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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Germany’s presumptive new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, faces challenges both at home and overseas following his conservative alliance’s election victory on Feb. 23, 2025. A strong showing from the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) – which Merz, in line with other mainstream German parties, refuses to countenance as a coalition party as part of an unofficial “firewall” against extremism – will make forming a functioning government tricky. But in the moments after the election results, it was the future of the European Union and its relationship with America that was his immediate focus: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” To understand why that is such a concern for Germany now and what “real independence” from Washington means, The Conversation U.S. turned to Garret Martin, an expert on U.S.-Europe relations at American University, for answers. What prompted Merz’s ‘real independence’ line? Presumably it was a response to a series of recent announcements and actions by the Trump administration that have shocked the German political establishment. This includes the sudden revelation that the U.S. would negotiate directly with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, but seemingly without the Europeans or Ukrainians involved. That development went down like a lead balloon in Berlin, especially considering Germany’s significant financial support of Kyiv since 2022. Moreover, the German establishment has also frowned at a series of recent declarations by members of the Trump administration. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he harshly criticized Europe for allegedly undermining freedom of expression, provoked clear pushback from German leaders. Trump, for his part, hardly endeared himself to his German allies when he denounced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator.” And, of course, Elon Musk’s interference in the German elections – as well as his open support for the far-right Alternative for Germany – provoked a fierce response from Merz. The then-candidate promised that Musk would need to be prepared for legal consequences for his meddling. How would this ‘real independence’ be achieved? Defining what “real independence” means and being able to implement such a drastic change in transatlantic relations will be a tall order. If by “real independence” Merz means that Germany would no longer rely on the U.S. for its security, then that would require several major steps. Merz would first need to convince his likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, that this is the right goal. After all, German governments are bound by very detailed coalition agreements. Second, Merz would need to significantly increase German defense spending. As it stands, Germany’s annual defense budget is slightly over US$90 billion, or 2% of its GDP. But a recent study by the economic think tank Bruegel suggests Berlin would need to increase its budget by $145 billion annually to defend Europe without the assistance of the U.S. But to achieve this, Merz will likely need to increase defense spending by such a level that it will contravene the country’s “debt brake.” This 2009 constitutional rule essentially caps the annual deficit that the government can take on. But overturning this mechanism would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the German Parliament. Merz’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union party won 28.6% of the vote – and even with the support of the country’s main center-left party, the Social Democrats, Merz will fall short of the parliamentary votes needed. Finally, “real independence” would also require convincing other European Union partners to join him down that path. Assuming that the Trump administration continues its current trajectory and further undermines NATO, the EU would have to step in to become a more prominent security actor for the continent. It might also require, as Merz hinted, that the United Kingdom and France be ready to share their nuclear weapons, since the U.S. may not be trusted anymore to defend NATO countries. All of these steps would cover “real independence” only in the security sphere and not touch other crucial policy areas, such as trade and energy. And that would be an equally tall order given the level of economic ties binding Germany to the U.S., as well as the looming threat of tariffs. What does this mean for German-US relations? Merz’s “real independence” statement would have been noteworthy coming from any German chancellor. But it is even more striking when one considers the fact that Merz is a committed transatlanticist who deeply admires the U.S. and counts Ronald Reagan as one of his role models. At 69, Merz came of age during the final years of the Cold War, when the U.S. played a key role in enabling German reunification. He worked for years for Atlantik-Brücke, a lobbying group pushing for closer transatlantic ties. And he has, by his own account, traveled more than 100 times to the U.S. Independence will not likely mean a complete divorce between the U.S. and Germany – the ties binding the two countries, whether economic, cultural or political, run too deep. However, we can expect that Berlin will not hesitate to take a more combative approach toward Washington when necessary, so to protect German and European interests. As Merz pointed out, it is clear that the Trump administration does “not care much about the fate of Europe.” What does this signal for Merz’s view of Germany’s position in the EU? Merz’s win will certainly lead to important shifts in Germany’s position in the EU, and could be a major boost for a union in need of leadership. His predecessor, Olaf Scholz, was hampered by a weak economy, divisions within his coalition and indecisive leadership in Europe. Moreover, poor relations with French President Emmanuel Macron also stalled the Franco-German partnership, normally a key engine of leadership in the EU. Merz certainly plans to take a very distinct approach toward the EU than his predecessor. His calls for “real independence” will certainly be very welcome in France, which has long called for Europe to be more responsible for its own security. As such, it opens up the possibility of far closer ties between Paris and Berlin than we saw in recent years. Moreover, Merz, with his more hawkish position toward Russia, could be counted on to provide greater support for Ukraine.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The commitment to free trade is based on the competitive advantage that nations gain from possessing certain material and human resources that are scarce in other countries. The exchange of goods under the umbrella of free trade results in a global benefit, as it fosters economic growth, improves the quality of goods, and diversifies supply. The free trade doctrine, which has governed international trade in recent decades, is opposed by protectionism, which seeks to favor domestic producers over foreign competition. Above All, Protectionism Trump's campaign to win votes from the U.S. automotive and agricultural sectors was based on extreme protectionism – which we could call the ‘Trump Doctrine’ – centered on the promise of raising tariffs on products from competing countries. The increase in tariffs to boost domestic production in non-competitive sectors clashes with the rules of the World Trade Organization and the already established trade relations with exporting countries. On the other hand, those who silently suffer from Trump's protectionist measures are American consumers, who will have to pay higher prices for imported products that are currently cheaper. The need to reorganize international trade flows had already been raised due to the existence of ecological, social, or economic dumping. In response to violations of competition rules and the presence of discriminatory situations, agricultural groups have demanded mirror clauses to ensure that imported products comply with the same regulations as domestic ones. However, all these proposals have been made within a negotiating framework and not in a disruptive and unilateral manner, as the Trump Doctrine does. Tariff Increases Specifically, the U.S. has formalized a 25% tariff on steel and aluminum from other countries, set to take effect on March 4. This impacts the Spanish industrial sector, which exports aluminum worth 500 million to the U.S. market. There are still no details on which Spanish agri-food products (such as wine, olive oil, meat, and dairy) may be affected and to what extent by the Trump Doctrine. Latin American countries are also at risk: in 2021, 86% of their agri-food exports were destined for three regions — the U.S. (23%), the EU (18%), and China (13%). The EU and Latin American countries belonging to Mercosur have the advantage of having signed an agreement in December 2024, which will allow them to strengthen their trade relations and potentially offset losses in the U.S. market. In response to these tariff attacks, countries have reacted by attempting to reach agreements among the affected nations. The European Union and Canada have met to design a joint strategy against the Trump Doctrine, and China is also considering reorganizing its trade flows, which could provide some relief for its exports. However, the damage caused by tariffs is global and does not only affect exporting countries. In the United States, there will be negative impacts on consumers and businesses in the form of higher prices and even shortages or the disappearance of some imported products. United States-Europe Trade Relations There is no free trade agreement between Europe and the United States, although an attempt was made, without success, to establish the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). However, progress has been made in harmonizing food safety regulations, quality standards, and data privacy rules. Nevertheless, Trump accuses Europe of "treating the United States very badly" and has warned that they must balance the "$350 billion" trade deficit. In Europe, the most exposed sectors to the threat of U.S. protectionism are aerospace, automotive, and agri-food. The countries at the highest risk include Germany (automotive), France (aerospace), the Netherlands (petrochemical), Italy (pharmaceutical), Ireland (technology), and Spain (agri-food), as they have the most open economies to foreign trade. On the other hand, the United States exports high-tech products, machinery, chemicals, and agricultural goods (corn, soy, meat) to Europe. In the digital sector, major U.S. companies (Amazon, Google, Apple, Meta) are well-positioned in the Old Continent, often engaging in market dominance abuses that the EU has attempted to curb through fines and legislative changes. Spanish exports to the United States focus on automobiles, machinery, and pharmaceutical and agri-food products (wine, olive oil, meat, dairy, and horticultural products). U.S. imports into the Spanish market primarily consist of machinery, electronic products, pharmaceuticals, financial services, and agricultural goods. The U.S. has invested in Spain in the automotive, technology, energy, distribution, and finance sectors. In turn, Spain has a presence in the North American market in the distribution sector (Inditex, Mango), renewable energy (Iberdrola, Acciona, Naturgy), communications, and infrastructure (Ferrovial, ACS, Sacyr). The Technological Battle A fierce competition is emerging in the development of space travel, military technology, and integrated artificial intelligence. In the geopolitical landscape, development cooperation, armed conflicts, climate change, and environmental sustainability are key issues to consider. We have just witnessed how restrictions on the supply of microprocessors stimulated China's creativity in the tech sector. China welcomed the new year with DeepSeek, its own AI model — with similar capabilities to ChatGPT but significantly lower costs — which has shaken the U.S. tech industry and triggered a stock market upheaval. Meanwhile, the EU is now trying to shake off its role as a mere spectator in the development of these new technologies and has just announced a €200 billion investment in the development of European AI. It is important to remember that Europe has been a pioneer in AI legislation, with the Artificial Intelligence Act approved by its Parliament at the end of 2023.  Outlook and Solutions The impact of trade wars depends, on one hand, on the measures imposed (tariff, fiscal, or regulatory) and the volume of existing trade flows. However, the characteristics of the regions, economic sectors, and affected social groups also play a crucial role. In the final countdown, before the implementation of the new tariffs, the United States reached a preliminary agreement with Mexico and Canada, granting a one-month pause before enforcing the announced tariffs. In the case of China, its response to the U.S. threat was to announce similar tariff increases on American products. Among European countries, there are different strategic approaches to the Trump Doctrine. The positions of the Paris-Berlin axis — ready to respond to U.S. tariff threats — and the Rome-Budapest axis are opposed. It remains to be seen whether Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who attended Trump's inauguration on January 20, will act as a mediator between the EU and the U.S. or if she will focus solely on securing a favorable position for Italy. Volatility, Uncertainty, Fluctuations A trade war affects foreign investments and creates volatility in financial markets due to the uncertainty it generates. Additionally, it reduces trade exchanges (imports-exports) and causes fluctuations in currency markets. The dilemma of “restructuring or rejection” posed by the Trump Doctrine involves the option of readjusting the existing order or entering into direct competition. For now, tensions remain high, and The Wall Street Journal, one of the major U.S. media outlets, describes the trade war as “absurd,” “unnecessary,” and “stupid.” The reality is that an atmosphere of international insecurity has been created regarding future investments, and stock markets have suffered losses. Meanwhile, the threatened countries insist they will enforce countermeasures, to which Trump responds by threatening to raise tariffs even further.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia President Vladimir Putin sent a guarded message of congratulations to Donald Trump on inauguration day, but then held a long direct call with his “dear friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping. From Putin’s perspective, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from energy sales to China and technology from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, mostly sanctions and suspicion. Moscow is hoping for a more positive relationship with the current White House occupant, who has made his desire for a “deal” to end the Ukraine war well known. But talk of exit scenarios from this 3-year-old conflict should not mask the fact that since the invasion began, Putin has overseen one of the worst periods in Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Transatlantic unity The war in Ukraine has foreclosed on options and blunted Russian action around the world. Unlike the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2022 invasion produced an unprecedented level of transatlantic unity, including the expansion of NATO and sanctions on Russian trade and finance. In the past year, both the U.S. and the European Union expanded their sanction packages. And for the first time, the EU banned the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas and ended support for a Russian LNG project in the Arctic. EU-Russian trade, including European imports of energy, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the war.   The two Nordstrom pipelines, designed to bring Russian gas to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unused. Revenues from energy sales are roughly one-half of what they were two years ago.   At the same time, the West has sent billions in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, enabling a level of resilience for which Russia was unprepared. Meanwhile, global companies and technical experts and intellectuals have fled Russia in droves. While Russia has evaded some restrictions with its “shadow fleet” – an aging group of tankers sailing under various administrative and technical evasions – the country’s main savior is now China. Trade between China and Russia has grown by nearly two-thirds since the end of 2021, and the U.S. cites Beijing as the main source of Russia’s “dual use” and other technologies needed to pursue its war. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods trade relationship with the West to one of vassalage with China, as one Russia analyst termed it. Hosting an October meeting of the BRICS countries – now counting 11 members, including the five original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – is unlikely to compensate for geopolitical losses elsewhere. Problems at home... The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40% of the budget and 25% of all spending. The government now needs the equivalent of US$20 billion annually in order to pay for new recruits. Russian leaders must find a way to keep at least some of the population satisfied, but persistent inflation and reserve currency shortages flowing directly from the war have made this task more difficult. On the battlefield, the war itself has killed or wounded more than 600,000 Russian soldiers. Operations during 2024 were particularly deadly, producing more than 1,500 Russian casualties a day. The leader who expected Kyiv’s capitulation in days now finds Russian territory around Kursk occupied, its naval forces in the Black Sea destroyed and withdrawn, and one of its own generals assassinated in Moscow. But probably the greatest humiliation is that this putative great power with a population of 144 million must resort to importing North Korean troops to help liberate its own land. ...and in its backyard Moscow’s dedication to the war has affected its ability to influence events elsewhere, even in its own neighborhood. In the Caucasus, for example, Russia had long sided with Armenia in its running battle with Azerbaijan over boundaries and population after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow has brokered ceasefires at various points. But intermittent attacks and territorial gains for Azerbaijan continued despite the presence of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers sent to protect the remaining Armenian population in parts of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s forces abruptly took control of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 100,000 Armenians fled in the largest ethnic cleansing episode since the end of the Balkan Wars. The peacekeepers did not intervene and later withdrew. The Russian military, absorbed in the bloody campaigns in Ukraine, could not back up or reinforce them. The Azeris’ diplomatic and economic position has gained in recent years, aided by demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s and support from NATO member Turkey. Feeling betrayed by Russia, the Armenian government has for the first time extended feelers toward the West — which is happy to entertain such overtures. Losing influence and friends Russia’s loss in the Caucasus has been dwarfed by the damage to its military position and influence in the Middle East. Russia supported the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad against the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 and saved it with direct military intervention beginning in 2015. Yet in December 2024, Assad was unexpectedly swept away by a mélange of rebel groups. The refuge extended to Assad by Moscow was the most it could provide with the war in Ukraine having drained Russia’s capacity to do more. Russia’s possible withdrawal from the Syrian naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim would remove assets that allowed it to cooperate with Iran, its key strategic partner in the region. More recently, Russia’s reliability as an ally and reputation as an armory has been damaged by Israeli attacks not only on Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Syria, but on Iran itself. Russia’s position in Africa would also be damaged by the loss of the Syrian bases, which are key launch points for extending Russian power, and by Moscow’s evident inability to make a difference on the ground across the Sahel region in north-central Africa. Dirty tricks, diminishing returns Stalemate in Ukraine and Russian strategic losses in Syria and elsewhere have prompted Moscow to rely increasingly on a variety of other means to try to gain influence. Disinformation, election meddling and varied threats are not new and are part of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. But recent efforts in East Europe have not been very productive. Massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania, for example, helped produce a narrow victory for an anti-NATO presidential candidate in December 2024, but the Romanian government moved quickly to expose these actions and the election was annulled. Nearby Moldova has long been subject to Russian propaganda and threats, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a “European course” in the constitution. The tiny country moved to reduce its dependency on Russian gas but remains territorially fragmented by the breakaway region of Transnistria that, until recently, provided most of the country’s electricity. Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming. When Moldova thumbs its nose at you, it’s fair to say your power ranking has fallen. Wounded but still dangerous Not all recent developments have been negative for Moscow. State control of the economy has allowed for rapid rebuilding of a depleted military and support for its technology industry in the short term. With Chinese help and evasion of sanctions, sufficient machinery and energy allow the war in Ukraine to continue. And the inauguration of Donald Trump is likely to favor Putin, despite some mixed signals. The U.S. president has threatened tariffs and more sanctions but also disbanded a Biden-era task force aimed a punishing Russian oligarchs who help Russia evade sanctions. In the White House now is someone who has openly admired Putin, expressed skepticism over U.S. support for Ukraine and rushed to bully America’s closest allies in Latin America, Canada and Europe. Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory.” The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous; it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin watchers argue that a more economically isolated Russia is less vulnerable to American economic pressure. A retreating Russia and an embattled Putin could also opt for even more reckless threats and actions – for example, on nuclear weapons – especially if reversing course in Ukraine would jeopardize his position. It is, after all, Putin’s war. All observers would be wise to note that the famous dictum “Russia is never as strong as she looks … nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself: “Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be.”

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Finally, after many leaks, hints, intimations and procrastinations, US President Donald Trump might have come up with something a bit more specific than his initial general promises to put an end to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 24 hours. For the first time a draft of his peace plan is on the table. The plan was revealed by various Ukrainian and European media last week and though it has never been officially confirmed by the White House or the State Department, there are reasons to believe that we indeed observe a gradual shaping of the new Administration’s position on arguably the most destructive and dangerous military conflict of our times. However, the devil is always in details. Let us have a closer look at what Trump has or may have in mind. Ceasefire According to the plan, the peace process should start with Presidents Putin and Zelensky having an urgent phone call followed by a face-to-face meeting no later than in the end of February or in the beginning of March. A complete ceasefire along the present line of contact should be in place by the day of 2025 Christian Easter (April 20) and European peacekeeping units will be asked to police a demilitarized zone separating the two sides (American troops will not have their boots on the ground). Shortly after that, by the time of the 80-year anniversary of the V-day in Europe (May 9), a comprehensive peace agreement should be signed and, if needed, ratified by the parties to the conflict. This is an exceptionally bold and ambitious time-table, but is it nonetheless realistic? First, it would be quite a challenge even to make Putin and Zelensky directly talk to each other. In fall of 2022, the Ukrainian President signed a special executive order forbidding himself engaging in any direct negotiations with his Russian counterpart. On the Russian side, there are serious doubts about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leader since his term in power already expired in May of 2024 and no national elections have been held after that. More importantly, it would be very hard to enforce the ceasefire, if and when such a ceasefire is reached. The experience of the Minsk Agreement implementation and international monitoring is not very reassuring, and the line of contact today is much longer than it was back in 2015. To put together a well-trained and properly equipped international monitoring mission of tens of thousands uniformed men and women would be next to impossible, at least within the time framework suggested by the US Administration. Needless to say, Russia would hardly accept a EU/NATO peacekeeping mission on its territory. Territorial compromises Trump apparently suggests that both sides should stick to the territories that they now have under their control. This idea logically implies a demand for Kyiv to accept Russian sovereignty on the parts of the four former Ukrainian regions as well as on the Crimean Peninsula that was reunited with the Russian Federation eleven years ago after the referendum of March, 2014. The Ukrainian side should also withdraw from the Russian territories in the Kursk region that it currently occupies. In exchange Russia should stop its ongoing offensive in Donbass and limit its territorial acquisitions to what it already has in its possession. This proposal is clearly not exactly what either Kyiv or Moscow would like to see as the final peace settlement. In Ukraine, they still hope that at some point thy will be in a position to restore the territorial integrity of the country including what they lost back in 2014—namely, parts of Eastern Donbass and Crimea. The Russian leadership, in its turn, intends to capture at least all the remaining territories of the four regions that it does not fully control now (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye) and maybe even to advance further West. (Kharkov, Odessa and so on). To reach a compromise between these two positions would be truly a formidable task. Future status of Ukraine According to Donald Trump, Ukraine should not become a NATO member—at least, in the foreseeable future. He remains skeptical about a possible Ukrainian contribution to the Alliance security, he does not want to enlarge the NATO’s zone of responsibility, and he does not want to cross Moscow’s red line on this very issue. However, Ukraine may still aspire to join the European Union before too long, and the United States is ready to assist Kyiv in meeting its European aspirations. A neutral status for Ukraine is something that many in Kyiv would lament and consider a serious setback, while many in Moscow would definitely appreciate and support. However, how can this neutrality be secured in the long term? After all, Ukraine has already been neutral; this status was explicitly stated in the very first declaration on Ukrainian sovereignty approved by the Ukrainian Parliament even before the Soviet disintegration and later on incorporated into the Ukrainian Constitution. And yet, since at least 2008 Kyiv was contentiously drifting away from this initial position; finally, the national Constitution was revised and the pro-Western Ukrainian political leadership started actively seeking membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. What would prevent future Ukraine from changing its mind once again in five or ten or twenty years from now, when neither Trump, nor Putin is around to stop it from moving in the NATO membership direction? Security guarantees Instead of offering Kyiv prompt NATO membership, Trump is ready to provide US security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for getting for the US business a preferential access to valuable Ukrainian mineral resources—including natural gas, lithium, titanium and graphite. The United States will continue to assist Ukraine with military hardware deliveries till at least 2030, but these deliveries will no longer take form of charity—they should generate appropriate profits for the US defence sector and create jobs for American workers. This part of Trump‘s proposals remains highly ambiguous and unclear. What kind of security guarantees is the United States willing to offer Ukraine? Are we going to see US military bases on the Ukrainian soil or any other manifestations of the US military presence there? Is Trump ready to turn Ukraine into another Israel or another Japan? If this is the case, then does such an arrangement really differ a lot from a Ukrainian membership to NATO? Would Moscow easily accept a not-so-symbolic US military presence so close to its borders? The proposed US access to Ukraine’s natural resources also raises many questions. Ukraine indeed has repositories of valuable minerals (arguably amounting to USD 15 trillion of total value), but most of these repositories are located on the territories that are now controlled by Russia. Sanctions As an additional incentive for Moscow to demonstrate the needed flexibility, Trump offers Russia to lift economic sanctions as a part of the overall peace arrangement. He argues that the Western sanctions have a profound negative impact on the Russian economy, slow down Russia’s modernization and prevent the country from taking its rightful place within the international economic system. The prospect of lifting sanctions should therefore motivate the Kremlin to go for a reasonable compromise in order to put an end to the fratricidal conflict. This idea sounds great, but it seems that Trump offers more than he can deliver. First, Russia suffers more from the EU sanctions than from the US sanctions; the Russia-EU trade has always been significantly larger than the Russia-US trade. No US President can simply ‘order’ the European allies of the United States to completely reverse their current policy towards Moscow, even if the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is miraculously stopped. The odds are that the EU sanctions imposed on Moscow will be in place for a long time, even if the US sanctions are lifted. Second, even on the US sanctions lifting, Donald Trump is not that omnipotent. Some of these sanctions have been approved by the US Congress and have become national laws. To recall or even to ease them, one should pass an appropriate legislative decision on the Capitol Hill, which might turn out to be extremely complicated and protracted. Reconstruction of Ukraine Like in many other cases, Trump has absolutely no intention to spend large amounts of US taxpayer’s money on reconstructing such a distant land as Ukraine. Instead, the US President would like to impose this heavy burden on the European Union (exactly like he intends to impose the financial burden of Gaza reconstruction on the Arab Gulf states). The price tag of Ukraine’s reconstruction might amount to USD 500 billion, and EU should be prepared to annually allocate up to USD 50 billion for ten years. A part of the funding, however, can come from special duties imposed on Russia’s energy exports in exchange for lifting Western sanctions on the Russian hydrocarbons production. This part of Trump’s proposals is based on a number of arbitrary assumptions, which are hard to assess at this point. Nobody really knows how much the Ukrainian reconstruction will ultimately cost and how long time it will take. The actual financial capabilities of the European Union might turn out to be more modest than Trump apparently expects, especially given the fact that the US Administration’s wish list for Europe is not limited to supporting Ukraine only, but also includes more generous contributions to NATO, multiple trade concessions, more economic engagement in the Middle East and so on. Ukraine’s absorption capacity might turn out to be limited as well, given the present state of economic and administrative reforms, rampant corruption and the exodus of a large part of the county’s population to Europe. Finally, it is hard to imagine how Trump will convince Putin to pay duties on Russia’s energy exports, particularly when Trump remains committed to bringing the global energy prices down to the extent possible. European security So far, the Trump Administration has not been very prolific on how the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict should affect a more general problem of the European security. Still, this dimension of a potential agreement has to be kept in mind, if the idea is to provide for a lasting peace in the Euroatlantic space. Russian officials have stated more than once that the ongoing conflict is not just a clash between Russia and Ukraine, but rather a standstill between Russia and the ‘collective West’. That implies that any settlement should include a broader range of arrangements on the future European security architecture, such as multilateral confidence building measures, mil-to-mil contacts at various levels and even some forms of conventional arms control in Europe. The problem is that Trump has never been particularly interested in any meaningful forms of multilateralism including multilateral arms control or confidence building measures. Moreover, he has always been skeptical of any arms control, bilateral including, regarding it as an unnecessary and potentially even harmful way to limit the US abilities to outspend and to outperform all its adversaries and rivals. This is why during his first term in power Trump decided to abandon the US-Soviet INF Treaty, was not eager to extend the New START Agreement and decided to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. It is not clear how with such an attitude Donald Trump is planning to ensure that there will be no other dangerous crisis in Europe soon after a settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is reached. To sum up, it is definitely good news that Donald Trump has finally come with some kind of a peace plane for Ukraine. To have something to consider and to discuss is undoubtedly better than to have nothing and to speculate about what the White House may or may not offer. Still, the Trump plan in its current form is only half-baked. It might be the right first step, not much more than the very first step. A lot will now depend on the US Administration commitment, stamina, patience and its attention span. Peace talks are different from business negotiations that Trump is so used to. In business negotiation, you can accept failures to reach a good deal and you can move on to other opportunities, which you will always find around in plenty. In peace talks, failure is not an acceptable outcome. First published in the Guacha.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the arrival of the Donald Trump administration, trade relations between the United States and Canada have undergone significant changes, particularly in light of the introduction of new 25% tariffs on Canadian goods, including automotive products, steel, and aluminum. These measures are justified as a "national threat" due to migration and drugs [1]. In response, Canada imposed reciprocal measures worth $155 billion, affecting food products, alcohol, electric vehicles, and aerospace products [2]. Experts predict that these mutual restrictions could reduce Canada's GDP by 2.6%, while the U.S. GDP could decline by 1.6% [3]. Additionally, a revision of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is expected. The Trump administration intends to evaluate trade imbalances and their impact on jobs, which could lead to a shift from a trilateral agreement to bilateral agreements. Risks of this revision include tightening rules of origin for the automotive industry, pressuring Canada to open its dairy market, and using the USMCA as leverage to address border security and migration issues. There is also an expectation that the U.S. will attempt to include border security and military spending issues in trade negotiations [4]. Through these actions, the United States could push Canada toward closer dialogue with China, strengthening its role as an alternative market for Canadian resources and becoming another significant factor in the changing trade dynamics between the U.S. and Canada. In the midst of the trade war with the U.S., Canada was left without clear leadership due to the resignation of Justin Trudeau and the suspension of parliament until the end of March. Not only did this lead to a split within the Liberal Party, with its members simultaneously competing for leadership and attempting to formulate a response to the external threat, but the lack of a unified strategy also weakened the country's position in negotiations with the U.S. administration. Amid the crisis, the provinces took matters into their own hands, increasing pressure on Ottawa. The introduction of tariffs has caused a split between the provinces, whose economies depend on trade with the U.S. in different ways. Newfoundland Premier Andrew Furey called the tariffs an "existential threat" and demanded tough retaliatory measures, including sanctions on critical minerals important for the American industry [5]. Meanwhile, Ontario, home to the automotive industry, which accounts for about 25% of the province's GDP, is demanding an aggressive response from the federal government to the U.S. actions. Preparing for early elections, the province announced a $23 billion business relief package, as well as reciprocal tariffs on American goods, including alcohol and home appliances, setting a precedent for other regions [6]. Alberta, where oil and gas exports make up 68% of the economy, opposed the ban on shipments to the U.S. Premier Danielle Smith called such measures "harmful to Canadians" and urged targeted retaliatory actions, such as tariffs on goods from "red states" [7]. British Columbia and Quebec opted for symbolic sanctions. Premier David Eby, for instance, imposed a ban on alcohol imports from Republican states and announced a priority for Canadian goods in government procurement [8]. Quebec, whose aerospace industry is closely tied to the U.S., has so far limited itself to strong rhetoric. The conflict of interest also emerged in the issue of internal trade barriers. The Trudeau government announced plans to eliminate interprovincial trade barriers, which are said to reduce GDP by $130 billion annually [9]. However, provinces with developed agriculture (Manitoba, Saskatchewan) are blocking the liberalization of the meat market, while Ontario and Quebec are defending the retention of dairy quotas. Premier of Nova Scotia Tim Houston, as a symbol of this systemic issue, criticized the inability to "ship a bottle of wine across the provincial border" [10]. Interprovincial and intergovernmental escalation could strengthen Canadian regionalism. According to the "B.C. Economic Forecast", 25% tariffs could cost British Columbia 120,000 jobs, while Ontario would lose 200,000 [11]. This will likely lead to increased demands from regions for a redistribution of federal subsidies, becoming a factor that threatens the unity of the country. So far, provinces are acting separately, from Ontario’s push for infrastructure investments to British Columbia’s initiative to accelerate projects in remote regions. The federal government is facing criticism from opposition parties that are calling for more support for the population rather than businesses, warning of rising prices for food and fuel. The Conservatives and the New Democrats have responded decisively, urging immediate action to protect Canadian workers and industries from the impact of tariffs. Pierre Poilievre and Jagmeet Singh have demanded that the government implement protective measures, further intensifying the political discourse around trade and economic policy. While this situation risks deepening divisions between the federal and provincial governments, U.S. tariffs present an opportunity for political unity among parties that typically have differing views on trade. The immediate threat could force various factions within the Liberal Party to unite around a common strategy to combat U.S. trade aggression. This could strengthen Trudeau’s position, as he takes steps to address public concerns related to job losses and economic stability. However, the long-term consequences for Canada's domestic politics may extend beyond immediate economic issues. The tariffs have sparked noticeable public outrage in Canada. Many Canadians are bewildered by Trump’s actions, particularly given the historically close economic ties between the two countries. Canadians have begun to publicly express their displeasure, such as booing the U.S. national anthem at sporting events, which reflects deep frustration with Trump’s unilateral decision [12]. This reaction also indicates that American actions are perceived as an unfair attack on Canadian sovereignty and economic stability. A recent survey conducted by the Canadian Labour Congress revealed that a significant majority of Canadians (around 80%) believe that American tariffs will increase the cost of living in Canada and negatively affect relations with the U.S [13]. Nearly 90% of respondents support government investment plans aimed at strengthening the Canadian economy and protecting jobs from the adverse effects of these tariffs. In light of these events, a movement is growing among Canadians to prioritize domestic goods over American imports. Many citizens are actively seeking ways to support local businesses as a form of protest against Trump’s tariffs. Social media campaigns urging consumers to buy Canadian-made products are gaining momentum, and some citizens are even canceling plans to travel to the U.S. as a manifesto against American trade policies. If the government’s retaliatory measures do not yield favorable results or if they worsen the economic downturn, public discontent may intensify, leading to shifts in voter sentiment ahead of this year’s elections. Economic difficulties will turn into political challenges, as voters tend to hold the ruling parties responsible for perceived failures in managing trade relations. Moreover, as Canada reevaluates its trade strategies in light of the aggressive policies of the U.S., there may be calls for a more assertive approach to international trade agreements and partnerships outside the North American region, which could significantly alter the platforms of Canadian political parties. References [1] Imposing Duties To Address The Flow Of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border. The White House Official Website. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-duties-to-address-the-flow-of-illicit-drugs-across-our-national-border/[2] Canada responded with $155 billion in mirror measures affecting food, alcohol, electric vehicles and aerospace products. Experts predict that these mutual restrictions could reduce Canada's GDP by 2.6% and the U.S.'s by 1.6%. CTV News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/canada-to-slap-25-per-cent-tariff-on-155b-of-us-goods-after-trump-initiates-trade-war/[3] Trump’s 25% Tariff Threat: New Analysis Reveals Severe Economic Fallout for Both Canada and the U.S. Canadian Chamber of Commerce’s Business Data Lab (BDL). November 28, 2024. Available at: https://chamber.ca/news/trumps-25-tariff-threat-new-analysis-reveals-severe-economic-fallout-for-both-canada-and-the-u-s/[4] Experts React: Trump Just Slapped Tariffs On Mexico, Canada And China. What’s Next? Atlantic Council (признан нежелательной организацией в РФ). February 2, 2025. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-trump-just-slapped-tariffs-on-mexico-canada-and-china-whats-next/[5] Premiers decry Trump's tariffs, announce countermeasures and call for federal response. CBC News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/several-premiers-decry-trump-s-tariffs-and-call-for-powerful-canadian-response-1.7448301[6] As Trump's tariffs become a reality, Ontario's party leaders pitch plans to respond. CBC News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/trump-tariffs-ontario-party-leaders-respond-1.7448203[7] 'It doesn't need to happen': Trump's tariffs rattle Alberta. Calgary Herald. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/it-doesnt-need-to-happen-trumps-tariffs-rattle-alberta[8] Premier announces immediate response, vows to defend B.C. against Trump tariffs. Office of the Premier of British Columbia. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0014-000077[9] Lack of federal leadership hurts Canada’s response to Trump tariff threat. Policy Options. January 29, 2025. Available at: https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2025/foreign-relations-confusion/[10]‘Time to fix this’: Could the tariff threat bring down Canada's interprovincial trade barriers, once and for all? Financial Post. January 30, 2025. Available at: https://financialpost.com/news/economy/tariffs-bring-down-canada-interprovincial-trade-barriers[11] Premier announces immediate response, vows to defend B.C. against Trump tariffs. Office of the Premier of British Columbia. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0014-000077[12] Fans at Raptors game continue trend of booing US national anthem at pro sporting events in Canada. Asssociated Press. February 3, 2025. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/fans-boo-national-anthem-tariffs-canada-2c7210574c0373348870a94445814407[13] Canadians reject Trump’s tariff threats: New CLC poll. Canadian Labour Congress. January 23, 2025. Available at: https://canadianlabour.ca/canadians-reject-trumps-tariff-threats-new-clc-poll/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The conflict in the African Great Lakes region, which had long remained in a low-intensity state, flared up again in the second half of January 2025. In the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter – DRC), rebel forces of the anti-government group M23, fighting against the Armed Forces of the DRC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC), launched an offensive and captured new territories. As of January 27, M23 entered the city of Goma, the largest city in the province [1]. Moreover, the DRC authorities claim that the city is also occupied by regular units of the Rwandan Armed Forces [2]. The rebel offensive has triggered panic and an outflow of local residents as well as refugees – Goma had been a refuge for several hundred thousand displaced persons. There are casualties not only among civilians but also among the UN peacekeeping contingent (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO) and peacekeepers from the Southern African Development Community – Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SAMIDRC. The escalation of the conflict has been condemned by leading world powers and the United Nations – the UN Security Council has demanded an immediate ceasefire [3].  Rwanda plays a distinct role in these events. The Congolese rebel group M23 consists of ethnic Tutsis living in the DRC and aims to “ensure the rights of the Tutsi ethnic minority in the DRC” [4]. It was formed in 2012 and, after several military operations against government forces, ceased hostilities. However, in October 2022, M23 resumed military operations in North Kivu. The DRC government almost immediately accused Rwanda of fully supporting M23 — accusations that Rwanda has categorically denied and continues to deny to this day [5]. However, the United States and several European countries, citing intelligence reports, have openly stated that M23 is being used by Rwanda as a proxy force to conduct military operations in the eastern DRC [6]. The current fighting in North Kivu is a direct consequence of the failed attempt by the government of the Republic of Angola to mediate the peace process. The President of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, ran in the 2018 elections partly on a promise to achieve peace in the east of the country. However, throughout his time in office, he has failed to make any significant progress in this direction. In 2024, Angolan President João Lourenço proposed direct negotiations between the leaders of Rwanda and the DRC [7], which led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the two countries at the end of June 2024. However, further progress toward peace encountered a major obstacle: Tshisekedi categorically refused to recognize M23 as a participant in the negotiation process, stating that they are terrorists with whom direct dialogue is impossible [8]. Nevertheless, after a series of meetings between the foreign ministers of Angola, the DRC, and Rwanda, an agreement was reached that M23 representatives would still take part in the negotiations [9]. However, the trilateral summit in Luanda, scheduled for December 15, 2024, was canceled just days before it was set to take place. Both sides blamed each other for the meeting’s collapse [10]. As it now appears, the failed summit may have served as a starting point for M23's January offensive in North Kivu. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, Angola’s Foreign Minister, Téte António, during a working breakfast with members of the UN Security Council, called on the Council to continue its strong support for the negotiation process, effectively acknowledging that Angola’s efforts on this track had failed [11]. At the same time, Rwanda’s Foreign Minister, Olivier Nduhungirehe, speaking at the UN Security Council on counterterrorism issues, sharply criticized the DRC government, stating that “despite the direct and clear threat of terrorism, the DRC is trying to divert attention from addressing real problems” and accusing the DRC of distorting the actual situation in the east of the country [12]. Just days after these statements, M23 launched its offensive. It is important to note that the rebels launched their offensive well-prepared. As early as October 2024, reports emerged that revenue from the sale of minerals was bringing M23 at least $300 000 per month, which the rebels used to arm and equip their combat units. For more than a year, M23 has controlled mines in the Rubaya area of North Kivu — these deposits contain 15% of the world’s coltan reserves, a strategically critical mineral essential for high-tech industries [13]. At the same time, FARDC units stationed in the province suffered from supply shortages and demonstrated low combat readiness [14]. As a result, M23 forces rapidly broke through, capturing key cities in the province. Currently, M23 (and, as it is believed, the Rwandan army) has taken control of the cities of Sake and Goma — securing all key crossroads and roads in this part of North Kivu. Sake provides M23 with a route south to the Numbi mining region, which is rich in tin, tantalum, niobium, and tungsten [15]. If this region also falls to the rebels, the revenue from mineral extraction and sales will reach enormous levels, transforming M23 from a purely military force into a political power. Additionally, Goma is a port on Lake Kivu, and with access to watercraft, the rebels could launch amphibious operations anywhere along the northern shores of the lake, further expanding their controlled territory. The most enigmatic factor at the moment remains the behavior of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Since the start of M23's offensive on Goma, his administration has not issued a single official statement. The last time Kagame commented on the situation in North Kivu was during a press conference on January 9, where he expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would take a more thoughtful and balanced approach to the conflict, considering all influencing factors [16]. On January 26, 2025, Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press statement expressing deep concern over the renewed escalation and reaffirming its commitment to a political resolution [17]. Apart from this, there have been no high-level statements from Kigali. However, political experts from various countries unanimously agree that all Rwandan state institutions, particularly the armed forces, are under Kagame’s total control [18]. They assert that any involvement of the Rwandan military in the DRC conflict — whether confirmed or merely suspected — would be impossible without his direct order. The most likely assumption is that Rwandan President Paul Kagame has begun implementing his long-term strategy: creating a buffer zone in eastern DRC with the help of M23. This would not only push the border further away (currently, the distance from Kigali to the DRC border is 150 km) but also significantly improve Rwanda’s economic position. The buffer zone’s territory would provide Rwanda with abundant water, agricultural, and mineral resources [19]. Moreover, such a buffer zone would give Kagame additional leverage in future negotiations, as the territories occupied by M23 would be directly linked to the political resolution of the conflict. A new territorial reality has already been established in eastern DRC. For Angolan President João Lourenço, this is a highly unfavorable outcome — his bid to become a regional peacemaker has failed [20]. One possible reason for Lourenço’s failure is the loss of U.S. interest in the DRC conflict at the end of 2024. As some analysts suggest, “Once Washington stopped applying pressure, Rwanda realized there was nothing to fear and withdrew from the negotiation process” [21]. Now, the task of translating this territorial reality into diplomatic and political terms has been taken up by Kenyan President William Ruto. On January 27, he issued an official statement announcing that a meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame would take place in the near future. If this meeting occurs and results in any agreements, it will mark a diplomatic success for Ruto and strengthen his position on the regional stage [22]. Notes: [1] Rwandan-backed rebels enter Congo's Goma in major escalation // https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-enter-centre-congos-goma-after-claiming-capture-city-2025-01-27/[2] DR Congo says Rwanda army in Goma // https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-says-rwanda-army-in-goma/a-71422564[3] Rebel Conflict in Congo Escalates with Capture of Goma // https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2025/january/goma-capture-congo-M23/[4] Luanda summit postponed: Kinshasa’s maneuvers to frustrate peace process // https://www.thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Luanda--summit--postponed%3A--Kinshasa%E2%80%99s--maneuvers--to--frustrate--peace--process_1626[5] Rwanda denies backing armed group in DRC // https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-militia-violence-3828930[6] Rwandan army ‘ready to invade DRC’ and help rebels seize city // https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jan/25/rwandan-army-ready-to-invade-drc-and-help-rebels-seize-city[7] Presidente angolano propõe diálogo directo entre Rwanda e RDC // https://angop.ao/noticias/politica/joao-lourenco-propoe-dialogo-directo-entre-rwanda-e-rdc/[8] Avancée du M23: Discours de Félix Tshisekedi (Intégralité) // https://actualite.cd/2022/11/04/avancee-du-m23-discours-de-felix-tshisekedi-integralite[9] POSTPONEMENT OF LUANDA SUMMIT DUE TO UNRESOLVED CRITICAL ISSUES // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/postponement-of-luanda-summit-due-to-unresolved-critical-issues[10] Emergency ministerial meeting on the current escalation of the conflict in Eastern DRC // https://amaniafrica-et.org/emergency-ministerial-meeting-on-the-current-escalation-of-the-conflict-in-eastern-drc/[11] Angola Aims for UN Security Council Support On DRC Issue // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230042.html[12] Africa: Rwanda Proposes Five Steps to Reinforce Africa's Counter-Terrorism Effort // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230067.html[13] M23 rebel roup generates approximately $300,000 a month from mining-UN // https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/01/m23-rebel-group-generates-approximately-300000-a-month-from-mining-un//[14] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[15] Petrology and Detail Geological Mapping of the Precambrian Basement Rocks of the Sn-Ta-Nb Numbi Deposit, Democratic Republic of the Congo // https://www.iieta.org/journals/eesrj/paper/10.18280/eesrj.090102[16] Africa’s anticipation of Trump’s foreign policy // https://en.igihe.com/politics-48/article/africa-s-anticipation-of-trump-s-foreign-policy[17] STATEMENT ON SITUATION IN EASTERN DRC // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/statement-on-situation-in-eastern-drc[18] The Case Against Rwanda's President Paul Kagame // https://www.newsweek.com/case-against-rwandas-president-paul-kagame-63167[19] What does Rwanda want in the DRC? // https://www.egmontinstitute.be/what-does-rwanda-want-in-the-drc/[20] Thousands uprooted as Congo M23 rebels near Goma in major advance // https://www.yahoo.com/news/thousands-uprooted-congo-m23-rebels-105837754.html[21] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[22] Rwanda, Congo presidents to meet as rebels take Goma, Kenya's leader says // https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-congo-presidents-to-meet-as-rebels-take-goma-kenya-leader-says-/7952210.html

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Valued at over $3 trillion, Nvidia, the world’s largest market capitalisation, exemplifies the transformative power of the microprocessor sector, but Europe’s lagging position raises significant concerns about sovereignty and competitiveness. Some companies are stepping up, offering concrete responses to these challenges and heralding a new era for European innovation in microprocessors. European socio-economic stability depends on it. A new era is fast approaching, with the US authorities having decided to strike a major blow by making it very difficult to export certain semiconductors, even to allied countries, thereby depriving half of Europe’s countries of easy access to US technologies. The global microprocessor market is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by unprecedented technological advances and intensifying geopolitical competition. Once considered a niche industry, microprocessors have become the backbone of modern economies, enabling everything from smartphones to artificial intelligence systems, from IoT to cloud computing. The rise of Nvidia, a global leader in AI, underscores this changing ecosystem. The company is set to replace Intel in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), who stated that the update aims to ensure “a more representative exposure to the semiconductors industry and the materials sector, respectively”. This dominance of a few global players underscores the challenges faced by other regions. While companies like Nvidia, AMD, and TSMC have set the standard for innovation, others—including once-mighty Intel—have struggled to keep up. Intel’s recent difficulties highlight the dynamic nature of the industry, where size and legacy alone no longer guarantee success. Instead, the ability to innovate, adapt, and secure supply chains is paramount. And initiatives are flourishing all around the world. As Europe works to bolster its presence in the microprocessor market, Latin America is emerging as a potential partner in the global semiconductor ecosystem. While the region does not yet have major microprocessor manufacturers, countries like Mexico and Brazil are becoming increasingly important in the broader supply chain. The United States, through initiatives such as the CHIPS Act, has sought to deepen its partnerships in Latin America, recognising the region’s strategic value for diversifying production and securing critical resources.  This should put Europe on alert. Indeed, the United States is planning on pushing forward with the development of microprocessor production capabilities across three Latin American countries: Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica. This strategy was unveiled by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in July 2024 as the ‘Western Hemisphere Semiconductor Initiative.’ Indeed, Mexico is attracting billions in investments in its semiconductor and tech industries. Amazon, announced plans to invest $6 billion in the country by 2026, creating over 50,000 jobs. The Chinese government had identified semiconductors as a priority as early as 1956 and has already channeled an estimated $150 billion to its semiconductor industry. Latin America’s potential lies in its ability to complement the global microprocessor market with assembly, testing, and raw material processing capabilities. Though the region has yet to produce a major semiconductor design firm, its role in the supply chain could expand as global players look to reduce dependency on Asia. This creates opportunities for regional collaboration and investment in the sector while strengthening US access to semiconductors. Indeed, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated: “By improving the backbone of our supply chains, better infrastructure will help ensure that the goods our people rely on – semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, medical supplies – are more affordable, more secure, and made right here in the Americas.” Incoming President Donald Trump’s planned tariffs on foreign imports could however have a real effect on tech giants’ outsourcing of manufacturing to Latin America, though. Even the Biden administration, a few days before its term, has decided to raise the stakes on microprocessors by further tightening sanctions against China. This illustrates the great sensitivity of the subject on the other side of the Atlantic and the need for Europe to rearm itself on the industrial front. Europe’s position in the microprocessor market remains precarious, and without sufficient scope for nearshoring and the development of a robust EU-focused development ecosystem, it could find itself falling way behind global competitors. Historically reliant on foreign suppliers for semiconductors, the region has recognised these strategic risks of this dependency. For Europe, this means creating an ecosystem in which innovative startups and new, EU-based technological initiatives are allowed to flourish. That’s the objective of the European Union’s “Chips Act”, which aims to increase local production capacity and support the development of homegrown technology. However, achieving these goals requires more than policy—it demands the emergence of innovative companies capable of competing on a global scale. Europe already has some important technological “links”, but not yet the whole chain. Among those links of emerging players is SiPearl, a French company specialising in the design of high-performance microprocessors. While still small compared to global giants, SiPearl represents a concrete step toward reducing Europe’s technological dependency. Its processors, designed for use in data centres and supercomputing, align with Europe’s strategic goals for technological sovereignty and innovation. SiPearl’s reliance on Taiwanese manufacturing reflects the broader global interdependence of the microprocessor market, but its designs are uniquely European, tailored to meet the region’s regulatory and security standards. The choice of Taiwan seems obvious at present, given that the processes used in Europe do not meet the requirements. Alternative foundries may be needed, such as Samsung, which has production capacities in South Korea and the USA, or even Intel. Indeed, this Eurocentric approach is at the heart of the firm’s strategy for development. CEO Philippe Notton underscores how the Chips Act does not go far enough in supporting start-up firms like his own: “the European Chips Act is a good start. If we manage to mobilise more public funds in the semiconductor sector to get things moving again, as is being done in most countries, that will be a positive thing.” Notton, like many in the sector, believes that startups are, however, being left behind by this policy. Nonetheless, there are some positive initiatives to support the objectives of the European Chips Act, such as the $3.2 billion investment by Silicon Box to build a semiconductor plant in northern Italy. This announcement was made last March by the Italian Minister of Enterprises, who was happy to show that Italy can “attract the interest of global technology players”. Europe is focusing on fostering innovation and reducing dependency through public-private partnerships. SiPearl is a prime example, but it is not alone. Other European companies, such as Infineon Technologies (Germany) and STMicroelectronics (a Franco-Italian firm), are making significant contributions to the semiconductor industry. MELEXIS, another firm based in Belgium, plays a critical role in developing specialized chips for the automotive industry, supporting Europe’s push for technological sovereignty in key sectors. This approach has also supported the growth of companies such as ASML in the Netherlands, a global leader in lithography machines essential for microprocessor manufacturing, and GlobalFoundries in Germany, which operates one of Europe’s most advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities. CEO Dr. Thomas Caulfield, has a more positive outlook, and emphasised Europe’s strategic position in the semiconductor industry, particularly highlighting the continent’s leadership in lithography through companies like ASML. He stated:  “Europe shouldn’t worry over issues of technology leadership for two reasons. One: You can’t do anything in semiconductors without lithography and Europe has ASML the leader in lithography. Nobody can do anything in semiconductors without giving capex to ASML, so Europe has great control of the semiconductor industry.” This highlights the multilateral ecosystem many are trying to develop in Europe, because together, these firms demonstrate the continent’s potential to become a hub for advanced microprocessor design and production. The microprocessor market is at a crossroads, offering Europe distinct opportunities to redefine its role in the global technology ecosystem. Success, however, will depend on sustained investment, strategic partnerships, and bold innovation. By leveraging its strengths, Europe can be both a leading player in design and manufacture as it used to be just a few decades ago. The opportunities are massive, but so are the risks of falling behind. The rewards of such efforts are, however, substantial: enhanced economic growth, greater technological sovereignty, and a pivotal role in shaping the future of the global microprocessor industry. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As a long-time observer of Iran, I have never seen the regime in such a precarious position. Perhaps there was a similarly dire moment at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, but even that pales in comparison to the current crisis. The effects of mismanagement, corruption, religion/faith over expertise and knowledge has rarely been so troublesome. Iran holds the second-largest gas and fourth-largest crude reserves in the world, but Iranians have to endure with daily power cuts. Universities, offices, and industry have been closed due to worsening fuel and power shortages. This has been credited to a lack of fuel and a lack of investment in maintaining and building of new powerplants, with a current 20-gigawatt electricity shortfall plaguing the system. There seems to be no easy fix for this. Water is also another major issue. Many, including myself, have previously written about the country’s water crisis and inefficient agricultural development. Aside from electricity cuts, water is also another amenity that gets cut regularly in the summer. Water rights and transfers from one area to another are major challenges that often causes protests. The price of petrol is another destabilising factor. Estimates suggest that up to 50 million liters of fuel are smuggled to neighboring countries. The price of petrol in Iran is currently around 0.01-0.02 USD per litre (Calculated at Toman/Dollar price of 800,000 Rial), while in Pakistan prices hover around  0.91 USD per litre, making it an extremely profitable business—one that Iran’s military and para-military organisations might be benefiting from too, considering the amount being smuggled. The current price of petrol is heavily subsidised, and the government cannot maintain current supply at such prices. In previous attempts to raise the price, Iranians have responded with protests, leaving the issue unresolved. Inflation and the everyday worsening of the currency crisis is also nothing new. In a new low, the US Dollar is now evaluated at around 830,000 Rial. When I left Iran in 2016, this was hovering at 33,000 Rial. In Iran everything has been tied to the Dollar, and such fluctuations and rises are making the people poorer. According to studies, Iran’s middle class shrank by a staggering 8 million between 2011 and 2021. I believe this has become even worse in the last few years. On the societal front, after the Women, Life, and Freedom movement in September 2022, which erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini in custody of Iran’s Morality Police, people’s rightful grievances were never responded too. Rather, the government doubled down, passing the stringent “Hijab and Chastity Act” to enforce stricter dress codes and further suppress women’s basic human rights. The act has not gone into force yet, but this defiance highlights the regime’s determination to maintain control at all costs, despite growing discontent, and its no-compromise attitude. Strategically, Iran is in a very weak position, with two prongs of its deterrence strategy weakened. Iran’s crown jewels, its proxies, have been heavily hit, depleted, and close to being made irrelevant during the past few years. Hamas and Hezbollah have suffered under successful Israeli attacks. Bashar al Assad, Syria’s former dictator, which Iran spent billions sustaining, is gone as well. Syria was an important access route to supply Iran’s proxies, and its loss is a major setback for the regime. Tehran has also suffered successive intelligence failures. And more recently, their man Haniyeh was killed in Tehran. Meanwhile, the exploding pagers saga should be enough to cause Iran’s intelligence community a major loss of confidence. Iran has also been heavily impacted in Israel’s last and perhaps largest attack on Iranian soil. Strategic targets, such as Iran’s ballistic missile production infrastructure, were hit, as well as their revered and advertised-as-impeccable air defenses and radar sites. The low accuracy of Iran’s ballistic missiles, used in attacking Israel, has also showcased that the nation’s ballistic missiles aren’t the super weapon Iran had presented them as. Diplomatically, Iran finds itself increasingly isolated. The return of Donald Trump to the White House makes the revival of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) unlikely. Without a resolution to its issues with Israel and the United States, the sanctions strangling Iran’s economy will persist. Moreover, any short-term agreements without broader changes in Iran’s foreign policy would likely unravel, as regional rivals and US allies push for renewed boycotts. The Path Forward To address its mounting crises, Iran must undertake two monumental shifts. First, it must resolve its disputes with Israel and the US to secure sanctions relief. Drawing lessons from Vietnam’s foreign policy, Iran needs to become “normal” to advance and develop. Bringing enduring peace and calm to the country, and reducing investment risks and attracting foreign capital in oil, energy, and infrastructure, would be vital steps toward economic recovery. Of course, the first shift could also go in another direction. With its proxies weakened, and the nation under attack, the regime could decide to cross the nuclear proliferation line and attain nuclear weapons. I believe a nuclear deterrent would give the regime a psychological sense of immunity and boost of confidence to continue doing heinous things internally and within the region. Iran should not be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Second, Iran requires sweeping internal reforms. Corruption must be eradicated, and a merit-based system should replace the current patronage networks. Civil liberties and media freedoms must be restored, and resources currently spent on proxies and “soft power” projects such as financing and managing Shiite mosques and religious centres across the globe should be redirected to domestic priorities, just to name a few. Is Change Possible? The prospects for such transformative and positive change seem dim. Resolving the Israel-US issue would require a fundamental shift in Iran’s (and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s, the current supreme leader) ideological stance—a prospect the regime appears unwilling to entertain. Similarly, internal reforms are hindered by entrenched corruption and the regime’s resistance to meaningful change. Even minor progress, such as the recent lifting of bans on WhatsApp and Google Play or women finally being allowed into football stadiums (under international pressure), is too slow and insufficient to address the scale of the crisis the country currently faces. Where does that leave Iran? The cumulative weight of these challenges—economic collapse, societal discontent, diplomatic isolation, and military setbacks— and Iran’s unwillingness to resolve them signals the potential fall of the Islamic Republic. The scale, length, and spread of the protests during the Women, Life, Freedom movement offers a glimpse of how this fall may occur. The unprecedented protests were able to wear down the security forces, occurring not across one week or month, but across many months and all across the country. In another example, the regime only managed to silence the green movement of 2009—a political movement that arose after the 12 June 2009 Iranian presidential election—because it was limited to Tehran and a few big cities, allowing them to bus security forces from smaller towns to suppress the protests. It can’t do that for large scale, nationwide protests. With Assad’s fall, it was discovered that Syria’s last prime minister was only being paid a monthly salary of US$140. This is no different for many of Iran’s security/defence agencies. There are many members of the police and officers in the army working two or three jobs to survive. Many of them deal with water/electricity/gas shortages, inflation, and devaluation of their assets and could change sides any moment if things heat up. I believe another wave of nationwide protests could start organically at any moment, as they did in 2019 following a hike in the petrol price, or in 2018 when the price of eggs went up. Any of the problems mentioned in the above or the culmination of them could light the cauldron of people’s anger and this time burn the regime down. Whether this collapse happens imminently or unfolds over the next few years, remains uncertain. What follows such a fall, however, will shape Iran’s future and the region’s stability.This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Security dialog among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was founded in 2007 by the USA, Japan, Australia, and India to promote a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, secure freedom of navigation and balance the growing influence of China. After a temporary dissolution, QUAD was revived in 2017. Since then, there have been regular meetings of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, which have led to concrete working groups in areas such as maritime security, modern technologies, infrastructure, climate change, health, space, and cyber security. QUAD has made considerable progress, including the provision of COVID-19 vaccines, decarbonization initiatives, the promotion of renewable energy and programs to improve maritime surveillance and digital infrastructure. QUAD is not a formal alliance, but an informal forum without a mutual defense commitment. Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common goals such as maritime security, infrastructure development and climate protection and offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Will QUAD change the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific? Founded in 2007 as an informal alliance by the USA, Japan, Australia and India, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) has proven its worth as a platform for regional security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, despite difficulties and interim dissolution. The original motivation for QUAD was the increasing concern about China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and the challenges to the rules-based order in the region. In recent years, cooperation in the QUAD has deepened and includes issues such as maritime security, maintaining free shipping lanes, the fight against terrorism and the promotion of sustainable economic development. Securing a free and open Indo-Pacific - in which all countries can act sovereignly and free from coercion - is a central concern of QUAD. The beginnings of cooperation between the four countries can be traced back to 20041. In response to the devastating Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, which killed over 230,000 people2, the USA, Australia, India, and Japan spontaneously formed an ad hoc grouping to pool and coordinate their resources and capacities for emergency relief in the disaster areas. The grouping disbanded after the end of the reconstruction aid in January 2005, but the positive outcome of the cooperation proved to be viable for the future and opened the way for further initiatives towards closer cooperation between the four Indo-Pacific states.3 First foundation and dissolution of QUAD It was the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who, as part of his new foreign and defense policy, called for a value-based dialogue between Japan, India, Australia, the USA, and other like-minded countries on common interests in the Indo-Pacific at the end of 2006. On May 25, 2007, representatives of the four countries met officially for the first time at an informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila.4 In September 2007, the maritime military exercise "Malabar" in the Indian Ocean, which had previously only been held bilaterally between the USA and India, was expanded to include participants from Japan, Australia and Singapore. This led to strong reactions from China, which sent official protest notes to the governments of the participating countries. Beijing portrayed QUAD as an anti-China initiative, while critics described the grouping as the nucleus of a future "Asian NATO "5. China's harsh criticism of the QUAD initiative and political changes in some of the four participating countries led to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue being dissolved after a brief time. Australia, where there was a change of government in December 2007, wanted to avoid a confrontation with its most important trading partner China and therefore announced its withdrawal from QUAD in February 2008. In Japan, the most important promoter of QUAD, Shinzo Abe, was forced to resign as Prime Minister at the end of 2007 after losing the elections. There was also increasing criticism of the purpose of QUAD in India and the USA, so that in 2008 the four countries ceased their activities in the direction of quadrilateral security cooperation.6 However, taking China into consideration did not lead to the hoped-for easing of tensions. On the contrary: China's massive military build-up, its territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, its threatening gestures towards Taiwan and the use of economic pressure to achieve foreign policy goals7 have further increased geopolitical tensions in the region. In the meantime, contacts and cooperation between the four QUAD states have continued and intensified at bilateral and minilateral level. In 2011, the first meeting at the level of state secretaries took place between the governments of Japan, India, and the USA. A similar trilateral cooperation meeting was established in 2015 between Japan, India, and Australia. India and the United States signed a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2015 and a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016.8 These agreements are a prerequisite for the interoperability of the armed forces of both countries. Since October 2015, Japan has been a regular participant in the annual naval exercise "Malabar" alongside India and the USA. And in 2017, Indian armed forces took part in the Australian naval exercise AUSINDEX for the first time, and two years later also in the air force exercise Pitch Black. Australia has been involved in the Malabar exercises again since 2020.9 Revival of the QUAD Shinzo Abe, who returned to the office of Japanese Prime Minister in 2012, put the concept of a quadrilateral security alliance (Democratic Security Diamond) in the Indo-Pacific back on the political agenda. He succeeded in convincing the new US President Donald Trump of the idea, leading to the first meeting of high-ranking representatives from the USA, Japan, India, and Australia on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in the Philippines in November 2017. The QUAD was revived.10 In June 2018, representatives of the four countries met on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Singapore and again in November of the same year at the East Asia Summit, also in Singapore. On May 31, 2018, the first official meeting of the foreign ministers of the four QUAD states finally took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Since then, the four foreign ministers have met once a year to discuss regional strategic challenges and priorities.11 The Biden administration has upgraded the Quadrilateral Dialogue to an important instrument for the implementation of its Indo-Pacific policy. On March 12, 2021, the first summit of QUAD heads of state and government took place, still in virtual form due to the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the summit, a joint final declaration, The Spirit of the QUAD,12 was published, which lists the key objectives and principles of the quadripartite dialog. On September 24, 2021, the QUAD heads of government met in person for the first time in Washington. Six permanent working groups were formed to deal with the policy areas of health, climate change and clean energy, critical and modern technologies, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity.13 On March 4, 2022, the four heads of government of the QUAD states convened for a virtual summit to discuss the impact of Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and to reaffirm the commitment of the four dialog partners to the Indo-Pacific region. The fourth QUAD Leaders’ Summit took place in Tokyo on May 24, 2022. The follow-up meeting planned for May 2023 in Sydney was canceled as US President Biden had to remain in Washington due to the domestic budget crisis. Instead, the heads of state and government met on May 20, 2023, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Prior to this, the foreign ministers of the QUAD met in India in March, where it was decided to establish a working group on combating terrorism.14 In 2024, there was one meeting at foreign minister level (July 29 in Tokyo, Japan) and one summit meeting of QUAD leaders (September 21, 2024, in Wilmington, USA). On September 20, 2024, one day before the summit in Wilmington, a bipartisan group of representatives and senators, the QUAD Caucus, was formed in the US Congress to promote cooperation between the USA and the other QUAD members (Japan, India, and Australia). In doing so, Congress is underlining the bipartisan recognition of the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific for the USA and strengthening the institutional anchoring of the QUAD partnership in the US political system.15 What concrete results has QUAD achieved since its revival in 2017? The six QUAD working groups established in 2021 cover the most important policy areas of quadrilateral cooperation: 1. Health Security Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the QUAD Group committed to producing one billion vaccine doses by the end of 2022 and making them available to countries in the Indo-Pacific. The USA, Japan and Australia supported the expansion of production capacities for coronavirus vaccines in India. Together, the four QUAD members donated over 400 million vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific countries in 2021 and 2022 and almost 800 million worldwide. In addition, the group of four supported the COVAX initiative with 5.6 billion US dollars. In September 2024, the "QUAD Cancer Moonshot" initiative was announced, which aims to reduce the number of cancer deaths in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through measures to prevent and treat uterine cancer16. 2. Climate Change The countries of the Indo-Pacific are particularly affected by climate change. The QUAD agenda aims to accelerate decarbonization, promote renewable energy and protect the maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the expansion of clean hydrogen technologies, climate information services and early warning systems as well as the diversification of supply chains. 3 Critical and Emerging Technologies The QUAD countries are committed to the responsible and safe use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G. Specifically, for example, the establishment of an Open Radio Access Network (RAN) in Palau, Micronesia, is being promoted, which will later be extended to other Pacific island states. 4. Space All four QUAD nations have their own space programs, which are linked by a large number of bilateral and minilateral cooperation projects. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, launched in 2022, aims to strengthen maritime security and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. It will provide countries in the region with real-time maritime surveillance information, primarily data from satellites, sensors, and other surveillance technologies. This will enable small and medium-sized coastal states in the Indo-Pacific to gain a better overview of maritime activities in their exclusive economic zones, such as illegal fishing, smuggling and piracy. 5. Cyber Security In 2022, the QUAD Cybersecurity Partnership was established to combat threats from cybercrime and state-sponsored attacks. The partnership is divided into four sectors, with each member of QUAD taking the lead in one sector to address cyber vulnerabilities. The sectors include critical infrastructure protection, supply chain resilience, skills training, and software security standards.17 6. Infrastructure QUAD countries are promoting the development of sustainable port infrastructure and announcing major investments in submarine cable projects to improve digital connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the goal was set to invest up to USD 50 billion in infrastructure projects in the region within five years. Launched in 2023, the QUAD Infrastructure Fellowship will provide over 1,800 fellowships, exchanges and other program opportunities for government officials and infrastructure professionals in the region to share best practices in infrastructure management. Outside of these six main themes, the QUAD group also collaborates in other areas: The QUAD Fellowship Program provides scholarships for master's and doctoral students in the fields of mathematics, computer science, natural sciences and technology (STEM) in the US, and since 2024, applicants from the ten ASEAN countries have also been admitted18. The Counterterrorism Working Group was founded in 2023. Other areas of cooperation mentioned in the QUAD plans are sustainable, transparent, and fair lending and financing practices, nuclear stability, and critical minerals. Conclusion The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QUAD has proven to be a stable and effective security policy dialog platform in recent years. QUAD has the potential to transform the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific by creating a strategic balance in the face of challenges such as China's rising power and territorial expansion. The QUAD promotes cooperation between the US, India, Japan, and Australia, the four most influential democracies in the region. Cooperation is based on shared values such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and adherence to international rules. QUAD is not a formal security alliance, there is no mutual defense commitment. It is a flexible, informal coalition forum that focuses on a wide range of issues, including broader security, the economy, infrastructure, technology, and climate change. QUAD has no institutional structures. There are annual summits of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, and the decisions of the summits are implemented by the state apparatuses of the member countries. The naval exercise "Malabar" is not an official part of QUAD but serves as a platform to strengthen military interoperability and is seen as an operational extension of QUAD's security objectives, particularly in the maritime domain. India plays a special role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It contributes not only its geographical and geopolitical importance in the Indo-Pacific, but also a perspective characterized by strategic autonomy and multipolar diplomacy. India is regarded as an important representative of the so-called Global South and is seen as a counterweight to China in this group of states.19 On the other hand, India avoids presenting QUAD as an explicitly anti-Chinese alliance in order to avoid putting too much strain on its own sensitive relationship with China. The EU and Germany should adopt a strategically balanced position towards QUAD that considers both the geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific and their own economic and security interests. The EU and Germany share with the QUAD states the goal of preserving a rules-based order, particularly regarding international maritime law (UNCLOS). To exert greater influence on the region, Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common interests such as infrastructure development, new and critical technologies, climate protection and maritime security. Joint infrastructure development projects in the Indo-Pacific could offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Information This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or by campaigners or campaign helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state, and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/2 Earthquake in the Indian Ocean 2004, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdbeben_im_Indischen_Ozean_2004  3 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ 4 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue5 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/  6 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 7 Feigenbaum, Eva A., „Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?”, MarcoPolo, Paulson Institute, 25. Juli 2017, https://macropolo.org/analysis/is-coercion-the-new-normal-in-chinas-economic-statecraft/?rp=m  8 Panda, Jagannath, „India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue”, 12. June 2020, RUSI, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/india-and-quad-plus-dialogue 9 Parker, Jennifer, „Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging”, 10. August 2023, The Strategist, ASPI, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-another-naval-exercise-malabars-vital-messaging/ 10 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 11 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024,  https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/  12 The White House, 12. March 2021, Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: „The Spirit of the QUAD”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/ 13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, „The QUAD”, last visit 02.12.2024, in https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad 14 Ebd. 15 U.S. Representative Ami Bera, M.D. (D-CA), Press Release, 20. September 2024, https://bera.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400409 16 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/ 17 Ebd. 18 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Kooperation international, „QUAD-Fellowship-Programm auf ASEAN-Staaten ausgeweitet“, zuletzt gelesen am 02.12.2024 in https://www.kooperation-international.de/aktuelles/nachrichten/detail/info/quad-fellowship-programm-auf-asean-staaten-ausgeweitet  19 Heiduk, Felix; Wirth, Christian: „The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the USA “, SWP-Aktuell, Nr. 35, June 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023A35/ 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This short analysis is based on the Security Complex theorem. Its departure point is the definition of the term, as introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.  The author then briefly introduces the historical background of the Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and their relationships with Russia and suggests further readings for those willing to consult the existing scientific literature. The central part of the analysis focuses on five distinct components of the Caucasus Security Complex, which include interconnected security concerns, a distinctiveness as a geographical region, anarchical structure, shared security dynamics and Social construction of threats. The paper concludes by examining the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus region for the two Great powers, Russia and the United States of America, and the reference for the European Union. The introduction I will start by briefly explaining the notion of a Security Complex for the reader's convenience. The term "security complex" was introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in their 1998 book Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  This refers to a distinct geographical region in which security concerns are interconnected. In other words, the security of one state in a complex is inextricably linked to that of others, creating a dynamic and often volatile environment. The key elements of this notion include: a) interconnected security concerns - a security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. b) Distinct geographical region - security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns. c) Anarchical structure - just like the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. d)  States within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. e) Social construction of threats – the concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. At the same time, it would be wise not to confuse the meaning of Security Complex with the notions of Security Community (shared sense of identity and trust among its members) or Security Regime (a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations). This short analysis will focus on three countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and explore their geopolitical situation at the beginning of 2025 from the perspective of a security complex theorem, particularly their relationships with Russia. Historical introduction The Caucasus, a region nestled between the Black and Caspian Seas, has a rich and tumultuous modern history. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, each with distinct cultural and historical trajectories, have navigated a complex landscape of imperial collapse, nation-building, and conflict. Armenia In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Armenians, then part of the Russian Empire, faced increasing tensions with their neighbours, particularly the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by the Ottoman government during World War I, resulted in the systematic extermination of 1.5 million Armenians. Following the collapse of the Russian Empire, Armenia briefly experienced independence before being incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922.    In 1988, the country was devastated by an earthquake and rising tensions with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to Armenia's renewed independence but also to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, also part of the Russian Empire, declared independence in 1918, establishing the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. This short-lived independence ended in 1920 with incorporation into the Soviet Union. Similar to Armenia, Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dominated much of Azerbaijan's post-Soviet history, resulting in significant displacement and ongoing tensions.  Georgia Georgia, too, declared independence following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. This independence was short-lived, as Georgia was invaded by the Red Army in 1921 and became part of the Soviet Union.  The country regained its independence in 1991. The post-Soviet period has been marked by internal conflicts, including the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and efforts to establish democratic institutions and closer ties with the West. The Security Complex of South Caucasus Regional Dynamics and Conflicts – Major issues The Caucasus region has been plagued by ethno-territorial conflicts, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict, rooted in historical territorial claims and ethnic tensions, has resulted in significant human suffering and remains a major obstacle to regional stability. Readers interested in in-depth analysis performed by scholars researching the region are advised to consult Jansiz & Khojaste. Their thought-provoking paper discusses the history of the Caucasus crisis and its impact on regional security.  Börzel & Pamuk examine the challenges of Europeanization and fighting corruption in the Southern Caucasus. The region's geopolitical significance, located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, has also led to great power involvement, further complicating regional dynamics.   The following part of the analysis will look at the region through the lens of the Security Complex theorem to analyse its dynamics of security interrelationship. This will, in turn, allow us to understand the role of the Caucasus for the Great Powers and the European Union. Interconnected security concerns  A security complex is characterised by a web of security interdependencies where a threat to one state is perceived as a threat to others, leading to a shared sense of vulnerability and a need for collective security arrangements. According to Natalie Tavadze, “It is important to understand that Eurasianinism and Moscow’s approaches toward the Caucasus correspond to each other. In this regard, the Central Caucasus is considered as Russia’s backyard. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea constitute strategic dimensions for Russia. The latter is determined to dominate the region and uses the “ethnic card” to keep the countries of the Central Caucasus off balance. From the Russian standpoint, any foreign influence in its “near abroad” is seen through the prism of its national security. Such a menace should be thwarted by any means, as Moscow made clear more than once that it does not entertain any notion of conceding territories of its utmost geopolitical interests.”  This extended but thought-provoking quote from one of the local experts pretty well sketches the region's security dynamics. Now, let us look at its geographical dynamics. Distinct geographical region. Security complexes are geographically defined. They are typically regional in scope, although they sometimes encompass more significant areas. The geographical proximity of the states within a complex contributes to the interconnectedness of security concerns.  Geographically, the Caucasus is defined by the Caucasus Mountains, a formidable range dividing the region into the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus. The Greater Caucasus, the main range, boasts towering peaks like Mount Elbrus, the highest peak in Europe. This rugged terrain has historically isolated communities, leading to the development of a rich mosaic of languages and cultures. The Lesser Caucasus, located south of the Kura-Aras Lowland, further adds to the region's geographical complexity. This varied topography, ranging from high-altitude glaciers to fertile valleys and semi-desert landscapes, supports a remarkable biodiversity. The Caucasus's location at the crossroads of continents has made it a historical battleground and a corridor for trade and migration. This strategic importance has left its mark on the region's cultural landscape. The Caucasus is home to many ethnic groups, each with its distinct language, traditions, and history. This diversity, while enriching, has also been a source of conflict and tension. Throughout its history, the region has witnessed numerous internal and external power struggles. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Caucasus Anarchical structureLike the international system, security complexes operate within an anarchical structure. There is no overarching authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes that can lead to heightened tension and conflict. As Cornell and Starr adequately observe, “Many states in the Caucasus struggle with weak governance structures. This weakness is characterised by a lack of effective state control over territories, which undermines the rule of law and the provision of public services. The failure to establish strong, sovereign states based on the rule of law leads to corruption and mismanagement, further complicating governance.”  At the same time, Russia's role is significant. Russian policies have often destabilised the region, as Moscow's interventions and attempts to maintain dominance can exacerbate local conflicts and governance issues. The reliance on coercive diplomacy and military presence has undermined the sovereignty of local governments and complicated efforts toward conflict resolution.Shared security dynamicsStates within a security complex share typical security dynamics, such as arms races, alliance formation, and conflict spirals. These dynamics create a self-reinforcing cycle of insecurity. The region has been plagued by unresolved armed conflicts, which create a persistent security deficit. These conflicts destabilise the affected areas and have broader implications for regional peace and security. The ongoing hostilities hinder effective governance and contribute to widespread instability. Partly as a consequence of this, the region has seen a rise in organised crime and radical ideologies, particularly in the North Caucasus, where poverty and unemployment create fertile ground for extremist groups. The intertwining of criminality and political violence poses a significant threat to governance and societal stability.On top of that, one continues to observe ethnic and national tensions. The presence of various ethnic groups with competing national aspirations exacerbates tensions. This situation is further complicated by external influences and historical grievances, leading to a complex landscape of inter-ethnic relations that can quickly escalate into violence.Finally, there are serious socio-economic problems. Economic collapse and high poverty levels across the region contribute to governance challenges. The lack of economic opportunities fuels discontent and can lead to social unrest, making governance even more difficult.The social construction of threatsThe concept of security complex recognises that security threats are not objective realities but are socially constructed. States within a complex share a common understanding of what constitutes a threat, which shapes their behaviour and interactions. In the case of the Caucasus, it is easy to identify a number of threats and challenges that are typical for this security complex. Regional Destabilization -  the aftermath of the Chechen war and ongoing frozen conflicts in regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh create instability. These conflicts may still have the potential for spill-over effects and have been exploited by international terrorist networks. Authoritarian Governance - there is a trend of growing authoritarianism in the region, with Soviet-era power structures maintaining control. Political opposition is often suppressed, leading to a lack of democratic reforms and deteriorating living standards.Ecological Issues - the region faces significant ecological challenges, such as the deterioration of the Aral Sea and limited agricultural land, which contribute to instability and can exacerbate existing tensions.Militant and Radical Islam - the rise of militant Islamic groups, partly due to the exclusionary tactics of local regimes, poses a security threat, although it is currently considered a lesser factor compared to issues like drug trafficking.The remaining part of the article will focus on the Caucasus region's geopolitical importance for Russia, the USA, and the EU.Geopolitical ImportanceFor RussiaRussian Federation has been a significant power in the region for many years. "Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus" by Neil Melvin (published by Royal United Services Institute) explores Russia's changing role in the South Caucasus amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. Historically, Russia has viewed the region as a buffer against Western influence and as integral to its ambitions in the Black Sea and the Middle East. However, the emergence of multipolarity and the involvement of new international actors, such as Turkey, Iran, and China, have challenged Russia's dominance. The 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts further shifted the balance of power, diminishing Russia's leverage, particularly with Armenia. In response, Russia is reconfiguring its strategy, emphasising economic and transport ties while maintaining a security presence. The document argues that Russia seeks to reassert its influence by fostering relationships with regional powers and adapting to the new geopolitical landscape. The Euro-Atlantic community faces challenges in countering Russia's efforts as regional states pursue multi-alignment policies, and the prospect of NATO and EU integration diminishes. Ultimately, the paper highlights the need for the West to recalibrate its approaches to effectively engage with the evolving realities of the South Caucasus.Additionally, the South Caucasus is significant for Russia for several reasons. Firstly, Russian troops in the South Caucasus allow Russia to project military power and influence regional security dynamics. Following the Second Karabakh War, Russia positioned peacekeepers in Azerbaijan and has military bases in Armenia, reinforcing its role as a key security provider in the area. Economically, the South Caucasus is strategically important for energy transit routes. Russia aims to maintain control over energy supplies and infrastructure that pass through the region, ensuring its leverage over energy distribution to Europe and other markets. Finally, Russia's involvement in mediating conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, allows it to assert its role as a key player in regional stability. By doing so, Russia can prevent conflicts from escalating that might threaten its interests or lead to Western intervention. For the USAIn 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published an interesting analysis by Rumer Sokolsky and Stronsky. According to the authors, the importance of the South Caucasus region for the U.S. is undisputable and rests on several arguments. According to the document, the main interests of the U.S. in the South Caucasus include: preserving regional stability (preventing the resumption of frozen conflicts and promoting a peaceful environment among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), supporting democratic change and governance (the U.S. seeks to support democratic transformations and better governance in the South Caucasus states, facilitating their integration into the international community), economic development (the U.S. is interested in fostering economic growth and development within the South Caucasus, recognizing that economic prosperity can contribute to stability), energy security (although the significance of Caspian energy resources is noted, allegedly the U.S. interest in energy from the region has become less vital due to changes in global energy markets) and finally, countering illicit activities (the U.S. is concerned with combating transnational crime and illegal trafficking, which poses risks to regional stability and security).  According to James Carafano (Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and the E. W. Richardson Fellow Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation), the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, which started in February 2022, caused the United States to reconsider its global interests and responsibilities diametrically.  Accordingly, the conflict has highlighted the need for energy diversification in Europe, leading to renewed interest in the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and other regional partnerships. The SGC, which connects gas fields in Azerbaijan to Europe, is crucial for reducing reliance on Russian energy and enhancing European energy security. Next, regional integration. Projects like the modernization of ports in Georgia and Azerbaijan are vital for developing logistics and transport networks and promoting regional cooperation. Turkey is expected to play an increasingly significant role in the South Caucasus, supporting regional integration and security as Georgia seeks alternatives to NATO and EU membership.The remaining challenges from the perspective of the US include: geopolitical Tensions (Russia, China, and Iran continue to exert influence in the region, although their capacities may be overstretched due to the ongoing war and sanctions), economic viability (the middle corridor faces challenges such as customs and border control issues and the need for modern infrastructure. However, it presents an alternative logistical route that is gaining interest from various stakeholders); climate policy Implications (the ongoing energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine may prompt changes in climate policies, potentially favouring increased investments in oil and gas infrastructure). Last but not least, the path ahead requires the U.S. to consider military cooperation - enhanced US military support for Azerbaijan could signal a deeper commitment to regional stability, Three Seas Initiative (3SI) - success in expanding the 3SI could benefit the South Caucasus by fostering infrastructure development and regional integration, Black Sea security - NATO's evolving role in Black Sea security will be critical in linking to the middle corridor and ensuring regional stability and finally investment in energy resources - interest in the Transcaspian Gas Pipeline and other energy initiatives will be significant for Europe's efforts to diversify energy supplies.For Europe (The EU)The South Caucasus is essential for the EU for several reasons. Firstly as a geostrategic gateway. The region is a crucial gateway between Europe and Asia, making it significant for trade routes and connectivity. It is positioned at the intersection of major global trade routes, enhancing the EU's access to East and South markets. Secondly, in terms of energy supplies. The South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, plays a vital role in the EU's energy strategy, especially as the EU seeks to diversify its energy supplies and reduce dependence on Russian energy. Azerbaijan is a key supplier of natural gas to the EU, which has become increasingly important following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.Thirdly geopolitically, the region's geopolitical landscape has shifted due to recent conflicts, including the war in Ukraine. The EU's engagement with South Caucasus countries is essential for maintaining stability and influencing regional dynamics, especially as these nations navigate their foreign policy options between the EU and Russia.Fourthly, as an economic partner. Strengthening ties with the South Caucasus countries can enhance economic collaboration, which is particularly important given the EU's interest in bolstering regional trade and investment. This can also increase economic growth and stability in the EU's neighbourhood.Finally, The South Caucasus is becoming increasingly significant in the context of EU sanctions against Russia, as it could serve as a transit route for goods. The EU's ability to monitor and influence trade flows through this region is critical for enforcing its sanctions.ConclusionThis short analysis proves the importance of the Caucasus (South Caucasus, to be more exact) for the international community and its potential to play the role of an essential geopolitical factor that could potentially tip the scale regarding the global balance of power. Recent political developments in Georgia (Georgian Protests 2024 – 2025), where the ruling party, Georgian Dream, won the majority of seats in parliament, were met with protests fueled by claims of the opposition parties that the elections were fraudulent.  The winning party has decided to suspend the talks with the European Union about the country’s accession to the EU until 2028.  The move is seen as anti-EU (ergo pro-Russian).  At the same time, pro-Russian commentators have claimed that the demonstrators have been supported by the CIA (a claim that has been put forward with regard to the Ukrainian Maidan of 2013 or even the HK protests of 2019). As it appears, the Southern Caucasus plays a crucial role on the geopolitical chessboard attended by the U.S.A., Russia, Turkey, Iran and the EU. All of them are, at least for the time being, interested in peace and stability, which means status quo, at least as long as the war in Ukraine is not decidedly over. The future depends, among others, on the outcome of the end of the Ukrainian war and the visions and actions of the 47th President of the U.S., who already stunned the world with his claims regarding the Panama Canal and Greenland.References1  Buzan, B and Wæver, O. 1998. “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.” Lynne Rienner Publishers.2  “Armenia.” 2018. https://armeniapedia.org/index.php?title=Armenia. 3  “აქართველო.” 2024. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country). 4  Jansiz, Ahmad, and Mohammad Reza Khojaste. 2015. “Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach.” Journal of Politics and Law. Canadian Center of Science and Education. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v8n1p83. 5  Börzel, Tanja A., and Yasemin Pamuk. 2011. “Pathologies of Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus.” West European Politics. 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Paper presented at the German-U.S. Conference, Conflicts in the Greater Middle East and the Transatlantic Relationship, Jena, February 28 - March 1, 2003. 10  Melvin, Neil. *Retying the Caucasian Knot: Russia’s Evolving Approach to the South Caucasus*. Occasional Paper. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2024. Accessed 30.1.2025. https://static.rusi.org/retying-the-caucasian-knot-russias-evolving-approach-to-the-south-caucasus.pdf 11  Neset, Siri, Mustafa Aydin, Ayça Ergun, Richard Giragosian, Kornely Kakachia, and Arne Strand. *Changing Geopolitics of the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War: Prospect for Regional Cooperation and/or Rivalry*. CMI Report, No. 4. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, September 2023. https://www.cmi.no/publications/8911-changing-geopolitics-of-the-south-caucasus-after-the-second-karabakh-war 12  Rumer, Eugene, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski. U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus: Take Three. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13079. 13  Carafano, James. "Future and Consequences of US Strategic Interest in the South Caucasus." *Caucasus Strategic Perspectives* 3, no. 2 (Winter 2022): 41-51. Caucasus Strategic Perspectives https://cspjournal.az/post/future-and-consequences-of-us-strategic-interest-in-the-south-caucasus-489. 14  Akhvlediani, Tinatin. "The EU and the South Caucasus: Geoeconomics at Play." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/the-eu-and-the-south-caucasus-geoeconomics-at-play?center=europe&lang=en 15  Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2024: Georgia." Last modified January 31, 2025. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/georgia. 16  Shamin, Sarah., 3 Dec. 2024. “Georgia protests: What’s behind them and what’s next?”. ALJAZEERA. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/3/georgia-protests-whats-behind-them-and-whats-next  17  DISINFO: Georgia protests are a planned CIA operation according to Maidan scenario. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/georgia-protests-are-a-planned-cia-operation-according-to-maidan-scenario/  see also: Kaltenberg, Kit., 6 Oct. 2023. “A Maidan 2.0 color revolution looms in Georgia”. https://thegrayzone.com/2023/10/06/maidan-color-revolution-georgia/