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With Sweden and Finland soon joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the alliance needs to act quickly to develop plans that acknowledge the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region. When Sweden and Finland become members, the alliance will need a comprehensive approach to security that considers the region as a whole—instead of dividing it into the traditional “Baltic” and “Nordic” camps. Since Peter the Great (1682–1725), Russia has had imperial designs on the region, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Russia’s tactical-level defeats in eastern Ukraine should not inspire strategic complacency in NATO policymakers. They should view the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO as the starting point, and not the finish line, for bolstering Baltic Sea security. If NATO takes the right steps, Sweden and Finland’s entry will allow the alliance to defend the Baltic states more easily and deter Russian aggression more effectively in the region. Among other things, the following measures can accomplish this goal: - Update and modernize NATO’s contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region- Emphasize the role of the Åland Islands, Gotland, and Bornholm, as well as the Danish Straits, in Baltic Sea contingency planning- Establish a NATO battlegroup in Finland- Increase the alliance’s maritime presence in the Baltic Sea- Establish a permanent military presence in the Baltic states- Establish a Baltic Sea Air Defense mission- Develop contingency plans for Belarus and Kaliningrad in the event of an armed conflict in the Baltic Sea regionA New Geopolitical Reality NATO needs to continuously update its contingency plans as the security landscape in Europe evolves and new members join the alliance. In the past, NATO has often been too slow to take these steps. For example, after the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) joined in 2004, NATO was hesitant to develop contingency plans for the Baltic states for fear that doing so might antagonize Russia. This complacency started to change in 2008 after Russia’s invasion of Georgia. At this time, NATO finally developed its first set of contingency plans for the Baltic states1 However, NATO did not start to take its security responsibilities on the eastern flank seriously until Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Immediately after the invasion, the United States deployed an infantry company to each of the three Baltic states on a rotational basis. 2 After the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, this modest US rotational presence transformed into the establishment of four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) multinational battalions stationed in Poland and the Baltic states.3 In 2020, the alliance adopted new defense plans for the Baltics4 Since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO has agreed to increase its troop presence in the Baltics from a battalion-sized force to a brigade “where and when required5 Now that Sweden and Finland will soon be NATO members, the alliance will need to update its planning for the Baltic Sea region once again. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO will be good for the alliance for several reasons. Both countries possess robust militaries that will add significant capabilities to the alliance. Both have demonstrated the political will to deploy forces abroad to places such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, the skies over Libya, and sub-Saharan Africa. Both have provided significant military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Perhaps most importantly, Sweden and Finland’s entry into the alliance provides much-needed clarity regarding their expected roles in the event of Russian aggression in the region. Specifically, NATO can more easily defend the three Baltic states if Sweden and Finland are in the alliance. Without these two countries inside NATO, the three Baltic states are geographically isolated from the rest of the alliance. To the east of the Baltic states are Russia and Belarus. To the west, Lithuania shares a border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad (see figure 1). Only Lithuania shares a land border with another non-Baltic NATO member—a 65-mile border with Poland to the southwest, between Kaliningrad and Belarus, known as the Suwalki Gap. This geographical isolation makes NATO’s contingency planning for the Baltic states difficult. While Russian military planners always assumed Finland and Sweden would come to NATO’s aid in the event of a crisis, NATO’s military planners had no such guarantee. Once Finland and Sweden join the alliance, their role in NATO’s regional security planning will finally be clarified. However, the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea means that NATO will need to update contingency planning for the land, air, and sea domains in the region: - Changes in the Baltic land domain. Finland has an 830-mile border with Russia. Though the Finnish military has adequately defended this border for decades, NATO ought to decide how it will integrate into Finland’s national defense plans. This is also true of Finland’s Åland Islands and Sweden’s island of Gotland—which NATO defense planning for the Baltic Sea region should now consider. Also, NATO will have to examine ground lines of communication (GLOCs) contingencies and defense plans for the entire Scandinavian Peninsula, and not just for Norway as has been the case for decades. As for the Baltic states, the Suwalki Gap will remain their main GLOC.  - Changes in the Baltic air domain. Sweden and Finland’s entry into the alliance doubles the number of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters operated by NATO’s Nordic member states.6 NATO already has a well-established Baltic Air Policing mission for the three Baltic States. With Sweden and Finland in NATO, the alliance will need to expand the mission and geographical scope of the existing Baltic Air Policing operation to one focused on air defense.  - Changes in the Baltic region maritime domain. Sweden and Finland’s entry into NATO will add another 95,775 square miles of economic exclusive zone and 2,780 miles of coastline to the alliance. The unique status of the Åland Islands (see figure 1) brings new challenges to NATO planners. Meanwhile, access to and use of Gotland bring opportunities. In addition, the Danish Straits and Denmark’s Bornholm Island will become even more important to NATO’s contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region.  NATO’s Baltic Chain of DefenseThe Baltic Sea region is home to geographical locations of strategic importance for regional security. This makes Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO imperative. History has shown that most military operations in the Baltic region require access to what is today Swedish and Finnish air, sea, and land. For example, during the Crimean War (1853–56) and the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918–20), the then Swedish fortress of Viapori (today known as Suomenlinna in Finland) and the Åland Islands played crucial roles. During both world wars, the Danish Straits—which border Swedish waters and serve as a gateway to the Baltic Sea—were highly contested. During the Cold War, Denmark’s Bornholm was an area of contention between the Soviet Union and NATO. In the twenty-first century, these considerations have not disappeared. As Sweden and Finland join NATO, they will add two vital pieces of Baltic Sea real estate to the alliance: the Åland Islands and Gotland. Along with Denmark’s Bornholm, these islands form a Baltic chain of defense for NATO. Åland Islands The Åland Islands are a group of 6,700 Finnish islands where the primary spoken language is Swedish. They have always been considered some of the most important geostrategic real estate in the Baltic Sea. During the Crimean War, Sir Charles Wood, Britain’s first lord of the admiralty, said, “Those islands hung over Stockholm as much as Sebastopol hung over Constantinople7 Since the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War, the Åland Islands have been demilitarized and have remained neutral. For the victors, this was considered a major achievement of the Crimean War. British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston told the House of Commons in 1856 that demilitarization of the islands “placed a barrier between her [Russia] and the north of Europe.”8 The 1921 Convention Relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland [sic] Islands reaffirmed the demilitarized and neutral nature of the islands and gave Finland the primary responsibility to guarantee this special status. Article 7 of the convention states that “if the neutrality of the zone should be imperiled by a sudden attack either against the Aaland [sic] Islands or across them against the Finnish mainland, Finland shall take the necessary measures in the zone to check and repulse the aggressor.”9 When Finland becomes a member of NATO, Helsinki’s military and security responsibilities to ensure that the islands remain demilitarized and neutral will also become, by extension, a NATO responsibility. Therefore, in a time of armed conflict, NATO must provide any assistance Finland needs to ensure that the special status of the Åland Islands remains in place. Gotland The Swedish island of Gotland is slightly smaller than Guam and sits approximately 60 miles off the coast of Sweden. It is strategically located halfway between Sweden and Latvia in the middle of the Baltic Sea. Due to its central location, there is a concern that Russian troops based in nearby Kaliningrad would attempt to occupy the island and deploy anti-aircraft and anti-shipping weapons platforms in the event of a war with NATO. Sweden maintained a permanent military garrison on the island for hundreds of years until 2005, when it decided to demilitarize the island as part of a downsizing program for the Swedish Armed Forces. One year after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government announced plans to remilitarize the island. Today, around 400 Swedish soldiers are permanently stationed on the island.10 Stockholm plans to boost the defense of Gotland further and to ensure it can reinforce the island quickly and easily if ever required. The Swedish government’s 2020 Total Defense 2021–2025 legislation stated,11 “Also important is enhancing the units on Gotland, where the core comprises a mechanized battalion with reinforcement resources.” In recent years, Gotland has also been the focus of US- and NATO-led military exercises in the region. For example, during the annual BALTOPS exercise in 2022, US Marines rehearsed amphibious operations on Gotland. Bornholm Bornholm is a Danish island strategically located at the mouth of the Baltic Sea. It recently made the news after sabotage—likely from Russa—damaged the Nord Stream pipelines nearby. At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union briefly occupied the island but returned it to Denmark in 1946. At that time Denmark and the Soviet Union unofficially agreed that NATO would not use the island, although Denmark maintained a military presence there during the Cold War. In June 2014, Russia carried out a simulated strike against Bornholm during an annual political festival with 90,000 attendees, including most of Denmark’s political elite.12 In the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, Danish policymakers began taking the island’s security more seriously. US policymakers have also noticed the island’s importance. In May 2022, as part of the DEFENDER-Europe 22 multinational exercises, the US military made history when it transported a US M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) battery in a C-17 Globemaster III that landed on Bornholm as part of a “rapid infiltration exercise,”13 the first time such a US military presence had occurred on the island. According to the US Army, the goal of the exercises was “to show the strategic reach of the HIMARS rocket system.” 15 Predictably, the Russian ambassador to Denmark, Vladimir Barbin, complained and warned that such a military exercise on Bornholm risks turning the island from a “peaceful haven into a potential military bridgehead.”15 It would be extremely naive to think Russia did not factor the importance of the Åland Islands, Gotland, and Bornholm, as well as the Danish Straits, into its Baltic Sea contingency planning.  NATO would be irresponsible if it did not do the same. The Kaliningrad Factor Not all the strategic spots in the Baltic Sea are part of NATO, as Kaliningrad Oblast is also important to regional security. Kaliningrad is a small Russian exclave along the Baltic Sea bordering NATO members Lithuania and Poland. In terms of size, it is slightly larger than Connecticut and has roughly the same population as Delaware. However, it plays an outsized role in Russia’s projection of power. Kaliningrad is part of Russia’s Western Military District and is home to two air bases (Chernyakhovsk and Donskoye) and Russia’s Baltic Fleet headquarters. Russia also has facilities for storing tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad,16 and some military strategists suspect that Russia keeps nuclear weapons there. 17 Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow maintained approximately 25,000 Russian troops and security personnel, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, S-400 air defense systems, P-800 anti-ship cruise missiles, and sizeable air and naval assets in Kaliningrad. Since 2016, Russia has also maintained Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad. The Iskander-M missile, which has a suspected range of 310 miles, can threaten Gotland and Bornholm with nuclear or conventional warheads from here. However, Russia has reportedly sent some of its forces, weapons systems, and other platforms to Ukraine since the Kremlin launched its invasion in February 2022.Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow maintained approximately 25,000 Russian troops and security personnel, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, S-400 air defense systems, P-800 anti-ship cruise missiles, and sizeable air and naval assets in Kaliningrad. Since 2016, Russia has also maintained Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad. The Iskander-M missile, which has a suspected range of 310 miles, can threaten Gotland and Bornholm with nuclear or conventional warheads from here. However, Russia has reportedly sent some of its forces, weapons systems, and other platforms to Ukraine since the Kremlin launched its invasion in February 2022.18 In reality, there is no accurate open-source assessment of what Russia maintains in Kaliningrad today. Kaliningrad is important for Russia’s geopolitical aims in the Baltic Sea for three reasons: 1. Kaliningrad allows Russia to project power in the region in a way it would be unable to without access to the exclave. If Moscow wanted to try capturing the Åland Islands, Gotland, or Bornholm, it would do so using Kaliningrad. 2. Kaliningrad serves as the cornerstone of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Baltic Sea region. If Russia has control of Kaliningrad during an armed conflict, NATO’s ability to act in the Baltic Sea region will be limited. 3. The possibility that Russia could access Kaliningrad through NATO and European Union member Lithuania offers Moscow an easy and low-cost way to increase tensions with the West. For example, in July, Russia falsely accused Lithuania of illegally blocking the transit of certain items to Kaliningrad.19 Also, many of the aerial incidents that cause NATO planes from Baltic Air Policing to scramble involve Russian planes flying to or from bases in Kaliningrad. Recommendations In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and with two states becoming new NATO members soon, the Baltic Sea region requires increased attention from the alliance’s leaders, who will need to develop a new strategy. The US should lead the way inside NATO to prepare the alliance to deal with these changes. The US and NATO can better prepare for contingencies in the Baltic Sea region by taking the following steps: - Update and modernize NATO’s contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region. With Sweden and Finland coming into the alliance, the geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region has changed. NATO should update its plans for the Baltic Sea region. It is in America’s interest to lead this process. - Publish a special annex to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO published its long overdue Strategic Concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit, but there was no formal input from Sweden and Finland since neither were members at the time. When both formally become members, NATO should work with Stockholm and Helsinki to publish a special annex to its 2022 Strategic Concept to factor in the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region. - Consider the special status of the Åland Islands in NATO’s plans. There is no doubt that Russia factors the importance and location of the Åland Islands into its war planning. The demilitarized and neutral status of the Åland Islands makes contingency planning tricky for NATO. When developing its approach to these islands, the alliance should look at how the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard—which shares some legal similarities with the Åland Islands—factors into NATO’s defense planning. NATO should also work in close consultation with the Finnish government and, where necessary and appropriate, the devolved government in Åland. - Call for a special North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting to be held on Gotland after Sweden joins. The NAC is the principal decision-making body inside NATO. The secretary general chairs its meetings. A special NAC meeting on Gotland would bring immediate awareness of Baltic Sea security issues to the Alliance. Establish a NATO enhanced forward presence (EFP) battlegroup in Finland. After the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, this modest US rotational presence transformed into the establishment of four EFP multinational battalions stationed in Poland and the Baltic states.20 At the 2022 NATO Summit, the alliance added EFP battlegroups to Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. When Finland joins NATO, it will be another frontline state on the eastern flank and should host an EFP battlegroup. As a confidence-building measure, NATO should ask Turkey to participate. - Lead efforts to establish a Baltic Sea Air Defense mission. While the Baltic Air Policing has been useful for policing the region’s airspace, more needs to be done. With Sweden and Finland inside NATO, and with Russia’s increased aggression, a robust and expanded Baltic Sea Air Defense mission is needed. Air policing alone is no longer enough. - Encourage the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Finland to receive NATO accreditation. Founded in 2017 to establish best practices for countering hybrid threats, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats already cooperates closely with NATO. The alliance should move to accredit the center to formally bring it into the existing family of NATO’s 28 accredited centers of excellence. This would be a quick and easy way to “fly the NATO flag” in Finland after it joins. - Establish a permanent military presence in the Baltic states. The deployment of the rotational EFP battlegroups to the region is a good start, but NATO ought to do more. The threat from Russia will remain for the foreseeable future. NATO needs to show an enduring commitment to the region by permanently stationing armed forces in each of the three Baltic states. - Factor Kaliningrad into NATO’s Baltic Sea region contingency planning. The US needs to work with its NATO allies to develop a strategy that deals with the Russian A2/AD capabilities in Kaliningrad in the event of an armed conflict. In particular, this effort requires close cooperation and planning with Poland. NATO cannot carry out any credible defense of the Baltic Sea region without neutralizing the threat from Kaliningrad. - Increase the maritime presence in the Baltic Sea. In recent months the US has increased its maritime presence in the Baltic Sea, but it can do more. Under the authority granted in the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey has blocked all warships from entering the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits while fighting continues in Ukraine. Last year, the US Navy spent a total of 111 days in the Black Sea.21 While the Montreux Convention restrictions are in place, the US and its allies should divert maritime assets that would have normally been deployed to the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. - Establish a US Marine Corps Baltic Sea Rotational Force. Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US Marine Corps operated a Black Sea Rotational Force that consists of a special-purpose Marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF). Now that the Black Sea Rotational Force cannot operate in the Black Sea due to the Montreux Convention restrictions, the US should consider establishing a similar task force for the Baltic Sea region. Such a task force would offer more joint military training opportunities for allies in the Baltic Sea region. - Make large-scale reinforcement exercises to the Baltic Sea region the norm. The US and Canada need to have the ability to reinforce Europe quickly. Countries in Western and Southern Europe should also be able to deploy forces quickly to Eastern and Northern Europe. For example, the straight-line distance from Portugal to northern Finland is more than 2,500 miles. Transporting forces over this distance quickly is no easy feat. During the Cold War, the US conducted an annual military exercise called Operation Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany). NATO should consider holding regular exercises focused on defending and reinforcing the Baltic Sea region. - Consider Belarus’s role in regional security. Since fraudulent elections in August 2020 kept him in power, the de facto leader of Belarus, President Aleksandr Lukashenko, has never been closer to the Kremlin. Belarus played an important role in enabling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian units that invaded from Belarus committed many of the worst atrocities against Ukrainian civilians. In the event of a Russian military intervention against a NATO member, the US should make it clear that it would not turn a blind eye to any Belarussian support provided to Russia. NATO should develop military plans accordingly, especially regarding the expected role of the Belarusian city of Grodno, located near the Suwalki Gap, in the event of a conflict in the Baltic states. - Leverage the US–UK Special Relationship in the Baltic Sea Region. The US and the UK are more effective actors in transatlantic security when they work together. For historical reasons, the UK has very close relations with the Baltic states, especially with Estonia and Latvia. Through its participation in the Northern Group, the UK also has an enhanced security presence in the Baltic Sea region due to the Joint Expeditionary Force.22 The US should work with the UK to identify areas of deeper defense and security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Conclusion The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO will bolster transatlantic security by adding two members who have the political will and the military capabilities to contribute to the security and stability of the Baltic Sea region. Their membership in NATO will deter Russia and diminish the likelihood of future conflict in the Baltic Sea region. However, as Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrates, no potential action by Moscow can be ruled out. Defending the Baltic states and deterring Russian aggression will be far easier and cheaper than liberating them. With Sweden and Finland in NATO, the defense of the Baltic states and security in the wider Baltic Sea region will be greatly improved. However, the alliance cannot dither or become complacent. NATO’s contingency plans need to continuously evolve as the security situation changes or as new members join the alliance. The time to get NATO’s plans in order for the Baltic region is now.

With the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the close ties between President Assad and his Turkish counterpart, Erdogan, were severed. Recently, more than a decade later, there have been increasing statements on reconciliation coming from Ankara – albeit coinciding with threats of a new military campaign. The Turkish President must thus choose – normalization or escalation. Recent increased attacks on Kurdish targets in northern Syria by Turkey and the Syrian rebel groups its supports raise the question whether Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to carry out his threat of May 2022 to begin another major ground operation against the Kurds. On the other hand, conciliatory statements regarding the Assad regime have been sounded recently in Turkey, and there has been discussion of the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries after over a decade of hostility and competition. These two processes appear to be contradictory, given that the Syrian regime opposes existing Turkish control of Syrian territories, and does not wish to see this control broadened. On the other hand, this may be a calculated Turkish move that aims to show the Turkish public a concerted multi-faceted effort to confront both the Kurdish underground and the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Discussion of events in northern Syria and the web of Syrian and Turkish interests can be used to assess the question, which trend will prevail in Turkish-Syrian relations: normalization or escalation? In mid-August 2022 widescale protests erupted in dozens of towns controlled by the Syrian opposition in the Idlib and Aleppo provinces in northwest Syria. The demonstrations featured the slogan of “We won’t reconcile,” in response to the surprising statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister on August 11: “We need to bring the opposition and regime together for reconciliation somehow, or there will be no permanent peace otherwise.” The Foreign Minister also announced that he had met his Syrian counterpart on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Belgrade in October 2021. Residents of the north were outraged at the statement, criticized Turkey harshly, and accused it of seeking “public normalization” with the Syrian regime. Indeed, on August 19 Erdogan even stated that “Turkey will need to take ‘higher steps’ with Damascus to end the ‘games’ being played in the region.” The antagonism generated by the Turkish statements should be seen in light of the history of Turkish involvement in Syria. A few months after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, when it became clear that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad did not intend to implement significant reforms, Turkey became one of the harshest critics of his regime. More than once Erdogan called him a murderer and called on him to resign. From the perspective of the rebels in Syria, peace between Turkey and Syria is tantamount to betrayal. Over the years, Turkey has supported and assisted various Sunni opposition organizations with funding, logistics, and arms. At the same time, Ankara viewed with concern the strengthening of the Kurds and the expansion of the territory run by them in northern Syria, resulting in part from their persistent and successful campaign against ISIS. Ankara was especially unhappy with the dominance of the Syrian branch of the Kurdish underground in the area, and feared the creation of contiguous Kurdish control along the Turkish-Syrian border. To forestall this situation, Turkey embarked on three military operations in 2016-2019, which led to Turkish control of several areas in northern Syria. In February 2020, in the wake of attacks by Syrian forces on Turkish army positions in which 34 Turkish soldiers were killed, Ankara embarked on Operation Spring Shield in the Idlib enclave. In March, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Turkey and Russia in Idlib; the agreement included the creation of a secure corridor around the M4 highway, and joint patrols by Russian and Turkish forces. Some 8,000 soldiers from the Turkish military remain in the region and lend military and logistical backing to the organizations operating there, primarily the Syrian National Army (formerly the Free Syrian Army) and the Salafi jihadist organization Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey is a highly-charged issue, both politically and economically. A significant majority of Turks do not want Syrian refugees to remain in the country, and this occasionally leads to acts of violence against refugees and expressions of racism. Today 3.7 million Syrian refugees who arrived in the wake of the civil war live in Turkey; most live outside refugee camps. As of March 2022, according to the Turkish Interior Minister, Turkey granted citizenship to 200,000 Syrians who entered its territory, while some 500,000 Syrians “voluntarily returned” to Turkey’s controlled territories in northern Syria. In May 2022 Erdogan declared that the Turkish government was formulating plans to resettle approximately one million Syrian refugees in Syrian territory. Turkey is interested in aid from external parties to help fund the building of residential complexes for refugees, and claims that areas under its control in northern Syria are safe enough for them. Over the last few years processes of Turkification have been underway in these territories, and Turkish influence and presence in the Idlib enclave has also expanded. Turkey invested in improved transportation links to the border crossings between the two countries and connected some of the electrical grids in northern Syria to the Turkish grid; Turkish cellular providers operate in these areas; Turkey set up more than ten Turkish postal offices in northern Syria; it pays public employees in the regions under its control in Turkish currency; and the Turkish lira is the primary currency in northern Syria. The Turkish language is taught in schools in these regions and cultural centers for teaching the Turkish language to adults were also opened. Clerics assigned by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, are stationed in mosques that Turkey opened or refurbished. In Idlib, Turkish influence is more limited than in regions under Turkish control in the north, but it is increasing there as well. In addition to military and logistical support for rebel groups, Turkey’s penetration of everyday life is apparent. For example, since 2018, Turkey began to play a more prominent role in the local economy and use of the Turkish lira became common. Turkey offered jobs and led development projects for rebuilding infrastructure, including dams, electric facilities, and roads. Over the past year Turkey has worked on building residential complexes for displaced people living in temporary camps in Idlib. Non-governmental Turkish organizations are also working on development in the province, including projects in housing, energy, culture, and finance. Normalizing Relations: Interests and Obstacles Turkey’s recent conciliatory tone and references to normalizing relations with Syria, while representing a 180-degree turn for Turkish foreign policy, may serve Erdogan in two main ways. First, they are perceived as active steps in managing the refugee problem and a first stage in sending refugees back to Syria. In addition, dialogue with Assad is seen as necessary in light of Russian pressure in this context, as expressed in recent meetings between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as part of broad negotiations between Ankara and Moscow. In light of the pattern of Turkification, it seems that the likelihood of Ankara withdrawing from the Syrian territories is low. At the same time Russian, Iranian, and American opposition to another Turkish broad-scale ground operation in Syria, as well as growing connections between the Kurds and the Assad regime in order to prevent such an operation, make it difficult for Turkey launch an operation on the scale that it would prefer. On the other hand, a limited military operation will only result in a slight boost to Erdogan’s popularity in Turkish public opinion. In parallel, over the past two years the Syrian regime has sought to rebuild its regional status and return to the heart of the Arab world. In this context, Syria normalized its relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Recent calls have also been heard to readmit Syria into the Arab League, from which it was expelled early in the civil war. Normalizing relations with Turkey may be part of this trend, and no less important, may lead to cessation or reduction of Turkish support for rebels and thus allow Assad to deal a crushing blow to the remaining opposition to his regime. However, reconciliation between the Assad regime and Ankara may be perceived as relinquishing Syrian territory and legitimizing Turkey’s presence there; Assad would like to regain sovereignty in all Syrian territory. The Syrian Foreign Minister declared that the country has not set preconditions, but normalization with Turkey will be achieved only when Ankara meets three demands: withdrawal from Syrian territory; an end to support for opposition organizations; and non-intervention in internal Syrian affairs. An additional impediment is the need to formulate an “Adana II Agreement.” In 1998, after Syria expelled the Kurdish underground leader from its territory, Syria and Turkey signed the Adana Agreement stating that Syria would declare the Kurdish underground a terror organization and not allow it to operate on Syrian territory. Annex IV of the agreement even stipulates that if Syria does not fulfill its commitments, Turkey may enter up to five kilometers into Syrian territory to operate against Kurdish underground activists. In order to rebuild the trust between the two states now, there must be either a new agreement between them, or at least a clarification that Syria remains committed to the Adana Agreement. It is doubtful, however, whether the Assad regime will be committed to this goal and whether it will be able to provide the security assurances demanded by Ankara. For the Syrian rebels in the north, Ankara’s reversal is a major blow to their standing, given that they had seen Turkey as a major ally and source of military and logistical support. In practice the Turkish presence is the major obstacle to attempts by the regime, with Russian and Iranian backing, to renew its control of the Idlib province. The population of the region has not given up on the values of the Syrian revolution and its principal aim of bringing down the Assad regime. Residents of northwestern Syria also fear that a political process will be imposed on them that does not address their needs. But the rebels do not have the means to convince Turkey not to change its policy, other than presenting scenarios of chaos in the event of an escalation in Idlib and the arrival of another million refugees to Turkish soil. In conclusion, the path to normalization between Turkey and Syria will not be smooth, but Erdogan and Assad may both gain from initial steps in this direction. Erdogan can present even a limited compromise, while taking strong military steps against the Kurdish underground in northern Iraq and northern Syria, as a signal to the Turkish public that he is doing what is necessary to deal with both Kurdish terror and the refugee problem. On the Syrian side, Assad can gain from normalization with Turkey as part of his efforts to reestablish Syria’s regional status, and as a means of distancing Turkey from the rebel organizations and neutralizing the most significant remaining pocket of resistance in the country.

Migration flows from South Asia to Western Europe have a long history, the origins of which can be traced in the colonial development of the states of this region.  The end of British colonial rule in India in 1947 was accompanied by the split of the once unified territorial space of Hindustan into two national entities - India and Pakistan. During the first decades after independence, there were intense migratory movements from the former colony to the former metropolis. British migration policy determined the direction and intensity of migration flows from the Hindustan Peninsula to the United Kingdom. The first post-colonial migration flows were based on the following reasons: Britain's interest in the influx of additional labor force, mostly of low qualification; the practice (which existed before 1947) of free human movements from the colonies to the mother country; features of the immigration policy of the United Kingdom, which allowed citizens of the countries of the British Commonwealth to choose their country of residence and even have their own companies in the UK. The vast majority of migrants from India were Sikhs, people from a peasant environment (mainly middle-class farms), who served in the colonial army and police units, as well as their relatives, who did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity to leave. Prior to the adoption of The British Commonwealth Immigration Acts 1962 and 1968 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, indians, as Commonwealth citizens, had unlimited rights to enter the territory of the former metropolis. Many of the new arrivals settled in industrial centers such as Leicester or Birmingham. Newly arrived migrants were employed in the textile and service industries. A significant part of them were employed in the services of Heathrow Airport in west London. The 1962 Act, which restricted the freedom of migration to the British Isles from the Commonwealth countries, actually already encouraged immigrants from India and other South Asian countries to settle on British territory. Soon their family members joined them. By the mid-1960s, most Indians arriving in the UK were listed as "dependants", as British government statistics described them. Dependents made up 75% of immigrants in 1965 and 80% in 1966. Migration flows from India to the former metropolis peaked in 1968, when the number of arrivals in the United Kingdom exceeded 23 thousand people. Migration flows from India intensified sharply between 1995 and 2005. Data from population censuses shows that the number of Indian migrants actually tripled between 1961 and 2001, from 166,000 to 470,000. To be fair, we note that the British, who were born in India, were also immigrants. In 2001, the Indian community in the United Kingdom numbered about 1 million people, with about a fifth of its composition coming from South Africa and former East African colonies. In 2007, the number of Indians in the UK increased to 1.3 million people. Until the early 1990s, the former metropolis remained the main haven for Indian migrants, but gradually their influx began to spread to Western and, to an increasing extent, Eastern Europe. For the period 1995–2005 about half of the migrants from India heading for Europe ended up in the UK. The rest preferred other EU countries, primarily Germany and Italy, which accounted for 18 and 12% of Indian migrants respectively. During the period under review, there was an increase, albeit slowly, in the number of Indians moving to Belgium and Sweden. Approximately 1,000 settlers per year settled in France, where the Indian community, which by the mid-2000s was about 65,000 people, largely consisted of ethnic Indians from Madagascar, the Seychelles, Reunion and Mauritius. For a better understanding of the reasons for the intensification of migration flows from India and other countries culturally related to this country, it is worth recalling the policy deliberately pursued by a number of European governments, the meaning of which was to invite skilled and relatively inexpensive labor from the “largest democracy in the world”. Thus, the temporary “green card” migration initiative that operated in Germany from 2000 to 2005 was initially focused on attracting Indian information technology specialists. In Italy, the Indian community was formed from those who initially entered the Apennines illegally, and subsequently received legal grounds for staying in the country. The vast majority of Indian migrants in Italy are from Punjab, working on dairy farms and other agricultural sectors. The development of information technology and related industrial clusters in India, the high-quality professional training of graduates from Indian institutes of technology - these and other factors predetermined the interest of the United States, Western Europe, and Australia in attracting skilled labor from India. Already in 2000, at least one third of migrants in the field of information technology in the UK represented India. In 2000–2004 more than 245 thousand migrants of this profession settled in the USA. In this kind of "migration competition" India was second only to Mexico, China and the Philippines. In the UK, in October 2004, a program was adopted to "naturalize" successful Indian students (as well as representatives of other Commonwealth countries) in the specialties: physical sciences, mathematics and engineering. The naturalization program has become an additional source of attraction to the United Kingdom of future specialists in the field of natural sciences and exact sciences from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. At the same time, this program has become a tool for managed migration to the UK. This practice is followed by the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, as well as France, Germany and the Netherlands. Demand for foreign labor with a high share of added intellectual value is ultimately determined by the characteristics of the socio-demographic structure of the population of Western European countries. The rapid “aging” of the workforce in the countries of the historical “core” of the current EU encourages the governing bodies of this organization to use such tools to attract future workers in the “knowledge economy” as educational fairs. At the same time, the use of foreign “intellectual production proletarians” is conceived as the provision of appropriate services without staying in a Western European country on a permanent basis. The movement of human capital from India and South Asian countries to Western Europe, in the understanding of local elites, has a twofold goal: 1) to increase the competitiveness of Western European economies in the world economy and at the same time 2) to deprive the countries of the South Asian region of independence in choosing national models for the development of the information technology industry. There are also restrictions even for this type of migration: the EU authorities are seriously afraid that the massive import of labor from India and other (not only South Asian) countries with a high share of added intellectual value may in the future undermine the reproduction of national scientific schools in Western European countries employed by developments in the field of information technology and their application in the economy. Finally, a group of political factors is of no small importance in the formation of the migration policy of the EU countries, in particular, dissatisfaction with the “substratum of other civilizations” in the Western European cultural environment on the part of forces supporting national populism. A significant proportion of Pakistani migrants to the UK originate from the Mirpur district in Azad Kashmir (area now under Pakistani control). The county has a long history of emigration. So, people from Mirpur worked as stokers on British ships, whose home ports were Bombay and Karachi. Subsequently, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some of them settled in the United Kingdom. Post-war Pakistani migrants in the British Isles took jobs in the textile factories of Lancashire, Yorkshire, Manchester and Bradford, in the car factories of the West Midlands and its largest city of Birmingham, filled the light industry development zones in cities such as Luton and Slough. Among other groups of migrants from Pakistan, it is customary to single out Punjabis who settled mainly in Glasgow, Birmingham and Southall, an area of west London that is often called “little Punjab”. The main migration flows from Bangladesh to the British Isles occurred in the first half of the 1970s. They were a reaction to civil unrest in the newly formed state and affected primarily the Sylhet region in the north-east of the country, located directly near the Bangladeshi-Indian border. Initially, Bangladeshi migrants were employed in steel mills and textile mills throughout the UK, but after the closure of these enterprises due to the economic crisis, Bangladeshi migrants rushed into small businesses, primarily in tailoring and catering, including restaurant business. Many people from Bangladesh actively joined the network of Indian restaurants, which was rapidly developing in those years, and subsequently took over a significant part of it. The first migration flow from the relatively developed Sri Lanka (before 1972 - Ceylon) to the UK, modest in size, falls on the 1960s-1970s. Migrants arriving from the former colony were employed in the UK National Health Service, as well as in other areas of the economy where white-collar workers work, becoming employees, administrators, managers, etc. For the most part, the migrants who arrived in the British Isles were from wealthy families and well-educated. They quickly found a use for their abilities in the United Kingdom. The second wave of Sri Lankan migration to the UK occurred in the 80s and was a product of the civil war that swept the island at that time. A significant number of wealthy Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in the former metropolis. The migrants of the second wave were not as well-born as their predecessors, however, like many refugees to the West, they did not belong to the "lower classes" of society. Sri Lankans are employed in the traditional segment of the service sector: in shops and restaurants, and some of them even managed to open their own business. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS OF 2015 Significant adjustments to the intensity of the movement of people from the territories of the “global South” to the space of the “historical North” were introduced by “truncated globalization” (which further exacerbated the contradictions between the leaders of the world economy, primarily the United States, Western Europe, Japan, with on the one hand, and the rest on the other). It gave rise to both active (“passionary” anti-globalization movements and projects) and passive (intensification of migration flows towards the original “core” of the EU) response of transitional societies – the main part of the ecumene. It is believed that the main migration “corridors” from transitional societies to industrialized countries will retain their main direction in the future, especially since demographic processes in the “global South” will continue to exert migration pressure on future generations in the coming decades. India (and South Asia in a broad sense) remains the territory of origin of the largest number of international migrants: 17.5 million Indians live abroad. For the countries of South Asia, a region with significant labor surpluses, migration eases labor market strains while contributing to poverty alleviation through remittances. It is therefore not surprising that the countries of the South Asian region remain the largest recipients of remittances in the world: in 2018, in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, remittances from abroad exceeded 5% of the GDP of these states. It is also worth noting the factor of internal migration in the countries of South Asia: for the period 2001–2011 the urban population of these countries increased by 130 million people, which became an additional incentive for external migration. The most desirable destination regions for illegal migrants from South Asia are Western Europe, North America and Oceania. Demographers note that South Asian migrants bound for Western Europe are smuggled to their destination mainly through Central Asia and the Russian Federation, but also through the Middle East towards the Western Balkans. Finally, South Asians are driven to move to Western Europe and the Gulf region by the constant risk of natural disasters, which primarily affect Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Obviously, the most socialized and adapted groups of the urban population of South Asia are ready to change their way of life. As of 2019, the largest migrant groups in the United Kingdom were immigrants from India, Poland and Pakistan. In the UK, France and Germany, there is a positive correlation between the high quality of human capital among migrants and their innovative activity. Migration flows are expected to influence the activation of the forces of national populism in Western Europe. Thus, after the migration crisis of 2015, the influence of the respective parties is rapidly growing, winning back positions from the centrists and social democrats. “People's parties” are becoming more and more successful, uniting various segments of the population, including those who are dissatisfied with the growing influx of “other civilizational substrate” into the countries of Western Europe. Thus, the policy of "traditional" parties contributes to the growth of the influence of the forces of national populism. Traditional parties justify their policy of accepting migrants by the need to integrate the labor market in the face of a growing shortage of skilled labor. According to traditionalists, the integration of the labor market has an inevitable consequence of strengthening the economic viability of society and increasing the viability of its political institutions, as well as the feeling of new arrivals of their belonging to the host society. The problem of socio-economic (as well as cultural) adaptation of migrants in the societies of Western Europe remains acute: in 2017 in the EU, the unemployment rate among migrants was 13.3%, while among the autochthonous population it did not exceed 6.9%. The coronavirus pandemic has made significant adjustments to the intensity of migration flows. As a result of the pandemic, the IMF blog writes, “migration flows suddenly stopped. The Great Lockdown is temporary, but the pandemic could reinforce general sentiments of insularity and disbelief in opening up to the outside world and have a more lasting effect on countries' propensity to accept migrants. Decline in immigration and high unemployment in destination countries will have a negative impact on the situation in its origin countries, especially the poorer ones, which are heavily dependent on the remittances that migrant workers send home”. The costs of migration also include the need to overcome geographical and linguistic barriers. Integration into the economic system of the host country implies a thorough mastery of its language, which is a precondition for the adaptation of migrants in a different cultural and social environment. So, immigrants from Bangladesh adapted well to the Apennine Peninsula because they were able to master the Italian language, which is difficult for the inhabitants of South Asia. As the Italians believe, people from Bangladesh are more industrious and less pretentious than Indians, and are ready to work in the most adverse conditions. Finally, migration from Bangladesh is economically beneficial for Italians: migrants with skills in light industry are welcome “guests” in the Apennines, since they make up a significant part of the staff of textile enterprises that manufacture products with the “Made in Italy” identification label especially valued by foreigners. Other dangers await the settlers. It is worth remembering that migrants to the West often find themselves in a “poverty trap” due to insufficient funds to pay the costs associated with migration. Nevertheless, experts believe that a one percentage point increase in migrant influx relative to total employment increases output by almost 1% by the fifth year of the resettlement in a new place. The desire of South Asians to move to Western Europe may be due to the fact that in the case of immigration to countries with emerging markets and transition societies, such a positive impact of labor productivity growth is not observed, primarily due to the difficulties of adapting to the conditions of local markets of underdeveloped countries. Migration can also create problems in the area of income distribution in the host society, since in some segments of the labor market, local workers (or people from Eastern and Central Europe who have already settled down in Western Europe) may suffer material damage, at least temporarily. Modern migration and migration policy in Western European countries continue to be influenced by the experience of previous decades. Thus, post-war migration to Western Europe from the former colonies was structured both by centuries of experience in moving along the route of the colony-mother country, and by a significant demand for relatively inexpensive labor for the needs of modernizing the economies of Western European countries after World War II. And some former colonial powers, such as the Kingdom of the Netherlands, were engaged in the movement of labor from their eastern possessions (Indonesia) to South America (Suriname). Historical memory is also invisibly present in the migration policy of France. So, in the 30s, almost a third of the population of this country was in the status of migrants, mainly they were immigrants from the countries of Southern Europe. Memories of the past, coupled with the migratory consequences of imperial existence, gave rise to the phenomenon of anti-immigrant political parties. The growth of the influence of the forces of anti-migrant populism was already observed in the 90s. Then the “National Front” quickly gained influence. As if responding to the challenge of anti-migrant populism, the right-wing government headed by E. Balladur is taking tough measures to limit the migration flow to the maximum and minimize emigration for political reasons. Subsequently, migration reforms were somewhat relaxed, but entry into France was strictly controlled, and the labor market was tightly regulated. The authorities of another colonial empire, Great Britain, acted in approximately the same way, pursuing a liberal line in relation to highly qualified migrants and implementing strict restrictive measures against refugees for political reasons. When assessing the prospects for resettlement of immigrants from India and other South Asian countries to Western European countries, it is necessary to take into account the EU factor, which has become a central element in building a new migration space in the unity of institutional rules for the movement of migrants and patterns of movement of peoples in the vastness of this integration association. It is important to keep in mind that migration is not a long-term solution to the demographic problems of the developed countries of Europe. It is assumed that most EU members, with the exception of France, Ireland and the United Kingdom, are doomed to a serious reduction in working-age populations in the coming decades. In addition, according to experts, labor markets in the EU countries are more inert and less flexible in relation to changing circumstances than in the US. Potential resettlers have to reckon with growing migration concerns in the EU's leading countries. At the same time, the attitude of receiving countries towards migration varies from country to country. Thus, in the countries of Southern Europe (Spain, Greece, Portugal), a “permissive” political culture that does not condemn migration is still influential. It is no coincidence that almost half of the migrants who have arrived in the EU since 2000 began their journey to Europe from Spain. However, even in Spain, new arrivals are viewed by public opinion not only as a socio-economic challenge, but also as a threat to cultural and ethnic identity. Since the early 1990s, the UK has been implementing a policy aimed at limiting the number of refugees and migrants as much as possible. Sometimes the authorities of the United Kingdom resort to frankly everyday motivation for their anti-migration actions, referring to the aggravation of the housing problem and the growth of social tension in London and southeast England. Nevertheless, the UK remains one of the preferred destinations for migration to Western Europe. Moreover, the very policy of the Western European states remains contradictory. On the one hand, the desire to appease public opinion results in uncompromising rhetoric against irregular migration. On the other hand, the desire to attract the skilled labor force necessary for the economy dictates an emphasis on the temporary nature of migration, which does not imply the granting of citizenship or residence permits. Nevertheless, since 2002, the number of people entering the EU has been an impressive figure - from 1.5 million to 2 million people. In other words, the conflict between the principles of the functioning of the nation-state and the guiding principles of multiculturalism defended by the settlers (as a method of managing interethnic relations in the host society) is becoming an integral part of the political development of many European countries. From now on, the confrontation between the principles of assimilation and multiculturalism becomes the axis of the entire socio-political development of the West. Until recently, multiculturalism had a strong influence on the attitude towards migrants in the Scandinavian countries, while assimilation has become clear in Greece, Austria, Poland, and Hungary. However, within the EU, the “multicultural consensus” is being increasingly tested for strength, in particular in Sweden. Similar trends are observed in the UK, France and the Netherlands. The sheer number of migrants can sometimes be misleading. Thus, the largest number of immigrants is recorded in large countries (Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom), while their highest proportions are noted in small states (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland), which has an inevitable projection on the sphere of political relations. In addition, many countries do not keep statistics on the religious affiliation of the population, which is done in the name of the sacred principles of secularism. However, the situation is starting to change. Thus, in the UK in 2001, they began to take into account the confessional identity of the population, primarily to control migration flows from India and South Asia. At the same time, in the censuses in France and Germany, religious affiliation is not yet recorded. By the ratio of the principles of multiculturalism and assimilation, it is customary to single out several groups of European states. States that do not officially recognize the fact of multiculturalism (Germany, France, Greece, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Ireland). At the same time, Italy, Finland, Germany, and Ireland practice bilingualism in relation to compact national minorities that have been living in these countries since ancient times. This principle does not apply to migrants. States that have delegated “linguistic powers” to several languages (Spain, Switzerland, Belgium). The envisaged status for French and Flemish in Belgium and the similar legal status for Catalan and Basque in Spain are intended to stop separatist tendencies in these societies and do not apply to the linguistic means of communication of migrants. States where multiculturalism has historically existed (United Kingdom, comprising England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), but its principles do not apply to migrants. States with a detailed policy towards migrants on a secular basis (Sweden, Norway), which is subjected to extensive criticism by various socio-political forces. States that initially accepted multiculturalism but subsequently rejected it (Netherlands). On the one hand, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the largest centers of multiculturalism, special services for helping migrants have been preserved. On the other hand, the main socio-political forces of the country and the parties expressing their interests are strongly opposed to further external migration, and not only from the “global South”. The attitude towards the principles of assimilation and multiculturalism is also manifested in the life attitudes and practical activities of various social forces. Thus, liberals and social democrats prefer the discourse of multiculturalism, while conservatives present themselves as the guardians of the values of the nation-state, Christian ethics and national culture. However, the above dichotomy acquires important clarifying characteristics and nuances when the analysis program includes the contradictory position of trade unions, on the one hand, belonging to the left side of the political spectrum, and on the other hand, forced by the logic of internal political development to counteract the migration of foreign labor and the adaptation of migrants in the host country. The attitude towards migration of the business community, conservative in its cultural orientations and attitudes, and at the same time interested in the import of foreign labor as a factor in “compensating” the insufficient demographic potential of an “aging society” and an instrument of economic growth within a particular Western European country, is also distinguished by a considerable originality. The initial unfriendly reaction of the local population to the new arrivals was dictated by fears of an exclusively economic nature, that is, the unwillingness to financially support migrants. Settlers were not then seen as a threat to national culture and national identity. However, as refugees settled in a new place, their families increased, religious buildings were built, and European politics were actively involved, the attitude of Europeans towards migrants began to change. The “clash of civilizations” (SP Huntington) in Europe intensified. The “racial riots” of 1958 in Great Britain can be considered the historical starting point for the escalation of conflicts on a civilizational basis. In this country, most migrants had the status of subjects of the British Empire, which definitely facilitated their entry into the arena of political life. Race remained at the heart of the issue of multiculturalism in the UK until at least the late 1990s. At first, no serious significance was attached to the factor of religion as a fundamentally different model of behavior in Western Europe. The spread of Islamist radicalism and terrorism, rooted, as some politicians now argue, in the Islamic value system, has become a kind of watershed. The essence of their ideas boils down to the fact that Islam is allegedly in a state of “permanent war” with the West in general and with Christianity and democracy in particular. This kind of sentiment is supported by a part of the Western European press, which regularly publishes anti-Islamic stories coming from the Middle East and Central Asia. Shifts in the positions of political parties in Western European countries on migration issues can be summarized as follows:  - there is a strengthening of the motives of national culture, the principles of assimilation and loyalty to European political values; - control over migration processes is being tightened, including increased attention to political refugees;  - the “horizontal” interaction of the migration authorities of the interested European countries in the field of control over the movement of foreigners to the EU countries is being strengthened;  - there is an actual refusal of the political elites of Western Europe from the principles of multiculturalism, as well as from the concept of "universal values";  - attempts are being made to introduce “rational” (that is, deliberately complicated) concepts of migration policy into the life of the EU countries;  - organizational resources and political powers of organizations supervising migration processes are increasing.  Such steps by the Western European elites, which do not formally abolish the principles of racial equality and the practice of religious rites by migrants, actually exclude the further development of the principles of multiculturalism. The situation of migrants is also complicated by the unwillingness of orthodox Muslim activists to compromise with the authorities of the host country in the sphere of religious rites, which undermines the position of supporters of multiculturalism in Western Europe. In the current conditions, militant opponents of multiculturalism are turning for support not only to Western European lumpen and outcasts, but also to a significant part of the middle class and anti-migrant parties that advocate Christian values. For their part, members of the Muslim community believe that the "war against terror" in the West, started in 2001, has escalated into a "war against Islam." In the smaller EU countries, fears of being “absorbed” by a foreign culture are constantly fueling radical, anti-immigrant sentiments.  It can be assumed that the events of the beginning of this century (September 11, 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorist attacks in the countries of Western and Southern Europe, etc.), as well as the European migration crisis of 2015–2016 laid the foundation for shifts in the public consciousness of the population of the EU leaders that are unfavorable for migrants. The dominance of multiculturalism was replaced by the idea of the nation-state as a community bound by the unity of interests and the norms of Christian culture. At present, in the broad sections of the population of Western Europe, the idea of the ongoing erosion of the fundamental principles of the life of society, which undermines its integrity, is being strengthened. In the current reality, even highly educated migrants are beginning to be seen as a threat to the national unity of society. Such mindsets are constantly fueled by the systemic economic crisis, which calls into question the once stable notions of multiculturalism as a force capable of simultaneously ensuring the prosperity and security of Western society. CURRENT TRENDS IN MIGRATION FROM SOUTH ASIA TO THE EU The migration crisis of 2015–2016 turned the problem of migration into a central political issue in the internal life of the leading Western European countries. In the new conditions, socio-political forces and parties that advocate tough restrictive measures against the influx of migrants of other cultures into the EU receive more and more significant support in the new conditions. However, the resettlement of immigrants from South Asian countries to Western Europe continues, which is confirmed by the example of the Netherlands and Italy. Migration from India and other South Asian countries to these two countries is mostly “productive” in nature: for the Netherlands, an influx of quality labor in the information technology sector is important, while Italy needs a “demographic dividend” in the agro-industrial complex. In the Netherlands, where there is a need for qualified personnel for a rapidly growing information technology cluster, educated migrants from India have benefited from the liberalization of migration policy in important segments of the economy. True, in this country, a kind of Damocles sword is suspended over the problem of migration: the murder of film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a native of North Africa stimulated the growth of anti-migrant sentiment in the Netherlands, which traditionally had a reputation as a “home of tolerance”. Note that the need for skilled workers in the Netherlands is higher than the EU average (by 10%). Here, as in other countries of Western Europe (primarily in the UK), expat Indians represent the most dynamically growing group of migrants. In the Netherlands, this community includes workers with the necessary professional training in the fields of information technology, consulting services, engineering, and enterprise personnel management. Significant Indian migration to the Netherlands began in the 1980s. By the beginning of the 2010s, about 22 thousand Indians lived in the country (compared to 9 thousand in 1996). The Kingdom attracts Indian migrants, first of all, with a favorable living environment, a high standard of living, the widespread use of the English language in the country, a tolerant attitude towards foreigners, etc.  Young educated Indians find themselves in the Netherlands in several ways. In addition to the traditional recruitment practices of Dutch companies, the factor of expanding the activities of Indian companies in the kingdom is becoming increasingly important. Thus, currently more than 200 companies from India, mainly from the information technology sector, are active in this country. It should be taken into account that the information technology sector, on the one hand, is a powerful driving force for economic growth in India, and on the other hand, this segment of the national economy accounts for more than 45% of all exports of services from India. Another way of delivering Indian labor to the Netherlands is the activity of transnational companies (TNCs) operating in the country, interested in attracting from India the profile workforce of the required quality. The reluctance of some Dutch people to perform certain types of activities in the information technology segment also plays a role. In this case, English-speaking and law-abiding Indians are perhaps the best candidates for high-paying positions in this sector. In other words, the Netherlands attracts skilled, expensive labor to the country, the price of which (as of the beginning of 2019) starts at 4.5 thousand euros per month and 3.2 thousand euros per month for people under 30 years old. In turn, the Italian economy is experiencing a need to increase the volume of dairy production, which opens up opportunities for the Indian labor force, primarily from the northern state of Punjab. Many migrants from India arrived in the Apennine peninsula without an accurate understanding of the nature of the Italian labor market and the peculiarities of Italian society. Some migrants have joined families of relatives who have already arrived in the EU. Arriving in the Apennines, Indian settlers from the Punjab countryside quickly adapted to northern Italy, an industrial zone that lacks quality labor for the agricultural sector. However, this was more a happy coincidence than the result of the successful functioning of the labor market due to the competent intervention of Italian government departments. Indian migrants have recently turned their attention to Italy. Thus, in 2003, the total number of Indian migrants to the Apennine Peninsula was fixed at around 35.5 thousand people, while by 2018 it had more than quadrupled to 151.7 thousand peoplef. As a result, India has now moved from 10th to 6th place in the list of the main “suppliers” of migrants to the EU countries (and to 5th place among non-EU countries). The configuration of the main concentrations of Indian immigrants to Italy has also become somewhat different. If in 2003 the Indians settled unevenly in the central subregions of northern Italy and in Rome, then at present the contours of settlement have become more dispersed: the Indians live mainly in ten provinces, and their largest concentration is in Brescia (14 thousand people per 200 thousand of the local population). Unlike the Netherlands, migration to Italy is often carried out on an unplanned basis - as a result of a situational shortage of labor in a particular segment of the labor market or as a situational reaction of the Italian migration system to migration flows from non-Western societies. It should be noted that in Italy the majority of Indians are engaged in low-skilled labor outside the agro-industrial complex, in particular in industry. In terms of the share of employment in this segment of the national economy, immigrants from India do not stand out among migrants who came from non-Western societies. The agricultural sector, being the area of activity of 28.6% (2016) of migrants, remains the main area for the application of labor skills for Indian migrants (24.1% of the total labor force from outside the EU countries). Even among self-employed workers who came from countries outside the EU, the share of Indians (7% in 2016) has increased almost sixfold since 2007. It should be noted that agriculture is a relatively small and ever-shrinking segment of the Italian economy, accounting for no more than 2% of the country's GDP and in which wages are only half of the total level in the national economy. However, when assessing the potential of the agro-industrial complex, nuances are important. Thus, with the declining role of agriculture, agricultural production in Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto tends to increase - not least due to the hard work of Indian immigrants. The dynamic dynamics of development in these regions is shown by dairy production. An illustrative example is Cremona (population - about 75 thousand people), the administrative center of the Italian province of the same name. The resettlement of Indians began in the first half of the 90s with the use of tourist visas. Dairy production in the region was affected by the technological modernization of this sector, which began in the 60s and sharply reduced the demand for labor in Italian agriculture. However, the reduction in the supply of labor in the dairy sector was so significant that it was necessary to attract skilled labor from abroad, and this was a historic opportunity for hardworking Punjabis. A particularly significant contribution of Indian migrants was to the preservation of the cheese industry in the province of Cremona. In other words, the traditions of working on the ground were in demand in the north of Italy, where climatic conditions and temperature conditions almost perfectly match those of the Punjabi. Finally, the hard work of the Indians, their willingness to work on weekends and holidays, as well as overtime, are invariably noted by Italian employers. However, the interest of Indians to work in Italy has its own practical reasons. On the one hand, overtime work allows you to earn up to 3 thousand euros per month, receiving part of the payment “in an envelope” (a procedure common in Italy). Thus, the total income increases, which allows not only to send part of the proceeds to Punjab, but also to invest in the future - to invest savings in various sectors of the Italian economy. On the other hand, living on farms at work allows Indians to avoid the vicissitudes of the housing market in Italy, including discrimination against newcomers. In addition, employers highly appreciate the role of family ties among Indians as a stimulant of productive work. It is significant that employers have a positive attitude towards such qualities of Indians as internal balance, punctuality in the performance of official duties, enthusiasm for work, and note their lower predisposition to conflicts (both with the employer and with colleagues), which favorably distinguishes Indians from, for example, Egyptians and Moroccans. However, it should be taken into account that the Punjabis are a historically formed community of high-quality labor force. Their qualifications are highly valued far beyond the borders of India, whose national economy clearly lacks professionally trained workers capable of performing modern production operations. European migration crisis in 2015–2016 made significant adjustments both to the routes of movement of immigrants, and to the intensity of the human flows themselves from the “global South” to the “historical North”. India and other countries of South Asia remain one of the main sources of migration activity in the world. The examples of the Netherlands and Italy show that there is a “demographic dividend” in the South Asia region that can be used to benefit economic growth and development in industrialized countries. Both the Dutch and the Italians use the services of India's competitive populations. This experience, perhaps, should be used by Russia, which is in need of importing a “demographic dividend”. However, it is advisable to remember that the Indian authorities, conducting relevant negotiations with the Russian leadership, offer labor with low qualification characteristics for export. Defending national interests in such a specific area of bilateral relations will contribute to a better understanding by the Indian side of our real needs in the import of human capital and will confirm Russia's serious attitude towards multidisciplinary cooperation with the "largest democracy in the world." 

Delivering Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine takes the war to a new level. Trying to look past the fog of war can help to predict how things might play out The decision of Germany and other NATO states to supply modern battle tanks and other armoured infantry vehicles to Ukraine takes the West’s involvement in the war to a new level. Presumably, in the further course of the war, the numbers mentioned so far will not be enough; the decision to provide tanks immediately sparked an international debate on delivering fighter planes as well. We are also hearing initial calls for NATO troops to be deployed to Ukraine as a ‘deterrent’, which would mean NATO becoming embroiled in the war. However, the discussion about the objectives in the Ukraine war mustn’t be muddied, even if clarifying these leads to a fierce dispute both within and amongst the NATO states. There is just too much at stake. The American and German governments indicate that they want to enable Ukraine to hold the frontline which it has fought for so far and liberate more areas wherever possible. All occupied territories, including Crimea, would probably be regained through a strategic approach of lengthy negotiations under the pressure of overwhelming Western sanction packages. This objective comes with the broader demand that Ukraine be enabled to reconquer its entire territory through military counterattacks, something also put forward by the Ukrainian leadership. The serious risks of escalation associated with this must be thoroughly analysed, which has largely been skirted around in the discussions so far. The fog of war prevents us from predicting how things will play out. All professional military policy experts are aware that their analyses, evaluations and forecasts are clouded by this; there are always bound to be frictions and surprises. However, looking at various scenarios can help us refine our assessments of what might be on the horizon. We will attempt to assess the potential effects of the new tank deliveries to Ukraine, using two scenarios that look ahead to the early summer of 2023. In both scenarios, it is assumed that the Ukrainian army will gradually receive about 100 Western battle tanks, most of the Leopard model, and around 100 largely German and American infantry vehicles by early summer 2023. The thirty-one M1 Abrams tanks previously promised are unlikely to be delivered by this point. Two tank battalions and two tank grenadier battalions – roughly equivalent to a brigade – will be equipped with the new heavy weapons systems by the early summer under both scenarios. Another assumption is that the widely anticipated Russian spring offensive, targeting the Luhansk or Donetsk area, will begin around the end of February or March. Very few Western battle and infantry vehicles, if any, are likely to be used, in what are expected to be highly intense battles with severe casualties. It is assumed with some uncertainty that the more professional and mobile Ukrainian defence can ward off larger operational gains from the major Russian units. These two scenarios look to the early summer after the Ukrainian army has taken delivery of the tanks from the West. Scenario 1: tank battle on the southern front, with limited Ukrainian territorial gainsBy the late spring, it becomes clear that the Ukrainian military intends to push hard towards the south from the area east and southeast of Zaporizhzhia. The goal is to advance over about 100 km to the Sea of Azov and cut the Russian troops off south of the river Dnieper and, more than anything, to stop Crimea from being supplied via the land bridge. The terrain in this area is mostly open and flat – highly beneficial to tanks – and, with the exception of the town of Melitopol, is only dotted with small villages. In the early summer of 2023, Ukraine makes bold advances south under favourable weather conditions, targeting the Sea of Azov coast. This results in the first major tank battle of the war, which sees German Leopards and Marders deployed at the front, as well as the American Bradleys and Strikers. With their better armour, agility and weapon effect, they clearly come out on top in a head-to-head battle. Ukrainian commanders, however, struggle to master the complexity of mixed-weapons combat, in which battle tanks, armoured infantry vehicles with tank grenadiers, artillery, sappers and air support must work together in close coordination to achieve the full force of impact. Heavy Russian tank and infantry forces withstand the advancing units. The Ukrainian counterattack progresses for about 30 km but then gets bogged down in the huge defensive firing, after Russian mechanised units succeed in pushing into the flank of the Ukrainian tank formations, jeopardising their supply. Soldier and material losses are severely high again on both sides. Pictures of destroyed Leopard tanks are plastered across the internet. German television channels and online media increasingly draw parallels with historical footage of German tanks during the Second World War in the same region. From a political and strategic perspective, attrition warfare has been consolidated in this scenario, despite tactical gains on both sides. Russia still has about 10 to 12 per cent of the Ukrainian territory under its control. The extensive exhaustion of weapons systems, spare parts and ammunition from the German and American armies is increasingly running down the operational capability and perseverance of the NATO forces on both sides of the Atlantic. As production capacity remains limited, there is increasing support for an agreement between the US, Ukraine and Russia to bring an end to the war. In Ukraine, the devastating losses are affecting more and more families, leading to political demands for a ceasefire. Opposition politicians demand that their president publish the actual losses incurred since the war began. Scenario 2: tank battle on the southern front, with the Ukrainian army advancing to the Sea of AzovScenario 2 is identical to scenario 1 up to the Ukrainian army’s counterattack from the area east of Zaporizhzhia. But in this scenario, operations are proceeding as planned by the Ukrainian General Staff. Kyiv has deployed forces equipped with Western tanks and infantry vehicles to the heart of the battlefield. With the superior firepower, armour and agility of the Leopard 2 tanks, they advance towards intermediate targets northeast of Melitopol after a few days. Leadership, fighting strength and motivation are once again proving weak amongst Russian ranks, while the Ukrainian troops’ command of mixed-weapons combat is better than initially expected by Western military experts. Leopard spearheads reach villages just off the coast, opposite Crimea. As Ukrainians advance, American-made HIMARS rockets destroy the new Russian bridge near Kerch in some places, rendering it unusable for supplying Crimea. Russia responds with the most intense air raid ever launched on Kyiv, with numerous casualties reported and electricity supply destroyed. The Russian president makes a brief statement following a stage-managed press conference with his General Staff. Putin first states that the Russian Federation now considers the NATO states that supplied heavy weapons to Ukraine as direct opponents in the war, regardless of any fine details in international law. The ongoing attack on Russian-occupied Crimea could only have come about through the massive involvement of Western states. The war has now created an existential dimension for the Russian Federation. As far as Russia is concerned, the entire war zone now extends to the territory of the Western states supporting Ukraine. He refrains from verbal warnings of nuclear war because his earlier threats were not taken seriously. Putin says he has ordered his Defence Minister and General Staff to supply some of the nuclear-capable missile troops with the nuclear warheads stored in depots. If the blockade of supplies to Crimea via the land bridge is not removed, Russia must use force through its tactical nuclear weapons. Russian bloggers report that the course of the war has brought unity to Kremlin leaders and only made them more determined to see it through, but this cannot be verified. A few hours later, American satellites pick up Russian convoys beginning their journey from the nuclear weapons storage facilities to the nuclear missile battalion deployment areas. This secret intelligence becomes public across the world. In a widely unexpected twist, China announces the largest mobilisation of its naval forces ever in the Strait of Taiwan. Its first fleet of warships has already set sail. The US and its NATO partners are now on the verge of a nuclear face-off that has escalated faster than many had believed, with consequences unimaginable for the whole of Europe. Western governments, the NATO Council and Military Committee, as well as the UN Security Council, meet day after day. Commentators can’t help but compare it to the height of the Cuban crisis. But NATO leaders clash on their assessments of the situation and their approach. In Berlin, huge demonstrations are held calling for an immediate end to the war, with the slogan ‘Stop the madness’. Of course, more optimistic scenarios can also be envisaged in which the Kremlin hands back Crimea without nuclear escalation. The powers that be, including those in Berlin, Washington and Paris, have so far held firm on their objective of not stepping into the grey area of getting directly involved in the war. But the danger of slowly and unintentionally sleepwalking into what would be the biggest catastrophe for the whole of Europe is growing and growing. Unexpected twists and turns (sometimes referred to as black swans or wild cards) can also create dynamic developments that are likely to be extremely difficult to control and contain. As more German tanks are sent to Ukraine, Germany’s share of responsibility for the course that the war takes – and the consequences thereof – increases and ultimately so does its right and need to influence the leadership in Kyiv.

Russia has been at war with Ukraine for more than 10 months, with no end in sight and with just as little prospect for direct negotiations between the warring parties. These were last broken off mutually on 17 May 2022. Since then, there have been repeated calls in Germany, whether in opinion articles or open letters, for more diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities. Such calls were often combined with demands for the federal government to cease arms deliveries to Ukraine: when all is said and done, peace is achieved not with arms, but with a truce, the argument goes. And continuing the war with the already unrealistic goal of a Ukrainian victory and the recapture of all the territory occupied by Russia would only mean useless bloodshed. These calls are all too understandable given the horrific images of suffering and destruction that reach us daily from Ukraine. Even so, it would be wrong right now to urge Ukraine to negotiate – or even give up parts of its territory and the people living there. Surely, no one wants the guns to go silent more than the Ukrainians themselves. They are the victims of this war. It is their hospitals, kindergartens and schools that have been destroyed by Russian missiles and drone attacks. Many have lost their homes. When the air raid sirens sound, it is they who sit in the shelters and who go without heating, electricity or running water, often for hours or days on end. The exact number of soldiers who have died at the front is unknown; US estimates put the count at up to 100,000. And yet, the Ukrainian government wants to continue the fight against the Russian aggressor – and only negotiate directly with Russia if and when the Kremlin first answers for its war crimes before an international tribunal and withdraws all troops from Ukraine, including from the illegally annexed areas. In this,  the government is supported by the vast majority of the Ukrainian population.Putin wants total control of UkraineIt is clear to the Ukrainians that the Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in finding a way for a secure coexistence with a sovereign and independent Ukraine that can determine its own future.  He wants it gone. In his view, today's Ukraine is nothing more than a ‘colony with a puppet regime’, an externally controlled and hostile ‘anti-Russia’, set up against the ‘real cultural, economic and social interests of the people and the true sovereignty of Ukraine’. For Putin, Ukraine and Russia are ‘one people’.  A Ukraine that is independent of Russia and wants to open up to Europe along the lines of its central European neighbours is unacceptable because it calls into question the very foundations of the Russian imperium, which Putin is determined to prevent from falling apart. The repeatedly expressed assumptions that Russia is ultimately only concerned with preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, or only has geographic interests in the Donbas, are wrong. In truth, Moscow wants Ukraine to relinquish much more: its freedom, its identity, its self-determination, its culture. The destruction of Ukrainian life, Ukrainian art and Ukrainian statehood, together with repressions – from murder to rape to abduction – in the occupied territories are clear demonstrations of this. So far, there is no reason to believe that Putin's thinking has changed in recent months. On the contrary, with every further step, Putin makes clear that he is not ready to make concessions. Although he and other members of the Russian government regularly mention the word ‘negotiations’, they have so far not presented a concrete option. As recently as the end of December 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeated the call for the ‘demilitarisation and denazification’ of Ukraine and described the illegally annexed areas of Ukraine as Russia’s ’new territories’. Clearly, Putin has not abandoned his goal of complete political control over the country but has merely adjusted his approach and timeline. Because Russia was not militarily successful, the devastating airstrikes on the Ukrainian civilian population and the energy infrastructure are now intended to break the population's will to resist and to wear down the country – until Russia is able to launch a new offensive in the spring. Putin is also counting on the fact that the western supporter states – also under pressure from their populations – will soon tire and run out of weapons, ammunition and money for Kyiv. If the West were now to press for a ceasefire or peace negotiations, perhaps with the threat that it would otherwise end support for Ukraine, that would signal to the Kremlin that its method is working and that all it has to do is wait until we lose patience. So far, none of the advocates of an imminent ceasefire have been able to convincingly explain how Putin can be persuaded to make concessions without exerting further military pressure on him.Preventing Russia from dictating peaceWe Germans, in particular, have for years been repeating the mantra that ‘there is no military solution’ to this or that conflict. Unlike Vladimir Putin: in Georgia, the Crimea and Syria, he has learned that he can very successfully use military force to achieve his political goals. In the current conflict, therefore, only Ukraine's military successes prevent such a dictated peace from happening. In other words, Russia must first be stopped and pushed back militarily before there can be any chance of real diplomacy. It's about enabling Ukraine to hold its own against the Russian invasion and showing Putin that even a new military offensive in the spring has no chance of succeeding – and that this won't change over time. The West itself has a paramount interest in Putin not making any gain from his war of aggression. His ambitions are a danger to all of Europe. If he gets away again with using force and nuclear blackmail to bring parts of another state under his control, this invites repetition elsewhere, be it by Russia or another state. The goal of an overall revision of the European security order, which is essential for peace and prosperity also here in Germany, was announced by Russia in the treaty texts of December 2021. The decision by Germany, the US and France to now also supply Ukraine with armoured personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles is therefore logical. It emphasises that the major military powers of the West will not force Ukraine into an unacceptable deal with Russia.  Of course, the danger of escalation must always be kept in mind when providing military support. However, the reactions after missiles fell on the Polish-Ukrainian border in particular has shown that the West is aware of this and is reacting prudently and is capable of risk management. Real negotiations will only begin again when both Russia and Ukraine come to the conclusion that there is more to be gained from a truce than from fighting on. Perhaps the cards will be reshuffled after spring — if the ’hot autumn’ and the ’winter of fury’ in Europe fail to materialise, if the western democracies continue to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine and if a new Russian offensive proves unsuccessful. What is certain is that any negotiations and compromises will reflect the resulting balance of power between the parties. Our goal must therefore be to get Ukraine ready as well as possible for this point in time and to prepare together with Kyiv for the moment when the window for diplomacy indeed opens.

Emmanuel Macron has just completed a state visit to the United States of which everyone, both on the American and French side, is pleased with the success. In the entourage of the French president, it is put forward that it was a state visit, therefore of primary importance in the protocol order. France also highlights that this was the first state visit by a foreign head of state to the United States since Biden's election, demonstrating the good relationship between the United States and France. . But it is always embarrassing to note that European countries systematically boast of being Washington's favorite, when the United States never boasts of maintaining good relations with a European country. This testifies to a recognition, on the part of Washington, of the peripheral status of European countries in relation to the United States. Sumptuous dinner in the gardens of the White House, successful visit to New Orleans to highlight the French-speaking world, celebration of unity against Russia in Ukraine… Some unfortunate subjects were nevertheless on the program, particularly on the economic level. . There was indeed talk of the US plan called the Inflation Reduction Act amounting to 370 billion dollars aimed at supporting the greening of the US economy, which, in the words of Emmanuel Macron, is “hyper-aggressive”. We can only be pleased that the United States is greening its economy. Moreover, at first, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen congratulated the United States for embarking on such a plan. But very quickly, France, Germany and European countries in general realized that this plan risked having extremely negative consequences on a European industry already in bad shape. Indeed, industrialists, regardless of their nationality, can recover up to 40% of their investment if they invest in the United States or in countries that have free trade agreements with them, namely Mexico. and Canada. The great fear of Europeans, exacerbated by the fact that the continent is already experiencing an economic crisis due to rising energy costs, inflation and an industry that is generally not doing very well, rests on the fact that American industrialists present in Europe can return to the United States to benefit from this aid, and even more so that European industrialists drop their investments in Europe to direct them to the United States. Some big names in European industry, particularly Germany, have already threatened to do so, also because of the extremely attractive cost of energy in the United States. Emmanuel Macron made very strong statements on this subject before his visit. This would have, according to him, allowed him to be heard by the American president. Heard okay, but not sure he was listened to. Joe Biden has indeed said that the United States does not apologize, that he does not apologize. He made no concessions to the demands of European politicians. Emmanuel Macron did not return with any tangible results. In the interview he gave to Le Parisien on Sunday December 4 on the plane that brought him back to Paris, Emmanuel Macron declared that American officials had told him that their objective was not to weaken European industry. If the goal is not this, it could be the result. Let's hope that this trip will have at least made it possible to awaken European consciences in the face of this danger for their economies. Once again, Europeans are lagging behind American decisions. Emmanuel Macron declared that for the moment no European voice had been raised against this American law. He is right, but we must now take action and not be content with good words, as was the case after the AUKUS affair. Joe Biden then assured Macron during a reconciliation meeting in Rome that the Americans would not do it again. France, which had recalled its ambassador to Washington, then sent him back. Not much had happened then. France and Europe cannot simply be satisfied with comforting, even anesthetic words from the Americans if they are not accompanied by concrete gestures and positive results. In reality, the United States defends its national interests, they are right to do so. Not acting in the same way, because divided and paralyzed, it is the Europeans who are at fault. There is not a “Buy European Act” like there is a Buy American Act. China on the one hand, the United States on the other really defend their interests, Europe does not. When France evokes the idea of defending the national interest against the United States, Paris is quickly accused of anti-Americanism. On the other hand, the United States is not accused of anti-Europeanism when it defends its national interest vis-à-vis Europe. Joe Biden is on the way to achieving what Donald Trump wanted to do, but he is doing it slowly. Donald Trump banged on the table, threatened and insulted, Joe Biden speaks in a soft and calm voice and assures Europeans of his friendship. We have often heard that it is time to get out of naivety about Russia or China. It may also be time to do it with regard to the United States because through such legislation they are not treating Europe as an ally. If the transatlantic strategic alliance is undeniable, especially in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the relationship remains, from a commercial and economic point of view, a competition. With this plan, this competition is no longer quite fair from the United States. It is essential to be aware of this in Europe. From a strategic point of view, the Europeans are paralyzed by the Russian military threat, they think that only the United States can defend them against this threat and that it is worth some concessions. But in fact, there is no major Russian military threat to European Union member countries. Indeed, Russia is proving unable to conquer the Donbass as a whole, and fails to control the territories it has illegally annexed. This makes the prospect of an attack on Western Europe difficult to envisage. The Russian military threat is therefore certainly to be put into perspective. It is not a question of doing so regarding the aggressive intentions of Vladimir Putin, but of measuring this threat from a capability point of view. If this military threat is more supposed than real, then this does not imply neglecting European economic and commercial interests to benefit from American protection. Emmanuel Macron therefore issued a warning cry. Now we have to take action.

Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s incumbent prime minister, was sworn into office for the third time on 17 November 2023. He once again heads a minority coalition government. This time, it includes the prime minister’s Socialist Party (PSOE) and Sumar (Sum or Add Up), a new left wing political platform launched by Yolanda Díaz, the incumbent and continuing labour minister and second deputy prime minister. While clear continuities exist, there are important changes regarding the junior party partner in the coalition. Sánchez’s previous cabinet, formed in 2020, included the radical left Unidas Podemos (United We Can), an alliance of Podemos and the United Left, the latter centred around the Spanish Communist Party. After much public discord, the weakened Podemos joined the Sumar alliance for the July 2023 parliamentary elections. Yet none of Sumar’s five ministerial posts (out of 22 total) in the new government went to Podemos. While Díaz hails originally from the United Left, Sumar is a more moderate ally for the Socialists, at least in terms of the likely tone and style of its government representatives. It remains to be seen how the disgruntled Podemos, with 5 of Sumar’s 31 seats in the Congress of Deputies, will affect governance and Díaz’s nascent platform. Continuing the practice on the political left of gender parity or majority women cabinets, the new government has 55 percent women ministers, four of whom are also deputy prime ministers. This government also confirmed Spain as a world leader in minority cabinets. Since Spain’s return to democracy in 1977, 75 percent of its cabinets have been minority ones, meaning the party or parties in the cabinet do not control a majority of seats in the parliamentary chamber to which the government is responsible. While Spain is used to making these cabinets (mostly) work, this may be the most complicated governing scenario to date. The leftist government faces a political right that is strong, angry, and mobilized—though this both challenges and serves as a buttress that could fortify the new government. The conservative Popular Party (PP), led by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, won the most votes and parliamentary seats in the July election, two percentage points and 14 seats more than the Socialists, yet far from a majority. As was already clear when the election returns came in, the PP candidate could not cobble together enough votes in parliament and failed in his attempt to become prime minister in September 2023. He received the votes of the PP, the far-right party Vox (Voice in Latin), and two representatives of right-leaning regional parties. Feijóo’s defeat was, in part, due to his party’s proximity and expected governing alliance with Vox. The political right is also strong in local and regional governments in Spain. Following the May 2023 subnational elections, the Popular Party leads 11 of Spain’s 17 powerful regional governments—in five it governs jointly with Vox. The Socialist Party only leads three regional governments. And the PP has a majority in Spain’s upper, though weaker, chamber of parliament, the Senate. The right has questioned Sánchez’s legitimacy, persona, and alliances stretching back at least to 2018 when he replaced PP Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, whom parliament removed in a constructive vote of no confidence. Sanchismo has become a popular buzzword the right uses to capture its disdain for the prime minister. Nonetheless, the anger and mobilisation on the political right, particularly from Vox and its supporters, but also from the PP and its supporters, peaked once it became public that Sánchez and the PSOE would support an amnesty for those involved in the 2017 Catalan independence push, despite Sánchez’s prior opposition to an amnesty and his claim that it would be unconstitutional. An amnesty was part of a deal to gain the support of pro-independence Catalan parties, ERC and Junts per Catalunya (Together for Catalonia), for Sanchez’s election as prime minister. The controversial leader of Junts, Carles Puigdemont, who resides in Brussels to escape Spanish judges, and would be the main beneficiary of an amnesty, has forewarned that the party’s support for the new government depends on clear advances in the devolution of central state powers to Catalonia and the recognition of the Catalan national identity. Amid significant societal division over the agreement, far right groups, in Trumpist style, engaged in violent protests in front of the PSOE’s headquarters. Protesters frequently showed support for Francoism and denounced what they considered to be a coup-d’état by the parliamentary majority. The extremist tone has put the PP in an uncomfortable position – it has attempted to calibrate its response via numerous demonstrations, expressing firm opposition while also trying to avoid being linked to the autocratic values visible at other demonstrations. The agreement with Junts also met with unprecedented criticism in judicial circles, particularly furious because the agreement mentions alleged lawfare, in reference to what Catalan nationalists view as an excessive legal response to the Catalan push for independence and its leaders. In contrast, most of the electorate that supported the parties of the new majority are relieved that the right-wing forces did not take control of the Spanish government, even though 40 percent of the PSOE voters are against this amnesty. To pass legislation (and survive), the government will need to consistently forge agreements among the government partners and with a diverse set of regionally based parliamentary allies. The latter include Catalan separatists on the left (ERC) and right (Junts), the centre-right Basque Nationalist Party, the Basque left-wing separatist EH-Bildu, the Galician nationalist and left-wing BNG, and the centre-right Canary Coalition. The government has almost no margin. Jointly these parties’ votes add up to 179, only three votes over an absolute majority. The Catalan Junts, with seven seats, is the most significant wildcard. While relative majorities of more yes than no votes are sometimes sufficient in Spain’s parliament, the opposition sums 171 votes. The most relevant ministers that have surrounded Sánchez since he became prime minister remain in the new cabinet, ensuring continuity in the main policy areas (finance, security, external affairs), although the influential minister of economy, Nadia Calviño, is expected to leave the executive in the coming weeks to become President of the European Investment Bank. The newcomers are expected to provide loyalty and a leftist hue to the government agenda, seeking to maintain their voters’ support in a polarised environment. This may be particularly significant in the new legislative term since the new executive will face more dilemmas when negotiating the policy agenda with its parliamentary partners. It will need to rely more on right-wing parties (PNV and Junts) than the prior government. Policy contradictions among the government’s allies will necessarily arise as many of them (PNV and EH-Bildu, Junts and ERC) are electoral opponents that will compete in the regional elections in the Basque Country and Catalonia in the coming months. We’ll need to wait and see how well the Spanish prime minister can live up to the spirit of his book, published four years ago, Manual of Resistance. Keywords government spain pedro sánchez spain prime minister socialist communist party democracy elections

China’s silence towards the European Union’s electric vehicle probe could mean that a more harmful retaliation is on its way During her State of the Union address on 13 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union would undertake an anti-subsidy probe against the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) sector. This signalled a major step in the EU’s shift to a more aggressive trade defence against China and raises the question of how China will react, given the importance of the Chinese market to key sectors of the European economy (including the auto and luxury sectors), and also given China’s crucial role in providing goods to the EU for the green transition? An EU-China High Economic and Trade dialogue on 25 September in Beijing, between EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis and his Chinese counterparts, may have given a glimpse into China’s mindset. There were fears Chinese officials would respond aggressively to von der Leyen’s announcement during Dombrovskis’s visit but this was not the case. Nevertheless, the silence may be deceptive. Three main factors should be taken into account when considering potential Chinese retaliation. Subtle but harmful retaliation First, China might file its own anti-subsidy investigation at the World Trade Organisation against key European sectors. This would not be difficult since Europe has ramped up its subsidies massively since the pandemic, and more recently has attempted to gain more ‘strategic autonomy’ in sectors including semiconductors. There is very little the EU can do about this potential retaliation, which would be costly for the sectors targeted and for the EU’s image as a free-trade and WTO champion. Second, China could try to persuade EU governments that the Commission-led investigation should be withdrawn. A similar probe happened in early 2014, when the EU launched an anti-subsidy investigation into solar panels produced in China. President Xi Jinping visited then Chancellor Angela Merkel right after the anti-subsidy investigation was announced. Subsequently, the issue was settled quickly, with the Commission withdrawing the case from the WTO. Based on this previous experience, China might prefer to take up the issue bilaterally, possibly with Germany again, rather than enter discussions with the Commission. But a major difference this time is the relative importance of the auto sector in the EU compared to solar power. The auto sector accounts for 14 million jobs in Europe and a good part of the EU’s exports. Exports of cars and components are heavily concentrated in a few EU countries, especially Germany. These exports to China have plummeted in 2023, with a close to 30% drop, and Chinese competition in third markets and even the EU market, has become much more intense. Third, also unlike the solar-panel probe, it is the Commission and not the sector being harmed that has filed the case. It will be harder for the Commission to withdraw the investigation because it would lose credibility. Merkel decided to accommodate Xi Jinping’s request in 2014 because she wanted to save the auto sector, even at the cost of hurting a smaller part of the German economy – the solar panel companies. The new investigation aims to protect the automotive sector. There could be consequences for major European auto companies producing electric vehicles in China, but jobs in Europe are now more important than the future of those companies in China. In any case, the future of European manufacturers is bleak; they seem to have already lost the EV race to their Chinese competitors. China will find it much harder to move the EU away from its decision to pursue an anti-subsidy investigation, differently to what happened in 2014. Lessons to learn There might be a lesson for Europe in what happened to Apple in China in September. Days before Apple’s launch of its new iPhone 15, Huawei launched its Mate 60 with upgraded functionalities which require high-end semiconductors. Beyond raising doubts about the effectiveness of US-led export controls on advanced semiconductors, this announcement constituted a direct challenge to Apple’s phone sales in China. Chinese officials were also prohibited from using iPhones and rumours spread in Chinese media in advance of the Apple launch about the underwhelming quality of the iPhone 15. Investors dumped Apple stock globally and the company lost about 6% of its value in a few days. China’s retaliation against the Commission’s anti-subsidy investigation might not be as direct and transparent, but it will still be harmful and might offer less room for the EU to respond. Europe’s strategic dependence on China is greater than in 2014 and this probe has the potential to cause a bigger fall-out for the EU. China has strengthened its position as a global power and uncompetitive behaviour could hit European core sectors harder because China has more power to retaliate. On the flip side, the stakes are higher for the EU given the importance of the auto sector in terms of jobs and exports. For that reason, China may not manage to deter the EU’s investigation as easily as it did in the past. But this may prompt China to threaten even larger retaliation.

Last week’s decision by the governments of Germany and France to postpone their joint biannual Cabinet meeting sent waves of comments about the future of the bilateral partnership.Some media in both countries even went as far as predicting the possible demise of French-German cooperation. Yet, at the same time, they largely ignored that President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Olaf Scholz will still meet this Wednesday, over a working lunch aimed precisely at dispelling misunderstandings between the two parties.In the midst of the confusion and the perplexity that have followed the postponement of the Cabinet meeting, it would be futile to deny problems in today’s relations between Germany and France. Too many grievances have been aired recently between the two capitals to pretend that all is fine. But are we really witnessing the chronicle of a death foretold or is it more a partnership in need of profound revision?For many observers, the piling up in the last months of diverging views between the two nations in so many areas—defense projects, the gas price ceiling, the sub-Mediterranean pipeline, state subsidies to enterprises, Chinese investments in Europe—has not only brought the cooperation between Berlin and Paris to a standstill, as illustrated by the postponed Cabinet meeting; it has also epitomized the vulnerability of a partnership that critics say has lost its efficiency and perhaps its purpose.According to these same commentators, the belief in necessary and useful French-German cooperation should be questioned when a new balance of power is emerging inside an enlarged EU and at a time when Germany itself is experiencing major changes in the very foundations of its economy and foreign policy.With a fundamentally transformed Europe comes the perception of a Franco-German partnership that is structurally flawed and increasingly outdated.Naturally, official voices on both sides of the Rhine are contesting this interpretation. And some well-versed commentators on French-German politics are quick to underline that relations between Paris and Berlin have never been a smooth affair.The coming into office of new governments alternatively in each capital has traditionally brought laborious periods of adjustment. Today, the so-called traffic light coalition in Germany is no exception and requires time to adapt.More substantially, deep divergences in the two countries’ interests have been there from the start. In fact, they are at the heart of the Franco-German partnership and can even be considered its raison d’être. It is precisely because former French president Charles de Gaulle and then German chancellor Konrad Adenauer understood early on the depth of divergences in their national interests that they decided in 1963 to work on an enduring partnership.From the opposition over the completion of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy to the birth of the euro or the new voting rights that favored Germany, the European integration process has seen Paris and Berlin overcoming time and again their deep-rooted differences to shape bilateral compromises that could be endorsed by all European states.If anything, the existential merit of the Franco-German partnership has been precisely to understand that the diverging interests between the two countries usually embodied the overall substance of the discussion at the European level.Agreements between Berlin and Paris therefore paved the way to solutions acceptable to all European partners. No doubt this prominence has stirred complaints from union members but, when faced with a collapse of French-German collaboration, the same members were the first ones to call for fence-mending between the two countries.This contribution of the Franco-German partnership to the EU’s progress still stands the test of time. Additionally, the enlarged EU has little to do with the reasons behind today’s grudges between Paris and Berlin.If there is one major complaint addressed in Paris to the Scholz government, it is that of a selfish Germany displaying too little solidarity for its EU partners.As for the criticisms addressed to France, they seem equally to blame French traditional eagerness to lead defense projects and distance Europe from U.S. leadership.So, what is missing today in the collaboration between Berlin and Paris that can explain that feeling of under-delivery? Perhaps it is the more substantial and free-flowing conversation at all levels of state institutions to build a deeper understanding between the two sides.Contacts at the highest political level are indispensable, but they are not enough to get messages through and have decisions implemented. More efficient working methods need to be applied with team leaders appointed on specific cooperation projects to keep them under constant review and deliver tangible results according to plans.At the same time, France and Germany should pay more attention to their Central and Eastern European partners’ concerns and misgivings. For that purpose, the Weimar Triangle—a format between France, Germany, and Poland—could be more often used and eventually enlarged.Accusations of “Franco-German imperialism” in some Eastern European capitals are exaggerated, but the misunderstanding they articulate must be heard.In the end, it is a revival of the partnership between France and German that is needed today—not a drifting apart of the two countries.

In the same way that it is difficult to say whether a single event in the last few decades marks Russia’s decisive breaking away from democratic path of development, it is difficult to say the same about the events of the last decade in Georgia. Nevertheless, this breaking away has taken place, although Estonia, the European Union, the United States, all Georgia’s Western friends have made powerless attempts to keep Georgia on track.Many observers think the turning point was July 2021, when Georgian Dream, the political party that has been in power since 2012, and is controlled by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, unilaterally revoked an agreement with the opposition on Georgia’s political organisation and the future development of its governance.This agreement was signed on 19 April 2021. It was mediated by the European Union, represented by President of the European Council Charles Michel during the last stage of the negotiations, and the Ambassador of the USA in Tbilisi. The agreement provided for ending the opposition’s boycott of the parliament (the opposition had been boycotting the work of the parliament since the parliamentary elections held in October 2020, because they considered the elections dishonest), releasing of important political prisoners (like Chairman of the United National Movement Nika Melia), strengthening the role of opposition in the parliament, judicial reform, pausing the appointments to the Supreme Court until elections, and election reform, including (partial) depoliticisation of the Central Election Commission.Although part of the opposition did not join the agreement, the EU considered it an important step in saving Georgia’s democracy. Charles Michel said at the signing ceremony, “This agreement is the starting point for your work towards consolidating Georgia’s democracy and taking Georgia forward on its Euro-Atlantic future.”Georgia’s ‘Yanukovych moment’On 28 July 2021, the Georgian Dream announced that they would unilaterally leave the agreement, accusing the opposition of the situation. Before that, the Government had appointed several judges to the Supreme Court in contravention of the 19 April agreement, earning the discontent of the EU and the Embassy of the US.A number of politicians saw the annulment of the agreement as Georgia’s “Yanukovych moment”, a turning point like the refusal to sign the EU association agreement by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych who chose to pursue the policy of Moscow. It is possible to see similarities here, but the blurring of Georgia’s course towards the West, the decline of Georgia’s success story began much earlier. Actually, by July 2021, the relations between Europe and the Government of Georgia had been worsening for years. Although Europe did not want to admit it, and does not want to admit it up to now, the beginning of Georgia’s big troubles is connected with the coming to power of Bidzina Ivanishvili at the elections of 2011. This in its turn is directly connected with the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and the course chosen by the West for resolving the post-conflict situation.As we remember, the ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was mediated by the then President of France Nicolas Sarkozy. A six-point peace plan was signed, where Russians committed to withdraw all their armed forces to the positions held before 8 August, to allow international monitoring of the region, to grant access to humanitarian aid, and to open international discussions on the modalities of security and stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In reality, the commitment to return armed forces to their usual quarters was met only by Georgia. Instead, a few weeks later Russia recognised the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.Understandably, the dominating interest of the West was to pacify, to “diffuse” the conflict – even Sarkozy’s ceasefire agreement was called a plan to diffuse the conflict in official EU documents. And with this, diffusing of Georgia’s democracy began.Although Europe did not want to admit it, and does not want to admit it up to now, the beginning of Georgia’s big troubles is connected with the coming to power of Bidzina Ivanishvili at the elections of 2011.Russia’s military objectives in Georgia were about security policy as much as domestic policy: reversing Georgia’s course towards the West, ending Georgia’s aspirations to NATO membership, and bringing about a government in Georgia that would be more or less in line with Russia’s interests. In the opinion of the majority of the great powers, it seemed to be in the interests of the West to have a Georgia that would not cause a new conflict with Russia. Since the government of Mikheil Saakashvili (President in 2004–2013) had no intention of changing the country’s NATO course or of seeking a compromise with Russia on the issue of Georgia’s sovereignty, the result was a situation in which Saakashvili was controversially in the way of both Western peacemakers and Vladimir Putin.With the wisdom we have today, many have admitted that the West’s weak reaction to the annexation of Crimea encouraged Putin to take the next steps. Less has been spoken about the even weaker reaction to Russia’s invasion against Georgia.In the summer of 2008, too, the Russian escalation was visible to Western intelligence services: aggressive rhetoric, Putin’s threats in Munich and Bucharest in spring 2008 (“We’ll do you Kosovo”), troop build-up, and so on. Yet the main interest of the West in the aftermath of the war, about which Georgia repeatedly warned in the summer of 2008, was to calm down the situation and Saakashvili and save the face of the Russians, i.e., not to blame them.An example of this policy is the so-called Tagliavini Report, commissioned by the European Union, which had to analyse the causes of the war and assess the responsibility of the parties. The Report found that both sides were guilty, Georgia should not have “started” and Russia “overreacted”. In the background, there was the dissolution process usual at the time, where Brussels said to the Georgian government something like this: put up with this report, we can’t make Putin angry and we have to blame you a bit, but you can get four billion in aid from us and we’ll go on being friends.Mistakes of the WestIn March 2009, Barack Obama’s administration announced a “reset policy” in the US-Russia relations. In other words, seven months after an act of aggression against a sovereign state, in which part of the blame was placed on the victim of the aggression to pacify the aggressor, Washington gave a signal to Moscow that all was forgotten, or at least forgettable. And forgivable.At a post-war meeting between Russia and the United States, where the conflicts between the two countries were discussed, the final communiqué contained a point that the only serious disagreement was the issue of Georgia. Tbilisi was happy with it, not realising that the reset policy in the US-Russia relations is more important than the security interests of a small country.Ivanishvili’s rise to power in Georgia belongs, at least contextually, to the policy of reset and saving of Putin’s face. In 2011, the Russian reputation makers, and possibly the US ones too, had so successfully spread the tales about Saakashvili’s madness, the Germans and the French were so “tired” of Saakashvili’s aggressiveness, that everyone – Washington, Brussels and Moscow – breathed a sigh of relief when “that madman” lost the elections. When Urmas Reinsalu, who was the Minister of Defence of Estonia at the time, drew attention to Ivanishvili’s Russian connections in the Wall Street Journal, it caused a widespread outrage in both the US and Estonian foreign ministries.Distancing from the Western orbitSince the defeat of the Saakashvili’s government in the elections of 2011, Georgia has been ruled by in the style of oligarchic party government for, to put it simply, two periods. In the first period, which lasted until around the 2018 presidential elections, at some levels until Joe Biden was elected US President in 2020, the Georgian Dream was at least formally pro-Western, kept NATO and the EU course, and the relations with Russia were cool on the surface. At the same time, several important steps were taken that did not bring about any special setbacks in Brussels, but were most probably welcomed in Moscow.Already in 2012, the systematic harassment, imprisonment and driving to exile of Saakashvili-era politicians began. The West found that it had to be tolerated to a certain extent. Most of Russia’s agents were released from prison. Visa freedom with Russia was restored, and it was done unilaterally. It is in force also now – all who have Russian passport can go to Georgia without a visa for a year.From election to election, the use of taxpayers’ money in the campaign of the ruling party became more dominant; essentially, the Georgian voter has had no real opportunity for free elections since 2011. Formally it is possible, but due to the biased media picture, massive pushing from the authorities and sometimes also physical harassment of the opposition, it is in fact impossible.Seven months after an act of aggression against a sovereign state, in which part of the blame was placed on the victim of the aggression to pacify the aggressor, Washington gave a signal to Moscow that all was forgotten, or at least forgettable.Ivanishvili’s clan also started taking over the economy. Initially, this was seen as almost inevitable; under Saakashvili, too, the government had its favourites, and when they were pushed aside, the majority of the voters really had nothing against it.Georgia’s quiet distancing from the Western orbit became more apparent in 2014. The reactions of the government of Georgia to the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s aggression in Donbass were extremely reserved. There were no contacts between Kyiv and Tbilisi, while the whole East Europe, Georgia’s old friends were doing all they could to support Ukraine. The first phone call between Prime Minister of Georgia Bidzina Ivanishvili and President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko after the annexation of Crimea took place in 2015, when Ivanishvili demanded the extradition of Saakashvili, who was working as an adviser to the Ukrainian government, to Georgia.Ukraine and Georgia essentially parted ways from 2014. The former tandem, who tried to get into NATO together and were mentioned in the final document of the Bucharest Summit in 2008, have since then been in somewhat different camps at official level. At the same time, a number of the Saakashvili-era Georgian officials have found employment at the Ukrainian government, working in the areas of law enforcement, anti-corruption and judicial reform. Since 2014, an entire unit of Georgian volunteers has been fighting in Ukraine, and it was on the basis of the Georgian Legion that the Ukrainian International Legion was created in February this year. At the same time, since the beginning of the new phase of the war, the Georgian government has prevented Georgian volunteers from going to war in Ukraine.Ivanishvili as the grey cardinalThe internal political situation that prevailed in Georgia after transition of power in 2011 changed at the beginning of 2021 at the latest. Maybe the historians will one day find out what exactly caused this change. Probably, it came about due to both domestic and foreign policy factors.On the one hand, the domestic political situation had been becoming increasingly tense, the opposition was increasingly critical. The opposition does not recognise the results of the parliamentary elections of October 2021, and since then, part of the opposition has been boycotting the parliament.Europe was increasingly dissatisfied with the stalling of reforms, and the government may have felt that a heavier hand was needed to stay in power. At the same time, after Joe Biden’s election victory, Putin probably began to actively prepare for war in Ukraine as well as to neutralise potential opponents of war from neighbouring countries.2021 began with Ivanishvili’s declaration that he was resigning from politics. Formally, he has not held any political office since then, but no one who knows Georgia seems to think that he does not continue to control the country.Decline of Georgian democracyWith the resignation of Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia in February 2021, a new and significantly more aggressive period began in Georgia. Gakharia, who has now also left the Georgian Dream to form his own political party, ostensibly resigned because he did not agree with the decision of the Georgian Dream to jail opposition leader and chairman of the United National Movement Nika Melia. Ivanishvili, who formally is not involved in politics, replaced Gakharia with his old ally and confidant Irakli Garibashvili. Garibashvili was the Prime Minister also in 2013–2015, but resigned due to his extreme unpopularity both in Georgia and in the West.Melia was sent to prison; in May 2021, the principal owner and head of the opposition-minded Mtavari TV Nika Gvaramia was also jailed. The founder of this TV channel and opposition politician Giorgi Rurua was already waiting for him there. Since then, the decline of Georgian democracy has become faster. The government is imposing control over the judiciary and constitutionally independent institutions (such as the national ombudsman and the election commission), the special services are taping opposition politicians and journalists and publishing the tapes selectively in the media, the government is harassing civil society.Georgia has officially taken the position that it will stay out of the war and accuses the USA of trying to draw Georgia into the war against Russia.Rapid deterioration of relations with the European Union began, culminating in the withdrawal from the so-called Michel’s agreement. The government also began to condemn openly, aggressively and offensively the restrained criticism of Georgia by both Europe and the USA. When the European Union announced after July 2021 that Georgia would no longer qualify for a loan meant for judicial reform, the Prime Minister of Georgia said that Georgia would refuse the loan and was not interested in criticism from Europeans. “But who exactly is the European Union?” asked the Minister of Defence of Georgia when a journalist interviewed him about the EU’s criticism towards the government of Georgia in September 2021. In the summer of 2021, it was found that the Georgian secret services had secretly also recorded the phone calls of Western diplomats. The representative of the Georgian government called the outrage expressed over this “overstepping the boundaries of the Vienna Convention”.The future will be decided in UkraineAfter 24 February 2022, the situation has changed for the worse. Georgia has officially taken the position that it will stay out of the war and accuses the USA of trying to draw Georgia into the war against Russia. There is a nearly constant public and hostile exchange of words between the US ambassador and the representatives of government and parliamentarians of Georgia.On the other hand, at the beginning of the war, Russia lifted several sanctions on Georgian agricultural products. Business between Russia and Georgia is thriving: Georgian goods are flowing to Russia and Georgian ports service Russian goods. According to Transparency International, more than 6000 companies with Russian owners have been registered in Georgia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Recently, a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians accused Georgia of helping Russia evade sanctions. In June, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a proposal to the US Congress to impose sanctions on Ivanishvili for violating the policy of sanctions against Russia.With such a policy, the government of Georgia has probably lost quite a lot of its already low support among the Georgian voters. Public support for Ukraine is general among Georgians, and the biggest demonstrations held this year have been against the war.The European Union took its first bold step in June, when the Summit decided to grant the status of candidate country to Ukraine and Moldova, but not to Georgia. The government’s criticism of Europe in reaction to this decision most probably did not convince the Georgians. An absolute majority of the Georgian people still support the accession to both the EU and NATO.