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The Move Forward Party (MFP) has achieved a stunning victory in the May 2023 general elections. Preliminary results released by the Election Commission of Thailand indicate that the MFP won 113 constituency seats and garnered 14 million party-list votes, resulting in 39 additional party-list seats. This remarkable outcome — 152 seats in total — makes the MFP the party with the largest number of seats in the House, providing it with the popular mandate to lead the formation of the next governing coalition. The MFP’s triumph marks a turning point in Thai politics, ending the longstanding winning streak of Thaksin-aligned parties since 2001 and signalling a clear rejection of Thailand’s conservative status quo. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which suggests that the MFP’s support base is confined to urban areas where university students are registered to vote, the MFP’s electoral success extends far and wide. In Bangkok, the party won 32 of 33 House seats; only one went to a candidate from Pheu Thai, which is aligned to Thaksin Shinawatra, the former premier in exile. Furthermore, the MFP managed to unseat entrenched political dynasties like the Asavahames in Samut Prakan and the Khunpluems in Chon Buri, who were considered invincible due to their deep-rooted patronage networks and local influence. The party even gained seats in traditional strongholds of the Pheu Thai party, such as seven out of 10 seats in Chiang Mai in the North, and one out of 10 seats in Udon Thani in the Northeast. The MFP’s strong performance, both nationally and provincially, is even more impressive given the changes in the political and institutional landscape. In the previous 2019 election, the Future Forward Party (FFP), the precursor to the MFP, won 31 constituency seats, a significant accomplishment for a newly formed party. However, this success was often attributed to fortuitous circumstances, as the FFP faced no direct competition from Pheu Thai in 100 constituencies. There, Pheu Thai opted not to field candidates to avoid contesting its sister party, the Thai Raksa Chart Party. The latter was dissolved by a court ruling for nominating as its prime ministerial candidate Princess Ubolratana, the elder sister of King. Similarly, the FFP won 50 party-list seats after receiving 6.33 million votes. This was attributed to the single-ballot Mixed Member Apportionment electoral system, which made it easier for smaller parties to secure party-list seats and reduced the zero-sum nature of constituency elections. Given Pheu Thai’s extensive campaigning in this election and the assumption that changes to the electoral system would hinder the MFP’s ability to convert support into House seats, significant losses for the MFP were expected. However, the party emerged even stronger than before. How is this so? A combination of factors contributed to the MFP’s “tsunami” surge. Some credit must be given to the party’s effective use of social media platforms. This allowed it to showcase its solid performance as an opposition party and engage with a broad coalition of supporters, bypassing traditional campaign methods that rely on vote-canvassing networks. The MFP appealed to these supporters, many of whom are younger generations of voters who previously had limited interest in politics or attachment to political parties, using ideology rather than patronage. The MFP’s success can also be attributed to its ability to capitalise on the momentum of pro-democracy movements since 2020. As a party that acts as an intermediary between social movements and parliamentary politics, the MFP carried out several activities, including bailing out detained activists, integrating them into its ranks, and pledging to translate their demands into tangible policies and legislative action. The MFP’s platform is also noteworthy for the clarity of its message, particularly its firm stance on amending Article 112 (the lese majeste law) and refusal to form a coalition government with generals involved in the May 2014 coup. This set it apart from rival parties such as Pheu Thai, which has been equivocal from the outset. In contrast to Pheu Thai, whose de facto leader Thaksin Shinawatra has signalled a willingness to compromise with actors associated with the Prayut regime, the MFP represents a strong and unequivocal repudiation of that regime. This could have caused fence-sitting supporters of both parties to vote in favour of the MFP. Finally, it is important to highlight the charismatic appeal of Pita Limjaroenrat, the leader and prime ministerial candidate of the MFP. Pita has proven extremely popular with large swathes of the electorate, even among older individuals and those who are not progressive-leaning. During the final stretch of the campaign, Pita performed well in public debates and captured the limelight in all media appearances. This overshadowed all other candidates, including Pheu Thai’s Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who receded from the spotlight due to childbirth on May Day. Ultimately, however, the MFP’s dramatic rise is perhaps best explained by the historical moment in which these factors converged. For nearly two decades, Thai politics has been trapped in a vicious cycle of power struggles between forces allied with the Shinawatras and those backed by the military and conservative establishment. As a consequence, Thai people, especially younger generations who bear the burden of crises stemming from political divisions not of their making, have grown disillusioned. They are weary of military strongmen whose ambitions for power undermine democratic institutions, traditional political and bureaucratic elites who preach good governance but do not practice it, and democratically elected governments that seem more accountable to oligarchic interests than the will of the people. Above all, they are frustrated by a dysfunctional political system that responds to their calls for greater freedom with deafening silence or even violence. Therefore, the MFP’s rise cannot solely be attributed to its campaign strategy, positioning, policy substance, or leadership. It also reflects the pent-up grievances and aspirations for a better future projected onto the party by millions of Thais. While the MFP’s triumph symbolises a resounding call for change and a new beginning, there are huge challenges ahead. The appointed Senate and the looming intervention from stakeholders of Thailand’s conservative status quo pose significant obstacles to structural reform. Whether the MFP can bring lasting change remains to be seen.

Located in southeastern Ukraine, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station (ZNPP) is Europe’s largest power plant that produced 23% of all Ukrainian electricity before Russia's invasion.  This critical energy source is amidst the chaos and destruction of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, a harrowing struggle that has wrought immeasurable suffering and upheaval upon the region. Following its capture by the Russian forces on March 4th 2022, there have been drastic disruptions to safe energy production and a heightened global concern for nuclear safety in the region. Introduction and backgroundZaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), located in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar, was built by Soviet design in the 1980s, with its last reactor being connected to the grid in 1995.  Amongst the ten largest nuclear facilities in the world, the Zaporizhzhia power plant consists of six water-cooling and water-moderating pressurized reactors. A global nuclear scare started on February 24, 2022, when Ukraine informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that “unidentified armed forces” have taken control of all facilities of Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant located in the Exclusion zone. The IAEA appealed for maximum restraint to avoid any action that may put the country’s nuclear facilities at risk and stressed the IAEA’s 2009 General Conference decision that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”. Later that week, on March 2nd, Russia stated that its military forces have taken control of the territory around Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. The next day, a large number of Russian tanks and infantry broke through the block-post into the town of Enerhodar, just a few kilometers from the ZNPP. Director General Grossi, appealed for “an immediate halt to the use of force at Enerhodar and called on the military forces operating there to refrain from violence near the nuclear power plant.” By March 4th, Ukraine informed the IAEA that the ZNPP had been shelled overnight, and a fire broke out on site. Although no essential equipment was affected, the first military action      resulted in the activation of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre in full response. At the end of the day, Ukraine announced that Russian forces had taken control of the ZNPP, but the power plant continued to be operated by its regular staff.  At the time, out of the plant’s six reactor units, two had undergone controlled shut down, two were being held in low power mode, one was shut down for maintenance and one was operating at 60 percent power. ZNPP’s dire situation since March 4, 2022Before the conflict, the ZNPP had access to the grid through four high-voltage power lines, but they have now all fallen victim to the fighting. The back-up power lines connecting the ZNPP to a nearby thermal power station are also down. The plant had also previously temporarily lost direct access to the electricity grid but could then still receive power through available back-up lines, or from one of its reactors that was still operating at the time. The Russian conquest was soon followed by disruptions in the electricity supply to the nuclear power plant, one of the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety. Less than two weeks after Russian forces seized the plant, Zaporizhzhia lost one of its three power lines. Since then, mainly as a result of shelling or other military action nearby, the nuclear plant has suffered numerous power cuts, mainly as a result of shelling. Although it has emergency diesel generators that are available to provide backup power, a secure off-site power supply from the grid is integral to ensuring nuclear safety.  Thus, following its first complete external power outage in August, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi set off from the Agency’s headquarters on an IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) to undertake vital safeguards activities at the plant.  That October, Zaporizhzhia lost its last remaining external power source due to renewed shelling, and had to rely on diesel generators again to cool the reactor and support other nuclear safety and security functions. In the next week, Zaporizhzhia lost all external power two more times, receiving electricity from a backup system for the third time in a span of ten days. Similar incidents unfolded in November as well, as the IAEA Director General continued to urge for the critical need to demilitarize the zone.  Based on historical data and industry experience, the nuclear industry aims for an average unplanned outage rate of less than 0.1 per reactor per year which statistically would mean less than one unplanned outage every 10 years. Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant experienced six in the past year alone. Cold shutdown of the ZNPP reactors doesn’t remove the risk – Spent fuel pools need constant coolingThe fission reaction that generates heat in a nuclear power plant is produced by positioning a number of uranium fuel rods in close proximity. Shutting down a nuclear reactor involves inserting control rods between the fuel rods to stop the fission reaction.The reactor is then in cooldown mode as the temperature decreases. According to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, once the temperature is below 200 degrees Fahrenheit (93 Celsius) and the reactor coolant system is at atmospheric pressure, the reactor is in cold shutdown. When the reactor is operating, it requires cooling to absorb the heat and keep the fuel rods from melting together, which would set off a catastrophic chain reaction. When a reactor is in cold shutdown, it no longer needs the same level of circulation. It was announced on September 11, 2022 by Energoatom, operator of the ZNPP that it was shutting down the last operating reactor of the plant’s six reactors, reactor No. 6. The operators have put the reactor in cold shutdown and this shutdown has mitigated a risk. Spent fuel pools also need constant circulation of water to keep them cool. And they need cooling for several years before being put in dry casks. One of the problems in the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan was the emergency generators, which replaced lost off-site power, got inundated with water and failed. In situations like that you get “station blackout” – and that is one of the worst things that could happen. It means no electricity to run the cooling system. In that circumstance, the spent fuel overheats and its zirconium cladding can cause hydrogen bubbles. If you can’t vent these bubbles they will explode, spreading radiation. If there is a loss of outside power, operators will have to rely on emergency generators. But emergency generators are huge machines – finicky, unreliable gas guzzlers. And you still need cooling waters for the generators themselves. The biggest worry is that Ukraine suffers from a sustained power grid failure. The likelihood of this increases during a conflict, because pylons may come down under shelling or gas power plants might get damaged and cease to operate.  According to one of the IAEA’s latest updates (#154, April 21, 2023):  “As a result of the warmer weather, the operator has started to put reactor Unit 6 in cold shutdown which is expected to be reached by the weekend, leaving only Unit 5 in hot shutdown to produce hot water and steam for the site. The two reactors were in hot shutdown during the winter to provide steam and heating to the ZNPP as well as heating to the nearby city of Enerhodar, where many plant personnel live.” The cooling pumps for the spent fuel pools need much less electricity than the cooling pumps on the reactor’s primary and secondary loops, and the spent fuel cooling system could tolerate a brief electricity outage. Now, at least if the plant loses offsite power, the operators won’t have to worry about cooling an operating reactor with cranky diesel generators. However, the plant still needs a reliable source of electricity to cool the six huge spent fuel pools that are inside the containment structures and to remove residual heat from the shutdown reactors. The serious risk of military actions for spent fuel storage racksOne more important factor is that the spent fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pools at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant were compacted to increase capacity, according to a 2017 Ukrainian government report to the IAEA. The greater number and more compacted the stored spent fuel rods, the more heat they generate and so more power is needed to cool them. There is also a dry spent fuel storage facility at the plant. Dry spent fuel storage involves packing spent fuel rods into massive cylinders, or casks, which require no water or other coolants. The casks are designed to keep the fuel rods contained for at least 50 years. However, the casks are not under the containment structures at the plant, and, though they were designed to withstand being crashed into by an airliner, it’s not clear whether artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, particularly repeated attacks, could crack open the casks and release radiation into the grounds of the plant. The closest analogy to this scenario could be a terrorist attack that, according to a seminal study by the National Research Council, could breach a dry cask and potentially result in the release of radioactive material from the spent fuel. This could happen through the dispersion of fuel particles or fragments or the dispersion of radioactive aerosols.  This would be similar to the detonation of a “dirty bomb,” which, depending on wind direction and dispersion radius, could result in radioactive contamination. This in turn could cause serious problems for access to and work in the plant. According to the IAEA’s latest update at the time of writing this analysis (#155, April 28, 2023): “IAEA experts present at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) were again forced to shelter this week after missile attack warnings, with the sound of continued shelling in the distance as military activity continues in the region. In addition, one landmine exploded near the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today…The increased military presence and activity in the region again underlines the importance and urgency of agreeing on the protection of the plant, Director General Grossi added.”What is going on and what can be doneWe need to begin to realize and emphasize that the need for compromise extends beyond Russia alone. There has been a certain reticence around the acknowledgement that Ukraine, despite being the “aggrieved” country, must also be willing to make concessions.  To designate Russia as the sole provoker of hostilities at the Zaporizhzhia plant is an objective falsity. It would be illogical for Russia to shell the plant once it has already seized control, unless there were provocations from the Ukrainian side. Interestingly, in spite of countless calls to pacify the region from Ukrainian and international diplomatic leaders, The Times of London on April 7, 2023 published a report detailing a failed Ukrainian attack on the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) that took place in October 2022. Ukrainian special forces launched an attack on the ZNPP, deploying US-provided HIMARS rockets at the site — an attempt that ultimately failed because of a stronger Russian counteroffensive. Any sort of projectiles nearing the site of a nuclear power plant is an inherently hazardous and potentially catastrophic assault, regardless of the origin of the launch.   Given the high stakes involved and the potential for irreparable harm, it is imperative for even Ukrainian forces to exercise restraint and refrain from any military action that could escalate the conflict, including airstrikes on Zaporizhzhia, even if it is under Russian control. Taking into account the tumultuous events that have transpired at Zaporizhzhia this past year, for the sake of preventing a global nuclear disaster, it is pertinent to prioritize nuclear safety. Counterintuitive as it may seem, it may be more prudent for Ukraine to strategically withdraw from the ZNPP site and attempt to repatriate it later in the war, when more comprehensive diplomatic negotiations can happen and Russia potentially depletes its resources.  War, in our opinion, is the worst enemy of nuclear safety. This is an unprecedented and volatile situation. Only through active, pragmatic engineering and nuclear diplomacy can an amenable and lasting solution to this vexing problem be found. In the foreword of President John F. Kennedy’s book, Profiles of Courage, his brother, Robert Kennedy said, President Kennedy was fond of quoting Dante that “the hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who, in a time of great moral crisis, maintain their neutrality” (December 18, 1963).  The potential catastrophic consequences of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant conflict demand action and a willingness to take a stance.  For Ukraine, taking a stance can mean stepping back and protecting the world from a nuclear calamity. The failure to do so risks being condemned to the “hottest places in Hell,” not in a figurative sense, but in a literal one. As the memory of the Chornobyl Disaster of 1986 still lingers, the potential danger posed by Zaporizhzhia's six reactors far surpasses that of the single reactor that caused the Chornobyl disaster. In the unfortunate event of an explosion, the repercussions would be hexfold that of Chernobyl's catastrophic aftermath, marking a somber moment in the history of nuclear power. Despite the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the  Russia-Ukraine conflict, the end of this protracted war is imminent. Even if we are facing problems that, as Robert Kennedy put it, people “fifty, even ten years ago, would not have dreamed would have to be faced,” it is of utmost importance to prioritize humanity above political objectives.  Following Dr. Henry Kissinger’s advice, Ukraine may like to exercise diplomacy, which “is the art of restraining power”, rather than brute force to repatriate its own Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, considering the high risks associated with military action on site. Ukrainians should not shame their military officers if they retreat from Zaporizhzhia, but rather, commend them for their strategic investment into the future prosperity of their country, their continent and possibly, their planet. A true measure of a hero lies not in their victories, but in their willingness to fight for what is right, even in the face of overwhelming odds. Right now, possibly accepting status quo at Zaporizhzhia is, at least in our opinion, what is the most right, but most certainly what is imperative. With Russia’s adamant military politics, Ukraine would be bravely resisting aggression on behalf of the world, on behalf of a future.  We realize that the IAEA has called on Russia and Ukraine to set up a “safety and security protection zone” around the plant. However, the IAEA is a science and engineering inspectorate and technical assistance agency. Negotiating and establishing a protection zone at a nuclear power plant in a war zone is entirely unprecedented and totally different from all past IAEA efforts. Establishing a protection zone requires negotiations and approvals at the highest political and military levels in Kyiv and Moscow.  It could be accomplished through backchannel, Track II-type diplomacy, specifically nuclear safety-focused engineering diplomacy. In the meantime, the IAEA needs strong support from the United Nations Security Council in the form of a resolution, mandate or the creation of a special commission. Admittedly, this is only a stopgap measure. In parallel with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s effort under the leadership of its Director, General Rafael Mariano Grossi, we believe that the U.N. Security Council should immediately empower a special commission to mediate between the warring parties. It could be modeled after the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in 2000, and appoint a prominent, senior international statesman as its head. We believe the person should be of the caliber and in the mold of the legendary former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden. Blix led the agency at the time of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and commands respect in today’s Russia and Ukraine. The great Prussian military theorist Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz once said: “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.”  These words still resonate today, reminding us that the quest for peace is not just about putting an end to violence, but about forging a path towards progress and prosperity. It is incumbent upon us to recognize that bringing an end to this conflict is not merely a cessation of violence, but a catalyst for the advancement of policy. As we strive towards resolving conflicts and achieving a lasting peace, it is our duty to recognize that this effort is not merely a tactical move, but a transformative one. By embracing a policy-driven approach, we can internalize the true nature of conflict, and use it as a means to move forward and effect real change. So let us be bold, but at the same time be pragmatic, and let us remember the words of Clausewitz as we work towards a brighter future for all. Let us see war not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end – a means to build a world where conflict is a thing of the past, and policy is the key to progress. President John F. Kennedy’s bold vision for political courage and making compromises in his aforementioned book, Profiles of Courage, also beautifully applies to this very context of Ukraine preserving its principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity while tactfully compromising with Russia over safeguarding Zaporizhzhia: “We shall need compromises in the days ahead, to be sure. But these will be, or should be, compromises of issues, not of principles. We can compromise our political positions, but not ourselves. We can resolve the clash of interests without conceding our ideas... Compromise does not mean cowardice. Indeed it is frequently the compromisers and conciliators who are faced with the severest tests of political courage as they oppose the extremist views of their constituents.”

In China-brokered talks, the two oil-rich and rival states of Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year split. Although the two sides need much confidence-building, their rapprochement carries the potential to change the regional geopolitical landscape at the cost of concerns for policy hawks in the US and Israel. The longstanding Iranian–Saudi sectarian and geopolitical rivalry has been a major source of tension and conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Traditionally, whereas Iran has sought to project itself as the guardian of Shia Islam, Saudi Arabia has claimed the leadership of Sunni Islam. Both have also competed for regional geopolitical supremacy. They have been involved, in opposition to one another, in some of the conflict-ridden flashpoints in the region, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Fearing Iran’s nuclear program and regarding the country as a regional threat, the traditionally US-backed Saudi Arabia has opened backdoor diplomatic channels with Iran’s other US-allied regional foe, Israel, and supported the normalisation of relations between some of its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, in particular) with the Jewish state in an anti-Iran front. In response, Iran has forged close ties with Russia and China. The Saudi execution of a prominent Shia cleric and Iranians’ storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran resulted in Riyadh cutting ties with Tehran in early 2016. However, the regional picture has lately changed for the two protagonists. Despite being under severe American sanctions and beset by public protests since September 2022, the Iranian Islamic regime has managed to maintain its regional influence in the Levant—the area stretching from Iraq to Lebanon—as well as Yemen and has made a show of its military strength by supplying Russia with deadly drones in the Ukraine conflict. Saudi Arabia hasn’t been able either to rebuff the Iranian influence or to maintain its historical trust of the US as a very reliable ally, especially in the wake of America’s inability to rein in Iran and to avoid defeat in Afghanistan. It has increasingly found it in its interest to diversify its foreign relations, forging closer relations with the very powers with which Iran has established camaraderie, most importantly China. The kingdom’s young de facto ruler Mohammad bin Salman has viewed this diversification as not only signalling his dissatisfaction with Washington’s criticism of his alleged human rights violations, but also aiding him with realising his vision to make Saudi Arabia a regional superpower by 2030. For this, he wants to reduce the country’s dependence on hydrocarbon as a source of wealth; expand its economy, trade and inflow of investment and high-tech industry; and change its social and cultural landscape, though not its authoritarian politics. He has found the Chinese model more appealing in this respect. Beijing could not be more pleased with the Iranian–Saudi rapprochement under its diplomatic auspices. It constitutes a major step, along with the recent peace proposal for Ukraine, in Beijing’s global diplomatic offensives to raise China’s credentials as a peacemaker through a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states on the world stage. The underlying message is to present the US as an interventionist ‘warmonger’ power. In addition, it paves the way for China’s deeper and wider economic and trade ties in a region from which it imports some 40% of its annual oil needs. These developments can only be unsettling for the US and Israel, both of which regard any regional easing on Iran, especially with China’s support, as contrary to their interests. The US wants to maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime over its nuclear program, regional influence and handling of recent domestic unrest, headed by Iranian women against theocratic restrictions and declining standards of living. It is also not keen to see Saudi Arabia tilt towards the very powers that the US seeks to contain. Israel regards Iran’s Islamic regime as an existential threat and has vowed to do whatever it takes to prevent it from becoming a military nuclear power. The two sides have been locked in a shadow war for some time. Israel has frequently attacked Iranian targets in Syria and Lebanon, assassinated several of the country’s nuclear scientists and raided its ships. In a more daring act, recently it directly attacked defence installations in Isfahan where Iranian nuclear facilities are located. In turn, Iran has targeted Israeli ships, intelligence and diplomatic personnel, and has promised to retaliate against any hostile Israeli action. Israel and Iran have at times come very close to serious blows. Any direct confrontation between them could have devastating consequences for the region and beyond. Having said that, it’s also important to be reminded that China has good cooperative diplomatic, security and intelligence relations with Israel. Can we expect Beijing to step in there as well to bring about a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, where the US has failed? Most likely not, given Israel’s intransigence not to give up its occupation and America’s unwavering strategic backing of it.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping was unanimously “reelected” for another five-year term at the Two Sessions, and the Chinese government approved significant changes in the party-state structure to counter the US-led West’s dominance and promote economic and technological self-sufficiency. At the same time, China is engaging in diplomatic activism in the Middle East and elsewhere, forcing Israel to reconsider regional dynamics and prepare for a protracted state of “struggle” between the two superpowers.  In March 2023, Chinese leader Xi Jinping marked several highly successful events. Internally, he was “reelected” for a third term as President, and externally, he brokered a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran – without any American involvement. These two developments coincided with the Two Sessions, China’s annual parliament meeting, where Xi passed far-reaching reforms aimed at increasing China’s economic and technological self-reliance in the face of Western adversaries. Judging by his remarks, it appears that under Xi China will continue its proactive foreign policy directed against the US-led global order. This in turn will test Israel’s ability to continue to maintain a balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis the two superpowers. Israel must now account for China’s growing influence in diplomatic and security theaters in the Middle East, as well as Beijing’s closer relations with Iran and Russia. To ensure its own security and economic interests, it must reconsider the regional dynamic while engaging in dialogue with the relevant actors. Finally, the escalation of tensions between the superpowers forces Jerusalem to prepare for extreme scenarios, most notably war in the Taiwan Strait. After a decade as president, Xi Jinping was unanimously reelected by the Chinese parliament for another five-year term. The vote – in which Xi was the sole candidate – was held as part of the annual Two Sessions, the Chinese legislature’s most important political gathering. The main event usually takes place over a seven-day period in March, when approximately 3,000 delegates from the National People’s Congress (NPC) – the legislative body – and some 2,000 delegates from the top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), convene in Beijing. In the course of the gathering, the Premier delivers a work report, while the delegates pass legislation, make amendments to the country’s constitution, and approve appointments in various state bodies. This year’s events were especially significant because they occurred immediately following the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in October 2022. At that gathering, which takes place every five years, Xi was also appointed to a third term as general secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Since the 1980s, every five years, the CCP has introduced widespread reforms in the structure of the party-state. Previous reforms included changes to the balance of power between the Party and the state in ways that conformed to the incoming leadership's priorities and vision, as well as domestic and foreign developments. This year, the NPC approved significant changes in the party-state structure, continuing the trend in which the CCP under Xi has been "swallowing up" the government, with the lines between the two becoming increasingly blurred. These changes reflect Xi's belief that only a strong and centralized party can deal with domestic and foreign challenges, particularly the United States, China's main strategic rival. Indeed, during a heavily-publicized meeting at the start of the Two Sessions between Xi and representatives of the Chinese business sector, the Chinese leader stunned the audience by launching a direct attack against Washington, which he blamed for "the unprecedented severe challenges" that China is facing, and for trying to "contain, blockade, and suppress" China. What made his remarks particularly noteworthy was that despite rising tensions between the superpowers in recent years, Xi avoided explicitly naming and shaming the United States, instead allowing Chinese diplomats to spar with Western hawks. As a matter of fact, an examination of Xi’s writings reveals that even early in his political life, he saw the West, and the United States in particular, through a Cold War prism. However, it was the trade war waged by the Trump administration, which later escalated into a comprehensive technological and geopolitical war, that reinforced for him the need for economic and technological independence. The Biden administration went even further in its efforts to prevent China from gaining access to critical technology, and unlike its predecessor, has been successful in securing allies’ support. The Chinese countermeasures can be found in its most recent reforms, which included increasing the powers of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) through the establishment of a new decision making body, the Central Science and Technology Commission, which is likely to be headed by Xi himself. Some of the ministry's specialized functions were transferred to relevant government ministries as part of the restructuring. The changes will allow the ministry to focus on macro-management of competition in innovation and to foster local development of basic research, core technologies, and a solution to the problem of the "bottleneck" imposed by the West, such as restrictions on China's import of microchips and airplane engines. In addition, a new institution, the National Data Bureau, will be tasked with managing digital resources, under the auspices of the Chinese government’s top macroeconomic management agency, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). This year's reforms likewise highlighted China's financial sector, with the establishment of the new National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA) and expanded powers for the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It was also decided to cut 5 percent of the central government and party workforce. Beyond the economic rivalry with the United States, the ramifications of the war in Ukraine, and COVID-19 restrictions, Beijing faces a host of internal challenges: a skyrocketing debt-to-GDP ratio (at the end of 2022, it stood at 273 percent), a declining population, a real estate bubble, natural resource pollution, a slowdown in imports and exports, high savings levels among households, and income inequality. If the rivalry with the United States intensifies – for example, if China were to invade Taiwan – Beijing would have to anticipate the imposition of additional sanctions, similar to those that Russia has been struggling with for the past year. Yet until such time as the situation vis-à-vis the United States reaches a critical stage, if at all, and against the backdrop of increasing concern in the international business community about the direction China is heading under Xi, Beijing is attempting to project to the world “business as usual.” At the conclusion of the Two Sessions, the incoming prime minister, Li Qiang, appeared to be smiling as he told foreign reporters that the United States and China must cooperate, because “there are no winners in a conflict.” He also promised that he would ensure a competitive, market-oriented, and fair environment that would protect the rights of Chinese and foreign businesses. However, here too the Party’s “invisible hand” was evident when he added that “the role of the new government is to execute and implement the important decisions and plans laid out by the CPC Central Committee.” The new appointments of other senior positions reflected the same ambivalence that Li expressed in his remarks. On the one hand, the Congress decided to extend the terms of 24 of the 26 ministers and national commissions, among them the head of the China’s central bank, Yi Gang, and Finance Minister Liu Kun, even though they had reached retirement age. One of the two new appointees, on the other hand, is Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, who has been sanctioned by the US since 2018 for purchasing Russian weapons. Unlike his predecessors, who had battle experience, Li is an aerospace engineer in training. He was the former director of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) space and cyber programs, as well as the deputy commander of the PLA's Strategic Support Force, which was in charge of China's space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. Aside from the obvious defiance toward the US, his appointment demonstrates the importance that China places on modernizing China's military technology, given the ever-increasing restrictions imposed on technological imports to China. Self-sufficiency should not be confused with isolationism. The agreement brokered by Beijing between Saudi Arabia and Iran on March 10 – while  the Two Sessions were in session – was the clearest indication that China intends to maintain its active foreign policy. Granted, China pushed through an open door, given the conflicting parties’ inherent need for an agreement to focus on their economies, and only time will tell whether the agreement will hold; nonetheless, this was the first time that Beijing has led any kind of mediation effort, let alone successfully, and the United States was not even in the room. In doing so, China has demonstrated that it can use its dominant economic and commercial position to advance diplomatic and security objectives, ostensibly as an "alternative" to the United States. China’s global ambitions are not limited to the Middle East. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as stated in the government's work report, will celebrate its tenth anniversary in October. What began as a central-southeast Asian initiative has evolved into a global network of "silk roads" emanating from China and extending into space, with hundreds of massive infrastructure projects worth over $1 trillion in 146 countries. The BRI has had to deal with a number of implementation and funding challenges over the years, so it has been scaled back. At the same time, Chinese officials emphasize that it will remain a focal point of Beijing's foreign policy, with the emphasis shifting to smaller but more strategic projects such as bolstering global supply chains and cooperating in the digital domain, as well as healthcare, public policy, renewable energy, and people-to-people and diplomatic ties. Xi has unveiled other ambitious projects in recent years, most notably the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which is tasked with promoting the United Nations' goals for sustainable development, and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). At the conclusion of the Two Sessions, Xi announced the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), the details of which remain unknown. As with the BRI, any success story that can be classified as development or security will be attributed to them, even if it occurred years before these initiatives. This is what happened with the Saudi-Iranian agreement or the Chinese peace initiative to end the Ukrainian war, both of which Beijing hailed as shining examples of the GSI in action. In practice, these initiatives reflect Beijing's desire to reshape the global order to reflect its interests and values, while undermining the United States-led West's dominance in its spheres of influence. For example, Xi described the GCI as "a new form of human civilization" that "shatters the myth that modernization is equal to Westernization. The bottom line is that the Two Sessions and the extension of Xi’s term of office indicate that China will continue to push itself to the forefront of the international stage. The next five years will be defined by a stronger push for self-sufficiency, financial stability, and technological advancement. At the same time, China will not close itself off to the rest of the world. On the contrary, China will not back down from "a struggle" against what Xi refers to as the West's and the United States' "attempts to blackmail, contain, and blockade" it. This spirit was evident during the first press conference given by China's new foreign minister, Qin Gang, who warned that "if the United States does not hit the brakes, but continues to speed down the wrong path...there will surely be conflict and confrontation." While Western doors are closing in on China, Beijing will continue to see Israel as a backdoor for securing core technologies that will help it achieve self-reliance, rendering Israel obsolete in the long run. This is evident in the recent influx of Chinese commercial delegations to Israel, following Beijing's lifting of travel restrictions. Simultaneously, the US-Israel Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology, launched during President Joe Biden's July visit to Jerusalem, will examine Israeli-Chinese cooperation, particularly in the less regulated hi-tech sector and academia. The agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as Xi's recent visit to Russia, during which the parties agreed to "increase contacts over security issues in the Persian Gulf," indicates that China's diplomatic activism in the Middle East will only grow. The evolving situation in which China and the US both play key roles in regional geopolitics – against the backdrop of increased competition between the two countries and the war in Ukraine – forces Israel to reconsider regional dynamics. In order to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear power in peaceful means, Jerusalem must deepen its dialogue with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and its Arab partners in the Negev Forum on regional security and economic interests. Finally, if a conflict between China and the United States is truly "inevitable," Israel must prepare for the worst-case scenario, in which two superpowers go to war in the Taiwan Strait, and consider the implications for its relations with Beijing.

Countries across the Middle East have engaged in an unprecedented pattern of reconciliation to protect their interests amid fluctuations in the international order. But without deliberate international support, these new ties can easily unravel. On 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced their intention to restore diplomatic relations over a two-month period, in a deal brokered by China. Riyadh’s reconciliation with Bashar al-Assad in Syria is also underway, and its behind-the-scenes engagement with Israel has increased. This rapprochement with Iran and other regional efforts matter because they shed light on a significant region-wide trend of de-escalation that has been underway since the resumption of high-level UAE–Iran relations in 2019. In the wake of geopolitical tensions and distraction, it also marks a shift towards direct Middle East regional conflict management which – should it last – is a first for countries in the region. Driven by a combination of conflict fatigue, COVID-19, a focus on economic security, continued concern over declining US engagement, and increased geopolitical competition, states across the Middle East have engaged in an unprecedented pattern of reconciliation to protect their interests amid fluctuations in the international order. New US priorities on regional security A key driver of this new approach is certainly connected to regional perceptions of inconsistent US security support. This sentiment is not new but has been mounting since the Obama administration articulated new US priorities directed towards China and Russia. The Trump and Biden administrations both continued this policy and demonstrated similar signs of distraction when the US withdrew from Afghanistan while calling on its partners in the Middle East to share the burden of regional security. The outpouring of Western support for Ukraine while little is being done to stem threats from Iran has further confirmed a perception across the Middle East that US support is declining, despite continued assurances by US policymakers. Countries in the region have also realised that confrontation with Iran has not only failed to deliver the desired results but has also exposed them to economic vulnerabilities. For the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular, the June 2019 attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the September 2019 attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure caused a change in thinking. Moreover, multiple rounds of domestic protests and maximum pressure international sanctions have also failed to get Iran to adjust its regional posture or reduce support for regional proxy groups. Reaching out to Iran was an opportunity to hedge against further attacks and directly manage, rather than outsource, their security. Five rounds of bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, organized by Iraq, sought to stabilize tensions. While these discussions stalled due to the stalemate over the JCPOA and ongoing protests in Iran, they paved the way for Beijing’s intervention. This has led to an unprecedented wave of diplomatic contact and subsequent outreach across the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been particularly involved in efforts to put out regional fires. Abu Dhabi has taken the lead in engaging with Tehran, Ankara and Damascus, with Riyadh following closely behind. Notably, the UAE’s National Security Adviser Tahnoun bin Zayed – the country’s brightest spark – has led the way and proven to be an adept tactician by dousing, if not completely extinguishing, the flames. Abu Dhabi also made a bold move in signing the Abraham Accords with Israel in September 2020. Although the two countries had long-established relations behind the scenes, formalizing its relationship with Israel allowed Abu Dhabi to rapidly advance its goals in finance, technology, healthcare, education and defence. Although Abu Dhabi signing the accords was conditional on Israel not annexing parts of the West Bank, it managed to bypass the centrality of Palestine as the region’s most pressing challenge. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia will continue to backchannel with Israel, but will only normalize under the right conditions and with the right incentives. The normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran marks the formal end of seven years of heightened tensions and could have important consequences for the war in Yemen, Iran’s role in the region and regional stability more broadly. While the move is unlikely to lead to a major reset in regional relations – and Beijing’s capacity to remain involved is unclear – it has given rise to a pause in which some advances could be made. Although Yemen is a difficult nut to crack, a significant step toward a longer-term truce is being negotiated. Underpinning the ceasefire and dampening down cross-border activity would provide Saudi Arabia with some respite and lessen Iran’s frustration with Iran International and other Saudi-funded broadcasters hostile to the Iranian regime. Bahrain is expected to follow Riyadh’s lead and resume dialogue with Tehran. More productive examples include the end of the Qatar crisis. The 2021 Saudi-led Al-Ula agreement led to a significant reset of GCC ties following the 2017 blockade of Qatar. In this instance, Riyadh demonstrated its appetite for fresh foreign policy interventions and, with the backing of Kuwait, rode a little roughshod over UAE and Bahrain sensibilities – all in the name of lowering regional temperatures. A knock-on effect of warming Saudi-Qatar ties has been the strengthening of ties between Egypt and Qatar, which hit an all-time low following Sisi’s seizure of power in 2013. Relations between Qatar and Bahrain have also been restored. In other words, the change in regional environment has allowed states locked in combat – both literally and metaphorically – to lay down their arms and start a dialogue. Restoring ties with Syria and ending long rivalries Elsewhere, the UAE has taken the lead in restoring Arab state ties with the Assad regime in Syria, with Jordan in lockstep. Although this is a step-by-step process, news that Saudi Arabia will soon open its consulate in Damascus suggests that normalization – despite US and EU sanctions – is well underway. In fact, states including Egypt are showing willingness to restore Syria to the Arab League and are expected to invite Assad to attend the 2023 Arab League summit. Although it is unlikely that Gulf Arab states will bankroll Syria’s reconstruction – they are much too canny for that – they will support early recovery, on the condition that Assad curtails the Captagon trade to the Gulf. Meanwhile, the March 2022 reconciliation between Turkey and the UAE, followed by a similar rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, has formally ended a decade-long rivalry. This has been followed by a restoration of Turkey-Israel relations, while a reconciliation between Turkey and Egypt is also underway. This pattern of de-escalation is indeed a significant shift away from the confrontation that has dominated Middle East politics since the Arab Spring. For the time being though, the range and diversity of new alignments should not be seen as anything more than a pattern of hedging to manage the geopolitical juggling between the US, Russia and China. Moreover, these shifts cannot solve entrenched mistrust or dust off the tensions built up during the past decade of regional competition. Rather, they should be seen as deliberate recalibrations aimed at conflict management and reducing economic vulnerability. Only with time and sustained political investment can this de-escalation turn into meaningful change and a true regional reset. But without deliberate international support, these new ties can easily unravel.

Macron has raised doubts about how serious France is when it comes to managing the negative externalities of China’s rise. Just when it seemed the European Union was finally achieving strategic coherence as a global geopolitical actor, French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China has shattered that myth. The French president and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, headed to China last week, hoping to project a sense of unity vis-à-vis Beijing at a time when global fault lines are sharpening among major powers. The two leaders were aiming to stabilise an increasingly difficult trade relationship with their largest trading partner as well as try to push China into taking a more active role in ending the Ukraine war. Other European leaders, like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, have also tried to engage Chinese leadership in recent months. But Macron went beyond others as he advocated “strategic autonomy” for Europe as a “third superpower.” Arguing that Europe faces “the great risk” if it “gets caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy”, Macron stirred up instant controversy by suggesting that Europe must reduce its dependency on the U.S. and avoid getting dragged into a confrontation between China and the U.S. over Taiwan. In case of an aggravation of the U.S.-China conflict, Macron advocated, “we [Europe] will not have the time nor the means to finance our own strategic autonomy, and we will become vassals, whereas we could become the third pole [in the world order] if we have a few years to develop this”. Though von der Leyen went to China at Macron’s invitation, the visit has been overshadowed by Macron’s posturing and Beijing’s apparent glee that it is indeed possible to drive a wedge in transatlantic relations. Macron was given a red carpet welcome in China, and his comments have received widespread coverage. The Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times said the comments were “clearly the result of Macron’s long-term observation and reflection” and represented a path that was “relatively objective, rational, and in line with Europe’s own interests”. Macron has described the visit as an attempt to “consolidate common approaches” over the war in Ukraine and to force China to acknowledge the costs of its ties with China. But it was hardly evident how this was achieved during and after the visit. Ursula von der Leyen, who has been largely given the cold shoulder in China, has been much more emphatic in her denunciation of the Chinese 12-point plan to end the war in Ukraine and has been underlining the need for “de-risking” in Europe’s trade ties with China. But Macron’s intervention has led to an intense backlash from all sides. The Europeans are making it evident that there is hardly any widespread support for the French leader’s position. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China said in a statement that Macron’s comments are “severely out of touch” with sentiment across European leadership and that he does not speak for Europe. In particular, the officials of central and eastern Europe have been vocal in their dismay and opposition to Macron’s policy preferences. “Instead of building strategic autonomy from the United States, I propose a strategic partnership with the United States,” Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki bluntly put it to his European partners. Those European nations that are on the frontlines of Russian military aggression see the challenges of today in existential terms. They have no time for a French philosophical treatise on statecraft. With France and Germany devoid of any significant military prowess, the reliance of the EU on the U.S. is a strategic imperative. Macron’s ill-timed comments have once again revealed the divergences between the “old” and “new” Europe, even though “old” Europe has not been supportive of Macron’s worldview. Reactions from the U.S. have been equally scathing. Though the White House has maintained that it is “focused on the terrific collaboration and coordination that we have with France”, the Republicans have latched onto this controversy. The Republican senator Marco Rubio rhetorically asked if, after Macron’s comments, the US should just consider focusing its foreign policy on containing China and leave Europe to handle the war in Ukraine. Mike Gallagher, the Republican chairman of the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, described Macron’s comments as “embarrassing” and “disgraceful.” And of course, former President, Donald Trump was more colourful in his response when he said that Macron “is over with China kissing [Xi’s] ass in China.” Macron’s stance will be concerning to Washington as they are likely to embolden China, even as it reignites the debate about how much America should commit to European security. Macron has been under siege in France, with his approval ratings down in the dumps and his government narrowly surviving a vote of no confidence last month. So posturing on the global stage on an issue that has had a long pedigree in French politics perhaps makes sense for him politically. Ad he has made controversial comments in the past as well, such as NATO experiencing “brain death” and trying to offer Russian President Vladimir Putin “security guarantees” months after his invasion of Ukraine. But at a time when the West has tried with great difficulty to project a serious China policy and when Chinese aggression, especially against Taiwan, has been explicit, making remarks that end up doing exactly the opposite of what the visit was intended for in the first place betrays a lack of resolve that Beijing will be only too pleased to exploit. And for France’s partners in the Indo-Pacific, Macron has raised doubts about how serious France is when it comes to managing the negative externalities of China’s rise.

The political crisis currently experienced by Israel has its origins in the structure of the political system of this country, institutionalized since the twenties of the last century, in British Palestine, through the installation of an electoral system first adopted by the Jewish community authorities, which was growing with immigration, and then by the State of Israel since its establishment in 1948. It was a parliamentary proportional representative system, with a single national list, with an entry band for Parliament that varied from 1% of the votes to the current 3.25%. This system worked regularly while the big parties of the time –Labor and Likud (liberal nationalist)– received a large percentage of votes that allowed them to choose minor partners for the government coalition and at the same time they were led by politicians who possessed high levels of legitimacy by their foundational roles in Israel, such as were Ben Gurion and Begin. Around the 1980s, electoral parity began to emerge between the possible government coalitions led by both parties, and this situation gave rise to governments of national unity led by Shamir and Peres. Later, the big parties lose electoral support, and the government coalitions are increasingly weak. This is because the leader of the party that wins the first electoral majority wins just over a quarter of the votes, while to achieve a coalition that includes more than 50% of the parliamentary seats, he must pay high 'prices' to the small parties and depends more and more on them in order not to lose the government. This is the current case of the Netanyahu government. The attempt at electoral reform in the 1990s, which separated the election of the Prime Minister from the parliamentary election - from the coalition supporting the government - failed, as it reinforced both ideologically and electorally the smaller parties. Ultimately, at the beginning of this century, the previous system was restored with an increase in the percentage of votes required for entry into Parliament. At the same time, Israel lacks a written Constitution and instead has a series of basic laws that outline the structure of the State and safeguard the rights of citizens and minorities. In the 1990s, the Israeli constitutional void was filled through judicial activism by the Supreme Court, which carried out a process of judicializing politics and exercised its authority to limit government actions and legislation that it deemed contrary to the prevailing legal system. Some politicians viewed this as an attempt by the Supreme Court to assert supremacy and curtail the popular will expressed through parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, the weakness of the major political parties and the personalistic and populist tendencies - which were accelerated during the years when electoral reform led to the separation of the election of the Prime Minister from that of the Parliament (Knesset) - led to Israel holding five national elections between 2019 and 2022, in which the major parties had great difficulty in generating stable government coalitions. The latest election, on November 1, 2022, granted the first majority to the Likud, and its leader, Netanyahu, formed a government coalition that they themselves described as "completely right-wing." The coalition includes, outside the Likud, three ultra-Orthodox parties and two religious nationalist parties. One problem with it is that it contains many ideological contradictions among its members and also generates serious disputes over the leadership of each of the sectors. An additional problem is that it includes a party - the Jewish Power party, led by Ben Gvir - that is openly anti-Arab in racist terms. Among the electoral proposals of this bloc of parties, which make up the current government, the one for judicial reform stood out, whose central content was to remove from the Supreme Court of Israel its role and authority with respect to the revision of legislation, as well as over the actions of the Government and its power to curb everything that it considered undemocratic and in opposition to the existing basic legislation. This would be accomplished through a series of laws that would change the judge election commission, removing the Supreme Court's right to veto judge appointments, and introducing a representative majority of the governing coalition on this commission. Another proposed law would give Parliament, with a 61-vote majority, the power to override any political decision of the Supreme Court. Beyond these, it is proposed to weaken the control authority that the Attorney General's Office has regarding appointments and government acts, and a series of measures that would practically eliminate the political powers of the Judiciary within the current Israeli system of checks and balances (brakes and balances designed to prevent any of the branches of the State from acquiring supremacy over the other two). The argument of Netanyahu and his coalition allies is that they have the power to carry out this judicial reform or revolution, since the people have wanted it and have manifested it through their vote in the last election. Beyond this, Netanyahu and his allies make “identity politics” arguments, which maintain that Israel, although governed by Likud-led coalitions, remains in the hands of the former Ashkenazi elites originating from historic Labor; and this means the discrimination of Eastern Jews from the institutions of power, such as the Supreme Court and the judicial system, the academic elite, the financial elite, the high-tech elite, and even certain military elites. The speed with which Netanyahu and the government coalition attempted to legislate this reform caused an unexpected popular protest to emerge from civil society, without clear political leadership, as the parliamentary opposition was practically dragged along by the popular protest. In addition, it should be noted that the protest is focused not only on the reform itself but also on Netanyahu's personal interest, as he is facing three corruption trials and the disqualification of Deri, the leader of the ultra-Orthodox Sephardic party Shas, from serving as a minister in the current coalition. The massive protests and strong international criticism, especially from the US and the European Union, along with a climate of instability that weakens the value of the national currency - the Shekel -, the withdrawal of capital, and threats in the area of internal and international security, have strengthened the protests and created coalitions among sectors that seemed irreconcilable before these recent events. Thus, reservists in elite units have stated that they will not continue to serve in their military roles under a Netanyahu dictatorship since, if everything depends on a parliamentary majority without balance between the powers, that majority forming the government coalition would delegate its parliamentary authority to him and the government would be in the hands of the prime minister, whom the protest activists consider a future dictator. Faced with this, the massive protests have included blockades of central roads and the paralysis of activities. Added to all this is the fact that the Minister of Security (Defense), Gallant, demanded that Netanyahu stop the reform legislation because the security situation - facing Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza - during this month of Ramadan is perceived as dangerous and it is a bad period to add internal instability. Netanyahu prevented Gallant from making a public statement explaining all of this, although Gallant did so while Netanyahu was on an official visit to London. Netanyahu reacted by declaring that Gallant would no longer lead the Ministry of Security (Defense), but he did not send him the dismissal letter. When Netanyahu fired Gallant on Sunday night, a large crowd took to the streets across the country to protest this measure, and the next morning, in a special meeting, the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor), in coordination with the associations of industrialists, merchants, and bank directors, declared a general strike that paralyzed Ben Gurion airport and large sectors of the entire country. As a result of all this and after a day of intense negotiations within the government coalition - facing the religious nationalist parties, who, due to past issues and settlement problems in the West Bank, were the ones who most demanded the reform, and alongside the Minister of Justice, Levin, who is the author of the reform plan - Netanyahu declared that the reform is on hold for the next month to make way for a conciliatory negotiation that produces an agreed reform of the Israeli legal system, in negotiations that will be guided by President Herzog. It is clear that legislating a Constitution at this time, with the multiple fractures of Israeli society aligning in two polarized blocs, is a pipe dream. It is also necessary to understand that behind the attempt at judicial reform-revolution, there is an ineffective political system that must be reformed and updated in order to face the multiple challenges of Israel in the 21st century, which are very different from those of a century ago when this system began to be institutionalized.

Tunisia is beset by deepening political and economic challenges. President Kais Saied is transforming the country’s parliamentary system into an authoritarian presidential one that has become increasingly repressive. Arrests and convictions of opposition politicians have surged. Saied’s aggressive anti-foreigner discourse has fuelled xenophobic sentiment and contributed to a spike in violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. Economically, Tunisia is grappling with the fallout of a decade of sluggish growth compounded by a series of economic shocks since 2020. The nation’s public debt has soared, with significant debt repayments looming. As the country tries to deal with mounting financial constraints, its inability to attract foreign loans is further clouding its economic future. Saied now must decide whether to embrace a credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or potentially default on Tunisia’s foreign debt. Against this backdrop, the EU and, in particular, Italy have a pivotal role to play. They can either help steer Tunisia toward a more stable economic future or watch it descend into chaos. A worrying political and economic outlook While the protests that led to the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, the promise of a more democratic and egalitarian society in the North African country did not come to fruition. To be sure, the protests did lead to the overthrow of autocratic Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. Moreover, Tunisia was the sole country to emerge from the regional uprisings with a new democracy. That experiment, however, foundered after Saied – who was elected to the presidency in 2019 – seized a monopoly on power in July 2021. Over the past two years, he has replaced the country’s semi-parliamentary system with one lacking checks and balances, consolidating power in his hands. People’s fear of repression resurfaced. Since mid-February 2023, arrests and convictions of public figures, especially politicians, have accelerated, undermining a disorganised and divided opposition. Meanwhile, large sections of the population have focused on survival in the face of a worsening economic crisis and have increasingly disengaged from politics. President Saied has attempted to shore up his dwindling support by pushing nationalist policies. He has jailed members of the opposition in a move that seems aimed at bolstering his standing with swathes of the public who are frustrated with the former political class. Saied has also xenophobically accused sub-Saharan migrants of conspiring to change Tunisia’s identity, creating a climate conducive to repeated violent attacks against a vulnerable minority. Economically, the country is still reeling from a decade of slow growth. After the 2011 uprising, the Tunisian government combatted rising unemployment in part by hiring hundreds of thousands of civil servants. Today, the public sector is the country’s largest employer and half of the annual budget is spent on the public payroll. At the same time, public and private investment in infrastructure, research and other growth-enhancing spending items has dropped significantly, leading to a sharp decline in GDP growth. External factors also chipped away at the Tunisian economy. The Covid-19 pandemic brought a collapse in tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, led to a spike in commodity prices. Surging inflation – particularly in food prices – and shortages of basic goods have eroded Tunisian living standards. Against this backdrop, Tunisia’s public debt has skyrocketed, reaching nearly 90 per cent of GDP in 2022, with substantial financing requirements needed to maintain current levels of spending. Credit rating agencies have downgraded the country as it struggles to balance its budget. The latest downgrade took place in June, when Fitch lowered Tunisia’s rating to CCC- (well into junk status territory). As a result, access to international financial markets has been virtually shut off, given the prohibitive interest rates (over 20 per cent) that this sovereign rating would entail. While the current account deficit has shrunk and foreign currency liquidity has improved over the past few months because of an uptick in tourism revenues and remittances from Tunisians working abroad, servicing its external debt will continue to be extremely challenging. With 2.6 billion US dollars in repayments scheduled for 2024 (including a euro-denominated bond maturing in February, equivalent to 900 million US dollars), it is still unclear how the government will be able to secure sufficient funds to meet these liabilities. The 2024 budget draft anticipates loans from Algeria and Saudi Arabia, as well as other, as yet unknown, external sources. The IMF deal and the role of the EU Despite these financing difficulties, Tunisia has not yet signed a deal with the IMF. In October 2022, Tunisia and the IMF agreed on the terms of a 48-month, 1.9 billion US dollar loan aimed at stabilising the economy, but Saied rejected the deal, fearing social unrest from cutting subsidies and reducing the public sector wage bill. The IMF board postponed the deal in response. Since then, the president has remained steadfast in his rejection of what he calls “foreign diktats” from the IMF and Western states. The Europeans – in particular, Italy – have pressed the IMF to reopen negotiations and offered incentives to persuade Saied to accept a revised deal, despite their internal divisions on how to treat Tunisia. They are applying this pressure largely because the economic fallout from a debt default could further increase the number of people – both nationals and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa – leaving Tunisia for Europe. While some EU member states, such as Germany, have taken a more critical stance towards Kais Saied’s authoritarian turn, eventually the migration, security and economic interests of Italy and, to an extent, France seem to have prevailed within the EU. Due to its geographic proximity to Tunisia, Italy would receive a majority of a migration influx, at least initially. For this reason, the Italian government has reiterated its concerns over Tunisia’s economic situation on multiple occasions, while refraining from expressing any criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian turn and violent attacks against sub-Saharan migrants. The EU has offered incentives to Tunisia to accept a deal with the IMF. After Giorgia Meloni and later EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte visited Tunis in June, they unveiled 900 million euros in macro-financial assistance conditioned on a deal with the IMF and 105 million euros for joint cooperation on border management and anti-smuggling measures to reduce irregular migration to Europe. Despite the sweeteners the EU offered, the likelihood of a revised deal between Tunisia and the IMF has receded. In August, Saied removed the head of government, Najla Bouden, who had been directly involved in the negotiations with the IMF, and replaced her with a more pliant official, Ahmed Hanachi. Since then, Tunisia hasn’t put forward a revised proposal to the IMF. In October, the president reinforced his position by sacking Economy Minister Samir Saied after the latter claimed that a deal with the IMF would send a reassuring message to Tunisia’s foreign creditors. Tunisia has also rejected part of the funds offered by the EU. On 3 October, Saied rejected the first tranche of EU financial help, declaring that this “derisory” amount ran counter to the agreement between the two parties and was just “charity”. The repercussions of this refusal on the rest of the EU’s financial incentives are unclear. A fork in the road There are obvious reasons for Tunisia to secure a loan from the IMF. It would send a reassuring signal to Tunisia’s foreign partners and creditors. It could encourage Gulf Arab states to provide additional financial support in the form of government loans and deposits with the central bank, and investment in the economy. That would provide the Tunisian government with breathing space. But implementation of reforms required under the loan’s terms could set off anti-government protests by the country’s main trade union (the UGTT) and, in turn, government-led repression. To forestall such a scenario, the president himself could incite protests and riots by using nationalist rhetoric to scapegoat the IMF for any unpopular measures required by the loan. A no-agreement scenario, however, would have much more severe and potentially even catastrophic consequences. Without a loan, Tunisia would struggle to find alternative funding sources to meet its scheduled foreign debt repayments. Saied could then resort to a politically motivated strategic default, followed by negotiations to restructure the country’s external debt. Some Tunisian economists and supporters of the president are advocating for this approach: they say that declaring bankruptcy on external debt would allow the government to hammer out a restructuring plan with creditors and argue that the impact on the economy would be fairly limited, thanks to Tunisia’s capital controls and its banking sector’s low exposure to foreign bonds. But this approach carries great risk, as a foreign debt bankruptcy could lead to a run on Tunisian banks and destabilise the financial sector. In addition, the government could end the central bank’s independence to print money, fuelling an inflation spiral. Politically, a default and its socio-economic repercussions could open the door to a dangerous spiral of social and criminal violence. It could also boost irregular outward migration, with Tunisians fleeing the growing political and economic chaos. Widespread protests may erupt against the disastrous social effects of the president’s failed economic policy, prompting a violent response targeting businesspeople and political opponents for their alleged links to the West, as well as Western diplomats and the local Jewish community. Balancing economic support and respect for rights In light of these two possible scenarios, the EU and Italy should continue to encourage the Tunisian authorities to negotiate with the IMF, which remains the least politically and economically destabilising option on the table for Tunisia, if carried out with due care. At a minimum, a revised deal should include reduced expenditure cuts compared with the earlier proposal, particularly in the context of energy subsidies. At the same time, Italy and the EU should exercise caution and avoid turning their understandable concerns about Tunisia’s stability into a blank check for the president. In particular, they should press the authorities to rein in the abuses perpetrated against migrants and stave off potential attacks against opposition politicians, businesspeople and the local Jewish community. Aside from humanitarian considerations, this would serve Italy’s overarching goal of curbing migration: after all, attacks against the sub-Saharan minority have spurred outward migration, a trend that would accelerate if government persecution becomes even more severe. While supporting the deal, however, the EU and Italy should also prepare for the possibility of Tunisia continuing to reject it and declaring a foreign debt default. In such a scenario, the EU should be prepared to offer emergency financing to the country to help with imports of wheat, medicines and fuel. In doing so, the EU should synchronise the positions of member states to prevent conflicting agendas. Schisms have already emerged between countries like Germany and Italy over how to address Tunisia’s authoritarian drift. For this reason, acknowledgement of the importance of internal stability could provide a common ground in overcoming divisions and helping prevent a new wave of anti-migrant violence.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin of Russia are two very different leaders. The way in which each defines a national identity shapes their leadership and sectors of support.      As we pass one year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attention is fixed on how the war in Ukraine will unfold this year. What happens in 2023 will have implications not only for Ukraine and Russia but for the international order more broadly. One factor that has influenced the trajectory of war so far, and is likely to continue to do so in 2023, is the distinct leadership styles of President Zelenskyy and President Putin. Zelenskyy and Putin could not be more different as leaders. Putin leads a personalist autocracy, having risen through the ranks of the Russian security services to claim the presidency in 2000. Zelenskyy, a newcomer to both politics and government, was freely elected in competitive elections in 2019. Putin leads in the style of nationalist-populist leaders. He has slowly but consistently tightened his grip on power since his first electoral success in 2000, shaping Russia into an electoral autocracy. Putin is very much a man of his generation. At 70 years old, he grew up and established himself during the time of the Soviet Union and now surrounds himself with advisors of a similar or more advanced age. He is very far from media savvy, reportedly not even owning a smart phone. Zelenskyy, on the other hand, is a master of media communications, having operated as an actor and comedian before becoming president. Also a man of his generation at 45 years old, Zelenskyy forged a media career in the post-Soviet world of the emerging democracy of Ukraine. A self-made comedian and media personality, he is a part of Ukraine’s dynamic and entrepreneurial civil society.National identity: A glorious past or a bright future?A key factor that distinguishes Zelenskyy and Putin as leaders is the way in which they draw on national identity in their leadership. For Putin, Russia’s national identity is static and homogenous. There is one acceptable version of Russian identity; variations are considered deviant and a threat. For Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s national identity is dynamic and inclusive. The unifying elements of Putin’s vision of national identity are specific communal factors: shared language, history, religion, culture, or ethnicity. For Putin, such elements create a common bond and a common purpose among those who possess them. In 2021 Putin stated: “Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus… bound together by one language…, economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and – after the baptism of Rus – the Orthodox faith… we are one people.” For Putin, this idea of an exceptional nation simultaneously evokes Russian entitlement based on past glory, as well as Russia’s victimhood and humiliation at the hands of foreign enemies. Putin’s popularity “is tied to the idea of reanimating Russia’s past to reinstate the country’s greatness.” In 2022, Putin praised the conquests of the historical Russian ruler Peter the Great as returning to Russia what was “rightfully” hers. At the same time, for Putin, Russia’s greatness is under threat from the West. By contrast, Zelenskyy himself brings together the fractured components of Ukrainian identity in his own person. He is a Russian-speaking Ukrainian born in the east of the country who embodies a strong Ukrainian identity that is distinct from a Russian one. In Zelenskyy’s words: “[Ukrainians] are all different. They fight wearing the cross, the crescent, the star of David. Lads from Western Ukraine and from the south-east. Russian speakers from Kharkiv and Kryvyi Rih and Ukrainaian speakers from Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk… All different. All Ukrainians.” The unifying element of Zelenskyy’s national identity is a focus on the human striving for freedom and dignity. This factor also constitutes a universal element – uniting Ukrainians with others who share these values. In contrast to Putin, for Zelenskyy, history is not used to illustrate a glorious and longed-for past, but rather to show that the human drive for freedom can triumph over oppression to create a brighter future. As Zelenskyy stated to the UK parliament in February 2023: “[Both of] our people went through crises and growth, inflation, and periods of social losses and social gains. It was tough but we always found strength and stamina to move ahead and achieve results… We know freedom will win… We proved together that the world truly helps those who are brave in defending freedom. And thus, paves the way for a new history.”Does national identity galvanise support?Ultimately, military outcomes will be decisive in determining whether and how the war might conclude this year. However, Putin and Zelenskyy’s distinct imaginings of national identity contribute to galvanising support with audiences domestically and across the world. Domestically, Putin’s static and homogenous national identity appeals to those for whom it provides certainty and belonging to a specific idea of what it means to be Russian. For this segment of the Russian population, the ongoing war only serves to reinforce Russia’s entitlement to territorial control beyond its borders, as well as the looming spectre of humiliation at the hands of the West. This constituency will not lose faith in Putin’s war in 2023. However, if Russia fails militarily, these supporters may grow dissatisfied with the outcome, if not the war itself. Globally, Putin’s emphasis on the West as Russia’s central opponent will further isolate Russia from Western countries. However, Putin’s assertion of a homogenous identity does appeal to groups who conceptualise their own identity in a similar way within their own context. Additionally, Putin’s narrative of Russian victimhood by the West resonates in countries that are uncomfortable with a US-led global order or have an enduring historical memory of Western colonialism. Nevertheless, given Putin’s emphasis on Russian particularism, this is more likely to create tacit acceptance of Russia’s actions than stir costly action in support of Russia’s war. Domestically, Zelenskyy’s dynamic and inclusive Ukrainian identity, with an emphasis on the striving for freedom, appeals to broad swaths of the Ukrainian population – and aligns with the sense of purpose felt by those fighting on the frontlines. This is unlikely to change in 2023. As Russia doubles down on asserting its self-proclaimed right to control Ukraine, the idea of freedom and agency become ever more galvanising. Beyond Ukraine, Zelenskyy’s emphasis on a common human striving for freedom as a basis for identity invites others who align with this notion to rally alongside Ukraine. This will continue to boost support for Ukraine in established democracies – but also beyond, in places where populations or leaders resonate with a smaller state fighting against a stronger one to determine its own political and social reality. In the coming months we are likely to see military escalation between Ukraine and Russia. A less-visible factor that will contribute to the trajectory of this conflict is whether Putin and Zelenskyy’s distinct articulations of national identity will maintain traction with their respective constituencies. Will Putin’s homogenous and static national identity, that harks back to a time of historical glory, continue to appeal – or will it fracture if Russian glory on the battlefield falls short? Will Zelenskyy continue to be able to unify the diverse aspects of Ukrainian society into a coherent whole – and will this unity hold past his leadership? The answer to these questions will shape the societal impacts of this war – in both Ukraine and Russia – long after the fighting has ceased.

In the Philippines, digital disinformation campaigns have become central to electoral politics. Unfortunately, their use of vitriolic and socially divisive techniques has become increasingly normalised in the country’s politics, as these techniques are put into play even between national voting seasons. In the Philippines, one pernicious technique that digital disinformation campaigns use is to fan the flames of toxicity on social media. By instigating the loudest and most polarised online supporters to express support for a particular political camp, disinformation producers ignite social media engagement from the broader public. These producers target the most socially divisive of people’s ‘imaginaries’ about politics. As the authors wrote in a previous piece, these imaginaries refer to people’s shared narratives and collective emotions about the political world in which they live.  The year preceding the Philippines 2022 national elections saw disinformation stoking Filipinos’ nationalist and racist sentiments. This was done by hyping up the Chinese military’s supposedly impending occupation of the Philippines and by blaming the pandemic situation on Manila’s rapprochement with China. Such campaigns targeted deep-seated Filipino narratives and emotions of resentment towards the Chinese, which problematically lump together the Chinese state, Chinese nationals, and even Filipinos of Chinese descent.  Some anti-Chinese sentiments are historically rooted. However, more recent resentment has arisen in reaction to China’s increasingly assertive claims in what the Filipinos call the West Philippine Sea (that is, the Philippine-claimed portion of the South China Sea), the feeling of a subtle invasion due to the almost 300 per cent increase of overseas Chinese in-migration to the Philippines between 2016 to 2019, and even the fear of China annexing the Philippines as a province.  Despite former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte’s so-called pivot to China, Filipinos generally disliked China’s disregard for the 2016 United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision favouring the Philippines on the territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea. The presence of Chinese Philippine offshore gaming operators (or POGO) workers, Chinese-only restaurants, Chinese-subtitled movies in cinemas, and reports of Chinese tourists being rude to Filipinos also heightened the sense that the country was being gradually ‘colonised’. In the lead-up to the 2022 Philippines elections, disinformation drawing from such shared narratives and collective emotions regarding anti-Chinese resentment featured in campaigns across political camps. Supporters of Duterte disseminated content like misleading videos to bolster his image as a strong leader and master tactician. This played into the crafted narrative of him pursuing the Philippines’ best interests by hedging between China and the U.S. Meanwhile, supporters of anti-government factions targeted Duterte’s perceived closeness to Beijing, thinking that this was one of the few weaknesses in his campaign. These anti-Duterte elements put out content falsely attributing quotes to Duterte and his allies that were aimed at amplifying the image of his government as China’s lapdog. To explore the impact of such disinformation on Filipinos, the authors conducted qualitative interviews from June to December 2021 with 15 of Manila’s precarious middle-class citizens. Although these individuals had incomes that technically allowed them a taste of the middle-class lifestyle, they did not live in gated communities and were still exposed to the difficult grind of life in Manila. The interviewees answered questions on disinformation about the Philippines-China territorial disputes and the Covid-19 pandemic. When interviewees who supported Duterte were confronted with disinformation meant to positively portray his government’s approach to Beijing (that included friendlier ties with China), that they would engage in mental acrobatics to reconcile this content with their narratives and emotions of resentment against the Chinese. One of the clearest articulations of this came from a 29-year-old administrative assistant, who disliked feeling that the Philippines was becoming a “province of China”. Without differentiating between Chinese nationals and Chinese Filipinos, she said that Manila’s Chinatown was teeming with Chinese people. She added, however, that even if she were uncomfortable with the Chinese influx into Manila, there was nothing “majorly wrong” with Duterte wanting to be close to China. She could forgive the president for this one thing.  Meanwhile, the interviewees who leaned towards opposing Duterte were adamant that despite their opposition to his stance towards China, they were “not racist”. However, their exasperation that no difficult issue could strike a mortal blow to Duterte’s popularity led to remarks that validated, even if only subtly, their internalised narratives and emotions of anti-Chinese resentment.  For instance, a 45-year-old store supervisor who claimed to have a nuanced view of China-Philippines relations expressed his unfounded belief that 90 per cent of the Chinese migrants presently in the Philippines were “illegal” and had “no papers”. He thought that the government’s laxity with these migrants was probably why Covid-19 spread in the Philippines. This reflects the problematically racist assumption that links the Covid-19 pandemic to the recent increase in the migration of Chinese into the country.  These interviews indicate that anti-Chinese digital disinformation from across political camps does not shift individual Filipinos’ political positions. However, these disinformation campaigns can reinforce toxic nationalism and racism in people’s shared narratives and collective emotions. This kind of impact is an urgent reminder that those engaged in counter-disinformation need to pursue a cross-sectoral code of conduct in election campaigns that explicitly shuns socially vitriolic and marginalising stances, which should include, amongst other factors, racism.