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Last weekend, Turkey held a historic election that will be crucial in deciding in the way the country is heading. Although almost all pre-election polls were predicting a narrow win for the main opposition candidate, the results are inconclusive, and the country will go to a runoff election in two weeks’ time. The new constitution voted in 2017 stipulates the parliament and presidential elections must be held at the same time. To win the presidential component of the election, a candidate must garner more than 50% of the votes. If none of the candidates receives greater than 50% of the votes, the election goes to a runoff election between the two candidates with the highest votes. This is precisely the situation Turkey faces now. Incumbent President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and his closest rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, will face each other in a runoff election on May 28.Who is Erdogan’s opposition and what were their arguments?There are two main blocks that fought to win in a bitter and ruthless campaign. The broad opposition National Alliance is made up of six political parties, spearheaded by the Kilicdaroglu-led Republican People’s Party (CHP) party. CHP is known for its pro-secularist policies, and for this reason have been fiercely opposed by the religious segment of Turkish voters. To turn this image around, Kilicdaroglu promised a broad reconciliation policy to unite the country and heal the wounds of the past. He also followed an appeasement strategy by drawing under the National Alliance the national and conservative leaning Good Party (IP) and three minor religious parties, the conservative Happiness Party (SP), Future Party (GP) and Solution Party (DEVA). The last two parties’ inclusion in the alliance are significant, as they are respectively led by Ahmet Davudoglu, a former prime minister and Erdogan’s former foreign minister, and Ali Babacan, who served as the minister of economy until 2019 under successive Erdogan governments. Holding the alliance together was important, as a key criticism against the opposition was its fragmented nature, which some argued would make it impossible to form a concerted front against Erdogan. The National Alliance successfully overcame this hurdle. The next problem was who would be the collective candidate of the National Alliance. The polls consistently showed mayors of Ankara and Istanbul ahead of Kilicdaroglu as candidates. Turkish voters tend to prefer politicians with proven public office track record – two of the mayors had this but Kilicdaroglu did not. In a decision some argue was politically motivated, Imamoglu was charged and sentenced to three years for insulting the Electoral Council (YSK). This took him out of contention. Another spanner in the works for the National Alliance was the self-nomination of Muharrem Ince for the presidential election. Ince was CHP’s nominee in the 2018 election where he lost to Erdogan. The National Alliance was fearful Ince’s candidacy would split opposition votes, which would in turn take the election to a second round that would advantage Erdogan. Ince announced his withdrawal from the race two days before the election, after several images were circulated on internet alleging him having an affair. Battered and bruised, Kilicdaroglu remained as the main opposition candidate in the last stretch. He had three main arguments in his campaign. The first was the failure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s 2023 goals and objectives. Turkey was supposed to enter the top 10 economies in the world. Turkey barely stays within the top 20, at 19th. What is worse, the economy has been on a downturn for the past three years. The Turkish lira has plummeted in value and inflation has reached as high as 85.5%. Kilicdaroglu has pointed to the high price of onion and potatoes as a symbol of economic crisis and worsening cost of living for many Turks. The second is the increasing reputation of nepotism, corruption and wasteful government spending, which has been long criticised by many segments of Turkish society. Mismanagement of the government were widely criticised immediately after the February 2023 earthquake, delivering further a blow to Erdogan and his government. Finally, Kilictaroglu tried to present a new vision for the electorate. He announced a four-step reform program that would make Turkey ● more democratic● more productive, with investment in agriculture and industry● a social state with services● able to sustain these reforms. What was Erdogan’s election strategy?Unfortunately for Kilicdaroglu, his message could not be heard by all voters, especially those in small towns and rural areas who primarily rely on conventional media of TV and newspapers. As a result, he won the majority vote in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, but Erdogan was in front in inland areas and smaller cities. A key strategy for Erdogan is controlling the Turkish media. Turkey has one of the highest rates of detained and jailed journalists in the world – in fact, it is second only to China. During April, Erdogan received more than 33 hours of airtime on the state-run TRT channel. Kilicdaroglu had just 32 minutes. The incumbent government’s job was relatively easier. Erdogan was the natural candidate for the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led People’s Alliance. Ultra nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) has been supporting the AKP government since 2015. The alliance also included several minor religious and nationalist parties. The ruling block had three main arguments against the opposition. First was the secular history of CHP, established by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and now led by Kilicdaroglu. In the 1990’s, CHP was the leading defender of the headscarf (hijab) ban for women. Erdogan argued if Kilicdaroglu became president, religious Muslims in Turkey would lose their freedoms gained in the past two decades under his rule. Second was Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi religious identity. Alevism is a branch of Shi’a Islam followed by about 5-10% of Turks within a largely Sunni nation. The Erdogan camp was hoping the Sunni majority would not relate to Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi orientation. Third was the accusation that Kilicdaroglu would collude with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK, the Kurdish separatist organisation that was responsible for many terrorist activities in Turkey. The extreme implication was that Kilicdaroglu would divide the country along Turkish and Kurdish lines, a charge vehemently denied by Kilicdaroglu. It seems the fear mongering strategy against Kilicdaroglu worked, and Erdogan will go to the runoff election ahead of his rival. What is likely to happen next? Erdogan, nevertheless, has been wounded. If 50+% gives political legitimacy, and Erdogan is the incumbent president, he lost some legitimacy by receiving less than 50% of the votes last weekend. The Turkish media will play a key role in the next two weeks. They are in a conundrum. They cannot be too critical of Erdogan and support Kilicdaroglu for fear of a post-election crackdown if Erdogan wins. But they would also not want to be seen as too supportive of the Erdogan government in case Kilicdaroglu wins the election. Erdogan will have no qualms about putting excessive pressure on the media, and that may be sufficient to tip the election in his favour. Kilicdaroglu will have a chance to face Erdogan, with no other opposition candidate, in an electoral duel. If he is able to appeal to people who did not vote for Erdogan, he may pull off a narrow win. His strategy will be to call for all voters to turn up and vote if they do not want another five year’s of Erdogan rule and economic hardship.

Turkey’s 2023 election is one of the most significant in its hundred-year history. After years of currency crashes, vanishing foreign currency reserves and surging inflation, rethinking economic policy will be a top priority for whoever is eventually sworn in. At the time of writing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is claiming victory, but votes are still being counted and a run-off round is looking distinctly possible. Erdoğan and his ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002 not long after the previous incumbents’ economic mismanagement had caused a major crisis that sent the lira and stock market plunging. In exchange for an IMF rescue, the outgoing government had introduced reforms such as an independent central bank, banking and finance regulators, taking steps to reduce public deficits and debt, and proper public procurement rules. The AKP wisely stuck to these reforms, which paid handsome dividends. Inflation fell from above 50% in 2001 to single digits within three years. Foreign investment improved significantly, allowing annual economic growth to average 7% from 2002-07. This produced sizeable productivity gains, and benefited large parts of society, significantly reducing inequality. The global financial crisis of 2007-09 caused Turkish exports to collapse, but the country recovered relatively quickly after advanced economies cut their interest rates to almost zero. This encouraged investors to borrow cheaply and put money into emerging markets like Turkey in search of decent returns. Choppy waters The turning point, both politically and economically, came in 2013. Demonstrations in Istanbul against construction activity in Gezi Park, one of the last remaining green areas in the city, quickly turned into a nationwide movement against the government’s growing authoritarianism. Erdoğan responded with a crackdown, deploying riot police and detaining hundreds of protesters. This would become a defining characteristic of his regime, permeating through to all other aspects of governance. Around the same time, international investors began pulling back from emerging markets as the US Federal Reserve started tightening monetary policy. There have been several cycles of loosening and tightening since then, but the money hasn’t returned to Turkey. Foreign ownership of Turkish government bonds has fallen from 25% in May 2013 to below 1% in 2023. Similarly, investors have pulled out more than US$7 billion (£5.6 billion) from the Turkish stock market. Investor concerns grew worse after a referendum in 2017 created an executive presidency that bestowed enormous powers on Erdoğan. He has used this to the full, effectively reducing most institutions to independent entities only on paper. The central bank of Turkey is a case in point. As inflationary pressures started to mount in 2021, and unlike almost every other central bank, it cut interest rates sharply - from 19% to 8.5% today. This pushed inflation to a 24-year high of 84% in August 2022. Erdoğan’s insistence on low interest rates to promote growth has also severely weakened the lira, which is down 80% against the US dollar in the last five years. To add to the problem, Turkey’s imports are much higher than its exports, causing a current account deficit of 6% of GDP. Turkey’s tragic lira: Lira vs US dollar. TradingView To prop up the lira, the authorities have squandered a huge amount of foreign exchange reserves. They have also resorted to swapping agreements with friendly Gulf nations like the United Arab Emirates, in which Turkey has borrowed Emirati dirhams in exchange for lira. But this doesn’t address the underlying problems. As of April 2023, Turkey’s net foreign currency reserves are down to negative US$67 billion. The authorities have been forced to introduce unconventional measures to keep the wheels turning. These have included protecting lira bank deposits against dollar depreciation by promising to make up any losses, requiring exporters to relinquish 40% of their foreign currency earnings, and barring banks from lending to companies with significant foreign currency holdings. What next? A rethink is inevitable after this election, though two very different scenarios are foreseeable. If Erdoğan wins, one would expect some normalisation with the west. Turkey has been difficult over major issues such as Sweden and Finland joining Nato, recently yielding on Finland but continuing to object to Sweden. With the EU the major destination for Turkey’s exports and hence source of hard cash, Ankara’s approach to the west could potentially soften under Erdoğan after the election. On the other hand, the AKP’s election manifesto has not offered any novelty on the economic policy front. It seems very unlikely that Erdoğan would change his stance on low interest rates, in which case the lira is likely to plunge further. Opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has consistently been ahead in the polls in the run-up to the election and has just been boosted by the withdrawal of one of the other main candidates. An opposition victory, especially if decisive, would allow for a proper reset, most obviously starting with raising interest rates to deal with high inflation. This would maximise foreign investment, boosting economic growth while alleviating the pressure on the lira. This is easier said than done, however. Interest rates might need to rise to 30% to break inflation, which would likely cause a nasty recession. As if that wouldn’t put enough pressure on the government’s finances, there have been various electoral giveaways and costly promises from both sides. Much other spending is also required. The US$50 billion cost of building new homes in regions hit by the two recent earthquakes is just one example. Meanwhile, there has been a significant deterioration in the rule of law, press freedoms and civil liberties. The AKP has relied overly on construction for growth, which has come at the expense of farming, turning a country that was once self-sufficient in food into a major importer. Education and procurement have suffered from endless reforms. Success in any business in Turkey now requires access to the ruling party elite. But if undoing all this damage is going to be arduous, it still matters greatly for the rest of the world. Turkey is a key part of international community, not only as a member of Nato and the G20 but at the crossroads of trade between Asia and Europe. It still has enormous potential, with a young population and dynamic business culture. The results of this election are therefore likely to have ramifications far beyond Turkey’s borders.

The political crisis currently experienced by Israel has its origins in the structure of the political system of this country, institutionalized since the twenties of the last century, in British Palestine, through the installation of an electoral system first adopted by the Jewish community authorities, which was growing with immigration, and then by the State of Israel since its establishment in 1948. It was a parliamentary proportional representative system, with a single national list, with an entry band for Parliament that varied from 1% of the votes to the current 3.25%. This system worked regularly while the big parties of the time –Labor and Likud (liberal nationalist)– received a large percentage of votes that allowed them to choose minor partners for the government coalition and at the same time they were led by politicians who possessed high levels of legitimacy by their foundational roles in Israel, such as were Ben Gurion and Begin. Around the 1980s, electoral parity began to emerge between the possible government coalitions led by both parties, and this situation gave rise to governments of national unity led by Shamir and Peres. Later, the big parties lose electoral support, and the government coalitions are increasingly weak. This is because the leader of the party that wins the first electoral majority wins just over a quarter of the votes, while to achieve a coalition that includes more than 50% of the parliamentary seats, he must pay high 'prices' to the small parties and depends more and more on them in order not to lose the government. This is the current case of the Netanyahu government. The attempt at electoral reform in the 1990s, which separated the election of the Prime Minister from the parliamentary election - from the coalition supporting the government - failed, as it reinforced both ideologically and electorally the smaller parties. Ultimately, at the beginning of this century, the previous system was restored with an increase in the percentage of votes required for entry into Parliament. At the same time, Israel lacks a written Constitution and instead has a series of basic laws that outline the structure of the State and safeguard the rights of citizens and minorities. In the 1990s, the Israeli constitutional void was filled through judicial activism by the Supreme Court, which carried out a process of judicializing politics and exercised its authority to limit government actions and legislation that it deemed contrary to the prevailing legal system. Some politicians viewed this as an attempt by the Supreme Court to assert supremacy and curtail the popular will expressed through parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, the weakness of the major political parties and the personalistic and populist tendencies - which were accelerated during the years when electoral reform led to the separation of the election of the Prime Minister from that of the Parliament (Knesset) - led to Israel holding five national elections between 2019 and 2022, in which the major parties had great difficulty in generating stable government coalitions. The latest election, on November 1, 2022, granted the first majority to the Likud, and its leader, Netanyahu, formed a government coalition that they themselves described as "completely right-wing." The coalition includes, outside the Likud, three ultra-Orthodox parties and two religious nationalist parties. One problem with it is that it contains many ideological contradictions among its members and also generates serious disputes over the leadership of each of the sectors. An additional problem is that it includes a party - the Jewish Power party, led by Ben Gvir - that is openly anti-Arab in racist terms. Among the electoral proposals of this bloc of parties, which make up the current government, the one for judicial reform stood out, whose central content was to remove from the Supreme Court of Israel its role and authority with respect to the revision of legislation, as well as over the actions of the Government and its power to curb everything that it considered undemocratic and in opposition to the existing basic legislation. This would be accomplished through a series of laws that would change the judge election commission, removing the Supreme Court's right to veto judge appointments, and introducing a representative majority of the governing coalition on this commission. Another proposed law would give Parliament, with a 61-vote majority, the power to override any political decision of the Supreme Court. Beyond these, it is proposed to weaken the control authority that the Attorney General's Office has regarding appointments and government acts, and a series of measures that would practically eliminate the political powers of the Judiciary within the current Israeli system of checks and balances (brakes and balances designed to prevent any of the branches of the State from acquiring supremacy over the other two). The argument of Netanyahu and his coalition allies is that they have the power to carry out this judicial reform or revolution, since the people have wanted it and have manifested it through their vote in the last election. Beyond this, Netanyahu and his allies make “identity politics” arguments, which maintain that Israel, although governed by Likud-led coalitions, remains in the hands of the former Ashkenazi elites originating from historic Labor; and this means the discrimination of Eastern Jews from the institutions of power, such as the Supreme Court and the judicial system, the academic elite, the financial elite, the high-tech elite, and even certain military elites. The speed with which Netanyahu and the government coalition attempted to legislate this reform caused an unexpected popular protest to emerge from civil society, without clear political leadership, as the parliamentary opposition was practically dragged along by the popular protest. In addition, it should be noted that the protest is focused not only on the reform itself but also on Netanyahu's personal interest, as he is facing three corruption trials and the disqualification of Deri, the leader of the ultra-Orthodox Sephardic party Shas, from serving as a minister in the current coalition. The massive protests and strong international criticism, especially from the US and the European Union, along with a climate of instability that weakens the value of the national currency - the Shekel -, the withdrawal of capital, and threats in the area of internal and international security, have strengthened the protests and created coalitions among sectors that seemed irreconcilable before these recent events. Thus, reservists in elite units have stated that they will not continue to serve in their military roles under a Netanyahu dictatorship since, if everything depends on a parliamentary majority without balance between the powers, that majority forming the government coalition would delegate its parliamentary authority to him and the government would be in the hands of the prime minister, whom the protest activists consider a future dictator. Faced with this, the massive protests have included blockades of central roads and the paralysis of activities. Added to all this is the fact that the Minister of Security (Defense), Gallant, demanded that Netanyahu stop the reform legislation because the security situation - facing Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza - during this month of Ramadan is perceived as dangerous and it is a bad period to add internal instability. Netanyahu prevented Gallant from making a public statement explaining all of this, although Gallant did so while Netanyahu was on an official visit to London. Netanyahu reacted by declaring that Gallant would no longer lead the Ministry of Security (Defense), but he did not send him the dismissal letter. When Netanyahu fired Gallant on Sunday night, a large crowd took to the streets across the country to protest this measure, and the next morning, in a special meeting, the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor), in coordination with the associations of industrialists, merchants, and bank directors, declared a general strike that paralyzed Ben Gurion airport and large sectors of the entire country. As a result of all this and after a day of intense negotiations within the government coalition - facing the religious nationalist parties, who, due to past issues and settlement problems in the West Bank, were the ones who most demanded the reform, and alongside the Minister of Justice, Levin, who is the author of the reform plan - Netanyahu declared that the reform is on hold for the next month to make way for a conciliatory negotiation that produces an agreed reform of the Israeli legal system, in negotiations that will be guided by President Herzog. It is clear that legislating a Constitution at this time, with the multiple fractures of Israeli society aligning in two polarized blocs, is a pipe dream. It is also necessary to understand that behind the attempt at judicial reform-revolution, there is an ineffective political system that must be reformed and updated in order to face the multiple challenges of Israel in the 21st century, which are very different from those of a century ago when this system began to be institutionalized.

Tunisia is beset by deepening political and economic challenges. President Kais Saied is transforming the country’s parliamentary system into an authoritarian presidential one that has become increasingly repressive. Arrests and convictions of opposition politicians have surged. Saied’s aggressive anti-foreigner discourse has fuelled xenophobic sentiment and contributed to a spike in violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. Economically, Tunisia is grappling with the fallout of a decade of sluggish growth compounded by a series of economic shocks since 2020. The nation’s public debt has soared, with significant debt repayments looming. As the country tries to deal with mounting financial constraints, its inability to attract foreign loans is further clouding its economic future. Saied now must decide whether to embrace a credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or potentially default on Tunisia’s foreign debt. Against this backdrop, the EU and, in particular, Italy have a pivotal role to play. They can either help steer Tunisia toward a more stable economic future or watch it descend into chaos. A worrying political and economic outlook While the protests that led to the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, the promise of a more democratic and egalitarian society in the North African country did not come to fruition. To be sure, the protests did lead to the overthrow of autocratic Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. Moreover, Tunisia was the sole country to emerge from the regional uprisings with a new democracy. That experiment, however, foundered after Saied – who was elected to the presidency in 2019 – seized a monopoly on power in July 2021. Over the past two years, he has replaced the country’s semi-parliamentary system with one lacking checks and balances, consolidating power in his hands. People’s fear of repression resurfaced. Since mid-February 2023, arrests and convictions of public figures, especially politicians, have accelerated, undermining a disorganised and divided opposition. Meanwhile, large sections of the population have focused on survival in the face of a worsening economic crisis and have increasingly disengaged from politics. President Saied has attempted to shore up his dwindling support by pushing nationalist policies. He has jailed members of the opposition in a move that seems aimed at bolstering his standing with swathes of the public who are frustrated with the former political class. Saied has also xenophobically accused sub-Saharan migrants of conspiring to change Tunisia’s identity, creating a climate conducive to repeated violent attacks against a vulnerable minority. Economically, the country is still reeling from a decade of slow growth. After the 2011 uprising, the Tunisian government combatted rising unemployment in part by hiring hundreds of thousands of civil servants. Today, the public sector is the country’s largest employer and half of the annual budget is spent on the public payroll. At the same time, public and private investment in infrastructure, research and other growth-enhancing spending items has dropped significantly, leading to a sharp decline in GDP growth. External factors also chipped away at the Tunisian economy. The Covid-19 pandemic brought a collapse in tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, led to a spike in commodity prices. Surging inflation – particularly in food prices – and shortages of basic goods have eroded Tunisian living standards. Against this backdrop, Tunisia’s public debt has skyrocketed, reaching nearly 90 per cent of GDP in 2022, with substantial financing requirements needed to maintain current levels of spending. Credit rating agencies have downgraded the country as it struggles to balance its budget. The latest downgrade took place in June, when Fitch lowered Tunisia’s rating to CCC- (well into junk status territory). As a result, access to international financial markets has been virtually shut off, given the prohibitive interest rates (over 20 per cent) that this sovereign rating would entail. While the current account deficit has shrunk and foreign currency liquidity has improved over the past few months because of an uptick in tourism revenues and remittances from Tunisians working abroad, servicing its external debt will continue to be extremely challenging. With 2.6 billion US dollars in repayments scheduled for 2024 (including a euro-denominated bond maturing in February, equivalent to 900 million US dollars), it is still unclear how the government will be able to secure sufficient funds to meet these liabilities. The 2024 budget draft anticipates loans from Algeria and Saudi Arabia, as well as other, as yet unknown, external sources. The IMF deal and the role of the EU Despite these financing difficulties, Tunisia has not yet signed a deal with the IMF. In October 2022, Tunisia and the IMF agreed on the terms of a 48-month, 1.9 billion US dollar loan aimed at stabilising the economy, but Saied rejected the deal, fearing social unrest from cutting subsidies and reducing the public sector wage bill. The IMF board postponed the deal in response. Since then, the president has remained steadfast in his rejection of what he calls “foreign diktats” from the IMF and Western states. The Europeans – in particular, Italy – have pressed the IMF to reopen negotiations and offered incentives to persuade Saied to accept a revised deal, despite their internal divisions on how to treat Tunisia. They are applying this pressure largely because the economic fallout from a debt default could further increase the number of people – both nationals and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa – leaving Tunisia for Europe. While some EU member states, such as Germany, have taken a more critical stance towards Kais Saied’s authoritarian turn, eventually the migration, security and economic interests of Italy and, to an extent, France seem to have prevailed within the EU. Due to its geographic proximity to Tunisia, Italy would receive a majority of a migration influx, at least initially. For this reason, the Italian government has reiterated its concerns over Tunisia’s economic situation on multiple occasions, while refraining from expressing any criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian turn and violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. The EU has offered incentives to Tunisia to accept a deal with the IMF. After Giorgia Meloni and later EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte visited Tunis in June, they unveiled 900 million euros in macro-financial assistance conditioned on a deal with the IMF and 105 million euros for joint cooperation on border management and anti-smuggling measures to reduce irregular migration to Europe. Despite the sweeteners the EU offered, the likelihood of a revised deal between Tunisia and the IMF has receded. In August, Saied removed the head of government, Najla Bouden, who had been directly involved in the negotiations with the IMF, and replaced her with a more pliant official, Ahmed Hanachi. Since then, Tunisia hasn’t put forward a revised proposal to the IMF. In October, the president reinforced his position by sacking Economy Minister Samir Saied after the latter claimed that a deal with the IMF would send a reassuring message to Tunisia’s foreign creditors. Tunisia has also rejected part of the funds offered by the EU. On 3 October, Saied rejected the first tranche of EU financial help, declaring that this “derisory” amount ran counter to the agreement between the two parties and was just “charity”. The repercussions of this refusal on the rest of the EU’s financial incentives are unclear. A fork in the road There are obvious reasons for Tunisia to secure a loan from the IMF. It would send a reassuring signal to Tunisia’s foreign partners and creditors. It could encourage Gulf Arab states to provide additional financial support in the form of government loans and deposits with the central bank, and investment in the economy. That would provide the Tunisian government with breathing space. But implementation of reforms required under the loan’s terms could set off anti-government protests by the country’s main trade union (the UGTT) and, in turn, government-led repression. To forestall such a scenario, the president himself could incite protests and riots by using nationalist rhetoric to scapegoat the IMF for any unpopular measures required by the loan. A no-agreement scenario, however, would have much more severe and potentially even catastrophic consequences. Without a loan, Tunisia would struggle to find alternative funding sources to meet its scheduled foreign debt repayments. Saied could then resort to a politically motivated strategic default, followed by negotiations to restructure the country’s external debt. Some Tunisian economists and supporters of the president are advocating for this approach: they say that declaring bankruptcy on external debt would allow the government to hammer out a restructuring plan with creditors and argue that the impact on the economy would be fairly limited, thanks to Tunisia’s capital controls and its banking sector’s low exposure to foreign bonds. But this approach carries great risk, as a foreign debt bankruptcy could lead to a run on Tunisian banks and destabilise the financial sector. In addition, the government could end the central bank’s independence to print money, fuelling an inflation spiral. Politically, a default and its socio-economic repercussions could open the door to a dangerous spiral of social and criminal violence. It could also boost irregular outward migration, with Tunisians fleeing the growing political and economic chaos. Widespread protests may erupt against the disastrous social effects of the president’s failed economic policy, prompting a violent response targeting businesspeople and political opponents for their alleged links to the West, as well as Western diplomats and the local Jewish community. Balancing economic support and respect for rights In light of these two possible scenarios, the EU and Italy should continue to encourage the Tunisian authorities to negotiate with the IMF, which remains the least politically and economically destabilising option on the table for Tunisia, if carried out with due care. At a minimum, a revised deal should include reduced expenditure cuts compared with the earlier proposal, particularly in the context of energy subsidies. At the same time, Italy and the EU should exercise caution and avoid turning their understandable concerns about Tunisia’s stability into a blank check for the president. In particular, they should press the authorities to rein in the abuses perpetrated against migrants and stave off potential attacks against opposition politicians, businesspeople and the local Jewish community. Aside from humanitarian considerations, this would serve Italy’s overarching goal of curbing migration: after all, attacks against the sub-Saharan minority have spurred outward migration, a trend that would accelerate if government persecution becomes even more severe. While supporting the deal, however, the EU and Italy should also prepare for the possibility of Tunisia continuing to reject it and declaring a foreign debt default. In such a scenario, the EU should be prepared to offer emergency financing to the country to help with imports of wheat, medicines and fuel. In doing so, the EU should synchronise the positions of member states to prevent conflicting agendas. Schisms have already emerged between countries like Germany and Italy over how to address Tunisia’s authoritarian drift. For this reason, acknowledgement of the importance of internal stability could provide a common ground in overcoming divisions and helping prevent a new wave of anti-migrant violence.

Monday, March 27 was supposed to be a red-letter day for the new far-right Israeli coalition government, when it planned to slide through the Knesset the central provision of its “judicial overhaul” bill, comfortably ahead of the Passover recess beginning on April 2. Instead, it ended up being one of the most extraordinary days in Israeli history. Spurred by the “firing” of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant by Prime Minister Benjamin (“Bibi”) Netanyahu the evening before, the demonstrations against the overhaul, which had been building in intensity for over two months, became overwhelming. Universities, businesses, Ben-Gurion Airport, and Israel’s embassies and consulates abroad were all closed down in protest, and a general strike was scheduled for the following day. Air Force reserve pilots and other security personnel on whom the military heavily relies were threatening to not report for training or duty. In the face of this completely unprecedented protest, Netanyahu announced he would suspend the bill’s progress “to try to reach a broad agreement during the next Knesset session,” which begins on May 1. The announcement was delayed while Bibi worked out a deal with one of his coalition partners, Itamar Ben-Gvir, minister of national security and head of the neo-Kahanist Jewish Power Party, to organize a new “National Guard,” which, its opponents charge, would constitute “a paramilitary organization that would operate inside Israel in times of crisis, mainly to deal with rioting and nationalist incidents involving Israeli Arabs.” They view it as a new reason not to compromise. Nevertheless, dialogue has already begun with the Knesset opposition under the auspices of President Isaac Herzog. Netanyahu was unquestionably forced to make the postponement concession by the massive outpouring of protest; one poll showed that two-thirds of the Israeli public was against the legislation in its current form. Nevertheless, his entire coalition supports the reform in its current form. Even Minister of Defense Gallant, who is apparently remaining in office since he was not given the requisite legal notice, stressed that his call for delay stemmed solely from fear of damage to Israel’s military preparedness after thousands of Israel Defense Forces reservists threatened not to show up for duty. The handful of coalition MKs, all from Likud, who had indicated reservations about proceeding immediately, were likewise aboard in principle. This may make the negotiations difficult, if not impossible. Dialogue, of course, is the civilized way to proceed, but finding a solution even remotely palatable to all is made significantly more difficult by the disparate composition of the coalition, in which Netanyahu holds less power and influence than in any of the previous five governments he headed. His four coalition partners are ideologically driven and all have very different visions of Israel’s society and priorities than do most Israelis or, in fact, than did Netanyahu himself during most of his political career. Moreover, with the increasing polarization of Israeli society during the last decade, the non-Arab Israeli parties have now formed into two solid blocs, usually called right and left, but they are more accurately described as “never-Bibi” and “pro-Bibi if he does what we want.” However, neither his partners nor his opponents retain any trust in Bibi’s word, and there is considerable suspicion he may push the reforms through unaltered. Thus, despite his promise to delay the bill and negotiate with the opposition, the regular Saturday night demonstration attracted as many — or more — Israelis as the previous ones.Concurrence on neutering the Supreme CourtWhile the genesis of the current crisis is complex, its way was paved by Netanyahu’s desperate attempts to end his ongoing corruption trial and Justice Minister Yariv Levin’s deep ideological commitment to shattering the existing judicial system by making it “more democratic,” i.e., rendering the Supreme Court powerless to invalidate laws passed by the Knesset majority. But the overhaul has received crucial support from a coalition of three distinct minority groups in Israeli society with their own political goals or grievances, all in the pro-Bibi bloc: 1. The two Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) parties, which want to block the Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of their blanket exemption from military service, exempt their schools from minimum education requirements, increase state support for yeshiva students, as well as remove the Court’s ban on Shas party Chair Aryeh Deri from serving as a minister because of two convictions for corruption. 2. Extremist settlers and supporters in the Jewish Power and Religious Zionism parties, who want to remove any legal obstacles to increased settlement, permit the annexation of part or all of the West Bank, and prevent punishment for atrocities like the recent settler pogrom in the West Bank village of Hawara, as well as make Israel “more Jewish.” While there has been an extreme anti-Arab right wing in Israel since at least the 1980s, this is the first time they have been part of a government, with their leaders in significant positions of power. They view the Supreme Court as their main obstacle, though it has only occasionally blocked settler activities in the West Bank. 3. The Kohelet Forum, a well-financed think tank that has gained significant influence in Israeli right-wing circles in recent years, which is pushing for the removal of legal norms preventing the adoption of American libertarian principles foreign to Israel. Their influence is primarily in the Likud.Deep cultural/political rootsThe broader impetus for these reforms has both a larger cultural context as well as a more political one. They emerge from a cultural polarization that has been building since the 1950s and a political tension evident since at least the time of Israel’s First Lebanon War in 1982. They can also be understood in the context of the decade-old worldwide movement toward populism and away from liberal democracy, with distinctive Israeli characteristics. The cultural context harkens back to the immigration to Israel in the 1950s of “Eastern Jews” (Mizrahim) from Arab and Muslim countries, over a million of whom arrived in Israel during the 1950s and 1960s, trebling Israel’s population. It is now generally recognized that they were demeaned and disparaged by officials from the then-hegemonic Labor movement, and Mizrahim are still, on average, less educated and wealthy compared to Ashkenazim (Jews of Central and Eastern European ancestry). Overwhelming Mizrahi support for the right-wing Likud party was a principal factor in its victory of 1977 and control of the premiership for 33 of the subsequent 45 years. All these governments were coalitions — no Israeli party has ever won an outright majority — generally with the participation of the two ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties, the National Religious (settler-dominated) party, and one or another centrist party that enabled Netanyahu to play one side against the other. Despite this fairly consistent political control, the single most important theme of Likud messaging has been opposition to the alleged (and partially real) “Ashkenazi”- and “leftist”-dominated Israeli establishment. This theme has been especially pronounced during the 22 years of Netanyahu’s leadership of the party (though all Likud chairmen have been Ashkenazim who rose to power within the country’s traditional power structures). The claims of elite domination have reached a crescendo in recent months and are now being put forward as the principal justification for the judicial reforms. Likud/Mizrahi complaints of being shut out of the Israeli power structure are not entirely unfounded, despite Likud’s control of the government, today and over the past four decades. There is no doubt that secular, moderately liberal Ashkenazim dominate the academic, legal, military, cultural, and business elites — obviously some more than others. However, the particular bête noir of the Haredim, the settler religious right, and the personal concern of Netanyahu and Deri is the courts, especially the Supreme Court, because that is the sole institution capable of blocking their disparate objectives. Protesters — and most of the Israeli establishment — see it as the critical — and sole — body exercising any check on the government and Knesset majority, given the absence of a written constitution, a second legislative chamber, a federal system, or any other such institution, one or more of which is present in virtually every other democratic country. The protesters are similarly, or perhaps even more, disparate than the “reformists.” Their core is indeed the educated Ashkenazi middle class, but also contains wide swathes of virtually all other social groups in the country with the exception of Israeli Palestinians, who would indeed be hard hit by the overhaul but who largely regard this as an intra-Jewish dispute. The protest organizers have been at pains to emphasize the non-ideological and non-left-wing nature of the protests, hence the ubiquitous Israeli flags and the absence of Palestinian ones. Of course the left is intimately involved and hopes these protests against the right will help to revive its depleted fortunes. The left sees the occupation as the root cause of the right’s insistence on the overhaul, and expects that Arab parties will be among the first victims of an empowered right if the reforms are enacted.Difficulties in reaching a compromiseTechnically, a compromise agreement including some of the “reforms” but leaving a viable system of checks and balances in place could easily be reached. However, this is unlikely, primarily because the two religious Zionist parties, Jewish Power and Religious Zionism, are ideologically committed to fundamental changes that the Supreme Court would certainly block. In addition, Justice Minister Levin and a few others in the Likud seem unalterably committed to the full overhaul, undercutting Netanyahu’s announced willingness to negotiate. The two Haredi parties may, however, be more flexible, as they have no commitment to the secular Israeli state and usually are able to obtain what they need through the political process. The only person in a position to transform the political debate and completely change its terms is Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. There has long been speculation that he could be offered a “get out of jail free card” by the prosecution in his ongoing trial on corruption charges, specifying that the charges would be dropped if he foreswore political activity. The opposition has no doubt that his main reason for staying in power is to change the Court and legal system sufficiently as to avoid any chance of conviction, which he indignantly denies. Some have recently speculated that the humiliation of being forced to change his mind and accept the postponement may drive him to accept the plea bargain. While chances still seem against that happening, if he did accept it, that would immediately transform the political map of Israel. A number of right-wing politicians have left Likud and the rightist bloc over the years because of their treatment by him — and they were part of the recently deposed, unwieldy 18-month “Government of Change,” which contained left, right, and centrist elements (all of the rightists and many of the centrists were ex-Netanyahu partners and supporters). Were Netanyahu to be out of the picture, a center-right coalition could be formed, perhaps even without new elections, that could pass an amended judicial reform package, presumably limiting the damage to checks and balances. The far right would be left out in the cold, the Haredim would join, and the tattered Israeli left would possibly be strengthened but would still be small. However, no one currently believes that is likely to happen. Claims have been made that Netanyahu has promised the hard-liners in his coalition that he won’t compromise, in which case there is little doubt that the demonstrations will be renewed, although whether they will be strengthened or weakened by the delay can’t be predicted. Minister Levin has promised large counter-demonstrations as well, heightening the likelihood of violence, some of which has already started. In fact, the most controversial provisions have already passed their preliminary “readings,” and could be approved on 24-hour notice once the Knesset returns. Besides the opposition in the street, the new provisions would immediately be brought before the Supreme Court, which would almost certainly declare them invalid, leading inevitably to a full-bore constitutional crisis based on the Court declaring invalid the legislation that purported to strip it of that power. Commanders of many of Israel’s security branches have already intimated that in such a contest of legitimacy, they would go with the Supreme Court rather than the government. Of course, this crisis is not taking place in a vacuum. The day after Bibi backed down, President Joe Biden warned that he “cannot continue down this road,” leading to charges of interference in Israel’s internal affairs. Closer to home, Bibi’s grandiose hopes of widespread Israeli-Arab peace based on the 2020 Abraham Accords are crumbling or, at the least, have entered a deep freeze. The United Arab Emirates cancelled a scheduled visit by Netanyahu in January, just after his government was formed, while Jordan was deeply upset by remarks that Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich made denying the existence of a Palestinian people (something the Israeli government formally recognized in 1993), while standing on a stage festooned with a banner showing Israel’s borders as including not only the West Bank but Jordan as well. Moreover, the big prize Netanyahu hoped to bring into the Abraham Accords, namely Saudi Arabia, has closed the door on them, at least for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the kingdom’s recent China-brokered resumption of ties with Iran is a poke in Israel’s eye (as well as that of the U.S.), besides attenuating one of the main reasons for Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, namely, fear of Iran. Despite the gravity of the situation, some Israelis, at least on the protesters’ side, found reasons for optimism, apart from whether or not the overhaul would go through. Unlike many other countries in which populist regimes have enfeebled political and civil liberties — Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Russia, and India are only a partial list — Israelis chanting “De-mo-kra-tia” poured out onto the streets for months, while senior retired military, business, and civic leaders, as well as all manner of civil society institutions, declared their opposition to the overhaul, with some, such as high-tech venture capitalists, able to convincingly warn of serious consequences. This will presumably serve as a warning and check on any future governments, left or right, showing authoritarian tendencies. Even those hoping Israel will change its stance on the conflict with the Palestinians drew some comfort from the massive demonstrations, hoping that they could portend a new vision of democracy, despite the left’s dismal showing in recent elections. That, however, remains to be seen.

Last week’s surprise two-and-a-half-hour visit to Amman by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, where he met King Abdullah for the first time in almost five years, is a significant diplomatic victory for the kingdom. The visit happened due to the United States’ pressure on Netanyahu and a few days after White House National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, was in Israel and the West Bank.  Sources say that CIA Director William Burns was also in the region before Israel’s raid into the Jenin refugee camp on Thursday and played a crucial role in facilitating the Netanyahu-Abdullah meeting. A day before Netanyahu arrived in Amman, accompanied by the chief of Israeli intelligence, sources confirmed that the heads of intelligence bodies of several Arab and Gulf countries were also in Amman.  According to Israeli sources, Netanyahu reiterated his commitment to honoring the historical and legal status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque. This came after weeks of rising tensions between the Netanyahu-led newly-formed far-right government and Jordan. A day after the new Israeli government was sworn in early January, Israel’s new Minister of National Security, the ultra-nationalist Itamar Ben Gvir, made a short tour of the Aqsa compound, eliciting  Jordanian, Arab, and international denunciation.  Jordan has been bracing for a confrontation with the new Israeli government since Netanyahu won the elections last October and began negotiating with far-right politicians to form a coalition. King Abdullah and Netanyahu had sparred over Israeli breaches of Aqsa for years, and it is no secret that the Jordanian monarch does not trust the veteran Israeli premier. A few days before Netanyahu’s government took office, King Abdullah told CNN that he was prepared for conflict should the status of Jerusalem’s holy sites change. He expressed concern that “Israel is trying to push for changes to his custodianship of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in occupied East Jerusalem, warning that he has “red lines” and that “if people want to push those red lines, then we will deal with that.” The most dangerous escalation occurred on January 17 when Israeli police blocked a routine visit by Jordan’s ambassador to Tel Aviv to the Aqsa. He was later allowed but not before a diplomatic crisis got out of hand. While Israel claimed it was a misunderstanding, Jordan viewed the incident as setting a dangerous precedent. Here, the king called for the support of Jordan’s allies in the Gulf, Europe, and the United States. It is believed that Jordan was certain that the next provocation, which would be the most critical, needed to be pre-empted. This was when the US stepped in, putting pressure on Netanyahu to visit Amman and pledge to honor the status quo. Brinkmanship For King Abdullah, further escalation at the Aqsa would push both sides to adopt a policy of brinkmanship whose outcome would be disastrous. Facing mounting economic challenges at home, a crisis at Aqsa would force the king to take drastic measures. His “red lines” could go as far as suspending the peace treaty with Israel. However, that would open a political Pandora’s Box. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a signatory to the Abraham Accords, has stood firmly by King Abdullah during the recent crisis. The UAE stands with Jordan on two basic premises – its support for the two-state solution and status quo for Aqsa. Several analysts had noticed that the royal court statement, released following the meeting, did not mention the Hashemite custodianship. However, it underlined the need to observe Aqsa’s historical status quo. Some argue that the legal and historical status quo, which goes back to the late 19th century and has been observed by the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, and later by Israel, makes it legally impossible for Israel to disregard. The Hashemite custodianship, referred to as “a special role” in the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty, is less precise. According to another view, Jordan wants to ensure that responsibility for maintaining the status quo at Aqsa is not restricted to Jordan alone but is an international commitment. While Ben Gvir vowed to repeat his Aqsa breaches a day after the Amman meeting – saying only Israel has sovereignty over Jerusalem and the Temple Mount – it is believed that Netanyahu, at least for now, will avoid further provocations with Jordan. All eyes will be on the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s ongoing visit to the region. He is expected to underline support for Jordan’s custodianship and the status quo understanding at Aqsa.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, today, at the Prime Minister's Knesset office, met with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo. Prime Minister Netanyahu showed them sections of the horrific footage from the IDF Spokesperson's Office and told them afterwards: "We face a peculiar kind of enemy, a particularly cruel and inhuman foe. They're genocidal. They're not fighting for this or that territory; they're fighting to eliminate the Jewish state in whatever boundary. They say so. Their charter says if you find a bush and a Jew is hiding behind it, kill the Jew. Kill all the Jews. Their goal goes beyond the destruction of Israel. They're part of an axis of terror: Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis. They say death to America—that's the Great Satan. Israel is the Small Satan. I hope I don't find any offense with any of you. You're a middle-sized Satan. They hate our free civilization. They want to bury it. They have an ideology that is mad. In the 21st century, after the Enlightenment, after the Scientific Revolution, after the advance of human rights and democracy, this is sheer madness. I don't give it relative moralism that says, moral relativism that says, well, they have this society. They can do these horrible things to women. They can do these horrible things to human beings. That's their value system. That's not a value system. That's something that has to be fought. And one thing that we discovered in the 21st century is that our assumption that we can live our civilized lives in our advanced countries, seeking peace, prosperity and progress, and we can just sit back and the barbarians will not come back, they come back. They come back in many places, and if we are unwilling to fight the barbarians, they will win. There's a great historian that I admire, an American Christian Humanist by the name of Will Durant, who wrote, in the last century he wrote "The History of Civilization." And he said history does not favor Jesus Christ over Genghis Khan. History favors the strong. Your moral values do not stand up if you're not willing to fight for them. Here is a classic case of savagery and barbarism against civilization. Now, this savagery has two techniques. One is to deliberately target civilians. The whole laws of war, humanitarian law, which we're committed to completely, makes a simple distinction. On one line, they draw, they draw a line in the middle of the world and they say on one line are combatants, and the other line are non-combatants. You can target the combatants. You should target the combatants. But don't deliberately target the non-combatants. They can be hurt, unintentionally. That accompanies every legitimate war. What the terrorists do is erase the sense of sin. They say everyone is a target. These girls in a music festival, these women. They're targets. Babies. They're targets. Old people. They're targets. Holocaust survivors. They're targets. Everyone is a combatant. Everyone! They not only target everyone, every citizen, no one is a civilian, no one is exempt from their murder, from their harm. They also hide behind their civilians. They deliberately implant themselves in hospitals, in schools, in residential areas, in UN facilities. They fire their rockets from there. Thousands of them. We might have an alert as we speak. There is no symmetry here! These people target directly our cities all the time. Thousands and thousands and thousands of rockets. Falling on Barcelona, falling on Madrid, falling on Brussels, falling on Antwerp. Or any one of the European cities. Thousands! Israel is a small country. They deliberately target civilians and they deliberately hide behind civilians and use them as a human shield. That's a war crime. So what is a democracy, committed to the human, to the laws of war, supposed to do? Do the laws of war give exemption to such criminals? And the answer is: They don't. They say do your best to target the terrorists. Do your best to minimize civilian casualties. But if we, the democracies, accept, say that under no circumstances should we go in because civilians tragically get killed, then we lost. We lost before we begin. You lost and you lost. Spain lost. Belgium lost. Because this will spread. You will see it. Very soon. Because the Axis of Terror is not going to stop. If they can emerge victorious here, they intend to bring down the Middle East, and next they'll go to Europe. After that they'll go elsewhere. If you think I'm exaggerating, I am not. This is where the pivot of history now is going to be decided. Do we stop them there? Or do they come to you? Now, how do you stop them? What do you do? What did the Western countries, what did the democracy do when terrorists embed themselves amidst civilians? Let me say from the start that any civilian death is a tragedy. Any one. And to avoid them, what you do is first, you try to get the civilians out of harm's way. And that's exactly what we did. We asked, called, sent leaflets, phoned the civilians in the areas where we were going to hit the terrorists, the Hamas terrorists, and we said please leave. When they tried to leave, Hamas kept them at gunpoint. Stay, because Hamas doesn't care that their civilians are killed. This is a messianic death cult that hides in the bunkers. As one of their spokesmen said: the underground belongs to Hamas; aboveground, so civilians, that's Israel's problem and the UN problem. Not their problem. On the contrary. It's their shield. So, what do you do? We ask them to leave. Hamas tries to stop them from leaving. Thankfully, many left. We set up a safe corridor, from the north of Gaza, where we were concentrating our effort against the terrorists, to the south. A safe zone in the south, safe corridor to the south. Hamas shot the safe corridor. They fired on the safe corridor, so the people would be trapped in. But they kept on leaving. I'm happy to say that there is a decline in civilian casualties, which is our goal. Our goal is to have none. And primarily that's because of the ground action. The ground action has resulted in the fact that the warnings that we give are addressed by the population, the civilian population that goes south. When they go south, we give them humanitarian support. There are about 150 trucks now going in. Probably go up to 200 and beyond: food, medicine, water. I have not seen yet the effort that I'd like to see from the UN and the international agencies to build there shelters. Winter is coming and there is no reason not to build tens of thousands of tents in the safe zone, next to the safe zone. Because they don't enter the safe zone, the UN, which I think is shocking. I said, okay, we'll give you a lot of little zones. And they're building little safe zones to get the population out of harm's way. Israel is doing everything in its power to get the population out of harm's way. Hamas is doing everything in its power to keep that population in harm's way. That's the facts. I'll give you an example – Hitler, the original Nazis, they invade Europe, they do these horrors on a mass scale. And by the way, these killers would do exactly what Hitler did if they could away with it. The difference is only in capability, not in intent and not in savagery. Hitler invades Europe, perpetrates these horrible savageries, the Holocaust and so on. And so on. And the Allies invade. They invade Normandy. The German army is in the cities. You've seen the footage. The Allies say, "No, we can't do anything. We can't fire," because they're amid civilians? Of course not. They try to do exactly what we are doing: try to minimize the cost. And then they go through the cities of France and they go through the cities of Germany. And unfortunately, many, many, many civilian casualties occur. I don't know what history would have been like if we had demonstrations and protests in the West against the Allies for incurring civilian, German civilian casualties. I know history would have been very different. But we are the Allies, along with the moderate Arabs, with the United States, with Europe. We're the Allies. And they're the new Nazis. Israel cannot be held to a standard that no one is being held to. We have to fight the terrorists. We're in complete compliance with international law. I think in many ways, we're setting a different standard. We seek to minimize civilian casualties, and Hamas seeks to maximize it. And I would strongly urge you to make that distinction, not merely because it's right and just, but because your very societies are on the line. You're next. This is a battle for civilization. It has to be won. We will win it, because we have no other choice. We don't have a future if we don't. Hamas has already said, 'We'll do it again and again and again.' So we'll have to eradicate them. Just as you couldn't leave a reduced Nazi presence, you know, in Germany. You couldn't do that. And we are not going to leave a reduced Hamas presence in Gaza. But the consequences are much bigger. And I think that we should all unite in making sure that this kind of savagery never shows its face again. I thank you." The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding.

For seven weeks, Iran has been gripped by widespread protests — the first of their kind driven by women — following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini at the hands of the regime’s so-called morality police. These demonstrations represent perhaps the most sustained domestic challenge to the clerical leadership since 1979, despite efforts by authorities to quell the unrest through mass arrests, beatings and killings, and internet and social media cuts. The head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) even warned protesters that Oct. 29 would be their “last day of riots,” in a sign that security forces will intensify their crackdown on the unrest, which Iranian leaders have blamed on Israel and the United States. The charge against Israel is nothing new; but as with previous rounds of accusations, Tehran has yet to produce tangible evidence to substantiate its claim that the Israeli intelligence service is, together with the U.S., the real mastermind behind the protests. Ironically, while the official narrative from Iran has long been that Israel is a decaying power unable to stand up to Tehran, it is Israeli assessments on the state of the protests that appear to be of most interest to the senior leadership in Tehran. Kayhan, the newspaper closest to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who appoints the paper’s chief editor, wrote in an editorial in mid-October that even Israel has accepted that the protests will ultimately fail to topple the regime. By quoting a couple of Israeli television commentators, the paper wishfully concluded that Israeli experts have determined that “the number of protesters in Iran is small and they lack [a shared] ideology” and that “Unrests in Iran require maturity, leadership, planning and political vision, and currently we do not have any of these.” The stock Khamenei’s top men put in Israeli assessments of the prospects for popular unrest would seem bizarre if it were not so clearly intentional. Pointing the finger at Israel is self-serving for officials in Tehran. Trying to pin a nationwide uprising on a detested regional rival, one whose existence the Islamic Republic has refused to accept since 1979, is obviously more convenient than acknowledging the genuine grievances pushing Iranian protesters to the streets. In reality, Iran’s leaders know very well that while the U.S. and Israel both might have an interest in shaping and aiding the protest movement once it began, this large-scale mobilization of the Iranian public is a result of the regime’s own policies. No foreign intelligence service would be able to orchestrate such a large-scale popular revolt on its own; the population of the country would not have risen up like this had it not been so chronically beaten down by the regime’s policies since 1979. But yet the very same anger that the Islamists have created among the Iranian public has become an opportunity for the Israelis in their multi-front campaign against Tehran. The ongoing threat of nuclear brinkmanship has long loomed over Israel’s decades-old shadow war with Iran. While cyberattacks and assassinations might be effective tools deployed by Israel to destabilize Iran’s internal apparatus, the protests have revealed another powerfully simple yet possibly destabilizing strategy at its disposal: speaking directly to the Iranian people. Iran’s leaders would likely contend that this isn’t the first time foreign powers have intervened in Iran’s domestic politics, pointing to the role the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British secret services played in overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953. For their part, Israel and the U.S., while denying involvement in the protests’ inception, would say that that, today, they are merely expressing support for a population that’s looking to break free from the tight grip of Tehran’s militant clerical political class. Israel’s political landscape is famously divided, which is why, yesterday, Nov. 1, the country held its fifth national election in less than four years. But there is virtual unanimity across the political spectrum when it comes to supporting the protesters in Iran. And since the protests began in mid-September, Israel’s public diplomacy efforts have been ramping up across all levels of society in more direct ways not seen for decades. Israel is currently home to tens of thousands of Jewish people born in Iran or born to Iranian parents, including major public figures like Rita, one of Israel’s most famous singers, former President Moshe Katsav, or former heads of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Shaul Mofaz and Dan Halutz. From early October, dozens of Israelis have gathered in Jerusalem in support of the women of Iran. Protests have also spread across the Middle East and to Europe and North America, as well. This past weekend, in Tel Aviv, hundreds of Israelis gathered, waving Israeli and pre-1979 Iran flags while chanting, “From Tel Aviv to Tehran, we are standing together.” It’s not uncommon to see Israelis protesting against the theocratic regime in Iran. In fact, stoking fear in Israelis about Iran’s nefarious nuclear program is typically a cornerstone of any Israeli prime minister’s tenure, especially under Benjamin Netanyahu, who repeatedly said that the Islamic Republic was the single greatest existential threat to Israel. Still, an overzealous Israeli response to the protests in Iran could backfire and lend credibility to the narrative from Tehran that Israel is behind them, according to David Menashri, an Iran expert and professor emeritus at Tel Aviv University. “With the regime claiming that the protests are initiated by the U.S. and Israel, Israeli public support may be a double-edged sword for them,” Menashri explained. Relations between Iran and Israel haven’t always been so acrimonious. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the two countries enjoyed 30 years of cooperation. In 1950, Iran even became the second Muslim-majority nation (after Turkey) to recognize the State of Israel. Iran fit neatly into the “Periphery Doctrine” espoused by Israel’s founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, which referred to his ambition to forge an alliance with non-Arab enemies of its enemies, including Iran and Turkey. But those days are over. Officials in Tehran are now very likely anticipating more Israeli efforts as part of what Iran considers to be a broader Israeli information war — a campaign that will seek to target the Iranian population and to keep them mobilized against the regime in Tehran to the extent possible. This campaign aims to stress two simple points of view to the Iranian population: First, that the common enemy of Israel and the Iranian people is the militant Islamist ideology of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. And second, that a bright future awaits Iranian-Israeli relations as soon as the policy preferences of the Iranian people are reflected in Iran’s foreign policy. As Israel ratchets up its public diplomacy, the leadership in Tehran will be forced to respond. But it is hard to see what effective counter-arguments the Islamic Republic has left at its disposal that might put the brakes on this latest Israeli initiative and momentum.

With the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the close ties between President Assad and his Turkish counterpart, Erdogan, were severed. Recently, more than a decade later, there have been increasing statements on reconciliation coming from Ankara – albeit coinciding with threats of a new military campaign. The Turkish President must thus choose – normalization or escalation. Recent increased attacks on Kurdish targets in northern Syria by Turkey and the Syrian rebel groups its supports raise the question whether Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to carry out his threat of May 2022 to begin another major ground operation against the Kurds. On the other hand, conciliatory statements regarding the Assad regime have been sounded recently in Turkey, and there has been discussion of the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries after over a decade of hostility and competition. These two processes appear to be contradictory, given that the Syrian regime opposes existing Turkish control of Syrian territories, and does not wish to see this control broadened. On the other hand, this may be a calculated Turkish move that aims to show the Turkish public a concerted multi-faceted effort to confront both the Kurdish underground and the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Discussion of events in northern Syria and the web of Syrian and Turkish interests can be used to assess the question, which trend will prevail in Turkish-Syrian relations: normalization or escalation? In mid-August 2022 widescale protests erupted in dozens of towns controlled by the Syrian opposition in the Idlib and Aleppo provinces in northwest Syria. The demonstrations featured the slogan of “We won’t reconcile,” in response to the surprising statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister on August 11: “We need to bring the opposition and regime together for reconciliation somehow, or there will be no permanent peace otherwise.” The Foreign Minister also announced that he had met his Syrian counterpart on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Belgrade in October 2021. Residents of the north were outraged at the statement, criticized Turkey harshly, and accused it of seeking “public normalization” with the Syrian regime. Indeed, on August 19 Erdogan even stated that “Turkey will need to take ‘higher steps’ with Damascus to end the ‘games’ being played in the region.” The antagonism generated by the Turkish statements should be seen in light of the history of Turkish involvement in Syria. A few months after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, when it became clear that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad did not intend to implement significant reforms, Turkey became one of the harshest critics of his regime. More than once Erdogan called him a murderer and called on him to resign. From the perspective of the rebels in Syria, peace between Turkey and Syria is tantamount to betrayal. Over the years, Turkey has supported and assisted various Sunni opposition organizations with funding, logistics, and arms. At the same time, Ankara viewed with concern the strengthening of the Kurds and the expansion of the territory run by them in northern Syria, resulting in part from their persistent and successful campaign against ISIS. Ankara was especially unhappy with the dominance of the Syrian branch of the Kurdish underground in the area, and feared the creation of contiguous Kurdish control along the Turkish-Syrian border. To forestall this situation, Turkey embarked on three military operations in 2016-2019, which led to Turkish control of several areas in northern Syria. In February 2020, in the wake of attacks by Syrian forces on Turkish army positions in which 34 Turkish soldiers were killed, Ankara embarked on Operation Spring Shield in the Idlib enclave. In March, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Turkey and Russia in Idlib; the agreement included the creation of a secure corridor around the M4 highway, and joint patrols by Russian and Turkish forces. Some 8,000 soldiers from the Turkish military remain in the region and lend military and logistical backing to the organizations operating there, primarily the Syrian National Army (formerly the Free Syrian Army) and the Salafi jihadist organization Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey is a highly-charged issue, both politically and economically. A significant majority of Turks do not want Syrian refugees to remain in the country, and this occasionally leads to acts of violence against refugees and expressions of racism. Today 3.7 million Syrian refugees who arrived in the wake of the civil war live in Turkey; most live outside refugee camps. As of March 2022, according to the Turkish Interior Minister, Turkey granted citizenship to 200,000 Syrians who entered its territory, while some 500,000 Syrians “voluntarily returned” to Turkey’s controlled territories in northern Syria. In May 2022 Erdogan declared that the Turkish government was formulating plans to resettle approximately one million Syrian refugees in Syrian territory. Turkey is interested in aid from external parties to help fund the building of residential complexes for refugees, and claims that areas under its control in northern Syria are safe enough for them. Over the last few years processes of Turkification have been underway in these territories, and Turkish influence and presence in the Idlib enclave has also expanded. Turkey invested in improved transportation links to the border crossings between the two countries and connected some of the electrical grids in northern Syria to the Turkish grid; Turkish cellular providers operate in these areas; Turkey set up more than ten Turkish postal offices in northern Syria; it pays public employees in the regions under its control in Turkish currency; and the Turkish lira is the primary currency in northern Syria. The Turkish language is taught in schools in these regions and cultural centers for teaching the Turkish language to adults were also opened. Clerics assigned by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, are stationed in mosques that Turkey opened or refurbished. In Idlib, Turkish influence is more limited than in regions under Turkish control in the north, but it is increasing there as well. In addition to military and logistical support for rebel groups, Turkey’s penetration of everyday life is apparent. For example, since 2018, Turkey began to play a more prominent role in the local economy and use of the Turkish lira became common. Turkey offered jobs and led development projects for rebuilding infrastructure, including dams, electric facilities, and roads. Over the past year Turkey has worked on building residential complexes for displaced people living in temporary camps in Idlib. Non-governmental Turkish organizations are also working on development in the province, including projects in housing, energy, culture, and finance. Normalizing Relations: Interests and Obstacles Turkey’s recent conciliatory tone and references to normalizing relations with Syria, while representing a 180-degree turn for Turkish foreign policy, may serve Erdogan in two main ways. First, they are perceived as active steps in managing the refugee problem and a first stage in sending refugees back to Syria. In addition, dialogue with Assad is seen as necessary in light of Russian pressure in this context, as expressed in recent meetings between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as part of broad negotiations between Ankara and Moscow. In light of the pattern of Turkification, it seems that the likelihood of Ankara withdrawing from the Syrian territories is low. At the same time Russian, Iranian, and American opposition to another Turkish broad-scale ground operation in Syria, as well as growing connections between the Kurds and the Assad regime in order to prevent such an operation, make it difficult for Turkey launch an operation on the scale that it would prefer. On the other hand, a limited military operation will only result in a slight boost to Erdogan’s popularity in Turkish public opinion. In parallel, over the past two years the Syrian regime has sought to rebuild its regional status and return to the heart of the Arab world. In this context, Syria normalized its relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Recent calls have also been heard to readmit Syria into the Arab League, from which it was expelled early in the civil war. Normalizing relations with Turkey may be part of this trend, and no less important, may lead to cessation or reduction of Turkish support for rebels and thus allow Assad to deal a crushing blow to the remaining opposition to his regime. However, reconciliation between the Assad regime and Ankara may be perceived as relinquishing Syrian territory and legitimizing Turkey’s presence there; Assad would like to regain sovereignty in all Syrian territory. The Syrian Foreign Minister declared that the country has not set preconditions, but normalization with Turkey will be achieved only when Ankara meets three demands: withdrawal from Syrian territory; an end to support for opposition organizations; and non-intervention in internal Syrian affairs. An additional impediment is the need to formulate an “Adana II Agreement.” In 1998, after Syria expelled the Kurdish underground leader from its territory, Syria and Turkey signed the Adana Agreement stating that Syria would declare the Kurdish underground a terror organization and not allow it to operate on Syrian territory. Annex IV of the agreement even stipulates that if Syria does not fulfill its commitments, Turkey may enter up to five kilometers into Syrian territory to operate against Kurdish underground activists. In order to rebuild the trust between the two states now, there must be either a new agreement between them, or at least a clarification that Syria remains committed to the Adana Agreement. It is doubtful, however, whether the Assad regime will be committed to this goal and whether it will be able to provide the security assurances demanded by Ankara. For the Syrian rebels in the north, Ankara’s reversal is a major blow to their standing, given that they had seen Turkey as a major ally and source of military and logistical support. In practice the Turkish presence is the major obstacle to attempts by the regime, with Russian and Iranian backing, to renew its control of the Idlib province. The population of the region has not given up on the values of the Syrian revolution and its principal aim of bringing down the Assad regime. Residents of northwestern Syria also fear that a political process will be imposed on them that does not address their needs. But the rebels do not have the means to convince Turkey not to change its policy, other than presenting scenarios of chaos in the event of an escalation in Idlib and the arrival of another million refugees to Turkish soil. In conclusion, the path to normalization between Turkey and Syria will not be smooth, but Erdogan and Assad may both gain from initial steps in this direction. Erdogan can present even a limited compromise, while taking strong military steps against the Kurdish underground in northern Iraq and northern Syria, as a signal to the Turkish public that he is doing what is necessary to deal with both Kurdish terror and the refugee problem. On the Syrian side, Assad can gain from normalization with Turkey as part of his efforts to reestablish Syria’s regional status, and as a means of distancing Turkey from the rebel organizations and neutralizing the most significant remaining pocket of resistance in the country.

Jordan’s King Abdullah is not known for mincing words, especially when speaking to a foreign audience or media. After all, he was the one who back in 2004 coined the term “Shia crescent,” which proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq.  It proved to be a stern warning to the world and the region about the possible emergence of an ideological Shia crescent extending from Tehran to Beirut that Iran dominates through Baghdad and Damascus. Few took his warning seriously then, and many years later, the region finds itself embroiled in a multi-layered crisis with one common denominator: an ideologically-driven Iran. So, it was not surprising that King Abdullah issued another firm warning, on May 18, in an interview with H.R. McMaster in Washington, DC, for the Battlegrounds series by Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. During this interview, the king said that the Russian presence in the south of Syria was a source of calm. He added that their absence would create a “…vacuum [that] will be filled by the Iranians and their proxies, so, unfortunately, we are looking at maybe an escalation of problems on our borders.” His statements were seen as prophetic and pre-emptive. The Russians were still going nowhere at that specific moment. They have been in Syria since 2015, and the king was the first Arab leader to welcome their intervention specifically to offset the presence of pro-Iran militias, especially in the south so close to the borders with Jordan.  Through close personal rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the king was able to reach an understanding under which, among other things, the Kremlin would run military patrols along the shared borders and keep pro-Iran militias as far away as possible from the Jordanian borders. However, the king’s recent statements may have divulged an intrinsic concern that as the inconclusive war in far-away Ukraine drags on, consuming more of Moscow’s political, economic, and military assets, the Kremlin might be forced to redeploy its forces elsewhere. Such a scenario could divert some of its troops from parts of Syria and leave a void in the south that pro-Iranian militias would then fill.An Intensifying Drug WarJordan’s problems in southern Syria are multi-faceted. Besides the possible encroachment of pro-Iran militias, including Hezbollah, Amman is worried that ISIS is slowly re-merging in the vast eastern desert between Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi told this writer last month that Amman is monitoring militant movements and drug-making facilities close to its borders with Syria.  Making things more complicated is the fact that since late last year, the Jordanian armed forces have found themselves in the middle of an intensifying drug war along the border with Syria, which is becoming more intense, dangerous, and challenging. In January, the Jordanian army intercepted and repulsed a vast operation that killed 27 smugglers and confiscated a large cache of hashish and Captagon pills. A Jordanian officer was killed in one of the operations, and three border guards were wounded. The escalation has forced the Jordanian army to change the rules of engagement, giving its officers a free hand in dealing with the smugglers. To make things more complex, Jordan spoke of organized smuggling operations where “rogue” members of the Syrian army were involved. On May 23, a senior Jordanian army officer said, “dangerous Iranian organizations are conspiring and targeting Jordan’s national security.” According to him, smugglers receive support from “undisciplined groups from the Syrian border guards” while using sophisticated reconnaissance and surveillance technology, including drones. The drug war consumes Jordanian resources as the army tries to keep the 360-kilometer-long border under control. Jordan has highlighted that the kingdom has become a gateway for smugglers who use its territory to reach Gulf and European markets. Evidence suggests that the Syrian regime uses the drug network to generate billions in illicit money to fund its ailing treasury. The escalation of the drug war has cast a shadow over King Abdullah’s attempt to rehabilitate President Bashar Assad’s regime. A senior Jordanian official tells this writer that Amman has received no response from the Damascus government regarding the possible complicity of members of the Syrian army in smuggling activities. While there has been no evidence that Russian forces in southern Syria have withdrawn, several unconfirmed western reports indicate that some Russian military assets in Syria have been redeployed and may have left the country. On May 18, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. (IRGC) has received sizable military shipments in Syria in April, and pro-Iran militias have taken strategic positions in the central parts of the country following the Russian withdrawal. On May 22, the same paper reported that the Russian military police had run patrols along the border with Jordan near Daraa, Suwayda, and the Yarmouk River basin. It seems that Amman has suspended its efforts to normalize ties with Damascus in contrast to a spike in official contacts between the two sides late last year and earlier this year. Pundits in Amman believe that the possibility of a significant geopolitical shift in southern Syria has put the détente between the two countries on hold. In his recent interview, King Abdullah also talked about a possible “escalation of problems on our borders,” a stark reminder that Jordan will not stand by if it directly threatens its security emanating from southern Syria. That could include launching pre-emptive cross-border special operations bringing Jordan’s armed forces closer to engaging Syrian soldiers and pro-Iran militants.