performance support environmental investments. High-rate climate change performance drives governments and investors toward investing in this area; thus, environmental investments tend to increase. These results are consistent with the study results of Raza et al. (2021). As a result of their study, Raza et al. (2021) stated that the climate change performance is an important channel for the general environmental change, and that renewable energy has a very important role in this regard.  In addition, the study concludes that population growth and inflation negatively affect environmental investments. These results are consistent with Suhrab et al. (2023), but not with Yang et al. (2016). While Suhrab et al. (2023) obtained results regarding the negative effects of inflation on green investments, Yang et al. (2016) focused on the positive effect of population on renewable energy. Finally, the effect of the real GDP per capita on environmental investments has been found to be positive. These results are also consistent with Tudor and Sova (2021). The authors found that Real GDP encourages green investments. This study offers policymakers a number of policy recommendations. These are presented below. • One of the important factors affecting the climate change performance is the raising of awareness of the populations in these countries at this point, and providing them with the knowledge to demand clean energy. In this way, consumers, would demand environmental energy, and investors would invest more in this area. This is of great importance in increasing environmental investments. • The climate change performance also shows how transparent the energy policies implemented by countries are. Therefore, the more achievable and explanatory are the goals of policy makers in this regard, the more climate change performance will increase, which will strengthen environmental investments. • Moreover, the initial installation costs are the most important obstacles on the way toward developing environmental investments. At this point, the country needs to develop support mechanisms that would encourage investors to invest more. • Environmental investments, similar to other types of physical investments, are greatly affected by the country’s macroeconomic indicators. At this point, a stable and foresighted economic policy will encourage an increase in such investments. The countries in the sample group represent developing countries. Therefore, in many countries in this category, the savings rates within the country are insufficient to make investments. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском ABSTRACT This essay brings space into the international relations of Asia. It orients readers to three unfolding trends that are shaping the evolution of the new space race at present – democratization, commercialization, and militarization (DCM). It surveys how these trends reflect, illuminate, or are connected to the theory and practice of international relations (IR) both in global and regional settings in Asia. Where possible, it brings in the space activities of the main independent and autonomous space powers in Asia – China, Japan, India, South Korea, North Korea – and probes what their activities signify for international and regional politics. It ends with some thematic takeaways for space policy, strategy, and diplomacy. Space is a strategic domain, meaning that its uses cut across civilian and military realities and will therefore long remain of vital interest to all states. Since its inception, space has drawn significant and long-standing attention in the fields of law and policy. Lawyers, legal scholars, diplomats, and policy analysts have covered the rise and interpretation of the space law regime in place today, which is centered on a set of space treaties, resolutions, and organized multilateral activities.Footnote1 Thanks to these efforts we have a good understanding of governance frameworks, the challenges they face, and how they may play out in constructing the peaceful uses of outer space. But studies that bring international relations (IR) theory and practice to bear on outer space affairs are far fewer in comparison to the voluminous law and policy literature. While IR scholars have generated works related to other emerging technologies, such as drones, cyberweapons, and artificial intelligence, space generally still remains understudied.Footnote2 This is surprising as the critical infrastructure of space anchors modern economies, militaries, and societies in a way no other technology does. It lies at the intersection of virtually all political, economic, and social forces that have been and will remain of concern to states. The space domain is not aloof from the “harsher realities of politics;”Footnote3 and, in fact, continues to reflect almost every feature of global politics in play – ideology, nationalism, aid, integration, division, and security, for example.Footnote4 Using the lens of states and their national interests, this symposium is among the first comprehensive efforts to combine IR perspectives, space studies, and the history, politics, and economics of Asia – a region with the most dynamic, ambitious, and competent sovereign space powers today. Alongside China, Japan, India, and North Korea, South Korea has risen rapidly as another determined player that is leveraging its industrial capabilities, alliances, and networks to position itself in the unfolding competition of the new space race. Australia and New Zealand, and other countries in South and Southeast Asia have also long been marked with emerging space activities and ambitions.Footnote5 These developments come at a time when both the United States and China are leading two different space regimes that extend beyond territorial matters to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and celestial bodies.Footnote6 What states are doing in the IR of space, who with, why, and how affects prospects for war and peace. One indication of the importance of space nested in the contemporary geopolitical flux is reflected in The Camp David Joint Statement from August 2023, in which the U.S., South Korea, and Japan seek to enhance trilateral dialogues on space security.Footnote7 This essay guides readers to developments in the space domain, and the ways they connect to the theory and practice of IR. The first part interrogates the idea of the IR of space at the broadest level, and sets out the three principal trends that are shaping its evolution today – democratization, commercialization, and militarization (DCM). The second part then turns to asking where Asia fits in this tapestry, drawing on the intellectual lineage of key debates in the field as well as the findings from this symposium. The third part extracts some thematic takeaways that are likely to be of interest to makers of space policy, strategy, and diplomacy. What is the International Relations of Space? Space has always been – and will long remain – couched in IR theory that is centrally concerned with alternative explanations about competition and cooperation.Footnote8 The paradigmatic or theoretical approach analysts bring to space – such as realism, liberalism, constructivism, and so on – has consequences for relations among and within states.Footnote9 Political scientists are increasingly interested in the theory and practice of the IR of space, and in understanding the implications for real-world collaboration, competition, leadership, and diplomacy.Footnote10 This section provides a guide to the principal actors and the trends of the new space race in which they seek to position. The State in the International Relations of Space For the foreseeable future, outer space affairs will remain rooted in the geopolitics on Earth, and this will necessitate a focus on the makers of policy, strategy, and diplomacy. Nothing about this is new. Space could not escape the “political rivalries of this world” in the old space race; and the idea that U.S. leaders may well have had no option from the late 1950s onwards but to “allow for all possibilities by speaking of idealism and acting with realism” speaks with equal force to the complexities of decision-making in the present space race.Footnote11 The IR of space is about actors, their motivations, and the consequences of their actions for stability in, through, and at the nexus of space. This general framing of the IR of space draws attention away from unproductive and narrow theoretical debates, encourages analytical eclecticism, and privileges a pragmatic, policy-relevant, and problem-focused approach.Footnote12 Further, the approach locates actions and agency in known circumstances, remains deeply attentive to both material and ideational processes over time, is mindful of situational idiosyncrasies, and in sync with the inevitable ups and downs of geopolitics. Frankly, this kind of eclectic pragmatism is necessary in a dynamic domain in which scholars and practitioners want to grapple with visible challenges that need real-world solutions. As in other areas, a focus on states allows us to capture the “deeper political foundations, trajectory, centrality, and implications”Footnote13 of newer developments that can be consequential for the theory and practice of IR. Even when theoreticians are supportive of, opposed to, or merely agnostic about states as a unit of analysis, almost all of them have to grapple with interactive state actions at both the domestic and international levels.Footnote14 The idea of space policy analysis, which draws attention to sub-state actors and drivers of decision-making while crisscrossing levels of analysis, certainly enriches our understanding of major players beyond the West.Footnote15 But in many emerging space countries, and especially in the IR of Asia, the state remains the gatekeeper to the domestic-international nexus. Focusing on states also induces an equality in the IR of space, as many developing and emerging countries do not have the numerous legal, commercial, and nonprofit actors from the advanced industrial world who seek to influence outcomes across international forums and processes. This state-centricism is especially relevant in the strategic space domain − 95% of which comprises dual-use space technologies.Footnote16 In it, states are proactively seeking to position their countries vis-à-vis others because its very duality promises both civilian and military benefits. This reality is reinforced by the present legal space regime, which privileges the role of states as a matter of public international law. As on Earth so also for space, it is ultimately states that back and consume innovative space technologies, design strategies and policies, and construct or scuttle governance in line with their political and economic interests.Footnote17 None of this is to suggest that states are the only actors in the space domain, or that their preferences magically prevail in all matters of policy, strategy, or diplomacy. Rather, at the end of the day, it is states that possess both the ultimate and final authority over their citizens, thus regulating how this collective interacts with its counterparts.Footnote18 The Key Trends Shaping the IR of Space The new space race demands as well a new way of seeing the whole picture, which balances its principal trends without privileging any one of them. All states are presently navigating the intersections of three deeply intertwined trends in the new space race that pose novel questions and challenges for their own security – democratization, commercialization, and the slide from militarization to outright weaponization (DCM).Footnote19 While these trends may be analytically distinct, they are in reality fluid, nonlinear, and synergistic. They are interwoven into the fabric of the IR of space today, and if a problem-focused approach is to lend itself to real-world solutions it is meaningless to talk about strategy or policy concerning one or another in isolation. This has implications for IR theory more generally. A plethora of well-debated approaches, concepts, and constructs mark its two main subfields of international security and international political economy across all regions of the world – war, peace, balance of power, industrial policy, interdependence, governance, norms, diplomacy, for example. These theoretical constructs have to reconcile with the complexities of DCM. Doing so prevents hyperbole about a “knowable and certain future” for organizations, societies, and soldiers with stakes in space.Footnote20 It encourages vigilance about the commercialization-militarization axis fueling gray-zone ventures in space, where a commercial space actor operating for a rival could do what previously was the realm of only government military operations.Footnote21 It prevents naïve thinking that space commerce is unrelated to defense, or that private assets cannot become legitimate military targets in the fog of war.Footnote22 When it comes time to pass United Nations resolutions backed by a leading space power that can govern prospects for space safety how old and new actors in space align diplomatically on a normative basis is affected by their industrial and political interests in the context of DCM.Footnote23 The high-profile return of industrial policy in the U.S. stretches to the space industrial base, and includes efforts to strengthen the resilience of its supply chains with commercial space players and nongovernmental actors.Footnote24 As an analytical rubric, the trends in the DCM triumvirate, fleshed out below, help states see the many moving and equally important parts of the new space race, connect actions and technologies involving their counterparts spread around the world, and build a far more balanced awareness of the policies and strategies necessary to advance their own interests amid all the dynamism. The triumvirate, in short, is a powerful conceptual reminder for all states that “the church of strategy must be a broad one” in the space domain.Footnote25 One trend of the triumvirate stems from changes in manufacturing and accessibility, which have opened up — or “democratized” — the space domain to newcomers. Many of the newer state entrants have created space agencies, written national space legislation, targeted specific manufacturing or regulatory niches, and signed agreements with international partners and private companies. Alongside the rising number of nation-states, this democratization draw in nongovernmental entrants such as commercial startups, activist billionaires, criminal syndicates, and so on who could aid or thwart government objectives.Footnote26 New actors continue to proliferate across all regions and continents, with activities that crisscross the public and private spheres and that affect prospects for transnational collaboration in myriad ways. The year 2023 is illustrative of democratization in practice. In mid August, the SpaceX Crew Dragon spacecraft reached the International Space Station (ISS).Footnote27 This was the seventh crew rotation mission by SpaceX, a private U.S. company, and it carried four civilian agency astronauts from America, Europe, Russia, and Japan. In its previous mission to the ISS, SpaceX flew NASA astronauts, along with those from Russia and the United Arab Emirates. Earlier in May, SpaceX used its Dragon spacecraft and Falcon 9 rocket to launch an all-private astronaut mission to the ISS for a company called Axiom Space, which aims to build the world’s first commercial space station; it then carried passengers from the United States as well as both a male and female astronaut from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.Footnote28 Democratization extends to the moon. With India’s successful soft-landing on the moon in August, yet another Asian country after China now holds the distinction of being on the lunar surface.Footnote29 Private actors in Asia are also part of the tapestry. While a lunar lander attempt by a private Japanese company, ispace, was not successful in April, the company is persevering with bringing both governments and private payloads to the moon.Footnote30 More foundational for the purposes of enabling certainty for commercial transactions are some of the steps ispace took prior to the launch. It was granted a license by the Japanese government to engage in an “in-place” property transfer of ownership of lunar regolith to NASA. All these developments represent a dramatically varied landscape, which also raises challenges for building meaningful consensus in the years ahead.Footnote31 A second trend in the triumvirate is commercialization, driven by a whole new generation of space entrepreneurs. Chief among their unprecedented innovations are reusable rocketry and mega-constellations of satellites, driven by so-called newspace corporations such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, Amazon, Planet, ICEYE, Blacksky, Axelspace, and Synspective. Together these companies have not only changed prospects for frequent and cheaper access to space, but they have also changed the geospatial view of virtually all human activities on the planet, whether on land or the oceans.Footnote32 These newer entrants present competition for more established players like Boeing, Arianespace, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsui, and Thales Alenia, for example. All these corporations seek profitable niches in the global space economy, which one estimate puts at a minimum of $384 billion in 2022 and others put higher.Footnote33 Notably, the present satellite industry accounts for over 70% of the space economy. This indicates a “space-for-earth” economy, meaning space goods and services with direct use on Earth such as telecommunications and internet infrastructure, Earth observation satellites, military satellites, and so on.Footnote34 This reality accounted for 95% of the revenues earned in the space sector in 2019. Given the dependence of the global economy on space-based assets, some argue the commercial peace thesis may stay the hand of space-related conflict.Footnote35 This is good news also if the space market grows, as projected, to between $1.1 trillion and $2.7 trillion by the 2040s.Footnote36 But there is a healthy debate about what else may be scalable beyond just the satellite-enabled communications infrastructure that sustains the space economy at present. Further, despite all the rosy projections about the space economy, there is little information about which of the venture-backed private newspace entrants is or likely to be profitable anytime soon. After over two decades of operation, it is only recently that SpaceX, which leads with its rocket launches and internet-satellite business, has reported it generated $55 million in profits on $1.5 billion in revenue in the first quarter of 2023.Footnote37 In the non-satellite segment of the space economy, the search for new markets and customers certainty continues worldwide. But government budgets will matter to the survivability of many innovative technologies, products, and services where market prospects are nascent, emerging, or just plain uncertain. These include, for example, commercial human spaceflight, space stations, lunar landers and habitats, and space resources mining. The total governmental budgets for space programs worldwide is estimated to be between $92.4 billion to $107 billion.Footnote38 The U.S. government leads the world with the largest institutional budget at around $55 billion; setting aside the collective European budget at $14 billion, the single-country budgets that successively follow the U.S. are China (speculatively, $10 billion), Japan (over $4 billion), Russia ($3.5 billion), and India ($1.96 billion). More generally, the presence of government actors alerts us to a range of theoretical political economy considerations that cut across geopolitics and geoeconomics in the space domainFootnote39: the logic of state-centricism in and out of Asia in fostering innovation, the multifaceted drivers of space commercialization and privatization around the world, and the newspace business hype that needs to be reconciled with the dynamics of state interests in economic-security linkages. A final trend in the DCM triumvirate is militarization sliding into weaponization of a dual-use technology. But we may be returning to the historical roots of space technology because what we now think of as dual-use originated as military first.Footnote40 From rockets to satellites to missile defense, civilian and commercial space technologies can be morphed to serve military or national security ends. A state’s military space power can be measured not just by total space expenditures but also latent capabilities in existing commercial architecture.Footnote41 Many actors can access, or collaboratively develop, a wide spectrum of military capabilities while professing to pursue worthy civilian and commercial goals, such as launching rockets, enabling satellite communication, expanding Earth observation, developing GPS capabilities, or servicing malfunctioning satellites. These activities can be legitimized as peaceful and defensive, but their uses can also be converted to offensive purposes. As more actors join space activities and as commercial players spread space products and technologies around the world, the ambiguities of dual-use space technologies make it more and more difficult to distinguish a space asset from a weapon, or space control operations as defensive or offensive. This melding of the commercialization-militarization axis means that many advanced, emerging, and disruptive technologies that are significant for defense applications and for potentially gaining an edge over rivals are couched in commercial rather than military-industrial complexes; these technologies and capabilities are also spread unevenly across geopolitical lines.Footnote42 Depending on their financial and organizational capacities to adopt innovations, states may well face risky scenarios in an international system out of tune with power realities in which the actual balance of power diverges sharply from the distribution of benefits.Footnote43 Further, the problem is that all space assets are equally vulnerable to a range of both kinetic and non-kinetic threats, which can go from an irreversible missile hit to temporarily disabling electronic and cyber attacks on a space asset.Footnote44 Since it is hard to separate military and civilian space services, accidental or purposeful actions against those used by the military would inevitably also affect those used by civilian and commercial stakeholders. Protecting access to space and safeguarding operations within space are, therefore, a vital interest for all states interested in space for national advancement. Unfortunately, no orbit is safe or secure. This is especially concerning for the United States, which is the world’s most space-dependent power, and whose nuclear command-and-control operations worldwide rely on space assets. As of January 2023, roughly 67% of all operating satellites belonged to the U.S., with a significant part of them commercial.Footnote45 This dependence will only grow as U.S.-led mega constellations, as well as other in-space activities, proliferate. Accidents can happen, and this specter is rising as orbits become more and more crowded with civil, commercial, and military activities.Footnote46 Orbital debris, big and tiny leftovers from decades of space activities that whiz around at lethal speeds, already represent known hazards. The ISS often has to maneuver to get out of the way, and functioning satellites are also vulnerable. Satellites can collide accidentally, degrading or ending their operations; human beings can die. But it is the menace of purposeful and deliberate targeting of the space-enabled infrastructure that cannot be ruled out in the geopolitical turmoil today. There is an intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and its allies, China, and Russia over the making of a new world order.Footnote47 This means also that there are ample incentives for U.S. adversaries to deny the heavily space-dependent United States use of its space assets in peacetime or wartime under cover of dual-use ambiguities; there are also incentives for the U.S. and its allies to do the reverse to adversaries.Footnote48 In all likelihood, every country would suffer under such scenarios, but the heavily space-dependent U.S. would suffer most. Kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) tests have already been carried out by some of the top spacefaring powers – China (2007), the U.S. (2008), India (2019), and Russia (2021) – and have led to a U.S. declaration to ban them.Footnote49 In the non-kinetic realm, cyber attacks are a looming realistic threat for satellites and other space assets just as they for any another digitized critical infrastructure.Footnote50 Many key U.S. allies, such as Japan and Korea as well as members of NATO, see the same threats and, with extended deterrence in mind, have begun working closely with the U.S. to reshape security architectures and postures in the space domain. The war in Ukraine has also changed perceptions worldwide about the safety of the critical infrastructure of space, with Russia’s electronic and cyberattacks targeting satellite systems.Footnote51 Both the U.S. and its allies also understand that targeting U.S. space assets affects the great power status of the U.S. – the basis for its hard and soft power – which is why space will long remain a national and international imperative. Space is also pivotal because it is at the intersection of virtually all emerging and disruptive technology frontiers, such as AI, quantum computing, and cyber weapons, which can potentially affect a country’s military edge over others.Footnote52 One indication of the importance of U.S. space systems to the government for critical national and homeland security functions is reflected in institutional budgets. Worldwide, in 2021, an estimate is that civilian budgets were around $54 billion and military budgets at about $38 billion.Footnote53 The United States stands out relative to the rest of the world, irrespective of the actual size of these budgets, accounting for just under 60% of all government expenditures on space program on a global basis. The U.S. military space budget is estimated to be between roughly $30–34 billion dollars, significantly higher than its civilian budget at around $25–26 billion. With the formation of the U.S. Space Force, and the perceived growing threat to space, these patterns are unlikely to shift and will affect the evolution of U.S.-led space security architectures worldwide. Beyond orbital regimes, there are also concerns about celestial bodies, which include the moon, Mars, comets, and asteroids. The moon has become a prestigious prize. There is a race to put the next humans and outposts on it. While every state wants to be a space nation and to benefit from space-enabled prosperity and security all the way to the moon the simple point is that not all of them can be in the elite club of states who have the will and capabilities to do just that.Footnote54 Collaboration too is likely to remain divisive in the new lunar space race, whether intentional or not.Footnote55 54 countries have already signed the Artemis Accords led by the U.S. since 2020, which contain principles outlining civil exploration in space that are heralded for their openness, transparency, and predictability for all stakeholders.Footnote56 Meanwhile, China has entered into an MOU with Russia to establish an international lunar research station, with multiple scientific and exploration objectives, that is likely to be constructed on the south pole of the moon.Footnote57 The south pole on the moon is where both China and the U.S. have marked out potential landing sites as their new competing lunar programs get underway.Footnote58 It is also the region in which India, a signatory of the Artemis Accords, was instrumental in confirming the presence of water and where it has also soft-landed before anyone else.Footnote59 While no IR analyst can easily predict how the strategic culture of any state will affect its behavior in the context of space resources or space habitats it is foreseeable that such developments are significant for advancing national and relative power.Footnote60 The defense-industrial complex in the United States is paying attention to what all this will mean for the balance of power in space. The LunA-10 framework represents the next-generation quest for an integrated 10-year lunar architecture that could catalyze a commercial space economy with the U.S. in the lead.Footnote61 How competition and collaboration play out depends on how states choose to reconcile the trends of the DCM triumvirate with their own interests as they, and their counterparts, all set their sights on the moon. As technologies are always uncertain and the landscape of allies and rivals can shift, diplomacy for space security may be more necessary than ever as these lunar armadas set off.Footnote62 How Does Space Fit in the International Relations of Asia? The new space race is not going into some vacuum in the study and practice of the IR of Asia. Nor are the regional space politics divorced from the DCM trends that are reshaping prospects for all actors across all continents. There is history and intellectual precedent in how we can expect Asian states to engage with DCM trends, signifying also prospects for conflict and collaboration both in and out of the region. It is especially important to get this narrative right at a time when Asia can boast the greatest concentration of independent and autonomous space powers relative to every other region on the planet, making it pivotal for the future of space security. These are, to date, also the principal powers who have been central to shaping the dynamics of the IR of Asia in the world – China, Japan, India, North Korea, and South Korea. Caveats and Preexisting Works A few things first. This is not the place to get into polemics about what Asia is, a contested term that is perhaps most useful for differentiating it from the equally murky idea of the “West.”Footnote63 For the purposes of this essay the most useful broad category is the one from the United Nations which categorizes Member States into the regional group of the “Asia-Pacific.”Footnote64 This includes countries from Northeast, Southeast, South, Central, and Southwest Asia as well as those from the Pacific islands. This keeps us attuned to not just to the activities of the independent and autonomous space powers, but also others in the broader Asia-Pacific, such as Australia, New Zealand, and others in Southeast, Central, South, and West Asia, who are also making strides and positioning in the DCM triumvirate. This broad sweep is likely to be most useful for understanding the entanglements of the space domain in the years ahead. There is of course a substantial body of knowledge on the IR of Asia. This is also not the place to do justice to the painstaking works that have, over decades, improved our solid understanding of key aspects of the IR of Asia and allowed us to portray region-wide, sub-regional, and extra-regional interactions. A few broad works can only help us extract and reflect on the broad nature of the subject-matter involved in the making of IR of Asia to date, which continues to resonate in debates about whether or not Asia’s geography is “ripe for rivalry.”Footnote65 In very broad brushstrokes the subject-matter includesFootnote66: historical, political, and social forces that have shaped the region over time; the relevance or irrelevance of mainstream Western IR theories; the making and makeup of foreign economic or security policies; the drivers of integration or rivalries amid structural global shifts, the organizational and institutional patterns of governance, for example. More closely mirroring the IR concepts and constructs noted earlier, there are also in the IR of Asia prominent cross-cutting ideas, such as the role of states and industrial policy, economic-security linkages, technonationalism, economic regionalism and interdependence, regional organizations and institutions, balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, alliances and security architectures, and so on. But as in IR more generally, so also regionally there appears to be less of a focus on integrating space technologies into the broader fabric of changed global and regional politics. In terms of work on specific technologies in Asia, there has certainly been longstanding attention on conventional military capabilities, nuclear acquisitions, and ballistic missile defense, all of which can exacerbate security dilemmas. But there is less so on space in particular, though a number of works have contributed to our general understanding of individual space powers in Asia.Footnote67 The findings from this symposium, interwoven with IR themes below, also contributes to advancing these knowledge frontiers with implications for national interests, regional risks, and interstate stability. A cogent case for a space race in Asia back in 2012 did not prejudge any particular outcome for space security. Footnote68 In the broad sweep of space activities across Northeast, Southeast, and South Asian countries, one conclusion at the time was that Asia’s emerging space powers were keenly attuned to keeping score, following relative gains, and marking nationalist advantages vis-à-vis regional rivals. Footnote69 From the benchmark of that study, the question is what has changed in terms of Asian states and their motivations in a world returned to great power competition. Su-Mi Lee raises these questions at the start of this symposium focusing on the case of South Korea: Will South Korea and other Asian states take sides between great powers building competing blocs in the region? Or as a middle power, will South Korea recast itself as an agenda setter, rather than a passive follower, and expand its own network in space development, independently of great powers, and contribute to the peaceful uses of outer space? Jongseok Woo offers up a view on the impact of the ongoing Sino-U.S. rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region specifically on South Korea’s strategic choices in security and military affairs, as well as its space policies. There is a close connection between South Korea’s space policies and its broader economic, security, and military interests. He asserts that South Korea’s choice to align with the United States and China on trilateral cooperation in space development has arisen directly as a response to China’s assertive and aggressive policies in the Asia-Pacific region, which have also fostered negative perceptions about China among South Koreans. Material and Ideational Building Blocks There are also material and ideational building blocks that clue us into the ways space can be brought into the IR of Asia. They can guide work at a theoretical level, illuminate intersections with the politics and trends of the DCM worldwide, lead to distinctive expectations about collaboration and stability, and help us reflect on likely pathways for policy, strategy, and diplomacy in the new space race. There are three thematic clusters fleshed out below that might prove to be fruitful for these aims: (1) the state and industrial policy, intertwined with thinking on technology, economic-security linkages, and geoeconomics, (2) complex regional interdependence including economic integration, supply chains, and institutional governance, and (3) security architectures and alliances amid the changed geopolitical dynamics of the U.S.–China bipolar competition. All these clusters suggest that divorcing military and economic security for states in the region would be an analytical and policy blunder in the new space race. The Evolution of the State and Industrial Policy First, whatever the debates about its nature,Footnote70 the state in the IR of Asia is alive and well. Relative to other actors, it is unlikely to be displaced as the preeminent sovereign entity, particularly in matters of industrial and technological transformations. It has a distinguished pedigree in the region, finding its conceptual role at the center of huge theoretical and policy controversies about states and economic development.Footnote71 At one point, eight economies – Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand – rose prominently in the international economy, a phenomenon that became known as the “East Asian miracle.”Footnote72 At the heart of the controversy was the role played by states, and whether their interventions in the market made the difference to their economic and industrial transformations. The domestic institutional configurations of the so-called newly industrializing countries (NICs) also drew attention to the reasons why states could manage to undertake industrial policies in the ways they did.Footnote73 All this came at a time of new thinking about the merits of free trade, in which activist trade policies were shown to possibly advantage some countries relative to their competitors especially in high-technology industries.Footnote74 As today, so then, high-technology industries, such as semiconductors, were at the epicenter of controversies about the fairness of then perceived Japanese activism.Footnote75 Asia is again center stage in these policy concerns, such as those about the foundational global value chain in semiconductors that fuel high-technology production and consumption. Between 2016 and 2020, 26 economies in Asia and the Pacific accounted for about 84% of total world integrated circuit exports.Footnote76 They also accounted for about 62% of total world electrical and optical equipment exports in 2021. Long mindful of their positions in the global political economy, all this suggests that for states of all stripes across Asia “developmentalism is not dead,” picking winners is still of interest, and, as in the past for other strategic sectors so also for the foreseeable future, Asian states will remain involved in shaping the frontiers of space technologies to their home advantage.Footnote77 Industrial policy motivations have clearly been a driver of South Korea’s expanding space program, and Kristi Govella points out the South Korean government has considered potential commercial opportunities when making decisions about how to structure its engagement with regional space institutions. The maxim of “rich country, strong army” pervades the intellectual landscape of prominent works, alerting us that for many countries in Asia the synergistic pathway to security comes through technology and the economy. These symbiotic economic-security fundamentals resonate in both regional and country-specific works.Footnote78 Japanese planners, for example, have long enhanced Japan’s technological edge by stimulating the interdiffusion of civil-military applications and the nurturance of a military-commercial axis.Footnote79 While not inattentive to the policy tradeoffs that must be made in practice, the Japanese state remains consistent in the twin goals maximizing both its military and its bargaining power through economic means.Footnote80 China is held up as a techno-security state – innovation-centered, security-maximizing – at a historic moment of bipolarity in world politics in which both China and the U.S. see the economic-security nexus as a pivotal peacetime battleground.Footnote81 These themes resonate also in the idea of geoeconomics – best thought of as “the logic of war in the grammar of commerce” – that would hold in a world of territorial states seeking technological innovation not just for its own sake but to explicitly maximize benefits within their own boundaries.Footnote82 With themes that echo seminal works on economic-security linkages,Footnote83 the practice of geoeconomics means the use of economic instruments in defense of national interests and geopolitical gain while being watchful of the impact on the home country of others doing exactly the same.”Footnote84 Whether geoeconomics is criticized or refined as an idea,Footnote85 is considered relevant or irrelevant to state conduct, or even goes in and out of fashion, its core continues to resonate in lively debates about the nature of statecraft in the IR of Asia.Footnote86 The case of space in South Korea is instructive along these themes. Given that the economics of the space industry require a long-term commitment with massive investments, Wonjae Hwang’s principal argument is in line with the idea of the developmental state. The South Korean government is taking a lead role in developing the space industry, and its core geoeconomic strategy in space manifests in the promotion of public–private partnerships. By building a strong governing structure within the public sector, coordinating with selective private partners, assisting them with financial support and technology transfer, the government has built strong partnerships with private firms in the space industry. There are plans to establish also a guiding public institution, which can make far-sighted plans for space development, implement the plans, and control associated institutions. As a latecomer to the space race but as a critical player in the global supply chains in the space industry, he also discusses how South Korea has promoted international partnerships with other space powers such as the U.S., EU, India, Australia, and the UAE. Complex Regional Interdependence Second, Asian economies and their integration into the international system makes them pivotal players. But indicators suggest that regional economic integration is important too.Footnote87 A regional cooperation and integration index, which tracks and meshes key dimensions across all principal regions of the world is noteworthy.Footnote88 In 2020, the index in which higher values mean greater regional integration, the EU was recorded at 0.59, North America at 0.49, and Asia and the Pacific at 0.43. This puts the Asian region on par with its peers in the global political economy. As concerns about supply chain vulnerabilities rise worldwide, less visible forces behind Asian economic fusion will also rise to shape strategies. In 2014, production networks were acknowledged as outlets for new modes of interstate friction such as between Japan and China but were still seen as reinforcing traditional commercial liberal arguments.Footnote89 Over time, despite the dramatic expansion of global supply chains involving all actors in the region over, the phenomenon remained underappreciated. But work on point finds that they may be more distinct, complex, and unique mechanisms of interdependence, and could well affect prospects for interstate conflict and cooperation in and out of the region.Footnote90 Their very presence complicates blustering proclamations of decoupling or derisking in both regional and global politics. States across Asia remain watchful about trade and investment agreements to enhance their regional and international economic prospects.Footnote91 Whatever the criticisms about this institutional proliferation, it draws attention to Asian standing and strategies relative to other regions. Among the most high-profile developments is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with 15 members including 10 ASEAN countries as well as Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.Footnote92 China and Japan, respectively, account for around 48% and 19% of the RCEP GDP.Footnote93 RCEP’s comparative indicators put it ahead of its peer agreements, with 28% of global trade, 31% of the share of global GDP, and about 30% of world populationFootnote94 The agreement’s economic significance was deemed considerable, with one estimate suggesting it could generate over $200 billion annually to world income, and $500 billion to world trade by 2030.Footnote95 The duality of space technology also creates new dynamics for the IR of space in Asia. Even agreements that are technically about trade can be seen as opportunities to enhance alliances and alter the broader security context.Footnote96 This thinking should be borne firmly in mind in analyses of regional space governance, which is nested in broader international legal and normative frameworks. The degree of institutional density in an issue area, such as preexisting rules or regimes on point, may condition the type of diplomacy countries like China pursue in projects from space stations to lunar research stations.Footnote97 It also affects how countries like Japan can use institutional constructs for political reassurance in the region.Footnote98 At present, two markedly different Asian institutions, the China-led Asia Pacific Regional Space Organization (APSCO) and the Japan-led Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) mark diplomatic prospects for the regional dynamics of collaboration and competition stretched over decades.Footnote99 Asia also leads other regions with two other space-centered institutions, the India-led Centre for Space Science Technology and Education in the Asia-Pacific (CSSTEAP) and the China-led Regional Centre for Space Science Technology and Education in the Asia-Pacific. Kristi Govella argues that these institutions have been shaped by broader geopolitical dynamics in the region, and that rising space players like South Korea carefully choose how to engage with these regional institutions on the basis of economic, security, and institutional factors. She further claims that diplomatic engagement with regional space institutions can complement states’ security alliances and bolster relationships with other like-minded strategic partners. Future patterns of regional cooperation will also continue to shape and be shaped by nonhierarchical international regime complexity in the space domain.Footnote100 Current trajectories suggest scenarios in which states’ à la carte approaches affect the integrity of existing cooperative multilateral space law and processes. Security Dynamics and Alliances Third, there is evidence for longstanding expectations that Asia’s economic rise would lead to increased military capacities and modernizationFootnote101 The grouping of Asia and Oceania stands out in this respect.Footnote102 In 2022, it accounted for about $575 billion in military spending, with China, Japan, and South Korea making up 70% of that. This figure is second only to North America with over $900 billion of military spending, the bulk of which is by the United States. Estimates between 2018 and 2022 also suggest that Asia and Oceania accounted for 41% of the total global volume of major arms, the largest compared to other regions; and, with 11% of the total, India is the largest arms importer of all countries. All this should be set against the politics of a region with the busiest sea lanes, nine of the ten largest ports, seven of the world’s largest standing militaries, and five of the world’s declared nuclear nations.Footnote103 The region is also marked by an intensifying bilateral security competition between the U.S. and China that increases the risk of inadvertent escalation of hostilities, entangling conventional, nuclear, and space capabilities.Footnote104 The U.S. has stated outright that it will consider the use of nuclear weapons in the event of any kind of a “significant” nonnuclear strategic attack on its or its allies’ nuclear forces as well as “their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” whose nodes run in and through space.Footnote105 In believing that the U.S. seeks to lower the threshold for nuclear use and so degrade its conventional strength China is responding by expanding and modernizing both its conventional and nuclear capabilities.Footnote106 A new arms race may well be underway, enmeshing old and new warfighting domains like space and affecting prospects for arms control and strategic stability. Amid these shifting military postures and perceptions, security architectures matter and have received significant attention for their origins, shapes, consequences, and transformations in the IR of Asia.Footnote107 If, prior to the 1990s, Asia was “infertile ground” for security institutions today it seems the opposite is true; new security institutions such as QUAD have come to stand alongside old ones like the ASEAN Regional Forum.Footnote108 The United States is prominent in the region for its creation of a network of bilateral alliances seen not just as instruments of containment against rivals but also as instruments of control over allies.Footnote109 As the view of space as a warfighting domain embeds itself in regional security architectures formal U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea in the region are coalescing, connecting and responding in distinct ways.Footnote110 As well, they are motivated by other security threats and dynamics – territorial disputes and politics, North Korean missile threats and its other purported scientific missions into space – that have sobered prospects for stability in regional and global politics. Asia is leading the world in how some of these space-centric alliance transformations are coming about, and how they may affect military operations such as communication and intelligence gathering. In practice, the U.S.-led military alliances also serve as contracts in which, while one component is certainly a military commitment, there is also agreement about a continuous (and changing) exchange of space goods and services.Footnote111 The U.S.- Japan Alliance, with its attendant geoeconomic and geopolitical elements in play, is the first bilateral one in Asia to extend to the space domain.Footnote112 Although its legal foundations need far greater clarity in light of existing international space law and policy, as well as shifting nuclear postures, this extension is nevertheless becoming more concrete with the formation of a new subordinate command in Japan for the U.S. Space Force.Footnote113 But these pronounced changes on the military side sit alongside others; the Japanese state is also continuing to bargain to enmesh its civilian and commercial space interests under the umbrella of the alliance, such as those related to GPS or astronauts on the moon. A similar story is unfolding under the U.S.-Korea Alliance. As Scott Snyder notes in this symposium, the combination of South Korea’s entry into the space launch and satellite sectors and the emergence of the Sino-U.S. geostrategic competition have made it possible for both countries to pursue bilateral cooperation within the alliance. Space cooperation within the alliance brings South Korea on board to support U.S.-led development of international norms for use of space and strengthens the U.S. space-based military infrastructure to protect South Korea from adversary threats while also assisting South Korea’s long-term aspirations to gain a part of the commercial space sector. There are also implications for the hub-and-spoke model of U.S. alliances in Asia. It may not have originally encouraged trust and interactions between quasi-allies such as Japan and South Korea that are not directly allied but share the United States (hub) as a common ally. But this model may be transforming in the space domain. Tongfi Kim explains that South Korea–Japan relations, traditionally the weakest link in U.S.–Japan–South Korea trilateral cooperation, have made remarkable progress since the inauguration of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in May 2022. Due to the three states’ increasing focus on space security and geopolitical development in East Asia, Kim argues, space cooperation is one of the most promising paths for institutionalizing the trilateral cooperation. What are the Thematic Takeaways? Asian states are not just passive recipients in the new space race but proactive and high-profile shapers of the DCM trends in it. They represent the new forces of democratization, which opens up diplomatic opportunities for new alignments in pursuit of material and normative quests. They know the unprecedented trends in space commercialization can boost their industrial base and position them for economic prosperity in the new frontier. They are attuned to how space militarization can give them a military edge and, carried to its extreme, how weaponization can dash prospects for strategic stability around and above us. A few takeaways stand out. The Gravity of the International Relations of Space Has Shifted to Asia Asia leads all other regions of the world with the highest concentration of independent and autonomous sovereign states – China, Japan, India, South Korea, North Korea – who possess some of the most advanced capabilities for civilian, commercial, and military space. They do not act in unison but are guided by their own national imperatives. Along with Australia and New Zealand, they are also joined by a wide variety of states in Southeast, South, and West Asia who aim for niche capabilities or capitalize on geographic locations. The State in Asia Will Be the Prime Decision-Maker in Shaping Space Activities Consistent with the state-centric nature of the IR of Asia, both the top and emerging spacefaring powers in Asia will seek to shape and balance the DCM trends in line with their own economic and political interests. They will not be dictated to, but can be persuaded through bargaining and communication. Many will try to take advantage of commercial trends abroad while reinforcing them at home, some will try to strike a balance in the commercialization-militarization axis, but a few will attempt to shift it toward offensive purposes. Dual-Use Space Technology is Another Means to Wealth and Security for Asian States All Asian states are interested in acquiring space technology, whether through direct or indirect means, to advance their prosperity and security. This is consistent with a historic intellectual lineage in the region about staying abreast of strategic high-technology sectors that crisscross civilian and military benefits, and that promise to pull other sectors along. The intersection of the space domain with emerging and disruptive technology frontiers – AI, quantum, cyber – is also of vital interest to all principal regional actors. New Patterns of Interconnectedness May Stay the Hand of Space Conflict Space nationalism drives the principal spacefaring states to compete with others in and out of the region. But continued economic integration – trade and investment flows, resilient supply chains, and space assets that facilitate them – also underpin prospects for continued engagement among all regional players. Its disruption is of concern to regional states, as in the U.S. bid to secure critical supply chains for semiconductors worldwide. As well, regional institutions that formally and informally govern relations, including those focused on space, routinize engagements, and information exchanges among all states. U.S.-Led Alliances in Asia are at the Forefront of Transforming into Space Alliances Security institutions in Asia are important for continued dialogue in the region, and for socializing emerging players into the realities of the new space race. But the designation of space as a warfighting domain — and of the U.S. declaration about the need to protect command-and-control structures that underpin extended deterrence — has put U.S.-led alliances with Japan and South Korea at the center of transformations into space alliances. This may affect the “hub and spoke” model, with the spokes also strengthening their relations in the distant future. Much however, depends on the continued domestic political support in the U.S., Japan, and Korea for alliances and such alliance transformations in the years ahead. Asian States Will Be Pivotal to Shaping or Scuttling Prospects for Peace - in Outer Space The capabilities of Asian states make them ideal candidates for large-scale collaboration in space, as well as on the moon and beyond. Diplomatically, they are being courted in the bipolar space competition between the U.S. and China. The rules on which they operate, and who gets to write and interpret them, will matter for patterns of polarity in the IR of space. Some Asian states have responded by signing up to U.S.-led interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty in practice, such as in the Artemis Accords. Other states from Asia may move to the China-led camp with Russia for an international lunar research station. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On September 24, 2024, speaking from the gargantuan Kazan International Exhibition Centre during the BRICS Summit in Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphatically extolled the “collective rise of the Global South [as] a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world.” While celebrating “Global South countries marching together toward modernization [as] monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” the Chinese leader hastened to add that China was not quite a part of but at the Global South’s “forefront”; that “will always keep the Global South in [their] heart, and maintain [their]roots in the Global South. As emerging powers in the BRICS+ grouping thronged Kazan in a clear sign to the West that they would not unwittingly entrench Vladimir Putin’s full-scale diplomatic isolation, China’s message was clear: as a great power, they would not ignore or undermine the interests of the Global South.  The rise of the Global South as a central voice in world politics concurs with the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a diplomatic field. This is not a coincidence, as they are both intimately related to broader changes in the international order, away from a US-led liberal international order, toward a post-liberal one, whose contours are still being defined, but where informal groupings, such as the BRICS+ play a key role. One could even argue that it is this transition to a new order that has pushed states to engage diplomatically on issues around cyberspace. What was once the purview of the Global North, and particularly the US, is now a contested domain of international activity. In this text we explore how the Global South has entered this contestation, and how it articulates its ever-growing presence in shaping the agenda of this domain. However, as cyber diplomacy is mainstreamed across the Global South, it is unclear whether it will continue to be a relevant collective force in forging the rules and norms that govern cyberspace, or whether the tendency will be for each country to trace their own path in service of their independent national interests. The evolution of cyber diplomacy in a post-liberal world Cyber diplomacy is very recent. One could argue that its practice only really started in the late 1990s, with Russia’s proposal of an international treaty to ban electronic and information weapons. Cyber diplomacy, as “the use of diplomatic resources and the performance of diplomatic functions to secure national interests with regard to the cyberspace” (or more simply, to the “the application of diplomacy to cyberspace”  is even more recent, with the first few writings on the topic emerging only in the last 15 years.   To be sure, the internet was born at the zenith of the US-led liberal international order and was viewed as an ideal tool to promote based on liberalism, free trade and information exchange with limited government intervention and democratic ideals. Cyber libertarians extolled the virtues of an independent cyberspace, free from state control and western governments, particularly the US, did not disagree. They viewed the internet as the perfect tool for promoting US global power and maintaining liberal hegemony -“ruling the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas.” The internet was ensconced in the relatively uncontested unipolar geopolitical moment. As the pipe dreams of a liberal cyberspace began to unravel with China and Russia pushing for an alternate state-centric vision of cyberspace, cyber diplomacy began to emerge both as a “response to and continuing factor in the continuing battle in and over cyberspace.” Explicitly, we can pin down its origin to two factors. First, is the perception that cyberspace was becoming an increasingly intertwined with geopolitics and geo-economics, with states starting to better understand its threats, but also its opportunities. Moonlight Maze, the 2007 attacks against Estonia or even Stuxnet were all cases that helped focus the mind of policymakers around the world. Second, the broader context of underlying changes in the international order necessitated cyber diplomacy as a bridge-building activity both to mitigate great power rivalry and to preserve the stability of cyberspace and the digital economy. Private companies, till then the beneficiaries of an open and de-regulated internet, also had to step in to ensure that their own interests and profit motives were safeguarded. These two intertwined factors dominated the discussions around cyber diplomacy for most of the 2000s. Initially, the predominant focus was arms control, reflected in the composition of the first few Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) iterations, the forum created by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to discuss the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in international security. And although experts appointed by countries from the Global South were present since the first meeting in July 2004 the debate was very much framed as a discussion among great powers. As discussions progressed, and the GGE became a process in itself, some states outside the permanent members’ group started to engage more actively. This also coincided with the progressive creation of cyber diplomacy posts and offices in foreign ministries around the world. The field was becoming more professional, as more states started to realise that these were discussions that mattered beyond the restrictive group of power politics. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, or Kenya started to push for the discussion of issues that affected a larger group of states, with a particular focus on cyber capacity building not just at the UN-GGE but also at other multilateral and multi-stakeholder processes and conferences including the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN First Committee (after an acrimonious diplomatic process) had an important effect in the diversification and democratisation of the discussions, as these were now open to the whole UN membership, and non-state actors were given the opportunity to observe and participate in these sessions. Further, in 2022, the UN set up an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a cybercrime convention (adopted by consensus by UNGA members in December 2024) that also enabled all UN members to participate in the negotiations. The opening up of these processes exposed many states, particularly in the Global South, to the field, and it forced them to actively engage in discussions that until recently were seen as the dominion of great powers. The African Group and the G77 were now able to actively participate in the discussions, with frequent statements and contributions. Conceptualising the Global South in cyber diplomacy As cyber diplomacy progressed, policy-maker and academics alike understood global cyber governance to be divided along three main blocs of states. The status quo defenders were led by the US and (mostly Western) like-minded states, focused on the promotion of liberal values and non-binding norms shaped by a multi-stakeholder approach and adherence to existing tenets of international law but resisted significant changes in the governance of cyberspace. A revisionist group, led by Russia and China, advocated for a new binding international treaty and multilateral governance with the objective of guaranteeing security and order rather than necessarily promoting liberal values. Given this impasse, the role and influence of a group of states termed ‘swing states’ or ‘digital deciders’ has been recognized as critical to determining the future of cyberspace, most prominently in a detailed 2018 report by the Washington DC-based think-tank New America . This grouping that largely includes emerging powers from the Global South including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, are understood as countries that are yet to “gravitate towards either end of the spectrum, some undecided and others seeking a third path.” Given these groupings, it is worth considering how the Global South fits in with present conceptualisations of cyber diplomacy, or whether it is a grouping at all. The term ‘Global South’ has come in for some criticism given the heterogeneity of countries it describes and its geographical inaccuracy (many Global South countries are not quite in the geographical South.) To be fair, the term never aspired for terminological accuracy and was instead coined to conceptually represent a group of countries during the Vietnam dissatisfied with the political and economic exploitation from the Global North. In that regard, Global South is a “mood,” a metaphor for developing countries aiming to find their way in an increasingly contested world. The war in Ukraine only augmented these fissures as the West were confounded by the Global South’s refusal to take a stand against brazen Russian aggression in Europe. The developing world saw it differently though: in an international order long-built on racism and inequality, expecting these countries to take a stand in their “petty squabbles” while they had also carried out “similarly violent, unjust, and undemocratic interventions—from Vietnam to Iraq” was a bridge too far. The Ukraine war helped clarify the combination of behaviours that countries within the Global South exhibit to attain this strategic goal: ideological agnosticism or neutrality; selective engagement with norms and rules; and finally, multi-pronged bilateral and minilateral groupings, with equidistance from the major powers. These three approaches helped illuminate the multiple different forms of agency that each developing country exercises vis-à-vis the international order based on their own interests and quest for strategic autonomy. However, what became evident as Russians bombs started to fall on the street of Kyiv, was already visible in these states’ interactions in cyber diplomacy. First, much of the Global South has refused to take an explicit stand on the controversial fissures that the leading powers have spent much of their time debating, including whether cyberspace governance should be state-centric or driven by new rules or existing international law.  Throughout the negotiating processes at the UN OEWG and AHC, as Russia and China clashed with the United States and its allies on the text of several controversial proposals, most developing countries took an agnostic approach, neither explicitly endorsing or opposing any of these potential treaty provisions. (There are naturally some exceptions: an analysis of voting patterns suggests that Iran and North Korea have firmly pegged themselves to the Russian and Chinese side of the aisle whereas some smaller developing countries have gravitated towards the US side of the aisle.) Second, there has been selective engagement when security or developmental interests are directly impacted. For example, in its joint submission to the UN’s Global Digital Compact (GDC), the G77+China asserted the need for equitable cross-border data flows that maximize development gains. The GDC is the UN’s first comprehensive framework for global digital cooperation. Long concerned about the misuse of the multi-stakeholder model by private actors for profit at the expense of developmental interests, the G77 also highlighted the need for “multilateral and transparent approaches to digital governance to facilitate a more just, equitable and effective governance system.” Finally, countries in  the Global South have entered into multiple technology partnerships across political and ideological divides. US efforts at restricting the encroachment of Chinese hardware providers like Huawei and ZTE into the core technological periphery of several Global South countries using allegations of surveillance were sometimes rebuked, given the Five Eyes’ proclivity and reputation for also conducting similar surveillance, including on top officials. By being agnostic on controversial ideological issues, countries in the Global South have been able to maintain ties with great powers on all sides of the political spectrum and foster pragmatic technological partnerships. Will the Global South rise? The Global South’s rise as a potent force in cyber diplomacy will, however, depend on three factors. Can it maintain ideological consistency on developmental and rights concerns, including on how the internet is governed at home? Can they continue to work with multiple partners without succumbing to pressure either from Washington or Beijing? Will emerging powers in the Global South (like India, Brazil and Indonesia) bat for the interests of the larger developing world, rather than simply orchestrating global governance to service their own interests or that of the regime in power? Given that cyber diplomacy emerged and developed as the playground of great powers, analysing it through the perspective of the Global South enables us to focus on cyber governance as an issue that goes beyond (cyber)security concerns – including economic development and identity (cutting across issues of race, gender, and colonialism) – and to see the world from a perspective that goes beyond the dynamics of great power competition. Analytically, it is useful to understand how these states position themselves and justify their actions on behalf of the whole. When looking inside the box, we see some collective movement but also a desire on part of the great powers, including China to incentivise the developing world to see the world as they do. The Global South remains relevant as a construct that captures the mood of the developing world on the geopolitics of technology of cyber issues. Its “great strength” will emerge not from swinging between Washington and Beijing or being orchestrated through New Delhi or Brasilia. It will instead come through standing their ground, in service of their own security and developmental interests in cyberspace. And as they progress, it remains to be seen whether the “Global South” retains its relevance as an analytical construct or whether it will give way to other denominations that better capture the developing world’s nuances and differences vis-à-vis the international cyber order. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the international political economy of Korea and its effects due to geopolitical tension between China and the USA. Design/methodology/approach Economic war between China and the USA has prolonged longer than expected. Aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, reforming the supply chain has been the centre of economic tension between China and the USA. Quite recently, with the rapid expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms, distribution channels come upon a new economic tension between the two. And now is the time to pivot its pattern of conflict from competition into cooperation. In this end, economic diplomacy could be a useful means to give a signal of cooperation. From the view of economic diplomacy, this paper tries to analyse the projected transition of economic war between China and the USA with its implication on the trade policy of Korea. Findings As an implementation of economic diplomacy, China suggested the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing trade logistics among related countries to gain competitiveness. In 2023, the Biden administration suggested the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor as a counter to BRI, which will be a threshold for changing trade policy from economic war into economic diplomacy. As a result, it is expected China and the USA will expand their economic diplomacy in a way to promote economic cooperation among allied states, while the distribution channel war would continue to accelerate the economic tension between China and the USA. Korea has to prepare for and provide measures handling this geopolitical location in its trade policy or economic diplomacy. Originality/value This research contributes to the awareness and understanding of trade environments from the perspective of economic diplomacy. 1. Introduction The advent of globalisation has led to widespread economic integration, creating global production networks and markets. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a significant setback to this trend. In the wake of COVID-19, an economic war has arisen between China and the USA, centred on the restructuring of global supply chains following widespread disruptions. International political economy (IPE) examines the power dynamics between states and the structures of influence within regional economies. Consequently, economic diplomacy has gained unprecedented attention. Economic diplomacy focuses on government actions regarding international economic issues, distinct from political diplomacy through its market-oriented approach in foreign policy. Putnam (1988) categorises economic diplomacy into two levels: unilateralism and bilateralism. Unilateral economic diplomacy (or unilateralism) often relies on hard power, involving decisions on trade liberalisation or market protection without negotiation. Bilateral economic diplomacy (or bilateralism) or multilateral economic diplomacy (or multilateralism), by contrast, involves negotiation among trade partners, resulting in agreements such as regional or global free trade agreements (FTAs). A vast range of state or non-state actors engage in economic diplomacy, navigating the complex interplay between international and domestic factors. Defining economic diplomacy is extremely challenging, but one useful definition is “the broad concept of economic statecraft, where economic measures are taken in the pursuit of political goals, including punitive actions such as sanctions” (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008).  Figure 1 Recent trend of economic diplomacy To exert influence internationally, ministers and heads of government strive to demonstrate their capacity for national security through two primary approaches, as shown in Figure 1 (above): economic war (or competition) and economic diplomacy (or international cooperation). In the context of global supply chain restructuring, the economic conflict between China and the USA has intensified, marked by threats of supply chain disruptions. This has led to emerging strategies aimed at “crowding out” the USA from global supply chains (去美戰略) or excluding China through alliances such as the Allied Supply Chain and Chip 4. While economic war is inherently “temporary” due to its painstaking nature, economic diplomacy or international cooperation offer a more “long-term” approach because it is gains-taking. This paper analyses the factors contributing to the prolonged nature of this economic war and explores potential outcomes of the supply chain tensions between China and the USA from the perspectives of IPE or geo-economics. In conclusion, it highlights the importance of preparing for trade policy adjustments and strategic economic diplomacy. 2. International trade war and strategic items2.1 Supply chain The supply chain encompasses a network of interconnected suppliers involved in each stage of production, from raw materials and components to the finished goods or services. This network can include vendors, warehouses, retailers, freight stations and distribution centres. Effective supply chain management is a “crucial process because an optimised supply chain results in lower costs and a more efficient production cycle” [1]. Within the supply chain, a leading company typically holds governance power, enabling it to coordinate scheduling and exercise control across the interconnected suppliers, resulting in reduced costs and shorter production times (Gereffi et al., 2005) [2]. Since the 2000s, forward and backward integration have been key strategies for managing time, cost and uncertainty in supply chains. For example, Toyota’s Just-In-Time (JIT) system demonstrated the efficiency of locally concentrated supply chains until disruptions from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and the Thailand flood. Following supply chain shutdowns in 2020, many businesses shifted from local to global supply chains, utilising advancements of the information technology (IT) and transportation technologies to geographically diversify operations. As the need for a systematically functioning global supply chain has grown, a leading nation, much like a leading company, often assumes governance power in international trade and investment, as illustrated in Figure 2 (below), by aligning with the leadership of a dominant market competitiveness, which makes this leadership valuable.  Figure 2 Supply chain The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to the global supply chain, causing sudden lockdowns that led to widespread supply chain disruptions. To mitigate the risks of future global disruptions, supply chains have begun restructuring to operate on a more regionally segmented basis. In this shift toward regional supply chains, China and the USA are at the centre, drawing allied countries within their spheres of influence. This alignment helps explain why the economic war between China and the USA has lasted longer than anticipated. 2.2 Strategic items China has restricted exports of two rare metals, gallium and germanium, which are critical to semiconductor production. Kraljic (1983) highlighted the importance of managing “strategic items” within the framework of supply chain management, as shown in Figure 3. Kraljic emphasises the need to strengthen and diversify critical items. The Kraljic matrix provides a valuable tool for identifying essential items that require focused management within the supply chain.  Figure 3 Kraljic matrix Kraljic identified the importance of managing “bottleneck items” in strategic supply chain management – items that present high supply risk but have relatively low business value. Due to the potential costs associated with non-delivery or compromised quality of strategic items, these must be closely monitored and controlled. From a risk management perspective, establishing medium-term business relationships and collaboration with suppliers is essential. For example, South Korea imports over 90% of its urea for agricultural and industrial purposes from China [3]. Heavily dependent on China for urea supplies due to pricing factors, Korea faced challenges when China imposed export controls on urea, underscoring Korea’s vulnerability within China’s sphere of influence. The European Union (EU) also faces challenges with critical raw materials (CRMs). China remains the EU’s sole supplier of processed rare earth elements, while Chile supplies 79% of its lithium. In response, the EU introduced the CRM Act (CRMA) to support projects aimed at increasing “the EU’s capacity to extract, process, and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify supplies from the third countries” [4]. 2.3 Resilient supply chain alliance In contrast to China’s approach of leveraging supply disruptions to strengthen its influence, the Biden administration in the USA has adopted a cooperative approach focused on building resilient supply chains (Pillar 2) through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which includes 14 member countries [5]. The need for resilient supply chains has been further underscored by the Russia–Ukraine crisis. The IPEF aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities by fostering global efforts to reduce risks associated with concentrated, fragile supply chains [6].  Figure 4 Resilient supply chain alliance In Figure 4, the EU Commission presented the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) in September 2022, a crisis governance framework designed to ensure the availability of essential goods and services during future emergencies. The SMEI operates on three levels: contingency planning, vigilance and emergency. The contingency planning phase focuses on collaboration among member states to mitigate supply chain disruption and monitor incidents. The vigilance phase can be activated when a significant disruption is anticipated, enabling specific measures such as mapping and monitoring supply chains and production capacities. Finally, the emergency phase is activated in cases of severe disruption to the functioning of the single market [7]. Establishing a resilient supply chain through international cooperation may be appealing, yet the reality often falls short of the ambition. In South Korea, the IPEF took effect on 17 April 2024, after an extended negotiation process, marking the first multilateral agreement on supply chains. As a result, during non-crisis periods, the 14 member countries will collaborate to strengthen international trade, investment and trade logistics. In times of crisis, member countries will activate a “crisis response network”. Conversely, opportunities for negotiation with China, South Korea’s largest trading partner, are essential for building supply chain resilience [8]. China has pursued an industrial policy focused on enhancing its supply chain management capabilities. In the semiconductor sector, the decoupling between China and the USA has become increasingly evident. Contrary to expectations, China has adopted a policy of internalising its supply chains, returning to the integration strategies of the 2000s rather than furthering globalisation. A promising opportunity for transformation between the two countries has emerged recently. Since 2015, China and South Korea have maintained bilateral FTA, and with the second phase of FTA negotiations currently underway, there is an opportunity to strengthen trade and investment ties, fostering positive progress through international cooperation. 2.4 China manufacturing exodus During the COVID-19 pandemic, China imposed sudden lockdowns without prior notice or preparation, halting production and logistics cycles. This “zero COVID” policy may have triggered a shift towards “de-risking” China from supply chain disruptions. Although China still offers significant advantages as “the factory of the world,” with vast market potential, prolonged trade tensions with the USA, intensified during the Trump administration, have prompted global manufacturers with substantial USA market bases to relocate operations amid rising geopolitical uncertainties. For example, Nike and Adidas have shifted much of their footwear manufacturing to Vietnam, Apple has begun iPhone production at a Foxconn in Chennai, India, and AstraZeneca has contracted production with India’s Serum Institute. In the pre-globalised era, defining the Rule of Origin (ROO) was straightforward, as a product’s components were usually manufactured and assembled within a single country. However, with the complexity of global supply chains, particularly since 2012, determining ROO has become a time-consuming and subjective process. ROO are classified as either non-preferential or preferential. The USA applies non-preferential ROO to restrict imports from countries like Cuba, Iran and North Korea, while offering trade preference programmes for others. Preferential ROO are used to determine duty-free eligibility for imports from approved countries [9], whereas non-preferential ROO play a crucial role in “country of origin labelling, government procurement, enforcement of trade remedy actions, compilation of trade statistics, supply chain security issues.” [10] China manufacturing exodus may negatively impact capital inflows into Hong Kong, traditionally seen as the Gateway to China. In 2023, Hong Kong’s initial public offering volume fell to a 20-year low of $5.9bn [11]. While China-oriented business remains in Hong Kong, which returns fully to Chinese control in 2047, non-China-oriented businesses have migrated to Singapore. As the certainty of contract and ownership rights forms the foundation of capitalism, this capital flight from Hong Kong is likely to persist. 3. Trade logistics and economic corridors Globalisation has allowed supply chains to leverage interdependence and interconnectedness, maximising efficiency. However, while these efficiencies have been beneficial, they have also created a fertile ground for friction between trade partners due to a “survival of the fittest” mindset and the principle of “winner takes all.” This interdependence has also highlighted vulnerabilities; the global supply chain struggled to manage the disruptions caused by COVID-19, prompting a shift towards regional integration initiatives, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. As the global economy seeks stability, collaboration over competition has become increasingly essential, with economic diplomacy emerging as a priority. The prolonged economic war between China and the USA arguably needs to shift towards economic diplomacy. The global supply chain is restructuring into regional supply chains, building resilience by operating in regional segments that can withstand crises. Michael Porter introduced the concept of value chain as “a set of activities that a firm performs to deliver a valuable product or service to the market.” [12] Complex finished goods often depend on global value chains, traversing multiple countries. As shown in Figure 5, the value chain consists of supply chain and trade channel components. While the focus has traditionally been on which country holds lead status within a regional supply chain, the emphasis is now shifting to how these regional segments can be interconnected and relayed. In this context, the supply chain competition may evolve into a “channel war” in international trade, where trade logistics will centre on the internal flow of goods, standardising channel processes and establishing authority over these channels.  Figure 5 Supply chain v. trade channel 3.1 Trade logistics It is natural for governments to seek environments that enhance competitiveness within in their countries. In terms of trade, effective trade logistics are essential for maintaining competitive advantage. As a prerequisite, a strong IT management infrastructure is indispensable. As shown in Figure 6, trade logistics encompass the internal flow of goods to market, integrating physical infrastructure with operating software – such as transport hubs, warehouses, highways, ports, terminals, trains and shipping vessels. Key areas of conflict in trade logistics involve the standardisation of channel processes and determining who holds governance over operation of these logistics systems. This is equally relevant within the digital economy. Recently, Chinese e-commerce – often referred to as C-commerce – has aggressively sought to gain control over digital distribution channels, interconnected delivery networks and trade logistics via digital platforms. Chinese platforms such as Taobao, Temu and AliExpress are actively working to increase their monthly active users (MAUs), positing themselves as counterweights to USA-based platforms such as Amazon and eBay in digital trade [13].  Figure 6 Trade logistics When the agenda of establishing international trade logistics is introduced to relevant trade members across various countries, initial progress and effective responses are often achieved. However, efforts soon encounter obstacles related to standardising logistics processes and establishing operational governance. Greater reliance on international institutions could help resolve these issues (Bayne, 2017). Yet governments frequently prioritise domestic interests, and after prolonged negotiations, the risk of international agreements failing increases. Amid the economic war between China and the USA, China launched a trade logistics initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt One Road, in 2013. Often referred to as the New Silk Road, the BRI aims to establish economic corridors for trade logistics. The World Bank estimates that the BRI could boost trade flows by 4.1% and reduce trade costs by 1.1% [14]. In response, the Biden administration proposed the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in September 2023 to strengthen transport and communication links between Europe and Asia as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. IMEC has been well received by participating countries, with expectations of fostering economic growth, enhancing connectivity and potentially rebalancing trade and economic relations between the EU and China [15]. Both BRI and IMEC are ambitious projects aimed at boosting international trade through substantial investments in trade logistics infrastructure. Each seeks to assert governance over international trade channels, signalling that the supply chain war may soon evolve into a trade channel war between China and the USA. 3.2 Economic corridors Economic corridors are transport networks designed to support and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and information. These corridors often include integrated infrastructure, such as highways, railways and ports, linking cities or even countries (Octaviano and Trishia, 2014). They are typically established to connect manufacturing hubs, high-supply and high-demand areas, and producers of value-added goods. Economic corridors comprise both hard infrastructure – such as trade facilities – and soft infrastructure, including trade facilitation and capacity-building measures. The Asian Development Bank introduced the term “economic corridor” in 1998 to describe networks connecting various economic agents within a region [16]. Economic corridors are integrated trade logistics networks, providing essential infrastructure for connecting regional segments of supply chains. As supply chains increasingly operate in regional “chunks,” linking these segments becomes ever more important. Economic corridors typically include a network of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, terminals and ports. Initiatives like the BRI and IMEC use economic corridors as instruments of economic diplomacy, shifting strategies from hard power to soft power, as shown in Figure 7. Because less-developed or developing countries often lack sufficient funding to invest in trade logistics, they tend to welcome these initiatives from developed countries, which offer international collaboration and support. However, these initiatives usually come with the condition that participating countries must accept standardised trade processes and governance led by the sponsoring developed country.  Figure 7 Economic corridor initiatives as economic diplomacy To succeed, economic corridors must meet three key conditions [17]. First, government intervention is essential, as economic corridor initiatives primarily involve public infrastructure investments beyond the scope of the private sector. In realising these projects, governments must reconcile three tensions to ensure their policies are mutually supportive: tensions between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures and between governments and other stakeholders. Second, intermediate outcomes should be measured and demonstrated as results of economic corridors, allowing participants to experience tangible benefits throughout these longer-term projects. Finally, economic corridors should deliver broader benefits. Participants need incentives to utilise the infrastructure sustainably. These benefits may extend beyond economic welfare, such as wages and income, to include social inclusion, equity and environmental gains, which support the long-term viability of the infrastructure. 4. BRI vs IMEC4.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - Silk Road The BRI can be a modern-day realisation of the Silk Road concept, connecting Europe as a market base with China as a production base. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, which connected trade routes across Eurasia, the BRI poses potential challenges due to its extensive connectivity. Firstly, there are social and environmental externalities, such as increased congestion and accidents from concentrating traffic flows through limited links and nodes within trade networks. Secondly, while the connectivity may benefit the production and market bases at either end, regions situated between these hubs, through which highways and railways pass, may gain minimal advantage. Thirdly, there is often a mismatch between where costs and benefits are realised. Transit regions that facilitate network traffic often see fewer direct benefits compared to high-density nodes within the network. 4.2 India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) - The Spice Road The ancient Spice Roads once connected the Middle East and Northeast Africa with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods such as cinnamon, ginger, pepper and cassia, which, like silk, served as a form of currency. The IMEC proposes a modern route from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Greece. Since its announcement in September 2023, some regional experts have expressed reservations about its feasibility, particularly regarding the connection between the Middle East and Israel. The project has faced delays due to the Israel–Hamas war. Despite these challenges, IMEC holds potential to drive economic growth and strengthen connectivity, especially as countries like Vietnam and India emerge as alternative manufacturing bases for companies relocating from China. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, IMEC is not viewed as a challenge to China but rather as an opportunity to diversify their economies and solidify their roles within the Middle East region [18]. 5. Conclusion A new trade war between China and the USA has begun, with the Biden Administration’s introduction of IMEC as a counter to China’s BRI. This shift could soon transform the nature of economic war from a focus on supply chains to one on trade channels. The China manufacturing exodus was further accelerated by supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the economic tensions between China and the USA, the restructuring of global supply chains into regional networks has made significant progress. With China maintaining its stance on export controls for strategic items, South Korea must prepare for resilient supply chain management. In relation to China–Korea FTA, which is currently undergoing its second phase of negotiation, South Korea should seek clarity on the transparency of China’s strategic item controls. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) plays a key role in monitoring the quality of inbound investments; similarly, South Korea is experiencing increased inbound investment due to the manufacturing shift from China and should apply similar standards to evaluate investment quality. This emerging economic war between China and the USA is now marked by the competing initiatives of the BRI and IMEC. The BRI can be viewed as a modern Silk Road, linking China with Europe, while the IMEC seeks to establish a trade logistics corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Greece. The South Korean Government should take proactive steps to prepare for the evolving dynamics of the trade war between China and the USA. CitationOh, J.S. (2025), "International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-11. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-06-2024-0031  Notes 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp2. According to Gary Gereffi et al, 5 governance types of a lead company could be categorised as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.3. Korea imports urea from 12 countries including Qatar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in addition to China.4. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en5. IPEF was launched on May 23,2022 at Tokyo. 14 member countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA. 4 Pillar of IPEF are Trade (Pillar 1), Supply Chain (Pillar 2),Clean Economy (Pillar 3) and Fair Economy (Pillar 4).6. Critics say “lack of substantive actions and binding commitments, instead focusing on process-driven framework building.” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/its-time-ipef-countries-take-action-supply-chain-resilience7. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_54438. As of 2023, the first-largest trade partner of Korea is China (Trade volume of $267.66bn), the second is the US ($186.96bn) and the third is Vietnam ($79.43bn)9. As preferential ROO contain the labour value content requirement in the USMCA, it could increase compliance costs for importers. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3452410. USITC(1996), Country of Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations and Practices, USITC Publication 2975, July, pp. 2–411. https://www.barrons.com/articles/hong-kong-financial-center-china-46ba5d3612. Porter identifies a value chain broken in five primary activities: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and post-sale services. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/concepts_approaches_in_gvc_research_final_april_18.pdf13. MAU is a metric commonly used to identify the number of unique users who engage with apps and website. MAU is an important measurement to the level of platform competitiveness in the digital trade logistics or e-commerce industry.14. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/12/china-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-global-chemical-industry.html15. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2023/10/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-us-businesses16. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which first used the term in 1998, defines economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets. http://research.bworldonline.com/popular-economics/story.php?id=350&title=Economic-corridors-boost-markets,-living-conditions17. Legovini et al. (2020) comments traditional cross border agreements of transport investment focuses only on a narrow set of direct benefits and cost. However, economic corridors can entail much wider economic benefits and costs such as trade and economic activity, structural change, poverty reduction, pollution and deforestation.18. Arab Centre Washington D.C. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/ References Bayne, N. (2017), Challenge and Response in the New Economic Diplomacy, 4th ed., The New Economic Diplomacy, Routledge, London, p. 19.Blanchard, J.M.F. and Ripsman, N.M. (2008), “A political theory of economic statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 371-398, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The governance of value chain”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 78-104, doi: 10.1080/09692290500049805.Kraljic, P. (1983), “Purchasing must be supply management”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 61 No. 5, September.Legovini, A., Duhaut, A. and Bougna, T. (2020), “Economic corridors-transforming the growth potential of transport investments”, p. 10.Octaviano, B.Y. and Trishia, P. (2014), Economic Corridors Boost Markets, Living Conditions, Business World Research, Islamabad, October.United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1996), “Country of origin marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices”, USITC Publication, Vol. 2975, July, pp. 2-4.Further readingPorter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press.Putman, R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics; the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 427-600.USITC (2019), “Global value chain analysis: concepts and approaches”, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, April, pp. 1-29.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском This paper was earlier published as Issue & Policy Briefs on May, 16th 2025 on the Website of The Institute for Security & Developement Policy. The April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack marks a significant moment in South Asia’s evolving security matrix. While the India–Pakistan binary continues to dominate discourse, China’s ambiguous posture following India’s Operation Sindoor warrants deeper scrutiny. This issue brief assesses Beijing’s silence, the implications for China-India ties, and China’s alignment with Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Drawing on past crises like Pulwama, Balakot, and Uri, it interrogates China’s selective neutrality, its shielding of Pakistan, and the erosion of its credibility as a regional stabilizer. By weaving in Chinese media narratives and official statements, the analysis critically evaluates whether Beijing is prepared—or even interested—in playing a constructive role in South Asian stability. The brief concludes that unless India recalibrates its strategic assumptions and narrative posture, China will continue to manipulate the region’s instability through plausible deniability and transactional diplomacy. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025,1 which killed 25 Indians and 1 Nepali and injured dozens more, is the latest chapter in South Asia’s long-running saga of cross-border militancy. Yet it would be a mistake to frame it solely within the India–Pakistan binary. As India launched Operation Sindoor in response— targeting terrorist infrastructure across the Line of Control (LoC)—the silence and subsequent posture of China signaled deeper tremors in the broader regional architecture. Kashmir has long served as a crucible of IndiaPakistan hostility, but the Pahalgam attack— attributed to the Pakistan-backed group The Resistance Front (TRF),2 which is a front for the UN-proscribed Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba—has unfolded in a regional context far more complex than previous crises. India’s swift military response via Operation Sindoor, while reminiscent of the 2019 Balakot precedent, came in a more layered geopolitical moment, where any Indian action reverberates beyond Islamabad to Beijing. Despite issuing a generic statement of terming India’s Operation Sindoor “regrettable,”3 Beijing offered no commentary on the Pakistan-backed terror attack itself. By sidestepping the central provocation—the targeting of Indian civilians by a known Pakistani terror outfit—China has raised fundamental questions about the strategic calculus guiding its relations with both Islamabad and New Delhi.  New Delhi’s official narrative continued to underscore its commitment post Operation Sindoor to “commitment to non-escalation, provided it is respected by the Pakistan military”.4 However, during May 8-9, Pakistan responded with a drone offensive targeting Indian military sites,5 prompting countermeasures. By May 10, Pakistan had a name for its retaliatory escalation: Operation Bunyan Marsoos,6 which came to an abrupt halt when a ceasefire was agreed upon between India and Pakistan later in the day.7 Despite ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the announcement, the agreement seems to be holding currently.  Yet what stood out amid this tit-for-tat dynamic was China’s conspicuous silence and strategic responses. Post Pakistan’s escalation on May 9, the topic of India-Pakistan conflict was completely absent from the pre-approved questions of the regular press briefing by the Chinese Ministry.8 Even in response to the news of the ceasefire, China’s statement has been guarded, stating it hopes India and Pakistan will “consolidate and extend” the same.9 As China distances itself from India’s narrative but attempts to show semblances of neutrality, it raises doubts over the credibility of Sino-Indian normalization. While the two countries may engage in tactical military disengagements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Pahalgam episode demonstrates that deep strategic distrust remains. India’s engagement with counterterrorism in the region has often required it to navigate a diplomatic minefield, particularly when the international community does not uniformly support its security concerns. The post-Balakot moment saw similar divisions, with China refusing to back India’s actions at multilateral fora while amplifying Pakistan’s grievances. Such flashpoints, unpacked later in this brief, underscore a consistent Chinese pattern—a trend that has deepened in the aftermath of Pahalgam. What differentiates this latest incident, however, is the broader geopolitical backdrop.  The Pahalgam incident hence emerges as a compelling prism through which to examine the strategic entanglements involving China in South Asian geopolitics. China’s posture following Operation Sindoor calls to question its regional credibility10 and the future of the still recovering India-China bilateral post the 2020 Galwan clash. In essence, the Pahalgam incident is a microcosm through which to assess whether Beijing is capable of playing a stabilizing role in South Asia or if it remains tethered to old geopolitical loyalties that undermine its normative credibility.11 China’s Calculated Ambiguity and Strategic Hedging  At first glance, China’s reaction to the Pahalgam attack appeared predictably neutral,12 reiterating a standard line against terrorism in all forms albeit without naming Pakistan-based groups, which then evolved into calling for an “impartial probe” into the attack.13 Beijing’s ambiguous position is hardly new. It has long shielded Pakistan from international pressure on terrorism-related matters. In 2023, for instance, China blocked a UN Security Council listing of Sajid Mir—a Lashkar-e-Taiba commander with ties to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.14 Such acts are not isolated; they are part of a broader calculus in which Pakistan is Beijing’s irreplaceable partner in South Asia. This alignment is driven by both geopolitical and geo-economic considerations. Pakistan is China’s all-weather partner (全天候伙伴关系 or quántiānhòu huǒbàn guānxì),15 crucial not just for counterbalancing India but also for securing the western front of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is a flagship component of BRI and runs through an unstable Gilgit-Baltistan and, despite India’s vehement opposition, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Stability in these zones is key to China’s western frontier strategy, giving it a vested interest in maintaining the status quo—even if that includes cross-border terrorism targeting India.  Further compounding the issue is the unspoken quid pro quo between Beijing and Islamabad: Pakistan remains silent on China’s domestic repression of Uyghurs,16 while China refrains from condemning Pakistani-linked Islamist militant groups. This transactional compact allows both states to shield each other on their respective internal and external security issues, forming a mutually reinforcing axis of silence.  In times of crisis, this axis manifests through diplomatic choreography. For example, during the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020, Pakistan was among the few countries to openly17 support China’s position, even as the rest of the world urged de-escalation.18 Conversely, during moments of India-Pakistan tension, Beijing reliably leans toward a neutral but structurally pro-Pakistan position. During the 2016 Uri attack, Beijing maintained a studied silence while subtly encouraging bilateral restraint. In 2019, when India moved to revoke Article 370 granting Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, China supported Pakistan’s “legitimate rights and interests” in Kashmir.19  Furthermore, post the 2019 Pulwama attack, China refused to list Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief as a global terrorist under UNSC Resolution 1267.20 This narrative strategy appears to serve a dual function: first, to construct a regional imaginary in which India is framed as a destabilizing actor across multiple contested peripheries; and second, to subtly align with Pakistan’s security perceptions without overt endorsement as seen during Balakot as well with Chinese state media closely relaying Pakistan’s perspectives.21 Such framing enables Beijing to reinforce an adversarial posture vis-à-vis India while maintaining formal neutrality. More critically, it delegitimizes India’s counterterrorism imperatives by projecting them as part of a broader pattern of assertiveness rather than as legitimate responses to asymmetric threats. The aftermath of Pahalgam has reinforced this pattern. Structural Limits of Sino-Indian Normalization –and the idea of China as a stabilizer Although India and China have made some progress in military disengagement following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash and the October 2024 border agreement, the Pahalgam episode reveals the limitations of this tactical thaw. China’s refusal to acknowledge Pakistani provocations— or even address the cross-border violence in its Operation Sindoor press briefings—shows that Beijing’s strategic alignment with Pakistan remains intact. This persistent ambiguity damages the credibility of any “reset” in India-China relations. It also underscores a recurring pattern in Chinese state discourse, where India’s actions across both the LoC and Line of Actual Control (LAC) are presented as signs of regional destabilization.22 The result is a rhetorical sleight of hand: India’s counterterrorism efforts are rebranded as adventurism, while China claims neutrality.  India for its part has walked a delicate line on China’s own internal security policies.23 India’s cautious approach is also seen on the Uyghur issue, where it has stopped short of criticizing China. India’s intent is to prevent further escalation with China, particularly amid the tensions along the Himalayan border.24 Ironically, this caution has earned India neither Chinese neutrality on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism nor any softening of China’s positions on Kashmir. India must prepare for the possibility of a more overt China-Pakistan strategic alignment in the Himalayan theatre—as seen briefly with the short-lived Himalayan Quad.25 A major point of pride in Chinese social media and state-media news circulating currently is the alleged downing of Indian aircrafts, “three Rafale f ighter jets, one MIG-29 fighter aircraft, one Su30 fighter jet, and one Heron drone”26 by the Pakistani air force. India has not confirmed these losses. China has emerged as Pakistan’s principal defense partner, supplying approximately 81 percent of its arms imports between 2020 and 2024.27 This strategic partnership was evident during the recent military exchanges with India, where Pakistan deployed Chinese-made J-10C f ighter jets and PL-15 air-to-air missiles.28 The J-10C, a 4.5-generation aircraft equipped with advanced avionics and radar systems, played a pivotal role in Pakistan’s aerial defense, which the Chinese social media is celebrating in disc. China’s support extends to artillery systems, such as the SH-15 155mm truck-mounted howitzer, and advanced radar installations along the LoC.29 China’s participation in February 2025 in Pakistan’s multinational naval exercise AMAN further consolidates the partnership’s expansion into the Indian Ocean.30 This deepening military collaboration underscores China’s commitment to bolstering Pakistan’s defense capabilities, thereby influencing the strategic balance in South Asia. Concurrently, on May 9, as Pakistan responded to Operation Sindoor,31 China conducted a live-fire military exercise in Tibet involving truck-mounted artillery and long-range rockets. Although conducted within Chinese territory, the exercise’s temporal proximity to the crisis raised red flags within Indian security circles. Of particular concern was increased PLA logistical activity along the G219 highway—an artery critical for mobilization across Tibet and Xinjiang. Such maneuvers are not incidental; rather, they reflect deliberate strategic signaling. Given the history of the China-India border standoff from April 2020 to October 2024, this latest development underscores Beijing’s continued use of military exercises as coercive diplomacy (胁迫性外交 xiébò xìng wàijiāo). The drill’s timing suggests that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not merely observing the India-Pakistan escalation, but actively inserting pressure on India’s northern front to exploit its two-front dilemma. At the same time, China’s approach to international order is selective. It supports rules when they are advantageous and obstructs them when they threaten. This raises an important question for policymakers: can Beijing ever be a partner in building a rule-based regional order when its strategic habits are so conditional? The Pahalgam silence is not simply an oversight; it reflects a broader unwillingness by China to apply consistent normative standards when its interests are at stake. India, therefore, faces not just a tactical silence, but a strategic contradiction—one that complicates regional security architecture. This difference also further highlights China’s inability to be a stabilizing regional actor or mediator—a niche it is building for itself in West Asia—in South Asia owing to its national interest driven biased approach to regional conflicts.32 China increasingly brands itself as a mediator in global hotspots—from IranSaudi rapprochement to ceasefire proposals in Ukraine. Yet in South Asia, this “stabilizer” identity appears performative. Its refusal to challenge Pakistan undercuts its credibility as a neutral actor. The narrative of “community of shared future” (人类命运共同体 rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) rings hollow when Beijing prioritizes geopolitical returns over regional peace. In this regard, it is also critical to note that India’s claim to great power status hinges not only on its material capabilities but also on its willingness to shape global norms on terrorism. To do so, a post-Pahalgam India may need to deepen its engagement with global norm entrepreneurs—from middle powers in Europe and Asia to civil society actors and multilateral institutions. Additionally, it must better leverage its leadership in forums like the G20 and BRICS to reframe regional security debates. If China wishes to be seen as a responsible stakeholder, it must be challenged to behave like one. In forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which have been focused on regional non-traditional security, China’s bias becomes more evident—obstructing Indian efforts to spotlight Pakistan’s terror links33 while promoting counterterrorism cooperation that suits its agenda.34 The SCO’s regional antiterrorism structure (RATS) has increasingly focused on threats aligned with Beijing’s internal definitions, particularly extremism related to Xinjiang, while sidelining India’s concerns about transnational Islamist militancy based in Pakistan.  However, Beijing’s notion of “Asia for Asians” appears hypocritical when it shelters Pakistan but obstructs regional counterterrorism consensus—especially in RATS under the SCO umbrella. Beyond multilateral diplomacy, China’s reluctance to endorse Indian perspectives has extended to informal channels. While India and Pakistan engage in kinetic and symbolic war over territory and identity, China operates in the background as both facilitator and firewall for Pakistan. Backchannel discussions have repeatedly seen Chinese interlocutors urge restraint on both India and Pakistan—without distinguishing between a state defending its civilians and one enabling non-state actors. This false equivalence erodes India’s trust and limits the scope for genuine regional cooperation. From Response to Strategy:  How Should India Read into Beijing’s Silence? India’s recent history is littered with crises where tactical victories often came at the cost of longterm ambiguity. In the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, for instance, India successfully reestablished control over its territory but failed to push for international accountability on Pakistan.35 Similarly, the 2017 Doklam standoff with China ended with a disengagement, but left the broader strategic questions unresolved. Even the 2020 Galwan clashes, despite their tragic costs, did not lead to sustained support or narrative building. What unites these episodes is a recurring pattern: India seeks resolution through calibrated responses while both adversaries exploit the absence of sustained international pressure. The Pahalgam attack threatens to repeat that pattern unless India broadens the strategic scope of its response—not merely in military terms but in diplomatic signaling, normative positioning, and alliance formation. India’s challenge is not just the asymmetry of violence with Pakistan—it is the asymmetry of narrative and support in multilateral spaces. Despite India’s restraint on Chinese internal matters, such as its silence on Xinjiang in UN forums, China has shown no reciprocal flexibility on Kashmir or Pakistan-based terrorism. This lack of strategic reciprocity is widening the gap between tactical cooperation and strategic mistrust. It also casts doubt on China’s repeated offers to play the role of a regional stabilizer. Beijing is unlikely to act as an honest broker in India-Pakistan disputes because it is structurally invested in Pakistan’s strategic and territorial claims, especially those in Kashmir. Moreover, the geo-economic dimension complicates the landscape further. China’s massive infrastructure projects through Pakistan-administered territories give it a direct stake in the political and security status quo in Kashmir. Any Indian attempt to assert sovereignty over the entire region threatens not just Pakistan’s territorial claims but China’s physical investments. It is for this reason that Chinese diplomats have avoided endorsing even moderate Indian positions on Kashmir. Even in backchannel diplomacy, Chinese officials urge restraint from both sides but refrain from applying pressure on Pakistan to dismantle terrorist networks—a selective neutrality that undermines India’s trust in Beijing’s intentions. Going forward, Indian policymakers may consider more assertive linkages between China’s Kashmir positions and India’s stance on Tibet and Xinjiang. While such rhetorical escalation risks deepening the rift, it may serve as a deterrent to Beijing’s selective neutrality. More broadly, India must prepare for a strategic environment in which a China–Pakistan alignment in the Himalayas becomes less tactical and more entrenched. If China continues to describe Jammu & Kashmir as “disputed territory,” Indian policymakers may feel justified in elevating the discourse on Chinese internal colonialism in places like Tibet and Xinjiang.36 While such a shift would risk further alienation, it could also serve as a deterrent against China’s one-sided narratives in multilateral spaces. Forecasting China’s future position on Jammu and Kashmir suggests continuity rather than change. As long as CPEC remains central to China’s regional vision, Beijing will oppose any Indian attempt to alter the territorial status quo in ways that threaten Pakistan’s legal or strategic control over its administered areas. Even if the Pahalgam incident spurs limited backchannel diplomacy, it is unlikely to alter China’s fundamental incentives in the region. The question, then, is whether the Pahalgam attack has merely revealed existing patterns in China’s South Asia policy or whether it marks a turning point. In one sense, it reaffirms an uncomfortable reality: Beijing’s anti-terrorism policy is primarily inward-looking and defined by the logic of state sovereignty, not regional peacebuilding. Terrorism that originates in Xinjiang is treated as an existential threat to the Chinese state, meriting mass surveillance, reeducation camps, and transnational intelligence cooperation. But terrorism that originates in Pakistan and targets India is diplomatically bracketed, treated as either a bilateral problem between New Delhi and Islamabad or, more insidiously, as a counterweight to Indian assertiveness. In the wake of Pahalgam, Indian policymakers face a difficult but necessary recalibration. While India has long pursued strategic autonomy, this doctrine cannot translate into strategic silence in the face of double standards. New Delhi must continue to assert its case in global forums— not only in terms of territorial integrity but also normative consistency. A longer-term Indian strategy may also involve diversifying its diplomatic partnerships in ways that offset Chinese influence. This includes expanding cooperation with regional and extra-regional actors who share India’s concerns about crossborder terrorism and authoritarian influence in multilateral institutions. The elevation of minilateral forums such as the Quad and closer coordination with Europe and Southeast Asian partners could enable India to construct new coalitions that constrain Chinese room for maneuverability as Beijing’s current incentives give it little reason to alter course. As long as CPEC remains a geostrategic and economic priority, and Pakistan serves as both a buffer and a partner, China will continue to downplay Islamabad’s transgressions. Any backchannel diplomacy following Pahalgam is unlikely to produce meaningful rebalancing unless India reshapes the cost-benefit calculations driving China’s current Sout​h Asia posture. The Pahalgam terrorist attack is not merely an India-Pakistan crisis. It is a regional flashpoint that pulls China out of the shadows and into the foreground of South Asian security dynamics. Beijing’s silence—strategic, deliberate, and revealing—shows that China is not yet ready to play the role of a stabilizing power in the region. Instead, it continues to hedge its bets, uphold transactional alliances, and avoid normative positions on terrorism that might alienate Pakistan. For India, the path forward involves more than military preparedness. It demands a recalibration of strategic assumptions about China’s role in regional crises. The Pahalgam attack may not shift China’s behavior immediately, but it sharpens the contours of a regional order where Beijing is less bystander and more stakeholder— one whose interests often run counter to India’s pursuit of stability and security. In this landscape, India must think beyond Pakistan and confront the deeper structural dynamics of the Pakistan-China bonhomie. About ISDP  The Institute for Security and Development Policy is a Stockholm-based independent and non-profit research and policy institute. The Institute is dedicated to expanding understanding of international affairs, particularly the interrelationship between the issue areas of conflict, security and development. The Institute’s primary areas of geographic focus are Asia and Europe’s neighborhood. Endnotes  1. Esha Mitra, Mukhtar Ahmad, Aishwarya S Iyer, Kara Fox and Jessie Yeung, “Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot,” CNN, April 23, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/22/asia/gunmen-open-firejammu-kashmir-intl. 2. “Statement by Foreign Secretary: OPERATION SINDOOR,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 7, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39473; see also, M. Sudhir Selvaraj, “A Primer on The Resistance Front, the Group Behind the Pahalgam Attack,” The Diplomat, April 30, 2025, https://thediplomat. com/2025/04/a-primer-on-the-resistance-front-the-group-behind-the-pahalgam-attack/. 3. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Ongoing Situation Between India and Pakistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, May 7, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202505/ t20250507_11616523.html. 4. “Transcript of Special briefing on OPERATION SINDOOR (May 08, 2025),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 8, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/39479/Transcript_of_Special_ briefing_on_OPERATION_SINDOOR_May_08_2025. 5. “Special briefing on Operation Sindoor (May 09, 2025),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 9, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSEo4RpICoY&t=491s. 6. Abid Hussain, “Pakistan launches Operation Bunyan Marsoos: What we know so far,” Al Jazeera, May 10, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/10/pakistan-launches-operation-bunyan-marsoos-what-we-know-so-far. 7. “India-Pakistan ceasefire updates: Pakistan violates ceasefire understanding along Jammu border,” The Hindu, May 11, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/operation-sindoor-pahalgam-attack-india-pakistan-live-updatesmay-10-2025/article69559875.ece. 8. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on May 9, 2025,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, May 9, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202505/t20250509_11618305. html. 9. “China calls on India, Pakistan to consolidate ceasefire momentum: FM spokesperson,” Xinhuanet, May 12, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20250512/3024d6c69d154eb7ac23968925bdca2b/c.html. 10. Eerishika Pankaj and Omkar Bhole, “China’s Thinking on Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor: Impact on its Regional Credibility,” Organisation for Research on China and Asia, May 7, 2025, https://orcasia.org/article/1165/chinasthinking-on-pahalgam-and-operation-sindoor. 11. Hayley Wong and Seong Hyeon Choi, “Why China may find it hard to play peacemaker in India-Pakistan conflict,” South China Morning Post, May 8, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3309452/why-chinamay-find-it-hard-play-peacemaker-india-pakistan-conflict. 12. “China condemns Pahalgam terror attack that resulted in multiple casualties: FM,” Global Times, April 23, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202504/1332699.shtml. 13. Suhasini Haidar, “China calls for ‘impartial probe’ into Pahalgam,” The Hindu, April 28, 2025, https://www.thehindu. com/news/international/china-calls-for-swift-and-fair-investigation-into-pahalgam-terror-attack/article69499929.ece. 14. PTI, “India slams China at UN for blocking move to designate 26/11 accused Sajid Mir as ‘global terrorist’,” The Hindu, June 21, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slams-china-at-un-for-blocking-move-todesignate-2611-accused-sajid-mir-as-global-terrorist/article66993043.ece. 15. “中华人民共和国和巴基斯坦伊斯兰共和国联合声明（全文）,” FMPRC, February 6, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/202502/t20250206_11550130.shtml; see also, “Wang Yi: Develop China-Pakistan All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership with “Four Commitments”,”Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, May 15, 2024, in.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/202405/t20240516_11305420.htm. 16. Ben Westcott, “Pakistan PM Imran Khan refuses to condemn China’s Xinjiang crackdown,” CNN, June 22, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/22/asia/imran-khan-xinjiang-axios-intl-hnk. 17. “Interview: ‘India wants to quell domestic dissent after China clash by diverting attention’,” Dawn, June 26, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1565331.18. Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “What Does the China-India Standoff in Ladakh Mean for Pakistan?” The Diplomat, June 24, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-does-the-china-india-standoff-in-ladakh-mean-for-pakistan/. 19. Keegan Elmer, “China says it will support Pakistan ‘upholding its rights’ in Kashmir row with India,” South China Morning Post, August 10, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3022254/china-says-it-willsupport-pakistan-upholding-its-rights. 20. “Pulwama attack: What about Wuhan spirit, Shashi Tharoor condemns China’s protection to Jaish-e-Mohammad,” India Today, February 15, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pulwama-attack-wuhan-spirit-shashi-tharoorcondemns-china-protection-jaish-e-mohammad-1456963-2019-02-15. 21. “Pakistan condemns India’s ‘blatant aggression,’ says it brings ‘two nuclear-armed states closer to major conflict’,” Global Times, May 7, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1333486.shtml#:~:text=,said%20the%20 statement; Xinhua, “Pakistan army says Indian aircraft cross LoC,” China Daily, February 26, 2019, https://www. chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/26/WS5c74eebba3106c65c34eb81d.html#:~:text=,minister%20told%20the%20state%20 TV. 22. “India can change course for the better with China,” Global Times, July 8, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ content/1193819.shtml#:~:text=India%27s%20relations%20with%20many%20of,even%20adventurous%2C%20 recent%20foreign%20strategies. 23. “Human rights must be respected: India after Xinjiang vote,” The Times of India, October 8, 2022, https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/human-rights-must-be-respected-india-after-skipping-xinjiang-vote/articleshow/94713915.cms. 24. “Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute,” International Crisis Group, November 14, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india-china/334-thin-ice-himalayas-handling-india-china-borderdispute; Arkoprabho Hazra, “Why Is India Silent on China’s Human Rights Record at the UN?” The Diplomat, October 27, 2020,  https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/why-is-india-silent-on-chinas-human-rights-record-at-the-un/; see also  Raj Verma, “Domestic Political Drivers and Chinese Diplomacy: Xinjiang and Counter-Terrorism in South Asia,” Asian Perspective 44, no. 4 (2020), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/766324. 25. Jagannath Panda, “The Trans-Himalayan ‘Quad,’ Beijing’s Territorialism, and India,” China Brief 20 (20), November 12, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/the-trans-himalayan-quad-beijings-territorialism-and-india/. 26. Feng Fan, “Pakistani PM vows to avenge ‘our innocent martyrs’; India FM warns any attacks will be met with ‘firm response’: media,” Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1333630.shtml. 27. Hayley Wong, “China supplied 81% of Pakistan’s arms imports in the past 5 years, SIPRI says,” South China Morning Post, March 16, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3302515/china-supplied-81-pakistans-armsimports-past-5-years-sipri-says. 28. Seong Hyeon Choi, “Kashmir conflict: the Chinese warplanes and weapons used by Pakistan,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3310172/kashmir-conflict-chinese-warplanesand-weapons-used-pakistan. 29. “Pakistan Deploys Chinese SH-15 Howitzers Along India Border: New Long-Range Artillery Threat Emerges,” Video, Defence Security Asia, April 30, 2025, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/pakistan-deploys-chinese-sh-15-howitzersalong-india-border-new-long-range-artillery-threat-emerges/. 30. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy to join multinational drill in Pakistan, eye maritime security boost,” Global Times, February 6, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1327941.shtml. 31. Ajay Banerjee, “China holds military drills in areas adjoining Ladakh,” The Tribune, May 9, 2025, https://www. tribuneindia.com/news/india/china-holds-military-drills-in-areas-adjoining-ladakh/. 32. Tushar Shetty, “The Dragon-Elephant Dance: China and India’s Battle for South Asia,” The Diplomat, April 22, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/the-dragon-elephant-dance-china-and-indias-battle-for-south-asia/. 33. “India delivers strong message to Pakistan at SCO; Jaishankar condemns terrorism,” The Economic Times, October 17, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-delivers-strong-message-to-pakistan-at-sco-jaishankarcondemns-terrorism/articleshow/114274767.cms?from=mdr. 34. Linda Maduz, “Flexibility by design: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the future of Eurasian cooperation,” Center for Security Studies, May 2018, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/Maduz-080618-ShanghaiCooperation.pdf; see also  Gunjan Singh, “Terrorism casts its shadow over SCO meet, China-Pakistan ties,” Deccan Herald, October 14, 2024, https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/terrorism-castsits-shadow-over-sco-meet-china-pakistan-ties-3231147. 35. Pravin Sawhney, “Bottomline - Kargil Legacy,” Force, https://forceindia.net/bottomline/kargil-legacy/. 36. “Kashmir issue proves India unqualified for UN Security Council seat,” Global Times, September 8, 2019, https://www. globaltimes.cn/content/1161229.shtml.

Abstract The EU-India–Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, relaunched in 2022 after a nine-year hiatus, represent a significant step towards deepening economic and geopolitical ties between the European Union (EU) and India. The agreement, with its potential to eliminate tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and enhance market access, particularly in services such as telecommunications, could substantially increase trade volume between the two entities, offering promising economic prospects. By creating a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, the FTA offers significant economic opportunities in sectors such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment. More importantly, it serves as a geopolitical tool aligned with the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, aiming to strengthen partnerships with like-minded democracies and potentially counterbalance China’s increasing influence, reassuring them about its geopolitical implications. Therefore, this study examines the potential economic and geopolitical opportunities and challenges associated with the EU-India FTA. It concludes that, perhaps unsurprisingly, much depends on the foreign and security policies of great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. Key Words: EU, India, Free Trade Area, Geopolitics Introduction Negotiations regarding the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were initially launched in 2007. The talks were suspended in 2013 due to a gap in ambition and resumed after a nine-year pause with a formal relaunch on June 17, 2022, announced by Union Minister Piyush Goyal and European Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis in Brussels.[i] This relaunch also included separate negotiations for an Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) and an Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs), reflecting a broader agenda to enhance bilateral economic relations. The EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting for €124 billion in goods trade by 2023 (12.2% of the total Indian trade). India is the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, representing 2.2% of the total trade in goods. Trade in services reached €59.7 billion in 2023, nearly double the 2020 level, with a significant portion being digital services, highlighting the growing economic interdependence.[ii]       *Data acquired from the European Commission at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en Negotiation Rounds and Progress Since the relaunch, ten rounds of negotiations have been conducted, with the following timeline detailing key developments:   ·         Acquired through Grok. Prompt: What is the latest on the EU – India FTA Negotiations? At: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1922705918707265888 (14 May 2025) What is so important regarding FTAs? Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have become the cornerstone of international trade policy by reshaping global economic landscapes and geopolitical dynamics. These agreements aim to reduce trade barriers and foster economic cooperation among member states; however, their implications extend far beyond mere economic exchanges. Economic Consequences of Free Trade Areas One of the primary economic consequences of FTAs is the creation of new trade opportunities among the member states. By reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, FTAs encourage specialisation and efficiency and increase trade volumes. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is expected to boost intra-African trade by creating a single market for goods and services that can unlock regional value chains and enhance economic integration.[i]  Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has expanded trade between Indonesia and China, although the benefits may be asymmetric, with Indonesia's imports growing faster than exports.[ii] However, FTAs can also lead to trade diversion, in which member states import goods at the expense of non-member countries. This phenomenon can harm non-members by reducing market access and undermining global trade liberalisation efforts.[iii] For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which never entered into force,[iv] and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which shared the same fate, were criticised for potentially marginalising non-member states and creating a fragmented global trade system.[v] FTAs often attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by creating more integrated markets. For instance, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has stimulated FDI inflows into member states such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, contributing to GDP growth.[vi] Similarly, establishing Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in China has promoted financial employment and industrial upgrading, particularly in the middle and western regions, balancing regional development.[vii] However, the benefits of FTAs are not always distributed evenly. Some studies suggest that while FTAs may boost economic growth for member states, non-members may experience adverse impacts such as reduced trade volumes and deteriorating terms of trade.[viii] Geopolitical Consequences of Free Trade Areas FTAs often serve as tools for geopolitical influence, allowing powerful states to shape their global economic order. For example, the TTIP and TPP were partly designed to counterbalance China's rising economic influence and establish new trade standards.[ix] Similarly, the RCEP has reinforced China's economic leadership in Asia, while the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) has allowed the United States to maintain its influence in North America.[x] For smaller countries like Vietnam, FTAs can enhance international recognition and strategic balancing between major powers, contribute to regional integration and stability, influence internal political legitimacy and power dynamics, and provide tools to manage geopolitical risks and external shocks. FTAs, especially New Generation Free Trade Agreements (NGFTAs) such as the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), act as economic instruments and geopolitical tools that shape Vietnam's global and regional order position.[xi] The geopolitical implications of FTAs are evident in their impact on international trade governance. The proliferation of mega-regional trade agreements has challenged the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO), creating a fragmented trade landscape.[xii] This shift has raised concerns about the marginalisation of developing countries and the erosion of global trade rules. FTAs can also mitigate interstate conflict by increasing war costs. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) catalyses regional peace, fostering economic interdependence and reducing the likelihood of conflict.[xiii] Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has strengthened economic ties between Indonesia and China, reducing potential geopolitical tensions in the region.[xiv] FTAs are not always effective in preventing conflict. In some cases, they may exacerbate tensions by creating unequal benefits or excluding certain states. For example, the TPP and TTIP have been criticised for their exclusionary nature, which may have contributed to trade tensions between member and non-member states.[xv] FTAs often serve as building blocks for broader regional integrations. For instance, the EU began a series of FTAs and customs unions before evolving into a deeply integrated economic and political bloc. Similarly, AfCFTA is part of a broader vision for African economic integration, aiming to create a single market and customs union. The proliferation of FTAs has also raised concerns regarding the future of multilateralism. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations has stalled, and the rise of mega-regional trade agreements has further fragmented the global trade system.[xvi] This has led to calls for a more inclusive and equitable approach to trade governance that ensures that developing countries are not left behind.Free trade has profound economic and geopolitical consequences. It shapes global trade patterns, influences regional stability, and affects the distribution of wealth and power. Although FTAs offer significant economic growth and integration opportunities, they also pose inequality, exclusion, and sustainability challenges. EU – India FTA Opportunities Economic The potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and India presents significant economic opportunities for the EU driven by eliminating trade barriers, increased market access, and deeper economic integration. First, the services sector is a critical area where the EU can benefit significantly from an FTA with India. The EU's services exports to India could more than double, while India's services exports to the EU would increase by approximately 50%.[xvii] This growth is attributed to reduced trade barriers and the liberalisation of sectors such as telecommunications, which has been identified as a key area for reform. Arguably, half of the predicted export expansion is driven by reforms to domestic regulations, particularly in the telecommunications sector, which could further enhance the EU's competitive position in the Indian market. The FTA is expected to eliminate tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers, creating a more level-playing field for the EU businesses in India. The FTA of EU-Indian trade could approximately double, particularly in business services.[xviii] This liberalisation would increase trade volumes and lead to structural changes in both economies, with the EU potentially gaining a competitive advantage in high-value-added sectors. The FTA would create a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, enabling the EU and India to reap the benefits of economies of scale. This integration would be particularly beneficial for manufactured goods, such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment, where intra-industry trade could lead to efficiency gains and cost reductions. These economies of scale could also give the EU a competitive edge in global markets, helping to stimulate economic growth and job creation.[xix] Geopolitics and security The EU–India FTA is an economic arrangement and a geopolitical tool that aligns with the EU's broader objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU's geopolitical position and security interests are central to understanding the opportunities and challenges presented by the FTA. The EU's engagement with India through the FTA is deeply rooted in its Indo-Pacific strategy, formally launched in 2021. This reflects the EU's ambition to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, an area increasingly characterised by multipolar competition, particularly between the United States and China. The EU's strategy is driven by recognising that the Indo-Pacific is the "pivotal region" of the 21st century, and its economic and security dynamics will shape global governance.[xx] While the EU's new strategy does not take a confrontational stance towards China, it reflects increased concerns about Beijing’s growing assertiveness and the implications of the US-China rivalry for Europe. The strategy advocates for a multifaceted engagement with China, encouraging cooperation and protecting EU interests and values. An FTA with India is a key component of the EU’s strategy. India's growing economic and political influence in the Indo-Pacific region makes it a critical partner for the EU. The EU views India as a like-minded democracy that shares concerns about China's assertiveness and the need for a rule-based international order. This alignment creates a unique opportunity for the EU to deepen its strategic partnership with India by leveraging economic cooperation to strengthen geopolitics.[xxi] The EU's engagement with India is part of its broader effort to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU and India share concerns regarding maritime security, cybersecurity, and the challenges posed by China's growing influence in the region. The FTA can serve as a foundation for deeper collaboration on security issues such as counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and disaster management.[xxii] The EU's security strategy in the Indo-Pacific also emphasises the importance of upholding a rule-based international order. An FTA with India can help promote this objective by reinforcing shared norms and standards in trade, investment, and intellectual property rights. This alignment is critical in China's increasing assertiveness and need for like-minded partners to counterbalance its influence.[xxiii] The EU's approach to an FTA is also shaped by its identity as a normative power. The EU has historically sought to promote its values, such as human rights, environmental sustainability, and social justice, through trade agreements. The FTA with India allows for advancing these values by incorporating labour rights, environmental protection, and sustainable development clauses.[xxiv] However, its geopolitical and economic realities constrain the EU’s ability to promote its normative agenda. The EU must be pragmatic and balance its value-based approach with the need to secure concessions on market access and other economic interests. This tension is evident in EU trade policy, where strategic and economic interests often precede normative objectives.[xxv] EU – India FTA Challenges Existing literature on the challenges the EU–India FTA poses is sparse. Generally, scholars admit that FTA, especially those negotiated by the EU, can face varying degrees of politicisation and contestation from civil society, as seen with TTIP and CETA.[xxvi] This finding suggests the potential for public opposition to new FTAs. In addition, the EU often pursues ambitious agreements beyond tariff reductions, including behind-the-border measures and regulatory cooperation.[xxvii] While FTAs aim to boost trade, their impact can be uneven. Some agreements have failed to entirely realise the expected benefits of trade and investment flows.[xxviii] There are also concerns that FTAs may reduce policy space for developing country partners to pursue alternative development strategies.[xxix] Economic However, several economic challenges regarding the EU-India negotiated FTA can be easily identified. To begin, the talks were stuck for nearly two decades, mainly because the EU and India had different goals. The EU wants deeper integration, including investment and competition policies, whereas India prefers a more limited agreement. This has led to repeated delays, and little progress has been made. Specifically, market access has been a point of contention, especially in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and automobiles. India imposes high tariffs on EU cars (60-100%) compared to the EU's 6.5% on Indian cars, and it protects its agricultural sector, making it difficult for EU farmers to enter the market. The EU also wanted India to open up services such as accountancy and legal work, but India resisted due to fears of competition.[xxx] The EU has strict rules, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and sustainability directives, which India sees as overregulatory and burdensome. This creates friction, as India worries these rules could act as trade barriers. There are also issues with intellectual property rights, where the EU wants stronger protection, but India resists keeping generic drugs affordable.[xxxi] Finally, the EU has invested heavily in India, around €100 billion by 2020, but India's decision to end bilateral investment treaties in 2016 and stalled talks on investment protection since 2023 creates uncertainty. There is also a trust deficit, with India fearing EU regulatory overreach and the EU worrying about compliance.[xxxii] Geopolitics and security As mentioned above, the EU's engagement with India is part of its broader strategy to deepen ties with the Indo-Pacific region. This strategy is driven by the need to counterbalance rising powers like China and enhance its global influence. The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway Initiative reflect this ambition, emphasising the importance of strategic partnerships with like-minded actors such as India.[xxxiii] China's growing economic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific region poses a significant challenge for the EU and India. The EU has expressed concerns about China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is seen as a tool for expanding Chinese influence.[xxxiv] The EU and India share a common interest in promoting rules-based international order and countering China's increasing dominance. This alignment has been a key driver of their strategic partnership, with both sides seeking to enhance trade, technology, and security cooperation.[xxxv] The Russia-Ukraine war has further complicated the geopolitical landscape, with significant implications for EU-India relations. While the EU has strongly supported Ukraine, India has maintained a more neutral stance by prioritising its strategic partnership with Russia.[xxxvi] This divergence in approach has created tensions, particularly in terms of energy security and sanctions, which could impact FTA negotiations. The EU and India face various traditional security challenges that affect their strategic partnerships and FTA negotiations. China's military modernisation and assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region have heightened security concerns for the EU and India. The EU has expressed support for India's role in maintaining regional stability, particularly in China's actions in the South China Sea and along the India-China border.[xxxvii] The EU and India are also concerned about regional instability, including Myanmar and the Korean Peninsula. These issues underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation between the two partners.[xxxviii] As for non-traditional security challenges, climate change and energy security are key areas of cooperation between the EU and India. The EU has emphasised the importance of transitioning to renewable energy sources, while India has sought to balance its energy needs with environmental concerns.[xxxix] In addition, the increasing importance of digital technologies has highlighted the need for cooperation in cybersecurity and data protection areas. The EU and India are interested in collaborating with digital infrastructure and innovation.[xl] Conclusion According to the European Parliament, “India was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1962. With the formal establishment of the EU in 1993, India signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1994, which opened the door to broader political interaction between the two. […] The relationship was upgraded to a 'Strategic Partnership' during The Hague's 5th India-EU Summit in 2004. From 1980 to 2005, EU-India trade grew from €4.4 billion to €40 billion. The EU was India's largest trading partner at the time, accounting for 22.4% of Indian exports and 20.8% of imports”.[xli] Despite these incentives, India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[xlii] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[xliii] Finally, although the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. 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