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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Erdogan’s Turkey could not only, once again , become a mediator in Venezuela and push for a solution. It could also become a safe haven for an exiled Maduro As Nicolás Maduro loses support domestically and among regional allies, he may be inclined to accept a deal or amnesty to secure a future away from the uncertainty in Venezuela. The opposition pledged not to seek “revenge” or to persecute members of Maduro’s administration. However, without his grip on power, Maduro may not feel safe in Venezuela – even with an amnesty. Recently, The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. had explored all options in secret negotiations, including offering Maduro an amnesty from drug-trafficking charges in exchange for him stepping down. The President of Panama, José Raúl Mulino, proposed facilitating Maduro’s safe transit through Panama to a third country so that he could leave office peacefully. But, at this point, Turkey could emerge as a potential refuge if he decides to leave power. Since 2016, Turkey has become a key strategic partner for the Maduro regime, joining countries like China, Russia, Iran, and India. This relationship has been bolstered by frequent visits from Maduro and public support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Although Erdogan has not officially congratulated Maduro yet following the contested election, he was among the few leaders to speak with him afterward. During their call, Erdogan praised the Venezuelan people for a peaceful election and invited Maduro to Turkey soon to further advance bilateral projects. Pro-government Turkish media quickly picked up the news, highlighting that Maduro will soon be visiting Turkey. If he leaves power and moves abroad, Maduro is likely to prefer an autocratic destination like Turkey over a democratic one. His strong ties to Turkey and comfort with Erdoğan are quite evident. Maduro has officially visited Turkey more than any other country in the past seven years, frequently praising its culture and becoming a fan of Turkish TV shows. His connection to Turkey gained further attention when a viral video showed him and his family dining at an upscale Istanbul steakhouse during a 2018 visit, which sparked outrage in crisis-hit Venezuela at the time. Additionally, Maduro is quite popular among the Turkish public. During his legitimacy crisis in January 2019, Turkish citizens showed strong support on social media with hashtags like “#WeAreMaduro” and “#WeWontLetThemTakeMaduroDown.” His firm stance on the Palestine issue particularly resonated with the Turkish people, and some even prayed for his conversion to Islam. Financially, Turkey could be Maduro’s best option. There are several allegations that Maduro may have hidden wealth in Turkey. The Venezuelan government’s big volume of transfer of gold to Turkey in exchange for food supplies is well-documented. While Venezuelan officials claimed the gold would be returned once refined, it never came back and is suspected to be held in Turkish banks. The U.S. authorities have highlighted several corruption scandals involving shell companies in Turkey linked to the gold for food program. Turkey’s financial system has already faced scrutiny for money laundering, and in 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed Turkey on its gray list due to concerns about money laundering and terrorist financing. Additionally, Turkey has a history of granting residency to individuals with international criminal warrants. Through its “golden passport” program, Turkey offers citizenship to those who can afford it, providing a haven for international criminals. Given these factors, Maduro and his associates might see Turkey as a viable option for securing both their financial freedom and safety. Legally, Maduro might worry that while Washington could drop its charges against him, it can’t prevent an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) into his regime’s human rights abuses. Turkey’s non-membership in the ICC could offer Maduro a sense of security from such potential charges. While Turkey signed the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC, it has not ratified it and is thus not bound by the court’s rulings. For instance, Turkey ignored an ICC request to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who attended an Istanbul summit in 2017 despite facing genocide and war crimes charges. Under Erdoğan’s government, Turkey’s relatively lenient stance on legal issues could provide a safe haven for Maduro and his associates seeking to escape international scrutiny. As the Biden administration pushes Brazilian President Lula to persuade Maduro to step down and facilitate a transition, Turkey could emerge as an attractive asylum option for him. Ankara has previously attempted to mediate between Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition, but those efforts stalled due to the opposition’s internal conflicts. Recently, Maria Corina Machado asked Turkey to play a role in resolving Venezuela’s presidential crisis. The Venezuelan opposition might convince Turkey to support a transitional government by promising to safeguard Turkish investments in the post-Maduro era. Erdoğan’s Turkey, eager to enhance its international reputation as a mediator after its attempts in the Ukraine, Gaza and Ethiopia conflicts, would likely be interested in re-engaging and playing a role in Venezuela’s negotiations. This presents a unique chance to negotiate Maduro’s exit and prevent Venezuela from descending into a worse political conflict.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Let's imagine for a moment that any given day, in the evening hours, an upset (even unbalanced) person were to stop his car in front of the least protected and safest U.S. Embassy in the world, the one on Havana's Malecon, and open fire on the venue until his automatic rifle ran out of bullets. Let's continue imagining that the Cuban authorities, parsimonious and self-important, caught the offender and four years passed without a word on what had happened. Then one fine day, the Granma newspaper announces that the terrorist had been acquitted for alleged insanity at the time of the act and that it had taken them four long years to figure it out. Could anyone foresee what the reaction of the United States would be? Obviously, this story is fictional; it does not coincide with reality. What is contradictory - and even laughable- is that the United States lists Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism”, for a second time, as of January 2020. At this very minute that is the first and highest barrier that prevents our countries from considering a return to the path of a respectful relationship. Organizations and politicians linked to the most conservative sector in the United States have played an important role in the most persevering approaches to Cuba and have promoted for years a new relationship between the two countries, which contrasts with the usual aggressiveness and intransigent public stance of the Republican Party since 1959. The closest thing to lifting a ban on the sale of food and medicines to Cuba occurred back in the year 2000, implemented by the Republican George W. Bush, when at the same time, his administration was bringing back the Plattist ideology of intervention, at which time they even chose a pro-consul who would supervise “the Cuban transition”, once the revolutionary government had collapsed: Caleb McCarry A few years later we would get to see McCarry himself, a member of the staff of then US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Corker, promote dialogue with the Cuban government during a visit to the supposed main enemies of the United States in the region, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, meet with the Cuban foreign minister and president, and thus join those from the conservative sector who are betting on a more constructive relationship with Cuba. In a speech in 2011, the Cuban American senator for Florida, Marco Rubio emotionally pointed out Carlos Gutiérrez, at that time Secretary of Commerce of the United States, also of the Bush administration, as one of the references to which the so-called Cuban exile should look to in order to corroborate his undeniable success. A few months after the opening launched by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro in December 2014, it would be Carlos Gutiérrez himself who would walk freely along the halls of Cuba's emblematic Hotel Nacional and join the conservatives who are betting on a transformation of ties with the island. In what he himself describes as a radical change of posture, this new attitude of Gutiérrez would take him to Cuba on numerous occasions until he headed the US-Cuba Business Council, an organization that, as part of the US Chamber of Commerce, promotes economic relations between the two countries. “I have lost many of my friends in Miami”, he would declare years later to the alternative media Belly of the Beast. Equally noteworthy was the activism of Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia (2003-2011), who in June 2010 would lead a delegation of 43 businessmen to Cuba, and who six years later would become Secretary of Agriculture in the Trump administration. “We would love to have Cuba as a customer” Perdue would declare at his confirmation, ratifying his support for allowing U.S. exports to Cuba. The absence of “merits” for the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, cynically coordinated with the then right-wing government in Colombia and energetically rejected by the current one, confirms its political and sanctioning content as the measure serves as an effective component of the package of sanctions that the United States calls “policy of maximum pressure towards Cuba”. The damage that such a designation does to the credibility and national interest of the United States and to the population of the island, which it claims to support, is profound and sustained. Its effects start in Washington but do not stop there; they are evident in the refusal of different entities to enter into economic and financial relations of any kind with Cuba, some of them even located in the territories of Havana's allies. The treacherous nickname of “terrorist”, as an integral part of the intensified sanctions policy, is partly responsible for the current wave of migration that is being carried out by a share of despairing Cubans. Together with the other nationalities present there, this complicates the operation of the southern border of the United States, an issue that has become a matter of life and death for the Republican leadership and, according to recent surveys, the main interest of the American electorate for the presidential elections of 2024. One of the Republican champions against disorderly migration has been the current governor of Texas Gregg Abbott, who with his policies has even challenged the founding principles of the U.S. federal union and has generated problems with neighboring Mexico. However, Abbott was another of those who showed up in Havana in 2016 to demonstrate his interest in a better relationship. Devoid of all political preconceptions, Abbott spoke in Havana of the inevitability of the end of the “embargo”, of the importance that a change of policy would have for Texas in general and for the southern port of Houston in particular. He did not mention migration because the Cuban migration was not a problem for Texas then. Other conservative politicians would stroll through Havana exhibiting a discourse of coexistence: Richard Lugar, Jeff Flake, Tom Emmer, John Boehner, and even the economic advisors of the Trump Organization, which, by the way, seems to keep alive one of its commercial firms in the Cuban property registry. The visits of the U.S. agribusiness lobby have also been constant over the years headed by numerous executives and businessmen of absolutely republican affinity. Right now it could be said that even defenders of the MAGA tendency are to be found among the latter, all interested in an improvement of the economic ties with Cuba. Few media outlets have objectively reported the impact of Cuba's inclusion on the criticized list and the human toll taken by the policy of maximum pressure on the Cuban population. One of them has been the popular conservative show “Full Measure” hosted by U.S. anchor Sharyll Atkisson. At a time when the United States is competing aggressively with other leading global powers, the anti-Cuban stance substantially affects the national interest of the United States, taking into account that the more belligerent the United States is, the greater the Cuban need to open itself financially and economically to other partners, not always to Washington's liking. The evidence of the damage caused to the Cuban economy by the disastrous combination of Trump's measures with the Covid-19 pandemic, has made President Joe Biden prefer, at least in his first four years in office, to maintain the Republican agenda of maximum pressure towards Cuba and wait to see if, by an act of providence, he could be the first American president of the modern era to set foot in Havana, without the presence of a revolutionary government in place. The expert on Cuban issues William LeoGrande does not give him much hope. In a recent article he describes the Cuban economy as famished, but the Cuban government as solid and far from an unexpected breakup or collapse, which contradicts the optimistic speech of Undersecretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols, in Madrid. LeoGrande clarifies that Cuba was not a failed state when Biden assured it was in 2021 and neither is it now, that despite all the economic difficulties and the unprecedented intensification of the “embargo,” the government remains united and unwavering. “With a cohesive ruling elite, a loyal military, and no organized and effective opposition, there is no plausible shift toward a sudden regime transition in Cuba in the foreseeable future,” he asserts. The eventual arrival in 2024 of a more conservative administration to the White House, headed by Trump himself, and the possible incorporation of Senator Marco Rubio to that administration, will surely make them bet on prolonging the economic losses that the U.S. tolerates as a result of its deep limits to the relationship with Cuba. It will continue to curtail the travel rights of Americans and interfere like a Big Brother with the business interests of its citizens, all to comply - once and for all- with the Mallory Memorandum of April 1960. The greatest pressure for regime change in Cuba comes precisely from the closest state, Florida, which, contradictorily, would benefit the most from a more functional treatment of Havana. With a roster of politicians led by Governor Ron DeSantis, Senators Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, who have acted out of electoral interests, without realizing that a pragmatic relationship with the island is in the best interest of the Union and also of its voters . As much as some blame the Cuban government for the current wave of migration to the United States, there is one real fact that cannot be ignored. In 2014, as President Barack Obama deployed his new policy of rapprochement with Cuba, the island was flourishing, Cubans were hopeful about the changes there, and migration levels to the United States could be considered optimal. Controlling illegal migration across the southern border of the U.S. and Mexico will continue to be a priority of the Republican Party. How much better would this situation be if conservatives were to promote a normalization of relations with Cuba, give back to its citizens the constitutional right to travel wherever they want and allow their businessmen to make money on the island, which it so badly needs? It has been concluded that in the case of the Central American countries, the solution to migration lies in greater U.S. investment there, which will open up greater employment opportunities and give people the hope of being able to progress without having to migrate. So, is it really expected that continuing to squeeze Cuba will control the exodus across the southern border? It would be smarter to give the green light to U.S. companies to take advantage of the opportunities in the investment portfolio and compete with European hotel chains in Cuba, to facilitate the new Cuban businessmen's financial procedures so that they can make their way in the face of the new opening of the Cuban government and, even, from the closed concept of U.S. national security, to prevent others from doing so. Undoubtedly, Cuba will have to be respected as an independent and sovereign country. Knowing fully that we are not talking about an associated free state, way beyond the historical strategic and hegemonic pretensions of the U.S. Empire over the years in relation to the island. Establishing a constructive relationship of coexistence with the island of Cuba, even with a government that does not please Washington, would be of great importance for the stability of the southern part of the United States. Law and Order, a precept equally upheld by U.S. conservatives over the years, would win hands down, as evidenced by the effective anti-drug collaboration between the two countries that the United States acknowledges in its latest annual report on the subject, despite a scenario that muddles all contact. I am inclined to believe that relationships are possible if the necessary quota of seriousness and pragmatism is applied to the process. A little known example is that of the frequent coordination between authorities on both sides of the territory occupied by the Guantanamo Naval Base, the military enclave resulting from the archaic Platt Amendment, which the Cuban government has for years denounced as illegal and inadmissible. The politicized and unwarranted inclusion of Cuba in the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, issued unilaterally by the State Department, is there to prevent anything from blossoming. Correcting that mistake would be the first of all steps.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Since 1825, Bolivia has averaged a new government every 26 and a half months. A study by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, Political Science professors at the University of Kentucky, indicates that from 1950 to 2010, there were 23 coup d'état cases in the country. These include 11 successful actions, defined as those that allowed the insurgents to control power for at least a week. The decade in which Bolivia recorded the most coups was the 1970s, with some years experiencing two consecutive cases. Another study by The Washington Post reports that during the country's independent history, there have been over 190 attempts at coups and revolutionary processes. Bolivian historian Manuel Contreras attributes this situation to elements of internal politics, such as the absence of strong institutions and "an unprofessional military prone to this type of adventures". [1] Bolivia is currently facing multiple crises. The most prominent is in the political sphere, stemming from the division between President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales, who lead different factions of the Movement for Socialism–Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP) and are vying for the party’s nomination for the 2025 presidential elections. This fragmentation is also reflected in a conflict with the judiciary, due to rulings made by judges regarding Morales' potential presidential candidacy, among other decisions. Additionally, the country is experiencing significant economic deterioration due to a decrease in foreign currency reserves and fuel shortages, which are heightening social discontent. In this context, it was reported that there was an attempted coup on June 26. The rift between the MAS leaders weakens the institutional framework needed to respond to these various crises. This article briefly reviews all these elements. Background: resignation of former President Evo Morales Evo Morales governed for three terms, from 2006 to 2019. In 2016, a referendum was held to consult citizens about modifying Article 168 of the country's Constitution, which stipulates that the presidency is for five years, with the possibility of re-election only once consecutively. At that time, the "no" vote won, and the constitutional reform project was narrowly rejected. [2] In 2017, Evo Morales filed a challenge of unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. The Court determined that Morales could run for a fourth consecutive presidential term in the 2019 elections, arguing that unlimited re-election is a right protected by the American Convention on Human Rights, which, it was claimed, takes precedence over the Bolivian Constitution. [3] On October 20, 2019, Bolivia held general elections. [4] Initially, the results pointed to a runoff between President Evo Morales and former President Carlos Mesa. During the vote count, the Preliminary Results Transmission System (TREP) was abruptly halted and resumed almost 24 hours later with a shift in the trend. [5] Subsequently, Morales was declared the winner in the first round by a narrow margin. [6] Almost simultaneously with the announcement of the new results by the president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Bolivia (TSE), María Eugenia Choque, dozens of police officers positioned themselves near the headquarters where the electoral authorities were receiving the tallies. Accusations of fraud and massive protests were followed, [7] demanding either a runoff or the annulment of the elections. [8] As mentioned, before Evo Morales' presidency, the military in Bolivia attempted several times to overthrow the government in power. During the MAS leader’s mandate, institutional relations were strengthened. Several measures were taken to transform the military mentality and bring it closer to the Bolivian people. In 2009, the Armed Forces adopted the wiphala, the indigenous flag. In 2016, a mandatory “anti-imperialist" school was established for military personnel aspiring to be promoted. Morales referred to himself as the "first private soldier president," increased the military budget from $114 million in 2001 to $483 million in 2018, and was the only democratic president to purchase large quantities of weapons and equipment. At the same time, Morales provoked resentment among the military by removing "neoliberal" commanders and prosecuting the chiefs who handed over missiles to the United States in 2005. Additionally, he imprisoned the officers responsible for the 2003 repression in El Alto, which resulted in the death of 67 protesters. These measures failed to change the "conservative spirit of the armed forces." [9] Over time, a rift was developed between the military and Morales. In late 2019, under the leadership of Williams Kalimán, members of the Army appeared on television asking for Morales' resignation, which led to his ousting. The former president initially rejected accusations of fraud from opposition groups and organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and denounced an attempted coup orchestrated by his political adversaries and sectors of the armed forces. [10] However, he agreed to call for new elections, but this was not enough to ease the tensions. [11] On November 10, 2019, Evo Morales resigned from his position. [12] He then left Bolivia, first for Mexico and later for Argentina, where he was granted political asylum. [13] As a result, the presidential line of succession was disrupted, with several key government figures resigning. In this context, Jeanine Áñez, who was the second vice president of the Senate, assumed the interim presidency on November 12, 2019. Her proclamation took place in a parliamentary session without a quorum, which sparked controversy and accusations of illegitimacy from Morales' party, MAS, and other sectors. In his view, Morales stated from Mexico that "the most insidious and nefarious coup in the history" of his country had been carried out. [14] Struggle among the leaders of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) In the 2020 elections, Luis Arce, former Minister of Finance under Morales, was elected, running as the MAS candidate. [15] Former President Evo Morales returned to Bolivia a year after leaving the country, a day after Arce assumed the leadership of the Andean state. Analysts say that the dispute between the two politicians began on the day of Arce's inauguration in November 2020. In his inaugural speech, Arce did not mention Morales. Political scientist Susana Bejarano says that the president "made a textbook mistake by not giving Morales a place [...]. Without having a role, Morales exerted pressure through his influence, and Arce responded" [16] In recent months, Morales has referred to Arce as "the worst president of the democratic era" and has also accused him of leading the country’s economy to deterioration. For Arce, Morales is his "main opponent," and his supporters accuse Morales of wanting to control the country. [17] In October 2023, Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca were expelled from MAS by the leadership aligned with Evo Morales due to their refusal to attend a congress held in Cochabamba. This clearly defined the two factions: the “Evista” faction, which supports Morales' leadership, and the "Arcista" (or renewal bloc) that did not recognize the expulsion of the president and Choquehuanca. [18] The Minister of Government, Eduardo del Castillo, a prominent figure in the Arcista sector, believes that Morales “conceives of MAS from the person rather than from social organizations.” On the other hand, Morales’ faction accuses the Arcistas of being close to the political right, trying to take over a social base that does not belong to them, and forgetting the revolutionary principles of the movement. [19] Recently, in May, the Arcistas organized a congress in the city of El Alto, where they elected Grover García as the new president of MAS in place of Morales, but the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) did not approve this conclave. Meanwhile, the Evistas attempted to hold their congress in Villa Tunari, in the Cochabamba region, Morales' political and union stronghold, but the TSE also did not recognize that meeting. This has temporarily left the MAS candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections in suspense. [20] Both groups have tried several times to hold national congresses to appoint a new leadership (and thus comply with the Electoral Law) and to select a presidential candidate. [21] However, the TSE has disqualified all the sessions and insists that both factions hold "a joint congress" to comply with the party's statutes. In September 2023, Morales announced his candidacy for the presidency, challenging Arce, who is expected to seek re-election. The former president has accused the government of trying to block his candidacy and has also threatened that there will be "upheaval" in Bolivia if he is disqualified. [22] The Bolivian Congress is bicameral; the Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 representatives, of which MAS holds 75 seats [23], and 24 of them are Arcistas. Meanwhile, the Senate is made up of 36 members [24], with 21 belonging to the MAS caucus, of which 7 are Arcistas. [25] The party also celebrated its 29th anniversary, albeit in a divided manner, with the Arcistas in La Paz and the Evistas in Santa Cruz. This struggle has extended to the Congress, where Arce lost the majority due to the MAS split. Political scientist Fernando Mayorga says that the fracture caused legislators close to Morales to move forward with agreements with the opposition to pass various laws, such as the suspension of the mandates of the Judicial branch magistrates, or to block others, such as the approval of external loans for public finances. [26] This situation has led the government to accuse Morales of provoking a "structural crisis scenario" to "shorten" Arce's mandate. The president has even stated that he is the target of a "soft coup" by Morales' followers. On the other hand, the former president accuses the government of incompetence and corruption [27] and has said that he has "ideological, programmatic, organizational, and even ethical differences" with Arce. He has also pointed out that there are no opportunities for reconciliation with the government because it has shifted to the right. [28] Confrontation with the Judiciary Part of the struggle between the former president and the current president involves the Judiciary, which Evo Morales considers aligned with Luis Arce. Bolivia is the only country in Latin America that elects its high judicial courts [29] by popular vote since 2009. That is how two elections have been held, in 2011 and 2017. [30] At the end of 2023, the term of the magistrates concluded; however, the lack of agreements within MAS (and with the opposition) to define the candidates has delayed the judicial election process. [31] The Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) also contributed to this delay by declaring some laws approved by Parliament to convene the judicial elections unconstitutional. For these reasons, the TCP decided to extend its mandate and that of the other judicial bodies to "avoid a power vacuum." In early June, during a joint session of the Senate and the Lower House, Evistas and opposition legislators approved a bill that suspends the magistrates of the high judicial courts, without the presence of Arcistas legislators. This meeting was convened by the president of the Senate, Andrónico Rodríguez, an ally of Morales. The TCP deemed this process illegal, as the senator did not have the backing to assume the role of president of the Assembly. [32] The Tribunal pointed out that the presidency of Congress is the responsibility of the country's vice president, David Choquehuanca, who, according to Rodríguez, was acting as interim president due to a trip by the country's president, Luis Arce. [33] The law also nullifies all the rulings that the magistrates approved in the last year. A source close to Vice President Choquehuanca stated that overturning these rulings would be "chaotic" and argued that it aims to provoke a political and social crisis. Meanwhile, other experts, such as the constitutionalist Israel Quino, believe that nullifying these legal acts is necessary for the country to "return to the rule of law." [34] At the end of 2023, the TCP issued a ruling nullifying indefinite re-election in the country, which disqualifies Morales from running in the 2025 elections. This decision overturns the 2017 ruling that allowed the former president to be re-elected that year. If the TCP is not renewed, this ruling cannot be reviewed. Supporters of the former president are demanding the resignation of the magistrates from the highest courts, alleging that the Judiciary "follows orders from the government." Meanwhile, Evo Morales accuses the government of sabotaging the judicial elections. After a series of road blockades by Morales' followers, President Arce issued a law in February aimed at holding the elections in September. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced that it expects the Congress to issue the call for the elections. [35] The economic situation and social discontent in Bolivia Bolivia's economy grew at an annual rate of 4.7% from 2005 to 2019. The government channeled the profits from natural gas exports into social programs and salary increases, which helped reduce poverty from 60% in 2006 to 37.2% in 2019. [36] A new indigenous middle class also emerged. Gas production increased after Evo Morales' 2006 decree to nationalize hydrocarbons. Additionally, Bolivia has the world's largest lithium reserves, with 23 million metric tons (MT). Along with Chile and Argentina, these countries form the "Lithium Triangle," holding more than two-thirds of the world's reserves. However, Bolivia's production of this element is still very low (600 tons per year), presenting significant growth opportunities for the future. [37] Since the end of the raw materials boom in 2014, Bolivia relied on high public spending and domestic credit to sustain economic growth. Over time, these measures increased debt and reduced international reserves and accumulated fiscal savings. The COVID-19 pandemic worsened the situation. After it ended, the Bolivian economy recovered. However, the level of indebtedness, the decline in natural gas production, and modest international reserves have put pressure on the foreign exchange market, where a parallel exchange rate has emerged. [38] Natural gas production decreased from 56.6 million cubic meters per day (Mm³/d) in 2016, with oil revenue of $1.755 billion, to 31.9 Mm³/d in 2023, with an income of $2.048 billion, according to official information. Bolivia has seen low production in its oil and gas fields, requiring the import of gasoline and diesel, which are then sold at subsidized prices in the domestic market — a cost that is increasingly difficult to sustain. [39] “As a result of the decline in natural gas production, the amount of dollars coming into the country has decreased," says economist Jaime Dunn. According to the Central Bank reports, international reserves dropped from $15.122 billion in 2014 to $1.796 billion in April 2024 [40], attributed to the decline in revenue from gas sales to Brazil and Argentina and the lack of approval for new loans in the Congress. [41] The prices of basic goods have also increased. For months, long lines of people trying to obtain dollars have been observed, as well as the expansion of a parallel market for this currency. The shortage of dollars has impacted both importers and exporters. The most affected product has been fuel purchased from abroad. Bolivia imposed a subsidy on gasoline and diesel more than 15 years ago. Now, specialists warn the country doesn't have the dollars to buy them. This is a problem because Bolivia imports 56% of the gasoline and 86% of the diesel it consumes. Bolivian President Luis Arce has acknowledged that the situation is "pathetic." According to him, it is due to the "lack of a clear hydrocarbon policy in the country" in recent years. [42] To mitigate the situation, he ordered the militarization of the fuel supply system to prevent the smuggling of subsidized diesel to neighboring countries. [43] This combination of fuel and currency shortages has sparked protests from merchants and transporters in various cities across the country. Several sectors have taken to the streets to demand a solution to the rising costs of essential goods. [44] In 2023, there were almost 200 days of blockades. To address the situation, in February, Economy Minister Marcelo Montenegro announced a series of economic reforms, such as easing export restrictions and creating a diesel auction for large producers. However, these measures still seem insufficient. The tension generated by the situation has also affected Arce's popularity, which has dropped to 18% [46] according to polls. [45] Some social protest calls are attributed to supporters of Evo Morales, although these groups deny it. [47] To exacerbate these problems, the country has experienced droughts and high temperatures, which have damaged agricultural production and caused wildfires in the Bolivian Amazon. Lake Titicaca, among other bodies of water, has dropped to historically low levels. Residents of the El Alto neighborhood, in the heights of La Paz, only receive water sporadically during the day. [48] Reactions after the attempted coup In this context of political strife and economic deterioration, it was reported on June 26th that there was an attempted coup led by General Juan José Zúñiga, who has been dismissed and is now in prison. [49] The Minister of Government, Eduardo Del Castillo, stated that the insurrection had been planned for three weeks. The official indicated that the action resulted in 12 gunshot injuries and led to the arrest of about 20 military personnel and civilians. A new high command has also been appointed. Del Castillo emphasized that although the government had received information about previous attempts at destabilization and "soft coups," none had reached the scale of the reported events. [50] Analysts believe that Zúñiga appears to be an unhappy general with little support. [51] According to various journalistic reports, he was perceived as the "general of the people." [52] He was appointed as the General Commander of the Army in November 2022 and reaffirmed in January of this year by the president. Before that, he held the position of Chief of the General Staff. According to the Bolivian newspaper ‘El Deber’, Zúñiga was the closest military officer to Arce and was at odds with former President Evo Morales. [53] According to Army records, in 2020, Zúñiga ranked 48th out of 65 officers in the 1990 class. ‘El Deber’ notes that Zúñiga has close ties with mining and union sectors. However, throughout his career, he has faced accusations of misappropriation of public funds, for which he was sanctioned. In 2022, Zúñiga was mentioned by Evo Morales as the leader of an Army group that engaged in "permanent persecution" against political leaders like him. This elite faction, known as the ‘Pachajchos’, carried out military intelligence operations, [54] they had influence in the assignment of officers' posts, and played an important role in combating smuggling. [55] Following the brief insurrection, it is expected that the fracture between former President Evo Morales and President Luis Arce will deepen. On one hand, the government's version claims to have successfully quelled an attempted military coup in less than four hours. Retired Army Colonel Jorge Santistevan described Zúñiga as an amateur, leading an uprising without military consent, with improvised tactics and an empty speech. "This was an adventure, not a coup," stated analyst Omar Durán. [56] On the other hand, Evo Morales and opposition sectors describe the events as "a self-coup," "a political show," "an adventure," or "a parody" by Luis Arce Catacora, allegedly orchestrated with General Zúñiga and his supporters to victimize the president and boost his popularity. [57] This version aligns with what Zúñiga declared when he was arrested. In several posts on the social network "X", Morales has commented on the situation. He criticized the president's actions, called for a thorough investigation of the events, and even apologized to the international community for seeking their support in the face of the apparent coup (a narrative later adopted by Argentina). [58] Additionally, Evista Senator Luis Adolfo Flores argued that there was no police action to prevent the seizure of the plaza, for example, and he highlighted the "inaction" of the Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo. Another member of the Upper House, William Torrez, agreed that it was not a genuine coup. [59] Senate President Rodríguez posted on social media that "between the self-extended magistrates, a supposed coup or self-coup, the Bolivian people are sinking into uncertainty. This institutional disorder is leading the country to a situation of chaos and distrust." [60]. Luis Arce says that foreign interests are involved in the attempted coup, aiming to benefit from Bolivia's natural resources. He also claims that former President Evo Morales is willing to go to any lengths, even questioning the government's actions, in order to be a candidate for the 2025 elections. [61] On the other hand, the failed coup in Bolivia could worsen the current dollar shortage in the Andean country, said the global investment bank BancTrust & Co., based in London. "Although the coup apparently failed, the crisis will leave its mark. Political instability and the government's weakness will likely make it difficult for authorities and the private sector to access alternative sources of hard currency financing in the future, exacerbating the current crisis," BancTrust & Co. said in a commentary on the situation in Bolivia. [62] On the other hand, the rift between Arce and his mentor, Evo Morales, weakens Bolivian democracy, blocks any strategy against the economic crisis, keeps Congress paralyzed, and opens the door to ventures like that of General Zúñiga. Researcher Armando Ortuño warns that "the military coup was a symptom of political disorder. There is a weak government facing multiple crises." [63] Ortuño points out that in the short term, to address the political crisis, there must be some sort of agreement between Arce and Morales. [64] Jean Pierre Lavaud, a French sociologist, believes that the current major problem stems from "the internal struggle within MAS." [65] Another possible effect of this rift is that the opposition could win the next elections. [66] Additionally, Evo Morales' vice president, Álvaro García Linera, fears that this power struggle between the two leaders could strengthen the military. It will be problematic if Morales' supporters use the military to weaken the president, while the Evistas use them to contain the former president. García Linera argues that the military structure always has its own agenda and could pose a risk to national stability. Legal notice The article was created and published by the Gilberto Bosques Center for International Studies of the Senate of the Republic of Mexico (webpage https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/). The analysis and research do not represent the position of the Senate or its members. References [1] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo [2] Jaime Cárdenas Gracia, “Informe sobre el referéndum boliviano de 2016”, Boletín mexicano de derecho comparado, 50(148), 81-112, abril de 2017. consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-86332017000100081 [3] Jorge Sánchez Morales, “Elecciones generales en Bolivia, 2019. Una reflexión de derecho comparado”, Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, 2020. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.te.gob.mx/editorial_service/media/pdf/250320241450414990.pdf [4] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: Carlos Mesa acusa a Evo Morales de ser el "protagonista de un golpe de Estado" y llama a continuar las protestas”, BBC News Mundo, 23 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50161520 [5] BBC News Mundo, Elecciones en Bolivia: suspenden el recuento provisional de votos cuando todo apuntaba a una segunda vuelta entre Evo Morales y Carlos Mesa, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50119933 [6] BBC News Mundo, “Elecciones en Bolivia: el conteo preliminar sitúa a Evo Morales como virtual ganador sin necesidad de segunda vuelta y en medio de denuncias de fraude”, 21 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50134370 [7] Swiss Info, “Claves sobre el polémico proceso por fraude electoral de 2019 en Bolivia”, 28 de julio de 2021. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024, en: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/claves-sobre-el-pol%C3%A9mico-proceso-por-fraude-electoral-de-2019-en-bolivia/46822282 [8] Boris Miranda, “Elecciones en Bolivia: por qué hay cuestionamientos y denuncias de fraude sobre los resultados preliminares que sitúan a Evo Morales como ganador en primera vuelta”, BBC News Mundo, 22 de octubre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50146649 [9] Fernando Molina, “De Evo Morales a Luis Arce: las conspiraciones de los militares bolivianos contra el Movimiento al Socialismo”, El País, 28 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-29/de-evo-morales-a-luis-arce-las-conspiraciones-de-losmilitares-bolivianos-contra-el-movimiento-al-socialismo.html [10] Norberto Paredes, “Evo Morales: ¿hubo un golpe de Estado en Bolivia? BBC Mundo consultó a 6 expertos”, BBC, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50375002 [11] Fernando Molina, “Bolivia: ¿golpe o (contra)revolución?”, Nueva Sociedad, noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en:https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-golpe-ocontrarevolucion/?fbclid=IwAR0dIgxoErXdbi2oKUw8JGkYxTFfRlKZaJFGm9DlTN7b0zJ3VwNGXPWYli0 [12] Abraham Zamorano y Boris Miranda, “Evo Morales renuncia a la presidencia de Bolivia: 5 claves que explican por qué tuvo que dimitir el mandatario indígena”, BBC. News Mundo, 10 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina50369434#:~:text=Evo%20Morales%20pas%C3%B3%20en%20menos,el%20que%20anunci%C3%B3%20su%20dimisi%C3%B3n. [13] BBC News Mundo, “Asilo a Evo Morales en México: las consecuencias para AMLO del paso del expresidente boliviano”, 14 de diciembre de 2019. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50790682 [14] Deutsche Welle, “Jeanine Áñez asume presidencia interina de Bolivia”, 13 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/jeanine-%C3%A1%C3%B1ez-asume-presidencia-interina-de-bolivia/a-51219169 [15] BBC News Mundo, “Luis Arce, ganador de las elecciones en Bolivia, a la BBC: "Si Evo Morales quiere ayudarnos será muy bienvenido pero eso no quiere decir que él estará en el gobierno"”, 20 de octubre de 2020. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticiasamerica-latina-54610692 [16] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales ensombrece el futuro de Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-07-01/la-fractura-entre-luis-arce-y-evo-morales-ensombrece-el-futuro-de-bolivia.html [17] EFE, “Momentos clave que llevaron a Bolivia a su actual crisis política y social”, El Universal, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/momentos-clave-que-llevaron-a-bolivia-a-su-actual-crisis-politica-y-social/ [18] Fernando Molina, “El partido de Evo Morales expulsa al presidente Luis Arce y agrava la guerra política en Bolivia”, El País, 5 de octubre de 2023. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-10-05/el-partido-de-evo-morales-expulsa-al-presidente-luis-arce-y-agravala-guerra-politica-en-bolivia.html [19] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [20] EFE, “Momentos clave…”, op. cit. [21] Fernando Molina, “Evo Morales anuncia que será candidato a la presidencia de Bolivia en medio de la guerra con Luis Arce”, El País, 24 de septiembre de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-09-24/evo-morales-anuncia-que-sera-candidato-a-lapresidencia-de-bolivia-en-medio-de-la-guerra-con-luis-arce.html [22] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves para entender la crisis política y económica detrás del intento de golpe de Estado denunciado por el presidente de Bolivia”, BBC, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c6p2r06lenjo [23] Cámara de Diputados de Bolivia, ”Composición de la Cámara de Diputados”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://diputados.gob.bo/diputados-home/ [24] Cámara de Senadores de Bolivia, ”Bancadas”. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://web.senado.gob.bo/legislativa/bancadas [25] Marco Antonio Chuquimia, ”El 'evismo' es mayoría en el Senado: tiene la presidencia y la jefatura de bancada”, El Deber, 18 de octubre de 2023, consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/el-evismo-es-mayoria-en-el-senado-tiene-la-presidencia-y-la-jefatura-debancada_343939 [26] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce que la falta de diésel en Bolivia es “patética””, El País, 12 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-13/luis-arce-reconoce-que-la-falta-de-diesel-en-bolivia-es-patetica.html [27] Fernanda Paúl, op cit. [28] Sputnik, ”Evo Morales descarta reconciliación dentro del MAS”, Elpais.cr, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.elpais.cr/2024/03/12/evo-morales-descarta-reconciliacion-dentro-del-mas/ [29] Se eligen por voto popular los cargos del Consejo de la Magistratura, el Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y el Tribunal Agroambiental. Fernando Molina, “La elección popular de jueces en Bolivia se atasca en el Congreso”, El País, 30 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-08-31/la-eleccion-popular-de-jueces-en-bolivia-se-atasca-en-elcongreso.html [30] Idem. [31] Idem. [32] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-boliviano-suspende-a-losmagistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [33] Infobae, “El Congreso de Bolivia aprobó el cese del mandato de altos magistrados en una polémica sesión que comenzó a oscuras”, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/07/el-congreso-de-bolivia-aprobo-el-cesedel-mandato-de-altos-magistrados-en-una-polemica-sesion-que-comenzo-a-oscuras/ [34] Fernando Molina, “El Parlamento boliviano…”, op. cit. suspende a los magistrados de las altas cortes en una sesión declarada ilegal por el Constitucional”, El País, 7 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-08/el-parlamento-bolivianosuspende-a-los-magistrados-de-las-altas-cortes-en-una-sesion-declarada-ilegal-por-el-constitucional.html [35] Fernanda Hernández Orozco, “¿Cómo le ha ido a Bolivia con la elección directa de jueces?”, Expansión, 18 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 28 de junio de 2024 en: https://expansion.mx/mundo/2024/06/18/como-le-ha-ido-a-bolivia-con-la-eleccion-directa-de-jueces [36] Congressional Research Service, “Bolivia: An Overview, 16 de mayo de 2022”. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2022 en: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11325 [37] Ivan Castano, “Bolivia has the World's Largest Lithium Reserves. Is it Worth Investing In?”, 31 de julio de 2023. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/bolivia-has-the-worlds-largest-lithium-reserves-is-it-worth-investing-in [38] Banco Mundial, “El Banco Mundial en Bolivia”, 14 de abril de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bolivia/overview [39] Redacción Movant, “Bolivia: baja en la producción de gas y su impacto económico”, infobae, 12 de mayo de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/05/12/bolivia-baja-en-la-produccion-de-gas-y-su-impacto-economico/ [40] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op .cit. [41] France 24, “Bolivia cierra 2023 con las reservas internacionales más bajas en 17 años”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20240105-bolivia-cierra-2023-con-las-reservas-internacionales-m%C3%A1s-bajas-en-17- a%C3%B1os [42] Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. o [43] Pablo Stefanoni, “Bolivia: claves de la asonada militar y sus coletazos”, Nueva Sociedad, junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.nuso.org/articulo/bolivia-claves-de-la-asonada-militar-y-sus-coletazos/ [44] Deutsche Welle, “Militares controlan estaciones de combustible en Bolivia”, 13 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/militares-controlan-estaciones-de-combustible-en-bolivia/a-69348165 [45] Fernanda Paúl, “3 claves…”, op. cit. [46] Fernando Molina, “Luis Arce reconoce…”, op. cit. l [47] Fernando Molina, “Fracasa el intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia: detenido el general rebelde”, El País, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-26/el-presidente-de-bolivia-denuncia-movilizaciones-irregulares-del-ejercito.html [48] Ivan Ellis, “La caída de Bolivia en un profundo caos y sus implicaciones para la región”, Infobae, 25 de noviembre de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/11/25/la-caida-de-bolivia-en-un-profundo-caos-y-sus-implicaciones-para-laregion/ [49] Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, “Intento fallido de golpe de Estado en Bolivia”, Senado de México, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/analisisinvestigacion/contexto/fallido-golpe-bolivia/viewdocument [50] Infobae, “El Gobierno de Bolivia reveló que los militares planearon el golpe durante tres semanas”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/el-gobierno-de-bolivia-dijo-que-los-militares-planearon-el-golpe-durantetres-semanas-y-que-su-lider-ya-habia-sido-cesado/ [51] The Editors, “Daily Review: Bolivia’s Failed Coup Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg”, World Politics Review, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/daily-review-bolivia-coup-arce/ [52] Pablo Stefanoni, “Arcistas’ vs ‘evistas’: los riesgos de despertar monstruos en Bolivia”, El País, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/arcistas-vs-evistas-los-riesgos-de-despertar-monstruos-en-bolivia.html [53] El Deber, “Toma del Palacio Quemado: Zúñiga, el militar más cercano al Presidente, sacó a la tropa militar, fue aprehendido y dijo que actuó por orden de Arce”, 26 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/toma-del-palacio-quemado-zuniga-el-militarmas-cercano-al-presidente-saco-a-la-tropa-militar-fue-apr_374314 [54] BBC News Mundo, “Quién es Juan José Zúñiga, el general que lideró lo que el presidente de Bolivia calificó de "intento de golpe de Estado" y luego fue arrestado”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c035jg3j13ro [55] El Deber, “Los ‘Pachajchos’ son vistos como un grupo de poder en las Fuerzas Armadas”, 6 de noviembre de 2022. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/los-pachajchos-son-vistos-como-un-grupo-de-poder-en-las-fuerzas-armadas_302903 [56] Tuffí Aré Vásquez, “Golpe fallido, autogolpe, montaje o qué: los datos y las dudas en Bolivia al día siguiente del levantamiento militar”, Infobae, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/06/27/golpe-fallido-autogolpemontaje-o-que-los-datos-y-las-dudas-en-bolivia-al-dia-siguiente-del-levantamiento-militar/ [57] Idem. [58] Cuenta en “X” de Evo Morales, 30 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://x.com/evoespueblo/status/1807496134119571492?s=48&t=RUbtGPN92qpBD2NHDoDKUg [59] El Día, “Federaciones del Trópico tildan de "show", "novela" y "autogolpe" lo ocurrido en plaza Murillo”, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.eldia.com.bo/2024-06-27/pais/federaciones-del-tropico-tildan-de-show-novela-y-autogolpe-lo-ocurrido-en-plazamurillo.html [60] Pablo Stefanoni, op. cit. [61] Federico Rivas Molina, “Luis Arce: “Evo Morales pone en duda el golpe militar fallido por sus aspiraciones políticas personales””, El País, 29 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 1 de julio de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-30/luis-arce-evo-morales-pone-en-duda-el-golpe-militar-fallidopor-sus-aspiraciones-politicas-personales.html [62] Daniel Salazar Castellanos, “Intento de golpe de Estado en Bolivia podría agravar escasez de dólares, según banco de inversión”, Bloomberg en Línea, 27 de junio de 2024. Consultado el 2 de julio de 2024 en: https://www.bloomberglinea.com/2024/06/27/intento-de-fallido-golpe-de-estadoen-bolivia-podria-agravar-escasez-de-dolares-segun-banco-de-inversion/ [63] Federico Rivas Molina, “La fractura entre Luis Arce y Evo Morales…”, op. cit. [64] Idem. [65] Gerardo Lissardy, “La tumultuosa historia de Bolivia como "el país con más intentos de golpe de Estado" desde 1950 (y por qué su crisis actual sorprende a los expertos)”, BBC, 28 de junio de 2204. Consultado el 29 de junio de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cne4787lpnzo 66Pablo Biderbost y Guillermo Boscán, “La historia turbulenta de Bolivia: más de 190 intentos de golpes y revoluciones”, The Conversation, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/la-historia-turbulenta-de-bolivia-mas-de-190-intentos-de-golpes-yrevoluciones-233495

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” Venezuelan election authorities proclaimed incumbent Nicolás Maduro victor in the 28 July presidential poll despite evidence brandished by the opposition showing its candidate won by a landslide. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Phil Gunson explains what the ensuing outcry means for Venezuela’s protracted crisis. What happened? Under enormous international attention, Venezuela held presidential elections on 28 July. The polls pitted unpopular incumbent Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013 after being anointed by late President Hugo Chávez as his successor, against a relatively unheralded opposition candidate, Edmundo González. González had established a commanding lead in pre-election opinion polls, in large part thanks to the endorsement of banned opposition leader María Corina Machado. Six hours after most polling stations closed, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Maduro victorious, but neither then nor in the days since has it provided any breakdown of the results by polling station or evidence to substantiate its announcement. Convinced that the election had been stolen, opposition supporters, many from working class communities, took to the streets the following day. They have been met with a violent response from state security services, which have made clear they will stand with the Maduro administration and unfurled a wave of targeted arrests. With Maduro digging in, the past few days’ turbulence could leave in its wake a weakened government, a galvanised but frustrated opposition, and a broad front of foreign governments all struggling to determine their next moves. How did we get here? Much of the controversy that swirled around the 2024 presidential campaign and election is a legacy of the domestic and international rancour that followed the previous, disputed presidential vote six years ago. In 2018, the prohibition of certain opposition candidates and parties – who mostly boycotted the poll – as well as a heavily tilted electoral playing field helped President Maduro secure a second term. But his victory was dismissed as illegitimate by the U.S., the European Union and many of Venezuela’s neighbours. The next year, over fifty countries opted instead to recognise Juan Guaidó, chair of the opposition-led parliament, as interim president. Washington imposed sweeping economic sanctions as successive opposition efforts sought to topple Maduro, only for the government to hold its ground through a wave of political repression, with the help of almost seamless backing from the military and support from Russia, Iran, Cuba and other states. At the same time, the Norwegian government facilitated sporadic rounds of talks between the government and opposition. Despite prolonged deadlock, these talks ultimately led to a breakthrough: the Barbados Agreement of October 2023 saw the Maduro government promise improved conditions for the 2024 election, while receiving in return (via parallel talks with President Joe Biden’s administration) conditional sanctions relief. The government’s concessions nevertheless came with strings attached. Although the authorities allowed the main opposition coalition, the Unitary Platform, to hold a primary election, they reaffirmed a ban on the runaway winner, Machado, holding elected office and blocked the candidacy of her chosen substitute, Corina Yoris. González, a 74-year-old retired diplomat, was the opposition’s third choice, but despite being an unknown with no previous political experience, he soon garnered massive support, touring the country with the hugely popular Machado. Ten candidates, backed by 38 political parties, eventually appeared on the official electronic ballot, many of them thinly veiled plants by the government, which intended them as a ploy to divide and confuse opposition voters and create the appearance of a diverse and competitive election. But the campaign rapidly took a shape that was not to the government’s liking – a two-horse race, in which reputable polling companies all gave González a massive lead, of up to 30 points and more, over Maduro. Most striking was the rapturous reception given to opposition campaign rallies in urban slums and agricultural states in the interior, which had until recently been the strongholds of chavismo – the political movement created by late president Chávez. “María Corina was here last week and filled the main street”, said an opposition supporter in the Andean state of Mérida. “Maduro came the next day and only filled half of it, despite all the buses from out of town”. The government did its best to impede the opposition’s rallies, banning Machado from traveling by air, cancelling public transport in the vicinity, digging up highways and setting up roadblocks ahead of them. It closed down radio stations, blocked websites and kept the opposition message largely out of the mass media. Millions of voters were disenfranchised. For the Venezuelan diaspora – estimated to number eight million migrants and refugees who have left the country over a decade of economic contraction and political tumult – arbitrary rules prevented them from registering to vote; at home, enrolment was marred by lack of information, as well as of time and opportunities to register. The National Electoral Council, dominated by a pro-government majority, failed even to adhere to its own election timetable, and overlooked or omitted a number of key steps. As in previous campaigns, the government abused its power by using state resources to bolster the Maduro campaign, while extorting contributions from private businesses and closing down those that gave any assistance to their adversary. With all signs nevertheless pointing to an opposition victory, many observers, including Crisis Group, foresaw that the Maduro administration would resort to even more extreme tactics to avoid losing power. But in the event, at least in the run-up to the election, it proved more restrained than expected. The government refrained from banning González’s candidacy or using its control of the Supreme Court to have the party ticket on which it was registered declared invalid. Ongoing talks between Washington and Caracas, as well as pressure from neighbouring and relatively friendly left-leaning governments in Brazil and Colombia, may possibly have dissuaded Maduro from adopting such draconian measures. Hopes that a low turnout among opposition voters alongside chavismo’s tried and tested methods of electoral mobilisation would again lead to victory may also have persuaded authorities not to act earlier. But none of this meant that the administration was prepared, when push came to shove, to give up power. What happened on election day? Election day itself was largely peaceful and voting took place normally, with only a minority of polling stations reporting irregularities. Exit polls and quick counts organised by the opposition indicated that Maduro was headed for defeat. But there were soon signs that the government might not be prepared to concede. As polls closed, opposition witnesses and election workers in voting precincts across the country reported that electoral authorities (at times supported by chavista operatives and members of the security forces), were trying to deny them copies of the vote tallies, called “actas”. These actas are printed out by each voting machine once polls close and constitute the physical corroboration of the electronic result that is sent to CNE headquarters and amalgamated into a final nationwide vote count. All participating political parties are entitled to them by law. Concerned about the implications, at 11pm, Unitary Platform coordinator Omar Barboza publicly called on the government not to “take a wrong step”. The hours after the polls closed (technically at 6pm, although many remained open later, even without people in line to vote) were tense, with both sides claiming to have won but with no official results from the electoral authorities. Shortly after midnight, CNE president Elvis Amoroso – a close ally of President Maduro – announced that, with 80 per cent of returns tallied, Maduro had obtained 51.2 per cent of the vote and that his lead of around 700,000 votes indicated an “irreversible” tendency. Machado and González then appeared before the cameras, with Machado saying, “We won, and everyone knows it”. The commission pronounced Maduro the election winner in a Monday morning event in Caracas. What evidence is there to suggest that the results may have been falsified? Both opposition and international suspicions of foul play have been heightened by the failure of guardrail systems to function as intended. In principle, the integrity of the vote should be protected by the actas, the paper tallies that each of the 30,026 voting machines produces once the polling station has closed. This safeguard was introduced under late president Chávez, and makes the Venezuelan system, according to electoral experts, one of the best in the world. Yet the CNE has so far failed to publish or distribute electronically the breakdown of voting by polling station and voting machine, despite Amoroso’s promises to do so. It also did not complete the post-voting audit of over half the machines, which the rules required it to. Its website, until the time of writing, was offline. Presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, a former member of the CNE board, said on 30 July that an electoral observer representing his campaign could attest that the results bulletin CNE head Amoroso read out on election night was not the one generated by the electronic voting system. Caracas has offered little by way of explanation for the apparent irregularities. The government has accused the opposition of hacking the system, saying that a cyberattack initiated in North Macedonia accounts for the delay in transmitting the results from voting machines (the North Macedonian government has said it has no evidence such an attack took place). But, regardless, the CNE has been unable to explain why problems with the electronic system would affect the tally sheets, which are printed before transmission, or why it cannot provide the actas it says it received on the evening after polls closed. Machado and the Unitary Platform, meanwhile, say they have managed to obtain over 80 per cent of the physical tallies through a network of observers, covering around 90 per cent of voting precincts. A day after the election they posted the breakdown of the vote, together with images of each acta, on a website that permits members of the public to consult them. The government immediately moved to block access to the site, which has not stopped thousands of Venezuelans reaching it through the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). Against this backdrop, the Carter Center, the only professional international observer mission for the polls allowed to produce a public assessment, stated on 31 July that the election “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic”. The Center cited the lopsided playing field during the campaign and said that, given the lack of access to the full tally, it could not “verify or corroborate the results of the election” declared by the CNE. How much post-election unrest has there been and what is the risk of further violence? The government’s announcement sparked unrest on 29 July, the day after the election, which saw spontaneous demonstrations against the Maduro government. Protesters burned tires, blocked highways and toppled several statues of Hugo Chávez. The demonstrations, which mainly drew inhabitants of poorer communities that used to be pro-government strongholds, were met with force by security forces and chavista para-police groups known as colectivos. At least twenty deaths have so far been reported along with over 1,000 arrests, according to the government and human rights organisations. Machado and González expressed solidarity with the demonstrators and called for restraint by government forces, but have not convened marches themselves. The opposition is no doubt conscious that since the first major anti-Maduro protest wave in 2014, the government has brutally quashed such demonstrations on numerous occasions, leading to over 250 people killed and thousands of arrests as unarmed protesters have clashed with riot squads from the police and National Guard. The government’s ferocious response to protests in 2017 provoked international outrage and paved the way for the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to open an investigation into possible commission of crimes against humanity. There is little to suggest that things would be easier for demonstrators this time. The armed forces high command has made clear that it will stand by Maduro. Military leaders were present at his investiture by the CNE as president-elect on Monday morning, and on the following day gave a press conference in combat fatigues to reiterate their “unconditional” backing for his government. On Tuesday, Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino published a statement accusing international “fascist structures” of trying to discredit the exemplary demonstration of civic duty by Venezuelans and reaffirming the military’s “loyalty” to Maduro. In an apparent effort to avoid violence, Machado and González opted to organise brief rallies (what they called “popular assemblies”) on 30 July; another nationwide gathering has been called for Saturday. Sources close to the opposition affirm they have also made efforts to talk directly to the government, but these have so far been rebuffed. This has left them struggling with the question of how simultaneously to sustain pressure on the authorities to revisit the results without eliciting an even more severe response, while holding together an opposition coalition that has traditionally squabbled over tactics and strategy. Meanwhile, arrests of leading opposition figures – including Freddy Superlano, the national coordinator of opposition party Voluntad Popular and a close ally of Machado – signal that Maduro is ready to crack down hard on the opposition. Jorge Rodríguez, Maduro’s right-hand man and head of the National Assembly, has called for Machado and González to be arrested and tried. Six members of Machado’s election team, who have spent months in the residence of the Argentine ambassador to avoid arrest, risked capture after the government ordered Argentine diplomats expelled. (Brazil then offered to represent Argentine interests in Venezuela as long as the embassy remained closed.) For now, Maduro seems to be abstaining from taking this step, although the government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services indicate that it is ready to tighten its authoritarian grip across the country, even at the cost of becoming a regional pariah. What should the outside world do? Countries in the region and further afield that have commented on the election have generally pressed for full transparency concerning the 28 July poll results, including publication of a complete breakdown of voting by polling station. The exception is countries with strong links to Maduro, including Russia, China, Cuba, Bolivia and Honduras, among others. Caracas has brooked no criticism. On the day after the election, after six Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay) bluntly declined to recognise Maduro’s victory without a detailed breakdown of the figures, Caracas ordered their diplomatic representatives expelled. (Panama had already ordered its diplomats out.) The government followed up by banning flights to and from Panama, the Dominican Republic and Peru, leaving Venezuelans feeling more isolated from the world once again. On Thursday, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement that “it is clear to the United States … that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes”. Top Venezuelan officials and government propagandists insist that the refusal of many countries to accept Maduro’s re-election is simply a rerun of the aftermath of the 2018 election, and that a right-wing conspiracy, led by the U.S., is using González’s supposed victory as a pretext for another bid to overthrow the Venezuelan government. Some key countries – in particular Brazil and Colombia (both neighbours of Venezuela), and with certain reservations, Mexico – have sought to cling precariously to what little hope remains for compromise, refraining from declaring outright that the result is a fraud while insisting on the need for transparency. But with the Maduro government seemingly bent on intensifying polarisation and dismissing all challenges to its version of events, the chances of reaching any kind of consensus on how to resolve the electoral dispute currently look remote. A session on 31 July of the Organization of American States failed to pass a resolution on the issue, with half the member states abstaining or declining to attend. (Venezuela, while formally a member, does not participate in the organisation.) Diplomatic efforts by Brazil as well as Colombia and the U.S. are reportedly ongoing, but face a key obstacle. If any moves to greater transparency in the vote count will put Maduro’s hold on power at risk (as increasingly seems to be the case), then he is highly unlikely to move in that direction. For now, he has put the matter of settling the dispute in the hands of the Supreme Court, which like the CNE is loyal to him and will simply endorse the result. Despite Maduro’s extreme prickliness, the risks that an unresolved election dispute will extend Venezuela’s political and economic crisis – at the expense of its people and the region – make it essential that Bogotá, Brasilia and Mexico City continue to press the Venezuelan government to prove the result in an independent and impartial forum, or be ready to agree an alternative route to some form of negotiated transition. What happens now? For now, Maduro’s plan appears to be to batten down the hatches and try to ride out the storm. In the past, he has been able to take advantage of outside pressure to rally his supporters and quell dissent within chavismo, claiming Caracas is resisting imperialist interventionism abetted by the forces of domestic “fascism”. This may well work again, at least over the short term. The ruling Socialist Party, or PSUV, and the armed forces have stood by him despite what appears to have been a brazen refusal to accept the verdict from the ballot box. Still, Maduro is likely to emerge from the process weakened, both at home and abroad. His candidacy was not universally popular among chavistas, and his failure to deliver a credible triumph at the polls or lay the basis for economic growth and social peace will have further eroded his standing. His reputation abroad, notably among more sympathetic governments in Latin America, is likely to suffer, and at some stage the country and senior officials might face additional U.S. and EU sanctions. It remains to be seen whether a president who has been unable so far to disprove opposition claims of election victory and who can apparently only promise deeper international isolation and a stagnant economy, will still command respect among the factions that make up the movement. As for the opposition, indignation as to the outcome is leavened by what they believe their candidate achieved, reportedly gaining four million votes more than Maduro – representing not only their first ever apparent victory over chavismo at this level, but the biggest margin of victory ever in a Venezuelan presidential election. They are, for now, much more united than they have been for several years. But that does not solve the bind they are in. Assuming Maduro clings to power, further dilemmas await them. Parliamentary and local elections are due to take place next year, but the government might be tempted to bring them forward. If it does, the opposition will face a quandary that has tormented it for much of chavismo’s 25 years in power: do they stick to the method of contesting elections, despite the government’s apparent disregard for the most basic rules of democracy, or do they boycott the polls, a tactic they have used in the past but which simply allowed the government to win by default? If they do spurn elections, it is unclear what other options the opposition might embrace beyond the campaigns of street protest and foreign sanctions that have thus far failed to dislodge the government, and in the case of sanctions, deepened the country’s humanitarian misery. Despite the opposition’s frustration at yet another election dispute following years of patient negotiations, it remains the case that a solution to Venezuela’s long-running political crisis – and a peaceful, gradual return to democratic governance – will require full-scale talks between the two sides. If the current crisis has any upside, it is the opportunity it could present to convince a majority on both sides that the moment for talks has now arrived. Opposition leaders, governments in the region, and multilateral bodies – above all the UN – should continue to press for a full accounting of the election results. But they should also use all the channels at their disposal to urge Maduro and senior officials to understand the electoral crisis as the latest episode of a debilitating dispute that, without a course correction, will simmer endlessly to the detriment of the Venezuelan people. They should insist that the government’s efforts over the last five years to restore its political legitimacy will come to naught without a comprehensive negotiation process aimed at defusing tensions, reestablishing representative politics and rekindling economic growth. As efforts by third countries to restart negotiations continue, the opposition and its allies should prepare themselves to discuss difficult issues if they do. These include inevitable demands from senior chavistas for robust guarantees to protect them from legal peril in the event that they leave high office. At the same time, they should avoid the temptation, always present when options seem limited or non-existent, to threaten coercive force or slap on more sanctions so as not to be seen to be “doing nothing”. The solution to Venezuela’s ills does not lie in piling more punishment on a population that is already suffering a humanitarian emergency, but instead using existing sanctions and the prospect of their lifting as an incentive for the government to compromise. Whether there will be an opening for meaningful talks any time soon is anyone’s guess. Right now, chavismo seems more girded for intransigence than negotiation and compromise. Hopes for a better outcome remain slender. Some voices in the opposition are advocating a face-saving deal for Maduro, in which he would step down in favor of a consensus candidate agreed to by both the government and opposition ahead of a fresh election. It is not a proposal that appears to have great prospects for success at this point in time. But at a deeply troubling moment for Venezuela, options for a way out of the hardening deadlock should be nurtured and sustained.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Elections, in simplified terms, usually involve deciding between continuity or change. That decision was clearly expressed by Mexican voters. The results of the electoral day on June 2nd in Mexico reflect that approximately two-thirds of the votes cast favor continuity and, to some extent, a deepening of the outgoing administration's policies. Starting from the theory, this deepening will apply to foreign policy. Following the electoral day, expectations, proposals, questions, and prospects arise. These lines aim to address those that fall within the international sphere. It is advisable to begin with a brief diagnosis of the context and Mexico's recent international actions. It can be confidently stated that the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy, particularly non-intervention, were invoked with a particular emphasis. This emphasis was maintained throughout López Obrador's six-year term, in line with a nationalist-oriented foreign policy. The reference to these principles was made in regional matters as well as in the global thematic agenda. Regionally, in North America, the path was guided by the principle of respect for sovereignty and recognition of shared responsibility in matters that foster understanding, a spirit of cooperation, and a strategic partnership. However, it became evident that in some sensitive issues, antagonistic views do exist. To the south of our border, the overall assessment indicates a strengthening of ties, with a greater emphasis on Central American countries, through the strengthening of political dialogue and Mexico's cooperation agenda with specific social development programs. However, with some South American countries, Mexico experienced and continues to experience disagreements, which have led to a pause and even a setback in Latin American and Caribbean integration. Across the Atlantic, Mexico's relationship with its European counterparts continued on its path toward intensifying friendship and deepening political dialogue as strategic allies, despite brief disagreements. However, on balance, there is also a pause in the formalization of our modernized Global Agreement with the European Union. With the rest of the world's regions, Mexico sought greater diversification. However, it is still an unfinished endeavor. Despite efforts to promote dialogue and greater cooperation on regional and global agendas, bilateral relations with many countries remained on the sidelines of the priorities. In international forums, Mexico has stood out by advocating for the revitalization of multilateralism to create a more favorable global environment capable of addressing and resolving the multitude of global crises that concern the entire international community. For Mexico, the multilateral arena served as a mechanism to balance and counteract asymmetries with other countries and to enhance Mexico's prestige in favor of a world grounded in International Law, a system of clear rules. There have been achievements in Mexico's multilateral policy during this government. It is important to highlight the greater prominence gained in United Nations (UN) bodies, including the decision to occupy a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the 2021-2022 biennium, those years were extremely challenging for international stability, peace, and security. This is a characteristic element of a State's foreign policy. Thus, Mexico consolidated a continuous, relevant, and stable relationship with the UN's principal body. Despite the complex scenario in which international security was constantly challenged, our diplomacy in the Council adopted a constructive attitude. Mexico played a successful role in bridging distant positions. Mexico's stances and decisions were supported, as has historically been the case, by legal rigor and in favor of peace and human rights, which has earned it recognition. Thus, our multilateral policy succeeded in capitalizing on credibility and trust among the international community. Another achievement of Mexico in the multilateral sphere has been the call to the international community and the effort to persuade major powers and emerging countries of the urgent need to reform the UN considering global reconfigurations. For Mexico, it is clear that the measures required for a comprehensive reform must be guided by the principles of representativeness, democratization, transparency, and effectiveness. With this foundational assessment, what can be anticipated in terms of foreign policy for the upcoming administration led by Claudia Sheinbaum? What recommendations could be made for Mexico's international efforts in the coming years? The answers to these questions revolve around finding consensus on the need to build a State foreign policy, rather than a government policy. A foreign policy with long-term objectives and vision that allows for the accommodation of the nuances and emphases each head of the Executive may bring. To outline some recommendations, we must emphasize that Mexico is a globally strategic country. The voice of our country and the diplomatic prestige accumulated over the years exert tangible influence on the international stage. Our country plays a key role in the trends and dynamics of international trade and global production chains, being among the top ten exporting countries in the world. In addition to this, Mexico will continue to benefit from the relocation of companies and investments. Thanks to this global phenomenon, known as “nearshoring,” our country could solidify its position as an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment, including the one from Asia, and will have the potential to develop clusters of technological innovations, among other sectors. Therefore, broad opportunities for global engagement are emerging for Mexico. However, the conflict dynamics that prevail on the international scene present complex challenges for Claudia Sheinbaum's management of foreign policy. Commercial, military, or geopolitical tensions, such as the situation in the South China Sea, the war between Russia and Ukraine, or the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, pose challenges that require reaching agreements on a wide range of issues, particularly in security, migration, climate change, and sustainable development. Identifying and deepening convergences with key countries will be essential to easing the many international tensions that Mexico will face at the beginning of Sheinbaum's term. Our bilateral relationship with the United States is, without a doubt, the clear priority in Mexico's foreign agenda. Mexico's outlook toward the world begins there, at our northern border. The ties of interdependence are broad and deep. Our country and the United States need each other. Therefore, among the issues that could constitute the first successes of Sheinbaum's international agenda could be taking important steps in advancing and deepening a strategic partnership from which cooperative benefits can be derived, setting aside rhetoric. In our relationship with the United States, the main thematic axes from which opportunities arise are bilateral trade, investments, production chains and competitiveness through innovation; migration; security; and border management. Challenges are also apparent in these areas. The vitality of the bilateral relationship demands, first and foremost, building an effective, institutionalized, and frequent dialogue through periodic summits and high-level meetings, in addition to achieving mutual recognition of shared responsibilities in the most significant issues. This is a critical condition, regardless of who occupies the White House in the coming years. Deepening and further institutionalizing this bilateral dialogue is urgent given the likelihood of a remastered “Trumpism” version reaching the Oval Office. These variables will be conclusive and decisive in paving the way toward 2026, the year of the first USMCA review. The goal is to ensure that the review focuses on the formalities of the process, meaning it should be free from deep renegotiations or political setbacks. We now know that Marcelo Ebrard will have the important mission of leading this difficult task for Mexico. One of Ebrard's assets, in addition to his experience during the negotiation of the USMCA, is that he is a familiar figure to our North American counterparts. Our relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is also of utmost importance. It has become clear that this bilateral relationship is essential for Mexico's present and future. The Asian country plays a crucial role in the network of political relations that the Mexican government must continue to weave and deepen, especially considering and recognizing the predominant, superpower role that China exerts in global politics, technological development, investments, and trade. The geopolitical tensions and trends in which the PRC government has played a leading role grant and validate a stronger position for China in the region and, by extension, on the global chessboard. While few doubted years ago, and no one doubts today, that the dynamism of the Chinese economy is of growing importance in terms of the behavior and current state of the world economy. Furthermore, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Given the positioning that the Asian country has achieved, strengthening the bilateral relationship is vital to achieving the global and regional power balances that are in Mexico's best interest. Therefore, Mexico must approach China both politically and economically. It is essential that the government and the business sector jointly adopt medium and long-term measures to achieve a strategic rapprochement, with an updated agenda and innovative dialogue mechanisms that bring both countries closer together. Achieving this also involves the need to foster mutual understanding through cultural exchanges. Consequently, it will be imperative for the new Mexican President to work towards continuing to intensify and expand our relationship with China, primarily in economic and technological matters, as well as in identifying common ground and affinities on global issues. With Europe as a whole, it will be a priority to achieve the signing of the new Global Agreement with the European Union to deepen our alliance. This includes countries with which our bilateral relations are historic, such as Spain; leading EU countries, such as Germany — our main trading partner in Europe — and France; and the group of Eastern European countries where threats to the established international order are clearly perceived at their borders. Additionally, it will be essential to reaffirm Mexico's interest in working alongside all European countries to formulate joint strategies to restore peace and ensure international security. Our ties with Latin America and the Caribbean deserve special mention. The equation of Mexico's foreign policy toward this region, which is undoubtedly a priority, must reaffirm its commitment to strengthening mechanisms for political coordination, advancing regional integration, and agreeing on common policies and principles to achieve shared economic and social development, well-being for the population, and a migration management approach based on human rights, with an emphasis on the comprehensive protection of migrants. Considering that globally there are now 281 million migrants, Mexico will need to assert its regional convening power by stressing the urgency of addressing the structural causes of this phenomenon, condemning hate speech against migrants, and advocating for the need to develop political and legal frameworks that contribute to the sustainable development and the well-being of populations. In this region, the relationship with Brazil will become increasingly strategic, based on the leadership roles that each country plays and the shared values. In the current context, there is an evident political and ideological affinity between both governments, which translates into an additional advantage that will allow us to further strengthen our bilateral ties. This conclusion also considers Brazil's importance within the BRICS framework. Therefore, Tlatelolco should capitalize on the opportunities for alignment with Itamaraty on regional political issues and contributions to resolving crises in certain countries, such as Haiti. Of course, the comprehensive regional partnership that Mexico promotes and seeks within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the fertile ground that political and diplomatic coordination initiatives could experience within its framework, may spark interest for Brazil and clearly outline synergies leading to closer relations. Perhaps the upcoming visit to Mexico by Brazilian President Lula da Silva will provide the ideal opportunity to illustrate the potential harmony between the two countries in advancing the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean and in articulating global initiatives. Undoubtedly, the bilateral issues with some governments in the region, the aired tensions, and the challenges to Latin American integration are imperative topics for the next president and her cabinet to address. Solutions to these pending matters will not be simple or quick. Common ground is limited, and the ideological distances between different leaderships in the region are evident. The relevance of the region to Mexico cannot be denied, given the shared cultural and historical heritage with these countries. However, the divergence of political directions taken by governing groups and the alternations in power across the region have led to a series of ideological and political transitions toward radical centralization of power, evident in regimes characterized by strong presidential figures. Pragmatic approaches in their most extreme forms loom, and given the structural fragility and vulnerability of their economies, they provoke sociopolitical unrest, instability, and emigration, among other outcomes. Therefore, the challenges are complex, and the priorities emerging from the region are clear. Other areas of opportunity for Claudia Sheinbaum's foreign policy will include diversifying our political and commercial relations with emerging and influential countries in regions of growing global importance, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Opening new diplomatic and consular missions in these areas will be ideal and will yield benefits in the medium term. Reactivating political dialogue and cooperation with all international and regional actors is also imperative. The drive to expand our diplomatic footprint in traditionally neglected regions will increasingly take on a sense of urgency. In addition to this diversification, it will be necessary to strengthen the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID, in spanish). Its institutional strengthening should begin with building an international cooperation agenda based on both the results and needs of supply and demand. It seems necessary to increase the capacity of resources allocated to the international cooperation that Mexico offers. It also seems viable to adopt a more proactive and forward-looking approach to cooperation, with a high value on innovation, where Mexico can position itself as a recipient of cooperation in areas such as technological innovation and energy transition. Equally important is to continue betting on trilateral or triangular cooperation schemes, as this decision is based on recognizing shared visions and priorities with other countries, which contributes to strengthening collaborative ties with countries in the region and in various parts of the world. In addition to all of this, there are several other issues that will need to be addressed. To briefly mention a few, it will be crucial to emphasize the urgency of developing international actions aimed at expanding spaces for multilateral engagement and building common positions on issues such as food security, climate change, and the transition to clean and green energy — topics of personal interest to Claudia Sheinbaum given her background, knowledge, and experience. Other topics, also of a global nature and requiring priority attention, include those related to health; contributions to the refinement and progress of International Law codification; the promotion of innovative instruments such as our Feminist Foreign Policy; and, of course, the formulation of initiatives and leadership in multilateral efforts to restore peace. It is important to pause and emphasize that the issue of international peace is one in which Mexico enjoys a reputation as a builder of bridges for understanding. Our advantages lie not only in our traditional pacifist and conciliatory policy but also in the credibility provided by our multiple memberships, which facilitate Mexico's voice and vote in many international organizations. This will undoubtedly contribute to identifying potential consensus and common positions in favor of sustainable peace. These same multiple memberships and Mexico's prestige can be translated into contributions to the urgent need to reform the UN to ensure an updated international system. Individually or collectively, the issues described constitute crucial topics for defining the international profile and image that will be built around the elected president and what her foreign policy will be during her 6-year term. However, it is worth pausing for a reflection that is undoubtedly relevant. The personal decisions that Claudia Sheinbaum makes regarding her trips abroad will carry significant weight. The future international trips of the Head of the Executive, in case they occur frequently, will be an important element to consider in terms of the international presence that Mexico wishes to adopt. In this regard, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro next November presents itself as a valuable first opportunity for Sheinbaum to appear alongside the leaders of the world's most important economies. The advantages of this trip are obvious, as it goes without saying that Mexico's foreign policy fully aligns with the three general priorities of Brazil's G20 presidency. As in this group, global forums are also expecting Mexico's voice to be represented at the highest level. Likewise, the profile of the future Mexican president necessitates highlighting the enormous environmental challenges and adaptability issues imposed by the evidence of climate change. In this context, it is worth noting that Sheinbaum inspires hope. The odds suggest that she could capitalize on international leadership grounded in her political commitment and academic background in this particular area. She seems to understand clearly that it is essential to advance in energy transition and will need to work towards and persuade others to increase public and private sector investments in the proportion of renewable energy within the country's energy matrix. The environmental policies and the focus on energy efficiency, due to their characteristics and implications of global shared responsibility, will occupy a significant portion of the time and space on both the domestic and international agendas during the next Mexican administration. Sheinbaum has the credentials and interest to make progress in the direction demanded by the global climate emergency and to take on a leading role. The work of Alicia Bárcena, the current Foreign Minister and future Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources, will be crucial in supporting and advancing global agreements on this issue. Bárcena's technical and practical knowledge of this agenda is a guarantee, and her appointment underscores the importance of the environmental agenda. As with the start of any new administration, it may be worthwhile to revisit the interpretation of the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy. This exercise will need to be carried out considering the limited flexibility that the tumultuous global landscape allows. Despite these contextual limitations, adherence to the principled foundation of our international actions should first and foremost offer a range of resources that can be translated into practical solutions for the successful conduct of Mexico's affairs beyond its borders. The principles are, in essence, fundamental elements for the conduct of foreign policy, and at the same time, they are subsidiary to the definition of strategies for Mexico's international actions. They are not, by definition, meant to be declarative priorities. Instead, they constitute the legal framework for acceptable, possible, and desirable actions and decisions, including their role in safeguarding and upholding the national interest. But they will be useful to the extent that they provide predictability, guide our international actions, signal the positions and definitions that should be valid in line with Mexico's international stature, contribute to our diplomatic tradition, and enhance Mexico's prestige and image. In other words, as our history has shown, their value does not lie in declarations but in their contribution to building global agreements with our international partners and allies, both bilaterally and within the framework of multilateral and regional organizations. For these principles to translate into practical advantages, it is desirable to accompany them with the exercise of soft power and the promotion of Mexico through our valuable cultural, natural, artistic, and historical heritage. To achieve all of the above and meet these objectives, it will be necessary to overcome the obstacle of resource scarcity. To be consistent with the goal of exercising a global presence that corresponds to Mexico's position on the international stage, it is imperative to strengthen action capacities and allocate resources. Additionally, organizational schemes must be developed to skillfully direct actions in both bilateral and multilateral arenas to fully achieve the aforementioned foreign policy objectives. The answer will largely lie in relying on and supporting the professionals of Mexican diplomacy and diplomatically skilled personnel who can act within the framework of our constitutional foreign policy principles and prioritize cooperation over conflict. Therefore, it is essential to recognize the need to affirm that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strengthened by the capabilities of the Mexican Foreign Service (SEM, in spanish). It is the oldest service in the country, which has gradually taken on more responsibilities. A service characterized by its committed and professional work in pursuit of Mexican interests and the best causes of humanity. The implementation of this foreign policy, based on the diplomatic tradition embodied by the SEM, should also promote the creation of cooperative synergies through the virtuous tripod of collaboration among universities and research centers, businesses and organized civil society, and the government. Despite its apparent abstraction, foreign policy is as important as domestic policy; this underscores the importance of investing effort and political will in consolidating Mexico's international actions as a State policy. It is clear that global challenges require cooperative actions and common solutions characterized by shared responsibility. Mexican diplomacy possesses sufficient experience, political sensitivity, skill, historical awareness, global perspective, a commitment to serving national interests, and intellectual capital to take the initiative in addressing the solutions that both the world and Mexico demand. The world is increasingly interdependent, interconnected, and globalized. It is also alarmingly radicalized, navigating through axiological debates, as demonstrated by election results in various parts of the world. Mexico needs to contribute to a more stable, orderly, and peaceful world. Finally, these reflections on the international agenda of Mexico's future president would be incomplete without mentioning the person who will lead the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been confirmed by Claudia Sheinbaum herself that Juan Ramón de la Fuente will take on this responsibility. In addition to his personality, which will open doors and contribute to a positive atmosphere for negotiations with his counterparts, his professional experience and shared scientific profile, together with Sheinbaum and Bárcena, combined with a global outlook, are among his strengths. His tenure in the SEM as Mexico's permanent representative to the UN in New York, along with his accumulated international experience working closely with this universal organization's family, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), bolster his credentials in guiding and advancing Mexico's interests in global forums. His appointment is seen as a positive development, and it raises expectations.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Good afternoon, everyone. It is an honor for me and for Argentina to participate in this Peace Summit organized by President Zelenski, with whom we have established a close relationship. We Argentinians are fully aware of the value of peace and democratic coexistence as guiding principles of life in society, and that is why I want to especially thank you for the invitation to this event. I want to express, on behalf of the Argentinian people, our utmost support for the people of Ukraine and our friend, President Zelenski, as defenders of the idea of freedom, we condemn any form of violence, whether between individuals, but particularly, we repudiate war as an illegitimate mean of resolving conflicts between nations. War, tragic by nature, can never be the answer to problems that should be resolved in the political sphere. War is not a legitimate tool for resolving conflicts; it is the last resort of a people who must defend themselves, nothing more, nothing less. We are defenders of the idea of freedom. Liberalism, as we understand it, is the respect and protection of the life projects of others, based on the principle of non-aggression, in defense of the right to life, freedom, and private property. As defenders of freedom, we can advocate for nothing other than peace among free peoples and nations. When we say that the guiding principle of our doctrine is the defense of individuals' lives, liberty, and property, we are expressing that there is a direct relationship between peace, commerce, and prosperity. There is no economic prosperity without free trade, and there is no free trade without peace. Free trade naturally promotes peace, because as Bastiat said, "where trade enters, bullets do not," or as Milton Friedman said, "I may hate my neighbor, but if he doesn't buy my product, I go bankrupt." As a fervent believer in the philosophical consciousness found in liberalism and peace, I make this brief defense of these principles today, as they seem to have gone out of fashion. I believe it is an important step for Argentina to be present first at the G7 Summit and now here at this Peace Summit. It is part of the great shift we are undertaking as a country after decades of turning our back on the world. There is a new Argentina that is once again embracing the ideas that, 150 years ago, made it one of the most prosperous countries in the world. There is a new Argentina that also seeks to reclaim the prominent role in the concert of nations that it once held and never should have abandoned. Know that Argentina will always be committed to defending the ideas that made great the West, and that for us, peace among free nations is not only a moral duty but also a necessary condition for prosperity. Thank you all very much.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Donald Trump is now having his lead whither before him as the fresh and young face of Kamala Harris steps forward for the Democrats. It is Trump’s to lose, and any continuation of current tactics are unlikely to be unhelpful. Only a few days ago most of us expected that Donald J Trump would win the battle to become the next president of the United States, beating an aging and befuddled Joe Biden by a substantial majority, according to the polls. Today, we ponder the implications of the first black and South Asian woman running for president and of America electing its first woman president in history. Kamala Harris has long been written off as a contender for the highest office by members of the commentariat, but many are now changing their tune. Within days of Biden renouncing the nomination, leading Democrats and commentators were lining up to give her their strong support and admitting that their earlier judgments could have been wrong. Late but unequivocal support came from Barack and Michelle Obama, who had allegedly been doubtful about her prospects or suitability for the office. In a call to Harris, captured on video, the former president said he “couldn’t be prouder to endorse [Harris] and to do everything he could to get her through the election and into the Oval Office.” Michelle Obama told Harris: “I am proud of you. This is going to be historic.” In a subsequent statement the Obamas said that “There is no doubt in our mind that Kamala Harris has exactly what it takes to win this election and deliver for the American people.” Within a week, everything had changed. Such is the nature of this year’s American presidential election. It is going to be a contentious, close and, almost certainly, dirty fight. But Kamala Harris, a former state prosecutor, has already shown she has more than enough steel in her to withstand whatever blows Trump and his acolytes choose to throw, and can give as good as she gets. The assaults will come but it is unlikely they will inflict any serious wounds, and the return to the White House that Trump longs for and had assumed was his for the taking is, in fact, his to lose. Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator at the Financial Times, sat down with political analyst Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of the National Interest magazine, after learning of the belated withdrawal of Joe Biden from the presidential race, to discuss how strong a candidate Kamala Harris would be. Heilbrunn told Rachman, “I think Harris will be an extremely formidable candidate who is well positioned to slice and dice Donald Trump on a variety of issues, ranging from abortion to gun control to women’s rights. And I don’t think he has any idea of what awaits him. …. The climate is perfect for Harris because she does represent the generational change that the country has been thirsting for. If the Republicans stick with Trump, who is almost 80 years old, they now have the candidate who is elderly and clearly the loopy, if not mentally challenged.” It is not hard to imagine what Mr Trump’s response might be, but were I asked, I would respectfully suggest that he avoids the use of personal invective against Kamala Harris – it will almost certainly backfire on him. Harris, for her part, would be well advised to do the same, avoiding bashing Trump as a convicted felon in favour of convincing the people that she can be trusted to defend American values at home and abroad, acknowledging voters’ struggle with inflation, continuing to speak out strong for women’s reproductive rights, and endorsing America’s global role and the rule of law. Of course, the decision is a matter for the people of the United States, not those of us who live in Europe or elsewhere. But suddenly we feel an uplift of spirit: there is a real contest to play out in the next 100 or so days. Having survived an assassination attempt, Mr Trump enjoys an unshakable hold on his party. But he can be beaten. His rambling and mean-spirited acceptance speech for the party’s nomination at the Republican convention showed the man for what he is. Kamala Harris has made a compelling start in raising funds for her campaign and attracting strong support. She was the beneficiary of Joe Biden’s obstinacy in relinquishing the fight for a second term; his delay in doing so averted an open primary, which she may have lost. Simply by being 59, she is now the face of a new generation of leadership, making Donald Trump, the oldest nominee in history. Despite all this, she remains the underdog in this race, and time is not on her side. Her status as the uncontested nominee for the Democratic party in the presidential election could lead quickly to recriminations if her campaign starts to go wrong. We must hope that Ms Harris can show the American people that she is up to the job of president, and offer them—and the world—hope.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After his visit to France, which is taking place these days, a crucial NATO summit, scheduled in Washington from July 9 to 11, awaits the American president, who, soon to end his term, must face the sad record of his foreign policy. Obviously, if we compare him to Trump, who was nothing but chaos and incompetence, there is no comparison. Nevertheless, if we are somewhat honest, we must recognize that the Biden years, as far as international affairs are concerned, will have been cruel. Cruel for America, which will have seen its influence diminish even more, and for the Western bloc in general, dragged along by it, to which the global South has ceased to give credit, in particular because of the double standards practiced in Gaza and Ukraine. The first major error was to condition the return of the United States to the Iranian nuclear agreement on Iran's strict compliance with the terms of 2015 and on new negotiations on ballistic missiles. While it was the United States that unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Vienna nuclear deal with Iran, under the Trump administration in 2018, leading Iran to increase its uranium enrichment and reduce its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it would have been more adroit for the Biden administration to make a gesture of goodwill towards Tehran by first returning to the agreement before making its legitimate demands. This would have changed nothing in substance, but everything in form, and we might not be here today. As imperfect as the agreement wanted by Obama was, and as unpleasant as the Mullahs' regime is, the JCPOA at least had the merit of having stabilized the region somewhat. Joe Biden's second mistake in international policy, this one of historic magnitude, of course concerns Ukraine. Readers of these correspondences know that, as the son of a Ukrainian woman and with family not far from the front line of the Minsk agreements, I condemned the illegal invasion led by Putin, a mafia president if ever there was one, on February 24, 2022. They may also remember that I pleaded, at the beginning of the war, for a “muscular” response from NATO, namely the creation of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, as Zelensky had requested. This was, in my opinion, the only way to calm things down and bring the Russian president, whose army had proven incapable of reaching kyiv, to the negotiating table. This is not the option that Washington has chosen. Instead, it has decided to arm the Ukrainian forces and push them to continue and continue a war that they will probably, and unfortunately, not be able to win, neither in the short term nor in the medium term – the long term does not exist since they will probably be abandoned by America by then –, due to a lack of sufficient men and equipment. Since we knew that without the risky deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian soil, which would probably have led to a new world war, the battle was lost in advance, it was irresponsible not to invite Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate when, in the fall of 2022, Ukraine found itself, if not in a position of strength, at least in a favorable position in the Donbass. A missed opportunity that may not come again. The Ukrainian defeat that seems to be looming would therefore not only be that of Kiev, but also that of the policy of an American president trapped in the prism of the Cold War. This policy, devoid of strategy, will have consisted largely of waging a proxy war with Russia, without any precise objective, other than that of pushing Ukraine to fight until an improbable “final victory”. Finally, third and fourth significant errors: the visionless approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adopted by the 46th President of the United States throughout his term, who has never really tried to relaunch the peace process and the two-state solution, as well as his lack of consistency in his relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he nevertheless detests. A lack of consistency that led Joe Biden and his entourage to condemn the massacres committed by the IDF in the Gaza Strip while providing it with the weapons necessary to perpetrate them and which forced the United States to build an artificial port at more than 320 million dollars in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gazans, because Israel subjects land access points to drastic controls. Other inconsistencies in current American diplomacy could be noted, such as the sanctions against Cuba, decided by Trump and maintained by his successor, who, however, when he was vice-president, had been at the origin of the resumption of relations with Havana. But the image that will remain indelibly attached to Biden's international policy, and which will have set the tone for the majority of Americans, is the debacle in Kabul in August 2021. Biden is obviously not responsible for the Afghan disaster as a whole, but this unprecedented rout of American power is his work and bears his signature. While nothing was forcing the United States into haste, it was he who stubbornly clung to the August 31 date to conclude the American withdrawal negotiated by his predecessor. This chaotic end was then perceived as a humiliating defeat, revealing the failure of American foreign policy and the mismanagement of conflicts. Paralyzed in front of their screens, the American people saw their military power, a power that they were told was unparalleled in human history, thwarted by "peasants armed with Kalashnikovs and riding mopeds," to quote a television commentator. Joe Biden is a sincere man, full of good intentions, but a man who is definitely a prisoner of the past and therefore overwhelmed by the geopolitical challenges of today's world. In the Ukrainian crisis, he has led America and its allies into a deadlock, while his adversaries have consolidated a Sino-Russian bloc, allied with North Korea and Iran, and supported by South Africa, as well as many other states around the world, perhaps even India. The November election will obviously not be played out on the international stage, but this theme will nevertheless be present in the debates. Joe Biden will then find himself confronted with a record that few of his predecessors suffered while campaigning for re-election. To find a similar situation, we have to go back to the time of Jimmy Carter.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In the popular imagination, the Caribbean is paradise, an exotic place to escape to. But behind the images of balmy beaches and lush hotel grounds lies a crisis, the likes of which its residents have never experienced. Caribbean islands are in a water crisis, and their governments have warned that water scarcity may become the new norm. Within the past five years, every island in the region has experienced some sort of water scarcity. For example, Trinidad is experiencing its worst drought in recent memory, and residents are under water restrictions through at least the end of June 2024, with fines for anyone who violates the rules. Dominica, considered the nature island of the Caribbean for its mountain rain forests, is seeing a significant decrease in freshwater resources and increasingly frequent water shortages. In Grenada, known as the spice isle, drought has affected water systems throughout the island. Jamaica is also facing water restrictions and has had to resort to water shutoffs in recent years, limiting water availability to a few hours per day in some areas. St. Vincent and St. Kitts have had to ration water. Barbados has experienced several water bans in recent years. In fact, recent data shows that the Caribbean is one of the most water-stressed regions in the world. I study the intersection of critical infrastructure and disasters, particularly in the Caribbean. Safe water is essential for all human activity and public health. That’s why it is important to understand the root causes of the water crises and to find effective, affordable ways to improve water supply systems. 3 reasons water demand is outstripping supply Changing precipitation patterns and droughts are straining Caribbean water supplies, but water demand has also been outstripping supply for a number of reasons. 1. Rapid urbanization and industrialization The Caribbean is one of the most rapidly urbanizing regions in the world. About three-quarters of its population lives in cities, and that percentage is rising, adding pressure on public water systems. At the same time, increased industrialization and commercialization of agriculture have degraded water quality and in some cases encroached on sensitive water catchment areas, affecting the soil’s capacity to retain water. This competing demand for limited fresh water has reduced stream flows and led to water being drawn down from sensitive sources. In Dennery North, a major farming community in St. Lucia, water shortages have left residents collecting water from rivers and other sources for their homes and farms. Unregulated extraction of groundwater can also worsen the problem. Many islands depend on groundwater. For example, 90% of water supply in Barbados comes from groundwater, while in Jamaica it is 84%. However, increasing demand and changes in annual rainfall patterns are affecting the ability of aquifers or groundwater to recharge. As a result, supply isn’t keeping up with demand. This is a huge problem for the island of Utila, located off the coast of Honduras, where the current rate of aquifer recharge is only 2.5% annually. For comparison, Barbados has a recharge rate of 15% to 30% of annual rainfall. 2. Water-intensive tourism industry It’s no secret that the Caribbean is a popular tourist destination, and tourist economies depend on vast quantities of water. Even during water rationing, water is diverted to hotels and other tourist-dependent sites first. That can leave local residents without water for hours or days at a time and facing fines if they violate use restrictions. Tourism not only increases the consumption of water but also the pollution of water resources. Building golf courses to attract more tourists further increases tourism’s water demand and runoff. 3. Weak water infrastructure governance Another problem water systems face is weak governance that leads to excessive loss of treated water before it even reaches the customer. A well-performing water utility will usually have water losses – known as nonrevenue water – below 30%. In the Caribbean, the average nonrevenue water is 46%, with some as high as 75%.   The reasons range from lack of appropriate management practices to metering inaccuracies, leaks and theft. Climate change and extreme weather worsen water insecurity These troubled water systems can struggle on good days. Worsening extreme weather, such as hurricanes and flooding, can damage infrastructure, leading to long outages and expensive repairs. The Caribbean is the second-most disaster-prone region in the world. The islands face frequent earthquakes, landslides, devastating hurricanes and other destructive storms. As global temperatures and sea levels rise, the risk of extreme weather and storm surge causing erosion, flooding and saltwater contamination increases.   Three months after Hurricane Maria hit in 2017, well over 14% of the Caribbean population was still without potable water. Hurricane Dorian in 2019 left Grand Bahama Utility Co. and the country’s Water and Sewerage Corp. with U$54 million in damages. A year after Dorian, WSC was “still working on restoring operations to pre-Hurricane Dorian levels.” How hybrid rainwater harvesting can help Improving water access in the Caribbean means working on all of those challenges. Better governance and investment can help reduce water loss from theft and leaks. Government and social pressure and educating tourists can help reduce waste at hotels and resorts. There are also ways to increase water supply. One involves being more strategic about how the islands use a practice the region has relied on for centuries: rainwater harvesting. Rainwater harvesting involves capturing rainwater, often from where it runs off rooftops, and storing it for future use. It can replace irrigation, or the water can be treated for household uses. Right now, rainwater harvesting is not managed as part of the islands’ centralized water management system. Instead, households bear the cost to finance, build and maintain their own systems. Finding technical support can be difficult, leaving households to contend with seasonal variations in water quantity and quality. That makes risks to drinking water safety difficult to identify. If rainwater harvesting were instead combined with central water systems in a managed hybrid water model, I believe that could help expand safe rainwater harvesting and address water issues in the region. It’s a relatively new concept, and integrating decentralized sources can be complex, including requiring separate pipes, but it has potential to reduce water stress. Decentralized sources, such as rainwater harvesting, groundwater or recycled gray water, could serve as backup water sources during shortages or provide water for nonpotable purposes, such as flushing toilets or irrigation, to reduce demand for treated water. Engineers in Australia are weighing the potential of hybrid water systems to help face the challenges of delivering secure, safe and sustainable water in the future. Fulfilling a human right in the islands The World Health Organization has declared that access to a sufficient, safe and reliable water supply is a fundamental human right, and that to accomplish this, water suppliers have a responsibility to provide adequate quantities of potable water. Hybrid water systems could help ensure water safety and security for island communities and improve the water systems’ resilience amid the human and environmental pressures facing the Caribbean.