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한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français It has long been held that embassies should be treated as “off-limits” to other nations. Yet in a single week, two governments – both long-established democracies – stand accused of violating, in different ways, the laws surrounding foreign diplomatic missions. First, on April 1, 2024, Iran’s embassy in Damascus was bombed, presumably by Israel, killing several high-ranking commanders of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Then, on April 5, Ecuadorian police forced their way into the Mexican Embassy in Quito to arrest a former vice president of Ecuador who was seeking political asylum. Both actions have led to claims of international law violations and accusations that the Vienna Convention, which establishes the immunity of diplomatic missions, was contravened. As someone with a fair amount of knowledge of embassy life – I have served as Chile’s head of mission in China, India and South Africa and coedited The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy – I believe the two incidents are of greater concern than much of the international community appears to be viewing them. Contrary to the famous quip from late businessman and presidential candidate Ross Perot, embassies are not just “relics of the days of sailing ships.” Rather, in an increasingly complex world where geopolitical conflict, mass migrations, pandemics and climate change require careful and stable diplomatic management, any incidents that erode the sanctity of embassy rules could have serious negative consequences. In short, they make for a more dangerous world. Curious indifference to embassy attack Of the two recent incidents, the Iranian embassy bombing is the more serious, as it involved the loss of life and resulted in warnings of retaliatory attacks. Yet, Western countries, leaders of which often voice concern over upholding the so-called “rules-based order,” have been reluctant to condemn the act. It was notable that the three liberal democracies on the U.N. Security Council – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – all refused to condemn the strike on Iran’s embassy when the issue came up before them. Israel, while not officially acknowledging responsibility, argued that the Iranian ambassador’s residence was not really a diplomatic venue but “a military building … disguised as a civilian building.” As such, to Israel it was a perfectly legitimate target. But by this logic, nearly all embassies would be seen as fair game. Almost by definition, the vast majority of embassies – particularly of the larger countries – are populated with significant numbers of military and intelligence personnel. To suggest that for that reason embassies should lose their diplomatic immunity and become legitimate targets for armed attacks would bring the whole edifice of the Vienna Convention crashing down. And with it would come the structure on which worldwide formal diplomatic interactions are based. Bedrock diplomatic principles The case of Ecuador, though less serious because it did not involve loss of life, is a bit more complex and demands some unpacking. At the center of the diplomatic spat between Ecuador and Mexico is former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who served four years behind bars following a 2017 conviction on corruption charges. Glas is now facing trial on different charges, prompting his December 2023 application for asylum at the Mexican Embassy. Mexico accepted the request and conveyed this to the Ecuadorian government. The latter justified its decision to send police into the Mexican embassy on the grounds that it believes Glas cannot be granted political asylum as he is a convicted felon. There is some basis to this claim: Under the Organization of American States’ Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, political asylum cannot be given to convicted felons unless the charges behind such conviction are of a political nature. But at the same time, Article 21 of the Vienna Convention states that diplomatic missions enjoy full immunity and extraterritoriality, meaning the host government does not have the right to enter an embassy without the authorization of the head of mission. Ecuador argues that Mexico abused its diplomatic immunity, leaving it no option other than to send police in. Yet, here a crucial distinction needs to be made. Diplomatic immunity and the extraterritoriality of foreign missions are bedrock principles of the Vienna Convention. Political asylum is a separate matter that should be handled on its own. As such, if the Ecuadorian government considered Glas not to qualify for political asylum, it could have attempted to legally block the move or refuse safe passage for the asylum-seeker to exit the embassy and leave the country. Mexico would have strong grounds to counter such measures, however, as according to the Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, it is up to the asylum-granting state to decide whether the case is politically motivated. Implications for the future Regardless of the merits of the asylum case, sending in the equivalent of a SWAT team to storm the embassy represents a deliberate violation of diplomatic norms. There is a long history of Latin America politicians seeking asylum who spent many years holed up in embassy buildings because governments would not grant them safe passage – the most notable being Peruvian leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who spent five years at the Colombian Embassy in Lima. Yet, with a few exceptions, not even in the darkest hour of Latin America’s military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s were police permitted to storm into embassy buildings to arrest asylum-seekers. And this highlights what makes Ecuador’s actions especially worrisome. Precisely because of Latin America’s problems with political instability and a tradition of military coup, the laws surrounding political asylum and diplomatic immunity are necessary. Undermining the Vienna Convention in the way Ecuador has risks setting a precedent that other governments might be tempted to follow. Political asylum in Latin America has traditionally worked as a safety valve, allowing deposed leaders to get themselves out of harm’s way. Weakening the diplomatic structures in place supporting asylum will make the handling of democratic breakdowns more difficult. It also risks exacerbating regional disagreements. We are already seeing this with Mexico breaking relations with Ecuador as a result of the embassy raid. Making diplomacy more difficult Of course, embassy violations are not unprecedented. Guatemala’s dictatorship attacked the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in 1980, killing several asylum-seekers, including a former vice president. And Uruguay’s military government sent security forces into the Venezuelan Embassy in Montevideo in 1976 to arrest a left-wing militant who had sought asylum, leading to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries. But those events in the relatively distant past were widely and rightly condemned at the time as the product of authoritarian regimes with little regard for international conventions. The comparatively relaxed international attitude to the embassy violations by Israel and Ecuador reflects, I believe, a failure to grasp the significance of eroding diplomatic immunity and norms. As global challenges increase, embassies and their representatives become more important, not less so. If the takeaway from the two latest embassy incidents is that the protection of diplomatic premises can be secondary to whatever is politically expedient on any given day, then it will be of great detriment to the management of international relations. Diplomacy will become much more difficult. And given the enormity of the challenges the world faces today, that is the last thing any country needs.

Haiti is experiencing a widespread crisis of its institutions, political turmoil, high levels of poverty, disorder and increasing violence in the streets. Last nearly 5,000 people were assassinated and another 2,500 were kidnapped, according to the United Nations, more than double the number in 2022. [1] In this context, on March 11th, Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who is out of the country, announced his resignation once the necessary mechanisms for the transition of the government are in place. This publication describes the events that led to Henry’s resignation, the international community’s reaction, the outbreak of violence, as well as some points for reflection on what lies ahead for the Caribbean country. The resignation of Ariel Henry The current Prime Minister of Haiti, came to power following the assassination of the country’s former president, Jovenel Moise, in 2021. He had previously stated that he would resign in February, but later indicated that he would do so only once national security was restored. On February 29, following pressure from members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Henry pledged to hold general elections before August 31st next year. In the meantime, the regional mechanism would send an assessment team to help plan the elections. [2] Although CARICOM does not have a unified foreign policy, they “generally promote democratic governance” in their public discourse, said Rasheed Griffith, executive director of the ‘Instituto de Estudios del Progreso del Caribe’. [3] Henry’s reluctance to resign soon caused the violent protest to escalate, especially in Port-au-Prince, where most of the city is controlled by gangs. Among the gangs, one leader, Jimmy Chérizier, has stood out, calling for Henry’s government to be overthrown and warning of a “civil war that will lead to genocide” if the prime minister does not resign. [4] In addition, last January, the mandates of the last ten elected senators in Haiti officially expired, leaving the country without any officials elected by the people. Moreover, Henry’s government is linked to that of the also controversial Moise, who in any case, would have ended his term in February 2022. Henry has remained in office without constitutional legitimacy. [5] Last week, after traveling abroad, Henry tried to return to Haiti, but had to change his itinerary because gangs blocked access to the Port-au-Prince airport. The Prime Minister sought to land in the Dominican Republic and cross the border but was prevented from doing so by the neighboring nation’s authorities, so he was deviated to Puerto Rico. The United States then urged the Caribbean leader to “accelerate the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance structure.” [6] Originally, Henry had gone to Kenya to sign an agreement to pave the way for a multinational force to operate in Haiti. Amidst the growing violence and insecurity on the streets, the European Union evacuated its personnel on March 14th. The spokesman for the diplomatic division of the European Commission, Peter Stano, said that the bloc is “extremely concerned” about the situation, given the attacks on hospitals and prisons, food shortages and blocked infrastructures. [7] The US Armed Forces also withdrew non-essential personnel from its embassy, as reported by the Southern Command in a statement. [8] The UN has stated that it will remain in Haiti. On March 11th, senior officials from different countries met in Kingston, Jamaica, for a meeting convened by CARICOM to analyze the crisis. The US State Department reiterated Washington’s support for the creation of an “independent” body to assume presidential powers in Haiti, as well as the deployment of a security mission to help contain the violence. It also announced that it will provide 300 million pesos to alleviate the situation in the Caribbean country. [9] The initiative, which contemplates these resources, is under review by the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee [10]. From Puerto Rico, Henry participated in the CARICOM meeting virtually. At the end of the meeting, during a press conference, the temporary president of the Caribbean Community and leader of Guyana, Irfaan Ali, announced that Henry had agreed to resign from his position. He said the prime minister would step down after “the establishment of a transitional presidential council and the appointment of an interim authority”. Later, in a video, Henry stated that he would continue to “handle current affairs until the appointment of a prime minister and a government”. The council will include the participation of the main political parties, the private sector and the Montana Agreement, a coalition that proposed the formation of an interim government and a roadmap following Moise’s assassination [11]. Among the members of the mechanism is the political force Pitit Desalin, led by former senator and presidential aspirant Moise Jean-Charles. The EDE party of former Prime Minister Charles Joseph, the Fanmi Lavalas formation, and the December 21st coalition led by Henry, will also have a vote [12]. In addition, there will be two non-voting observers, one from civil society and another from the religious community. None of the members of the collegiate body may have been accused or convicted in any jurisdiction, be sanctioned by the UN, or seek a position in the upcoming elections in the country [13]. In theory, this council should be defined tomorrow, Thursday, March 14th, in the meantime, negotiations are underway to define who will form this structure [14]. The United States indicated that Henry could stay in Puerto Rico or go anywhere in its territory in case it is unsafe to return to Haiti [15]. Actions to set up a multinational support mission Since 2022, Prime Minister Henry called on the international community to integrate a support mission to strengthen the Haitian National Police (HNP) [16]. Kenya responded to this call in July 2023, when it announced its intention to “lead” the initiative and send “1,000 police officers to the Caribbean nation” [17]. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2699, authorizing the deployment of a multinational ad hoc security support mission to Haiti, under the leadership of Kenya [18]. The start of this operation has been delayed due to challenges in African country’s courts, which a few days ago the leaders of Haiti and Kenya tried to resolve by signing a bilateral security agreement. The international community has responded very timidly to the initiative. The Bahamas pledged 150 people. Jamaica and Antigua & Barbuda expressed their willingness to help. Benin offered to send 2,000 soldiers [19]. Spain also showed interest in contributing to the cause. However, on March 10th, the UN stated that despite the promises, a trust fund to pay for this force only amounts to 10 million dollars [20]. The new mission will not be a blue helmet operation. Its objectives will be to protect the state institutions, as well as critical infrastructure and transportation hubs. They will also seek to pacify gangs. It has been reported that an advanced contingent of several hundred officers will be deployed to survey the terrain [21]. To avoid repeating the problems the UN mission has had in the country, such as the spread of cholera and cases of exploitation and sexual abuse, there will be very rigorous scrutiny to oversee the multinational mission. This time the Security Council resolution demands appropriate wastewater management measures to prevent the introduction and spread of disease, as well as robust, secure, and accessible mechanisms for lodging complaints and conducting investigations into any allegations of misconduct, including sexual assault [22]. However, for the time being, Kenya has communicated that the deployment of its agents is on hold until a new government is formed in the Caribbean nation, as officials said on March 12th. Spike in violence and importance of gangs Port-au-Prince has been the epicenter of gang violence, especially the National Police stations, its cadet academy, the prisons, from which more than 3,500 prisoners have fled, the Sylvio Cator national stadium and the international airport [23]. On March 3rd, the Government declared a state of emergency and a curfew in most of the country, [24] which will be extended until March 22nd. The gang members’ main demand was the resignation of the prime minister, although they also seek to prevent the deployment of international forces. According to international analyst Robert Muggah, the gangs hope to be part of a governing council to lead the country [25]. According to a report done by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, there are up to 200 gangs operating in Haiti, and almost half of them have a presence in Port-au-Prince. They range from small groups of youths sharing guns to gangs of more than a thousand people with permanent salaries and automatic weapons that belong to hierarchical organizations. There are two more visible groups: the G-Pèp and the G-9 Family, which control the poorest neighborhoods of the capital. They have been linked to political parties: the G-9 is close to the ruling Haitian Tèt Kale, while the G-Pèp tends to support opposition forces. In this crisis, the G-9 and its allies have taken over the ports and roads surrounding the country’s main airport [26]. Delinquency controls 80% of the capital [27]. Gang members are often aligned with elite businessmen and politicians who finance them [28]. The leaders of some gangs announced an informal alliance called “Vivre Ensemble” (Living Together). As noted above, the most notable leader is Jimmy Chérizier, who is known as “Barbeque”. He was an elite policeman and has shown himself to be bloodthirsty in his operations [29]. Reports say his gang was receiving support from the government of Jovenel Moise [30]. While CARICOM leaders met to discuss the situation in Haiti, Chérizier told reporters that if the international community continued on the same path, it would only “generate more chaos”. “We Haitians have to decide who is going to be the leader of the country and what model of government we want” [31]. Clashes in Port-au-Prince have caused hundreds of inhabitants of the northern part of the capital to flee their homes. The UN reported that more than 800 people died in January. The violence is also driving tens of thousands of Haitians out of the country. The Dominican Republic is the main destination of that diaspora. For this reason, President Luis Abinader issued a cry for help to “save” Haiti [32]. For now, the Dominican government maintains the cancellation of flights to and from Haiti and on March 6th, Carlos Luciano Díaz Morfa, Minister of Defense, announced that they have incorporated strict security measures in the border zone, including more equipment and more personnel [33]. In the United States, the Defense Department and military officials told the Congress that they must be prepared for a possible mass migration from Haiti [34]. Dozens of people have died in the violent attacks and over 15,000 Haitians have been left homeless after fleeing their communities during these clashes. Food, water, fuel, and medical care are scarce. The humanitarian situation is dire. As a result, many people feel that the best thing to do is to leave the country [35]. According to the United Nations, approximately one million people are on the brink of famine, with 350,000 displaced [36]. What’s next after the Prime Minister’s resignation Some experts wonder what role the gangs will play. Robert Fatton, an expert on Haitian politics at the University of Virginia, says they will necessarily have to participate in the national discussion. Officials will have to deal with the groups and try to convince them to disarm [37]. According to an analysis by Crisis Group, the gangs will have two options in the face of deployment of the multinational forces: if they perceive weakness, they will not submit, but if they see that the intervention is strong, they will consider under what conditions they could disarm [38]. In these circumstances, gangs have emerged as power brokers in Haiti for the first time, posing a challenge for any transitional government [39]. However, for many civic and religious groups involved in the talks, this is a red line. Chérizier’s next steps are unknown. Days ago, he said that if Henry resigned, “all areas around Port-au-Prince that are blocked or inaccessible will be reopened” and “attacks on police stations will stop” [40]. He also vowed to begin “the real fight against the system of oligarchs and corrupt people” and proposed his own “peace plan”. He demands total amnesty for gang members and that the country be governed by a “council of wise men” in which he would have a place [41]. On March 11th, Chérizier announced that the “Viv Ansanm” gang alliance will not recognize any government resulting from the agreement with CARICOM and that “it is up to the Haitian people to designate their rulers”. On the other hand, an advisor to Guy Philippe, the former rebel leader who recently returned to Haiti and called for “revolution” against Henry, warned that any new government must include him [42]. There is uncertainty about the timing of the transition. For now, security conditions in Port-au-Prince are precarious, while doubts persist about the timetable for deploying an international mission to reinforce the local police and restore order [43]. These days, Henry’s resignation seems to have eased the situation in the capital, as no attacks on government offices or police stations have been reported. The main CPS cargo port opened, and some fuel was allowed to leave the Varreux facilities near the port. However, protests continue in opposition to the CARICOM plan [44]. The economist and political scientist Joseph Harold writes about three aspects of the crisis. First, Haitians are in a humanitarian emergency and aid is not enough. The distribution of supplies should be done by national institutions, not international agencies. This practice weakens the institutional framework. Resources to alleviate the emergency amount to 720 million dollars and only 16% have been collected [45]. In terms of security, it will be difficult for the multinational solution to be successful. Experts are skeptical that a relatively small force led by Kenya, whose officers speak English, not Creole or Frech, will help control the situation [46]. Wooldy Edson Louidor, a Colombian-Haitian professor at the Javeriana University of Colombia, affirms that the support of the international community is important, “but to achieve a Haitian solution. And this involves returning to constitutional order” [47]. Haitians have traditionally opposed any foreign intervention in their internal affairs and pride themselves on being the first black republic to emerge after a slave revolt during European colonialism [48]. The third point is the elections that must be organized [49]. This is not a recipe for conflict resolution, but it is a necessary step. It gives the international community and local actors a goal to work towards [50]. In this sense, analyst Philippe de Bard points out the importance of designing an electoral system that contemplates the constitution of a reliable electoral roll, the integration of a permanent electoral council and the creation of an independent dispute mechanism. He believes that it will be necessary to evaluate the necessary constitutional reforms. A new electoral law requires the approval of the Haitian Parliament, which does not exist today [51]. The immediate term, the challenge is to control the gangs and create a capable police force. After that, the effort should focus on developing a political strategy to establish conditions for free elections [52]. According to proposals by leading figures, this could happen in about two years [53]. In 2009, writer and journalist Sergio Ramirez did a report on Haiti, following two devastating hurricanes and before the 2010 earthquake. He interviewed the head of the UN Stabilization Mission, Hédi Hannabi, who said, “this is not the classic peacekeeping mission, because there are no two parties in conflict, what we have is anarchy, the presence of gangs, and the absence of institutions. If we were to leave today, chaos would ensue. The problem is that more than ten years later, the disorder situation continues [54]. References [1] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas que han invadido la capital de Haití y qué quieren?”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/03/09/espanol/haiti-pandillas-que-pasa.html [2] CARICOM, “Communiqué – 46th Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM”, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://caricom.org/communique-46th-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-caricom/ [3] Catherine Osborn, “How Haiti’s Unelected Leader Lost America’s Blessing”, Foreign Policy, 7 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/07/haiti-crisis-gangs-ariel-henry-united-states-caricom-elections/ [4] Sarah Morland, “Haiti PM commits to elections by 2025, CARICOM to send team”, Reuters, 29 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-pm-commits-elections-by-2025-caricom-send-team-2024-02-29/ [5] Monique Clesca, “Haiti’s Rule of Lawlessness”, Foreign Affairs, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/central-america-caribbean/haitis-rule-lawlessness [6] Catherine Osborn, op. cit. [7] Deutsche Welle, “UE evacúa a todo su personal de Haití”, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/ueevac%C3%BAa-a-todo-su-personal-de-hait%C3%AD-y-caricom-convoca-cumbre-de-urgencia/a-68493344 [8] Colin McCullough, “Estados Unidos evacuó al personal no esencial de su embajada en Haití por el aumento de la violencia de pandillas”, CNN, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/10/ejercito-ee-uu-evacuo-personal-no-esencialembajada-haiti-trax/ [9] Jennifer Hansler and Tara John, “US will contribute $300 million to Haiti’s multinational security mission”, CNN, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/11/americas/haiti-us-blinken-security-mission-intl-latam/index.html [10] Matt Berg y Eric Bazail-Eimil, “State just sent Republicans their Haiti plan”, Politico, 12 de marzo de 4024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/03/12/state-just-sent-republicans-their-haiti-plan-00146474 [11] Monique Clesca, “Haitians Have a Solution to Haiti’s Crisis”, World Politics Review, 8 de septiembre de 2022. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-gangs-protests-crisis-corruption-crime/ [12] Dánica Coto y Evens Sanon (AP), “El premier de Haití dice que renunciará tras pico de violencia. No está claro quién tomará el relevo”, Los Angeles Times, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/articulo/2024-03-12/elpremier-de-haiti-dice-que-renunciara-tras-pico-de-violencia-no-esta-claro-quien-tomara-el-relevo [13] DW, “Dimisión de Ariel Henry, una esperanza para Haití”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/dimisi%C3%B3n-de-ariel-henry-una-esperanza-para-hait%C3%AD/a-68503873 [14] Widlore Mérancourt, Samantha Schmidt, Michael Birnbaum y Amanda Coletta, “As leader resigns, Haitian politicians rush to form new government”, The Washington Post, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/12/haitiprime-minister-ariel-henry-resigns/ [15] El País, “El caos y una ola de violencia sin precedentes fuerzan la renuncia del primer ministro de Haití, Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-12/el-caos-y-una-ola-de-violencia-sin-precedentes-fuerzan-la-renuncia-del-primerministro-de-haiti-ariel-henry.html [16] DW, “Haití reitera la necesidad de una fuerza multinacional”, 10 de junio de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-reitera-la-necesidad-de-una-fuerza-multinacional/a-65877041 [17] Frances Robles, “An International Force May Be Headed to Troubled Haiti, again”, The New York Times, 1 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 11 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/01/world/americas/haiti-international-intervention.html [18] Emily Mae Czachor, “U.S. military airlifts embassy staff from Port-au-Prince amid Haiti's escalating gang violence”, CBS News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-military-airlifts-evacuation-staff-embassy-port-au-prince-haiti-gangviolence/ [19] Samuel Salgado, “Haití firma acuerdo con Kenia para que policías de Nairobi lideren misión de seguridad”, France24, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240301-hait%C3%AD-y-kenia-firman-acuerdo-paraque-polic%C3%ADas-de-nairobi-lideren-misi%C3%B3n-de-seguridad [20] Jacqueline Charles, “U.S., Caribbean leaders propose plan to lead Haiti out of crisis and toward elections”, The Miami Herald, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article286558805.html#storylink=cpy [21] Crisis Group, “Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold?”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b49-haitis-gangs-can-foreign-mission-break-their-stranglehold [22] Ídem [23] Pablo Ferri, “Haití camina hacia el desastre a la espera de ayuda internacional”, El País, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-10/haiti-camina-hacia-el-desastre-a-la-espera-de-ayuda-internacional.html [24] Carlos S. Maldonado, “Haití, en estado de urgencia y toque de queda tras la huida de miles de presos de una cárcel de Puerto Príncipe”, El País, 3 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-03/miles-de-presos-huyen-de-la-principal-carcel-dehaiti-tras-un-asalto-de-las-bandas-criminales.html [25] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [26] Ídem [27] Nacho Carretero, “Haití, cuando colapsa un Estado”, El País, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/eps/2023-07-02/haiti-cuando-colapsa-un-estado.html [28] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [29] Tom Phillips y Luke Taylor, “Is the feared gang boss ‘Barbecue’ now the most powerful man in Haiti?”, The Guardian, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/10/haiti-gang-boss-kingpin-barbecue-jimmy-cherizier [30] InSight Crime, “Jimmy Chérizier, alias ‘Barbecue’”, 10 de noviembre de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/haitiorganized-crime-news/jimmy-cherizier-alias-barbecue/ [31] Coto y Sanon (AP), op. cit. [32] Carlos S. Maldonado, op. cit. [33] Jessica Hasbun, “Después no se quejen de las acciones que vamos a tener que hacer”: la advertencia del presidente Luis Abinader por crisis en Haití”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/advertencia-republicadominicana-haiti-luis-abinader-orix/ [34] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití, las pandillas y la dimisión del primer ministro en vivo: noticias y más”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/ultimas-noticias-sobre-la-escalada-de-la-violencia-en-haiti-y-dimision-delprimer-ministro-en-vivo [35] Frances Robles, David C. Adams y Andre Paultre, “With Haiti in Chaos, a Humanitarian Crisis Is Rapidly Unfolding”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/09/world/americas/haiti-gangs-political-uprising-ariel-henryhumanitarian-crisis.html [36] Philippe de Bard, “In Haiti, as Elsewhere, Elections Alone Are Not the Answer”, Foreign Policy, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/12/haiti-gang-violence-elections-ariel-henry-resignation/ [37] Coto y Sanon, op. cit. [38] Crisis Group, op. cit. [39] Sam Woolston, “Prime Minister’s Resignation Tips Haiti Into Uncharted Territory”, Insight Crime, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/news/prime-minister-resigns-haiti-unchartered-territory [40] Matt Rivers, “Haiti's most notorious gang leader plots its future amid rebellion”, ABC News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://abcnews.go.com/International/haitis-notorious-gang-leader-plots-future-amid-rebellion/story?id=107994731 [41] Amalendu Misra, “Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own”, The Conversation, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/jimmy-barbecue-cherizier-the-gangsterbehind-the-violence-in-haiti-who-may-have-political-aspirations-of-his-own-225514 [42] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití”, op. cit. [43] Infobae, “Crece la incertidumbre en Haití tras el anuncio de renuncia del primer ministro Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/03/12/crece-la-incertidumbre-en-haiti-tras-el-anuncio-de-renuncia-delprimer-ministro-ariel-henry/ [44] Al Jazeera, “Uneasy quiet in Haiti capital after prime minister pledges to step down”, 13 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/3/13/uneasy-quiet-in-haiti-capital-after-prime-minister-pledges-to-step-down [45] Fernando del Rincón, “Hay incoherencia en la respuesta internacional para la situación en Haití, dice analista”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/haiti-violencia-bandas-inseguridad-ariel-gobierno-conclusiones-tv/ [46] Tom Phillips, Archie Bland y Oliver Holmes Haiti, “What caused the gang violence and will it end now the PM has quit?”, The Guardian, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/08/haiti-crisis-gang-jailbreak-explained [47] Isabella Escobedo, “Haití: radiografía de un Estado fallido”, DW, 5 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-radiograf%C3%ADa-de-un-estado-fallido/a-68448368 [48] BBC News, “La multimillonaria multa que Haití le pagó a Francia por convertirse en el primer país de América Latina en independizarse”, 30 de diciembre de 2018. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-46680927 [49] Fernando del Rincón, op. cit. [50] James Bosworth, “To Address Its Crisis, Haiti Needs an Elected Government, World Politics Review, 26 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-elections-gangs-crisis/ [51] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [52] The Washington Post (editorial), “Haiti needs security now. For the future, it needs democracy”, 8 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/03/08/haiti-violence-gangs-chaos-anarchy-kenya-peacekeepers/ [53] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [54] Sergio Ramírez, “Haití, un país en extinción”, El País, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/opinion/2024-03-12/haiti-un-pais-en-extincion.htm

That there is a miscommunication between Paris and Berlin is something that is already being unreservedly acknowledged even among the power leaders in the two capitals. The rift caused by the war in Ukraine is the arena in which tensions are being played out. But there are underlying factors that have contributed to making this gap a major concern for the European stability. We point out the following: The strategic factor Geography determines strategic choices. Germany has always looked to the East as a pole of concern, but also as a pole of opportunity. The former has almost always outweighed the latter. Wars have historically conditioned coexistence with Rusia, regardless of the political regime that has existed in each historical stage. There is one incontrovertible fact: Germany has never won a war against Russia. On the other hand, when talking about peace, German interests have prevailed. Hence in Berlin (or in Bonn, during the first Cold War) there has always been a tendency towards appeasement towards Moscow. Earlier, Hitler wanted to postpone the inevitable confrontation with Stalin’s Russia with a tactical, not a strategic pact (in 1939), a move to gain time and consolidate his domination of Western Europe. With the victory of the Soviet Union, Germany endured the division of the country for almost half a century, a punishment even more humiliating than the previous ones. The western part prospered, and the eastern part stagnated. However, this underhand triumph did nothing to facilitate the reconciliation. Willy Brandt understood this very well when he launched his ‘Ostpolitik’ (Eastern policy) in the early 1970s. The initiative caused concern in Washington, not so much because it was opposed to a thaw it shared, but because of the risk of losing control of the process. There was also some reluctance in Paris. De Gaulle and his heirs had always maintained an open channel of cooperation with Moscow but were distrustful of German overtures. With the crisis of the Soviet system, Franco-German tensions surfaced again. A united and strong Germany awakened the ghost of three devastating wars for France. The Chancellor at that time, Kohl was Gorbachev’s main supporter and acted as a fundraiser for a Soviet Union that was falling apart at the seams. Germany’s repeated commitment to peace and European integration did not seem to be a sufficient antidote to the vision of an Eastern Europe, ‘germanized’ by the economic weight of the new political and territorial power. Germany’s actions in the Yugoslav wars, initially perceived in Paris as ‘dynamiting’, contributed to increase those fears. After the failure of the democratization trial in the ‘new’ Russia, largely caused by a predatory capitalism encouraged from the West, Germany continued to cultivate very close relations with Moscow to prevent an undesirable drift in the Kremlin. Until the successive crises in Ukraine have brought this strategic project to a halt. In France, there has always been an interest in an autonomous relationship model with Moscow, whether in collaboration with Germany or the United States, but in no way subordinate. Gaullist nationalism has survived, both on the right and on the left. Somehow, the French elites have tried to avoid Paris from playing a secondary role in relations with the Kremlin, whether in cooperation or confrontation. Hence Macron (‘more papist than the Pope: more Gaullist than the General’), will attempt a risky mediation game with Putin after the phantom intervention in Crimea and the more obvious one in the Donbas, in 2014; and eight years later, when the invasion of Ukraine was consumed. There has been much speculation about the true intentions of the French president’s trip to Moscow. Macron is anything but naive. Perhaps it was indeed the inevitable need of the Elysée Palace to leave its mark. Now that any conciliation with Moscow seems distant, Macron takes the lead among the ‘hawks’ and pretends to forget that he once wanted to look like a ‘dove’, by suggesting that, although there is no allied consensus, sending soldiers to Ukraine cannot be ruled out to prevent a Russian military triumph. Of all Macron’s gambits, this has been the most or one of the riskiest. And the one that has provoked the most irritation on the other side of the Rhine [1]. Since February 2022, Germany has buried the various branches of the ‘Ostpolitik’, a task falling to a Social Democratic chancellor, perhaps the most unremarkable and least suited for high-level leadership. Olaf Scholz announced the ‘zeitenwende’ (translatable as “change of era, or time”). Half a century of rapprochement with Russia was called into question. The economic equation (energy raw materials in exchange for machinery and capital goods) in bilateral relations was dissolving under the weight of Western sanctions against Moscow. Moreover, the pacifist post-Hitler Germany committed to a military effort of $100 billion (to start with), aimed rejuvenating, strengthening, and expanding the Germany military apparatus. But in everything there is a limit, or a red line. Germany has not been shy with Putin, despite being the European country most harmed by embargoes, limitations and constraints in the Russian oil and gas consumption. Economic war was accepted as inevitable in Berlin. However, caution has been exercised, particularly in the supply of arms to Ukraine. Nonetheless, Germany is, after the United States, the largest net contributor to Kiev’s arsenals [2]. Let’s not forget that. France has also taken its precautions in pressuring the Kremlin, as has the US, despite the rhetoric and the cold war propaganda prevailing for the past two years. That is why Macron’s latest ‘provocation’ has annoyed Berlin so much. Moreover, as usual in his boasts, the French president added insult to injury by suggesting that Ukraine’s delicate fragility demanded more “courage” and less timidity from the allies [3]. Scholz replied with diplomatic and bureaucratic discretion, without any outbursts, recalling that NATO’s decisions ruled out ‘boots on the ground’ (sending troops to Ukraine). But his Defense Minister, Pistorious, could not resist returning the favor and admonishing him for his new moral lesson. The foreign ministers of both countries attempted to ‘diplomatically’ solve the crisis days later, but did not risk holding a joint press conference in order not to show that the political wound between Berlin and Paris was still open. The leak of a meeting of senior German military commanders, spied on by Russian agents, further clouded the atmosphere [4]. Another element unchanged since the Cold War: Berlin may support the European autonomous defense project, but it has never ceased to consider it as subordinate to NATO. The American nuclear umbrella is untouchable, then and now. And not even an eventual (and only speculative, for now) strategic availability of the French nuclear arsenal is capable of changing that axiom [5]. Political factors Apart from strategic considerations, domestic political factors have also played a role in this latest crisis. Macron faces the European elections with the apprehension of a seemingly inevitable victory of the far-right ‘Rassemblement National’. It was once considered a pro-Russian party and even generously funded by the Kremlin. In recent years, the party’s chairwoman has tried to distance herself from the Kremlin but has not entirely succeeded. And Macron wants to exploit this supposed vulnerability of a woman he has defeated twice in the presidential elections, but who seems destined to occupy the Elysée Palace in 2027 if she achieves successful results in this year’s European elections. In this week’s parliamentary debate on the bilateral security agreement with Kiev, Marine Le Pen ordered an abstention. She made it clear that she supports the Ukraine resistance, so that there would be no doubt about her change of attitude towards Russia. But he saw in the initiative of the President’s party a clear intention for electoral gain. Divisions were evident on the left: rebels and communists voted against, while socialists and ecologists voted in favor, but the latter rejected the suggestion of troops deployment. Scholz also faces a challenge from the far right, with elections this autumn that could consolidate the dominance of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) in the eastern states (Eastern Länder). This party has won over citizens who do not have such negative memories of the GDR, but in its rise, it has also bitten into the social democratic base. The chancellor does not want to appear too hostile to an electorate that does not participate in the anti-Russian discourse. Institutional factors In this Paris – Bonn clash, as in previous ones, the structure of the respective political systems also exerts a disturbing influence. The French political system is presidential; the German one is parliamentary. In France, the President has exclusive and personal authority over foreign policy. He does not even need his own majority (in this case, the minority that supports him) to formulate his international proposals. In Germany, by contrast, the Chancellor has to negotiate foreign policy with the coalition partners, and even on rare occasions when there has been a single-party majority government, the Bundestag has exerted considerable influence. Personal factors Finally, personal style is also not to be dismissed. It is not unusual for the Elysée Palace and the Chancellery to be inhabited by like-minded characters. The French President is conditioned by the aura of a political system that relies on an exalted figure and demands real, but also impactful, leadership. Both being and appearing so. The Chancellor, on the other hand, is a sort of ‘primus inter pares’, no matter how prominent. Therefore, since 1945, the personal stature of German leaders has always been framed in firm structures that prevent hyper-leadership. It is the Chief’s (Fuhrer) chastisement. This limitation (historical and political) is sometimes reinforced by a purely personal style. At present, the gap is perhaps the widest in the last eighty years. A French President who likes to talk and a Chancellor who is perhaps the most discreet since the post-war period. De Gaulle and Adenauer cultivated little personal relationship, but neither intended to. Pompidou and Brandt never got along particularly well, although the German took great care that his growing popularity did not irritate in Paris… until the Guillaume scandal ended his career. Giscard and Schmidt gave their cooperation a technical character, forced by the oil crisis following the wars in the Middle East. Mitterrand and Kohl raised the tone of the bilateral relationship but did not always adjust their personal dynamics. The German was the longest-serving post-war chancellor and so, the most mediatic, but the Frenchman never renounced, on the contrary, the solemnity with which the office was exercised. Merkel played down Sarkozy (and later Hollande), but not to highlight her personal qualities, but to put them at the service of Germany’s undisputed economic leadership in post-Cold War Europe. Macron wanted to put an end to this French ‘inferiority’, with difficulty. It is not clear that he succeeded against a retreating Merkel, but he thinks he has it easier with the unremarkable Scholz. Notes [1] “France-Allemagne, un tándem secoué par l’épreuve de la guerre en Ukraine”. PHILIPPE RICHARD & THOMAS WIEDER. LE MONDE, 9 de marzo. [2] “German Chancellor pledges to boost [ammunition] production for Ukraine”. DER SPIEGEL, 5 de febrero (versión en inglés). [3] “Le débat sur l’envoi de soldats en Ukraine révèle les profondes differences de vision de la guerre parmi les allies”. LE MONDE, 6 de marzo. [4] “Now It’s Germany’s turn to frustrate Allies over Ukraine”. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 de marzo. [5] “Dans cette nouvelle ère où l’affrontement a remplacé la cooperation, la question de la dissuasion nucleaire reprend tout son sens”. SYLVIE KAUFFMANN. LE MONDE, 7 de febrero.

With the possibility of a second Trump presidency looming, it is high time to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans Lest anyone had missed the point, Donald Trump has now provided helpful clarification of his attitude towards America’s NATO allies – and specifically those that fail to spend the benchmark 2 per cent of their GDP on defence. If elected he would, he declared at a campaign rally, “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to underspending NATO allies. Reacting to a storm of protest from European leaders, he was happy to repeat himself: “Look, if they’re not going to pay, we’re not going to protect. OK?”. Nowadays, it is less easy for complacent Europeans to shrug off such observations as typical Trumpisms. They have evidence that Trump redux would be likely to apply his malevolent instincts much more efficiently than he did in his chaotic first term as president. And the chances of him having the opportunity to do so are increasingly likely: he has now steamrollered the opposition in the early Republican primaries, and is ahead of Joe Biden in the polls. No one can any longer ignore the real possibility that in less than a year’s time the occupant of the White House could toss the whole responsibility for keeping Ukraine in the fight against Russia into European laps, whilst insisting that from here on in they see to their own defence. It would therefore hardly be premature if Europeans began to explore how each other views the situation; to make contingency plans; and even to take some precautionary steps. The two key challenges are obvious. The first is how to get more weapons, and especially ammunition and air-defence missiles, to Ukraine. Since Russia’s invasion, Europeans have done better at this than might have been expected – but they have not done as well as the need now demands, and not nearly enough to support Ukraine if the United States withdraws its aid. The EU, and especially the European Commission, have played a prominent role here, providing financial incentives for member states to donate from their own stocks and to expand production facilities. But talk of moving European defence industries onto a war footing has yet to be realised; and although the commission will shortly unveil proposals for an ambitious European defence industrial strategy, this can only succeed if member states evince more enthusiasm for collective action than they have so far shown. Only three months ago France, Germany, Italy, and Spain jointly warned the commission to stay off their turf and respect national “prerogatives” on defence. The second key challenge that Europeans should be facing up to is how they would defend themselves without US backing against a Russia that had – the possibility can no longer be discounted – imposed a humiliating ‘peace’ on Ukraine. The “dormant NATO” plans being proposed by right-wing US think-tanks foresee a wholesale withdrawal of US ground forces from Europe. But Europeans have huge psychological difficulties in bringing themselves to discuss the US as they would any other foreign power, even in situations where their own strategic interests are manifestly different from those of the superpower. NATO’s disastrous involvement in Afghanistan, for instance, would never have dragged on for so many fruitless years had not its European members studiously avoided any collective discussion of a campaign which each saw exclusively through the prism of its own bilateral relations with the US. Compounding these challenges is the fact that there is no institutional setting in which Europeans could confer. Their task is, in effect, to Europeanise NATO’s defence plans, but this can hardly be discussed in NATO. That organisation, after all, is where European militaries gather to be told what to do by Americans, but the current US administration can scarcely be expected to lead a discussion premised on its own defeat in the November presidential election. The EU has neither locus nor credibility in military operational matters. The reality is that, if a strategy for defending Europe without the Americans is to emerge, this can only be on an ‘intergovernmental’ basis – through bilateral and minilateral discussion amongst Europe’s main defence players. At the alliance’s 2022 Madrid summit, NATO doubled down on its strategy of forward defence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has demonstrated that we are in a technological era in which defensive systems have the advantage over the traditional means of attack. Destroying massed Russian armour turned out to be relatively easy; getting Russians out now that they have dug themselves in is the devil’s own job. So in Madrid allies resolved to reinforce NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” – boosting in-place forces in eastern and central Europe. But predictably, Europeans have been happy to leave this largely to the Americans, who reinforced their presence in Europe with an additional 20,000 troops. The challenge for European chiefs of staff and defence planners now is to work out how, if the need arises, to substitute for US in-place forces in the frontline states; what capabilities and defensive infrastructure will be needed to halt any assault at the borders; and how to organise the communications and data networks necessary to form an effective system that ties together disparate sensors and missile, drone, and artillery assets. Such planning is now an urgent requirement, not just as a matter of military preparedness, but for psychological reasons. Europe’s frontline states have long felt their western European allies lack not only US military credibility, but also a serious understanding of the scale of Putin’s threat. Europeans will only hang together under a second Trump presidency if they are ready to trust each other, and specifically if the most vulnerable states see a real prospect of western European states putting many more of their bodies on the line as in-place forces. The last couple of years, in which predominantly eastern European states have agreed to purchase an astonishing $120 billion of weapons from American contractors, suggests a fatal tendency to believe that maybe Trump can be propitiated by such largesse. Fortunately, the return of Donald Tusk as Poland’s prime minister has substantially increased the odds of Europeans hanging together even in a Trump 2.0 scenario. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland (the Weimar Triangle) have just met to discuss strengthening Europe’s efforts. If, as expected, the British Labour party returns to government later this year, then the United Kingdom would be an obvious addition to this group. Indeed, a necessary one: it is hard to envisage a credible European defence of the continent that did not clutch in Europe’s second nuclear power. Keir Starmer has made clear his ambition to restore defence ties severed by Brexit. There is no time to waste: the prime minister-in-waiting could usefully make an early trip to Paris to initiate conversations with the UK’s closest continental ally.

Demarcating the land border between Israel and Lebanon is an important and necessary step—but is it right to do under fire? In this document, INSS researchers provide an answer to this question and detail the background and points of disagreement between the two countries on this issue As part of the American-led efforts to use diplomatic means to end the fighting that has been ongoing for nearly five months between Israel and Hezbollah, the need to demarcate an agreed-upon border between Israel and Lebanon was also on the agenda. The Lebanese government is eager to include border demarcation in any ceasefire agreement and has adopted the same policy on this matter as Hezbollah, linking an end to the fighting to the cessation of Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and presenting a hardline maximalist approach to border demarcation. Negotiations over the land border between the two countries are likely to be exhaustive due to the complexity of the issue and the wide gaps between the sides. It would be wrong, therefore, to conduct them under fire. At the same time, as part of an agreement to end the conflict, it is feasible to include an agreement over the establishment of a mechanism to discuss the issue at the next stage—once the fighting on the Israel–Lebanon border has died down. Increasingly concerned that the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah could escalate further and turn into an all-out war, the United States is working to advance a diplomatic move that would lead to a ceasefire. France, and more recently the United Kingdom and Germany have joined the Americans in this effort. The Americans have entrusted the task to US President Joe Biden’s close adviser, Amos Hochstein, who successfully brokered the maritime agreement between Israel and Lebanon, which was signed in October 2022. At the behest of the Lebanese, Hochstein has been trying over the course of the past year to recreate this success and to get the parties to agree to a permanent land border. Thus far, he has not been successful. Beirut recently raised again the issue of demarcating the land border between Israel and Lebanon in the framework of efforts to secure a ceasefire between the IDF and Hezbollah, which have been engaged in limited combat along Israel’s northern border since Hezbollah initiated the conflict on October 8. The fighting has been ongoing since then, in parallel to the war in Gaza. In their discussions with American officials, acting Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and his foreign minister, Abdallah Bou Habib, have been pleased by the Biden administration’s willingness to help broker a ceasefire and to restore quiet to southern Lebanon. They say that they are committed to a diplomatic solution and to international decisions, with an emphasis on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. At the same time, they have taken a hardline position and have been forced to toe the Hezbollah line. They have done so not only in terms of linking an end to the fighting on the Lebanon border with a cessation of IDF operations in the Gaza Strip but also in terms of their demands when it comes to demarcating the land border. Their opening position is intransigent. In their diplomatic meetings and in interviews they have given to the media, both Mikati and Habib have raised the demand that Israel withdraws from every inch of Lebanese territory and, at the same time, they speak about the Mandate-era border, which was adopted as part of the 1949 Armistice Agreements, as the reference point rather than the Blue Line, the line of withdrawal identified in 2000 by the United Nations, without prejudice to any future border agreement. Reports in the Israeli and Lebanese media suggest that the issue was also raised during Hochstein’s recent visits to Israel (on January 4 and again on February 4) and Beirut (on January 11), but for the time being, Hezbollah and, in its wake, the Lebanese government are adamant that they will not pursue a diplomatic channel as long as the war in Gaza is ongoing. Milestones in the Demarcation of the Border between Israel and Lebanon The border between Israel and Lebanon, which is around 120 kilometers in length,[1] was demarcated more than a century ago as part of the Franco–British Agreement on Mandatory Borders that was signed in Paris in December 1920. That agreement saw the two European superpowers divide up the territory of the Ottoman Empire between them and agree on the borders between both Lebanon and Syria (readers must understand that it was not between Lebanon and Syria specifically, but between the territory of both and Palestine), which were under the French Mandate, and Palestine, which was under the British, from the Mediterranean Sea to Hama (which now makes up the border triangle between Israel, Syria, and Jordan). The agreement drew out the general path of the border, and the sides agreed to set up a joint commission to demarcate the exact path of the border. The commission was headed by two officers—French Lieutenant Colonel Paulet and British Lieutenant Colonel Newcombe. The commission demarcated the border, and in March 1923, the final agreement was approved by both countries. It was ratified in 1935 by the League of Nations. The system used by the commission to demarcate the border—a process that took an entire year and which left behind meticulous documentation of its work—was old-fashioned and problematic; it led to huge inconsistencies in the border. The border they drew up did not fully correspond to the border that was agreed on in Paris in 1920, but it was marked on the ground using piles of rocks. These piles were eventually replaced by 71 posts known as boundary pillars (BPs), of which 38 were placed along the Israel–Lebanon border. It should be noted that most of these BPs disappeared or were destroyed, making later demarcation difficult. Throughout the Mandatory period, right up until Israel and Lebanon gained their independence, the boundary drawn up by the commission was recognized as the international border. It was also the boundary that was used for the March 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon. That agreement, which the Lebanese are citing as their reference point for demarcation today, was not a detailed demarcation of the boundary. Rather, the agreement merely stated that the “armistice line will run along the international border.” In other words, along the border that was drawn up by the two Mandatory powers and approved in 1923.[2] Following the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon in May 2000 and as part of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 (1978), the United Nations tried to demarcate the IDF’s withdrawal line using a team of its own cartographers. They drew what became known as the Blue Line, which deviates in several points from the Mandate-era boundary, and they based it on cartographic data and the interpretation thereof by members of the team. Israel and Lebanon both accepted the Blue Line as the line to which IDF forces would withdraw from southern Lebanon, but Lebanon submitted reservations that turned into points of contention between the sides. The UN approach is to recognize a border line upon which both parties will agree, although it is doubtful that Lebanon will agree to the Blue Line as the basis and likely will insist on the 1949 line. After the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Israel and Lebanon agreed to physically demarcate the Blue Line on the ground, and to this end, a professional committee was formed. This committee determined the exact location of 470 reference points along the Blue Line—around four such points for every kilometer. The goal of marking the border using blue barrels was to make the border clear to the local population, to military personnel, and to the United Nations—and to prevent any inadvertent Blue Line crossings or violation. Thus far, however, barrels have only been placed on around half of the reference points (more than 270). Each of them was only placed after Lebanon and Israel had examined its exact position and given their approval. Points of Contention between Israel and Lebanon Along the Border Region After the delineation and demarcation of the Blue Line, Lebanon presented reservations regarding 13 points along the Blue Line, covering an area of 485,000 square meters (not including the territory in the triangle of borders with Syria beyond the 1949 Armistice Line). To this day, this remains the main point of contention between the two countries. According to the Lebanese, these points deviate from the boundary that was determined in the 1949 Armistice Agreement (see the map in Appendix A). These points have been discussed at length over the years in contacts between the sides as part of the tripartite meetings and coordination mechanism established by UNIFIL. On a number of occasions, there were even reports that they have reached understandings about a solution for seven of them (although there has been no official announcement that they have been resolved). In July 2023, before the outbreak of the current conflict, the Lebanese foreign minister claimed that of the 13 contested points, agreement had been reached over seven, and that there were only six left to be resolved. Two months later, however, the Lebanese army issued an official statement in which it said that it still sees the 13 as being violations by Israel (the Lebanese see the territory on their side of the 1949 Armistice Line and the Blue Line as having been occupied by Israel) and that nothing had been finalized on the matter. Moreover, the army said representatives in the tripartite coordination mechanism did not have the authority to approve this. Recently, against the backdrop of negotiations, the issue was again raised in an interview given by Mikati. On February 1, he claimed that seven of the 13 points had already been settled, but that there were still major gaps in the positions of both sides with regard to the remaining six. Five days later, the foreign minister made a similar argument. The table below shows the 13 contested points, most of which could be resolved with some good will from both sides. At the same time, a number of points of strategic importance will be hard to resolve—primarily the first point close to the coast at Rosh Hanikra (B1), given its strategic location and its importance to both sides. This was one of the reasons that Israel demanded within the maritime agreement to preserve the status quo at this particular point, which was initially intended to be the starting point for the maritime demarcation, and to postpone the discussion on it until negotiations took place over the land border. >> Table: Lebanese reservations over the demarcation of the Blue Line    According to some recent reports, in addition to the 13 familiar points, Lebanon has already presented more Israeli violations and has demanded that Israel withdraw from 17 other areas beyond the Blue Line, some of which correspond with the 13 previous areas of contention. This is in contrast to the recently stated position of the Lebanese prime minister and foreign minister, both of whom referred only to the 13 contested areas. Details of these points, as published by the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Akhbar newspaper, appear in Appendix B. In addition to the points of contention along the Israel–Lebanon border, there are also a number of substantial contested points on the Golan Heights. The Lebanese have laid claim to areas that were captured by Israel from Syria in 1967 during the Six-Day War in the border triangle between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. According to Beirut, Israel must return these territories, which it claims as its own, before any resolution of the conflict with Syria, which has opted not to deal with the issue at the current time. Further complicating the situation in these areas is the Golan Heights Law that Israel passed in 1981, which formalized the change in the legal status of the Golan and determined that the area fell under Israeli law, jurisdiction, and authority. These disputes form a major part of Hezbollah’s narrative. The organization argues that it is fighting for the liberation of more Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation, while exacerbating the already intense disputes between Beirut and Jerusalem and using them as part of its struggle against Israel. Therefore, it is no coincidence that many of Hezbollah’s military attacks during the past nearly five months of fighting have also been directed at the areas of Mount Dov and Shebaa Farms. There are two main areas in question: The northern part of the village of Ghajar: Lebanon claims sovereignty over the northern part of the village, which is located on the original border between Syria and Lebanon. Indeed, Lebanon’s claim is not entirely groundless, since the Blue Line dissects the village, in accordance with the findings from 2000 by UN cartographers, who worked according to maps in their possession. The northern part of the village, therefore, is in Lebanese territory, even though it was captured by Israeli forces from Syria in 1967 and its residents are Alawites. Lebanese complaints intensified after September 2022, when Israel erected a fence to the north of the village to prevent infiltrations from Lebanon. The erection of this fence was done in coordination with the IDF, which took into account the residents’ suffering from having their village split in two and the fact that entry was only possible via a border police and military checkpoint. Closing off the village from the north allowed it to open to visitors. In addition to the northern section of the village, Lebanon is also demanding territory to the east of the village. The Shebaa Farms: This is an unpopulated agricultural area on Mount Dov (the foothills of Mount Hermon), between the village of Ghajar and the Lebanese village of Shebaa (in the border triangle), which Beirut claims belongs to the village. From an Israeli perspective, this strategic area is vitally important in order to monitor a hostile region. Evidence of this was provided in October 2000, when three Israeli soldiers were abducted in a cross-border raid. It is no coincidence that Hezbollah’s first attack during the current conflict, on October 8, was against Mount Dov, which has become a key target over the past months. In contrast to the official Lebanese position, Hezbollah also has claims to more Israeli territory, which it wants to “liberate from occupation.” There are seven Shiite villages in the Upper Galilee which were abandoned or evacuated, and then captured by Israel during the War of Independence in 1948. It should be stressed that in official statements from Beirut about the border dispute with Israel, these villages are not mentioned. However, it is likely that, even after the resolution of the dispute over border demarcation between the two countries, Hezbollah will continue to refer to these villages as occupied Lebanese territory. This is an integral part of its efforts to maintain its status as “defender of Lebanon” and it will be used to incite hostility toward Israel. From an Israeli perspective, it would be wrong to negotiate the border demarcation under fire. The issue of border demarcation has, as mentioned, come up as part of the diplomatic efforts to end the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel; the Lebanese side (and, it seems, the mediators) raised it as one of the things that Israel could offer in order to promote a ceasefire. However, given the ongoing escalation and the possibility of all-out war, it appears that it would not be the right course of action for Israel to include negotiations over the future land border in talks aimed at securing a ceasefire—notwithstanding the importance of an agreed-upon resolution of the issue. There are several reasons for this: The time element: Negotiations are likely to be long and complex, given the profound disagreements that exist, especially over three points: Rosh Hanikra (B1); the village of Ghajar; and the Mt. Dov/Shebaa Farms. Such talks will not be completed quickly and will not lead to a ceasefire any time soon, especially given that the Lebanese side is currently presenting a particularly hard line. Israel, on the other hand, is interested in an immediate end to the fighting, so that the evacuated residents of the North can return to their homes as soon as possible. This argument is also supposed to convince the Americans, who are also keen to secure a ceasefire sooner rather than later and to avoid regional conflagration. An achievement for Hezbollah and the loss of a bargaining chip: If Israel were to hand over territory to Lebanon—no matter how little—as a result of the current conflict, it would inflate Hezbollah’s sense of accomplishment, as well as its claimed status as the ‘protector of Lebanon.’ It would also strengthen its argument to remain an armed organization, against the wishes of those citizens in Lebanon who want it to turn over its weapons to the Lebanese army. Moreover, Israel would lose a bargaining chip in the anticipated negotiations over the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, especially in terms of its desire for Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River. The same is true of a partial solution, regarding, for example, the seven border points over which there is agreement in principle. While Hezbollah would portray this as a “victory,” the disagreements and the reasons for continued conflict would remain unaddressed. There is no official address on the Lebanese side with which Israel can sign any agreement, given the political vacuum that exists there. Since the last election in Lebanon, in May 2022, a transitional government has been in power and, since the end of President Michel Aoun’s term of office in October 2022, Lebanon has yet to elect a replacement. As per the constitution, it is the Lebanese president who has the authority to sign such agreements; indeed, it was Aoun who signed the maritime border agreement with Israel on his last day in office. Similarly, opponents of any agreement with Israel could challenge the authority of the current interim government to engage in negotiations on any issue with Israel. In conclusion, reaching an agreement on the route of the land border between Israel and Lebanon would be an important element in forging a new reality in the region. However, it would not be right to hold a complex discussion on the issue, and certainly not to accept a partial agreement that would include Israel’s surrendering of territory, as long as Hezbollah has not agreed to cease the current fighting, which it initiated. Therefore, Israel must reject the inclusion of the issue in the preliminary understandings over a ceasefire and must insist that negotiations over the demarcation of the land border only take place at a later stage. Appendix A Map of the Disputed Areas According to the Lebanese Side  Appendix B Lebanese Claims of Israeli Violations Along the Blue Line    Note: These are areas that Israel currently occupies and which the Lebanese claim violate the Blue Line. This list was published on September 7, 2023, by the Al-Akhbar newspaper, which is affiliated with Hezbollah. [1] “It’s time to talk about the Blue Line: Constructive re-engagement is key to stability,” March 5, 2021, https://unifil.unmissions.org/it%E2%80%99s-time-talk-about-blue-line-constructive-re-engagement-key-stability [2] Haim Srebro, True and Steady: Mistakes in the Delimitation of the Boundaries of Israel and Their Correction (Tzivonim Publishing, 2022), p. 143.

2024 has begun intensely and looks extremely busy for the neighboring continent: up to 18 countries will hold general elections at a time of global polarization where democracies are strained by the rise of populism and the growing influence in Africa of countries like Russia, China, and Türkiye. It is not every year that the African continent has an electoral calendar as relevant and extremely busy as the one we are starting in 2024: specifically, 18 general elections are expected to be held this year in Africa. Comoros, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Mozambique, Botswana, Chad, Tunisia, Mauritius, Namibia, Ghana, Algeria, Republic of Guinea, South Sudan, and Guinea Bissau have already passed, will or should go through this important stage in the next twelve months. And I maintain that it is a transcendental year because the test of democracy for all these countries is taking place in a context of enormous global polarization, in a world that seems to increasingly reward populist options. In the background of our observation of all these electoral processes and aware that, in many countries, certain deficiencies in democratic culture can be detected, there is a fundamental debate underway among Africans themselves, but which challenges us directly. Aren’t we in the West trying to impose a model of democracy that, as we can see, has not been useful in so many African countries? A complex debate, undoubtedly, but as a democrat, it does not allow for many nuances in my view, beyond the fact that what matters is that the people can participate in their government and express themselves, and that they can do so in freedom, without coercion, threats, or conditions. However, all these processes must also be seen from a geopolitical point of view. Europe, which has always insisted the most on democratic demands, is losing steam in Africa. The European Union, and the voids it leaves behind have been filled by countries such as China, Russia, or Türkiye, which do not hesitate to violate democratic procedures or respect for human rights. Because Russian influence in certain areas of Africa has not only been military: its interference in fields such as disinformation has weakened the democratic approaches that we, Europeans, have always defended and inspired. And China, which would almost deserve another article, will be discussed another day, since its dominance is economic, tied by the granting of credits. It is also evident that among African youth a clear critical analysis of colonialism, and how their countries have been related to European countries until today, is growing. In West Africa, the one around us, this clearly leads us to France, which is highly questioned throughout the Sahel, but which in a certain way affects the image of all the countries that we could include in what we call “the West”, whether we have a colonizing history or not. And that should also call us to reflect on how badly we have done and how selfish we Europeans have been with the African continent, giving priority to our commercial and geopolitical interests. Not so long ago, and forgive the harshness of the term, is where we went to hunt black people later sell them, in a spurious trade of human beings. Some of these electoral processes will take place in territories of great relevance for our country, such as the neighboring Senegal, that current sender of a large part of the people who come to us on board of small boats and “cayucas”. I write these lines on a morning (Friday, January 26th) in which, despite a horrible windstorm and very rough seas, the arrival of cayucos to the Canary Islands has not stopped, six of them in the last few hours, with more than 300 people, one of them to the island of El Hierro with two corpses on board. The drama does not stop, and it is even more difficult for me to digest it amidst information from Fitur in which we celebrate the wonderful prospects for the arrival of more and more tourists. There is barely a month to go before a key electoral process for Senegal, this friendly country, until a few years ago considered a beacon for democracies throughout West Africa. Journalist José Naranjo, who lives in Dakar, wrote the other day in El Pais that these are the most open elections in recent Senegalese history. Many of the Senegalese migrants who arrived in the Canary Islands during this record-breaking 2023 pointed to the political climate in the country and its impact on local economies as one of the causes for risking their lives at sea, so it is clear the importance of how the election results unfold, and how the electoral results are accepted. This is followed by the Sahel countries. The ‘non-democratic’ situation in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger or Chad is extremely complex, reflecting the tense geopolitical moment they are experiencing, marked by the rise of terrorism – the pressure exerted by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, with an increasingly well-founded fear of their expansion towards the West African coastal countries, like Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo or Benin –, the European withdrawal from the region and the subsequent rapprochement with Russia of the countries currently governed by military juntas. In the Sahel, three countries are due to hold general elections in 2024 to return to the democratic path. They are Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad. In Mali and Burkina Faso, the situation is almost the same: after two coups d’etat in each case, the resulting military junta expelled from the country the European military missions that were assisting them in the fight against terrorism and moved closer to Russia. Amid sanctions by the international community and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the countries not only postpone the elections (in the case of Mali), but also argue that, given the delicate moment of the fight against jihadist forces, organizing election is not a priority. The last of our Sahelian neighbors is Mauritania, a country with close economic and even sentimental ties to the Canary Islands archipelago. Mauritania is a Sahelian country that differs from its neighbors in that it is not governed by a military junta, but by a democratically elected president. The current ruler, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, came to power in 2019 after elections that were deemed free and transparent by international observers. Ghazouani has pushed for a gradual political opening, releasing political prisoners, allowing the return of exiles, and favoring dialogue with the opposition. However, the country continues to face challenges such as the threat of jihadist terrorism, poverty, slavery, and ethnic discrimination. Its presidential elections are scheduled for June 22. Very soon we will see our Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, visiting the country. Another country facing a key election this year (expected in October) is South Africa. The ruling African National Congress (ANC), the party that succeeded with Mandela in defeating segregationism, faces its biggest challenge since the end of apartheid, as polls suggest it could lose its absolute majority in Parliament for the first time. Some corruption scandals, the economy (inflation, unemployment, or electricity blackouts) and the great inequalities experienced by South African society seem to have questioned the traditionally, calm majority, of the party now led by President Cyril Ramaphosa. Let us not forget that, together with Nigeria, South Africa is the economic engine of the African continent and that, at the global and geopolitical level, it is already a leading player. Its decisive gesture of suing Israel for genocide against the Palestinians at the International Court of Justice has put it in the limelight, positioning it as the voice of the global south at a time when that global south is making a decisive place for itself on our geopolitical map. All this is to explain that we are facing a series of elections in key countries in our neighborhood, with complicated histories and complex contexts that we must keep an eye on. Because this year there are not only elections in the United States. Next door, in Africa, everything that happens also concerns us. Article written by José Segura Clavell, General Director of Casa África, and published on January 26th, 2024 in eldiario.es and on January 27th, 2024 in Kiosco Insular and Canarias7.

No interlocutor for Haiti mission’s international troops. Haiti’s acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry announced he will resign. The timeline for his resignation is still unclear—it depends on the appointment of a transitional presidential council, jointly proposed by the United States, the Caribbean Community, and Henry’s administration. Henry’s announcement comes less than two weeks after he and Kenyan President William Ruto agreed to send 1,000 Kenyan police officers to Haiti as part of a Kenya-led multinational security mission (MSS). The mission’s aim is to support Haiti’s overwhelmed and outgunned national police force, less than 10,000-strong. The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Benin, among others, may join their mission, potentially adding thousands more troops and police officers. And donor nations, including the United States, Canada, Germany, France and Guyana, have pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in support. Yet the response looks to be too late and too little. Kenya’s promise to send officers is still in doubt, as courts have blocked government plans for over six months, and opposition lawmakers may mount a fresh challenge. Donor financial pledges total less than half the UN’s estimated need. And even if the troops arrive, they may not have a functioning government to work with. As the international community dithered, the situation on the ground deteriorated. Gangs now control over 80 percent of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and have attacked police stations, a port, Port-Au-Prince’s international airport, and two prisons, releasing some four thousand inmates. With Henry having agreed to resign—but no new government currently in place—it’s unclear who can play the role of interlocutor for the MSS. Without stability, more Haitians will flee. Already, over 126,000 Haitians have arrived as part of the Biden administration’s new humanitarian parole program that allows them to come and work for two years, outnumbering tens of thousands of Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan migrants that also qualify. Mexico received more than 40,000 Haitian asylum requests in 2023 alone. And more look to join the hundreds of thousands of Haitians living across the Western Hemisphere if the Haitian state fails. Peru’s “pact of the corrupt” is succeeding where Guatemala’s failed without international pressure. Last year in Guatemala, an incongruous coalition of lawmakers from different parties earned the nickname the “pact of the corrupt” as they joined forces to erode the rule of law and overturn election results. Thanks in large part to sustained international pressure, including targeted U.S. sanctions against nearly 300 lawmakers, Guatemala’s “pact” failed to keep President Bernardo Arévalo, an anti-corruption reformer, from taking office. A group of far-right and far-left Peruvian lawmakers is conducting a similar move, passing laws to reduce judicial independence and undermine conditions for free and fair elections. On March 7, Peru’s “pact” fired two of the seven top magistrates from the National Justice Board, which names prosecutors and judges and helps choose election authorities. This could enable lawmakers to influence the selection of election authorities next year in the run-up to Peru’s 2026 general elections by threatening further purges. Last year, a coordinated joint statement from U.S., EU, and Latin American embassies in Peru forced lawmakers to back down from firing the National Justice Board magistrates. But this time around, similar democracy eroding moves triggered less unified international pushback. Senators Tim Kaine and Ben Cardin released statements in defense of the National Justice Board, and the State Department’s global anti-corruption coordinator met with the magistrates before the ouster. That could help explain why Peru’s congress fell short of the votes it needed to suspend more magistrates, including the National Justice Board president. But without more coordination and the threat of targeted sanctions, Peru’s “pact of the corrupt” seems to have won this round. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

President Emmanuel Macron has set his strategy for this year’s European Parliament election. At its heart are pro-Europeanism, support for Ukraine – and an eye to shaping the leadership of EU institutions Populist radical-right parties are expected to win big in the European Parliament election this June, as a major study by the European Council on Foreign Relations found. The results are likely to drive a rightward shift in who runs the EU institutions, including the European Commission. With his party set to come a poor second on current polling, last month President Emmanuel Macron dismissed his prime minister and replaced the government. To show he is not – yet – a lame duck president, he has put himself at the heart of proceedings. The political choice he is presenting to the country is one between himself and the far-right. Unapologetic pro-Europeanism and support for Ukraine are central planks in this offer. And, although this is not the first time he has made the far-right his main target, this time around the president is seeking to do so from the centre-right. This is almost certainly with a view to building the strongest political position to weigh in on the pivotal decisions around who runs the EU institutions, once Europe has voted this summer. Macron matters When the president introduced his new government last month, the scenography of the occasion told its own story: he was seated on a stage with his entire government looking on at him from the side. France’s new government is indeed concentrated more than ever around the person of the president. Many of its members, including the prime minister, Gabriel Attal, owe him their political careers and rose to prominence under his aegis. Those ministers who were seen as insufficiently committed to the president’s agenda – or with whom he disagreed publicly – were shown the door. In many ways, this was a silent admission of failure. After his Renaissance party fell short in the 2022 legislative election, the president tasked the prime minister, Elisabeth Borne, with building coalitions in parliament to get the government’s legislation through. This largely failed, with the government resorting to the “49.3 mechanism” to ram through major legislation such as pensions reform. Last December it even lost control of parliamentary business altogether, to the point where a split Renaissance voted for an immigration law largely framed by the right and far-right. Macron appears to have responded to this bruising experience by making himself the central decision-maker in France, with the prime minister’s role to implement the priorities handed down to him. However, the composition of the government also tells its own story – one that has the next election in view. Macron has reached further into the right of the political spectrum. Out of 11 new ministers, seven previously served in right-wing administrations. And it is not just about personnel: when Attal addressed the National Assembly on 20 January, he expanded on themes that are typically associated with more conservative policymaking, such as underlining the value of work, the importance of accountability, and the need to deregulate. The president appears to be courting what remains of the traditional French right. Targeting the far-right For the coming four months until the election, Macron’s camp is facing an uphill battle against a rising far-right . With 31 per cent in the polls, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National party is racing ahead in voting intentions. (Support for the far-right Reconquête! stands at 7 per cent.) The president’s camp also runs the risk of losing voters to the socialist-ecologist list in the wake of the controversial pensions and immigration votes. As a consequence, Macron is visibly taking on the far-right, denouncing the “incoherence” of its politics – as he has done before, in his two presidential wins and the 2019 European election. “Let’s act, let’s do, let’s change our habits, and demonstrate that we can change things and people’s everyday lives”, Macron hammered home when announcing his priorities for the new government. His prime minister echoed this: “What I want is action, action, action, results, results, results.” The promotion of younger, talented faces is also something that has served Macron well before. At age 34 and 38, both the prime minister and the new foreign minister are the youngest ever to hold their respective offices in the Fifth Republic. And the similarities between Attal and the leader of Rassemblement National, Jordan Bardella, have not gone unnoticed. Both are young, popular, and effective communicators who have often faced off over the years. Unapologetically pro-European The final new-old trick is for the president to place support for the European project at the heart of his political offering. Since his meteoric rise in politics in 2017, support for the European Union has long provided the sharpest contrast with the far-right. For these reasons, the president has lately doubled down on his pro-Europeanism, pushing for EU solutions to domestic policy questions, from immigration, to climate, to energy. Even amid a difficult domestic context, this has been his go-to option: in response to recent nationwide protests by farmers, Macron pointed to the EU’s common agricultural policy and trade policy as ways to remedy the crisis. Again, his new personnel embody the pro-EU – and pro-Ukraine – politics. Foreign minister Stéphane Séjourné has been a member of the European Parliament since 2019, and was leader of the Renew group until his elevation. Séjourné’s appointment signals Macron will maintain his pro-enlargement, pro-Ukraine approach – the surest way for him to appear the clearest choice for those who want to stop the far-right. Séjourné reasserted France’s support for EU enlargement, a position Macron had made clear at the Globsec conference in Bratislava in May 2023. His first trip as a minister was to Ukraine, where he stated that it “is and will remain France’s priority”. He followed this up with a visit to Germany and Poland, affirming France’s interest in the “Weimar format” of close cooperation between Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw. * With populism and the radical right on the rise, centrist parties are in retreat across Europe. Current polling suggests the liberal Renew group in the European Parliament will shrink after the election, reducing its influence over who gets the top EU jobs. If Macron is able to limit the damage – finishing close to Rassemblement National would be enough – without deviating from his pro-European and pro-Ukrainian stances, he will have safeguarded his political standing in Europe. And he will do so just at the moment of prime influence over shaping the EU institutions. Macron’s right-of-centre positioning of his new government would also be compatible with a European Council that will likely tilt right. The coming months in French politics are set to be a bumpy ride. They will reveal whether the president can see off the far-right in more or less the same way as before – or whether offering the same choices with new faces will prove insufficient this time around.

Somalia and Turkey recently announced that they would expand the terms of a defence agreement first signed on 8 February 2024 to include the maritime sector. This came as tensions rose between Somalia and landlocked Ethiopia. Ethiopia is seeking access to the Red Sea through Somaliland, a breakaway state of Somalia. Federico Donelli, an international relations professor whose research covers Red Sea security and politics, puts this defence agreement into context. What’s the scope of the relationship between Turkey and Somalia? Turkey’s entry into Somalia in 2011 started out as a humanitarian partnership but soon turned into a strategic one. Its support since has been economic and infrastructural and has increasingly included the military. The Turkish government saw Somalia’s failed statehood and the lack of other major international stakeholders as an opportunity to increase its popularity across Africa. Turkey aimed to: - gain international visibility - test its ability to intervene in conflict and post-conflict scenarios - increase market diversification into east Africa - cultivate its image as a benevolent Muslim middle power by promoting Islamic solidarity. Several Turkish faith-based associations and NGOs already active in Africa became directly involved in development and relief projects. Major national brands, such as Turkish Airlines, promoted campaigns to raise funds for Somalia. Within a few years, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was portrayed by the government and perceived by the Turkish public as a domestic issue. Turkey’s early efforts to bring Somalia back to the table of the international community were successful. With the reopening of Mogadishu’s port and airport in 2014, both managed by Turkish companies, the economic situation in Somalia improved compared to the previous decade. Turkish political elites began to present their involvement in Somalia as a success story. This is despite some remaining critical problems, including failing to root out the terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab. Turkey took responsibility for training the Somali National Army in partnership with other stakeholders, including the European Union and the United States. It opened a military base in Mogadishu in 2017. The base trains one of the army’s elite units, the Gorgor Brigades, and serves as a Turkish military outpost in the region. Al-Shabaab’s persistence has convinced Turkey that it needs to provide more active military support for Somalia’s development. Ankara also wants to protect its economic and political investments in Somalia. Finally, behind the Turkish deal with Somalia is the politics around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato). Over the past 12 months, Turkey has moved closer to the United States. It’s positioned itself as an effective ally in Africa to counteract the negative effects of France’s withdrawal – such as the increasing influence of Russia. Turkey’s commitment to Somalia follows its efforts in Libya. In both cases, Turkey has proven willing to take on the security burden that other Nato members, particularly Italy, have refused to meet. Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is, therefore, part of a broader foreign policy strategy to gain more autonomy in global politics. Increased relevance within Nato would help achieve this. What’s the context of the maritime defence pact between Turkey and Somalia? Turkey and Somalia began working on an agreement between November 2023 and January 2024. Turkey agreed to train and equip Somalia’s naval force and help patrol the country’s 3,333km coastline. Turkey’s defence sector has had increasing influence in Ankara’s foreign policy decisions. Turkey sees itself as an exporter of defence industry products, and as a partner in training special forces and police. African countries are among the main targets for the Turkish defence sector. Somalia, therefore, provides an opportunity to spread more Turkish production and items. In 2022, Turkey became, along with the United States, the main backer of a new offensive against Al-Shabaab. It provided logistical support to the Gorgor forces and air cover to the national army. This cooperation has led to the 10-year defence agreement, including maritime security, signed in February 2024. Turkey and Somalia have been working on the accord for some time, but recent regional events have undoubtedly affected the announcement’s timing. An Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding in January 2024 is one such event. Turkey has good relations with Somaliland, but considers the territorial integrity of Somalia to be essential for its stability. At the same time, the Horn of Africa’s political dynamics are shifting. Mounting tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia have led to new coalitions involving regional and extra-regional players. It’s important not to oversimplify, but two factions are emerging. On one side are Ethiopia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the other are Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. At first, Turkey sought to mediate between the factions to defuse tensions. But its agreement with Somalia reduces Turkey’s room for manoeuvre. Although the relationship with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed appears to be unaffected, there could be negative repercussions, especially for the many Turkish economic interests in Ethiopia. What is the UAE factor? When it comes to the Horn of Africa, the UAE plays a pivotal role. Turkey and Somalia each have a relationship with the Emirates. From 2014 to 2020, Turkey engaged in bitter rivalry with the Emirates in the wider Red Sea area. This was driven by the two countries’ different visions for the region’s future. Relations improved from 2020. During the 2020-2022 war in Tigray, both Turkey and the UAE supported the Ethiopian government. But recent developments in the Horn of Africa, such as the UAE-backed Ethiopia-Somaliland deal, threaten to create new friction between Turkey and the Emirates. Turkey doesn’t have the political will or material capacity to sustain this. In the past three years, the UAE has supported the Turkish economy with direct investment, changing the balance of the relationship. The situation is similar for Somalia. From a commercial and security perspective, the Emirates is important in Somalia. The UAE manages two key Somali ports – Berbera and Bosaso. It’s also moving to take over Kismayo. And the Emirates has been one of Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s principal backers. It would be risky for the Somali president to break ties with Abu Dhabi. What happens next? There is still much uncertainty about how the Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding and the Turkey-Somalia defence cooperation agreements will be put into practice. What’s clear is that both the UAE and Turkey are becoming more active and influential in the region. And that African dynamics within and between states are closely intertwined with regional and global trends.

In retrospect, there was perhaps nothing surprising about Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. Vladimir Putin’s intentions were, after all, hiding in plain sight and signaled in the months running up to the incursion. What could not be foreseen, however, is where the conflict finds itself now. Heading into its third year, the war has become bogged down: Neither is it a stalemate, nor does it look like either side could make dramatic advances any time soon. Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, having secured the latest major battlefield victory, but Ukrainian fighters have exceeded military expectations with their doggedness in the past, and may do so again. But as a foreign policy expert and former journalist who spent many years covering Russia, I share the view of those who argue that the conflict is potentially at a pivotal point: If Washington does not continue to fully support President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military, then Ukraine’s very survival could be at risk. I believe it would also jeopardize America’s leadership in the world and global security. How the conflict develops during the rest of 2024 will depend on many factors, but three may be key: supplies, information and political will. The supplies race Russia and Ukraine are locked in a race to resupply its war resources – not just in terms of soldiers, but also ammunition and missiles. Both sides are desperately trying to shore up the number of soldiers it can deploy. In December 2023, Putin ordered his generals to increase troop numbers by nearly 170,000, taking the total number of soldiers to 1.32 million. Meanwhile, Ukraine is said to be looking at plans to increase its military by 500,000 troops. Of course, here, Russia has the advantage of being able to draw on a population more than three times that of Ukraine. Also, whereas Putin can simply order up more troops, Zelenskyy must get measures approved through parliament. Aside from personnel, there is also the need for a steady supply of weapons and ammunition – and there have been reports that both sides are struggling to maintain sufficient levels. Russia appears particularly eager to boost its number of ballistic missiles, as they are better equipped for countering Ukraine air defense systems despite being slower than cruise missiles. Increasingly, Moscow appears to be looking to North Korea and Iran as suppliers. After Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, visited Russia in 2023, the U.S. accused Pyongyang of supplying Russia with ballistic missiles. Iran, meanwhile, has delivered to Russia a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and drones. Ukraine, meanwhile, is dependent on foreign military equipment. Supplies were stronger at the beginning of the war, but since then, Ukraine’s military has suffered from the slow, bureaucratic nature of NATO and U.S. deliveries. It wasn’t, for example, until the summer of 2023 that the U.S. approved Europe’s request to provide F-16s to Ukraine. Ukraine needs more of everything, including air defense munitions, artillery shells, tanks and missile systems. It is also running short of medical supplies and has seen hospital shortages of drugs at a time when rampant infections are proving resistant to antibiotics. Perhaps the biggest factor that remains in Russia’s favor when it comes to supplies is the onerous restrictions placed on Ukraine from the West, limiting its ability to attack Russian territory with U.S. or NATO equipment to avoid a wider war. For example, the Ukrainian military had a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System with a 50-mile range that could hit targets inside Russia, but it modified the range to keep the U.S. military satisfied that it would not cross a Russian red line. If this policy could be relaxed, that might be a game changer for Ukraine, although it would raise the stakes for the U.S. The information war The Ukraine conflict is also a war of messaging. To this end, Putin uses propaganda to bolster support for the campaign at home, while undermining support for Ukraine elsewhere – for example, by planting stories in Europe that cause disenchantment with the war. One outrageous claim in the early weeks of the war was that Zelenskyy had taken his own life. The rumor came from pro-Russia online operatives as part of an aggressive effort to harm Ukrainian morale, according to cybersecurity firm Mandiant. More recently, in France, stories appeared that questioned the value of assistance to Ukraine and reminded the public of the negative impact of Russian sanctions on the French. Stirring dissent in this way is a classic Putin play to raise doubts. And investigative reporting points toward a disinformation network being run out of the Kremlin, which includes social media bots deployed on Ukrainian sites spreading stories of Zelenskyy’s team being corrupt and warning that the war would go badly. Given that Putin controls the Russian media and is quick to crack down on dissent, it is hard to really know what Russians think. But one reputable polling agency recently reported strong support in Russia for both Putin and the war in Ukraine. Ukrainians, too, still support the fight against Russia, polling shows. But some war fatigue has no doubt lowered morale. There are other signs of domestic strain in Ukraine. At the end of 2023, tensions grew between Zelenskyy and his top military commander, General Valery Zaluzhny who had complained about weaponry. Zelenskyy ended up firing the military chief, risking political backlash and underscoring that not all is well in the top chain of command. Should disunity and war fatigue continue into the war’s third year, it could serious impair Ukraine’s ability to fight back against a resurgent Russian offensive. The politics of conflict But it isn’t just domestic politics in Ukraine and Russia that will decide the outcome of the war. U.S. politics and European unity could be a factor in 2024 in determining the future of this conflict. In the U.S., Ukraine aid has become politicized – with aid to Ukraine becoming an increasingly partisan issue. In early February, the Senate finally passed an emergency aid bill for Ukraine and Israel that would see US$60.1 billion go to Kyiv. But the bill’s fate in the House is unknown. And the looming 2024 presidential elections could complicate matters further. Former president Donald Trump has made no secret of his aversion to aid packages over loans, calling them “stupid,” and has long argued that Americans shouldn’t be footing the bill for the conflict. Recently, he has made bombastic statements about NATO and threatened not to adhere to the alliance’s commitment to protect members if they were attacked by Russia. And uncertainty about American assistance could leave Europe carrying more of the financial load. European Union members have had to absorb the majority of the 6.3 million Ukrainians who have fled the country since the beginning of the conflict. And that puts a strain on resources. European oil needs also suffer from the sanctions against Russian companies. Whether these potential war determinants – supplies, information and politics – mean that the Ukraine war will not be entering a fourth year in 12 months time, however, is far from certain. In fact, one thing that does appear clear is that the war that some predicted would be over in weeks looks set to continue for some time still.