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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Emmanuel Macron’s second Sorbonne speech showed that the French leader wants to shape a European legacy that will outlast his presidency. In doing so, he also highlighted the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship. In the end, it was a typical speech by French President Emmanuel Macron that members of the government and MPs, journalists and students heard on Thursday morning at the Sorbonne in Paris. It was too long, as the president himself admitted after about an hour. It was also too complicated, many listeners agreed: for almost seven years, translators, analysts, and often Macron’s own advisors have struggled with the metaphors and the convoluted three, four or five-point plans expounded by the president, who has been frequently accused in France of no longer being able to reach his fellow citizens. And yet it was a speech that no other current top politician in Europe would likely be capable of delivering. An emotional speech, sometimes angry and disappointed, then confident again, at times even rousing. A courageous speech, with a firework of analyses and proposals that addressed many pressing issues for the future of the EU. In between defense policy, the green and digital transformations of the economy and international trade policy, the protection of borders and asylum policy, and the threats to the liberal democracies of the West, one central concern dominated this long speech: the sovereignty of the European Union—an echo of his first Sorbonne speech of 2017, which has remained the obsession of the youngest and most pro-European president in French history. Disappointments in Defense Policy Right from the start, Macron measured himself against his own promises, particularly in security and defense policy, where strengthening the EU’s sovereignty is most urgently needed. In 2017, he proposed an EU intervention force, a defense budget, a doctrine for the armed forces, and the promotion of a strategic culture. Global political developments have since proved him right; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has left Germany and other countries “bare” in terms of security policy since 2022. However, the EU has still not implemented Macron's proposals and so the security of 450 million EU citizens could once again depend on a few thousand voters in US swing states in the November presidential election there. If Macron is to be believed, however, there have been successes since 2017 that need to be built on after the forthcoming European Parliament elections this June. In terms of security policy, he included the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which 13 EU member states have joined since 2017. The initiative only delivered a real operational impact in the form of the Takuba special forces mission, which fought terrorist groups in the Sahel from 2020 under French leadership. Berlin refused to take part in Takuba and it ended after a few months. The mission was also unable to prevent the EU from being ousted by Russia and other states in the Sahel and suffering a massive loss of influence. If Takuba is presented as a success, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is in bad shape. Achievements to Be Built on in Future By contrast, the initiative to strengthen European sovereignty in economic policy, which Macron predictably emphasized in his speech, was truly successful from a French perspective. The fact that the German government agreed to take on joint EU debt in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is seen across party lines in Paris as the president's biggest European policy victory since 2017. Macron recalled that the then finance minister and current German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, even spoke of a “Hamiltonion moment” in an interview, alluding to a permanent joint EU budget. For Macron, this remains the prerequisite for genuine EU sovereignty and therefore a goal for the remaining three years of his presidency.
 

France is confident that it will be able to persuade the German government to take this step in the coming years. In his speech, Macron referred several times to a recently published report by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, which contains proposals for strengthening the EU single market and for joint investments and is likely to influence the agenda of the next European Commission. While Macron was giving his Europe speech, journalists in Brussels were speculating about the French president's support for Mario Draghi, another former Italian head of government who has ambitions for the commission presidency. The current president, Ursula Von der Leyen, who is German, was not mentioned at all in the speech. Draghi will also present recommendations for increasing EU competitiveness—very much in line with Macron. Signals to the German Partner Joint debt issuance will inevitably lead to renewed conflict between Germany and France in the coming months. Perhaps that is why Macron praised the relationship with Germany so frequently, emphasizing the value of the Aachen Treaty signed in 2019, cooperation during the pandemic and two joint arms projects that have recently made progress. Nevertheless, the French president could not resist a few digs. He emphasized the importance of nuclear power for the EU’s energy supply, praised French initiatives to form a “nuclear alliance” at the EU level, and called for the expansion of the “Europe of the atom.” More surprising than this old conflict was his allusion to the cannabis legalization introduced by Germany’s coalition government. He said some partners believed that the liberalization of drug policy was right, while he believed it to be wrong. Instead, the authority of the state should be strengthened. Fault Lines in the Franco-German Relationship Beyond these policy issues, the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship also became evident in the second Sorbonne speech: Macron repeatedly emphasized the danger of the EU becoming a “vassal” of the United States, losing its independent voice in the world, and degenerating into a “corner of the West.” Macron said the era of free trade and globalization was coming to an end and he referred to the triad of European dependencies often cited in France these days, most of which are particularly aimed at Berlin: Russian gas, Chinese export markets, and US security guarantees. Both the US and China were increasingly ignoring international rules that only the EU abided by, he claimed. The EU was acting “naively,” endangering the competitiveness of its industries and risking being responsible for its own failure in the process. The palpable fear of decline that ran through Macron’s speech did not only refer to the economy. The old fear of the Europeans, especially the French, of being culturally dominated by the US also flared up in many places. The multilingualism of Europe's youth, which Macron had invoked in 2017, is in a bad way. Despite Brexit, English dominates the EU institutions in Brussels. This is unlikely to change in the future, on the contrary. Thanks to Netflix and TikTok, young people all over Europe speak the same language. The EU, Macron said, barely controlled this digital space anymore and produced no content. Even worse than the withering of multilingualism was the fact that the EU no longer offered any positive narratives. For observers of French politics, this clearly echoed Macron’s concerns about opinion polls ahead of the European elections. His party alliance is lagging far behind the far-right Rassemblement National party, whose 28-year-old leading candidate Jordan Bardella is particularly popular with first-time voters and on social media. Macron’s second Sorbonne speech was therefore also intended to boost the campaign of his party’s leading candidate in the European elections, Valérie Hayer. However, Macron confined himself to a few allusions, probably also because he is for the first time being perceived as a burden for his party’s chances in the election campaign. Departure from Macron While preparing his speech, Macron must have thought back more than once to his first Sorbonne speech in 2017. The new speech heralds the beginning of his farewell as president of France. He has around three years left to turn the optimistic promises made at the beginning of his first term into a European policy legacy that will outlast his presidency. At the end of his speech, Macron quoted Hannah Arendt: “The only way to influence the future” was to “make promises and keep them.” Macron has promised a lot since 2017. No matter what else one might think of him: he is a visionary, the likes of whom has not been seen in the German chancellery for many years. Perhaps that is why the great European, the former German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, who died in December, wanted Macron to give a speech in recognition of his life's work. However, Macron still owes the EU the second part of Arendt's quote—the fulfillment of promises—in many areas. He knows that. And so, in parts of his speech, he came across as a driven man, one who is running out of time. This was also evident in another quote that Macron placed at the end of his speech, which raises the biggest question of all, the answer to which is anything but certain in France: Referring to Ernest Renan’s famous lecture, also delivered at the Sorbonne, in 1882, entitled: “What is a nation?” Macron called for the EU to ask itself the same essential question. If he succeeds in providing this impetus over the next three years, the EU would once again have something to offer, including to the young listeners of his speech. And Macron would have kept his big promise on European policy.


Please note that this article is only available in English. Abstract: During the peak of the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, some states imposed export bans on medical goods to prevent their exportation during the emergency situation brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the manner in which this policy was applied caused much discontent especially between neighbouring countries and allies, particularly due to the confiscation of pre-ordered goods destined for countries also experiencing a crisis situation. This paper analyses the rise of inter-state tensions due to export bans at the peak of the pandemic and calls for the need to revise the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) export bans framework which currently contains a number of gaps exacerbating the problem and leaving a legal gap. The paper discusses those gaps in the WTO’s legal framework and highlights the areas in need of revision to avoid repeating the troubles of the past pandemic. Introduction Faced with political pressure and an extraordinary situation during the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, some countries resorted to the use of export bans as a tool to ensure that they have enough medical supplies for their population. However, their use of export bans also involved the confiscation of medical goods destined for delivery to their neighbours and allies. Such behaviour provoked discontent among those states expecting the delivery of their ordered medical supplies which were urgently needed as the death-toll from Covid-19 was sharply rising. This article starts by explaining the instances where confiscations using export bans occurred, namely between the United States and Germany, the US and Barbados as well as France and the United Kingdom. The paper also discusses the ‘near misses’ involving some European states where the export bans were initially used to confiscate the goods of other European countries, but then those goods were ultimately allowed to be delivered abroad to their delivery location. The discussion then shifts to the international legal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) governing the use of export bans and then shows how this legal framework is flawed in certain areas as it contains some gaps that may be exploited for conducting unconstrained confiscation operations. An overview of existing studies on export bans then reveals that this policy is already harmful in several ways (Evenett 2020a; Bown 2020; Barichello 2020). The article then ends with a concluding discussion emphasising how export bans are particularly harmful when used in relation to pre-ordered goods and reiterating the need for a revised WTO legal framework on export bans. Incidents of confiscations using export bans The three incidents below all occurred during the peak of the covid pandemic in 2020 when countries faced life and death situations. The three cases also involved the use of export bans to justify the confiscation of medical goods pre-ordered by other states. US vs Germany This incident occurred on 3rd April 2020 involving the United States and Germany (Crump 2020). This particular event captured a lot of media attention and included the release of high-level statements from both sides, with accusations of “modern piracy” being directed towards the US (BBC 2020a). The main issue here was that approximately 200,000 N95 masks that Germany had ordered for its police force were diverted to the United States (Selinger 2020). The masks shipment dispatched from China from an American company was diverted to the US during a transfer between planes in Thailand (Selinger 2020). Germany stated that the masks were confiscated in Bangkok by American officials and that those masks were ordered from a US producer (Crump 2020; DW 2020). The next day, the US company 3M denied Germany’s claims and told a German news agency that it did not have any paperwork regarding a shipment for Germany (DW 2020). However, Germany had made it clear on 3rd April that it had ordered and paid for those urgently needed masks from a US company (Berlin 2020). In fact, Germany referred to earlier accusations made by French officials against the US for buying France’s masks in China and added that “the U.S. administration has obliged the American conglomerate 3M by law to supply the U.S. with as many N95 respiratory masks as possible, such as those used in hospitals” and that “the group also manufactures in China” (Berlin 2020a). Significantly, the media was already reporting how the American company 3M “has been prohibited from exporting its medical products to other countries under a Korean-War-era law invoked by President Donald Trump” (BBC 2020a). The BBC (2020a) added that “on Friday [3rd April], Mr Trump said he was using the Defence Production Act (DPA) to demand that US firms provide more medical supplies to meet domestic demand”. Zooming in on Trump’s official statements during the Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing reveals significant information when he stated that:  I’m also signing a directive invoking the Defense Production Act to prohibit export of scarce health and medical supplies by unscrupulous actors and profiteers. The security and Secretary — the Secretary of Homeland Security will work with FEMA to prevent the export of N95 respirators, surgical masks, gloves, and other personal protective equipment. We need these items immediately for domestic use. We have to have them. […] We’ve already leveraged the DPA to stop the hoarding and price gouging of crucial supplies. Under that authority, this week, the Department of Health and Human Services, working with the Department of Justice, took custody of nearly 200,000 N95 respirators, 130,000 surgical masks, 600,000 gloves, as well as bottles — many, many, many bottles — and disinfectant sprays that were being hoarded (Whitehouse 2020, emphasis added).  Trump’s statements are important because they include the significant number of 200,000. Although Trump did not specify where those 200,000 N95 were confiscated from, the number remains important (BBC 2020a); it is the same number of masks that Germany reported. More importantly, the official statement also supports the fact that the DPA was used as a tool for confiscating goods. Trump’s statements describe these good as being ‘hoarded’ prior to their confiscation, however, the statements from Germany’s side indicate that those masks were intended for the German people. As significant as Trump’s statements were the ones made by Berlin’s Interior Senator who blamed the US for the confiscation of the N95 masks (DW 2020). In fact, he stated that:  We consider this an act of modern piracy. This is not how you deal with transatlantic partners. Even in times of global crisis, there should be no wild west methods. I urge the federal government to urge the United States to comply with international rules (Berlin 2020b; BBC 2020a).  As such, this incident saw direct statements from the German side, indicating that Germany saw the US’ behavior as deviating from international rules. Yet despite Trump’s statements in the press briefing, he directly addressed the German incident, denying the claims by saying that “there has been no act of piracy” (Crump 2020). Similarly, the spokeswoman for the American embassy in Bangkok denied that the US had knowledge of the mask shipment bound for Germany (Tanakasempipat 2020). Despite the US’ constant denial of state involvement, it remains a fact that an order of 200,000 masks destined for Germany was never delivered. Moreover, at no point did the developments mention non-state entities, but rather, the discourse had remained solely at the inter-state level and the main issue for discussion was the US’ use of the Defence Production Act to secure vital medical goods. US vs Barbados On the 5th of April, Barbados was brought into the picture when 20 ventilators donated to Barbados by a Philanthropist where “barred from exportation” by the US government (Barbados Today 2020). Moreover, as stated by the Barbadian Health and Wellness minister, these ventilators were already “paid for” (Barbados Today 2020). In explaining this incident, the Health minister clarified that “it has to do with export restrictions being placed on certain items” (Connell 2020). Thus, the Barbados incident was another instance where export bans were used as the justification for confiscating important medical supplies that were destined for another country. As for the US’ response to this incident, The Miami Herald wrote that a State department spokesperson’s email response “seemed to suggest that some previous media reports about seized medical exports may not be accurate” (Charles 2020). However, given that this is an incident relating to a Caribbean Island whose relations with the US are far from hostile, it is unlikely that this confiscation incident was characterised by significant inaccuracies. France vs UK Another instance of confiscation via export bans was reported during the pandemic, but this time, the location was Europe. The incident happened in March 2020 and had the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) as the victim and France as the accused. France’s actions were reported by Euronews when it stated that:  France has forced a face mask manufacturer to cancel a major UK order as the coronavirus-inspired scramble for protective gear intensifies. The National Health Service ordered millions of masks from Valmy SAS near Lyon earlier this year as COVID-19 threatened. But amid a global shortage, France earlier this week ordered the requisition of all protective masks made in the country (Euronews 2020). France’s export ban placed the company in an uncomfortable situation as it was prohibited from fulfilling the NHS’ order. Indeed, the company director commented that "the requisition does not allow any wiggle room for us to deliver to the NHS, but it is complicated because the NHS was the first client to order and uses our masks all year long” (Euronews 2020). It is important to note that four months later, the Guardian revealed that Valmy had a contract with the NHS that was signed in 2017 where this company “was required to deliver almost 7m FFP3 respirator masks to the UK at 17p per mask in a pandemic situation as soon as the order was activated” (Davies and Garside 2020). The NHS did indeed activate the contract in early February, however, the French “sweeping requisition decree” ultimately meant that France seized the masks within its borders (Davies and Garside 2020). Near misses: tensions in Europe The incidents below can be described as “near misses" as the accused states initially confiscated other state’s products, but eventually gave them back to their neighbours. The cases here are particularly useful for showing how the misuse of export bans has the potential to harm diplomatic relations between neighbouring states and allies, especially when the ban is placed over other states’ pre-ordered goods. Germany vs neighbours One of such instances occurred between Germany and Switzerland, but this time Germany was the accused. The incident was reported on the 9th of March 2020 and caused a strain in Germany’s relationship with Switzerland during the pandemic. The “diplomatic spat” started a week after the German government banned exports on most protective medical goods (Dahinten and Wabl 2020). Switzerland was particularly angered when 240,000 masks travelling to it were blocked from crossing the German border to enter Switzerland (Dahinten and Wabl 2020). Switzerland then called the German ambassador for “an emergency meeting” regarding this issue amid a very tense situation, especially when it hardly manufactures protective equipment itself (The Local 2020). Eventually after a call was scheduled between the leaders of both countries, Germany modified the ban on the 12th of March, adding exemptions and then removed it completely the following week (Hall et al. 2020). Germany’s diplomatic relations were equally weakening with another neighbour, but this time, the neighbour was a European Union (EU) member. The point of conflict was of course the export ban on protective equipment. The Austrian Economy minister commented on this ban by stating that:  It can’t be that Germany is holding back products for Austria just because they happen to be stored in a German location […] these products are for the Austrian market, and unilateral moves by Germany are just causing problems in other countries (Dahinten and Wabl 2020).  Such statements indicate that placing export bans on other states’ goods seriously angers the importing states as such bans make them feel that their interests are being completely ignored by their counterparts. France vs neighbours France also got a share of the criticism in March when it seized the supplies of the Swedish company Mölnlycke located in France after announcing an export ban on masks and other medical goods (AP 2020; Marlowe 2020). The conflict erupted between France and Sweden when the French ban was placed over Mölnlycke’s Lyon Warehouse that is responsible for distributing personal protective equipment to Southern Europe as well as Belgium and the Netherlands (Marlowe 2020). Significantly, the seized stock was composed of 6 million masks, all of which “had been contracted for”, including a million masks each to Italy and Spain (Marlowe 2020). Eventually, France allowed the shipments to go to Italy and Spain despite initial reluctance to do so (AP 2020). However, the easing of the situation was mainly due to the “crucial efforts” of Sweden’s prime minister who was thanked by Mölnlycke on the 4th of April for his role in the removal of the French export ban on the Lyon Warehouse (Mölnlycke 2020). It is important to note that this instance also made its way to the European Parliament on the 3rd of April where the French export ban was questioned and criticised as “yet another demonstration of the lack of European solidarity” (EP 2020). Thus, this specific incident resonated across the whole of Europe, and not in a positive way. Export bans: the GATT framework The international law on export bans falls under the competence of the WTO, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 which itself is mainly composed of the 1947 GATT agreement (GATT 1994). Significantly, article XI of the agreement titled ‘General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions’ prohibits the use of export bans when it states that:  No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party (GATT 1994).  However, the agreement leaves out certain exemptions where this prohibition does not apply, the relevant one here being “export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party” where the GATT clearly states that “the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extent to” it (GATT 1994, XI, 2(a)). The emphasis on the temporary application of such measures is important and is further clarified in the WTO’s timely report on “export prohibition and restrictions” issued at the peak of the Covid pandemic where it explained that:  The reference to a measure that is "temporarily applied" indicates that the carve-out applies to measures applied for a limited time, taken to bridge a "passing need". In turn, "critical shortage" refers to deficiencies in quantity that are crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage, or a turning point (WTO 2020, annex 1).  Of relevance to the export bans legal framework is also Article XX of the GATT (1994) titled “General Exceptions” that states how:  Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures […] (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  Thus, here the GATT agreement allows countries to use export bans when it is necessary to protect lives. The WTO’s report confirms the relevance of this exception to the Covid-19 situation when it explains that:  In the context of COVID-19, Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 could be used to justify a ban or quantitative restriction on the exportation of goods, so long as such a measure would be necessary and effective in contributing to protecting the health of that country's citizens (WTO 2020, Annex 1).  Thus, in terms of international law, countries are allowed to make use of export bans when faced with exceptional circumstances. During the Covid pandemic, the WTO member states did indeed make use of the exceptions and exemptions codified in the GATT agreement while informing the WTO of their new policies (Pauwelyn 2020, 107). However, when life is back to normal, their use remains illegal. Thus, overall, the export bans legal situation can be described as residing in a ‘legal grey zone’ whereby their use, though normally prohibited, can be justified and permitted in serious situations requiring them (Pelc 2020, 349). Nonetheless, it is important to note that the international legal framework here does not provide clarification for situations where the export ban exemption is placed on pre-ordered or pre-paid-for goods supposed to go to other countries. Indeed, the current legal framework suffers from a number of ambiguities as explained below. The first ambiguity relates to the term “destined goods.” When prohibiting export bans, article XI speaks of “export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party”. Thus, clearly, countries cannot put their hands on goods going to other countries for this would be illegal. However, the carve-out intended to “prevent or relieve critical shortages” is not detailed enough as to clarify if this also applies to goods “destined” for other countries (GATT, article XI, 2(a)). Even if the “destined” statement is applied to the exemption, the ambiguity remains. Much of the ambiguity rests on how to interpret the term “destined” from the export prohibition paragraph: is the term “destined” applied here generally whereby a company in Country X is an exporter and thus it’s goods will naturally be “destined” for other countries, or does the term imply goods that are ready-to-travel to other countries who have already placed an order or paid for goods? Clearly, it’s the second interpretation when applied as an exemption that has been the cause of conflict between the states in the previous section. However, regardless of which interpretation is intended in the GATT, instances where countries confiscate orders destined for other countries is seen as politically and morally unacceptable by the latter; “modern piracy” was how Germany described it. Thus, whatever the world leaders had in mind when they agreed to this exemption, clearly it now needs a lot of clarification. Secondly, there is ambiguity over the situation regarding donated goods. This is an important question especially given the Barbados case. Here the goods sold in country X were already bought in Country X (from a philanthropist in Country X) to be sent to country Y. Thus, a transaction had already taken place and the goods now belong to the philanthropist who is kindly giving this order to Country Y. Does an export ban apply to this situation? Logically, there is little to no justification for its application in this scenario, but the GATT agreement still needs to confirm this. Thirdly, there is ambiguity over the situation of “guest” companies. Given the globalised world we live in, does this exemption apply to international companies geographically located in country X? This was the main cause of tension between Sweden and France when France imposed the export ban over the Swedish company’s Warehouse. A logical consideration of this situation would lead to a ‘no’ answer to this question, but it is also acknowledged that the company may be subject to the geographical jurisdiction and the laws of the country that it is located in. Thus, it is important that the relationship between the host country and the foreign company is clarified when it comes to export prohibitions. Fourthly, there is ambiguity over the timeline of enforcing an export ban policy. The Covid crisis saw quick decisions being taken and implemented. This was particularly the case with export bans and was to the detriment of the importing states. In the case of the US-Germany incident, the confiscation of the masks on their way to Germany occurred hours before the US president announced invoking the defence production Act. In fact, the US policy on export restrictions became official on the 7th of April after the Federal Emergency Management Agency published it (Bown 2020). Significantly, FEMA stated that “this rule is effective from April 7, 2020 until August 10, 2020” (FEMA 2020). Thus, the obvious question arises: on what basis were the masks going to Germany confiscated? Similarly, on what basis were the ventilators destined for Barbados blocked by the US on the 5th of April? If the WTO steps in to advise on the implementation of such export bans, the situation would be greatly improved. Finally, there is ambiguity over the extent to which one country may enforce its policy, particularly in other countries. The US-Germany case was sensationalised by an “international hunt” for masks in Bangkok; thus, here the US officials imposed the export ban on an American company in a foreign country outside their national jurisdiction. However, the question remains, is this permissible under the GATT? The GATT articles did not go that far, but it is important that the international legal framework answers this question. Overall, several unanswered questions resulting from the brevity of the GATT’s article on export bans require answers. Filling in those gaps in the GATT would greatly improve the legal framework on export bans and ease tensions between member states. The next section takes a closer look at export bans, particularly their discussion in the literature and their unwelcome effects. The effects of export bans The academic literature on export bans mainly focuses on their effects, either on several states or on specific case-studies. Prior to Covid-19, a number of studies were mainly concerned with the effects of export bans following the food price crisis in 2007-2008 when countries made use of export restrictions on agricultural commodities in an attempt to stabilise domestic markets (e.g. Liefert, Westcott, and Wainio 2012; Dorosh and Rashid 2013; Timmer 2010). However, following the coronavirus pandemic, some studies have focused on their use on medical goods and agricultural goods as well as on their effects (Koppenberg et al. 2020; Pelc 2020; Evenett 2020b). Nevertheless, what unites almost all the studies on export restrictions is that they mainly agree that such bans do more harm than good. The recent studies on export bans are important because they demonstrate how this policy results in negative effects. For example, Simon Evenett (2020a, 831) in his recent work argues that “export bans on masks, for example, erode the capability of trading partners to cope with the spread of COVID-19. Rather than beggar-thy-neighbour, export bans on medical supplies effectively sicken-thy-neighbour”. He further analyses the effect of the export ban from the perspective of the developing countries cut-off from receiving advanced medical equipment such as ventilators, and explains that whenever this policy is implemented, “a significant share of the world’s population” is prevented from accessing this vital equipment (Evenett 2020a, 832). Evenett (2020a, 833) therefore recommends that governments consider other alternatives to export bans that “do not impede foreign purchases”. Significantly, Evenett also discusses the effect of the export curbs on the exporting country itself and argues that this policy is counter-productive:  Whatever temporary gain there is in limiting shipments abroad, the loss of future export sales will discourage local firms from ramping up production and investing in new capacity, which is exactly what the WHO has called for. In practical terms, during a pandemic this mean that an export ban “secures” certain, currently available medical supplies at the expense of more locally produced supplies in the future (Evenett 2020a, 832).  Internationally, export bans have also been shown to have severe effects on several countries at once. Chad Bown’s (2020, 43) work on the Covid pandemic demonstrates how “taking supplies off the global market can lead to higher world prices and reduced quantities, harming hospital workers in need in other countries”. He also cautions that their use during the pandemic may invoke a “multiplier effect”, similar to the one observed during the sharp price increases of agricultural goods in the 2000s when “one country’s export restriction led to additional global shortages, further increasing world prices, putting pressure on other countries to impose even more export restrictions” (Bown, 2020, 44). Richard Barichello’s (2020, 223) study on Covid-19 and the agricultural sector also highlights the negative effect of export bans while observing how some countries have already imposed export restrictions on staple goods such as rice and cereal products during the pandemic. Barichello acknowledges that such export bans could have a positive effect on countries such as Canada if a consequence of such a ban increases the price of a commodity that it exports. However, he also explains the gravity of the adoption of export bans during current times when he writes that:  The distributional effects of adding export restrictions will, like the COVID-19 crisis itself, fall most heavily on the poor in importing countries by reducing trade, raising food prices, and reducing food security in all but the export countries of that commodity (Barichello 2020, 223). Export bans have also been shown to have “intangible” negative effects that are also significant. Hoekman, Firoini and Yildirim’s (2020) study focuses on export bans from an “international cooperation” perspective and emphasises the foreign policy damages resulting from export bans. The authors write that “in the case of the EU, the immediate policy responses of some member states may have damaged the European project by eroding trust among European partners” (Hoekman, Firoini and Yildirim 2020, 78). Simon Evenett (2020b, 54) adds that export restrictions are a “gift to those economic nationalists abroad that want to unwind or shorten international supply chains”; such nationalists can then claim that relying on the foreign market is unreliable. It is significant that the WTO itself discusses a similar point in its Covid-19 report on export restrictions when it lists the following as part of the “other possible consequences” of export bans:  An erosion of confidence in the multilateral trading system, in particular if restrictions negatively impact the most vulnerable, especially least-developed countries, whose healthcare systems are already strained. It would be difficult for importing members to trust a system that fails to produce tangible benefits in times of crisis and may lead to general calls to ensure that production of medical and other products only take place at the national level (WTO 2020, 9).  The WTO (2020, 9) also highlights how from a health-perspective, export bans may ultimately weaken the fight against the coronavirus when it states how: “given its global nature, if some countries are not able to combat the disease, this coronavirus, or mutated strains of it, will inevitably recirculate and contaminate the populations of all countries, including those imposing the export restrictions”. Thus, an export ban on medical goods is not the soundest policy to implemented during a pandemic. Effects of export ban confiscations & concluding thoughts It is important to consider the consequences of using export bans specifically as a confiscation technique. The points raised above are still of high relevance. However, there are three main disadvantages that are particularly prominent when countries place export bans on other states’ goods. Firstly, enforcing this policy on the goods of other states creates severe tensions between countries at different levels. The first one is at the diplomatic level whereby the officials of country Y express their discontent to officials of country X. Such tensions then easily transmit to other places. Indeed, at the citizenry level, these tensions take the foreground as the citizens in country Y read the news and frown at what their neighbouring states are doing to them in times of need. Thus, the misuse of export bans can be seen as a threat to diplomacy, international trade, and to the principles of establishing friendly relations between states and peoples. Secondly, shortages and stress are another effect of this policy when enforced on other states’ goods. When countries place orders, it is usually because they have a need for those orders. When those orders are then confiscated, those expecting the orders are left empty-handed and in a stressful situation. The stress is generated after the realisation that their plans for fighting the virus have been compromised; orders placed months or weeks ago will now not reach their borders despite those orders being just hours away from arrival. In the above cases, the German police and the NHS had to deal with the unpleasant news that their mask orders will not arrive. Such export bans create a difficult situation for the importing nations and for their institutions, as they then try to seek alternative suppliers at a very short notice. Finally, the implementation of this policy on other states’ orders sends worrying empirical signals. Scholars of IR when they first learn about international politics naturally ask whether the world we live in is a very “realist” world characterised by “survival of the fittest” instinct, or whether it is a world that accommodates international law and inter-state cooperation, despite anarchy. This is the essence of the classical debate between Realists and neo-Liberal Institutionalists (Mearsheimer 1994; Walt, 1997; Ikenberry 2011; Martin 1992). It is reassuring that in the previous discussion, the WTO still had a role to play. The European Commission also tried to solve the disputes arising between its members over the export bans (EC 2020). However, despite those interventions, it was clear that the cause of the problem was the unilateral export ban policy that was quickly being implemented at the discretion of the member states over what was destined for other states. As such, there is an urgent need for the WTO to revise its export ban legal framework to prevent the above scenarios from ever repeating in the future. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea, or the DPRK, which has been under discussion since January 2024, could not only be perceived as a reciprocal visit after the North Korean leader’s visit to the Russian Far East in the fall of 2023 but also as an extremely important step in bolstering relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. Vladimir Putin visited North Korea in 2020, and along with the inter-Korean summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in 2000, this was a landmark event that allowed the DPRK to overcome its foreign policy isolation and Russia to embark on its “pivot to the East.” One could say that the Russian president’s visit to a country, which the Collective West had brandished as a “pariah” state, was a demonstration of Moscow’s reluctance to join the collective condemnation of the Pyongyang regime. Russian-North Korean relations have seen both ups and downs due to Russia’s view on the DPRK’s aspiration to join the nuclear club. On the one hand, Moscow understands Pyongyang’s position, but on the other hand, it does not accept it because it would destroy the existing world order built on the authority of the UN and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moscow has rather tried to play by the established international rules, and although Russian and U.S. diplomats could argue at length about the extent of sanctions following another nuclear test or missile launch, the idea that every step by the DPRK toward becoming a nuclear power would generate opposition was never questioned. However, since the late 2000s and even more so since the early 2010s, the world has been moving towards a new model of the world order, or rather, it has been a gradual transformation of the old one. The confrontation between the “Collective West” and the “Global South” intensified; the UN and other structures began to turn into a system of justifying double standards, losing the role of an impartial arbiter; and war began making its comeback to politics. In this precarious environment, we see the malfunction of the accepted mechanisms and, although the contours of the new world order have not yet been defined, many elements of the traditional structure of global security are losing their significance. The common political, economic and information space is giving way to the era of blocs, which, due to the competition in the Russia-China-U.S. triangle, inevitably affect Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, the “Asian NATO,” which was being formed after the trilateral summit in Camp David, seeks to justify its existence by a hypothetical alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang or Pyongyang and Beijing, positioned as an alliance of authoritarian regimes threatening democracy and democratic values. Meanwhile, this cooperation is unproven, to put it mildly, and it is based on innuendos or facts that at best (highly likely) can be regarded as circumstantial rather than direct evidence. Note that the intensification of speculations about some secret arms deals between Moscow and Pyongyang did not begin on the eve of Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia. This narrative has been on since June-August 2023, against the backdrop of the apparent failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which had suffocated from a shortage of ammunition, among other reasons. This is why the campaign could be viewed as putting pressure on Seoul to reconsider its policy on the supply of ammunition and lethal weapons to Ukraine. In this context, one of the options for further unfolding of events is the so-called “self-fulfilling prophecy” coming true, when cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang may become a response to the actions of their adversaries within the framework of the “security dilemma.” North Korean statements in late 2023 and early 2024 about a radical change in inter-Korean policy and rejection of the unification paradigm caused a stir in expert circles and were even positioned as preparations for a forceful solution to the inter-Korean problem, even though it was more like a model of “non-peaceful coexistence” – something similar to the Soviet-American confrontation in the Cold War era. Meanwhile, South Korean President Yun Seok-yol’s speech in honor of the March First Movement for Independence in 2024, where he actually declared that the liberation of Korea would be fully accomplished only after the elimination of the DPRK, which should take place with the help of the international community, went virtually unnoticed, although in terms of inflaming regional tensions this was a much more serious step. As a result, a more substantial revision of Moscow’s policy toward Pyongyang is expected from the Russian president’s visit to North Korea. The most radical forecasts concern the legitimization of military or military-technological cooperation and, more importantly, Russia’s withdrawal from the regime of international sanctions against the DPRK. As preliminary steps in this direction, Western experts refer to Russia’s position in the UN Security Council, where it first blocked the attempts of the United States and its satellites to further increase sanctions pressure on Pyongyang, and then, using its veto, paralyzed the official group of experts that formally monitored the sanctions regime and its violations that, in fact, proved to be nothing else than another instrument of pressure and name-calling. In this context, Russia’s withdrawal from the sanction regime seems logical, but Moscow is now seriously weighing the risks. On one side of the scale is the benefit of expanding cooperation with the DPRK, as many of its areas are currently blocked by sanctions. On the other is restrictions through the UN, since a situation when a permanent member of the Security Council, which voted in favor of sanctions, openly violates the relevant resolution, will clearly become a reason for a new round of pressure. The arguments that Russia as an aggressor should be expelled from the UN or deprived of its veto power periodically leak into the public domain, and these will have to be reckoned with. That is why Russia’s position currently boils down to the fact that it is against new sanctions, but intends to comply with the old ones, although proceeding from the principle of “what is not forbidden is allowed.” Therefore, when speaking about further expansion of cooperation between the two nations, it is necessary to divide this cooperation into several levels of involvement, the depth of each to depend on a whole set of factors. First of all, the level of confrontation between Russia and the Collective West, the regional situation in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, and, to a much lesser extent, on the military and political situation on Russia’s borders. It is not quite likely that Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un sign a number of documents “on the transition to the next level” straight off. Rather, this will be a matter of developing a road map, where a system of cooperation will be worked out in advance, depending on the further development of the situation, with preliminary preparations being made first. The first level of cooperation involves advances in existing areas for collaboration – their intensification is already clearly visible from the increased contacts between the two states in certain areas. First of all, this is the search for ways of economic cooperation that would not violate sanctions or exploit the “gray zones,” at best, to avoid direct accusations. Such work is carried out, including through an intergovernmental commission. The intensification of economic ties, which Western experts pass off as the consequences of the “arms deal,” indirectly proves this, since we are talking about the movement of ships with unknown cargo on board. Second, it is the further development of transportation and communication infrastructure: we can expect not only the construction of a cross-border road bridge and the emergence of a regular railroad service, but also the arrival of Russian cellular communications in the DPRK or the connection of certain segments of the DPRK to the Russian Internet. It is not a question of replacing the existing intranet with something more, but those who have the right or ability to go online will do better. At the same time, cooperation of hacker groups or the training of North Korean specialists in such things will not be possible at the current level of cooperation, but only at the next level, where both countries will be galvanized by a common threat. Third, there are prospects for cooperation in technology. Yet, so far, we’ve been talking not so much about transferring offensive military technologies to the North, but rather about North Korean satellites being launched on Russian carrier rockets, for example, or Russian computing power helping calculate the processes by which a nuclear test will be dictated only by political rather than technological necessity. Fourth, there are prospects for cooperation in tourism, which does not fall under sanctions, given that the DPRK has been investing in attempts to create appropriate infrastructure organized according to European standards. The first group of tourists has already started visiting the DPRK, and if the “first pancake” is not a blob, more tourists will flock to the DPRK from Russia than even from China, as the Chinese have not been visiting Pyongyang too eagerly, despite the fact that the tourist cluster in Wonsan and the modernized cluster in the Kumgang Mountains were originally intended for them. Finally, cooperation in education, healthcare, sports, and culture is very important. Contacts at the level of ministers or their deputies are the clearest sign of diplomatic activity intensification in the spring of 2024. In the future, it may even be a question of saturating North Korean medical centers with Russian equipment or opening a branch of a Russian hospital in Pyongyang with Russian medical staff and modern equipment, designed not only for Russians or other foreigners, but also for the local population. The next level of engagement implies that Moscow and Pyongyang may enter into covert cooperation that violates the sanctions regime but does not directly disregard the UN resolution. Here, it is primarily a matter of using North Korean labor, which has earned a good reputation for its combination of value for money, the lack of criminal inclinations, and relative invisibility not only in Russia’s Far East. Some Russian officials have already announced their desire to import North Korean construction workers, so some Western experts have already accused the countries of organizing such cooperation under the guise of importing students, for example, who, according to Russian law, have the right to work part-time. Other potential areas of cooperation include increased supplies of energy or prohibited dual-use goods that would nevertheless be used for peaceful purposes. In essence, everything that the Western media and biased experts have long accused Moscow and Pyongyang of doing would finally become a reality at this stage. The next level of engagement implies that Russia may bluntly despise the sanctions regime in favor of a full-scale cooperation with the North, including in the military-technical domain. In particular, North Korean construction workers may openly travel to Russia’s Far East under this arrangement. As for military-technical cooperation, Russian carriers will then start launching satellites for dual or military purposes, plus Moscow may start transferring something useful to Pyongyang – more likely elements of technology rather than military equipment. In the extreme case, we could talk about single samples as prototypes for subsequent localization. The same may apply to the transfer of North Korean technologies to Russia, not so much as direct supplies of weapons or armaments, but rather as the creation of opportunities for screwdriver assembly or other options of creating equipment clones. Theoretically, it is possible that the DPRK, while rearming its military units and switching from old to new equipment – for example, from 152 mm caliber to 155 mm caliber – will be dropping “obsolete ammunition” to Russia. However, such options look highly unlikely, because the possibility of an inter-Korean conflict is not going anywhere, and the experience of the North Korean Defense Forces shows how quickly peacetime ammunition stocks are depleted in the event of their use by the standards of a full-scale military conflict rather than a local skirmish. The final level of cooperation, where all restrictions are lifted, can only be possible in case of extreme necessity, as the author believes, because it is associated with too high a level of associated risks. Thus, despite the fact that some representatives of Russia’s patriotic camp would like to take literally the statement that “Russia and the DPRK are in the same trench,” any option of internationalization of the conflict on the Russian side, in the author’s opinion, is not worth the consequences. First, it opens the door for similar actions on either side, which is fraught with volunteers from NATO appearing in sufficient numbers. Second, this would cause logistical and communication problems. Third, a significant part of the Russian mass consciousness will perceive such a step as a weakness of the Kremlin, failing to complete the SMO without external assistance. That is why the author believes that the consequences of the Russian president’s visit to the DPRK are unlikely to have a quick and direct impact on the course of the special military operation. Moreover, in any case, the implementation of the summit decisions will take some time, and the more extensive they are, the more time will be needed to put them into practice. And given the international situation, it will be difficult to separate the long-term consequences of the summit from the reaction to a possible change in the current situation. Anyway, when Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea takes place, this will be a landmark demonstration of the new level of relations between the two nations and Moscow’s diplomatic support for Pyongyang. Specific agreements may well be classified as secret, which is why “Scheherazade stops the allowed speeches,” preferring to deal with the analysis of events that have already taken place.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Last March 16th, the Election Commission of India informed the public media about the schedule for the upcoming legislative elections in the country for the period 2024-2029. However, this announcement does not mark the beginning of the Indian electoral process, as since 2023, different national political parties had been shaping their candidates and, in some cases, initiating their political campaigns in preparation for the elections. The schedule, announced by the electoral authority, is divided into seven phases, and will be extended from April 19th, 2024, until June 1st of the same year, with vote counting taking place on June 4th. India’s independence from the British Colonial Empire in 1947 marked the beginning of a profound process of political, economic, and social transformations that determined the life of the society and the surrounding countries. The founding fathers of the country, not without setbacks, promoted the drafting and subsequent approval of a constitution that recognized the secular character of the country, reinforcing the idea of a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multi-religious India. Additionally, in the text, the foundations of the country's political system were declared, and consequently, its electoral system. India’s political and electoral system: General aspects India is a federal parliamentary democratic republic, so its political system is a combination of the parliamentary and presidential systems with a greater emphasis on the parliamentary system, where the President is the head of state, and the Prime Minister is the head of government. The President is elected by an Electoral College composed of members of Parliament and cannot act without the approval of the Council of Ministers, who are chosen by the Prime Minister. This is why the Prime Minister is more important than the President. The Indian Parliament is bicameral, meaning it consists of the ‘Lok Sabha’ (House of the People or Lower House) and the ‘Rajya Sabha’ (Council of States or Upper House). The ‘Rajya Sabha’ comprises 238 members, representing the States and the Union Territories, and 12 members designated by the President. Candidates are elected by the Legislative Assembly of the States and Union Territories through the single transferable vote system via proportional representation. On the other hand, the Members of Parliament of the ‘Lok Sabha’ are elected every five years directly by the electorate; the Prime Minister is typically the leader of the party with the most seats in the ‘Lok Sabha’. The party which has the majority of the 543 seats in the Lower House of Parliament can form a government and appoint a Prime Minister from among its winning candidates. In case that no party holds a simple majority, different parties form coalitions until they acquire the necessary number of seats to elect a Prime Minister. [1] While some alliances are formed before elections, many alliances are negotiated after results are announced and may even change during a government's term. The legal framework to conduct elections specifies that the supervision, direction, control, preparations, and behavior of the elections shall be established in the Election Commission, independently of the incumbent government (Article 324). The Election Commission also establishes the principle of adult suffrage (Article 326) and makes a general stipulation regarding the reservation of seats for backward castes, tribes, and the so-called Anglo-Indians (Articles 330-333). A person is qualified to be a candidate for election if they are over 25 years old for the ‘Lok Sabha’ and 30 for the ‘Rajya Sabha’, in addition to being a voter in a parliamentary constituency (Times of India, 2024b). The seats are distributed among the states in proportion to their population: more people mean more seats. Approximately 25% of the seats are constitutionally reserved for members from two disadvantaged communities: the Scheduled Castes (SC), also known as Dalits, and the Scheduled Tribes (ST), which represent India’s tribal populations or Adivasis. Eighty-four seats are reserved for SC candidates, and forty-seven seats are reserved for ST candidates (Times of India, 2024a). In these electoral constituencies, only candidates from the protected groups can participate in the elections, although all eligible adults can cast their votes. Although the Indian Parliament recently passed a new measure to reserve one-third of legislative seats for women, the implementation of this law has been postponed until after 2024. 2014 and 2019 general elections in India. A comparative analysis India’s unique characteristics make any political process there highly complex. The extensive geographical dimension, the contrasts between different climates and terrains, the remote nature of settlements, especially in mountainous regions, and the challenge posed by large, overpopulated cities, make election, whether state or general, become an event of immense proportions. In fact, general elections in India are considered the largest political, democratic, and logistical exercise in the world. In the electoral process of 2014, according to the numbers published by the Pew Research Center, there were 788 million voters, including nearly 150 million who would have been eligible to vote for the first time. In a survey conducted by the same Center between December 2013 and January 2014, the Indian public, by a three-to-one margin, preferred the BJP over the then-ruling INC. Additionally, 60% of the respondents stated they had a very favorable opinion of Modi, while only 23% held the same opinion about Rahul Gandhi, the INC candidate (Stokes, 2014). From April 7th to May 12th, 2014, the Sixteenth General Elections were held in India, they were divided into ten stages across the country's 35 states and Union Territories. Voting took place for representatives from 543 constituencies, with 412 for the general population (General), 84 for the Scheduled Castes, and 47 for the Scheduled Tribes. The total number of candidates for these constituencies was 8,251, of which 7,577 were men, 668 were women, and 6 were "others". The average number of candidates per constituency was 15. There were 927,553 polling stations distributed across the country. The electoral roll consisted of 834,082,814 citizens, with 553,020,648 voters participating, reaching an effective electoral participation rate of 66.30% (Moreno Hernández, 2015). The BJP campaign, which presented Narendra Modi for the first time as its strongest candidate for Prime Minister of the country, was characterized by building an image around Modi as the "development man" — the man who would facilitate comprehensive development in India, having successfully implemented his governance model for over 10 years as Chief Minister in Gujarat. The campaign capitalized on popular discontent and sought to focus its message on the upper and middle classes, as well as the youth, through a developmental discourse that extensively utilized information technologies such as social media and unprecedented media bombardment in India at that time. Modi personally addressed over 400 rallies in a span of 7 months, traveling more than 300,000 kilometers to participate in nearly 200 campaign events, while the holographic projections of his figure and broadcasts of his speeches reached nearly all Indian constituencies (Muralidharan, 2014), effectively transforming the parliamentary campaign into what resembled a presidential-style elections. On May 16th, 2014, the total vote count was conducted. The results showed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the BJP, as the clear winner, securing most of the constituencies, specifically 336 out of 543, which represents 61.8% of the total seats. It is noteworthy that the BJP alone won 282 seats, accounting for 31.34% of the total votes, meaning that out of the 834,082,814 citizens eligible to vote, only 171,660,230 decided to cast their ballots in favor of the BJP. However, the indisputable victory of the right-wing requires a deeper analysis, as the outcome in 2014 does not compare to the 1984 elections when the Congress Party won 414 seats. This highlights the need for caution when referring to the "orange wave" as a pan-Indian phenomenon (Moreno Hernández, 2015). Voter turnout in Indian elections tends to be high: the parliamentary elections of 2019 saw a 67% turnout of the total eligible population. Votes are cast electronically in over a million polling stations, requiring around 15 million employees during voting. To reach all possible voters in villages and isolated islands in the Himalayas, electoral officials travel by any means available, including trains, helicopters, horses, and boats. In 2019, the elections took place in seven phases between April 11th and May 19th, with all votes being counted on May 23rd. Typically, the first phase of elections is held in a specific set of geographic regions, and subsequent phases gradually move across the country to cover other regions. Without primary elections, party leaders have complete control over the nomination of their candidates. If candidates fail to secure the party endorsement, they may run as independents, putting them at a disadvantage compared to party-backed candidates. Out of 543 Members of Parliament elected in 2019, only four were independent candidates (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). While they are considered the elections with the highest number of voters in the world, due to being the most populous country globally, this exercise is also considered one of the most expensive. According to studies, in the 2019 elections, political parties spent over $7 billion. Specifically, parties and candidates spent approximately $8.7 billion to attract more than 900 million eligible voters (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). Regarding the total number of candidates fielded and the electoral roll, in 2019, 8,054 candidates representing 673 parties contested the elections to have the opportunity to become Members of Parliament. Nearly 615 million people (67.4% of Indians) voted in 2019: this was the highest voter turnout recorded. For the first time in history, the persistent gender gap between male and female participation disappeared. In these elections, the ‘Bharatiya Janata Party’ (BJP), in power since 2014, increased its strength by 21 seats to 303 in the ‘Lok Sabha’, securing 38.55% of the votes cast. The number of seats won by its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) also rose to 350, but fell short of a two-thirds majority, and its percentage of votes increased to 45%. In monetary terms, the BJP received over 73% of the declared donations from India's largest political parties in 2017-2018 and over 94.5% of the electoral bonds, totaling at least £19 million. Overall, it is estimated that all political parties spent a total of over £6.7 billion, more than three times the cost of the United States presidential elections in 2016 (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). Mistakes made by the principal opposition party, the Indian National Congress (INC), led to it winning only 52 seats out of 545, just eight more than in the 2014 elections. This was a result of differences among political leaders within the organization, a complacent approach to its program in the elections, betting on its voters repeating the trend of rejecting the incumbent government, and a refusal to accept pre-electoral alliances with regional parties in key States (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). India’s 2024 General election: approximations On March 16th, 2024, the Election Commission of India publicly announced the schedule for the ‘Lok Sabha’ elections to appoint the 543 seats. This schedule will be implemented nationwide in seven phases, from April 19th to June 1st, with the vote count taking place on June 4th, including assembly elections, by-polls, and general elections. The current government’s term ends on June 16th, 2024 (Hindustan Times, 2024a). Additionally, the data provided reveals that in this political process, the electoral roll amounts to a total of 968.8 million voters, of which 497 million are men and 471 million are women. It was also reported that 18.4 million voters fall in the age group of 18 to 19 years, 26.3 million are new voters, and 48,044 are senior citizens.  Source: The Times of India Similarly, according to the mandate of the Supreme Court of India, data related to electoral bonds issued to each contesting party between April 12th, 2019, and January 11th, 2024, were published. The figures revealed that the largest recipient of donations was the BJP, and the largest national donor was the company Future Gaming and Hotel Services. This company accounted for bonds worth 1,365 million rupees distributed among several parties. The second-largest donor was Megha Engineering and Infrastructure Limited (MEIL) with 966 million rupees, of which 60.5% went to the BJP. In financial terms, the BJP received a total of 6,061 million rupees, with MEIL being its largest donor, followed by Qwik Supply Chain and Vedanta. For the INC, the largest donor was Vedanta with 125 million rupees, followed by Western UP Power Transmission Company Limited and MJK Enterprise, amounting to a total of 1,422 million rupees (Hindustan Times, 2024b). Currently, in India, there are two main coalitions competing in the 2024 general elections: the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), both of which include several parties. The NDA, led by the BJP, is a coalition of right-wing conservative parties formally established in 1998 to counter the then-dominant INC. Prominent parties in the alliance include the National People's Party (NPP), Shiv Sena, Janata Dal, Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), Janata Dal, Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party (RLJP), and the currently dominant Bharatiya Janata Party since 2014. The candidate for prime minister is the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has stated the intention of securing over 400 seats for the NDA in these elections (Mint, 2024). The INDIA bloc was formed in 2023 by 26 opposition parties. It is currently led by the president of the INC, Mallikarjun Kharge, who is also the leader of the opposition in the Upper House of the Parliament. Other parties comprising the bloc include the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), Aam Aadmi Party, Samajwadi Party, Shiv Sena (Uddhav Balasaheb Thackeray), Communist Party of India (Marxist), and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (WION, 2024).  Source: Hindustan Times On Friday, April 5th, the INC released its manifesto, this time focusing on equity, youth, women, farmers, workers, the Constitution, the economy, federalism, national security, and the environment. Its 2019 counterpart, mainly focused on the economy and livelihoods, also committing to cover government contracts and eliminate regulations to start a business. It also promised a budget for farmers and pledged to make the non-payment of agricultural loans a civil crime (Hindustan Times, 2024c). On the other hand, for the 2019 general elections, the BJP's electoral manifesto (Sankalp Patra) addressed issues related to nationalism, agriculture, infrastructure, governance, and zero tolerance towards terrorism. Similarly, commitments to amending the citizenship law to protect religious minorities from neighboring countries and the revocation of Article 370 of the Constitution addressing the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir and its change to a semi-autonomous position were fulfilled during the party's and Modi's mandate over the last 5 years. In the 2019 manifesto, the BJP also promised a pension scheme for all small and marginalized farmers in the country, a macroeconomic stability, as well as job generation and gender equality (Hindustan Times, 2024c) Final Considerations The main surveys point to the BJP with Modi at the helm as the primary winning force in the elections. While the intention of both his party and the alliance he leads to conquer more than 400 seats is somewhat ambitious and hasn't been achieved since 1984 when the INC won 144 seats, the NDA is poised as the clear winner in these elections. On the other hand, India is divided by rivalries, political defections, and ideological clashes. "Analysts say that discussions about the allocation of seats within the alliance have cooled off, partly due to the demands of the Congress Party to field its own candidates in most seats, even in states where it is weak" (Agrawal and Anand, 2024). The truth is that the 2024 elections in India are shaping up as an exercise where the BJP and its coalition appear as clear winners. At the same time, it is very challenging for opposition leaders and parties to confront Modi, who after 10 years of national governance and 13 years of state administration, has demonstrated mostly successful implementation of his governance model. The INC and INDIA start from a very disadvantaged position when facing an overwhelming media machinery, a government that promotes laws to silence opposition, thus playing on favorable ground. Additionally, it's worth noting the growing popularity of the Prime Minister, who ranks as one of the most popular leaders worldwide with a 78% national approval rating. In a politically and religiously polarized India, where the government has been promoting an economic, social, and religious agenda aligned with the leading party for the past 10 years, and with a powerful technological and media mechanism, it is unthinkable to imagine that Modi will not secure his third consecutive term at the helm of the country. References Agrawal, Aditi y Anand, Utkarsh (2024). Electoral bonds: Donor-party link public after SC push. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/poll-bonds-donor-party-link-public-after-sc-push-101711046938707.html Mint (2024). BJP’s first list of candidates for Lok Sabha elections 2024 to be out today. https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/lok-sabha-elections-2024-bjp-first-list-to-be-out-today-11709377057949.html Rai, Indrajeet (2024). How BJP’s strenghts and weakness match up with Congress’s. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lok-sabha-elections-2024-pm-modi-rahul-gandhi-bjp-congress-how-bjps-strengths-and-weakness-match-up-with-congresss/articleshow/108614186.cms?utm_source=wa_channel&utm_medium=notification#google_vignette Times of India (2024b). Congress releases fourth list of 46 candidates for Lok Sabha polls. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/congress-releases-fourth-list-of-46-candidates-for-lok-sabha-polls/articleshow/108737876.cms?utm_source=wa_channel&utm_medium=notification Wion (2024). Lok Sabha Elections 2024: List of parties competing in the upcoming polls. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/lok-sabha-elections-2024-list-of-parties-competing-in-the-upcoming-polls-700851/amp Moreno Hernández, Dulce J. (2015). De Gujarat a India: Análisis de la trayectoria política y candidatura a Primer Ministro de Narendra Modi. Tesis de Maestría en Estudios de Asia y áfrica, Centro de Estudios de Asia y África, Colegio de México. https://repositorio.colmex.mx/concern/theses/wd375w520?f%5Bcenter_sim%5D%5B%5D=Centro+de+Estudios+de+Asia+y+%C3%81frica&f%5Bdirector_sim%5D%5B%5D=Banerjee-Dube%2C+Ishita&f%5Blanguage_sim%5D%5B%5D=espa%C3%B1ol&f%5Bmember_of_collections_ssim%5D%5B%5D=Producci%C3%B3n+Institucional&locale=en&per_page=100&view=list Stokes, Bruce (2014). Indians’ support for Modi, BJP shows an itch for change. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2014/02/27/indians-support-for-modi-bjp-shows-an-itch-for-change/ Molina Medina, Norbert y Duarte Peña, Juan J. (2015). Narendra Modi y la India de hoy (Primera Parte). Universidad de Los Andes, Centro de Estudios de África, Asia y Diásporas Latinoamericanas y Caribeñas “José Manuel Briceño Monzillo”. Muralidharan, Sukumar (2014). Modi, media and the feel-good effect. Himal Southasian. https://www.himalmag.com/comment/modi-media-and-the-feel-good-effect Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul (2019). Modi’s return as prime minister of ‘New India’. International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/05/modi-return-new-india/ Hindustan Times (2024a). Lok Sabha Election 2024 Highlights: Polls begin on April 19, results on June 4; MCC kicks in. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/lok-sabha-election-2024-date-live-election-commission-esi-voting-result-date-time-schedule-announcement-today-march-16-101710550714891.html?utm_source=whatsapp&utm_medium=whatsappChannel Times of India (2024a). Lok Sabha elections: BJP releases fifth list of candidates, fields Kangana Ranaut, Naveen Jindal. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lok-sabha-elections-bjp-releases-fifth-list-of-candidates-fields-kangana-ranaut-from-mandi/articleshow/108753780.cms?utm_source=wa_channel&utm_medium=notification Hindustan Times (2024b). BJP’s 5th candidates list for Lok Sabha election: Kangana Ranaut from Mandi, Arun Govil from Meerut. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kangana-ranaut-bjps-candidate-from-mandi-arun-govil-from-meerut-101711294635407.html?utm_source=whatsapp&utm_medium=whatsappChannel Hindustan Times (2024c). In 2019, Congress’s manifesto primarily focused on economy, livelihoods. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/in-2019-congress-s-manifesto-primarily-focussed-on-economy-livelihoods-101712316094820.html [1] An important feature of the process of electing the Prime Minister of India is that all candidates must be a member of the ‘Lok Sabha’ or ‘Rajya Sabha’, which means the candidate must contest elections to secure a seat representing a particular locality.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction The recent parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Korea on April 10th, 2024, with the purpose of forming the XXII Legislature of the National Assembly, have had a significant political significance almost halfway through the current president’s term, Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party (PPP). Since the beginning of his presidency in 2022, most of the Parliament was dominated by the liberal Democratic Party (DPK), which had won the previous elections of this type in 2020 amid the impact of Covid-19. To understand the political system of the Republic of Korea, it is necessary to know that, during the period of authoritarian government in the 20th century, politics were controlled by a single dominant party, although others formally existed. Since the democratization stage, there has been a marked bipartisanship that has dominated the political landscape. This process has been characterized by the alternation between government and opposition. Initially, the evolution of these two parties has not been under the same name, as they have changed frequently, so they are commonly known as conservatives (identified by the red color) and progressives (identified with the blue color). The change of political branding has accompanied the process of merging political organizations, both before and after elections. These organizations continue to be largely led and centered around the figures of the leaders, showing a high level of factionalism and personalism. Although formally the Republic of Korea presents a multi-party system, it has been de facto a two-party system, characterized by a low level of institutionalization. Its key characteristics are deeply rooted in regionalism and ideology, with generation, class and gender associated with these. Meaning that, traditionally the western part of the country has had a more progressive tendency, while the eastern part has been more conservative, and in 2024 this was no exception (figure 1). The DPK is currently identified as the first and the PPP as the second, respectively; it should be added that in terms of gender, women generally identify more with the DPK, while young men with the PPP. Figure 1: Partisan delimitation by color after vote counting for the 22nd National Assembly elections.     Source: Naver (2024) Year 2022 marked the first time that 18-year-olds were eligible to vote in presidential elections and participate in local elections. Both the former People’s Party, and the PPP saw these young voters as a key demographic group. As the PPP consolidated support among young male votes with the rise of Lee Jun-seok and his claim of reverse discrimination, the DPK intensified its efforts to attract young female voters (Kim, 2022). While the country’s politics are dominated by two main parties, which have changed names at certain times, there is also a group of parties with lesser proportional representation or even none in the National Assembly. The major political forces currently are the DPK and the PPP, although others include the Green-Justice Party (center-left position, supporting dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), New Future (centrist reformist), New Reform Party (conservative), Rebuilding Korea Party (centrism, liberalism, and reformism), Liberal Unification Party (far-right), among others. In total, there are more than 15 minor right-wing parties, around seven that are centrist, and about five that are progressive. There are also others that are focused on a single issue, such as the Women’s Party, and some that have attempted to register without success, like the Nuclear Nation Party, with a fascist conception. [1] For the 2024 parliamentary elections, the Electoral Advisory Committee, composed of 33 experts from various fields including media, academia, legal circles, public relations, and civic groups, was tasked with ensuring fair election management and advancing the electoral system. In a meeting in February 2024, the council promoted new measures to enhance public confidence in electoral management. It was decided to respond to illegal acts such as videos created by artificial intelligence, as had previously occurred against the country’s president, and to improve the objectivity and reliability of electoral opinion polls. Measures were taken, including the addition of verification procedures in the vote counting process; changing the notation format, such as from serial numbers on postal ballots to 1-dimensional barcodes; and managing surveys and vote counting, with constant dissemination of videos from cameras in storage locations, such as advance ballot boxes, to determine the transparency and reliability of the electoral management through the establishment of a plan to improve procedures (National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea, 2024). Parliamentary elections 2024, results and impacts While the National Assembly was controlled by the DPK in May 2022 when conservative President Yoon came to power, the PPP’s efforts were focused on gaining control of the legislature in the recent April 2024 elections. Unfortunately for the latter, the results have once again been dominant for the DPK. The general elections on April 10 saw the highest turnout of the country in 32 years, following a historic peak in early voting, as announced by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The total turnout reached 67%, representing an increase of 0.8% compared to the general elections of 2020, which recorded a turnout of 66.2% (see figure 2). Out of 44.88 million eligible voters, approximately 29.66 million people cast their votes in 14,259 polling stations to elect 300 lawmakers for the 22nd National Assembly. (…) Voters cast two votes, one for the 254 single-member constituencies and another for the remaining 46 proportional representation seats. A total of 21 parties contested the elections based on districts, while 38 political parties competed for proportional representation (Jung, 2024). Figure 2: Voting trends in the different elections from 2016 to 2024 in the Republic of Korea.     Source: National Election Commission The main opposition party, the DPK, is poised to achieve a decisive victory in the general elections, with the broader liberal opposition bloc expected to secure up to 200 seats in the 300-member National Assembly. This projection deals a significant blow to President Yoon Suk-yeol. Exit polls conducted by the nation’s top three broadcasters KBS, MBC, and SBS indicated that the DPK was projected to secure between 178 to 197 seats when combining electoral victories with proportional representation seats obtained by its satellite party, the United Democratic Party. This outcome will solidify the DPK’s participation in the current Assembly controlled by the opposition for the next four years. Meanwhile, the ruling PPP was projected to secure between 85 to 105 seats, including those obtained through proportional representation from its satellite party, the People's Party (Lee, 2024). The results were fairly accurate, with almost all votes counted, as the DPK won 161 out of 254 directly contested seats, while the PPP only secured 90 seats (Lee C., 2024). The Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), a progressive-leaning party led by former Justice Minister Cho Kuk, was on track to secure between 12 to 14 seats, marking a notable debut in its first elections since its launch in March. The party chose not to field candidates in the constituencies but focused solely on proportional representation seats. Among other minor parties, the New Reform Party, led by former PPP leader Lee Jun-seok, was projected to secure one to four seats. The New Future Party, headed by former DPK leader Lee Nak-yon, was expected to secure up to two seats (Lee, 2024). The emergence of the RKP is related to internal divisions within the DPK following the conclusion of President Moon Jae-in’s presidency (DPK), which intensified after the 2022 presidential elections when supporters and opponents of Moon divided. Its leader, former Justice Minister Cho Kuk and a supporter of Moon, who emerged as a political phenomenon, is expected to represent a new threat to the administration of Yoon Suk-yeol, as the party made it clear during the electoral campaign that its goal is to punish the “autocratic” administration that, it claims, is controlled by former prosecutors, including Yoon (Nam, 2024). If the final election results, which will be confirmed in the early hours of July 11th (night of July 10th Cuba time), fall within the range of the exit polls, the RKP will be the third largest political party in South Korea, after the main opposition DPK and the ruling PPP. Cho, who served as the Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs and Minister of Justice during the previous administration of Moon Jae-in, is widely described as one of Yoon’s main antagonists for the presidency. He has been under scrutiny for years over allegations that he and his wife fabricated academic documents to get their daughter admitted to medical school. Yoon, who was the prosecutor general at the time (2020), insisted on investigating Cho, leveraging those actions to rise in politics among conservatives and eventually be elected president. (…) Cho lost his job as a professor at Seoul National University, his wife went to prison, and their daughter lost her medical license. Under the Yoon administration, the Cho family has literally lost everything, and this background has transformed him into a political champion who has lost everything and is standing against the administration (Nam, 2024). As of 2 am on April 11th in South Korea (1 pm on April 10th, Cuba time), the count stood at 92.95%, with the DPK (더불어민주당) accumulating 158 elected seats out of the 254 seats for single-member constituencies; the PPP (국민의힘), 93, while the New Future Party (새로운미래), New Reform Party (개혁신당), and the Progressive Party (진보당) has each obtained one seat up to that point (see figure 1). Lee Jun-seok, candidate of the New Reform Party, was elected as a member of the National Assembly after 13 years of entering politics. He was the leader of the PPP (the youngest in the party’s modern political history) at the time of the 2022 presidential elections and contributed to President Yoon’s landslide victory. In late 2023, he split from the party and formed a new one after a long-standing feud with the majority faction of the PPP, composed of loyalists to President Yoon Suk-yeol. Lee is considered by the DPK as a leader who could lead the development of far-right populism and is followed by young men who are negative towards feminism. Political figures like former Foreign Minister Park Jin, who resigned from his position to run in the elections, lost with 46.3% against his DPK rival who obtained 53.8%, causing further negative impacts on President Yoon's presidency (박기호, 2024). Even though he loses the majority, it is important for President Yoon to have key figures from his party in the National Assembly. Currently, he is facing internal political challenges regarding the rejection of increases in medical school admissions, questions about his wife's corruption issues, among other elements. The president's popularity level ranges between 34-40% in recent times, so such a setback will affect him for the remainder of his term. These election results could lead Han Dong-hoon, interim leader of the ruling PPP, former prosecutor, and close to the president, to diminish his prominence and wait for the local elections in 2026. The results of the DPK, combined with the satellite parties that support it in the National Assembly, could lead to a series of future conflicts with the executive, making it difficult for Yoon and the PPP to govern freely. The DPK has several contradictions with the PPP from domestic policy to foreign policy. Particularly on foreign policy issues, they are more inclined to improve relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), strengthen ties with China, and not overly reinforce links with the United States. On issues with Japan, they oppose the current policy of rapprochement and maintain firm stances on unresolved historical issues. Regarding China, there have been some recent signs of change with the idea of holding a trilateral summit between South Korea, China, and Japan at the end of May. Final considerations The results of the parliamentary elections in favor of the DPK and against the PPP will complicate the mandate of the current President Yoon Suk-yeol, especially on many domestic policy issues, with three years remaining in his term. In this scenario, the DPK, from the opposition, would have the ability to unilaterally enact contentious bills, neutralizing the power of the presidential veto. In an even worse scenario, which remains plausible, they might attempt to pass a bill to impeach the president. In recent months, they have already tried to take actions, including those related to corruption allegations against the president's wife, involving a gift from the "Dior" brand. So far, President Yoon Suk-yeol has been able to navigate some executive actions through presidential decrees to fulfill several of his political promises without going through parliament. Additionally, he has unilaterally vetoed some bills passed by the DPK. However, several of Yoon's key initiatives, including the abolition of the income tax on investments and the relaxation of the inheritance tax, have remained pending due to the need for law revisions. Losing his party in the elections further complicates the power of veto, as once the president vetoes a bill, it returns to the legislature for a second vote, and to be approved again, it requires the support of more than half of all legislators and approval by two-thirds of those present. During the 2024-2026 period, there could be a political stalemate that not only increases the contradictions between the president and the National Assembly dominated by the DPK, but also within his own party. Escalation of the situation in the Korean peninsula could be a factor that also puts pressure on the DKP-led legislature regarding the executive. REFERENCES Jung Da-hyun (2024). Voter turnout hits 32-year high at 67%. Disponible en: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/04/356_372452.html. Kim Kaitlyn (2022). Evolution of South Korean Party Politics. Disponible en: https://keia.org/the-peninsula/evolution-of-south-korean-party-politics/. Lee Hyo-jin (2024). DPK poised to clinch landslide victory in general elections. Disponible en: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/04/356_372455.html. Nam hyung woo (2024). Disgraced ex-Minister Cho Kuk returns as political phenom. Recuperado en: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/04/356_372449.html National Election Commission of Republic of Korea (2024). NEC Holds the 22nd National Assembly Election Advisory Committee. Disponible en Naver (2024). 제22대 국회의원선거 경기 성남시분당구갑 개표. Disponible en: https://search.naver.com/search.naver?where=nexearch&sm=tab_etc&query=%EC%A0%9C22%EB%8C%80+%EA%B5%AD%ED%9A%8C%EC%9D%98%EC%9B%90%EC%84%A0%EA%B1%B0+%EA%B2%BD%EA%B8%B0+%EC%84%B1%EB%82%A8%EC%8B%9C%EB%B6%84%EB%8B%B9%EA%B5%AC%EA%B0%91+%EA%B0%9C%ED%91%9C. Swissinf (2024). Cierran los centros de votación en Corea del Sur sin incidentes de importancia. Disponible en: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/cierran-los-centros-de-votaci%C3%B3n-en-corea-del-sur-sin-incidentes-de-importancia/75462528. 박기호 (2024). 서울 민주 34곳·국힘 14곳 앞서…양천갑·도봉갑·영등포을·마포갑 접전. Disponible en: https://n.news.naver.com/article/421/0007473672?type=journalists. [1] Un partido hitleriano que ha presentado su intento de registro por séptima vez. Ver en Comisión Electoral Nacional: https://www.nec.go.kr/site/nec/ex/bbs/View.do?cbIdx=1086&bcIdx=189796.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français India, being the largest country by population, has a great responsibility and right to show global leadership. Having chaired the recent G20 summit successfully, and as a member of important global partnerships such as BRICS and Quad, India is strategically placed to play a crucial role in geopolitics in the coming decades. Being the world’s largest democracy places a responsibility on India to drive a global agenda that will foster democracy in other countries. As a member of the Quad, with three other democracies, India can play a key role in upholding a rules based international order. Today, we live in a world that is much different to the world that emerged in 1945, after the Second World War, or in 1991 when the Cold War ended. In both instances, the United States emerged as the dominant superpower. American power, relative to the rest of the world, is now in clear decline and therefore even a loose alliance of democracies that includes India shifts the tide against competing structures of governance. Economic Rise of India India is the fastest growing major economy in the world today and is set to be the third largest economy in the world by the end of this decade. Of course, an alternative way to assess India’s development may be to measure its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita which is relatively low at less than US$3,000. However, the sheer size of its overall GDP and growing population gives the overall economy serious importance. India’s large population and the steady expansion of its middle class positions India as a lucrative economic ally for many countries in the world, both as a market and supplier of goods and services. It also makes India an attractive market to invest in, particularly in the current climate of de-risking and diversifying supply chains. Many global corporate powerhouses such as Facebook, Google, Apple, and Saudi Aramco have invested in India. Economic cooperation also inevitably results in stronger political relations, and it is very likely that this trend will continue. Strategic Advantages of India India’s greatest asset in terms of geopolitics and economics will be its democratic system of governance. India presence in the Quad for instance has legitimising effect. All members are democracies, but India is by far the world’s largest democratic nation. Democracy will also help India on the economic front. All advanced economies, with the exception of a few oil rich nations and city states, are democracies. That is because, as argued in a piece for the IMF in 2022, economic growth needs innovation, and innovation is better fostered in a democracy where there is free thinking and creativity. Many nations can become middle-income nations without democracy, but to transition to an advanced economy, they need stronger democratic values. South Korea and Taiwan provide examples of middle-income nations that evolved into high-income economies after a stronger transition toward democracy. Democracy together with population diversty can be a major factor that pushes India to break through the middle-income trap. Meanwhile, the median age of India, which is 32 years, is around 10 years younger than China’s. This is a strategic advantage not only in economic terms but also politically in international relations for India. This will mean an increase in the workforce which can help produce India’s industrial and services goods. A younger population will also result in a larger consumer market and will, more importantly, drive greater inward foreign direct investment. Additionally, a younger population will also result in larger tax revenue for the Indian government which can be used for development. It also results in less financial resources being directed towards an ageing population. As countries such as China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh grow, with outsourced manufacturing playing a large role in their economic agendas, India, which is weaker on manufacturing, has the advantage when it comes to services exports, such as consulting, IT-BPM, and education. India is a center for services outsourced by Western companies, with services exports anticipated to hit US$2 trillion by 2030. English proficiency in India adds to the advantage, but many other factors also play major roles. India has a large skilled workforce especially in information technology, software development, and business process outsourcing. Technology hubs around the country, such as in Bangalore where large global tech companies and startups are based, and government support, add to the scale at which India can expand this critical export in the coming decades. The software services industry, for example, has matured, resulting in sector upscaling. Interestingly, 20 percent of the world’s semiconductor design engineers are employed in India. These aforementioned attributes position India as an ideal strategic partner for many countries. Countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, European nations, Japan, Australia, Canada, and South Korea consider India a natural ally. India is also building ties in its region with the Gulf nations to its west and with the ASEAN nations to its east. India’s neighbour to its south, Sri Lanka, recently went through its worst economic crisis since independence in 1948. After defaulting in April 2022, Sri Lanka came to a standstill with no fuel for 3 weeks, 12 hour power cuts, and food and medicine shortages. It was India that came to the rescue, with US$4 billion at its most vulnerable time, giving a clear message to the world that India is a partner that will stand up for them. Talal Rafi is an Economist and Expert Member of the World Economic Forum. He is currently a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Asian Development Bank, and also a Regular Columnist for the International Monetary Fund. His work has been published by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, World Economic Forum, London School of Economics, UNFCCC, Chatham House London, Deloitte and Forbes.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français On 24 February 2022, Russian troops pushed into Ukraine from multiple fronts, bombarding cities like Kharkiv and the capital Kyiv. The invasion plunged Europe into its worst security crisis in decades and prompted a massive outpouring of military aid and economic sanctions on Russia from NATO and Western allies (Ramzy 2022). There were warning signs beforehand, as Russia had massed over 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders for months and issued demands to roll back NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe (Roth, Dan, David and Nana 2022). Yet the full-scale invasion still came as a shock via its violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force (United Nations 2022). From a liberal perspective emphasizing democratic norms, international law, and human rights, Russia’s actions were indefensible and morally reprehensible. However, six key realist arguments can explain Russia’s rationale for the Ukraine invasion; security dilemmas and geographical insecurity, attempt to regain a sphere of influence, implementation of an offensive realist strategy, revisionism against the U.S.-led liberal international order, diversionary war theory, and autocratic insecurity and domestic politics. Realist Theory and Core Tenets Realism is one of the leading theories in the study of international relations, originating from thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and later articulated by 20th century scholars like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz (Burchill, Andrew and Richard 2013). It posits that international politics is characterized by anarchy and a struggle for power between sovereign nation-states pursuing their own national interests (Waltz 1979). Key assumptions underpin the bulk of realism: 1. States are the primary actors and the fundamental units of analysis in the anarchic international system with no supranational authority. 2. All states possess offensive military capabilities that render them potentially dangerous to one another. 3. States can never be certain of other states’ future intentions or actions, leading to mistrust and worst-case scenario planning. 4. In this self-help system, states must look out for their own national interests and survival as the principal motive (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2014). 5. While economic and cultural factors are important, military force and power politics take primacy in realist analysis. Realism tends to view human nature as flawed and egoistic, distrustful of lofty ideals like global peace or international cooperation. It emphasizes pragmatism over moral principles and ethics, assuming states will act opportunistically when their interests require it (Carr 1964). The accumulation of military capabilities and economic power is seen as a means for states to increase their relative power and security in an anarchic, zero-sum world (Mearsheimer 2001). Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, place a significant emphasis on human nature and decision-making elites in their understanding of international relations. They argue that politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature (Chimni 2017). Morgenthau, in particular, has been described as one of the most important political thinkers of the 20th century and one of the greatest realist thinkers of all times (Chimni 2017). Classical realists believe that their pessimistic vision of human nature is reflected in politics and international relations. In contrast, neorealists or structural realists, like Kenneth Waltz, emphasize the constraints imposed by the anarchic structure of the international system (Lobell 2017). Waltz’s neorealism, first outlined in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics, argues that power is the most important factor in international relations. He posits that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system) (Waltz 1979). Within the neorealist school, there are two main schools of thought: defensive realism and offensive realism. Defensive realists, following Waltz, argue that states merely aim to maintain the existing balance of power for survival. They assert that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain security. They contend that aggressive expansion upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue is ensuring its security (Lobell 2017). On the other hand, offensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer see states as persistently seeking opportunities for relative gain and hegemony when possible. Mearsheimer, in his groundbreaking work “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, argues that states seek to maximize their power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. He contends that only by creating an imbalance of power in its own favour will a state be able to maximize its security (Üstündağ 2020; Wivel 2017). The Realist Rationale for Russian Invasion of Ukraine Ukraine shares a 1,500-mile border with Russia, and its core territory was formerly part of Russia until 1991 (Plokhy 2023). From Moscow’s perspective, the prospect of Ukraine aligning with the West and integrating with NATO was an existential threat to Russian power that it could not accept (Lindsay 2022). Realists argue that a Ukraine aligned with NATO could enable the deployment of offensive weaponry close to Russia’s borders and threaten its access to the Black Sea, a warm water port it has coveted for centuries (McCallion 2023). As the core of realist theory warns, the basic structure of an anarchic and self-help system means states can never feel secure about other states’ future intentions or actions (Waltz 1979). When one state enhances its security, it undermines another’s. According to Mearsheimer, “Because no state can ever be sure that other states will not use their offensive capabilities for aggressive purposes, every state is compelled to look for ways to guarantee its own survival” (2014, 77). Seen from this perspective, Russia’s invasion can be rationalized as a pre-emptive move to neutralize what it saw as an imminent strategic threat. Closely related to arguments about great power status is the realist notion of states pursuing spheres of influence or buffer zones to enhance their security. The realist argument is that all great powers in history, including Russia, have sought to control the security dynamics in adjacent regions by maintaining relations with nearby smaller states that are aligned with their interests (Mearsheimer 2019). Ukraine, with its geostrategic position between Russia and Europe, is viewed as critically important terrain in Russia’s desired sphere of influence. Realists argue that rather than the expansion of Western liberal democracy, Russia was fundamentally motivated to invade to reestablish a favourable balance of power, security arrangements, and compliant buffer states on its periphery (Trenin 2022). Allowing Ukraine to align itself closely with NATO and host potential offensive forces was seen as a step too far by Moscow. Beyond defensively reacting to perceived security threats in the region, it can be inferred that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects a calculated strategy of offensive realism – persistent and opportunistic efforts to enhance its power economically and militarily to establish regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001). Under this view, Putin aimed to take advantage of a window of opportunity and weakness in the West to redraw boundaries and spheres of influence in Europe. Putin is said to want to rebuild a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe, principally embracing former Soviet republics such as now independent Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine. He has frequently bemoaned their “loss” after the Soviet Union collapsed. Putin may also hope to demonstrate to the west (and Russians) that the country is still a superpower. (Tisdall 2022, para. 2). Related to the offensive realism interpretation, some realists frame Russia’s invasion as an act of revisionism against the U.S.-dominated liberal international order that emerged after the Cold War (Kotoulas 2022). For decades, Russia complained about perceived encirclement by NATO and about what it viewed as disrespect and disregard for its interests in relation to Ukraine and its own sphere of influence (Sakwa 2022). The realist view is that even after the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and its allies continued to expand in ways that threatened Russia’s core interests and left it feeling boxed in by the steady eastward march of NATO (Smith and Dawson 2022). From this perspective, Russia eventually decided it needed to upset the liberal order and use brute force to re-establish itself as a great power capable of exerting sway on its periphery. Russia under Putin has no intention of entering into an American-run liberal world order but instead wants a multipolar world in which Russia enjoys a blocking position if not an outright veto. This is because Putin himself is ideologically averse to western liberalism (Grant 2022). By forcefully altering borders and facts on the ground in Ukraine, the realist argument suggests Russia aimed to disrupt the Western-centric world order and assert its regional dominance. Another realist interpretation views Russia’s invasion through the lens of diversionary war theory – the idea that leaders may provoke external conflict to divert public attention from domestic turmoil or unpopular policies (Levy and Vakili 1992). There is precedent for Russian leaders using force abroad for domestic purposes, from Stalin’s invasion of Finland in 1939 to Putin’s wars in Chechnya and 2008 invasion of Georgia (Ferraro 2023). From this view, Putin faced a host of domestic challenges in 2022, from economic malaise, rampant corruption and wealth inequality, to the prospect of more anti-regime protests like those in 2020 and early 2022 (Sharifulin 2023; McHugh 2023). “The Russian invasion of Ukraine could have been an attempt by Putin to garner popularity by invoking a distorted interpretation of Russia’s history and playing on Russian nationalism” (Rogers and Yi 2022, para. 3). From the foregoing it is obvious that launching a nationalist, irredentist campaign to reconquer historically Russian lands in Ukraine may have been calculated to bolster Putin’s domestic standing and shift discussion away from internal grievances. The realist logic is that leaders will take aggressive foreign policy actions when domestic audiences become restive, to rally patriotic support and legitimacy. Finally, another related realist explanation rooted in Russia’s domestic politics is the theory of autocratic insecurity, or fear among authoritarian leaders like Putin that if they compromise or appear weak, it could undermine their regime survival (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012). This aligns with defensive realist logic, where states will act pre-emptively and uncompromisingly when core interests and stakes are their very existence. The argument is that Putin saw the 2022 events in Ukraine as an existential threat to his regime’s survival and legitimacy, given its claims to defend ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine (Pifer 2023). A miscalculation that resulted in losing influence over Ukraine could inflame nationalist opposition at home and tarnish Putin’s carefully cultivated strongman image. It is evident that Putin’s war is motivated by longstanding concerns that if Russia doesn’t reassert its control over the territories it traditionally dominated, his regime – along with Russia’s status as a great power – will be undermined. The autocratic insecurity thesis suggests Putin felt he had to escalate in Ukraine to ensure his own political survival and Russia’s place as a relevant great power. Counterarguments and Moral Debates While the realist perspective offers several compelling interpretations of Russia’s strategic calculations and motivations underlying the Ukraine invasion, it leaves many fundamental questions unanswered and provokes heated moral debates. First, even if Russia felt genuine security concerns or resented Western encroachment, it had many alternative foreign policy options short of a full-scale war that caused catastrophic death and suffering. Failure to pursue diplomacy or de-escalation is difficult for realists to fully explain or justify. Second, a core tenet of the Westphalian system of nation-states is that countries cannot violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others through force or aggression. Russia’s actions obliterated this international norm, raising questions about the validity of applying an amoral, power-politics lens that glosses over legal and human rights considerations (Kampmann 2021). Just as a burglar cannot be the judge of his own cause, you cannot allow a nation to be the sole arbiter of its own interests against those of the rest of the world whenever that happens to militate against the general interest and settlements Third, a consistently neglected component in realist thought is the key role of ideological and domestic factors in shaping interests and threat perceptions. Putin’s Russkiy Mir (“Russian World”) ideology views Ukraine as an artificial state and integral part of the greater Russia – a visceral belief that drove many of his decisions as much as geopolitical power calculations (Suslov 2022). The invasion thus cannot be fully explained without understanding the pseudo-historical mythmaking that permeated the Kremlin’s worldview. Finally, while providing interesting insights into Russia’s strategic cost-benefit analysis, realist arguments struggle to wrestle with the ethics and wisdom behind the invasion. Even if the goals aligned with maximizing Russia’s national interests, the terrible human costs and economic damage now suffered by Russia itself cast the decision as potentially catastrophic and self-defeating overreach. Conclusion In conclusion, the realist theoretical prism of international relations offers several potentially compelling rationales for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – security dilemmas, spheres of influence, offensive realism, revisionism against the liberal order, diversionary war, and autocratic insecurity. These arguments help elucidate how Russia assessed its strategic interests and the potential costs and benefits surrounding the attack. At the same time, the realist perspective is limited in several respects. It glosses over the war’s violation of international law and sovereignty norms. It cannot fully explain Russia’s diplomatic misfires or the moral dimensions surrounding humanitarian atrocities and the terrible destruction inflicted. And its focus on systemic incentives neglects the key role Russian domestic politics, pseudo-historical mythos, and Putin’s own ideological zealotry played in driving the conflict. Ultimately, while the realist lens provides useful analytical tools for dissecting state behaviour and interests, it is inherently amoral and therefore unsuited to grapple with complex human tragedies such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. References Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater, and Richard Devetak. 2013. Theories of International Relations. Bloomsbury Academic. Carr, Edward Hallett. 1964. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper & Row. Chimni, Bhupinder S. 2017. “The Classical Realist Approach to International Law: The World of Hans Morgenthau.” In International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches, 38-103. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588196.004. Ferraro, Vincent. 2023. “Why Russia Invaded Ukraine and How Wars Benefit Autocrats: The Domestic Sources of the Russo-Ukrainian War.” Center for Asian Studies/ Russia & Post-Soviet Space Section, University of São Paulo (LEA-USP). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4522176. Grant, Stephanie. 2022. “Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Is Not Just about Borders or Power. For Putin, It’s about Identity.” ABC News, February 24. abc.net.au/news/russia-ukraine-invasion-borders-power-vladimir-putin-identity/100858372. Kampmann, Christoph. 2021. “The Treaty of Westphalia as Peace Settlement and Political Concept.” In International Law and Peace Settlements, edited by Marc Weller, Matilda Retter, and Attila Varga, 64-85. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108627856.005. Kirby, Jen, and Jonathan Guyer. 2022. “The Increasingly Complicated Russia-Ukraine Crisis, Explained.” Vox, February 23. https://www.vox.com/22917719/russia-ukraine-invasion-border-crisis-nato-explained. Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kotoulas, Ioannis E. 2022. “Russia as a Revisionist State and the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine.” In The Russian-Ukrainian War (2014-2022): Historical, Political, Cultural-Educational, Religious, Economic and Legal Aspects, 1-10. Baltija Publishing. https://doi.org/10.30525/978-9934-26-223-4-6. Kuchins, Andrew C., and Igor Zevelev. 2012. “Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change.” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1: 147-161. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.642597. Levy, Jack S., and Lily I. Vakili. 1992. “Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case.” In The Internationalization of Communal Strife, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky, 118-146. Routledge. Lindsay, James M. (Host). 2022. “Putin’s Choices, With Michael Kimmage.” In The President’s Inbox. Podcast audio, March 29. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/putins-choices-michael-kimmage. Lobell, Steven E. 2017. “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism.” Oxford Research Encyclopedias, International Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.304. McCallion, C. 2023. “Assessing Realist and Liberal Explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian War.” McHugh, D. 2023. “Russia’s Economy Holds Up, but Growing Challenges Test Putin.” The Associated Press, March 13. https://apnews.com/article/russian-economy-ukraine-war-putin-sanctions-0231252b7a145040530245b58590f7f0. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton. Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5: 77-89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306. Mearsheimer, John J. 2019. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order.” International Security 43, no. 4: 7-50. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. Pifer, S. 2023. “Russia, Ukraine and Existential War.” Stanford University, The Center for International Security and Cooperation. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/russia-ukraine-and-existential-war. Plokhy, Serhii. 2023. “Serhii Plokhy: ‘Russia Thought It Was Invading the Ukraine of 2014’.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. https://www.chathamhouse.org. Ramzy, Austin. 2022. “The Invasion of Ukraine: How Russia Attacked and What Happens Next.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/why-russia-attacked-ukraine.html. Rogers, K., and J. Yi. 2022. “How the War in Ukraine Might Change Putin’s Popularity among Russians.” FiveThirtyEight, March 11. www.abcnews.com/538. Roth, Andrew, Dan Sabbagh, David Blood, and Nana de Hoog. 2022. “Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Where Are Putin’s Troops and What Are His Options?” The Guardian, February 14. https://www.theguardian.com/international. Sakwa, Richard. 2022. The Russia Scare: Fake News and Genuine Threat. 1st ed. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003177401. Sharifulin, Valery. 2023. “More Corrupt, Fractured and Ostracised: How Vladimir Putin Has Changed Russia in Over Two Decades on Top.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/more-corrupt-fractured-and-ostracised-how-vladimir-putin-has-changed-russia-in-over-two-decades-on-top-188761. Smith, N. R., and G. Dawson. 2022. “Mearsheimer, Realism, and the Ukraine War.” Analyse und Kritik 44, no. 2. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023. Suslov, Mikhail. 2018. ““Russian World” Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of “Spheres of Influence”.” Geopolitics 23, no. 2: 330-353. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1407921. 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한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, recently stated at the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives of the Diet that “…he strongly feels the need to boldly change the current situation of the ties between Japan and the DPRK,” and “…it is very important that he himself establishes (…) relations with the President of the State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, and continues to make efforts through different channels for this purpose”. Immediately, the KCNA agency released, in response to the statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister, a declaration from Kim Yo Jong, the Deputy Director of the Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The One in charge of the affairs related to the Republic of Korea and the United States – now it seems also with Japan – commented that she found it noteworthy that the Japanese media have assessed Prime Minister Kishida’s words as “a different position from before” regarding the issue of DPRK-Japan bilateral relations. She added that “there is no reason not to evaluate positively” the words of the Japanese Prime Minister if he shows the “true intention” to move forward the relations between the two countries “by courageously freeing themselves from the shackles of the past”. He added that if Japan abandons its “bad habits” such as unjustly violating the self-defense rights of the DPRK and stops turning the already resolved issue of abductions into an obstacle, there is no reason to prevent a rapprochement between the two countries and the day may come when Kishida visits Pyongyang. She noted that, if Japan opts for a new path to improve relations and approaches the North with “respectful and sincere” behavior, the two countries can create a “new future” together. According to Kim Yo Jong, she made her statements not from an official position, but in a “personal capacity”, something that can be questioned, as she appears as the closest collaborator of her brother Kim Jong Un, and the fact that she holds the high responsibility of being the deputy director of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the WPK, formally requires her to uphold party discipline. The most immediate antecedent to Kim Yo Jong’s remarks was when, earlier this year, as western Japan was recovering from an earthquake that killed more than 200 people and damaged tens of thousands of homes in Niigata Prefecture, the Chairman of the State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, sent a message of “sympathy and condolences” to the Japanese Prime Minister, which was seen as unusual and a conciliatory note, given Pyongyang’s demonstrated animosity towards successive Japanese governments and the systematic messages of grievances sent by the DPRK’s official media. Now, a month later, through Kim Yo Jong, the DPRK sends a new signal that it may be willing to improve relations with Japan. However, many observers view with skepticism the supposed show of commitment towards reconciliation with Japan because, over the decades, events raise suspicious about whether their pronouncements were sincere or not. For well-known historical reasons, the DPRK-Japan relations have never been healthy. Especially, in the last two decades when they have been distinguished by their progressive worsening. Successive administrations, especially those of Shinzo Abe and Yoshihide Suga, have taken the nuclear threat as a pretext for their militaristic ambitions, something that has severely displeased the leadership in Pyongyang. Due to what the North Koreans call “infamous submission” to the US, expressions of disdain from high-ranking officials towards Tokyo are regular occurrences. The most controversial issue revolves around the matter of the abducted Japanese. Although in 2002, coinciding with the first visit to Pyongyang of then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the DPRK and Japan signed a historic agreement committing an early normalization of bilateral relations and leading to the return of five of the abducted Japanese, Tokyo holds Pyongyang responsible for the abduction of 17 Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, with 12 of them still believed to be in the DPRK. However, Pyongyang admits to having abducted only 13 individuals, claiming to have returned five and stating that the remaining eight had died. What is most unnerving in the eventual Japan-North Korea ties is that Pyongyang assumes the abductee issue as a “settle issue” and Tokyo keeps it as a priority on its political-diplomatic agenda. To date, Japan continues to present the abductees as a premise for talks at any level, while the DPRK considers it as already solved and furthermore, the issue of nuclear weapons and missiles has nothing to do with the improvements of bilateral ties, as Pyongyang considers it as its legitimate self-defense. Japan finds it extremely difficult to accept such conditions. The DPRK’s increasingly sophisticated missiles are constantly being projected into the Sea of Japan and have even flown over Japanese territory. Japan also perceives the possibility that, like South Korea, the DPRK will carry out preventive nuclear strike when it sees signs of real and imminent risk. And, as far as the abduction issue is concerned, all indicates that Japan is not ready to accept that it has been resolved. It is a combination of social forces, forming a critical mass that puts pressure on the Japanese government to act in favor of finding a plausible solution to the abduction issue. In this regard, the Japanese government’s chief spokesman, Yoshimasa Hayashi, stated at a press conference that Japan remains unchanged and “…intends to comprehensively resolve outstanding issues, such as nuclear energy, missiles and abductions”. It is well known that the Japanese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly appealed to its counterparts in friendly countries to the DPRK to make efforts to lead to talks with Pyongyang authorities. It is documented that these efforts have been unsuccessful due to their reluctant stance towards Tokyo. Why is the DPRK rushing to positively assimilate Prime Minister Kishida’s words now? In a previous article, we discussed how at the January 15th, 2024 session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Chairman Kim Jong Un made a decision to sever all ties with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which he called as the “number one hostile country” and indicated to constitutionally endorse a better definition of the border and physically destroy all inter-Korean symbols. We saw that the main thing was to “erase” from the Constitution what he referred to as “inherited concepts” that classify South Koreans as compatriots and likewise, the term unification, removing phrases he assessed as “deceptive” such as “3,000 miles of golden water, rivers and mountains” and “80 million Koreans”, arguing that “…it is correct to specify in the corresponding article [of the Constitution] that the Republic of Korea is firmly considered as the number one hostile country and immutable main enemy”. The above-mentioned contrast with the position that presumably highlights the expectation of an eventual improvement in relations with Tokyo, which has the same status as a major ally of Washington in East Asia, as does Seoul, and which together form a harmonious triangular anti-DPRK alliance. It is notorious that a priority of the DPRK, reinforced in recent times, has always been to fracture the US-ROK-Japan axis. It is convenient to recapitulate that, under the Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump administrations, when Pyongyang – Seoul and Pyongyang – Washington relations exhibited relative understanding and détente, the DPRK furiously attacked the Abe administration, with the same purpose of breaking the alliance. Pyongyang may find it worthwhile to engage with Tokyo under the assumption of forcing open some cracks in the recently strengthened trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. This is because under conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea has sought, with the support of the Biden Administration, closer relations, and more stable ties with Japan, including defense and intelligence information exchange, and to a significant extent, has achieved it. However, the Seoul-Tokyo-US convergence suffers from fragility, which is reflected in the appreciable differences over the shared history between South Korea and Japan, and the ongoing disputes with the former colonial ruler over comfort women and forced laborers. In addition, there is US political volatility; in both Seoul and Tokyo there are uncertainties about whether Washington would directly involve itself in a conflagration involving either of them with the DPRK, as well as whether Washington would accommodate South Korea’s nuclear aspirations and unreservedly support Japan’s abandonment of the status of its Armed Forces as self-defense forces. Still, it can be argued that, as risk management and empathy sustainer, Kishida will keep Seoul and Washington abreast of his dealings with Pyongyang. In March, he will visit Seoul and in April, Washington; these would be important indicators of alignment between the trio. Kishida will seek the blessing of the Yoon and Biden administrations, anticipating that Kim Jong Un will move toward a summit that Kishida has so often called for. Washington has moved forward in supporting Japan’s attempts to engage with the DPRK. The ROK and Japan are in close communication on any future Tokyo-Pyongyang dialogue. Meanwhile, South Korea says that any contact between Japan and the DPRK should be conducted in a manner that helps promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Conclusions We are in the presence of a new diplomatic gamble by the DPRK that illustrates the level of specialization it has reached in managing its complicated relations with the main US allies in East Asia, who, in turn, are perceived as systematically confrontational countries. A straightforward resolution of the outstanding issues for discussion (nuclear weapons, missiles, and abductions) between Kim Jong Un and Fumio Kishida is not to be expected. These are issues on which the DPRK and Japan have diametrically different positions and directly concern the comprehensive strategic security of both countries, including the recurring abduction issue, which is associated with the political gain of any Japanese government. A meeting at the Japan-North Korea summit would be one of the few pleasant surprises to be received in the context of the vicious circle of conflict associated with the DPRK. It would be attractive to see a determined understanding between Pyongyang and Tokyo. It may be foreseeable that a Kim Jong Un - Fumio Kishida meeting will take place, but the past and present history negates any prospect of success. For this to happen, both sides will have to make principled concessions that, if made, will have combined counterproductive political effects. Bibliographic references KCNA. Kim Yo Jong publica declaración con el tema de relaciones Corea-Japón. Disponible en: http://www.kcna.kp/es/article/q/cba25051838d476c95acd451a45ae8a8.kcmsf KBS WORLD Prensa japonesa: Kim Yo Jong busca desestabilizar alianza Seúl. Washington-Tokio. Disponible en: https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=s&id=In&Seq_Code=88473 Leonardo Estandarte. Corea del Norte-Japón: Kim Yo-jong plantea la hipótesis de la visita de Kishida a Pyongyang. Disponible en: https://www.agenzianova.com/es/news/Corea-del-Norte-Jap%C3%B3n-Kim-Yo-Jong-plantea-la-hip%C3%B3tesis-de-la-visita-de-Kishida-a-Pyongyang/ Kim Yo Jong dice que Corea del Norte está abierta a mejorar sus lazos con Japón. Disponible en: https://reporteasia.com/relaciones-diplomaticas/2024/02/15/kim-yo-jong-corea-del-norte-mejorar-lazos-japon/ Japón califica de inaceptable que Corea del Norte afirme que la cuestión de los secuestros está resuelta- Disponible en: https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/es/news/20240216_15/ Jesse Johnson. North Korea-Japan summit push gains steam after remarks by Kim´s sister. Disponible en: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/02/16/japan/politics/japan-north-korea-summit-push/ Mitch Shin. Will Kim Jong Un Meet with Japan´s Prime Minister Kishida? Disponible en: https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/will-kim-jong-un-meet-with-japans-prime-minister-kishida/

In the first two months of the year, general elections (presidential and/or legislative) were held in three countries of the Indo-Pacific, the area towards which the center of gravity of the world balance is shifting, according to experts: Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Together they account for nearly 700 million inhabitants, almost 9% of the world’s population, and host the largest number of Muslims in the world. The authoritarian bias there is so significant that the elections are mere ceremonies of power legitimization, more directed outside than inside of the country. The same happens in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, etc. Dynastic democracies, tutelary democracies, or both at the same time. False democracies. Bangladesh: a party-state? In Bangladesh, the Awami League won three out of four seats in the Parliament in January, a slightly lower percentage than in the 2018 elections, but with no diminution of its overwhelming power. The country’s prime minister is Sheikh Hasina Wajed, daughter of the father of independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman [1]. Abstention, estimated at 60%, best explains the electoral result. The main opposition parties boycotted the elections in protest against the lack of transparency of the process and, above all, against the attacks on basic freedoms. Some of the opposition leaders are serving prison sentences for unjustifiable reasons. Reports of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial executions are frequent [2]. Hasina claims to maintain the progressive line of her father, but the evolution of her regime indicates otherwise. The Awami League has maintained a power alternation with the conservative nationalists. But lately, her most feared enemy has been the Islamist radicals. In this fight, Hasina has counted on the support of India. The current government of Narendra Modi was more sympathetic to the nationalists, but pragmatism has imposed a close collaboration. Authoritarian drift in both countries has favored this convergence. Pakistan: a dictatorship in disguise In Pakistan, the elections have been even more controversial and stormy. The army is the real – if not the only – effective political actor [3]. The parties have wielded power since the military formally ceded it to them in 1998. Only nominally. The military domination over the institutions of the State remains unchanged. The reactive coup d’état has been replaced by preventive actions that determine or strongly condition the electoral result. Those who deviate or threaten to step out of the military script are discredited. It happened again this year. The populist movement of Isham Khan (a former cricket champion, the national sport) was until just two years ago the ruling party, having won the 2018 election. But he was covertly accused of a series of crimes, convicted, and imprisoned in 2022. Ironically, Khan had been the military’s preferred candidate, without whose favor he could hardly have secured victory. He believed that with his popularity, he could sideline his former protectors. Grave mistake. The military pulled the strings of justice, and Khan’s party was prevented from contesting in the elections [4]. The cricketer did not give up. From jail he denounced the military tutelage (which he had previously accepted with better or worse taste) and promoted candidacies related to his party under the label of “independents”. The challenge has been successful but insufficient. The “independents'' won a hundred seats, which are not enough to form a government majority [5]. The two parties that have been alternating in power in the last decades, the Muslim League (led by the conservative Sharif Brothers) and the People’s Party (political structure of the Bhutto family, of a confused and debatable center-left) hastened to agree to form a coalition government. Between them they have more than 130 deputies [6]. The cynicism of Pakistani politics is more than remarkable. The two parties now joining forces have been close enemies with a shared fate: both have been battered by the military, which has imprisoned and forced their leaders into exile on several occasions. In fact, the founder of the Bhutto dynasty (Zulfikar Ali) was overthrown after a military coup in 1971, charged and convicted in 1974 for the alleged murder of a political opponent and finally executed in 1979. His daughter Benazir was twice prime minister, deposed, exiled, and assassinated by an alleged Islamic extremist in 2007, when she was returning to her country. The Sharifs, powerful businessmen, have had a less tragic fate, but they have lived between favor and disgrace. Corruption has been the legal basis for their downfalls, with no little foundations. But it has been used as a weapon when it was convenient for the headquarters. Nawaz Sharif has now preferred to step back from the front line and reinstate as prime minister his brother Shehbaz, who held the post after the fall of Khan. The head of the clan went into exile in Saudi Arabia and only when he successfully negotiated the cancellation of the penalties, he returned to Pakistan to control the political process after the partial liquidation of Imran Khan. The post-election pact also has a prize for the Bhutto family. Although the formal leader of the PPP is Bilawal, Benazir’s son, who really pulls the strings is his widowed father, Asif Ali Zardari, who has also served sentences for corruption, of which there are few doubts. Zardari will be the new President, a more ceremonial position, but not without power to maintain his privileges. The outlook for the two now coalited dynasties is frightening. By 2026, Pakistan will have to pay $78 billion in foreign debt service, one of the highest in the world. This represents almost a quarter of its GDP (340 billion). Negotiations with the IMF are a dogfight, but the room for maneuver is almost nil [7]. Economic deterioration has been unstoppable in recent decades. At the beginning of the century, Pakistan’s economy was five times smaller than that of its rival, India; today it is one tenth [8]. Neither the military nor the political elites have been able to redirect the successive crisis. Pakistan is a ship adrift, in a permanent state of war with India. Both enemies have nuclear arsenals, which adds an enormous factor of danger to their recurrent disputes. Pakistan has been a major player in the protracted war in Afghanistan, as both, an ally and a rival of the United States, successively or alternately. In Washington they never knew whether the Pakistani military was helping or boycotting them. Bin Laden was killed by an American commando while hiding in Abbottabad, a city where many officers live, but the powerful military intelligence always denied knowing his whereabouts. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, relations between Pakistan and the United States have lost weight. In Washington, the “Indian card” is now a priority. However, the traditional economic and military ties between Pakistan and China compel Americans not to neglect this elusive and chaotic partner. Indonesia: Duo of former rivals In Indonesia, things are not looking any better. In the presidential elections, the winner was Prabowo Subianto, an authoritarian military officer who played an outstanding repressive role during the military dictatorship of his father-in-law, General Suharto, who led the country in the last third of the century, amid atrocious violations of human rights [9]. If the pacts in Pakistan lack any political ethics, in Indonesia it is three quarters of the same. Or worse. Five years ago, the current President, Joko Widowo (known as Jokowi), abandoned the pale progressivism of the ‘Democratic Party of Struggle’, founded by Megawati, Sukarno’s daughter, and joined the populist current in vogue. With this tactical shift he managed to defeat the conservative nationalist of GERINDRA (Great Indonesia Movement), who had turned to Prabowo as a ‘strongman’ figure to seize power. Widowo consolidated his hold on power with a populist policy of large infrastructure projects, partly financed by China, a tough hand against crime and radical Islamism, and an ambiguous balance in relations with Washington and Beijing. When he felt strong, Widowo integrated Prabowo into his government as no less than the Minister of Defense. Sukarno would have turned in his grave. That was not all. Jokowi wanted to form his own dynasty, but his son Gibran was still too young to inherit his post. He even had to twist the law (with the complicity of a judge who was his brother-in-law) so that he could be a candidate… but not for his party, from which he definitely separated, but as Prabowo’s second [10]. Success was guaranteed. The duo of former rivals has won the presidential elections by a wide margin. But in the legislative elections the result was more disputed. According to provisional data, the former general will not be able to count on an aligned Parliament. In any case, in such a corrupt and institutionally fragile country, cohabitation could be smoother than expected [11]. The director of the Asia-Pacific program at London’s renowned Chathan House anticipates changes, but he is confident that Prabowo’s pragmatism will limit his authoritarian instincts [12]. This ‘wishful thinking’ by Western analysts when assessing authoritarian regimes with a democratic façade is very recurrent and responds to the persistent logic since the Cold War. After all, what determines their blessing is not the democratic quality of political systems but their willingness to defend or act in accordance with Western interest. And in today’s times, being on the “right side” of history essentially means taking sides with the West in the strategic dispute with China. NOTES [1] https://www.cidob.org/biografias_lideres_politicos/asia/bangladesh/hasina_wajed [2] “Bangladesh is now in effect a one-party state”.THE ECONOMIST, 8 de enero. [3] “The Military is still pulling the strings in Pakistan’s election”. MUNEEB YOUSUF & MOHAMAD USMAN BHATTI. FOREIGN POLICY, 5 de febrero. [4] “Pakistan’s real test begin after elections”. AL JAZEERA, 8 de febrero. [5] “The rise and fall, and rise again of Imran Khan”. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 de febrero. [6] “Imran Khan’s opponents reach deal to shut his allies out of government”. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 de febrero. [7] “Pakistan can’t stop the cycle of discontent”. HUSAIN HAQQANI. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 16 de febrero. [8] “Pakistan is out of friends and out of money”. THE ECONOMIST, 14 de febrero. [9] “Indonesia’s election winner has a dark past and a cute image”. JOSEPH RACHMAN. FOREIGN POLICY, 14 de febrero. [10] “Indonesia’s election reveals its democratic challenges”. THOMAS PEPINSKY. BROOKINGS, 12 de enero. [11] “La démocratie indonésienne résistera-t-elle à la presidence de Prabowo Subianto?” COURRIER INTERNATIONAL, 16 de febrero; “The world’s third-biggest democracy could be sliding backwards”. ISHAAN THAROOR. THE WASHINGTON POST, 14 de febrero. [12] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/continuity-prabowo-means-change-indonesia; “Indonesia’s democracy is stronger that a strongman”. BEN BLAND. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 13 de febrero.

Haiti is experiencing a widespread crisis of its institutions, political turmoil, high levels of poverty, disorder and increasing violence in the streets. Last nearly 5,000 people were assassinated and another 2,500 were kidnapped, according to the United Nations, more than double the number in 2022. [1] In this context, on March 11th, Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who is out of the country, announced his resignation once the necessary mechanisms for the transition of the government are in place. This publication describes the events that led to Henry’s resignation, the international community’s reaction, the outbreak of violence, as well as some points for reflection on what lies ahead for the Caribbean country. The resignation of Ariel Henry The current Prime Minister of Haiti, came to power following the assassination of the country’s former president, Jovenel Moise, in 2021. He had previously stated that he would resign in February, but later indicated that he would do so only once national security was restored. On February 29, following pressure from members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Henry pledged to hold general elections before August 31st next year. In the meantime, the regional mechanism would send an assessment team to help plan the elections. [2] Although CARICOM does not have a unified foreign policy, they “generally promote democratic governance” in their public discourse, said Rasheed Griffith, executive director of the ‘Instituto de Estudios del Progreso del Caribe’. [3] Henry’s reluctance to resign soon caused the violent protest to escalate, especially in Port-au-Prince, where most of the city is controlled by gangs. Among the gangs, one leader, Jimmy Chérizier, has stood out, calling for Henry’s government to be overthrown and warning of a “civil war that will lead to genocide” if the prime minister does not resign. [4] In addition, last January, the mandates of the last ten elected senators in Haiti officially expired, leaving the country without any officials elected by the people. Moreover, Henry’s government is linked to that of the also controversial Moise, who in any case, would have ended his term in February 2022. Henry has remained in office without constitutional legitimacy. [5] Last week, after traveling abroad, Henry tried to return to Haiti, but had to change his itinerary because gangs blocked access to the Port-au-Prince airport. The Prime Minister sought to land in the Dominican Republic and cross the border but was prevented from doing so by the neighboring nation’s authorities, so he was deviated to Puerto Rico. The United States then urged the Caribbean leader to “accelerate the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance structure.” [6] Originally, Henry had gone to Kenya to sign an agreement to pave the way for a multinational force to operate in Haiti. Amidst the growing violence and insecurity on the streets, the European Union evacuated its personnel on March 14th. The spokesman for the diplomatic division of the European Commission, Peter Stano, said that the bloc is “extremely concerned” about the situation, given the attacks on hospitals and prisons, food shortages and blocked infrastructures. [7] The US Armed Forces also withdrew non-essential personnel from its embassy, as reported by the Southern Command in a statement. [8] The UN has stated that it will remain in Haiti. On March 11th, senior officials from different countries met in Kingston, Jamaica, for a meeting convened by CARICOM to analyze the crisis. The US State Department reiterated Washington’s support for the creation of an “independent” body to assume presidential powers in Haiti, as well as the deployment of a security mission to help contain the violence. It also announced that it will provide 300 million pesos to alleviate the situation in the Caribbean country. [9] The initiative, which contemplates these resources, is under review by the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee [10]. From Puerto Rico, Henry participated in the CARICOM meeting virtually. At the end of the meeting, during a press conference, the temporary president of the Caribbean Community and leader of Guyana, Irfaan Ali, announced that Henry had agreed to resign from his position. He said the prime minister would step down after “the establishment of a transitional presidential council and the appointment of an interim authority”. Later, in a video, Henry stated that he would continue to “handle current affairs until the appointment of a prime minister and a government”. The council will include the participation of the main political parties, the private sector and the Montana Agreement, a coalition that proposed the formation of an interim government and a roadmap following Moise’s assassination [11]. Among the members of the mechanism is the political force Pitit Desalin, led by former senator and presidential aspirant Moise Jean-Charles. The EDE party of former Prime Minister Charles Joseph, the Fanmi Lavalas formation, and the December 21st coalition led by Henry, will also have a vote [12]. In addition, there will be two non-voting observers, one from civil society and another from the religious community. None of the members of the collegiate body may have been accused or convicted in any jurisdiction, be sanctioned by the UN, or seek a position in the upcoming elections in the country [13]. In theory, this council should be defined tomorrow, Thursday, March 14th, in the meantime, negotiations are underway to define who will form this structure [14]. The United States indicated that Henry could stay in Puerto Rico or go anywhere in its territory in case it is unsafe to return to Haiti [15]. Actions to set up a multinational support mission Since 2022, Prime Minister Henry called on the international community to integrate a support mission to strengthen the Haitian National Police (HNP) [16]. Kenya responded to this call in July 2023, when it announced its intention to “lead” the initiative and send “1,000 police officers to the Caribbean nation” [17]. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2699, authorizing the deployment of a multinational ad hoc security support mission to Haiti, under the leadership of Kenya [18]. The start of this operation has been delayed due to challenges in African country’s courts, which a few days ago the leaders of Haiti and Kenya tried to resolve by signing a bilateral security agreement. The international community has responded very timidly to the initiative. The Bahamas pledged 150 people. Jamaica and Antigua & Barbuda expressed their willingness to help. Benin offered to send 2,000 soldiers [19]. Spain also showed interest in contributing to the cause. However, on March 10th, the UN stated that despite the promises, a trust fund to pay for this force only amounts to 10 million dollars [20]. The new mission will not be a blue helmet operation. Its objectives will be to protect the state institutions, as well as critical infrastructure and transportation hubs. They will also seek to pacify gangs. It has been reported that an advanced contingent of several hundred officers will be deployed to survey the terrain [21]. To avoid repeating the problems the UN mission has had in the country, such as the spread of cholera and cases of exploitation and sexual abuse, there will be very rigorous scrutiny to oversee the multinational mission. This time the Security Council resolution demands appropriate wastewater management measures to prevent the introduction and spread of disease, as well as robust, secure, and accessible mechanisms for lodging complaints and conducting investigations into any allegations of misconduct, including sexual assault [22]. However, for the time being, Kenya has communicated that the deployment of its agents is on hold until a new government is formed in the Caribbean nation, as officials said on March 12th. Spike in violence and importance of gangs Port-au-Prince has been the epicenter of gang violence, especially the National Police stations, its cadet academy, the prisons, from which more than 3,500 prisoners have fled, the Sylvio Cator national stadium and the international airport [23]. On March 3rd, the Government declared a state of emergency and a curfew in most of the country, [24] which will be extended until March 22nd. The gang members’ main demand was the resignation of the prime minister, although they also seek to prevent the deployment of international forces. According to international analyst Robert Muggah, the gangs hope to be part of a governing council to lead the country [25]. According to a report done by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, there are up to 200 gangs operating in Haiti, and almost half of them have a presence in Port-au-Prince. They range from small groups of youths sharing guns to gangs of more than a thousand people with permanent salaries and automatic weapons that belong to hierarchical organizations. There are two more visible groups: the G-Pèp and the G-9 Family, which control the poorest neighborhoods of the capital. They have been linked to political parties: the G-9 is close to the ruling Haitian Tèt Kale, while the G-Pèp tends to support opposition forces. In this crisis, the G-9 and its allies have taken over the ports and roads surrounding the country’s main airport [26]. Delinquency controls 80% of the capital [27]. Gang members are often aligned with elite businessmen and politicians who finance them [28]. The leaders of some gangs announced an informal alliance called “Vivre Ensemble” (Living Together). As noted above, the most notable leader is Jimmy Chérizier, who is known as “Barbeque”. He was an elite policeman and has shown himself to be bloodthirsty in his operations [29]. Reports say his gang was receiving support from the government of Jovenel Moise [30]. While CARICOM leaders met to discuss the situation in Haiti, Chérizier told reporters that if the international community continued on the same path, it would only “generate more chaos”. “We Haitians have to decide who is going to be the leader of the country and what model of government we want” [31]. Clashes in Port-au-Prince have caused hundreds of inhabitants of the northern part of the capital to flee their homes. The UN reported that more than 800 people died in January. The violence is also driving tens of thousands of Haitians out of the country. The Dominican Republic is the main destination of that diaspora. For this reason, President Luis Abinader issued a cry for help to “save” Haiti [32]. For now, the Dominican government maintains the cancellation of flights to and from Haiti and on March 6th, Carlos Luciano Díaz Morfa, Minister of Defense, announced that they have incorporated strict security measures in the border zone, including more equipment and more personnel [33]. In the United States, the Defense Department and military officials told the Congress that they must be prepared for a possible mass migration from Haiti [34]. Dozens of people have died in the violent attacks and over 15,000 Haitians have been left homeless after fleeing their communities during these clashes. Food, water, fuel, and medical care are scarce. The humanitarian situation is dire. As a result, many people feel that the best thing to do is to leave the country [35]. According to the United Nations, approximately one million people are on the brink of famine, with 350,000 displaced [36]. What’s next after the Prime Minister’s resignation Some experts wonder what role the gangs will play. Robert Fatton, an expert on Haitian politics at the University of Virginia, says they will necessarily have to participate in the national discussion. Officials will have to deal with the groups and try to convince them to disarm [37]. According to an analysis by Crisis Group, the gangs will have two options in the face of deployment of the multinational forces: if they perceive weakness, they will not submit, but if they see that the intervention is strong, they will consider under what conditions they could disarm [38]. In these circumstances, gangs have emerged as power brokers in Haiti for the first time, posing a challenge for any transitional government [39]. However, for many civic and religious groups involved in the talks, this is a red line. Chérizier’s next steps are unknown. Days ago, he said that if Henry resigned, “all areas around Port-au-Prince that are blocked or inaccessible will be reopened” and “attacks on police stations will stop” [40]. He also vowed to begin “the real fight against the system of oligarchs and corrupt people” and proposed his own “peace plan”. He demands total amnesty for gang members and that the country be governed by a “council of wise men” in which he would have a place [41]. On March 11th, Chérizier announced that the “Viv Ansanm” gang alliance will not recognize any government resulting from the agreement with CARICOM and that “it is up to the Haitian people to designate their rulers”. On the other hand, an advisor to Guy Philippe, the former rebel leader who recently returned to Haiti and called for “revolution” against Henry, warned that any new government must include him [42]. There is uncertainty about the timing of the transition. For now, security conditions in Port-au-Prince are precarious, while doubts persist about the timetable for deploying an international mission to reinforce the local police and restore order [43]. These days, Henry’s resignation seems to have eased the situation in the capital, as no attacks on government offices or police stations have been reported. The main CPS cargo port opened, and some fuel was allowed to leave the Varreux facilities near the port. However, protests continue in opposition to the CARICOM plan [44]. The economist and political scientist Joseph Harold writes about three aspects of the crisis. First, Haitians are in a humanitarian emergency and aid is not enough. The distribution of supplies should be done by national institutions, not international agencies. This practice weakens the institutional framework. Resources to alleviate the emergency amount to 720 million dollars and only 16% have been collected [45]. In terms of security, it will be difficult for the multinational solution to be successful. Experts are skeptical that a relatively small force led by Kenya, whose officers speak English, not Creole or Frech, will help control the situation [46]. Wooldy Edson Louidor, a Colombian-Haitian professor at the Javeriana University of Colombia, affirms that the support of the international community is important, “but to achieve a Haitian solution. And this involves returning to constitutional order” [47]. Haitians have traditionally opposed any foreign intervention in their internal affairs and pride themselves on being the first black republic to emerge after a slave revolt during European colonialism [48]. The third point is the elections that must be organized [49]. This is not a recipe for conflict resolution, but it is a necessary step. It gives the international community and local actors a goal to work towards [50]. In this sense, analyst Philippe de Bard points out the importance of designing an electoral system that contemplates the constitution of a reliable electoral roll, the integration of a permanent electoral council and the creation of an independent dispute mechanism. He believes that it will be necessary to evaluate the necessary constitutional reforms. A new electoral law requires the approval of the Haitian Parliament, which does not exist today [51]. The immediate term, the challenge is to control the gangs and create a capable police force. After that, the effort should focus on developing a political strategy to establish conditions for free elections [52]. According to proposals by leading figures, this could happen in about two years [53]. In 2009, writer and journalist Sergio Ramirez did a report on Haiti, following two devastating hurricanes and before the 2010 earthquake. He interviewed the head of the UN Stabilization Mission, Hédi Hannabi, who said, “this is not the classic peacekeeping mission, because there are no two parties in conflict, what we have is anarchy, the presence of gangs, and the absence of institutions. If we were to leave today, chaos would ensue. The problem is that more than ten years later, the disorder situation continues [54]. References [1] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas que han invadido la capital de Haití y qué quieren?”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/03/09/espanol/haiti-pandillas-que-pasa.html [2] CARICOM, “Communiqué – 46th Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM”, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://caricom.org/communique-46th-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-caricom/ [3] Catherine Osborn, “How Haiti’s Unelected Leader Lost America’s Blessing”, Foreign Policy, 7 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/07/haiti-crisis-gangs-ariel-henry-united-states-caricom-elections/ [4] Sarah Morland, “Haiti PM commits to elections by 2025, CARICOM to send team”, Reuters, 29 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-pm-commits-elections-by-2025-caricom-send-team-2024-02-29/ [5] Monique Clesca, “Haiti’s Rule of Lawlessness”, Foreign Affairs, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/central-america-caribbean/haitis-rule-lawlessness [6] Catherine Osborn, op. cit. [7] Deutsche Welle, “UE evacúa a todo su personal de Haití”, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/ueevac%C3%BAa-a-todo-su-personal-de-hait%C3%AD-y-caricom-convoca-cumbre-de-urgencia/a-68493344 [8] Colin McCullough, “Estados Unidos evacuó al personal no esencial de su embajada en Haití por el aumento de la violencia de pandillas”, CNN, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/10/ejercito-ee-uu-evacuo-personal-no-esencialembajada-haiti-trax/ [9] Jennifer Hansler and Tara John, “US will contribute $300 million to Haiti’s multinational security mission”, CNN, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/11/americas/haiti-us-blinken-security-mission-intl-latam/index.html [10] Matt Berg y Eric Bazail-Eimil, “State just sent Republicans their Haiti plan”, Politico, 12 de marzo de 4024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/03/12/state-just-sent-republicans-their-haiti-plan-00146474 [11] Monique Clesca, “Haitians Have a Solution to Haiti’s Crisis”, World Politics Review, 8 de septiembre de 2022. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-gangs-protests-crisis-corruption-crime/ [12] Dánica Coto y Evens Sanon (AP), “El premier de Haití dice que renunciará tras pico de violencia. No está claro quién tomará el relevo”, Los Angeles Times, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/articulo/2024-03-12/elpremier-de-haiti-dice-que-renunciara-tras-pico-de-violencia-no-esta-claro-quien-tomara-el-relevo [13] DW, “Dimisión de Ariel Henry, una esperanza para Haití”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/dimisi%C3%B3n-de-ariel-henry-una-esperanza-para-hait%C3%AD/a-68503873 [14] Widlore Mérancourt, Samantha Schmidt, Michael Birnbaum y Amanda Coletta, “As leader resigns, Haitian politicians rush to form new government”, The Washington Post, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/12/haitiprime-minister-ariel-henry-resigns/ [15] El País, “El caos y una ola de violencia sin precedentes fuerzan la renuncia del primer ministro de Haití, Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-12/el-caos-y-una-ola-de-violencia-sin-precedentes-fuerzan-la-renuncia-del-primerministro-de-haiti-ariel-henry.html [16] DW, “Haití reitera la necesidad de una fuerza multinacional”, 10 de junio de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-reitera-la-necesidad-de-una-fuerza-multinacional/a-65877041 [17] Frances Robles, “An International Force May Be Headed to Troubled Haiti, again”, The New York Times, 1 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 11 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/01/world/americas/haiti-international-intervention.html [18] Emily Mae Czachor, “U.S. military airlifts embassy staff from Port-au-Prince amid Haiti's escalating gang violence”, CBS News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-military-airlifts-evacuation-staff-embassy-port-au-prince-haiti-gangviolence/ [19] Samuel Salgado, “Haití firma acuerdo con Kenia para que policías de Nairobi lideren misión de seguridad”, France24, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240301-hait%C3%AD-y-kenia-firman-acuerdo-paraque-polic%C3%ADas-de-nairobi-lideren-misi%C3%B3n-de-seguridad [20] Jacqueline Charles, “U.S., Caribbean leaders propose plan to lead Haiti out of crisis and toward elections”, The Miami Herald, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article286558805.html#storylink=cpy [21] Crisis Group, “Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold?”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b49-haitis-gangs-can-foreign-mission-break-their-stranglehold [22] Ídem [23] Pablo Ferri, “Haití camina hacia el desastre a la espera de ayuda internacional”, El País, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-10/haiti-camina-hacia-el-desastre-a-la-espera-de-ayuda-internacional.html [24] Carlos S. Maldonado, “Haití, en estado de urgencia y toque de queda tras la huida de miles de presos de una cárcel de Puerto Príncipe”, El País, 3 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-03/miles-de-presos-huyen-de-la-principal-carcel-dehaiti-tras-un-asalto-de-las-bandas-criminales.html [25] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [26] Ídem [27] Nacho Carretero, “Haití, cuando colapsa un Estado”, El País, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/eps/2023-07-02/haiti-cuando-colapsa-un-estado.html [28] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [29] Tom Phillips y Luke Taylor, “Is the feared gang boss ‘Barbecue’ now the most powerful man in Haiti?”, The Guardian, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/10/haiti-gang-boss-kingpin-barbecue-jimmy-cherizier [30] InSight Crime, “Jimmy Chérizier, alias ‘Barbecue’”, 10 de noviembre de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/haitiorganized-crime-news/jimmy-cherizier-alias-barbecue/ [31] Coto y Sanon (AP), op. cit. [32] Carlos S. Maldonado, op. cit. [33] Jessica Hasbun, “Después no se quejen de las acciones que vamos a tener que hacer”: la advertencia del presidente Luis Abinader por crisis en Haití”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/advertencia-republicadominicana-haiti-luis-abinader-orix/ [34] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití, las pandillas y la dimisión del primer ministro en vivo: noticias y más”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/ultimas-noticias-sobre-la-escalada-de-la-violencia-en-haiti-y-dimision-delprimer-ministro-en-vivo [35] Frances Robles, David C. Adams y Andre Paultre, “With Haiti in Chaos, a Humanitarian Crisis Is Rapidly Unfolding”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/09/world/americas/haiti-gangs-political-uprising-ariel-henryhumanitarian-crisis.html [36] Philippe de Bard, “In Haiti, as Elsewhere, Elections Alone Are Not the Answer”, Foreign Policy, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/12/haiti-gang-violence-elections-ariel-henry-resignation/ [37] Coto y Sanon, op. cit. [38] Crisis Group, op. cit. [39] Sam Woolston, “Prime Minister’s Resignation Tips Haiti Into Uncharted Territory”, Insight Crime, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/news/prime-minister-resigns-haiti-unchartered-territory [40] Matt Rivers, “Haiti's most notorious gang leader plots its future amid rebellion”, ABC News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://abcnews.go.com/International/haitis-notorious-gang-leader-plots-future-amid-rebellion/story?id=107994731 [41] Amalendu Misra, “Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own”, The Conversation, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/jimmy-barbecue-cherizier-the-gangsterbehind-the-violence-in-haiti-who-may-have-political-aspirations-of-his-own-225514 [42] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití”, op. cit. [43] Infobae, “Crece la incertidumbre en Haití tras el anuncio de renuncia del primer ministro Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/03/12/crece-la-incertidumbre-en-haiti-tras-el-anuncio-de-renuncia-delprimer-ministro-ariel-henry/ [44] Al Jazeera, “Uneasy quiet in Haiti capital after prime minister pledges to step down”, 13 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/3/13/uneasy-quiet-in-haiti-capital-after-prime-minister-pledges-to-step-down [45] Fernando del Rincón, “Hay incoherencia en la respuesta internacional para la situación en Haití, dice analista”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/haiti-violencia-bandas-inseguridad-ariel-gobierno-conclusiones-tv/ [46] Tom Phillips, Archie Bland y Oliver Holmes Haiti, “What caused the gang violence and will it end now the PM has quit?”, The Guardian, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/08/haiti-crisis-gang-jailbreak-explained [47] Isabella Escobedo, “Haití: radiografía de un Estado fallido”, DW, 5 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-radiograf%C3%ADa-de-un-estado-fallido/a-68448368 [48] BBC News, “La multimillonaria multa que Haití le pagó a Francia por convertirse en el primer país de América Latina en independizarse”, 30 de diciembre de 2018. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-46680927 [49] Fernando del Rincón, op. cit. [50] James Bosworth, “To Address Its Crisis, Haiti Needs an Elected Government, World Politics Review, 26 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-elections-gangs-crisis/ [51] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [52] The Washington Post (editorial), “Haiti needs security now. For the future, it needs democracy”, 8 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/03/08/haiti-violence-gangs-chaos-anarchy-kenya-peacekeepers/ [53] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [54] Sergio Ramírez, “Haití, un país en extinción”, El País, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/opinion/2024-03-12/haiti-un-pais-en-extincion.htm