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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back perpetual wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. Within two weeks of the election of Donald Trump, outgoing US President Joe Biden took an extremely disruptive step in international relations, pushing the conflict in Ukraine to a much more dangerous level by authorising Kiev to use American long-range missiles against Russian territory, a rogue move certainly intended to hinder the détente his successor had announced.As if that weren’t enough, a week later, Turkey (the largest NATO army in Europe) launched an offensive in neighbouring Syria through intermediaries led by HTS*, the former Al-Nusra Front*, effectively tearing up the Astana agreements with Moscow and Tehran on its role in Syria. Towards the end of the Biden administration, two major escalations took place in the two largest military conflicts taking place today, in Ukraine and the Middle East, both geographically separated by Turkey, which has now entered the scene. At whose behest? It would be naive to think that Erdoğan took the initiative to stage the invasion of Syria without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the Americans, the British, the Israelis and the Europeans. Organising, training and arming tens of thousands of men on Syrian territory under his authority or in Turkey itself is an operation that requires logistical and intelligence coordination between various state and non-state entities. Anatolia is the Eurasian axis par excellence, where three tectonic plates meet (the Eurasian, the African and the Arabian). Geographically, Turkey has always been an asset to NATO, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is where the natural spaces of Turkish projection and influence collide with those of Russia. For decades, NATO has tolerated Turkey’s neo-imperial ambitions, especially during the Erdoğan era, even if they have historically been anti-Western. This is a strategic asset that the Atlanticists are saving for the right moment. In reality, Turkish nationalism has been expressed in these regions since the early 1980s, and in the 1990s, with the vacuum left by the post-Soviet chaos, its influence spread and the Turan project was revived, which is now very visible in the form of the Organisation of Turkic States. But Turanism isn’t Ankara’s only asset. On the one hand, the Turkish diaspora in Europe, on the other hand the Islamic charity and educational network that Turkey manoeuvres in Africa, and on the other hand the military expansion with several bases in a good dozen countries in Europe, Africa, the Caucasus and the Middle East, shape Turkey’s aspirations to project power in the world. The crossroads of the Levant The reactivation of the Syrian civil war, or even the dismemberment of the country, is full of contradictions, unlikely alliances and unclear objectives, but also the hidden but known interests of a number of external actors who have been trying to take over the country since 2011. It serves Israel well, after more than 40 years of occupation of the Golan Heights, which are legally Syrian. Tel Aviv could extend its dominance in the area in the face of a Syria that is likely to be dysfunctional and without an army. Netanyahu’s regional escalation is also his way out of the mess he got himself into over a year ago in Gaza and Lebanon, while he waits for the new US administration, full of Zionists in foreign policy positions. Coincidentally or not, the hordes of jihadists took over Syria the day after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was announced. It should come as no surprise that behind this episode lies a tacit pact between Ankara and Tel Aviv to eliminate Iranian influence from the region. The US role is more nebulous. Officially, it didn’t make a statement until the final fall of Assad. But it’s also a role that doesn’t need clarity because it’s the only power that has allowed itself to occupy Syria since 2014, especially with clandestine military bases in the centre-south and east of the country, justifying this blatant international illegality with the flimsy excuse of being able to “fight ISIS*”. In reality, the US is ensuring a strategic military presence with an eye on Iran and Russia, which will certainly be formalised with the next phase in Syria. In addition, Washington has several major players on the ground, such as the Kurds of the SDF, who control the north, and the Free Syrian Army, which confronts them. On the other hand, the leader of the HTS, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who now controls most of the territory, spent five years in US prisons in Iraq (including the notorious Abu Ghraib). Al-Julani will surely be the most important and valuable asset for American interests in this proxy war. But what have the Western powers given Erdoğan to make him take the initiative to conquer Syria? What is the bargaining chip? Is the new Syrian government willing to give up the Russian base in Tartus, or is its removal one of NATO’s conditions for Erdoğan? What about Palestine and the genocide in Gaza? Will Lebanon follow the possible fragmentation of Syria? Who will form the new government, and what will be its vision for the future? Will there be an energy agreement between Ankara, Baku and Brussels? What will happen to trade, energy and infrastructure relations between Turkey and Russia? Will Turkey still be a candidate for the BRICS? Many big questions have been asked. Syria and Ukraine, the same conflict The most worrying aspect of the current scenario is that the two ongoing conflicts, surrounded by volatile regions, are moving closer together. The HTS, brought to Syria by Ankara, has been in Ukraine learning new combat tactics and night attacks from Kiev troops using advanced drones supplied by Qatar. Unlike the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Qatar has never sympathised with the Assad government after it took over Aleppo. Among the members of the Arab League, Qatar, an ally of Turkey (which has a naval base in Doha), is the only Arab country that has consistently sided with the Syrian Salafist opposition since 2011. After Erdoğan’s move, Russia will not be able to accept a freeze in military activity on its borders, lest it see the enemy rearm. It is therefore impossible to expect a ‘Minsk 3’ for the Trump era. In any case, an understanding between Russia and the US is necessary. After such a dark four years of the Biden administration, which brought war again to Europe and the Middle East, there is certainly hope for better relations between the world’s two largest military powers. An escalation of the conflict in Ukraine is unthinkable. More immigration for a Europe in recession For Europe, the current situation in Syria is terrible because it opens up new prospects for hundreds of thousands more refugees, depending on how the situation in Syria develops. Assad’s Syria was a dictatorship, just like Gaddafi’s Libya, but it provided a stability that is no longer guaranteed. The ‘melting pot’ that Europe’s major cities have become after 20 years of perpetual US wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria also has the potential to bring the inter-community and interethnic problems of the Middle East onto European soil at a time of recession, as is the case in Germany. With this move, Turkey has opened the game and shown that it wants to compete with Russia for its sphere of influence. Erdoğan has taken on the destabilising role his external superiors have assigned him. Erdoğan’s alignment with Western designs in Syria opens a rift in relations with Moscow and should be seen as a declaration of intention. War on multipolarism The Syrian war, which has all the makings of a protracted affair, is also a far-reaching move against the BRICS, since Turkey was one of the main candidates for membership of the organisation. The control of this strategic region, which is increasingly in the domain of the Silk Roads and the BRICS, is now entering a period of predictable instability. Indeed, the very strange Hamas attack in October 2023 took place in the middle of the new members of the group (Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran), and launched a war on the region along the lines of the ‘creative destruction’ advocated by the neoconservative think tanks. Just when everything was getting ready for a new US administration that seemed at least minimally pragmatic and willing to engage in dialogue and put an end to the Ukrainian conflict, and to the joy that for the first time in three years a Western statesman was uttering the word ‘peace’, Biden has treacherously shown what his real legacy is: bringing back the eternal wars, creating chaos through bribery and corruption, financing coups d’état, unfreezing dormant conflicts and playing one against the other. An old practice of those who can’t compete with economics, trade and diplomacy and think they can with wars. *- banned in the Russian Federation

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now? One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad. But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers. What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham? Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad. The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world. In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.” The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.” This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid. Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria. Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success? Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia. Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria. The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war. It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold. This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics. Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally. How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria? To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations. Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement. This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services. Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups. Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses. In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government. This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups. In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs. Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests. Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off. What does the US think of the group and al-Golani? The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions. Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani. However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list. What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader? First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad. But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies. First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large. This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws. Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups. Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity. Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country. However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support. Sections of this article were first published in an article for The Conversation on Dec. 2, 2024.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The changes which officially made to the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence on November 19, 2024, served as a signal from Russia to the West in response to the first use of U.S. and British-made tactical missiles on Russian territory.  Judging by Russia's actions, the adjustment of its nuclear policy is part of a plan for retaliatory escalation steps, which was prepared some time ago when the United States came close to deciding on the use of its missile weapons deep within Russian territory. We are at the beginning of a dangerous escalation spiral, which could potentially lead to a conventional conflict between Russia and the United States, followed by a nuclear conflict. The immediate task of the Doctrine is to clarify the essence of future Russian signals to the adversary, ensuring their proper interpretation. At the same time, several innovations introduced in this document could have far-reaching consequences for the containment strategies of all world states. Emerging Challenges First and foremost, the changes in the doctrine are driven by the technological revolution that has occurred in military affairs over the past few decades. This revolution has effectively erased the distinction between what was once considered conventional military-technical or military cooperation and direct involvement in warfare. The core of this revolution is that the information and technological aspects of modern warfare now play a decisive role in shaping the course of combat operations. Superiority in technical intelligence, command and control systems, and information processing can provide a decisive advantage on the battlefield and transform the capabilities of weapons systems that might previously have been considered obsolete. A great power providing its partner with real-time intelligence, space communications infrastructure, and command and control and data processing software, all while requiring continuous technical support, provides the ability to fully control and direct the activities of a junior ally. Before the digital age, the recipient of even the most sophisticated weapons could use them as they saw fit, without anyone knowing, at least as long as they had the capacity to maintain them. Real-time intelligence assistance was nearly impossible: satellite images on analog media, typically only usable at the strategic command level, could be transmitted to an ally. Now, Ukraine’s American backers have the ability to blind the Ukrainian Armed Forces and paralyze the Ukrainian command and control system with a single click: all long-range strikes, including those carried out by drones assembled by Ukraine, are planned jointly, and none are carried out without American approval. Thus, any external power that provides significant assistance to a warring party, connected with the use of modern systems of satellite and electronic intelligence, information processing and control, is a full-fledged participant in the war. Consequently, retaliatory strikes against its troops and territory are fully justified. Technical changes are combined with political ones. The progress of the American model of globalization, which continued until recently, led to the coming to power in a number of countries of real "citizens of the world", claiming to enter the global elite and detached from national interests. Such states, under the leadership of a globalist elite accumulating their capital abroad, are capable of making colossal human and economic sacrifices, significant territorial losses in order to implement political directives imposed on them from outside. The durability of such regimes can be significant due to the powerful propaganda apparatus created with American assistance, as well as the systematic use of mass repressions, extrajudicial killings, torture, etc. sanctioned by the United States. Georgia during the reign of Saakashvili and modern Ukraine are classic examples of modern American proxies following this path. This model of relations is much more dangerous than the American alliances of the Cold War, when junior partners of the United States had almost complete freedom in domestic policy and tried to follow their national egoistic interests. Solutions There is no doubt that Russia has the right to strike American reconnaissance and communication satellites, as well as reconnaissance aircraft and drones involved in providing information support for the activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The only question is the feasibility of this step in achieving the goals of the Special Military Operation (SMO). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously stated, in particular, that Western satellites involved in supporting military operations could be legitimate targets for a Russian strike. The updated "Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence" extend this logic to the sphere of nuclear deterrence. The "Basic Principles" specifies that aggression against Russia and/or its allies by a non-nuclear state, carried out with the support of a nuclear state, is considered as their joint attack. Other changes concern possible scenarios for the future use of service "kamikaze states" like Ukraine by the enemy against Russia. This is the receipt of reliable information about a massive launch (take-off) of air attack weapons of all types (from drones to missiles) and their crossing the Russian border. The US can quickly give its proxy a huge capability to strike deep into Russia with drones and missiles; even if Russia completely destroys the immediate aggressor with a retaliatory strike, it will suffer heavy losses, and the US will remain the winner. Therefore, the US should be the target of a retaliatory strike on par with the immediate aggressor. Given the widespread proliferation of long-range attack drones around the world, and the US policy of transferring intermediate- and shorter-range cruise missiles to its junior allies, this condition should potentially create a new framework for future local conflicts. Given that the ability of France and the UK to produce long-range weapons without extensive use of US technology is largely lost, any massive long-range strike against sensitive forces inside Russia, delivered with Western weapons and/or big data, should result in a strike against the US. At this point, since American and European long-range strikes on Russia have already been carried out, Russia probably has no choice but to transfer to one or two countries the weapons or technology that will allow them to reliably deliver payloads to North America and Western Europe: the Americans and Europeans must pay. But how widespread such a practice will be in the future is one of the important questions of the post-war world order. In the course of the current conflict, the question of strikes on American targets will probably arise with the further expansion of the practice of American proxy strikes deep into Russian territory. Another change related to the response to threats of possible conflicts in the coming years was the specification of the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the event of non-nuclear aggression against Russia. If earlier the condition for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons was defined extremely vaguely as "aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened", now we are talking about a "critical threat to the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity" of Russia and Belarus. As the experience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in the Kursk region showed, the United States can send its proxies to carry out operations that lead to an advance into Russia by tens of kilometers. In the future, each such operation should be considered as an attack by the United States on Russia. The Problem of Defining Criteria The issue of "proxy states" or "kamikaze states," which can be rapidly rearmed and thrown into battle under external control, will continue to increase. This will be driven by the development of military capabilities (particularly those involving artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms, and weapon systems, etc.) in combination with the refinement of methods for societal control. Russia is not the only one that will have to deal with this problem. In the long term, there will be a difficulty of developing criteria for the level of "support" by a nuclear state for a non-nuclear country, at which the actions of the junior partner become their joint aggression.  Probably, we can talk about finding a combination of political, economic and military-technical conditions, at which the "junior partner" can no longer be considered as a separate participant in international relations. In this case, the responsibility for any significant attacks from it on Russian or Belarusian territory should be borne by the patron state. Such criteria must be logical and transparent, and their development and announcement probably need to be done in advance. Perhaps such a practice will gain some currency in the future unstable world as a way to protect the national territories of great powers from attack, narrowing the potential for the use of "service states".

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah entered a 60-day ceasefire on Nov. 26, 2024, a move aimed at reducing tensions in the region more than a year into a multifront conflict.Under the terms of the deal, Israel would gradually withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and Hezbollah would fully withdraw north of the Litani River. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Army would “deploy and take control over their own territory,” U.S. President Joe Biden said, adding that the United States, France and other allies have pledged to support the deal.But what does the deal mean for the parties involved and future prospects for a more permanent cessation of hostilities? The Conversation U.S. turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert of Lebanon and border conflicts in the Middle East, to explain why they reached a ceasefire now and what it means going forward. Why is the ceasefire deal happening now? The timing of this ceasefire is the result of a convergence of interests among the government in Israel, Hezbollah itself and that of its chief sponsor, Iran – but all for different reasons. For the Israeli government, domestic issues are at play. First off, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are exhausted after more than a year of war. This is particularly true for Israeli reservists, a growing number of whom are not turning up for duty. The Israeli general public, too, is tired of conflict, and a majority favors a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also has internal issues in his government to contend with. He is facing pressure from the ruling coalition’s ultra-Orthodox partners to draw up laws exempting ultra-Orthodox Jews from the military draft. Reducing the need for active personnel by quieting the front with Lebanon will help in that regard. The secular and national-religious sectors of the society who do serve in the IDF and who are upset with the possibility of a formal draft-exemption law for ultra-Orthodox men may be more inclined to swallow this pill if the war with Hezbollah is over. From the Israeli army’s perspective, the war in Lebanon is coming to a point of diminishing returns. It has succeeded in weakening Hezbollah’s military standing but has been unable to wipe the militant group out entirely. This also factors into Hezbollah’s thinking. The group has been seriously debilitated in Lebanon; the war has eroded its military capabilities. Unlike its previous position – reiterated time and again over the past year by its now-dead leader, Hassan Nasrallah – that a ceasefire would only be possible if first it is reached between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran are now willing to delink the two fronts. This leaves Hamas in a far weaker position as they are now left without the support of Iran’s main proxy “axis of resistance” group. Drawing Hezbollah, and other aligned groups in the region, into direct confrontation with Israel had been Hamas’ hope when it launched its attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hezbollah and Lebanon’s other political factions also have strong domestic pressures to contend with. Lebanon has more than 1 million refugees as a result of the conflict – the vast majority of them Shia, the branch of Islam that Hezbollah is drawn from. The conditions in Lebanon have increased the risk of sectarian fighting between Shia and others factions in the country. For Hezbollah leaders, the time may seem right to cut their losses and prepare to regroup as a political and military body. Iran, too, is seeking to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon as soon as possible. The deal comes as Tehran is bracing for a U.S. administration that could have a more hawkish position on Iran and its proxies in the region, of which Hezbollah is the most significant. With a new Iranian president, and a new U.S. administration, a ceasefire between Iran’s main proxy and Israel may be a first step to Tehran building a constructive dialogue with a Trump White House. What is the role of the US in the ceasefire? What is interesting for me is that despite the very clear position of the U.S. in favoring Israel during the past year of conflict, it still functions as an effective mediator. It is thanks to the U.S. that there is a ceasefire – and it comes despite the fact that Washington is far from neutral in this conflict, being a chief ally of Israel and its main provider of weapons. But the Lebanese government and Hezbollah see a U.S. role, too. And this is not new. The United States was the mediator in the 2022 landmark agreement that, for the first time, set out the maritime boundaries between Israel and Lebanon. The ceasefire deal benefits both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations. For President Joe Biden, it would represent a diplomatic success after a year in which the U.S. has failed to mediate any breakthrough in the conflict in Gaza, and it is an opportunity for Biden to finish his presidency on a positive foreign policy note. From the perspective of Trump, the ceasefire in Lebanon will represent one less problem for him to face. What might be the consequences for Lebanon and Israel? Lebanon has the most at stake in this ceasefire holding. The country was already in a perilous economic situation before the war, and months of fighting has only worsened the structural, economic and political crises in the country. It is as dire as it can get. Further, the war has reignited sectarian tension in Lebanon – talk of a return to civil war in the country is not far-fetched. Lebanon-Israel border: A zone of continued conflict The lower reaches of the Litani River, outlined in blue, are the northern edge of a U.N.-proposed buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Golan Heights, which neighbors Syria, is also disputed territory in the region. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Palestinian territories that are governed by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority respectively, are also often areas of violent conflict.   But there is uncertainty over how the ceasefire will affect the various rival factions in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has been weakened and may well now look for a way to reassert its strength in Lebanon’s politics. The main question is how the other factions and parties respond to that. With a weak Hezbollah, other factions may challenge the militant organization in ways they haven’t before. Before being decimated by Israel, there were no rival groups in a position to challenge Hezbollah in Lebanon. But that has all changed: Hezbollah’s military power has been degraded and Nasrallah, the group’s leader, killed. And Nasrallah was not just the face and brains of Hezbollah, he was also the group’s most important link to Iran. There is concern among some Lebanon experts that the gap left by a weakened Hezbollah may see a struggle for power and further strife in the country. And I believe there should be no illusions that Hezbollah will try to reassert itself as a domestic force. Complicating matters is the fact that any realignment of political forces in Lebanon comes amid a political vacuum. There has been a caretaker government – and no president – for two years now since Hezbollah conditioned the appointment of a new president with the candidate being an ally of the group. Now, Lebanese politicians would need to agree on a new president who in turn would appoint a new prime minister and government. It remains to be seen how this will unfold with a weakened Hezbollah. For Israel, the ceasefire will provide an opportunity to reconstruct parts of the north that have been devastated by Hezbollah missiles and a possible return of the 60,000 Israelis who fled northern areas close to the Lebanon border. It will also allow the Israel Defense Forces to regroup, refresh and focus their resources in Gaza, rather than fighting on two fronts. Could the ceasefire lead to a permanent peace deal? I don’t see any permanent peace deal on the horizon, given the fact that the fundamental political goals of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran have not changed and that the Israel-Palestine conflict continues to fester. But I am hopeful that the ceasefire could lead to calm and stability between Israel and Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The details of the ceasefire agreement are not very different from U.N. Resolution 1701 that ended the last major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. That agreement brought relative calm to the region for 18 years, even if Hezbollah, supported by Iran, used these years to build up its military capability and prepare for a potential ground invasion of northern Israel. In my view, there is a possibility for greater stability this time around given the fact that the ceasefire agreement also stipulates that, if and when it becomes permanent, the deal would serve as a basis for negotiations over the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial boundary. This would not be an easy task, particularly in the area of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar. But with goodwill and good intentions, even difficult border disputes could be resolved.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction In 2010, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was established and ratified in 2011, with membership expanding to 33 countries. According to the organization’s statements, its aims include “deepening the integration of Latin American countries, promoting international peace, and respecting human rights.” Additionally, there is an implicit ambition among several members to reduce the political and economic influence of the US in the region, as suggested by the context of some of the organization’s statements.[2] With a total population of about 635 million people, covering an area of about 22 million km², and accounting for 17% of the United Nations (UN) voting power, their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis for 2023 is approximately $12.8 trillion, equivalent to 7.8% of the world’s GDP. However, four of the 33 countries contribute more than $9.6 trillion, or about 75% of the GDP. These four countries also comprise 68% of the total population of the regional group, as shown in the following table:[3]   CELAC’s Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood The Latin American and Caribbean region has the highest percentage of leftist political regimes in the world. Among the 19 most significant countries in the region, 12 are now run by left-wing governments, accounting for 63% of the total. These leftist-led countries represent 92% of the region’s people and 90% of its GDP.[4] This demographic and economic dominance is clearly reflected in CELAC’s stance on two interconnected issues: the position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood, marked by varying degrees of rejection of Israeli policy, and a relative independence from US influence in the region. First: CELAC’s Stance as a Political Bloc on Operation al-Aqsa Flood[5] At the eighth CELAC summit, held in March 2024 in Kingstown, the capital of St.Vincent and the Grenadines, a lack of consensus emerged among the members regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Despite the compromise language in the conference statement, 27 countries endorsed it while 6 countries opposed it.[6] The resolution included the following points:[7] a. Condemning the killing of civilians on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides and emphasizing the need to protect civilians in accordance with international law.b. Supporting the UN General Assembly call for a ceasefire.c. Demanding the immediate and unconditional release of hostages.d. Urging the delivery of humanitarian aid to the affected areas in the Gaza Strip (GS).e. Calling for a peaceful solution based on the two-state solution. Second: Stances of the Central States within CELAC[8] Countries with left-leaning governments are often the most vocal in supporting the Palestine issue, as reflected in their leaders’ statements. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro slammed “the international position regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza,” and pointed out that “international justice exists only to protect the interests of American, European, and Western imperialism, in order to conceal the massacres committed against Palestinian families.” Brazilian President Lula da Silva aligned with this view, calling on “the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to set aside their differences and put an end to the genocide in Gaza.” He reiterated his call for an immediate ceasefire, as outlined in the CELAC statement from the 8th Congress. Additionally, he noted Brazil’s efforts to support UN Security Council resolutions aimed at halting the fighting in GS, which were vetoed by the US. Colombian President Gustavo Petro criticized both the United States and Europe for supporting “Israel in committing genocide against the Palestinians,” with similar sentiments expressed by Nicaragua. Generally, the positions of CELAC countries, particularly the major powers, can be categorized into three distinct stances, as illustrated in the table below:[9]   1. Countries closest to the Israeli position: This group varies in their level of support for Israel, as illustrated by the following indicators: a. The Salvadoran stance is notably one of the most vehement against the Palestinians, despite President Nayib Bukele being a Christian of Palestinian descent who calls for the “demise of the Palestinian resistance.” This position aligns closely with that of Paraguay, one of the few countries to label the Palestinian resistance as “terrorism” and announce plans to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Paraguay’s stance on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is marked by a consistent lack of condemnation at the UN and frequent abstentions from voting on resolutions that support Palestinian rights. b. The Jewish minority in Argentina plays a significant role in influencing the government. With a population of between 300–400 thousand, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Latin America and the fifth largest in the world. The attacks on Jewish institutions in Argentina during 1992–1994, which were linked to Iran—a key supporter of Palestinian resistance—also influenced the government’s stance, despite opposition from the pro-Palestinian Worker’s Left Front – Unity party. c. Guatemala, with a population of about 18 million, was the first Latin American country to move its embassy to Jerusalem. It is also one of the centers of gravity for Anglican Christianity, which tends to be more sympathetic to Zionism. 2. Countries that have adopted a middle ground, attempting to balance support for and opposition to both sides of the conflict: a. Both Mexico and Brazil criticized the attack on Israel on 7/10/2023, but strongly condemned the Israeli response. b. In the diplomacy of Brazil and Mexico, a role reversal was observed. The presidencies of both countries adopted more articulate positions than their foreign ministries, where traditional diplomatic language prevailed. c. Mexico has not severed ties with Israel; however, its representatives at the UN have sharply criticized the Israeli government. d. Ecuador can be included in this group due to its effort to mediate peace between the Palestinian resistance and Israel by sending Ecuadorian Vice President Verónica Abad in October 2023. Additionally, Ecuador has backed Palestine’s bid for full membership in both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, though it has explicitly condemned the resistance attack that occurred in October 2023. 3. Countries that support Palestinian rights are typically left-leaning and their policies often exhibit the following characteristics: a. Nicaragua unequivocally supported the Palestinian position and even received some Palestinian leaders after the war. b. Colombia has taken a definitive stance in strong support of Palestine. It is one of the most vocal critics of Israeli policies, culminating in its decision to sever diplomatic ties with Israel. Colombian President Gustavo Petro has sharply condemned Israeli actions in Gaza, labeling them as “genocide.” It is important to note that Colombia’s position is significant given its historical and strategic ties with Israel. Although Colombia relies on Israeli military equipment for combating armed opposition and drug trafficking groups, and there has been a free trade agreement between the two countries since 2020, as well as various agreements since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1957, trade data shows a 53% decline in trade between Israel and Colombia following the recent conflict, compared to 2022. c. The Cuban and Venezuelan position was a continuation of their traditional support for the Palestinian right, and Cuba justified the Palestinian attack on 7/10/2023 as a reaction to 75 years of oppression of the Palestinians. d. Bolivia did not condemn the Palestinian attack in October, instead focusing its statements on de-escalating the conflict between the two sides. However, the lack of Israeli response to its calls led Bolivia to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Additionally, Bolivia supported South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and endorsed a case before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Colombia and Belize have also cut ties with Israel. Notably, during the last week of June 2024, Bolivia experienced a failed coup attempt, raising suspicions that the US and Israel may have been involved as retaliation for Bolivia’s clear stance on the Gaza war.[10] e. The significant presence of the Palestinian community in Chile, the largest in Latin America with nearly half a million having Palestinian roots, has notably influenced Chilean politics. This influence is reflected in the Chilean Senate’s Human Rights Commission decision to ban companies from importing goods produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. A US State Department official characterized this decision as one that unfairly singles out Israel.[11] f. Honduras has exhibited a decrease in its support for Israel following Israeli attacks on civilians, leading the government to summon the Israeli ambassador to protest these actions. In 2021, Honduras was one of the first countries to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, joining Guatemala and Paraguay, which had made similar moves in 2018. However, Guatemala reversed its decision and returned its embassy to Tel Aviv shortly thereafter. The shift in Honduras’ stance can be attributed to the change in leadership from a right-wing to a left-wing administration after Xiomara Castro assumed the presidency in 2022. g. Since the beginning of the war, Latin American countries’ positions in support of Palestine have evolved at the diplomatic level in particular, and have begun cutting ties and recalling ambassadors from Israel, which was initiated by Chile, Colombia, and Honduras, while Bolivia and Belize cut diplomatic ties with Israel completely. Bolivia was one of the five countries that referred the situation in GS to the ICC for investigation in November 2023. In the referral, Bolivia cites evidence of crimes against Palestinians including murder, torture, inhumane treatment, persecution, apartheid, forced displacement, and the destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage. Mexico and Chile did the same in January 2024, whereas Brazil’s and Colombia’s foreign ministries issued statements supporting South Africa’s legal action against Israel before the ICJ. The Brazilian position has been the leading one, which has strained relations between Brazil and Israel despite efforts by the Brazilian Israelite Confederation (CONIB) to mend fences. However, the Brazilian president’s remarks that “what is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people hasn’t happened at any other moment in history” except one: “When Hitler decided to kill the Jews,”[12] combined with the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s endorsement of European countries’ recognition of Palestine as a state and support for a two-state solution, have solidified Brazil’s stance against Israeli policies. CELAC’s Vote at the UN A review of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions reveals that the countries most resistant to supporting resolutions favoring Palestinian demands are Guatemala, Paraguay and Argentina, followed by Haiti, Uruguay, Panama and El Salvador. These countries often either oppose or abstain from voting. Argentina, with a population of nearly 46 million, is the most significant ally of Israeli policy. This is followed by Guatemala with about 18 million people, Paraguay with around 7 million, Panama with 4.5 million and Uruguay, with approximately 3.5 million people. Argentina ranks third among CELAC countries in terms of GDP and fourth in terms of population. Argentina’s stance on Palestinian rights reflects the political shift introduced by President Javier Milei, who aims to align Argentina more closely with the Western capitalist bloc through his foreign policy.[13] Argentina did not support the General Assembly resolution calling for a ceasefire in December 2023 and opposed the resolution to grant Palestine full membership in the UN. The Argentine position can be attributed to the following reasons:[14] a. President Javier Milei’s religious inclination towards Judaism was evident in his prayers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in 2021, accompanied by Rabbi Shimon Axel Wahnish, who was later appointed as Argentine ambassador to Israel. Although the Argentine president is a Catholic Christian, some sources suggest he is considering converting to Judaism. However, other sources claim that President Milei’s display of Jewish faith is a way to express repentance and counter accusations that he concealed his support for a Nazi sympathizer. b. The Argentine president’s intention to strengthen ties with the Jewish minority in Argentina, as previously mentioned, faced opposition from nearly four thousand Argentine Jewish intellectuals, who voiced concern over Milei’s “political use of Judaism.” This concern was highlighted when he became one of the first world leaders to visit Israel after the war erupted, offering high praise for Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies and pledging to move Argentina’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Interestingly, the Argentine president demonstrated a clear bias towards Israel when he cut his state visit to Denmark short, following the Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024, which was in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. President Meli then convened a crisis committee alongside the Israeli ambassador to Argentina and his security minister, who began criticizing the positions of other Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Chile, describing them as “Islamic hotbeds” and accusing them of hosting Hezbollah elements. He also criticized the defense agreement Iran concluded with Bolivia in July 2023. c. Milei, a university economics professor, bases his economic ideology on far-right principles and anti-leftist Peronism in Argentina, making him the most eager to strengthen the relationship with the US and, consequently, with Israel. d. It is noted that trade relations between Israel and Argentina are escalating significantly. Israeli exports to Argentina increased annually by 15.2% from 2017 to the end of 2022, reaching $156 million in 2022. Similarly, Argentine exports to Israel increased annually by 25.2%, reaching $200 million in 2022. Third: Trends in Public Opinion in CELAC Countries Quantitative studies on access to information and data from various sources show that Latin American countries lead the world in relying on social media for obtaining and sharing information. This trend has influenced Israel’s public image in the region.[15] Public opinion polls in Latin America reveal that approval of the way US President Joe Biden’s is dealing with the GS war is modest. A survey of six major Latin American countries showed the following results:[16]   The approval rate with Biden’s GS war policy in six countries is notably low, at around 26%. In contrast, the same survey indicates that the disapproval in these countries is more than double the approval rate, reaching approximately 57%. Meanwhile, the people of CELAC countries expressed their solidarity with Palestine after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This solidarity was evident in demonstrations involving former presidents, civil society organizations, popular sectors, football associations, artists and universities, particularly in Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina, etc. Conclusion The “instability” in political orientations towards international issues is a key feature of Latin American countries’ policies, largely due to the frequent shifts in political regimes and the consequent changes. In analyzing the positions of Latin American countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict, four factors seem to be the most significant in shaping this relationship:[17] 1. The political shifts between leftist and rightist regimes, whether due to coups or presidential elections, often characterize these countries as “unstable.” This is particularly evident in major countries within this group, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia. This instability is reflected in their stances on the Arab-Israeli conflict: leftist regimes typically support Palestine, while rightist ones back Israel. 2. The positions of these countries on Israel are notably influenced by US policies. Some countries align with the US stance to avoid potential pressure, a pattern observable since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. 3. A growing trend among Catholic Christians toward Anglicanism, which shares a closer religious alignment with the Israeli position. 4. Israeli presence in the technological sector of the Latin American economy is significant. In major Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, more than 450 Israeli companies are active in this industry. The data we have discussed highlight the need for resistance forces to recognize the significance of this region in the following ways: 1. Despite a noticeable division among Latin American countries in their responses to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath, the balance of support leans considerably toward the resistance. This is due to the increasing leftist inclination in the region, particularly in its major countries. Demonstrations in support of Palestine have occurred in Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Peru and Chile. 2. Cutting ties with Israel, recalling ambassadors, or participating in cases against it in the ICJ and the ICC by Latin American countries is perhaps the most significant in terms of political impact. This development requires follow-up, including providing these countries with relevant information and support to reinforce this trend. 3. Despite their Anglican background, public opinion trends in these countries reveal a strong sympathy for Palestinian suffering, which is more than twice as significant as the sympathy for Israel. This is evident from the approval rates toward President Biden’s pro-Israel policies. These findings suggest the need for engaging with leftist forces in the region based on shared libertarian values. 4. Comparing the trade between Latin American and Israel, which was $6 billion in 2022, to the trade with Arab countries, the trade volume with the Gulf countries alone is more than three times greater than that with Israel. However, the political influence of these trade relations with the Arab world remains relatively modest.[18] 5. Arab and Palestinian diplomacy should focus on four Latin American countries-Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia—due to their significant political, economic and demographic influence in the international arena. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals. [2] CELAC/ Zone of Peace: “A key step to countering the globalization of militarism” – UN Expert, site of The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 3/2/2014, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2014/02/celac-zone-peace-key-step-countering-globalization-militarism-un-expert [3] World Economic Outlook Database: October 2023, site of International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October/weo-report?c=311,213,314,313,316,339,218,223,228,233,238,321,243,248,253,328,258,336,2; GDP, PPP (current international $) – Latin America & Caribbean, site of World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=ZJ; and List of Latin American and Caribbean countries by GDP (PPP), site of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_American_and_Caribbean_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)#cite_note-1 [4] Latin America’s left-wing experiment is a warning to the world, site of The Economist newspaper, 18/5/2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/05/18/latin-americas-left-wing-experiment-is-a-warning-to-the-world [5] For a historical overview of Israel’s relations with Latin America, see Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Academic Paper: Israeli Relations with Latin America, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/4/2021, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2021/04/05/academic-paper-israeli-relations-with-latin-america/ [6] Estimates vary, but the number of signatories is likely to be 27, see CELAC member states divided over Israel-Gaza war stance, site of SEARCHLIGHT, 5/3/2024, https://www.searchlight.vc/front-page/2024/03/05/celac-member-states-divided-israel-gaza-war-stance; and Brazil, 23 other Celac countries call for immediate ceasefire in Gaza, site of Agencia Brasil, 4/3/2024, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2024-03/brazil-23-other-celac-countries-call-immediate-ceasefire-gaza [7] CELAC summit fails to take unanimous position on Gaza, site of iWitness News, 2/3/2024, https://www.iwnsvg.com/2024/03/02/celac-summit-fails-to-take-unanimous-position-on-gaza [8] Latin American peace, anti-imperialism, and Gaza at the heart of CELAC, site of Al Mayadeen English, 1/3/2024, https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/latin-american-peace–anti-imperialism–and-gaza-at-the-hear; Oliver Stuenkel, The Israel-Hamas War Is Inflaming Polarization in Latin America, site of Americas Quarterly (AQ), 16/11/2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-israel-hamas-war-is-inflaming-polarization-in-latin-america; Ecuador VP says she will go to Israel amid spat with president, Reuters News Agency, 28/11/2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ecuador-vp-says-she-will-go-israel-amid-spat-with-president-2023-11-28; and At CELAC, Lula extols the potential of Latin Americans and Caribbeans as an integrated bloc, site of Planalto, 5/3/2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/03/at-celac-lula-extols-the-potential-of-latin-americans-and-caribbeans-as-an-integrated-bloc [9] For detailed information on the positions of CELAC countries, either individually or as a bloc, please refer to the following references, see Rogelio Núñez Castellano and Carlos Malamud, Latin America and the Gaza crisis, site of The Elcano Royal Institute, 24/11/2023, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-and-the-gaza-crisis; Enrique Reina (@EnriqueReinaHN), site of X (Twitter), 3/11/2023, 10:01, https://x.com/EnriqueReinaHN/status/1720531624289575107; Brazil’s president withdraws his country’s ambassador to Israel after criticizing the war in Gaza, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-israel-ambassador-withdrawn-af9d295d989a86c4fcd8ca4531350f42; Colombia breaks diplomatic ties with Israel but its military relies on key Israeli-built equipment, AP, 3/5/2024, https://apnews.com/article/colombia-israel-diplomatic-ties-military-equipment-0c04009ccfc6110e20ee358403509500; President Milei’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension in Argentina and beyond, AP, 3/6/2024, https://apnews.com/article/milei-judaism-hezbollah-israel-hamas-war-netanyahu-d8831369a6bc8a96205d4080d2b2045b; Argentina demands that Bolivia explain its new defense agreement with Iran, AP, 25/7/2023, https://apnews.com/article/argentina-bolivia-iran-defense-mou-2cb8c5917fdb6d3e01af4c67af969797; Israel/ Argentina, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg; Latin America divided and nuanced on Israel-Hamas conflict, site of Buenos Aires Times, 1/11/2023, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/latin-america-divided-and-nuanced-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict.phtml; Marta Tawil Kuri, Perspectives from the Global South: Latin America’s Fragmented Approach to Palestine, site of Arab reform initiative (ARI), 15/12/2023, https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/perspectives-from-the-global-south-latin-americas-fragmented-approach-to-palestine; IntelBrief: Leaders in Latin America Speak Loudly on Gaza, site of The Soufan Center (TSC), 1/3/2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-1; Honduran president in Israel for opening of Jerusalem embassy, site of i24NEWS, 24/6/2021, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/1624517565-honduran-president-in-israel-for-opening-of-jerusalem-embassy; Angeline Montoya, In Honduras, the mixed track record of President Xiomara Castro, site of Le Monde, 10/2/2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/10/in-honduras-the-mixed-track-record-of-president-xiomara-castro_6015218_4.html; Latin America countries hold rallies in support of Palestine, site of Anadolu Agency (AA), 4/3/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/latin-america-countries-hold-rallies-in-support-of-palestine/3154305; Latin America: Demonstrations expressing support for Palestinians scheduled in several regional cities Oct. 20-22, site of Crisis24, 20/10/2023, https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/10/latin-america-demonstrations-expressing-support-for-palestinians-scheduled-in-several-regional-cities-oct-20-22; Gaza solidarity sweeps across Latin America, site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 23/10/2023, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231023-gaza-solidarity-sweeps-across-latin-america; Alejandro Santos Cid, University Gaza solidarity protests extend to Mexico: ‘We are urgently calling for an end to genocide’, site of EL PAÍS, 4/5/2024, https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-05-04/university-gaza-solidarity-protests-extend-to-mexico-we-are-urgently-calling-for-an-end-to-genocide.html; site of PRIMICIAS, 7/10/2023, https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/politica/ecuador-condena-ataque-hamas-israel (in Spanish) [10] See Lithium, severing ties with Israel, or rapprochement with Russia? What is the secret to the failed Bolivian coup?, site of RT, 28/6/2024, https://arabic.rt.com/world/1578053- الليثيوم-غزة-أم-موسكو-أيهم-كلمة-السر-في-الانقلاب-البوليفي-الفاشل/; and Türkiye and Bolivia: Experiences of Resisting Coups in a Changing World, site of Turk Press, 29/6//2024, https://www.turkpress.co/node/102003 [11] Patricia Garip, What Does Latin America Think About the Israel-Hamas War?, site of Foreign Policy, 29/1/2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/29/israel-hamas-gaza-war-latin-america-chile-argentina-colombia-mexico-genocide/ [12] Lazar Berman, Israel livid as Brazil’s Lula says Israel like ‘Hitler,’ committing genocide in Gaza, site of Times of Israel, 18/2/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-livid-as-brazils-lula-says-israel-like-hitler-committing-genocide-in-gaza/ [13] Argentina shifts historic position on Palestine as UN member state, Buenos Aires Times, 10/5/2024, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-shifts-historic-position-on-palestine-asun-member-state.phtml [14] AP and TOI STAFF, Argentinian president’s surprising devotion to Judaism and Israel provokes tension, Times of Israel, 3/6/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/argentinian-presidents-surprising-devotion-to-judaism-and-israel-provokes-tension/; Argentina/ Israel, site of Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/arg/partner/isr; and Israel/ Argentina, OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/isr/partner/arg [15] 4 Trends Among Latin American Internet Users That Will Impact the Market in 2022, site of Americas Market Intelligence (AMI), 9/1/2022, https://americasmi.com/insights/trends-latin-american-internet-users-marketing/#:~:text=In%20Latin%20America%2C%2083%25%20to,websites%2C%20broken%20down%20by%20country; and Annie Pforzheimer, Latin American Views on the Gaza War Are in Flux, site of The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune journal, November 2023, https://jstribune.com/pforzheimer-latin-american-views-on-the-gaza-war-are-in-flux [16] Survey conducted in Spring 2024, see Majorities disapprove of the way Biden is dealing with the Israel-Hamas war, site of Pew Research Center, 10/6/2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/11/how-well-is-biden-handling-international-issues/gap_2024-06-11_us-image-2024_5_06 [17]Gian Luca Gardini (ed.), External Powers in Latin America: Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism and South-South Cooperation (Routledge, 2021), pp. 153-163; and Political stability – Country rankings, site of TheGlobalEconomy.com, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/Latin-Am [18]Chase Harrison, Explainer: Latin America’s Relationship with Israel and Palestine, site of Americas Society (AS), Council of the Americas (COA), 16/11/2023, https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-latin-americas-relationship-israel-and-palestine; and “Cultivating Ties: Deepening trade and investment between Latin America and the GCC,” site of Economist Impact, The Economist Group, 2022, https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/economist_impact__dcci_latam_report_10th_march_2022_english_web.pdf

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The next president of the US will face various challenges that divide the nation, including a nuclear defense policy. The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy. Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal. The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those threats, along with China’s growing military might, US Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China. Thanks to those events and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people. And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China. The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation  The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5th, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.) At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21st, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine. Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities. Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow. Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable. The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it. In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.) Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5th, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them. The Three-Way Arms Race  Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable. Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states. Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike. Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China. As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program. The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China. “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal. Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation. The Need for Citizen Advocacy  For many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale. And one thing should be made clear: adding more weapons to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation. As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.” A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril. The article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Since 1825, Bolivia has averaged a new government every 26 and a half months. A study by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, Political Science professors at the University of Kentucky, indicates that from 1950 to 2010, there were 23 coup d'état cases in the country. These include 11 successful actions, defined as those that allowed the insurgents to control power for at least a week. The decade in which Bolivia recorded the most coups was the 1970s, with some years experiencing two consecutive cases. Another study by The Washington Post reports that during the country's independent history, there have been over 190 attempts at coups and revolutionary processes. Bolivian historian Manuel Contreras attributes this situation to elements of internal politics, such as the absence of strong institutions and "an unprofessional military prone to this type of adventures". [1] Bolivia is currently facing multiple crises. The most prominent is in the political sphere, stemming from the division between President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales, who lead different factions of the Movement for Socialism–Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP) and are vying for the party’s nomination for the 2025 presidential elections. This fragmentation is also reflected in a conflict with the judiciary, due to rulings made by judges regarding Morales' potential presidential candidacy, among other decisions. Additionally, the country is experiencing significant economic deterioration due to a decrease in foreign currency reserves and fuel shortages, which are heightening social discontent. In this context, it was reported that there was an attempted coup on June 26. The rift between the MAS leaders weakens the institutional framework needed to respond to these various crises. This article briefly reviews all these elements. Background: resignation of former President Evo Morales Evo Morales governed for three terms, from 2006 to 2019. In 2016, a referendum was held to consult citizens about modifying Article 168 of the country's Constitution, which stipulates that the presidency is for five years, with the possibility of re-election only once consecutively. At that time, the "no" vote won, and the constitutional reform project was narrowly rejected. [2] In 2017, Evo Morales filed a challenge of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. The Court determined that Morales could run for a fourth consecutive presidential term in the 2019 elections, arguing that unlimited re-election is a right protected by the American Convention on Human Rights, which, it was claimed, takes precedence over the Bolivian Constitution. [3] On October 20, 2019, Bolivia held general elections. [4] Initially, the results pointed to a runoff between President Evo Morales and former President Carlos Mesa. During the vote count, the Preliminary Results Transmission System (TREP) was abruptly halted and resumed almost 24 hours later with a shift in the trend. [5] Subsequently, Morales was declared the winner in the first round by a narrow margin. [6] Almost simultaneously with the announcement of the new results by the president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Bolivia (TSE), María Eugenia Choque, dozens of police officers positioned themselves near the headquarters where the electoral authorities were receiving the tallies. Accusations of fraud and massive protests were followed, [7] demanding either a runoff or the annulment of the elections. [8] As mentioned, before Evo Morales' presidency, the military in Bolivia attempted several times to overthrow the government in power. During the MAS leader’s mandate, institutional relations were strengthened. Several measures were taken to transform the military mentality and bring it closer to the Bolivian people. In 2009, the Armed Forces adopted the wiphala, the indigenous flag. In 2016, a mandatory “anti-imperialist" school was established for military personnel aspiring to be promoted. Morales referred to himself as the "first private soldier president," increased the military budget from $114 million in 2001 to $483 million in 2018, and was the only democratic president to purchase large quantities of weapons and equipment. At the same time, Morales provoked resentment among the military by removing "neoliberal" commanders and prosecuting the chiefs who handed over missiles to the United States in 2005. Additionally, he imprisoned the officers responsible for the 2003 repression in El Alto, which resulted in the death of 67 protesters. These measures failed to change the "conservative spirit of the armed forces." [9] Over time, a rift was developed between the military and Morales. In late 2019, under the leadership of Williams Kalimán, members of the Army appeared on television asking for Morales' resignation, which led to his ousting. The former president initially rejected accusations of fraud from opposition groups and organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and denounced an attempted coup orchestrated by his political adversaries and sectors of the armed forces. [10] However, he agreed to call for new elections, but this was not enough to ease the tensions. [11] On November 10, 2019, Evo Morales resigned from his position. [12] He then left Bolivia, first for Mexico and later for Argentina, where he was granted political asylum. [13] As a result, the presidential line of succession was disrupted, with several key government figures resigning. In this context, Jeanine Áñez, who was the second vice president of the Senate, assumed the interim presidency on November 12, 2019. Her proclamation took place in a parliamentary session without a quorum, which sparked controversy and accusations of illegitimacy from Morales' party, MAS, and other sectors. In his view, Morales stated from Mexico that "the most insidious and nefarious coup in the history" of his country had been carried out. [14] Struggle among the leaders of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) In the 2020 elections, Luis Arce, former Minister of Finance under Morales, was elected, running as the MAS candidate. [15] Former President Evo Morales returned to Bolivia a year after leaving the country, a day after Arce assumed the leadership of the Andean state. Analysts say that the dispute between the two politicians began on the day of Arce's inauguration in November 2020. In his inaugural speech, Arce did not mention Morales. Political scientist Susana Bejarano says that the president "made a textbook mistake by not giving Morales a place [...]. Without having a role, Morales exerted pressure through his influence, and Arce responded" [16] In recent months, Morales has referred to Arce as "the worst president of the democratic era" and has also accused him of leading the country’s economy to deterioration. For Arce, Morales is his "main opponent," and his supporters accuse Morales of wanting to control the country. [17] In October 2023, Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca were expelled from MAS by the leadership aligned with Evo Morales due to their refusal to attend a congress held in Cochabamba. This clearly defined the two factions: the “Evista” faction, which supports Morales' leadership, and the "Arcista" (or renewal bloc) that did not recognize the expulsion of the president and Choquehuanca. [18] The Minister of Government, Eduardo del Castillo, a prominent figure in the Arcista sector, believes that Morales “conceives of MAS from the person rather than from social organizations.” On the other hand, Morales’ faction accuses the Arcistas of being close to the political right, trying to take over a social base that does not belong to them, and forgetting the revolutionary principles of the movement. [19] Recently, in May, the Arcistas organized a congress in the city of El Alto, where they elected Grover García as the new president of MAS in place of Morales, but the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) did not approve this conclave. Meanwhile, the Evistas attempted to hold their congress in Villa Tunari, in the Cochabamba region, Morales' political and union stronghold, but the TSE also did not recognize that meeting. This has temporarily left the MAS candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections in suspense. [20] Both groups have tried several times to hold national congresses to appoint a new leadership (and thus comply with the Electoral Law) and to select a presidential candidate. [21] However, the TSE has disqualified all the sessions and insists that both factions hold "a joint congress" to comply with the party's statutes. In September 2023, Morales announced his candidacy for the presidency, challenging Arce, who is expected to seek re-election. The former president has accused the government of trying to block his candidacy and has also threatened that there will be "upheaval" in Bolivia if he is disqualified. [22] The Bolivian Congress is bicameral; the Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 representatives, of which MAS holds 75 seats [23], and 24 of them are Arcistas. Meanwhile, the Senate is made up of 36 members [24], with 21 belonging to the MAS caucus, of which 7 are Arcistas. [25] The party also celebrated its 29th anniversary, albeit in a divided manner, with the Arcistas in La Paz and the Evistas in Santa Cruz. This struggle has extended to the Congress, where Arce lost the majority due to the MAS split. Political scientist Fernando Mayorga says that the fracture caused legislators close to Morales to move forward with agreements with the opposition to pass various laws, such as the suspension of the mandates of the Judicial branch magistrates, or to block others, such as the approval of external loans for public finances. [26] This situation has led the government to accuse Morales of provoking a "structural crisis scenario" to "shorten" Arce's mandate. The president has even stated that he is the target of a "soft coup" by Morales' followers. On the other hand, the former president accuses the government of incompetence and corruption [27] and has said that he has "ideological, programmatic, organizational, and even ethical differences" with Arce. He has also pointed out that there are no opportunities for reconciliation with the government because it has shifted to the right. [28] Confrontation with the Judiciary Part of the struggle between the former president and the current president involves the Judiciary, which Evo Morales considers aligned with Luis Arce. Bolivia is the only country in Latin America that elects its high judicial courts [29] by popular vote since 2009. That is how two elections have been held, in 2011 and 2017. [30] At the end of 2023, the term of the magistrates concluded; however, the lack of agreements within MAS (and with the opposition) to define the candidates has delayed the judicial election process. [31] The Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) also contributed to this delay by declaring some laws approved by Parliament to convene the judicial elections unconstitutional. For these reasons, the TCP decided to extend its mandate and that of the other judicial bodies to "avoid a power vacuum." In early June, during a joint session of the Senate and the Lower House, Evistas and opposition legislators approved a bill that suspends the magistrates of the high judicial courts, without the presence of Arcistas legislators. This meeting was convened by the president of the Senate, Andrónico Rodríguez, an ally of Morales. The TCP deemed this process illegal, as the senator did not have the backing to assume the role of president of the Assembly. [32] The Tribunal pointed out that the presidency of Congress is the responsibility of the country's vice president, David Choquehuanca, who, according to Rodríguez, was acting as interim president due to a trip by the country's president, Luis Arce. [33] The law also nullifies all the rulings that the magistrates approved in the last year. A source close to Vice President Choquehuanca stated that overturning these rulings would be "chaotic" and argued that it aims to provoke a political and social crisis. Meanwhile, other experts, such as the constitutionalist Israel Quino, believe that nullifying these legal acts is necessary for the country to "return to the rule of law." [34] At the end of 2023, the TCP issued a ruling nullifying indefinite re-election in the country, which disqualifies Morales from running in the 2025 elections. This decision overturns the 2017 ruling that allowed the former president to be re-elected that year. If the TCP is not renewed, this ruling cannot be reviewed. Supporters of the former president are demanding the resignation of the magistrates from the highest courts, alleging that the Judiciary "follows orders from the government." Meanwhile, Evo Morales accuses the government of sabotaging the judicial elections. After a series of road blockades by Morales' followers, President Arce issued a law in February aimed at holding the elections in September. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that it expects the Congress to issue the call for the elections. [35] The economic situation and social discontent in Bolivia Bolivia's economy grew at an annual rate of 4.7% from 2005 to 2019. The government channeled the profits from natural gas exports into social programs and salary increases, which helped reduce poverty from 60% in 2006 to 37.2% in 2019. [36] A new indigenous middle class also emerged. Gas production increased after Evo Morales' 2006 decree to nationalize hydrocarbons. Additionally, Bolivia has the world's largest lithium reserves, with 23 million metric tons (MT). Along with Chile and Argentina, these countries form the "Lithium Triangle," holding more than two-thirds of the world's reserves. However, Bolivia's production of this element is still very low (600 tons per year), presenting significant growth opportunities for the future. [37] Since the end of the raw materials boom in 2014, Bolivia relied on high public spending and domestic credit to sustain economic growth. Over time, these measures increased debt and reduced international reserves and accumulated fiscal savings. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened the situation. After it ended, the Bolivian economy recovered. However, the level of indebtedness, the decline in natural gas production, and modest international reserves have put pressure on the foreign exchange market, where a parallel exchange rate has emerged. [38] Natural gas production decreased from 56.6 million cubic meters per day (Mm³/d) in 2016, with oil revenue of $1.755 billion, to 31.9 Mm³/d in 2023, with an income of $2.048 billion, according to official information. Bolivia has seen low production in its oil and gas fields, requiring the import of gasoline and diesel, which are then sold at subsidized prices in the domestic market — a cost that is increasingly difficult to sustain. [39] “As a result of the decline in natural gas production, the amount of dollars coming into the country has decreased," says economist Jaime Dunn. According to the Central Bank reports, international reserves dropped from $15.122 billion in 2014 to $1.796 billion in April 2024 [40], attributed to the decline in revenue from gas sales to Brazil and Argentina and the lack of approval for new loans in the Congress. [41] The prices of basic goods have also increased. For months, long lines of people trying to obtain dollars have been observed, as well as the expansion of a parallel market for this currency. The shortage of dollars has impacted both importers and exporters. The most affected product has been fuel purchased from abroad. Bolivia imposed a subsidy on gasoline and diesel more than 15 years ago. Now, specialists warn the country doesn't have the dollars to buy them. This is a problem because Bolivia imports 56% of the gasoline and 86% of the diesel it consumes. Bolivian President Luis Arce has acknowledged that the situation is "pathetic." According to him, it is due to the "lack of a clear hydrocarbon policy in the country" in recent years. [42] To mitigate the situation, he ordered the militarization of the fuel supply system to prevent the smuggling of subsidized diesel to neighboring countries. [43] This combination of fuel and currency shortages has sparked protests from merchants and transporters in various cities across the country. Several sectors have taken to the streets to demand a solution to the rising costs of essential goods. [44] In 2023, there were almost 200 days of blockades. To address the situation, in February, Economy Minister Marcelo Montenegro announced a series of economic reforms, such as easing export restrictions and creating a diesel auction for large producers. However, these measures still seem insufficient. The tension generated by the situation has also affected Arce's popularity, which has dropped to 18% [46] according to polls. [45] Some social protest calls are attributed to supporters of Evo Morales, although these groups deny it. [47] To exacerbate these problems, the country has experienced droughts and high temperatures, which have damaged agricultural production and caused wildfires in the Bolivian Amazon. Lake Titicaca, among other bodies of water, has dropped to historically low levels. Residents of the El Alto neighborhood, in the heights of La Paz, only receive water sporadically during the day. [48] Reactions after the attempted coup In this context of political strife and economic deterioration, it was reported on June 26th that there was an attempted coup led by General Juan José Zúñiga, who has been dismissed and is now in prison. [49] The Minister of Government, Eduardo Del Castillo, stated that the insurrection had been planned for three weeks. The official indicated that the action resulted in 12 gunshot injuries and led to the arrest of about 20 military personnel and civilians. A new high command has also been appointed. Del Castillo emphasized that although the government had received information about previous attempts at destabilization and "soft coups," none had reached the scale of the reported events. [50] Analysts believe that Zúñiga appears to be an unhappy general with little support. [51] According to various journalistic reports, he was perceived as the "general of the people." [52] He was appointed as the General Commander of the Army in November 2022 and reaffirmed in January of this year by the president. Before that, he held the position of Chief of the General Staff. According to the Bolivian newspaper ‘El Deber’, Zúñiga was the closest military officer to Arce and was at odds with former President Evo Morales. [53] According to Army records, in 2020, Zúñiga ranked 48th out of 65 officers in the 1990 class. ‘El Deber’ notes that Zúñiga has close ties with mining and union sectors. However, throughout his career, he has faced accusations of misappropriation of public funds, for which he was sanctioned. In 2022, Zúñiga was mentioned by Evo Morales as the leader of an Army group that engaged in "permanent persecution" against political leaders like him. This elite faction, known as the ‘Pachajchos’, carried out military intelligence operations, [54] they had influence in the assignment of officers' posts, and played an important role in combating smuggling. [55] Following the brief insurrection, it is expected that the fracture between former President Evo Morales and President Luis Arce will deepen. On one hand, the government's version claims to have successfully quelled an attempted military coup in less than four hours. Retired Army Colonel Jorge Santistevan described Zúñiga as an amateur, leading an uprising without military consent, with improvised tactics and an empty speech. "This was an adventure, not a coup," stated analyst Omar Durán. [56] On the other hand, Evo Morales and opposition sectors describe the events as "a self-coup," "a political show," "an adventure," or "a parody" by Luis Arce Catacora, allegedly orchestrated with General Zúñiga and his supporters to victimize the president and boost his popularity. [57] This version aligns with what Zúñiga declared when he was arrested. In several posts on the social network "X", Morales has commented on the situation. He criticized the president's actions, called for a thorough investigation of the events, and even apologized to the international community for seeking their support in the face of the apparent coup (a narrative later adopted by Argentina). [58] Additionally, Evista Senator Luis Adolfo Flores argued that there was no police action to prevent the seizure of the plaza, for example, and he highlighted the "inaction" of the Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo. Another member of the Upper House, William Torrez, agreed that it was not a genuine coup. [59] Senate President Rodríguez posted on social media that "between the self-extended magistrates, a supposed coup or self-coup, the Bolivian people are sinking into uncertainty. This institutional disorder is leading the country to a situation of chaos and distrust." [60]. Luis Arce says that foreign interests are involved in the attempted coup, aiming to benefit from Bolivia's natural resources. He also claims that former President Evo Morales is willing to go to any lengths, even questioning the government's actions, in order to be a candidate for the 2025 elections. [61] On the other hand, the failed coup in Bolivia could worsen the current dollar shortage in the Andean country, said the global investment bank BancTrust & Co., based in London. "Although the coup apparently failed, the crisis will leave its mark. Political instability and the government's weakness will likely make it difficult for authorities and the private sector to access alternative sources of hard currency financing in the future, exacerbating the current crisis," BancTrust & Co. said in a commentary on the situation in Bolivia. [62] On the other hand, the rift between Arce and his mentor, Evo Morales, weakens Bolivian democracy, blocks any strategy against the economic crisis, keeps Congress paralyzed, and opens the door to ventures like that of General Zúñiga. Researcher Armando Ortuño warns that "the military coup was a symptom of political disorder. There is a weak government facing multiple crises." [63] Ortuño points out that in the short term, to address the political crisis, there must be some sort of agreement between Arce and Morales. [64] Jean Pierre Lavaud, a French sociologist, believes that the current major problem stems from "the internal struggle within MAS." [65] Another possible effect of this rift is that the opposition could win the next elections. [66] Additionally, Evo Morales' vice president, Álvaro García Linera, fears that this power struggle between the two leaders could strengthen the military. It will be problematic if Morales' supporters use the military to weaken the president, while the Evistas use them to contain the former president. García Linera argues that the military structure always has its own agenda and could pose a risk to national stability. Legal notice The article was created and published by the Gilberto Bosques Center for International Studies of the Senate of the Republic of Mexico (webpage https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/). The analysis and research do not represent the position of the Senate or its members. References [1] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo [2] Jaime Cárdenas Gracia, “Informe sobre el referéndum boliviano de 2016”, Boletín mexicano de derecho comparado, 50(148), 81-112, abril de 2017. consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-86332017000100081 [3] Jorge Sánchez Morales, “Elecciones generales en Bolivia, 2019. Una reflexión de derecho comparado”, Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, 2020. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.te.gob.mx/editorial_service/media/pdf/250320241450414990.pdf [4] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: Carlos Mesa acusa a Evo Morales de ser el "protagonista de un golpe de Estado" y llama a continuar las protestas”, BBC News Mundo, 23 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50161520 [5] BBC News Mundo, Elecciones en Bolivia: suspenden el recuento provisional de votos cuando todo apuntaba a una segunda vuelta entre Evo Morales y Carlos Mesa, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50119933 [6] BBC News Mundo, “Elecciones en Bolivia: el conteo preliminar sitúa a Evo Morales como virtual ganador sin necesidad de segunda vuelta y en medio de denuncias de fraude”, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50134370 [7] Swiss Info, “Claves sobre el polémico proceso por fraude electoral de 2019 en Bolivia”, 28 de julio de 2021. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024, en: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/claves-sobre-el-pol%C3%A9mico-proceso-por-fraude-electoral-de-2019-en-bolivia/46822282 [8] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: por qué hay cuestionamientos y denuncias de fraude sobre los resultados preliminares que sitúan a Evo Morales como ganador en primera vuelta”, BBC News Mundo, 22 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50146649 [9] Fernando Molina, “De Evo Morales a Luis Arce: las conspiraciones de los militares bolivianos contra el Movimiento al Socialismo”, El País, 28 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-29/de-evo-morales-a-luis-arce-las-conspiraciones-de-losmilitares-bolivianos-contra-el-movimiento-al-socialismo.html [10] Norberto Paredes, “Evo Morales: ¿hubo un golpe de Estado en Bolivia? BBC Mundo consultó a 6 expertos”, BBC, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50375002 [11] Fernando Molina, “Bolivia: ¿golpe o (contra)revolución?”, Nueva Sociedad, noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en:https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-golpe-ocontrarevolucion/?fbclid=IwAR0dIgxoErXdbi2oKUw8JGkYxTFfRlKZaJFGm9DlTN7b0zJ3VwNGXPWYli0 [12] Abraham Zamorano y Boris Miranda, “Evo Morales renuncia a la presidencia de Bolivia: 5 claves que explican por qué tuvo que dimitir el mandatario indígena”, BBC. News Mundo, 10 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50369434#:~:text=Evo%20Morales%20pas%C3%B3%20en%20menos,el%20que%20anunci%C3%B3%20su%20dimisi%C3%B3n. [13] BBC News Mundo, “Asilo a Evo Morales en México: las consecuencias para AMLO del paso del expresidente boliviano”, 14 de diciembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50790682 [14] Deutsche Welle, “Jeanine Áñez asume presidencia interina de Bolivia”, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/jeanine-%C3%A1%C3%B1ez-asume-presidencia-interina-de-bolivia/a-51219169 [15] BBC News Mundo, “Luis Arce, ganador de las elecciones en Bolivia, a la BBC: "Si Evo Morales quiere ayudarnos será muy bienvenido pero eso no quiere decir que él estará en el gobierno"”, 20 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticiasamerica-latina-54610692 [16] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales ensombrece el futuro de Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-07-01/la-fractura-entre-luis-arce-y-evo-morales-ensombrece-el-futuro-de-bolivia.html [17] EFE, “Momentos clave que llevaron a Bolivia a su actual crisis política y social”, El Universal, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/momentos-clave-que-llevaron-a-bolivia-a-su-actual-crisis-politica-y-social/ [18] Fernando Molina, “El partido de Evo Morales expulsa al presidente Luis Arce y agrava la guerra política en Bolivia”, El País, 5 de octubre de 2023. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-10-05/el-partido-de-evo-morales-expulsa-al-presidente-luis-arce-y-agravala-guerra-politica-en-bolivia.html [19] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [20] EFE, “Momentos clave…”, op. cit. [21] Fernando Molina, “Evo Morales anuncia que será candidato a la presidencia de Bolivia en medio de la guerra con Luis Arce”, El País, 24 de septiembre de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-09-24/evo-morales-anuncia-que-sera-candidato-a-lapresidencia-de-bolivia-en-medio-de-la-guerra-con-luis-arce.html [22] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves para entender la crisis política y económica detrás del intento de golpe de Estado denunciado por el presidente de Bolivia”, BBC, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c6p2r06lenjo [23] Cámara de Diputados de Bolivia, ”Composición de la Cámara de Diputados”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://diputados.gob.bo/diputados-home/ [24] Cámara de Senadores de Bolivia, ”Bancadas”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://web.senado.gob.bo/legislativa/bancadas [25] Marco Antonio Chuquimia, ”El 'evismo' es mayoría en el Senado: tiene la presidencia y la jefatura de bancada”, El Deber, 18 de octubre de 2023, consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/el-evismo-es-mayoria-en-el-senado-tiene-la-presidencia-y-la-jefatura-debancada_343939 [26] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce que la falta de diésel en Bolivia es “patética””, El País, 12 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/luis-arce-reconoce-que-la-falta-de-diesel-en-bolivia-es-patetica.html [27] Fernanda Paúl, op cit. [28] Sputnik, ”Evo Morales descarta reconciliación dentro del MAS”, Elpais.cr, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.elpais.cr/2024/03/12/evo-morales-descarta-reconciliacion-dentro-del-mas/ [29] Se eligen por voto popular los cargos del Consejo de la Magistratura, el Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y el Tribunal Agroambiental. Fernando Molina, “La elección popular de jueces en Bolivia se atasca en el Congreso”, El País, 30 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-08-31/la-eleccion-popular-de-jueces-en-bolivia-se-atasca-en-elcongreso.html [30] Idem. [31] Idem. [32] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-boliviano-suspende-a-losmagistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [33] Infobae, “El Congreso de Bolivia aprobó el cese del mandato de altos magistrados en una polémica sesión que comenzó a oscuras”, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/07/el-congreso-de-bolivia-aprobo-el-cesedel-mandato-de-altos-magistrados-en-una-polemica-sesion-que-comenzo-a-oscuras/ [34] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano…”, op. cit. suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-bolivianosuspende-a-los-magistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [35] Fernanda Hernández Orozco, “¿Cómo le ha ido a Bolivia con la elección directa de jueces?”, Expansión, 18 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://expansion.mx/mundo/2024/06/18/como-le-ha-ido-a-bolivia-con-la-eleccion-directa-de-jueces [36] Congressional Research Service, “Bolivia: An Overview, 16 de mayo de 2022”. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2022 en: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11325 [37] Ivan Castano, “Bolivia has the World's Largest Lithium Reserves. Is it Worth Investing In?”, 31 de julio de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/bolivia-has-the-worlds-largest-lithium-reserves-is-it-worth-investing-in [38] Banco Mundial, “El Banco Mundial en Bolivia”, 14 de abril de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bolivia/overview [39] Redacción Movant, “Bolivia: baja en la producción de gas y su impacto económico”, infobae, 12 de mayo de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/05/12/bolivia-baja-en-la-produccion-de-gas-y-su-impacto-economico/ [40] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op .cit. [41] France 24, “Bolivia cierra 2023 con las reservas internacionales más bajas en 17 años”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20240105-bolivia-cierra-2023-con-las-reservas-internacionales-m%C3%A1s-bajas-en-17- a%C3%B1os [42] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. o [43] Pablo Stefanoni, “Bolivia: claves de la asonada militar y sus coletazos”, Nueva Sociedad, junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-claves-de-la-asonada-militar-y-sus-coletazos/ [44] Deutsche Welle, “Militares controlan estaciones de combustible en Bolivia”, 13 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/militares-controlan-estaciones-de-combustible-en-bolivia/a-69348165 [45] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. [46] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce…”, op. cit. l [47] Fernando Molina, “Fracasa el intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia: detenido el general rebelde”, El País, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-26/el-presidente-de-bolivia-denuncia-movilizaciones-irregulares-del-ejercito.html [48] Ivan Ellis, “La caída de Bolivia en un profundo caos y sus implicaciones para la región”, Infobae, 25 de noviembre de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/11/25/la-caida-de-bolivia-en-un-profundo-caos-y-sus-implicaciones-para-laregion/ [49] Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, “Intento fallido de golpe de Estado en Bolivia”, Senado de México, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/analisisinvestigacion/contexto/fallido-golpe-bolivia/viewdocument [50] Infobae, “El Gobierno de Bolivia reveló que los militares planearon el golpe durante tres semanas”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/el-gobierno-de-bolivia-dijo-que-los-militares-planearon-el-golpe-durantetres-semanas-y-que-su-lider-ya-habia-sido-cesado/ [51] The Editors, “Daily Review: Bolivia’s Failed Coup Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg”, World Politics Review, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/daily-review-bolivia-coup-arce/ [52] Pablo Stefanoni, “Arcistas’ vs ‘evistas’: los riesgos de despertar monstruos en Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/arcistas-vs-evistas-los-riesgos-de-despertar-monstruos-en-bolivia.html [53] El Deber, “Toma del Palacio Quemado: Zúñiga, el militar más cercano al Presidente, sacó a la tropa militar, fue aprehendido y dijo que actuó por orden de Arce”, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/toma-del-palacio-quemado-zuniga-el-militarmas-cercano-al-presidente-saco-a-la-tropa-militar-fue-apr_374314 [54] BBC News Mundo, “Quién es Juan José Zúñiga, el general que lideró lo que el presidente de Bolivia calificó de "intento de golpe de Estado" y luego fue arrestado”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c035jg3j13ro [55] El Deber, “Los ‘Pachajchos’ son vistos como un grupo de poder en las Fuerzas Armadas”, 6 de noviembre de 2022. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/los-pachajchos-son-vistos-como-un-grupo-de-poder-en-las-fuerzas-armadas_302903 [56] Tuffí Aré Vásquez, “Golpe fallido, autogolpe, montaje o qué: los datos y las dudas en Bolivia al día siguiente del levantamiento militar”, Infobae, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/golpe-fallido-autogolpemontaje-o-que-los-datos-y-las-dudas-en-bolivia-al-dia-siguiente-del-levantamiento-militar/ [57] Idem. [58] Cuenta en “X” de Evo Morales, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://x.com/evoespueblo/status/1807496134119571492?s=48&t=RUbtGPN92qpBD2NHDoDKUg [59] El Día, “Federaciones del Trópico tildan de "show", "novela" y "autogolpe" lo ocurrido en plaza Murillo”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eldia.com.bo/2024-06-27/pais/federaciones-del-tropico-tildan-de-show-novela-y-autogolpe-lo-ocurrido-en-plazamurillo.html [60] Pablo Stefanoni, op. cit. [61] Federico Rivas Molina, “Luis Arce: “Evo Morales pone en duda el golpe militar fallido por sus aspiraciones políticas personales””, El País, 29 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/luis-arce-evo-morales-pone-en-duda-el-golpe-militar-fallidopor-sus-aspiraciones-politicas-personales.html [62] Daniel Salazar Castellanos, “Intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia podría agravar escasez de dólares, según banco de inversión”, Bloomberg en Línea, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bloomberglinea.com/2024/06/27/intento-de-fallido-golpe-de-estadoen-bolivia-podria-agravar-escasez-de-dolares-segun-banco-de-inversion/ [63] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [64] Idem. [65] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo 66Pablo Biderbost y Guillermo Boscán, “La historia turbulenta de Bolivia: más de 190 intentos de golpes y revoluciones”, The Conversation, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/la-historia-turbulenta-de-bolivia-mas-de-190-intentos-de-golpes-yrevoluciones-233495

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” Venezuelan election authorities proclaimed incumbent Nicolás Maduro victor in the 28 July presidential poll despite evidence brandished by the opposition showing its candidate won by a landslide. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Phil Gunson explains what the ensuing outcry means for Venezuela’s protracted crisis. What happened? Under enormous international attention, Venezuela held presidential elections on 28 July. The polls pitted unpopular incumbent Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013 after being anointed by late President Hugo Chávez as his successor, against a relatively unheralded opposition candidate, Edmundo González. González had established a commanding lead in pre-election opinion polls, in large part thanks to the endorsement of banned opposition leader María Corina Machado. Six hours after most polling stations closed, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Maduro victorious, but neither then nor in the days since has it provided any breakdown of the results by polling station or evidence to substantiate its announcement. Convinced that the election had been stolen, opposition supporters, many from working class communities, took to the streets the following day. They have been met with a violent response from state security services, which have made clear they will stand with the Maduro administration and unfurled a wave of targeted arrests. With Maduro digging in, the past few days’ turbulence could leave in its wake a weakened government, a galvanised but frustrated opposition, and a broad front of foreign governments all struggling to determine their next moves. How did we get here? Much of the controversy that swirled around the 2024 presidential campaign and election is a legacy of the domestic and international rancour that followed the previous, disputed presidential vote six years ago. In 2018, the prohibition of certain opposition candidates and parties – who mostly boycotted the poll – as well as a heavily tilted electoral playing field helped President Maduro secure a second term. But his victory was dismissed as illegitimate by the U.S., the European Union and many of Venezuela’s neighbours. The next year, over fifty countries opted instead to recognise Juan Guaidó, chair of the opposition-led parliament, as interim president. Washington imposed sweeping economic sanctions as successive opposition efforts sought to topple Maduro, only for the government to hold its ground through a wave of political repression, with the help of almost seamless backing from the military and support from Russia, Iran, Cuba and other states. At the same time, the Norwegian government facilitated sporadic rounds of talks between the government and opposition. Despite prolonged deadlock, these talks ultimately led to a breakthrough: the Barbados Agreement of October 2023 saw the Maduro government promise improved conditions for the 2024 election, while receiving in return (via parallel talks with President Joe Biden’s administration) conditional sanctions relief. The government’s concessions nevertheless came with strings attached. Although the authorities allowed the main opposition coalition, the Unitary Platform, to hold a primary election, they reaffirmed a ban on the runaway winner, Machado, holding elected office and blocked the candidacy of her chosen substitute, Corina Yoris. González, a 74-year-old retired diplomat, was the opposition’s third choice, but despite being an unknown with no previous political experience, he soon garnered massive support, touring the country with the hugely popular Machado. Ten candidates, backed by 38 political parties, eventually appeared on the official electronic ballot, many of them thinly veiled plants by the government, which intended them as a ploy to divide and confuse opposition voters and create the appearance of a diverse and competitive election. But the campaign rapidly took a shape that was not to the government’s liking – a two-horse race, in which reputable polling companies all gave González a massive lead, of up to 30 points and more, over Maduro. Most striking was the rapturous reception given to opposition campaign rallies in urban slums and agricultural states in the interior, which had until recently been the strongholds of chavismo – the political movement created by late president Chávez. “María Corina was here last week and filled the main street”, said an opposition supporter in the Andean state of Mérida. “Maduro came the next day and only filled half of it, despite all the buses from out of town”. The government did its best to impede the opposition’s rallies, banning Machado from traveling by air, cancelling public transport in the vicinity, digging up highways and setting up roadblocks ahead of them. It closed down radio stations, blocked websites and kept the opposition message largely out of the mass media. Millions of voters were disenfranchised. For the Venezuelan diaspora – estimated to number eight million migrants and refugees who have left the country over a decade of economic contraction and political tumult – arbitrary rules prevented them from registering to vote; at home, enrolment was marred by lack of information, as well as of time and opportunities to register. The National Electoral Council, dominated by a pro-government majority, failed even to adhere to its own election timetable, and overlooked or omitted a number of key steps. As in previous campaigns, the government abused its power by using state resources to bolster the Maduro campaign, while extorting contributions from private businesses and closing down those that gave any assistance to their adversary. With all signs nevertheless pointing to an opposition victory, many observers, including Crisis Group, foresaw that the Maduro administration would resort to even more extreme tactics to avoid losing power. But in the event, at least in the run-up to the election, it proved more restrained than expected. The government refrained from banning González’s candidacy or using its control of the Supreme Court to have the party ticket on which it was registered declared invalid. Ongoing talks between Washington and Caracas, as well as pressure from neighbouring and relatively friendly left-leaning governments in Brazil and Colombia, may possibly have dissuaded Maduro from adopting such draconian measures. Hopes that a low turnout among opposition voters alongside chavismo’s tried and tested methods of electoral mobilisation would again lead to victory may also have persuaded authorities not to act earlier. But none of this meant that the administration was prepared, when push came to shove, to give up power. What happened on election day? Election day itself was largely peaceful and voting took place normally, with only a minority of polling stations reporting irregularities. Exit polls and quick counts organised by the opposition indicated that Maduro was headed for defeat. But there were soon signs that the government might not be prepared to concede. As polls closed, opposition witnesses and election workers in voting precincts across the country reported that electoral authorities (at times supported by chavista operatives and members of the security forces), were trying to deny them copies of the vote tallies, called “actas”. These actas are printed out by each voting machine once polls close and constitute the physical corroboration of the electronic result that is sent to CNE headquarters and amalgamated into a final nationwide vote count. All participating political parties are entitled to them by law. Concerned about the implications, at 11pm, Unitary Platform coordinator Omar Barboza publicly called on the government not to “take a wrong step”. The hours after the polls closed (technically at 6pm, although many remained open later, even without people in line to vote) were tense, with both sides claiming to have won but with no official results from the electoral authorities. Shortly after midnight, CNE president Elvis Amoroso – a close ally of President Maduro – announced that, with 80 per cent of returns tallied, Maduro had obtained 51.2 per cent of the vote and that his lead of around 700,000 votes indicated an “irreversible” tendency. Machado and González then appeared before the cameras, with Machado saying, “We won, and everyone knows it”. The commission pronounced Maduro the election winner in a Monday morning event in Caracas. What evidence is there to suggest that the results may have been falsified? Both opposition and international suspicions of foul play have been heightened by the failure of guardrail systems to function as intended. In principle, the integrity of the vote should be protected by the actas, the paper tallies that each of the 30,026 voting machines produces once the polling station has closed. This safeguard was introduced under late president Chávez, and makes the Venezuelan system, according to electoral experts, one of the best in the world. Yet the CNE has so far failed to publish or distribute electronically the breakdown of voting by polling station and voting machine, despite Amoroso’s promises to do so. It also did not complete the post-voting audit of over half the machines, which the rules required it to. Its website, until the time of writing, was offline. Presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, a former member of the CNE board, said on 30 July that an electoral observer representing his campaign could attest that the results bulletin CNE head Amoroso read out on election night was not the one generated by the electronic voting system. Caracas has offered little by way of explanation for the apparent irregularities. The government has accused the opposition of hacking the system, saying that a cyberattack initiated in North Macedonia accounts for the delay in transmitting the results from voting machines (the North Macedonian government has said it has no evidence such an attack took place). But, regardless, the CNE has been unable to explain why problems with the electronic system would affect the tally sheets, which are printed before transmission, or why it cannot provide the actas it says it received on the evening after polls closed. Machado and the Unitary Platform, meanwhile, say they have managed to obtain over 80 per cent of the physical tallies through a network of observers, covering around 90 per cent of voting precincts. A day after the election they posted the breakdown of the vote, together with images of each acta, on a website that permits members of the public to consult them. The government immediately moved to block access to the site, which has not stopped thousands of Venezuelans reaching it through the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). Against this backdrop, the Carter Center, the only professional international observer mission for the polls allowed to produce a public assessment, stated on 31 July that the election “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic”. The Center cited the lopsided playing field during the campaign and said that, given the lack of access to the full tally, it could not “verify or corroborate the results of the election” declared by the CNE. How much post-election unrest has there been and what is the risk of further violence? The government’s announcement sparked unrest on 29 July, the day after the election, which saw spontaneous demonstrations against the Maduro government. Protesters burned tires, blocked highways and toppled several statues of Hugo Chávez. The demonstrations, which mainly drew inhabitants of poorer communities that used to be pro-government strongholds, were met with force by security forces and chavista para-police groups known as colectivos. At least twenty deaths have so far been reported along with over 1,000 arrests, according to the government and human rights organisations. Machado and González expressed solidarity with the demonstrators and called for restraint by government forces, but have not convened marches themselves. The opposition is no doubt conscious that since the first major anti-Maduro protest wave in 2014, the government has brutally quashed such demonstrations on numerous occasions, leading to over 250 people killed and thousands of arrests as unarmed protesters have clashed with riot squads from the police and National Guard. The government’s ferocious response to protests in 2017 provoked international outrage and paved the way for the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to open an investigation into possible commission of crimes against humanity. There is little to suggest that things would be easier for demonstrators this time. The armed forces high command has made clear that it will stand by Maduro. Military leaders were present at his investiture by the CNE as president-elect on Monday morning, and on the following day gave a press conference in combat fatigues to reiterate their “unconditional” backing for his government. On Tuesday, Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino published a statement accusing international “fascist structures” of trying to discredit the exemplary demonstration of civic duty by Venezuelans and reaffirming the military’s “loyalty” to Maduro. In an apparent effort to avoid violence, Machado and González opted to organise brief rallies (what they called “popular assemblies”) on 30 July; another nationwide gathering has been called for Saturday. Sources close to the opposition affirm they have also made efforts to talk directly to the government, but these have so far been rebuffed. This has left them struggling with the question of how simultaneously to sustain pressure on the authorities to revisit the results without eliciting an even more severe response, while holding together an opposition coalition that has traditionally squabbled over tactics and strategy. Meanwhile, arrests of leading opposition figures – including Freddy Superlano, the national coordinator of opposition party Voluntad Popular and a close ally of Machado – signal that Maduro is ready to crack down hard on the opposition. Jorge Rodríguez, Maduro’s right-hand man and head of the National Assembly, has called for Machado and González to be arrested and tried. Six members of Machado’s election team, who have spent months in the residence of the Argentine ambassador to avoid arrest, risked capture after the government ordered Argentine diplomats expelled. (Brazil then offered to represent Argentine interests in Venezuela as long as the embassy remained closed.) For now, Maduro seems to be abstaining from taking this step, although the government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services indicate that it is ready to tighten its authoritarian grip across the country, even at the cost of becoming a regional pariah. What should the outside world do? Countries in the region and further afield that have commented on the election have generally pressed for full transparency concerning the 28 July poll results, including publication of a complete breakdown of voting by polling station. The exception is countries with strong links to Maduro, including Russia, China, Cuba, Bolivia and Honduras, among others. Caracas has brooked no criticism. On the day after the election, after six Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay) bluntly declined to recognise Maduro’s victory without a detailed breakdown of the figures, Caracas ordered their diplomatic representatives expelled. (Panama had already ordered its diplomats out.) The government followed up by banning flights to and from Panama, the Dominican Republic and Peru, leaving Venezuelans feeling more isolated from the world once again. On Thursday, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement that “it is clear to the United States … that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes”. Top Venezuelan officials and government propagandists insist that the refusal of many countries to accept Maduro’s re-election is simply a rerun of the aftermath of the 2018 election, and that a right-wing conspiracy, led by the U.S., is using González’s supposed victory as a pretext for another bid to overthrow the Venezuelan government. Some key countries – in particular Brazil and Colombia (both neighbours of Venezuela), and with certain reservations, Mexico – have sought to cling precariously to what little hope remains for compromise, refraining from declaring outright that the result is a fraud while insisting on the need for transparency. But with the Maduro government seemingly bent on intensifying polarisation and dismissing all challenges to its version of events, the chances of reaching any kind of consensus on how to resolve the electoral dispute currently look remote. A session on 31 July of the Organization of American States failed to pass a resolution on the issue, with half the member states abstaining or declining to attend. (Venezuela, while formally a member, does not participate in the organisation.) Diplomatic efforts by Brazil as well as Colombia and the U.S. are reportedly ongoing, but face a key obstacle. If any moves to greater transparency in the vote count will put Maduro’s hold on power at risk (as increasingly seems to be the case), then he is highly unlikely to move in that direction. For now, he has put the matter of settling the dispute in the hands of the Supreme Court, which like the CNE is loyal to him and will simply endorse the result. Despite Maduro’s extreme prickliness, the risks that an unresolved election dispute will extend Venezuela’s political and economic crisis – at the expense of its people and the region – make it essential that Bogotá, Brasilia and Mexico City continue to press the Venezuelan government to prove the result in an independent and impartial forum, or be ready to agree an alternative route to some form of negotiated transition. What happens now? For now, Maduro’s plan appears to be to batten down the hatches and try to ride out the storm. In the past, he has been able to take advantage of outside pressure to rally his supporters and quell dissent within chavismo, claiming Caracas is resisting imperialist interventionism abetted by the forces of domestic “fascism”. This may well work again, at least over the short term. The ruling Socialist Party, or PSUV, and the armed forces have stood by him despite what appears to have been a brazen refusal to accept the verdict from the ballot box. Still, Maduro is likely to emerge from the process weakened, both at home and abroad. His candidacy was not universally popular among chavistas, and his failure to deliver a credible triumph at the polls or lay the basis for economic growth and social peace will have further eroded his standing. His reputation abroad, notably among more sympathetic governments in Latin America, is likely to suffer, and at some stage the country and senior officials might face additional U.S. and EU sanctions. It remains to be seen whether a president who has been unable so far to disprove opposition claims of election victory and who can apparently only promise deeper international isolation and a stagnant economy, will still command respect among the factions that make up the movement. As for the opposition, indignation as to the outcome is leavened by what they believe their candidate achieved, reportedly gaining four million votes more than Maduro – representing not only their first ever apparent victory over chavismo at this level, but the biggest margin of victory ever in a Venezuelan presidential election. They are, for now, much more united than they have been for several years. But that does not solve the bind they are in. Assuming Maduro clings to power, further dilemmas await them. Parliamentary and local elections are due to take place next year, but the government might be tempted to bring them forward. If it does, the opposition will face a quandary that has tormented it for much of chavismo’s 25 years in power: do they stick to the method of contesting elections, despite the government’s apparent disregard for the most basic rules of democracy, or do they boycott the polls, a tactic they have used in the past but which simply allowed the government to win by default? If they do spurn elections, it is unclear what other options the opposition might embrace beyond the campaigns of street protest and foreign sanctions that have thus far failed to dislodge the government, and in the case of sanctions, deepened the country’s humanitarian misery. Despite the opposition’s frustration at yet another election dispute following years of patient negotiations, it remains the case that a solution to Venezuela’s long-running political crisis – and a peaceful, gradual return to democratic governance – will require full-scale talks between the two sides. If the current crisis has any upside, it is the opportunity it could present to convince a majority on both sides that the moment for talks has now arrived. Opposition leaders, governments in the region, and multilateral bodies – above all the UN – should continue to press for a full accounting of the election results. But they should also use all the channels at their disposal to urge Maduro and senior officials to understand the electoral crisis as the latest episode of a debilitating dispute that, without a course correction, will simmer endlessly to the detriment of the Venezuelan people. They should insist that the government’s efforts over the last five years to restore its political legitimacy will come to naught without a comprehensive negotiation process aimed at defusing tensions, reestablishing representative politics and rekindling economic growth. As efforts by third countries to restart negotiations continue, the opposition and its allies should prepare themselves to discuss difficult issues if they do. These include inevitable demands from senior chavistas for robust guarantees to protect them from legal peril in the event that they leave high office. At the same time, they should avoid the temptation, always present when options seem limited or non-existent, to threaten coercive force or slap on more sanctions so as not to be seen to be “doing nothing”. The solution to Venezuela’s ills does not lie in piling more punishment on a population that is already suffering a humanitarian emergency, but instead using existing sanctions and the prospect of their lifting as an incentive for the government to compromise. Whether there will be an opening for meaningful talks any time soon is anyone’s guess. Right now, chavismo seems more girded for intransigence than negotiation and compromise. Hopes for a better outcome remain slender. Some voices in the opposition are advocating a face-saving deal for Maduro, in which he would step down in favor of a consensus candidate agreed to by both the government and opposition ahead of a fresh election. It is not a proposal that appears to have great prospects for success at this point in time. But at a deeply troubling moment for Venezuela, options for a way out of the hardening deadlock should be nurtured and sustained.