Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Haiti is experiencing a widespread crisis of its institutions, political turmoil, high levels of poverty, disorder and increasing violence in the streets. Last nearly 5,000 people were assassinated and another 2,500 were kidnapped, according to the United Nations, more than double the number in 2022. [1] In this context, on March 11th, Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who is out of the country, announced his resignation once the necessary mechanisms for the transition of the government are in place. This publication describes the events that led to Henry’s resignation, the international community’s reaction, the outbreak of violence, as well as some points for reflection on what lies ahead for the Caribbean country. The resignation of Ariel Henry The current Prime Minister of Haiti, came to power following the assassination of the country’s former president, Jovenel Moise, in 2021. He had previously stated that he would resign in February, but later indicated that he would do so only once national security was restored. On February 29, following pressure from members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Henry pledged to hold general elections before August 31st next year. In the meantime, the regional mechanism would send an assessment team to help plan the elections. [2] Although CARICOM does not have a unified foreign policy, they “generally promote democratic governance” in their public discourse, said Rasheed Griffith, executive director of the ‘Instituto de Estudios del Progreso del Caribe’. [3] Henry’s reluctance to resign soon caused the violent protest to escalate, especially in Port-au-Prince, where most of the city is controlled by gangs. Among the gangs, one leader, Jimmy Chérizier, has stood out, calling for Henry’s government to be overthrown and warning of a “civil war that will lead to genocide” if the prime minister does not resign. [4] In addition, last January, the mandates of the last ten elected senators in Haiti officially expired, leaving the country without any officials elected by the people. Moreover, Henry’s government is linked to that of the also controversial Moise, who in any case, would have ended his term in February 2022. Henry has remained in office without constitutional legitimacy. [5] Last week, after traveling abroad, Henry tried to return to Haiti, but had to change his itinerary because gangs blocked access to the Port-au-Prince airport. The Prime Minister sought to land in the Dominican Republic and cross the border but was prevented from doing so by the neighboring nation’s authorities, so he was deviated to Puerto Rico. The United States then urged the Caribbean leader to “accelerate the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance structure.” [6] Originally, Henry had gone to Kenya to sign an agreement to pave the way for a multinational force to operate in Haiti. Amidst the growing violence and insecurity on the streets, the European Union evacuated its personnel on March 14th. The spokesman for the diplomatic division of the European Commission, Peter Stano, said that the bloc is “extremely concerned” about the situation, given the attacks on hospitals and prisons, food shortages and blocked infrastructures. [7] The US Armed Forces also withdrew non-essential personnel from its embassy, as reported by the Southern Command in a statement. [8] The UN has stated that it will remain in Haiti. On March 11th, senior officials from different countries met in Kingston, Jamaica, for a meeting convened by CARICOM to analyze the crisis. The US State Department reiterated Washington’s support for the creation of an “independent” body to assume presidential powers in Haiti, as well as the deployment of a security mission to help contain the violence. It also announced that it will provide 300 million pesos to alleviate the situation in the Caribbean country. [9] The initiative, which contemplates these resources, is under review by the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee [10]. From Puerto Rico, Henry participated in the CARICOM meeting virtually. At the end of the meeting, during a press conference, the temporary president of the Caribbean Community and leader of Guyana, Irfaan Ali, announced that Henry had agreed to resign from his position. He said the prime minister would step down after “the establishment of a transitional presidential council and the appointment of an interim authority”. Later, in a video, Henry stated that he would continue to “handle current affairs until the appointment of a prime minister and a government”. The council will include the participation of the main political parties, the private sector and the Montana Agreement, a coalition that proposed the formation of an interim government and a roadmap following Moise’s assassination [11]. Among the members of the mechanism is the political force Pitit Desalin, led by former senator and presidential aspirant Moise Jean-Charles. The EDE party of former Prime Minister Charles Joseph, the Fanmi Lavalas formation, and the December 21st coalition led by Henry, will also have a vote [12]. In addition, there will be two non-voting observers, one from civil society and another from the religious community. None of the members of the collegiate body may have been accused or convicted in any jurisdiction, be sanctioned by the UN, or seek a position in the upcoming elections in the country [13]. In theory, this council should be defined tomorrow, Thursday, March 14th, in the meantime, negotiations are underway to define who will form this structure [14]. The United States indicated that Henry could stay in Puerto Rico or go anywhere in its territory in case it is unsafe to return to Haiti [15]. Actions to set up a multinational support mission Since 2022, Prime Minister Henry called on the international community to integrate a support mission to strengthen the Haitian National Police (HNP) [16]. Kenya responded to this call in July 2023, when it announced its intention to “lead” the initiative and send “1,000 police officers to the Caribbean nation” [17]. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2699, authorizing the deployment of a multinational ad hoc security support mission to Haiti, under the leadership of Kenya [18]. The start of this operation has been delayed due to challenges in African country’s courts, which a few days ago the leaders of Haiti and Kenya tried to resolve by signing a bilateral security agreement. The international community has responded very timidly to the initiative. The Bahamas pledged 150 people. Jamaica and Antigua & Barbuda expressed their willingness to help. Benin offered to send 2,000 soldiers [19]. Spain also showed interest in contributing to the cause. However, on March 10th, the UN stated that despite the promises, a trust fund to pay for this force only amounts to 10 million dollars [20]. The new mission will not be a blue helmet operation. Its objectives will be to protect the state institutions, as well as critical infrastructure and transportation hubs. They will also seek to pacify gangs. It has been reported that an advanced contingent of several hundred officers will be deployed to survey the terrain [21]. To avoid repeating the problems the UN mission has had in the country, such as the spread of cholera and cases of exploitation and sexual abuse, there will be very rigorous scrutiny to oversee the multinational mission. This time the Security Council resolution demands appropriate wastewater management measures to prevent the introduction and spread of disease, as well as robust, secure, and accessible mechanisms for lodging complaints and conducting investigations into any allegations of misconduct, including sexual assault [22]. However, for the time being, Kenya has communicated that the deployment of its agents is on hold until a new government is formed in the Caribbean nation, as officials said on March 12th. Spike in violence and importance of gangs Port-au-Prince has been the epicenter of gang violence, especially the National Police stations, its cadet academy, the prisons, from which more than 3,500 prisoners have fled, the Sylvio Cator national stadium and the international airport [23]. On March 3rd, the Government declared a state of emergency and a curfew in most of the country, [24] which will be extended until March 22nd. The gang members’ main demand was the resignation of the prime minister, although they also seek to prevent the deployment of international forces. According to international analyst Robert Muggah, the gangs hope to be part of a governing council to lead the country [25]. According to a report done by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, there are up to 200 gangs operating in Haiti, and almost half of them have a presence in Port-au-Prince. They range from small groups of youths sharing guns to gangs of more than a thousand people with permanent salaries and automatic weapons that belong to hierarchical organizations. There are two more visible groups: the G-Pèp and the G-9 Family, which control the poorest neighborhoods of the capital. They have been linked to political parties: the G-9 is close to the ruling Haitian Tèt Kale, while the G-Pèp tends to support opposition forces. In this crisis, the G-9 and its allies have taken over the ports and roads surrounding the country’s main airport [26]. Delinquency controls 80% of the capital [27]. Gang members are often aligned with elite businessmen and politicians who finance them [28]. The leaders of some gangs announced an informal alliance called “Vivre Ensemble” (Living Together). As noted above, the most notable leader is Jimmy Chérizier, who is known as “Barbeque”. He was an elite policeman and has shown himself to be bloodthirsty in his operations [29]. Reports say his gang was receiving support from the government of Jovenel Moise [30]. While CARICOM leaders met to discuss the situation in Haiti, Chérizier told reporters that if the international community continued on the same path, it would only “generate more chaos”. “We Haitians have to decide who is going to be the leader of the country and what model of government we want” [31]. Clashes in Port-au-Prince have caused hundreds of inhabitants of the northern part of the capital to flee their homes. The UN reported that more than 800 people died in January. The violence is also driving tens of thousands of Haitians out of the country. The Dominican Republic is the main destination of that diaspora. For this reason, President Luis Abinader issued a cry for help to “save” Haiti [32]. For now, the Dominican government maintains the cancellation of flights to and from Haiti and on March 6th, Carlos Luciano Díaz Morfa, Minister of Defense, announced that they have incorporated strict security measures in the border zone, including more equipment and more personnel [33]. In the United States, the Defense Department and military officials told the Congress that they must be prepared for a possible mass migration from Haiti [34]. Dozens of people have died in the violent attacks and over 15,000 Haitians have been left homeless after fleeing their communities during these clashes. Food, water, fuel, and medical care are scarce. The humanitarian situation is dire. As a result, many people feel that the best thing to do is to leave the country [35]. According to the United Nations, approximately one million people are on the brink of famine, with 350,000 displaced [36]. What’s next after the Prime Minister’s resignation Some experts wonder what role the gangs will play. Robert Fatton, an expert on Haitian politics at the University of Virginia, says they will necessarily have to participate in the national discussion. Officials will have to deal with the groups and try to convince them to disarm [37]. According to an analysis by Crisis Group, the gangs will have two options in the face of deployment of the multinational forces: if they perceive weakness, they will not submit, but if they see that the intervention is strong, they will consider under what conditions they could disarm [38]. In these circumstances, gangs have emerged as power brokers in Haiti for the first time, posing a challenge for any transitional government [39]. However, for many civic and religious groups involved in the talks, this is a red line. Chérizier’s next steps are unknown. Days ago, he said that if Henry resigned, “all areas around Port-au-Prince that are blocked or inaccessible will be reopened” and “attacks on police stations will stop” [40]. He also vowed to begin “the real fight against the system of oligarchs and corrupt people” and proposed his own “peace plan”. He demands total amnesty for gang members and that the country be governed by a “council of wise men” in which he would have a place [41]. On March 11th, Chérizier announced that the “Viv Ansanm” gang alliance will not recognize any government resulting from the agreement with CARICOM and that “it is up to the Haitian people to designate their rulers”. On the other hand, an advisor to Guy Philippe, the former rebel leader who recently returned to Haiti and called for “revolution” against Henry, warned that any new government must include him [42]. There is uncertainty about the timing of the transition. For now, security conditions in Port-au-Prince are precarious, while doubts persist about the timetable for deploying an international mission to reinforce the local police and restore order [43]. These days, Henry’s resignation seems to have eased the situation in the capital, as no attacks on government offices or police stations have been reported. The main CPS cargo port opened, and some fuel was allowed to leave the Varreux facilities near the port. However, protests continue in opposition to the CARICOM plan [44]. The economist and political scientist Joseph Harold writes about three aspects of the crisis. First, Haitians are in a humanitarian emergency and aid is not enough. The distribution of supplies should be done by national institutions, not international agencies. This practice weakens the institutional framework. Resources to alleviate the emergency amount to 720 million dollars and only 16% have been collected [45]. In terms of security, it will be difficult for the multinational solution to be successful. Experts are skeptical that a relatively small force led by Kenya, whose officers speak English, not Creole or Frech, will help control the situation [46]. Wooldy Edson Louidor, a Colombian-Haitian professor at the Javeriana University of Colombia, affirms that the support of the international community is important, “but to achieve a Haitian solution. And this involves returning to constitutional order” [47]. Haitians have traditionally opposed any foreign intervention in their internal affairs and pride themselves on being the first black republic to emerge after a slave revolt during European colonialism [48]. The third point is the elections that must be organized [49]. This is not a recipe for conflict resolution, but it is a necessary step. It gives the international community and local actors a goal to work towards [50]. In this sense, analyst Philippe de Bard points out the importance of designing an electoral system that contemplates the constitution of a reliable electoral roll, the integration of a permanent electoral council and the creation of an independent dispute mechanism. He believes that it will be necessary to evaluate the necessary constitutional reforms. A new electoral law requires the approval of the Haitian Parliament, which does not exist today [51]. The immediate term, the challenge is to control the gangs and create a capable police force. After that, the effort should focus on developing a political strategy to establish conditions for free elections [52]. According to proposals by leading figures, this could happen in about two years [53]. In 2009, writer and journalist Sergio Ramirez did a report on Haiti, following two devastating hurricanes and before the 2010 earthquake. He interviewed the head of the UN Stabilization Mission, Hédi Hannabi, who said, “this is not the classic peacekeeping mission, because there are no two parties in conflict, what we have is anarchy, the presence of gangs, and the absence of institutions. If we were to leave today, chaos would ensue. The problem is that more than ten years later, the disorder situation continues [54]. References [1] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas que han invadido la capital de Haití y qué quieren?”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/03/09/espanol/haiti-pandillas-que-pasa.html [2] CARICOM, “Communiqué – 46th Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM”, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://caricom.org/communique-46th-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-caricom/ [3] Catherine Osborn, “How Haiti’s Unelected Leader Lost America’s Blessing”, Foreign Policy, 7 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/07/haiti-crisis-gangs-ariel-henry-united-states-caricom-elections/ [4] Sarah Morland, “Haiti PM commits to elections by 2025, CARICOM to send team”, Reuters, 29 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-pm-commits-elections-by-2025-caricom-send-team-2024-02-29/ [5] Monique Clesca, “Haiti’s Rule of Lawlessness”, Foreign Affairs, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/central-america-caribbean/haitis-rule-lawlessness [6] Catherine Osborn, op. cit. [7] Deutsche Welle, “UE evacúa a todo su personal de Haití”, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/ueevac%C3%BAa-a-todo-su-personal-de-hait%C3%AD-y-caricom-convoca-cumbre-de-urgencia/a-68493344 [8] Colin McCullough, “Estados Unidos evacuó al personal no esencial de su embajada en Haití por el aumento de la violencia de pandillas”, CNN, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/10/ejercito-ee-uu-evacuo-personal-no-esencialembajada-haiti-trax/ [9] Jennifer Hansler and Tara John, “US will contribute $300 million to Haiti’s multinational security mission”, CNN, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/11/americas/haiti-us-blinken-security-mission-intl-latam/index.html [10] Matt Berg y Eric Bazail-Eimil, “State just sent Republicans their Haiti plan”, Politico, 12 de marzo de 4024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/03/12/state-just-sent-republicans-their-haiti-plan-00146474 [11] Monique Clesca, “Haitians Have a Solution to Haiti’s Crisis”, World Politics Review, 8 de septiembre de 2022. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-gangs-protests-crisis-corruption-crime/ [12] Dánica Coto y Evens Sanon (AP), “El premier de Haití dice que renunciará tras pico de violencia. No está claro quién tomará el relevo”, Los Angeles Times, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/articulo/2024-03-12/elpremier-de-haiti-dice-que-renunciara-tras-pico-de-violencia-no-esta-claro-quien-tomara-el-relevo [13] DW, “Dimisión de Ariel Henry, una esperanza para Haití”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/dimisi%C3%B3n-de-ariel-henry-una-esperanza-para-hait%C3%AD/a-68503873 [14] Widlore Mérancourt, Samantha Schmidt, Michael Birnbaum y Amanda Coletta, “As leader resigns, Haitian politicians rush to form new government”, The Washington Post, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/12/haitiprime-minister-ariel-henry-resigns/ [15] El País, “El caos y una ola de violencia sin precedentes fuerzan la renuncia del primer ministro de Haití, Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-12/el-caos-y-una-ola-de-violencia-sin-precedentes-fuerzan-la-renuncia-del-primerministro-de-haiti-ariel-henry.html [16] DW, “Haití reitera la necesidad de una fuerza multinacional”, 10 de junio de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-reitera-la-necesidad-de-una-fuerza-multinacional/a-65877041 [17] Frances Robles, “An International Force May Be Headed to Troubled Haiti, again”, The New York Times, 1 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 11 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/01/world/americas/haiti-international-intervention.html [18] Emily Mae Czachor, “U.S. military airlifts embassy staff from Port-au-Prince amid Haiti's escalating gang violence”, CBS News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-military-airlifts-evacuation-staff-embassy-port-au-prince-haiti-gangviolence/ [19] Samuel Salgado, “Haití firma acuerdo con Kenia para que policías de Nairobi lideren misión de seguridad”, France24, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240301-hait%C3%AD-y-kenia-firman-acuerdo-paraque-polic%C3%ADas-de-nairobi-lideren-misi%C3%B3n-de-seguridad [20] Jacqueline Charles, “U.S., Caribbean leaders propose plan to lead Haiti out of crisis and toward elections”, The Miami Herald, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article286558805.html#storylink=cpy [21] Crisis Group, “Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold?”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b49-haitis-gangs-can-foreign-mission-break-their-stranglehold [22] Ídem [23] Pablo Ferri, “Haití camina hacia el desastre a la espera de ayuda internacional”, El País, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-10/haiti-camina-hacia-el-desastre-a-la-espera-de-ayuda-internacional.html [24] Carlos S. Maldonado, “Haití, en estado de urgencia y toque de queda tras la huida de miles de presos de una cárcel de Puerto Príncipe”, El País, 3 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-03/miles-de-presos-huyen-de-la-principal-carcel-dehaiti-tras-un-asalto-de-las-bandas-criminales.html [25] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [26] Ídem [27] Nacho Carretero, “Haití, cuando colapsa un Estado”, El País, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/eps/2023-07-02/haiti-cuando-colapsa-un-estado.html [28] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [29] Tom Phillips y Luke Taylor, “Is the feared gang boss ‘Barbecue’ now the most powerful man in Haiti?”, The Guardian, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/10/haiti-gang-boss-kingpin-barbecue-jimmy-cherizier [30] InSight Crime, “Jimmy Chérizier, alias ‘Barbecue’”, 10 de noviembre de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/haitiorganized-crime-news/jimmy-cherizier-alias-barbecue/ [31] Coto y Sanon (AP), op. cit. [32] Carlos S. Maldonado, op. cit. [33] Jessica Hasbun, “Después no se quejen de las acciones que vamos a tener que hacer”: la advertencia del presidente Luis Abinader por crisis en Haití”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/advertencia-republicadominicana-haiti-luis-abinader-orix/ [34] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití, las pandillas y la dimisión del primer ministro en vivo: noticias y más”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/ultimas-noticias-sobre-la-escalada-de-la-violencia-en-haiti-y-dimision-delprimer-ministro-en-vivo [35] Frances Robles, David C. Adams y Andre Paultre, “With Haiti in Chaos, a Humanitarian Crisis Is Rapidly Unfolding”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/09/world/americas/haiti-gangs-political-uprising-ariel-henryhumanitarian-crisis.html [36] Philippe de Bard, “In Haiti, as Elsewhere, Elections Alone Are Not the Answer”, Foreign Policy, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/12/haiti-gang-violence-elections-ariel-henry-resignation/ [37] Coto y Sanon, op. cit. [38] Crisis Group, op. cit. [39] Sam Woolston, “Prime Minister’s Resignation Tips Haiti Into Uncharted Territory”, Insight Crime, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/news/prime-minister-resigns-haiti-unchartered-territory [40] Matt Rivers, “Haiti's most notorious gang leader plots its future amid rebellion”, ABC News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://abcnews.go.com/International/haitis-notorious-gang-leader-plots-future-amid-rebellion/story?id=107994731 [41] Amalendu Misra, “Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own”, The Conversation, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/jimmy-barbecue-cherizier-the-gangsterbehind-the-violence-in-haiti-who-may-have-political-aspirations-of-his-own-225514 [42] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití”, op. cit. [43] Infobae, “Crece la incertidumbre en Haití tras el anuncio de renuncia del primer ministro Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/03/12/crece-la-incertidumbre-en-haiti-tras-el-anuncio-de-renuncia-delprimer-ministro-ariel-henry/ [44] Al Jazeera, “Uneasy quiet in Haiti capital after prime minister pledges to step down”, 13 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/3/13/uneasy-quiet-in-haiti-capital-after-prime-minister-pledges-to-step-down [45] Fernando del Rincón, “Hay incoherencia en la respuesta internacional para la situación en Haití, dice analista”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/haiti-violencia-bandas-inseguridad-ariel-gobierno-conclusiones-tv/ [46] Tom Phillips, Archie Bland y Oliver Holmes Haiti, “What caused the gang violence and will it end now the PM has quit?”, The Guardian, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/08/haiti-crisis-gang-jailbreak-explained [47] Isabella Escobedo, “Haití: radiografía de un Estado fallido”, DW, 5 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-radiograf%C3%ADa-de-un-estado-fallido/a-68448368 [48] BBC News, “La multimillonaria multa que Haití le pagó a Francia por convertirse en el primer país de América Latina en independizarse”, 30 de diciembre de 2018. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-46680927 [49] Fernando del Rincón, op. cit. [50] James Bosworth, “To Address Its Crisis, Haiti Needs an Elected Government, World Politics Review, 26 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-elections-gangs-crisis/ [51] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [52] The Washington Post (editorial), “Haiti needs security now. For the future, it needs democracy”, 8 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/03/08/haiti-violence-gangs-chaos-anarchy-kenya-peacekeepers/ [53] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [54] Sergio Ramírez, “Haití, un país en extinción”, El País, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/opinion/2024-03-12/haiti-un-pais-en-extincion.htm

Another drug war has begun in Latin America. The newly elected president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, has declared a state of emergency and the military is being used to tackle violence and drug trafficking in a country that is part of the transnational cocaine smuggling trade. Ecuador will probably realise what other countries in Latin America have done: military solutions to the illicit drug problem do not work. For decades, the Colombian government has confronted powerful drug cartels and drug-related violence with a policy guided by a series of UN treaties that prohibit drugs and oblige governments to prosecute recreational drug use and production. These treaties are known as the “drug prohibition regime”. Under the mantle of these treaties, the US has pushed Latin American governments to implement tough laws on drug use, and crackdown on drug cartels in an attempt to tackle drug trafficking and drug addiction. Governments, such as Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador and Honduras, have used their armies against drug cartels since the 1980s. However, the use of the military in the region, with operations supported by the US Drug and Enforcement Agency, has not prevented an increase in violence in the region. In the case of Mexico, researchers have found a relationship between the deployment of the military in anti-drug operations and the rise of homicides since 2007. Moreover, drug addiction has not reduced in the US (one expected outcome of the “war on drugs”). Nowadays, Latin America and the Caribbean is the most violent region in the world. According to the 2023 report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 34% of the homicides on the planet during 2021 happened in the Americas. Many of these homicides relate to the global war on drugs. Some Latin American administrations have started to push back against policies that make drugs illegal. For example, Bolivia legalised indigenous production of coca crops in 2011. Uruguay and Jamaica legalised some purchases of cannabis in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Mexico and Colombia are discussing cannabis regulation. Some of these governments, including Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia, tried to put forward a plan for a new global approach to drug use in 2016 at a UN general assembly special meeting but proponents of this failed to convince other countries to allow all types of drug decriminalisation. However, the assembly did reach an agreement to allow countries to regulate the medical uses of some previously illegal drugs such as cannabis. Now, these countries led by Colombian president Gustavo Petro will call for a new UN meeting to try to get more support for a new approach to the “war on drugs”. Colombia’s role Since the early 1960s, Colombia has been the epicentre of the global war on drugs. Infamously known as the centre of production of cocaine trafficked by regional criminal organisations, this country is experimenting with a peace process on two fronts: first, with the guerrillas, and second, with the drug cartels. Petro was elected with the promise to reduce the endless problem of violence. In September 2023, Petro asked his Mexican counterpart, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to help convene a new UN meeting to overhaul the international approach to illegal drugs. Petro was also responding to pressure from global research showing the existing policy was not working. For example, public health experts in The Lancet have argued that making drugs illegal has failed to stem drug use. There is a longstanding debate about whether proposing the end of drug prohibition – and the war on drugs as a consequence – will stop violence and reduce harmful addiction. From 2011, a group of former world leaders and intellectuals (such as former presidents of Mexico and Colombia, César Gaviria, Juan Manuel Santos and Ernesto Zedillo) have pushed for the end of drug prohibition. The data seems to back up their claims that prosecuting drug consumption and production is not reducing addiction. According to the Global Burden of Disease Data, from the Institute For Health Metrics and Evaluation, since the late 1990s, the number of drug users with drug dependence has increased from 40 to 50 million users yearly around the world, despite the “war on drugs”. But Petro faces an uphill battle to gather support to challenge the drug prohibition regime. In September 2023 Latin American governments signed the Cali declaration, calling for a UN assembly on the global drug problem to be held in 2025, one year before Petro’s presidency ends. But the US, which is experiencing a fentanyl opioid epidemic, is not likely to be positive about making more drugs legal. US president Joe Biden is less prone to tackle drug policy with police prosecution and his approach includes alternatives such as treating addicts in health clinics instead of incarceration. If in November Donald Trump wins the presidential election, drug policy is likely to be more militarised than ever. The former president explored using US military force in Mexico to tackle fentanyl smuggling through Mexico. López Obrador helped to organise the September 2023 Cali conference, but domestically he is not pursuing drug legalisation policies. He has deployed the Mexican military to reinforce drug confiscation of fentanyl after pressure from the US government. Petro might find an ally in Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei. The new Argentinian president has declared he favours drug legalisation, inspired by his libertarian position. However, Argentina is facing increasing crime rates in some regions and this security challenge might dissuade him from pursing drug legalisation. Beyond the Americas, some European countries might back the initiative, such as Portugal which decriminalised personal possession of all drugs in 2001. There, possession results in confiscation or a fine, but not imprisonment. If political factors align, Petro might edge forward with his plans to tackle the global war on drugs differently. However, international tensions and the recent war in Ecuador have complicated the scenario. Hopefully, scientific evidence may force countries to consider new options.

With the possibility of a second Trump presidency looming, it is high time to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans Lest anyone had missed the point, Donald Trump has now provided helpful clarification of his attitude towards America’s NATO allies – and specifically those that fail to spend the benchmark 2 per cent of their GDP on defence. If elected he would, he declared at a campaign rally, “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to underspending NATO allies. Reacting to a storm of protest from European leaders, he was happy to repeat himself: “Look, if they’re not going to pay, we’re not going to protect. OK?”. Nowadays, it is less easy for complacent Europeans to shrug off such observations as typical Trumpisms. They have evidence that Trump redux would be likely to apply his malevolent instincts much more efficiently than he did in his chaotic first term as president. And the chances of him having the opportunity to do so are increasingly likely: he has now steamrollered the opposition in the early Republican primaries, and is ahead of Joe Biden in the polls. No one can any longer ignore the real possibility that in less than a year’s time the occupant of the White House could toss the whole responsibility for keeping Ukraine in the fight against Russia into European laps, whilst insisting that from here on in they see to their own defence. It would therefore hardly be premature if Europeans began to explore how each other views the situation; to make contingency plans; and even to take some precautionary steps. The two key challenges are obvious. The first is how to get more weapons, and especially ammunition and air-defence missiles, to Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion, Europeans have done better at this than might have been expected – but they have not done as well as the need now demands, and not nearly enough to support Ukraine if the United States withdraws its aid. The EU, and especially the European Commission, have played a prominent role here, providing financial incentives for member states to donate from their own stocks and to expand production facilities. But talk of moving European defence industries onto a war footing has yet to be realised; and although the commission will shortly unveil proposals for an ambitious European defence industrial strategy, this can only succeed if member states evince more enthusiasm for collective action than they have so far shown. Only three months ago France, Germany, Italy, and Spain jointly warned the commission to stay off their turf and respect national “prerogatives” on defence. The second key challenge that Europeans should be facing up to is how they would defend themselves without US backing against a Russia that had – the possibility can no longer be discounted – imposed a humiliating ‘peace’ on Ukraine. The “dormant NATO” plans being proposed by right-wing US think-tanks foresee a wholesale withdrawal of US ground forces from Europe. But Europeans have huge psychological difficulties in bringing themselves to discuss the US as they would any other foreign power, even in situations where their own strategic interests are manifestly different from those of the superpower. NATO’s disastrous involvement in Afghanistan, for instance, would never have dragged on for so many fruitless years had not its European members studiously avoided any collective discussion of a campaign which each saw exclusively through the prism of its own bilateral relations with the US. Compounding these challenges is the fact that there is no institutional setting in which Europeans could confer. Their task is, in effect, to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans, but this can hardly be discussed in NATO. That organisation, after all, is where European militaries gather to be told what to do by Americans, but the current US administration can scarcely be expected to lead a discussion premised on its own defeat in the November presidential election. The EU has neither locus nor credibility in military operational matters. The reality is that, if a strategy for defending Europe without the Americans is to emerge, this can only be on an ‘intergovernmental’ basis – through bilateral and minilateral discussion amongst Europe’s main defence players. At the alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit, NATO doubled down on its strategy of forward defence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has demonstrated that we are in a technological era in which defensive systems have the advantage over the traditional means of attack. Destroying massed Russian armour turned out to be relatively easy; getting Russians out now that they have dug themselves in is the devil’s own job. So in Madrid allies resolved to reinforce NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” – boosting in-place forces in eastern and central Europe. But predictably, Europeans have been happy to leave this largely to the Americans, who reinforced their presence in Europe with an additional 20,000 troops. The challenge for European chiefs of staff and defence planners now is to work out how, if the need arises, to substitute for US in-place forces in the frontline states; what capabilities and defensive infrastructure will be needed to halt any assault at the borders; and how to organise the communications and data networks necessary to form an effective system that ties together disparate sensors and missile, drone, and artillery assets. Such planning is now an urgent requirement, not just as a matter of military preparedness, but for psychological reasons. Europe’s frontline states have long felt their western European allies lack not only US military credibility, but also a serious understanding of the scale of Putin’s threat. Europeans will only hang together under a second Trump presidency if they are ready to trust each other, and specifically if the most vulnerable states see a real prospect of western European states putting many more of their bodies on the line as in-place forces. The last couple of years, in which predominantly eastern European states have agreed to purchase an astonishing $120 billion of weapons from American contractors, suggests a fatal tendency to believe that maybe Trump can be propitiated by such largesse. Fortunately, the return of Donald Tusk as Poland’s prime minister has substantially increased the odds of Europeans hanging together even in a Trump 2.0 scenario. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland (the Weimar Triangle) have just met to discuss strengthening Europe’s efforts. If, as expected, the British Labour party returns to government later this year, then the United Kingdom would be an obvious addition to this group. Indeed, a necessary one: it is hard to envisage a credible European defence of the continent that did not clutch in Europe’s second nuclear power. Keir Starmer has made clear his ambition to restore defence ties severed by Brexit. There is no time to waste: the prime minister-in-waiting could usefully make an early trip to Paris to initiate conversations with the UK’s closest continental ally.

Watch on YouTube A drone attack that killed three American troops and wounded at least 34 more at a base in Jordan has increased fears of a widening conflict in the Middle East – and the possibility that the U.S. may be further drawn into the fighting. President Joe Biden vowed to respond to the assault, blaming Iran-backed militias for the first U.S. military casualties in months of such strikes in the region. But to what extent was Iran involved? And what happens next? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on asymmetric warfare and militant groups in the Middle East, to answer these and other questions. What do we know about the group that claimed responsibility? Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, which translates as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, has claimed responsibility for the drone attack. However, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is not a single group per se. Rather, it is a term used to describe an umbrella organization, which, since around 2020, has included various Iran-backed militias in the region. Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon. Today, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity – that is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level the groups have their distinct agendas. The collective is notorious for its staunch anti-U.S. posture and dynamic military campaigns, such as a recent two-day drone operation targeting American forces at an Iraqi airbase. Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition remains elusive. This deliberate strategy hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. What do they hope to achieve in attacking a US target? Iranian-backed militias have been intensifying attacks on U.S. forces in recent months in response to American support for Israel in the Israel-Hamas conflict, and also to assert regional influence. Since the beginning of the conflict in October 2023, Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly struck American military bases in Iraq and Syria, recently expanding their attacks to include northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border. The deadly assault on Jan. 28 marks a significant escalation, though – it is the first instance during the Israel-Hamas war that American troops have been killed. Where is Tower 22 – the US base hit in drone attack? Three American troops were killed at a camp in Jordan near the Syrian border.   The attack in Jordan forms part of a strategy by Iranian-backed militias to counter Washington’s support for Israel in the Gaza conflict. But it is also aimed at advancing a wider goal of pushing U.S. forces out of the Middle East entirely. By coordinating attacks under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, these groups are trying to display a unified stance against U.S. interests and policy, showcasing their collective strength and strategic alignment across the region. What role did Iran have in the attack? Iran has officially denied any involvement in the drone strike. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports. Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, has provided such militias with money, weapons and training. However, the extent of Iran’s command and coordination in specific incidents like the Jordan attack remains unclear. At this stage, more concrete evidence is necessary to firmly implicate Iran. As Iran expert Nakissa Jahanbani and I recently explained in an article for The Conversation, Iran’s strategy in the region involves supporting and funding militia groups while granting them a degree of autonomy. By doing so, Iran maintains plausible deniability when it comes to attacks carried out by its proxies. So while Iran’s direct involvement in the attack has not been definitively established, Tehran’s long-standing support of groups like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is well documented, playing a significant role in the regional conflict dynamics and geopolitical strategies. What options does the US have to respond? It isn’t clear how the U.S. intends to respond to the attack. The Biden administration faces complex dynamics when it comes to responding to attacks linked to Iranian-backed militias. While a forceful military strike is an option that the Biden administration appears to be looking at, targeting Iran directly on its own soil is fraught with risks and may be seen as a step too far. Even when targeting Iranian interests or personnel, such as the assassination of Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, the U.S has conducted these actions outside Iranian territory. Iran’s denial of direct involvement in the attack further complicates the situation and makes it less likely that the U.S. attacks Iran in retaliatory strikes. But adopting a targeted approach, such as striking militia leaders outside of Iran, raises questions about the effectiveness of U.S. tactics in deterring Iran and its proxies. This strategy has been employed in the past, yet it has not significantly curbed Iran’s or its proxies’ aggressive actions. The concern is that while such strikes are precise, they may not be enough to deter ongoing or future attacks. The key to the strategy’s success may rest in identifying the most influential factors, or “centers of gravity,” that can effectively influence Iran’s behavior. This means determining key leaders, critical infrastructure or economic assets, which, if killed, destroyed or seized, could substantially alter Iran’s decision-making or operational capabilities. The Biden administration’s need to balance a strong response with the geopolitical consequences highlights the difficulties of navigating a tense and evolving situation. How might the attack affect the wider Middle East conflict? How the U.S. responds could reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape and influence the dynamics of proxy warfare in the region. A strong military response from Washington might deter Iranian-backed militias from future attacks, but it could also provoke them into taking more aggressive actions. In the short term, any U.S. retaliation – especially if it targets Iranian interests directly – could escalate tensions in the region. It could also exacerbate the cycle of tit-for-tat strikes between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict. And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power.

A wave of violence, neoliberalism and drug trafficking Ecuador has been grappling with a profound crisis marked by heightened insecurity, exacerbated by the implementation of neoliberal policies and widespread impoverishment over the past few years. The looming threat of a quasi-permanent state of conflict, at least until the upcoming elections, coupled with a concerning trend towards creeping authoritarianism, while not yet institutionalized, casts a shadow over the current state of affairs. “By associating the presentation of meat to a dog with a bell sound for a certain number of times, eventually the bell sound alone will determine salivation in the dog.” - Pavlov's experiment There is much neuropolitics in the unraveling of the most recent events in Ecuador, with the worsening internal crisis and the draconian responses decided by President Daniel Noboa. There is the neuropolitics of terror, there is neuropolitics in the performance anxiety of a newly elected president who is confronted with a situation, already clear from the outset, that threatens to undermine his eventual future election. And there is much psychopolitics in a country that cannot shake off its visceral hatred of the years of the "Revolucion Ciudadana" on the one hand or its unconditional love for its father Rafael Correa on the other. And who inevitably falls back "like Pavlov's dog," into electoral choices that favor the country's economic elites in the belief that they are choosing the lesser evil. And there is a country exhausted by impoverishment, marginalization, viral weakening of the state apparatuses. And on the other side, again, overseas, there is a kind of Pavlovian reflex that a civil war, or a coup, is going on in Ecuador today. A hell on Earth, in short. A Pavlovian reflex that seems to hide a sort of latent "Orientalism" that still permeates the reading of events on this continent on the other side of the ocean. It will therefore be necessary to use the classic Occam's razor, to try to debunk the facts, news, and interpretations and get to the grain of things. The grain of things is so called. Ecuador has been experiencing for some years now an overt situation of increasing insecurity brought about by the penetration of as many as 22 drug trafficking gangs (Colombian, or affiliated with the Mexican cartels of Jalisco - Nueva Generación and Sinaloa, assisted by Albanian gangs present on the country's coast, which also suggests connections with the Calabrian "ndrangheta") mostly in the coastal regions. The homicide rate is among the highest in Latin America. Regions such as Esmeraldas - with an overwhelming majority of Afro population, which has always been marginalized and impoverished, or Guayas, in one way or another, are fertile or strategically relevant terrain for cocaine routes. The former due to the great availability of cheap "labor," "gatilleros" they call them, notably suburban boys left to their own devices, victims of a historical fate that marginalizes them, who for a fistful of dollars receive a gun and simply pull the trigger. Or they go to extort bribes, "vaccinations," from traders or families. The latter for the important port of Guayaquil, territory to be controlled to export drugs to the United States and Europe, often inside banana containers, as happened in a recent large seizure at the port of Gioia Tauro, Calabria, Italy. The penetration of narcos gangs into Ecuador undergoes a paradoxical acceleration with the peace process in Colombia when border areas "controlled" by the FARC are abandoned and left prey to new paramilitary formations or the coca-producing gangs. Ecuador thus finds itself between two producing regions such as Colombia and Peru, with porous borders, small and large ports from which to ship cargoes, a social fabric torn apart by years and years of neoliberal policies, an economy centered almost exclusively on an extractivist model that leaves large swaths of the population impoverished (and which is, after all, the "good" face of that of the narco-economies), a society ridden with enormous inequalities, first and foremost in urban areas, informal labor markets, and rampant corruption in state apparatuses. A dollarized economy that also makes money laundering easier, and further backed up by widespread illegal gold mining. What better combination for the narco-traffickers to make it the place for processing and shipping their goods? There is a strong correlation between the application of the IMF's neoliberal "shock doctrine," and its social, political and economic consequences, and the spread of organized crime. A correlation that calls for a indepth analysis of the root causes causes of what can be considered a "polycrisis" that runs through the small Andean country, certainly not used to situations such as that experienced in the past in Colombia or currently in Mexico. A polycrisis that is evident by analyzing in filigree the events of the last six months. Let us rewind the tape to August of last year. Riots have been igniting in prisons for some time. Gang clashes, often aided by the connivance of prison authorities (how else would one explain the presence of weapons and explosives used in the riots?) rage with unprecedented brutality. The prison problem stems from widespread pan-penalism in state apparatuses and an essentially punitive and deeply patriarchal view of retribution, and one that has disproportionately increased the type of crimes for which people go to jail (even for driving without a license). And by the construction in 2014 of three maximum security prisons in which narcos are locked up, creating the conditions for their transformation into command centers and theaters of internal wars among them. The presidential election campaign, convened prematurely following then-President Lasso's decision to dissolve parliament recurring to the mechanism of "muerte cruzada" and go to the polls to avoid impeachment proceedings for corruption, is actually dominated by the issue of security. Close to the opening of the polls, there comes the knockout blow that will determine the election outcome. First the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, a champion of the fight against corruption, killed in Quito at a campaign event, few weeks after Augustin Intriago, the mayor of Manta, another port city, a territory in the hands of gangs like others on the coast. In the days that followed, the hitherto minor figure of the coastal candidate, an expression of local and national oligarchies - the same ones that had supported Lasso at the time - emerged in the polls. A young man unknown to most, a sort of electora underdog, Daniel Noboa, son of "Alvarito" great tycoon of the banana industry, a permanent candidate for president, and grandson of Isabel a Guayaquil’s wealthiest real estate entrepreneur. In the runoff Noboa wins against the Revolucion Ciudadana candidate, Luisa Gonzales, and immediately makes of security his priority. He faces a very complex scenario. A Congress in which on paper it does not enjoy a majority (although it will later vote by a majority for the first economic measures and the state of internal armed conflict also by virtue of a pact with important sectors of the oppositions), the overwhelming majority of territories controlled by opposition parties (Revolucion Ciudadana and Pachakutik, the reference party of the powerful CONAIE, Confederation of Indigenous Organizations of Ecuador). In the background is the important victory in the national referendum against oil extraction in the Yasuni, which foreshadows the existence of a social and ecological movement far stronger than electoral numbers. In short, Noboa appears from the outset to be a kind of lame duck who will experience a situation, to return to the neuropolitics mentioned above, of a real post-electoral stress disorder, squeezed between the urgency of giving strong and impactful signals to counter organized crime and that of responding in the short time of his term (new elections are due for mid 2025), to the interests of the lobbies to which he refers. Tertium non datur, even if that tertium is represented by the overwhelming majority of the country, already affected by the pandemic. And it is precisely there, in that "tertium," "from below," Uruguayan sociologist Raul Zibechi would say, that decision makers should start to reconstruct a plausible hypothesis of a country capable of another future. It is that tertium to which the country's resources should be devoted, young people and adolescents left alone and in the grip of criminal gangs, with fathers and mothers migrating out of desperation, crossing the Isthmus of Darien on foot to try to get to the United States. So even before he takes office, Noboa finds himself making some pre-government reshuffles, launches a security plan, "Phoenix," then decides to get the inconvenient vice president, a great Vox sympathizer, out of the way by sending her to Israel with the assignment of "special envoy" for peace. And he gets to work. A few weeks go by and the "Metastasis" scandal explodes, proof of how far the narcos have managed to penetrate the judicial sector, squeezed between corruption and death threats. In the meantime, the president begins to set his economic agenda by presenting laws aimed mainly at flexibilizing the labor market, creating free-trade, tax-free zones that coincide with the large estates and plantations of the agribusiness tycoons, announcing the removal of fuel subsidies, the main detonant of last year's indigenous uprising, brutally suppressed by the Lasso government. A "ley economica" that would create great resistance in the country, and which responds, along with the others, to the need to secure support from the International Monetary Fund. In parallel, funds to local authorities are reduced, the security department under his direct command is even closed. A tax "amnesty" for the highest incomes is announced. Cases of corruption in the security apparatus follow one another. Noboa prepares a package of legislative proposals and amendments to the Constitution that would allow the police and army to have a free hand and enjoy total immunity, which in fact is already the case thanks to the decrees issued by Lasso, who several times resorted, in vain, to the state of emergency. Nothing new then. He then attempts the popular plebiscite card a few months before the new election deadline. To the first 11 referendum questions announced, it then adds others, even including issues that only partly have to do with the issue of security. These include the opening of casinos, or measures to ease foreign direct investments. Proposals that a leading constitutionalist and former member of the Constitutional Court, Ramiro Avila Santamaria, defined as unconstitutional or unfounded. The decision is now up to the Court. Then comes the sensational news of the escape from prison in Guayaquil of one of the leaders of the Choneros gang, alias "Fito," allegedly occurring as early as Christmas, and of another leader of the "Lobos" apparently implicated in the murder of Villavicencio. A severe blow to the government's credibility to which Noboa responds with yet another declaration of a state of emergency, resulting in a curfew from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m., a decision to have the army assist the police in public order operations, and the restriction of the right of assembly and the inviolability of the home. The narcos' response is immediate: new riots in prisons, attacks on some police stations, and the "raid" - the details of which have yet to be fully clarified - of a commando breaking into a live broadcast of a Guayaquil television station. A blow to the heart of his main electorate. Fact of the matter is that within a handful of hours of the blitz a new decree is issued in which the President - for the first time in the country's history - declares a state of internal armed conflict, that would be fought by the army, and recognizing the 22 gangs as "belligerent" parties. The crisis thus shifts from being a matter of public order to one of actual war, governed by international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva convention. Upon the announcement of the measure, the country goes into panic. Classes are suspended and will remain in online modality for several days, the evacuation of public buildings is ordered, and contingents of soldiers are dispatched to guard sensitive targets. The president locks himself up in the Carondelet Palace with senior state officials to decide what to do. After a few hours, military big brass in full uniform appear in front of the cameras, explaining the situation to the country and giving the line. A coup? There goes the first Pavlovian reflex. And yet no, Decree 111 declaring a state of "internal armed conflict" is overwhelmingly approved by Congress, even by the leftist opposition parties that had from the outset given declaration in favor of national unity. Indeed the main concern is that of not appearing as those who throw up their hands in the face of organized crime, a tasty opportunity for opposing parties in the upcoming 2025 presidential and parliamentary elections. A civil war? Not even, since we are not faced with organizations structured in paramilitary form, nor are we faced with an armed conflict on a national scale, but rather with public order operations "with boots on the ground" in well-defined territories. The declaration of war is in fact a media coup for effect to create the conditions for a "national unity" and "war", in which a clear distribution of tasks is emerging. On the one hand, the military, which from now on takes command of public order operations, with the police at their service (something that creates quite many frictions) and which can thus reaffirm their role and their credibility before the people. It must be said that the presence of the military in the streets is - at least in the capital Quito - very sporadic, the effect appears to be mostly symbolic. On the contrary the situation is pretty different in prisons where the military can now intervene freely to suppress riots and free that hundred hostages still in the hands of the rioters. Or when launching raids or searches in the "hot" outskirts of crime-ridden cities. However, even in the symbolic also lurks the risk of a pervasive "securitization" of public space, resulting in the inhibition of every possible form of dissent or social conflict. Noboa was quick to declare that even those who do not take action against gangs, (by extension one could also interpret those who oppose his policies) could be considered "the enemy." And then, in that public space now controlled by the military, there is a clear risk that the real victims of repression will end up being those marginal and marginalized classes, guilty only of being such, or of having dark skin. The precedent of "false positives" in Colombia comes to mind, where the military, in order to demonstrate the success of their operations, displayed to the public corpses of poor people in guerrilla uniforms. The military thus takes over – de facto - the public space determining by default the direction in which the country will go. In parallel, the private space is taken care of by the president with new decree-laws presented invoking the need to raise funds for internal warfare, from raising VAT to 15 percent, to the liberalization of the energy sector, the rejection of the result of the public consultation on Yasuni in order to continue drilling to generate funds to support the “war”, to policies aimed at attracting foreign capital. In the background are two agreements on cooperation in the military and security sector with the United States signed months ago by Lasso providing for the albeit temporary presence of the military on the national territory. They are in a hurry in Washington, with the specter of Trumpian “America First” isolationism looming. No surprise that the Ecuadorean Constitutional Court ruled that no approval by Congress is required. Then the free trade agreement with China, so far stalled by Congress, is due to go into effect soon. What about what exists and lives between public and private space? Movements? Civil society organizations? Theirs are the only expressions of criticism and dissent. CONAIE declares solidarity with the victims of the conflict, urges communities to organize indigenous guards to protect their territories (so far almost untouched by narco violence) and warns the government not to use the pretext of war to impose anti-popular measures. Its Amazonian organizations have recently taken to the streets to protest the construction of one of the two “Bukele-model” megaprisons in the Pastaza province. Environmental and indigenous movements are now denouncing Noboas’ decision against the ITT Yasuni’s decision. On the other hand, human rights organizations point the finger at the inappropriateness of the use of the military instrument, and the possible serious effects on human rights. The risks to the millions of Ecuadorians and Ecuadoreans working in informal economies or on temporary contracts are also stressed, as well as how the state of exception may increase cases of intra-family and gender-based violence. The rest is still a work in progress. The risk of a sort of permanent state of war that will characterize the country and the public debate at least until the next elections is just around the corner together with a creeping authoritarianism, certainly not at the institutional level, but surely in the state of affairs. Although the decrees of emergency and state of internal armed conflict have a duration of two months, it is highly unlikely that in that time the state will be able to declare victory. Since when you declare a war you must also be clear about when you are going to win it. Which at the moment is very vague and indefinite. Will it be when all Colombian or Venezuelan criminals are deported? Which is very difficult since the Constitution recognizes the human right to free mobility. Or when will they all be put in jail? Or when they will all be "shot down"? (numbers range from 30 to 50 thousand gang members), according to the term used by the mainstream press. This article was published originally in the Transnational Institute under the Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 licence

The attacks on shipping in the Red Sea is a test for the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy to deal with China In a House Armed Services Committee hearing in March 2023 on the US posture and security challenges in the Middle East and Africa, it was acknowledged that “…President Biden’s decision to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all US forces from Afghanistan has undermined our national security.” The developments of the past few weeks in the Red Sea have made this assertion seem prophetic. Yemen’s Houthi rebels have strategically positioned themselves to exploit less monitored zones in the Red Sea and the broader Arabian Sea. With numerous naval vessels navigating this critical route linking the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea, countering the Houthi rebels and their assaults on global shipping has become exceedingly challenging for the US. The Houthi rebels have connected these attacks to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, tying the halt in hostilities along shipping lanes to a ceasefire negotiation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Their strategy involves increasing attacks on ships and holding them as leverage to prompt the US to pressure Israel for a ceasefire. The timing of the Houthi actions aligns with Israel’s focused operations in southern Gaza and a waning Congressional backing in the US for continuous financial support for overseas conflicts. Tactically, the Houthis see an opportunity to open a third front in the maritime domain, even as the Israeli air defence systems are overwhelmed by combined rocket attacks of Hamas and Hezbollah in the north and south. In an offensive barrage last week, the Hezbollah carried out six attacks in eight hours. In the maritime domain, the Houthis have carried out multiple UAV, rocket and missile attacks targeting a dozen merchant ships in the larger Indian Ocean. Iran has conducted attacks on US and Israeli vessels in the region as well. A recent attack on an Israeli vessel off the west cost of India near Veraval is a red flag for safety and security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Indo-Pacific. With unmanned aerial vehicles and use of other technological capabilities, the attacks on ships could be rapid, discreet, damaging and, most of all, with little or no accountability. Often, the vulnerabilities associated with international strategic choke points have always been assessed from the perspective of State complicity, resting States’ conviction on limited capacities of non-State actors to exact huge costs. If anything, the Red Sea crisis shows that even with little but calculated external support, non-State actors could indeed significantly disturb the predictability of global supply chains and bring merchandise flow to a halt. The economic impact of increased attacks in the Red Sea is already being felt, as many ships have begun to avoid the route through the Red Sea and prefer the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa. This has caused worries of delay in the global freight markets and pricing concerns in energy dependent countries beside the security concerns for shipping companies such as Maersk. Since the Israel-Hamas war began, the US Central Command has been active in preventing a slew of UAV attacks by the Houthi rebels. For the US, the situation developing in the Red Sea presents a combination of political, economic and strategic challenges. The ongoing Israeli operation in Gaza has politically isolated the US at the global level as the only country to oppose a UNSC ceasefire resolution. The political heat from the Israel-Hamas war is being felt at home with dwindling youth support for President Biden as presidential elections near. The economic costs of the two wars – one in the Middle East and the other in Ukraine – is already tearing the US Congress apart. At the strategic level, coordinated attacks on international shipping threatens to force a rebalancing of the US force posture in the Indo-Pacific. The US currently has two aircraft carriers positioned in the Middle East since the Israel-Hamas war began. While a strong US military presence in the region may have prevented the war from spreading through the region, any additional and long-time concentration of force posture in the Gulf may be detrimental to Washington’s Indo-Pacific intent. Indeed, America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is being tested in the Middle East through five core ideas. Firstly, the recentring of US forces in the Middle East contradicts the intended pivot towards Asia. Secondly, the attacks orchestrated by the Houthis and Iran highlight the unpredictable threats that can disrupt supply chains in the region. Thirdly, the US faces challenges in executing counterterrorism and counterpiracy efforts in the Indo-Pacific, especially while collaborating with allies. Moreover, integrating the Middle East into an Indo-Pacific connectivity project appears increasingly challenging. Lastly, China’s refusal to join the US in protecting the Red Sea shipping lanes reveals Beijing’s divergent strategy for engaging with the Middle East from that of the US.

In the United States, there is a complex process of annual budget adoption for the next fiscal year, which begins on October 1. Budget adoption proceeds according to a certain schedule. Ultimately, by September 30, The House of Representatives and the Senate must introduce 12 appropriations bills of the main government activities for the next fiscal year, and then the president must sign them. In case if all 12 appropriation bills are not passed, an almost complete suspension of the government institutions activities occurs (shutdown). In case if a part of the bills is passed, only those federal agencies that did not receive appropriations will be shut down. Shutdown means that government employees have to take forced leave without pay. Only those institutions that are of critical importance to national security continue to operate. For instance, employees who are responsible for the safety of the US’s nuclear arsenals and monitoring of hydroelectric power plants and energy lines continue to work in the Department of Energy. Also, active military personnel continue to perform their duties. Institutions with special self-financing funds (such as post office, customs) continue to operate in a certain mode. In addition to adoption of annual discretionary spending, the US also has mandatory spending for basic social and several critically needed areas of government activity. This financing is carried out from special off-budget funds and does not depend on annual approval by US Congress, in this way society is protected from the consequences of political struggle to some extent. Social security and healthcare programs, such as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, also continue to operate. The US Congress widely uses a tool called a continuing resolutions (CR) for a certain period in the amount that was included in the previous budget to avoid a shutdown. These resolutions become laws after they are signed by the President. Since this kind of resolutions extend appropriations from the previous fiscal year, it interferes with the activities of federal agencies because they have to freeze their spending levels, it also makes it difficult to plan future projects and creates risks for government contractors. A few comments on the history of the issue. Last time when Congress completed the budget approval process on time, before the start of the fiscal year, was in 1997. Since in 1976 Congress transitioned to the modern budget process, based on the 1974 Budget Act, there have been 20 "funding gaps," including cases when funding was not allocated even for a single day. The longest government shutdown in U.S. history lasted 35 days, from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, during the Trump administration. On March 9, 2023, President Joe Biden submitted to Congress the budget proposal for fiscal year 2024, estimating expenses at $6,883 billion (25.3% of GDP) and a budget deficit at $1,846 billion (6.8% of GDP). This year, the budget process became more complicated because in June 2023, lawmakers passed the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA) to avoid a technical default on the national debt. This law, by suspending the "debt ceiling," established caps on discretionary spending for fiscal years 2024 and 2025. When appropriations for fiscal year 2024 were being discussed in Congress, the provisions of the FRA sparked debates about spending levels. The White House requested an additional $20.6 billion for emergency aid to Ukraine and $12 billion for domestic disaster relief. In August 2023 Joe Biden's administration submitted to Congress a request for additional funding of $40 billion, which included $24 billion for military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and other international needs, and $12 billion for domestic disaster relief. The right-wing Republicans in the House of Representatives sought to secure budgetary powers for the administration well below FRA-agreed levels and to include new provisions on border security. The debates continued until Saturday, September 30, when the House of Representatives approved a temporary resolution (335 votes in favor, 91 against, including one Democrat), extending government funding until November 17. The resolution includes disaster relief (a concession to the Democrats) but does not include additional funding for Ukraine (a concession to the Conservatives). The Senate approved the bill on Saturday evening (88 in favor, 9 against). The bill passed through both chambers in just 12 hours, setting a speed record. Joe Biden signed it before midnight, preventing a government shutdown. "It's a total rollercoaster," - Guy Reschenthaler, the Deputy Chairman of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives, commented on the day's events. In the next month and a half, we can expect a new round of struggle over budget expenses. In particular, Senate leadership from both parties issued a joint statement committing to vote for continued funding for assistance to Ukraine in the "coming weeks." On October 3, the House of Representatives for the first time in history voted to remove Republican Kevin McCarthy from his position (initiated by the far-right Republican Matt Gaetz from Florida); members of his own party voted for his removal, accusing McCarthy of seeking support of Democrats to prevent a shutdown. According to official prognosis, the budget deficit is expected to grow relative to GDP. The increasing deficit will significantly increase the federal debt (which has already exceeded $33 trillion) over the next decade, and interest costs to service it will correspondingly increase. Interest payments will jump from $665 billion in 2023 to $1.393 trillion in 2033. The Biden administration and Congress are caught between Scylla and Charybdis: they need to address the problem of a massive budget deficit and national debt while continuing to make budgetary injections to support the economy, socio-economic and defense priorities. All this intensifies the struggle over budget expenditures. The threats of government shutdowns have become a bargaining chip in disputes over budget policy. The decision-making process in the US budgetary sphere is becoming increasingly politicized, undermining trust in the government and does not contribute to solving the problems really facing the country.

Canada's military and defense policy in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) is centered around three key objectives: promoting peace, security, and stability, including efforts to deter aggression, respond to crises, and enhance defense capabilities; maintaining trade, investment, and supply chain stability; and promoting diversity and inclusivity, financing educational, cultural, and tourism projects. To achieve these goals, Canada has taken a series of steps to increase its presence in the region, expand its participation in exercises with allies and partners, invest in military capabilities, including long-range maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine defense systems, and strengthen its intelligence and surveillance capabilities in the region. Enhancing the country's position in the IPR contributes to protecting national interests and increasing the ability to counter regional threats, particularly: - The growing military presence of China, which is rapidly modernizing its armed forces and increasing its influence. - The proliferation of non-state actors (terrorist groups, piracy). - Climate change, leading to rising sea levels and extreme weather events that threaten coastal communities and infrastructure. For example, a significant event in the country's foreign policy and an expression of its efforts to strengthen security in the Indo-Pacific region was the arrival of three Canadian naval vessels in Yokosuka, Japan, on August 28, 2023. These ships, part of Canada's Pacific Fleet, were the first Canadian military vessels to visit Japan since 2019. The visit occurred against the backdrop of increased tension due to China's growing military influence (e.g., military exercises) and North Korea's series of missile tests, including an intercontinental ballistic missile. The primary goal of the Canadian ships' visit to Japan was to participate in joint exercises with regional partners (the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) aimed at strengthening military alliances, expanding security cooperation, and enhancing regional preparedness. Coordination among the armed forces of allies contributes to improved communication, mutual understanding, and operational compatibility when working collectively. It also allows for knowledge sharing and the development of common strategies to address regional security challenges. Firstly, Canada has traditionally focused its foreign policy on the Atlantic and the Arctic. However, this visit signals Canada's growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region, recognizing its strategic importance, and the country's intention to actively contribute to regional stability. Canadian foreign policy is based on the principles of multilateralism and cooperation. Canada prioritizes building partnership relationships, encouraging dialogue, and participating in regional initiatives. It actively engages in regional and international forums (ASEAN, East Asian Summit). Canada also follows the same multilateral principle in defense and security. Deploying naval forces in the IPR aligns with these principles. Secondly, by joining forces with allies and partners in Southeast Asia, such as Japan, Canada strengthens existing security alliances and signals its readiness to cooperate with like-minded countries to maintain regional peace. Simultaneously, Ottawa sends a clear message to China that it intends to develop military cooperation to deter aggression in the region. Furthermore, the Canadian government places increasing importance on developing bilateral relations, promoting trade and investment growth, strengthening security cooperation on issues such as counter-terrorism and maritime security. The presence of Canadian naval vessels will enhance operational compatibility and coordination between allied fleets, bolstering the defense network in the Indo-Pacific region and deterring China from aggressive actions. Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy, approved in 2022, highlights two key regional factors of instability that increase tension and international concerns. Firstly, it is Beijing's ambition to assert its maritime claims in the South China Sea, including the construction of military facilities on disputed land features. Secondly, it is North Korea's missile tests and the development of nuclear weapons. In response to these threats, Canada is taking steps to strengthen cooperation and partnership relations in the IPR. This includes enhancing military presence, conducting joint exercises (for example, the "Malabar 2023" military exercise in August), and participating in diplomatic dialogues. By deploying naval forces, Canada follows in the footsteps of its key allies - the United States, Australia, and Japan, which are also actively bolstering their presence in the region. By combining diplomatic and defense efforts, these countries aim to ensure freedom of navigation and adherence to international law principles. Thus, Canada demonstrates that the government closely monitors the situation and will make efforts to maintain a regional order based on international legal rules and norms. Its presence serves as a signal to China, North Korea, and other potentially destabilizing actors that Canada is committed to regional security principles and is ready to support its allies and partners in countering any potential threats. Ottawa is not only developing and strengthening ties with allies and other regional players but also emphasizes a proactive, consistent approach in implementing its policy in the IPR, a commitment to maintaining peace and stability. The expansion of Canada's naval presence should serve as a deterrent to potential threats, demonstrate solidarity with like-minded countries, and show regional powers that Canada is a reliable ally. The intensification of regional policy is, in part, related to Canada's desire to balance between China and the United States since tension in their relations continues and influences global processes. The Canadian government's policy in the Indo-Pacific region is based on carefully building relationships with both countries, aiming to maintain a balance while advancing its own interests. Cooperation in security and defense, participation in regional initiatives, military exercises, and dialogues aimed at addressing common security issues are significant components of Canada's Indo-Pacific policy, as the country intends to play a more active role in the region. However, the development of this policy will be influenced by the following factors in the medium and long term, which are important for the national interests of the country and its allies: ● Ensuring maritime security: The Indo-Pacific region hosts some of the busiest maritime routes in the world, which are crucial for global trade. Canada is likely to increase its deployment of ships and aircraft, as well as participate in joint exercises with allies and partners to secure these sea lanes. ● Deepening military and political cooperation with allies and partners: Canada is a member of the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance and has close security ties with the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. These countries, sharing a common interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, will expand their cooperation with Canada through joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and participation in joint military operations. Canada's military and defense policy will largely be shaped by the opportunities presented by its allies and partners. ● Investment in military capabilities and increased defense spending to enhance capabilities to address challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly unstable, with a growing risk of conflict. Canada will need to adapt its military policy to changing security conditions.

Ukraine was the major topic discussed at the NATO summit in Vilnius, the Alliance capital closest to Kyiv. President Zelensky’s call for a clear timetable for his country’s membership dominated the political debate. Less attention was given to the topic with the biggest impact on the Allies: the radically changed requirements for NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. The Vilnius summit has blessed the new defense plans, for which the member states “commit the necessary forces, capabilities and resources”. What does this imply for the NATO countries? This article analyzes the consequences of the new NATO requirements, broken down into four themes: budgets, force structure and capability requirements, readiness, and military presence on the Eastern Flank.   In 2014, at its Wales summit, NATO Allies committed to spending 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense no later than 2024. The forecast is that 19 of the 29 European NATO Allies will have realized the 2% target in 2024. As Iceland has no armed forces, the total number can be lowered to 28. It implies that approximately one third of the European Allies do not live up to the Wales commitment ten years on. Even worse, some Allies have already announced that they will not realize the target even by 2030. The Vilnius language – the 2% GDP target is “a minimum” from now on – stands in stark contrast to these facts. BUDGETS - MONEY SPENT ON DEFENSE The input issue – money spent on defense – continues to present a divided NATO, composed of three categories of Allies: First, the underspenders that will not spend 2% GDP on defense in 2024 and in the years immediately following. The list includes smaller countries such as Croatia, Slovenia and Luxembourg. However, on the minus 2% list one can also find – from North to South – Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Denmark has set the aim of reaching the 2% target by 2030 and Belgium even later, by 2035. Second, the correct spenders: Allies that have taken measures to achieve the 2% target in 2024, thus fulfilling the Wales target. However, they will face the challenge of living up to a minimum of 2% after 2024. This applies to Germany, the Netherlands and others, who have not made firm commitments to live up to the Vilnius “minimum” target of 2% GDP. The third category is the overspenders, comprising Allies spending more than 2% now or in the future. This group includes the countries close to Russia – the Baltic states and Poland – but also major Allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States. The champion is no longer the US (3.49%) as Poland will spend 3.9% GDP on defense in 2023.  Due to the mix of underspenders, correct spenders and overspenders, the overall European average will rise to almost 2.05% in 2024, but it is clear that the burden within Europe is not equally divided among all Allies. This sends the wrong signal to Russia and it undermines the European aim to become self-reliant for its security and defense. Furthermore, there is the issue of ensuring sustained investment over the long term. For restructuring the armed forces and realizing defense equipment procurement plans, more time is needed than the duration of an average government Atlantisch perspectief 21 term (4-5 years). A change of government after elections may lead to redrafting the defense budget and defense plans, in particular when economic circumstances are deteriorating as was the case in 2010 and in the years that followed. For defense investment, predictability and continuity are required. The solution is to agree on a long-term national defense investment fund for a period of up to at least 10 years. Naturally, parliaments would have a final say in the annual approval of the budget within the overall financial framework of a long-term defense investment fund. From the perspective of adapting and modernizing the armed forces of the NATO Allies, such a long-term financial commitment – connected to the defense plans and acquisition programs – should be connected to the political debate on the 2% minimum spending target. Such sustained and guaranteed financial input is absolutely required to achieve the output, based on the NATO requirements. FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS Although NATO’s three core tasks of deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security remain in place, the Vilnius summit communiqué puts the first task “at the heart of the Alliance.” Based on SACEUR’s requirements, “the planning for our collective defense will be fully coherent with the planning for our forces, posture management, capabilities, and command and control.” The Allies will have to “deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defense, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer competitors.” Region-specific plans will be developed for three areas: Northern Europe (from the Arctic to the Gulf of Finland); Central Europe (from the Baltic states to the Alps) and Southern Europe (from the Black Sea to the whole of the Mediterranean). In terms of command & control (C2), Northern Europe will be covered by the Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Norfolk (Virginia, US), Central Europe by the JFC in Brunssum (the Netherlands), and Southern Europe by the JFC in Naples (Italy).  For the NATO countries bordering Russia, this might not entail a great deal of change. The Baltic states and Poland have consistently campaigned for strengthening the Alliance’s force posture for collective defense with an emphasis on high-end warfighting capacities. Their own defense planning and force structures have already been tailor-made for that purpose, and investment is mainly channeled towards modernizing heavy land forces. However, for Allies in Western Europe NATO’s new force structure and capability requirements may lead to amending their defense planning, including taking into account regional plans. For example, the UK-NL Landing Force that has been training for years in Northern Norway, might also be deployed to Finland or Sweden. The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), led by the UK, could become an earmarked early-entry force for the Northern Flank. In that case, it might require a more fixed composition of the JEF. In Central Europe, even more emphasis will be placed on strengthening land forces for high-intensity warfighting. Germany and Poland are two key European force providers. Other Allies – such as the Netherlands – will have to deliver dedicated contributions. From now on, NATO plans will ask for brigades, divisions, and army corps instead of the tailor-made task forces that were deployed to Afghanistan and elsewhere. Combined arms will be required instead of infantry-heavy forces for crisis management. More robustness and more firepower, less highly mobile and lightly armed troops are the new characteristics.  Jointness and networked operations in all domains (sea, land, air, cyber, and space) are 21st century necessities, requiring high-technology capacities in the digital area and in space, in particular to ensure redundant communications for information-steered, networked operations. The NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capacities need to be enhanced and modernized, encompassing all layers of air defense – the importance of which has been shown in the war in Ukraine. Long-range firing delivered by rocket artillery, cruise missiles and other systems will become the norm of the ‘need to have’ for armed forces. This capability also requires a better and more robust C2 architecture and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare (EW) systems, and other sensors for target acquisition. The Vilnius communiqué refers to continuing “to invest more in advanced and interoperable capabilities across all domains, placing particular emphasis on combat capable, predominantly heavy, high-end forces and capabilities.” This sounds like an evolution, but for many Allies it implies a revolution in defense planning and investment or, in the words of the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, “unparalleled integration of NATO and national military planning”. READINESS The new NATO Force Model (NFM) was already agreed upon at the Madrid summit in July 2022. According to the NFM, Allies “are delivering a larger pool of dedicated combat-capable forces, including forces at high readiness, improving our military responsiveness, and harnessing regional expertise and geographic proximity.” In the past, the Alliance had the NATO Response Force (NRF) at high readiness (at 5-30-day notice-to-move (NTM)) with the first elements of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at very short NTM (within 48 hours). The 40,000-military-strong NRF will be replaced by the Allied Reaction Force (ARF), that can provide a quickly deployable NATO response option to threats or crises wherever they occur. Completely new are the tier 1-3 high readiness forces: over 100,000 in tier 1 with a NTM of up to 10 days; around 200,000 in tier 2 (NTM 10-30 days) and at least 500,000 in tier 3 (30-180 days NTM). With these new readiness requirements the number of forces that Allies will have at readiness levels up to 30 days has increased by almost a factor of 10. For the NRF, NATO Allies were making available, on rotation, companies, battalions, battle groups and comparable air and naval units. In the NFM, brigades and divisions, full squadrons and naval task groups will have to be ready to deploy within short timeframes depending on the allocation to tier 1 to 3. This will pose enormous challenges to Allies, not only in terms of personnel but equally in operationally ready-to-deploy equipment, enablers (such as transport capacities), and all necessary logistical support. Ammunition stocks will have to be built up to higher NATO norms. Military mobility requirements – all legal arrangements, infrastructure adjustments, transport means, available staging areas and so forth – need to be fulfilled. Naturally, all of this cannot be arranged overnight. It will take at least five to ten years to transform and modernize the Allied forces to fulfil these far-reaching military requirements. The NFM may look simple on paper, but it is the most challenging NATO demand since the end of the Cold War. PRESENCE ON THE EASTERN FLANK Decisions to reinforce NATO’s military enhanced Forward Presence were already taken at the Madrid summit with the following two most important elements: (i) the deployment of battlegroups in four additional Allied countries (Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria), and (ii) scaling up the NATO battle groups to brigade-size formations where and when required. At the time, the UK, Canada and Germany announced that their battle groups in respectively Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be scaled up to brigades. The additional troops were not to be stationed permanently in the three Baltic states. Brigade headquarters would be established and the equipment for these brigades would be prepositioned in those countries. The model envisaged that troops would be transferred from their home bases in times of crisis or for exercises. Two weeks before the Vilnius summit, the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that his country would station a ‘robust brigade’ with 4,000 troops in Lithuania. Without openly saying so, Pistorius presented a change to the concept announced by Germany the year before. Not only will the brigade headquarters and the equipment be permanently present in Lithuania, the military personnel of a combat brigade are to be located forward as well. On the eve of the Vilnius summit, the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that his country’s military presence in Latvia would be increased to around 2,200 troops.  The Baltic states have pressed strongly for the permanent presence of brigade-sized NATO forces on their soil. NATO itself has met its need by replacing the concept of ‘deterrence by punishment’ by ‘deterrence by denial’ – meaning that every inch of NATO territory has to be defended. The Baltic states have argued that the existing multinational battle groups – suitable for acting as a ‘trip wire’ in case of a Russian attack, but not being able to defend their territory until reinforcements arrive – are no longer suitable for that purpose. Lacking strategic depth, ‘deterrence by denial’ requires the permanent presence of combat-ready NATO forces, at least of brigade size along with the national army units of the three Baltic states.  The same requirement would logically apply to the other five countries that house NATO battle groups. Infrastructure to house the troops and preposition the equipment of the NATO combat brigades will have to be built, which will take time and money. Training areas might have to be expanded. Transferring from ‘trip wire’ battle groups to combat brigades also raises the question of what to do with the smaller contributions – often of company size – from other NATO countries. For example, so far the Dutch contribution to the battle group in Lithuania has consisted of rotating companies – often of different compositions (air mobile, light infantry, mechanized). When Germany transforms its battle group to a combat brigade, Berlin might call on the Netherlands army to contribute a mechanized battalion or combat support (such as artillery). In that case, the issue of prepositioning equipment and permanently stationing troops in Lithuania also becomes a defense-planning topic for the Netherlands with financial and other consequences. THE WAY AHEAD NATO summits come and go. Next year, Heads of State and Government will meet in Washington, D.C. for the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. In November 2024, American citizens will elect a new president. The years of strong commitment by the US to supporting Ukraine and NATO may turn into years of retreat, should a Republican president enter the White House. European Allies will be even more pressed to step up their defense efforts than in the current situation. But even should the Democrats win the presidential election, the European NATO countries will face serious challenges in implementing the decisions of the Vilnius summit. In view of the primary focus of the US on the Pacific/East Asia, the pressure on Europe to become more self-reliant is here to stay. Defense budget growth has to be sustained over the long term. Investment in combat-ready forces and logistics including larger ammunition stocks needs to be stepped up, which also requires industrial production to be ramped up. More military personnel will have to be on stand-by readiness, and a larger number of troops have to be deployed to the Eastern Flank. Equipment needs to be prepositioned in the area. NATO’s regional plans will direct national defense planning, investment, training and exercises. They will also channel multinational cooperation, clustering countries located on the Northern, Central-Eastern and Southern European Flanks with those Allies earmarking their forces for the collective defense task in those respective regions.  The consequences of NATO’s Vilnius summit have yet to sink in within national political circles. The Alliance’s military authorities and diplomats have delivered an ambitious agenda for “modernising NATO for a new era of collective defence”. All presidents and prime ministers of the Allied countries have committed themselves to implementing the Vilnius decisions. History shows that words are not always followed by deeds, such as in the case of achieving the NATO 2% target. The Russian aggression against Ukraine – violating the principles and norms of the international order – should be more than a wake-up call. Europe now needs to stay awake and invest in its defense to fulfil NATO’s requirements as well as to become more self-reliant for its own security.

Now with 11 members, BRICS’ decision-making by consensus will be that much more difficultOnce upon a time, the BRICS were nothing but a slogan devised by Goldman Sachs’ economists to describe four emerging market economies to which South Africa was later added. But more than a decade later, the grouping, now with an investment bank—New Development Bank—of its own is besieged by dozens of countries of the Global South for membership.The Johannesburg summit of BRICS has drawn unusual interest around the world. There was a time when it barely merited a mention in the western press, but now it has been the subject of major stories, in which some saw BRICS as brittle whiel others thought it was  seeking to challenge the G7 and the western world through a process of enlargement. While the BRICS puts itself forward as a unified face of the emerging economic powers, the reality is that within the organisation—which  is neither a trade nor military bloc—there is considerable jostling between two Asian powers who are developing a global imprint—India and China.BRICS expansion announced in JohannesburgOne of the issues where this jostling played out in was the BRICS expansion process. Reportedly, 40 countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, though some 22 nations had formally expressed interest in joining the bloc. With the latest expansion, Iran, Egypt, Argentina, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and UAE have been offered membership effective 1 January 2024. That there was a bit of lobbying is evident from the fact that  last week, President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran spoke on the phone with Prime Minister Modi. According to the official spokesman, they talked about “regional and bilateral matters” as well as issues like the expansion of BRICS. The two leaders later met in Johannesburg as well.There was some doubt at the beginning of the summit as to whether expansion would actually be announced. This was because of the intense negotiations over the names of the proposed members.Earlier this month, an Indian official spokesman had clarified that India believed that BRICS expansion should take place through “full consultation and consensus” among members of the bloc. In his speech at the summit, the Prime Minister made it clear that “India fully supports the expansion of the BRICS membership. And welcomes moving forward with consensus in this.” On Thursday, too, there were reports that there were “eleventh hour negotiations” over the potential new members. Reuters claimed that an agreement had meant to be adopted on Wednesday, but it was delayed by India’s introduction of new criteria for membership. On Tuesday President Lula of Brazil had made it clear that his country was did not want to be any kind of “a counterpoint to G7, G20 or the United States. We just want to organise ourselves.”In an organisation that acts through consensus, getting in is difficult, but global politics is about give and take and a certain degree of persuasion and arm twisting does go on. So does the notion of giving a push to countries who you see eye to eye with and blocking countries that you don’t. Sometimes the negotiation involves two powerful players splitting the difference and negotiating the entry of countries in such a way that a balance of sorts is maintained. This is the way India became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation dominated by China. India’s case was pushed by Russia to balance China, and Beijing finally agreed to have India, if Pakistan, its “iron” friend, could become a member at the same time.Another element in such organisations is that countries seek membership not just to further their interests but to block the ambitions of others. In this way, China sought and became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) arrangement and once in there, it has used its vote to block efforts by the United States (US) to shape APEC into an Asia Pacific Economic Community in the manner of the European Economic Community that finally gave rise to the European Union.India has been reportedly joined by Brazil in resisting the haste and suggesting that new members may first be given the status of observers. The Indian position has been that while it was all for expansion, there was need to develop and standardise mechanisms to consider the applications and move on them.As of now, BRICS is more of a symbol than a unified and purposive entity. True, it has members like China and India who wield substantial power in their respective regions, but the entity itself hardly functions as an economic bloc of any kind. It does have the New Development Bank headquartered in Shanghai, which, in 2021, sharply stepped up its disbursements to US$7.6 billion, with its total disbursements being of the order of US$32 billion for infrastructure and sustainable development in four continents . The initial subscribed capital of the bank is equally distributed among the BRICS members.China’s role in and vision for BRICSBeijing, no doubt views BRICS as a means of offsetting US global power. In a page 2 commentary in the People’s Daily by someone with the nom de plume  “Huanyu Ping,” said that currently the world governance system was “at a historical turning point”. The growth of the emerging market and developing countries has enhanced their influence. But the western-dominated global order was a “stumbling block to world economic development and social progress.” The multilateralist BRICS was therefore providing a model for decisions to be made on the basis of equality and consensus, as testified by the share-holding of the New Development Bank. They also actively promoted reform of the global governance system and upheld the validity of multilateral and multipolar solutions.There should be no doubt about the weightage China has within BRICS. It has a GDP more than twice the size of the other members combined. Its economy may have slowed down but it is still growing, with IMF predicting a 5.2 per cent growth as against 5.9 for India. The others are growing at less than 1 per cent.  It has played a significant role in getting together two of the new incoming members, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 2022, China was the largest trading partner of South Africa, India and Brazil.There should be little doubt that China sees Africa as a battleground in the global struggle against the US. In a meeting with President Cyril Ramaphosa on Tuesday, President Xi spoke of the urgent need for China to promote cooperation with Africa because of “changes and chaos” in the world, an indirect allusion to the US. He took up the theme in the Business Forum meeting that he did not attend, but where his speech was read out: “Right now, changes in the world, in our times, and in history are unfolding in ways like never before, bringing human society to a critical juncture.”China may swear by multilateralism, but it is not really comfortable with it. What it is seeking to do is to shape institutions like BRICS in its own image for countering its principal rival, the United States of America. In this, it is unlikely to get Indian support, so what it is trying to do is to pack its membership with countries where it has already made significant investments through its Belt & Road Initiative. Such countries would be inclined to follow its global agenda, which is now manifesting itself as the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and the Global Civilisation Initiative.The Chinese aim, according to James Kynge in the Financial Times is two-fold. The first is to ensure that large parts of the world remain open to Chinese investment and trade in an environment where western attitudes are increasingly hardening. And the second is to have a bloc of votes in multilateral forums like the United Nations (UN) to project Chinese influence.In the turbulent world, China’s path is not an easy one. Its economy is slowing down and its global security calculations have been roiled by the Russian adventure in Ukraine. Further, in promoting the Global South it runs up against India which has its own ambitions, as well as the backing of the west. Even while promoting the UN and its institutions, China is not interested in any serious reform there because that could result in a bigger role for its adversaries like Japan and India.Done increases with the expansion of its membership. Now, with 11 members, things will be that much more difficult. The BRICS countries have economies and geopolitical profiles that are hugely divergent, and which makes consensus-based decision-making hugely difficult.