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At a time of intense polarisation in Pakistani society, the army cannot remain unaffected by intense divisions among Pakistanis. The images of enraged mobs attacking a Corps Commander’s residence and General Headquarters (GHQs) immediately after the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan illustrate the challenge facing Pakistan’s mighty army. Speculation of divisions among the army’s officer corps notwithstanding, there is no doubt that the chain of command and discipline within the army will endure. But at a time of intense polarisation in Pakistani society, the army cannot remain unaffected by intense divisions among Pakistanis. Imran Khan enjoys massive popularity in military families, which have spent the last three decades hating the country’s traditional politicians. Serving and retired military officers and their children have had a privileged life since the days of General Zia ul Haq and most of them buy into the overly simplistic view that Pakistan’s only problem is politicians who are “crooks” or “traitors”. Since, in their view, Imran Khan is neither, and he also reflects nationalist ‘jazba’; he is the only civilian leader acceptable to them. In my book ‘Reimagining Pakistan’, I have explained the concept of ‘jazba’, which means ‘passion, spirit, and strong feeling or emotion’, a uniquely Pakistani blend of religion, patriotism, and antagonism towards India, the United States, and anyone else who might interfere with the greatness for which Pakistan is destined. For those who believe, ‘jazba’ is the guarantor of Pakistan’s success in all fields, from the sport of cricket to the economy and warfare. The believers in ‘jazba’ often do not analyse, they only emote. For them, Pakistan’s problems are not the result of bad policies. They are attributable to “the lack of sincerity and jazba” of someone or the other. Imran Khan’s engineered political rise was largely based on the ‘jazba’ narrative. In fact, his hardcore followers speak of ‘jazba junoon’, or the spirit of madness, in loving him as Pakistan’s saviour. The army nurtured the ‘jazba’ narrative that propelled Imran Khan into power and is now finding it difficult to get men and women who live in or have grown up in cantonments to change their worldview just because senior generals have realised its limitations. Pakistan’s generals have always been divided between pragmatists, who realise the complexities of the world, and those who are ideological to the point of ignoring everything else. The latter are often drawn to conspiracy theories, which Imran Khan also loves spreading. Former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa had thought that he could use Imran Khan’s charisma and celebrity status to create a political force that would keep traditional politicians in check and enable him to drive from the back seat while maintaining the trapping of democracy. That did not work out. When Bajwa tried to make pragmatic adjustments in Pakistan’s relations with the West and India, Imran Khan stuck to the ideological paradigm. Moreover, Pakistan’s economy did not do better under Khan, who failed to fulfil his key promise of repatriating wealth allegedly ‘stolen’ from Pakistan by traditional politicians and stashed abroad. Imran Khan also interfered with Bajwa’s personal ambitions and that led to Bajwa’s decision not to help his mentee beat the Vote of No Confidence brought against Khan last year by the traditional politicians. Imran Khan has, over the years, become a master narrative builder, which is easy to do when you deliberately ignore every fact and have cult-like followers who accept everything you say. Khan blamed his ouster on a conspiracy by the United States and virtually called upon the army to restore him to office or hold immediate elections, which he hopes to win. The army’s refusal to do so has led to stepping up of rhetoric against the army’s senior commanders. It is wrong to portray Khan’s supporters as having turned against the army or even against military intervention in politics. His party, Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), has in its ranks the son of late military dictator General Zia ul Haq, the grandson of Pakistan’s first coup maker Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and all major civilian collaborators of General Pervez Musharraf. None of them have publicly said anything to suggest there was anything wrong with Pakistan’s past military interventions. By speaking out against the current army leadership, these people are simply trying to get the army to put its weight behind Khan again, where they feel it rightly belongs as long as Pakistan is a democracy. If, at some point, Pakistan’s democratic system breaks down again, and direct military ruler returns (which is difficult under current circumstances), many of Khan’s supporters will go back to supporting the army against ‘corrupt’ politicians (minus Khan, of course.) Imran Khan’s strategy seems to be to use his popularity with military families to force a change in the high command’s decisions. Several years ago, Khan had remarked in a dinner conversation overseas, which was recorded on video, that Pakistan’s generals feared the mob. In recent months, he has been testing out his theory by gradually unleashing the mob against the army. But if, as a Chinese government statement recently described it, the Pakistan army is the “defender of Pakistan’s national security and stability”, its leaders cannot afford to be swayed by either the mob or the ideological spirit of military family members and retired officers. Given its size and command structure, the Pakistan army is not an institution that can easily be fractured or divided. But ideologues have flourished in its ranks before and might exist even now. The late Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, for example, often bragged that he put his Islamic faith and his own resolve to protect Pakistan from external and internal enemies above his loyalty to the chain of command or to Pakistan’s Constitution. But Gul’s bragging came largely after retirement. Even now, the most outspoken advocates of Imran Khan’s cause are retired officers, not serving ones. Pakistan’s army chief has to take into account the sentiment of his officers and troops but, at the end of the day, the decisions of the army High Command prevail. We are currently seeing a massive effort by Imran Khan and his supporters to sway the High Command. Of course, attacking military installations will probably dent that effort significantly.

President Petro seeks rapprochement with Venezuela Colombia and Venezuela were once part of the same state, have shared a history since their creation, have the same colours on their flags and share a 2,219 km border. What happens on one side of the border affects the other. However, relations between the two sister nations have not always been friendly and have experienced some very critical moments. The inauguration of Gustavo Petro as Colombian president in August 2022 marked a turning point for the prospects of bilateral relations, especially politically, but also economically and socially.The story of a complicated relationshipDespite the traditionally close political, social and economic ties, bilateral relations have been fraught with tension in recent decades. For example, the armed conflict in Colombia led to considerable emigration of Colombians to Venezuela for many years from the second half of the 20th century. The inauguration of Hugo Chávez as President of Venezuela in the late 1990s marked another turning point in relations between the two countries. For more than a decade, bilateral relations were marked by profound differences between Chavez's leftist government and Colombia's conservative government. The panorama deteriorated further when Nicolás Maduro took office in 2013, following the death of Hugo Chávez. Relations between the two countries suffered from the complex humanitarian emergency in Venezuela and the start of mass migration to Colombia triggered by the "Operation to Liberate the People". This operation forced about 22,000 people, mostly Colombians, to leave Venezuela in 2015. According to unofficial data, this number could be as high as 32,000. Ten years later, according to the R4V Coordination Platform for Migration from Venezuela, more than 7 million people have left Venezuela, of which about 2.5 million have resettled in Colombia. While relations were already going through a phase of erosion after the last presidential summit between Juan Manuel Santos and Nicolás Maduro in 2016 and the border closures pushed by Maduro, the discourse against the Venezuelan regime intensified when Iván Duque took office as Colombian president. Bilateral relations were de facto severed in 2019 after Colombia recognised Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president and attempted to force the Maduro regime to allow humanitarian aid into the country with a concert at the border. In February 2019, Maduro decided to sever diplomatic and consular relations with Colombia and gave all Colombian diplomatic personnel 24 hours to leave Venezuela. The common border has been closed three times in the last seven years. The longest period, during the Duque government, was from March 2020 to October 2021 (570 days). This was the longest border closure in the history of both countries. While foreign policy towards Venezuela was at an impasse due to broken relations as well as the recognition of oppositionist Juan Guaidóas a legitimate president, former President Duque focused on measures to protect and integrate Venezuelan migrants at home. The most important of these is the "Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants" (ETPV), a complementary procedure to the international protection system for refugees that allows Venezuelan migrants to move from temporary protection status to normal migration status within a period of 10 years. Today, around 1.5 million migrants already have the Temporary Protection Permit (PPT) and thus a secure, 10-year legal residence status. The Duque government's innovative and generous migration policy has been recognised worldwide. Restarting relations under President PetroSince the Petro government took office on 7 August 2022, circumstances have changed. For the first time in many years, the presidents of both countries are supposedly on the same side of the political spectrum. Already during the election campaign, Gustavo Petro had announced the resumption and normalisation of relations with Venezuela in case of his election victory. In the meantime, Petro has already paid several visits to Venezuela, as have the First Lady, Verónica Alcocer, the Foreign Minister, Álvaro Leyva, and the Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Germán Umaña. In his seven months in office, Petro has already travelled to Venezuela four times to meet with President Maduro. Critics, however, criticise the lack of institutionalisation and intransparency of these meetings. So far, no bilateral thematic agenda has been revealed to flesh out the political declarations of intent to normalise relations. There is a lack of transparency and information and there are no joint statements on the content of the meetings. In recent months, ambassadors Armando Benedetti (Colombia) and Félix Plasencia, who was later replaced by Carlos Martínez (Venezuela), were appointed. On 26 September 2022, the border reopened at the Simón Bolívar Bridge. Subsequently, the Atanasio Girardot Bridge was inaugurated and the "Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments" and the "Recast of the Partial Scope Agreement No. 28", which had governed trade relations between the two countries since 2011, were signed. President Petro places the expansion of trade relations at the centre of his Venezuela policy. German Umaña, current trade minister and former director of the Colombian-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, is considered an expert on Venezuela. According to the Táchira Chamber of Commerce, trade with Colombia reached USD 600 million in 2022, twice as much as in the previous year, but much less than expected by the authorities.  Trade relations are (still) a long way from earlier times, when Venezuela was Colombia's second-largest trading partner. Another important issue in the normalisation of relations is the restoration of consular relations. So far, however, progress on this issue has been slow. The opening of the first Venezuelan consulate in the Colombian border town of Cúcuta was announced only a few days ago. Moreover, the facilities are not yet fully functional. Expectations for the normalisation of relations are high, especially in the border region. In addition to a functioning consular operation in both countries, the regulation of public transport and the re-establishment of air connections as well as a stronger reactivation of trade are needed. It remains to be seen how long it will take for trust to be restored with Venezuelan partners and for economic and social relations to return to the level of earlier times. Parallel to the rebuilding of bilateral relations, a change in the discourse on the migration of Venezuelans to Colombia can be observed in the Colombian government. This important issue does not seem to be on the bilateral agenda - notwithstanding projections that the numbers of migrants to Colombia will continue to increase, reaching almost three million people by 2023, according to R4V projections. At the national level, President Petro seems to want to shift the focus on the migration issue, seeking to extend the legalisation of immigrants under the ETPV to other nationalities and dismantling part of the institutional framework. The most drastic decision in this regard was the abolition of the Office for the Care and Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants. The office, created in 2018, was previously considered a key instrument for effective implementation of migration and integration policies, as well as for coordination between local and regional governments and the national government. When President Petro took office, the migration issue was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; however, many processes and responsibilities remain unclear, as experts criticise. Critics suspect that the Maduro regime may be pushing to exclude the uncomfortable migration issue from the political and public discussion in order to make progress on other issues in return. Despite the symbolically important resumption of relations and progress in some aspects, major challenges remain in political, economic, migration and security terms. Representatives of civil society and the private sector are calling for a concrete bilateral working agenda as well as more transparency and participation beyond the symbolic politics visible so far.Energy transition and "complete peace"Gustavo Petro came to government with the promise of profound change. The revival of relations with Venezuela is part of this domestic and foreign policy paradigm shift because it is central to the planned energy transition and the "complete peace" propagated by Petro. Thus, gas imports from Venezuela are to support Colombia's exit from coal and oil production. And in the negotiations with the ELN guerrillas, the regime of Nicolás Maduro sits at the table as a guarantor state. The proposal to rely on gas imports from Venezuela in the future has met with criticism from the opposition and experts, as it would put Colombia's currently self-sufficient energy supply at risk and place it in a relationship of dependency with Venezuela.  Although Colombia has proven gas reserves for eight years and sufficient capacity not to depend on other countries for its desired energy transition, the government is considering the possibility of not signing any more contracts for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas. Instead, gas imports from Venezuela are to fill the expected energy gap. The debate is taking place in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which is not only driving up international energy prices, but also highlights the risks of making one's sovereignty dependent on other countries for energy supplies. According to the Colombian Natural Gas Association (Naturgas), importing gas would increase the price for Colombian households by about five times. President Petro, on the other hand, publicly stated that Colombia was already importing gas from other countries. While gas prices were rising, private actors were enriching themselves, the president said. Experts question whether Venezuela will really be able to supply gas in the quantities needed, given the state of its current infrastructure.  Whether the early phase-out of fossil energy production and the massive expansion of renewable energies propagated by President Petro in the election campaign will really be supported by gas imports from Venezuela is currently still an open question. Beyond the government's political rhetoric, there are increasing signs that state revenues from oil and gas production will be necessary in the medium term to finance a sustainable energy transition. Besides the energy transition, Venezuela is also an important actor for the Colombian peace process. The Petro government's decision to make Venezuela the guarantor of the negotiation process with the National Liberation Army (ELN) was therefore not unexpected. As a binational guerrilla active on both sides of the border, negotiations with the ELN are hardly realistic without Venezuela's participation. According to information from InSight Crime, the ELN has a permanent presence in eight states of the neighbouring country; at least five members of the central command have their permanent residence in Venezuela. Nevertheless, critics accused the president of unnecessarily legitimising Nicolás Maduro's regime internationally through this mediating role. Security experts consider it paradoxical to appoint Nicolás Maduro as guarantor of the process, as there is evidence of cooperation between Venezuelan security forces and the ELN. It is therefore uncertain which interests the Maduro regime represents in accompanying the negotiations.President Petro in the mediating roleWhereas under its predecessor governments, Colombia was recognised internationally as an actor that clearly criticised the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro, the humanitarian crisis of the Venezuelan people and the resulting refugee migration flows to other countries, the discourse has now changed. Petro sees himself more in the role of mediator to alleviate Venezuela's isolation and to support dialogue on democratic elections in the neighbouring country. The issue of Venezuela played an important role during his state visit to the US. In talks with the US government, he advocated an easing of sanctions against Venezuela if Maduro was willing to make concessions in return. In his speech to the Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States (OAS), he proposed rewriting the democratic charter to put Venezuela and even Cuba back on the path to democracy. Another example of Colombia's new mediating role was the International Conference on Venezuela in Bogotá on 25 April, to which the Petro government invited representatives from more than 20 countries. The initiative was endorsed by the Maduro regime, the United States and part of the Venezuelan opposition. According to Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva, the aim of the conference was to unblock negotiations between Maduro and the Venezuelan opposition in Mexico in order to hold democratic elections in Venezuela and, in turn, to persuade the international community to end economic sanctions. Attention was drawn to the expulsion of Juan Guaidó, who entered the country illegally and was immediately put on a scheduled flight to Miami by the Petro government. The conference did not lead to concrete results; even a joint final declaration was missing. Afterwards, participants described the conclusions of the Colombian government as one-sided. Whether the Petro government's continued rapprochement with Venezuela can also convince the international community to ease sanctions will largely depend on the progress of negotiations on democratic elections between Maduro and the opposition.ConclusionDespite some important steps such as the opening of the border and the resumption of diplomatic relations, it is still too early to make a conclusive assessment of the prospects for Colombian-Venezuelan relations. Political rhetoric and symbolic politics are contrasted by a bilateral thematic agenda that is still barely discernible. The ultimately unsuccessful political approach of the previous Duque government, which was characterised by non-recognition and the goal of replacing Maduro's regime, has given way under President Petro to an open attitude that is willing to engage in dialogue. Critics accuse President Petro of not taking sufficient account of the authoritarian character of the Venezuelan government in the course of the rapprochement and of strengthening the Maduro regime in its self-chosen role as international mediator and advocate for the easing of sanctions. While the tone and interpersonal relationship between political leaders on both sides of the borders has visibly eased, structural challenges and clashes of interests - migration to Colombia, the role of the ELN, economic interests, security and drug trafficking - remain and require complex and institutional approaches. While the Maduro regime can play for time in negotiations with the opposition to secure its own hold on power, President Petro has only one term in office to implement his ambitious domestic and foreign policy agenda. Venezuela is an important player and possible partner in this, especially with regard to the peace process and the desired energy transition. President Petro still has more than three years left in his term to prove that his détente course towards Venezuela is the better policy approach to strengthen democracy, security and development in the region.

In the last two years, China's leader, Xi Jinping, has announced three global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). What exactly are they, how do they differ from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and what do they imply for the State of Israel?  In the last two years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has announced three global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These new initiatives are a means of bolstering the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, with Xi at its head. More importantly, they reflect how China’s foreign policy has evolved and the lessons learned from its global engagement in the ten years since

Putin’s plan is to wait out what he sees as inevitable changes in the West and Ukraine. These days, however, Russia’s elites are liable to see defeatism in inaction.Nothing is happening in Russia. At least, that’s the impression given by Vladimir Putin over the past six months. On some level, the president has been extremely active, secretly micromanaging the war effort and publicly pretending to be dealing with routine matters from meetings on the economy to the launch of a tram line in the occupied Ukrainian city of Mariupol. Yet there are no presidential initiatives in the works for adapting the country to the new wartime reality and all that it involves.  Putin has stubbornly remained disengaged in this sense, despite drone strikes on the Kremlin, mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin’s crusade against the Defense Ministry, and even Ukraine’s looming counteroffensive. He prefers to give lectures on history and offer optimistic assessments of Russia’s economic prospects—and pessimistic ones of the West’s. This doesn’t mean, of course, that there really is nothing happening in Russia: quite the contrary. But what is happening has far less to do with the president’s plans or strategic interests than it does with the corporate interests of individual departments and figures. What is happening is largely a response to the worsening conditions facing Russia. Take the digitization of Russia’s system for issuing conscription notices, a move forced by the difficulties surrounding conscription during a war that is not going according to plan. Or how repression has deepened, in an attempt at self-preservation by the system amid fast-growing geopolitical risks and fears of defeat. Repressive inertia and self-aggrandizement by major institutions such as the FSB and the defense and finance ministries have driven many recent decisions, including the return of ideology. Justice Minister Konstantin Chuichenko has spoken openly about the possibility of introducing a new official ideology that would extend to education, cinema, theater, and poetry. This process has long since ceased to be under Putin’s direct control and is now developing independently of him, albeit with his passive consent. Here and in other important debates, Putin’s voice is absent. Should Russia’s borders be closed? Should those who have already left have their rights restricted? Who is to be exempted from mobilization? How are those designated as “foreign agents” by the state to be punished? What should be done about Prigozhin? How should the country respond to incidents like drone strikes and attempts to assassinate “ultra-patriots”?   The stances of parliamentarians, party leaders, cabinet ministers, military bloggers, and the security services on these and other matters are all well known. Yet Putin says nothing, intervening only to take steps such as retreating from the key Ukrainian city of Kherson, suspending Russia’s participation in the New START nuclear agreement, or pulling out of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Even in his long-awaited address to the Federal Assembly, he merely listed measures already taken by the government. Today, Putin is just about the only person in Russia who is not increasingly engaged in politics, from former president Dmitry Medvedev, State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, and Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev to Prigozhin, the war bloggers, and television hosts. It is as though the president has recused himself, devoting himself to secret military and geopolitical matters, the details of which are known to few. This is not a sign of fear or weakness. Rather, it reflects Putin’s growing messiah complex. At present, literally all his political hopes and plans hinge on external changes that are out of his control. Putin has no instruments or resources with which to change the situation in his favor. Yet he believes that the world will change all the same and deliver him Kyiv’s capitulation.  Putin’s plan is to wait out what he sees as the inevitable transformation of the West and Ukraine. Any fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive has given way to the conviction that little will change on the battlefield, beyond minor setbacks that he is prepared to tolerate. The calculation in the Kremlin is that absent a military breakthrough, Ukraine’s elite will fracture, leading to the emergence of a “party of peace” (i.e., capitulation), while in the West, internal divisions will force cuts to military and political support for Kyiv. Putin’s hopes cannot be dismissed as completely baseless, but his problem is that this approach is anathema to Russia’s restless political class. For all its loyalty and pliability, it has evolved dramatically during the war. These days, Russia’s elites are liable to see defeatism in inaction. All of this creates the conditions for the political ambitions of parastatal actors to soar. Despite their reputation for being instruments of the Kremlin, they are gradually building political capital and may one day run out of patience with the regime and challenge it. Already, Putin is struggling to explain what exactly he is waiting for.    In the first months of the war, many took notice of how the once-marginal pro-war “ultra-patriots” had matured politically and come to dominate the information space. Today, the officious hawks, such as Medvedev, Volodin, and Patrushev, are losing their place in Russian politics to the angry patriots, including Prigozhin, former Donbas commander Igor Strelkov, and the war bloggers. Compared to each other, the former seem like opportunists and armchair generals, while the latter, having emerged in combat conditions, look much more like the real thing.  The regime is not under threat so long as Putin’s ratings remain stable, and besides, the mechanism of power is still completely under his control. Yet his public paralysis and refusal to assume responsibility for the resolution of the most pressing problems facing Russia cannot but render him and his courtiers politically irrelevant and create a vacuum to be filled by the ultra-patriots. The day may come when Putin finds himself dependent on a once harmless bunch made dangerous by his opacity and inaction.

Spain is suffering a prolonged drought, sparking water rationing in some parts of the country because of depleted reservoirs, causing the wildfire season to start months earlier than usual and destroying crops or farmers deciding not to plant them, which could push up food inflation (13% in April).  April was abnormally hot. The state meteorological agency Aemet said temperatures were between 7ºC and 11ºC above the average, making that month the hottest since records began in 1961. The temperature at one point in Andalusia reached an unprecedented 38.8ºC in Córdoba, underscoring Spain’s vulnerability to climate change. The temperature cooled down in May, but there was very little rain.  Spain’s dramatic situation came as the World Meteorological Organisation predicted that annual average temperatures will most probably break records again in the next five years.  So desperate are people for rain that parishioners in the Andalusian city of Jaén held a procession this month, bearing aloft a statute of Christ known as El Abuelo and calling for the first time since 1949 for the Lord to open the heavens and bring rain.  The Socialist-led coalition government announced an unprecedented €2.2 billion package of measures, including increasing the availability of water by building desalination plants and doubling the proportion of water reused in urban areas. Olive oil production –Spain accounts for 45% of the world’s supply– could be more than halved this year. The government also announced legislation that will ban outdoor workers when the meteorological office issues high temperature alerts. This followed the death of a Madrid street sweeper during last July’s heatwave.Drought is not a new phenomenon in Spain, but this one is something extraordinary. Spain has not had ‘normal’ levels of rain for three years. Just 12 litres per square metre of rain fell in the first three weeks of April, one-quarter of the normal amount. In early May, 27% of Spanish territory was in either the drought ‘emergency’ or ‘alert’ category, creating a tinderbox. Blazes ravaged 54,000 hectares of land in the first four months of the year, three times the amount in the same period of 2022, according to the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS).  Spain’s last severe drought was in 1993-96 when around one-quarter of the population was subject to water restrictions. Some towns in Andalusia had supplies cut off for more than 15 hours a day. In 2008 a prolonged drought forced the authorities to bring in water to Barcelona via boat to guarantee domestic use. Catalonia is again one of the most affected regions. Restrictions in many areas have been in force since March, including limiting showers to five minutes, banning the cleaning of cars and the watering of gardens. At the town of L’Espluga de Francolí (population 3,600), water supplies are turned off for nine hours during the night. The Sau reservoir, a key drinking water source, is so low that a medieval village, flooded when the reservoir was created in the 1960s, has emerged.  Rain is very unevenly distributed in Spain. The areas with the highest water abundance per surface unit are in the north and Galicia (known as the ‘wet’ Spain), much more sparsely populated than in the south, in particular, with values higher than 700 mm/year. A popular saying among Galician farmers –la lluvia es arte– (‘rain is art’) was once turned into a tourism slogan. In the rest of the country (the ‘dry’ Spain), water availability does not exceed 250 mm/year. The lowest water availability in Spain occurs in the Segura basin, where it does not reach 50 mm/year (around 20 times less than in Galicia and five times lower than the national average).  In the late 1970s the Spanish government turned Murcia, Alicante and Almería in the south-east –an area where water is minimal and none of the major rivers flow– into ‘Europe’s market garden’ by transferring water from the Tagus through the 300km Tajo-Segura Trasvase, a system of pipelines and an aqueduct. This feat of hydraulic engineering was originally planned during the Second Republic in 1931, built during the Franco dictatorship and put into service after the dictator’s death.  In a country with 17 regional governments of different political colours, as of the 1978 Constitution, water management is a sensitive issue that crosses boundaries and inflames sentiments. One of the major providers of water for the trasvase is the vast reservoir at Buendía in the region of Castilla-La Mancha, where I have long had a house. Farmers there feel aggrieved when they are restricted in using ‘their’ water because it is needed elsewhere. The trasvase has long been embroiled in disputes over how much water should or should not be transferred through it.  Farmers in the south-east benefiting from the trasvase, who produce around 70% of Spain’s vegetables and a quarter of fruit exports, are up in arms over the plans of the Socialist-led minority national government to raise the minimum level of the Tagus at source as this will result in less excess water being transferred. The level needs to be increased in order to remain in line with EU regulations on river water levels, following court rulings. Ecologists say the Tagus is at risk from overexploitation by agriculture and climate change. The plan aims to increase the river’s flow from 6 cubic metres per second to 8.6 cubic metres by 2027.  Without sufficient water, 100,000 jobs are at risk, according to the farming association SCRATS. The father of the novelist Antonio Muñoz Molina, who had a market garden in Úbeda, Andalusia, used to greet ecstatically the year’s first rain with the following words: Es lo mismo que si estuvieran cayendo billetes verdes (‘It’s as if it were raining green banknotes’, in reference to the 1,000 peseta notes at the time).  The politics of the trasvase are complicated: the Socialists control the region of Castilla-La Mancha and back the national government; Valencia, which Alicante forms part of, opposes the plan, despite being also governed by the Socialists, as does Andalusia, where Almería is located, and Murcia, both of them regions run by the conservative Popular Party (PP).  Farmland surrounding the Doñana national park, Europe’s most important wetland and a UNESCO World Heritage site, has been particularly prone to illegal wells. The authorities have long turned a blind eye. Virginijus Sinkevičius, the EU’s environmental chief, attacked a plan last month by the government of Andalusia to increase the amount of irrigable land around Doñana by 800 hectares. This would be tantamount to an amnesty for the strawberry farmers who have already sunk illegal wells there. He said the bloc would use ‘all the means available’ to make sure Spain complied with a 2021 European Court of Justice ruling condemning it for breaking EU rules on excessive water extraction in Doñana.  Farmers switched some years ago from olives to strawberries and other berries, which consume more water. Close to half of Spain’s aquifers are already in poor condition. Before 1985, groundwater was treated as private property and thus not subject to any regulations.  In another part of Andalusia, near the city of Malaga, the Civil Guard arrested 26 people in raids on illegal wells. The Guard’s environmental crimes division identified 250 infractions by fruit farmers. Spain is Europe’s biggest producer of tropical fruit.  Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called the drought ‘one of the central political and territorial debates of our country over the coming years’. Resolving the water problem will require a national political consensus, something that is woefully lacking in so many other areas.

Recep Tayyib Erdogan will remain president of Turkey for another five years after winning Sunday’s run-off election over his long-time rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. If he serves the full five-year term, he will have held power for 26 years – almost the entire history of Turkey in the 21st century. What is astonishing is how the majority of Turkish people elected Erdogan despite a worsening economy and now chronic hyperinflation that would likely bring down any government in a democratic country. So, how did Erdogan win the election and, more significantly, what is likely to happen in the country in the foreseeable future?Free but far from fairThe election was free in that political parties could put forth nominees on their own and carry out campaigns. Parties also had the right to have representatives in every polling station to ensure the votes were counted correctly. And voters were free to vote. However, the election was far from fair. First, a potential leading rival in the race, Ekrem Imamoglu, was sentenced in December to more than two years in prison on a charge of “insulting public figures”. Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul, dealt Erdogan’s party a rare defeat in the 2019 Istanbul elections. Polls had shown he could win against Erdogan in the presidential election by a comfortable margin. Some argue the court ruling was politically motivated. With Imamoglu out of the picture, the opposition had to coalesce behind Kilicdaroglu, the weakest of all possible high-profile candidates. Erdogan also has an almost ubiquitous grip over the Turkish media, engineered through Fahrettin Altun, the head of media and communication at the presidential palace. Turkish media are either directly owned by Erdogan’s relatives, such as the popular Sabah newspaper managed by Sedat Albayrak, or controlled through managing editors appointed and monitored by Altun. Some independent internet news sites such as T24 practice self-censorship in order to remain operational. With this massive media control, Erdogan and his men ensured he had the most television airtime. Erdogan was depicted in the media as a world leader advancing Turkey by building airports, roads and bridges. He was put in front of dozens of journalists on TV, but all the questions were prepared in advance and Erdogan read his answers through a prompter. Altun also orchestrated a massive smear campaign against Kilicdaroglu. The opposition leader received minimal airtime, and when he was in the media, he was depicted as an inept leader unfit to rule the country. Altun not only controlled the conventional TV channels and print media, but also social media. On Twitter, a very influential platform in Turkey, Altun used bots and an army of paid trolls and influencers to seek to control the dialogue. And it worked. Sufficient number of voters were swayed through confusion and fear that the country would be far worse if Kilicdaroglu was elected. Lastly, there was the potential for fraud due to the non-transparent way the election results are processed. Once each ballot box is counted, the ballot and result sheet are transported by police in cities and the military in regional areas to the electoral commission. Both the police and military are under Erdogan’s tight control. The results are then reported only through the state-owned Anadolu Agency, while in the past they were reported by multiple independent agencies. Even if no evidence of fraud emerges in this election, the spectre could put in doubt the integrity of the entire electoral process.Staunch support from religious votersThere are two other factors that were decisive in the elections. The first is the support Erdogan received from Sinan Ogan, who was third in the first round of the presidential election two weeks ago, with 5.2% of the votes. Erdogan persuaded Ogan to throw his support to him. The second and most important factor was the way Erdogan was viewed in an almost mythical fashion by conservative and religious voters. For them, Erdogan is a religious hero and saviour. The religious population in Turkey has long suffered persecution in the name of secularism. For them, Kilicdaroglu and his Republican People’s Party symbolised that persecution. Although Kilicdaroglu abandoned the party’s previous strict secular policies, these voters never forgave it for preventing Muslim women from wearing the head scarf in educational and state institutions and keeping religion out of public life and politics for decades. The conservative and religious right in Turkey sees Erdogan as a world leader and a hero who struggled against ill-intentioned forces, both internally and externally, to make Turkey great again.What is likely to happen in Turkey post-election?Turkey desperately needed a change of government and a breath of fresh air. Now the social, political and economic suffocation is likely to get worse. Erdogan had promised a Turkish revival by 2023, which is the 100th anniversary of the republic’s founding. Turkey was supposed to enter the top 10 economies in the world by then. However, Turkey barely sits in the top 20, at 19th. The economy has experienced a significant downturn in the past three years. The Turkish lira has plummeted in value, leading to a dollar-based economy. But dollars are hard to come by. The Turkish Central Bank kept the economy afloat by emptying its reserves in the last few months for the elections. The Central Bank has been running a current account deficit of US$8-10 billion dollars every month, and its reserves last week fell into the negative for the first time since 2002. Now Erdogan has to find money. He will resort to high interest foreign loans and embark on a diplomatic spree of the oil-rich Muslim countries to draw some of their funds to Turkey. The uncertainty around how successful these endeavours will be and their likely short-term gain may throw the Turkish economy into recession. For the people of Turkey, this could mean massive unemployment and a reduced standard of living. The inflation rate had reached a 24-year high of 85.5% last year, and may go even higher, as the cash-strapped government continues to print digital money to pay for its large bureaucratic workforce. On foreign policy, Erdogan will continue to try to become a regional power independent of NATO, the European Union and the US. He will likely continue to strengthen Turkey’s ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which has been a worry for Turkey’s Western allies.What does the future hold?This will be Erdogan’s absolute last term in office, according to the Turkish constitution, and it could possibly be cut short. The 69-year-old president has many health problems. He is becoming increasingly physically frail, finding it hard to walk, and his speech often slurs. In coming years, his health may get worse and he may have to hand over his presidency to a trusted deputy. The other possibility is that potential leaders in his party could decide to carry out a party coup to topple Erdogan before his term is up, so they can garner public support ahead of the 2028 presidential election. While there may be some political stability in post-election Turkey for now, the country will be in economic, social and political turmoil for the foreseeable future. Correction: This piece has been amended to say that if the Turkish economy slips into recession, it could mean massive unemployment and a reduced standard of living, instead of reduced cost of living.

Late night on May 12, the official spokesperson of the Pakistan military, Major General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, came on Geo TV to dispel rumours about resignations and dismissals of officers of the Pakistan Army. Since the events of May 9—the large scale violence that broke out after the arrest of Imran Khan, much of it targeted against the Pakistan Army and its installations and establishments—there have been reports that the Corps Commander of IV Corps along with some other senior officers were removed from their posts. On May 12, a former army major who has been running a relentless campaign against the current army leadership from the United Kingdom, revealed names of officers who had been sacked for disobeying orders. There were also rumours that a number of other Corps Commanders who were believed to be part of the Imran Khan cult were on the firing line and would soon be sacked. It was amidst such sensational ‘news’ spreading like wild fire over the last few days that the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) chief came out with a somewhat perfunctory clarification that is really not going to silence the jungle telegraph that has gone into an overdrive. Clearly, all is not well within the Pakistan Army. That the Pakistan Army is a divided house is not breaking news. Over the last one year, there are straws in the wind, whispers in corridors of power, insinuations and inferences that suggest that the divisions in the rank and file, and even in the top brass, are not just personality driven but also ideologically and politically. Imran Khan appears to have achieved what was supposed to be impossible and unacceptable—dividing the Pakistan Army. If General Asim Munir is now trying to stamp his authority over the Army and restore the command and control system of the only somewhat functional institution in an otherwise dysfunctional country, then this is an exercise fraught with risk. Drastic steps to enforce discipline and reassert the authority of the Army Chief at this stage could either precipitate the crisis in the Army or consolidate it behind the chief. In case of the former, the crisis of the state in Pakistan will become deeper. The institutional integrity and coherence of the Pakistan Army will be irretrievably damaged. If a cabal of generals succeed in defying the Army Chief, then it will be a template that will be followed by others as well. Forget about coups against civilian governments, the new normal will be coups against the Army Chiefs. In the worst case scenario, Islamabad might even witness Khartoum like scenes. But even if General Munir manages to hold on, the discontent in the rank and file will be palpable and could hobble him and his command. In the past also, the much vaunted discipline and unity of Pakistan Army has come under tremendous strain with ambitious generals trying to grab power and middle ranking and junior officers questioning their superiors. After the 1971 debacle, the junior officers literally abused the top brass openly which forced them to not stay in office. In the 1970s, some young officers planned a coup against the army leadership. In the mid-1990s, a group of officers led by Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi plotted to wipe out the entire top rung of the military and grab power. In the early 2000s, there were arrests made of disgruntled officers who were linked with the Hizbut Tehrir. Among other officers, a brigadier was arrested. At that time, the then Director General of ISPR, Major General Athar Abbas, had said the Army cannot allow officers to become members of another group or cult, which is precisely what is happening today where officers appear more loyal to the Imran cult than to their own institution. There was also a conspiracy hatched by a cabal of generals, including the Inter-Services Intelligence chief and a couple of Corps Commanders, against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and General Raheel Sharif when they used Imran Khan’s 2014 ‘dharna’ to create conditions in which the PM would sack Raheel Sharif, and the Army would move in doing a double regime change—in the government and in the army. Although all these plots failed, they suggest a persistent problem in the Pakistan Army, of officers tempted to usurp power. Something similar is underway now. Only this time, things appear to be far more fraught than ever in the past.

The Move Forward Party (MFP) has achieved a stunning victory in the May 2023 general elections. Preliminary results released by the Election Commission of Thailand indicate that the MFP won 113 constituency seats and garnered 14 million party-list votes, resulting in 39 additional party-list seats. This remarkable outcome — 152 seats in total — makes the MFP the party with the largest number of seats in the House, providing it with the popular mandate to lead the formation of the next governing coalition. The MFP’s triumph marks a turning point in Thai politics, ending the longstanding winning streak of Thaksin-aligned parties since 2001 and signalling a clear rejection of Thailand’s conservative status quo. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which suggests that the MFP’s support base is confined to urban areas where university students are registered to vote, the MFP’s electoral success extends far and wide. In Bangkok, the party won 32 of 33 House seats; only one went to a candidate from Pheu Thai, which is aligned to Thaksin Shinawatra, the former premier in exile. Furthermore, the MFP managed to unseat entrenched political dynasties like the Asavahames in Samut Prakan and the Khunpluems in Chon Buri, who were considered invincible due to their deep-rooted patronage networks and local influence. The party even gained seats in traditional strongholds of the Pheu Thai party, such as seven out of 10 seats in Chiang Mai in the North, and one out of 10 seats in Udon Thani in the Northeast. The MFP’s strong performance, both nationally and provincially, is even more impressive given the changes in the political and institutional landscape. In the previous 2019 election, the Future Forward Party (FFP), the precursor to the MFP, won 31 constituency seats, a significant accomplishment for a newly formed party. However, this success was often attributed to fortuitous circumstances, as the FFP faced no direct competition from Pheu Thai in 100 constituencies. There, Pheu Thai opted not to field candidates to avoid contesting its sister party, the Thai Raksa Chart Party. The latter was dissolved by a court ruling for nominating as its prime ministerial candidate Princess Ubolratana, the elder sister of King. Similarly, the FFP won 50 party-list seats after receiving 6.33 million votes. This was attributed to the single-ballot Mixed Member Apportionment electoral system, which made it easier for smaller parties to secure party-list seats and reduced the zero-sum nature of constituency elections. Given Pheu Thai’s extensive campaigning in this election and the assumption that changes to the electoral system would hinder the MFP’s ability to convert support into House seats, significant losses for the MFP were expected. However, the party emerged even stronger than before. How is this so? A combination of factors contributed to the MFP’s “tsunami” surge. Some credit must be given to the party’s effective use of social media platforms. This allowed it to showcase its solid performance as an opposition party and engage with a broad coalition of supporters, bypassing traditional campaign methods that rely on vote-canvassing networks. The MFP appealed to these supporters, many of whom are younger generations of voters who previously had limited interest in politics or attachment to political parties, using ideology rather than patronage. The MFP’s success can also be attributed to its ability to capitalise on the momentum of pro-democracy movements since 2020. As a party that acts as an intermediary between social movements and parliamentary politics, the MFP carried out several activities, including bailing out detained activists, integrating them into its ranks, and pledging to translate their demands into tangible policies and legislative action. The MFP’s platform is also noteworthy for the clarity of its message, particularly its firm stance on amending Article 112 (the lese majeste law) and refusal to form a coalition government with generals involved in the May 2014 coup. This set it apart from rival parties such as Pheu Thai, which has been equivocal from the outset. In contrast to Pheu Thai, whose de facto leader Thaksin Shinawatra has signalled a willingness to compromise with actors associated with the Prayut regime, the MFP represents a strong and unequivocal repudiation of that regime. This could have caused fence-sitting supporters of both parties to vote in favour of the MFP. Finally, it is important to highlight the charismatic appeal of Pita Limjaroenrat, the leader and prime ministerial candidate of the MFP. Pita has proven extremely popular with large swathes of the electorate, even among older individuals and those who are not progressive-leaning. During the final stretch of the campaign, Pita performed well in public debates and captured the limelight in all media appearances. This overshadowed all other candidates, including Pheu Thai’s Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who receded from the spotlight due to childbirth on May Day. Ultimately, however, the MFP’s dramatic rise is perhaps best explained by the historical moment in which these factors converged. For nearly two decades, Thai politics has been trapped in a vicious cycle of power struggles between forces allied with the Shinawatras and those backed by the military and conservative establishment. As a consequence, Thai people, especially younger generations who bear the burden of crises stemming from political divisions not of their making, have grown disillusioned. They are weary of military strongmen whose ambitions for power undermine democratic institutions, traditional political and bureaucratic elites who preach good governance but do not practice it, and democratically elected governments that seem more accountable to oligarchic interests than the will of the people. Above all, they are frustrated by a dysfunctional political system that responds to their calls for greater freedom with deafening silence or even violence. Therefore, the MFP’s rise cannot solely be attributed to its campaign strategy, positioning, policy substance, or leadership. It also reflects the pent-up grievances and aspirations for a better future projected onto the party by millions of Thais. While the MFP’s triumph symbolises a resounding call for change and a new beginning, there are huge challenges ahead. The appointed Senate and the looming intervention from stakeholders of Thailand’s conservative status quo pose significant obstacles to structural reform. Whether the MFP can bring lasting change remains to be seen.

Located in southeastern Ukraine, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station (ZNPP) is Europe’s largest power plant that produced 23% of all Ukrainian electricity before Russia's invasion.  This critical energy source is amidst the chaos and destruction of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, a harrowing struggle that has wrought immeasurable suffering and upheaval upon the region. Following its capture by the Russian forces on March 4th 2022, there have been drastic disruptions to safe energy production and a heightened global concern for nuclear safety in the region. Introduction and backgroundZaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), located in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar, was built by Soviet design in the 1980s, with its last reactor being connected to the grid in 1995.  Amongst the ten largest nuclear facilities in the world, the Zaporizhzhia power plant consists of six water-cooling and water-moderating pressurized reactors. A global nuclear scare started on February 24, 2022, when Ukraine informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that “unidentified armed forces” have taken control of all facilities of Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant located in the Exclusion zone. The IAEA appealed for maximum restraint to avoid any action that may put the country’s nuclear facilities at risk and stressed the IAEA’s 2009 General Conference decision that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”. Later that week, on March 2nd, Russia stated that its military forces have taken control of the territory around Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. The next day, a large number of Russian tanks and infantry broke through the block-post into the town of Enerhodar, just a few kilometers from the ZNPP. Director General Grossi, appealed for “an immediate halt to the use of force at Enerhodar and called on the military forces operating there to refrain from violence near the nuclear power plant.” By March 4th, Ukraine informed the IAEA that the ZNPP had been shelled overnight, and a fire broke out on site. Although no essential equipment was affected, the first military action      resulted in the activation of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre in full response. At the end of the day, Ukraine announced that Russian forces had taken control of the ZNPP, but the power plant continued to be operated by its regular staff.  At the time, out of the plant’s six reactor units, two had undergone controlled shut down, two were being held in low power mode, one was shut down for maintenance and one was operating at 60 percent power. ZNPP’s dire situation since March 4, 2022Before the conflict, the ZNPP had access to the grid through four high-voltage power lines, but they have now all fallen victim to the fighting. The back-up power lines connecting the ZNPP to a nearby thermal power station are also down. The plant had also previously temporarily lost direct access to the electricity grid but could then still receive power through available back-up lines, or from one of its reactors that was still operating at the time. The Russian conquest was soon followed by disruptions in the electricity supply to the nuclear power plant, one of the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety. Less than two weeks after Russian forces seized the plant, Zaporizhzhia lost one of its three power lines. Since then, mainly as a result of shelling or other military action nearby, the nuclear plant has suffered numerous power cuts, mainly as a result of shelling. Although it has emergency diesel generators that are available to provide backup power, a secure off-site power supply from the grid is integral to ensuring nuclear safety.  Thus, following its first complete external power outage in August, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi set off from the Agency’s headquarters on an IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) to undertake vital safeguards activities at the plant.  That October, Zaporizhzhia lost its last remaining external power source due to renewed shelling, and had to rely on diesel generators again to cool the reactor and support other nuclear safety and security functions. In the next week, Zaporizhzhia lost all external power two more times, receiving electricity from a backup system for the third time in a span of ten days. Similar incidents unfolded in November as well, as the IAEA Director General continued to urge for the critical need to demilitarize the zone.  Based on historical data and industry experience, the nuclear industry aims for an average unplanned outage rate of less than 0.1 per reactor per year which statistically would mean less than one unplanned outage every 10 years. Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant experienced six in the past year alone. Cold shutdown of the ZNPP reactors doesn’t remove the risk – Spent fuel pools need constant coolingThe fission reaction that generates heat in a nuclear power plant is produced by positioning a number of uranium fuel rods in close proximity. Shutting down a nuclear reactor involves inserting control rods between the fuel rods to stop the fission reaction.The reactor is then in cooldown mode as the temperature decreases. According to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, once the temperature is below 200 degrees Fahrenheit (93 Celsius) and the reactor coolant system is at atmospheric pressure, the reactor is in cold shutdown. When the reactor is operating, it requires cooling to absorb the heat and keep the fuel rods from melting together, which would set off a catastrophic chain reaction. When a reactor is in cold shutdown, it no longer needs the same level of circulation. It was announced on September 11, 2022 by Energoatom, operator of the ZNPP that it was shutting down the last operating reactor of the plant’s six reactors, reactor No. 6. The operators have put the reactor in cold shutdown and this shutdown has mitigated a risk. Spent fuel pools also need constant circulation of water to keep them cool. And they need cooling for several years before being put in dry casks. One of the problems in the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan was the emergency generators, which replaced lost off-site power, got inundated with water and failed. In situations like that you get “station blackout” – and that is one of the worst things that could happen. It means no electricity to run the cooling system. In that circumstance, the spent fuel overheats and its zirconium cladding can cause hydrogen bubbles. If you can’t vent these bubbles they will explode, spreading radiation. If there is a loss of outside power, operators will have to rely on emergency generators. But emergency generators are huge machines – finicky, unreliable gas guzzlers. And you still need cooling waters for the generators themselves. The biggest worry is that Ukraine suffers from a sustained power grid failure. The likelihood of this increases during a conflict, because pylons may come down under shelling or gas power plants might get damaged and cease to operate.  According to one of the IAEA’s latest updates (#154, April 21, 2023):  “As a result of the warmer weather, the operator has started to put reactor Unit 6 in cold shutdown which is expected to be reached by the weekend, leaving only Unit 5 in hot shutdown to produce hot water and steam for the site. The two reactors were in hot shutdown during the winter to provide steam and heating to the ZNPP as well as heating to the nearby city of Enerhodar, where many plant personnel live.” The cooling pumps for the spent fuel pools need much less electricity than the cooling pumps on the reactor’s primary and secondary loops, and the spent fuel cooling system could tolerate a brief electricity outage. Now, at least if the plant loses offsite power, the operators won’t have to worry about cooling an operating reactor with cranky diesel generators. However, the plant still needs a reliable source of electricity to cool the six huge spent fuel pools that are inside the containment structures and to remove residual heat from the shutdown reactors. The serious risk of military actions for spent fuel storage racksOne more important factor is that the spent fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pools at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant were compacted to increase capacity, according to a 2017 Ukrainian government report to the IAEA. The greater number and more compacted the stored spent fuel rods, the more heat they generate and so more power is needed to cool them. There is also a dry spent fuel storage facility at the plant. Dry spent fuel storage involves packing spent fuel rods into massive cylinders, or casks, which require no water or other coolants. The casks are designed to keep the fuel rods contained for at least 50 years. However, the casks are not under the containment structures at the plant, and, though they were designed to withstand being crashed into by an airliner, it’s not clear whether artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, particularly repeated attacks, could crack open the casks and release radiation into the grounds of the plant. The closest analogy to this scenario could be a terrorist attack that, according to a seminal study by the National Research Council, could breach a dry cask and potentially result in the release of radioactive material from the spent fuel. This could happen through the dispersion of fuel particles or fragments or the dispersion of radioactive aerosols.  This would be similar to the detonation of a “dirty bomb,” which, depending on wind direction and dispersion radius, could result in radioactive contamination. This in turn could cause serious problems for access to and work in the plant. According to the IAEA’s latest update at the time of writing this analysis (#155, April 28, 2023): “IAEA experts present at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) were again forced to shelter this week after missile attack warnings, with the sound of continued shelling in the distance as military activity continues in the region. In addition, one landmine exploded near the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today…The increased military presence and activity in the region again underlines the importance and urgency of agreeing on the protection of the plant, Director General Grossi added.”What is going on and what can be doneWe need to begin to realize and emphasize that the need for compromise extends beyond Russia alone. There has been a certain reticence around the acknowledgement that Ukraine, despite being the “aggrieved” country, must also be willing to make concessions.  To designate Russia as the sole provoker of hostilities at the Zaporizhzhia plant is an objective falsity. It would be illogical for Russia to shell the plant once it has already seized control, unless there were provocations from the Ukrainian side. Interestingly, in spite of countless calls to pacify the region from Ukrainian and international diplomatic leaders, The Times of London on April 7, 2023 published a report detailing a failed Ukrainian attack on the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) that took place in October 2022. Ukrainian special forces launched an attack on the ZNPP, deploying US-provided HIMARS rockets at the site — an attempt that ultimately failed because of a stronger Russian counteroffensive. Any sort of projectiles nearing the site of a nuclear power plant is an inherently hazardous and potentially catastrophic assault, regardless of the origin of the launch.   Given the high stakes involved and the potential for irreparable harm, it is imperative for even Ukrainian forces to exercise restraint and refrain from any military action that could escalate the conflict, including airstrikes on Zaporizhzhia, even if it is under Russian control. Taking into account the tumultuous events that have transpired at Zaporizhzhia this past year, for the sake of preventing a global nuclear disaster, it is pertinent to prioritize nuclear safety. Counterintuitive as it may seem, it may be more prudent for Ukraine to strategically withdraw from the ZNPP site and attempt to repatriate it later in the war, when more comprehensive diplomatic negotiations can happen and Russia potentially depletes its resources.  War, in our opinion, is the worst enemy of nuclear safety. This is an unprecedented and volatile situation. Only through active, pragmatic engineering and nuclear diplomacy can an amenable and lasting solution to this vexing problem be found. In the foreword of President John F. Kennedy’s book, Profiles of Courage, his brother, Robert Kennedy said, President Kennedy was fond of quoting Dante that “the hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who, in a time of great moral crisis, maintain their neutrality” (December 18, 1963).  The potential catastrophic consequences of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant conflict demand action and a willingness to take a stance.  For Ukraine, taking a stance can mean stepping back and protecting the world from a nuclear calamity. The failure to do so risks being condemned to the “hottest places in Hell,” not in a figurative sense, but in a literal one. As the memory of the Chornobyl Disaster of 1986 still lingers, the potential danger posed by Zaporizhzhia's six reactors far surpasses that of the single reactor that caused the Chornobyl disaster. In the unfortunate event of an explosion, the repercussions would be hexfold that of Chernobyl's catastrophic aftermath, marking a somber moment in the history of nuclear power. Despite the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the  Russia-Ukraine conflict, the end of this protracted war is imminent. Even if we are facing problems that, as Robert Kennedy put it, people “fifty, even ten years ago, would not have dreamed would have to be faced,” it is of utmost importance to prioritize humanity above political objectives.  Following Dr. Henry Kissinger’s advice, Ukraine may like to exercise diplomacy, which “is the art of restraining power”, rather than brute force to repatriate its own Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, considering the high risks associated with military action on site. Ukrainians should not shame their military officers if they retreat from Zaporizhzhia, but rather, commend them for their strategic investment into the future prosperity of their country, their continent and possibly, their planet. A true measure of a hero lies not in their victories, but in their willingness to fight for what is right, even in the face of overwhelming odds. Right now, possibly accepting status quo at Zaporizhzhia is, at least in our opinion, what is the most right, but most certainly what is imperative. With Russia’s adamant military politics, Ukraine would be bravely resisting aggression on behalf of the world, on behalf of a future.  We realize that the IAEA has called on Russia and Ukraine to set up a “safety and security protection zone” around the plant. However, the IAEA is a science and engineering inspectorate and technical assistance agency. Negotiating and establishing a protection zone at a nuclear power plant in a war zone is entirely unprecedented and totally different from all past IAEA efforts. Establishing a protection zone requires negotiations and approvals at the highest political and military levels in Kyiv and Moscow.  It could be accomplished through backchannel, Track II-type diplomacy, specifically nuclear safety-focused engineering diplomacy. In the meantime, the IAEA needs strong support from the United Nations Security Council in the form of a resolution, mandate or the creation of a special commission. Admittedly, this is only a stopgap measure. In parallel with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s effort under the leadership of its Director, General Rafael Mariano Grossi, we believe that the U.N. Security Council should immediately empower a special commission to mediate between the warring parties. It could be modeled after the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in 2000, and appoint a prominent, senior international statesman as its head. We believe the person should be of the caliber and in the mold of the legendary former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden. Blix led the agency at the time of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and commands respect in today’s Russia and Ukraine. The great Prussian military theorist Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz once said: “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.”  These words still resonate today, reminding us that the quest for peace is not just about putting an end to violence, but about forging a path towards progress and prosperity. It is incumbent upon us to recognize that bringing an end to this conflict is not merely a cessation of violence, but a catalyst for the advancement of policy. As we strive towards resolving conflicts and achieving a lasting peace, it is our duty to recognize that this effort is not merely a tactical move, but a transformative one. By embracing a policy-driven approach, we can internalize the true nature of conflict, and use it as a means to move forward and effect real change. So let us be bold, but at the same time be pragmatic, and let us remember the words of Clausewitz as we work towards a brighter future for all. Let us see war not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end – a means to build a world where conflict is a thing of the past, and policy is the key to progress. President John F. Kennedy’s bold vision for political courage and making compromises in his aforementioned book, Profiles of Courage, also beautifully applies to this very context of Ukraine preserving its principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity while tactfully compromising with Russia over safeguarding Zaporizhzhia: “We shall need compromises in the days ahead, to be sure. But these will be, or should be, compromises of issues, not of principles. We can compromise our political positions, but not ourselves. We can resolve the clash of interests without conceding our ideas... Compromise does not mean cowardice. Indeed it is frequently the compromisers and conciliators who are faced with the severest tests of political courage as they oppose the extremist views of their constituents.”

Chinese leader Xi Jinping was unanimously “reelected” for another five-year term at the Two Sessions, and the Chinese government approved significant changes in the party-state structure to counter the US-led West’s dominance and promote economic and technological self-sufficiency. At the same time, China is engaging in diplomatic activism in the Middle East and elsewhere, forcing Israel to reconsider regional dynamics and prepare for a protracted state of “struggle” between the two superpowers.  In March 2023, Chinese leader Xi Jinping marked several highly successful events. Internally, he was “reelected” for a third term as President, and externally, he brokered a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran – without any American involvement. These two developments coincided with the Two Sessions, China’s annual parliament meeting, where Xi passed far-reaching reforms aimed at increasing China’s economic and technological self-reliance in the face of Western adversaries. Judging by his remarks, it appears that under Xi China will continue its proactive foreign policy directed against the US-led global order. This in turn will test Israel’s ability to continue to maintain a balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis the two superpowers. Israel must now account for China’s growing influence in diplomatic and security theaters in the Middle East, as well as Beijing’s closer relations with Iran and Russia. To ensure its own security and economic interests, it must reconsider the regional dynamic while engaging in dialogue with the relevant actors. Finally, the escalation of tensions between the superpowers forces Jerusalem to prepare for extreme scenarios, most notably war in the Taiwan Strait. After a decade as president, Xi Jinping was unanimously reelected by the Chinese parliament for another five-year term. The vote – in which Xi was the sole candidate – was held as part of the annual Two Sessions, the Chinese legislature’s most important political gathering. The main event usually takes place over a seven-day period in March, when approximately 3,000 delegates from the National People’s Congress (NPC) – the legislative body – and some 2,000 delegates from the top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), convene in Beijing. In the course of the gathering, the Premier delivers a work report, while the delegates pass legislation, make amendments to the country’s constitution, and approve appointments in various state bodies. This year’s events were especially significant because they occurred immediately following the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in October 2022. At that gathering, which takes place every five years, Xi was also appointed to a third term as general secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Since the 1980s, every five years, the CCP has introduced widespread reforms in the structure of the party-state. Previous reforms included changes to the balance of power between the Party and the state in ways that conformed to the incoming leadership's priorities and vision, as well as domestic and foreign developments. This year, the NPC approved significant changes in the party-state structure, continuing the trend in which the CCP under Xi has been "swallowing up" the government, with the lines between the two becoming increasingly blurred. These changes reflect Xi's belief that only a strong and centralized party can deal with domestic and foreign challenges, particularly the United States, China's main strategic rival. Indeed, during a heavily-publicized meeting at the start of the Two Sessions between Xi and representatives of the Chinese business sector, the Chinese leader stunned the audience by launching a direct attack against Washington, which he blamed for "the unprecedented severe challenges" that China is facing, and for trying to "contain, blockade, and suppress" China. What made his remarks particularly noteworthy was that despite rising tensions between the superpowers in recent years, Xi avoided explicitly naming and shaming the United States, instead allowing Chinese diplomats to spar with Western hawks. As a matter of fact, an examination of Xi’s writings reveals that even early in his political life, he saw the West, and the United States in particular, through a Cold War prism. However, it was the trade war waged by the Trump administration, which later escalated into a comprehensive technological and geopolitical war, that reinforced for him the need for economic and technological independence. The Biden administration went even further in its efforts to prevent China from gaining access to critical technology, and unlike its predecessor, has been successful in securing allies’ support. The Chinese countermeasures can be found in its most recent reforms, which included increasing the powers of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) through the establishment of a new decision making body, the Central Science and Technology Commission, which is likely to be headed by Xi himself. Some of the ministry's specialized functions were transferred to relevant government ministries as part of the restructuring. The changes will allow the ministry to focus on macro-management of competition in innovation and to foster local development of basic research, core technologies, and a solution to the problem of the "bottleneck" imposed by the West, such as restrictions on China's import of microchips and airplane engines. In addition, a new institution, the National Data Bureau, will be tasked with managing digital resources, under the auspices of the Chinese government’s top macroeconomic management agency, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). This year's reforms likewise highlighted China's financial sector, with the establishment of the new National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA) and expanded powers for the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It was also decided to cut 5 percent of the central government and party workforce. Beyond the economic rivalry with the United States, the ramifications of the war in Ukraine, and COVID-19 restrictions, Beijing faces a host of internal challenges: a skyrocketing debt-to-GDP ratio (at the end of 2022, it stood at 273 percent), a declining population, a real estate bubble, natural resource pollution, a slowdown in imports and exports, high savings levels among households, and income inequality. If the rivalry with the United States intensifies – for example, if China were to invade Taiwan – Beijing would have to anticipate the imposition of additional sanctions, similar to those that Russia has been struggling with for the past year. Yet until such time as the situation vis-à-vis the United States reaches a critical stage, if at all, and against the backdrop of increasing concern in the international business community about the direction China is heading under Xi, Beijing is attempting to project to the world “business as usual.” At the conclusion of the Two Sessions, the incoming prime minister, Li Qiang, appeared to be smiling as he told foreign reporters that the United States and China must cooperate, because “there are no winners in a conflict.” He also promised that he would ensure a competitive, market-oriented, and fair environment that would protect the rights of Chinese and foreign businesses. However, here too the Party’s “invisible hand” was evident when he added that “the role of the new government is to execute and implement the important decisions and plans laid out by the CPC Central Committee.” The new appointments of other senior positions reflected the same ambivalence that Li expressed in his remarks. On the one hand, the Congress decided to extend the terms of 24 of the 26 ministers and national commissions, among them the head of the China’s central bank, Yi Gang, and Finance Minister Liu Kun, even though they had reached retirement age. One of the two new appointees, on the other hand, is Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, who has been sanctioned by the US since 2018 for purchasing Russian weapons. Unlike his predecessors, who had battle experience, Li is an aerospace engineer in training. He was the former director of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) space and cyber programs, as well as the deputy commander of the PLA's Strategic Support Force, which was in charge of China's space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities. Aside from the obvious defiance toward the US, his appointment demonstrates the importance that China places on modernizing China's military technology, given the ever-increasing restrictions imposed on technological imports to China. Self-sufficiency should not be confused with isolationism. The agreement brokered by Beijing between Saudi Arabia and Iran on March 10 – while  the Two Sessions were in session – was the clearest indication that China intends to maintain its active foreign policy. Granted, China pushed through an open door, given the conflicting parties’ inherent need for an agreement to focus on their economies, and only time will tell whether the agreement will hold; nonetheless, this was the first time that Beijing has led any kind of mediation effort, let alone successfully, and the United States was not even in the room. In doing so, China has demonstrated that it can use its dominant economic and commercial position to advance diplomatic and security objectives, ostensibly as an "alternative" to the United States. China’s global ambitions are not limited to the Middle East. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as stated in the government's work report, will celebrate its tenth anniversary in October. What began as a central-southeast Asian initiative has evolved into a global network of "silk roads" emanating from China and extending into space, with hundreds of massive infrastructure projects worth over $1 trillion in 146 countries. The BRI has had to deal with a number of implementation and funding challenges over the years, so it has been scaled back. At the same time, Chinese officials emphasize that it will remain a focal point of Beijing's foreign policy, with the emphasis shifting to smaller but more strategic projects such as bolstering global supply chains and cooperating in the digital domain, as well as healthcare, public policy, renewable energy, and people-to-people and diplomatic ties. Xi has unveiled other ambitious projects in recent years, most notably the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which is tasked with promoting the United Nations' goals for sustainable development, and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). At the conclusion of the Two Sessions, Xi announced the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), the details of which remain unknown. As with the BRI, any success story that can be classified as development or security will be attributed to them, even if it occurred years before these initiatives. This is what happened with the Saudi-Iranian agreement or the Chinese peace initiative to end the Ukrainian war, both of which Beijing hailed as shining examples of the GSI in action. In practice, these initiatives reflect Beijing's desire to reshape the global order to reflect its interests and values, while undermining the United States-led West's dominance in its spheres of influence. For example, Xi described the GCI as "a new form of human civilization" that "shatters the myth that modernization is equal to Westernization. The bottom line is that the Two Sessions and the extension of Xi’s term of office indicate that China will continue to push itself to the forefront of the international stage. The next five years will be defined by a stronger push for self-sufficiency, financial stability, and technological advancement. At the same time, China will not close itself off to the rest of the world. On the contrary, China will not back down from "a struggle" against what Xi refers to as the West's and the United States' "attempts to blackmail, contain, and blockade" it. This spirit was evident during the first press conference given by China's new foreign minister, Qin Gang, who warned that "if the United States does not hit the brakes, but continues to speed down the wrong path...there will surely be conflict and confrontation." While Western doors are closing in on China, Beijing will continue to see Israel as a backdoor for securing core technologies that will help it achieve self-reliance, rendering Israel obsolete in the long run. This is evident in the recent influx of Chinese commercial delegations to Israel, following Beijing's lifting of travel restrictions. Simultaneously, the US-Israel Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology, launched during President Joe Biden's July visit to Jerusalem, will examine Israeli-Chinese cooperation, particularly in the less regulated hi-tech sector and academia. The agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as Xi's recent visit to Russia, during which the parties agreed to "increase contacts over security issues in the Persian Gulf," indicates that China's diplomatic activism in the Middle East will only grow. The evolving situation in which China and the US both play key roles in regional geopolitics – against the backdrop of increased competition between the two countries and the war in Ukraine – forces Israel to reconsider regional dynamics. In order to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear power in peaceful means, Jerusalem must deepen its dialogue with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and its Arab partners in the Negev Forum on regional security and economic interests. Finally, if a conflict between China and the United States is truly "inevitable," Israel must prepare for the worst-case scenario, in which two superpowers go to war in the Taiwan Strait, and consider the implications for its relations with Beijing.