Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the Muscat Round Pave the Way for a Potential Deal Between Washington and Tehran? The US-Iranian talks held in Muscat concluded on Saturday, April 12, 2025, successfully addressing contentious issues between the two nations, particularly the Iranian nuclear program crisis. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi led the Iranian delegation, while Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff headed the US team, with Oman serving as mediator throughout the proceedings. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the prevailing atmosphere during the discussions. President Donald Trump characterized the talks as "progressing very well," while Witkoff described the Oman negotiations as "very positive and constructive." According to Araqchi, all parties demonstrated their commitment to advancing discussions until reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Upon conclusion of these productive negotiations, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced a second round of indirect talks would be held on Saturday, April 19, again in Muscat with Omani mediation. Round One The US-Iran talks in Muscat hold significant importance as they represent the first diplomatic engagement since negotiations ceased between April 2021 and September 2022, which had occurred in a 4+1 format with indirect US participation. Notably, these Muscat discussions mark the first diplomatic exchange under both Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump. Several key implications emerge from these talks: 1- A face-saving negotiation format for both sides: Following the announcement of planned discussions, Washington consistently pressed for direct talks to expedite the process and quickly reach an agreement. Tehran, conversely, insisted on indirect engagement, at least initially, to build confidence in American sincerity. According to published reports, the American and Iranian delegations occupied separate rooms in Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi's residence, exchanging written messages through Omani mediators—satisfying Iran's requirement for indirect negotiations. Reports also indicate that after the approximately two-and-a-half-hour session concluded, Araghchi met briefly with Uytkov, conversing for several minutes in the Omani Foreign Minister's presence before departing—thereby fulfilling Washington's desire for direct engagement. Beyond these procedural arrangements for the initial round, such compromises demonstrate both sides' willingness to overcome obstacles impeding an agreement, potentially foreshadowing solutions to other challenges expected during future negotiation rounds. 2- Disagreement over the framework for negotiations: A disagreement over the scope of negotiations has persisted between the two sides since the initial round of talks. Iran adamantly maintains that discussions should focus exclusively on nuclear matters, leaving out both the missile program and regional role concerns. Supporting this position, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei stated on April 13 that an agreement had been reached to limit negotiations to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, confirming these topics would constitute the agenda for upcoming talks. Meanwhile, Washington remains adamant about including additional issues in negotiations with Tehran, particularly arms programs, with the missile program at the forefront. Witkoff stated that any diplomatic agreement with Iran would depend on verification of its uranium enrichment programs and, ultimately, confirmation of the missile arsenal Iran has developed over the years. Tehran has repeatedly declared openness to measures verifying it does not possess nuclear weapons, often citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's fatwa prohibiting such weapons. Such declarations may indicate willingness to reduce its nuclear program and potentially return to the 3.67% enrichment levels stipulated in the 2015 agreement—significantly lower than current levels exceeding 60%. However, Iran has firmly rejected completely dismantling its nuclear program (like the "Libyan model") or transferring highly enriched uranium to third countries, citing distrust of Washington and concerns about another withdrawal from agreements as occurred during Trump's presidency in 2018. Regarding the missile program, Revolutionary Guards spokesman Ali Mohammad Naeini responded to Witkoff's statement about including the missile arsenal in negotiations by declaring that Iran's military capabilities, including its missile program, represent a "red line" that remains non-negotiable under any circumstances. 3- Potential Iranian economic incentives: Some sources indicate that, in response to Trump's letter, Iran offered "economic benefits" that could advantage American companies if an agreement was reached between the two sides. These sources estimated potential benefits at $1 trillion or more. The proposal aligns with President Pezeshkian's April 9 statement that Supreme Leader Khamenei would not object to American investments entering Iran, "but without conspiring against Iran." Araghchi confirmed this position in his Washington Post article published that same day, calling on the United States to prefer diplomatic options when dealing with Iran and describing the Iranian economy as a "trillion-dollar opportunity" for American companies and businessmen. Tehran's attempts reveal a desire to motivate the Trump administration, which prioritizes trade and investment as key determinants of political engagement. One reason Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement was Washington's lack of benefit from investment deals allowed by the opening to Iran, while Europeans gained advantages, particularly in oil and petrochemical sectors. Consequently, Tehran is strategically focusing on economic opportunities, potentially driving Iran toward diplomatic approaches with Washington and an agreement that would lift the burden of sanctions imposed on the country. 4- European exclusion: No European party participated in the Muscat negotiations, and Washington likely held no consultations with the "European Troika" (Britain, France, and Germany) that participated with Iran in the 2015 agreement. Sources indicate that the meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of the three European countries, on the sidelines of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on April 3, failed to produce any joint plan addressing contentious issues with Iran. The exclusion reflects tense relations between Washington and its European allies, stemming from numerous disagreements—most notably the current US administration's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war and the tariffs imposed on most countries, including European ones. Moreover, it highlights Trump's desire to engage with Iran unbound by other parties' interests. Europeans prefer a diplomatic approach to dealing with Tehran, an approach Trump does not see as entirely reliable. Instead, he considers the military option a viable alternative should negotiations fail or not yield an agreement with Tehran. Nevertheless, the "European Troika" maintains significant leverage over Tehran through the so-called "trigger mechanism." The mechanism enables automatic reinstatement of UN sanctions imposed on Iran prior to the 2015 agreement if any of these countries complains to the Security Council about Iran's violation of the agreement. Such leverage perhaps explains why the Iranian delegation in Muscat requested its American counterpart ensure Washington assumes responsibility for preventing activation of the "trigger mechanism" against Tehran. Consequently, the "European Troika" countries will remain parties to negotiations between the United States and Iran, regardless of their format. Potential Effects Following the initial US-Iran discussions in Muscat, several potential repercussions can be anticipated: 1- Postponing the military option: The positive atmosphere during the Muscat talks, coupled with the announcement of future rounds of discussions, suggests Washington may delay military action regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Initially, the Trump administration advocated for military intervention as a pressure tactic to compel Tehran back to negotiations and secure a swift agreement on its nuclear program. Nevertheless, with ongoing dialogue between both parties, any military options might remain on hold until the results of these diplomatic exchanges become clearer. The escalating costs of military conflict may compel both sides to favor diplomatic negotiations and concessions. Tehran recognizes that American strikes on its nuclear facilities—whether conducted unilaterally or with Israeli cooperation—would present an overwhelming challenge to counter and manage. Similarly, Washington acknowledges that bombing Iran's nuclear installations could expose American forces and bases throughout the region to retaliatory attacks from Tehran or its armed proxies, while potentially disrupting vital maritime traffic. Given these high-stakes calculations, both nations may increasingly prioritize diplomatic solutions to resolve their differences, with Washington maintaining military action only as a final option should negotiations fail. 2- Supporting the chances of signing an agreement: Unlike previous negotiations during the Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi administrations, realistic data suggests Tehran faces severe time constraints. Trump has imposed a temporary deadline for Iran to resolve its nuclear program, with military action serving as the alternative. The military option has gained momentum as Tehran lost substantial capabilities among its regional proxies, which would have increased the cost of any attack against it. Moreover, according to Israeli and American accounts, the Israeli strike on October 26, 2024, successfully destroyed critical defense systems within Iranian territory. The approaching October 18 expiration date of the 2015 nuclear agreement intensifies pressure on Iran. Urgency mounts as the nation seeks a solution before the European Troika countries activate the "trigger mechanism" prior to that deadline. Unlike negotiations during the Rouhani and Raisi administrations, current talks will likely proceed more rapidly. Trump's April 13 statement that he expects "a decision on Iran will be made very quickly" further suggests the possibility of an expedited agreement with Iran. 3- Internal Iranian opposition: The move to hold negotiations with Washington may face opposition from some hardline fundamentalist groups. Despite Tehran's negotiations with Washington receiving approval from Khamenei and influential institutions rather than originating from Pezeshkian's government, resistance to these discussions remains possible. Statements from hardline Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) member Hamid Rasaei suggest underlying opposition when he claimed "the current negotiations were conducted with the Supreme Leader's approval to prove their failure, and for some optimistic officials to discover once again that the Americans are not committed and that it is irrational to rely on them." Additionally, any potential deal allowing American investments into the Iranian market might trigger objections based on constitutional restrictions. Articles 81 and 153 specifically prohibit granting concessions to foreign companies and foreign control of resources. From this perspective, such diplomatic moves could encounter resistance from institutions controlling key economic sectors, including the Revolutionary Guard and the bazaar. Some hardliners may interpret these developments as "Westernization of the economy," viewing them as concerning repetitions of historical scenarios embedded in Iranian collective memory. 4- Strengthening the role of the Iranian Foreign Ministry: The information that preceded the Muscat round of talks claimed three figures had been appointed to represent the Iranian delegation: Ali Larijani, advisor to the Supreme Leader; Mohammad Foruzandeh, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council; and Mohammad Javad Zarif, former assistant to the Iranian president for strategic affairs. However, the actual Iranian delegation to Oman was headed by Foreign Minister Araghchi, and included his aides for political affairs, Takht-e Ravanchi; Kazem Gharibabadi, for legal and international affairs; and Ismail Baghaei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, along with other negotiators and technical experts. The composition aligned with Araghchi's earlier assertion that responsibility for the negotiations would fall to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such prioritization indicates the regime's desire to send diplomatic messages, similar to events following former Iranian President Rouhani's election in 2013, which ultimately led to the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement. The diplomatic approach contrasted with periods when Tehran leaned toward hardline positions, during which broad powers were granted to the National Security Council to manage the nuclear issue, as seen during the terms of former presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Raisi. The regime's strategy appears inseparable from other domestic preparations made in anticipation of signing an agreement with the West. Notable examples include moving toward approval of conditions necessary for joining the Financial Action Task Force on Terrorism and Money Laundering (FATF), which would help Iranian banks access services provided by the SWIFT international financial transfer system. Some analysts attribute additional internal measures to this effort, including revisions to the strict provisions of the "chastity and hijab" law, the release of individuals under house arrest such as prominent reformist figure Mehdi Karroubi, and the easing of certain restrictions on internet use. 5- Russian and Chinese discontent: Negotiations between the United States and Iran may provoke discontent from Russia and China, fellow parties to the 2015 nuclear agreement. Both nations fear Tehran might forge an agreement with Washington that would undermine the coordination among Russia, China, and Iran. These concerns intensify amid severely strained Washington-Beijing relations following the announcement of historically high mutual tariffs between the two countries. Adding to the tension is Trump's apparent indifference resulting from Russian President Putin's delay regarding the US peace plan for Ukraine. Accordingly, Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi's visit to Moscow was announced ahead of the second round of talks scheduled for April 19 to brief the Russian side on the progress of the talks with Washington. Additionally, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Vasilievich Vershinin, during a meeting of supporters of the UN Charter in Moscow. The diplomatic efforts represent an attempt to allay Russian concerns and send a message to Washington that Tehran has other international alternatives if the current negotiations fail. In conclusion, the Muscat negotiations served as an exploratory round for both American and Iranian delegations, allowing each side to clarify intentions and demonstrate commitment before proceeding to subsequent steps. Complex and difficult differences persist between the parties, yet both clearly favor diplomatic solutions, at least temporarily, with success hinging upon American demands and potential Iranian concessions. Future rounds will likely experience heightened tension, leaving all possibilities open regarding the ultimate outcome of these diplomatic efforts.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq, international and regional warnings about the resurgence of ISIS have resurfaced, driven by mounting evidence of the group’s reorganization and its exploitation of the security vacuum left by military collapses and political instability. Since late 2024, multiple reports have pointed to a noticeable uptick in ISIS activity, an increase in the frequency of its attacks, and a growing ability to maneuver and recruit—fueled by weak regional coordination and diverging priorities among key international actors. Far from being ideologically defeated, ISIS appears to be reshaping itself within a volatile landscape, threatening to usher in a new phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the following analysis explores the main features of the group’s resurgence, the dynamics of its territorial re-expansion, and the regional and international efforts to contain it—seeking to unpack the nature of this renewed threat and assess its potential implications. International Warnings Over the Growing Threat of ISIS A series of international and regional statements and warnings issued since late 2024 reflect mounting concerns over the reemergence of the terrorist group ISIS on the regional scene, amid fragile security conditions and a diminished capacity to contain unconventional threats. In December 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, in a phone call with the UK Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer, revealed alarming signs of ISIS regrouping. He noted that the organization had managed to seize large stockpiles of weapons following the collapse of Syrian army units that abandoned their arsenals—enabling ISIS to expand its territorial presence in parts of Syria. This alarming development has not only been flagged by Iraq but has also featured prominently in international reports. On February 10, 2025, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, during a briefing before the Security Council, confirmed that ISIS continues to demonstrate a striking ability to adapt and evolve its tactics, despite ongoing security and military pressure from member states and international and regional partners. The 20th report of the UN Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security emphasized that the group has not been ideologically defeated; rather, it is restructuring itself within the security and political voids present in Syria, Iraq, and other areas. In the same context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned in March 2025 of a "real danger" posed by ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, pointing to the lack of political settlements and the breakdown of certain internal security structures as conditions conducive to the group's return. His warning echoed the concluding statement of the meeting of foreign ministers from Syria’s neighboring countries, held in Amman, Jordan, on March 9, 2025. The ministers expressed deep concern over the escalating ISIS threat and underscored the need to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms—particularly in intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations along Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stressed that "combating ISIS is no longer a local issue, but a collective responsibility that demands effective regional readiness and robust international support." He highlighted that the group’s threat has grown not only in terms of manpower but also in terms of military capabilities, and that its reach is now expanding beyond border areas into the Syrian heartland itself. These developments indicate that, despite the significant blows dealt to it in recent years, ISIS continues to benefit from the fluid geopolitical landscape in Syria—one that creates security gaps the group can exploit to reposition and reorganize itself. Furthermore, the conflicting priorities among international and regional actors in the Syrian file are hindering the formation of a unified front to confront this renewed threat. This fragmentation makes the challenge far more complex and reinforces the notion that the battle against ISIS remains far from over—both on the ground and within the broader framework of collective security. Signs of Escalation ISIS continues to consolidate its presence in Syria through its deployment across two geographically separate yet strategically interconnected regions—demonstrating the group’s persistent ability to exploit security gaps and divergences among local and international actors. The first area lies in Syria’s northeastern region, known as al-Jazira, which is nominally under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite this control, ISIS has maintained a notable presence in the southern desert of al-Hasakah province, geographically linked to the northeastern outskirts of the city of Al-Bukamal, particularly around the town of Al-Baghuz—the group’s last urban stronghold before its official collapse. This geographic footprint extends beyond Syria’s borders into Iraq, specifically into the Hadar desert in Nineveh province. Although concrete barriers now separate the two countries, ISIS has retained a clear ability to move across the border, as confirmed by testimonies from residents in the rural areas of al-Hasakah—rekindling memories of the "parallel state" dynamic the group sought to establish during its peak between 2014 and 2017. The year 2024 saw a marked increase in ISIS activity within Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the group carried out 491 operations throughout the year. In its report released on December 30, 2024, the Observatory noted that ISIS has successfully exploited political and military turmoil to reorganize and launch targeted attacks. In line with this, the Soufan Center reported on December 18 that ISIS attacks had tripled in frequency compared to 2023. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on July 17 that the group claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria during just the first half of 2024—clearly reflecting a strategy aimed at “escalating operational activity to compensate for structural decline.”  This upward trend reinforces the growing assumption that ISIS is leveraging fragile security conditions not only to expand its territorial influence but also to challenge other extremist groups—most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria. HTS has faced internal challenges linked to the novelty of its governance experiment and has been weakened by surprise attacks that undermine its structure and heighten insecurity in its areas of control. ISIS, in turn, appears intent on diffusing HTS’s efforts, exacerbating divisions among factions, and exploiting public discontent with local elites. These developments have also triggered serious concerns over potential spillover effects in Iraq, especially given the deeply interwoven geographic linkages between the Syrian and Iraqi theaters of operation. The cross-border mobility of ISIS operatives could reactivate dormant cells in Iraq’s western and northern provinces—particularly given the thousands of radicalized individuals currently held in Iraqi prisons, making these facilities potential targets for jailbreaks or attempts to reassert control, as seen in the earlier Ghweran prison attack in al-Hasakah. In light of this complex battlefield landscape, the fight against ISIS is far from over. The group—demonstrating notable tactical agility—is reconstituting itself within existing voids, capitalizing on fragmentation, and continually seeking new pathways for resurgence through the shifting terrain of regional geopolitics. The inability of certain local and regional powers to formulate a sustainable, collective counterterrorism strategy only further emboldens the group’s ambitions. Contours of a New Phase in the War Against ISIS The final months of 2024 and early 2025 witnessed a series of high-profile operations targeting senior ISIS leaders, signaling a tactical shift in the counterterrorism strategies adopted by international and regional powers. This shift marks the beginning of a new phase in the fight against ISIS—one that moves beyond random strikes to a focused campaign against the group’s leadership infrastructure. On December 20, 2024, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a precision airstrike in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, initially claiming it had killed ISIS’s leader, known as “Abu Yusuf.” However, CENTCOM later revised its statement, clarifying that the target was not the overall leader but a senior commander named Mahmoud “Abu Yusuf,” along with two of his aides. This correction reflects the complex intelligence challenges involved in identifying high-ranking ISIS figures, especially in an environment riddled with infiltration and security deception. In a related development, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani announced in March 2025, via a post on the platform X, the killing of one of the group’s most dangerous operatives: Abdullah Maki Masleh Al-Rifai, known as “Abu Khadijah,” who held the title of “Wali of Iraq and Syria” within ISIS's organizational structure. His elimination, the result of coordinated efforts between Iraqi intelligence and the Joint Operations Command—supported by the international coalition—demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-layered coordination in tracking down the group’s hidden leadership. On the European front, France returned to active operations against ISIS in Syria for the first time in over two years. In December 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that French warplanes had conducted precision strikes on ISIS positions inside Syrian territory. He emphasized that the operation, carried out the previous Sunday, underscored France’s continued commitment to counterterrorism efforts in the Levant. This marked France’s first such strike since September 2022—indicating a potential reactivation of its counterterrorism role and a broader effort to reassert European engagement in Syria, a file that has largely been dominated by the U.S., Russia, and Turkey. These three operations—American, Iraqi, and French—reflect what appears to be a renewed “leadership decapitation campaign” targeting ISIS commanders amid rising concerns over the group’s resurgence in Syria and Iraq. Yet, while such strikes carry strategic importance, they cannot substitute for broader efforts to dismantle the ideological, organizational, and financial foundations that allow ISIS to regenerate. Killing leaders may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities, but it does not ensure its eradication unless accompanied by comprehensive political and security solutions that address the roots of extremism and the institutional fragility on which the group thrives. In a notable development suggesting a qualitative shift in how regional states are approaching the terrorism file, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria announced in February 2025 the establishment of a joint cooperation mechanism to confront ISIS. The agreement emphasizes close coordination between foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, covering areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations. This move reflects a shared recognition that the terrorist threat transcends borders and demands coordinated frameworks that go beyond bilateral interests toward a collective regional security logic. This agreement laid the foundation for a broader process that culminated in a high-level five-party summit on March 8, 2025. The meeting brought together foreign and defense ministers, senior military commanders, and intelligence chiefs from the four founding countries, with Lebanon later joining the process. From the Turkish side, the meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın—highlighting Turkey’s strategic investment in this forum as a platform for reshaping the security landscape in northern Syria and Iraq. More broadly, this nascent regional alliance reflects a growing inclination to reduce dependence on Western powers in managing regional security issues. Instead, it seeks to establish a “new security architecture” led by Middle Eastern nations themselves—reviving the role of Arab and regional capitals in controlling border zones and reclaiming areas that ISIS may seek to exploit as fallback havens for regrouping and redeployment. Conclusion The available data indicates that ISIS is entering a new phase of reactivation and repositioning in the Syrian theater, capitalizing on the security and political collapse following the fall of central authority, and on the conflicting agendas of regional and international actors. Despite targeted strikes against some of its leaders, the group continues to demonstrate its operational adaptability and its ability to evolve amid shifting field dynamics. The resurgence of ISIS attacks and its expansion into ungoverned spaces signal a complex phase of confrontation—one that demands more than just military maneuvers. The success of the war against ISIS in Syria depends not only on precision strikes but also on the establishment of effective regional security partnerships and the activation of political and developmental pathways that address the root causes of extremism. As the group seeks to exploit divisions, its complete disappearance will hinge on the creation of a comprehensive deterrence architecture—one that goes beyond temporary fixes and moves toward sustainable strategies that tackle the structural foundations of militancy, not just its symptoms.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Signed in 2024, the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has reshaped regional dynamics, potentially granting Ethiopia sea access via Berbera in exchange for Somaliland’s recognition. This move challenged Somalia’s territorial integrity and prompted Mogadishu to align itself with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia. While the crisis reflects Ethiopia’s strategic push for a maritime presence, it also captures Somaliland’s long-standing quest for independence. In the wider Red Sea region, regional tensions are exacerbated by extra-regional actors which include the UAE, Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have their own interests therein. Although, external actors do not directly cause conflict, their involvement emboldens local actors and escalates rivalries. Hence, the Red Sea region has a growing importance in contemporary global geopolitics. Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Geopolitical Ambitions and the Quest for Recognition The year 2024 began with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The latter, formerly British Somaliland, was part of Somalia, from which it unilaterally seceded after Siad Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has been self-ruled and is considered a de facto state. However, the Hargheisa authority does not enjoy any international legal recognition. If implemented, the agreement with Addis Ababa would give Somaliland its first significant de jure recognition. In return, the Hargheisa authorities would grant Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera and the concession of a coastal area for military use. The situation revolves around three key regional players: Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland. Each of these actors has engaged in activities driven by its own objectives and strategic priorities. Ethiopia’s decision is influenced by several practical economic and strategic factors. Following the Eritrean War in the early 1990s, Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports and became the world’s most populous landlocked country. Since 1998, Djibouti’s ports have handled 95 per cent of trade to and from Addis Ababa. Sea access through Djibouti costs Ethiopia between $1.5 and $2 billion annually which Ethiopia’s rulers, since 2019, begun to express more strongly that they consider this spending excessive and unsustainable in the medium to long term. To reduce Addis Ababa’s dependence on Djiboutian ports, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed believes it is necessary to find a viable alternative. Before the MoU, Ethiopia had considered several alternatives to Djibouti, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Kenya. The idea of developing an economic and trade corridor between Addis Ababa and the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden began to take shape in the final months of 2023. Somaliland’s main port has been operated by the Emirati company – DP World since 2015, which has developed its infrastructure and increased its cargo transit capacity. Ethiopia estimates that it can divert between 12 and 15 per cent of the total volume passing through Djibouti’s ports to Berbera and, in the long term, connect its industrial zones to several trade corridors. From a strategic point of view, Ethiopian assessments are influenced by Addis Ababa’s national role conception. Ethiopia sees itself as the leading regional power because of its history and traditional economic and political weight in the region. Consequently, Ethiopian elites perceive the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as their natural strategic spheres. For this reason, the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs recently announced the ‘Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.’ The new agenda aims to expand the sphere of national interest and action eastwards towards the sea, unlike in the past when the focus of Ethiopia’s strategic projection was mainly on the Nile Basin. Indeed, Ethiopia’s ambitions as a regional power are challenged by its lack of a maritime gateway. For Addis Ababa, having a presence in the Red Sea would provide two strategic benefits: first, it would strengthen its standing in the region; second, it would bolster Ethiopia’s international role by enhancing cooperation in multilateral anti-piracy efforts. In short, the Ethiopian government sees maritime projection as a strategic resource and a gateway to the geopolitics of the coming decades, which will focus on Asia and the Indo-Pacific in particular. Therefore, one of the key clauses of the MoU allows Ethiopia to establish a military outpost in Lughaya, a town overlooking the Gulf of Aden, for at least fifty years. According to Ethiopian plans, the naval base will become the headquarters of the nascent Ethiopian navy. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a further step on the difficult path to independence. In the past year, the issue of Somaliland’s independence has gained renewed attention and relevance. This pursuit of self-determination is deeply rooted in a historical context that stretches back to the 19th century, predating the regime of Siad Barre. The Somalilanders’ path began during a pivotal time when the British Empire established agreements with various Somali clans, particularly the Gadabuursi, Issa, and Habr Awal. In 1884, the region was officially designated as British Somaliland, a protectorate that enjoyed a measure of autonomy and governance, distinguishing it from the colonial dominance exerted by Italian authorities in southern Somalia. Following the unification of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960, the social, economic, and political conditions of the people of Somaliland began to deteriorate, leading to widespread discontent and a strong desire for independence. Over time, the Siad Barre regime cast a long shadow over Somaliland, leading to widespread discrimination and marginalisation. The political and economic machinations of the central government often neglected the aspirations of the Somaliland people, fuelling a growing sense of injustice. In this context, collective memory became a powerful cornerstone of identity, highlighting the stark contrasts between Somaliland’s struggles and Somalia’s divergent trajectories in the turbulent post-Siad Barre era. Hargheisa’s quest for independence is rooted in historical grievances and reflects the unique identities and trajectories of its people. The Somaliland narrative often draws comparisons with the current situation in the rest of Somalia. Over the past three decades, this de facto state has made significant progress towards sustainable institutional and administrative development albeit on a very limited budget. The democratisation process is also crucial to further the development of Somaliland’s independence. The recent national elections held last November demonstrated the political maturity of all parties involved. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated government to the electoral process is a remarkable event in the region and stands out as one of the few such instances in the continent. The achievements of the institution-building process in Somaliland are even more striking when compared to the path taken by Somalia. Somalia’s Diplomatic Counterbalance and the Emergence of an Anti-Ethiopian Block  The signing of the MoU by Ethiopia and Somaliland raised concerns among regional actors, particularly Somalia. As Somaliland is formally and legally recognised as an integral part of Somalia, there were fears that Hargeisa’s claims to independence were gaining momentum. Mogadishu was particularly concerned that Ethiopia’s official recognition of Somaliland’s claims could trigger a domino effect, leading other regional and extra-regional actors to follow suit. Therefore, Somalia saw Ethiopia’s actions as a deliberate act of intimidation that threatened its territorial integrity at a sensitive time for its political future. Somalia faces several challenges, including the struggle to establish an effective institutional framework, particularly with regard to the relationship between the central government and the federal states, and also the fight against the terrorist group – al-Shabaab. In response to the MoU, the Somali executive, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, launched an intense diplomatic campaign to prevent its implementation and recognition by the international community. Somalia has sought support from regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU). In doing so, Somalia has consolidated alliances with both regional and extra-regional actors. As a result, the dynamics between these three actors – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland have become increasingly intertwined. Mogadishu’s natural anti-Ethiopian partners are two of Addis Ababa’s historical rivals: Eritrea and Egypt. Compared to 2018, the year of normalisation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the situation today is very different. The positions of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quickly diverged following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (2022), which ended the two-year conflict in Tigray. Eritrea, which had supported the Ethiopian military campaign, refused to negotiate with the Tigrayan authorities, represented by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The distance between the two leaders has widened as Ethiopia’s claims to the sea have grown. Indeed, Asmara fears that Ethiopia is eyeing its ports, a fear fuelled by the rhetoric of Abiy and other Ethiopian leaders. Conversely, Isaias has used his leadership and many regional relationships to foster a kind of ‘anti-Ethiopian coalition’. One significant change has been Egypt’s increasing involvement in the region. Mogadishu’s rapprochement with Cairo was formalised in August 2024 with the signing of a defence agreement. This agreement centres on Egypt’s intention to support Somalia’s request for the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops currently stationed in Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly known as Atmis, replaced by the Aussom mission on 1 January 2025). The strengthening of Somali-Egyptian relations, supported by Asmara and involving Djibouti through a security cooperation agreement, has consolidated an anti-Ethiopian bloc. This alignment represents a significant shift in the regional balance and illustrates Egypt’s changing Africa policy. Since 2020, Egypt has reaffirmed the importance of its southern relations. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has gradually reassessed Egypt’s African relations and promoted a geopolitical strategy that emphasises a north-south axis, rather than the east-west axis that dominated in previous decades. The Red Sea region, including the Nile Basin, is now a key part of this new strategic framework, which is shaped by Egypt’s historical rivalry with Ethiopia. Between the two states, the balance on the Nile has changed. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given Ethiopia a strategic advantage over Egypt. Egypt therefore had to adapt its approach to the ongoing dynamics by deciding to expand the areas of contention toward the sea. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia therefore provided an opportunity to increase Egypt’s footprint in the region. Regional Tensions and Extra-regional Actors in the Red Sea The MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland has opened a new phase in tensions. The focus of regional tensions is shifting to the coastal areas, particularly the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are marked by a number of security and defence agreements. Common strategic interests underpin the alignment of the anti-Ethiopian bloc, which includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt. Somalia views any legal recognition of Somaliland’s independence as an existential threat. For Djibouti, the economic damage from increased trade through Berbera is marginal but potentially devastating to its fragile internal balance of power. Eritrea perceives Ethiopia as an ongoing threat, and the current Ethiopian government is seen by Asmara as highly unreliable, raising concerns about a potential escalation of violence along their shared borders. Finally, for Egypt, the assessment of its regional position is of particular importance. Traditionally, Cairo has regarded the waters between Suez and Aden as its ‘lake’. As a result, like Addis Ababa, it regards the entire region as part of its sphere of influence. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey are among the most active players in the region. The UAE has supported the MoU to capitalise on investments in Berbera and Addis Ababa. Turkey, on the other hand, has taken a more balanced approach, thanks to its strong political and commercial ties with Ethiopia and Somalia. For Ankara, however, Somalia’s integrity must not be questioned. Following their rapprochement in 2021, the UAE and Turkey have maintained good relations. Despite their different strategies and some disagreements, both nations share a common interest in maintaining a central role in regional affairs. Other extra-regional players, such as France and Saudi Arabia, are also active in the background. France supports the MoU as part of its ongoing efforts to increase its presence in East Africa, which began at the same time as its withdrawal from the Sahel region. Its base in Djibouti is destined to become more central to French policy as French military presence in West Africa is being reduced. French officials see this increased influence in regional affairs as essential to France’s future interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical focus is shifting from the Gulf to the Red Sea, opposes the implementation of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. It seeks to counter regional projects promoted by the UAE. This might be as a result of the long-standing political rift between the two Gulf monarchies. Extra-regional actors do not directly cause an increase in regional conflicts. Rather, it is local actors who, feeling empowered by their connections with these extra-regional partners, perceive their environment as more permissive and gain the confidence to take assertive actions that they may not have considered before. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on why Ethiopia and Somaliland decided to sign the MoU at this historic moment. This perspective also helps to explain other regional crises, such as the civil war in Sudan and the conflict in Tigray. The different transformations in the international system have created a context in which local actors can seek multiple forms of external support. Increased alignment and overlap between local and regional rivalries has increased the willingness of actors to take assertive action, leading to a general increase in inter- and intra-state tensions. However, the flexible nature of alliances can also mitigate the risk of the trickle-down effect that often accompanies such alliances. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Middle East braces for another escalation of conflict, Tehran finds itself cornered by Donald Trump’s coercive diplomacy, facing the stark choice between strategic concession or regional confrontation. Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has reignited US–Iranian hostilities, transforming Yemen into a strategic flashpoint. His administration’s doctrine of militarised diplomacy, cloaked in zero-sum calculations, has elevated the Houthis from a peripheral proxy to a principal trigger for escalation. By explicitly linking Houthi missile fire to Iranian command, Trump has effectively nullified Tehran’s longstanding strategy of plausible deniability.  Historically, Iran’s use of proxies has relied on operating within a grey zone; projecting influence while avoiding direct confrontation. Trump’s return seeks to dismantle this strategic ambiguity, reclassifying all proxy activity as acts of Iranian statecraft. The US military has launched its most expansive campaign under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) against the Houthis since the Red Sea crisis began in late 2023, targeting ballistic missile infrastructure, drone depots, and senior leadership in Yemen. The operation, launched on 15 March, marked a strategic shift, following Trump’s re-designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and his vow to “rain hell” on their positions if the attacks continued. Trump’s rhetoric has escalated accordingly, and he has warned: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of Iran.”  This traps Tehran in a paradox: either abandon the Houthis, risking both reputational credibility and strategic depth, or absorb the full brunt of US retaliation. Neither option is strategically tenable. Recognising the stakes, Iran has reportedly urged the Houthis, via Omani intermediaries and back channel diplomacy in Tehran, to scale down their maritime attacks, particularly in the Red Sea. However, Houthi leadership has publicly dismissed such appeals, reaffirming their commitment to targeting Israeli shipping and rejecting external interference in their operational decisions. Their resistance is fuelled by ideological conviction, conflict-tested resilience, and an expanding sense of regional purpose.  Since the beginning of the recent Israel-Hamas conflict, and amid Hezbollah’s decline, Hamas’s isolation, and Syria’s collapse, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s most assertive proxy. Their attacks on Red Sea shipping and missile strikes against Israel, while mostly intercepted, nonetheless embarrass Arab regimes and stretch Israeli and American defensive postures.  The renewed Gaza conflict, triggered by Israel’s March 2025 bombing that killed five Hamas leaders and over 400 civilians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, has collapsed the fragile ceasefire and reignited a multifront war involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. With Gaza’s death toll now exceeding 50,000, Hamas frames its actions as part of a broader resistance to Israeli aggression. This development has galvanised regional anger and contributed to a broader mobilisation among Iran-aligned actors. Hezbollah has resumed intermittent rocket fire along the Lebanese border, while the Houthis, citing solidarity with Gaza, have intensified missile launches towards Israeli territory, including attempted strikes near Ben Gurion Airport, underscoring their expanding operational capacity and the symbolic coordination anchoring the Axis of Resistance.   Tehran’s influence may be weakening. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated a higher risk appetite, often acting beyond Iran’s preferred thresholds of escalation. This divergence complicates Tehran’s efforts to preserve plausible deniability while reaping the strategic dividends of proxy activism. The resulting imbalance reveals a deeper problem: Iran seeks the benefits of Houthi militancy without bearing the cost, an increasingly unsustainable equilibrium under Trump’s zero-tolerance posture.  Iran’s dilemma: no more deniability  According to the 2025 US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment, the Houthis continue to enhance their military capabilities through arms and dual-use technology imports from Russia and China. The smuggling of drone components through the Red Sea and the Omani-Yemeni border indicates a pattern of sustained logistical support. By dismantling Iran’s plausible deniability and publicly attributing every Houthi strike to Tehran, Washington seeks to force a binary: either Iran controls its proxies or accepts full strategic liability.  This exposes Tehran to a potential regional escalation that it is likely unprepared to navigate. The US narrative, amplified by Trump’s statements and CENTCOM’s operational tempo, collapses the operational gap between proxy and patron. This leaves Iran with shrinking room for strategic manoeuvre, particularly as it seeks to avoid direct conflict while preserving deterrent credibility. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have already conducted cross-border raids into Yemen, and Israel is lobbying for expanded UN sanctions on Iran’s missile program.  Backchannel bargains: araghchi’s high-wire diplomacy  Amid growing domestic unrest, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly been granted authority to pursue indirect negotiations with Washington. While Supreme Leader Khamenei maintains opposition to direct talks, the use of European and Omani channels offers Tehran a diplomatic off-ramp, though under immense diplomatic and political pressure. Araghchi, a veteran of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks, is viewed as more pragmatic than hardliners in the regime.  This opening follows Trump’s letter to Khamenei, demanding a new nuclear agreement within two months. The letter includes explicit demands: dismantle uranium enrichment, abandon missile development, and sever ties with regional proxies.   Iran’s nuclear posture remains opaque. The IAEA confirms Tehran has stockpiled enough 60 percent enriched uranium for multiple warheads if refined further. Yet, Iran insists its nuclear aims are peaceful. Semi-official sources suggest that continued Western escalation could prompt withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Iran’s domestic pressures are compounding. The economy suffers under inflation, sanctions, and currency collapse. The unrest in Urmia during Nowruz—the Persian New Year celebrated on the spring equinox—driven by inter-ethnic Kurdish-Azeri tensions, underscore the regime’s waning ability to manage internal dissent. With state institutions weakened, and central authority increasingly concentrated in the hands of Khamenei, public disillusionment is deepening.  The squeeze on Iran: less room to manoeuvre  Iran’s ability to maintain the status quo is under unprecedented strain. Its decades-old strategy of “strategic patience” is becoming harder to sustain. Though Iran continues to nurture ties with China and Russia, and remains engaged with European interlocutors,these relationships no longer offer the same buffer. The European Union, constrained by Washington’s hard-line approach, lacks the independence to offer credible guarantees.  Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia remain resolute in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The Begin Doctrine, which justified Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), may resurface should diplomacy falter. The spectre of unilateral military action now shapes Tehran’s strategic calculus.  Regionally, Iran’s proxy entanglements are escalating. The synchronised attacks from the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah are overstretching Israeli defences and fuelling calls in Tel Aviv for broader regional offensives. Israeli retaliation, paired with US military strikes, has intensified the risk of a wider conflagration. Arab regimes, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, fear being drawn into the fray, threatening their economic visions for 2030 and beyond.  Meanwhile the Palestinians remain largely abandoned, with no Arab state willing to absorb the population of Gaza as Trump toys with expulsion scenarios. This hard-line vision, absent regional consensus, risks igniting further instability across Jordan, Egypt, and the broader Arab world. Trump’s coercive diplomacy may satisfy tactical aims but alienates Arab publics, a recipe for internal backlash across fragile states.  Yet, abandoning its nuclear leverage is not politically viable for the Iranian regime. Any concessions must be matched by credible, enforceable guarantees—a lesson painfully learned from Trump’s unilateral exit from the JCPOA in 2018. Tehran may accept a phased or limited deal but will resist anything perceived as total capitulation.  In sum, Iran now faces a multidimensional siege: external coercion, proxy volatility, domestic instability, and ideological polarisation. Trump’s second term seeks to corner Tehran into submission, not negotiation. Yet, by collapsing the space between proxy action and state responsibility, Washington may provoke precisely what it seeks to prevent: a regional war with no clear exits. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction The Ansar Allah "Houthis" group announced the resumption of its ban on Israeli ships passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Tuesday, March 11, 2025, following the expiration of the deadline it had given Israel to allow humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. This was stated in a recorded speech by the group's military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, posted on his account on the X platform, where he declared that their forces "confirm the resumption of the ban on all Israeli ships in the designated operational areas in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden, following the expiration of the deadline granted by the group's leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, to mediators to pressure the Israeli enemy into reopening the crossings and allowing aid into the Gaza Strip." In response, U.S. Secretary of  Defense Pete Hegseth vowed on Sunday, March 16, 2025, that the United States would carry out "relentless" strikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen until the group ceases its military operations targeting American assets and global shipping routes. In this context, Houthi-affiliated media outlets reported on Sunday, 16March 2024, that approximately 40 American airstrikes on the capital, Sanaa, as well as Saada and Al-Bayda, resulted in a preliminary toll of 32 casualties and over a hundred injuries. These operations take place amid escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran and signs that U.S. strikes are focused on the tactical deterrence of the Houthis, making them part of a broader American strategy aimed at containing Iranian influence. This escalation coincides with the collapse of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, reinforcing the possibility that the region may be heading toward a new phase of entangled military confrontations. This paper examines the objectives and messages underlying this military campaign, focusing on the prospects of continued escalation between the United States and the Houthis and the possibility of it extending into a direct confrontation with Iran. It also seeks to answer a critical question: Will Washington succeed in deterring the Houthis through these operations, or will this strategy lead to a greater escalation that could involve a broader confrontation with Iran? This is especially relevant given the growing indications that Israel is intensifying pressure on the United States to push it toward direct conflict with Tehran. Amid the complexities of the regional landscape, the paper considers the strategic dimensions of these operations, including U.S. messaging toward Iran, Israel’s efforts to expand the scope of confrontation, and the role of international allies in shaping the escalation pathways. It also explores possible scenarios for future developments, ranging from continued limited strikes to the potential outbreak of a large-scale regional confrontation. From this perspective, the paper will highlight the key American messages and underlying objectives of this military campaign, which should be taken into account when discussing the primary goals of this campaign at this critical juncture. These can be interpreted as follows: American Messages; During his first term, U.S. President Donald Trump adopted a "maximum pressure" policy on Iran, which manifested in the imposition of a broad set of economic sanctions that significantly impacted the Iranian economy, along with the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, 2018. Continuing this approach, Trump reaffirmed his hardline stance on Iran's nuclear program even before officially assuming office again in January 2025. Since announcing his candidacy for the presidential elections in July 2024, he has emphasized the need for a "new nuclear deal" with Iran. On September 26, 2024, he stated: "We must reach an agreement, because the consequences are impossible. We must reach an agreement." As part of his escalating position toward Tehran, upon taking office, Trump signed a presidential memorandum on February 5, 2025, reinstating the maximum pressure policy on the Iranian government, aiming to block Tehran’s path to acquiring a nuclear weapon and counter its destabilizing influence abroad, according to a White House statement at the time. In a further escalation against what is known as Iran’s "proxies" in the region, the United States launched large-scale airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen. The Pentagon announced that since Saturday, March 15, 2025, it had targeted 30 Houthi sites in the largest U.S. military operation in the Middle East since Trump's return to the White House.  This ongoing military campaign cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader U.S. approach toward Iran, which is characterized by stringent economic sanctions and firm official statements underscoring Washington’s determination to exert maximum pressure on Tehran. These military strikes are part of a wider American strategy aimed at delivering clear and direct messages to Iran: that the United States is not only capable of countering any Iranian threat but is also resolute in defending its interests and allies in the region. Reinforcing this stance, U.S. President Donald Trump  declared on March 17, 2025, that Iran would be held accountable for any future attacks carried out by the Houthis, a clear indication that the Trump administration might consider direct strikes against Iran if the Houthis continue targeting American interests—especially if evidence emerges of military or intelligence support from Tehran. This statement reveals the potential for U.S. military strikes against Iranian targets or Iran’s affiliated groups in the region as part of an escalatory strategy designed to deter Tehran—not only in response to proven arms support for the Houthis in the future but also concerning its nuclear program. This comes within the context of Trump’s threats before launching the military campaign against the Houthis. On March 13, 2025, Washington delivered an official message to Iran, giving it a choice between negotiating a new agreement or facing direct military action. However, Tehran rejected negotiations under threat, further increasing the likelihood of escalation in the coming period. Israel’s Efforts to Open the Iran Front; The recent U.S. strikes on the Houthis in Yemen are part of an escalating military confrontation in the Middle East, coinciding with Israeli attempts to drag the United States into a broader conflict with Iran. Since the outbreak of Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government has been pushing Washington toward a more aggressive stance against Iran. This was highlighted by The Washington Post on October 14, 2025, which noted Israel’s readiness to launch military strikes against Iranian targets, necessitating U.S. support and backing. Israel seeks to expand the scope of regional conflict by urging Washington to respond militarily to Houthi threats in the wake of the Gaza war. It appears that Tel Aviv is attempting to lure the United States into escalating tensions with Iran, particularly given Tehran’s logistical and military support for the Houthis. Thus, targeting the group could serve as a preliminary step toward broadening military operations to include direct Iranian targets, increasing the likelihood of escalation with Iran. Israel is betting on escalation, as suspicions grow over Netanyahu’s intentions to widen the war with Iran by exploiting ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Yemen. Israel views continued military pressure on Tehran and its proxies as a means to weaken Iran’s regional position and potentially push the U.S. toward more confrontational steps. This comes at a time when the influence of Iran’s allied factions has waned—particularly in Syria, where Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed on December 8, 2024, and in Lebanon, following Israel’s extensive strikes on Hezbollah, which resulted in the deaths of most of its senior leadership, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Therefore, targeting the Houthis carries a direct message to Tehran: Washington is prepared to expand its operations against regional threats, which may provoke escalatory responses from Iran. This scenario aligns with Israel’s objectives of reinforcing its stance against Iran. Since the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in January 2025,  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been retreating from the deal under intense criticism from Israel’s far-right factions. In this context, Israel has resumed and expanded its attacks on Gaza. On Tuesday, March 18, 2025, Netanyahu’s office announced that Israeli forces had targeted Hamas positions across the Gaza Strip. This move is part of an escalatory policy aimed at keeping the war ongoing and preventing any long-term truce, as Israel considers continued military operations necessary to impose its political and security conditions. Furthermore, Israel is seeking to shift the confrontation to broader fronts. The Israeli military is expanding its presence in Syria, continuing airstrikes against Iranian targets and affiliated militias, while maintaining its military foothold in southern Lebanon despite the ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah in November 2024. This indicates that Tel Aviv is not only intensifying its military operations in Gaza but is also pushing for a larger escalation against Iran, which is the main backer of Hezbollah and Palestinian armed factions. This reflects Israel’s intent to keep regional tensions high and reshape the rules of engagement in the Middle East. In light of this, Israel is expected to cooperate with the United States in conducting precision strikes against the Houthis in Yemen in the near future, as well as in potential assassination operations targeting Houthi leaders. Additionally, it may participate in military actions against nuclear and military sites inside Iran, potentially triggering Iranian retaliation and further regional tensions. This escalation would serve to appease Israel’s far-right factions and the ruling coalition, which has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the government and topple Netanyahu over his handling of Gaza and Iran. The escalation opportunities with Iran U.S. strikes may push the Houthis to intensify their attacks, especially in parallel with Israel’s escalation of airstrikes on Gaza at the moment. In his latest speech, the leader of Ansar Allah linked the cessation of attacks on Israeli ships in the Red Sea to the entry of aid into Gaza, which is not expected at this stage "despite mediators calling for a return to negotiations," given Israel’s resumption of the war on Gaza alongside the American military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. This may necessitate additional American escalation, particularly after Trump held Iran responsible for any future Houthi attacks. On March 16, 2025, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hossein Salami, vowed to respond to any attack following threats from U.S. President Donald Trump against Tehran over Washington’s strikes on the Houthis in Yemen. In statements broadcast on state television, Salami said, "Iran will not start a war, but if anyone threatens it, we will respond appropriately, decisively, and firmly." This statement reflects Iran’s deterrence policy while also keeping the door open for a potential escalation if Washington decides to attack Iran by directly targeting Iranian sites. Hossein Salami’s statement carries a dual message: Tehran affirms that it does not seek war, but at the same time, it brandishes the threat of a strong response if it faces any direct threat. This message primarily targets the United States and serves as a means to deter any further escalatory measures by Israel regarding the Iranian nuclear file.  Salami's statement also aims to rely on escalatory rhetoric to reinforce his image domestically, especially amid the ongoing economic and military pressures on Iran. These statements also seek to reassure the Iranian public that the regime remains strong and capable of defending its interests against both the United States and Israel. Despite Iran’s statements affirming that it does not seek war, it simultaneously adopts the approach of "flexible deterrence," leaving the door open for escalatory options if Tehran is subjected to direct strikes. This keeps the region facing open-ended scenarios, ranging from the continuation of indirect confrontation through proxies to the possibility of events spiraling into a broader confrontation if Washington and Tel Aviv decide to go beyond limited strikes to directly targeting Iran. The Limits of U.S. Effectiveness in Deterring the Houthis Since the escalation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the United States has adopted a dual military and political strategy in an attempt to restore lost deterrence. However, questions remain about the effectiveness of this policy in achieving its desired objectives, particularly given the Houthis' ability to adapt to U.S. pressure and continue their escalatory maritime operations. As part of these efforts, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the formation of a multinational naval force in December 2023 to protect navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden under Operation "Prosperity Guardian." While this force has enhanced security measures, Houthi attacks have persisted, indicating that military deterrence alone has not been sufficient to completely halt the attacks.So far, the Houthis have divided their maritime campaign into five phases, which can be outlined as follows:• Phase One: Attacks focused on missile strikes targeting Israel, beginning in October 2023 with the Gaza war, and on Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea starting in November 2023.• Phase Two: In December 2023, attacks expanded to include all ships heading to Israeli ports. Vessels with direct or indirect ties to Israel, as well as those that had previously visited Israeli ports, became targets.• Phase Three: In January 2024, attacks expanded further to target ships linked to the United States and the United Kingdom.• Phase Four: In May 2024, the scope widened again to include ships owned or operated by entities that also own vessels visiting Israeli ports.• Phase Five: This phase was announced after the Houthis launched the "Yafa" drone at Tel Aviv on July 19, 2024, marking a continuation of the previous phases. In each phase, the group managed to force more vessels to avoid the southern Red Sea. By the fourth phase, from at least late April 2024, additional shipping companies engaged in trade with Israeli ports had started avoiding the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. At the same time, on certain occasions, the attacks drew attention to other regional activities, such as Russia’s oil trade. U.S. efforts to restore deterrence against the Houthis face complex challenges, as limited military strikes and political sanctions have not decisively curbed the group’s escalation. While Washington seeks to strike a balance between applying military pressure and maintaining regional stability, the Houthis have demonstrated their ability to adapt to these pressures and expand their maritime operations, benefiting from Iranian support and escalating geopolitical tensions. In this context, the airstrikes launched by the Trump administration in Yemen marked the first time the U.S. had explicitly targeted Houthi leaders, in addition to their military centers and command-and-control hubs. The success of American deterrence against the Houthis may largely depend on adopting more aggressive strategies, such as the targeted assassination of key Houthi leaders—similar to Israel’s approach against Hezbollah commanders. This tactic could weaken the group's central leadership and disrupt its organizational structure, potentially limiting its ability to coordinate maritime attacks. However, this approach carries significant risks, as it may provoke the Houthis into even more aggressive retaliatory actions and potentially increase the likelihood of direct Iranian involvement in the confrontation. Possible Scenarios Iran Avoiding Direct Support for the Houthis to Prevent a Confrontation with Washington: Iran's lack of direct response to Israel’s escalation against Hezbollah in Lebanon—despite its declared "Unity of Fronts" doctrine—suggests a likely pattern that could also apply to its handling of U.S. escalation against the Houthis in Yemen. While Iran utilizes proxy groups to expand its regional influence, its direct military involvement remains constrained by complex strategic calculations related to the balance of power, the cost of escalation, and the ability to deter adversaries without being drawn into an open confrontation. In the case of Hezbollah, despite Israel’s recent military actions, Iran chose to regulate the intensity of the confrontation rather than push for a full-scale war. This reflects a strategy of "remote management," where Tehran supports its allies without direct engagement. The same approach may apply to the Houthis, particularly since the U.S. escalation occurs within the broader context of the Washington-Tehran standoff over the nuclear issue and aims to deter Houthi threats to international shipping. This perspective is reinforced by a statement from Hossein Salami, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on March 16, 2025, in which he asserted that "Iran will not start a war, but it will respond appropriately, decisively, and resolutely if threatened." This statement indicates that Tehran prefers to maintain a defensive stance rather than an offensive one that could lead to full-scale military escalation. At the same time, it does not want to appear weak in the eyes of its adversaries, meaning it may scale back its support for the Houthis in the short to medium term. It can be argued that U.S. military action against the Houthis is unlikely to trigger direct Iranian intervention unless Iran itself comes under direct attack. Should Iran face large-scale strikes on military sites within its borders, it may respond by expanding support for its regional proxies—despite their declining influence—through the provision of more advanced military technology or by mobilizing other militias in the region to divert pressure away from Iran. This scenario reflects a recurring pattern in Iranian strategy, wherein Tehran employs a "brinkmanship" approach without crossing red lines that would provoke a direct U.S. military response. Regional Escalation: The recent escalation—marked by the Houthis’ announcement of targeting the U.S. aircraft carrier Harry Truman and a U.S. destroyer in the Red Sea on March 18, 2025—signals a critical phase in the ongoing confrontations, particularly under the hardline Trump administration. Unlike the Biden administration's more restrained approach, Washington may push for a broader escalation against the Houthis' capabilities in Yemen, especially if Tehran's continued involvement in supplying the group with advanced weapons and technology is confirmed. The Trump administration is likely to view sustained attacks on its forces and naval assets as crossing a red line, potentially prompting an expansion of retaliatory measures. This could include intensified airstrikes on Houthi military sites within Yemen and targeting the infrastructure Iran uses to transfer weapons to the group. U.S. actions may also escalate to the point of considering direct strikes against Iran itself. However, given the geopolitical complexities, American strikes may not be limited to Yemen and Iran alone. They could extend to Iran’s regional proxies in Iraq and Lebanon, particularly if Iran-aligned factions target U.S. interests in the region. These factions have the capability to pose direct threats to American assets, which may prompt Washington to expand its military responses beyond the immediate Houthi threat.The Most Likely Scenario:  Given the current circumstances, the most probable scenario is the first one—where Iran avoids directly supporting the Houthis or engaging in a full-scale war with Washington, while the U.S. expands its military strikes against the Houthis' infrastructure. This stems primarily from Iran’s strategic caution in avoiding a direct confrontation with both Tel Aviv and Washington, aligning with its broader approach to regional crises, as seen in its management of the escalation between Israel and Hezbollah. However, Iran is likely to enter the conflict only in one case—if it faces a direct military attack. Conclusion The recent escalation in the Red Sea reflects the complexity of the regional landscape, where international and regional interests intersect, keeping the crisis open to further developments in the near future. While global powers seek to contain tensions and prevent a full-scale escalation, striking a balance between deterrence and containment remains a crucial factor in shaping the region’s security strategy. In this context, the United States faces significant challenges in deterring the Houthis, as the group has demonstrated a high degree of adaptability to military and political pressures. On the other hand, Iran’s approach to the U.S. escalation against the Houthis reflects a cautious strategic stance, as Tehran prefers to avoid direct confrontation with Washington while continuing to support its allies indirectly. Given the ongoing tensions, the Red Sea remains a key focal point in global security and economic calculations, necessitating more comprehensive approaches to address the escalating challenges.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise to power in 2002, one might ask whether we can speak of an Erdoğan Doctrine in Turkish foreign policy. The answer is no. Unlike classical doctrines that follow a consistent ideological or strategic framework, Erdoğan’s approach to both domestic and international politics is marked by pragmatic opportunism, transactional maneuvering, and tactical adaptability. His foreign policy does not stem from a fixed set of principles but rather from a fluid, recalibrated strategy designed to ensure political survival, power consolidation, and economic self-preservation. Yet, despite this adaptability, Erdoğan has consistently instrumentalized Islamism, Ottoman nostalgia, and Turkish nationalism as mobilizing forces, shaping both Turkey’s domestic landscape and its global positioning. These ideological currents serve not as doctrinal foundations but as strategic tools, deployed selectively to consolidate power and justify an increasingly interventionist and authoritarian foreign policy. Rather than an Erdoğan Doctrine, what we observe is a dynamic political strategy, one that shifts according to regional and global realities, balancing ideological rhetoric with realpolitik pragmatism. Erdoğan’s political trajectory has been characterized by extreme opportunism. Early in his tenure, he presented himself as a pro-Western democrat, championing Turkey’s EU membership and economic liberalization. However, as his grip on power consolidated, he shifted towards authoritarian populism, discrediting Western institutions and embracing an anti-Western, neo-Ottomanist discourse. His ability to manipulate ideological positions for strategic gain suggests that Erdoğan’s doctrine is less about consistent principles and more about sustaining power through ideological fluidity. This transactional nature extends to foreign policy, where Erdoğan has engaged in contradictory alliances. Turkey has simultaneously sought stronger ties with Russia while maintaining a position in NATO, balancing relations with Iran while confronting it in Syria, and denouncing Western imperialism while leveraging economic ties with the EU. The 2016 failed coup attempt marked a pivotal moment, after which Erdoğan’s rhetoric became deeply anti-Western, securitizing foreign policy as an extension of domestic political struggles. One of the defining characteristics of the Erdoğan strategy is the obliteration of the traditional boundary between domestic and foreign policy. In Erdoğan’s Turkey, foreign policy decisions are primarily driven by domestic political calculations rather than long-term strategic considerations. Military operations in Syria and Libya were framed as nationalist victories, consolidating Erdoğan’s support base while deflecting attention from economic crises. Political rivals and dissidents are routinely accused of being Western puppets or linked to foreign conspiracies, reinforcing anti-Western nationalism. Erdoğan actively uses the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a political tool, portraying himself as the protector of Muslims abroad and positioning Turkey as the leader of a global Islamic movement. This lack of distinction between internal and external affairs means that every foreign policy move is designed for domestic legitimacy. Military interventions, diplomatic crises, and economic policies are all packaged for domestic consumption to maintain Erdoğan’s image as a leader defying Western hegemony. Erdoğan has strategically invoked Islamist rhetoric and Ottoman nostalgia to mask domestic corruption, repression, and economic mismanagement. His use of Islamism is highly pragmatic rather than ideological. While Erdoğan once promoted a pro-business, moderate Islamist stance, he has increasingly aligned with more radical Islamic groups to rally conservative voters. Neo-Ottomanist narratives have been used to justify interventions in the Middle East and Africa, portraying Turkey as the rightful heir to regional leadership. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has become an ideological tool for Erdoğan, framing his rule as divinely sanctioned while attacking secular and Western influences. Erdoğan’s economic policies reflect the same transactional nature. He has oscillated between free-market policies to attract Western investment and state-led crony capitalism to consolidate his own economic elite. However, his militarization of foreign policy has created deep economic vulnerabilities. Erdoğan’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 missiles resulted in U.S. sanctions and exclusion from the F-35 program, exacerbating Turkey’s economic downturn.  Aggressive gas exploration efforts isolated Turkey from the EU and regional actors, worsening trade relations. While Erdoğan has relied on Qatari financial support, recent Gulf rapprochements have left Turkey geopolitically and economically vulnerable. Turkey’s economic dependence on Western markets and capital contradicts Erdoğan’s anti-Western rhetoric, further proving that his doctrine is driven by short-term political survival rather than a coherent strategic vision. Rather than a structured geopolitical vision, the Erdoğan strategy is best understood as a political survival mechanism that combines: Extreme pragmatism and transactionalism, shifting alliances and ideological positions as needed; the fusion of domestic and foreign policy, where foreign affairs are a continuation of domestic power struggles; the instrumentalization of Islamism and Ottoman nostalgia, masking authoritarianism and economic decline; short-term opportunism at the cost of long-term strategy, leading to Turkey’s increasing diplomatic and economic isolation. Erdoğan’s rule has been marked by ad-hoc decisions, contradictions, and reactive policies that serve his immediate political needs rather than a grand vision for Turkey’s future. This transactional-opportunism makes the Erdoğan Doctrine an impossibility—while he projects an image of Islamic, nationalist leadership, his foreign policy is dictated by opportunism, insecurity, and personal political survival. The consequences of this approach are a weakened economy, diplomatic isolation, and an increasingly authoritarian state, making the long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s model highly uncertain.  Another major characteristic of Erdoğan’s strategy is the securitization of domestic and foreign policy. Since Erdoğan ascended to the presidency in 2014, and particularly after the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant transformations. These changes are marked by a growing reliance on securitization—the framing of domestic and international challenges as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures. Erdoğan’s approach has been shaped by three key factors: Islamist ideology, Ottoman nostalgia, and the deep-seated trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres. These factors have driven Turkey into high-risk foreign policy ventures, many of which have backfired, leading to strategic isolation, economic instability, and declining influence on the global stage. Erdoğan’s political strategy has been centered on constructing an image of perpetual threat to the Turkish state and nation. This approach is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of betrayal and encirclement—most prominently symbolized by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which sought to partition Anatolia and subject it to foreign control. This “Sèvres Syndrome” has been instrumentalized to justify an aggressive foreign policy, military interventions, and an increasingly authoritarian domestic stance.  Erdoğan has fused Turkish nationalism with political Islam, portraying Turkey as both the heir to the Ottoman Empire and the champion of Sunni Muslims. This synthesis has fueled a revisionist foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. However, these ambitions have often led Turkey into conflicts with former allies and regional powers, undermining its strategic position. Erdoğan’s foreign policy, shaped by securitization, Islamist nostalgia, and historical trauma, has backfired spectacularly in multiple arenas. While he has sought to redefine Turkey as a great power, his tactics have instead led to growing regional isolation, economic instability, and internal discontent. The failure to balance nationalist rhetoric with pragmatic diplomacy has left Turkey more vulnerable than ever—caught between Western skepticism, Russian opportunism, and Middle Eastern volatility. Unless Erdoğan recalibrates his approach, Turkey risks further decline in both regional and global affairs. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdoğan came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation, shifting from a Western-oriented, EU-focused trajectory to a more assertive, independent, and, increasingly, anti-Western stance. While initially adopting a “thin populist” approach that emphasized regional engagement, neo-Ottomanist rhetoric, and Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and West, the AKP’s foreign policy has evolved into a “thick populist” approach dominated by a strong anti-Western narrative. This transformation was solidified after the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and, even more so, after the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, which the Turkish government blamed on the West-backed Gülen Movement. The growing securitization of Western powers and the increasing emphasis on Turkey’s Islamic and civilizational identity have led to an overt de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Erdoğan’s securitization of foreign policy has manifested in several high-risk ventures that have largely failed to achieve their intended objectives: Turkey’s military interventions in Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring) were aimed at eradicating the Kurdish YPG, which Ankara views as an extension of the PKK.  However, this policy has led to severe tensions with the United States, which has supported the YPG as a key ally against ISIS. The result is a diplomatic impasse that has weakened Turkey’s influence in Syria while increasing its military entanglements. Turkey’s intervention in Libya, backing the Government of National Accord (GNA) against Khalifa Haftar, was an extension of Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. While it temporarily secured Turkish energy and maritime interests, it alienated Egypt, the UAE, France, and Greece, leading to counteralliances that have restricted Turkish maneuverability.  Erdoğan’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system was framed as a move for strategic autonomy but resulted in sanctions from the United States and exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet program. While this was meant to demonstrate Turkey’s independence, it has made the country increasingly reliant on Moscow, further complicating relations with NATO. Erdoğan’s aggressive posture has damaged Turkey’s relations with Western allies, leading to economic consequences, loss of diplomatic leverage, and isolation in Europe. Erdoğan’s confrontational approach—such as threatening to flood Europe with refugees—has eroded trust and reinforced perceptions of Turkey as an unpredictable and transactional partner. Erdoğan’s security-driven foreign policy has had dire economic consequences. The Turkish lira has suffered dramatic depreciation, foreign investment has declined, and inflation has soared. The Turkish public, initially supportive of Erdoğan’s assertiveness, is increasingly disillusioned as economic hardship worsens. Erdoğan’s securitization of policy has created short-term political gains but long-term strategic vulnerabilities. No one takes Turkey as a credible ally. His nationalist-Islamist rhetoric has been effective in consolidating domestic support, especially among conservative and nationalist voters, but it has also deepened Turkey’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Finally, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has been anti-Western.  A key driver of Erdoğan’s anti-Western foreign policy has been the gradual populist transformation of the AKP and consolidation of his power by purging other prominent personalities within the party.  Initially, under the leadership of Erdoğan, the party adopted a moderate, reformist discourse that prioritized EU membership, economic liberalization, and cooperation with Western allies. However, over time, populist tendencies became dominant, with Erdoğan increasingly portraying himself as the true representative of the “real” Turkish people against both domestic and international elites. Populist foreign policy, as seen in Turkey and elsewhere, follows a binary logic that pits “the virtuous people” against “the corrupt elite.” In the Turkish context, this binary has been extended to the international arena, with the West—Europe and the United States—constructed as the foreign equivalent of the corrupt elite, standing in opposition to Turkey’s rightful role as a global power.  The early years of AKP rule were marked by a pragmatic approach that balanced Turkey’s Western orientation with a regionalist vision. This period saw active engagement with the EU, NATO, and the U.S., while at the same time expanding relations with the Middle East, Balkans, and Africa under Ahmet Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” doctrine. During this era, anti-Western rhetoric was limited, and Turkey’s regional activism was framed as complementary to, rather than a rejection of, its Western ties. Following the Gezi Park protests and, more dramatically, the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan’s rhetoric became openly hostile toward the West. Western governments were accused of plotting against Turkey, harboring terrorists, and undermining Turkey’s sovereignty. Erdoğan framed his leadership as a struggle against an imperialist West determined to prevent Turkey’s rise. As he declared in 2019, “Turkey is now a country whose agenda is not determined [by others] but who determines her own agenda.” Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy became an extension of Erdoğan’s domestic populist struggle, where anti-Westernism served as both an ideological tool and a strategy for political survival. Another major factor behind Turkey’s anti-Western turn is the fusion of Islamist and nationalist discourses, which have become the defining ideological pillars of Erdoğan’s foreign policy. This ideological shift is best understood through the contrast between Kemalism and Neo-Ottomanism. Traditionally, Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by Westernization, secularism, and nationalism. The country’s founding ideology sought integration with Europe, NATO membership, and alignment with the U.S. in the Cold War. However, Kemalist elites were also skeptical of foreign entanglements, leading to a cautious and isolationist diplomacy. Neo-Ottomanism and the “New Turkey” Vision of Erdoğan is anti-Western, Islamists, and serves for Erdoğan’s regime survival rather than national interest of the country. Under Erdoğan, a revisionist historical narrative emerged, portraying the Ottoman Empire as a great civilization that was undermined by Western colonialism and internal betrayals. In this vision, modern Turkey is the rightful heir of the Ottoman legacy and should reclaim its leadership role in the Islamic world. Erdoğan has repeatedly invoked the trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920)—which proposed partitioning Turkey—as evidence that the West continues to conspire against Turkish sovereignty.  This ideological framework has shaped Turkey’s new foreign policy identity, positioning it as a leader of the Muslim world rather than a subordinate member of the Western alliance. As Erdoğan’s government became more authoritarian and Islamist, relations with the EU steadily deteriorated. The post-2016 crackdown on opposition figures, journalists, and academics led to increasing criticism from European leaders, reinforcing Erdoğan’s narrative that the EU is hypocritical, biased, and Islamophobic. While Turkey officially remains an EU candidate country, Erdoğan has openly questioned the sincerity of European leaders, arguing that the EU is a “Christian club” that will never accept a Muslim-majority country.  Erdoğan’s government has rejected Western liberal values, reversing democratic reforms and undermining the independence of judicial institutions, the media, and civil society. As a result, Turkey has moved closer to authoritarian models seen in Russia, China, and the Gulf states. Erdoğan’s anti-Western and de-Europeanized foreign policy is not just a reaction to specific diplomatic disputes—it is a structural transformation rooted in populism, ideology, and strategic recalibration. By casting the West as Turkey’s primary “other,” Erdoğan has crafted a nationalist-Islamist narrative that legitimizes his power, mobilizes his base, and redefines Turkey’s role in the world.  While this approach has granted Turkey short-term strategic flexibility, it has also left it increasingly isolated, economically vulnerable, and diplomatically constrained. The long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s foreign policy remains uncertain, especially as domestic economic troubles and shifting global dynamics continue to reshape Turkey’s geopolitical landscape. One of the key arguments in understanding Turkey’s foreign policy shift is the interaction between domestic authoritarianism and international behavior. Unlike traditional middle powers, which pursue stability, Turkey’s domestic political dynamics—specifically Erdoğan’s populist authoritarian rule—have fueled its unusual, risk-prone foreign policy choices. Erdoğan has increasingly used foreign policy as a tool for domestic political survival, framing Turkey as a besieged nation fighting Western imperialists. Opposition parties are often accused of being aligned with “foreign agents” or Western powers, further deepening polarization. Nationalist rhetoric has been amplified during military operations, boosting public support for interventions in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском To better understand the current situation in Turkey, where massive demonstrations have been taking place non-stop since the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu on March 19, we need to take a look at some Turkish words - with no real French translation - that have made their appearance, or reappearance, in the public sphere, and which reflect the rewriting of political rules that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government is currently enforcing. Arrested on March 19, along with dozens of his partners, elected representatives and members of the Republican People's Party (CHP, Kemalist), on charges of “corruption”, “terrorism” and “helping the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)”, Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, 53, elected in 2019 and re-elected in 2024, was stripped of his mandates and imprisoned on March 23. The authorities have also set about challenging his academic credentials, since, according to the Constitution, the President of the Republic must be a university graduate. However, Imamoglu's university degree, obtained 32 years ago at Istanbul University, has just been cancelled under pressure from the authorities. Ironically, Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself is suspected of not having actually obtained the university degree he claims to have, and cannot produce any proof of university attendance (photos, testimonials, etc.), even though the university from which he claims to have graduated asserts that he was indeed a student there. This brutal dismissal of a key political figure in Turkey, who appealed to both the secular electorate and conservative circles, and who was expected to be the opposition candidate against Erdogan in the 2028 presidential election, immediately sparked a widespread reaction. For the past week, the country has been swept by a wave of huge demonstrations, bringing together hundreds of thousands of people expressing their solidarity with the imprisoned leader. They range from young people and academics to citizens from towns traditionally loyal to the AKP. While the mainstream media remain strangely silent, and X has already blocked numerous opposition accounts at Ankara's request, figures put forward by the CHP General Secretary put the number of demonstrators at one million. Against this explosive backdrop, it's worth taking a closer look at some of the specific terms used in current Turkish public debate, which reflect the current situation in a country in turmoil. The “secret witness” (Gizli tanık) First term: Gizli tanık, French for “secret witness”. In Turkey, the use of “secret witnesses” was legalized by Law no. 5726 on Witness Protection, adopted on December 27, 2007 and published in the Official Gazette on January 5, 2008, at a time when the Gülenist movement dominated the judiciary in agreement with the ruling AKP. This system of Gizli tanık prevents the cross-examination of witnesses and facilitates the pre-trial detention, and subsequent conviction, of all suspects in political cases: all it takes is for a secret witness to testify against them. This practice was first introduced in 2007 in the Ergenekon trials. It was subsequently used against Kurds in the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) trials in 2009. It continues to be used in various court cases today. It was this “secret witness” that was used by the authorities to bring charges of corruption and terrorism against Imamoglu. Mayors dismissed and replaced by power-appointed administrators (Kayyum) Our second term, kayyum, refers to the crucial figure of the “guardian”. In Turkey, it refers to a person appointed by a court or civil authority to manage property, particularly real estate, or an institution. This measure comes into play when the head of an institution is unable to perform his or her duties or is removed from office for reasons defined by law. The application of kayyum appointments to municipalities in Turkey was legalized by decree-law no. 674, published on September 1, 2016, during the state of emergency instituted after the attempted putsch of July 15, 2016. This decree gave the Ministry of the Interior the power to remove mayors accused of being linked to terrorist organizations and appoint administrators in their place. Following the adoption of this regulation, many municipalities, particularly those run by the pro-Kurdish HDP party, were placed under administrative guardianship. Since 2016, a total of 160 kayyum appointments have been made. Among the charges against Imamoglu is the existence of an electoral agreement, dubbed the “Urban Pact”, concluded with the HDP ahead of the 2024 municipal elections. Paradoxically, this accusation comes at a time when the government is conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, the historic leader of the PKK, with a view to disarming the Kurdish movement. At dawn on March 23, 2025, the judge ordered that Ekrem Imamoglu be remanded in custody on the charge of “corruption”, while the charge of “terrorism”, the only one that would allow the appointment of a kayyum in Istanbul, remained under discussion. Gezi Park: reminiscences of the 2013 mobilization Our third term is Gezi, which literally means “promenade”. It refers to a park in the heart of Istanbul, adjacent to Taksim Square, a mecca for political mobilization. The “Gezi movement” refers to a wave of protest that erupted in Turkey in May 2013 following an urban redevelopment project threatening this park, one of the few green spaces in central Istanbul. Initially led by environmentalists, the mobilization quickly turned into a vast protest movement against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accused of authoritarianism and increasing interference in public life, with the desire to demolish the park being equated with a desire to deprive the opposition of a traditional gathering place. The protest was violently repressed by the police, and Gezi became a symbol of democratic resistance in Turkey, marking a lasting rift between the authorities and a section of civil society. The current protests are reminiscent of this movement in certain respects, but this time the motivation is strictly political. The aim is to denounce, above all, the manipulation of democratic rules by those in power. The participation or otherwise of Kurdish circles in these events is not insignificant. Whereas in 2013, Kurds only mobilized individually, in the context of the peace process with the AKP, today, the pro-Kurdish DEM party (which replaced the HDP in 2023), could officially lend its support to the pro-Imamoglu rallies. With its former leader Selahattin Demirtas, behind bars since 2016, sentenced last year to 42 years in prison, and Öcalan himself recently calling for the PKK's self-dissolution, DEM's position is being closely scrutinized. If the Kurds, in an organized way, join the protests in favor of Ekrem Imamoglu, the new movement has a chance of succeeding. On the other hand, if, as in Gezi, Kurdish political organizations - first and foremost the DWS and PKK - are reluctant to interfere with the ongoing peace process with Ankara, then the disorganized youth will once again find themselves helpless in the face of tear gas. Of course, it's up to the CHP to lead the movement. But the militant experience of the Kurdish movement far exceeds that of the middle-class youth who support the CHP; too individualistic, insufficiently committed, these citizens have much to learn in terms of mobilization from the Kurds, who have been fighting for decades. Bad loser (Mızıkçılık) Translation: “Refusing defeat, changing the rules during the game and using bad faith to consolidate power.” In plain English, it's the sore loser who doesn't accept defeat even before being defeated! This term is widely used by demonstrators to refer to the AKP's behavior - behavior reminiscent of that of the same party almost ten years ago. After the June 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey, the AKP had lost its absolute majority, but violence provoked by both the PKK and military forces, notably linked to the Kurdish question, had disrupted the political process. This situation had created a climate of insecurity and instability, leading to early elections in November 2015; these would enable the AKP to regain an absolute majority, strengthening Recep Tayyip Erdogan's position. Today, this tactic can be applied again to remove a potential opponent before the next elections. A new element has been added to this complex picture: the solidarity with Imamoglu shown by many Western mayors, who publicly denounce the attack on democratic principles and respect for the rule of law in Turkey. But could this support be manipulated by the Turkish government for propaganda purposes? In a climate where every gesture of international support is scrutinized, it is clear that this solidarity could be misused to reinforce the image of an isolated country, or to distract attention from the real domestic issues at stake. Ultimately, the situation in Turkey remains extremely fragile. In Istanbul, a metropolis of over 15 million inhabitants, the gamble of neutralizing a political opponent of this caliber entails considerable risks, especially in a context where youth and academics are mobilizing with vigor. Marked by unpredictable reversals, Turkey's trajectory leaves open the possibility that popular resistance will eventually force the government to back down, allowing Imamoglu to retain a promising political future beyond his current goals. But we said the same for Selahattin Demitas, who has been in prison for almost... ten years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The plans of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel can only weaken the Hebrew State's last regional allies. The expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza -which the breakdown of the truce by Israeli forces on 17 March is intended to provoke- could lead, by a domino effect, to the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt, while the annexation of the West Bank could have the same consequences in Jordan. The warmongering policy of the Netanyahu government has profoundly altered the strategic balance of power in the Middle East in favour of the Jewish state. Operation ‘Iron Swords’ in Gaza has considerably reduced the military capabilities of Hamas, which is said to have lost between 15,000 and 20,000 men and almost all its leaders. Hezbollah, decapitated, deprived of thousands of fighters and of its anchorage points south of the Litani river, is no longer able to maintain a sufficient threat to dissuade Israel from directly attacking its Iranian sponsor. And the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad's regime has completed the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’. Against this backdrop of a reversal of the strategic balance of power totally in Israel's favour, the Netanyahu government, spurred on by its radical wing embodied by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, could consider ‘settling’ the Palestinian question once and for all. To do so, he would have to continue the process of colonising the West Bank and force the Palestinians to abandon the Gaza Strip, in line with Donald Trump's announcements. Assured of the support of the White House, with no regional adversaries capable of standing up to him militarily, Netanyahu could, driven by a certain hubris, lay the foundations for the realisation of a ‘Greater Israel’ extended to Gaza and the biblical ‘Judea-Samaria’, that is the West Bank. Nevertheless, this apparently beneficial dynamic for Israel could, in the medium and long term, position the Hebrew State in a strategic impasse, seriously compromising its security and its chances of building a lasting peace with its neighbours. The resumption of the colonisation process in the West Bank has two very dangerous consequences for Israel: the rise of Hamas in the West Bank and a total discrediting of the Palestinian Authority set up after the 1993 Oslo agreements. Since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, demonstrations against the Palestinian Authority have become such a common occurrence that the regime of Mahmoud Abbas can only hold on to power at the cost of increasingly violent repression. In this context, it is hard to see what could prevent Hamas from taking power in the West Bank, which would open up a new front and a colossal new security challenge for Tsahal. The creation of a ‘Greater Israel’, over and above the legal and moral issues it would raise, seems all the more dangerous for the security of the Israeli state as it would weaken two neighbouring regimes which, until now, have contributed as much as possible to regional stability: Jordan and Egypt. The weakening of Jordan's indispensable partner In addition to weakening the Palestinian Authority, i.e. its only Palestinian partner and interlocutor, Israel's policy of relaunching the colonisation of the West Bank could cause a political earthquake in Tel Aviv's other partner: Jordan. The Hashemite kingdom, where almost 60% of the population is descended from Palestinians who fled the Nakba in 1948-1949 and the Israeli conquests after the Six-Day War in 1967, has been living with the rhythm of pro-Palestinian riots since Since 7 October 2023, Jordan has been evolving in sync with pro-Palestinian riots, which express the solidarity of the Jordanian street with the Palestinians, but also echo a sharp criticism of King Adballah's policy of rapprochement with the Jewish state since the Wadi Araba agreements signed by his father Hussein with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994. In fact, Jordan plays an active role in Israel's security by fighting terrorism and the establishment of Hamas in the refugee camps of Zarqa, Baqa, Jabal Al Hussein and Jerach. It also plays a fundamental strategic role in opposing Iran: Iranian missiles and drones all flew over Jordanian skies during the major attack carried out by Iran in April 2024, and Jordanian anti-aircraft defences helped to thwart the Iranian attack. This strategic position between Israel and the Persian Gulf via southern Iraq explains in particular the installation of Western bases such as Azraq, where European (French and German in particular) and American aircraft and air defence equipment are stationed. In the event of a massive Israeli air offensive against Iran's nuclear programme, Jordanian airspace would play an essential role, as it would be an obligatory route for Israeli aircraft on their way to Iran. However, Likud's policy continues to undermine this precious ally for Israel, by strengthening the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition force to the Hashemite monarchy. Organised around the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood movement is tolerated by the authorities and has achieved impressive electoral success: after the legislative elections in September 2024, the IAF became the main political force in the Jordanian parliament, winning 31 seats out of 138. This success is all the more spectacular given that the Jordanian electoral system only allows list voting at national level to fill 38 seats, the other 100 being reserved for local notables loyal to the regime and allocated via ballots organised in constituencies where the parties are not represented. The result of last September's Jordanian elections was therefore a veritable tidal wave for the Brotherhood. This phenomenon is essentially explained by the mobilisation of the electorate around the theme of support for Gaza, of which the numerous demonstrations that have shaken Jordan are another symptom. In this context, what would be the consequences for the Hashemite kingdom of stepping up settlement on the West Bank? The massive influx of Palestinian refugees would obviously strengthen the FIA, which is particularly well rooted in the Palestinian diaspora. This situation is all the more explosive in that the descendants of Palestinian refugees, despite having been granted Jordanian nationality, act as a veritable diaspora and refuse to cut ties with their country of origin. The very spectacular demonstrations that took place in the country during the last two weeks of April 2024 are the most recent proof of this. In order to condemn Jordan's aid to Israel in its war against Iran and to express their solidarity with Hamas and the ‘axis of resistance’, Jordanians of Palestinian origin are mobilising in Hiraks, youth movements that have emerged in the post-Arab Spring context, condemning the monarchy's ‘compromises’ with Israel as much as rising prices and unemployment. In this context, the King of Jordan finds himself forced to make his security partnerships with Israel invisible or even to reduce them, and could eventually withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba agreements, for fear of seeing social unrest rise and the Muslim Brotherhood inexorably gain in popularity. In the long term, the demographic and political rise of the Palestinian opposition to the Hashemite monarchy threatens the latter's vital prognosis and therefore Israel's security. The return of the Muslim Brotherhood to Egypt and the risk of the collapse of the Al-Sissi regime A similar reasoning can be applied to Egypt, where Marshal Al-Sissi's regime, in place since 2013, would not emerge unscathed from a massive influx of Palestinians from Gaza. The implementation of the Trump plan and the displacement of the two million Gazans in Egypt would considerably strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood in a country where it already holds a majority in public opinion, as demonstrated by the success of Mohamed Morsi in the 2012 elections, and has remained so despite the severe repression it has been the target of since then. By participating in the displacement of Gazans, the regime in Cairo would see itself accused by public opinion of participating in the Israeli colonisation of Gaza, which would lead to a reflex of solidarity on the part of the Egyptian street towards the Palestinians that the Egyptian military regime might not survive. As in Jordan, if Trump's plan for Gaza were to come to fruition, it is hard to see what could stop the Muslim Brotherhood from taking power in Egypt, even if it is currently operating clandestinely and organising itself primarily from abroad (Turkey and Qatar). However, calling into question the 1979 Camp David agreements and the total remilitarisation of the Sinai are undoubtedly the first measures that would be taken by a government aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose anti-Zionism is one of its main guiding principles. In addition to this security disaster for its southern border, Israel would see a new axis of resistance forming around it which, unlike the one currently led by Iran, would be Sunni, more rooted in regional nationalism and would bring together the major powers allied to the Muslim Brotherhood: Turkey, Qatar and HTC's Syria. In this hypothetical context, Israel would be surrounded by enemy states and its survival would once again be threatened, as was the case in the early 1960s before the Six-Day War of 1967. The Trump plan would accentuate the spectacular gap between, on the one hand, an Arab street that is very hostile to the normalisation of relations with Israel and anxious to defend the Palestinian ‘Dar Al Islam’ and, on the other hand, Arab regimes that have become partners or even allies of Israel. The inconsistencies of Trump's Middle East policy should be noted here: on the one hand, he intends to bring Israel closer to its Arab neighbours by extending the Abraham Accords of 2020 (which enabled the normalisation of relations between Israel on the one hand and Morocco, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Sudan on the other), while at the same time nurturing the breeding ground for insurrection on which the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is developing. Ultimately, implementing the Trump plan would have disastrous consequences for Israel: turning the streets of Arab countries against their respective governments in a confrontation that could lead to a new Arab Spring under the banner of anti-Zionism. In this respect, it is interesting to note that this scenario had already been anticipated by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the theorist of Al-Qaeda, at the time of the second intifada : “The opportunity for the jihadist movement to lead the ummah in the jihad for Palestine is greater than ever, because all the secular currents which were outbidding the Palestinian cause and competing with the Islamic movement for the leadership of the ummah in this cause have discovered themselves, in the eyes of the ummah, by recognising Israel's right to exist, engaging in talks and complying with international decisions to liberate what remains of Palestinian territory - or what Israel is willing to give up (the only difference being the amount of crumbs Israel will leave to Muslims and Arabs).” Trump and Netanyahu's plans: a disaster for Israel In conclusion, Trump's and Netanyahu's ‘plans’ for Gaza and the West Bank are not just a breach of international law and do not just raise a moral debate. First and foremost, they appear to be a strategic aberration that could very quickly backfire like a boomerang on the Jewish state. The definitive abandonment by Likud and its extremist allies of the two-state solution, and the resumption of the settlement process in the West Bank and possibly Gaza, are undermining Israel's Arab partners. They put an end to the process of normalisation pursued by Israel towards its neighbours since the Camp David agreements with Egypt in 1979 and could ultimately lead to a return to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the destruction of the Jordanian monarchy, two partners essential to Israel's security. This new anti-Zionist coalition led by the Muslim Brotherhood would be far more dangerous for Israel than the current Iranian-led resistance front. Unlike the Ayatollahs' regime, this new axis of resistance could strike Israel without using proxies, and maintain a climate of permanent insecurity on Israel's borders by hosting the rear bases of terrorist groups or militias fighting the Jewish state on its territory. The dream of a ‘Greater Israel’ remains an ideological chimera in which the security of the Israeli state could be the main victim in the long term.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A series of rapid domestic political changes in Lebanon has disrupted the established balance of power, creating a foundation for a reassessment of the positions of key players. Amid a pause in regional escalation, the debate on the decline of Hezbollah’s influence — long the dominant military and political force in the country, has become a topic in numerous publications. However, there is no consensus on the group's future: some experts predict its complete disappearance, while others, on the contrary, believe that the current conditions will serve as a catalyst for its restructuring. A sober view of what Hezbollah represents today seems more important than ever. Since the election of Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon and the subsequent appointment of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister, Lebanese politics has continued to undergo changes that are shaping its new landscape. The intensification of diplomatic contacts, escalating tensions in the border region, and unexpected administrative decisions — all these factors reflect the search for a renewed equilibrium that aligns with contemporary realities. Weakened by war and political shifts, Hezbollah finds itself at the center of these transformational processes. Hezbollah's Pyrrhic Victory With the end of active military operations in November 2024, the question arose regarding the extent of the damage suffered by the Shiite group. Despite all the statements by the organization's Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, about a "great victory" over the Zionist enemy, the pathos of his rhetoric is significantly devalued when confronted with the stark reality. In fact, the transition of Hezbollah’s current leader to this position from his long-held role as Deputy Secretary-General — a position he occupied for over 30 years under Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah — is directly linked to a key consequence of the war: significant losses within the organization’s ranks. One of the most devastating blows to the group was the physical elimination of the majority of its leadership. Since Hezbollah’s involvement in supporting Hamas's "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation, key figures within the organization have been consistently targeted and killed. Among them were prominent Radwan Unit commander Wissam Tawil, the heads of the Nasr and Aziz special units Talib Abdallah and Mohammed Nasser, as well as the overseer of Hezbollah’s rocket program and chief military advisor to the Secretary-General, Fuad Shukr. Additionally, Ibrahim Aqil, a member of the Jihad Council, Hezbollah’s main military body, was also eliminated. The most shocking event, however, was the death of Hezbollah's longtime leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, following an Israeli strike on Dahiyeh, the southern suburb of Beirut. The attack also claimed the lives of another Jihad Council member, Ali Karaki, and General Abbas Nilforoushan, a commander of Iran’s Quds Force. Hezbollah supporters would likely have reacted with even greater dismay to the elimination of Hashem Safi al-Din, the head of the group's Executive Council [1]. This is because the Shura Council, Hezbollah's main administrative body, is required to elect two Secretary-Generals every three years — one acting and the other "reserve". This procedure was established in the 1990s after the assassination of Hezbollah’s second leader, Abbas Musawi, to prevent internal discord and confusion in the event of a sudden elimination of the Secretary-General. Hashem Safi al-Din was precisely such a designated successor, yet due to his untimely death, he never had the opportunity to enact this contingency mechanism. The losses suffered by the Shiite group, of course, were not limited to its senior command. Before the launch of Israel’s Operation Northern Arrows, the number of Hezbollah casualties among rank-and-file members was estimated at around 400–500 fighters. However, by the end of the Third Lebanon War, Arab and Israeli sources reported that this number had risen to 3,000–4,000, accounting for approximately 6–8% of the organization's 50,000-strong force (as estimated by the U.S. Congress). This figure does not even include a significant number of non-fatal combat casualties — those wounded and rendered incapable of further service. It is also important to note that the number of casualties continues to rise even after the ceasefire agreement came into effect, as Israel’s interpretation of the agreement grants it "full military freedom of action" against Hezbollah. The Israeli military continues to carry out air and missile strikes on any targets suspected of harboring Hezbollah members or being linked to the group. By the end of December 2024, the number of ceasefire violations had already exceeded 300 cases. The "Blue Helmets" (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL) peacekeeping mission in Lebanon has expressed concern over Israel’s actions. Another crucial aspect of Hezbollah’s post-war situation is the state of its missile arsenal, which posed the primary threat to Israel. As of March 2024, the group was estimated to possess between 100,000 and 200,000 missiles, the majority of which were short-range rockets. According to U.S. and Israeli assessments, Hezbollah’s remaining arsenal now constitutes between 20% and 50% of its pre-war stockpile. However, independent analysts tend to agree only with the upper limit of this estimate. Thus, it becomes almost indisputable that the events of the Third Lebanon War have dealt a significant blow to Hezbollah. The hopes of its supporters for a swift and miraculous recovery are unlikely to materialize. Given the deteriorating geopolitical environment and growing internal pressure on Hezbollah within Lebanon, it remains unclear where the organization will find the resources for its restoration. At the same time, it would be premature to write off the Shiite group entirely. Even Israeli media acknowledge this, publishing bold headlines stating that Hezbollah has not been defeated. The most valuable asset of any political organization is its people, and in this regard, Hezbollah still holds strong advantages. Among objective Lebanese analysts, there is a consensus that support for Hezbollah within the Shiite community remains consistently high. Some even argue that its position has strengthened. Faced with widespread dissatisfaction with the group outside its sectarian base and increasing external pressure on Lebanon, Shiites fear becoming scapegoats. The fear of collective punishment is pushing them to rally around their traditional leadership, as they recognize that they are all in the same boat. Today, the ball is in Hezbollah’s court. The group must act with the utmost responsibility and precision to justify the trust of its supporters. A key focus of this strategy will be its cooperation with the new government, where Hezbollah and its allies, notably, still hold a significant position. The New Cabinet: Remembering Siniora or Bring Back My 2005 On Saturday, February 8, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced the completion of the formation of a new national government, calling it a "government of reform and salvation". The process took 26 days, which, for the country's political history in the 21st century, is almost a record. The only time a cabinet was formed faster was in 2005, when Prime Minister Fouad Siniora assembled his government in 19 days amid nationwide mobilization following the Cedar Revolution [2]. This rapid pace is, in fact, a testament to the critical state of Lebanon, whose governmental and bureaucratic system only begins to "wheeze into action" when it is just steps away from plunging into the abyss. The cabinet has been deliberately composed of 24 figures who are formally unaffiliated with political parties [3] and do not intend to participate in future elections. According to the prime minister's vision, this approach is meant to reduce political friction within the government and ensure its effective functioning. Instead of engaging in Lebanon’s traditional positional party politics, ministers are expected to focus solely on their respective portfolios. However, the consultation process between the prime minister and political forces somewhat dilutes the effectiveness of this strategy. Powerful parties still have a significant influence over appointments due to the requirement for parliamentary approval of the cabinet. Nevertheless, the composition of the new government has been strongly influenced by the personal vision of reform-minded President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam — an unusual situation for Lebanon. Ten ministerial candidates were directly nominated by this top-level tandem, while another twelve were backed by political forces [4]. Despite widespread predictions of doom, the Hezbollah-Amal duo — often referred to as the "Shiite duo" — secured four trusted representatives in the government, two from each organization. Another Shiite quota, assigned to the Minister of State for Administrative Development, became a compromise between the Prime Minister and Speaker Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal. However, in the final assessment, this was still framed as a "non-partisan" appointment made on behalf of the head of government. Thus, the configuration of Shiite ministers in the new cabinet clearly demonstrated the practical inevitability of Hezbollah and Amal’s continued influence. The political weight of the "Shiite duo" simply did not allow the Prime Minister to significantly limit their representation in the highest executive body, even though it seems that Nawaf Salam himself is at least somewhat interested in weakening Hezbollah and Amal’s positions. Furthermore, Amal managed to retain its long-standing monopoly over the Ministry of Finance, which was given to former MP Yassine Jaber, a member of the movement. This appointment was preceded by intense speculation, as the Finance Minister holds the second most powerful position in government after the Prime Minister. Any governmental decision that requires budgetary allocations must be signed off by the Finance Minister, meaning that the lack of approval could effectively block any government initiative. Although Jaber was quick to assure that he would not abuse his position, it is clear that President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, who are oriented toward the West and the Gulf monarchies, are unlikely to be pleased that a key tool for obstructing government operations remains in the hands of figures close to pro-Iranian Hezbollah. At the same time, it appears that in exchange for this “veto” power, another mechanism of obstruction for the Shiite duo has been neutralized — the current cabinet includes a Shiite minister who is not directly dependent on the will of Hezbollah and Amal. This means that if the four representatives of the duo decide to withdraw from the government in an attempt to delegitimize it, the Minister of State for Administrative Development, Fadi Makki, will remain in office. As a result, the argument about the lack of Shiite representation — and therefore the alleged illegitimacy of the cabinet — would become irrelevant. This move by the country’s leadership was not merely a symbolic concession — it is rooted in historical precedents. During the tenure of Fouad Siniora’s government (2005–2009), Hezbollah and Amal effectively withdrew [5] all five Shiite ministers from the cabinet, arguing that the government had become unrepresentative due to the absence of Shiite figures. At that time, Hezbollah and its allies demanded the formation of a national unity government in which the opposition — meaning themselves — would hold a so-called "blocking third". Government decisions in Lebanon require a two-thirds majority, meaning that a political force controlling at least one-third of the cabinet plus one minister has the power to veto decisions and, if necessary, bring down the government. The crisis peaked in 2008, leading to violent clashes between Hezbollah and pro-government forces, which resulted in over 100 casualties. The conflict was eventually resolved, but it remains a cautionary precedent in Lebanese politics. Since then, and until the formation of the current cabinet, every Lebanese government has had one political alliance that held the coveted "blocking third", effectively giving it the ability to stall the cabinet's work. This dynamic is precisely why Lebanon has experienced four governmental crises since 2009. Against this backdrop, Nawaf Salam’s decision to eliminate this risk in the new cabinet appears prudent, as it significantly reduces the chances of yet another executive power collapse. Meanwhile, the Minister of Finance remains a trump card in the hands of Nabih Berri, a highly skilled political tactician. It will only be played if the stakes become too high and the current political arrangement starts leading toward defeat. The Shiite duo is not in a position to oppose the government without cause, but it still has the leverage to defend its core interests when necessary. At the same time, the Shiite duo’s main domestic political opponents — the Lebanese Forces (LF) and Kataeb Party — secured a total of five ministerial portfolios. Additionally, two seats in the government went to candidates from the traditionally Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which has a long history of political maneuvering in pursuit of the best outcome for its community. Its de facto leader, Walid Jumblatt, has alternated between criticizing Hezbollah and aligning with it, depending on the political climate. Another ministerial position was assigned to Noura Bayrakdarian, a representative of the Lebanese branch of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) "Dashnaktsutyun". The Dashnaks have long been junior partners in the March 8 Alliance [6] and have maintained close ties with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Notably, for the first time in two decades, the FPM failed to secure a single cabinet appointment — a situation last seen during Fouad Siniora’s government. A particularly symbolic shift occurred with the Ministry of Energy, a traditional stronghold of the FPM, which was handed over to the Lebanese Forces (LF). The decoupling of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) from Hezbollah, which we previously discussed, largely predetermined the Shiite bloc’s isolation in the new government — this is the first time they are in the cabinet without a strong Christian ally (the Marada Movement has also been left "overboard"). Following the cabinet’s approval, FPM leader Gebran Bassil expressed willingness to work constructively in opposition, yet at the same time, he voiced serious dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister’s actions. According to Bassil, Nawaf Salam granted greater influence over the cabinet’s composition to Shiite and Druze forces, at the expense of Christian and Sunni interests. His discontent over FPM’s exclusion from the government was further evident during the parliamentary confidence vote. During the session, Gebran Bassil accused the Prime Minister of reneging on commitments made during consultations over his appointment. As a result, the FPM faction refused to support a vote of confidence in Nawaf Salam’s government, stating that the Prime Minister "did not deserve it". However, the parliamentary confidence vote left Gebran Bassil and his Strong Lebanon bloc in the minority. The ministerial statement delivered by the Prime Minister focused on the same priorities outlined in President Joseph Aoun’s inaugural speech: restoring the rule of law and sovereignty, reforming institutions, and committing to the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. The declaration contained at least two clear warning signals directed at Hezbollah. Nawaf Salam reaffirmed the government’s stance that only the state should have the authority to decide on matters of war and peace and hold a monopoly on the use of weapons. Regarding judicial independence, the declaration stressed the urgent need to shield the judiciary from interference and pressure, particularly in relation to the investigation of the Beirut port explosion. This was an explicit reference to the fact that the "Shiite duo" has been obstructing the work of Judge Tarek Bitar, who, in the course of his investigation, attempted to summon high-ranking members of the Amal Movement for questioning. In his speech, Mohammed Raad, the leader of Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, while offering a few policy recommendations, refrained from harsh criticism of the government and expressed the faction’s trust in it. Other MPs' speeches reflected cautious optimism toward the government's agenda, frequently emphasizing that their support was conditional and could only be justified by concrete steps toward promised reforms. Common ground for the speeches were calls to resolve the problems of depositors and the entire banking sector, to conduct electoral reform and future elections on time, and to economically revitalize depressed areas. The two most popular appeals turned out to be issues that opposing forces usually raise on their banners - the need to put an end to the Israeli occupation and to hand over all weapons to the state. Ultimately, 95 MPs voted to vote in confidence in the cabinet, 12 voted against it and 4 abstained from voting. Overall, the new Lebanese government appears to be, at the very least, an extremely interesting and therefore promising structure. Attention is drawn both to the stylistic aspects – the high representation of women and people with an academic background – and to the formal ones – the absence of a blocking third and the large number of ministers appointed by a tandem of senior officials. All this creates the impression of a very balanced and well-composed cabinet, which is likely to be largely capable of coping with the ambitious tasks of restructuring the country. At the same time, the cabinet in its current form will exist only until the parliamentary elections in May 2026, when the updated balance of power will be established. In this regard, the little over a year that the cabinet has seems to be a period that is insufficient to achieve all the goals set, but suitable for starting the flywheel of change. And despite the fact that Hezbollah and the new Lebanese leadership, represented by the president and prime minister, do not find understanding on all issues, there is something that unites them - to put it mildly, a cool attitude towards Israel. However, on this front, as it turns out, everything is not going as smoothly as we would like. Retreating "Israeli-Style": The IDF Bids Farewell, But Doesn’t Quite Leave… The ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel officially expired on February 18, by which time the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were expected to fully withdraw from Lebanese territory. However, few anticipated that the process would proceed without surprises, given reports of Israel’s interest in extending the agreement once again. Indeed, just one day before the deadline, Israeli military officials announced that, as a temporary measure, the army would maintain its presence on five strategic heights. The United States, as the leading party in the ceasefire monitoring committee established by the agreement, was quick to support this move. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s entire political leadership — including the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament — continues to insist on the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. Israel's strategy in the Lebanese direction remains in the logic of tough and uncompromising suppression of security threats. In reality, the "delay" of Israeli troops and the continuation of strikes devalue the entire meaning of the established agreements, giving one of the parties a "legal" opportunity to violate them. In turn, in response, the Israelis insist that Hezbollah is violating its obligations to care for the Litani River. Some experts suggest that the five strongholds in southern Lebanon will become objects of long-term occupation. Control over the hilly terrain along the perimeter of the Israeli border deep in Lebanese territory should obviously create a certain buffer zone, which in theory will secure the borders of the Jewish state. However, if the IDF does not plan to linger on Lebanese soil, it is not very clear until what point its military presence is necessary. In accordance with the agreements, this territory is taken under control by units of the Lebanese Armed Forces, which do not pose any threat to Israel. Moreover, the sincerity of statements about the temporary nature of such measures also calls into question the fact that the land component of the cross-border tensions between Hezbollah and Israel has never been the main cause for concern. The main threat has always come from the missile potential of the Shiite group. In his recent statement, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem predictably demanded a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory after October 18 and called on the government to pursue this without compromise. At the same time, he did not disclose what specific actions would be otherwise, but noted that “everyone knows how to deal with occupation.” The restrained tone of his remarks (albeit against the backdrop of the usual anti-Israeli rhetoric) and the lack of any particular threats in the words of the organization’s leader in the language of Hezbollah can be considered cautious statements. Without a doubt, the group at this stage does not have the resources to actively oppose Israel: deliberately going into confrontation today is the same as throwing a slingshot at a tank. Moreover, escalation puts at risk the predominantly Shiite population of southern Lebanon, which is a key component of the organization’s supporters and has already become refugees. The Waning Influence of Hezbollah In addition to the challenges of de-occupation of Lebanese territory, both domestic and foreign policy developments in recent months have been marked by other significant events. All of them point to a certain reconfiguration of Lebanon’s political landscape — one that, more often than not, appears to be unfavorable for Hezbollah. The expected shift is taking place in the system of foreign relations - preconditions for strengthening American-Saudi influence are emerging, namely, the name of the recently elected president of the country was associated with the protection of Washington and Riyadh. Thus, it is this alliance (but, above all, the Saudis) that has for many years acted as a counterweight to Iranian influence on Lebanon, the main conductor of which is Hezbollah. In January, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, visited Beirut for the first time in 15 years. He expressed support for the president and the prime minister in their course for reform. A few weeks later, the example of her Saudi colleague was followed by the deputy special representative of the US president for the Middle East, Morgan Orgatus. However, her visit caused much more noise: from indignation over a ring in the form of the Star of David at a meeting with the Lebanese president to an audience with an ally of Hezbollah, the speaker Nabih Berri, who during the conversation called Israel "absolute evil". It is curious that the American envoy's visit took place on the eve of the announcement of the cabinet composition. In this regard, her statements that «Hezbollah should not be part of this government in any form» did not go unnoticed, especially after the list of ministers was made public. Another big event was the announcement that Lebanon had a “future” again. Saad Hariri, the longtime leader of the Mustaqbal (Arabic for “future”) movement and former prime minister, announced his return to politics after a three-year hiatus on the twentieth anniversary of the assassination of his father, also Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Before the 2022 parliamentary elections, he announced that he would not participate in them and effectively dissolved his movement. This step left the Sunni forces fragmented (and therefore weak), and the Sunni part of Lebanese politics was left without a clear leader at the helm. This happened because Mustaqbal had long dominated this segment of society, and now Saad Hariri found the best opportunity to make a political comeback. His return to politics can also be seen as an additional factor in the growth of Saudi influence, since he himself is a native of Riyadh and a subject of the kingdom. His ties to the Al Saud family, which go back to his father, have never been a secret, but after the incident in 2017 [7], the relationship has been going through hard times. He also has certain connections to the Emirati elite, in particular to Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Finally, the most important news of recent weeks is the government-initiated ban on Iranian civilian aircraft landing in Lebanon, and in particular at Beirut's Rafik Hariri International Airport. After one of the Iranian airliners was denied landing, Hezbollah supporters began protests and blocked the road to the only international airport in the country. The government's extension of this measure, first until February 18, and now indefinitely, is due to information published by the IDF that Iran is sending funds to Hezbollah via aircraft. In his statement following the events, Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem did not vigorously attack the country's leadership, noting that the decision was made under the threat of an Israeli «strike on the runway» if the Iranian plane landed. At the same time, he criticized the government's position, which assumes compliance with Israeli orders. This development once again demonstrates the waning power of Hezbollah and reveals how tense the situation is in Lebanon. *** The recent public funeral of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, as a symbol of the end of an era, involuntarily becomes the leitmotif of complex internal Lebanese processes. The flight of Israeli fighters over the funeral procession of many thousands and the absence of the president and prime minister, despite the invitation, make comments unnecessary. At present, in the words of the funeral speech of Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem, the time has come for “state responsibility” — Hezbollah is deliberately giving way to the proscenium (but not leaving), realizing the sensitivity of the moment and its own difficulties. And although today it seems that the new reality has already been formed, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that this transition is still far from complete. Most likely, a somewhat predictable situation (if this is applicable to Lebanon at all) will be achieved only after the parliamentary elections in 2026. The path to them in the next year or so will be no less important, but electoral cycles often tend to present surprises. For now, Hezbollah's chosen line of minimizing conflict and a reasonable, but sometimes unyielding, conversation with the new government seems balanced. Three aspects will be key factors at this time that can determine Hezbollah's future. First, the degree of consolidation of the Shiite population around the organization. The extent to which the leadership manages its resources in relation to people is the extent to which the group will remain firmly on its feet. As after the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah (through its institutions such as Jihad al-Binaa [8]) is engaged in the reconstruction of housing in the affected areas and the payment of targeted compensation (rent). However, this campaign is already facing financial difficulties, despite the tens of millions of dollars spent, since the organization relies almost exclusively on Iran. In this and other dimensions, Tehran's position in the medium term is also critical. Second, the topic of Hezbollah's disarmament will acquire particular importance in the foreseeable future. This problem has already been outlined by the country's top leadership on several occasions, and has also been mentioned in the government's declaration to parliament and supported by a considerable number of deputies in their speeches thereafter. It is becoming clear that such statements are not a bluff, they are for the benefit of Lebanon's international image, but it is not yet at all obvious how this process can be set in motion without clashes within the country. The requisition of weapons from Hezbollah will mean a radical change in the ontological foundations of the group's existence. Strictly speaking, it will no longer be Hezbollah, but something else. The last defining aspect, certainly related to everything outlined earlier, is Israel's behavior. Its escalation will catalyze two mutually directed processes - the government will increasingly put pressure on Hezbollah with the goal of pacifying it or even disarming it, while the group itself will be less and less willing to do so. At the same time, the scenario in which the Israelis manage to completely defeat Hezbollah seems as unrealistic as the idea that Israel will soon abandon its assertive (if not aggressive) policy of suppressing security threats. In this regard, the development of the situation in the Washington-Tehran-Tel Aviv triangle will, for obvious reasons, continue to be relevant for Lebanon and Hezbollah. It is still too early to see Hezbollah as a dying swan. At this stage, the organization stands at a crossroads, where the choice of path carries significant consequences. Only time will tell whether the new leadership can make the right decisions, rebuild the organization's structure, and improve its internal Lebanese relations. The current state of international politics, with its unexpected twists and sudden outcomes, suggests that Hezbollah should rather be viewed as a black swan.  1. The Executive Council is one of the five main bodies of Hezbollah, responsible for the non-military and non-political development of the group (education, social support, medical care, media support, etc.). 2. The Cedar Revolution is a series of popular protests after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, centered around the Syrian military presence in Lebanon (both condemning and supporting it). As a result of the protests, Syrian troops were withdrawn from the country after 30 years on Lebanese soil. 3. According to the Lebanese newspaper L’Orient-Le Jour, the Minister of Youth and Sports Nura Bayrakdaryan is an active member of the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun party, however, according to the prime minister’s inaugural statements, the cabinet does not have any ministers who are party members. 4. There are 24 ministers in the government, including the prime minister and deputy prime minister, respectively, the remaining 22 ministers are responsible for their respective areas. 5. The ministers stopped participating in the government's work and submitted their resignations, which, however, were not accepted by the prime minister. 6. The pro-Syrian (and/or pro-Iranian) parliamentary bloc that emerged as a result of the Cedar Revolution of 2005 was formed on the basis of three major political forces: Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, as well as their junior partners. 7. In November 2017, while serving as the prime minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri was effectively detained in Saudi Arabia. He then went on television to announce his resignation and condemn Hezbollah and Iranian influence in the country. The situation was later resolved and the prime minister was released. 8. Jihad al-Binaa is an organization within Hezbollah that is involved in the construction of infrastructure and the construction (reconstruction) of buildings.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/