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Abstract The Russian invasion of Ukraine has inflicted a significant blow to the EU’s defence strategy, jeopardising its ability to contribute adequately to the transatlantic security architecture and slowing the development of a continental strategic autonomy. In view of this, Germany and Italy should strengthen bilateral defence cooperation, particularly regarding industrial and procurement policies. As Berlin and Rome are two pillars of Europe’s industrial defence basis, closer bilateral cooperation would facilitate EU defence consolidation and enhance Europe’s military credibility. The future Italian-German Action Plan, the specifics of which are still unknown, is an excellent opportunity to establish a joint defence strategy centred on sectors of mutual interest. 1. European defence after 24 February 2022  As we are writing, a full-scale war is unfolding in Europe, with a nuclear power as the aggressor. War crimes against civilians are being committed on a massive scale and – as of June 2023 – more than eight million refugees have crossed the borders to seek shelter in the EU. As put by the European Court of Human Rights, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine arguably represents the greatest challenge to human rights since World War II (WWII). The war has deteriorated the global security and macroeconomic environment, while inflation, food emergency and the worsening climate crisis are negatively reinforcing each other. The war deeply affected the European security architecture. In the years prior to the war, the Ursula von der Leyen-led European Commission had already been advocating for the Union to take significant steps to strengthen the EU’s position as a geopolitical player worldwide, establishing a series of tools – such as the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the Strategic Compass – to boost EU defence capabilities. The Russian invasion of Ukraine compelled the EU revise its plans, as it was clear that the bloc was far from prepared to face a crisis of such geopolitical magnitude right across its borders. Policies and tools designed well in advance to cope with hard security challenges would have certainly improved the efficacy of the European response. The absence of such supranational structures of political-military coordination opened the doors to centrifugal tendencies, only partially contained by the urgency to address the calamitous emergency of the conflict. Ostensibly, the inadequacy of the EU as a security provider is one of the key factors pushing some member states – and especially those on the Eastern borders – to rely even more on NATO as a guardian of stability.  The request to join NATO by the Finnish and Swedish governments in the face of the Ukrainian war might be interpreted as a negative signal for the credibility of the EU as a defensive alliance, weakening any perspective of Europe to develop an autonomous defence policy. And while the news may be welcomed by those who see NATO as the primary security provider for the continent, it is less enticing for the EU member states who are not part of the Atlantic Alliance. Contrary to the purpose of the two organisations to “play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles” on security issues, this cannot occur if European countries are unable to stand on their own two feet militarily and independently contribute to transatlantic security and burden-sharing.  Current EU defence arrangements are currently insufficient to strengthen a European pillar in NATO, let alone leaving the door open for true strategic autonomy. The practical objectives set out by the Strategic Compass (i.e., the creation of a rapid deployable force of 5,000 units) are obviously unfit to face major conventional military challenges stemming from Russia, but also from a potential conflict over Taiwan or in the Middle East and North Africa region (the latter of which features far less prominently in the latest NATO Strategic Concept). Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that in the near future the Compass will play a significant role in reshaping the organisation of CSDP missions of crisis management and capacity-building.  The war may also undermine the EU efforts to strengthen the European defence market, whose integration has long been welcomed also by the US. In this regard, the priority is arguably the development of the European Defence Fund. At the outset, this instrument had a dual purpose: promote the research and development of modern military systems required by the member states and nurture the intraEuropean supply chains. In other words, the EDF was devised to increase the competitiveness of EU defence companies while strengthening the European Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The initial success of the EDF calls, which resulted in the funding of dozens of multinational initiatives, indicates at least some desire on the part of European companies and governments to invest in the project and embrace this political priority. However, already today the EDF budget of just eight billion euro over seven years is a far cry from the investment needed to reduce the fragmentation of a sector wherein the major EU players represent only a portion of the overall internal market. For decades, the EU defence industry has faced stiff competition from the United States, the United Kingdom, and even South Korea, to the point where many non-EDTIB companies now have profound roots in the procurement traditions of member states. As a consequence, the EU industry lags behind international competitors in key sectors such as disruptive technology, as the European Defence Agency (EDA) acknowledged last year. Aware of this situation, the EU Commission in 2022 launched the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), an instrument that should convey common procurement projects by providing the member states willing to cooperate with both financial incentives and a common procurement platform. However, this platform could even involve associated countries and thus bring into the EDTIB complementary contractors from the UK, Norway, Switzerland, or the US. The effect of this newly established strategy on the EDTIB has yet to be determined and will depend heavily on its implementation; the impact of both the EDF and EDIRPA will be limited if allocations go toward further fragmentation of military stockpiles and will spur additional duplication of capabilities across domains. The creation of a new European main battle tank (also called as the Main Ground Combat System – MGCS) is an example of the limited role that EU procurement might play in the near future. The MGCS has a history dating back to 2015, when it was evident that the EU tank fleet needed an upgrade to keep up with global competition and the EDA was tasked with the responsibility to coordinate the Member States’ investments in R&D. The effort to expedite the delivery of a new model was further accelerated in response to the Ukraine conflict. Yet, in 2022, the only tank project nearing maturity was the new “Panther”, which was the result of a unilateral German initiative led by Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. Considering that Italy and France chose to upgrade their legacy tanks and that the only quasi-European programme, the Franco-German MGCS, is hobbling back, the most likely outcome will be the widespread acquisition of nationally developed systems (including the Korean K2) instead of a common European design. Indeed, the never-ending debate over the development of the MGCS is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to concerns about the EDTIB’s future. Inevitably, the shipment of defence systems to Kyiv will deplete the EU member states’ strategic readiness. To fill the void, the EU nations will most likely initiate a new phase of national procurement to replenish existing stocks. If the procurement of these systems (primarily tanks, artillery, armoured vehicles, missile defence systems, man portable equipment and various kinds of ammunition) prioritises off-theshelf solutions, even if this is in accordance with EDIRPA guidelines, the European Defence Agency’s effort to achieve European interoperability that can embrace NATO standards will be jeopardised. 2. The Italian-German contribution to European defence cooperation  Italy and Germany seem to be on the verge of signing off on an “Italian-German Action Plan” for expanding bilateral cooperation, which is anticipated to encompass a variety of topics ranging from industrial issues to foreign policy. Among the sectors of envisaged cooperation, defence is one of the most prominent. Indeed, the two nations are pillars of the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base and home to renowned prime contractors such as Leonardo, Rheinmetall, ThyssenKrupp AG, and Fincantieri. The investments of these two nations in acquisition, research, and development represent a significant portion of total European military expenditures. This privileged position in the EU landscape makes even more significant the commitment of Rome and Berlin to increase their military spending as a reaction to the Russian aggression. Meeting in Versailles in March 2022, all the EU member states vowed to establish new capabilities and prepare strategic enablers to operate jointly whenever necessary. Nevertheless, the scale and time of this commitment differs between the two countries. Italy should in theory reach the NATO target of spending 2 per cent of its GDP in defence by 2028. The pace of such an increase is very much uncertain, and Italy’s defence budget remains deeply unbalanced, with substantial expenditures focused on personnel costs and few resources directed to exercise and maintenance. Instead, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Germany has responded to the Zeitenwende (“historical turning point”) of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by setting up a one-off fund of 100 billion euro, the Sondervermögen (“special fund”), and a commitment to bring the Bundeswehr’s regular budget in line with the 2 per cent threshold for years. Yet, doubts exist on whether the fund will suffice given inflationary pressures and Berlin’s yawning gap in defence capabilities. It is estimated that Germany will likely need to spend some 300 billion euro worth to put the Bundeswehr in a position to once again be a credible military tool. Differences also exist in the strategic priorities of the two countries. Growing Italian defence investments over the last decade have focused mainly on improving the armed forces’ ability to project power into the “wider Mediterranean”, establishing for instance the carrier strike group Cavour and an amphibious landing group. Germany, on the other hand, is emphasising a return to territorial defence: it recently (re-) instated structures such as a territorial headquarter (Territorialen Führungskommando) for domestic operations and logistical support to allied operations in Europe, putting the Eastern flank front and centre in its strategic outlook.  The disparities in the two countries’ budgetary provisions are thus both qualitative and quantitative, as Italy’s stagnating defence expenditures are allocated differently than Germany’s growing defence budget. This must be balanced against differences in public opinion. Despite Russia’s aggression and the country’s international obligations, the majority of Italians oppose any increase in military spending. In contrast, the German electorate is experiencing change of heart, as it has abandoned long-standing scepticism defence matters and is now massively supporting the government’s stance on strengthening the national military capacity.  The was in Ukraine is offering the opportunity to the two nations to improve their complementarities in several sectors, starting with major investments to plug the holes in basic defence capabilities caused by underspending in ground-based air defence, an improved focus on dual-use technologies, and a promotion of a more integrated procurement process that prioritises ammunition and the development of strategic enablers such as cyber and space capabilities.  A comprehensive political-industrial-military approach would provide Berlin and Rome with a common ground for enhancing their strategic response to the unfolding crisis in Ukraine. Italy and Germany should focus on filling voids in the respective armed forces; more investments in dual technologies such as space capabilities and cyberwarfare, as well as other traditional domains, would also be essential.  The two countries should also commit to joint procurement as the only way to preserve and boost Europe’s Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) in the aftermath of an unprecedented spike in demand for defence goods. The stir provoked in France and Italy by the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, which appears to favour US- and Israeli-made ground-based missile defence systems at the expense of their European counterparts, is revealing: when there is an emergency, there are a few possible trading partners today that could be associated in procurement without compromising medium- to long-term development plans. Therefore, strengthened cooperation in the field of procurement would allow for more transparent communications with international partners, promoting the excellence of the two national industries without fuelling protectionist impulses which would waste resources (or efficiency) on short-sighted projects.  A holistic spending approach, seeking complementarity and rewarding the excellence of small and medium-sized businesses, would be advantageous to the majority of industrial sectors, given the number of prospective investment domains. Italy and Germany are home to a large number of small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) in the defence industry, and these firms frequently hold the keys to the two nations’ competitive advantage in sectors such as sensor technology and electronic and cyber warfare. Both nations have a vested interest in influencing European programs, such as the EDF, to more effectively stimulate innovation within their respective defence ecosystems.  Similarly, the two countries should create synergies within initiatives funded through the EDF. Italy and Germany are already working together in the European medium-altitude, long endurance, remotely piloted aircraft system (MALE RPAS) programme, which is a PESCO project co-financed through EDF and managed by OCCAR that has the objective to empower Europe with a modern and competitive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system. Interestingly, both countries share similar sensitivities when it comes to the employment of armed drones, despite the fact that Italy decided to arm its drones without the decadeslong parliamentary and public debate that marked Germany’s decision to equip its own Heron TP drones with weapons. Moreover, both Rome and Berlin are extremely cautious when it comes to automation, and military interlocutors in both countries stress the importance of keeping a human in the loop.  Space is another area of potential cooperation. The protection of Italian assets (defence from kinetic attacks as well as cyber threats) feature prominently in Rome’s 2019 National Space Security Strategy. Cooperation with Berlin could boost complementarities in sectors with a strong electronics component. The two nations are jointly working on strategic enablers trough the Defence of Space Assets (DoSA), a PESCO initiative whose goal is providing training for space military operations, space resilience and access to space and in-space operation. Both of these projects – obviously started before the breakout of the Ukrainian war – are evidently connected with the upcoming defence challenges that Europe, and thus the two countries, will be facing in a next future. Cooperation is also feasible in the field of electronics, which entails crossdomain capabilities with dual-use benefits for the civilian sector. In this regard, Leonardo’s acquisition of Germany’s Hensoldt is encouraging, as it could facilitate the establishment of economies of scale in the field and pave the way for new collaborations in other industries. Notably, reciprocal support could be conceivable in the areas of avionics, manned-unmanned teaming and combat cloud technologies. Given Germany’s decision to purchase F-35 multirole jets to replace its aging Tornado fleet, Berlin could greatly benefit from Rome’s special relationship with the US and British aerospace industries, as well as its experience in the F-35 programme via the Cameri production facility. A further area in which cooperation should be reinforced is underwater technologies. In this field, Italian and German companies are already collaborating, and the realisation of the U212 NFS submarine is a good instance of the brilliant results that can be achieved together. Cooperation between Fincantieri and ThyssenKrupp could be furthered also considering the expanding interest in the underwater environment and research in underwater unmanned vehicles (UUVs). Italy’s long-standing necessity to protect its critical seabed infrastructure in the Mediterranean basin makes it an appealing partner to Germany, which is especially alarmed over potential repeats of the Nord Stream sabotage. The establishment of the German-led NATO Critical Undersea Infrastructure Protection Cell may offer some further chances of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this regard.  Germany and Italy should also do more together on land systems, notably tanks and mechanised vehicles. Germany has a strong European lead in this realm, while Italy has some positive experiences with the Centauro and a non-negligible niche of turret making. The challenge will be to facilitate Italian participation in the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) project, managed by the FrancoGerman consortium KNDS. From a German perspective, MGCS is supposed to eventually foster a Europe-wide consolidation of land systems technologies and production. An Italian contribution, joining the consortium and transforming it in a true European initiative, would be especially timely given the urgent need for Italy to modernise its armoured fleet, but also to raise Europe’s overall production capacities and match the mounting continental demand for tanks. Furthermore, Italy is currently examining options to create a new hub for land systems, in order to rationalise the current industrial supply chain and procure a successor to the Dardo infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). The offer by Rheinmetall to produce its new Lynx IFV in partnership with Italian companies within the national borders should be carefully considered in order to foster much-needed economies of scale in this domain. Another enticing area of bilateral cooperation for Berlin could be a partnership designed to support its decision to make the Bundeswehr greener. Germany has already demonstrated a developing awareness of the environmental impact of its military activities. This correlation is recognised by both NATO and the EU, and it is believed to be particularly significant in three fields (listed in decreasing importance): static pollution produced by military barracks and other defence buildings; pollution generated by the systems themselves and military mobility; and the dispersion of ammunitions or other wastes, particularly to sea. Italy, for its part, has already devised a strategy to address the dilemma between defence and the ecological transition. The lion’s share of this strategy consists of a plan to control the energy supply of all military installations on Italian territory, renovate vital defence-related infrastructures, and increase the military’s mobility’s sustainability. Research into alternative energy sources for the military, such as solar panels, may reduce the reliance of forward operational bases on petroleum runs, which are particularly susceptible to guerrilla attacks when deployed in contested territories. Conclusions and outlook The so-called Zeitenwende is proving to be all but easy to live up to for Germany, while Italy still has to prove it perceives any urgency when it comes to a change of pace in defence spending. In this situation, cooperation between the two states can help to alleviate the burden imposed by the radical changes both countries will need to implement in their defence policies. Both countries’ defence budgets are currently being increased, but while this was necessary after a long period of underfunding of the respective armed forces, it also comes with some risks. The primary danger is that both Berlin and Rome will use the concept of European strategic autonomy to appease national industrial champions rather than actually implementing plans to strengthen EU defence initiatives. Despite some positive signals, it is uncertain how much of Germany’s 100 billion euro special fund will be invested in multinational strategic armament projects. Similar risks are present in Italy, which badly needs to replenish its stocks after the latest shipments to Ukraine.  The authentic European commitment of the two nations should inevitably result in joint efforts, beginning with technological and industrial advancement. Italy and Germany have declared their willingness to increase their defence expenditures to 2 per cent of GDP, as agreed upon at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. This old threshold, which after 24 February 2022 has become a starting point rather than a ceiling for many within the Alliance, will not necessarily enhance the EU’s defence profile. In contrast, national increases in the defence expenditures that are not coordinated may paradoxically be detrimental to the strategic autonomy of the EU. As a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the imperative need of many EU countries to purchase or upgrade weapons has a negative impact on the European industrial base. In the future, countries with a proclivity to cooperate, such as Germany and Italy, should maximise the potential of strategic, industrial and cultural synergies in the defence sector. This cooperation should begin as a bilateral effort within the framework of the forthcoming Italian-German Action Plan and, whenever feasible, translate into bilateral initiatives in the defence industry. Initiating pragmatic projects and generating industrial and political realities is the most effective method to advance European integration. This is something that can be accomplished more easily by beginning with a bilateral perspective while remaining open to the eventual participation of other EU nations.

The meeting of the G7 in Hiroshima has become a new symbol of the combat coordination of the Western and Eastern fronts of the global cold war. These two fronts are designed to pincer Russia and China, to prevent them from continuing to create a world order that rejects the "rules" invented in Washington. On the Western Front, stretching from Finland to Turkey, a continuous chain of military bases has already been created and an open military conflict has been provoked in Ukraine. NATO, which has been preparing for a clash with our country for several decades, has played a key role in coordinating the countries and armed forces of the West against Russia. On the Eastern Front of the Cold War, the same scenario is repeated, but with a time lag of several years. After the failure of hopes for the “constructive involvement” of the Celestial Empire, an open confrontation with it began to unfold in 2018, when a trade, a “color    revolution” in Hong Kong and a massive pumping of weapons in Taiwan began. By that time, the US had military agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, but there was no coordinating organization like NATO. Therefore, Washington began to demand that the bloc's "zone of responsibility" be extended to the Indo-Pacific region. In the meantime, the military bloc AUKUS (Australia, Great Britain and the US) was urgently created and the military-diplomatic organization QUAD (Australia, India, the US and Japan) was activated. The successes achieved and the next tasks in building up the front of the anti-Chinese forces of America, Europe and Asia should have been the topic of discussion at the Hiroshima summit. AUKUS and QUAD, in turn, were going to demonstrate a new level of coordination during Biden's trip to Australia to meet with the leaders of the member countries of the two organizations. But something went wrong, and the US President did not fly to Canberra. Among the explanations, the most plausible seems to be Indian leader Modi's unwillingness to draw his country even deeper into Western bloc structures. The triumphal march was not performed upon returning to Washington, not only because of this discrepancy. With regard to “decoupling” with China, different approaches appeared in the ranks of the G7, which were reflected in the final communiqué. A real "divorce" with its largest trading partner does not suit the European members of the G7. The desire to “sit on two chairs” and maintain profitable ties with Beijing without violating the requirements of Euro-Atlantic discipline at the same time is obvious. This is a line of high-ranking visitors seeking a meeting with Xi Jinping, and the words of the communique, designed to be understood by Beijing leaders: “Our political campaigns are not designed to harm China or slow down its economic progress and development.” The communiqué also notes that the G7 does not engage in "divorce" and does not "lock inward." Washington's desire to strengthen the Eastern Front was not crowned with complete success also thanks to Beijing's own "counteroffensive" on the Western Front. The new "counteroffensive" was the mission of China's special envoy, Ambassador Li Hui. He should clarify the official position of the parties to the Ukrainian conflict and talk about different scenarios. Beijing emphasizes that Li Hui should collect information, and not offer ready-made solutions. Therefore, in addition to Kyiv, he will visit Warsaw, Paris, Berlin, Brussels and complete this first trip in Moscow. Prior to Li Hui's tour, China's Vice President Han Zheng, party foreign policy curator Wang Yi, and Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Europe a few weeks before Li Hui's tour. Even Xi Jinping got involved, talking to Zelenskiy on the phone. Beijing launched this "counteroffensive" in response to the "offensive" of NATO. The bloc's area of responsibility has already been officially extended to the Indo-Pacific region, and a regional headquarters is to be opened in Tokyo. The Chinese may well draw a parallel of the ongoing events with the accession of Japan in 1936 to the Anti-Comintern Pact. A year later, the emboldened Japanese began an all-out war against the Celestial Empire, capturing Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Nanjing in a few months. Only the diplomatic, military and financial assistance of the Soviet Union prevented the capitulation of the Republic of China along the lines of France. China, in turn, prevented Tokyo from attacking the USSR at the already appointed time - August 29, 1941. The Imperial Headquarters did not dare to fight until the end of the "Chinese incident" simultaneously with China and the Soviet Union. Then, for the first time, two interconnected and mutually beneficial strategic fronts emerged. Now the situation of "two fronts" is repeated. Russia's military successes coincided with the G-7 summit in Hiroshima. The Western Front again supported the Eastern. Now the Pentagon will once again analyze the plans for operations around Taiwan. The "combat coordination" of Russia and China began to pick up increased pace after the visit to Moscow of President Xi Jinping. The agreements of the two commanders-in-chief are now being implemented by other leaders. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and Party curator of China's special services, secretary of the Political and Legal Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP Chen Wenqing visited Moscow. In turn, Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Mishustin and several hundred heads of ministries and departments, leading entrepreneurs went to Beijing. Although it is unlikely that all of them will be able to achieve a breakthrough on their tracks in a couple of days in the Middle Kingdom, even a short stay in Beijing and Shanghai will help you see the “Chinese miracle” with your own eyes and be convinced in detail of the importance of interaction. After all, the “turn to the East” should take place in the minds of our politically shaping elite, which has not yet got rid of the illusions about the possibility of returning the “good old days” with the West. The China-Central Asia summit, which took place on May 18-19, 2023 in the ancient capital of the Silk Road, the city of Xi'an (Chang'an), can also be considered part of the Chinese "counteroffensive" in response to the "containment" by the collective West. Ahead of us are new summits of NATO and the Group of Seven, new meetings of the leaders of the SCO and BRICS. All of them fit into the logic of the formation of a new global architectonics. A key role in preventing the concentration of Western forces against one or the other of the main competitors - Russia and China - is played by the "combat coordination" of the two countries. It meets the national interests of both nations and therefore will only grow.

Zelensky’s European tour has won critical support for Ukraine’s counter-offensiveAs the war in Ukraine intensifies, President Volodymyr Zelensky has concluded a series of successful visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London to shore up support from key allies. The timing of Zelensky’s visit is critical for Ukraine’s efforts on the battlefield and beyond. It has allowed the Ukrainian presidenta and his main European allies to coordinate their approach on the economic and diplomatic fronts of the war as well, which will be equally decisive in determining how this war will end, and when. Military support from his allies has been on top of Zelensky’s agenda during his whistle-stop tour of Europe. And finally, it seems that Ukraine’s European allies are following in Washington’s footsteps and moving beyond their earlier hesitation to provide Kyiv with more equipment for its upcoming counter-offensive in Bakhmut. On Saturday, May 13, ahead of Zelenskiy’s arrival in Berlin, Germany announced a further €2.7 billion (£2.35 billion) of support, including much-needed quantities of artillery ammunition. In addition, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall confirmed a joint venture with Ukraine’s Ukroboronprom to build and repair tanks in Ukraine. On Sunday, May 14, Zelensky secured promises in Paris from the French president, Emmanuel Macron, for new armoured vehicles and air defence systems. On Monday, May 15, British prime minister Rishi Sunak agreed to provide Ukraine with hundred of attack drones, in addition to the Storm Shadow cruise missiles that have already been delivered to strengthen Ukraine’s air defences. These commitments are important for providing Ukraine with the ammunition, equipment, training and repairs the country needs against a Russian adversary that has significant manpower advantages. This does not guarantee a sweeping success of the anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive, but it will make serious gains on the battlefield more likely for Kyiv. And it signals a commitment by its western partners to back this offensive with more than encouraging noises.The sanctions gameThe war in Ukraine is not only fought, and can not only be won, on the battlefield. From the beginning, the western approach was twofold: strengthen Ukraine and weaken Russia. The latter was achieved through unprecedented sanctions, with the EU now on its tenth sanctions package since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The EU is now discussing the eleventh sanctions package, this time with a focus on enforcing existing sanctions and closing loopholes by imposing secondary sanctions against countries, companies and individuals deliberately circumventing the existing sanctions against Russia. Sanctions will also be discussed at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, from May 19 to 21. Further measures are expected to target the Russian energy sector and place more limitations on exports to Russia. The four European countries Zelensky visited in the past few days – France, Germany, Italy and the UK – are all members of the G7, while the EU attends as an observer. Including other members the US, Japan and Canada, the G7 represents some of Ukraine’s most powerful partners who will send an unambiguous message to Russia concerning sanctions and their enforcement. This will not break the Russian war machine, but it will make it more costly, including for Russia’s few remaining allies, to sustain the war effort in Ukraine at the current level. Seen from this longer-term perspective, it also makes Ukrainian gains in any counter-offensive more sustainable by limiting Russia’s capabilities to mount any offensives in the future.The third front: diplomacyMeanwhile, Chinese envoy Li Hui is beginning his tour of European capitals, including Moscow and Kyiv, to explore a political settlement for the war in Ukraine. This made it important for Zelensky to be sure that his red lines are clearly understood, accepted and communicated by Rome, Berlin, Paris and London. The support from these European capitals is no longer in doubt. And neither is support from Brussels. Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg was clear in his message at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit on May 15: he expects the alliance to commit to a multi-year support programme to help Ukraine move towards Nato military standards. This will be discussed at the Nato summit in Vilnius in July. The EU is considering a new China strategy, including how it can engage with China on the war in Ukraine. The union is open to such an engagement and has cautiously welcomed China’s position paper in this respect. But it is a major win for Zelensky that the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, backed Zelensky’s peace plan which, among other things, rules out any territorial compromises. Zelensky’s visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London are part of an ongoing positioning of the major allies in this war. For the Ukrainian president, it was critical to make sure that he keeps the west united behind his efforts to defeat Russia. His apparent success in doing so indicates that he presented his European counterparts with a credible plan and realistic requirements for support. Yet it is also clear that Kyiv and its partners in Europe and beyond realise that there will eventually come a point at which they will have to negotiate an end to the war with Russia. The evident strength of western unity and commitment that has transpired over the past few days is as much a message of support to Ukraine as it is one of deterrence for Russia and caution to China. The way it will be received there will determine how soon a negotiated settlement will be possible that restores Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Canada will commit only minimal resources to ensuring collective security. At a time of war in Ukraine, and high alert in NATO, such promises are unwelcome and deeply dismaying to all others who have committed to minimum spending goals.  It’s hard to know what’s worse from the Canadian perspective: the fact that the Discord leak revealed that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were writing about Canada’s military capabilities in a less than positive light or the fact that the Washington Post picked up on the leaked memo and ran it as an exclusive story. The memo refers to an apparent statement by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at a recent NATO meeting that Canada would never meet NATO’s benchmark defence spending goal of 2 percent of GDP. What is remarkable is not so much what Trudeau said, but the fact that he said it. Canada’s failure to come close to NATO’s 2 percent goal is longstanding. The fact that the government anticipates being in that position for some time is also not a surprise. To tell close allies that we never intend to get there is something different. The memo makes clear that Canada’s allies, including and perhaps most especially, the United States are unhappy about this, using words such as concern, strain, frustration, and disappointment. More worrying still, the memo states that Canadian military leaders “perceive that politicians do not care about supporting them.” A military struggling to fulfill its obligations in the face of financial stricture is one thing. A military struggling under financial constraint while feeling politically unsupported is quite another. In response to the Post article, the prime minister stressed that Canada is a “reliable ally.” He and other officials pointed to Canada’s commitments and roles on the international stage, including the deployment of approximately 700 Canadian troops to Latvia, where they lead a NATO battle group. But this isn’t about the roles Canada plays. It’s about what it doesn’t do. And what it doesn’t do, and hasn’t done for many years, is to prioritise or even maintain military spending at a level that ensures its own capacity for basic defence, and also its capacity to support allies in a way commensurate to their commitment to us. The memo revelations are unlikely to shame the Canadian government into change. Indeed, if the Canadian people were going to see a change, one of the most likely recent opportunities was in the government budget of April 2022. At that point, and against great odds, the Ukrainians had successfully pushed the Russians out of the north of their country and were making gains in the south. Canada is home to the largest Ukrainian population in the world outside of Ukraine and Russia. Canadians of Ukrainian heritage are deeply entrenched in every aspect of Canadian society, including at the highest levels of government. Beyond the diaspora, Canadian public support for the Ukrainian cause, and dismay at the violation of territorial boundaries, is strong and widespread. If ever there was a moment when the Canadian government could have announced a major increase in defence spending, that was it. It did not happen. At NATO’s core is the Article 5 collective security guarantee, the certainty that each will come to the other’s defence. The iron clad nature of that commitment is central to the organisation’s strength, as witnessed by President Joe Biden’s warning to Russia of the commitment to defend “every inch” of NATO territory when Russia began its advance into Ukraine. It’s what keeps the organisation together and makes states like Finland and Sweden want to join. Saying Canada won’t meet the 2 percent target is not the same as saying Canada won’t come to the defence of its allies if needed. It is, however, the equivalent of saying Canada won’t even try to match the commitment everyone else has made to a baseline of preparedness. The attention on Canada’s dismissal of the 2 percent goal reflects a larger issue – that Canada’s military capacities are limited; that it is incapable of more than one major commitment at a time; that its support for its allies is thus also limited, and that this situation is unlikely to change in the near to medium term. Although allies have been suitably diplomatic in their responses to the memo’s revelations, to say Canada has no intention of meeting the 2 percent goal is a signal of disrespect that has surely not been missed by them. Canada is in a unique position geopolitically. Canada and the US share the longest undefended border in the world. The second largest country on the globe, more than 80 percent of Canada’s population lives within 150 kilometres of the US border. Canada makes a vital contribution to US national security by its simple presence on the US northern border, not just as a firm ally, but as a total non-national security threat. The reverse is also true. Much of the explanation as to Canada’s approach to defence spending can be found in those facts. Canada minimises its defence spending because it can, because it knows that any serious threat to its own territorial integrity will be seen by the United States as an equivalent threat to its own territorial integrity. This implicit “free ride” on defence is both a fact and a choice. And, it is all the more reason to do more, or at least to aspire to do the minimum. So why put up with it? Canada’s strong international reputation has its historical roots in the two world wars. In each case, Canada raised a military that was among the strongest of the allies, and its performance on the battlefield exceeded all expectations. NATO allies know that in a crisis Canada will do its best to support them. The problem is that its best won’t be as good as it could be without sustained and truly substantial increases in defence spending.

In the given article, the focus will be on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a defining organization of collective security policy, representing the Western Hemisphere in the Black Sea region. The article will discuss the objectives and strategies of the organization, taking into account the role of Russia as one of the most significant actors in the region.  After the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, NATO began expanding eastward. Countries such as Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became members of the organization. During the time of the Cold War and the conflict with the USSR, some new members joined the NATO alliance, such as the Warsaw Pact countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland) and other post-Soviet states, including the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). These actions irritated Russia, especially when the NATO enlargement process continued in the Baltic region. Accordingly, to these events, excitement has followed the representatives of Russia’s Duma. The officials demanded the deployment of troops to ensure security and to enforce the idea of adding additional forces to the region in line with established parameters. However, one important detail is that despite the deployment of troops, several aerial and special operations were carried out in the region of the Baltic Sea, which included disrupting the line of command in the region and affecting the established procedures. An interesting thing that happened in 2009, during NATO expansion in 2009, the Kremlin did not go against the accession of Albania and Croatia, there were indirect statements from officials that the enlargement of NATO on the European continent is disturbing and undermines the security of the continent.  Accordingly, taking into account that each stage of NATO's expansion was exciting for Russia, and this stemmed from the fact that the very idea of this expansion was the formation of a united and strong Europe, which was also a prerequisite for the elimination of Russian influences, official Russia did not take pro-aggressive steps to exclude its proximity to the organization.  Despite Russia's warning that NATO should not expand to the East, this process continued. In 2008, NATO announced (at the Bucharest summit) that Ukraine and Georgia would become members, which Russia saw as a strategic threat, especially when Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Republic, was promised that NATO would not go East. The main reason why Russia reacted so strongly to the expansion was due to the geopolitical aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, which it believed would affect the country's security and strategic interests.  The Black Sea region has always been of great interest to NATO, this basin is a connecting link between the Caspian, Mediterranean, and Aegean seas, it is at the same time a very strategic corridor to connect with the Middle East, which doubled the interests of the great powers in the region, among them NATO. After the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region is in the interest of the USA and there were 3 specific reasons for this; The spread of democracy, cooperation in the field of security, and third and most important for the US, the diversification of energy resources. On the other hand, the democratic development of the independent states represented in this region and the convergence with the standards of the West and NATO turned out to be critically incompatible with the interests of Russia. It was also unacceptable for Moscow to develop energy projects on the European continent using the Black Sea region without him. Therefore, Russia, in order to prevent the countries of the region from achieving their goals and hindering their Euro-Atlantic integration, created and/or maintained control over the conflict centers in the region, which it then used for manipulation and coercion. In short, regardless of the variety of conflicts in the Black Sea region, each of them was and is being managed under Russian interests, be it the conflicts of Karabakh, Abkhazia-Tskhinvali, or Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  There are several reasons for the tension between Russia and NATO in the Black Sea region, the first of which is the concentration of a large number of Russian military forces in the region and the resulting conflicts. Second, the region is a kind of springboard where Russian and NATO military forces have to interact closely, which is also a source of constant tension.  On the other hand, It is rather interesting that despite the fact that in many cases NATO member states are driven by common interests, it happens that they have formed different visions for developing tactics to deal with existing challenges. One of the reasons why NATO is not properly represented in the Black Sea is Turkey and its recent policy. For example, in 2001, a multinational military-naval organization named "Blackseafor" was created on the initiative of Turkey. (BlackSeafor(2001). The member states of the organization were; Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. By creating this model, Turkey tried to increase its role by weakening NATO's representation in the Black Sea region, it even worked at some level, and one of the reasons why NATO's flank is currently the weakest in the Seven Sea region is the above-mentioned event. However, Turkey has a tense situation with Syria and it needs NATO defense systems, so it has to find a balance in the direction of cooperation between Russia and NATO in order to ensure the security of the region.  However, it should be noted that after joining NATO, Romania becomes an important springboard for the organization. At the Warsaw summit, it was Romania that came up with the initiative to create the NATO Black Sea Fleet, which received positive evaluations both in Berlin and in the NATO headquarters and Washington. Bulgaria used to be more restrained in the Black Sea, thus avoiding provoking Russia too much. But after the war between Ukraine and Russia, the policy has changed, since 2021, Bulgaria has been the head of the NATO naval training operations in the Black Sea, the name of the operation is "Breeze" and it was last held in July 2022, where 24 combat and support boats, 5 military aircraft, 4 helicopters, and up to 1400 soldiers participated. There were several goals and reasons for conducting these exercises, one of which was stated above to increase the alliance's interests in the Black Sea region, and the other was to at least weaken Russia's dominance and maritime monopoly.  The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the events taking place in the Black Sea are directly connected and affect the European security system. It should be noted that before the Warsaw Summit, NATO did not have a proactive plan regarding its role in the Black Sea region (2016). An agreement was reached at the Warsaw Summit, thus highlighting that improving the defense capabilities of partner countries is in direct interest with NATO's interests, which will ultimately strengthen European security. That is why the strengthening of Ukraine's military potential is considered to strengthen the eastern flank of the organization. But until the war is raging and the future/outcome of this conflict is still uncertain, it is rather impossible to speak clearly about the very future of the organization.

The UK is reportedly planning to officially designate the Russian mercenary firm Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation. This would put Wagner on a list with 78 other groups, including ISIS, al Qaeda and newer white supremacist organisations. The UK has had lists of “proscribed organisations” for decades, previously including groups in the Northern Ireland conflict, and then creating a more global list in the early 2000s. Once an organisation is listed, it becomes a criminal offence to belong to the group or support the group – with a punishment of up to 14 years in prison. Dozens of other countries have similar lists. The UK’s proscription of Wagner could be an important global signal – the UK would be among the first to label Wagner a terrorist group. This could encourage other countries to do the same, and possibly discourage countries from working with Wagner in the future. The home secretary has the discretion to proscribe a group if it is involved in terrorism, defined generally as violence to influence the government or intimidate the public for some political or social goal. The minister takes into consideration both the nature of the organisation, and “the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism”. Wagner appears to have used terrorism in Ukraine and beyond. For example, two men who reportedly worked for Wagner admitted to killing hundreds of civilians, including dozens of children. The group is also implicated in massacres of hundreds of civilians in Mali, according to Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organisations. The UK and its allies are supporting Ukraine in its defence against the Russian invasion. As a result, the UK government is within its rights to proscribe the group. But should it? There are some reasons to question whether proscription is the best course of action. It would be somewhat unusual to include Wagner – a company, a for-profit enterprise – with groups like al Qaeda or Boko Haram, which are motivated by radical ideologies more than profits. For this reason, it seems, the US has labelled Wagner as a transnational criminal organisation, and imposed sanctions usually used on organised crime. Wagner also stands out because it works for the Russian state, so it is less of a “non-state actor” (and arguably not one at all) than traditional terrorist groups. However, the UK already proscribes a variety of groups that receive state support, such as Hezbollah. Including state actors alongside non-state actors on a terrorist list can blur the distinction of what is a “terrorist”, and open such lists up to endless expansion, but it has been done before.A symbolic designation It’s questionable how much of an effect UK proscription would have on a group operating thousands of kilometres away. However, the government has expressed suspicion about Wagner transferring money from the UK after financial sanctions were placed on Russian oligarchs. Such actions would become illegal with proscription. Any support for the group, by any person or institution in the UK, would be criminalised. Additionally, my own research suggests that proscription can reduce terrorism when the group operates in a country (like Ukraine) aligned with the proscribing state. International cooperation on counterterrorism is essential. Another study I worked on with Hyeran Jo and Joshua Alley shows that proscription is more likely to be effective when used on groups that depend on funding from private donations, for example from a diaspora community. Making it illegal to associate with or fund a group means their support is quickly eroded, as are their capabilities to carry out attacks. This raises questions about how much proscription would hurt Wagner, which is mostly funded by the Russian state. Proscription might be a helpful addition to the economic sanctions already placed on Russia. But we shouldn’t expect it to have major financial effects on its own on the group’s activities, since Wagner gets most of its resources from Russia. More than direct material consequences, proscription could be important for symbolism. Declaring Wagner a terrorist organisation would further signal international disapproval of the Russian invasion, and it would be a mark of shame for Wagner, which is trying to expand its global footprint. Countries like Mali that hire Wagner might look for alternatives if the group is widely recognised as a terrorist organisation. Negative consequences It is important to note that there can be negative consequences of terrorist proscription. Scholars have shown that it can make it more difficult to end wars. Governments become more hesitant to make a deal with a legally-designated “terrorist”, and third parties are slow to facilitate negotiations for the same reason. However, this might not directly matter for the Wagner case, since Ukraine would negotiate with Russia, not Wagner. There are also reasons to believe that proscription can have negative economic effects. Humanitarian organisations have warned that proscription can create a “chilling effect” on charity donors, non-governmental organisations and other important actors who may want to support civilians affected by these situations, because of concern about inadvertently funding a terrorist organisation, or being accused of doing so. The UK government should keep these concerns in mind and try to mitigate negative unintended effects of proscription. Overall, terrorist proscription might not be the ideal policy tool for Wagner, since the group is a business and not a traditional ideological group. And it’s not clear proscription would affect the group much in the short term, since most of its money comes from the Russian state. However, proscription could be an important global signal, and it could deter potential support for an entity that has clearly used terrorism.

In 1948, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed between the Soviet Union and Finland, providing a key basis for relations between the two states that was to last throughout the cold war. With memories of the 1939 “winter war” between the two still acute, the agreement embodied the Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine, named for two of Finland’s post-war presidents who developed the idea between 1946 and 1982 of a neutral Finland close to the USSR. It also set the context for the term “Finlandisation” used by international relations scholars to describe external interference by a powerful country in the foreign policy of a smaller neighbouring state. A year later, on April 4 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the 12 founding members of Nato. Throughout the cold war, Finland remained a neutral state – although more due to circumstance than by choice. And despite its 1,340km (832 mile) border with Russia, it chose not to join Nato in the late 1990s, even as many of its eastern European neighbours did. It officially abandon its policy of neutrality in 1994, joining Nato’s Partnership for Peace and then the European Union in 1995. But aspirations to become a full Nato member state had not quite matured. That all ended with Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Finland (and Sweden) submitted their formal applications to join the alliance on May 18 2022 and this was endorsed by Nato members at the most recent summit in Madrid in June. Although accession to Nato membership was relatively quick, there were objections from some members, most notably Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Hungary. Turkey held up membership for Finland – and is still doing so for Sweden – due to its concerns over what it called support for terrorist groups, namely the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK). Hungary also raised objections due to what it regarded as criticism by the Nordic states with regard to the strength of Hungarian democracy. But Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg said recently he is confident that Sweden could become a member by summer.View from MoscowIf Putin was hoping to achieve the Finlandisation of Nato as one of his strategic aims of the war, what he has actually achieved was the “Natoisation” of Finland since it has now become the alliance’s 31st member state. With this comes Article 5 guarantees – the an attack on one member is an attack on the alliance as a whole and must be responded to as such. This fundamentally changes the defence and security posture of Finland, and European security architecture as a whole. Implications include the size and geographical focus of the alliance (even more so if Sweden joins in the not-too-distant future) as well as inter-organisational relations between Nato and the EU, the other key pillar of the European security architecture. And Finland is not playing catch up in order to meet its Nato commitments. In fact, Finland will be a net contributor to the alliance’s overall collective defence. Over recent years, it has been modernising its armed forces, purchasing robust military capabilities and, unlike the majority of member states, it meets the Nato target of 2% of GDP spent on its own defence. Putin has, of course, issued warnings to Finland (and Sweden) about joining the alliance. In 2016, Putin stated that “When we look across the border now, we see a Finn on the other side. If Finland joins Nato, we will see an enemy.” Although there have been mixed signals with regard to Russia’s views on the sovereign right of Finland to join a collective defence organisation if it so chooses (although Russia does not extend this position to Ukraine itelf), it is gravely concerned that Nato will position military capabilities in Finland, on its border – and close to Russia’s own strategically important bases and geography. Although Russia is very much focused on correcting its strategic blunders in Ukraine, it will at some stage begin to recover and, therefore, reconstitute its armed forces and military posture. Of particular concern could be Russia’s increased dependency on its tactical nuclear posture to offset its (temporarily) decreased capacity with regard to conventional capabilities. Although we do not know what the future holds, given both the duration and eventual outcome of the war, Russia will continue to have security concerns. And now it has a border with Nato that will run from the High North down to the Black Sea and beyond. This is guaranteed to lock in continued tensions between the alliance and Russia for years to come. Nato fundamentally thinks of itself as a collective defence organisation, with (nuclear) deterrence as its core strength. Russia will continue to see the alliance as a key stalwart undermining its threat perceptions and ability to affect its own near abroad. So as the Finnish flag is raised at Nato HQ in Brussels, It would be naive to think that Russia will not respond – even if its power to do so is currently somewhat diminished.

With Sweden and Finland soon joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the alliance needs to act quickly to develop plans that acknowledge the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region. When Sweden and Finland become members, the alliance will need a comprehensive approach to security that considers the region as a whole—instead of dividing it into the traditional “Baltic” and “Nordic” camps. Since Peter the Great (1682–1725), Russia has had imperial designs on the region, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Russia’s tactical-level defeats in eastern Ukraine should not inspire strategic complacency in NATO policymakers. They should view the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO as the starting point, and not the finish line, for bolstering Baltic Sea security. If NATO takes the right steps, Sweden and Finland’s entry will allow the alliance to defend the Baltic states more easily and deter Russian aggression more effectively in the region. Among other things, the following measures can accomplish this goal: - Update and modernize NATO’s contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region- Emphasize the role of the Åland Islands, Gotland, and Bornholm, as well as the Danish Straits, in Baltic Sea contingency planning- Establish a NATO battlegroup in Finland- Increase the alliance’s maritime presence in the Baltic Sea- Establish a permanent military presence in the Baltic states- Establish a Baltic Sea Air Defense mission- Develop contingency plans for Belarus and Kaliningrad in the event of an armed conflict in the Baltic Sea regionA New Geopolitical Reality NATO needs to continuously update its contingency plans as the security landscape in Europe evolves and new members join the alliance. In the past, NATO has often been too slow to take these steps. For example, after the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) joined in 2004, NATO was hesitant to develop contingency plans for the Baltic states for fear that doing so might antagonize Russia. This complacency started to change in 2008 after Russia’s invasion of Georgia. At this time, NATO finally developed its first set of contingency plans for the Baltic states1 However, NATO did not start to take its security responsibilities on the eastern flank seriously until Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Immediately after the invasion, the United States deployed an infantry company to each of the three Baltic states on a rotational basis. 2 After the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, this modest US rotational presence transformed into the establishment of four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) multinational battalions stationed in Poland and the Baltic states.3 In 2020, the alliance adopted new defense plans for the Baltics4 Since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO has agreed to increase its troop presence in the Baltics from a battalion-sized force to a brigade “where and when required5 Now that Sweden and Finland will soon be NATO members, the alliance will need to update its planning for the Baltic Sea region once again. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO will be good for the alliance for several reasons. Both countries possess robust militaries that will add significant capabilities to the alliance. Both have demonstrated the political will to deploy forces abroad to places such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, the skies over Libya, and sub-Saharan Africa. Both have provided significant military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Perhaps most importantly, Sweden and Finland’s entry into the alliance provides much-needed clarity regarding their expected roles in the event of Russian aggression in the region. Specifically, NATO can more easily defend the three Baltic states if Sweden and Finland are in the alliance. Without these two countries inside NATO, the three Baltic states are geographically isolated from the rest of the alliance. To the east of the Baltic states are Russia and Belarus. To the west, Lithuania shares a border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad (see figure 1). Only Lithuania shares a land border with another non-Baltic NATO member—a 65-mile border with Poland to the southwest, between Kaliningrad and Belarus, known as the Suwalki Gap. This geographical isolation makes NATO’s contingency planning for the Baltic states difficult. While Russian military planners always assumed Finland and Sweden would come to NATO’s aid in the event of a crisis, NATO’s military planners had no such guarantee. Once Finland and Sweden join the alliance, their role in NATO’s regional security planning will finally be clarified. However, the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea means that NATO will need to update contingency planning for the land, air, and sea domains in the region: - Changes in the Baltic land domain. Finland has an 830-mile border with Russia. Though the Finnish military has adequately defended this border for decades, NATO ought to decide how it will integrate into Finland’s national defense plans. This is also true of Finland’s Åland Islands and Sweden’s island of Gotland—which NATO defense planning for the Baltic Sea region should now consider. Also, NATO will have to examine ground lines of communication (GLOCs) contingencies and defense plans for the entire Scandinavian Peninsula, and not just for Norway as has been the case for decades. As for the Baltic states, the Suwalki Gap will remain their main GLOC.  - Changes in the Baltic air domain. Sweden and Finland’s entry into the alliance doubles the number of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters operated by NATO’s Nordic member states.6 NATO already has a well-established Baltic Air Policing mission for the three Baltic States. With Sweden and Finland in NATO, the alliance will need to expand the mission and geographical scope of the existing Baltic Air Policing operation to one focused on air defense.  - Changes in the Baltic region maritime domain. Sweden and Finland’s entry into NATO will add another 95,775 square miles of economic exclusive zone and 2,780 miles of coastline to the alliance. The unique status of the Åland Islands (see figure 1) brings new challenges to NATO planners. Meanwhile, access to and use of Gotland bring opportunities. In addition, the Danish Straits and Denmark’s Bornholm Island will become even more important to NATO’s contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region.  NATO’s Baltic Chain of DefenseThe Baltic Sea region is home to geographical locations of strategic importance for regional security. This makes Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO imperative. History has shown that most military operations in the Baltic region require access to what is today Swedish and Finnish air, sea, and land. For example, during the Crimean War (1853–56) and the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918–20), the then Swedish fortress of Viapori (today known as Suomenlinna in Finland) and the Åland Islands played crucial roles. During both world wars, the Danish Straits—which border Swedish waters and serve as a gateway to the Baltic Sea—were highly contested. During the Cold War, Denmark’s Bornholm was an area of contention between the Soviet Union and NATO. In the twenty-first century, these considerations have not disappeared. As Sweden and Finland join NATO, they will add two vital pieces of Baltic Sea real estate to the alliance: the Åland Islands and Gotland. Along with Denmark’s Bornholm, these islands form a Baltic chain of defense for NATO. Åland Islands The Åland Islands are a group of 6,700 Finnish islands where the primary spoken language is Swedish. They have always been considered some of the most important geostrategic real estate in the Baltic Sea. During the Crimean War, Sir Charles Wood, Britain’s first lord of the admiralty, said, “Those islands hung over Stockholm as much as Sebastopol hung over Constantinople7 Since the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War, the Åland Islands have been demilitarized and have remained neutral. For the victors, this was considered a major achievement of the Crimean War. British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston told the House of Commons in 1856 that demilitarization of the islands “placed a barrier between her [Russia] and the north of Europe.”8 The 1921 Convention Relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Aaland [sic] Islands reaffirmed the demilitarized and neutral nature of the islands and gave Finland the primary responsibility to guarantee this special status. Article 7 of the convention states that “if the neutrality of the zone should be imperiled by a sudden attack either against the Aaland [sic] Islands or across them against the Finnish mainland, Finland shall take the necessary measures in the zone to check and repulse the aggressor.”9 When Finland becomes a member of NATO, Helsinki’s military and security responsibilities to ensure that the islands remain demilitarized and neutral will also become, by extension, a NATO responsibility. Therefore, in a time of armed conflict, NATO must provide any assistance Finland needs to ensure that the special status of the Åland Islands remains in place. Gotland The Swedish island of Gotland is slightly smaller than Guam and sits approximately 60 miles off the coast of Sweden. It is strategically located halfway between Sweden and Latvia in the middle of the Baltic Sea. Due to its central location, there is a concern that Russian troops based in nearby Kaliningrad would attempt to occupy the island and deploy anti-aircraft and anti-shipping weapons platforms in the event of a war with NATO. Sweden maintained a permanent military garrison on the island for hundreds of years until 2005, when it decided to demilitarize the island as part of a downsizing program for the Swedish Armed Forces. One year after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government announced plans to remilitarize the island. Today, around 400 Swedish soldiers are permanently stationed on the island.10 Stockholm plans to boost the defense of Gotland further and to ensure it can reinforce the island quickly and easily if ever required. The Swedish government’s 2020 Total Defense 2021–2025 legislation stated,11 “Also important is enhancing the units on Gotland, where the core comprises a mechanized battalion with reinforcement resources.” In recent years, Gotland has also been the focus of US- and NATO-led military exercises in the region. For example, during the annual BALTOPS exercise in 2022, US Marines rehearsed amphibious operations on Gotland. Bornholm Bornholm is a Danish island strategically located at the mouth of the Baltic Sea. It recently made the news after sabotage—likely from Russa—damaged the Nord Stream pipelines nearby. At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union briefly occupied the island but returned it to Denmark in 1946. At that time Denmark and the Soviet Union unofficially agreed that NATO would not use the island, although Denmark maintained a military presence there during the Cold War. In June 2014, Russia carried out a simulated strike against Bornholm during an annual political festival with 90,000 attendees, including most of Denmark’s political elite.12 In the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, Danish policymakers began taking the island’s security more seriously. US policymakers have also noticed the island’s importance. In May 2022, as part of the DEFENDER-Europe 22 multinational exercises, the US military made history when it transported a US M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) battery in a C-17 Globemaster III that landed on Bornholm as part of a “rapid infiltration exercise,”13 the first time such a US military presence had occurred on the island. According to the US Army, the goal of the exercises was “to show the strategic reach of the HIMARS rocket system.” 15 Predictably, the Russian ambassador to Denmark, Vladimir Barbin, complained and warned that such a military exercise on Bornholm risks turning the island from a “peaceful haven into a potential military bridgehead.”15 It would be extremely naive to think Russia did not factor the importance of the Åland Islands, Gotland, and Bornholm, as well as the Danish Straits, into its Baltic Sea contingency planning.  NATO would be irresponsible if it did not do the same. The Kaliningrad Factor Not all the strategic spots in the Baltic Sea are part of NATO, as Kaliningrad Oblast is also important to regional security. Kaliningrad is a small Russian exclave along the Baltic Sea bordering NATO members Lithuania and Poland. In terms of size, it is slightly larger than Connecticut and has roughly the same population as Delaware. However, it plays an outsized role in Russia’s projection of power. Kaliningrad is part of Russia’s Western Military District and is home to two air bases (Chernyakhovsk and Donskoye) and Russia’s Baltic Fleet headquarters. Russia also has facilities for storing tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad,16 and some military strategists suspect that Russia keeps nuclear weapons there. 17 Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow maintained approximately 25,000 Russian troops and security personnel, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, S-400 air defense systems, P-800 anti-ship cruise missiles, and sizeable air and naval assets in Kaliningrad. Since 2016, Russia has also maintained Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad. The Iskander-M missile, which has a suspected range of 310 miles, can threaten Gotland and Bornholm with nuclear or conventional warheads from here. However, Russia has reportedly sent some of its forces, weapons systems, and other platforms to Ukraine since the Kremlin launched its invasion in February 2022.Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow maintained approximately 25,000 Russian troops and security personnel, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, S-400 air defense systems, P-800 anti-ship cruise missiles, and sizeable air and naval assets in Kaliningrad. Since 2016, Russia has also maintained Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad. The Iskander-M missile, which has a suspected range of 310 miles, can threaten Gotland and Bornholm with nuclear or conventional warheads from here. However, Russia has reportedly sent some of its forces, weapons systems, and other platforms to Ukraine since the Kremlin launched its invasion in February 2022.18 In reality, there is no accurate open-source assessment of what Russia maintains in Kaliningrad today. Kaliningrad is important for Russia’s geopolitical aims in the Baltic Sea for three reasons: 1. Kaliningrad allows Russia to project power in the region in a way it would be unable to without access to the exclave. If Moscow wanted to try capturing the Åland Islands, Gotland, or Bornholm, it would do so using Kaliningrad. 2. Kaliningrad serves as the cornerstone of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Baltic Sea region. If Russia has control of Kaliningrad during an armed conflict, NATO’s ability to act in the Baltic Sea region will be limited. 3. The possibility that Russia could access Kaliningrad through NATO and European Union member Lithuania offers Moscow an easy and low-cost way to increase tensions with the West. For example, in July, Russia falsely accused Lithuania of illegally blocking the transit of certain items to Kaliningrad.19 Also, many of the aerial incidents that cause NATO planes from Baltic Air Policing to scramble involve Russian planes flying to or from bases in Kaliningrad. Recommendations In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and with two states becoming new NATO members soon, the Baltic Sea region requires increased attention from the alliance’s leaders, who will need to develop a new strategy. The US should lead the way inside NATO to prepare the alliance to deal with these changes. The US and NATO can better prepare for contingencies in the Baltic Sea region by taking the following steps: - Update and modernize NATO’s contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region. With Sweden and Finland coming into the alliance, the geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region has changed. NATO should update its plans for the Baltic Sea region. It is in America’s interest to lead this process. - Publish a special annex to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO published its long overdue Strategic Concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit, but there was no formal input from Sweden and Finland since neither were members at the time. When both formally become members, NATO should work with Stockholm and Helsinki to publish a special annex to its 2022 Strategic Concept to factor in the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region. - Consider the special status of the Åland Islands in NATO’s plans. There is no doubt that Russia factors the importance and location of the Åland Islands into its war planning. The demilitarized and neutral status of the Åland Islands makes contingency planning tricky for NATO. When developing its approach to these islands, the alliance should look at how the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard—which shares some legal similarities with the Åland Islands—factors into NATO’s defense planning. NATO should also work in close consultation with the Finnish government and, where necessary and appropriate, the devolved government in Åland. - Call for a special North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting to be held on Gotland after Sweden joins. The NAC is the principal decision-making body inside NATO. The secretary general chairs its meetings. A special NAC meeting on Gotland would bring immediate awareness of Baltic Sea security issues to the Alliance. Establish a NATO enhanced forward presence (EFP) battlegroup in Finland. After the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, this modest US rotational presence transformed into the establishment of four EFP multinational battalions stationed in Poland and the Baltic states.20 At the 2022 NATO Summit, the alliance added EFP battlegroups to Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. When Finland joins NATO, it will be another frontline state on the eastern flank and should host an EFP battlegroup. As a confidence-building measure, NATO should ask Turkey to participate. - Lead efforts to establish a Baltic Sea Air Defense mission. While the Baltic Air Policing has been useful for policing the region’s airspace, more needs to be done. With Sweden and Finland inside NATO, and with Russia’s increased aggression, a robust and expanded Baltic Sea Air Defense mission is needed. Air policing alone is no longer enough. - Encourage the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Finland to receive NATO accreditation. Founded in 2017 to establish best practices for countering hybrid threats, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats already cooperates closely with NATO. The alliance should move to accredit the center to formally bring it into the existing family of NATO’s 28 accredited centers of excellence. This would be a quick and easy way to “fly the NATO flag” in Finland after it joins. - Establish a permanent military presence in the Baltic states. The deployment of the rotational EFP battlegroups to the region is a good start, but NATO ought to do more. The threat from Russia will remain for the foreseeable future. NATO needs to show an enduring commitment to the region by permanently stationing armed forces in each of the three Baltic states. - Factor Kaliningrad into NATO’s Baltic Sea region contingency planning. The US needs to work with its NATO allies to develop a strategy that deals with the Russian A2/AD capabilities in Kaliningrad in the event of an armed conflict. In particular, this effort requires close cooperation and planning with Poland. NATO cannot carry out any credible defense of the Baltic Sea region without neutralizing the threat from Kaliningrad. - Increase the maritime presence in the Baltic Sea. In recent months the US has increased its maritime presence in the Baltic Sea, but it can do more. Under the authority granted in the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey has blocked all warships from entering the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits while fighting continues in Ukraine. Last year, the US Navy spent a total of 111 days in the Black Sea.21 While the Montreux Convention restrictions are in place, the US and its allies should divert maritime assets that would have normally been deployed to the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. - Establish a US Marine Corps Baltic Sea Rotational Force. Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US Marine Corps operated a Black Sea Rotational Force that consists of a special-purpose Marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF). Now that the Black Sea Rotational Force cannot operate in the Black Sea due to the Montreux Convention restrictions, the US should consider establishing a similar task force for the Baltic Sea region. Such a task force would offer more joint military training opportunities for allies in the Baltic Sea region. - Make large-scale reinforcement exercises to the Baltic Sea region the norm. The US and Canada need to have the ability to reinforce Europe quickly. Countries in Western and Southern Europe should also be able to deploy forces quickly to Eastern and Northern Europe. For example, the straight-line distance from Portugal to northern Finland is more than 2,500 miles. Transporting forces over this distance quickly is no easy feat. During the Cold War, the US conducted an annual military exercise called Operation Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany). NATO should consider holding regular exercises focused on defending and reinforcing the Baltic Sea region. - Consider Belarus’s role in regional security. Since fraudulent elections in August 2020 kept him in power, the de facto leader of Belarus, President Aleksandr Lukashenko, has never been closer to the Kremlin. Belarus played an important role in enabling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian units that invaded from Belarus committed many of the worst atrocities against Ukrainian civilians. In the event of a Russian military intervention against a NATO member, the US should make it clear that it would not turn a blind eye to any Belarussian support provided to Russia. NATO should develop military plans accordingly, especially regarding the expected role of the Belarusian city of Grodno, located near the Suwalki Gap, in the event of a conflict in the Baltic states. - Leverage the US–UK Special Relationship in the Baltic Sea Region. The US and the UK are more effective actors in transatlantic security when they work together. For historical reasons, the UK has very close relations with the Baltic states, especially with Estonia and Latvia. Through its participation in the Northern Group, the UK also has an enhanced security presence in the Baltic Sea region due to the Joint Expeditionary Force.22 The US should work with the UK to identify areas of deeper defense and security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Conclusion The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO will bolster transatlantic security by adding two members who have the political will and the military capabilities to contribute to the security and stability of the Baltic Sea region. Their membership in NATO will deter Russia and diminish the likelihood of future conflict in the Baltic Sea region. However, as Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrates, no potential action by Moscow can be ruled out. Defending the Baltic states and deterring Russian aggression will be far easier and cheaper than liberating them. With Sweden and Finland in NATO, the defense of the Baltic states and security in the wider Baltic Sea region will be greatly improved. However, the alliance cannot dither or become complacent. NATO’s contingency plans need to continuously evolve as the security situation changes or as new members join the alliance. The time to get NATO’s plans in order for the Baltic region is now.

With the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the close ties between President Assad and his Turkish counterpart, Erdogan, were severed. Recently, more than a decade later, there have been increasing statements on reconciliation coming from Ankara – albeit coinciding with threats of a new military campaign. The Turkish President must thus choose – normalization or escalation. Recent increased attacks on Kurdish targets in northern Syria by Turkey and the Syrian rebel groups its supports raise the question whether Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to carry out his threat of May 2022 to begin another major ground operation against the Kurds. On the other hand, conciliatory statements regarding the Assad regime have been sounded recently in Turkey, and there has been discussion of the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries after over a decade of hostility and competition. These two processes appear to be contradictory, given that the Syrian regime opposes existing Turkish control of Syrian territories, and does not wish to see this control broadened. On the other hand, this may be a calculated Turkish move that aims to show the Turkish public a concerted multi-faceted effort to confront both the Kurdish underground and the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Discussion of events in northern Syria and the web of Syrian and Turkish interests can be used to assess the question, which trend will prevail in Turkish-Syrian relations: normalization or escalation? In mid-August 2022 widescale protests erupted in dozens of towns controlled by the Syrian opposition in the Idlib and Aleppo provinces in northwest Syria. The demonstrations featured the slogan of “We won’t reconcile,” in response to the surprising statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister on August 11: “We need to bring the opposition and regime together for reconciliation somehow, or there will be no permanent peace otherwise.” The Foreign Minister also announced that he had met his Syrian counterpart on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Belgrade in October 2021. Residents of the north were outraged at the statement, criticized Turkey harshly, and accused it of seeking “public normalization” with the Syrian regime. Indeed, on August 19 Erdogan even stated that “Turkey will need to take ‘higher steps’ with Damascus to end the ‘games’ being played in the region.” The antagonism generated by the Turkish statements should be seen in light of the history of Turkish involvement in Syria. A few months after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, when it became clear that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad did not intend to implement significant reforms, Turkey became one of the harshest critics of his regime. More than once Erdogan called him a murderer and called on him to resign. From the perspective of the rebels in Syria, peace between Turkey and Syria is tantamount to betrayal. Over the years, Turkey has supported and assisted various Sunni opposition organizations with funding, logistics, and arms. At the same time, Ankara viewed with concern the strengthening of the Kurds and the expansion of the territory run by them in northern Syria, resulting in part from their persistent and successful campaign against ISIS. Ankara was especially unhappy with the dominance of the Syrian branch of the Kurdish underground in the area, and feared the creation of contiguous Kurdish control along the Turkish-Syrian border. To forestall this situation, Turkey embarked on three military operations in 2016-2019, which led to Turkish control of several areas in northern Syria. In February 2020, in the wake of attacks by Syrian forces on Turkish army positions in which 34 Turkish soldiers were killed, Ankara embarked on Operation Spring Shield in the Idlib enclave. In March, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Turkey and Russia in Idlib; the agreement included the creation of a secure corridor around the M4 highway, and joint patrols by Russian and Turkish forces. Some 8,000 soldiers from the Turkish military remain in the region and lend military and logistical backing to the organizations operating there, primarily the Syrian National Army (formerly the Free Syrian Army) and the Salafi jihadist organization Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey is a highly-charged issue, both politically and economically. A significant majority of Turks do not want Syrian refugees to remain in the country, and this occasionally leads to acts of violence against refugees and expressions of racism. Today 3.7 million Syrian refugees who arrived in the wake of the civil war live in Turkey; most live outside refugee camps. As of March 2022, according to the Turkish Interior Minister, Turkey granted citizenship to 200,000 Syrians who entered its territory, while some 500,000 Syrians “voluntarily returned” to Turkey’s controlled territories in northern Syria. In May 2022 Erdogan declared that the Turkish government was formulating plans to resettle approximately one million Syrian refugees in Syrian territory. Turkey is interested in aid from external parties to help fund the building of residential complexes for refugees, and claims that areas under its control in northern Syria are safe enough for them. Over the last few years processes of Turkification have been underway in these territories, and Turkish influence and presence in the Idlib enclave has also expanded. Turkey invested in improved transportation links to the border crossings between the two countries and connected some of the electrical grids in northern Syria to the Turkish grid; Turkish cellular providers operate in these areas; Turkey set up more than ten Turkish postal offices in northern Syria; it pays public employees in the regions under its control in Turkish currency; and the Turkish lira is the primary currency in northern Syria. The Turkish language is taught in schools in these regions and cultural centers for teaching the Turkish language to adults were also opened. Clerics assigned by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, are stationed in mosques that Turkey opened or refurbished. In Idlib, Turkish influence is more limited than in regions under Turkish control in the north, but it is increasing there as well. In addition to military and logistical support for rebel groups, Turkey’s penetration of everyday life is apparent. For example, since 2018, Turkey began to play a more prominent role in the local economy and use of the Turkish lira became common. Turkey offered jobs and led development projects for rebuilding infrastructure, including dams, electric facilities, and roads. Over the past year Turkey has worked on building residential complexes for displaced people living in temporary camps in Idlib. Non-governmental Turkish organizations are also working on development in the province, including projects in housing, energy, culture, and finance. Normalizing Relations: Interests and Obstacles Turkey’s recent conciliatory tone and references to normalizing relations with Syria, while representing a 180-degree turn for Turkish foreign policy, may serve Erdogan in two main ways. First, they are perceived as active steps in managing the refugee problem and a first stage in sending refugees back to Syria. In addition, dialogue with Assad is seen as necessary in light of Russian pressure in this context, as expressed in recent meetings between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as part of broad negotiations between Ankara and Moscow. In light of the pattern of Turkification, it seems that the likelihood of Ankara withdrawing from the Syrian territories is low. At the same time Russian, Iranian, and American opposition to another Turkish broad-scale ground operation in Syria, as well as growing connections between the Kurds and the Assad regime in order to prevent such an operation, make it difficult for Turkey launch an operation on the scale that it would prefer. On the other hand, a limited military operation will only result in a slight boost to Erdogan’s popularity in Turkish public opinion. In parallel, over the past two years the Syrian regime has sought to rebuild its regional status and return to the heart of the Arab world. In this context, Syria normalized its relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Recent calls have also been heard to readmit Syria into the Arab League, from which it was expelled early in the civil war. Normalizing relations with Turkey may be part of this trend, and no less important, may lead to cessation or reduction of Turkish support for rebels and thus allow Assad to deal a crushing blow to the remaining opposition to his regime. However, reconciliation between the Assad regime and Ankara may be perceived as relinquishing Syrian territory and legitimizing Turkey’s presence there; Assad would like to regain sovereignty in all Syrian territory. The Syrian Foreign Minister declared that the country has not set preconditions, but normalization with Turkey will be achieved only when Ankara meets three demands: withdrawal from Syrian territory; an end to support for opposition organizations; and non-intervention in internal Syrian affairs. An additional impediment is the need to formulate an “Adana II Agreement.” In 1998, after Syria expelled the Kurdish underground leader from its territory, Syria and Turkey signed the Adana Agreement stating that Syria would declare the Kurdish underground a terror organization and not allow it to operate on Syrian territory. Annex IV of the agreement even stipulates that if Syria does not fulfill its commitments, Turkey may enter up to five kilometers into Syrian territory to operate against Kurdish underground activists. In order to rebuild the trust between the two states now, there must be either a new agreement between them, or at least a clarification that Syria remains committed to the Adana Agreement. It is doubtful, however, whether the Assad regime will be committed to this goal and whether it will be able to provide the security assurances demanded by Ankara. For the Syrian rebels in the north, Ankara’s reversal is a major blow to their standing, given that they had seen Turkey as a major ally and source of military and logistical support. In practice the Turkish presence is the major obstacle to attempts by the regime, with Russian and Iranian backing, to renew its control of the Idlib province. The population of the region has not given up on the values of the Syrian revolution and its principal aim of bringing down the Assad regime. Residents of northwestern Syria also fear that a political process will be imposed on them that does not address their needs. But the rebels do not have the means to convince Turkey not to change its policy, other than presenting scenarios of chaos in the event of an escalation in Idlib and the arrival of another million refugees to Turkish soil. In conclusion, the path to normalization between Turkey and Syria will not be smooth, but Erdogan and Assad may both gain from initial steps in this direction. Erdogan can present even a limited compromise, while taking strong military steps against the Kurdish underground in northern Iraq and northern Syria, as a signal to the Turkish public that he is doing what is necessary to deal with both Kurdish terror and the refugee problem. On the Syrian side, Assad can gain from normalization with Turkey as part of his efforts to reestablish Syria’s regional status, and as a means of distancing Turkey from the rebel organizations and neutralizing the most significant remaining pocket of resistance in the country.

Delivering Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine takes the war to a new level. Trying to look past the fog of war can help to predict how things might play out The decision of Germany and other NATO states to supply modern battle tanks and other armoured infantry vehicles to Ukraine takes the West’s involvement in the war to a new level. Presumably, in the further course of the war, the numbers mentioned so far will not be enough; the decision to provide tanks immediately sparked an international debate on delivering fighter planes as well. We are also hearing initial calls for NATO troops to be deployed to Ukraine as a ‘deterrent’, which would mean NATO becoming embroiled in the war. However, the discussion about the objectives in the Ukraine war mustn’t be muddied, even if clarifying these leads to a fierce dispute both within and amongst the NATO states. There is just too much at stake. The American and German governments indicate that they want to enable Ukraine to hold the frontline which it has fought for so far and liberate more areas wherever possible. All occupied territories, including Crimea, would probably be regained through a strategic approach of lengthy negotiations under the pressure of overwhelming Western sanction packages. This objective comes with the broader demand that Ukraine be enabled to reconquer its entire territory through military counterattacks, something also put forward by the Ukrainian leadership. The serious risks of escalation associated with this must be thoroughly analysed, which has largely been skirted around in the discussions so far. The fog of war prevents us from predicting how things will play out. All professional military policy experts are aware that their analyses, evaluations and forecasts are clouded by this; there are always bound to be frictions and surprises. However, looking at various scenarios can help us refine our assessments of what might be on the horizon. We will attempt to assess the potential effects of the new tank deliveries to Ukraine, using two scenarios that look ahead to the early summer of 2023. In both scenarios, it is assumed that the Ukrainian army will gradually receive about 100 Western battle tanks, most of the Leopard model, and around 100 largely German and American infantry vehicles by early summer 2023. The thirty-one M1 Abrams tanks previously promised are unlikely to be delivered by this point. Two tank battalions and two tank grenadier battalions – roughly equivalent to a brigade – will be equipped with the new heavy weapons systems by the early summer under both scenarios. Another assumption is that the widely anticipated Russian spring offensive, targeting the Luhansk or Donetsk area, will begin around the end of February or March. Very few Western battle and infantry vehicles, if any, are likely to be used, in what are expected to be highly intense battles with severe casualties. It is assumed with some uncertainty that the more professional and mobile Ukrainian defence can ward off larger operational gains from the major Russian units. These two scenarios look to the early summer after the Ukrainian army has taken delivery of the tanks from the West. Scenario 1: tank battle on the southern front, with limited Ukrainian territorial gainsBy the late spring, it becomes clear that the Ukrainian military intends to push hard towards the south from the area east and southeast of Zaporizhzhia. The goal is to advance over about 100 km to the Sea of Azov and cut the Russian troops off south of the river Dnieper and, more than anything, to stop Crimea from being supplied via the land bridge. The terrain in this area is mostly open and flat – highly beneficial to tanks – and, with the exception of the town of Melitopol, is only dotted with small villages. In the early summer of 2023, Ukraine makes bold advances south under favourable weather conditions, targeting the Sea of Azov coast. This results in the first major tank battle of the war, which sees German Leopards and Marders deployed at the front, as well as the American Bradleys and Strikers. With their better armour, agility and weapon effect, they clearly come out on top in a head-to-head battle. Ukrainian commanders, however, struggle to master the complexity of mixed-weapons combat, in which battle tanks, armoured infantry vehicles with tank grenadiers, artillery, sappers and air support must work together in close coordination to achieve the full force of impact. Heavy Russian tank and infantry forces withstand the advancing units. The Ukrainian counterattack progresses for about 30 km but then gets bogged down in the huge defensive firing, after Russian mechanised units succeed in pushing into the flank of the Ukrainian tank formations, jeopardising their supply. Soldier and material losses are severely high again on both sides. Pictures of destroyed Leopard tanks are plastered across the internet. German television channels and online media increasingly draw parallels with historical footage of German tanks during the Second World War in the same region. From a political and strategic perspective, attrition warfare has been consolidated in this scenario, despite tactical gains on both sides. Russia still has about 10 to 12 per cent of the Ukrainian territory under its control. The extensive exhaustion of weapons systems, spare parts and ammunition from the German and American armies is increasingly running down the operational capability and perseverance of the NATO forces on both sides of the Atlantic. As production capacity remains limited, there is increasing support for an agreement between the US, Ukraine and Russia to bring an end to the war. In Ukraine, the devastating losses are affecting more and more families, leading to political demands for a ceasefire. Opposition politicians demand that their president publish the actual losses incurred since the war began. Scenario 2: tank battle on the southern front, with the Ukrainian army advancing to the Sea of AzovScenario 2 is identical to scenario 1 up to the Ukrainian army’s counterattack from the area east of Zaporizhzhia. But in this scenario, operations are proceeding as planned by the Ukrainian General Staff. Kyiv has deployed forces equipped with Western tanks and infantry vehicles to the heart of the battlefield. With the superior firepower, armour and agility of the Leopard 2 tanks, they advance towards intermediate targets northeast of Melitopol after a few days. Leadership, fighting strength and motivation are once again proving weak amongst Russian ranks, while the Ukrainian troops’ command of mixed-weapons combat is better than initially expected by Western military experts. Leopard spearheads reach villages just off the coast, opposite Crimea. As Ukrainians advance, American-made HIMARS rockets destroy the new Russian bridge near Kerch in some places, rendering it unusable for supplying Crimea. Russia responds with the most intense air raid ever launched on Kyiv, with numerous casualties reported and electricity supply destroyed. The Russian president makes a brief statement following a stage-managed press conference with his General Staff. Putin first states that the Russian Federation now considers the NATO states that supplied heavy weapons to Ukraine as direct opponents in the war, regardless of any fine details in international law. The ongoing attack on Russian-occupied Crimea could only have come about through the massive involvement of Western states. The war has now created an existential dimension for the Russian Federation. As far as Russia is concerned, the entire war zone now extends to the territory of the Western states supporting Ukraine. He refrains from verbal warnings of nuclear war because his earlier threats were not taken seriously. Putin says he has ordered his Defence Minister and General Staff to supply some of the nuclear-capable missile troops with the nuclear warheads stored in depots. If the blockade of supplies to Crimea via the land bridge is not removed, Russia must use force through its tactical nuclear weapons. Russian bloggers report that the course of the war has brought unity to Kremlin leaders and only made them more determined to see it through, but this cannot be verified. A few hours later, American satellites pick up Russian convoys beginning their journey from the nuclear weapons storage facilities to the nuclear missile battalion deployment areas. This secret intelligence becomes public across the world. In a widely unexpected twist, China announces the largest mobilisation of its naval forces ever in the Strait of Taiwan. Its first fleet of warships has already set sail. The US and its NATO partners are now on the verge of a nuclear face-off that has escalated faster than many had believed, with consequences unimaginable for the whole of Europe. Western governments, the NATO Council and Military Committee, as well as the UN Security Council, meet day after day. Commentators can’t help but compare it to the height of the Cuban crisis. But NATO leaders clash on their assessments of the situation and their approach. In Berlin, huge demonstrations are held calling for an immediate end to the war, with the slogan ‘Stop the madness’. Of course, more optimistic scenarios can also be envisaged in which the Kremlin hands back Crimea without nuclear escalation. The powers that be, including those in Berlin, Washington and Paris, have so far held firm on their objective of not stepping into the grey area of getting directly involved in the war. But the danger of slowly and unintentionally sleepwalking into what would be the biggest catastrophe for the whole of Europe is growing and growing. Unexpected twists and turns (sometimes referred to as black swans or wild cards) can also create dynamic developments that are likely to be extremely difficult to control and contain. As more German tanks are sent to Ukraine, Germany’s share of responsibility for the course that the war takes – and the consequences thereof – increases and ultimately so does its right and need to influence the leadership in Kyiv.