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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. 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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Social media manipulation, rural discontent and mainstream complacency: Romania’s cancelled elections offer a stark warning for Europe’s democracies E lections are rarely straightforward, especially in high-stakes environments — and particularly in Romania. The EU member state at the Black Sea, which shares the longest border with Ukraine and, until now, has been a staunch US ally and trusted NATO member, now faces profound political uncertainty following the abrupt cancellation of its presidential elections last Friday. The elections were halted after intelligence services revealed interference in the electoral process by a ‘state actor’, widely presumed to be Russia, aimed at favouring an unexpected far-right candidate. The Constitutional Court intervened, ordering a complete restart of the electoral process. Proceeding with the second round under these circumstances would have effectively turned it into a de facto hidden referendum on Romania’s pro-Western orientation. However, the crisis is far from resolved. The electoral turmoil has left Romania’s democratic mainstream fragmented and facing difficult choices. Stabilising the economy, reducing the fallout from the political crisis and forming a functional parliamentary majority are critical tasks. The Romanian case offers crucial takeaways for other European nations, particularly regarding the disruptive role of social media platforms like TikTok in democratic elections. Curbing Russia’s hybrid warfare capabilities, which exploit these platforms to stoke public anxieties and deepen political divisions, requires swift and coordinated action at the European level. A far-right surge nobody saw coming Romania’s presidential and parliamentary elections were supposed to be held in succession between 24 November and 8 December, with the parliamentary elections sandwiched between the two rounds of the presidential election. The sudden rise of the independent candidate Călin Georgescu, until recently a fringe figure, as a serious contender in the first round of the presidential election triggered a far-right surge. The parliamentary election results that followed one week later revealed the fragility of the democratic mainstream against the radical right, which nobody could have predicted mere weeks ago. Georgescu’s unexpected victory in the first presidential round dealt a heavy blow to Romania’s traditional parties, the Social Democrats (PSD) and the centre-right National Liberals (PNL), which have formed the governing coalition since 2021. Not only were their candidates – Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu (PSD) and Senate Chairman Nicolae Ciucă (PNL) – both surpassed by Georgescu. But the parties themselves each lost almost 10 per cent compared to previous elections. The Social Democrats recorded their worst performance in history, securing 22 per cent of the vote and 123 mandates (down from 157). Although they remain Romania’s largest political force, their ability to form a stable majority is now in question. Meanwhile, the National Liberals lost half their seats, securing only 72 mandates. The other centre-right party, Save Romania Union (USR), fared no better, dropping from 90 to 59 mandates, in spite of their candidate, Elena Lasconi, entering into the presidential runoff with Georgescu. This is in stark contrast to the gains made by the radical right. The Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) surged into second place with 18 per cent of the vote, while two other smaller far-right parties – SOS Romania and the Party of Young People (POT) – crossed the five per cent threshold for the first time. Together, radical right-wing factions now control almost 35 per cent of the new legislature. Who is the far-right candidate who has upended Romania’s politics? A 62-year-old self-proclaimed expert on sustainable development, Călin Georgescu has ties to the ultra-religious, ultra-nationalist movement that also propelled AUR into parliament in 2020. His relationship with AUR, however, was short-lived, as some of Georgescu’s controversial statements proved too extreme even for this party. Dubbed ‘Kremlin Georgescu’ by some because of his Putin-friendly stance, he is no longer tethered to a single party — a factor that many believe has been crucial to his success in a country where trust in political parties is historically low. His blunt position on party politics is summed up in a short sentence: ‘Political parties are bankrupt’, he concluded after the parliamentary elections of 1 December. His statement echoes another rant from April this year when he emphatically declared that ‘Political parties are nags for the golden chariot of the Romanian people. There will be no more political parties in this country. None!’ When questioned about this, Georgescu retorted that he had merely quoted from a Romanian philosopher, Petre Țuțea, a former member of the Iron Guard, a fascist, ultra-nationalist organisation during Romania’s inter-war period. Țuțea’s exact quote, however, would send shivers down anyone’s spine: ‘Political parties are horses for the golden chariot of Romanian history; when they become nags, the Romanian people send them to the slaughterhouse.’ It’s all about the support for Ukraine Georgescu didn’t just reject party politics, he also questioned the core pillars of Romania’s foreign policy — its membership of NATO and the EU, and the US security umbrella. In Georgescu’s view, NATO is ineffective as a defensive alliance. He recently described the Deveselu Aegis Ashore anti-missile defence system, which Romania has been hosting since 2015, as a ‘disgrace to diplomacy’. While other presidential candidates reaffirmed Romania’s commitment to Ukraine, Georgescu campaigned on the promise of pursuing ‘peace’ through rapprochement with Russia, a move that aligns with his praise of ‘Russian wisdom’ in foreign policy. His position resonated with voters increasingly anxious about the war’s economic and security implications. Romania, which shares a long border with Ukraine, has felt the effects of the conflict through rising energy prices, an influx of refugees and trade disruptions. Public sentiment has shifted in recent months, influenced in part by debates in US politics about ending the war in Ukraine. Georgescu’s populist rhetoric, bolstered by the re-election of Donald Trump, helped him capitalise on these war-related anxieties and positioned him as a challenger to the status quo. Georgescu’s surprising rise reflects deep societal divisions in Romania and growing disenchantment with the political and economic establishment. His support is concentrated among voters in rural and economically disadvantaged regions, areas that have long felt neglected by post-communist reforms. A 2021 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) study described these regions as ‘rural and old industrial areas with significant socio-economic challenges’, where many residents experienced the transition to democracy and capitalism as a period of frustration, humiliation and injustice. Georgescu’s platform, ‘Food, Water, Energy’, resonated with voters in these areas. The programme proposes policies at odds with EU norms, including nationalisation and preferential taxation for local businesses. These ideas appealed to small farmers and business owners struggling with rising production costs and competition from cheap Ukrainian grain imports. EU environmental regulations, perceived as burdensome, further fuelled discontent. Protests by Romanian farmers earlier this year, blocking border crossings with Ukraine and Moldova, highlighted these grievances. His rhetoric also struck a chord with Romanians working abroad, many of whom feel abandoned by the state. For decades, urban centres have benefited disproportionately from EU funding and foreign investment, leaving the peripheries to fend for themselves. Georgescu positioned himself as the champion of the forgotten majority, offering a voice to those who felt excluded from Romania’s post-communist success story. A TikTok made Manchurian candidate TikTok proved to be the ‘secret weapon’ that catapulted Georgescu into the political spotlight. Just weeks before the elections, he was virtually unknown to the public, but his discreet TikTok campaign rapidly expanded his reach within days. Declassified documents from Romania’s intelligence services reveal that Georgescu’s TikTok network spanned 25 000 accounts and allegedly received substantial support from a ‘state actor’. Notably, around 800 of these accounts, initially created as early as 2016, remained largely dormant until two weeks before the elections. This highlights the alarming vulnerability of modern politics to manipulation via social media platforms. TikTok’s popularity in Romania – 47 per cent of the population has an account – has made the platform a powerful tool. By contrast, only 36 per cent of people in France and less than 27 per cent in Germany have an account on TikTok. Among voters aged 18-24, who predominantly use this platform, Georgescu secured 30 per cent of the vote, far outpacing his support among older demographics. This is the age group that, according to a recent FES Youth Study, declares the highest fear of violence and war (56 per cent), sees corruption as the main problem for Romania (72 per cent) and agrees with the statement that it would be good for Romania to have a strong leader who doesn’t care much about the parliament and elections (41 per cent). This is, however, only a small part of the picture. While social media played a role in Georgescu’s success, allowing him to rise from obscurity, the rest has to do with a combination of factors that culminated in a cascade of failures and bad decisions of the mainstream parties. The inability of Romania’s mainstream political parties to acknowledge and address the fears, anxieties, and grievances of the electorate alienated many voters. Amid rising concerns about an impending economic downturn and the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, the political class appeared detached from reality. Although the grand coalition remained in government, the Social Democrats and National Liberals devoted much of the electoral campaign to petty controversies and fruitless disputes, failing to engage with issues that mattered to voters. This relentless squabbling overshadowed any opportunity to highlight the government’s notable achievements, which were far from insignificant. These included massive progress on infrastructure projects on a scale unprecedented in the past two decades, Romania’s inclusion in the US Visa Waiver Program and a landmark breakthrough toward full Schengen accession. Adding to this, the lacklustre presidential candidates fielded by the mainstream parties compounded voter frustration and drove many to seek alternatives. The Social Democrats’ overconfidence resulted in sloppy campaign planning and a narrow focus on a single strategy that hinged on their candidate, Marcel Ciolacu, facing far-right AUR candidate George Simion in the presidential runoff. This strategy was decisively upended by Georgescu’s unexpected surge. Moreover, the PSD’s ‘accommodationist stance’ toward AUR – rooted in the party’s preference for transactional, give-and-take politics – contributed to the normalisation of far-right narratives centred on ethnic nationalism and Christian conservatism. This approach not only weakened the democratic mainstream but also provided fertile ground for the radical right to gain legitimacy and momentum. As Romania grapples with its largest budget deficit in years and faces mounting political uncertainty, the ability of democratic forces to regroup and form a stable majority will be critical in the weeks to come. So far, all parties from the democratic mainstream, Social Democrats included, have signalled that they understand how important it is to form a stable majority. Failure to do so risks further empowering extremist forces and destabilising the nation’s pro-European trajectory.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The victory of the “non-systemic” Donald Trump in the presidential election this time may not have been a surprise, but, as in 2016, it leaves no one indifferent. The world can be roughly divided into those who welcome the Republican's success and those who see the election results as bad news.   The first group includes the leadership of Israel, Georgia, Hungary, and Slovakia. The second group comprises Ukraine, Germany, France, China, and Iran. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan falls into the jubilant camp—he places high hopes on bilateral relations and joint solutions to global crises.  Does R. T. Erdoğan have grounds for optimism? “Chemistry” and Non-Interference in Internal Affairs Looking back at Donald Trump’s previous four years in office, it becomes clear that the results for Turkey were ambiguous. On the one hand, a personal chemistry developed between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald Trump — the American leader has a natural affinity for strong leaders, as Angela Merkel recently noted in her book.   Even as a presidential candidate, Trump praised Erdoğan in an interview with The New York Times for successfully suppressing the attempted coup. In the same interview, given a week after the failed coup attempt, Trump suggested that the U.S., not being a model of democracy itself, has no right to demand Ankara adheres to civil liberties. Furthermore, he indicated that he would not prioritize ideological issues in relations with a NATO ally. Overall, Donald Trump largely fulfilled his campaign promises. The White House refrained from emphasizing human rights issues or openly supporting the opposition — despite having plenty of reasons to do so. During Trump’s first term, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan cracked down on the organizers of the coup attempt and conducted mass purges within the military, law enforcement, judiciary, and education systems. He also arrested Kurdish politicians, including the founder of the Peoples' Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtaş, and consolidated his power by transitioning from a parliamentary to a presidential system.At the time, the U.S. liberal press was particularly concerned that Trump was “ignoring Mr. Erdoğan's authoritarian repression of his own people”. Four months after Donald Trump's inauguration, he welcomed his Turkish counterpart to the Oval Office and acknowledged Turkey's efforts in the fight against ISIS (a terrorist organization banned in Russia). Shortly thereafter, in August 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces launched Operation Euphrates Shield to clear the Syrian city of Al-Bab of terrorists. Under Donald Trump, Ankara-Washington relations had their contentious issues, but many of them were largely inherited from Barack Obama's administration. The attempted coup in Turkey occurred during the Democratic administration in the U.S., and none of the Western leaders, except the British Prime Minister, condemned the coup. It was under Obama that Turkish-American relations entered a genuine crisis.   Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began turning away from NATO and the EU, strengthening ties with Russia by negotiating the Turkish Stream pipeline, purchasing S-400 missile systems, and constructing the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. At the same time, the Obama administration refused to extradite preacher Fethullah Gülen, whom the Turkish leadership considers the mastermind behind the coup attempt. The Apple of Discord — Syria   The primary, though not the only, sticking point between Trump and Turkey was Syria. On one hand, U.S. support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the fight against ISIS began under Barack Obama, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized him for supporting terrorism. However, under Donald Trump, the U.S. continued supplying weapons to the YPG, which became part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under Pentagon patronage.  At the same time, Trump welcomed Turkey's fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), even though Ankara views the YPG as the PKK’s Syrian offshoot. In November 2017, however, the White House announced it would halt arms supplies to the Kurdish militias. The logic was that ISIS had been defeated, and the U.S. needed to focus on resolving the Syrian conflict and containing Iran. To achieve these goals, allies were essential, and Turkey, as a long-standing NATO member with the region’s most powerful army, clearly outweighed the YPG in strategic importance. Under Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had the opportunity to address the negative legacy of Barack Obama in Syria. In 2018, he launched Operation Olive Branch, seizing control of the Kurdish canton of Afrin alongside the Syrian armed opposition. In October 2019, Turkey conducted Operation Peace Spring.  Before its commencement, Turkey hoped that the U.S. would facilitate the withdrawal of Kurdish forces to the southern part of the country. Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Erdoğan warned that if the Pentagon failed to achieve this, the Turkish Armed Forces would unilaterally establish a so-called “safe zone” along the Turkish border. This zone would involve pushing out the YPG and their political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). On October 7, two days before the operation, Trump applied pressure on Turkey, threatening to “destroy and obliterate” its economy. Ultimately, Turkey carried out its operation. While the U.S. did not officially approve it, they withdrew their troops from the combat zones. On October 17, the U.S. and Turkey reached an agreement to pause the operation, allowing Kurdish forces to leave a 30-kilometer zone in northern Syria.   Details of the conflict resolution were finalized on October 22, when Erdoğan and Putin signed a memorandum in Sochi. According to the agreement, YPG members were required to withdraw 32 kilometers south from the entire Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey, along with the Syrian armed opposition, maintained control over the areas it had captured, stretching from Tel Abyad to Ras al-Ayn.  Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey agreed to conduct joint patrols in territories cleared of YPG, extending “up to 10 kilometers from the border to the west and east of the Peace Spring operation zone, excluding the city of Qamishli”. Relations between the American and Turkish presidents were further strained by Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems. Under Donald Trump, Turkey was removed from the F-35 fighter jet development program as punishment for the deal.   Another point of contention arose in July 2018, when Trump threatened Turkey with “major sanctions” over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson. Erdoğan suggested exchanging Brunson, who was accused of ties to Gülenists, for Fethullah Gülen.   In the end, Brunson was released in October the following year, but Ankara made it clear that the court’s decision was not a result of Trump’s pressure but rather an independent ruling by a democratic state. Donald Trump’s Pragmatism  Despite points of divergence inherited from Barack Obama and new conflicts that emerged, Donald Trump consistently sought to remain pragmatic. He acted from a position of strength, but avoided alienating his partner.  On October 15, Trump imposed 50% tariffs on Turkish steel, and just two days later, he called Erdoğan a “hell of a leader” and thanked him for halting military actions in Syria.   Toward the end of his term, Trump attempted to ease tensions with Turkey. During a White House meeting on November 13, 2019, he openly admitted to being a “big fan” of the Turkish leader, describing their relationship as “wonderful”. In return, Erdoğan referred to the Republican president as a “dear friend”.   At the same meeting, Trump expressed hope to resolve disagreements over the S-400 and F-35 issues “through dialogue”. What Are the Expectations?  Donald Trump’s first term left a lasting impression on Turkish society. The Republican’s threats in 2018 triggered the first collapse of the lira, and now, with Turkey’s economy in deep crisis, similar incidents are even more dangerous.  Economist Fatih Ozatay fears that a new trade war initiated by Trump could provoke retaliatory actions from other players, including China. A reduction in global trade volumes would impact Turkey’s economy by shrinking its export opportunities and further increasing pressure on the lira. Optimism from Turkish Leadership The Turkish leadership remains optimistic. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was among the first world leaders to congratulate the Republican on his return to the Oval Office. As soon as the U.S. election results were announced, Erdoğan posted on the social media platform “X”: “Congratulations to my friend Donald Trump, who won the U.S. presidential election after a hard-fought battle and was re-elected as president”. The following day, Erdoğan called Trump, expressing hope for future cooperation. An invitation for Trump to visit Turkey has already been sent. Peace in Ukraine Turkey has invested significant effort into resolving the Ukrainian conflict. Notably, the first and only successful attempt at addressing the conflict was made in Istanbul in March 2022. Turkey also acted as a mediator in the “grain deal”, the exchange of Ukrainian and Russian prisoners, and the largest prisoner swap between Russia and the West since the Cold War.   Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned that the war in Ukraine is heading either toward a frozen conflict or escalating into a global war. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly criticized the West for escalating the conflict. He recently described the decision to approve long-range strikes as “fueling the war” by Joe Biden.   “You won't achieve anything by following the principle 'after us the deluge'” Erdoğan cautioned. The Turkish leadership understands that no matter how much Erdoğan attempts to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow, all efforts will come to nothing without a shift in the White House’s stance. Under Joe Biden, Ankara grew disillusioned with the West’s willingness to negotiate, but with Donald Trump, things could change.  “If we see that the U.S. administration under Donald Trump approaches this issue from a settlement perspective, we can easily bring this war to an end”, Erdoğan stated. He emphasized that Turkey remains committed to pursuing peace, and if Trump’s peace-oriented rhetoric becomes reality, the chances of success will significantly increase. Gaza – Under Question, Hope for Syria When it comes to the Middle East, the main “issues” remain Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. In Lebanon, peace was achieved at the end of November — Joe Biden secured a ceasefire. The current head of the White House has promised to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well, but so far, no progress has been observed. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan believes that under Donald Trump, the Middle East could see “lasting peace and stability”, with the Republican exerting “significant influence on the political and military balance” in the region. Trump's skills as a businessman to impose his will and negotiate could lead to agreements. It is worth recalling that the Abraham Accords — Israel's agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco — were reached under his administration, and for Palestine, he developed the “Deal of the Century”. At the same time, Turkey understands Donald Trump and his team have a pro-Israel stance — this is evident from his previous decisions regarding Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the nuclear deal. In the new administration, Secretary of State Mark Rubio aims to eliminate Hamas rather than negotiate with it. The future Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, an evangelical, considers the construction of the Third Jewish Temple on the site of one of Islam's holiest sites, the Dome of the Rock, to be acceptable. Hakan Fidan highlighted Trump’s pro-Israel team at the end of November: “If you look at [Trump’s] cabinet, it signals that his pro-Israel team will support all of Netanyahu's expansionist ambitions. However, if we rely on Trump's own words, 'I did not come to start new wars but to end them,' we might see an opposing trend. We will observe how these two contradictory signals balance with each other and how this will impact the region soon”. In an earlier statement, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested to the newly elected U.S. President that halting arms supplies to Israel would help resolve the situation in the region. However, it is unlikely that this request will be heeded, especially considering that even Joe Biden, who has been critical of Benjamin Netanyahu, did not dare to take such a step. Cooperation in Syria appears more realistic for Ankara, albeit with reservations. Speaking at the COP29 conference in Baku, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again stated that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) might resume fighting against Kurdish militias in Syria and complete Operation “Peace Spring”, advancing both westward and eastward from already controlled territories.  In his “analysis of Trump”, Hakan Fidan expressed hope that Trump would withdraw 800 American soldiers from all of northeastern Syria, which would enable the TAF to carry out the operation. However, the minister expressed doubts that President Trump would agree to such a step immediately: “My impression of Donald Trump is this: despite his statements on various issues, he tends to postpone decisions on critical matters”. “A Trusted Ally” in the White House  While the situation with Israel is relatively clear—Donald Trump is surrounded by anti-Iran and anti-Palestinian hawks—Turkey has fewer allies in the new administration. One notable exception is political strategist Susie Wiles, who will serve as the Chief of Staff at the White House. Wiles is a veteran of politics and a trusted adviser to Trump, having worked on his presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2020. She has strong ties to lobbying networks and a deep understanding of the president's interests.   Wiles has extensive experience working with prominent lobbyist Brian Ballard, who represented Turkey's interests in Washington. A key moment in this relationship was the 2017 meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Brian Ballard, which advanced the lobbying of Turkish business interests in the United States. Susie Wiles, leveraging her connections and influence, successfully conveyed Turkey's priorities to Donald Trump and his administration, resulting in significant actions — such as attempts to close legal cases against the Turkish bank Halkbank, whose executives were accused of illegally transferring billions of dollars to Iran. Wiles' ties to Brian Ballard suggest that she will continue to advocate for Turkey's interests in her new role, particularly in the context of strategic trade between the two countries. The political strategist's influence could potentially soften the “America First” stance when it comes to Turkey, possibly leading to compromises in areas like Syria. For the finalization of Operation “Peace Spring”, Ankara requires a “green light” from the U.S., which currently backs the YPG. Wiles' position may play a pivotal role in facilitating this agreement. Optimism for the Future? The Erdoğan administration's hopes for improved relations with the U.S. under Donald Trump are not solely based on prior positive experiences with him and his encouraging statements on various issues. Turkish leadership had a highly unpleasant experience interacting with Joe Biden's team. Early in his presidency, Biden officially recognized the mass deaths of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. His administration exerted pressure on Turkey over its stance on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and anti-Russian sanctions, even imposing sanctions on Turkish companies.   The State Department and the White House frequently criticized Turkish authorities for human rights violations and the erosion of democratic principles in the country, almost openly supporting the opposition bloc during the 2023 presidential elections. Additionally, largely due to Pentagon opposition, Turkey refrained from completing its operation in Syria. Just days before Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's meeting in 2019, the House of Representatives approved sanctions against Turkey for its military operation in Syria. While many issues during Trump’s previous presidency could be attributed to an anti-presidential Congress, this time, the Republican president will face fewer restraining mechanisms, as his party dominates both the Senate and the House of Representatives.   It is also worth noting that the anti-Turkish Armenian and Greek lobbies wield greater influence over the Democratic Party than over the Republicans. Donald Trump's pragmatism, combined with his support from Congress and the presence of a “trusted ally” within his administration, provides grounds for improving Turkish-American relations. However, systemic issues between the two countries remain, imposing limitations even on a “dear friend” like Trump.  Turkey continues to diversify its foreign policy. Ankara is unwilling to sacrifice key economic, energy, and infrastructure projects with Russia and China as it integrates into the SCO and BRICS. The Syrian case could become a factor of either convergence or antagonism, particularly if Trump refuses to compromise on the Kurdish issue.  At the same time, potential escalation in Idlib, which could hinder normalization between Damascus and Ankara, would enhance U.S. influence in Turkish politics. Lastly, if Trump fails to bring peace to Palestine, Turkey is likely to intensify its policies and rhetoric against Israel, further straining relations with the newly elected president.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The French president appoints veteran centrist François Bayrou as prime minister after Bayrou threatened to withdraw his party from the presidential coalition. Strong with the weak and weak with those at his own level — quite small, in fact. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, displayed this behavior on Friday at the start of a new chapter in the endless decline of his presidency. The head of state, who in the past acted ruthlessly against union protests (2023) and the Yellow Vest Revolt (2018), gave in to the pressures of veteran centrist François Bayrou. The leader of the MoDem Party managed to impose himself as head of the Executive against Macron's initial intentions. It was a morning worthy of an episode of the series ‘Baron Noir’. A true reflection of the agony of the presidential model of the Fifth Republic. Nine days after the successful motion of no confidence against the conservative government of Michel Barnier, the Élysée announced that the appointment would take place on Friday morning. The president had already missed his initial deadline to make the appointment by Thursday night, and prolonging the uncertainty would have further heightened the sense of ridicule. On the same Friday, at five in the morning, Macron called Bayrou, whose name had been at the top of all predictions to replace the former European Brexit negotiator, and told him he would not be chosen, according to the TF1 network. That call led to a heated meeting of nearly two hours at the presidential headquarters. During the meeting, Bayrou threatened Macron with withdrawing his party's (MoDem) deputies from the presidential coalition if he was not chosen as prime minister. “I joined you to do great things, not small ones. (…) It’s simple: if you don’t appoint me, I will withdraw my people”, warned the three-time presidential candidate (2002, 2007, and 2012), according to ‘Le Monde’. Such a move would have dealt a severe blow to an already weakened Macronism, which holds only 164 deputies (out of 577) and represents the second-largest bloc in the National Assembly, behind the left (192). Macron gave in at the end of a tumultuous morning. Instead of his preferred choices when he woke up that day — Sébastien Lecornu (Defense Minister) or Roland Lescure (former Industry Minister) — he opted for the 73-years-old Bayrou. Interestingly, the French head of state, who arrived at the Élysée in 2017 promising to revitalize the Fifth Republic, has now moved from appointing the oldest prime minister in that regime's history (Barnier) to another of the same age. Both are career politicians with 40-year trajectories. And with the added complication in the case of the newly appointed Prime Minister, who is burdened by a corruption case set to be retried on appeal in 2025. Less neoliberal than Macron "I don't think Macron is thrilled about facing the final stretch of his presidency with a prime minister like Bayrou, who has a tough and complicated character," explains political scientist Virginie Martin about the mayor of Pau, a town of 80,000 inhabitants in southwestern France. His appointment as head of the executive reflects, on one hand, the internal tensions within Macronism, which is clearly in decline. On the other hand, it shows the president's stubbornness in retaining control of the government rather than accepting an opening of the Executive towards the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP), which narrowly won the snap elections on July 7. Although Macronism obtained less than 15% of the votes in the European elections and came third in the first round of the legislative elections with 20%, it does not relinquish power. It takes advantage of parliamentary fragmentation into three nearly irreconcilable blocs (the left, Macronist center-right, and the far-right) and the extensive powers granted to the president by the Constitution. “It seems incomprehensible to me from an electoral standpoint,” criticized Marine Tondelier, secretary-general of the Greens, regarding the appointment of one of Macron’s earliest significant allies. The current president and the leader of MoDem joined their political paths in February 2017. At that time, they reached an agreement that led to Bayrou’s withdrawal from that year’s presidential campaign, which proved key to Macron’s victory in May. Just a few weeks before that pact, the veteran leader had made harsh remarks about his future ally: “It won’t work (…), because the French will see what’s behind this hologram. There is an attempt by financial powers that are no longer satisfied with economic control but also want political power.” Since then, relations between the two have never been entirely smooth. As he did again this Friday, Bayrou has repeatedly threatened to withdraw MoDem from the presidential coalition, which also includes Macron’s party, ‘Renaissance’, and Horizons. “He is an heir to the Christian democratic tradition. He is neither a Thatcherite liberal nor an anarcho-liberal — in the pure style of Javier Milei,” explains political scientist Jean Petaux regarding the main ideological difference between Bayrou and Macron, whose political DNA is more influenced by neoliberal ideas. Budgets defined by austerity "I am aware of the Himalaya we have before us," Bayrou stated on Friday afternoon during his inauguration ceremony at Matignon. He was referring to France's delicate financial situation, as the country is set to close the year with a public deficit exceeding 6%, more typical of a period of severe crisis. His first test will be the drafting and adopting the 2025 budget law. As Barnier previously attempted, the newly appointed prime minister will likely try to address the deficit with budgets marked by harsh austerity — his predecessor had planned a €40 billion cut in public spending. He may attempt to soften this by introducing some form of special tax on the wealthiest. The former Brexit negotiator “had already proposed a temporary tax on the windfall profits of large corporations. During the parliamentary debate, the left and Bayrou’s party deputies agreed to approve an amendment proposing that this tax be applied for more than two years,” recalls Petaux. The traditional right-wing party, ‘Les Républicains’ (LR), will likely support the approval of the public budget. Despite his strained relationship with former President Nicolás Sarkozy, who still holds some influence over LR, Bayrou may convince the post-Gaullist party to remain in the government, which it joined in September under Barnier. Key figures in the current government — Sarkozy ally Rachida Dati (Culture), conservative Catherine Vautrin (Territories), and the xenophobic Bruno Retailleau (Interior) — are confident they will retain their positions. A non-aggression pact with the Socialists? In contrast, ‘La France Insoumise’ (aligned with Spanish Parties ‘Podemos’ or ‘Sumar’), which represents the Popular Front party with the largest number of deputies, announced a motion of no confidence against Bayrou. “If they want to keep the same people in key positions, including Retailleau in Interior, and do nothing about pensions, ecology, and tax justice, I see no other option but censure,” stated the ecologist Marine Tondelier. Her party is divided but seems to lean toward outright opposition, like ‘La France Insoumise’. The big question is the position of the Socialist Party (PS) and the far-right National Rally (RN). Their stance will determine whether Bayrou lasts longer in Matignon than Barnier, who was censured less than three months after his appointment. The center-left party stated that it “will not participate in the government and will remain in opposition.” However, it distanced itself from its ‘La France Insoumise’ allies by opening the door to a non-censure agreement. Their conditions include the prime minister refraining from using Article 49.3, which allows laws to be passed without a parliamentary vote and contributed to Barnier's downfall. They also demanded that he abandon plans to push a tough immigration law early next year. "I feel that there are many false moves by the Socialists," says Martin, a professor at Kedge Business School. Their distancing from ‘La France Insoumise’, which is pursuing an uncertain strategy aimed at forcing Macron's resignation and preparing for early presidential elections, is due to "the pre campaign for the 2026 municipal elections" as well as "the Socialist Party's congress next year." The party's secretary-general, Olivier Faure, a supporter of unity among progressive forces, risks losing his position at that internal summit due to the offensive from the party's right wing, led by former President François Hollande and the mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo. A cordial relationship with Le Pen If Bayrou ultimately fails to secure a non-aggression pact with the Socialists, he will have the option of Marine Le Pen. The National Rally (RN) welcomed the appointment of the MoDem leader with apparent satisfaction, as he maintains a somewhat cordial relationship with Le Pen’s movement. “In 2022, he lent his signature to Le Pen so she could run in the presidential elections,” arguing for political pluralism. “He also proposed the creation of a ‘bank for democracy’ to address the far-right’s financing issues, which led them to seek funds (up to 11 million euros) from a Russian bank close to the Kremlin,” Martin recalls. Nevertheless, the major point of commonality between Bayrou and Le Pen is their legal troubles. Despite being one of Macron’s earliest allies, Bayrou has played a secondary role over the past seven years due to his alleged involvement in a scheme involving fake assistants in the European Parliament. The Paris Court acquitted him in early 2024, but it did convict eight MoDem officials and imposed a €400,000 fine on the party. Additionally, the prosecution appealed against the ruling, and the case will be retried on appeal. It is a scheme very similar to the one for which the far-right leader was tried this past fall. His verdict is expected on March 31, and he faces a possible five-year disqualification with immediate effect. This could trigger a political earthquake in France. The future of the Fifth Republic's crisis will depend not only on Parliament but also on the courts. This article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract Religious extremism and radicalization have dominated the discourse on the causes of terrorism. However, little is written of other drivers of terrorism, such as economic and social deprivations, which could prompt religious groups to resort to terrorism. Scholars have sufficiently analyzed the imports of radical ideological and religious views on the emergence of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. By contrast, the Seleka and anti-Balaka terrorists of the Central African Republic introduces a new perspective to the explanation of terrorism. This essay uses the analytical framework of abnormality and State fragility to discuss the rise of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The essay argues that the historical precedent of State failure and weak institutions provides a catalyst that propels the use of terrorism by religious groups, the state and organized groups to demand political and economic dividends as well as a tool for power contestations and regime change. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and building nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. They include the transformation of the subsistence farming culture to a masses-driven cash crop economy for exportation, which will manage state fragility and promote civil-military counter-terrorism culture at the grassroots. IMPACT STATEMENT Terrorism is one of the greatest threats to human security and the survival of the state in the 21st century. Since the 9/11 bombings, scholars and policymakers have committed significant resources to unpack the causes and course of terrorism. In this paper, we look away from the prevailing drivers of terrorism such as religious radicalisation and offer another lens through which policymakers and framers of counter-terrorism operations can view the use of terrorism by religious groups, individuals, and non-state actors within a state. The paper argued that where a state is unable to fulfil its social contract with the citizens, such a state permits its citizens to use terrorism as a tool to derive the benefit which the state failed to provide. The paper draws instances from the trajectories of the Balaka and Anti-Seleka terrorist groups operating in the Central Africa Republic. Introduction Terrorism has become a fundamental problem for individuals, groups and the state to manage in different parts of the globe. The growing nature of terrorism has made terrorists strong actors in national politics and international relations. The contemporary world records the increasing influence of terrorists. This has become true in the relations between Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran and other countries of the Middle East. Ironically, the multiplier effect is manifested in protest and politics across American universities and transportation of goods across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Studies on terrorism have linked the increasing use of terror by organized groups and States to ethnic, ideological, political, and religious factors (Schmid, Citation1998; Shultz, Citation1978). Essentially, the discourse on religiously motivated terrorism, although controversial and problematic, is prevalent particularly following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaida, and Boko- Haram (Jackson, Citation2012, p. 1). Elu and Price (Citation2014) linked terrorism in Africa to deprivation. Cilliers (Citation2001) argued that the root causes of terrorism and conflict in Africa include climate change, competition over resources, marginalization of the majority and global militarism. Nevertheless, critical terrorism studies have shown that more than the religiously and ideologically motivated use of terror by organized groups; the state also uses terrorism to drive its political objectives, especially against opposition groups (Lacqueur, Citation2001; Jackson et al., 2015). This study contributes to scholarship on how State failure and weak political institutions provide a catalyst that crystallizes the use of terrorism by religious and organized groups in demanding political dividends and power contestation. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. While Okereke et al. (Citation2016) study is in line with the position of this study, particular focus is on the unique nature of terrorism in CAR. It is this nature of state fragility that has weakened the ability of the state in CAR to provide other necessary societal conditions, resources, social amenities and developments that are needed to curb or eliminate terrorism. For instance, the inability of the state to provide and fund sustainable, functional education has created a society where people can easily be brainwashed to join terror sects. Again, the fragile nature of the CAR state has also undermined its ability to generate sustainable employment and a vibrant economy where a greater per cent of the citizenry could engage in small and medium-scale enterprises or engage in meaningful economic activities that would deny them the idleness that pushes them to terror activities. The place of ethnic, identity and ideological factors in driving terrorism cannot be neglected in CAR. This is because it is the fusion of state fragility and the advanced nature of ethnicity that drove the country into full-fledged terrorism as against mere ethnic crisis, thereby creating the absurdity that ethnic tension has become a driver of terrorism. The connection between economics, education and terrorism is deeply connected. In short, when the three factors are weak in a particular environment like CAR, and they become inflamed with religious fundamentalism, terrorism will be ignited in a very deadly form. The same factor played an active role in the mobilization of men and women who joined the Boko Haram terror sect in Nigeria (Ani kelechi et al., Citation2018). This is because the etymology of the word Boko Haram emanates from the traditional Hausa idea in the colonial era, which conceptualized and projected Western education (Boko) as a sin (Haram). Thus, the uneducated masses in North Eastern Nigeria did not desire further schooling to join a sect that was fighting for a hitherto historic ideology (Kukah, Citation2009). The position of Kukah (Citation2009) was also captured by Zenn et al. (Citation2013), who also linked local grievances to ideology (that was dominant in CAR) and internal politics of Nigeria in developing the study on terrorism. It should be noted that the concept of terrorism has evolved, and the precise meaning has remained contentious and exacerbated (Adibe, Citation2020; Ramsay, Citation2015). Puccetti (Citation2021) has argued that failing states create conditions for fostering terrorism. However, he has maintained that not all failing states experience the emergence of terrorism. Gaibulloev et al. (Citation2024) studied how terrorist groups survive in failed states. They maintain that in a state that is failing, terrorist groups easily survive. However, these studies did not particularly focus their analysis on the Central African Republic. The structural weakness and failure of the state have remained the major drivers of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The central objective of the study is to evaluate the place of state fragility and abnormality in the development of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The key research question is, to what extent is terrorism in the Central African Republic a function of state fragility and abnormality? The situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) represents a new dimension to the motivation for terrorism among organized groups. The CAR is one of Africa’s most economically viable states, but it repeatedly scores at the bottom of global development indices (World Bank, 2020: Boas, Citation2014). Economic and political development in the country remains, at best, a paradox because the poverty rate, inequality, and underdevelopment in the country, do not correlate with the country’s rich natural and human resources. With large-scale unemployment, poverty, terrorism, insurgency, maritime piracy, trafficking, increased insecurity, and delayed economic and political reform and integration, the CAR presents an example of an abnormal and fragile state in Africa. The absence of a standing state security apparatus means that the state does not have a monopoly on national force and security. As a result of weak political institutions, contestation to State power and regime change is a function of a ‘group’s ability to exert a higher degree of terror (Crescent, 2018, p. 8). It is this failed political, economic and security environment that triggers the proliferation of terrorism in the CAR. The study was developed using secondary data sourced from journals and books. The analysis of earlier scholars was sourced thematically and used to enrich the content of the study. This paper is significant because it breaks away from the simplistic explanation of terrorism in CAR as a mere religious and ideological phenomenon. It interrogates how an impoverished population can possess the capability for terrorism and contributes to the argument of state-sponsored terrorism. The paper argues that the insufficiencies of State institutions, a poor economy, and a security apparatus in disarray permit the use of terrorism by an impoverished population to demand political accountability and change. The argument of the paper is structured in two parts. The first part provides an overview of the CAR, clarifies and critiques the concepts of terrorism, state fragility, and abnormality, and the second part analyses the linkages between terrorism and state fragility and abnormality in CAR and concludes. Conceptual clarification terrorism versus state fragility and abnormality terrorism There is no precise definition of the concept of terrorism. The varying use of the concept by scholars, policymakers, and observers to create the desired political effect, the attempt to determine what fits and does not fit as terrorism, and efforts to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence make the concept difficult to define (Shimid, 1998, Weinberg et al., Citation2004). As a ‘contested ‘concept’, terrorism has been variously defined. Lacqueur (Citation1999) has argued that there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution in the character of terrorism. The new terrorist represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the familiar traditional terrorist groups (Hoffman, Citation1999). Terrorism covers the manipulation of fear to attain defined goals. Traditionally, terrorists target the killing of great political figures to ignite massive reactions like the killing of Archduke Ferdinand. However, during colonial rule in Africa, the imperial administrators were increasingly accusing Africans who challenged their exploitative rule as terrorists. This was the case with Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and the Zikist movement in Nigeria, among other nationalist movements that employed radical ideologies towards decolonization. However, the reality is that terrorism and terrorists change in form, scope and dynamics. They are more organised, strategic, and focused on unleashing harm and threats to individuals, groups, and states. While several scholars present terrorists as men and women who are irrational in their decisions, the reality is that terrorists are radicalized to rationally manipulate fear and violence to achieve certain goals that are set out by the protagonists of the terror onslaught (Ani & Uwizeyimana, Citation2021). The complexity in conceptualizing terrorism in CAR and many parts of Africa like Nigeria made Ramsay (Citation2015) to argue that terrorism should not be defined. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. Notwithstanding, Alex Schmid gave a popular definition of the concept. According to him, Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the primary targets (Schmid, 1988, p. 28). Furthermore, the above definition captured the orthodox perspective of terrorism as an act of State and non-state actors. Nonetheless, the definition follows the traditional explanation that terrorism is ideologically, religiously, and politically motivated. It undermined how weak political and economic institutions in a State could permit the use of terrorism to demand social and economic development and reforms by groups (Ani & Osisioma, Citation2014). Such uses of terrorism often have a clear target selection. In such situations, the persistent use of terrorism is aided by weak political and economic structures and intended to coerce the government to improve the economic and social life of the people (Ani & Chukwu, Citation2014; Anikelechi et al., Citation2018). In turn, the government uses terrorism in the absence of strong state security institutions for counterterrorism operations (Ani & Uzodike, Citation2015). Similarly, the absence of a strong political and state security institution permits the sponsorship of terrorism by external actors for their economic interests (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). Evidence of this type of terrorism is found in the Central African Republic, where religious groups form a coalition and use terrorism to demand economic and political dividends from the government. The next section of the essay will conceptualize State fragility and abnormality as a driver of terrorism in Central Africa. The weakness of the state, therefore, creates a sustainable environment for terrorism to strive. When the state is weak, and the machinery of the state cannot effectively deliver on its expected targets of providing the needs of the masses and guaranteeing the security of lives and properties, it naturally creates a lacuna that manifests in what is generally referred to as the ungoverned spaces. This is a collection of areas that are not under active state control, experience partial state control, or have a relatively weak presence of the rule of law (Bernard & Daful, Citation2021; Gov.UK, n.d.). It is this causal relationship between the nature of the state in the Central African Republic and the rise of terrorism that worsened the conditions for the security of lives and properties in the country. These ungoverned spaces are further occupied directly and indirectly by terror actors. Moreover, from these ungoverned space, they begin to launch their influence into other parts of the country and beyond. Downey (Citation2021) maintained that the United States’ war on terror did not deter ungoverned spaces in Africa. State fragility and abnormality As with terrorism, the concept of state fragility is complex and lacks a precise definition. Although a novel concept in development policy, the concept has been variously defined. The United Kingdom Department for International Development uses the term to describe the failure or lack of will and capacity by a State to perform its core functions and responsibilities to the citizens (DFID, 2005). According to the World Bank, fragile States are low-income countries scoring below 3.2 and below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. It applies to states that have higher tendencies to fail in their economic, security, and political obligations to their citizens (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 1). As a result, there is a prevailing atmosphere of poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, insecurity, weak institutional frameworks, lack of territorial control, and a high propensity to conflict and civil war (OECD, Citation2012, Citation2014). A state is described as fragile when there is an increase in poverty and economic decline, with State institutions incapable of handling civilian grievances arising from inequality in the distribution of wealth, representation, and access to public institutions (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 7). It should be noted that these main characteristics of state fragility are widespread in Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and CAR. These states share widespread poverty as a visible status of the economy among their citizens. Again, the nature of their insecurity is widespread within the sovereign state. Unfortunately, the managers of these states focus on advancing their exploitation of state resources, thereby creating opportunities for Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to advertise their quest for followership using social media and, in some cases, declaring dominance over some specified ungoverned spaces within the country (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). The difference among these sects is that Al Shabab survives on sea piracy in the Gulf of Guinea more than any other source of economy when compared to the terrorists in CAR (Anyika et al., Citation2022). Again, while Boko Haram and Al Shabab make use of social media to advertise and advance their network, economy, training and resources with international jihadi fighters and terrorist groups, terrorism in CAR is relatively domesticated (Anikelechi et al., Citation2018) In the Central African Republic, the income level of the masses remains low due to a weak national economy. There is a lack of bubbling production units and companies that could enhance mass production for commercial purposes and export earnings in general. The prevailing atmosphere of poverty and widespread unemployment and underemployment ensures that the society is prone to the negative influence of foreign terror sponsors as well as exposes the masses to the culture of exploitation by those who use their minimal resources to attract the frustrated poor and unemployed into the world of terrorism. The nature of the national geography also gives an advantage towards the expansion of insecurity and terror attacks within the country. Similarly, the concept of State abnormality is novel; the word is used in this paper to describe a State with full prospects and potential in terms of human and natural resources for development and economic growth but lacking in the human initiative and capacity to drive necessary developments and growth. In other words, the natural and economic resources in an abnormal State do not match the level of progress in all ramifications. An abnormal state is, therefore, a State riddled with developmental paradoxes. It is worth noting that all fragile and abnormal states are prone to and riddled with conflicts and threats of violence (Eugene, Citation2020). Moreover, scholars do not agree on the exact indices or parameters for measuring State fragility and abnormality. There is controversy over how the concept is operationalized and who sets the parameters for measuring fragility and abnormality (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 2). However, Besley and Persson argue that in a fragile and abnormal State, there is the pathology of State ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and raising revenues or political violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict or even both pathologies are present at the same time (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Similarly, the World Bank uses the CPIA ratings based on Economic Management, Structural Policies, Social Inclusion and Equity Policies, and Public Sector Management and Institutions to measure fragile States. Moreover, the Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity observed three major features of fragile States – authority, service, and legitimacy failures (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Nonetheless, an overview of the working definitions of different organizations and agencies proposed above reveals three basic variables in measuring fragile and abnormal States. This paper has classified these three variables as legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps based on the core functions of the state. For this paper, the fragile state and abnormality of the state will be measured based on the existence of some legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps in the Central African Republic. Discussion on Terrorism in CAR: The State Fragility and Abnormality Linkages Geographically, the Central African Republic is located at the centre of the African continent. The country’s current borders were established by the French during the scramble and partition of Africa in the late 19th century. Because of its central location, the CAR shares boundaries with multiple countries within the Central African region of the African continent; these countries include Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan. The country covers an area of 622,984 sq. km with a population of about 4.7 million (BBC Africa, 2018). The country is made up of over 80 ethnic nationalities of varying sizes in both land areas of concentration and number and with distinct languages (Alusala, 2017, p. 11). Economically, the Central African Republic is endowed with natural resources, including uranium, oil, gold, diamonds, and timber, as well as a huge potential for hydroelectric power. However, these resources have not been properly harnessed, and the little activity that exists does not generate much income for the state as it is dominated by foreign powers that align with some privileged politicians to exploit them for their selfish interests (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 4). The country came under colonial domination in 1899 and attained political independence from France on 12 July 1960 (Alusala, 2017, p. 13). Statistics show that since 2013, the country has witnessed over 29 terrorist activities by both state and non-state actors resulting in over 1764 deaths and about 851 injured (World Data, Citation2020). The legitimacy gap is a key feature of fragile and abnormal States. Legitimacy gaps describe the institutional instability undermining public decision-making processes’ predictability, transparency, and accountability (Andersen & Engberg-Pedersen, Citation2008). Legitimacy gaps exist in a state where the electoral process that produces political leaders is compromised, tele-guided, or subverted, leading to the emergence of unpopular leaders who execute elitist policies. In such a system, the pervasive inconsistency in the process of regime change permits the use of force, violence, or threats in the acquisition and consolidation of State power. As a consequence, compliance with the state is achieved by force, violence, or threat of it (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 9). The use of violence guarantees that the state maintains an advantage over other armed groups and legitimizes its grip on power (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). The use of terrorism by organized groups and the state in CAR is linked to the fact that there is no clear electoral approach to acquiring State power. At independence in 1960, the government of David Dacko institutionalized the one-party system to maintain its grip on power and whittle down opposition groups. This gave rise to pockets of political crises and protests, which were met with autocracy, kidnapping, and torture of protesters by State security agents (Le Vine, Citation1968, p. 12). Similarly, the second President, Jean-Bidal Bokasso, dissolved the parliament in 1976 and declared himself Emperor for the life of the CAR. His regime was characterized by torture, assassination, and oppression of political opponents, including the murder of over 100 demonstrating school children. Furthermore, when General Andre Kolingba seized power in 1981, he used State machinery to suppress and detain oppositions groups that supported a democratic system in the country. This use of force, violence, and intimidation by leaders to attain or sustain political power created the legitimacy gap that triggered terrorism by the Seleka and Anti-Balaka coalitions in the CAR. Consequently, legitimacy gaps in the country precipitated external/State sponsors of terrorism in CAR. For instance, the French government provided arms and support for the regime of Jean-Bidal Bokasso, who was willing to cut off economic and political relations with China and subsequently for the Anti-Balaka groups against the Selekas in 2013 following the overthrow of the Balaka-led government. Similarly, neighbouring countries like Chad and Sudan continue to support rebel leaders who agree to protect their economic interests (Congressional Research Group, Citation2024). For instance, in 2003, Chadian President Idriss Déby provided support for the Anti-Balaka leader Francoise Bozize, who overthrew Ange-Felix Pattasse. However, in 2013, Deby switched his support for the Seleka leader Michel Djotodia to replace Bozize. Consequently, in 2014, Derby used his militia to stand down the government of Djotodia and airlifted the entire CAR government to N’Djamena, where Catherine Samba-Panza was elected as the President of the transitional government (Lombard, Citation2014). The externalization of legitimacy in the CAR was effectively perfected during the colonial era. There was no unified system of political administration in CAR under the French colonial administration. The French leased the territory to private companies to run for their profit (Marima, Citation2014). In the absence of a unifying force for all peoples within the colony, colonial resistance was coordinated along ethnic lines, leading to the emergence of a multifarious coalition of ethnic groups who struck deals with concessionary companies to replace the French colonial officials (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). By leasing out different parts of the country to private companies to administer, the colonialists had given room for the privatization of state force, interference by foreign powers, and the proliferation of different armed groups with different ideologies of independence. The system has continued since independence and has created what Knoope and Buchanan-Clarke described as: A system whereby CAR politicians are often more concerned with the personal relationships they hold with these outside sources of power than with fulfilling their social contract with CAR citizens. This has resulted in a weak state that has little legitimacy to govern beyond the capital. (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Notwithstanding the introduction of a multi-party system in 1993, successive leaders of the country have failed to sustain the system as a legitimate means of political transition. Rather, it was characterized by meeting the personal ambition of the leaders, intent on staying in power, destroying the opposition, and ensuring their political interests (Siradag, Citation2016, p. 5). Consequently, a well-functioning state must possess the capacity to deliver certain public goods that improve the lives of its citizens as well as provide infrastructure that stimulates economic growth and development (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Fragile and abnormal states are remarkable for their lack of capacity to stimulate economic growth and development and a high dependence on foreign aid (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Capacity gaps in the Central African Republic can be seen from the inability of the government to provide basic amenities for its citizens. Since the country gained independence in 1960, successive governments have failed to establish state institutions that provide social, economic, and political dividends to the people (Sıradag, 2017, p. 1, International Crisis Group, Citation2017). Over half of the country’s 4.6 million people depend on UN humanitarian aid, the highest recipient of UN aid destinations globally (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). The public sector in CAR since independence is characterized by deplorable working conditions, absence of educational opportunities for children, large-scale corruption, mismanagement of public finances, irregular payment of salaries, a lack of sanitation, absence of educational opportunities for children, and permanent insecurity (Boas Citation2014. This situation not only questions the capacity of successive CAR governments but also increases the disillusionment towards government officials. Amidst economic resources, the country ranks as one of the least developed and poorest in the world. Per capita, the national income is a meagre $774, and about 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (Trading Economics, Citation2018). A report by Conciliation Resources showed that the country’s debt tripled to 1.8 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2011. The study further revealed various anomalies in the execution of projects, ranging from corruption and embezzlement of project money to compromised accounting procedures and a lack of vigilance. The CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2016, economic growth in the country slowed from 5 percent to 4.4 percent (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, only 10 of the 460 industries that operated in the country in the 1970s are functional. The only university in the country with a capacity of 1000 students has more than 20,000 students (Paul-Crescent et al. Citation2018, p. 8). These negative functional indicators suggest that the country is not just fragile but also abnormal because it lacks the initiative and capacity to harness its resources. Moreover, the use of terrorism by the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka groups is not aligned with religious identity but with the government’s inability to bridge the socio-economic inequalities in the country (Conflict Scan, Citation2017, p. 3). Successive governments in the country perpetrated inequality in the distribution of infrastructure between the Muslims who dominated the northern region and the Christians who dominated the southern region. Economic marginalization and neglect suffered in these regions provided a background for the use of terrorism by the northerners under the Seleka coalition to demand a fair share of the national resources and control of State power. For instance, the provinces of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto suffered marginalization and neglect as successive governments failed to establish schools, hospitals, roads, and general infrastructure. This led to the emergence of rebel groups who began to launch an attack on government facilities, taking hostages and seeking to take over power to protect their interests (International Crisis Reports, 2017). Furthermore, the replacement of the National Armed Forces with private security created security gaps in the CAR, which permitted the continued use of terrorism by both the State and organized groups (Global Security, Citation2020). When President Bozize came to power in 2003, he established a presidential guard made up of Chadian mercenaries to protect his government. Subsequently, successive governments have continued to maintain private securities at the expense of the national armed forces. The absence of a national security agency for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens means that the state is not the only legitimate monopoly of force. By maintaining private security, the state can carry out successful acts of terrorism against opposition groups. The anti-Balaka group was one of the groups mobilized by the Bozize government in 2003 to provide security for rural communities (CAR Briefing, Citation2014). However, following the rise of the Seleka coalition, he reactivated them in 2013 to protect his administration and help keep him in power till the general elections scheduled for 2016 (Kah, Citation2014, p. 9). Anti-balaka terrorism resulted in the ethnic cleansing of members of the Seleka coalition and created massive refugee crises and internal displacement (Amnesty International, Citation2014). This privatization of State security paved the way for foreign intervention and the upsurge of militia armed groups who perpetrate violence to secure State power, unleash vendetta as well as protect their members. The composition of these groups is constantly changing but is often made up of self-defence militia, highway robbers, and former members of the security and defence force. Between 2002 and 2017, 14 armed groups were identified (International Crises Group, 2017). Similarly, France, Chad, and Cameroon, among other foreign powers, have at one time or another, armed one group or another to protect their geo-strategic and economic interests in the CAR (Boas Citation2014),). In 2013, following serial bombings and killings which resulted in the death of over 2000 civilians, the Seleka, backed by Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, under Michel Djotodia usurped State power from the Christian-led government (International Crisis Group, Citation2017, p. 7). In a retaliatory move, the Anti Balaka began its reign of terror to counter the Seleka coalition. The Anti-balaka group did not start as a religious group but emerged out of the need to provide security to the population; they were motivated by their thirst for revenge (Kah, Citation2014, p. 36). The absence of government security forces in the peripheral and geostrategic areas of the country including Bocaranga, Ndassima, Yassine paved the way for rebel groups to control the rich mineral resources of the region while using revenue generated from the resources to finance their operations (African Union, Citation2018; Lombard, Citation2014). Added to failed security architecture is the question of State dispensation of justice and equity and asses to the State justice system. The State justice system has been subverted and hijacked by some members of the state who maneuver and manipulate the system to serve their selfish interests and intimidate opposition groups (Kah, Citation2014, p. 37, Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Basic institutions such as the Office of the Prosecutor, the tribunals, the gendarmerie, the Police, and the prison services are not operational in most parts of the country (Amnesty International, Citation2014). Conversely, it is imperative to appreciate the religious undertone of insurgency in the CAR. Since the escalation of the conflict in 2013, religion has been used as an instrument to radicalize members of both the Seleka and Anti-Balaka groups. The dynamics of terrorism have drawn the lines between Muslims and Christians in the country. Up till 2013, when the Seleka coalition (dominated by the Muslims) overthrew the government, the country was under a Christian leadership that paid little attention to the development of the Muslim-dominated Northern region of the country. Only two Muslims have been in parliament since the independence of the country (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). This painted a picture of political exclusion and economic marginalization by the Christians. These grievances were easily mobilized by the Seleka leader Djotodia during the coup of 2013. The rise of the Anti-Balaka groups and the consequent bombings of Muslim centers such as Mosques and schools have added to the narrative of religious terrorism (Union Africane, Citation2018). The presence of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko-Haram, the Islamic State, and Al-shabaab increases the risk of infiltration and violent Jihad by the Seleka groups (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). Moreover, although the parties involved in the use of terrorism are drawn along religious lines, they do not claim to establish a state along religious line. Their use of terrorism is motivated by the weak political institutions and economic inequalities which are core features of fragile States (Besley & Persson Citation2011). In its manifesto, the Muslim Seleka coalition had three mandates: to topple the Bozize regime, take control of the state, and seize the natural resources (International Crisis Group, Citation2017). The anti-Balaka, on the other hand, is determined to maintain its grip on power by attacking Muslim civilians and bombing Muslim villages. These two main rebel groups have splintered into several movements over time. Some sources put the number of armed groups currently operating in the country at about twenty (Union Africane, Citation2018). The legitimacy crises in the country and the inability to set a blueprint for political transition and regime change have laid a culture of violence as the fastest way to gain State power, and CAR politicians have consistently used such armed groups to get to power or when in power, to fight bandits and other small criminal groups in remote parts of the country (Paul Crescent et al., 2018, p. 11). Conclusion The sovereign states within the African continent face different forms of nation-building challenges. This ranges from poverty to conflicts and other multiple forms of insecurity. Unfortunately, when the insecurity level within a country grows so that the state cannot fulfil its obligation of ensuring the protection of lives and properties, the state could be considered fragile. Unfortunately, the state does not become fragile in a day or year; rather, state fragility emerges from multiple weaknesses of the state, which strives when abnormal or dysfunctional behaviours are allowed to grow over time by the institutions of the state. Studies on terrorism have shown that economic and weak political institutions within a state make it possible for terror groups to emerge. These terror groups further degenerate the state of security within the polity. This study draws from existing literature to investigate the emergence of terrorism in the CAR. The study reveals that the state’s failure directly manifests in the state’s character and the state’s inability to perform its fundamental roles. The CAR state is very weak due to the inability of the state to transform or refine its mineral resources and use the products to produce good governance. The character of the state was weak in the provision of employment, basic education and eradication of mass poverty within the country, thereby allowing the masses to be dependent on religious and ethnic cleavages as an opium that determined their social relations. Consequently, this affiliation and addiction to religious inclinations soon divided the CAR state and found expression in religious fanaticism and fundamentalism. The paper argued that the use of terrorism by religious groups and the state in the CAR is a direct consequence of the failure to utilize State resources for the betterment of the people and not from the desire to establish a State based on religious ideologies. This is because the primary role of the state is to provide good governance, which is meant to transform the lives of the citizenry. The various religious armed groups are reacting to a long history of negligence, deprivation, isolation, and frustration arising from the government’s inability to mobilize State resources for equitable national development and self-actualization for the citizens. In this context of a broken social contract, the country fits itself into the fragile and abnormal State theory. Worthy of note in the use of terrorism in CAR is the sponsorships by foreign countries, which further buttresses the claim of State fragility. By and large, by situating the CAR within the purview of fragility and abnormality, this paper has opened up underlying historical and developmental issues that are critical in understanding and addressing terrorism in the country. Why terrorism in CAR has not attracted sufficient attention from international actors and their role in escalating terrorism in the CAR country merits further research and study. In conclusion, there is a need for leadership transformation in the CAR State. The leaders of the state must focus on the development of national resources to provide social amenities and meet the basic needs of the masses. They must build a circular state where national identity and patriotism are central to national transformation through intergroup cohesion and resource (human and material) development. It is then that the conditions of sustainable peacebuilding and societal transformations would be created in CAR. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The changes which officially made to the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence on November 19, 2024, served as a signal from Russia to the West in response to the first use of U.S. and British-made tactical missiles on Russian territory.  Judging by Russia's actions, the adjustment of its nuclear policy is part of a plan for retaliatory escalation steps, which was prepared some time ago when the United States came close to deciding on the use of its missile weapons deep within Russian territory. We are at the beginning of a dangerous escalation spiral, which could potentially lead to a conventional conflict between Russia and the United States, followed by a nuclear conflict. The immediate task of the Doctrine is to clarify the essence of future Russian signals to the adversary, ensuring their proper interpretation. At the same time, several innovations introduced in this document could have far-reaching consequences for the containment strategies of all world states. Emerging Challenges First and foremost, the changes in the doctrine are driven by the technological revolution that has occurred in military affairs over the past few decades. This revolution has effectively erased the distinction between what was once considered conventional military-technical or military cooperation and direct involvement in warfare. The core of this revolution is that the information and technological aspects of modern warfare now play a decisive role in shaping the course of combat operations. Superiority in technical intelligence, command and control systems, and information processing can provide a decisive advantage on the battlefield and transform the capabilities of weapons systems that might previously have been considered obsolete. A great power providing its partner with real-time intelligence, space communications infrastructure, and command and control and data processing software, all while requiring continuous technical support, provides the ability to fully control and direct the activities of a junior ally. Before the digital age, the recipient of even the most sophisticated weapons could use them as they saw fit, without anyone knowing, at least as long as they had the capacity to maintain them. Real-time intelligence assistance was nearly impossible: satellite images on analog media, typically only usable at the strategic command level, could be transmitted to an ally. Now, Ukraine’s American backers have the ability to blind the Ukrainian Armed Forces and paralyze the Ukrainian command and control system with a single click: all long-range strikes, including those carried out by drones assembled by Ukraine, are planned jointly, and none are carried out without American approval. Thus, any external power that provides significant assistance to a warring party, connected with the use of modern systems of satellite and electronic intelligence, information processing and control, is a full-fledged participant in the war. Consequently, retaliatory strikes against its troops and territory are fully justified. Technical changes are combined with political ones. The progress of the American model of globalization, which continued until recently, led to the coming to power in a number of countries of real "citizens of the world", claiming to enter the global elite and detached from national interests. Such states, under the leadership of a globalist elite accumulating their capital abroad, are capable of making colossal human and economic sacrifices, significant territorial losses in order to implement political directives imposed on them from outside. The durability of such regimes can be significant due to the powerful propaganda apparatus created with American assistance, as well as the systematic use of mass repressions, extrajudicial killings, torture, etc. sanctioned by the United States. Georgia during the reign of Saakashvili and modern Ukraine are classic examples of modern American proxies following this path. This model of relations is much more dangerous than the American alliances of the Cold War, when junior partners of the United States had almost complete freedom in domestic policy and tried to follow their national egoistic interests. Solutions There is no doubt that Russia has the right to strike American reconnaissance and communication satellites, as well as reconnaissance aircraft and drones involved in providing information support for the activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The only question is the feasibility of this step in achieving the goals of the Special Military Operation (SMO). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously stated, in particular, that Western satellites involved in supporting military operations could be legitimate targets for a Russian strike. The updated "Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence" extend this logic to the sphere of nuclear deterrence. The "Basic Principles" specifies that aggression against Russia and/or its allies by a non-nuclear state, carried out with the support of a nuclear state, is considered as their joint attack. Other changes concern possible scenarios for the future use of service "kamikaze states" like Ukraine by the enemy against Russia. This is the receipt of reliable information about a massive launch (take-off) of air attack weapons of all types (from drones to missiles) and their crossing the Russian border. The US can quickly give its proxy a huge capability to strike deep into Russia with drones and missiles; even if Russia completely destroys the immediate aggressor with a retaliatory strike, it will suffer heavy losses, and the US will remain the winner. Therefore, the US should be the target of a retaliatory strike on par with the immediate aggressor. Given the widespread proliferation of long-range attack drones around the world, and the US policy of transferring intermediate- and shorter-range cruise missiles to its junior allies, this condition should potentially create a new framework for future local conflicts. Given that the ability of France and the UK to produce long-range weapons without extensive use of US technology is largely lost, any massive long-range strike against sensitive forces inside Russia, delivered with Western weapons and/or big data, should result in a strike against the US. At this point, since American and European long-range strikes on Russia have already been carried out, Russia probably has no choice but to transfer to one or two countries the weapons or technology that will allow them to reliably deliver payloads to North America and Western Europe: the Americans and Europeans must pay. But how widespread such a practice will be in the future is one of the important questions of the post-war world order. In the course of the current conflict, the question of strikes on American targets will probably arise with the further expansion of the practice of American proxy strikes deep into Russian territory. Another change related to the response to threats of possible conflicts in the coming years was the specification of the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the event of non-nuclear aggression against Russia. If earlier the condition for the transition to the use of nuclear weapons was defined extremely vaguely as "aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened", now we are talking about a "critical threat to the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity" of Russia and Belarus. As the experience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in the Kursk region showed, the United States can send its proxies to carry out operations that lead to an advance into Russia by tens of kilometers. In the future, each such operation should be considered as an attack by the United States on Russia. The Problem of Defining Criteria The issue of "proxy states" or "kamikaze states," which can be rapidly rearmed and thrown into battle under external control, will continue to increase. This will be driven by the development of military capabilities (particularly those involving artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms, and weapon systems, etc.) in combination with the refinement of methods for societal control. Russia is not the only one that will have to deal with this problem. In the long term, there will be a difficulty of developing criteria for the level of "support" by a nuclear state for a non-nuclear country, at which the actions of the junior partner become their joint aggression.  Probably, we can talk about finding a combination of political, economic and military-technical conditions, at which the "junior partner" can no longer be considered as a separate participant in international relations. In this case, the responsibility for any significant attacks from it on Russian or Belarusian territory should be borne by the patron state. Such criteria must be logical and transparent, and their development and announcement probably need to be done in advance. Perhaps such a practice will gain some currency in the future unstable world as a way to protect the national territories of great powers from attack, narrowing the potential for the use of "service states".

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah entered a 60-day ceasefire on Nov. 26, 2024, a move aimed at reducing tensions in the region more than a year into a multifront conflict.Under the terms of the deal, Israel would gradually withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and Hezbollah would fully withdraw north of the Litani River. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Army would “deploy and take control over their own territory,” U.S. President Joe Biden said, adding that the United States, France and other allies have pledged to support the deal.But what does the deal mean for the parties involved and future prospects for a more permanent cessation of hostilities? The Conversation U.S. turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert of Lebanon and border conflicts in the Middle East, to explain why they reached a ceasefire now and what it means going forward. Why is the ceasefire deal happening now? The timing of this ceasefire is the result of a convergence of interests among the government in Israel, Hezbollah itself and that of its chief sponsor, Iran – but all for different reasons. For the Israeli government, domestic issues are at play. First off, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are exhausted after more than a year of war. This is particularly true for Israeli reservists, a growing number of whom are not turning up for duty. The Israeli general public, too, is tired of conflict, and a majority favors a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also has internal issues in his government to contend with. He is facing pressure from the ruling coalition’s ultra-Orthodox partners to draw up laws exempting ultra-Orthodox Jews from the military draft. Reducing the need for active personnel by quieting the front with Lebanon will help in that regard. The secular and national-religious sectors of the society who do serve in the IDF and who are upset with the possibility of a formal draft-exemption law for ultra-Orthodox men may be more inclined to swallow this pill if the war with Hezbollah is over. From the Israeli army’s perspective, the war in Lebanon is coming to a point of diminishing returns. It has succeeded in weakening Hezbollah’s military standing but has been unable to wipe the militant group out entirely. This also factors into Hezbollah’s thinking. The group has been seriously debilitated in Lebanon; the war has eroded its military capabilities. Unlike its previous position – reiterated time and again over the past year by its now-dead leader, Hassan Nasrallah – that a ceasefire would only be possible if first it is reached between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran are now willing to delink the two fronts. This leaves Hamas in a far weaker position as they are now left without the support of Iran’s main proxy “axis of resistance” group. Drawing Hezbollah, and other aligned groups in the region, into direct confrontation with Israel had been Hamas’ hope when it launched its attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hezbollah and Lebanon’s other political factions also have strong domestic pressures to contend with. Lebanon has more than 1 million refugees as a result of the conflict – the vast majority of them Shia, the branch of Islam that Hezbollah is drawn from. The conditions in Lebanon have increased the risk of sectarian fighting between Shia and others factions in the country. For Hezbollah leaders, the time may seem right to cut their losses and prepare to regroup as a political and military body. Iran, too, is seeking to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon as soon as possible. The deal comes as Tehran is bracing for a U.S. administration that could have a more hawkish position on Iran and its proxies in the region, of which Hezbollah is the most significant. With a new Iranian president, and a new U.S. administration, a ceasefire between Iran’s main proxy and Israel may be a first step to Tehran building a constructive dialogue with a Trump White House. What is the role of the US in the ceasefire? What is interesting for me is that despite the very clear position of the U.S. in favoring Israel during the past year of conflict, it still functions as an effective mediator. It is thanks to the U.S. that there is a ceasefire – and it comes despite the fact that Washington is far from neutral in this conflict, being a chief ally of Israel and its main provider of weapons. But the Lebanese government and Hezbollah see a U.S. role, too. And this is not new. The United States was the mediator in the 2022 landmark agreement that, for the first time, set out the maritime boundaries between Israel and Lebanon. The ceasefire deal benefits both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations. For President Joe Biden, it would represent a diplomatic success after a year in which the U.S. has failed to mediate any breakthrough in the conflict in Gaza, and it is an opportunity for Biden to finish his presidency on a positive foreign policy note. From the perspective of Trump, the ceasefire in Lebanon will represent one less problem for him to face. What might be the consequences for Lebanon and Israel? Lebanon has the most at stake in this ceasefire holding. The country was already in a perilous economic situation before the war, and months of fighting has only worsened the structural, economic and political crises in the country. It is as dire as it can get. Further, the war has reignited sectarian tension in Lebanon – talk of a return to civil war in the country is not far-fetched. Lebanon-Israel border: A zone of continued conflict The lower reaches of the Litani River, outlined in blue, are the northern edge of a U.N.-proposed buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Golan Heights, which neighbors Syria, is also disputed territory in the region. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Palestinian territories that are governed by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority respectively, are also often areas of violent conflict.   But there is uncertainty over how the ceasefire will affect the various rival factions in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has been weakened and may well now look for a way to reassert its strength in Lebanon’s politics. The main question is how the other factions and parties respond to that. With a weak Hezbollah, other factions may challenge the militant organization in ways they haven’t before. Before being decimated by Israel, there were no rival groups in a position to challenge Hezbollah in Lebanon. But that has all changed: Hezbollah’s military power has been degraded and Nasrallah, the group’s leader, killed. And Nasrallah was not just the face and brains of Hezbollah, he was also the group’s most important link to Iran. There is concern among some Lebanon experts that the gap left by a weakened Hezbollah may see a struggle for power and further strife in the country. And I believe there should be no illusions that Hezbollah will try to reassert itself as a domestic force. Complicating matters is the fact that any realignment of political forces in Lebanon comes amid a political vacuum. There has been a caretaker government – and no president – for two years now since Hezbollah conditioned the appointment of a new president with the candidate being an ally of the group. Now, Lebanese politicians would need to agree on a new president who in turn would appoint a new prime minister and government. It remains to be seen how this will unfold with a weakened Hezbollah. For Israel, the ceasefire will provide an opportunity to reconstruct parts of the north that have been devastated by Hezbollah missiles and a possible return of the 60,000 Israelis who fled northern areas close to the Lebanon border. It will also allow the Israel Defense Forces to regroup, refresh and focus their resources in Gaza, rather than fighting on two fronts. Could the ceasefire lead to a permanent peace deal? I don’t see any permanent peace deal on the horizon, given the fact that the fundamental political goals of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran have not changed and that the Israel-Palestine conflict continues to fester. But I am hopeful that the ceasefire could lead to calm and stability between Israel and Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The details of the ceasefire agreement are not very different from U.N. Resolution 1701 that ended the last major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. That agreement brought relative calm to the region for 18 years, even if Hezbollah, supported by Iran, used these years to build up its military capability and prepare for a potential ground invasion of northern Israel. In my view, there is a possibility for greater stability this time around given the fact that the ceasefire agreement also stipulates that, if and when it becomes permanent, the deal would serve as a basis for negotiations over the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial boundary. This would not be an easy task, particularly in the area of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar. But with goodwill and good intentions, even difficult border disputes could be resolved.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In Rio de Janeiro, world leaders are gathering for a historic summit. The G20, the symbol of global governance, is at a crossroads. The planet is waiting. The climate, economic and geopolitical challenges are urgent.Since yesterday, at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, under the strategic engagement of Russia, Foreign MinisterSergey Lavrov, guided by the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, has been playing a key role in discussions on combating inequality, hunger and poverty, as well as reforming global institutions. Together with the BRICS Alliance, innovative initiatives are being put forward to strengthen economic cooperation and global stability, including sustainable development projects and strategic trade agreements. This Summit is proving to be a crucial platform for addressing pressing global challenges such as security and climate change, while potentially influencing global governance and international relations in the years to come.Geopolitical context of the summit, the madness of the Biden administrationAs the G20 group meets in Rio de Janeiro to reconcile the positions of the balance of power in the global chessboard, the recent antithetical decisions of the United States, held on the very eve of the summit and supported by France and Great Britain, are once again dispersing the positions to be reconciled. The Western minority, accustomed to living off the labor of the planetary majority, is lamentably trying to redefine the dynamics of the international community in its favor, by authorizing deep strikes on Russian territory. This approach, adopted by the Biden administration, reflects both madness and a vision of resistance in the face of the potential defeat of Ukraine and NATO allies against Russia, while seeking a reaction that could exacerbate global tensions. This audacious geopolitical calculation, perceived as a last-ditch attempt to consolidate Ukrainian positions before a potential change in American leadership, marks a turning point towards a dangerous escalation of hostilities. It can also be compared to a very big step taken towards the start of the Third World War.The 2024 G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro is therefore taking place in a complex geopolitical context, marked by key global issues. International conflicts, exacerbated in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, and tensions over the role of the United States, France, Great Britain and the collective West are at the heart of discussions on global security. While António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) urges the G20 to adopt actions aligned with the UN Charter – although Western ambitions of domination are being challenged by the rise of the BRICS Alliance – the Western minority continues to pour oil on the embers precisely to satisfy its ambitions of eternal domination.The climate crisis, meanwhile, is forcing more ambitious policies, as the G20, responsible for 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions, must revise its commitment to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Also, growing economic inequality and the need for reforms to a perceived unfair international financial system underscore the urgency of changing the global financial architecture. Despite the political challenges, the summit embodies a push towards stronger multipolarism, with key players such as Sergei Lavrov, Xi Jinping, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, etc., advocating for international cooperation. The political transition in the United States, with the imminent departure of Joe Biden and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, adds uncertainty, potentially impacting global cooperation and sustainability efforts. This nineteenth summit of the Group of Twenty powers (G20) is crucial to encouraging collective action in the face of complex challenges related to security, climate, the economy and international cooperation.Russia’s engagement in the world chessboardRussia’s participation in this Rio de Janeiro Summit is of major strategic importance. Led by Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and mandated by the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian delegation demonstrates the country’s strong commitment to global discussions. Russia aims to take a leading position in addressing global challenges such as combating inequality, hunger and poverty, and reforming international institutions. Mr. Sergey Lavrov’s interventions at the plenary sessions are essential, while his bilateral talks with other world leaders could lead to decisive agreements, strengthening international relations. Capitalizing on its long history of global engagement, Russia is ideally placed to influence these crucial debates for the future of the planet.Positive initiatives of the BRICS Alliance in global dynamicsThe BRICS, originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and expanded over time to BRICS+ – represent an undeniable emerging force in global economic cooperation, as demonstrated by their landmark initiatives at the Rio Summit yesterday. By establishing the New Development Bank, these nations are demonstrating their commitment to financing joint infrastructure projects, strengthening their synergy and displaying a clear desire for de-dollarization. The significant progress made in social security also demonstrates their determination to improve social protection on a large scale. Looking ahead, the BRICS countries are committed to driving reform of international financial institutions, placing their economic weight at the heart of global decisions, while working towards sustainable development and the fight against climate change. Speeches by representatives such as Mr. Sergei Lavrov at the summit captured attention, underscoring the BRICS’ determination to impact global governance and promote a more equitable and sustainable economic future.The impact of the summit on global governanceAs mentioned above, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, represents a crucial opportunity to transform global governance and have a lasting impact on the future of the planet and international relations. Since yesterday, this strategic meeting has been addressing major issues such as the reform of international institutions, requested in particular by the member countries of the BRICS Alliance, the proactive fight against climate change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and international security requiring enhanced cooperation in the face of current geopolitical tensions. Through decisive decisions, the summit could establish a new multipolar world order and decide on the choice between cooperation and global confrontation. The challenge lies in reconciling national and global interests, strengthening trust between international partners, and finding innovative solutions to address the complex challenges of our era. The G20 Summit in Rio thus offers a unique platform for leaders to demonstrate their leadership and vision, thereby shaping a multipolar and sustainable future for future generations.It can be said that the 2024 edition of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro marks a turning point where world leaders are called upon to choose: cooperation or confrontation, progress or stagnation. The future of the planet is now in their hands. Today’s decisions, contained in the Summit Declaration, will shape the world of tomorrow. History will judge.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sea of Cooperation: New Opportunities for the Development of China — ASEAN RelationsSoutheast Asia (SEA) is gaining increasing importance with the changing global order. The region is once again experiencing a period of competition between the “great powers”. During the Cold War some countries managed to stay out of the Soviet-American confrontation, but today, integration into economic, technological, and humanitarian exchanges forces members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to reshape their foreign policy in line with the prioritization of partnerships with various centers of power. SEA has significant economic growth potential, making cooperation beneficial and conflicts costly. Despite the tempting logic of harsh realism in contemporary geopolitical conditions, there remains space in this region for the traditions of idealism and complex interdependence as prerequisites for peaceful coexistence.When Profit Matters More than ClaimsThe ASEAN Summit-2024, held in October in Vientiane, clearly became a platform for a multidimensional dialogue between the “Great East Asian” countries, including India. Almost all participants tried to avoid raising contentious issues; in particular, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, emphasized Japan’s investments in Southeast Asian countries and avoided discussions about the possibility of forming an “Asian NATO”. Similar ideas about freedom from confrontations and unilateral attempts to change the balance of power were expressed by the President of South Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol. Narendra Modi focused on enhancing multilateral cooperation between Asian states in the fields of information technology, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure modernization, which would help accelerate the recovery of production and distribution chains after the COVID-19 pandemic. Chairman of the State Council of China, Li Keqiang, firmly pointed to “external forces” as the main culprits of disrupting regional order.According to him, China is ready to work with each ASEAN country in the interest of establishing a common market and achieving sustainable development. The Prime Minister stated that China and Southeast Asian countries are opening up to each other, and this process inevitably contributes to mutual prosperity, which will have a positive impact on the entire world. Notably, in 2023, the trade turnover between China and ASEAN countries exceeded 900 billion USD for the second consecutive year, and has nearly doubled over the past 10 years. The greatest activity is observed in developing relations with Vietnam and Malaysia, which together account for 230 and 191 billion USD, respectively. This means that today, Southeast Asian countries are collectively a more important partner for Beijing (in terms of volume) than the United States or the European Union.It is not surprising that at the events within the framework of the ASEAN Summit, including numerous bilateral meetings, the focus was on mutually beneficial cooperation, including issues related to further removing barriers and optimizing transport routes. Li Keqiang's statement at the 27th China-ASEAN Summit regarding the update of the Free Trade Agreement with the Association highlights the clear dominance of the economic component of cooperation over security issues, ideological differences, and other disagreements. Of course, there are opinions that Laos, in its capacity as chair, deliberately separated political issues from economic ones, but what is wrong with that?Only Philippine President F. Marcos Jr. was left alone, accusing the Chinese Coast Guard of reckless and unjustified pressure in the «exclusive economic zone». This is despite the fact that in July, an agreement was reached allowing the Philippines to deliver supplies to the “Sierra Madre” ship, which had been intentionally grounded 10 years ago at the Ayungin Shoal as a forward post for a Marine Corps unit.Professionally and SafelyToday, the South China Sea (SCS) is home to some of the busiest maritime communication routes. At least 500,000 vessels pass through the region each year, accounting for approximately 40% of global cargo traffic, and more than a million civilian flights cross the airspace above the sea annually. This high intensity of exchanges increases the importance of ensuring the safety of transport amidst unresolved disputes over the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, the ownership of parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the escalation of US-China geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Formally, the multilateral dispute over the islands and maritime areas between ASEAN member states and China remains unresolved.In September, the Beijing-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative published a report on the situation in the region. The authors of the document note that in recent years, the United States has pursued an offensive strategy to contain China, primarily using the “instability factor” in the South China Sea to escalate the multilateral dispute and fuel anti-China sentiments. Washington has also encouraged territorial claims by ASEAN countries against China, based on its own interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the concept of a “rules-based order”. So far, these flare-ups of claims against Beijing, which are sometimes accompanied by incidents between coast guard vessels, have not resulted in significant disruptions to freedom of navigation and air traffic. Moreover, China notes that the majority of the contacts have been “professional and safe”. Undoubtedly, in the event of increased tensions—such as more active actions by the air force, navy, and coast guards of various countries toward Chinese aircraft and vessels—logistical routes would need to be reorganized, which could lead to significant losses not only for China but for the entire regional economy. However, despite attempts by the US and its allies to assign special geopolitical significance to the situation in Southeast Asia, the situation remains manageable. As a result, Beijing still believes that peaceful resolution is possible.China Daily cites the opinion of specialists from the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), who believe that, in terms of ensuring the stability of international trade flows, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not under threat. However, in the military dimension, instability is growing, primarily due to excessive US interference.[1] The Institute argues that American activities, which involve sending military ships and aircraft to demonstrate power, only provoke disputes over sovereignty and borders. Such actions create a dangerous misconception among the leadership of several countries that Washington will intervene if necessary to contain China's expansion, thus assisting in resolving the dispute through pressure. The demonization and constant condemnation of China have already negatively affected bilateral relations with the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which requires significant diplomatic efforts from the Chinese leadership to normalize relations.Military activity is noticeably increasing in Southeast Asia, involving both regional and non-regional states. In addition to the United States, countries such as Japan, Australia, and European NATO members — Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands — are also becoming involved. In total, the US Navy conducts over 1,600 ship hours annually in the region, with at least 3,000 additional ship hours contributed by auxiliary forces. In the airspace above the South China Sea, approximately 30,000 sorties by combat aircraft and helicopters were recorded in 2023, a third of which involved non-regional states, with no fewer than 7,800 sorties conducted by the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.At CIIS, it is believed that through military actions, Washington is “inflating” its own importance in ensuring freedom of navigation, despite the fact that the US has no merit in this — China itself does not hinder shipping and views patrol and training missions from other countries with understanding. However, joint coast guard exercises between the two most outspoken opponents of China's activities in the South China Sea (the Philippines and Vietnam), as well as “ASEAN-wide” naval maneuvers, initiated by Indonesia, have attracted the attention of the PLA command. The main troublemaker in the region, according to Beijing, is the United States, which effectively ignores the “rules” it established for the safe passage of ships, vessels, and aircraft, constantly maintaining a military presence in the region where the greatest threat actually comes from US military forces. These actions are seen as an attempt to maintain hegemony in the face of “strategic retreat” and to push regional countries away from expanding cooperation with China by artificially creating an unsettled atmosphere and undermining multilateral confidence-building measures.The Chinese leadership's course of separating trade, economic, and investment cooperation from territorial disputes is generally understood by Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore, which claim parts of the Spratly Islands. However, it has also become a target for criticism from radical circles in these countries, clearly incited by Washington. As negotiations have shown, China and Southeast Asian countries are capable of independently developing mutually acceptable rules of action in the South China Sea, based on international law principles and taking into account each other's interests and concerns. The main idea is to establish direct dialogue in any disputed situation, maintain a constant consultation mechanism, preserve constructive negotiations, and adhere to the principle of peaceful resolution.ASEAN countries clearly do not want confrontation with Beijing, but they are in urgent need of a reliable system for peacefully managing any activities in the waters and on the continental shelf, which still needs to be developed together, ensuring guarantees of unhindered access for exploitation. Peace and cooperation in the South China Sea are inseparable, and collective responsibility for security will invariably contribute to the development of multidimensional ties, further increase trade volume, and lead to the emergence of the Sea of Cooperation on the world map.Reference1. Jiang, Chenglong. South China Sea disputes still ‘manageable’. China Daily. September 28-29, 2024. P. 2.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском "Strategic autonomy" remains France's goalThe outcome of the US election has far-reaching political and economic implications for France, forcing the country, which is itself experiencing a serious political crisis, to define its own role in the world and in Europe. This was already clear in the run-up to the elections and was also commented on in initial reactions to the outcome. In the areas of trade and climate protection, but especially in the areas of security and defense, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States is an incentive for France to strengthen its own and European independence in order to protect French and European interests. The call for European partners to develop a foreign and security policy that strengthens Europe and reduces dependence on America without calling transatlantic cooperation into question remains the declared goal. Cooperation with Germany in particular is of crucial importance here.Security and defense policy: Europe is keyFrench President Emmanuel Macron has already worked with President Trump from 2017 to 2021. For him, another encounter with a President Donald Trump will therefore be nothing new. In France, at any rate, it seemed that internal preparations had also been made for the possibility of a second Trump administration. French representatives, in particular President Macron, had campaigned for strengthening European defense and making it more independent of the USA, especially when it came to NATO and defense. At national level, France has set up a special task force within the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs to deal with the various scenarios that a second Trump administration could bring. This task force is headed by Tristan Aureau, former Head of Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Europe and current Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot. With the actual election of Trump, however, there are still major challenges ahead for France and Europe that can only be tackled with a united European stance.The war in UkraineThere is also great concern in France that President Trump could freeze the war in Ukraine without involving the European partners by negotiating a ceasefire. A Trump-style freeze would mean abandoning the Ukrainian partner and that Ukraine would have to cede the territories conquered by Russia. This contradicts the French understanding that the war in Ukraine is a European issue that must first and foremost be resolved by the Europeans, certainly in consultation with the USA.Middle East conflictWhile Donald Trump has repeatedly reiterated his unreserved support for Israel, he has just as often made it clear that he wants to end the war as quickly as possible. The fact is that Trump is popular with Netanyahu's government, partly due to his actions during his first term in office (moving the US embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights). What exactly can be expected of him now is not known. In any case, France has repeatedly called for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon in recent weeks and emphasised this once again on the day of the US election.[i] Unlike the Trump-Netanyahu relationship, the relationship between Netanyahu and Macron has also suffered in recent weeks from the statements on the founding of the state of Israel, which have also caused irritation in France.[ii] It now remains to be seen to what extent the relationship between France and the US will develop on this issue as wellNATOAs far as NATO and the American security guarantees for Europe are concerned, France has traditionally emphasized the importance of NATO and advocated close cooperation with the USA. At the same time, however, France has been advocating for years - essentially what Trump is also calling for - that Europe should be the key to its own security and defense. As the EU's only remaining nuclear power with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, France aspires to influence world events, but also knows that this claim to leadership can only realistically be implemented with European partners in European security and defense policy.[iii] Macron made this clear in his second Europe speech at the Sorbonne in spring 2024, among other things, when he explained that they were aware that the US was focusing on itself and on China, and that Europe was not a geopolitical priority - regardless of which administration was in place in Washington. [iv] Even under an American Democratic government, Europe could no longer have assumed that there would be no partial US troop withdrawal. France's former ambassador to NATO, Muriel Domenach, also made it clear in an interview with the Grand Continent shortly before the US elections that it was not serious "[...] for Europe, with its wealth, heritage and responsibility, to resign itself to making its security entirely dependent on American decisions".[v] Trade policy: the fear of new import tariffsIn terms of trade policy, France is concerned about the effects of very likely protectionism under a second Trump administration, which could affect the French agricultural and aviation sectors in particular. Trump's announcements of import tariffs of 20% on all foreign products and also the prospect that Trump could impose import tariffs of 25% on wines and spirits from France, as he did in 2020, are causing great unease in France.However, a closer look reveals that trade policy under Joe Biden was also rather protectionist. One example of this from a French perspective is the Inflation Reduction Act, which was fundamentally oriented against China, but also had enormous consequences for Europe and France. During his state visit to Washington in December 2022, Emmanuel Macron had already taken a critical view of this plan and condemned it as "super aggressive".[vi]French reactions after the electionWhile Emmanuel Macron and the people involved in the government were quick to congratulate Trump and call for cooperation with the new American president, the right-wing and left-wing camps had different reactions.President and government: respect, willingness and cooperationThese words best summarize the reactions of politicians in government positions. President Emmanuel Macron congratulated Donald Trump via X on his election as US President even before the official announcement of the election results. Macron made it clear that he was prepared to work together, respecting their respective convictions and working together for peace and prosperity.[vii]Benjamin Haddad, Secretary of State for Europe, reacted in the same way, saying that we must find common ground and work together, while the answer to the challenges that the future brings lies "with ourselves". Thus, "Europeans [...] cannot accept that their security is decided without them, that tomorrow a capitulation is imposed on the Ukrainians, without the Ukrainians, without the Europeans."[viii]The reactions from the right: safe distance, warm congratulationsPrior to the elections, the French right had moderated its statements on Trump and muzzled its leaders in particular - with the exception of party leader Jordan Bardella - from commenting on Trump for party political reasons. The danger was considered too great that the political model proclaimed and exemplified by Donald Trump would stand in contrast to the institutionalization and de-demonization of the Rassemblement National. The deputy leader of the RN parliamentary group in the National Assembly, Jean-Philippe Tanguy, declared that Donald Trump was too negative for the party and embodied "excited populism". Nevertheless, Bardella had already indicated before the elections that he felt close to the ideas of President-elect Trump by expressing his admiration for American patriotism.[ix] After hesitant statements, however, it then became clear that the Rassemblement National supports Donald Trump. Bardella explained that France now had the task of taking its fate into its own hands and that a European defense had to be built.[x] Marine Le Pen, soberly agreed with this tone and called for this new political era to contribute to an improvement in bilateral relations and lead to constructive cooperation at international level.[xi]Eric Ciotti, who had only split from Les Républicains in the parliamentary elections, moved closer to the Rassemblement National and founded the new right-wing party A Droite, was very euphoric and described Trump's victory as a "wonderful victory of the American people against a system. A hope for peace, a defeat for the wokists. A way forward for the right in France and Europe. All the way to victory."[xii]Perplexity and cataclysm in the left-wing campThe goodwill and the euphoria prevailing in some quarters on the right contrasts with the reactions on the left in France. Social Democrat Raphael Glucksmann, Member of the European Parliament, described Donald Trump's election as a "global catastrophe" and a "nightmare for democracy, human rights and Europe".[xiii] The leader of the French Greens, part of the left-wing New Popular Front in the National Assembly, Marine Tondelier, expressed courage to the American citizens in the face of the "spreading hell".[xiv] Jean-Luc Mélénchon, founder of the left-wing populist party La France Insoumise, said that Trump's election was a consequence of a non-existent left-wing alternative in the US elections.[xv]Appeal to European and Franco-German cooperationHowever, the initial reactions were followed by Emmanuel Macron's direct appeal to Germany and Europe to come together and tackle the challenges of the future."I have just had an exchange with Chancellor @OlafScholz. We will work for a more united, stronger and sovereign Europe in this new context. By working together with the United States of America and defending our interests and values."[xvi]For Macron, a return to Franco-German cooperation is essential for a united, sovereign and independent Europe. This is also in line with the line taken by Friedrich Merz, who on election day in the USA, in a widely read guest article in the French daily newspaper Le Monde, lamented the European Union's constant hesitation in helping Ukraine and accused it of not sufficiently distancing itself from the Americans.[xvii] As early as November 7, the European summit hosted by Viktor Orbán in Hungary - a fervent supporter of Trump - will be about demonstrating this European unity.But Germany and France in particular must now show, regardless of the fact that both countries are in crisis mode, that they are once again moving closer together in this sense.References[i] https://www.leparisien.fr/international/israel/guerre-au-proche-orient-jean-noel-barrot-sera-en-israel-et-dans-les-territoires-palestiniens-ce-mercredi-05-11-2024-BAYPPARFV5DPBJ2HN5GLA7SXHE.php (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[ii]https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/10/16/les-tensions-entre-emmanuel-macron-et-benyamin-netanyahou-montent-d-un-cran-apres-les-propos-du-president-francais-sur-la-creation-d-israel-par-l-onu_6353358_3210.html (Aufruf 5. November 2024).[iii]https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/22-DGAP-MEMO-US2024_Jacob_DE.pdf (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[iv]https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/discours-sur-leurope (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[v]https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2024/10/30/vu-de-washington-le-maintien-de-100-000-personnels-en-europe-ne-va-pas-de-soi-une-conversation-avec-muriel-domenach-ancienne-ambassadrice-a-lotan/ (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[vi]https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/12/01/emmanuel-macron-blasts-joe-biden-subsidies-in-state-visit_6006235_4.html (Aufruf: 4. November 2024).[vii]https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1854073283420754221 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[viii]https://www.europe1.fr/international/presidentielle-americaine-leurope-doit-prendre-son-destin-en-main-reagit-la-porte-parole-du-gouvernement-francais-4277243 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[ix]https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/11/02/donald-trump-l-encombrant-modele-du-rassemblement-national_6372584_3210.html (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[x]https://x.com/J_Bardella/status/1854084071858876485 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xi]https://x.com/MLP_officiel/status/1854083504700600705 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xii]https://x.com/eciotti/status/1854060752946245644 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xiii]https://www.instagram.com/p/DCBWcJBsUgp/?img_index=1 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xiv]https://www.europe1.fr/international/presidentielle-americaine-leurope-doit-prendre-son-destin-en-main-reagit-la-porte-parole-du-gouvernement-francais-4277243 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xv]https://www.leparisien.fr/international/etats-unis/enfer-qui-se-profile-espoir-pour-la-paix-de-lfi-au-rn-les-reactions-des-politiques-francais-a-lelection-de-trump-06-11-2024-FP4V4HGZUZGOFGAQEOVGMST5F4.php (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xvi]Emmanuel Macron, https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1854075136468521077 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xvii]https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/11/05/friedrich-merz-president-de-la-cdu-la-politique-etrangere-et-de-securite-europeenne-est-dans-un-etat-de-desolation_6377309_3232.html (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).