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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The South China Sea (SCS) is a strategic region in international geopolitics and a hotspot of disputes involving sovereignty, economy, and security. This text analyzes the positions of two key actors in the region — China and the Philippines — whose growing tensions have been a defining factor in the evolution of the conflict. Located in Southeast Asia, the SCS borders China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, and connects the Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest maritime routes. Its wealth in fishery and energy resources has intensified disputes over the Pratas, Macclesfield, Paracel, and Spratly Archipelagos, which are claimed entirely or partially by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In this context, the SCS holds significant geopolitical importance. From the classical perspective of Alfred T. Mahan, maritime control is essential for a country to consolidate itself as a power, as it enables access to strategic resources, trade routes, and the projection of military power. Today, this remains a key factor of political, economic, and military influence in the macro-region that authors such as Ulises Granados (2022) refer to as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, the SCS conflict is a dispute rooted in the construction of geographic and political meanings. According to Gerard Toal, space is not fixed but rather a construction shaped by power relations and discourses. One example is its naming: China calls it the South Sea, the Philippines refer to it as the West Philippine Sea, and Vietnam calls it the East Sea. Each name not only reflects a territorial claim but also a geopolitical imaginary. Interests in the SCS date back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Japan exerted control over some areas through the state and its corporations. However, after World War II, sovereignty over these territories remained undefined, leading to competing claims from neighboring countries. During the Cold War, the United States strengthened its alliance with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations to contain communism, while China consolidated its presence in areas like the Paracel Islands. This context has been key in shaping the current competition over the sea. The Chinese government claims sovereignty in the SCS based on historical precedents going back to the Han dynasty. Beijing argues it recovered the Spratly and Paracel Islands after World War II, invoking the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945), which called for the return of territories occupied by Japan. In 1958, China issued the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, incorporating the Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel (Xisha), Macclesfield (Zhongsha), and Spratly (Nansha) Islands into its sovereign territory. Later, in 2009, it reaffirmed its claim through the Nine-Dash Line (NDL), a delimitation drawn in 1947 that encompasses nearly 80% of the SCS. Although this line is not clearly defined in international law, Beijing maintains that it holds sovereign rights within it and that disputes should be resolved without intervention from extra-regional actors — a stance that contrasts with the Philippines’ actions, which have sought international support to strengthen their position. From China’s perspective, its claims in the SCS are essential to its sovereignty and national security. For this reason, it has increased its naval, paramilitary, and civilian presence. Maritime projection and control of trade routes are also key aspects of its strategy to advance initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which is fundamental to its regional and international economic growth. In contrast, the Philippines has claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands since the 1970s and has resorted to legal and media avenues to denounce China. In 1995, it protested China’s construction of structures on Mischief Reef, and in 1997, it stationed the Sierra Madre ship in the Spratlys. Today, the Philippine Navy maintains operations in the area. Moreover, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, tensions escalated in 2009 when China reaffirmed the Nine-Dash Line. In response, in 2013, the Philippines brought the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), arguing that China was violating the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and asserting its rights over exclusive economic zones. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China's claims lacked legal basis under international law. However, China rejected the ruling, stating that it does not reflect its interpretation of territorial sovereignty based on its history and legal frameworks. Moreover, Beijing considered the Philippine complaint a unilateral action. In 2024, the Philippines enacted the “Maritime Zones Law” and the “Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act,” which define its maritime rights in the South China Sea. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected both laws, arguing they violate its sovereignty. From the Philippine perspective, China’s actions represent a challenge to its security, prompting it to seek support from ASEAN for a joint response in the SCS. However, the bloc’s positions are divided: the Philippines actively denounces China, Vietnam takes a more pragmatic approach, and Malaysia avoids confrontation. These differences have led ASEAN to adopt a moderate stance, prioritizing diplomacy over conflict. In summary, the Philippines is strengthening its alliance with the United States under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which ensures assistance in the event of an attack in the Pacific, including the SCS. This cooperation aligns with the U.S. geopolitical strategy in Asia, which has evolved from Obama’s “Asia Pivot” to the “Indo-Pacific” vision, focused on a “rules-based order” and the security of trade routes. However, the exclusion of China has led to perceptions that this strategy is a containment mechanism against the world’s second-largest economy. For example, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argues that the U.S. strategy aims to “besiege and contain China” through alliances that promote confrontation. He also claims it undermines regional cooperation, while the Asian giant promotes a “community with a shared future in the Asia-Pacific” based on integration and stability. Thus, China employs the concept of the Asia-Pacific and, although it remains cautious in its rhetoric, insists that its approach prioritizes cooperation and avoids a bloc-based logic in the region. In this context, during Balikatan, a joint military exercise between the U.S. and the Philippines in April 2024, Washington deployed Typhon missile systems in the northern part of the country. By the end of the year, Manila expressed interest in acquiring them, which Beijing perceived as a threat. In 2025, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stated he would reconsider the U.S. military presence if China ceased its territorial claims. China has not officially responded, and these remarks could be part of Philippine political rhetoric, reflecting its perception of threat in the region. Additionally, the Philippines has strengthened security cooperation with Japan, which also faces territorial disputes with China. In 2024, they signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement to facilitate military deployments, and Japan supported the modernization of the Philippine Navy. In 2025, both nations reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. While Manila strengthens its position through strategic alliances, Beijing views this as an attempt to internationalize the conflict. Another point is that the Philippines’ approach varies depending on the administration in power. During Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016–2022), Manila prioritized closer ties with Beijing, favoring economic cooperation. In contrast, the arrival of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in 2022 strengthened the alliance with the United States, increasing defense and security cooperation, but also escalating tensions with China. On the other hand, while the U.S. has expanded its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, Trump’s first term (2017–2021) had a more isolationist approach compared to the Obama (2009–2017) and Biden (2021–2025) administrations. The Philippine government hopes to maintain the agreements reached in 2024, although their continuity will depend on how the new Trump administration (2025–) manages its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, the Philippines cannot fully align with just one actor, as both China and the U.S. are essential to its economy. The United States is its main export market, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority, while China is its largest source of imported goods, top investor, infrastructure partner, and shares agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Therefore, while Manila strengthens its defense cooperation with the U.S. and maintains strategic interests in the South China Sea, its relationship with China remains crucial due to its economic importance. Final Considerations From a geopolitical perspective, cooperation between the Philippines and the United States seeks to counterbalance China's presence in the region, while China reinforces its position in the SCS for sovereignty and security reasons. In this context, the relationship between Manila and Washington, along with the stance of ASEAN members, will be decisive in the evolution of the conflict. Thus, the dispute in the South China Sea reflects a geopolitical competition between regional and extra-regional actors for control of strategic areas, where each defends its own interests. Although none of the parties appear to seek open conflict, increasing militarization and patrols have raised the risk of incidents that could escalate tensions. In this context, the future will depend on the willingness of actors to negotiate concessions, although the lack of consensus and divergent interests make a definitive solution unlikely in the short term. In this way, Alfred T. Mahan’s theories on maritime power remain relevant in the SCS, although their application is not absolute. Beyond the control of sea routes, the competition also unfolds through the construction of narratives by regional and external actors. The way these narratives shape alliances and perceptions will be key in defining power dynamics in the region.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском US tariffs on Indian goods will rise from 17% in 2023 to 26% in 2025. Yet the world's most populated country can see this aggressive US policy as an economic boon for three reasons: its low level of integration into the global market, its ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ policy of strategic autonomy and its position as an alternative to China. The United States is India's biggest customer. It accounts for 19% of India's exports. India considered itself relatively unaffected by the new US customs policy unveiled on April 2. US tariffs on Indian goods will rise from 17% in 2023 to 26% in 2025, if President Trump does not postpone the implementation date once again... This 26% figure is much lower than the duties imposed on other South-East Asian nations, which to some extent compete with Indian industry. Bangladesh, for example, has tariffs of 37%, Vietnam 46% and Thailand 36%. Certain key sectors of Indian industry, such as pharmaceuticals, are even exempt from additional duties. This exemption underlines the strategic importance of India's exports of generic medicines to the United States. A variable geometry customs strategy. India, which has no plans to retaliate, is confident of concluding a relatively advantageous agreement thanks to the bilateral negotiations that began in February 2025, following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the United States. Indian reindustrialisation? Some see this new customs policy as an opportunity for India to reindustrialise, something it badly needs to boost employment. Over the years, India has lost its comparative advantage in certain sectors to other South and South-East Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand and Vietnam. The latter face customs duties that are higher than India's, and that are rising faster. Is this likely to boost the competitiveness of these Indian industries? However, they would require long-term investment. India's industrial strategy has preferred to focus on more technologically advanced sectors, by introducing subsidies for the creation of production capacity through the Production Linkes Incentive (PLI) Scheme. The aim is to reduce dependence on imports and boost exports in priority sectors. The semi-conductor sector, for example, has benefited greatly, with the hope, among other things, of turning India into a manufacturing hub for these products. It hopes to attract €27 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). The task will certainly be made more difficult by the protectionist policies of the United States. Re-industrialisation in India will require regulatory reforms and investment in infrastructure. Despite the substantial progress made in these areas, more remains to be done. In any case, for US protectionist policy to encourage the development of Indian industry, it would have to be stable, which does not seem to be the primary orientation of the current Trump administration. Weak integration into world trade India's participation in world trade in goods is modest given the size of its economy: in 2023, India's market share in world trade was 2%. Despite its growing trade surplus with the United States, India has been relatively unaffected by the rise in tariffs, partly because Indian imports account for only 3% of total US imports. Its economy, which is very little integrated into global value chains, will de facto be less severely affected by the new US customs policy.  Although its economy trades few goods with the rest of the world, India has a comparative advantage in the service sector, which accounts for almost half of its exports of goods and services. Yet services are largely unaffected by tariffs and remain outside the perimeter of the new US policy. Indian protectionism: "Atmanirbhar Bharat" The protectionist stance adopted by the United States may reinforce the Indian government's conviction that it is right for its economy to be only marginally integrated into world trade in goods. The Indian economy is not very open and its trade policy has long tended towards protectionism. The latest industrial policy plan, "Atmanirbhar Bharat" ("Self-sufficient India"), aims to promote both exports and the strategic autonomy of the Indian economy in a number of sectors, including pharmaceuticals, solar energy and electronics. Since the ‘Made in India’ programme, India's industrial policy has not sought to create growth through exports, but to attract foreign capital to create production capacity in India, mainly for the Indian market. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has risen sharply, albeit from a relatively low base: it stood at 45.15 billion dollars in 2013. By 2022, it will have risen to $83.6 billion. India, more than ever courted India is strengthening its strategic position on the international stage. Its economy was already attracting the attention of investors, thanks to its potential market of 1.4 billion consumers and its position as Asia's alternative to China. The erratic behaviour of the Trump administration makes any partnership with India even more desirable, particularly for Europeans. There is no doubt that the trade talks for an agreement between the European Union and India, that began in 2022 and were brought back to the forefront by the visit of the President of the European Commission to New Delhi in February 2025, will take on a new dimension in the eyes of the Europeans. India's current nationalist government has worked hard to ensure that India becomes a pivotal player in the international community. This leading role on the international stage is a significant electoral asset that should strengthen Narendra Modi's influence within the country.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The first half of the 2020s dramatically changed the situation in Sahel. Military coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) brought the military to power. In Niger, the military junta that came to power, the National Council for the Protection of the Homeland led by Abdurahmane Tchiani, faced fierce criticism, sanctions, and a de facto economic blockade of the country by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In addition, ECOWAS has threatened military intervention, with the stated aim of restoring deposed President Mohamed Bazoum. In many ways, the risk of more military coups in countries in the region drove the organization, causing particular concern for Nigeria, its chairman at the time. Abuja positioned itself as a leader in the region, particularly in ECOWAS, so it was important for it to preserve the integrity of the organization and the status quo in neighboring countries. Pressure from France, in turn, also had a corresponding effect. Paris has significant economic interests in Niger due to the country's large uranium reserves to support French nuclear power plants. As a result, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger began a process to create a military alliance aimed at the common defense of the three countries, including the fight against terrorism and separatism. As a result, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was created on September 16, 2023, and transformed into a confederation on July 6, 2024. Thus, the range of cooperation between the three countries was broadened: now it covers not only military-political but also socio-economic spheres. Already on January 28, 2024, the AES countries announced their intention to leave ECOWAS, but since immediate withdrawal from the organization was not possible, they formally remained in the organization for another year, during which time the ECOWAS member states tried to find a compromise with the AES. On January 28, 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS. This political process in the Sahel significantly changes the balance of power in the region. Why did the AES countries witdraw from ECOWAS? The reasons for the withdrawal of states from the organization are related to the problems of separatism and terrorism in the region. In early 2012, at the height of the civil war in Libya, Libyan Tuaregs formed the “National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad” (MNLA) and moved to Mali to rebel against the government in order to create an independent Tuareg state. After the military coup in Mali in March 2012, the rebels took advantage of the situation and proclaimed the “Independent State of Azawad” in the north of the country. They were supported in this by fighters from the Ansar al-Din Front, who were in contact with Al-Qaeda. However, after the declaration of independence of Azawad, the Islamists did not accept the secular status of this unrecognized state, which led to contradictions with the MNLA. As a result of fighting between the Islamists and secular rebels, the latter were defeated and went underground. The entire territory of Azawad came under the control of radical Islamists. The Islamization of the movement, as well as Islamist attacks on southern Mali, forced France to intervene, as it could destabilize the situation in the region. Operation Serval was announced. ECOWAS, under Article 3 of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defense, signed in Freetown on May 3, 1981, was obliged to provide assistance to Mali for anti-terrorist operations Accordingly, and also referring to UNSC Resolution №2085, ECOWAS launched the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). As a result, France and ECOWAS managed to liberate all the towns captured by the militants by February 2013, after which the ECOWAS mission was placed under the auspices of the UN. The UN operation was called the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and was peacekeeping in nature. But these efforts were not enough to destroy extremist groups in Mali. Militants began to use guerrilla warfare methods, and a wave of terror began in the country's cities. Neither the UN mission nor the new French Operation Barkhan (2014–2021) were able to stop terror in the country. The situation worsened after a new radical Islamist group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a regional branch of al-Qaeda, appeared on the scene in 2017. It has operated not only in Mali, but also in Burkina Faso and Niger. Over the past few years, separatists of the Azawad Liberation Front have been in contact with JNIM, which could lead to the consolidation of anti-government forces and, as a result, further strengthen the terrorists' position in the country. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, while the number of conflict-related deaths in the Sahel per year in 2017 was about 5,400, it will be 25,000 in 2024. Both ECOWAS and France were powerless against this threat. The fight against guerrilla insurgents required special tactics and a great deal of manpower, but neither France nor ECOWAS had these tools. Although ECOWAS had repeatedly deployed troops to war-torn countries (e.g. Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.), it had no experience in fighting terrorism. In the Sahel, ECOWAS forces faced Islamists using sabotage and terrorism. In addition, ECOWAS is primarily an organization aimed at solving economic problems, so the vast majority of its resources are deployed in solving economic problems rather than military ones. However, for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the first priority is to eliminate separatist and terrorist groups, hence these countries give priority to security cooperation within the organization. Since ECOWAS did not provide sufficient assistance due to its inability to carry out the combat mission (in Burkina Faso and Niger ECOWAS did not conduct any anti-terrorist operations at all), the three countries preferred to create their own military alliance, which is focused on the fight against separatism and terrorism, takes into account all the peculiarities of the fight against guerrillas and corresponds to the common interests of the three countries. This is the reason for the withdrawal of the AES countries from the Economic Community. Apollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambèla, Prime Minister of Burkina Faso, in his statement of 30 January 2024, noted that for almost a decade, the three countries have been confronted by criminal groups supported, financed and equipped by their partners, with the indifference of some neighbouring countries and subregional organizations, including ECOWAS. It can be concluded that the Sahel countries are disillusioned with the ECOWAS policy on security issues in the region. What does the future hold for the "Sahel trio"? At the end of January 2025, the AES countries announced the creation of a 5,000-strong joint force contingent to fight terrorism, thus fulfilling the military alliance's primary objective of coordinated counterterrorism organization in the region. This has raised the profile of the military in power in the three countries. The course taken by the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger resonated with the public. On January 29, 2025, following the official announcement by the President of the ECOWAS Commission of the withdrawal of the AES countries, the people of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger took to the streets to celebrate. In the event of successful counter-terrorism operations in the region, popular support will increase, which will help to consolidate the power of the military and, as a result, stabilize the political situation in these countries at least in the medium term. However, for the final stabilization of the situation in the region, it is necessary to eliminate the terrorist threat, as well as to create strong and combat-ready armed forces. Not only the stabilization of the political but also the socio-economic situation in the Sahel countries depends on this. In contrast to the politico-military sphere, socio-economic ties with ECOWAS remain. Although the AES countries have also left ECOWAS, some key provisions of the organization remain in force. For instance, according to the official ECOWAS statement on the withdrawal of the AES countries dated January 29, 2025, passports and identity cards with the ECOWAS emblem remain in place, goods and services from the AES countries have access to the ECOWAS market under the same conditions, visa-free travel is maintained, and civil servants from the AES working in ECOWAS institutions are supported and retained in their positions. However, the same document notes that these conditions are temporary. Permanent terms of cooperation with the three countries will be adopted at a future Summits of Heads of State. The socio-economic situation in the Sahel countries is very difficult. According to the World Population Review, the percentage of the population below the poverty line is 45.5% in Niger, 44.6% in Mali and 43.2% in Burkina Faso. Although the states are rich in natural resources, they are unable to realize their full potential due to poor infrastructure. Continued investment in the economies of the three countries is needed, but the investment climate is deteriorating due to the terrorist threat. Economic difficulties can be overcome by joint efforts. The confederative beginnings of the AES provide an opportunity to begin the process of economic integration. The Sahel countries are seeking to establish an economic and monetary union, which will lead to a new currency called the Sahel. The logical continuation of these actions could be the exit from the franc zone. Thus, the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS could stabilize the political situation in the Sahel countries due to massive support for the AES exchange rate, while plans to create a single currency and leave the franc zone could strengthen the economic independence of the three countries. The Changing Regional Order in West Africa  For almost a century and a half, West Africa has been part of the French zone of influence. Ever since French troops established their control over these lands, all political and socio-economic processes in the region have taken place with direct French participation. However, over the past few years, France has significantly lost its influence in West Africa. The turning point in this was the failure of the anti-terrorist operation “Barkhan” in Mali, as a result of which France had to withdraw its troops from the country. After a series of military coups in the Sahel, which were largely anti-French in nature, Paris' position weakened further. French troops left Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Senegal. The final blow was the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS and the creation of the Confederation of Sahel States. This was particularly dangerous for France because the AES showed an alternative development alternative to West African countries. Now it is not only the pro-French ECOWAS that is acting as an integrationist grouping in West Africa, but also the AES. Already Chad is attempting rapprochement with the AES countries. On February 21–22, 2025, Chadian President Mahamat Déby attended The Panafrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou. In addition, the Central African head of state met with his Burkina Faso counterpart, Captain Ibrahim Traoré. During the dialog, the two sides discussed the fight against neo-colonialism and security challenges in the region. The French newspaper Le Monde regarded this as a possible rapprochement between Chad and the AES. Although Ghana acts more as an intermediary in the negotiations between the AES and ECOWAS, it has also made attempts to move closer to the AES countries. Thus, President John Dramani Mahama visited the AES countries from March 8–10, 2025. During his visit, he discussed with the Heads of State the strengthening of bilateral cooperation and security issues in the Sahel. The authority of the AES in Africa is gradually growing, which may encourage some countries in the region to move closer to the Confederation. On January 29, 2025, new AES passports were introduced and the flag of the Confederation of Sahel States was approved on February 22. All these measures should help strengthen the organization's position in the region.  Not only France, but also the United States is losing its former regional positions. In 2012, American troops were sent to Niger to fight terrorism, but after the coup in Niger in 2023, the military that came to power demanded that Washington withdraw its military contingent from the country. The United States had to make concessions. By early August 2024, all U.S. military personnel had been withdrawn from Niger, and military bases were placed under the control of local militaries. Russia is one of the actors whose regional positions are being strengthened. Moscow has been particularly active in cooperating with Mali. Since gaining independence in 1960, the Republic has signed a number of important economic agreements with the USSR and, after its collapse in 1991, with Russia. At the current stage of Russian-Mali relations, the range of cooperation has been significantly expanded: it also covers the military and political sphere. Thus, an agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed in 2003, in 2009 - Memorandum on cooperation in the field of combating terrorism and transnational organized crime, and in 2019 an Intergovernmental Agreement on Military Cooperation. Russia can be characterized as the main partner of the Sahel trio. Thus, it supported the initiative to create a Confederation of Sahel States. At the end of December 2024, Russian Ambassador to Mali Igor Gromyko said that Russia confirms its intention to continue to provide the necessary support to the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, including assistance in improving the combat effectiveness of the national armed forces, training of military and law enforcement personnel, as well as to develop mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation with these states, and added that the establishment of the AES is an important step in the fight against terrorism in the region. It is for the implementation of these tasks that the African Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense was established at the end of 2023 on the basis of the private military company Wagner, which aims to fight terrorism in the region. This is an important step toward consolidating Russia's position in West Africa. Russia is gradually pushing France out of the Sahel, and this is expressed not only in the military-political sphere, but also economically. The Russian Federation has signed a number of economic and trade agreements with the AES countries, which have seriously affected French companies and businesses in the Sahel. The most painful blow, perhaps, was the ban on uranium mining for the French company Orano in Niger, one of the largest uranium producers in the world. For France, uranium ore from Niger supplied a number of nuclear power plants. Since then, Russian companies have been invited to mine in Niger, including the French company Orano, one of the largest uranium producers in the world. For France, uranium ore from Niger supplied a number of nuclear power plants. Russian companies have since been invited to mine minerals in Niger, which include uranium. At the end of February 2025, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Exploration and Mining, which provides for the development of bilateral cooperation to strengthen Niger's mineral exploration and mining potential. China is also increasing its influence in the region. According to the China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese direct investments in Mali amounted to $600 million in 2023–2024 and $700 million in Niger. They were mainly directed to the metallurgical and oil sectors, as well as nuclear power. Military cooperation occupies an important place in China's relations with the Sahel countries. Thus, in July 2023, it became known about the signing of a contract for the supply of Chinese arms to Niger in the amount of $4.2 million. Although it is mainly light weapons (rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, rocket systems, etc.), the fact that there is a defense agreement greatly enhances China's authority in the region. Another actor that has increased its influence in the Sahel is Turkey. Ankara emphasizes military cooperation with the AES countries. So, in 2022, the Malian Armed Forces received unmanned aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB2, which are to be used in the fight against terrorism in the region. The diplomatic forum held in Antalya from March 1–3, 2024, highlighted the problems of the Sahel region. The forum was attended by representatives of the AES countries who criticized ECOWAS. In particular, Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop said that ECOWAS was inadequately addressing regional problems and that it had not responded to crises in the region but opposed the new foreign policy of the Sahel countries. In addition, the Minister noted that the harsh sanctions imposed on the AES countries had no legal basis, while cooperation within the framework of the AES appeared to be a solution to regional problems. *** The withdrawal of the AES countries from ECOWAS led to a transformation of the regional order in West Africa: an alternative to ECOWAS emerged in the form of the Confederation of Sahel States. The AES is not as capable as ECOWAS, but it is growing rapidly. There are already countries showing interest in the AES. Plans for economic integration will only strengthen the position of the organization, which will lead to the AES competing with ECOWAS. It remains to be seen whether this competition will turn into a confrontation. Russia, in turn, by supporting the military that came to power as a result of coups, is gradually pushing France out of the region. This is a serious challenge for French foreign policy, which will be extremely difficult to overcome at least in the medium term. The political vacuum created by the withdrawal of France and the United States from the Sahel has been filled not only by Russia, but also by China and Turkey. These countries are increasingly consolidating their influence in the region and seeking access to resources. There have been regular Islamist and separatist attacks on the armed forces of the three countries. The threat from jihadist groups is increasing. In order to finally stabilize the established regional order, it is necessary to destroy terrorist and separatist cells that threaten the current regimes of the AES countries, which will determine political stabilization in the three countries and the development of socio-economic projects. The Sahel countries are likely to continue cooperative efforts to combat terrorism and expand defense cooperation with Russia, Turkey, and China.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Middle East braces for another escalation of conflict, Tehran finds itself cornered by Donald Trump’s coercive diplomacy, facing the stark choice between strategic concession or regional confrontation. Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has reignited US–Iranian hostilities, transforming Yemen into a strategic flashpoint. His administration’s doctrine of militarised diplomacy, cloaked in zero-sum calculations, has elevated the Houthis from a peripheral proxy to a principal trigger for escalation. By explicitly linking Houthi missile fire to Iranian command, Trump has effectively nullified Tehran’s longstanding strategy of plausible deniability.  Historically, Iran’s use of proxies has relied on operating within a grey zone; projecting influence while avoiding direct confrontation. Trump’s return seeks to dismantle this strategic ambiguity, reclassifying all proxy activity as acts of Iranian statecraft. The US military has launched its most expansive campaign under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) against the Houthis since the Red Sea crisis began in late 2023, targeting ballistic missile infrastructure, drone depots, and senior leadership in Yemen. The operation, launched on 15 March, marked a strategic shift, following Trump’s re-designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and his vow to “rain hell” on their positions if the attacks continued. Trump’s rhetoric has escalated accordingly, and he has warned: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of Iran.”  This traps Tehran in a paradox: either abandon the Houthis, risking both reputational credibility and strategic depth, or absorb the full brunt of US retaliation. Neither option is strategically tenable. Recognising the stakes, Iran has reportedly urged the Houthis, via Omani intermediaries and back channel diplomacy in Tehran, to scale down their maritime attacks, particularly in the Red Sea. However, Houthi leadership has publicly dismissed such appeals, reaffirming their commitment to targeting Israeli shipping and rejecting external interference in their operational decisions. Their resistance is fuelled by ideological conviction, conflict-tested resilience, and an expanding sense of regional purpose.  Since the beginning of the recent Israel-Hamas conflict, and amid Hezbollah’s decline, Hamas’s isolation, and Syria’s collapse, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s most assertive proxy. Their attacks on Red Sea shipping and missile strikes against Israel, while mostly intercepted, nonetheless embarrass Arab regimes and stretch Israeli and American defensive postures.  The renewed Gaza conflict, triggered by Israel’s March 2025 bombing that killed five Hamas leaders and over 400 civilians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, has collapsed the fragile ceasefire and reignited a multifront war involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. With Gaza’s death toll now exceeding 50,000, Hamas frames its actions as part of a broader resistance to Israeli aggression. This development has galvanised regional anger and contributed to a broader mobilisation among Iran-aligned actors. Hezbollah has resumed intermittent rocket fire along the Lebanese border, while the Houthis, citing solidarity with Gaza, have intensified missile launches towards Israeli territory, including attempted strikes near Ben Gurion Airport, underscoring their expanding operational capacity and the symbolic coordination anchoring the Axis of Resistance.   Tehran’s influence may be weakening. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated a higher risk appetite, often acting beyond Iran’s preferred thresholds of escalation. This divergence complicates Tehran’s efforts to preserve plausible deniability while reaping the strategic dividends of proxy activism. The resulting imbalance reveals a deeper problem: Iran seeks the benefits of Houthi militancy without bearing the cost, an increasingly unsustainable equilibrium under Trump’s zero-tolerance posture.  Iran’s dilemma: no more deniability  According to the 2025 US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment, the Houthis continue to enhance their military capabilities through arms and dual-use technology imports from Russia and China. The smuggling of drone components through the Red Sea and the Omani-Yemeni border indicates a pattern of sustained logistical support. By dismantling Iran’s plausible deniability and publicly attributing every Houthi strike to Tehran, Washington seeks to force a binary: either Iran controls its proxies or accepts full strategic liability.  This exposes Tehran to a potential regional escalation that it is likely unprepared to navigate. The US narrative, amplified by Trump’s statements and CENTCOM’s operational tempo, collapses the operational gap between proxy and patron. This leaves Iran with shrinking room for strategic manoeuvre, particularly as it seeks to avoid direct conflict while preserving deterrent credibility. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have already conducted cross-border raids into Yemen, and Israel is lobbying for expanded UN sanctions on Iran’s missile program.  Backchannel bargains: araghchi’s high-wire diplomacy  Amid growing domestic unrest, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly been granted authority to pursue indirect negotiations with Washington. While Supreme Leader Khamenei maintains opposition to direct talks, the use of European and Omani channels offers Tehran a diplomatic off-ramp, though under immense diplomatic and political pressure. Araghchi, a veteran of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks, is viewed as more pragmatic than hardliners in the regime.  This opening follows Trump’s letter to Khamenei, demanding a new nuclear agreement within two months. The letter includes explicit demands: dismantle uranium enrichment, abandon missile development, and sever ties with regional proxies.   Iran’s nuclear posture remains opaque. The IAEA confirms Tehran has stockpiled enough 60 percent enriched uranium for multiple warheads if refined further. Yet, Iran insists its nuclear aims are peaceful. Semi-official sources suggest that continued Western escalation could prompt withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Iran’s domestic pressures are compounding. The economy suffers under inflation, sanctions, and currency collapse. The unrest in Urmia during Nowruz—the Persian New Year celebrated on the spring equinox—driven by inter-ethnic Kurdish-Azeri tensions, underscore the regime’s waning ability to manage internal dissent. With state institutions weakened, and central authority increasingly concentrated in the hands of Khamenei, public disillusionment is deepening.  The squeeze on Iran: less room to manoeuvre  Iran’s ability to maintain the status quo is under unprecedented strain. Its decades-old strategy of “strategic patience” is becoming harder to sustain. Though Iran continues to nurture ties with China and Russia, and remains engaged with European interlocutors,these relationships no longer offer the same buffer. The European Union, constrained by Washington’s hard-line approach, lacks the independence to offer credible guarantees.  Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia remain resolute in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The Begin Doctrine, which justified Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), may resurface should diplomacy falter. The spectre of unilateral military action now shapes Tehran’s strategic calculus.  Regionally, Iran’s proxy entanglements are escalating. The synchronised attacks from the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah are overstretching Israeli defences and fuelling calls in Tel Aviv for broader regional offensives. Israeli retaliation, paired with US military strikes, has intensified the risk of a wider conflagration. Arab regimes, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, fear being drawn into the fray, threatening their economic visions for 2030 and beyond.  Meanwhile the Palestinians remain largely abandoned, with no Arab state willing to absorb the population of Gaza as Trump toys with expulsion scenarios. This hard-line vision, absent regional consensus, risks igniting further instability across Jordan, Egypt, and the broader Arab world. Trump’s coercive diplomacy may satisfy tactical aims but alienates Arab publics, a recipe for internal backlash across fragile states.  Yet, abandoning its nuclear leverage is not politically viable for the Iranian regime. Any concessions must be matched by credible, enforceable guarantees—a lesson painfully learned from Trump’s unilateral exit from the JCPOA in 2018. Tehran may accept a phased or limited deal but will resist anything perceived as total capitulation.  In sum, Iran now faces a multidimensional siege: external coercion, proxy volatility, domestic instability, and ideological polarisation. Trump’s second term seeks to corner Tehran into submission, not negotiation. Yet, by collapsing the space between proxy action and state responsibility, Washington may provoke precisely what it seeks to prevent: a regional war with no clear exits. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском For over a decade, the world has witnessed mounting evidence of internment camps, forced sterilizations, family separations, religious and cultural persecution, organ harvesting, forced labor, and high-tech surveillance emerging from East Turkistan—an occupied nation China refers to as the “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” These atrocities, targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples, have led multiple governments, including the United States, to designate China’s actions as genocide, while the United Nations has identified them as crimes against humanity. The genocide of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other Turkic peoples is routinely framed as mere human rights violation or a symptom of authoritarian overreach. Such framing obscures the root cause: the illegal occupation and ongoing colonization of East Turkistan by China. To end the genocide and achieve lasting peace, dignity, and justice for the East Turkistani people, the world must recognize that this is not a question of human rights or religious persecution—it is a colonial crisis. And like all colonial projects, it demands not reform, but an end. East Turkistan, home to the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic peoples, has a long and distinct sovereign history, culture, and identity separate from that of China. While the Manchu Qing Empire occupied the nation in 1759, Qing occupation over East Turkistan has never been continuous or consensual. The people of East Turkistan persistently resisted, launching 42 uprisings between 1759 and 1864, and regained independence as the State of Yette Sheher (1864–1877), before being re-occupied by the Qing Empire in December 1877. In 1884, Beijing renamed the country “Xinjiang” (meaning “New Territory”)—a colonial term imposed to normalize its conquest, and Chinese settlers were encouraged to alter the nation’s demographics. These were not merely administrative measures—they were calculated steps in the construction of a colonial regime. Yet, the people of East Turkistan continued to resist the occupation and sought to re-establish their independence. The people of East Turkistan re-declared their independence twice in the 20th century—in 1933 and again in 1944—establishing the East Turkistan Republic.  before falling victim to geopolitical deals and military occupation. Both republics were short-lived, undermined by geopolitical maneuvering and military aggression. n 1949, following the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power, the People’s Liberation Army invaded East Turkistan with Soviet support. Under the pretext of “peaceful liberation,” the PLA dismantled East Turkistan’s sovereignty and imposed a colonial regime that persists today. Since then, Beijing has implemented long-term strategies aimed at erasing East Turkistan’s national identity and integrating the nation into its Han-centric nation-building project. These strategies have included mass settlement of Han Chinese colonists, criminalization of East Turkistani history and identity, suppression of cultural and religious freedoms, the dismantling of native institutions, and the violent suppression of dissent. Although some observers refer to these policies as “assimilation,” such language understates the scope and violence of China’s actions. This is not cultural integration—it is national erasure and demographic replacement. The ongoing Uyghur genocide is the latest phase in this decades-long campaign. It has moved beyond political repression into a full-fledged effort to destroy the East Turkistani nation physically, culturally, and psychologically. Millions of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic peoples have been arbitrarily detained in concentration camps, where they are subjected to indoctrination, torture, sexual violence, and forced labor. Furthermore, experts estimate that at least 25,000 to 50,000 Uyghurs are being killed annually solely for their organs. Uyghur and other Turkic women are forcibly sterilized or forced to undergo abortions to prevent the birth of future generations. Over a million Uyghur and other Turkic children are separated from their families and placed in state-run boarding schools designed to sever their cultural and linguistic ties. Over 16,000 Mosques, cemeteries, and historic sites have been demolished, while Uyghur and other Turkic language instruction has been eliminated from public education. In international law, these actions meet the criteria outlined in the UN Genocide Convention. China’s campaign fulfills all five of the acts defined as genocide. This includes killing members of the group through executions, massacres, deaths resulting from torture and neglect in concentration camps, and systematic organ harvesting. It also involves causing serious bodily or mental harm, through forced labor, indoctrination, physical and sexual abuse, and long-term psychological trauma. The Chinese regime has deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction, including mass internment, surveillance, forced separation of families, and deprivation of basic needs. Additionally, China has imposed measures intended to prevent births, such as forced sterilizations, abortions, birth prevention policies, and the destruction of Uyghur family structures. Finally, it has forcibly transferred children of the group to another group by removing over a million Uyghur and other Turkic children from their families and placing them in Chinese state-run boarding schools and orphanages. What makes this genocide even more insidious is its bureaucratic and technological sophistication. The CCP uses AI surveillance, biometric data collection, and big data policing to monitor and control every aspect of East Turkistani life. Genocide in East Turkistan is not committed with bombs or mass graves—it is executed with facial recognition cameras, QR codes, “predictive policing” apps, forced sterilizations, forced abortions, organ harvesting, and crematoriums to hide the evidence. The answer lies not in ideology alone but in geopolitical calculation. East Turkistan is central to Beijing’s global ambitions. It serves as the strategic linchpin of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which China seeks to reshape global trade and influence. Over 60 percent of China’s overland trade passes through the region. Rich in oil, natural gas, gold, lithium, and rare earth elements, East Turkistan is not only a corridor—but a resource base essential to China’s industrial economy. Chinese strategists have long seen East Turkistan as a buffer protecting the Chinese state from perceived threats to its west and north. This logic continues to shape Beijing’s approach today: the occupation of East Turkistan is central to advancing China’s geopolitical ambitions, including control over critical infrastructure, access to Central Asia, and the stability of its broader colonial system. The erasure of East Turkistan is not about internal security—it is about imperial consolidation and expansion. The Uyghur genocide is therefore not a domestic or regional issue—it is an international one. It is rooted in a colonial model of domination that has broad implications for global security, trade, and human rights. Yet the international community continues to treat East Turkistan as a part of China’s “internal affairs,” even as it condemns the crimes taking place there. This contradiction lies at the heart of the global failure to stop the genocide. By framing the issue merely as one of “human rights” or “religious repression,” leaders obscure the core truth: East Turkistan is an occupied country, and the Uyghurs are not a “minority group,” but a nation under siege. This framing benefits Beijing by allowing it to invoke sovereignty and non-interference to shield itself from accountability. In reality, China is misusing the language of sovereignty to justify colonization. This distortion of international norms must be challenged. Addressing the Uyghur genocide requires a shift in global thinking. First, East Turkistan must be recognized as an occupied country, with its people’s right to external self-determination affirmed under international law. The UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other legal instruments affirm the right of all peoples to determine their political status. Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples have never chosen to be part of China; their subjugation has been enforced through military occupation, demographic engineering, systemic repression, and a campaign of cultural and national erasure—not integration or coexistence, but elimination. Second, the genocide must be understood as part of a broader colonial project, not merely an episode of repression. This includes recognizing mass enslavement, demographic engineering, and physical and cultural erasure as fundamental tools of colonial domination. Efforts to address these violations must be paired with political actions to end China’s illegal occupation of East Turkistan. Third, the voices of East Turkistani institutions and leaders in exile must be included in international discussions about the future of the nation. The East Turkistan Government in Exile, along with rights groups and diaspora communities, have been calling for recognition, justice, and decolonization for decades. Their perspectives are essential to any serious solution. Finally, international legal mechanisms must be pursued with urgency. This includes supporting East Turkistan’s case at the International Criminal Court and filing additional cases at the International Court of Justice, sanctioning Chinese officials and entities involved in the genocide, and supporting investigations under universal jurisdiction laws in national courts. The failure of the international community to stop the genocide in East Turkistan is not merely a failure of will—it is a failure of principle. So long as governments, media, and international institutions continue to treat this as an “internal issue” for China, the genocide will continue. Only by reframing this as a crisis of occupation, colonization, and national survival can the path to justice become clear. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sweeping new tariffs on imported goods on April 2, 2025 – upending global trade and sending markets into a tailspin – he presented the move as a response to a crisis. In an executive order released the same day, the White House said the move was necessary to address “the national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit.” A trade deficit – when a country imports more than it exports – is often viewed as a problem. And yes, the U.S. trade deficit is both large and persistent. Yet, as an economist who has taught international finance at Boston University, the University of Chicago and Harvard, I maintain that far from a national emergency, this persistent deficit is actually a sign of America’s financial and technological dominance. The trade deficit is the flip side of an investment magnet A trade deficit sounds bad, but it is neither good nor bad. It doesn’t mean the U.S. is losing money. It simply means foreigners are sending the U.S. more goods than the U.S. is sending them. America is getting more cheap goods, and in return it is giving foreigners financial assets: dollars issued by the Federal Reserve, bonds from the U.S. government and American corporations, and stocks in newly created firms. That is, a trade deficit can only arise if foreigners invest more in the U.S. than Americans invest abroad. In other words, a country can only have a trade deficit if it also has an equally sized investment surplus. The U.S. is able to sustain a large trade deficit because so many foreigners are eager to invest here. Why? One major reason is the safety of the U.S. dollar. Around the world, from large corporations to ordinary households, the dollar is used for saving, trading and settling debts. As the world economy grows, so does foreigners’ demand for dollars and dollar-denominated assets, from cash to Treasury bills and corporate bonds. Because the dollar is so attractive, the Federal Reserve gets to mint extra cash for use abroad, and the U.S. government and American employers and families can borrow money at lower interest rates. Foreigners eagerly buy these U.S. financial assets, which enables Americans to consume and invest more than they ordinarily could. In return for our financial assets, we buy more German machines, Scotch whiskey, Chinese smartphones, Mexican steel and so on. Blaming foreigners for the trade deficit, therefore, is like blaming the bank for charging a low interest rate. We have a trade deficit because foreigners willingly charge us low interest rates – and we choose to spend that credit. US entrepreneurship attracts global capital – and fuels the deficit Another reason for foreigners’ steady demand for U.S. assets is American technological dominance: When aspiring entrepreneurs from around the world start new companies, they often decide to do so in Silicon Valley. Foreigners want to buy stocks and bonds in these new companies, again adding to the U.S. investment surplus. This strong demand for U.S. assets also explains why Trump’s last trade war in 2018 did little to close the trade deficit: Tariffs, by themselves, do nothing to reduce foreigners’ demand for U.S. dollars, stocks and bonds. If the investment surplus doesn’t change, the trade deficit cannot change. Instead, the U.S. dollar just appreciates, so that imports get cheaper, undoing the effect of the tariff on the size of the trade deficit. This is basic economics: You can’t have an investment surplus and a trade surplus at the same time, which is why it’s silly to call for both. It’s worth noting that no other country in the world enjoys a similarly sized investment surplus. If a normal country with a normal currency tries to print more money or issues more debt, its currency depreciates until its investment account – and its trade balance – goes back to something close to zero. America’s financial and technological dominance allows it to escape this dynamic. That doesn’t mean all tariffs are bad or all trade is automatically good. But it does mean that the U.S. trade deficit, poorly named though it is, does not signify failure. It is, instead, the consequence – and the privilege – of outsized American global influence. The president’s frenzied attacks on the nation’s trade deficit show he’s misreading a sign of American economic strength as a weakness. If the president really wants to eliminate the trade deficit, his best option is to rein in the federal budget deficit, which would naturally reduce capital inflows by raising domestic savings. Rather than reviving U.S. manufacturing, Trump’s extreme tariffs and erratic foreign policy are likely to instead scare off foreign investors altogether and undercut the dollar’s global role. That would indeed shrink the trade deficit – but only by eroding the very pillars of the country’s economic dominance, at a steep cost to American firms and families.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Good morning, everyone. Forty-three years after the beginning of the Malvinas War, we gather once again as a nation to commemorate our veterans and those who fell in combat, under the proud gaze of their families, to whom I also extend this tribute. Today, we remember those Heroes who gave their lives for the Homeland, who are part of the pantheon of those who forged our history through their sacrifice. Today, we honor them by reaffirming, with genuine determination, Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, as well as the surrounding maritime areas. Unfortunately, in recent decades, our sovereign claim over the islands has been directly or indirectly harmed by the economic and diplomatic decisions of the political caste. No one can take seriously the claim of a nation whose leadership is known worldwide for its corruption and incompetence, and for dragging Argentina into the arms of the world’s scum. A country that systematically impoverishes its land and sides with dictators and petty tyrants enters any diplomatic negotiation from a position of weakness. And if we add the disarmament and deliberate demonization of the Armed Forces, we had the perfect recipe for the Malvinas Islands to remain forever in foreign hands. The first step we must take, then, is to rise as a country in every sense — both materially and spiritually — and to reclaim the place in the international community that we should never have lost. And there is no other way to achieve this than by applying the ideas of liberty, both within our borders and beyond, by opening ourselves to international trade and adopting a foreign policy aligned with the free nations of the world. This is the first government in a long time that understands that a sovereign country must, first and foremost, be a prosperous country. Only then can we take the second step: to dignify our Armed Forces through the necessary investments that only a prosperous nation can afford. Growth is in vain if public spending is not reorganized, strengthening those areas in which the State should be involved and eliminating those that are unnecessary, because when the State assumes responsibilities that do not belong to it, it is always to the detriment of essential functions. Despite the political caste’s decades-long effort to convince us otherwise, Argentina needs a strong Armed Forces. They are essential to defend our vast territory from potential threats in a global context of growing uncertainty. They are also indispensable in any diplomatic discussion. In this regard, history is unforgiving: a strong country is a respected country. This does not mean that might makes right, but foreign policy cannot be conducted from a naïve and childish idealism either. For us, the Armed Forces are a source of pride. The time when they were undervalued has come to an end. Proof of this is that, on July 9 of last year, for the first time, more than 2,000 of our veterans led the military parade during the Independence Day celebrations, before a proud and grateful crowd for their actions in defense of the Homeland. That is also why we have just enacted a decree instructing the Ministry of Defense to grant the rank of Reserve Second Lieutenant to those Reserve Officer Candidate Soldiers who are veterans of the Malvinas War. This rank would have been granted to them upon completion of their military service, but it was left unfulfilled as they were discharged directly after the war ended. This is, simply put, about settling a debt with these Heroes — a debt that has been ignored for 43 years by successive governments and that we now intend to correct once and for all. Without all the above, any notion of sovereignty loses its meaning. Sovereignty is not about the State owning many companies, nor about financing the film industry, or second-rate concerts, or similar things. Believing that more State means more sovereignty is an Orwellian concept under which politics has historically tried to conceal its dirty dealings — resulting in a poor people enslaved by an omnipresent State. We, on the other hand, have come to reclaim that word, which until recently had been hijacked, and to restore the meaning it truly deserves. A sovereign people is a flourishing, vigorous, respectable people — and above all, a people proud of its Armed Forces. A nation like the one built by the generation of the 1880s, which, after a century of humiliation, we are rebuilding. As I’ve said on other occasions, we are not here to apply extravagant formulas, but rather to return to those strategies that once made us successful. And when it comes to sovereignty over the Malvinas, we have always made it clear that the most important vote is the one cast with feet. We hope that one day the people of the Malvinas will choose to vote with their feet — for us. That is why we seek to make Argentina such a powerful nation that they will prefer to be Argentine, and persuasion or deterrence won’t even be necessary to achieve it. That is why we have embarked on the path of liberation we are now walking — so that Argentina becomes the freest country in the world, once again has the highest GDP per capita on the planet, and inspires people around the world to dream of the Argentine dream. That is what this government understands by sovereignty. It is the standard by which we measure ourselves, and we will not settle for anything less. To conclude, on this second April 2nd that I experience as President, I want to once again reaffirm our unwavering claim over the Malvinas Islands, reinforcing our commitment to exhaust all diplomatic means within our reach so that they may return to Argentine hands. Finally, to the veterans, to their families, and to all those who wear the uniform in defense of the Homeland, I extend my eternal gratitude on behalf of all Argentines. May God bless the Argentine Republic, may the forces of heaven be with us! Long live freedom, damn it! Thank you very much! Long live the Homeland!

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia is a distinctly Nordic country. Its Arctic coastline stretches for twenty-four thousand kilometers, and almost two thirds of Russia’s territory is covered by permafrost. Among all Arctic states, Russia has by far the most numerous resident communities in the region in total exceeding two million people (approximately a half of the global Arctic population). All of the biggest cities to the North of the Arctic Circle—Murmansk, Vorkuta, Norilsk—are located in Russia. A very large part of Russia’s history for the last millennium has been included a relentless quest for fur, fish, timber, empty lands and new trading routes along the endless Arctic Ocean. Historians still debate whether this perpetual drive to the North has been a Russian blessing or a Russian curse. The expansion in the Northern direction offered the nation a variety of unique opportunities, but it also created numerous challenges that other Europeans never confronted. In any case, this movement had a critical formative impact on forging the Russian character and left a deep imprint on the national mentality. This heritage will undoubtedly stay with Russians in future, affecting their perceptions of themselves, the overall worldviews as well as many specific economic, social, military and other decisions. Economy Today, the Arctic region houses less than 1.3% of Russia’s population, but it accounts for some 12–15% of the national GDP and for 25% of all the exports. One fifth of all Russia’s oil and four fifth of natural gas are extracted here. The Arctic continental shelf, which remains not fully explored, contains even more hydrocarbons—at least 85 tln cubic meters of natural gas and 17.3 bln tons of oil. With many old easily accessible deposits of hydrocarbons on the continent being depleted, the only way for Russia to remain an energy superpower is by moving further North and by mustering its capacities of offshore drilling under quite harsh climate and weather conditions. Beyond oil and gas, Russia’s Arctic can offer such important minerals as nickel, copper, iron core, rare earth elements, platinum, palladium, etc. However, deep-water drilling not makes extracted hydrocarbons and other minerals quite expensive; for instance, most of sea-based oil repositories in the Arctic turn profitable with oil prices staying at USD 70–80 per barrel. With the global energy transition taking speed it is not clear whether international markets are likely to sustain long term demand for the expensive Russia’s Arctic fossil fuels. Besides, quite often this type of deep-water drilling requires a lot of state-of-the-art technologies that Russia does not always has at its disposal. For a long time, Moscow counted on its Western partners (US, Norway, Germany, UK) to get access to such technologies, but the geopolitical environment of today has made this cooperation impossible. Today, Russia counts mostly on China to replace its former partners from the West, but many China’s energy companies have to exercise caution and sometimes practice over-compliance with Western technology transfers restrictions fearing possible secondary US and EU sanctions. Another evident economic opportunity for Russia in the Arctic region is the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—a 5,600 km long transportation corridor that remains the shortest shipping route between Europe and the Asia-Pacific. With the Arctic ice melting and navigation seasons in the North getting longer due to global warming, NSR becomes commercially more attractive. Another assumed comparative NSR advantage is that it does not contain any security risks comparable to those existing today in the Red Sea or in the Gulf of Aden and has no physical restrictions that limit the cargo traffic through the Panama or Suez canals. Nonetheless, these are both technical and political obstacles on turning NSR into a major international transit route. The seas in the North of Eurasia are mostly very shallow and large modern deep draught container ships simply cannot use them without expensive dredging. Furthermore, the coastal infrastructure along NSR needs quite radical modernization and further maintenance. On top of these complications, today it is hard to imagine that EU states would accept NSR as a preferred transit corridor from the Asia-Pacific using Russia as the main link in this transit. This is why the odds are that in the nearest future NSR will be used mostly to serve Russia’s domestic cabotage needs as well as to ship Siberian oil, coal and LNG to China, India and other consumers in Asia. With due commitment, the annual size, which now amounts to almost 40 mln tons, can be doubled by 2030 and later on it can reach even 150 mln tons a year, but it will hardly ever successfully compete with the Suez Canal that can handle up to 150 mln tons of cargo in just one month. Security The security significance of the Arctic region for Russia has two distinctly different dimensions. First, such a long maritime border creates potential vulnerabilities and has to be protected against possible conventional encroachments (these might include not only actions taken by hostile states, but also by private poachers, human traffickers, etc.). Second, the Arctic region provides Russia with a unique unrestricted access to high seas for the national Strategic Naval Forces that are an organic part of the country’s nuclear triad; this access has to be preserved at any cost to maintain credible nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the United States and its NATO allies. A conventional challenge to the Russian Arctic could theoretically emerge either in the East, with an adversary entering the region through the Bering Strait, or in the West, from the NATO bases in North Atlantic of from Norway. The ongoing climate change and the Arctic ice melting may further increase Russia’s security vulnerabilities, opening the Arctic waters for more intense military traffic. It seems that for the time being Moscow is not particularly concerned about security challenges coming from the Asia-Pacific, though the recent changes in the defense postures of Japan and South Korea and even of a more remote Australia are significant enough to keep a close eye on them. The NATO naval capabilities in the West arguably present a much more immediate security challenge to Russia, especially with Finland and Sweden having joined the Alliance and Norway having lifted some of its earlier limitations on NATO’s use of the Northern Norwegian coastline. Being a predominantly continental military power, Russia cannot hope to defeat NATO in a large-scale conventional naval war, but it can try to deny NATO forces access to the Russian Arctic while maintaining secure access to the Northern Atlantic for the Russian Navy. The nuclear dimension is different. The Russian Northern Fleet is the largest, the most advanced and the most strategically important fleet in the Russian Navy. Its missions are not limited to the Arctic region alone, but are explicitly global; the Northern Fleet should be in a position to operate in any remote corner of the planet deterring a nuclear attack on the Russian Federation. Some of the newest types of Ballistic Missile Submarines (Borei-class) and Nuclear Attack Submarines (Yasen-class) are operating from Arctic bases, as well as many surface battleships including the sole aircraft carrier that Russia has now (“Admiral Kuznetsov”). The choice of the Arctic region to host a critically important component of the national strategic deterrence force was to a degree involuntary—both the Black and the Baltic Seas are semi-enclosed and exits from them are easy to block, and the free access to the Pacific Ocean for Russia is restricted by the US military infrastructure in Japan, in South Korea and in Alaska. Today, Moscow invests a lot into enhancing and modernizing its military presence in the Arctic region including reopening some of the old Soviet installations that were put out of operation in 1990s and building new ones. These installations include search and rescue centers, deep-water ports, air bases and air-defense missile complexes. All these efforts notwithstanding, they clearly reflect defensive rather than offensive nature of Russia’s military posture in the Arctic region. The conventional Russia’s capacities in the region are not sufficient to confidently cut NATO communication lines in the Northern Atlantic and they can hardly justify an extended NATO forward naval deployment in the Arctic. Avoiding a self-destructive navel arms race in the Nigh North remains a critical challenge for both Russia and its Western adversaries. Environment and Social issues Russia’s Arctic region is warming at a rate that is three times faster than the global average. In some parts of this vast territory (e.g. the North-Eastern tip of the Eurasian continent) the speed of warning is even higher. There is a widely shared view that global warming might have a positive impact on the region opening new opportunities in agriculture, transportation, fisheries, offshore oil and gas drilling and so on. Indeed, some of these opportunities might prove to be very real. However, the likely negative repercussions of global warming for the Arctic should not be underestimated. These include an accelerated coastal erosion, increased frequency of floods and other natural disasters decay of local ecosystems. The most visible manifestation of global warming detrimental impact on the region is permafrost thawing, which is expected to affect at least two thirds of the infrastructure in the coming years, including houses, bridges, railroads, highways, sea and river ports, airports and so on. The likely accelerating rise of sea levels would also have profound implications for the region; the West Siberian Lowlands are particularly vulnerable and a part of this huge landmass might ultimately turn into a seabed. Since Russia cannot stop global warming on its own, it pursues policies of climate change adaptation, including enhanced permafrost monitoring, enforcing new construction standards, creating additional wildlife sanctuaries for endangered species and reducing black carbon emissions. On top of the growing climate change pressure, Russia has to face many social problems in its Arctic region. The overall Arctic population of the country is steadily declining all the time since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Though the decline is not very steep—up to 20 thousand people a year,—for a rather modest Arctic community it is nevertheless quite significant. The Arctic salaries usually exceed Russia’s average, but the costs of living in the region are also higher than in the South. Long and dark winters, harsh cold winds and generally inhospitable environment do not provide incentives to settle in the region. The federal government is trying to cope with this problem by offering affordable housing loans, investing into public transportation and health systems, supporting local colleges and Universities and subsidizing social and cultural life in the region. A lot will depend on whether the Russian leadership has the needed resources to continue these initiatives for a long time and whether economic activities in the Arctic can go far beyond extracting mineral resources, fishing and transportation. Like many other Arctic countries, Russia faces many challenges related to indigenous communities residing in the North. Altogether these communities amount to approximately 250 thousand people belonging to at least forty different ethnic groups. Climate change is only one side of the problem that these groups face today though it contributes to shifting animal migration patterns, disrupting subsistence practices like reindeer herding and fishing, inundating villages and threatening traditional ways of life. However, even putting aside global warming one should confess that oil and gas exploration as well as other large-scale mineral resources extraction projects often lead to pollution and displacement of indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands. At the same time, being scattered along very large territories, indigenous peoples face difficulties in accessing healthcare, education, and legal services. It is not easy to combine traditional cultural and social practices with successful careers in modern business or in the rapidly changing public sector. There are no magic solutions to indigenous people’s problems. Yet, the existing Russian and foreign experience suggests that that the severity of these problems can be significantly reduced by implementing a broad range of economic, administrative, legal and social actions. These actions should include engaging representatives of indigenous population into bodies of local self-governance, shifting economic modernization plans from extensive growth to sustainable development, building resilient private-public partnership with local NGOs engaged, creating systems for assessing the impact of climate change on indigenous communities and involve them in environmental monitoring. First published in the Guancha.cn.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском This piece was originally published on March 11, 2025, by the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). View the original publication on the FPRI website.https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/forceful-taiwan-reunification-chinas-targeted-military-and-civilian-military-measures/ Bottom Line China is systematically preparing for a forceful reunification campaign by redesigning and intensifying military and civilian-military measures such as military mobilization, amphibious capabilities, standardization of operations, and resource stockpiling. The People’s Liberation Army’s expanded and improved military exercises around Taiwan since August 2022 have been shifting toward more coercive and multi-domain operations to assert control over the region. These systematic and incremental military and civilian-military measures might provide China with the tools to successfully conduct a potential forceful reunification with Taiwan in the near future. For nearly a century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have largely avoided direct military confrontations across the Taiwan Strait. However, there have been four notable exceptions: the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55, 1958, 1995–96, and most recently, 2022–23. In the first three instances, the status quo was primarily restored following the crisis. However, recent events suggest worrying trends highlighting that Beijing is preparing for a forceful reunification with Taiwan. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has already made reunification with Taiwan a part of his signature China Dream, announced during the 19th Party Congress meeting in 2017. However, this was not the first time Taiwan was featured prominently in speeches by top Chinese leaders. As political scientist Ketian Zhang highlights in her book China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion, annexing Taiwan is considered a core interest of China, with official references to its significance appearing regularly since 2003. The most recent instance was Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech on December 31, 2024, where he declared, “No one can stop the historical trend of reunification of the motherland” (誰也不能充實祖國統一的歷史大勢). But beyond rhetoric and political posturing, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has taken concrete measures over the past decade to advance Beijing’s reunification agenda. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, these measures have intensified, reinforcing China’s willingness to use force. This article highlights the PLA’s systematic and incremental military and civilian-military measures—capabilities that might provide China with the tools to successfully conduct a potential forceful reunification with Taiwan in the near future. These measures include changing the institutions and patterns of PLA mobilization, constructing and using civilian infrastructure in military exercises, and establishing a new status quo through increasingly coercive military exercises around Taiwan. They also include standardization of the PLA for greater efficiency, effectiveness, combat readiness, stockpiling resources, and re-enlisting veterans with specific skills. This article builds upon Oriana Skylar Mastro’s arguments in her piece “The Taiwan Temptation,” which contends that China’s expanding military capabilities and rising nationalism could drive Beijing to contemplate using force for reunification with Taiwan. It identifies granular military details, especially post-2020, but it doesn’t venture into arguments about the timing of the reunification, potential diplomatic backlash, or economic costs of the invasion. Recent Military-Civilian Measures Since 2015, the PRC has undertaken significant organizational, legal, and structural reforms to enhance the National Defense Mobilization System (NDMS) (國防動員系統). As China scholar Devin Thorne highlights in his recent testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, NDMS enables the PRC to harness its political, economic, technological, cultural, social, and other civilian resources from peacetime to wartime. This helps China to address a wide range of threats, such as escalations on its border, domestic instabilities, natural disasters, and other crises. It also bolsters China’s military logistics. As Thorne highlights, the key developments include the enactment of the National Defense Transportation Law in 2017, the introduction of updated auditing and surveying data on natural resources protocols in 2018 and 2021, the establishment of new NDMS offices beginning in December 2022, the creation of a new type of highly trained and professional local militia force since 2021, and the enhancement of cross-militia training initiatives starting in 2024. The PLA can mobilize private and civilian resources through the NDMS during national emergencies. It highlights China’s determination to prepare for potential contingencies, including escalation activities on its borders with India, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. Lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have further shaped these efforts. Once operational, the NDMS would ultimately allow the PRC to mobilize society and harness civilian and military resources more systematically and institutionally in case of a potential forceful reunification attempt with Taiwan. However, mobilizing resources and force is insufficient, as China would need to reach the other side of the Taiwan Strait during a potential escalation. Some scholars dismiss the idea that the PLA remains incapable of conducting amphibious operations at the scale needed to take control of Taiwan. Amphibious operations (landing assault) are one of the five most important campaigns (alongside anti-landing, island blockade, border area counter-attack, and counter–air-raid campaigns) discussed at length in the PLA’s first written doctrine on joint operations, Joint Campaign Outline, as operational requirements to take over Taiwan by force. Taiwan has 169,000 active military personnel, backed by 1.66 million reservists. As career naval officer Harlan Ullman explains, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, the PLA would need to mobilize at least 507,000 soldiers. By extension, to cross the 106-kilometer-wide Taiwan Strait to conduct landing operations, China would need thousands of ships—far more than the current PLA Navy capabilities of 234 operating warships. However, China has long been working to mobilize its civilian infrastructure to support its military campaign. For instance, the PRC has emphasized the construction of roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) (滾裝船) ships, which can use their power to set up ramps on docks or beaches to transport vehicles. Each RO–RO ship is estimated to carry at least three hundred vehicles and about fifteen hundred passengers. Since establishing the “strategic projection support ship fleets” in China’s major ship-building companies in 2012, the PLA has actively cooperated with local shipping companies to improve maritime “strategic delivery” capabilities by prioritizing the production of RO-RO ferries. According to naval strategist J. Michael Dahm, in January 2023, China had around thirty-one RO-RO ferries in operation. However, the Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out that the mainland shipyards would deliver up to two hundred RO-RO ships in the four years from 2023 to 2026. Furthermore, the PLA has used these ferries in military exercises in the Taiwan Strait since 2019. For instance, the first fifteen-thousand-ton ferry, Bang Chui Dao RO-RO ship (棒槌島滾裝船), participated in an amphibious assault exercise in 2019. Since then, the PLA has conducted such military exercises regularly. In July 2020, the PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault craft from civilian ferries toward the beach rather than port facilities, and it conducted day and night exercises off the coast of Guangdong Province. August 2021 was the first time the PLA used a ten-thousand-ton–class civilian ferry ship to land military exercises. Furthermore, in August 2022, after then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, six of these RO-RO ships, which are operated by the Bo Hai Ferry Group Company (渤海輪渡集團公司) and are affiliated with the PLA Maritime Militia 8th Transport Brigade (海上民兵第8運輸旅), headed south toward Xiamen—the closest point to Taiwan. The RO-RO ferries were used more frequently in cross-transportation military exercises in July and September 2023. Furthermore, it was also discovered in January 2025 that China is building at least five landing barges at the Guangzhou shipyard with unusually long road bridges that extend from the bow of the ship, which makes them relevant to amphibious landing operations. Although these vessels and barges are extremely susceptible to attacks from Taiwanese F-16s, warships, and submarines, they would be supported by the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA Rocket Force. The Changing Nature of Coercion and Military Exercises around Taiwan On September 17, 2020, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense published its first real-time military update, documenting PLA incursions into Taiwan’s de facto air defense identification zone (ADIZ). As meticulously recorded by Ben Lewis and Gerald C. Brown, by January 2025, there had been approximately eight thousand PLA violations of the ADIZ, including multiple crossings of the median line. Notably, Chinese warplanes crossed the median line in 2019 for the first time since 1999. However, Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan provided the PLA with a pretext to escalate its activities, culminating in multiple advanced military exercises conducted around Taiwan from all sides. Since August 2022, the PLA has conducted five large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. Most of them coincided with significant political events. For instance, the first military exercise in August 2022 followed Pelosi’s visit. This was succeeded by the inaugural PLA Joint Sword exercises in April 2023, coinciding with former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s visit to the United States and her meeting with then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy. Subsequent exercises included Joint Sword A in May 2024 and Joint Sword B in October 2024. These exercises aligned with the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te’s tenure and his National Day speech. The most recent military exercises, conducted in December 2024, were held shortly after President Lai Ching-te’s travels through the United States. Notably, President Lai did not engage with any major US leaders during his transit. However, the recent exercises display the opportunistic Chinese behavior of leveraging situations to establish a new normal through increasingly coercive activities in the Taiwan Strait. The Joint Sword A and B exercises and the December 2024 drills are particularly significant for understanding the evolution of China’s coercion pattern and the difference between China’s military posturing and its intentions in the Taiwan Strait. While the Joint Sword A and B drills were declared in advance and focused on anti-intervention and amphibious assault near Taiwan, recent December 2024 exercises intended to perform blockade, strategic deterrence, and anti-interventionism exercises. The latest exercises occurred across expanded locations like Fujian, Zhejiang, and the Western Pacific. Significantly, the December 2024 exercise, for the first time, witnessed all three of the PLA’s sea-facing theater commands—North, East, and South—jointly participating in an operation in the eastern waters of China, a key demand by the leadership to achieve multi-domain joint operations capabilities. Notably, these instances reveal that the Chinese leadership is keenly aware of the PLA’s pre-existing weaknesses, like amphibious assaults and anti-intervention operations, and has been pushing the PLA to address this gap gradually. They also leveraged elements of strategic deterrence and surprise while adhering to steps toward joint combat operations, a prerequisite for a forceful reunification. Geographically, these exercises extended beyond the Taiwan Strait to cover broader areas, including Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai, and the Western Pacific, indicating a shift toward controlling key maritime zones in the First Island Chain. Thus, with active participation from all major PLA services and the three sea-facing theater commands, and indulgence in numerous aspects of warfare targeted toward the PLA’s primary strategic direction—Taiwan—these exercises signalled a more nuanced and multi-layered operational focus. Multiple Standardizations within the PLA Over the past seven years, particularly in the post-pandemic period, China has prioritized comprehensive standardization of procedures with the PLA and its auxiliary support systems—non-combat systems and components that support and sustain military operations. PLA leadership has issued numerous directives to achieve uniformity across various domains, such as the construction of barracks, military equipment procurement, and the establishment of standardized military training grounds. These efforts are extended to standardizing resource allocation, engineering procurement, equipment support, logistical operations, medical services, communication infrastructure, cybersecurity systems, and intelligence gathering and analysis mechanisms. These initiatives highlight China’s attempt to enable standardization within the PLA’s military operations to enhance its overall efficiency, effectiveness, and combat readiness. Streamlining key processes, including operational logistics, equipment maintenance, and strategic communication networks, would help the PLA to accelerate achieving capabilities to perform multi-domain integrated joint operations. Standardization facilitates interoperability across services, theaters, and arms, resulting in seamless coordination among ground, naval, air, space, and cyber units. Developing these capabilities is a prerequisite for conducting multi-domain integrated joint operations, a requirement for forceful Taiwan reunification. They are also indicative of the PLA’s steps toward achieving operational readiness. It is particularly relevant in regional and near-regional escalations, such as those in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific Ocean, which could be possibilities during the Taiwan reunification campaign. Resource Stockpiling Resource stockpiling is an important indicator of a nation’s preparedness for a potential conflict. It involves the systematic accumulation of critical materials, energy reserves, food supplies, and industrial inputs essential during wartime. Such activities are often undertaken to ensure self-sufficiency, mitigate vulnerabilities, and maintain resilience in the face of potential embargoes, trade disruptions, or blockades. Agricultural economist Gustavo F.C. Ferreira highlights in his testimony to the US-China Economy and Security Review Commission that China has been significantly increasing its energy resource reserves, particularly coal, crude oil, and natural gas. The country has built an extensive storage capacity for crude oil, estimated to exceed 1.8 billion barrels, including strategic petroleum reserves and underground storage facilities. Additionally, he points out that China’s coal production has ramped up aggressively, with approval of expansion projects equivalent to the European Union’s annual coal production in just one year. He notes that beyond energy resources, the stockpiling extends to other critical areas such as food (grains and protein sources), strategic metals (rare earth, copper, and lithium), and technological components (semiconductors). These measures are supported by state policies to reduce China’s reliance on global markets and ensure continued operation during a conflict or escalation. Similarly, there are reports about China’s record 105.03-million-metric-ton import of soybeans in 2024. This marks a 6.5 percent increase from 2023. This surge is possibly due to China’s efforts to prepare for a contingency, particularly in anticipation of intensified trade tensions with the United States. Researcher Zongyuan Zoe Liu’s work highlights China’s strategies to shield its economy from potential Western sanctions by drawing lessons from sanctions imposed on Russia. She notes China’s attempt to increase economic and technological self-sufficiencies by immunizing its economy against sanctions and building financial resilience against potential sanctions by the United States. Re-enlistment of Veterans Since 2017, the PLA has notified several enlistment orders for veterans with specific skill sets. A key focus has been the integration of veterans into civil-military roles. This is supported by policies to re-enlist them in specialized units adhering to Xi’s stated and revealed military goals for the PLA. For instance, in the case of Taiwan-focused operations, the PLA’s re-enlistment efforts focus on operational readiness by re-enlisting veterans skilled in amphibious operations, cyber warfare, and missile systems. Since 2022, there has been an emphasis on integrating these veterans into critical roles, such as reserve forces, militia coordination, and rapid mobilization units. Beyond these six measures, several other developments—China’s heavy investment in dual-use infrastructure such as ports and airfields on the east coast, development of amphibious and airborne military capabilities like the large Type 075 landing ships and Y-20 aircraft, investment in offensive intelligence and cyber capabilities, deployment of strategic missile systems like the DF-15 and DF-21, training of the maritime militia with the PLA and their expansion to support the armed forces whenever required, and the integration of real-time battlefield awareness via the BeiDou navigation system—are additional factors to conclusively determine the PLA’s intention and readiness for a potential reunification campaign with Taiwan. Conclusion It is a political decision to pursue the reunification campaign. Western scholars dismiss such arguments on the basis of the PLA’s perceived lack of military preparedness and the significant economic costs China would incur during and after a reunification attempt. However, as this essay highlights, China is keenly aware of these considerations and is taking proactive steps to limit the fallout, if not eliminate it. This essay doesn’t argue whether China would attempt a forceful unification campaign or the cost of its campaign. Instead, it argues that through a combination of military and civilian measures, an effort has been made to address the possible critical vulnerabilities in military and economic sectors. The question remains about the PLA’s ability to execute and sustain complex cross-strait operations, especially after targeted military purges in 2023 and 2024. Every measure mentioned here can be seen in isolation and not as a part of a complex puzzle that indicates that the PLA is preparing to invade Taiwan. However, these measures involve systemic integration with military logistics, enabling rapid deployment and sustainability when required. A steady accumulation of capabilities indicates deliberate preparation for eventualities that may align with China’s political-military objectives across the Taiwan Strait.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This paper departs from an assumption derived from Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory: Germany is a de facto leader of European integration processes and the European Union as an institution.The first part of the analysis explores priorities and their corresponding challenges for the new German CDU-led cabinet. It examines issues around the ongoing war in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and outstanding questions about German-China cooperation.The second part looks at the recently proposed Security and Defence Union (SDU) project and its various challenges.In conclusion, it is suggested that Germany will likely dominate future defence efforts, the actual shape of which will also be determined by other players such as the US, Russia, China, Iran, Israel, India or Turkey.Key Words: Germany, Foreign Policy, EU, Geopolitics Introduction According to the Federal Election Commission, the German election on February 23 saw a record-breaking voter turnout of 82.5%. That's an increase from 76.6% in 2021 and the highest voter participation since unification in 1990.  With vote counting finished, preliminary results show that the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, and its sister Christian Social Union (CSU) won the election with 28.6% of the vote. (As of the writing of this paper, the coalition negotiations are in progress, and the new Merz-Lead government will likely be formed by Easter this Year).  Before we analyse the challenges ahead of Merz's Government, let us briefly note that Friedrich Merz belongs to the so-called 'Davos Crowd'. He regularly attends the World Economic Forum Meetings. Before fully dedicating himself to politics, Merz worked as a corporate lawyer and held a significant position at BlackRock, a leading global investment management firm. He served as the head of the supervisory board of BlackRock's German branch, a role that has drawn scrutiny due to BlackRock's CEO, Larry Fink, being a key figure at the WEF. By his critics, Merz is seen as a 'globalist puppet' who is likely to promote Agenda 2030-related policies and the Klaus Schwab Great Reset initiative at the expense of German citizens.   Challenges ahead of Germany and its new political leadership Under the new CDU-led Government, Germany will face significant international challenges in supporting Ukraine, managing US relations, and balancing China ties. - The war in Ukraine The ongoing war in Ukraine is a pressing issue, requiring Germany to sustain its support for Ukraine while managing its own energy security and economic interests. This involves coordinating with other EU and NATO members, which could be challenging given potential fatigue and differing national priorities.  The ongoing war in Ukraine, initiated by Russia's invasion in 2022, remains a critical challenge for Germany. The new CDU-led Government must sustain this support amidst potential fatigue and economic pressures. It goes without saying that the war has disrupted energy supplies, with Germany suspending the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and facing higher energy costs. The CDU, under Merz, has advocated for a strong stance against Russia. Still, challenges include maintaining EU unity, especially with some member states favouring dialogue with Moscow, and managing domestic economic impacts, such as inflation and cost-of-living pressures. This support towards sustained support to sanctions against Russia seems necessary, but it may strain Germany's resources and require coordination with NATO and EU partners. - Navigating Transatlantic Relations Germany's relationship with the United States, mainly through NATO, is vital for its security and economic interests. Even before the Trump election, German experts were ready to address the incoming challenges.  Trump's opposition to previous policies, such as climate commitments and trade agreements, has led to tensions. Traditionally aligned with the US, the CDU knew the need to balance cooperation on security issues, such as defence spending, with potential trade and climate policy disagreements. This challenge is compounded by the need to prepare for a world where Germany must pay more for its security, especially given the war in Ukraine.  Today, Germans are painfully aware that the relations with the United States are crucial, especially given that Trump's presidency has already led to tensions over trade and security policies. Germany seems willing to balance cooperation with the US while asserting its interests and those of the EU. This will be complicated due to conflicting interests regarding trade and the economy. Trump is expected to continue his protectionist policies, imposing tariffs on German goods like cars to address the trade deficit. This will likely lead to retaliatory measures from Germany and the EU, straining economic ties.  In fact, the European Commission already declared it would impose "countermeasures" from April 1 in response to US tariffs of 25 per cent on steel and aluminium imports.   Regarding defence and security - Trump will likely pressure Germany to increase defence spending, possibly threatening to reduce US troops in Germany, as he did in his first term by announcing a withdrawal of 12,000 troops (later reversed by Biden). This could push Germany to enhance its defence capabilities and meet NATO targets.  As for climate change and energy - Trump's scepticism towards climate agreements, such as the Paris Accord, will likely continue, clashing with Germany's leadership in renewable energy and its goal to phase out coal by 2038 at the latest.   Finally, there is the question of foreign policy, especially Russia and Ukraine - Trump's potential alignment with Russia could complicate Germany's position, particularly given its significant support for Ukraine. Reports suggest Trump might cut Ukraine out of negotiations with Russia, forcing Germany to take a more independent stance.   - Balancing Economic Relations with China Germany's economic ties with China are significant, with China being a primary export market and investment partner. However, the new German Government faces the challenge of addressing security and human rights concerns, such as intellectual property theft and China's assertive foreign policy. The CDU-lead coalition may push for greater diversification of supply chains and stricter regulations, as suggested by recent analyses.   This balancing act is crucial, as economic dependence on China could limit Germany's ability to take a firm stance on delicate issues regarding human rights. The challenge is maintaining economic benefits while mitigating risks, potentially through EU-level coordination and bilateral agreements, which could create diplomatic pressures and affect Germany's global trade position. Economic ties and the challenge of de-risking. Germany has deep economic ties with China, with significant trade and investment flows, particularly in the automotive and manufacturing sectors. However, the new government will face the challenge of reducing economic dependence, as outlined in the CDU's election platform, which calls for "reducing reliance on China".  This is driven by concerns over supply chain vulnerabilities, as seen in the CDU's criticism of previous decisions like allowing a Chinese state-owned company to invest in Hamburg's port.  The challenge lies in implementing de-risking strategies without triggering economic repercussions, such as reduced exports or investment pullbacks. Recent statements from Merz, such as warning German firms about the "great risk" of investing in China, indicate a stricter stance. Still, experts question whether this rhetoric will translate into firm policy, given the economic interests at stake.   Security concerns and strategic competition are at the forefront - Friedrich Merz recently grouped China with Russia, North Korea, and Iran in an "axis of autocracies," highlighting perceived threats to German and European security.  The CDU's position paper, adopted around Easter 2023, states that the idea of peace through economic cooperation "has failed with regard to Russia, but increasingly also China," signalling a shift toward a more security-focused approach.  This includes addressing issues like technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and cybersecurity, which could strain bilateral relations. The challenge is strengthening defence and economic security measures without escalating tensions, particularly as China's military capabilities grow. Merz's focus on European strategic autonomy, especially in light of US policy shifts under Donald Trump, may lead to increased cooperation with EU partners in China. Human rights and values-based diplomacy are important for the incoming CDU-led government. Therefore, it is likely to take a firmer stance on human rights issues, reflecting the CDU's emphasis on preserving the rule-based international order.  Merz has consistently called China "an increasing threat to [German] security," suggesting a values-based approach that could lead to diplomatic tensions.  The challenge is maintaining constructive engagement while addressing these issues, especially as China has offered a "stable, constructive partnership" post-election, seeking to inject "new vitality" into China-EU relations. Balancing economic interests with values-based diplomacy will be a key test for Merz's government.  As for the coordination with EU partners, Germany's China policy should probably align with the EU's broader strategy, which has shifted toward de-risking under the European Commission. This requires coordination with other member states, some of whom may prioritise economic ties over security concerns, creating potential friction. The challenge is to ensure a united EU front, particularly in trade negotiations and investment screening, where Germany's leadership will be crucial. Merz's advocacy for improved coordination with major European allies such as France and Poland suggests focusing on EU unity. However, coalition dynamics, potentially involving the dovish Social Democrats, could dilute this approach.  Compared to Angela Merkel's pragmatic approach and Olaf Scholz's cautious stance, Merz's leadership is expected to mark a "Zeitenwende" or turning point, with a more critical and security-focused China policy.  However, the extent of change depends on coalition dynamics, with potential partners like the SPD possibly moderating his approach, creating tension between rhetoric and policy implementation. The EU as a security actor This section of the paper outlines the significant challenges ahead for the EU, considering Germany's influence and the broader geopolitical landscape, especially regarding the future EU defence cooperation and its potential relations with NATO. According to German experts and policymakers, The EU must maintain unity in supporting Ukraine amid Russia's ongoing invasion. Under the CDU, Germany will most likely continue its policy in this regard, providing military aid and economic support. According to the Federal Foreign Office, the German Government has, since the start of the war, made available around 43.62 billion euros in bilateral support for Ukraine (as of 31 December 2024); this aid includes the critical area of air defence, a substantial winter assistance programme and energy assistance, help for those who have fled Ukraine, humanitarian aid, mine clearance operations and assistance with efforts to investigate and document war crimes. Furthermore, Ukraine and Germany signed a bilateral agreement on security cooperation on 16 February 2024.  European Army The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership's vision regarding the Europen defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four 'revolutionary' ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to potentially 35 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.   The German leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's 'special responsibility' for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government's 'special responsibility' for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity.   In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the 'best equipped armed force' in Europe.  Former Chancellor Scholz would, however, make it an open claim at times: "As the most populous nation with the greatest economic power and a country in the centre of the continent, our army must become the cornerstone of conventional defence in Europe, the best-equipped force".  The re-entrance of Trump into global politics only reinvigorated German calls for stronger defence cooperation. Amid a drive to shore up support for Ukraine after Donald Trump halted US military aid and intelligence sharing, European leaders held emergency talks in Brussels (6 March 2025). They agreed (Hungary did not support the document) on a massive increase in defence spending. According to the European Council's Conclusions, the European Commission is to propose a new EU instrument to provide Member States with loans backed by the EU budget of up to EUR 150 billion.  Apart from that, the document mentions several other instruments that are supposed to enhance Europe's defence capabilities: additional funding sources, new EU instrument for loans, support from the European Investment Bank (EIB), mobilising private financing, priority areas for defence capabilities (air and missile defence; artillery systems, including deep precision strike capabilities; missiles and ammunition; drones and anti-drone systems; strategic enablers, including in relation to space and critical infrastructure protection; military mobility; cyber; artificial intelligence and electronic warfare), joint procurement and standardisation, simplification of legal frameworks and finally coordination with NATO. Overall, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, presented a plan worth EUR 800 billion to increase European defence spending against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Will it be enough to create actual European defence capabilities, finally? Time will show. Europeans have been talking about common European defence for decades. So far, most of their achievements fall short of lofty political declarations.  Consequently, on March 19 this year, the European Commission unveiled the Joint White Paper for European Defence 2030.  (White papers are policy documents produced by the Governments that set out their proposals for future legislation.) Accordingly, the 22-page-long document consists of numerous 'bold' ideas to advance European defence cooperation toward a European Army. The key threats to European Security include correspondingly: military aggression from Russia, strategic competition (there is increasing strategic competition in Europe's wider neighbourhood, from the Arctic to the Baltic to the Middle East and North Africa), transnational challenges (issues such as rapid technological change, migration, and climate change are seen as serious stressors on political and economic systems), actions of authoritarian states (countries like China are asserting their influence in Europe and its economy, posing a strategic challenge due to their authoritarian governance style), hybrid threats (these include cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the weaponisation of migration. The document notes that these threats are interconnected and increasingly prevalent), geopolitical rivalries (ongoing geopolitical tensions in various regions, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, are highlighted as contributing to instability that directly affects Europe) and last but not least instability from neighboring Regions (proximity to conflict zones, especially in North Africa and the Middle East, leads to spillover effects such as migration and economic insecurity).  Notably, at the very beginning of the document, the EC makes an unequivocal statement: "The future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole. Since 2022, we have seen a full-scale, high-intensity war on the borders of the European Union with hundreds of thousands of casualties, mass population displacement, huge economic costs and deliberate destruction of vital energy systems and cultural heritage. The outcome of that war will be a determinative factor in our collective future for decades ahead". The document proposes several measures to support Ukraine amid its ongoing conflict, mainly through a "Porcupine strategy" to enhance Ukraine's defence and security capacity. The "Porcupine strategy" includes elements such as:  Increased Military Assistance - The EU and its Member States should significantly step up military and other assistance to Ukraine (providing large-calibre artillery ammunition with a target of delivering a minimum of 2 million rounds per year, supplying air defence systems, missiles (including deep precision strikes), and drones, supporting Ukraine's procurement of drones and further developing its production capacity through joint ventures with European industries and training and equipping Ukrainian brigades and supporting the regeneration of battalions). Direct Support to Ukraine's Defense Industry (the document emphasises the importance of directly supporting Ukraine's defence industry (encouraging EU Member States to procure directly from Ukraine's defence industry for donations to Ukraine and utilising EU loans to boost Ukraine's defence industry spending, estimated to reach around EUR 35 billion in productive capacity by 2025). Enhanced Military Mobility (the EU aims to improve military mobility corridors extending into Ukraine, facilitating smoother deliveries of military assistance and enhancing interoperability). Access to EU Space Assets (Ukraine should have enhanced access to EU space-based governmental services, which would aid in its defence capabilities). Coordination of Military Support (the EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell will coordinate military support for Ukraine, enhancing collaboration with NATO and other partners). Integration of Ukraine into EU Defense Initiatives (the document proposes integrating Ukraine's defence industry into EU initiatives and encouraging its participation in collaborative defence projects. Conclusion A 'Security and Defence Union' (SDU) has been recently proposed as a new institutional form of military cooperation among EU Members.  It is suggested that the SDU includes the UK, and given the special attention paid to Ukraine in the White Paper, it is logical to surmise that it (Ukraine) will also be a de facto member. The devil lies in details, however, and so financially speaking, Europeans have to address numerous challenges. For example, the European Defence Fund (EDF) details Euro 8 billion over 7 years (approx. Euro 1.12 billion/year), supports R&D, and has committed Euro 5.4 billion since May 2021.        Meeting these ambitious goals will be especially challenging given the funding constraints (EU instruments like EDF and EDIP have limited impact; EDIP at €750 million/year is less than 1% of €90 billion 2024 procurement, needs €9 billion/year for 10% impact), capability and industry gaps (post-Cold War cuts left significant gaps, needing €160 billion by 2018 if 2008 levels maintained, €1.1 trillion if all spent 2% GDP 2006-2020), political and partnership issues (US scepticism, especially under second Trump administration, makes EU states cautious), policy integration (balancing security and economic priorities).  Against this backdrop, Germany claims to rise to the occasion and take the leading role, passing a new defence budget, referred to by media as 'bazooka'.  A massive increase in military spending is paralleled by another military aid package to Ukraine (The €3 billion package approved by the Bundestag Budget Committee comes on top of the €4 billion in military aid to Ukraine already planned in the 2025 budget).  Where does it leave NATO? 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