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From a difficult accession process to full integration into the Schengen area and the Eurozone, ten years into its EU membership Croatia has been a “good EU pupil” and an example for EU candidates to follow. However, challenges remain in reaching European standards, particularly regarding administrative reforms and standards of living. When Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013 as the 28th Member State, it was the only European nation, except for Greece in 1981, to do so on its own. The newest EU Member’s accession was far from obvious due to complex political circumstances. Involved in the longest war in recent European history (1991-1995), Croatia was left with significant human and economic losses – 20 000 people killed and the cost of reconstruction amounting to 160 percent of GDP. The country’s difficulty to come to terms with war crime prosecutions, all of which were eventually acquitted, significantly impacted its relations with the EU. Consequently, Croatia missed the 2004 (Central and Eastern European States) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) rounds of accession and, somewhat ironically, was placed in the membership package with the Western Balkan countries and later in the accession negotiations with the eternal EU candidate Turkiye. Troubled border issues with Slovenia, then already an EU Member, further compounded the accession – unnecessarily as the Court of Justice of the EU confirmed in 2020. Per aspera ad astra: a good pupil of the EU The enlargement fatigue, which came as a result of the slow integration process for new members, enticed the Member States and the European Commission to be more demanding on Croatia. In addition to the Copenhagen political criteria introduced for all new enlargements, Croatia’s membership negotiations involved an unprecedented 35 chapters with specific opening and closing benchmarks, 160,000 pages of the EU’s Acquis Communautaire, and an additional monitoring process between closing negotiations and full membership, which all led to a long accession process, just short of a decade. With hindsight, this level of scrutiny most likely helped Croatia join the Schengen area and the Eurozone on 1 January this year – ahead of several Eastern European States. With its public debt-to-GDP ratio on the downward trajectory (68.4 percent at the end of 2022), Croatia is also performing better than other Mediterranean Eurozone States. The war, for which the country never received any reparations, and then the “lost decade” between 2004 and 2013 with the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, critically slowed Croatia’s economic growth, meaning it began its membership in the EU as its poorest growth prospects. Ten years on, macroeconomic data paints a more positive picture. Croatia’s GDP growth in the second decade of its EU membership has almost tripled compared to the decade before – reaching a staggering 13.1 percent in 2021. Croatia’s EU funds absorption has also significantly improved with the country receiving €12.1 billion in total from different funds. EU membership has facilitated a number of infrastructure projects, from the Peljesac bridge, one of the EU’s largest infrastructure investments, to reconstruction following earthquakes that hit Croatia in 2020. The accession to the Eurozone has lowered borrowing costs and given impetus to exports. It is expected that it will also boost tourism. Joining the Schengen area and removing borders with neighbouring EU Member States has enabled visitors to travel faster, with record numbers of tourists expected this year. Remaining hurdles Despite stellar numbers, systemic challenges remain affecting Croatia’s microeconomic performance. Overrepresentation of employment in the public sector, high and complex taxation, and inflexible labour laws have contributed to a stifling effect on business activity. Croatia’s average net salary is about €1100, well below the EU’s average, and its GDP per capita is among the lowest in the EU, half the EU average. Croatia’s population has consequently declined by nearly 10 percent to 3.8 million since joining the EU, a significant loss for a small country of mostly its younger population. It therefore does not come as a surprise that the country’s unemployment rate has been steadily decreasing over the years – it is currently at 5.6 percent. Labour shortages are being filled by workers from Balkan countries, but also by Asian workers, a cultural opportunity and a challenge for the rather homogenous Croatian society. Among experts and the business community, Croatia is still perceived as a relatively corrupt country,  fairing only marginally better than Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Several notable high-profile corruption cases in recent years demonstrates the scope of corruption. The EU-wide Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), established in 2021 to investigate corruption specifically related to EU funds, recorded 23 investigations in Croatia last year, most of which concerned regional development and agricultural funds. While the different reforms are underway, the question is whether they will be sufficient to diversify the country’s economy, still largely dependent on tourism (20 percent of Croatia’s GDP) and stop the demographic hemorrhage. New horizons Since Croatia’s accession, the EU has also faced a number of challenges. From the 2015 migration crisis to Brexit, and humanitarian, energy, and economic challenges brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has been forced to rethink its enlargement strategy. It has recently accepted Ukraine and Moldova as new candidates for EU membership, with Georgia in the pipeline. This is in addition to the already lined up Western Balkan states. Given the persisting political tensions and socio-economic gaps, the integration of such a disparate group of countries presents a difficulty. For now, the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war requires a cautioning of the EU’s openness. Croatia, as “good EU pupil,” can be a constructive factor in this process. It has been a strong supporter of further enlargement and with its recent experience can provide know-how and assistance. Croatia’s war, and the peacebuilding that followed, could be valuable for the post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine. Unlike some of the EU’s “enfants terribles” among new Member States, Croatia has not challenged the rule of law or broader EU values. So far, it has proved reliable in protecting the EU external border, which is positioned on the challenging Western Balkan migration route. Much of its good reputation in Brussels can also be thanked to the country’s prime minister, Andrej Plenkovic, who belongs to a progressive line of European conservative leaders gathered in the European People’s Party (EPP) that still rules the EU, as the biggest party in the European Parliament. Given its size, geographical position, and strong European identity, Croatia’s accession to the EU has been an exception in many aspects. However, its performance over the first ten years demonstrates that exceptions can be politically wise. Much as its famous soccer team, Croatia has been in many ways punching above its weight. Its “success story” could thus give an impetus to European integration and serve as a model for future EU enlargements.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to have changed course on his country’s foreign relations. At the last NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, he finally lifted his veto on Sweden’s proposed membership in the alliance; but his agreement is still incomplete as it requires the approval of the Turkish Parliament. And Erdoğan has apparently made parliamentary approval contingent on the US Congress approving his country’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets, which many assume may now be a done deal. Moreover, during the talks on Sweden’s accession, Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU) and hoped for a revival of the long-dead EU membership process. Prior to the Vilnius summit, Erdoğan further showcased his foreign policy outreach by hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ankara, signaling support for Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia.  On the domestic front, Erdoğan has formed a new cabinet that signals better relations with the West, as the most ardent anti-western member of the previous cabinet, former Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, has been left out. Additionally, the president aims to instill confidence in western markets by appointing respected figures like Mehmet Simsek as economy minister and Hafize Gaye Erkan as Central Bank governor. These appointments are seen as positive signals of an effort to strengthen economic ties with the West. This series of moves has triggered the hope, especially in western circles, that Turkey could return to the western fold and that Turkish-Russian relations will cool in parallel. However, pessimists, who see Turkey’s departure from the West as a done deal, disagree and are right to believe that Turkey’s relations with both the United States and European countries have fundamentally changed. It is no longer possible to go back to the early 2000s when Erdoğan was steering the country toward EU membership. The EU has no intention of admitting Turkey; but even if it did, the process would not be in Erdoğan’s favor. Nor is it possible to go back to the Cold War era, when Turkey was firmly embedded in the western geopolitical system. Turkey no longer sees Russia as a threat or an adversary in the sense that most western countries do. The fact that Turkey has resisted approving Sweden’s NATO membership for more than a year and that it will only do so in exchange for the delivery of F-16s shows how badly damaged Turkish-European and Turkish-American relations truly are. Therefore, pessimists point out that rather than signaling Turkey’s return to the West, the whole debacle proves how problematic and transactional Turkish-western relations have become. But these analysts overlook the fact that Erdoğan is pushing for a reorientation in foreign policy, and in his relations with the West in particular. This reorientation started long before the most recent presidential elections in May; but the president’s victory gave him a stronger hand to reboot his foreign policy, which is not aimed at bringing Turkey back into the West’s orbit, but rather at building better functioning relations with it. Turkey’s Departure from the West Turkey’s divergence from the West has taken place at the level of both political values and geopolitics. Over the last decade, Turkish democracy has been in serious decline. Especially after the transition to a hyper-presidential system in 2018, which eliminated all checks and balances in the political system, Turkey’s has become an increasingly autocratic regime. Turkish foreign policy has also become increasingly militarized, much to the chagrin of western capitals. Not only has Turkey used its military power in Syria, Iraq, and Libya but it has also deployed its navy to the Eastern Mediterranean, aggressively threatening the sovereignty of two EU countries: Greece and Cyprus. These aggressive policies were backed by an expansionist naval doctrine called Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland), whose ideology has disturbed western policymakers. The naval officers who created and developed the Blue Homeland concept never concealed their pro-Russian leanings and deliberately propagated an anti-American and anti-western narrative. These officers, and the political circles associated with them—dubbed Eurasianists in Turkey—have become an integral part of Turkey’s ruling coalition. Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia took place in such a context and represents the culmination of Turkish-American tensions. Turkey’s autocratic turn at home and its militarized foreign policy, which often work against the interests of its western allies, were simultaneous and mutually-reinforcing processes. But said foreign policy reached its limits toward the end of 2020. Turkey became regionally isolated with an overextended military, and its aggressive foreign policy, the rise of authoritarianism, and the subsequent decline of the rule of law plunged it into a protracted economic crisis. This economic downturn began to undermine Erdoğan’s meticulously-built power, as evidenced by his party’s defeat in the 2019 local elections. Unable to sustain autocratic rule, anti-westernism, and an aggressive foreign policy all at the same time, Erdoğan began to seek a new direction. The essence of the new approach is to maintain his authoritarian rule at home while becoming a less confrontational actor in foreign relations. Reorientation in Foreign Policy This reorientation began first in the Middle East, where Turkish authoritarianism was never going to be a cause for concern. Turkey began to mend fences with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while at the same time aligning itself with the emerging Abraham Accords framework in the region. While accommodating western geopolitical interests, Turkey’s relations with Iran began to enter a more confrontational phase. One of the main motivations for this regional restructuring was economic: Turkey continues to receive significant form of foreign investment from Gulf states. Another motivation was geo-strategic: Turkey hoped that normalization with Israel, and to a lesser extent with supposedly pro-western Arab regimes, would help ease tensions with the United States. While reconciling with its Middle Eastern rivals, the Erdoğan administration was also looking for opportunities to curry favor with Washington and increase its own importance in the eyes of the Biden administration. One of the early opportunities came in the summer of 2021 after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan when Turkey immediately stepped in and offered to take over the protection of Kabul International Airport. This initiative earned Erdoğan his first personal meeting with Biden. However, the unprecedented rapid collapse of the Kabul government prevented Ankara from using the Afghanistan front as a base to build its relations with the United States. A second opportunity arose in February 2022 when the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. New Opportunities for Erdoğan The war in Ukraine has had contradictory effects on Turkey’s foreign policy and on Turkish-western relations. On the one hand, it increased Turkey’s strategic value and facilitated its reengagement with the West. On the other hand, it created additional difficulties as western countries demanded that Turkey sever its ties with Russia, a demand that Turkey rejected. Erdoğan ultimately managed to spread the idea that perhaps it would be better for everyone if Turkey remained relatively neutral. Erdoğan’s personal ties with Putin and the complex and highly interdependent Turkish-Russian relations placed Turkey in a special position among NATO countries. Turkey therefore tried to maintain a pro-Ukrainian line without being anti-Russian. So far, Erdoğan has managed to maintain this seemingly paradoxical position. Turkey has given full military support to Ukraine, and especially in the early days of the war Turkish drones were vital for Ukraine’s defense. To be sure, this support was better than that of many European countries. Politically, however, and while condemning Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory since 2014, it has not joined in imposing sanctions on Russia, and the two countries have maintained good diplomatic relations. Erdoğan clearly enjoyed his balancing role. His policies during the Ukraine war have earned the Turkish public’s respect and helped, at least indirectly, in his reelection as they contributed to his image as a world-renowned statesman. Turkey also enjoyed the economic benefits of its being Russia’s main economic outlet. Not only did Turkish-Russian trade increase, but Putin lent a helping hand in the run-up to the elections by agreeing to delay Turkey’s natural gas payments and depositing much-needed foreign currency in the Turkish Central Bank. Erdoğan justified this unique position by emphasizing his mediating role between Ukraine and Russia and between the latter and the West. In this context, securing the grain deal was a particularly important achievement that helped Erdoğan justify his balancing act. Now the deal appears to be in tatters, raising questions about his ability to maintain his role as mediator. The Turkish president has also raised eyebrows in Moscow by recently hosting President Zelenskyy and increasing his support for Ukraine’s NATO membership. He even tested the Kremlin’s nerve by allowing Azov fighters to return to Ukraine with Zelenskyy, an apparent violation of a prisoner swap deal brokered by Turkey. Despite all this, Erdoğan wants to stick to his original position and continue to play the role of mediator. He is counting on the fact that Putin currently cannot afford a falling-out. Erdoğan has already indicated that he expects to host Putin in Turkey in August for a one-on-one meeting, although so far the Russian side has not confirmed the visit. Russia’s reaction to Turkey’s recent moves, such as ratifying Sweden’s NATO membership and supporting Ukraine’s NATO membership, has also been rather mute. Therefore, Turkey’s pivot to the West does not mean that it will cool its relations with Russia. Erdoğan realizes that the longer he maintains his balancing role, the stronger his hand will be with both the West and Russia. A Revitalization of Turkey-EU Relations? If there is no going back to the Cold War era, there is also no returning to the early 2000s, when Turkey was pushing for EU membership. Despite surprising everyone by rekindling the dormant EU membership process ahead of the Vilnius summit, Erdoğan’s move is unlikely to breathe life into Turkey’s EU accession aspirations. This is primarily due to the fact that EU membership would not align with the president’s personal interests, as it would necessitate a higher standard of the rule of law that might curtail his currently unchecked and absolute authority in the country. The accession process revolves around aligning a nation’s internal standards with EU norms, known as the community acquis. Consequently, becoming an EU member would demand a transformation of Turkey’s domestic political system, which currently concentrates power in Erdoğan’s hands. Given this, how should Erdoğan’s statements on revitalizing the EU process be interpreted? Part of the explanation has to do with his transactional style of policymaking. A master of brinkmanship and bargaining, Erdoğan often raises demands and stakes just to get a better deal. This is why Turkey’s foreign policy disputes are often resolved at the 11th hour, as is still the case with Sweden’s NATO membership. But these tactical moves also reflect Erdoğan’s genuine desire to improve relations with the EU. It is important to note, however, that Erdoğan does not necessarily want Turkey to be inside the EU; he simply wants to do business with it. The EU remains Turkey’s primary economic partner, and Ankara has long been demanding a modernization of the Customs Union agreement with the bloc to boost its trade. Moreover, better relations with European countries are expected to be instrumental in attracting much-needed foreign investment. Gulf money has only carried Turkey so far, and to solve its deep economic problems it is necessary to attract the financial power of the West. Thus, Erdoğan wants more engagement with Europe on the economy, defense, security, and refugee issues, but not in the context of EU membership. In fact, the refugee deal signed between Turkey and the EU in 2016 was designed precisely around the idea that Turkey is not and will not be part of the EU. Accordingly, Turkey continues to block the movement of refugees toward Europe in exchange for financial assistance from the EU. The bloc has recently concluded similar agreements with North African countries, aiming to externalize its refugee problem. For this cooperation with Turkey to work, Turkey needs to be outside the EU, not inside it. Thus, Turkey’s desire to create better working conditions with the EU is emblematic of the nature of its reorientation toward the West. Furthermore, western capitals seem increasingly willing to respond positively to overtures made by the Turkish President. Western Reaction to Erdoğan’s Moves It is not only Erdoğan who has changed his position; the West has also changed its approach to him. Biden and other western leaders were distancing themselves from Erdoğan in anticipation of his loss in the presidential elections. Biden did not invite him to Washington and did not visit Ankara, despite Turkey’s growing importance in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Knowing how much Erdoğan values personal meetings, Biden used them as leverage to resolve stalemates like the one over Sweden’s NATO membership. Moreover, having learned Erdoğan’s style of politics over the years, western leaders successfully avoided becoming his punching bag ahead of the elections, as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel did during Turkey’s 2017 constitutional referendum. To achieve this, they followed a policy of ignoring rather than supporting Erdoğan. But when the elections were over and he was set to rule Turkey almost single-handedly for another five years, western leaders rushed to congratulate him. It is also becoming much easier for the West to work with Turkey on a geostrategic and security level. For the United States, Turkish-American security cooperation is shifting from the Middle East to the Black Sea. Turkish-American relations in the Middle East have inevitably taken on a more political and ideological character, with the two countries’ different threat perceptions and respective approaches to the Kurdish issue and to Kurdish actors in northern Syria remaining the biggest challenge in bilateral relations. In contrast, Turkey and the United States are more in agreement on the Black Sea. Moreover, within the Pentagon, EUROCOM’s approach to Turkey is much more friendly than CENTCOM’s, and has a better track record of cooperation. For Europe, Erdoğan’s commitment to the migration deal makes him a valuable partner, especially given the growing anti-immigration stance of the Turkish and European publics. Moreover, Erdoğan’s preference for working with the EU but for simultaneously not genuinely pushing for membership in it fits well with European policies. The EU and Erdoğan are more in agreement on their common desire to keep Turkey out but to simultaneously build better working relations. Overall, it seems clear that Erdoğan is eying a new reorientation in his foreign policy. At the moment he is at the height of his power at home and does not need to use the West as a punching bag for domestic political gains. Furthermore, economic conditions and regional developments are compelling him to lean more toward western powers. As a result, Turkish foreign policy is poised to take a new direction. Nevertheless, any improvement in relations will likely be limited to the geostrategic and economic realms and will not encompass a realignment of political values. Without common political values, the result will be significantly improved but will remain transactional between Turkey and its western partners. This paper was originally published by Arab Center Washington DC. Republished with permission. © Arab Center Washington DC, October 2023.

Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end at some point, but when it will end as well as what the policy preferences of his successors might be are uncertain. It would be in the interests of the United States and Europe to signal on what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Russian leadership. Vladimir Putin has been the ruler of Russia since the turn of the century. He may remain in power through 2036, as the 2020 revision of the Russian constitution allows him to, or perhaps even longer. Then again, he may be ousted suddenly and surprisingly any day now, as the recent Wagner mutiny and the apparent lack of effective opposition to it within the Russian security services and public suggest is possible. Maybe he will decide not to run for re-election in 2024, though this does not seem likely. Sooner or later, though, Putin’s rule over Russia will come to an end. What is not at all certain, of course, is who will replace him and what sort of foreign policy the new leader will pursue. It would appear, though, that there are only a few possibilities. One is that Putin will be succeeded by someone just like him who will continue Moscow’s hostile policies toward Ukraine and the West in general. Another is that Putin will be replaced by someone within his circle that decides Moscow needs to cut its losses in Ukraine and rebuild good relations with the West both to revive Russia’s economy and to hedge against an increasingly powerful China. While this might seem unlikely, Russian and Soviet history are replete with examples of new autocratic leaders dramatically reversing key aspects of their predecessor’s policies. Yet another post-Putin possibility is an authoritarian leader who wants to cut Moscow’s losses in Ukraine but who sees the survival of both autocratic rule and even Russia’s territorial integrity as best served through increasing reliance on Chinese support and guidance. It is also possible that Putin’s rule will end as a result of the rise of democratic forces which want Russia to become part of the West and cooperate or join the EU or even NATO. For this scenario to occur, there would have to be a dramatic change of heart within the Russian security services about what is in Russia’s and their own interests. While this seems highly unlikely, there have been examples in other where military-backed autocratic rule gave way to democracy. Finally, whether Putin’s successor is autocratic or democratic, he or (much less likely) she may simply be weak as a result of having to deal with a compounding internal crisis resulting from Putin’s policies, including popular discontent over Russian casualties in Ukraine, economic decline, and secessionism in non-Russian or even Russian regions of the Russian Federation. What Can Europe and the United States Do? Russia’s post-Putin leadership and its policy preferences, whatever they may be, will have an enormous impact on Europe and the United States as well as other countries and regions of the world. But while obviously they hope to see Putin succeeded by a new leader who will end the war, withdraw from Ukraine, and improve Moscow’s ties with the West, Europe and the United States will have very little ability, if any, to affect the post-Putin transition — especially if the person who succeeds  him comes from within his inner circle. Putin has sought to rally Russian public support for his war in Ukraine through claiming that the West wants to bring about the breakup of Russia. Whether Putin himself actually believes this, there appears to be no possibility of changing his mind about the West being his implacable enemy. The United States and Europe, though, would do well to signal to whoever might succeed Putin that this is not the case. Specifically, Washington and Brussels should make clear how they would like to relate to post-Putin Russia. Such messaging should include the following points: Just as the United States and Europe support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, they also support the territorial integrity of Russia. The West has no interest in seeing the breakup of Russia. The United States and Europe will lift their economic sanctions on Russia (including those on Moscow’s exports of oil and gas) in response to Russian withdrawals from Ukrainian territory. The more occupied territory that Russia returns to Ukraine, the more Western economic sanctions against Russia will be lifted. While Europe and the United States would like to see Russia become a Western-style democracy, they acknowledge that whether it does so or not is an internal matter which Russians alone will determine. The United States and Europe are prepared to have normal relations with any type of Russian government — democratic or autocratic — which is willing to behave non-threateningly toward the West, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. While they respect the Russian government’s desire to continue cooperating closely with China, Western governments want Moscow to know that the United States, NATO, and the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (US, Japan, India, Australia) are willing to discuss common security concerns about China (which many Russians besides Putin have had) if and when the new Russian leadership wishes to discuss them. The articulation of these messages by the United States, Europe, and, regarding the last point, Quad governments, will not magically lead the Russian people, much less Putin’s inner circle, to oust Putin and embrace the West. Indeed, it is possible that a Putin loyalist successor will spurn them. But if the United States and Europe do not signal under what terms they would be willing to cooperate with a post-Putin leadership, then Washington and Brussels may reduce the chances that a post-Putin leadership will be willing to cooperate with the West.

Dear President Zelenskyy, dear Ukrainian friends, Two years ago I represented the EU at the first international summit of the Crimea Platform. And I stated clearly that Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be fully restored. And this applied to Crimea and this applied to the region of Donetsk and Luhansk. And I stand by that today. Since Russia invaded your country, you have suffered nearly 550 days of death and destruction, and Crimea is being used as a strategic springboard to launch its brutal attacks. And last September, just like they did in Crimea, Russia tried to illegally annex Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and this is again a cynical attempt to grab more land, to steal the identity of Ukrainian citizens, to abduct your children and to drive people from their homeland, like they are doing to the Tatars. I pay tribute to Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatar people, who travelled to Saudi Arabia with you, President Zelenskyy, in search of peace. Russia is perfecting the toolbox of terror and persecution that they applied in Crimea over nine long years, and they are now committing atrocities in cities and villages in the whole of Ukraine, many amounting to war crimes. The EU will continue to call for full accountability for these crimes, including for the crime of aggression, and will not recognise any illegal attempt to change the status of Ukraine’s territories, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, because respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries is a basic principle of the UN Charter and that’s why we support you, President Zelenskyy, and your peace formula based on these very principles. In Ukraine you are fighting for your freedom, you are fighting for your future and for your homeland, and in the EU we know you are also fighting for our common values. And that’s why we have imposed massive sanctions against Russia and that’s why we are supporting you with weapons and ammunition, and we will strengthen this support. We are also helping to meet your humanitarian needs, and we are determined to back your country with strong financial support. We stand with you in your fight for freedom, and we will stand with you as you rebuild your country. Our total support for Ukraine amounts to more than €76 billion. And we are preparing a multiannual financing plan of roughly €50 billion. Russia also continues to weaponise food, including by blockading and attacking your seaports. And this cruel Russian tactic hits the most vulnerable around the globe hardest. In the EU we continue to support the efforts of the United Nations and Turkey to get the Black Sea Grain Initiative back up running. And we are also strengthening our Solidarity Lanes through the EU to help get Ukrainian agricultural products to global markets. Ladies and gentlemen, this war is also a fight for your future, for your dream of a bright, democratic and more prosperous future within the EU. Last year Ukraine received EU candidate status. So your European Union future is no longer a question of if, it is a question of when. And later this year, the European Council will discuss the possibility of opening accession negotiations. And I am confident that the Ukrainian people and the leaders will rise to this historic moment. You can count on my personal support, you can count on the EU. We will stand by your side for as long as it takes. Slava Ukraini!

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine imposed a sudden energy shock on Europe 18 months ago. Faced with the prospect of much less Russian gas, there were fears that Europe’s energy infrastructure would not cope with winter 2022-23, causing economies to crumble.   Yet a mild winter and the EU’s gradual rollout of a plan to reduce its energy consumption and buy more from alternative suppliers saw it emerge shaken but not beaten on the other side.  Germany, Italy and other gas-reliant nations pivoted from Russian dependency without major electricity shortages. Since then, there has been more good news. Energy prices have fallen steadily in 2023, while Europe’s gas storage levels hit 90% capacity three months ahead of the November target and could even hit 100% in September.    According to politicians like the German energy minister, Robert Habeck, the worst of the energy crisis is over.  Yet, as we shall see, it’s a little early to be so confident.  New vulnerabilities  The share of EU piped gas imports from Russia fell from 39% to just 17% between early 2022 and early 2023. To cope with this shift, the EU has become much more reliant on shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) than before.  LNG’s total share of EU gas imports rose from 19% in 2021 to around 39% in 2022, amid a rapid upgrade to infrastructure that aims to have grown LNG capacity by one-third between 2021 and 2024. (Indeed, 13% of LNG imports into the EU actually still come from Russia, whose shipments have also significantly increased since the invasion).  This LNG increase has made European countries vulnerable to volatility in that market – particularly as 70% of these imports are bought at short notice rather than using the long-term oil indexed contracts that prevail in Asia.  For example, we’ve seen Europe’s benchmark gas price ticking upwards in recent weeks due to concerns over strikes at Australian LNG plants. This shows that supplies remain tight and that there are many potential disruptions in our highly interconnected world market.  To synchronise demand for LNG, the European Commission has introduced initiatives like the EU Energy Platform, an IT platform that makes it easier for supplier companies in member states to jointly buy the fuel. However, it is uncertain what level of supplies can be channelled through this instrument as it remains untested. Additionally, the industry fears this kind of state intervention could backfire and undermine the functioning of the market.  As for pipeline gas, Norway has overtaken Russia to become Europe’s leading supplier, providing 46% of the requirement in early 2023 (compared to 38% a year earlier). This extra load has strained Norway’s gas infrastructure. In May and June, delayed maintenance work caused sluggish flows that drove up prices, again showing how tight the European market is at present. Extended maintenance work in Norway leading to more obstructions in future looks distinctly possible.  Meanwhile, the EU is still expected to have to buy around 22 bcm (billion cubic metres) from Russia this year. That’s the equivalent of around 11% of all the pipeline gas used by the bloc in 2022. A large proportion is coming through Ukraine, and with the current Russia-Ukraine transit agreement unlikely to be renewed after it expires in 2024, this supply route is in jeopardy.  As part of the pivot away from Russia, the EU managed to reduce gas consumption by 13% in 2022, according to the International Energy Agency (against a target of 15%). In the months ahead, war-weary EU states may not do so well on this front.  It will not help that prices have fallen, nor that some states didn’t pull their weight last winter. Only 14 out of 27 EU members introduced mandatory energy reduction policies, while eastern states like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria did little to reduce consumption. Should there be a physical shortage of gas in continental Europe this winter, this might undermine calls for solidarity.  What comes next  The harsh reality is that for at least another two or three winters, Europe will have to hope for mild weather across the northern hemisphere without major interruptions to global LNG supply if it is to avoid significant gas price spikes.  Even as things stand, European gas prices remain around 50% above their pre-invasion long-run average, which is hurting both households and businesses. This is particularly important for Germany, the EU’s industrial powerhouse, with its energy-intensive automotive and chemical industries. There are growing concerns that continued high energy prices could promote de-industralisaton as energy-intensive industries move elsewhere.  The good news is that pressure on gas should at least subside from the mid-2020s. Significant new supplies of LNG will come online in the US and Qatar and the market will re-balance. European gas demand should also get significantly lower – down 40% by 2030, according to the energy reduction plan.  There is even talk of a supply glut by the end of the decade, depending on renewable energy deployment accelerating in Europe, and a new generation of nuclear power stations coming on stream. This would significantly reduce Europe’s need to import gas for good, but will only happen if the bloc coordinates effectively.  We saw what can be achieved in the months after the invasion when France supplied gas to Germany to help reduce its dependence on Russia, then Germany later supplied more electricity to French cities to help with outages caused by nuclear reactor maintenance.  The challenge is to take the same approach to decarbonisation. While France tries to gather support for nuclear modernisation both at home and elsewhere in Europe, it is facing opposition from the likes of the German-led “Friends of Renewals” group, which advocates building out only renewable energy. Divisions like these may prove a serious obstacle in achieving a more rapid energy transformation away from fossil fuels.  So while Europe has managed to pivot away from Russia’s pipeline gas, it will remain exposed to the volatility of global gas markets unless it reduces its gas demand significantly in the coming years.

Europeans should allow their countries to be hosts for free debate among the Russian emigrés of the 21st century. But they should resist the temptation to view the exiles as channels of influence to reform Russia.  Life as a refugee is always difficult. And being a Russian exile in Europe is difficult in its own way. You are blamed for the war you opposed. You might fight the blame, or you might own it and try to atone – either way, there is little you can do. And what you are able to do inevitably proves inadequate: it is hard to convince Europeans that Russian society does not bear blame for Vladimir Putin’s war; and you can never apologise enough to shake away the guilt. Alternatively, you might be of the opportunistic type, who arrives with a sense of entitlement in search of the good life – and also ends up disappointed by the cool welcome. Either way, you start slowly losing touch with home, while never quite agreeing with the worldview of your new neighbours.  The politically motivated exodus of Russians to Europe started slowly in around 2012 and dramatically intensified over the past year and a half. The exiles come with a panoply of views. There are those who indeed feel guilty about the war, because, as Russian citizens, they feel responsible for failing to prevent it. There are those who think of themselves first and foremost as victims of the Putin regime and refuse to be answerable for its crimes. There are those who do not bother with questions of guilt at all, but just come in search of a safe haven – for their money, perhaps, or from mobilisation. There are those who worked for the Putinist system before becoming disillusioned or falling out of favour; there are those who kept their distance from the very start. And finally, there are surely those who have not truly fled at all, but have been planted among the refugee community by the Russian special services.  Europeans and the European Union lack a common policy towards the exiles. While Ukrainian refugees will correctly remain Europeans’ priority, what should European decision-makers do about the fleeing Russians: embrace them; reject them; or put them on probation?  What should European decision-makers do about the fleeing Russians: embrace them; reject them; or put them on probation?  Some in Europe view the exiles as our best link to civil society in Russia; as a group who could be instrumental to democratising the country in the future. They suggest welcoming them, helping them, and working with them. Behind the scenes, though, many others, especially European officials working on security matters, are governed by caution: ‘We don’t know who these people really are,’ they say in private. ‘They might be anti-Putin, they might be undercover FSB. And if they are effective in their anti-Putin activities, the Kremlin might send assassins after them – which won’t help our security either.’  A third approach is to approve of Russians as long as they think and behave in particular ways. In many places the exiles are welcome as long as they conform to local expectations, which vary widely, and are maximalist in some places. A good illustration of this is the fate of TV Dozhd. Russia’s last-remaining liberal television channel moved its operations to Latvia, but soon lost its licence for its programming’s lack of Latvian subtitles, for referring to the Russian army as “our army,” and for using (probably accidentally) a map that showed Crimea as part of Russia. Consciously or otherwise, the Latvian government seems to have hoped TV Dozhd would become essentially a Russian-language Latvian television channel, taking Riga’s official line and helping to sway the views of Latvia’s extensive Russian diaspora. When TV Dozhd continued to operate as part of the Russian debate and media landscape – hence its reference to the Russian army as “ours” – it went beyond the bounds of the expectations of the Latvian authorities.  All approaches have their logic and merit. All have shortcomings too.  It is likely true that, for the time being, the exiles are Europe’s best link to Russian society. Most have friends and family in Russia, with whom they communicate on a daily basis. However, if the standoff endures, over time these links will weaken. Former friends, some of whom stayed, some of whom left, will take separate paths in life. They will be part of different debates, with different social codes. The exiles will slowly lose their authentic ‘feeling’ for Russia; they could start projecting their own hopes and fears upon reality. At that point, anyone who relies on the political analyses of the exile community alone will need to start double-checking its members’ assessments.  It is also hard to say what part the exile community can play in post-Putin Russia. To an extent this will depend on the length of time they are away. The Russians who fled the Bolshevik revolution after 1917 believed they would soon head back – and as a result lived out of suitcases for most of their lives. By contrast, those who left in the 1970s and 1980s expected never to return – but many had done so by the early 1990s. We simply do not know what the future holds for today’s emigrés.  It is also impossible to predict the influence they will have if they go back. In some societies – the Baltic states, for instance – returning exiles adapted smoothly and played important political and social roles following the collapse of the USSR. Not so in Russia – in the 1990s, the homegrown networks of post-Soviet Russian politics proved fairly impenetrable to those who had been away. This may change after Putin; or it may not.    It is unlikely that Europeans will ever have a truly common policy towards their Russian exile community. The questions of Russia and Russians are of different levels of sensitivity in different countries, and different states’ policies will always reflect that. Accepting this will make life easier for everyone, and Europe is diverse enough to welcome Russians in various ways. For instance, TV Dozhd may have moved to Latvia in the hope of being close to Russia in a town inhabited by exiles. But ultimately it may be better off in its new home in the Netherlands, where society is less instinctively suspicious of everything Russian.  Also, much of what regulates the daily life of Russian exiles – rules on visas, border crossing, residence permits, asylum – will remain in the competence of interior ministries, and thus outside the regulatory reach of the EU. Its institutions may still wish to draw up a list of recommendations or best practices, which could help member states at least streamline their actions, so that unilateral steps by some do not leave others exposed. (Think, for instance, of how the visa bans introduced by the Baltic states last year increased the migration pressure on Finland and Norway – until they too restricted the movement of Russians.) This would also help address the Kafkaesque set of regulations inside the EU faced by the exiles. But truly uniform policies across the bloc or the Schengen visa space are probably unrealistic for the time being.   Of course, the exiled Russians need to adapt to the societies where they have settled. They need to follow local rules and laws, and put up with local views about Russia – there is no avoiding that. However, their hosts should allow them to be themselves – Russian Russians – not just Russian-speaking Europeans.  Ultimately, Europeans’ approach should be to provide space for Russians without over-investing in them or instrumentalising them. Allow them space to live, safe from the Kremlin. Enable them to talk freely about Russia – painful and necessary as it is. For now, exile is the only place where there can be a Russian debate about the country’s political system, how to fix it, and how to atone for its crimes. Parts of their soul-searching may connect with the discourse in Russia, although there is no guarantee of this. But above all, Europeans should not view them as a column that will smash the Putinist regime. Do not embrace them as such, do not project your hopes onto them, and do not try to micromanage Russian politics with the help of exiled political leaders (even if they ask you to).  The rationale for welcoming Russians should be that Europe is Europe: a place that provides shelter for refugees and a home for honest debate. Europeans’ reasoning should not be rooted in any expectations about the political influence exiles will have in a future Russia – because that may never materialise. If those who departed eventually acquire such influence, it will be a welcome surprise. Above all, the more that Europeans steer clear of intra-Russian intrigues and political manipulation, the more likely it is that such influence will be worth the steadfastness of circumspection.

Thank you very much.  Dear Mr. Speaker Stephanchuk, Distinguished Members of the Verjovna Rada,Excellencies, dear friends. I am very grateful to be here today, on this very special day for my country. Today, 1st July,  Spain assumes the great responsibility of becoming the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the next six months. And I wanted that the very first thing I did in my new capacity was to address the people of Ukraine through their Verjovna Rada. I wanted to tell you that we are and will be with you as long as it takes. I wanted to tell you that we will support Ukraine no matter the price to pay. That we will be with you in the achievement of your aspirations to be a free and sovereign  country that decides its own destiny as a member of the European family. In short, I am here to express the firm determination of Europeans and Europe to fight against the illegal, unjustifiable and unjustified Russian aggression to Ukraine. Once again, I have the honour to address all of you in this temple of Ukrainian democracy. My first address took place in February, on the first anniversary of Russia’s aggression against your sovereignty and territorial integrity. Things have changed since then. Today Ukraine is in the midst of the counter-offensive against an enemy that is showing signs of weakness. We have all seen the events of last week. They speak for themselves. And, if one side shows weakness, it is because in front of him there is someone who shows the opposite: determination. It's what I can see, right here, and right now: determination, strength and courage. What I can see is a whole country that refuses to be subjected and fights for its independence with immense dignity. I know the price to pay is enormous. Especially in human lives lost. Nothing I can say here today can comfort a family that has lost a daughter, a son, a mother, a father or a husband. Men and women who gave their lives defending a free and democratic Ukraine.  Still, I want to do it from the bottom of my heart on behalf of my country, Spain. A country that mourns with you. A country that condemns every Russian attack against Ukrainian civilians, like the one at Kramatorsk. Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer was there. Severely injured, now fights for her life. Victoria was close to the front line, because she wanted to document the tragedy. She wanted to collect the memory of infamy. The lost heritage. The broken lives. The crimes committed. We need women Victoria Amelina, to write history. To tell the facts as they happened and preserve the memory of those who suffer this tragedy. Excellencies, dear friends, we do not forget that the European aspiration of the Ukrainian people was one of the excuses that triggered the Russian reaction and, in turn, the invasion. It was only fair to honour this aspiration by granting you the status of candidate to the European Union. No one deserves it more than you, than Ukraine. However, I know that this is not an easy process, especially with an ongoing war. To become a member state requires changes, reforms and sacrifices. Not long ago, Spain faced this challenge as a candidate country. But, let me tell you, that the process to become an European Union member taught us important lessons. One of them is that undertaking reforms has a value in itself. Reforms make your governance and your economy better, more modern and transparent. They bolster international confidence and proximity. They attract investment. And, in time, they will grant you access to our European Union. A Union, which is more than just the largest internal market in the world. Which is, above all, a community of values: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Last week, the European Commission made a positive assessment of Ukrainians, of Ukraine’s progress concerning the required reforms. I congratulate you for the progress made, especially thanks to the legislative work of this Rada, and I encourage you to keep up with it. It is worth the effort. Congratulations. And of course we will be eagerly awaiting the report of the European Commission in the fall, which will set the basis for the future. Excellencies, We want a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Only Ukraine can set terms and times for peace negotiations. Other countries and regions are proposing peace plans. The involvement is much appreciated, but, at the same time, we cannot accept them entirely. This is a war of aggression, with an aggressor and a victim. They cannot be treated equally. And ignoring the rules should in no way be rewarded. That is why we support President Zelenski’s peace formula, which is respectful with International Law and the UN Charter. Ukraine is paying a heavy prize in terms of destruction of cities and infrastructure. So, we need to make sure that the country is rebuilt, thus creating the conditions for its growth and prosperity. And we have already started. Today, Spain has decided to dedicate another 55 million euros, including offering 51 M€ through the World Bank Group to help finance Small and Medium Enterprises in Ukraine, as well as 4 M€ to the UN Development Program to provide schools in Ukraine with green-friendly and resilient energy systems. Reconstruction will take time and investment in many sectors. Spain is committed to accompanying Ukraine in this process. There are some areas, such as the railway infrastructure, in which our companies have the know-how that can make the difference. The Spanish government will support finance the necessary investments to adapt and upgrade infrastructures and productive sectors in your country. Yet, we understand that reconstruction and prosperity will only arrive if real, long-term security is achieved. My friends, in my view, it is clear that we cannot rely on the promises made after the Cold War anymore. We have to adapt to a different security environment, one in which concepts like peace, sovereignty or territorial integrity can no longer be taken for granted. The aggression on Ukraine has shown us that they need to be effectively defended. Not just with words, but with facts. Therefore, we will need to rethink the security framework to ensure that your country, Ukraine, will be able to live free from aggression or intimidation. As the President said, we are approaching the NATO Summit in Vilnius, which will follow on the commitments we made last year, in Madrid, the capital of Spain. Spain supports enhancing the political participation of Ukraine through the creation of a NATO-Ukraine Council, where you will no longer be an invitee, but a member, a full member. We are also in favour of enhancing the practical cooperation, to continue to adapt your defence sector to NATO Standards. These are, my friends, big steps forward that will be further discussed during the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius. Spain will continue to do its part as well: we are delivering more Leopard tanks, armoured personnel carriers and a field hospital with surgical capacity. We also continue to reach out to other countries and continents, to explain what is really happening here in Ukraine, but also to listen to their concerns, especially those related to food and energy security or insecurity, in this case. Excellencies, Last February, before my trip to Kyiv, someone in Madrid, in my city, was  wondering about the Ukrainian’s state of mind and asked me: “Do you think they are afraid?”. When I came back, after the visit, I had a clear answer to this question and I told them: Look, they are not afraid. They are going to win. It will take them weeks, or months. It will take tears, blood and sweat, but Ukraine is going to win this war. And they asked me “Pedro, Pedro, why?, why?”. And I said, “Because there are two battles. One happens in the battlefield. The other happens in the mind, because it’s a battle of ideas. And that one, the Ukrainian people have already won it”. Ukraine has chosen democracy in the face of those who despise it. Ukraine has chosen openness and freedom, in the face of those who fear it. Ukraine has chosen to sit, and discuss, and vote, and change, and evolve, in the face of those who only believe in force and obedience. Ukraine has chosen to be independent, to move freely, to trade, to invest, to prosper, to have hope, in the face of those who still have delusional dreams about old empires. The Ukrainian people have chosen the European way. The Ukrainian people ARE, you are Europeans. And you are Europeans not only because of a geographical imperative. You are Europeans by moral and spiritual commitment. So, dear friends. During this years, I have learned many things about Ukraine. Even some Ukrainian words. For instance, I have learned that "Mriya" (emriya) means “dream” in English, we say in Spanish Sueño. That was the name of the largest plane in the world, located at the Hostomel airfield when it was destroyed by Russian troops in February 2022. That plane brought medical supplies during the pandemic or carried humanitarian aid in natural disasters. It was a symbol, a pride for Ukraine. They destroyed the symbol, but they couldn’t destroy the idea. Now, I have learnt that Ukrainian engineers are already working on the reconstruction of that giant of the skies. Let me tell you that you are not just rebuilding an airplane: you are rebuilding a dream. One day, that dream will cross the skies again. And from there, here on the ground, we will see a new Ukraine reborn from the ashes of destruction. That’s what you fight for. You fight for peace, for security and prosperity for your children. And every Ukrainian soldier knows it. Russian soldiers fight because they are scared they will be punished if they don’t. They ask themselves everyday “what are we doing here?”. You are united, you stand on the moral high ground. They even rebel, as we saw a few days ago. That’s why they cannot win and you cannot lose. I came here today to tell you that Europe is open to those who make the choice. The European Union was built to prevent new wars. We chose to get together, to be “united in diversity”, and that made us stronger. Europe is with you, and you are one with Europe. Mui Yevropa! [¡Somos Europa!] Slava Ukraini [¡Viva Ucrania!]

Excellencies, President of the Malta Model United Nations Society, Conference Manager, Participants, Let me begin by thanking the organisers of this Conference for inviting me to deliver this address and for arranging the discussion on this very relevant and timely topic. I have to congratulate Their Excellencies for the very interesting presentations they have just made to this Conference. The subject matter of this Conference will seek to explore considerations of progress and how this can be done sustainably.  I believe that the theme of progress and development is a defining challenge of our era. We are struggling to come to terms with how to manage progress in a fair and equitable manner. For progress to be sustainable, we must ensure it is coupled with the practice of fair and just sharing of benefits as well as of burdens. In other words, we cannot have progress unless this is achieved through just and fair means. Let me, for the beginning, state that real and sustainable progress can only occur within a rules-based international system founded on commitment and mutual respect. As demonstrated since the inception of the United Nations in the aftermath of the Second World War, a rules-based international order is the only just alternative to a system where might makes right. This vision is at the core of the United Nations system – the promotion of respect for international rule of law and principles of sovereignty and self-determination as basic tenets of global diplomacy. “To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. These are among the first words of the United Nations Charter. These words remain the main motivation underpinning the work of the United Nations. Almost eight decades later, I note with concern that the integrity of this vision is severely threatened by the return of great power rivalry.  This last year has been a demonstration of what ‘realpolitik’ looks like in practice. The senseless and illegal aggression and the unrelenting violence unleashed on Ukraine are a direct threat to the cardinal principles of respect for sovereignty and self-determination. These events have unfortunately brought us face to face with the very dire consequences of war, war in Europe – something that Europe selfishly had thought was relegated to the past, because in actual fact, over the years, there was always some ongoing war somewhere on the globe. Unfortunately, on many occasions we absolve ourselves from any responsibility by convincing ourselves that “this does not concern us”. Our collective message has to be a clear and resounding one. We cannot return to a world where the strong do as they will and the weak are left to suffer what they must. We cannot accept that the fundamental principles of respect for sovereignty and self-determination be swept aside by aggression and military might, be it on our doorstep in Ukraine, further away in Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, or on the other side of the globe. In this regard, Malta’s neutrality as enshrined in our constitution does not imply indifference to the attacks on our shared principles, the deplorable loss of life during conflict and the suffering brought about upon innocent civilian people through famishes and food shortages, displacement and atrocities of war, not least sexual violence against women. Our Constitution does not imply indifference to these attacks. Indeed, our aspiration to serve on the United Nations Security Council for the term 2023-2024 stemmed precisely from our strong willingness to somehow contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in a meaningful manner. Together with the General Assembly, the Security Council is practically the highest organ of the United Nations. It deals with the most sensitive political issues that could arise. Our tenure comes at a time where the Council is highly polarised, seized as it is with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Despite this tense climate, Malta remains committed and determined to continue playing a constructive role in safeguarding the rules-based order and ensuring that our global institutions remain relevant in the contemporary world. We will continue to advocate the importance for accountability to be pursued in line with international law, as well as to ensure the fight against impunity – including for the crime of aggression. Excellencies, Friends, Fully conscious of the unequal distribution of wealth and resources, particularly the ever-widening gap between the rich consuming countries and the developing countries, we hold the key to push forward an agenda for fair progress built on the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030. Leave no one behind – is the central tenet and transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Goal number 10 of the Sustainable Development Goals is Reducing inequality within and among countries. Under this SDG, all UN Member States pledge to eradicate poverty in all its forms, end discrimination and exclusion, and reduce the inequalities that leave people behind.  A cursory look around us indicates that alongside globalisation and promises of better development outcomes, poverty, economic hardships and inequalities within and among countries, unfortunately, continue to persist. As the deadline for the SDGs approaches, the progress towards these goals is dangerously off track. These goals were scheduled to be met by 2030, that is only seven years from now. Can we make it on such a short period of time? A series of international shocks and crises – including the coronavirus pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the worsening climate emergency – have caused and continue to cause, further dislocation and displacement, laying bare the inequities and injustices of the world economy. Many countries face mounting debt, high interest rates as well as increasing poverty and hunger, besides internal strife to quench the never-ending lust for power.  Closer to home, the Mediterranean remains a reservoir of instability and huge political, economic and social disparities. Sadly, the political and economic situation continues to deteriorate in our immediate neighbourhood; the phenomenon of irregular migration, the existential threat posed by climate change, and the breakdowns in food-supply chains provide us with clear examples of things to come. Around the globe, lower and middle-income countries are vulnerable and exposed to political, economic, and ecological crises not of their own making. Many small island states are facing serious threats to their very own existence due to the progressive emigration of their population because of climate change and the probability of eventual rise in sea levels. Meanwhile, vulnerable populations, people living in poverty or marginalized due to their ethnicity, gender, religion or national origin, all need practical, people-centred, humane solutions to global problems like climate change or the pandemic. These challenges are multifaceted, and are transnational in nature, hence why it is necessary that they are resolved by international cooperation and by a responsive multilateral system. At a grassroots level, millions of people across the world continue to call for equal access to health, nutrition, education, energy, and mobility. Basic things which, unfortunately, they still do not have. These impassioned and genuine calls for social justice must not be ignored. We have to, and I say this very responsibly, avoid settling down in a “westernised” mentality, or worse still become too “Eurocentric” in our assessments, and thinking that the world is the same as Europe or the West. There is much more beyond this westernised mentality and Eurocentricity. Strange as it may seem, gender equality is growing more distant around the globe, with projections indicating that this will only, if ever, be achieved many years from now. Advancements in maternal health and access to quality education for young girls remains frustratingly low. The logic is simple: without the contribution of a disenfranchised half of the world’s population, we will only be able to fulfil half of our potential, or even less. Young and old, male and female, irrespective of race, creed or colour, we are all equal partners in this global effort to promote just societies that are expected to cater for the basic needs of citizens. When I speak of needs, I include such considerations as the importance to have – simple things – access to clean and efficient energy, quality health and educational services, and gainful employment opportunities. These are only some of the basic necessary ingredients. We must realise that the political exclusion of groups within our societies through xenophobia, racism, intolerance, and dehumanisation prevents equitable outcomes and destroys social cohesion, leading to societal tensions, unrest and possibly even open conflicts. We need to create inclusive societies and communities and an international order based on justice. In such societies, every human being should live in dignity and respect and lead a life that he or she has reason to value and cherish. Women, youth, ethnic groups, religious and other groups, all of civil society: these must all be equally empowered to participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect their lives. This is a fundamental prerequisite for social justice. Excellencies, In view of the above, I believe that we all agree that we are far from fulfilling our collective duty to secure a fairer future for the coming generations. The question therefore is: “What can we do about this? How do we move from the current state of affairs to the fair and equitable societies that we all aspire to create?” Man has always dreamt about ‘utopia’. We know it is not achievable, but at least we should keep on trying. I personally believe that youth as well as education both play a crucial role in this regard. In the words of the well-known educationalist Maria Montessori: “Establishing a lasting peace is the work of education. All politics can do is keep us out of war”. This does not mean that as political leaders we have no obligations in this respect. Quite the contrary. Our obligations, individually and collectively, relate to the promotion of education that is inclusive, that promotes the dignity of every human being and that recognizes the values of understanding, dialogue as well as solidarity. Education brings awareness of the environment, tolerance of the opinion of others, acceptance of the fact that we are one human race, and peace based on justice, love, and respect for others. This is key if we are to create socially just societies that prioritise progress as a means of securing a fairer future. Looking ahead, I believe that education is a key instrument to empower our youth. Youth empowerment has been a recurring theme throughout my Presidency. Young people from across the globe have a crucial role to play in prompting open dialogue, and to seek common ground with the aim of bringing about positive changes in our societies. This is why in 2016 I was motivated to organise the Young Mediterranean Voices initiative, together with the then High Representative of the European Union Federica Mogherini, and the Anna Lindh Foundation which is based in Alexandria. On that occasion, more than 600 students from all across the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf region put aside their differences to spearhead a culture of persuasion rather than confrontation, tolerance rather than condemnation, and acceptance rather than exclusion. Institutions like the Anna Lindh Foundation continue to promote such inclusive approaches for youths. Today, the Mediterranean is home to millions of young voices eager to develop their full potential and to build sustainable and inclusive societies.  But this is only one small region on the globe. The United Nations has to cater for all the rest. These are only some preliminary reflections which, I hope, you will find useful in the course of your debates and deliberations. I urge you all to make the best use of the outcomes of the exchanges you will be having in the coming days. What you will learn throughout this Conference could well influence the course of your lives in the coming years, so make the best of this experience. I wish you fruitful and productive discussions. Thank you, very much.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic / Dear KyriakosDear Ministers, Dear Governor, Dear Mayor of ThessalonikiDear Mr. Dzikas, Dear Greek friends It is, indeed, a privilege to address you in the context of the Thessaloniki International Fair. I thank the organizers of the HELEXPO and I thank the Greek Prime Minister for his kind invitation. Let me start by saying that during the last days and weeks we have witnessed the worst possible consequences of the climate crisis. We have seen scenes of destruction that we could not imagine we would see in our lifetime. Some of these tragic events happened here in Greece - our closest neighbor and most friendly country, just a few kilometers from our common border. Allow me to express my deepest condolences for the victims of the recent floods in your country and our full solidarity with the friendly Greek people. Tonight I want to send a message loud and clear: Greece is not alone. You have many partners and friends and we will spare no effort to help you mitigate the consequences. Bulgaria and the whole Europea Union stands with you.  We also have victims from the floods in Bulgaria. Both countries face similar problems, such as floods and fires. Helping each other and working together is a must. As an example, this year we have twice deployed Bulgarian firefighting teams to help you overcome devastating fires. Climate change is a global challenge, which demands a common answer. We need to work more closely together to share information and technologies, to integrate our weather forecast systems and our early warning systems to better prevent disasters in the future. I can assure you we are ready for such a mutually beneficial cooperation. Ladies and Gentlemen,Bulgaria is the honoured country at this year’s Thessaloniki International Fair. This is great honour for us, but above all, this is an acknowledgement of the exemplary level, which the relations between Bulgaria and Greece have reached. This is also an acknowledgement of the important role, which my country plays in the region. The presence at such an important international forum provides a broad range of opportunities to enhance further our already excellent economic ties. Bulgaria is represented in several related sectors such as IT, hi-tech, energy, infrastructure, construction, education, tourism and the food industry. Bulgarian companies with a strong international presence participate, including EnduroSat, a significant player in the satellite industry and space technology, and Telerik Academy, providing accessible and innovative digital technology training. Among the participants is Sofia Techpark which provides a platform for global, regional and national companies to develop innovative technologies and to exchange know-how. The Bulgarian Investment Agency, which supports the creation of projects leading to new jobs, exports and transfer of know-how, is also here. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, whose experts conduct scientific research, training and activities of international importance, is present as well. Dear Prime Minister,This is the right occasion to acknowledge the fact that your leadership has transformed Greece into an attractive destination for international investments. Let me assure you that this is valid also for the investments from Bulgaria. At present, they are mainly focused in the energy, infrastructure and tourism sectors. I hope that in the near future we will witness Bulgarian investments in new fields, such us communications and information technologies. The IGB project for the gas interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria, in operation since October 2022, in which Bulgaria participates with a 50% stake, is a clear example of a strategic, long-term investment with a broad regional scope. The same applies to the project for a floating LNG terminal near Alexandroupolis in which Bulgaria participates with 20%. We are jointly working on a project for an oil pipeline connecting Alexandroupolis and Burgas where we have the biggest refinery in the Balkans. Bulgaria has a particular interest in the plans for the future development and management of the Greek ports of Kavala and Alexandroupolis. Bulgarian businesses are also showing strong interest in using these two commercial ports, especially in the context of the blocked trade routes in the Black Sea due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.  All this implies the establishment of a much better, let me call it by its proper name, a modern connecting infrastructure between our two countries, relevant for two members of the European Union and bringing new opportunities for our economic cooperation in the next decades. These new realities are best embodied by the Sea2Sea initiative, which aims at connecting Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube river with the Greek ports in the north Aegean Sea through a modern transport, energy and communication infrastructure. In practical terms, it would be an alternative route to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Undoubtedly, Greece and Bulgaria have the potential to create together an energy and transport hub in Southeast Europe, the importance of which would be not only of regional, but of pan-European scale. Dear friends,I am scientist by profession. As such, I cannot offer a magic formula how to transform the Balkans into a prosperous and modern European region. But I strongly believe in three factors which might do the “miracle”: 1. The consolidating and transformational role of the European Union; 2. The regional connectivity 3. The good-neighborly relations.  Good-neighbourliness is an indispensable guiding principle for the regional transformation. What we have to ensure is that words turn into deeds by all countries in the region.  I am proud to say and I hope that my dear colleague Kyriakos Mitsotakis would agree with me that our two countries, Bulgaria and Greece, are leading by example. An example for the whole region.  The history of relations between Bulgarians and Greeks is very, very old. I can think of no other two nations in Europe who have a longer history of relations. We have been neighbours for centuries. We have shared a turbulent past, marked by ups and downs, wars and peace, opposing blocks and alliances. It is not a miracle that after more than a thousand years of controversies, today Bulgaria and Greece enjoy such exemplary good-neighbourly relations. The truth is that it has taken decades of joint efforts of wise Bulgarian and Greek politicians, incl. Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was born here in Northern Greece. It has taken a lot of good will and dedication from diplomats and ordinary people to overcome the shadows of the past and to build mutual respect, trust and confidence.  The Greek-Bulgarian relations have flourished because they have a solid ground –our common values and our strong belief in a democratic international system, based on the principles and norms of international law.   We are proud with our strategic partnership which plays a crucial role for the stability of the whole region of South-East Europe.  Our nations share common hopes and concerns.  We are allies and friends. We are good neighbours who respect and trust each other. Such relations have an enormous potential for the future generations of Greeks and Bulgarians and they deserve our dedication. Dear Greek friends, A thought by the famous Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard comes to my mind: You can understand life only looking backwards, but you can live your life only looking forward.    We cannot change history, but we can definitely shape our common future. Through leadership, strategic vision, more connectivity and mutually beneficial cooperation.  I believe we can do it together. Bulgaria and Greece.Hand in hand, leading by example. Thank you!

Dear Charles.  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Bled Strategic Forum and welcome to Slovenia.  This month, on the 3rd of August, Slovenia was hit by the most devastating floods in the country’s history. Within just a matter of hours, 10,000 people lost their homes. Families lost everything.  We were able to secure relief from the EU. We received offers of aid from our neighbouring countries within the region. Even NATO responded. Everyone understood the severity of the disaster and sent their best engineering teams, along with heavy equipment, some of whom are still here helping our people rebuild their communities. I would also like to express my gratitude to all of you, all of those who have already helped, either physically or financially, and to others who will perhaps contribute in the coming hours. It is by showing solidarity, by working hand in hand with our friends, neighbours, and allies, that we truly make the world a better place. This is a message that we should not forget under any circumstances, not just when we are facing dire times, because you never know when the situation will become too difficult for you.  And as Peter Grk, Secretary General of the Bled Strategic Forum said, in Europe, sometimes or even most of the time, we live under the impression that extreme events do not happen here. They happen far away, far abroad. Well, not anymore. The extreme weather that we are currently facing is, of course, a localized phenomenon. But the conditions that caused this weather are indeed worldwide. Climate change is not something that any of us can escape. It is here. It is happening. We can see its impact growing every year, though its specific effects are unpredictable. The only predictable thing about climate change is that it is not going to get any better by itself. This is a message that we must never forget.  Still, we need to put in place mechanisms to adapt to the catastrophes like the one that hit Slovenia three weeks ago, because they will happen again. And we can only address such a demanding project at the international level. No nation, especially not individual small nations, can face it alone. Even the biggest nations cannot face it alone. This is one of the most important messages that we will bring to the table during our membership in the UN Security Council. We want to place the climate agenda at the top of our priorities. And one reason why I think we may be successful in this endeavour, not because of the catastrophe that we faced three weeks ago, is that, as a very small country with little international clout makes us a very honest broker. I can tell you right now that we are brave enough to undertake this rule. We want to be an honest broker. We want to be sincere, perhaps addressing issues that bigger nations are somehow neglecting due to their own national agendas.  The second of our primary goals is figuring out how to bring peace to Ukraine. It is practically impossible at this time, perhaps, but we will invest all of our knowledge, all of our time in this one particular goal, whether we are ultimately successful or not. No one can tell. But will we try? Yes, we will, because this is the single most important topic on the table of the United Nations. And that's the only place where this war can end: at the table of the United Nations. And we will do everything we can to bring it forth.  Finally, I'm really glad to have all of you here, my dear colleagues from the Western Balkans. I'm glad that you all made it here safely. Nobody is missing. Just this in itself is a huge success. But it doesn't stop here, because the message that I want to impart, and I'm pretty sure that Charles [Michel] will do so even more decisively, but the message that I want to share is that the momentum is changing due to Russia’s aggression on Ukraine. The stance of European Union Member States regarding the enlargement of European Union took on a totally new perspective. Things are changing rapidly. In the next 12 months I'm pretty sure that the enlargement process will not just gain attraction but an entirely new perspective. And I urge all of you not to be left behind. I urge all of you to continue pressing on with the reforms, but also to be aware of what's going on regarding the changes within the European Union itself. We all know that we will have to reform our processes within the European Union. And as I said, these reforms will either happen within the next 12 months or they may not happen for a very long time. This is an occasion that shall not be overlooked. Slovenia will remain a strong supporter of your membership. Slovenia will continue to do all those things that are necessary within the European Council and also in dialogue with the European Commission to make it possible for you to become members of our European family, to put you where you belong. That is the last message that I wanted to impart: you all belong with us.  And as I said, none of these challenges that I addressed are going to be easy to meet. None. We will have to work hard. It will cost a lot of money, especially for flood relief and the reconstruction. It will take a lot of time, but we need to find both the courage and the wisdom. And we will do so, in order to show that yes, we can, we can build a better world. A world based on solidarity.  Thank you.