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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском To What Extent has it Increased and how has This Been Achieved? Abstract In February 2022, Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has to date continued for more than two years. In response, Western countries imposed increasingly strict sanctions. The Russian Armed Forces lost a significant quantity of armaments and by the autumn of 2022, the government faced the challenge of increasing sharply the production of weapons and munitions. Julian Cooper analyses the extent to which the challenge has been met, reviewing the available quantitative evidence in detail. His analysis confirms that there have been significant increases in the output of systems and munitions used extensively in the war. The author explores the means by which defence industry output has been increased and draws conclusions as to the nature of the Russian economic system and the institutional legacies of Soviet times. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine and this has been ongoing for over two years. In response, Western countries imposed increasingly severe sanctions in an attempt to constrain the development of the Russian economy and limit the ability of its industry to produce weapons. This is done by restricting access to imported high technology and dual-use goods, production equipment, components and materials. It soon became evident that the invasion had not gone according to Russia’s original expectations of a rapid operation. Instead, a protracted conflict developed with heavy losses in both human and material terms for both sides. The Russian Armed Forces lost a significant quantity of armaments, in particular tanks and armoured vehicles, artillery and air defence systems, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. By the autumn of 2022, the Russian government faced the challenge of increasing sharply the production of weapons and munitions vital to the successful completion of the operation which, though not acknowledged in Russia, had become a war. This article explores the extent to which Russia has been able to meet this challenge at a time when its defence industry is experiencing sanctions and a range of economic constrains, not least a shortage of labour exacerbated by a partial mobilisation of personnel to serve in the armed forces. The article comprises four parts. The first looks at the methods of measuring the output of the Russian defence industry. The second examines the available quantitative data in physical terms. The third section seeks to explain how it has been possible for Russia to increase significantly the output of some types of weapons and munitions in a relatively brief period of time. Finally, some conclusions are drawn as to Russia’s ability to adapt its defence industry to wartime conditions, and prospects for the future. Measuring the Output of the Russian Defence Industry In Soviet times, the production of weapons, munitions and other military-related goods was shrouded in almost total secrecy. This relaxed to some extent after the end of the Soviet Union, but to this day, Russia’s official statistical agency, the Federal Service for State Statistics, generally known as Rosstat, does not openly publish data on the military output of the country’s defence industry. However, this secrecy has its limits as the defence minister and other senior officials of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), in particular the deputy minister responsible for arms procurement, do release data on the output of some weapon systems, annual targets for the state defence order, and information on implementation, as will become clear later in this article. However, since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the volume and level of detail have diminished and even more so since February 2022. In addition, President Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, the minister for industry and his deputies also reveal details from time to time, as do the heads and other leaders of corporate structures producing military goods, such as Rostekh, Roscosmos, the United Aircraft Corporation (OAK) and the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK). A study of the data covering many years indicates that on the whole, the data released is reliable, with misrepresentation but no evident falsification. But one has to be alert to changes in the definitions employed, in particular whether the figures given apply to the output of new systems only, or to the total procurement of new, modernised and repaired older systems, an issue that has become significant since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Earlier works of the present author have sometimes focused on detailed analyses of quantitative data of this nature.1 In recent times, some observers have questioned the reliability of this type of information. An April 2024 CSIS report on Russia’s defence industry declared that, ‘While … the official data and statements from the Russian MOD are most likely exaggerated, and therefore should be taken with a grain of salt, they demonstrate the Kremlin has placed renewed emphasis on strengthening the domestic defence industrial sector’.2 While exaggerated statements are indeed often made, the degree of scepticism expressed is overstated in relation to the data. Undoubtedly, great care is needed in its analysis, but it still provides, as accepted by the authors of the CSIS report, a good overall picture of the general trend of development of military production. There is also an additional check on this, namely Rosstat’s regular reports of changes in the output of the manufacturing industry in rouble terms.3 Again, careful analysis is required with an informed knowledge of the industrial classification used, but the overall trends revealed reflect those provided by the quantitative data available from other sources. At a time when quantitative data on various aspects of the Russia economy is being strictly limited by the Russian authorities, not least on budget spending and foreign trade flows, it is better to have imperfect and fragmentary data than none at all. Measuring the Output of Military Goods in Physical Terms Reports of the output of military goods often appear in Russian media, though the data tends to be fragmented, often lacking precise definition and timescales. There are also similar reports of the output of civilian goods manufactured by defence industry companies. This section examines this evidence in detail from 2019, three years before the start of the Ukraine war, until the end of 2023, and plans for 2024, paying particular attention to the types of military goods that have played a significant role in the current combat. Every year in December, the Russian MoD reports on some of the new weapons procured during the year and plans for the following year. This evidence is presented in Table 1, in the Appendix section at the end of this article. From the table, it can be seen that since 2020, plans for the deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) have not been fully implemented, probably because of the failure to develop the Sarmat heavy missile to a point when it can be put into service. The acquisition of Borei-class strategic nuclear submarines has proceeded fairly smoothly and modernised/new Tu-160 strategic bombers are gradually entering service. These developments and the MoD’s procedure for reporting plans and outcomes leave no doubt that in Russia, the development and procurement of strategic nuclear systems remains the highest priority regardless of the war. Taking into account the military technology priorities of the war, it is probably best to consider the production of weapons on a sector-by-sector basis. Clearly, the war has given rise to a greatly increased demand for equipment and munitions for the ground forces, some types of combat aircraft and UAVs, certain types of missiles, air defence systems and electronic warfare systems. Demand for new naval vessels has been less urgent with the exception of nuclear submarines. Aircraft For the aircraft industry, the trend is clear. The production of some types of planes and helicopters found to be of value in the war has increased. However, data from 2020 onwards refers to both new aircraft and modernised older ones, making it very difficult to establish the number of the former. In the case of combat systems, the evidence indicates increased production of a few models, for example the Su-35S and Su-34, considered vital to the war and in one case, the Su-57, considered important for status reasons. Table 2 summarises the available data for 2019–23. The Su-57 is Russia’s first ‘fifth’ generation aircraft, although all serially built examples so far have an engine that is not really one of that status. It is a matter of great pride to the Russian leadership, although it has played only a modest role in the war. In the view of a leading Russian military specialist, the very costly and complex fifth generation aircraft ‘as yet are still absolutely not suited to real combat use …. The loss of a fifth-generation plane is on the one hand, a large financial loss, and a significant reputational loss’.4 Helicopters As for helicopters, it is very difficult to establish the number built for use by the armed forces in recent years. The building of civilian helicopters has been quite seriously affected by sanctions but this appears not to be the case for the main combat systems, the Ka-52/52M and the Mi-28NM. The Russian Air Force signed a contract for the former in August 2021, with 15 to be delivered in 2022 and another 15 in 2023. A new contract for an undisclosed number was signed in the summer of 2022. In July 2023, then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the volume of production of the Ka-52/52M had doubled compared with the preceding year, suggesting there were 30 planned for 2023.5 Serial production of the Mi-28NM started in 2020 and in that year a contract was signed for 98 units under the state armament programme to 2027.6 Shoigu also said in July 2023 that production of the Mi-28NM had increased three-fold from 2022, which in the view of a leading specialist on Russian aviation, Piotr Butowski, probably meant a target of up to 50 in 2023.7 One analyst concluded after a detailed study of the evidence that the armed forces received a total of 110 helicopters in 2022 against a plan for the year of 71, and actual deliveries of 48 in 2021, with a possible total of up to 125 units supplied in 2023.8 UAVs The evidence for the number of drones built is not easy to interpret as it depends on the type and scale of UAV that is being counted. There is no doubt that the number produced has increased sharply since 2020 when less than 1,000 were made. It appears that in the year 2022 the number increased to only a modest extent but then surged in 2023, reaching more than 20,000.9 This total almost certainly excludes the small first-person-view (FPV) type drones, now in large-scale use at the frontline on both sides and being assembled at quite a few locations in Russia, with components mainly imported from China. The two main types of Russian UAV that have had an impact on the battlefield are the Orlan family of reconnaissance drones, developed and built by the Special Technology Centre in St Petersburg, and the Lancet loitering system of Zala Aero, part of the Kalashnikov Concern. Both companies have been active in acquiring a range of Western components for their UAVs. The widely used Orlan-10, for example, has a small petrol engine built by Saito, a Japanese company.10 Naval Equipment The production of new naval equipment has not been a priority during the war apart from the building of nuclear submarines, the output of which is shown in Table 1. The handover of new naval vessels has been somewhat erratic, with the tendency to bunch in certain years. This has been partly because the building of surface ships in recent years has been disrupted to some extent by problems of engine supply. The building of Project 11356 frigates was abandoned when Ukraine stopped supplying power units. Ukrainian engines were also to be fitted to Project 22350 frigates, but in this case Russia managed to replace the engine and reduction gearing, permitting the hand over in 2023 of the Admiral Golovko.11 Project 21631 small missile ships originally had German engines but the supply ended in 2014. It was first decided that a Chinese engine would be used instead, but it was not suited for a naval ship, resulting in long delays before a domestically built alternative was developed.12 Similar problems appeared for Project 22800 Karakurt-class small missile ships, and at one point it appeared that they could end up with Chinese power units. However, those proved not to be adequate and a Russian replacement was found but not before there were delays in completing ships under construction.13 Project 22160 patrol boats were originally designed to have German MAN diesel engines and the first boat handed over in 2018 was fitted with one, but later ones, with some delay, had new Russian-built power units.14 Ground Forces Munitions Turning to the production of weapons and munitions for the ground forces, the availability of reliable quantitative evidence is more problematic, as it is often fragmentary, lacking definition and with growth figures between periods without adequate specification of dates. Table 3 summarises the available evidence. Tanks The data on the output of tanks has not been easy to assess. There are three categories: newly built ones, in recent times the T-90 and a few T-14 Armata; modernised older tanks, T-72 and T-80; and old tanks removed from storage, the T-54, which have undergone what the Russian MoD calls ‘capital repair’. Since the start of the war in 2022, any total given by the MoD is an aggregate figure covering all three. Main tank producer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) builds the T-90 and Armata, plus the modernised T-72, while modernised T-80 tanks are built by Omsktransmash, an affiliate of the UVZ holding company. Work on the renovation of older tanks is undertaken by Russian tank repair works, the output of which is hardly ever revealed.15 The Russian MoD said that in 2021, its ground forces were to receive more than 240 new and modernised T-72B3M, T-80BVM and T-90M Proryv tanks.16 The number of new T-90M was reported to be set at 70 units, with the remaining 170 tanks being modernised.17 This provides a base for assessing more recent data. In 2023, a total of 1,530 new, modernised and refurbished tanks were produced, which, according to the MoD, is a 3.6 times increase from the preceding year. This suggests an output of about 425 units in 2022, 1.8 times the 240 of 2021. Interestingly, in March 2023, deputy chair of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, declared that 1,500 tanks would be made in that year,18 followed a few days later by Putin, who said over 1,600 new and modernised tanks would be produced.19 Observers were quick to note that the total must include older tanks withdrawn from reserves, but were puzzled as to how many new tanks would be built. Military specialist Roman Skomorokhov, in a review of potential industrial manufacturers of tanks, concluded that in the short term, UVZ was the only manufacturer able to build new tanks, with a possible output of 500–600 a year at best.20 It is unlikely that UVZ has managed to build such a large number of tanks, especially when part of its production shop for tanks is being used to build small volumes of complex Armata systems. According to one anonymous source within Rostekh, the capacity of UVZ in October 2022 was 200–250 tanks.21 The work of Omsktransmash building modernised T-80s must be taken into account as well. In 2017, the factory received a contract to modernise 62 units of T-80BV to T-80BVM level and delivered 31 in 2018 and another 31 in 2019.22 In August 2020, there was a new contract for the modernisation of more than 50 T-80BVM tanks but no information has been revealed on its completion date or on the scale of additional contracts.23 However, in the autumn of 2023, Aleksandr Potapov, general director of UVZ, to which the Omsktransmash factory belongs, revealed that the MoD had called for the resumption of the serial production of T-80 tanks from scratch, an activity not undertaken since the 1970s.24 It is not known whether that has been implemented. Meanwhile, there have been several reports of the delivery to the front of batches of modernised T-80BVM. This suggests that in 2023, Omsktransmash and UVZ may have produced around 350 new and modernised tanks out of the total output of 1,530, meaning around 1,200 old tanks have undergone capital repair. This accords well with an IISS estimate of 1,180–1,280 units based on it monitoring the work of storage bases in Russia using commercial overhead imagery.25 As for the new T-14 Armata, Aleksei Krivoruchko, MoD deputy defence minister, said in August 2021 that the army would get 20 of them by the end of the year, with serial production set to start in 2022.26 There were reports in 2023 that it had been sent to the front to see action but there was little visible evidence to support this.27 There was speculation that it was found too complex and costly to risk using in real combat conditions and this was confirmed in early 2024 by the general-director of Rostekh, Sergei Chemezov, who said that it was not being used in the ‘special military operation’ zone because of its high cost and noted that it was cheaper for the army to buy T-90 tanks.28 Not surprisingly, this generated some scathing press comment about Russia’s preference for costly ‘parades’ and ‘white elephant’ tanks of no use in combat.29 Armoured Vehicles There are similar difficulties in assessing the output of armoured vehicles. The term usually covers infantry fighting vehicles (BMP) and armoured personnel carriers (BTR). However, sometimes it is extended to include armoured vehicles of the airborne forces like the BMD-4M and older Soviet systems such as the MT-LB. Many of these vehicles have been accumulated in the reserve stores of the MoD. Before the war, the annual output of armoured vehicles appears to have been modest, but it was stepped up quite rapidly in the second half of 2022 and more intensively in 2023, when, according to Shoigu, a total of 2,518 units of new, modernised and repaired machines was acquired. The new ones will have been BMP-3s built by the Kurganmashzavod company, which also produces modernised BMP-2 and now batches of repaired BMP-3. From the late summer of 2022, the factory has been working a six-day week in 12-hour shifts. It claimed that in the first half of 2023, it produced 95% of the total armoured vehicle output achieved in 2022 and planned to increase output by another 30% in the second half of 2023.30 New BTR-82A armoured personnel carriers are produced by the Arzamas Machine-building Factory of the Voennaya-Promyshlennaya Kompaniya (also known as Military Industrial Company). The earlier model, the BTR-80, is modernised by a repair factory to become the BTR-82AM. In 2020, the MoD ordered a total of at least 460 of both types, including 130 new BTR-82A. In addition, it planned to repair and refurbish 330 old BTR-80 units from reserves.31 In 2021, another order was made for more than 300 BTR-82A and BTR-82AM.32 In late 2021, it was announced that in spring 2022, state testing was to begin for the Bumerang armoured transporter first seen in 2015. It is not known if this happened, but in March 2023, there were sightings of a few Bumerang being transported to near the warzone. However, there were no reports of its use in combat and it may well be that this new system, like the Armata tank, was considered to be too complex and costly to be put into service in the war.33 Artillery Unfortunately, detailed information on the volume of production of artillery systems is not available. Occasionally, the MoD does report a total figure for missile systems and artillery (raketnye kompleksy i artilleriya). In 2018, a total of more than 120 units was reported, which included Kornet and Khrizantema-SP anti-tanks systems, Msta-SM howitzers, Iskander-M, and Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles. In 2020, the number increased to 551 units and in 2023, showed a very significant increase to more than 4,250 units.34 There are large stocks of old artillery systems so this total probably includes many that were restored for use during the year. The production of artillery is undertaken by several enterprises, with the largest producers consisting of: Perm Motovilikhinskiye Zavody, making a range of systems including 152-mm howitzers Msta-B and D-20, and 120-mm self-propelled systems Nona-S, Nona-SVK, Vena and the 240-mm Tyul’pan; and Volgograd Titan-Barrikady, making launch systems for the Iskander-M and the Bereg and Bastion shore naval artillery complexes.35 In addition, there is the Ekaterinburg Factory No. 9 imeni Kalinina, under Rostekh, producing barrel artillery systems, including the Soviet-era towed D-30A howitzer and guns for T-72 and T-90 tanks; Uraltransmash making the Msta-S 152-mm self-propelled howitzer widely used in the war; and UVZ making the 152-mm self-propelled Malva, developed by the Burevestnik Central Scientific Research Institute.36 Munitions and Missiles A final category of systems produced for the armed forces is munitions and missiles, sometimes summarised in Russian sources as means of destruction (sredstva porazheniya). This includes explosives, cartridges for small arms, artillery shells of various calibres, bombs, mines, missiles for multiple rocket launchers (MLRS), anti-tank systems, air defence systems and operational systems such as the Iskander-M. Given the wide range of products made by different branches of the defence industry, assembling data is extremely difficult, but munitions are clearly of such importance for Russia’s war effort that the topic merits treatment in some detail. To begin, it is probably easiest to start with the branch usually termed in Russian as munitions and special chemicals (boepripasy i spetskhimiya), which produces cartridges, shells, explosives, fuel for missiles and other chemicals. The munitions industry in Russia has been problematic since 1992. During the 1990s and early 2000s, there was little investment in the sector, and production volumes shrank rapidly, resulting in some enterprises closing down. Production equipment aged steadily, and many experienced personnel left the sector. A fundamental problem has been the vast spare capacities maintained in order to rapidly expand production in the event of a war. This appears to have been the case until recent times. According to the specialist on defence matters, Viktor Murakhovskii, more than 70% of capacity was for mobilisation. If state support for this was inadequate, enterprises would become loss making.37 For this reason, quite a few munitions plants were made so-called federal ‘treasury’ (kazennyi) enterprises, with guaranteed budget support regardless of their economic performance, thereby enabling them to keep reserve capacities. Many munitions enterprises are under the state corporation Rostekh and its holding Tekhnologiya Mashinostroeniya (Tekhmash), with its management company Tekhnodinamika. In late 2021, Rostekh had more than 30 enterprises and institutes engaged in the development and production of a wide range of munitions.38 In late 2022 and early 2023, there was mounting evidence of official concern that the domestic munitions industry was not adequately meeting the demand of the armed forces engaged in the war. Then Minister of Trade and Industry and Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov acknowledged that for a long time the munitions branch of the defence industry had been producing in limited quantities simply to top up stocks. He claimed, however, that in 2022, the volume of output of some munitions had increased from three to 10 times but more needed to be done.39 This prompted a number of military journalists to openly discuss the fact that very high rates of use of some munitions, notably those for artillery systems, had run down stocks necessitating prompt action to maintain supplies.40 At the end of December 2022, there was some decisive action to bring order to the munitions industry. A presidential edict was issued for 14 of the most prominent companies of the branch, including several treasury enterprises, to be transferred to the Rostekh state corporation for conversion into joint stock companies with 100% federal ownership. This was followed by a government order for its implementation. The list included the Kazan, Perm and Tambov (Kotovsk) powder factories and leading munitions producers such as the Kazan factory of precision machine building, Samara Kommunar works, Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Sverdlova and Avangard of Sterlitamak, Bashkortostan.41 The aim was clearly to improve their management and modernise them as quickly as possible, drawing on the considerable experience of Rostekh in turning round failing enterprises. Whether this move will enhance the industry’s ability to meet the urgent needs of the war remains to be seen. In May 2023, it was reported that Tekhmash had more than 50 enterprises, suggesting a quite sizeable expansion to meet increased wartime needs.42 From about September 2022, there were reports of factories switching to multi-shift work and hiring additional workers including at the Perm powder works. It is probably significant that soon after, it was also reported that the military production division (the Special Design Bureau (SKB)) of the nearby Motovilikhinskie Zavody, which builds MLRS, was doing the same.43 A major concern has been the production of large-calibre artillery shells, in particular 152 and 122mm shells for artillery systems, 125 and 115mm for tank guns and 120 and 82mm for mortars. The production of artillery shells involves division of labour, with some enterprises producing explosives or shell casings and others doing both. Leading producers include Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Ya M Sverdlova, with a branch in Biisk united with Biissk Oleumnyi Zavod. The factory is a basic producer of large calibre fragmentation munitions and also a leading producer of HMX (octogen) and hexogen. The Kopeisk Zavod Plastmass builds munitions as its basic activity, while the casings for them are made by Kirov Zavod Sel’mash, a large multi-product enterprise of Tekhnodinamika. Some enterprises involved in the production of large-calibre shells underwent enlargement in recent years. The Verkhneturinskii Mekhanicheskii Zavod (VTMZ) of Tekhnodinamika built a new shop to make artillery shell casings for field and tank artillery. It was estimated that it would result in a 150% increase in production for the state defence order after the shops were in full operation by the end of 2021.44 Kopeisk Zavod Plastmass created a new automated shop for the assembly of 100 to 152mm munitions for tank, field and ship guns before the war started, which was designed to secure a 150% increase in output. The plan was for the shop to be completed and put into action by 2023.45 Both these cases raise an interesting question: did Rostekh receive signals prior to the war that some expansion of capacities was desirable? Another type in high demand has been missiles for MLRS. The main developer and manufacturer of MLRS has long been the Tula NPO Splav imeni A N Ganicheva, which also produces missiles for them. Its products include the Grad, Uragan and Smerch systems and modified variants, the Tornado-G and Tornado-S. In July 2020, the CEO of Rostekh opened a new shop at Splav for the production of munitions for MLRS, but reports did not indicate its capacity.46 In early 2024, the factory was visited by Defence Minister Shoigu and it was reported that new capacity introduced into service in 2023 had made possible a fourfold increase in the production of munitions for MLRS.47 Another class of munitions is those for the mobile ballistic missile system Iskander-M (9K720). This operational–tactical system, which has a range of warheads including a nuclear option, was developed by the Kolomna Scientific Production Corporation Design Bureau of Machine Building. Missiles for it are developed by the Ekaterinburg OKB Novator and produced by the Votkinsk Machine-Building Factory. Sources did not indicate the volume of production of the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, also developed by OKB Novator. Russia has a distinct class of equipment for the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops (RChBD). In 2023, this amounted to 150 units of equipment, including the TOS-1A Solntsepek heavy thermobaric rocket launch system produced by Omsktransmash.48 When visiting the factory in April 2024, Shoigu was informed that the volume produced in 2023 had grown by 2.5 times by increasing capacity and round-the-clock work.49 According to Shoigu speaking in February 2024, the volume of production of munitions for it has been increased by 12 times.50 The producer has not been identified. In April 2024, a new longer-range system, the TOS-3 Drakon, was reported to be on the eve of final testing prior to serial production.51 Another class of munitions often used in Ukraine are bombs launched from aircraft. Data is lacking on the volume produced but developments are sometimes discussed in the media, including the work of certain enterprises, although their identity is not always revealed. In March 2024, Shoigu visited enterprises in Nizhegorodsk Oblast producing bombs and shells for artillery and tanks. One factory, clearly distinguishable as Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Y M Sverdlova, a very large producer of shells and bombs, was producing the heavy aviation bomb FAB-500 and reported significant increases in the scale of output, a doubling of the FAB-1500 output, and, in February 2024, the start of ‘mass production’ of the three-tonne high-explosive FAB-3000 which dates back to Soviet times and is intended for destroying highly protected targets, both industrial and military.52 The Dzerzhinsk factory is also bringing back into use from reserves the most powerful of all Soviet/Russian conventional artillery shells, the Tyul’pan 240-mm mortar, in use in the war against very heavily fortified structures.53 It was claimed in March 2024 that the enterprise, which in 2023 was taken into Rostekh, had over the past year achieved a fivefold increase in the volume of production of artillery shells and aviation bombs by bringing conserved capacities back into use and installing new equipment.54 Civilian Goods Finally, a brief look is taken at the output of civil and dual-use goods of importance to the economy during the war, some manufactured by companies of the defence industry. Table 4 presents evidence of the changing output of some important civilian goods from 2019–23. The table shows the impact of sanctions in 2022 and 2023 but also perhaps in some cases the fact that priority for military production has caused diminished focus on civil goods or, in the case of rail freight wagons built by UVZ, reduced output because of the transfer of some capacity to basic military goods, tanks and armoured vehicles. The building of civilian passenger aircraft has been very seriously affected by sanctions which have deprived almost all aircraft that were built earlier of their power units. To some extent, the same applies to helicopter and ship production. Sanctions probably also account for the reduced output of trucks, excavators and also integrated circuits, the production of which is to some extent dependent on imported materials and gases. But the machine tool industry that was already reviving after the sanctions imposed in 2014 has shown new growth, with increased output of both metal-cutting and metal-forming machines in both 2022 and 2023. Russia remains dependent to a significant extent on imported machine tools, but now these are supplied mainly by Chinese companies rather than those of Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan or the US. In 2021, 69% of imported metal-cutting and - forming machine tools came from ‘unfriendly’ countries, which dropped to 39% in 2022, while China’s share increased from 22% to 46%.55 Paths to Increasing the Output of Military Hardware The data assembled raises an interesting question: how has it been possible for the Russian defence industry to increase the output of some weapons and munitions to a significant extent in a relatively brief period of time? This is a topic that requires additional research but a number of paths can be identified. One factor has clearly been the policy turn in the autumn of 2022 to change the institutions responsible for leading and managing the work of the defence industry. Before that, fulfilling the state defence order for new weapons and the modernisation and repair of older systems had been the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, working with Rostekh, Rosatom, Roskosmos and other corporate bodies involved in military work, and with the MoD as the principal customer, actively monitoring the implementation of contracts. Overall responsibility for policy was in the hands of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) with the president of Russia as its chair. Since the war, there have been significant changes. In 2022, there was not a single VPK meeting with Putin as chair; indeed, he has not chaired a VPK meeting since 2017. Instead, Putin had three meetings with representatives of the defence industry, the first in September 2022 with a number of enterprise leaders, the second in December of the same year, and the third in May 2024 with some enterprise leaders and new ministers.56 The focus of the VPK has always been the state defence order for weapons, not other aspects of supplies to the armed forces, such as uniforms, food, fuel, lubricants and medicines. With the adoption of partial mobilisation, it quickly became clear that the rapid build up of deliveries of these non-weapon items presented a serious challenge. This almost certainly accounts for the decision by Putin in October 2022 to create a new structure to ensure that all necessary supplies for the special military operation were produced and delivered. A Coordination Council of the government was formed with the aim of meeting needs appearing in the pursuit of the war, including the delivery and repair of armaments, uniforms, medical–sanitary provision, repair and reconstruction work and logistics. The council is chaired by the prime minister and its participants are representatives of all the main ‘power’ ministries – MoD, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Emergency Situations, Rosgvard, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, the Main Directorate of Special Programmes (responsible for ensuring the survival of the government in the event of war by creating and managing secure bunkers, so-called ‘special objects’), and some other federal ministries.57 The Coordination Council met six times in 2022, nine times in 2023 and once in the first two months of 2024. It discussed a wide range of issues relating to the production and delivery of equipment to the forces engaged in the war with the participation of the relevant government agencies and the leaders of departments of the government’s own central office.58 It appears to be a body that monitors production and deliveries and decides on prompt action if problems are identified. Another official monitoring the work of the defence industry and the implementation of the state defence order is Dmitrii Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council and first deputy chair of the VPK. He was appointed to the post by Putin in December 2022 with the job of leading a working group to monitor the production and delivery of armaments to the armed forces. There have been visits by Medvedev and sometimes the working group to quite a few defence enterprises, including UVZ and Omsktransmash, to examine tank building. He has also visited producers of munitions and missile and in March 2024, visited Tambovskii Porokhovoi Zavod (Tambov Gunpowder Plant), a major producer of explosives, where the working group discussed investment plans.59 Given that Medvedev is independent of the government and the MoD, it is possible that Putin felt the need for another set of eyes and ears to check on both and report directly to himself. Not surprisingly, the monitoring of arms production is also a concern of the MoD and its minister, Shoigu (replaced in mid-May 2024), who has quite often visited companies considered vital to the war and national security more generally. In early 2024, he visited the Ekaterinburg Uraltransmash works for the production of artillery systems, where he sharply criticised the chief designer for delays in bringing new models into production.60 He also visited the Dubna Raduga design bureau of the Tactical Missile Corporation (KTRV) responsible for a range of air-launched cruise missiles. There, he called for longer-range missiles and increased production.61 In March 2024, it was clear Russia was concerned about the production of munitions. As noted above, Shoigu visited the Dzerzhinsk Zavod imeni Sverdlova and shortly after, as reported by the MoD, the ‘defence enterprises in Altai krai’.62 As is often the case, the local media were more forthcoming. They reported that in the same month, he also visited Biisk Oleumnyi Zavod, which produces explosives and is affiliated to the Dzherzhinsk works, and a major producer of munitions, Biisk Sibpribormash, a large volume supplier of a range of shells, bombs, cartridges and missiles for MLRS. At the former, he made clear his dissatisfaction with its rate of building new production facilities to double its capacity, and at the latter, he was informed that the volume of output had increased 3.5 times from 2022, about 300 new machine tools had been installed and an additional 1,600 workers taken on.63 In 2023, his visits included the Arsen’ev Progress works to check on the production of Ka-52M combat helicopters.64 While there has been some stability in the staffing of leading posts in the defence industry, the same cannot be said of the MoD in relation to logistics and securing the delivery of equipment and munitions to the front. Since the war started in February 2022, there have been four different deputy ministers for logistics, or ‘material and technical supply’ as it is known in Russia. First there was Dmitrii Bulgakov, in post for 12 years until dismissed in September 2022. He was replaced by Mikhail Mizintsev, the chief of the National Management Centre for Defence, but he resigned in April 2023 and was replaced by Aleksei Kuz’mentsev, appointed from the troops of the National Guard but with a background in logistics. He was in post for less than a year and in March 2024 was replaced by Andrei Bulygin, whose MoD career from 2011 was in logistics.65 When Russia decided to boost the output of certain weapons and munitions, some companies rapidly introduced multi-shift work and under the mobilisation conditions imposed on the defence sector, workers had little choice but to adapt to more demanding working regimes, often working weekends or during public holidays. At the end of 2022, workers in large enterprises of the defence industry of the Sverdlovsk region were working a six-day work week, of up to 12 hours per day, compensated by increased pay.66 This policy option is advantageous in that it probably required modest changes in the production equipment installed. It also appears that in quite a few cases, output was also increased by bringing into use spare capacities and making more intensive use of production shops. In addition, some civilian enterprises were engaged in supplying components to defence companies: according to Manturov, 850 companies are now participating in this.67 A path not often discussed openly but possibly very important in some branches of the defence industry is the bringing into operation of reserve mobilisation capacities. As this author has discussed in detail in a 2016 publication,68 Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a very elaborate system of mobilisation preparation in the event of war with the creation and maintenance of large reserve capacities at many industrial enterprises, stockpiles of materials and components and state mobilisation reserves of weapons, munitions, production equipment, fuel and other goods considered vital in a war or other national emergency. The system underwent reform in the 1990s and 2000s, to some extent reducing its scale and focusing it on a more limited set of defence-related companies considered essential to the country’s military capability. It has remained shrouded in secrecy. The evidence suggests that the enterprises most likely to retain mobilisation capacities were those producing munitions, missiles, ground forces equipment and certain types of aircraft and air defence systems. During the war there have been occasional explicit references to bringing mobilisation capacities into operation. In December 2022, at a meeting of the Coordination Council, Premier Mikhail Mishustin noted that during the previous two months, the government had adopted a number of normative acts for the introduction of ‘special measures’ in the economy for securing a steady flow of deliveries relating to the special military operation. They had opened up the possibility for the lead executors of the state defence order to use the entire production and technological potential, ‘including the partial or full de-conservation of mobilisation capacities and objects’.69 Another path of increasing the volume of deliveries to the armed forces is probably the release of so-called ‘emergency reserves’ (neprikosnovennykh zapasov). These reserves, part of the general mobilisation system, include many goods considered vital in a war or emergency, including foodstuffs, medicines, fuel and materials, but also materiel and systems of armament for the armed forces. The nature and volume of these reserves, managed by the Federal Agency for State Reserves, has always been a matter of extremely strict secrecy and those relating to the armed forces are rarely discussed openly.70 An exception was in 2022 when an issue of the MoD journal Vooruzhenie i ekonomika published an article on the role of the reserves, making it clear that they include stocks of weapons and other military equipment created in peacetime in order to secure the mobilisation and strategic deployment of the armed forces, especially during the early period of a war.71 It is stressed that older weapons, though often less effective than new ones, can still have military value, so keeping them in reserve, plus having munitions for them, remains important. The authors suggested that the funding of emergency reserves of armament and other material means should be at least one third of the amount of funding devoted to procurement under the state defence order.72 Interestingly, a January 2024 Ukrainian intelligence assessment of Russian missile and artillery ammunition production noted that ‘they are now trying to maintain a certain strategic reserve. As a rule this is about 30%’.73 After initial serious setbacks when the expected rapid success of the invasion of Ukraine failed to materialise, and once the Ukrainian counter-offensive also did not bring decisive results, Russia proved to be resourceful in adapting to a different form of warfare, attritional rather than a war of manoeuvre. Indeed, as has been argued by Alex Vershinin, Russia has probably adapted to a protracted war of attrition more successfully than Ukraine and its NATO allies.74 The Soviet Union produced, in the main, relatively simple, low-cost but rugged equipment in large quantities and maintained substantial stocks in the event of war. The Soviet leadership, civil and military, was well aware that Western countries, especially the US, produced more costly, higher technology conventional weapons. This thinking lived on in post-communist Russia and stocks were retained though on a smaller scale. The production of new weapons for a long time was focused on upgrades of Soviet systems but from about 2010, attempts to develop some new, higher technology systems began to increase and the country’s political, military and industrial leaders clearly took pride in these very expensive new developments as symbols of Russia’s regained status as a great power. At the same time, as discussed above, the basic elements of the Soviet system of mobilisation to prepare for war were also kept intact though reduced in scale. In Vershinin’s words, ‘Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win’.75 In May 2024, a new Russia government was approved, with significant changes in personnel concerned with defence and arms production. Sergei Shoigu was appointed secretary of the Security Council and Putin’s deputy leader of the Military-Industrial Commission, replaced as defence minister by Andrei Belousov, previously first deputy prime minister and a career economist with no direct experience of the military. He was replaced as first deputy premier by Denis Manturov, previously industry minister overseeing the defence industry; this position is now occupied by Anton Alikhanov, previously governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast. Putin gains two assistants in the Presidential Administration responsible for oversight of the defence industry: Aleksey Dyumin, previously governor of the Tula region, where the major concentration of defence industry companies is; and Nikolai Patrushev, formerly Security Council secretary, who will monitor the shipbuilding industry.76 Dyumin has been appointed to both the Coordination Council and the VPK.77 These changes indicate a determination to maintain the war effort, spend the military budget in a cost-effective manner, and ensure that needed weapons and munitions are produced and delivered to the forces in an effective manner. This is a government for a protracted war of attrition. Conclusion Since the start of the war, Western perceptions of Russia’s capabilities have undergone gradual change. At first there was much talk of military incompetence, an economy likely to falter and perhaps eventually collapse as sanctions mounted, and armed forces rapidly losing equipment and facing a munitions famine. But as Ukraine’s counter-offensive failed to make much progress and Russia’s forces dug in for a long war, attitudes began to change, and this was accompanied by an awareness that Russia’s economy was performing with greater vigour than expected, notwithstanding sanctions, achieving 3.6% growth in 2023.78 By the second half of that year, it also became apparent that weapons and munitions were still being supplied to Russian troops at the front in increasing quantity, a reality confirmed by the analysis of this article. There should be no surprise that Russia has come through the war as it has. After all, as Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes wrote in June 2014 during the first round of Russian combat with Ukraine, Russia is resilient: ‘Much is made of the alleged weakness of today’s Russian economy. This notion that the Russian economy is somehow fragile is the backbone of the sanctions argument. But inefficiency – which definitely does characterize Russia’s economy – is not the same as fragility. The very features of the Russian economy that account for its inefficiency and lack of competitiveness in the global economy are also its strengths in term of robustness to shocks’. Rather than considering the country as ‘a cockroach of an economy’, they conclude, ‘perhaps a more appropriate metaphor is Russia’s own Kalashnikov automatic rifle – low-tech and cheap but almost indestructible’.79 But there is an additional dimension to the Kalashnikov economy that merits serious attention: it is an economy that can be quickly mobilised to increase military production if the country’s leadership decides that is what is required. This is precisely what happened when Putin and the military leadership realised that there would not be a rapid end to the fighting. The defence industry and its main suppliers in other branches of the economy were very quickly switched to a wartime regime, which in Russian conditions was relatively easy, as most of the companies are state-owned and can readily be ordered to increase production, adopt multi-shift regimes of work, and enlarge capacities with budget funding guaranteed. The administrative structures for managing military production were adapted to the new conditions and the implementation of orders was very closely monitored. If inputs were found to be in short supply, reserve stocks were drawn down and imports secured by one means or another. However, contrary to a view often expressed by observers, Russia does not have a ‘war economy’. In the words of Vladimir Inozemtsev, it has an economy ‘adapted to war’ – the state-controlled defence sector operates within the framework of a functioning market economy.80 The government and the military focused efforts on military hardware considered essential to the conduct of the war, with lower priority for equipment required by the forces but not seen as being in urgent demand. The only real exception appears to have been the ongoing modernisation of the country’s strategic nuclear capability. In principle, there would seem to be no reason why this mobilised defence effort cannot be maintained for quite a long period of time. Budget allocations to the military have sharply increased in 2024, a large part of this additional funding probably going to the defence industry and investment in additional capacities identified as essential. While provisional intentions for 2025 and beyond suggest reduced funding for the military, as argued elsewhere, this could easily change in the federal budget for 2025–27, the drafting of which has started in July 2024.81 It is not without irony that advanced Western economies may now find the need to look closely at Russia to understand how to adapt to an age when a style of warfare typified by attrition may become more common than previously expected.   Notes 1 See, for example, Julian Cooper, Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011-2015 (Kista: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016), , accessed 30 March 2024. 2 Maria Snegovaya et al., ‘Back in Stock? The State of Russia’s Defense Industry After Two Years of the War’, CSIS, April 2024, p. 6. 3 See Rosstat, ‘Indeksy proizvodstva po Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Godovye dannye s 2015 g’ [‘Indexes of Production for the Russian Federation. Annual Data from 2025’], renewed 31 January 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 4 Roman Skomorokhov, ‘Ubiitsy idut za Su-57 ili Kto na nas s pyatym?’ [‘Killers are Going After the Su-57 or who is Coming After us With the Fifth?’], Top War, 26 February 2024, , accessed 26 February 2024. 5 BMPD, ‘Modernizirovannyi boevoi vertolyot Ka-52M’ [‘Modernised Combat Helicopter Ka-52M’], 23 July 2023, , accessed 25 July 2023. 6 Nikolai Grishchenko, ‘Nachalos’ seriinoe proizvodstrvo udarnykh vertoletov Mi-28NM’ [‘Serial Production of Mi-28NM Attack Helicopters has Started’], rg.ru, 30 September 2020, , accessed 4 February 2024. 7 BMPD, ‘Modernizirovannyi boevoi vertolyot Ka-52M’ [‘Modernised Combat Helicopter Ka52M’]. 8 Dmitrii Levichev, ‘Skol’ko my vypuskaem boevykh samoletov i vertoletov’ [‘How Many Combat Aircraft and Helicopters do we Produce?’], proza.ru, 30 December 2023, , accessed 10 January 2024. 9 Arms Trade, ‘General armii Valerii Gerasimov provel brifing dlya inostrannykh voennykh attashe’ [‘Army General Valerii Gerasimov Gave a Briefing to Foreign Military Attachés’], 21 December 2023, , accessed 1 August 2024. 10 Nikolay Staykov, ‘Catching Spiders: Russia’s Drone Companies and Sanctions Evasion’, The Insider, 19 February 2024, , accessed 19 February 2024. It can easily be established that the Saito engines are of a type fitted to model aircraft and therefore not subject to sanctions. 11 BMPD, ‘Progress v proizvodstve korable’nykh gazoturbinnykh dvigatelei V Rossii’ [‘Progress in the Production of Ship Gas Turbine Engines in Russia’], 30 November 2020, , accessed 5 April 2024. 12 BMPD, ‘Sdacha malogo raketnogo korablya “Vyshnii volochek” zatyagivaetsya iz-za problem s Kitaiskim dvigatelyami’ [‘Hand Over of Small Missile Ships ‘Vyshnii Volochek’ is Being Delayed Because of Problems With the Chinese Engines’], 7 February 2018, , accessed 10 May 2024. 13 BMPD, ‘Eshche o probleme dizel’nykh dvigatelei dlya malykh raketnykh korablei proekta 22800’ [‘Once Again on the Problems of Diesel Engines for Small Missile Ships of Project 22800’], 22 October 2018, , accessed 10 May 2024. 14 Mil.Press Flotprom, ‘Aleksandr Karpov: Kolomenksii dizeli khorosho pokazali sebya na patrul’nom korable proekta 22160’ [‘Aleksandr Karpov: Kolomensk Diesels Have Shown Themselves Well on Project 22160 Patrol Boats’], 9 July 2019, , accessed 10 May 2024. 15 See Julian Cooper, ‘How Many Operational Tanks Does Russia Have and will the Number Soon Increase?’, unpublished paper, University of Birmingham, May 2023, , accessed 25 May 2024. 16 TASS, ‘Sukhoputnye Voiska VS RF V 2021 godu poluchat svyshe 240 noveishykh tankov’ [‘The Russian Armed Forces’ Ground Forces Will Receive Over 240 New Tanks in 2021’], 11 September 2021, , accessed 20 May 2024. 17 Ivan Potapov, ‘V Pol’she nazvali chislo tankov u Rossii’ [‘In Poland Number of Russian Tanks Given’], 27 September 2021, , accessed 18 May 2024. 18 SCRF, ‘Zamestitel’ predsedatel’ Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiikoi Federatsii D. A. Medvedev otvetil na voprosy Rossiiskikh zhurnalistov i pol’zovatelei sotsial’noi seti “Vkontakte”’ [‘Deputy Chair of the Rf Security Council D a Medvedev Answered Questions of Russian Journalists and Users of the Social Network Vkontakte’], 25 March 2023, , accessed 20 March 2024; Dary’a Fedotova, ‘Vyyasnilsya sostav tankovoi armady, o kotoroi rasskazal Dmitrii Medevedev’ [‘Has Been Explained the Composition of the Tank Armada Which Medvedev Spoke of’], MK.ru, 23 March 2023, , accessed 10 March 2024. 19 Komsomol’skaya Pravda, ‘Putin zayavil namereniyakh Rossii proizvesti bolee 1,6 tysachi tankov za god’ [‘Putin Declared the Intention of Russia to Produce More Than 1,600 Tanks a Year’], 25 March 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 20 Roman Skomorokhov, ‘Kto dast’ Rossiiskoi armii bronyu’ [‘Who Gives Russia’s Army Armour’] Top War, 1 April 2023, , accessed 1 April 2023. 21 Georgii Aleksandrov, ‘Dulo dryan’ [‘The Barrel is Rubbish’], Novaya Gazeta, 31 October 2022, , accessed 1 November 2022. 22 Top War, ‘“Omsktransmash” polnost’yu vypolnil goskontrakt po postavke OBT T-80BVM’ [‘Omsktransmash Has Fully Met Stat Contract for Delivery of T-80BVM Main Battle Tank’], 12 December 2019, , accessed 19 December 2019. 23 Interfax.ru, ‘“Omsktransmash” po kontrakt s Minoborony RF modernizruet bolee T-80BV’ [‘Omsktransmash is Upgrading over 50 T-80BV Tanks under a Contract with the Russian Defence Ministry’], 26 August 2020, , accessed 10 March 2024. 24 Evgenii Kuprienko, ‘V Omske vozobnovyat proizvodstva tanka T-80’ [‘T-80 Tank Production to Resume in Omsk’], Superomsk, 11 September 2023, , accessed 10 March 2024. 25 Defence analysts Yohann Michel and Michael Gjerstad conclude that at current attrition rates, Russia will be able to sustain its assault on Ukraine for another two to three years or maybe even longer. See Yohann Michel and Michael Gjerstad, ‘Equipment Losses in Russia’s War on Ukraine Mount’, IISS, 12 February 2024, , accessed 12 February 2024. 26 Gazeta.ru, ‘V Rossiiskuyu armiyu do kontsa 2021 goda postupyat 20 tankov T-14 “Armata”’ [‘By End of the Year Russian Army Will Get 20 T-14 Armata Tanks’], 10 August 2021, , accessed 12 March 2024. 27 See, for example Top War, ‘Istochnik podtverdil primenenie tanka T-14 “Armata” v zone SVO podrazdelenyami “Yuzhnoi” gruppirovki voisk’ [‘A Source has Confirmed the Use of a T-14 Armata Tank in the Zone of the Special Military Operation by Subdivisions of the “Southern” Grouping of Troops’], 19 July 2023, , accessed 19 July 2023. 28 Ivan Potapov, ‘Chemezov ob”yasnil otsutstvie T-14 “Armata” v zone SVO’ [‘Chemezov Explained the Absence of T-14 “Armata” in the SVO Zone’], Lenta.ru, 4 March 2024, , accessed 4 March 2024. 29 See, for example, ‘“Tanki dorozhe zhiznei?”. Glava “Rostekha” priznal, chto tank “Armata” iz-za dorogovizny okazalas’ “belymn slonom” i ne budet uchastvovat’ v voine. Eto vyzvalo nasmeshki i kritiku v Z-soobshchestve’ [‘Tanks More Valuable Than Lives. Head of Rostekh has Acknowledged That the Armata Tank Because of its Cost has Turned out to be a ‘White Elephant’ and Will not Participate in the War’], Republic, 5 March 2024. 30 Anton Valagin, ‘Kurganmashzavod ustanovil rekord po postavkam BMP-2M i BMP-3’ [‘Kurganmashzavod Sets Record for Deliveries of BMP-2M and BMP-3’], RG.ru, 11 July 2023, , accessed 12 March 2024; Ria.ru, ‘“Kurganmashzavod” narastit vypusk boevykh mashin pekhoty eschche na 30 Protsentov’ [‘Kurganmashzavod to Increase Production of Infantry Fighting Vehicles by Another 30%’], 11 July 2023, , accessed 15 March 2024. 31 Kirill Ryabov, ‘Rezul’taty proizvodstva BTR-82A(M)’ [‘Results of the Production of BTR-82A(M)’], Top War, 2 March 2021, , accessed 10 March 2024. 32 Alexander Karpov and Alena Medvedeva, ‘“Effektivnaya ognevaya podderzhka”: Kak modernizirovannye bronetransportyory BTR-82A usilyat sukhoputnye voiska Rossii’ [‘“Efficient Fire Support”: How Modernised BTR-82A Armoured Personnel Carriers Will Strengthen the Russian Ground Forces’], RT in Russian, 28 February 2021, , accessed 11 March 2024. 33 Ria.ru, ‘Voennyi predstavitel’ anonsiroval gosispytaniya bronemashiny “Bumerang”’ [‘Military Representative Announced the State Testing of the Armoured Vehicle Bumerang’], 25 November 2021, , accessed 27 February 2024. The Reporter, ‘V zonu SVO napravlyaetsya noveishie bronetransportery “Bumerang”’ [‘The Newest Boomerang Armoured Personnel Carriers are Heading to the SVO Zone’], 1 March 2023, , accessed 27 February 2024. 34 MoD RF, p. 122, ; Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, ‘V Rossiiskie voiska za god postavleno svyshe 1,7 milliona edinits tekhniki’ [‘Over 1.7 Million Units of Equipment Were Delivered to the Russian Troops in One Year’], 27 December 2023, , accessed 25 February 2024. 35 Gleb Aleksushin, ‘Rossiiskie zavody stroyashchie artilleriyu - chem my raspolagaem’ [‘Russian Factories Building Artillery - What so We Possess’], Mify i tainy istorii [Myths and Mysteries of History], 3 December 2022, , accessed 25 February 2024. 36 Rostekh, ‘Rostekh zavershili kontsentratsii artilleriyskikh zavodov po sistema-pushki-vystrel’ [‘Rostec has Completed the Concentration of Artillery Factories According to the Gun-shot System’], 28 June 2023, , accessed 1 August 2024; UVZ, ‘V Rossii zavershili ispytaniya samokhodnogo artilleriiskogo orudiya “Mal’va”’ [‘In Russia the Testing of the Self-propelled Artillery Gun Malva has Been Completed’], 18 May 2023, , accessed 1 August 2024. 37 Sergei Val’chenko, ‘Ekspert nazval glavnye problemy Rossiiskii boepripasnoi otrasli’ [‘Expert has Named the Main Problems of Russia’s Munitions Branch’], 29 May 2022, , accessed 1 August 2024. 38 Rostekh, ‘Key Companies’, , accessed 21 October 2021. Note: site is no longer accessible. 39 Artem Feoktistov, ‘Manturov: Porokhovaya i boepripasnaya otrasli nuzhdayutsya v kratnom roste ob”emov proizvodstva’ [‘Manturov: Gunpowder and Ammunition Industries Need Multiple Growth in Production Volumes’], Gazeta.ru, 3 January 2023, , accessed 4 January 2023. 40 See Rob Lee, ‘Viktor Murakhovsky, Rybar and Ilya Kramnik posted about Russia’s artillery ammo issues. They suggest Russia produces/refurbishes 300k rounds per year (and had 2.6 million tons in storage in 2013) but was often firing 100k over the span of a couple of days.’, X post, 5 January 2023, , accessed 10 January 2023. 41 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 30.12.2022 No.987’ [‘Edict of the Russian President of 30 December 2022 No.987’], 30 December 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023; Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Rasporyazhenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 31.12.2022 No. 4390-r’ [‘Order of Russian Government of 31 December 2022’, 31 December 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023. 42 Ria.ru, ‘Rossiya v 20 raz narastila vypusk boepripasov dlya reaktivnoi artillerii’ [‘Russia has Increased Production of Rocket Artillery Ammunition by 20 Times’], 17 May 2023, , accessed 10 February 2024. 43 Yulian Rozhkova, ‘Iz-za uvelicheniya gosoboronzakaza Permskii porokhovoi zavod planiruet nanyat’ 350 sotrudnikov’ [‘Due to the Increase in State Defence Orders, the Perm Gunpowder Plant Plans to Hire 350 Employees’], 59.ru, 3 September 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023; Olga Yakuncheva and Marina Kuznetsova, ‘Oboronnye predpriyatiya Prikam’ya chastixhno perershli na kruglosutochnuyu rabotu’ [‘Defense Enterprises of the Kama Region Have Partially Switched to Round-The-Clock Work’], 59.ru, 19 September 2022, , accessed 5 March 2023. 44 Rostekh, ‘Rostekh otrkyl na Verkhneturinskom zavode novyi tsekh po proizvodstvodstvu korpusov snaryadov’ [‘Rostec Opened a New Workshop for the Production of Shell Bodies at the Verkhneturinskii Plant’], 1 July 2021, , accessed 5 March 2024. 45 Rostekh, ‘Rostekh zapustit novyi avtomatizirovannyi tsekh po proizvodstvu boepripasov’ [‘Rostec to Launch New Automated Ammunition Production Facility’], 22 September 2021, , accessed 5 March 2024. 46 Interfax.ru, ‘Novyi tsekh po proizvodstvu snaryadov dlya RSZO otkrylsya na Tul’skom “Splav” - vlasti regiona’ [‘New Workshop for Production of MLRS Shells Opened at Tula’s Splav - Regional Authorities’], 24 July 2020, , accessed 5 March 2024. 47 Aleksandr Tikhonov, ‘Ministr Oborony RF… proveril khod vypolneniya gosoboronzakaza predpriyatiyam OPK v Tul’skoi Oblasti’ [‘Minister of Defence of RF Expert has Checked the Fulfilment of State Defence Order at Enterprises in Tula Oblast’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 2 March 2024, pp. 1–2. 48 Krivoruchko, ‘S uchyotam vozrosshikh potrebnosti armii’ [‘With Account of Growing Needs of the Army’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 29 January 2024, pp. 1–3. 49 MoD, ‘Ministr Oborony RF proveril vypolnenie gosoboronzakaza predpriyatiem OPK v Omskoi oblasti’ [‘Minister of Defence RF has Checked the Fulfilment of State Defence Order at Enterprises in Omsk Oblast’], 19 April 2024, , accessed 19 April 2024. 50 Aleksandr Tikhonov, ‘Reshitel’no deistvuem na vsekh napravleniyakh’ [‘Decisive Action in All Directions’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 28 February 2024, pp. 1-2. 51 Kirill Ryabov, ‘Tyazhelaya ognemetnaya sistema TOZ-3 “Drakon” nakanune ispytanii’ [‘Heavy Thermobaric System TOZ-3 “Drakon” on the Eve of Testing’], Top War, 11 April 2024, , accessed 11 April 2024. 52 Varvara Kosechkina, ‘Rossiiskii zavod nachal v tri smeny vypuskat’ trekhtonnye superbomby.na chto oni sposobny?’ [‘Russian Plant Starts Producing Three-Ton Super Bombs in Three Shifts. What are They Capable of?’], 21 March 2024, , accessed 21 March 2024. 53 Sergei Ptichkin, ‘Boepripasy dlya oruzhiya “sudnogo dnya” poshli v seriyu’ [‘Ammunition for Doomsday Weapon Enters Production’], RG.ru, 28 March 2024, , accessed 30 March 2024. Note: the article does not identify the factory but from the photograph of Shoigu inspecting the munitions, it is clear that it was taken when he visited Dzerzhinsk works in March 2024. 54 Dzerzhinsk Vremya [Dzerzhinsk Time], ‘Sergei Shoigu proveril vypolnenie gosoboronzakaza v Dzerzhinske’ [‘Sergei Shoigu Checked the Fulfilment of the State Defence Order in Dzerzhinsk’], 22 March 2023, , accessed 12 March 2024. Note: Zavod imeni Sverdlova (then Zavod No. 80) was a leading munitions producer during the 1941–45 war, producing half of all explosives, 147 million artillery shells and 5.6 million aviation bombs. See Alexandra Vikulova et al., ‘Dzerzhinksii zavod No. 80 imeni Ya. M. Sverdlova’ [‘Dzerzhinskii Zavod No. 80 Named After Ya M Sverdlov’], , accessed 22 March 2024. 55 ‘Importozameshchenie v deistvii’ [‘Import Substitution in Action’], RITM Mashinostroeniya [Rhythm of Machine Building] (No. 7, 2023), p. 34, , accessed 1 August 2024. The evidence suggests that most of the imports from sanctioning countries were in the first half of 2022, probably ordered before sanctions were imposed. The development of the machine tool industry is discussed in detail in Julian Cooper, ‘The Machine Tool Industry of Russia at a Time of War and Sanctions’, Post-Communist Economies (Vol. 36, No. 5, 2024). 56 President of Russia, ‘Vstrecha s rukovoditelyami predpriyatii OPK’ [‘Meeting With CEOs of Defence Industry Companies’], 20 September 2022, , accessed 20 February 2024; President of Russia, ‘Soveshchanie s rukovoditelyami organizatsii OPK’ [‘Meeting With CEOs of Defence Industry Organisations’], 23 December 2022, , accessed 20 February 2024; President of Russia, ‘Vstrecha s rukovoditelyami predpriyatii OPK’ [‘Meeting With CEOs of Defence Industry Companies’], 25 May 2024, , accessed 25 May 2024. 57 President of Russia, ‘Perechen’ poruchenii po voprosam obespecheniya potrebnostei, voznikayushchikh v khode provedeniya spetsial’noi voennnoi operatsii’ [‘Instructions on Meeting the Needs of the Special Military Operations’], 19 October 2022, , accessed 15 March 2024. 58 For the reports of meetings, see Russian Government, ‘Coordinating Council under the Government of the Russian Federation for Ensuring the Needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Troops, Military Formations and Bodies – Documents and Events’, , accessed 18 March 2024. 59 For meetings from October 2022 to March 2024, see Security Council of the Russian Federation, ‘News and Information’, , accessed 18 March 2024. 60 Iz.ru, ‘Shoigu raskritikoval rukovodsto “Uraltranmash” za sroki vypuska tekhniki’ [‘Shoigu Criticised the Management of Uraltransmash for the Timing of its Equipment Output’], 31 January 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 61 KTRV, ‘Sergei Shoigu s rabochim vizitom posetil golovnoe predpriyatie KTRV’ [‘Sergei Shoigu Made a Working Visit to the Head Enterprise of KTRV’], 12 January 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. 62 Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘Ministerstvo Oborony RF Sergei Shoigu proveril vypolnenie gosoboronzakaza na predpriyatyakh oboronno-promyshlennogo kompleksa v Altaiskom krae’ [‘Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu Checked the Fulfilment of the State Defence Order at Enterprises of the Defence Industry in Altai Krai’], 30 March 2024, , accessed 30 March 2024. 63 Ibid.; ‘Posle vizit Shoigu v biisk stala ponyatna prichina smeny rukovodstva na oleumnom zavode’ [‘After Visit of Shoigu to Biisk it Became Clear Why the Leadership of the Oleum Factory was Changed’], 30 March 2024, , accessed 1 August 2024. Sibpribormash has an interesting past; it was based on two munitions enterprises built very rapidly in 1970 as a response to the border conflict with China. See Arsenal Otechestva, ‘“Sibpribormash” - polveka v stroyu’ [‘Sibpribormash – Half a Century in Service’], 5 May 2021, , accessed 25 February 2024. 64 For visits reported on the MoD website, see . 65 See, for an overview of these developments, Anastasia Korochkina, ‘Putin Tretii Raz S Nachala “Spetsoperatsii” Smenil Zamministra Oborony Po Matobespecheniyu’ [‘Putin has Replaced the Deputy Defense Minister for Material Support for the Third Time Since the Start of the “Special Operation”’], Forbes Russia, 11 March 2024, , accessed 12 March 2024. 66 TASS, ‘Vypolnyayushchie gosoboronzakaz zavody Urala pereveli na shestidnevku rabochuyu nedelyu’ [‘Those Fulfilling State Defence Orders at Factories of the Urals Have Switched to a Six-day Working Week’], , accessed 20 January 2024. 67 Military News, ‘K proizvodstvu voennoi tekhniki v RF seichas privlecheny 850 grazhdanskikh predpriyatii - Manturov’ [‘850 Civilian Enterprises are Currently Involved in the Production of Military Equipment in the Russian Federation - Manturov’], 13 May 2024, , accessed 13 May 2024. 68 See Julian Cooper, ‘If War Comes Tomorrow: How Russia Prepares for Possible Armed Aggression’, Whitehall Report, 4-16 (August 2016). 69 Russian Government, ‘Zasedanie Koordinatsionnogo soveta po obespecheniyu potrebnostei Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, drugikh voisk, voinskikh formirovanii i organov’ [‘Session of the Coordination Council for Securing the Needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Other Troops and Military Formations’], 27 December 2022, , accessed 29 December 2022. 70 See Cooper, ‘If War Comes Tomorrow’, pp. 27–32. 71 A A Zaitsev, V I Molokanov, M V Fateev, ‘Rol’ I mesto neprikosnovennykh zapasov material’nykh sredstv v sisteme Vooruzheniya Vooruzhennylh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [‘The Role and Place of Emergency Reserves of Material Means in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation], Vooruzhenie i ekonomika [Armament and Economics] (Vol. 61, No. 3, 2022), pp. 133–34. 72 Ibid., pp. 139–40. 73 Uliana Bezpalko and Daria Dmytriieva, ‘Russians Motivated to Fight for Money, 1,000-1,100 People Join Army Every Day - Defense Intelligence Representative’, 15 January 2024, , accessed 20 January 2024. 74 Alex Vershinin, ‘The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine’, RUSI Commentary, 18 March 2024. 75 Ibid. 76 President of Russia, ‘Prezident odpisal ukazy o naznachenii chlenov pravitel’stva Rossiiskogo Federatsii i direktorov sluzhb’ [‘The President Signed Decrees on the Appointment of Members of the Government of the Russian Federation and Directors of Services’], 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2024; Anastasiya Maier and Aleksei Nikol’skii, ‘S takim vyzovami stolknetsya novyi ministrov oborony Belousov’ [‘What Challenges Will Face New Minister of Defence Belousov’], Vedomosti, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2024; Viktoria Polyakova and Yulia Ovchinnikova, ‘Patrushev v administratsii prezidenta naznachili kuratorom korablestroeniya’ [‘Patrushev Appointed as Shipbuilding Supervisor in Presidential Administration’], RBC, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2014; Victoria Polyakova and Julia Ovchinnikova, ‘Kreml’ ob”yasnil novye naznacheniya Oreshkina i Dyumina’ [‘The Kremlin Explained the New Appointments of Oreshkin and Dyumin’], RBC, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2024. 77 President of the Russian Federation, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 11 yun’ 2024 no.480’ [‘Edict of the President of the Russian Federation of 11 June 2024 No. 480’], 11 June 2024, , accessed 11 June 2024; President of the Russian Federation, ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 11 yun’ 2024 no.477’ [‘Edict of the President of the Russian Federation of 11 June 2024 No.477’], 11 June 2024, , accessed 11 June 2024. 78 Rosstat, , accessed 20 April 2023. 79 Clifford G Gaddy and Barry W Ickes, ‘Can Sanctions Stop Putin?’, Brookings, 3 June 2014, , accessed 10 February 2024. In relation to the current war, Richard Connolly has also argued that Russia has a ‘Kalashnikov economy’, ‘quite unsophisticated but durable, built for large-scale use and for use in conflicts’. See Andrew Roth, ‘“A Lot Higher Than We Expected”: Russian Arms Production Worries Europe’s War Planners’, The Guardian, 15 February 2024. 80 Vladislav Inozemtsev, ‘Kak rossiiskaya ekonomika prisposobilas’ k voine’ [‘How the Russian Economy Adapted to War’], Important Stories, 14 May 2024, , accessed 14 May 2014. In the present author’s view, the US Treasury’s claim in July 2024 that Russia is completing ‘transition to a full wartime economy’ is an overstatement. See US Department of the Treasury, ‘As Russia Completes Transition to a Full War Economy, Treasury Takes Sweeping Aim at Foundational Financial Infrastructure and Access to Third Country Support’, press release, 12 July 2024, , accessed 15 July 2024. 81 See Julian Cooper, ‘Another Budget for a Country at War: Military Expenditure in Russia’s Federal Budget for 2024 and Beyond’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (No. 2023/11, December 2023), p. 22, , accessed 20 June 2024. Appendix Table 1: Ministry of Defence Annual Reports of Intentions and Implementation, 2019–24 (units)   P: planned procurement A: actual procurement 1. Planned and actual procurement data for 2019 includes new aircraft only; from 2020, explicit from 2021, implementation includes both new and modernised aircraft. 2. Data from 2019–21 includes tanks and armoured vehicles, but for 2022, planned procurement adds ‘artillery arms’. It is not known whether this also applies for 2023. 3. For 2020, the source gives three divisions of Yars plus one Avangard, but the number of missiles in a division can vary. The MilitaryRussia.ru blog gives 11 divisions (9 Yars and 2 Avangard). For 2021, the source gives two divisions of Yars plus one Avangard, while MilitaryRussia.ru gives 11 divisions (9 Yars and 2 Avangard). See MilitaryRussia.ru, ‘RS-24 Yars / Topol-MR - SS-X-29 / SS-29 / SS-27 mod.2 SICKLE-B’, last updated 10 June 2024, , accessed 20 June 2024. No up-to-date entry on Avangard is available. Sources: Russian MoD, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Vooruzhennykh Sil RF v 2018 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2018’], and equivalent reports for each year 2019 to 2023, official reports based on the presentations of the MoD and other senior officials to the December enlarged board meetings of the MoD of each year, 5 June 2024. Table 2: Production of Combat Aircraft and Trainers, 2019–23 (units)    Sources: For data from 2019 to 2022, see BMPD, ‘Postavki boevykh samoletov v Vooruzhennykh Sily Rossii v 2022 godu’ [‘Delivery of Combat Aircraft to Armed Forces of Russia in 2022’], 11 January 2023, , accessed 3 March 2024. For 2023 data, Su-57: TASS, ‘Istochnik: peredavaemye VKS v 2024 godu seriinye Su-57 poluchat dvigatelei vtorogo etapa’ [‘According to a Source: Serial Su-57 Delivered to the Air Force in 2024 Will Have Engines of the Second Stage’], 28 December 2023, , accessed 3 March 2024; Su-35S: BMPD, ‘Novaya partiya istrebitelei Su-35S postavlena VKS Rossii’ [‘A New Batch of Su-35s Fighters has Been Delivered to the Russian Air Force’], 9 May 2024, , accessed 3 March 2024; Su-34M: on the assumption that eight aircraft are needed to complete a contract, see BMPD, ‘VKS Rossii poluchili tret’yu v 2023 godu partiyu frontovykh bombarsirovshchikov Su-34M’ [‘Russian Air Force has Received the Third Batch in 2023 of Su-34m Frontal Bombers’], 22 November 2023, , accessed 4 March 2024; Su-30MS2 and Yak-130: the author believes four Su-30MS2 were delivered but as there was another delivery in December, the estimated total is six. In 2023, there were two deliveries of Yak-130, with each batch usually consisting of two trainers. See BMPD, ‘VKS Rossii postavleny novye istrebiteli Su-30SM2 i uhceboboevye samolyoty Yak-130’ [‘Russian Air Force Supplied with New Su-30sm2 Fighters and Yak-130 Trainer-Combat Aircraft’], 2 December 2023, , accessed 4 March 2024. Table 3: Production of Equipment for the Ground Forces, 2019–24 (units)     * New, modernised and repaired. ** Author’s estimate. 1. Artillery systems, self-propelled howitzers, MLRS, means of artillery reconnaissance and counter-battery struggle. These appear to include new, modernised and repaired arms. 2. All types, including means of remote mining and robot demining systems. 3. Small arms, grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and air defence systems. 4. Also know in Russian as sredstva porazheniya (means of destruction). 5. Includes Tsirkon, Kalibr and Uran cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. 6. Grad and Uragan MLRS. Sources: Tanks and armoured vehicles: For 2019 data, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2019 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2019’], ; for 2020 data, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2020 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2020’], . Tanks: for 2021 data, Vasilii Kuchushev, ‘Arsenal-2021. Chem v etom godu popolnilas’ Rossiiskaya armiya’ [‘Arsenal 2021. What the Russian Army has Received This Year’], 22 December 2021, , accessed 2 March 2024; in 2023, Shoigu stated 1,530 tanks were produced, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2023 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2023’], ; for the period from February 2022–end 2023, Shoigu said that production increased 5.6 times, with a 3.6 times increase for BMP, and a 3.5 times increase for BTR, . Armoured vehicles: for 2021, there were a total of 900 tanks and armoured vehicles, this value was calculated after subtracting 240 tanks, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2021 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2021’], ; for 2023, Shoigu stated that there were 2,518 BMP and BTR, . Vehicles (mainly military trucks): for 2021, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2021 godu’ [Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2021’], ; for 2023, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2023 godu’ [Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2023’], . Missile and artillery: for 2023, Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, ‘V Rossiiskie voiska za god postavleno svyshe 1,7 milliona edinits tekhniki’ [‘Over 1.7 Million Units of Equipment Were Delivered to the Russian Troops in One Year’], 27 December 2023, , accessed 2 January 2024. Engineering equipment: Aleksei Krivoruchko, ‘S uchyotam vozrosshikh potrebnosti armii’ [‘With Account of the Growing Needs of the Army’], Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 29 January 2024, pp. 1–3. Portable weapons: Ibid., pp. 1–3. Electronic warfare systems: Ibid., pp. 1–3. Kh-101 cruise missiles: Jack W Watling and Gary Somerville, ‘A Methodology for Degrading the Arms of the Russian Federation’, RUSI Occasional Papers, June 2024, p. 8 (Reports on Russian missile production seen by the authors in February 2024). All munitions, missiles and aviation munitions, missiles: Ibid., pp. 1–3. Munitions: for data on artillery shells for 2023 and 2024, and MLRS rockets, Watling and Somerville, ‘A Methodology for Degrading the Arms of the Russian Federation’, p. 7 (Russian MoD reports on munitions production seen by the authors in February 2024). New and restored large-calibre munitions: Dmitrii Levichev, ‘Skol’ko snaryadov my proizvodim dlya nashei armii’ [‘How Many Shells do we Produce for Our Army?’], Pozaru.ru, 18 March 2023, , accessed 5 March 2024. For the period of February 2022–end 2023, there was a 17.5 times increase in production of artillery munitions, MoD RF, ‘Itogi deyatel’nosti Voruzhennykh Sil RF v 2023 godu’ [‘Results of Activity of Armed Forces of RF in 2023’], . Table 4: Output of Selected Civilian Goods in Unit Terms, 2019–23 (units)     Sources: For data from 2019–22 except civilian ships, see Rosstat, ‘Proizvodstvo osnovnykh vidov produktsii v natural’nom vyrazhenii (godovoi dannye) so 2017 god - v sootvestvii OKPD2’ [‘Production of Main Types of Products in Physical Terms (Annual Data Since 2017 – in Accordance With OKPD2)]’, 11 October 2023, , accessed 1 March 2024; for data on rail freight wagons, 2020, see ‘Proizvodstva gruzovykh vagonov’ [‘Production of Rail Freight Wagons 2020–23’], , accessed 10 February 2024.ournal

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Major powers shape their foreign policy with a global view, positioning each region based on their opponents’ strategies there. Russia has recognized the need to develop its strategy in the Middle East to counter Western efforts to further disintegrate the Russian Federation after the Soviet Union’s collapse, particularly by fueling separatist inclinations within it. This is crucial for Russia, which includes 22 republics and 89 federal entities, with minorities making up 19% of its population. Russia recognized this trend through the following indicators: 1. The US call at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council Conference in Prague in 2003 to expand NATO’s work east and south, i.e., in an area extending from the Maghreb to Central Asia. 2. NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, a practical implementation of NATO’s expansion. 3. In 2021, the Israeli army was shifted from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the Central Command (CENTCOM), whose work covers the area of NATO’s expansion. Russian Strategy in the Middle East The “core” of Russia’s strategy in the Middle East is security and defense, evidenced by its foreign interventions in regions where NATO competes, including Georgia, Crimea, Syria, Libya, Belarus, Ukraine and the Sahel, as affirmed in Shanghai Cooperation Organization discussions. This focus is underscored by 40–50% of Russia’s military sales being directed to the region, alongside efforts to establish military bases in Syria, Libya and Sudan. Additionally, the development of the Russian-Chinese-Iranian strategic triangle, consolidated in 2019 with joint naval maneuvers, has deepened following the war in Ukraine. The Russian Strategic Framework Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The above outlines Russia’s strategic approach to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on Gaza Strip (GS) as follows: 1. Russia perceives Iran from two perspectives: as its strongest ally in the region and as the central figure in the axis of resistance. Operation al-Aqsa Flood has tested the Russian-Iranian relationship regarding its consistency. The Russian reaction to Israeli attacks on Syria remains insufficient. However, this does underline how Israeli policies are widening the rift in Russian-Israeli relations and gradually nudging Russia towards aligning with the resistance axis, especially given Israel’s support for the Western side in the Ukraine conflict. 2. Russia has feared that the GS war would impact its social stability for the following reasons: a. Riots erupted in Muslim-majority Dagestan following the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Israel shortly after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. b. Many of the Jews who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union hail from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is concerned that differences among these countries could destabilize its internal situation. 3. Russia exploited Western social unrest on the streets, in universities and within institutions to highlight double standards in comparing Western attitudes toward Israel and Russia. Operation al-Aqsa Flood diverted attention from Russia’s actions in Ukraine. 4. Operation al-Aqsa Flood redirected some US and Western aid from Ukraine to Israel, easing pressure on Russia. 5. The Israeli stance aligning with Ukraine prompted Russia to seek closer ties with Hamas. Russia utilized this approach to bolster its standing in Muslim countries and the developing world, bridging gaps with Islamic factions concerning its 2015 intervention in Syria. This was underscored by Russia hosting a Hamas delegation on 26/10/2023, resulting in the release of 3 out of 6 Russian captives, and another delegation on 24/6/2024. 6. The Ukrainian conflict compelled Israel to take a firm stance, publicly condemning Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, which subsequently strained Russia’s willingness to mend relations with Israel post-Operation al-Aqsa Flood. 7. If the Ukraine war has unified Western positions against Russia, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has created disparities that Russia is attempting to exploit, particularly following the stance of several European countries, spearheaded by Spain, on recognizing Palestine. 8. Russian public sentiment towards Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath is mirrored in the findings of a poll conducted by the Levada Center on 25/10/2023: • 88% of Russians are aware of the new escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in comparison with a poll regarding events in Ukraine, in which 86% stated they are closely following events. • 66% are not ready to support either side in the conflict. • 21% rather sympathize with the Palestinians, and 6% sympathize with Israel. • Older Russians are nearly four times more likely than younger people to express sympathy towards Palestine, a contrast to the prevailing sentiment in the West. • Only 46% of Russian Muslims sympathize with Palestine, mirroring the sentiment in Central Asian countries. • Respondents noted that the main responsibility for what is happening lies with the US and NATO countries (45%), while 12% place responsibility on Israel, and 8% of respondents place the blame on Hamas/Palestinian side. Russian diplomacy aligns closely with the Axis of Resistance in UN voting on international resolutions. However, regarding the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued rulings against Putin similar to those against the Israeli prime minister and defense minister, Russia does not adhere to the ICC’s rulings, as it is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the court. Concerning the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the genocide case involving Israel, Russia supports the court’s recognition of the principle of Palestinian genocide, emphasizing the urgency of halting violence. Russia’s General Attitudes Toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood Russia’s general stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on GS can be outlined as follows: 1. Endorsing a two-state resolution with a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem as its capital, with full UN membership for this Palestinian state; treating the West Bank (WB) and GS as a unified territory; calling for cessation of Israeli settlements and displacement of Palestinians; and upholding Hashemite guardianship over holy sites. 2. Choosing not to mediate between the resistance groups and Israel, deferring this role to the US, Qatar and Egypt. Nonetheless, Russian statements have reiterated the call for a lasting ceasefire in GS and the urgent release of captives without conditions. This stance was underscored in the April 2024 (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) BRICS statement. Russia has also implicitly criticized Ansar Allah’ activities in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, citing their impact on international maritime navigation freedom. Additionally, Russia has been unable to halt Israel’s ongoing airstrikes on Syrian targets. 3. Inviting delegations from the resistance to consult or assist Palestinians in resolving their internal political issues, seen by Israel as Russian recognition of the legitimacy of all resistance forces. 4. Enhancing Russia’s perception in the Arab public opinion, particularly within segments critical of Russia’s involvement in Syria since 2015. 5. Highlighting the double standards in the Western value system, particularly in how GS and Ukraine are positioned and compared. 6. Russia’s relatively advanced political stance contrasts sharply with its limited financial assistance to Palestine. 7. Between 2018 and 2023, Russia saw a 58.3% increase in exports to Israel and a 27.4% increase in imports. However, the Ukraine crisis and subsequent events have slowed down this growth.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Introduction Consistent with past behavior observed in previous instances of wars against Gaza Strip (GS), European capitals swiftly and predictably condemned the attack by Palestinian resistance forces on Israeli targets on 7/10/2023 in strong terms. This event was often portrayed with a clear bias towards Israel’s narrative, overlooking its background and context, and disregarding its military objectives, which primarily targeted Israeli occupation bases and barracks. Some European capitals took considerable time to reassess their positions and strive for a more balanced approach. Hasty Initial Positions In the first weeks of the war, political and media narratives in most European countries leaned towards portraying Israeli occupation as the victim, depicting the resistance’s actions as typical terrorist attacks akin to tragic events in Western countries. This narrative provided propaganda support to justify the brutal assault on GS. The aggression was justified by emphasizing “Israel’s right to self-defense,” echoing Israeli leadership’s claims of the resistance “using civilians as human shields,” all while neglecting international law and the safety of Palestinian civilians. Some European countries reacted vehemently during the genocidal war. They suspended aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a period, then penalized the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by withholding funding following Israel’s inflammatory accusations against the agency, only to later reverse these actions. Trends in European Positions Generally speaking, European positions during the GS war diverged along at least three lines, with relative differences in attitudes within each line: • Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries adopted an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli position that remained almost unchanged. • A trend that increasingly criticized the genocidal war and moved in a positive direction. This was evident in Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Malta, Norway and Slovenia. • A third trend avoided clear criticism without being at the forefront of partisanship, or vacillated in some positions, as in the case of France, which relatively modified its position in the second month of the war. These trends were evident in the positions on the ceasefire during the first months of the war, in voting behavior in international bodies, in taking punitive measures against the PA and UNRWA, and in the position on imposing sanctions on settlers. Implications of Positions on the European Union (EU) This divergence in positions has placed a burden on the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to articulate a coherent position representing the Union during this war. Non-EU member states, such as Britain, have adopted positions aligned with the US, while Norway has expressed critical attitudes toward the war. The prolonged duration of the war, the exposure of its brutality, and the growing public and elite opposition to it have led to a weakening of support for the war within Europe and have encouraged the opposite front. The divergence in positions was evident in that the EU was only able to reach a joint resolution supporting a ceasefire in GS in March 2024. This came with great difficulty due to the intransigence of capitals overwhelmingly aligned with Israel, which obstructed this step for almost half a year of the war. European positions have been weakened and discredited due to their contradictions, particularly regarding the Ukraine war. Positions favoring a brutal genocidal war have severely tarnished the image of the concerned European countries. Germany was even brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against it for “facilitating the commission of genocide” against Palestinians in GS via its arms exports to Israel. It is clear that the positions of many European countries are causing significant losses in terms of image, soft power and the privilege of moral guardianship that they once enjoyed as traditional defenders of “human rights” and “universal values.” These positions have also galvanized massive public protests within European countries, although these protests have not prompted significant political responses. Weaknesses in European positions have become apparent due to the lack of diplomatic initiatives from the EU or any of its member states, despite the active involvement of European actors across the region. Calls for a diplomatic solution, an end to the war or even statements advocating “restraint” have notably been missing from the primary European positions on the GS war. This omission can be attributed to the current alignment with the US administration and the influence of the prevailing support for the Israeli narrative of the war within Europe. Position on the Two-State Solution Merely expressing support for the “two-state solution,” pledging aid, and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation of Palestinians in Gaza Strip often serves as a superficial gesture, aligning more with the ongoing occupation and the devastating war on GS. These positions may also involve condemning Israeli “settler violence” in the West Bank (WB) and issuing threats of punitive actions against certain individuals, while simultaneously absolving the Israeli military of any accountability and deflecting criticism from the war on GS. The critical position toward Israel became evident through early voting behavior favoring a ceasefire in international forums, initiatives within EU bodies supporting this inclination, and the near-simultaneous recognition of the State of Palestine in Madrid, Dublin, Oslo and Ljubljana. This exerted pressure on other European countries, despite their customary declarations of support for the “two-state solution,” to reconsider their positions. However, major European capitals of influence, such as Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, still refrain from taking clear positions in pressuring Israel or recognizing the state of Palestine. Efforts to Contain War Expansion Since the war began, European capitals involved in decision-making have been eager to contain the war within GS. The prolonged duration of the war exerts pressure in this direction, particularly amidst concerns over potential escalation at the volatile Lebanese front and ongoing tensions and attacks near the Yemeni coasts and in the Red Sea region. European countries have taken noticeable steps in response, highlighted by French diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and the surrounding areas. Concurrently, European countries have refrained from participating in military maneuvers in the Red Sea, aligning themselves distinctively from US and British forces, thereby signaling a strategy to avoid direct entanglement in regional tensions. Western Strategic Polarization The positions of European decision-making centers have been notably influenced by the manifestations of Western strategic polarization in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, with Europe notably aligning with the US administration. Western powers seem to acknowledge the potential geopolitical ramifications of either losing the current war in GS or allowing it to escalate regionally. Moreover, the ongoing war serves as a significant test for the effectiveness of Western weapons, security and defense systems, particularly following the sudden blow on 7/10/2023. European parties’ concern for the strength of the Western alliance and transatlantic ties also motivates them to avoid weakening the position of President Joe Biden’s administration. Biden faces a challenging electoral test to renew his presidential term against Donald Trump, whose potential return to the White House raises concerns among Europeans. Conclusion Despite the mounting European criticisms of the Israeli occupation and the brutal genocidal war, the influential European position continues to refrain from imposing significant censure or punitive measures against Israel. Furthermore, it appears to align with the positions of its US ally on this matter, actively seeking harmony with them. However, Israel is increasingly posing a burden on Europe. While there is a gradual and hesitant shift towards greater recognition of the impossibility of Israel remaining above the law, along with an increased acknowledgment of the rights of the Palestinian people and the urgency to address them, this trend is becoming increasingly apparent. This is accompanied by waning confidence in the ability to overcome Palestinian resistance. Moreover, there is a growing unity among the Palestinian population in support of resistance, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo process and the pursuit of a peaceful solution.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском It is generally accepted that an international order is not the result of specific agreements, but the product of a common understanding of what can and cannot be done in relations between states. It is also generally accepted that all significant powers need to have relatively common ideas about why they recognize each other's right to exist and do not interfere in their internal affairs. In particular, the late Henry Kissinger wrote a lot about this, whose ideas were considered the standard of geostrategic thinking not only in the West, but also in our country. However, the coming times, apparently, will require a more creative approach to established views on how states can guarantee each other respect for basic interests and values. After all, it is the attack on them that always becomes the cause of conflict, as we are convinced by the example of the current military-political confrontation in Europe. In his speech at the UN Security Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that any agreement with the West on European security will have to contain "safeguards against unscrupulous interpretations." It is currently quite difficult to imagine what such safety catch might look like in physical terms, although the diplomats probably already have ideas on this topic. It can be guessed what the nature of such mechanisms should be. It is clear that the mechanisms should be aimed against the negative manifestations of the West's behavior. First, it is the West's desire to constantly create threats to others, as a central part of the global diplomatic game. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the physical ability to create such threats. The safety catches in this case are technical ways to ensure a situation where a state (or bloc) cannot change its behavior to hostile or take advantage of the omission in its selfish interests. Precisely cannot. Because "does not want" no longer works after, for example, Finland joined NATO. And the alliance itself simply trampled all the formal and informal principles on which they tried to build a security system in Europe after the Cold War. We see that not a single concluded then agreement works. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the main treaties on which the "rigid" framework of European security was based. NATO expansion to the east, in fact - the expansion of the territorial base of the American military presence in Europe - made all agreements in the field of conventional weapons meaningless. So, to come up with a new legal basis for peace in Europe is not a trivial task at all. And it remains to rely on the recognized skill of Russian diplomacy. A universal order that would suit everyone is unlikely now. It has always been relative before. However, in the century before last, there was at least a general idea among the leading powers about the principles on which the internal order in each of them should be based. Now it is difficult to think that Western countries will agree to recognize the right of Russia, China or other states to determine their own lives. First, any security order will inevitably be technical in nature, and not based on a common understanding of challenges and threats. This means that it will have little room for principles and a lot for specific parameters of how the West will not be able to threaten Russia's core interests. Russia's proposals at the end of 2021 already contained a fairly large number of such features of a functioning European security system. Apparently, they will have to return to them after the United States is ready to sit down at the table of serious negotiations. Much here will depend on how soon the understanding of the impossibility of continuing to pursue an irresponsible policy prevails in America itself. At least now, anxiety for the future of their country is heard in the statements of some American politicians. We will see to what extent their understanding that the reasons for the US difficulties relate to the internal situation can be translated into concrete decisions. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine that there will be a place for such a concept as trust in future agreements. Unfortunately, it is not available to all political systems without exception. We ourselves see how the Americans openly declare that any new administration can easily revise the agreements reached by the previous one. Continuity of policy is disappearing in the West – and this has always been the basis of stable diplomatic relations. Moreover, the modern world is extremely diverse. Trust is possible – as in the relations between Russia and China – in situations where both sides share a common understanding of the main threats. Russia and the West cannot have such a common understanding now. Simply because the entire surrounding world poses a threat to the United States and its satellites. And until Westerners can adapt to the new international reality, it will be quite difficult to take their words seriously. Therefore, trust in matters of European security should be based on the physical impossibility for the West to violate any agreements. And no one in Russia doubts that the desire to do so will periodically arise there. Thirdly, the legal basis for European security will most likely become broader. The situation in Europe has long ceased to be the business of the Europeans themselves. Especially since the positions of two powers with the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world – Russia and the United States – directly touch here. Their indirect proximity is a concern for the entire world and has little to do with the affairs of Europe. It is no coincidence that the most adequate proposals for ending the armed confrontation in Ukraine are currently coming from China, India, Brazil, or even African countries. The Europeans, in turn, are not prepared to offer anything at all that would reflect objective reality. They are simply going with the flow. In other words, security in Europe is simultaneously a local and global problem. The broader international community itself must guarantee how the West will comply with its probable obligations. And finally, the technical aspects themselves could include things that have not been widely used in international practice before. For example, the complete or almost complete demilitarization of individual territories and entire states. Unfortunately, the practice of the last 30 years has shown that not all states can bear such a heavy burden as the right to independently determine the parameters of their defense policy. The Baltic republics of the former USSR, Finland or the same unfortunate Ukraine could live quite happily if their political elites were not tempted to use the conflict with Russia to retain power despite any economic difficulties. Then they would probably have to work better on internal development, fit into the world economy, and not turn into centers of instability. In other words, the countries that cannot play an independent role in determining regional security should be relieved of the physical ability to create problems for it. Perhaps such an experience will become more widespread in the future. At least because the risk of turning sovereign states into springboards for confrontation between great powers is too great. The main technical and legal parameters of the European security system have yet to be invented by diplomats and agreed upon by politicians. However, it is already clear from bitter experience that it is no longer possible to leave the situation here in a state of uncertainty – it is too threatening to universal peace and survival.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Wagner Group has maintained an active and controversial presence in Africa since 2017, where it has contributed to regional instability, countered Western influence, and exacerbated human rights abuses. Despite the death of its figurehead in 2023, the emergence of the Africa Corps indicates that Russia’s covert geopolitical strategies in the region will persist. The Wagner Group has gained significant attention since its involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a paramilitary organisation with deep ties to the Russian government, Wagner’s operations blur the lines between state and non-state actions. This ambiguity challenges traditional frameworks of accountability and international law, complicating efforts to address its activities on the global stage. Ukraine is not the group’s only violent contribution to the destabilization of peaceful nations. Wagner has maintained an active presence across Africa since 2017, where it has been accused of numerous human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and targeting civilians. The bulk of these activities have unfolded in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. The Wagner Group’s international impact is multifaceted, affecting strategic, economic, and humanitarian outcomes. Functioning as a tool for Russian geopolitical ambitions, the group has contributed to regional instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, countered Western influence by infiltrating anti-Western and anti-colonial movements and sentiments online, and raised significant concerns regarding human rights and international law. In many of its areas of operations, Wagner’s presence has served as a catalyst for conflict escalation, and regional instability. In CAR and Mali, for instance, the group’s presence has been linked to increased violence and human rights abuses and undermining international and regional efforts towards peace and stability. The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef,” on 23 August 2023, came two months after his march on Moscow, sparked by dissatisfaction with the Russian Ministry of Defence’s actions in Ukraine. It is likely that many of the governments and regimes in Africa that “benefitted” from Wagner’s services were deeply concerned about Prigozhin’s death. At the same time, many may have been relieved, hoping that his death might change the brutal and terror-driven campaign of violence that had plagued the Sahel region at the group’s hands. Additionally, Wagner has provided Russia with a platform to pursue state interests through covert operations. Until the invasion of Ukraine, this allowed Putin to maintain plausible deniability regarding association with Wagner and its controversial activities. In addition to military engagements, Prigozhin orchestrated extensive propaganda and disinformation campaigns across Africa. These operations bolstered Russia’s influence in countries that Wagner operated in, while obscuring the ability for international bodies and states to accurately assess and address the allegations of human rights abuses that came alongside Wagner’s deployments. In CAR, the Wagner Group was deployed in 2018 to provide protection for mines, support the government, and offer personal protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. However, Wagner’s role in CAR far exceeded resource and government protection. The group actively engaged in military operations alongside members of the armed forces, leading to numerous accusations of serious human rights violations, including summary executions and sexual and gender-based violence. Despite these allegations, the group continued to receive support from the CAR government. The media outlet, Corbeau News, reported that President Touadéra had authorised Wagner’s sexual violence. This was evidenced in one of Wagner’s most extreme acts in CAR, which occurred in April 2022 when members of the group entered a military hospital in Bangui and sexually assaulted women and new mothers in the maternity ward. One source within the military administration of CAR stated that it was the third time members from the group had entered the maternity ward and assaulted women. In 2021, reports surfaced that Wagner would deploy to Mali to combat a rebel insurgency. This announcement sparked outrage from France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, who warned Mali against partnering with the group. Similar to its operations in CAR, Wagner’s presence in Mali has been marked by violence and instability. In April 2022, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing the massacre of 300 civilians during a joint military operation involving Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group from 27 March to 31. A key feature of Wagner’s presence has been countering Western influence in strategic regions. The provision of military support to governments and groups engaged in activities against Western-supported entities has been notably destructive. This dynamic was evident in Mali, where in 2022, an extensive disinformation campaign on social media, linked to Wagner, exploited anti-France and anti-imperialist sentiments to undermine the French presence. The campaign, along with “multiple obstructions” from Mali’s military junta led to France announcing the withdrawal of its military forces from Operation Barkhane in Mali in February 2022. Following the announcement, Malians celebrated in the capital, Bamako, and held signs stating, “Thanks Wagner” and “France is a terrorist nation.” Wagner-linked actors then continued their disinformation efforts, attempting to shift blame onto France following the discovery of a mass grave near a military base that French forces had recently vacated. Satellite imagery released by France later revealed Wagner Group mercenaries arranging the bodies in the mass grave. The bodies were believed to have come from a joint-military operation between the Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group in the same area in the days prior. In Africa, Wagner’s operations have been closely linked to the control and exploitation of natural resources. In countries such as CAR and Sudan, Wagner has secured access to valuable resources such as gold and diamonds. Recently, investigative efforts by groups like All Eyes on Wagner have revealed that the group has circumvented sanctions by exporting timber from CAR through Cameroon, in addition to operating an extensive blood diamond trading network. The Wagner Group’s involvement in these countries highlights the group’s role in bolstering autocratic regimes in exchange for strategic and economic benefits. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023 had already fuelled significant speculation about the group’s future. Nonetheless, the group’s strategic plan to support autocratic governments, orchestrate foreign interference, and expand influence remains both politically and economically appealing to Moscow. The potential dissolution of the Wagner Group would pose a significant challenge and require the rebuilding of established relationships in countries where it has operated. The emergence of the Africa Corps, a new organisation seemingly poised to assume many of Wagner’s operations, emphasises the strategic and economic value these activities provide for Russia. With the announcement in January 2024 that 100 Russian soldiers from the Africa Corps would deploy to Burkina Faso, it is clear that the Wagner model is one that will continue.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shaken the world order and has seriously disrupted international peace and security. The geopolitical impact, the causes of the war and the reasons invoked to justify the armed aggression have been widely discussed. Among the many facets of the war, there is one issue that requires special attention, since it constitutes, without a doubt, one of its most serious consequences: the death of hundreds of children and the abduction of thousands of them, in flagrant violation of humanitarian law. We aim to analyze the circumstances and consequences of these actions, which may constitute a war crime, and to evaluate their impact in the medium and the long term. Children as victims of the war Motyzhyn is a village in the Bucha region, forty-five kilometers west of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. It was occupied by Russian forces in the days following the invasion of February 24, 2022, for about a month and a half. Several houses in the town were destroyed and its school partially demolished. When the Russian troops had to withdraw, the bodies of five civilians who had been executed were found, with their hands tied behind their backs. Among them were the village’s mayor, her husband and their son, who had refused to collaborate with the invaders. Today, the school in Motyzhyn is being rebuilt, but the children and young students who saw their teachers and neighbours die cannot forget the images of war. A group of teenagers trembles as they give their testimony. They express their fear of not being able to have a safe, peaceful life, of not having a future in their land. Their lives are marked forever. They are not the only ones. The stories of children witness of atrocities number in the hundreds. There are thousands of children separated from their parents, either because they have died, or because the children themselves have been displaced away from the front of the war, or because they have been kidnapped and taken to occupied territories or outside of Ukraine, to Russia or Belarus. In March 2022, just a month after the full-scale Russian invasion, the United Nations estimated that 78 children had already died and 105 had been injured.' Just over a year later, on June 1, 2023, the UN issued a report according to which the number of children killed in Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion reached 525. The report also stated that there were at least 1047 children injured in 289 cities, towns and villages throughout Ukraine, both in the areas controlled by the Government and in those occupied by Russia, from that same date.2 The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, deployed in 2014 in the wake of the occupation of the Crimean peninsula occupation and the armed conflict in the east of the country, stated that until June 2023, the Russian invasion of February 2022 has caused a total of almost 9.000 civilian deaths and more than 15.000 injuries, warning that the real number could be considerably higher, due to the difficulties faced by UN observers in accessing some areas of Ukraine where intense fighting was recorded. In October, the said Observation Mission updated the number of civilian deaths at almost 10.000 people and tens of thousands of wounded. To the figures detailed in the referenced reports, which are not exhaustive, since no certain data is available on the areas occupied by the Russian Federation, we must naturally add the victims —-dead and injured children that have occurred since the date of evaluations so far. New cases are registered practically every day. The war in Ukraine has not only caused death and injury to children and adolescents. Forced displacement, abandonment of their homes, disruption of schooling and a normal life, are also indelibly marking their lives. In the first days of the Russian invasion, millions of families were separated, mothers and younger children leaving Ukrainian territory while fathers and older siblings joined the national forces. These massive displacements to, preferably, neighbouring countries -Poland, Romania, Moldova- and from there to other destinations, were carried out under very precarious emergency conditions. Most of the displaced had to remain for long months in refugee camps. According to information collected by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), some children had to escape from Ukrainian territory alone, thereby increasing their exposure to possible abuse, sexual exploitation and human trafficking. During the course of the war, there were also numerous internal displacements from Ukrainian regions where there is greater war activity to regions considered safer, with the consequent unavoidable consequences: housing precariousness, interruption of schooling and special difficulties for institutionalized or disabled children. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, established by the Human Rights Council on March 4, 2022, to investigate alleged violations and abuses of human rights, violations of International Humanitarian Law and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation (Resolution 49/1)3, documented sexual crimes and gender violence against civilians, in victims from 4 to 82 years of age. The Commission certified cases of children who were raped, tortured, illegally detained, murdered and injured in indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons. On April 4, 2023, the Council, through Resolution 52/32, Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression, extended the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry for a new period of one year. This Resolution, approved by 28 votes (Argentina), 2 against (China and Eritrea) and 17 abstentions (Bolivia, Cuba, India and others), in its paragraph 17 “Stresses the importance of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of children and protecting children from all forms of violence, including sexual and gender -based violence, and emphasizes the importance of investigating and documenting violations and abuses of the rights of the child and violations of international humanitarian law, including forcible transfers and deportation, by relevant mechanisms, including the Commission of Inquiry”.4 In its October 2022 report, the Commission of Inquiry signalled that it had found evidence of the commission of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law corresponding crimes, by the Russian authorities, in areas under their control on Ukrainian territory: “The evidence collected demonstrates that the Russian authorities have committed the war crimes of murder, torture, rape and other sexual violence and the deportation of children to the Russian Federation”.5 Shortly after the full-scale invasion began, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) entrusted its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) with monitoring the situation in Ukraine. In the three reports submitted to date, in July and December 2022 and in July 2023, the ODIHR refers to the children’s situation. In the first of those reports, the high number of hospitals and schools bombed by the Russian Army is recorded, in “apparent violation of their protected status under International Humanitarian Law”. The report indicates that, according to information from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, 1899 educational establishments were damaged and 215 were destroyed as of June 30, 2022.6 Also, in the OSCE’s sphere, the Moscow Mechanism adopted in 1991 allows its Member States to request the appointment of an ad hoc mission of independent experts to investigate a particular problem related to the human dimension of the OSCE, either in their own territory or in that of another Member of the Organization. Ukraine first invoked the application of this Mechanism on March 3, 2022, with the support of 45 Member States. A mission of three experts appointed under this framework was given a broad mandate, which was to establish possible contraventions of OSCE commitments, violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law; as well as possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including due to deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; and to collect and analyse this information with a view to presenting it to the corresponding accountability mechanisms, as well as to the courts or tribunals with jurisdiction in the matter. The Mission, whose mandate was renewed twice, prepared three reports: in April and December 2022 and in June 2023. In their First Interim Report of April 2022, the experts confirmed that the conflict has affected children in many different ways: first, they are among the direct victims of the war and, even if they are not directly victims, many of them have lost their parents, which implies a family life interrupted forever. The report stated that, according to United Nations figures, more than half of the Ukrainian population under 18 years of age -that is, 4.3 million people- had been displaced from February 24, 2022, to that date. More than 1.8 million had left the country, while the remaining 2.5 million were internally displaced. Many of these children and adolescents —among them several thousand who were institutionalized before the conflict- have travelled alone, exposing themselves to numerous risks: dying or being injured during displacement, the risk of human trafficking and exploitation, the risk of child labour, the risk of forced recruitment or the risk of gender violence. Likewise, the Report stated that the conflict has caused the largescale destruction of civil infrastructure and the interruption of vital services, such as food, water and electricity or the provision of health services, all of which also affect children.7 In May 2022, Missing Children Europe also published a report on the children who were reported missing in Ukraine during the first 60 days of war and called on the European Union and its Member States to provide support and protection to all children and families at risk of entering that condition as a result of the conflict.8 Forced displacement and kidnapping of children In early June 2022, on International Children’s Day, President Zelenskyi noted that as of that date, there were already 200.000 Ukrainian children who had been forced to leave the country and were dispersed in the territory of the Russian Federation. The purpose of those forced transfers of Ukrainian children, according to the president, “is not only to steal them, but to make those who were deported forget about Ukraine and unable to return.9 Ukraine has denounced, and Russia has admitted, the displacement of thousands of children to territories occupied by the Russian Federation or to its territory, although the figures indicated by both states differ. At the end of September 2023, the official website of the Government of Ukraine that provides updated data and consolidated information on children suffering from the consequences of the armed conflict, registered 19.546 deportees or forcibly displaced minors. According to statements by Ukrainian officials, this figure includes children who have crossed the border with the Russian Federation accompanied by their parents. It would also include those children sent —presumably with paternal consent- to summer camps. For its part, the Russian Federation maintains that approximately 744.000 Ukrainian children, transferred for reasons of “evacuation”, “medical treatment”, “vacation” or “rehabilitation travel”, now live in Russia or Russian-occupied territories. As of July 2023, the office of the Russian Federation Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, reported that of the approximately 4.8 million residents of Ukraine “accepted” in Russia since the beginning of the war, more than 700.000 would be minors, the vast majority of whom would have arrived in that country with their parents or other relatives.10 There was information and statements coming from Russia prior to that date, which would make said figure plausible.11-11bis The Ukrainian authorities have stated, however, that these figures could be exaggerated: Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmitro Lubinets, suggested that the number of children could reach 150.000.12 Meanwhile, the President’s Commissioner for Children’ Rights, Daria Gerasymchuk, estimates that there could be “between 200 and 300 thousand abducted children”.13 Although all the information available coincides in a very high number of deported minors, the difficulties in establishing accurate figures are evident, given the lack of information shared between the authorities of both countries and the complexity of the regulatory situation, since some Ukrainian territories have been “annexed” by the Russian Federation (without the recognition of the international community) and Putin’s government applies the legislation of that country to them, regarding matters such as nationality, citizenship, adoption and custody of minors. The difficulties that this creates from the point of view of Private International Law, in cases of parents or legal guardians of minors who require their return, as well as of Public International Law in restitution claims filed by the government of Ukraine, must be the subject of a detailed study. In its report to the Human Rights Council, the Monitoring Mission in Ukraine points out the lack of information about Ukrainian children, some of them institutionalized and with physical and intellectual disabilities, who have been transferred to localities within the occupied zones or deported to Russia. Cases are mentioned of children who were sent to summer camps in Russia, supposedly with their parents’ consent, but who were then not returned to their homes. The UN Mission warns that the government of the Russian Federation did not identify those children or reunite them with their families.14 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine identified three situations in which Russian authorities have transferred unaccompanied Ukrainian minors from an area controlled by them in Ukrainian territory to another area in the same situation or to the territory of the Russian Federation: i) minors who lost their parents or contact with them during the hostilities; ii) minors who were separated as a result of the arrest of their parents; iii) minors placed in public institutions. According to the Commission, in some of those cases the transfers were made in violation of International Humanitarian Law and qualify as illegal transfers or deportations, which constitutes a war crime. Another worrying aspect of the deportations is also pointed out, which arises from information provided by Commissioner Lvova -Belova, as well as from interviews with relatives or legal representatives of some children and from press information, and which refers to the placement of minors in foster families in the Russian Federation, with the ostensible goal of having them remain in that country for extended periods of time.15 Indeed, of the 31 minors transferred to the Russian Federation from a public institution in the city of Donetsk in May 2022, one was placed in the custody of Mrs. Maria Lvova- Belova, who in September of that year announced that the minor had been granted a Russian passport and he was now “ours”. This is not a unique case, as other abductions of Ukrainian children by Russian families have already been confirmed. Regarding the response of the Russian government to the concerns raised by the Commission and by public opinion in general, regarding an eventual mechanism agreed between the two States for the return of transferred children, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared in September 2023 that “If families are located, we will assist them in reunifying with those children”.16 Mrs. Maria Lvova-Belova in turn pointed out that if a child “has a parent with full parental rights, the family has every possibility of being reunified”.17 However, there are very few cases in which transferred minors have been returned to their parents, in response to private initiatives by the parents, legal guardians or the minors themselves. Occasionally, third States have also intervened to obtain the return of some children. However, these are always specific cases: the majority of transferred minors have not returned to Ukraine or been able to reunite with their parents; on the contrary, they have remained in the Russian Federation for long periods of time, since their abduction. These actions contravene the legal requirement of International Humanitarian Law, in the sense that evacuations of children must be temporary and can only occur in cases of force majeure for reasons of health or medical treatment. Considering these parameters, the Commission considered that transfers that continue over time are assimilated to illegal deportations, which constitutes a war crime. The reports of the OSCE-ODIHR, by direct mandate of the Organization or in application of the Moscow Mechanism, also refer to forced transfers of civilians and in particular to forced transfers and deportations of children. Furthermore, the Observation mission carried out by the third ODIHR report on application of the Moscow Mechanism in June 2023, was specifically designated to address that issue and was expressly mandated to “...establish the facts and circumstances involving possible violations of relevant OSCE commitments, violations and abuses of human rights and violations of International Humanitarian Law and Internacional Human Rights Law, as well as possible cases of war crimes and crimes against Humanity, associated with or resulting from the forcible transfer of children within areas of the territory temporary controlled or occupied by Russia and/or their deportation to the Russian Federation...”.18 In their reports, the experts address with great concern the forced transfers and deportations of unaccompanied children, signalling that the policies applied by the Russian Federation in such cases could be contrary to International Law. The last of these reports established that the reasons more commonly invoked to justify the organized displacement of these children are: i) evacuation for security reasons; ii) transfer for adoption or foster care purposes; and iii) temporary stays in the so-called “recreation camps”. “Evacuation for security reasons” was invoked as legal support for the massive transfers of the civilian population, including children, which were carried out from the Ukrainian regions so called “Donetsk and Luhansk republics”, even from a week prior to the invasion of 24 February 2022. By the 20th, the authorities of the Rostov region, in the Russian Federation, reported that more than 2.904 children from those regions of Ukraine had entered their territory. Regardless of the reasons invoked for their transfer or the form of integration: whether by adoption —preferably in cases of children from Crimea— or by virtue of temporary guardianship or custody, Ukrainian children find themselves in an entirely Russian environment, including language, customs and religion and are exposed to information campaigns aimed at re-educating them, as well as giving them military education. The authorities of the Russian Federation do not take any measures to actively promote the return of Ukrainian children to their country, but rather create obstacles for families seeking to recover them. The experts appointed by the ODIHR reported that, according to statements by officials and the media, the Russian Federation transferred children from occupied territories to “holiday camps”, but once transferred to Crimea or to Russian territory, they are not returned to their families as originally agreed. Cases are cited in Kherson, where in the wake of violent attacks and schools closures, some parents accepted Russia’s offer to take their children to camps in Crimea but were then unable to contact or retrieve them.19 Some Ukrainian minors were even forcibly transferred to Belarus, as it was admitted by the director of the Belarusian Red Cross, Dzmiytryi Shautsou, who pointed out that these transfers had been made for rehabilitation treatments. The authorities of that country recently admitted that more than a thousand children are in Belarus “for health reasons’. The ODIHR experts assessed that “although certain displacements carried out by the Russian Federation were in line with its obligations under International Humanitarian Law, other practices of non-consensual evacuation, transfers and prolonged displacement of Ukrainian children constitute violations of International Humanitarian Law, and in certain cases involve serious violations of the Geneva Convention IV (GCIV) and war crimes, particularly a violation of the prohibition of forcible transfer or deportation under article 49 of the GCIV”.20 They also considered that altering the nationality of Ukrainian children is a violation of Article 50 of the GCIV. Imposition of citizenship and illegal adoptions Just three months after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine began, President Vladimir Putin issued a Decree (330/2022) to facilitate the procedures for attributing Russian citizenship to those Ukrainian children who were not under their parents’ care, which opens the way for subsequent adoption by Russian families.21 This decree also grants directors of orphanages located in occupied territories the possibility of demanding Russian citizenship for minors under fourteen years of age, admitted to the institutions under their charge, without asking for their consent. In January 2024, Putin issued a new Decree (11/2024) officially aimed at facilitating the process of granting Russian citizenship to foreign nationals and stateless persons. This decree establishes that Ukrainian orphans and children who are not in family care can receive Russian citizenship by Putin’s personal decision alone, without considering all or some of the requirements of federal legislation.22 The naturalization process can be carried out by whoever has legal guardianship of the child or by the head of a Russian organization responsible for the minor. According to the Commissioner for Human Rights of Ukraine, Dmytro Lubinets, the next step after the granting of Russian citizenship is adoption by a Russian family: in this way deported Ukrainian children no longer count de jure as Ukrainians on Russian territory. The observation missions designated to evaluate possible violations of International Humanitarian Law in the framework of this war, had already expressed their concern about the adoption of the first decree (330/2022), highlighting that International Humanitarian Law prohibits the Russian Federation from changing the status of those children and that the procedures of the Russian Federation do not appear to include measures for the reunification of families or to ensure the principle of respecting the child’s best interest. Applicable international law prescribes that children have the right to retain their identity, name, nationality and family relationships and that children should not be separated from their parents against their will, except when the separation is carried out in accordance with due process of law and if it serves the children’s best interest. Following the issuance of Decree No. 330 by President Putin, several Russian officials admitted that Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine had been “adopted” by Russian families. A Russian-appointed Kherson regional administration official, speaking to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, announced that starting February 24, 2022, children born in that region would automatically acquire Russian nationality. Likewise, orphaned children would also be registered as Russian citizens.23 Shortly after, Ms. Maria Lvova-Belova stated that several Russian families had obtained temporary custody rights over 108 orphans from the Donbass region and, as she noted, “now that the children have received Russian citizenship, temporary custody can be transformed into permanent”.24 In October 2022, Lvova-Belova announced that already 350 orphaned children from Donbass had been placed in foster families in sixteen regions of the Russian Federation. The Commissioner’s Office reported that months earlier, in February 2022, around 2.000 orphaned children or children placed in public institutions without parental control, had been transferred to the Russian Federation and subsequently, those from Donetsk and Luhansk were placed in foster families or in public institutions. Lvova-Belova declared that she herself had adopted a fifteen-year-old minor transferred to the Russian Federation in a group that came from a public institution in the city of Donetsk. In a bulletin from her Office (2023), it was recorded that the other minors in that group were placed in family centers and later in foster families or under temporary custody of residents of the Moscow region. One of those minors, 17 years old Bohdan, was effectively “placed” in the care of a Russian family, given Russian documents, and recently received a summons to report to a recruiting office. Which means that he would probably have been forced to fight against his own country’s army. Bohdan, who in March 2023 had already tried to escape and return to Ukraine, was detained at the border. He was finally able to return to his country last November, thanks to the notoriety that his case gained and efforts from the governments of Ukraine and Qatar.25 Children’s relocations to the Russian Federation for the purposes of adoption or custody has been practiced with children from Crimea since the peninsula’s illegal annexation in 2014 and the subsequent application of Russian family laws. In October of that same year, the so-called Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the occupation administration of the peninsula made public an initiative called the “Train of Hope”, so that “families coming from other regions of the Russian Federation” can contact orphans and children who were not under parental care, with the aim of “placing” them in their families. Within the framework of the investigations conducted by designated international experts, the Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea reported that more than 1.000 children from the peninsula could have been deported to various parts of the Russian Federation through this initiative. The new legislation on the adoption of Ukrainian minors ordered by President Putin has even benefited a renowned Russian congressman, Sergey Mironov, president of the Only Russia political party -of the opposition authorized by the Russian State- who would have adopted with his wife, Inna Varlamova, a little two-year-old girl, Margarita, transferred to Moscow along with 47 other minors from a center for infants in Kherson. According to statements from the centre’s employees, it was Russian soldiers and officials who took Margarita —who had already been previously visited by Mrs. Varlamova, and shortly after returned to “evacuate” the rest of the children.26 Children forcefully transferred to Russia must attend schools with local curricula and books —-even some that have been edited or adapted since the beginning of the war to give a biased vision of History-, they are not allowed to speak Ukrainian and must express pro-Russian feelings, singing for example the national anthem of the Russian Federation, as part of a re-education campaign which includes “patriotic” and military instruction. The Moscow-appointed governor of the Zaporizhia region -which, although illegally annexed by Russia, is not fully occupied by its army- reported that the Russian Ministry of Culture had transferred more than 300 children from that region to Moscow and Saint Petersburg, in order to educate them in Russian culture, within the framework of a program that foresees the participation of more than 2.500 schoolchildren. From the Russian Federation, the governor of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, announced the launch of a three-year program in which more than 500 Ukrainian children from the Volnovaya region, in the occupied zone of Donetsk, will participate and will visit cultural heritage sites in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod. The forced reintegration and re-education of a large number of Ukrainian children can have serious ethnic and sociological consequences, causing a severe impact on the future projection of Ukrainians as a national group, by constituting a factor of disruption in its continuity. Psychological Impact The row of seven or eight children standing in front of a group of academics and foreign visitors, in the classroom of a school in which others are still completely destroyed, is a devastating image. They are teenagers, perhaps between twelve and sixteen years old, and some of them are holding hands to support each other. Only two or three of them speak, sometimes through tears; the others nod with eyes still full of terror. They have seen death and destruction and when they speak, they tell how hard the experience of the Russian occupation has been, but they also talk about their future. They are convinced that it will be very hard, that they will have a very different life than the one they had or dreamed of eighteen months ago, although they are also sure that they want to fight for that future. They don’t want to leave Ukraine, they say, they just want to be left alone to recover, study and rebuild their country. In its report on the psychological impact of the war on Ukrainian children and adolescents, “A Heavy Toll”, the nongovernmental organization Save the Children estimated that “the boys and girls in Ukraine have been forced to hide underground for an average of 920 hours in the last year (2022) - which is equivalent to 38,3 days, or more than a month- since the reactivation of the conflict on February 24 of last year’. They have been “constantly faced with danger” with “the psychological distress of having witnessed violence, separation from family and friends, displacement or lack of access to education”. The fighting has forced the closure of schools in many parts of the country and in those cases only the possibility of online education remains, but less than 30 percent of Ukrainian children have access to an individual computer and frequent power outages make access difficult for those who do have them. Many of them have lost years of education due to the duration of the conflict in the east since 2014, the quarantine due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing hostilities in the country.27 As mentioned above, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has documented cases in which minors have been raped, tortured, illegally confined, killed or injured in indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons. This exposure to permanent explosions, crimes, forced displacement and separation from family members profoundly affects the well-being and mental health of children and adolescents. 75 % of parents report that their children have symptoms of psychological trauma and that 1 in 6 children report memory problems, attention deficits and a decrease in their learning ability. The hostilities have had a significant impact on children’s right to education due to damage or destruction of hundreds of schools and daycare centers.28 Minors in recreational or educational fields. The ZMINA Center for Human Rights, a Ukrainian non-governmental organization, has verified the existence of at least 43 “camps” in the occupied areas of Ukraine, where the occupation authorities intern minors. Likewise, according to statements by Russian officials, a distribution of children from the occupied areas was organized in different centers for minors in Russian territory, assigning correspondence between districts or regions of Ukraine and regions of the Russian Federation. In cases of parents in a vulnerable situation, or who, due to the violence of the fighting in the area or the lack of housing or food, wish to protect their children, the occupation authorities offer them to sign a “consent for the transfer” document for a certain period of time, which does not specify the person who will take care of the minor. At the same time, the child’s documents and birth certificate are confiscated. The children are not returned at the end of the “recreation stay”: in some cases, the “stay” is extended, in others the children are transferred to another camp without their parents’ knowledge, and sometimes Russian regional leaders declare that the children will not return. One of the main objectives of internment in these camps would be the re-education of minors: according to the ZMINA report, at least 32 of the 43 camps are “actively and systematically involved in providing education and cultural development” of the Ukrainian children according to the Russian system. The program includes narratives about the nature of the large-scale invasion and the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Minors receive lessons on “main or important topics”, such as the peace-keeping operations of the Russian army in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia or Kazakhstan, the defeat of terrorists in Syria, the protection of Russian nationals and the “liberation” of the Donbass. And they must speak exclusively in the Russian language. The ZMINA'’s report recalls that according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, States are obliged for respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference. ... Due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background. The education of children under 15 years old, orphaned or separated from their families as a result of the war, should be entrusted to people with the same cultural traditions and, as far as possible, of the same nationality, language and religion.29 The Ukrainian government has established in Kyiv a center for the care of minors affected by the war, whether they are attacks’ survivors, recovered from deportations or who have remained in a filtration center: the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights, Minors are received there to give them support; they usually have an initial conversation with those responsible for the Center and are provided assistance with a multifunctional team of doctors, psychologists and other professionals. Margarita, 6 years old and her sister Xenia, 12, both of them born in Mariupol, recently passed through that Center. They had been deported to Russia and once recovered, were able to reunite with their mother. Their father is still a prisoner in the Russian Federation. And there now is Oleg, 12 years old, who gives a heartbreaking testimony: coming from a small town near Mariupol, he remembers the night when he heard 22 “Grads” explosions and shortly after the town was occupied. Oleg and his family spent two months in a basement, without bread or running water. One day when his mother and aunt went to another town in search of food, explosions were heard near the shelter. Oleg went out and found bodies of his neighbours lying on the street. Russian soldiers detained him, and he spent two months in a “filtration camp” until his family was able to rescue him. Today, Oleg suffers from eating disorders, psychological disorders and aggressiveness. Minors in “filtration camps”. Particular attention should be given to cases of minors who, by themselves or with their parents or relatives, have been detained by the Russian military or authorities appointed by the Russian government, for prolonged periods of time, in order to determine their status and loyalty to Ukraine. The “filtration” consists of a process of interrogating civilians from territories occupied by Russia in its military campaign, to find out their political opinions. It also includes the collection of biometric data and the requisition of their personal effects, including their cell phones. This process can last several hours or be extended for more than a month. If the parents of a minor fail to “approve” the filtration and are detained or forcibly disappeared, the minor will be deported to the Russian Federation. In September 2022, United Nations Under- Secretary General for Political Affairs and Peace -Building, Rosemary DiCarlo and Under- Secretary General for Human Rights and Head of UN Haigh Commissioner for Human Rights Office (OHCHR) in New York, Ilze Brands Kehris, presented reports to the Security Council, in which they addressed the “filtration” system practiced by Russia in the occupied Ukrainian territories. Rosemary DiCarlo, while mentioning the very high number of refugees and internal displaced people provoked by the war, emphasized that the persistent reports of forced displacements, deportations and the so called “filtration camps” are extremely worrying and demanded that such information be investigated with due diligence and with the cooperation of competent authorities. She added that the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine must have free access to all the individuals detained in connection with the war. llze Brands Kehris informed the Council that the OHCHR has verified that the Russian armed forces and armed groups related to them have subjected Ukrainian citizens to the practice of “filtering”, a system of security checks and collection of personal data during which they practice detailed searches and interrogations, and women and girls are at risk of sexual abuse. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations responded to these presentations that the term “filtration” does not have a clear definition in International Humanitarian Law and that the identification of Ukrainian citizens who want to emigrate to the Russian Federation is a normal practice for any army. Recalling that his country is the largest recipient of Ukrainian refugees, he underlined that this is a registration process, not “filtration.”30 International reaction The Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the Russian Federation is a party, prescribes in its Article 6 that “States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life” and that the Parties “shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child”.31 Given the increasingly critical conditions for minors in war zones, the UN General Assembly created in 1997 the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflicts, with the mandate of evaluating the progress, the measures adopted, and the difficulties detected in the protection of children in situations of armed conflicts. In a 2004 report, the Special Representation detected the six mayor violations against children committed in that context, one of which is the abduction of children. In 2015, following a new report that -particularly evaluating the situation of children in armed conflicts in African countries— highlights this crime, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2225 (2015) on the subject in which, among other recommendations, the resolution called for the “immediate, safe and unconditional” release of children kidnapped during the conflict.32 In July 2022, once a pattern of violations against children in the framework of conflict had been proved, Ukraine was included as a “situation of concern” in the UN Secretary General’s Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflicts. From this inclusion, the Organization has the responsibility of controlling and reporting on serious violations against children, which has been accomplished through the UN Human Rights Observation Mission (created previously, in 2014, following the invasion of Crimea) and from 2022, also through the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, whose reports we have commented on. In an almost unprecedented decision -with the only exception of Libya in 2011-, on April 7, 2022, the United Nations General Assembly decided the suspension of the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council, by 93 votes in Favor, 24 against and 58 abstentions (Argentina voted in Favor). In the text of the Resolution, the General Assembly expresses “grave concern at the ongoing human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, in particular at the reports of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation, including gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights...”. In its decision, the General Assembly considered the expressions of concern by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, as well as the latest update on the human rights situation in Ukraine by the human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine, of 26 March 2022.33 At the Latin-American regional level, the Organization of American States (OAS) approved a Communiqué34 and a Resolution35 condemning the Russian Federation for the invasion of Ukraine, and finally decided to suspend it as an Observer Member of the Organization.36 The European Parliament also adopted a decision on this issue. In July 2023, the European body issued a Joint Motion for a statement on the detention of two Ukrainian minors by Russian authorities and the denunciation of their actions against minors, citing numerous reports on the oppression of Ukrainian children, “the victims most vulnerable of the Russian war of aggression”. Parliament mentions figures of deceased and injured minors and those deported to Russia (around 19.500), as well as those missing (3.924) and condemns the deliberate Russian targeting of minors through measures that include forced transfer within the territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia, illegal deportations to Belarus and Russia, illegal adoptions and attempts to impose re-education on them.37 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a Resolution in April 2023, in which it stated that the forcible transfer and Russification of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation “indicates an intention to destroy Ukraine and Ukrainian identity, as well as the cultural and linguistic characteristics of its people” and highlighted that “the forced transfer of children from one group to another with the intention of destroying, totally or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group is considered a crime of genocide” according to the Convention against Genocide, in the first pronouncement of an international organization in that regard.38 In November of that same year, PACE approved the creation of a Special Committee for Ukrainian Children’s Affairs and in January 2024 it adopted Resolution 2529 (2024) in which “the Parliamentary Assembly firmly reiterates its condemnation of the full-scale war of aggression being waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the massive violations of the rights of Ukrainian children, who are particularly vulnerable victims of this war. Children should never be used as means of exerting pressure, or as war trophies”. Through the Resolution, “The Assembly calls upon member States’ parliaments to enhance their political support towards meeting the objectives of the humanitarian response plan for Ukraine, with a specific emphasis on the needs of internally displaced children and their families”.39 The kidnapping and transfer of Ukrainian children was the crime -a potential war crime for which, unlike the economic sanctions applied to institutions and individuals of the Russian Federation, international justice held President Vladimir Putin directly responsible. In late February 2022, International Criminal Court prosecutor Karim Kahn opened an investigation for war crimes and crimes against Humanity. Slightly more than a year after, on March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with the support of the UN, issued an arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin, in connection with alleged war crimes related to the deportation and “illegal transfer” of Ukrainian children. The international arrest warrant is extensive to the Russian Government’s Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova. In his statement on the decision, Prosecutor Kahn indicated that, based on the evidence collected, there are sufficient indications to believe that Putin and Lvova-Belova bear criminal responsibility for the illegal deportation and transfer or Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. He added that many of these children have been put for adoption in that country and that, by decree, President Putin had modified the applicable law in order to facilitate the granting of Russian citizenship to these children and, consequently, expedite their adoption by Russian families. Prosecutor Kahn also pointed out that these actions, among others, demonstrate the intention to permanently separate these children from their country of origin.40 The recovery of minors abducted by the Russian Federation is extremely difficult, given the particular conditions in which deportations take place and the subsequent distribution of children in territories occupied by Russia or in its own extensive territory, to which is added the change of identity through the granting of Russian nationality and adoptions. And as Belgian diplomat Mariam Lambert, who works with a non-governmental organization in the recovery of Ukrainian children, says: “they must be brought back quickly, because the more time passes, the more difficult it will be to track them and it will be much more traumatic for the children, after a new transfer, a new change in their lives, with the consequent psychological impact”. Many States and non-governmental Human Rights organizations constantly demand that Russia cease these kidnapping and deportation actions and return the minors currently in its possession. Recently, efforts carried out by Qatar have managed to return several minors between two and seventeen years old to Ukraine and their families, four the first time in October 2023 and six more in the first days of December the same year. Qatar also mediated for the return of Bohdan, a Ukrainian teenager who had been placed with a foster family in Moscow province and then summoned to military service, as we mentioned above. 41-41bis In December 2023, the Ukrainian Government convened the first meeting of the International Coalition of Countries for the Return of Ukrainian Children, which was attended by seventy-two high-level representatives from several countries - Canada, Qatar, the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, the Netherlands, Estonia, among others- and international organizations such as the United Nations Observation and Monitoring Mission, UNICEF, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, among others. The objective of this international coalition is to support Ukraine in the return of forcibly transferred minors, as well as their rehabilitation and reintegration. Unfortunately, between the noise of war cannons and the geopolitical confusion on the international scene, the tragedy of the Ukrainian children is not adequately addressed by the international media nor, consequently, sufficiently known. It is, however, one of the most worrying aspects of this war, in which Putin seeks precisely the extinction of the Ukrainian identity and the people of Ukraine as an independent nation. The world, Western or not, must open its eyes to this true tragedy and demand in every stance the restitution of the children of Ukraine and the interruption of a practice that defies all moral parameters and international coexistence. References: 1 United Nations. “One month after the war, note that half of Ukraine’s children have been displaced”. 15 March 2022. https://news.un.org/es/story/2022/03/1506172 2 United Nations. “More than 1500 children dead or injured in Ukraine’s war”. 1 June 2023. https://news.un.org/es/story/2023/06/1521552 3 Resolution 49/1 adopted by the Human Rights Council, March 4, 2022. Situation of Human Rights in Ucrania following the Russian invasion. 4 Resolution 52/32 adopted by the Human Rights Council,, April 4, 2023. Situation of Human Rights in Ucrania following the Russian invasion. 5 International Independent Investigative Commission Report to the UN General Assembly. October 18, 2022 6 OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Interim Report on reported violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Ukraine. 7 OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 132/2022 - ODIHR.GAL/26/22/Rev.1 - Report of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism’s mission of experts entitled ‘Report On Violations Of International Humanitarian And Human Rights Law, War Crimes And Crimes Against Humanity Committed In Ukraine Since 24 February 2022'. 8 War on Ukraine responsible for surge in missing children cases, Missing Children in Europe, 25 May 2022. https://missingchildreneurope.eu/press-releaseimed-2022/ 9 President Zelenskyi: 243 Ukrainian children have died, 446 have been injured and 39 remain disappeared, warning that these numbers could be even bigger, since there is no reliable information on the zones occupied by Russia. The Associated Press, “Volodymyr Zelenskyy Says 200,000 Children among Ukrainians Forcefully Taken to Russia,” First post, 2 June 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/world/volodymyr-zelenskyv-says-200000-children-among-ukrainians-forcefully-taken-to-russia-10747981.html 10 https://www.currenttime.tv/a/v-rossiyuvyvezli-bolee-700-tysyach-ukrainskihdetey/32527102.html 11 In May 2022, Russian news agency TASS published declarations from an official of the Russian Federations’ Ministry of Defense, Mikhail Mizintsev, on the transfer of a million people from Ukraine to Russia, including approximately 200.000 children, in the previous two months. The official added that this figure included more than 1.800 children who had been “evacuated to the Russian Federation” the day before from dangerous zones in Donetsk, Luhansk and other Ukrainian regions, “without the participation of the Ukrainian authorities”. 2 In July 2022, the same TASS agency reported that more than 2.8 million Ukrainians had entered the Russian Federation from Ukraine, including 448.000 children, in a dispatch collected by Human Rights Watch (09/2022) and by the OSDE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (12/2022). “We had no choice’: ‘Filtration’ and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia”, Human Rights Watch, 1 September 2022, https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forciblytransferring-ukrainiancivilians#fin107. 11 bis За год с Украины и из Донбасса на территорию РФ прибыло 5,3 млн беженцев, ТАСС, 20 февраля 2023. 12 Кількість незаконно вивезених у росію українських дітей може сягати 150 тисяч, Укрінформ, 17. 2. 2023. 13 У Офісі Президента заявили, що у росії створили понад 70 таборів для "перевиховання" депортованих дітей з України, Рубрика, 23 квітня 2023 14 Head of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine presents the latest human rights report 06 October 2023. https://ukraine.un.org/en/248423-head-unhuman-rights-monitoring-mission-ukraine-presents-latest-human-rights-report. 15 UNGA - A/78/540 Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. 16 See United Nations Web TV, “Press conference: H.E. Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation”, September 23, 2023. 17 See Maria Lvova-Belova, “Activities of the Russian Federation Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova to protect children during a special military operation”, The Bulletin, no. 1, 4 April 2023 (2023). 18 ODIHR.GAL/37/23/Rev.1/Corr.1 4 May 2023. Report on violations and abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, related to the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation. 19 Ibid. 20 ODIHR.GAL/37/23/Rev.1/Corr.1 4 May 2023. Report on violations and abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, related to the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation. 21 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 30.05.2022 No. 330, Russian Federation official internet portal of legal information, 30 May 2022, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202205300008. 22 President of the Russian Federation’s Decree 11/2024, January 4th, 2024. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/sXZxkRw7u0DOOSE2Snp3416FcAPNuPRL.pdf 23 “Moscow says babies born in occupied Kherson will automatically get Russian citizenship”, New York Times, 16 June 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kherson-babies-russian-citizenship.htm. 24 Lvova-Belova: Families from six regions of the Russian Federation will take custody over 108 orphans from Donbas, RGRU, 15 July 2022. 25 Ukrainian teen who received call-up to Russian army. BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67368313, 10/11/2023. 26 “Missing Ukrainian child traced to Putin ally” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646. 23/11/2023 27 Save the Children, A Heavy Toll – Full Report, 02/12/23. Boys and girls in Ukraine have spent 900 hours in bunkers, more than a month of their lives. https://www.savethechildren.es/sites/default/files/2023-02/ 28 A/77/5332/2322-23590 Report of the Independiente International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine - https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/637/77/PDF/N2263777.pdf? Open Element 29 Forcible Transfer and Deportation of Children from the Temporary Occupied Territories of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Analytical Report by the Human Rights Center ZMINA, April 2023. 30 UN Security Council, “Reports of Russian Federation Forces Putting Ukrainian Civilians in ‘Filtration’ Camps Must Be Investigated” SC/15023, 7 September 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15023.doc.html 31 Convention on the Rights of the Child. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instrumentsmechanisms/instruments/conventionrights-child 32 United Nations Security Council: Resolution 2225 (2015) adopted by the Security Council in its 7466a session, on June 18, 2015. https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2015/10114.pdf, Dr. Virginia Gamba, of Argentine nationality, has occupied the position of Secretary General Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflicts since April 2017. 33 UNGA, Eleventh extraordinary period of emergency sessions. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on April 7, 2022, ES-11/3 Suspension of the Russian Federation’s right to integrate the Human Rights Council. 34 Organization of American States General Secretariat Communiqué Comunicado C-008/22. Source: OAS. 35 Organization of American States Permanent Council Resolution “The crisis in Ukraine” (CP/RES. 1192 (2371/22), 3/25/2022. Source: OAS. 36 Organization of American States Permanent Council Resolution CP/RES. 1195 (2374/22), 4/24/2022. Source: OAS. 37 European Parliament “Joint Motion”. European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 2023 on the torture and criminal prosecution of Ukrainian minors Tihran Ohannisian and Mykyta Khanhanov by the Russian Federation (2023/2735(RSP)) 38 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9075/the-forcible-transfer-and-russification-ofukrainian-children-shows-evidence-ofgenocide-says-pace, Resolution 2495 (2023) https://pace.coe.int/en/files/31776/html, 4/27/23. 39 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 2529 (2024) Situation of the children of Ukraine, 25 January 2024. https://pace.coe.int/en/files/33348/html 40 ICC, Statement by Prosecutor Karim A. Khan KC on the Issuance of Arrest Warrants against President Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova, 17 March 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-againstpresident-vladimir-putin 41 Russia returns four Ukrainian children in Qatari deal. BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67121574, 10/16/2022 41 bis Qatar announces return of 6 Ukrainian children from Russia. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/gatar-announces-release-of-6-ukrainian-children/. 12/16/2023.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group”Tensions between China and the Philippines are increasing the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2024 – Spring Update, Crisis Group looks at how the EU can support regional diplomacy to mitigate maritime disputes. Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea and the dangers it would pose to global trade. Several countries are implicated in the set of complex sovereignty disputes in the sea, which stem from rival claims to various features and the maritime entitlements they generate, but recent incidents involving Beijing and Manila have triggered the greatest concern. The Philippines controls nine outposts in the Spratlys, a contested group of land and maritime features at the heart of the South China Sea. A submerged reef known as Second Thomas Shoal has become a dangerous flashpoint, with Chinese boats continually trying to block Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship housing a handful of soldiers that a former Philippine government purposely grounded in 1999 in a bid to assert sovereignty over the atoll. China, which also claims the shoal, first started interfering with these missions in 2014, but relations between the two countries in the maritime domain have never been as volatile as during the last seven months. Chinese boats have regularly rammed the Philippine supply vessels or doused them with water cannons, occasionally wounding the sailors on board. Manila has a Mutual Defence Treaty with Washington, making this burgeoning maritime dispute part of the geopolitical competition between the U.S and China. In effect, the South China Sea has become a zone where conflict risks are rife – and where Washington and Beijing could be drawn into direct confrontation. Considering these developments, the EU and its member states should: • Seek greater diplomatic engagement with both Beijing and Manila to keep tensions in check. They should also expand their diplomatic presence across South East Asia and, where relevant, establish reliable channels through which they could communicate with high-level authorities in China and other claimant states should disputes at sea escalate; • Work to promote respect for international law, particularly the law of the sea, as a source of neutral rules for dispute resolution and conflict prevention, for example by organising public events, roundtables and dialogues in Manila and elsewhere. While this measure may not bridge the divides between Manila and Beijing, it could at least help establish a level of mutual support and understanding among the other South China Sea claimant states; and • Strengthen coast guard cooperation with the Philippines, focusing on building capacity in areas such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. Troubled Waters The sovereignty disputes that underpin the tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea go back decades. But it was Beijing’s manoeuvres to take control of Mischief Reef (in the east of the Spratlys) from Manila in 1995 that altered the perceived balance of power between the two states and in the region, setting off the territorial dispute that has now taken a turn for the worse. China’s assertiveness in the sea has grown in the past few years, along with its military capabilities. The brewing territorial dispute made headlines in 2012 when Beijing in effect took control of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll 220km west of the Philippine mainland but within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), after a maritime altercation. The incident prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to file a case challenging China’s territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On 12 July 2016, the presiding arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of Manila, dismissing China’s claim to all the waters within its “nine-dash line”, which constitute almost the entire South China Sea. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. Beijing not only rejected the adjudication and the subsequent ruling, but it had also already undercut efforts to settle the dispute through legal channels by building and fortifying seven artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was winding its way through the system. This move fundamentally changed the status quo, enabling Beijing to post permanent garrisons in the area for the first time. By many accounts, China has thus ensured itself control of the sea in any situation below the threshold of armed conflict. A short lull in the maritime dispute appeared to follow. After coming to power in 2016, Aquino’s successor, Rodrigo Duterte, pursued a pragmatic policy toward Beijing. Duterte downplayed the tribunal’s decision and cast sovereignty issues aside, hoping to benefit from Beijing’s economic largesse in exchange. Yet his ambitious gambit did not pay off. Tensions at sea continued in the form of regular standoffs between the country’s coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fisherfolk struggled to reach their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the precious oil and gas reserves within its EEZ to which it is entitled under international law. In March 2021, Chinese ships massed around Whitsun Reef, an unoccupied feature in the sea, ringing alarm bells in Manila, where senior officials voiced public criticism of China’s behaviour for the first time in years. By the end of the Duterte administration, the Philippines had revived its ties with the U.S. and become more assertive still, filing several diplomatic protests with the Chinese government. Elected in 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Duterte’s successor, was initially disposed toward friendly relations with Beijing, but the relationship soured only a few months into his presidency. Although China remains the Philippines’ top trading partner, Marcos, Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping did not achieve the desired results: Beijing neither agreed to make major new investments nor curtailed its “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea, understood as coercive actions that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. These rebuffs have helped push Marcos, Jr. toward strengthening ties with Washington, and the Biden administration has, on several occasions, publicly committed that the countries’ Mutual Defence Treaty would be deemed triggered in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft or public vessels. In perhaps the most significant recent development, after a series of high-level visits by U.S. officials to Manila, the two countries agreed to scale up implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which gives U.S. troops rotational expanded access to Philippine military bases, and which China perceives as a provocation, especially given these bases’ proximity not just to the South China Sea but also to Taiwan. Manila has also received defence and diplomatic support from a host of other countries, particularly Japan and Australia. Despite the dispute it has with Vietnam over parts of the South China Sea, it has engaged, more quietly, with Hanoi, and acquired maritime defence equipment from India, thus expanding its circle of partners. Joint naval exercises with various countries have included large-scale ones with the U.S. in April, which involved the deployment of missiles that can reach targets almost 1,600km away – something that was sure to draw Beijing’s attention – and took place just after Manila wound up its first-ever trilateral presidential summit with Washington and Tokyo. In the meantime, the Marcos, Jr. administration has pursued what it calls a “transparency initiative”, publicising information about maritime incidents by inviting journalists to join its coast guard ships or posting video recordings of events almost as they are happening. Dramatic footage of Chinese vessels blocking, ramming or attacking its resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal with water cannons has generated widespread condemnation in the Philippines and abroad. Many consider these tactics to be bullying. For its part, and despite the 2016 ruling, Beijing asserts that Manila is intruding into its waters and maintains that it is demonstrating maximum restraint. China has also recently referred to a so-called gentleman’s agreement under former President Duterte that it says foresaw preserving a status quo in the South China Sea, with Manila ostensibly agreeing to supply only humanitarian goods and no construction materials to the BRP Sierra Madre; Manila denies that there was any such arrangement. Given the Philippines’ determination to continue resupplying its troops on the BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal will likely remain a flashpoint. Due to the constraints imposed at sea by the Chinese maritime militia and coast guard, Manila is starting to look into other means of provisioning its outpost, some of which are likely to irk Beijing even more, such as airdrops or closer U.S. naval escorts. In September 2023, a U.S. plane was in the shoal’s vicinity during a resupply mission, while a U.S. warship passed through waters nearby in December. But the shoal is not the only possible source of tension. Chinese vessels, both official and non-official, sail through many areas where Philippine fisherfolk traditionally work, while other features, such as Scarborough Shoal, are also points of friction. A large-scale encounter or accident at sea could be especially dangerous. Should a Filipino or Chinese national die during such a confrontation, it could stir nationalist sentiments in Manila and Beijing and heighten threat perceptions on both sides. In case of loss of life on the Philippine side, Manila would expect its U.S. ally to assist under the Mutual Defence Treaty, especially given the recent exchanges with Washington on that topic, although the U.S. has not said precisely how it would come to the Philippines’ aid. How such a dangerous situation would evolve depends in large part on Manila’s political decision to invoke the treaty and the choices Washington makes about how to fulfill its commitments. In principle, Beijing and Manila remain open to negotiations. But the bilateral consultative mechanism, a confidence-building measure designed in 2017 to manage maritime issues between the two countries, among other things, has generated no results of note. Meanwhile, efforts to create a Code of Conduct, which aims to reduce tensions at sea by setting up norms and rules between claimants and has been under discussion between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for over two decades, have stagnated. Why the Sea Matters The South China Sea is a vital waterway through which around one third of global shipping passes. Peace and stability in the sea are a prerequisite for safe trade and are demonstrably in the interest of the EU and its member states. At over 40 per cent, the share of the EU’s trade with the rest of the world transiting the sea is even higher than the global average. Instability in the area would deal a major blow to the European economy; even a slight disturbance of shipping routes could result in higher transport costs, shipping delays and acute product shortages. Should there be an escalation that pits China against the U.S. in a direct conflict, the consequences could be catastrophic and global. European positions toward South China Sea disputes have traditionally highlighted the importance of all parties respecting international law and the need for peaceful resolution, while being careful not to take sides. But over the last few years, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have driven a greater sense of urgency and something of a shift in European thinking. First, the EU and several of its member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies, designed to guide and promote cooperation with countries throughout the region. Secondly, Brussels has increased its diplomatic support for the Philippine position following maritime altercations, offering supportive statements in December 2023 and March 2024. Brussels and several European capitals now back Manila in regularly underlining the importance of UNCLOS and maritime law in the South China Sea context. Meanwhile, Europe’s presence in the region is growing, if slowly and in part symbolically. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific for the first time, while European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first trip to the Philippines by someone holding that office and an opportunity to express, at the highest level, the EU’s readiness to strengthen cooperation with the government in maritime security, among other areas. A German frigate entered the South China Sea in 2021, and French and Italian ships made port calls in Manila in 2023. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines agreed to resume negotiations over a free trade agreement, while a month later France announced talks regarding a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. While EU interest in the region is rising, European stances on the South China Sea are complex, with member states harbouring different views on maritime disputes in the region and, more broadly, on big-power competition. Some, such as France – which is the only EU member state to have overseas territories in the region (and which has significant EEZ interests there) – see themselves as having stakes higher than others and are keen to participate in the region’s discussions on security. Others, such as Greece and Hungary, are less concerned with maritime flare-ups so far away and tend to ascribe greater importance to maintaining good relations with Beijing. What the EU and Its Member States Can Do As the EU and its most powerful member states are drawn deeper into the South China Sea, they should raise their diplomatic game in the region – both to ensure awareness of mounting tensions and to look for ways to manage corresponding risks. As a practical matter, Brussels could leverage its status as an ASEAN Strategic Partner to seek more participation in that bloc’s security mechanisms and regional forums; the EU and member states could seek higher levels of engagement with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea on matters concerning the South China Sea; and Europe could post more diplomats to the region, including permanent defence attachés who speak the language of naval diplomacy. Of particular importance will be maintaining strong lines of communication with Beijing, where Europe is seen as still having some distance from the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which works to its diplomatic advantage. While to some extent this communication will be traditional bilateral statecraft, it may also mean looking for new opportunities and new channels for dialogue. For example, some member states could also seek to follow the precedent set by France and China in establishing a coordination and deconfliction mechanism between their militaries. Brussels should also continue raising the South China Sea in its engagement with Beijing as it did during the EU-China summit in 2023. Maintaining these channels will become both more difficult and more important if and when the EU and member states expand their operational presence in the region – for example, if they decide to establish a calibrated maritime presence in the South China Sea, as proposed by the EU envoy to the Indo-Pacific. Such a move is still deemed unlikely for now. As for public diplomacy, Brussels and EU member states should consider practical ways to promote principles of the law of the sea in the region, making the case that broader regional support for and adherence to these principles would provide neutral ground for peacefully avoiding and resolving disputes. While it is hard to see this approach appealing to Beijing, which has rebuffed the UNCLOS tribunal’s decision, there could still be benefits in forging closer cooperation among other claimant states. Convenings in Manila and other regional capitals could cover topics related to the continuing disputes but also to cross-cutting themes of regional interest such as fisheries. With negotiations over a regional Code of Conduct stuck, like-minded countries in the region could use these occasions to at least develop common positions on discrete issues that might be addressed by the Code or that could foster regional confidence-building in the South China Sea. Finally, in the realm of capacity building, European governments should continue to strengthen coast guard cooperation with South China Sea claimant states, helping them develop tools and protocols that might be used where appropriate to avoid confrontation and conflict. Since Aquino’s administration, Manila has tried to boost its coast guard capabilities. Given that many of the other claimant states’ vessels in the South China Sea are coast guard ships, and find themselves embroiled in maritime confrontations, a common approach on rules of engagement could help avoid misunderstandings at sea. Building on the EU’s integrated coast guard system, the EU could host or sponsor joint workshops to develop operating principles for the region’s law enforcement vessels and exchange best practices with Philippine authorities. Brussels could also fund agencies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen coast guard expertise on issues such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. European member states could also participate in joint activities with the Philippine and other ASEAN coast guards to strengthen fisheries control and maritime border protection and deter piracy or smuggling.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In March and April, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son’s nearly back-to-back visits to the U.S. and China highlighted Vietnam’s increasing penchant for delicate diplomacy with major powers amid the U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and Vietnam’s territorial tussles with China especially in the South China Sea (SCS), which Vietnam calls the East Sea. Much of the (perceived) disorder in the Indo-Pacific hails from the SCS, and one of Vietnam’s principal challenges is fostering order on its maritime borders. Therefore, Vietnam—historically distrustful of major powers—has been diversifying its relations by seeking security and defense ties with Indo-Pacific partners like the European Union (EU), India, and Japan, as well as with Russia, a country that poses an “existential threat” to the transatlantic allies. At the same time, Southeast Asia is battling disunity within the region for resolving disputes in the SCS, for instance. The regional multilateralism embodied by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems to lack teeth even as China ‘controls’ some of its members using its financial and economic heft. So clearly, efforts beyond Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” that deepen international solidarity are required. In a similar vein, Europe’s reluctant rapprochement with China in recent times amid the EU calling China a strategic challenge but continuing to look for economic engagement is reminiscent of Vietnam and much of Asia’s predicament vis-à-vis China. Moreover, like in Southeast Asia, not every member-country of the EU is embracing the Indo-Pacific construct, led by the U.S. Or even if a member does, like France or Germany, it does not spell the end of a productive relationship with China. Nonetheless, it is clear that the EU has started to take a greater interest in the growing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific, even as the disunity over the extent of the Indo-Pacific priorities, including China, is as apparent. In such a scenario, is it possible for the EU and Vietnam, and by extension ASEAN, to have greater convergence, if not congruence, in their policies? Revisiting Vietnam’s Lack of an Indo-Pacific Tilt The Indo-Pacific, the maritime space and littoral between the western Indian and Pacific Oceans, has become the world’s most geopolitically critical region. In this region, much of the focus and debate among the EU’s more proactive members, such as France, the Netherlands, and Germany, is in response to Chinese unilateralism, trade dependency, and unchecked Sino-U.S. contestation. Several of these EU members have come to understand each other’s positions on the Indo-Pacific. Gradually, there is a realization that it is not just about what the EU and its members seek to accomplish in the region but just as much the perspectives and priorities of key Indo-Pacific resident actors—and their views on European strategies and contributions. Vietnam is one such country that is worthy of greater European strategic attention. Vietnam is known for its “bamboo diplomacy”—a reference to the bamboo plant’s strong roots, sturdy stems, and flexible branches—balancing ties with the two big powers, the U.S. and China. In the words of Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, Vietnam’s foreign policy caters to “independence, self-reliance, peace, friendship and cooperation, and multilateralization and diversification of external relations and proactive international integration.” However, Hanoi has never officially and fully embraced the term “Indo-Pacific” nor the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific construct although it does recognize that some aspects of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific tenet advocated by the U.S. and its allies are compatible with its national interests. For instance, the order in the Asia-Pacific, a term that Hanoi prefers to use, should be rule-based. This speaks to one of Vietnam’s most important foreign policy priorities: finding peace and stability in the SCS disputes with China and other claimants. However, the order that Vietnam seeks is in more than just the security domain. The goal of development has been the highest priority since Doi Moi (renovation) in 1986. Economic growth is considered the backbone of national security and regime legitimacy. Hanoi’s development of foreign relations can be said to be grounded in its national development experience, with the stress on economic priority leading to national stability and international standing. Vietnam chooses to engage in the Indo-Pacific construct on its terms. Vietnam and EU Convergence On both economic and security fronts, Vietnam and the EU can find converged interests that align closer to each other. Even as Hanoi has not officially adopted the term “Indo-Pacific,” the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, if implemented well, could address both Vietnam’s economic and security needs. Despite its security and military power limitations in the Indo-Pacific, the EU can still play a crucial role in effectively addressing these needs, which are vital for the EU’s strategic interests as well. The two already have a Framework Participation Agreement. Vietnam is also part of the EU’s Enhancing Security In and With Asia (ESIWA) project, which covers crisis management and cyber security. This also aligns with the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, where Vietnam is considered a “solid” partner. Notably, both the EU and Vietnam face (potential) economic coercion from China. As China is now Vietnam’s largest trading partner, sudden trade restrictions hindering Vietnamese exports to China would dramatically hurt the Vietnamese economy. In this vein, Hanoi welcomed the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), hoping it would give opportunities to diversify its trading partners and thus mitigate the risks of economic coercion from China. On the other hand, the EU and its member-states are also trying to increase economic resilience by diversifying trading partners as they wrestle with economic overdependence on China. So, strategically, Brussels presents an excellent opportunity for Hanoi and vice versa. However, challenges remain. For example, all the EU member-states are still to ratify the Investment Protection Agreement signed along with the EVFTA. Even though this is usually a time-consuming procedure, the imperative to reap benefits as soon as possible has taken a setback amid a challenging geopolitical landscape. Nonetheless, the two sides are concerned about more than just traditional economic development; they are concerned about sustainable development and green transition. For instance, under the EU’s Global Gateway framework, the EU and Vietnam have signed the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), which looks to provide a multi-projects credit facility worth €500 million. This is supposed to be the EU’s primary focus in Vietnam now. Yet, Hanoi’s cautious approach for fear of falling into any potential debt trap could stymie smooth cooperation. Projects involving vast sums of money, such as the JETP, are also practically challenging to push at the moment as officials are afraid to be the targets of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaigns. Vietnam would also be keen for ASEAN and the EU as blocs to reinvigorate multilateralism and shore up security cooperation, particularly in the SCS disputes. ASEAN states, in general, are looking to the EU as a non-threatening balancing power to reduce the impact of the China-U.S. strategic competition. Among the potential areas of cooperation between the EU and Vietnam within the ASEAN are regional climate action measures, food security, digitalization, and tech innovation. The two sides must also use their partnership to realize an ASEAN-EU FTA. EU as a Security Balancer? The EU and Vietnam also share their commitment to upholding the rules-based order—an essential component of security cooperation because of the region’s strategic importance. However, improving communication and understanding of maritime incidents more effectively is challenging. The SCS territorial conflict is simmering, particularly between China and the Philippines. In 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) overwhelmingly ruled in favor of the Philippines, which China rejected. However, the ruling bolstered Vietnam’s claims, which were not openly welcomed by other ASEAN states besides the Philippines. In the absence of an agreement for a code of conduct (CoC) between China and ASEAN, which has been dragging on for years, China’s violations of international law in the SCS, including the latest against Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, have increased. Against this scenario, Vietnam and the Philippines have signed maritime security deals. At the same time, Vietnam would be reluctant to do anything more drastic, such as support the Philippines in its attempt to draft a “separate” CoC for fear of Chinese retaliation. While Vietnam is less discussed in major global media than the Philippines on the issue, Hanoi is actively using diplomatic means to internationalize the problem, bringing in more players to address complex territorial disputes to safeguard its sovereignty and promote regional peace. In this context, winning the support of the EU and its member-states would be strategically important for Vietnam. The Vietnamese side can facilitate this by providing foreign entities, including the EU, with more transparent and timely information when incidents occur. Naturally, using a media strategy like the Philippines might sensationalize the issue, which might be different from what Hanoi prefers as it walks a tightrope to balance its complex relations with China. However, Hanoi can at least offer foreign diplomats transparent and detailed information in a timely fashion to help them verify and assess the situation on the ground. This will speed up the EU’s and other potential like-minded states’ response to sea incidents and foster ways forward for more multilaterally agreeable forms of modus vivendi in the South China Sea. Ultimately, such a modus should serve China too. EU No Longer a Bystander The EU’s recent stance on the SCS issue has been its respect for a rule-based order and freedom of navigation, strong opposition to unilateral actions, and supporting the ASEAN-led “effective, substantive and legally binding” CoC while mentioning China but not singling it out. This is a change from the EU’s pre-Indo-Pacific embrace when it was a more divided, neutral house. The EU’s heavy dependence on maritime trade through the SCS mandates that the EU can no longer stand as a bystander. However, ASEAN claimant states, particularly Vietnam, would perhaps expect a sharper or clearer position, which the EU has indeed been moving toward. For example, in March 2024, the EU released a statement expressing concerns about the incidents involving “repeated dangerous maneuvers” by the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia in the SCS. This tilts to the U.S. line, even as the U.S. has been more vocal in directly criticizing China on the SCS, by calling China’s claims “completely unlawful” even before the current events. One could argue that despite the U.S. and its allies having been vocal, this has yet to lead to a concrete resolution of the conflict. However, if the EU cannot send clear signals on the issue, the division among like-minded countries will be seen as weak and exploitable in China’s eyes. Importantly, this is true not just for the SCS disputes but also for China’s coercive activities in general. Therefore, given the convergent non-confrontational, inclusivity-, and economic interests-oriented attitudes of both Vietnam and the EU toward the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific region, both sides are primed to embrace the other’s strategic outlook and up their game in the face of a challenging China and efforts to foster order.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The protests by the Kanak population are taking place against an electoral reform that will further benefit the settlers recently established on the island. In the background are the profits from nickel mining, which the metropolis wants to monopolize. The riots in New Caledonia have led the Government of the French Republic to intensify repression on the Pacific Island. This week, High Commissioner Louis Le Franc has announced that the police presence would be increased, nearly doubling from 1,700 to 2,700 officers. Officially, five people, including two police officers, have died in the clashes, which have arisen due to a legal change in the system of electing representatives that discriminates against the indigenous Kanak population, who make up 40% of the total population. The clashes are also a result of the deep inequality between the Kanak people and the settlers, who are organized into militias, and are said to have carried out executions of civilians. Kanak organizations claim that the death toll among civilians could be higher. Since Wednesday, May 15th, an emergency state has been declared in the archipelago, and the army has been deployed around ports and airports. More than two hundred people have been detained. The situation has worsened due to problems accessing food — due to distribution issues, according to the island government — and healthcare services, which have arisen since the unrest began in early May. The government has stated that in several neighborhoods, "control is no longer assured," and they hope to dismantle the barricades with explosives placed by the masses of protesters. It is estimated that there are around 9,000 protesters, of whom 5,000 are in Nouméa, the capital, especially in the neighborhoods of Kaméré, Montravel, and Vallée-du-Tir. Additionally, the metropolis has banned access to TikTok — a network used for information among the protesters — and the Ministry of Justice has announced "harsher penalties against rioters and looters." The Ground Action Coordination Cell (CCAT) is the main organization of the Kanak population and has linked the protests to the "methodical sabotage of the decolonization process by the French state" from the very beginning. The fact is that since 1986, New Caledonia has been part of the territories to be decolonized according to the United Nations. "Since Emmanuel Macron came to power, France has radically sabotaged the decolonization process," stated the anticolonial organization Survie in a statement. The government's response has been to discredit the CCAT as a "mafia-like" organization and to denounce foreign interference from Azerbaijan, a country which, according to the Élysée Palace, would be seeking revenge for France's support of its Armenian rivals in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Why do protests arise in New Caledonia? The protests arose in response to a reform by the French government aimed at expanding the electorate for provincial elections in New Caledonia, a territory with an estimated population of 300,000 people. The plan involves extending the right to vote to the recently settled colonial population, around 25,000 people, which would further exclude 40% of the island's indigenous population from the representative system, who are the most affected by poverty and exclusion. The settlers are already able to vote in French presidential and municipal elections, but the plan would change the balance in provincial elections. Thus, supporters of independence and the Kanak population interpret that the "Nouméa Accord" of 1988, which grants more guarantees to the Kanak population, would be reversed in order to further privilege the settlers who have gradually been settling in the territory, attracted by tax benefits and the relationship between their high salaries with European standards and the low prices in the archipelago. This is yet another nail in a hardline shift directed by Macron's government, which in 2021 imposed a referendum to shore up French colonial power over the archipelago despite demands for postponement from the Kanaks and significant voices in French society, who called for respect for the Kanak mourning for those who died from COVID-19. As expected, abstention determined the results. The current constitutional bill to "unfreeze" the electorate, which has been voted on in the Senate and must be endorsed by the French Assembly, has sparked multiple protests, including strikes at the port and airport of Nouméa, closure of numerous administrations, the beginning of a riot at the Nouméa prison, and clashes between police and youth from working-class neighborhoods of Nouméa. As noted in an article from the environmentalist newspaper Reporterre, the control of New Caledonia is strategic for France. The island hosts between 20 and 30% of the world's nickel resources, a resource used in the manufacturing of batteries for electric cars. One out of every four people works in the nickel sector, despite which the industry is in crisis, leading the metropolis, under the guidance of Bruno Le Maire, Minister of Economy, to present a "nickel pact" that would introduce millions in aid to the sector but, at the same time, reverse a 1998 agreement by which the island secured management of the nickel. The proposed pact, explained by an expert cited by Reporterre, "completely departs from the model of mining revenues that benefit New Caledonia for its own development" and follows point by point with a neocolonial logic. Additionally, the metropolis aims for the archipelago to export more raw material, which would lead New Caledonia to lose the added benefit of in-situ nickel processing.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском How France manages the first outbreak of serious violence in New Caledonia in 40 years will affect not only its future role there but its acceptance as a resident Pacific, and Indo-Pacific, power. The violence of indigenous independence supporters, many of them very young, signals that the inconclusiveness of earlier peace agreements risks taking New Caledonia back to the bloodshed of the 1980s. The unrest is targeting the capital, Noumea, and its population of Europeans, who mostly support staying French. The wounds are deep. The peace agreements that ended violence in the 1980s largely succeeded because of difficult and constant compromises by the French state, loyalist parties and independence parties. Mutual trust in the promises of those agreements to work towards self-determination underpinned the French state conducting three referendums in New Caledonia from 2018 to 2021. The first two were impeccably organised and showed, respectively, that 56.7 percent and 53.3 percent opposed independence. But the state dropped the ball in a third referendum in 2021, sticking with an intended voting date despite indigenous requests for postponement. At the time, hundreds of Kanaks had died from Covid-19. Their leaders said they could not ask their people to campaign or vote when their traditions required lengthy mourning rituals. The resulting indigenous boycott saw the count of opposition to independence soar to 96.5 percent. Since then, divisions have deepened. Loyalists, backed by the government in Paris, say all three votes were valid and want to cement the territory as part of France. Independence groups reject the third vote and seek another; some refuse to participate in discussion about the future. They rejected Macron’s offer of a chemin de pardon (path of forgiveness) when he visited in July 2023. They did not attend a meeting he convened, and their supporters did not turn out for his major speech there, sending a strong message of discontent. Macron then threatened unilateral action unless local parties came to an agreement. Informal discussions between some parties from each side in December ended with wide divergences, including over a further independence vote and voter eligibility. To set a deadline, Macron introduced legislation postponing local elections from April 2024 to December 2025, and he put forward another bill that would amend the French constitution, imposing broader voter eligibility and thereby diluting the Kanak voting share, unless locals reached agreement before the end of June. Demonstrations erupted into violence on 13 May, the day France’s National Assembly debated imposing from Paris the enlargement of voter eligibility. The destruction perpetrated by young Kanaks signalled not only to France and loyalist parties who were their targets but also to Kanak leaders and neighbouring countries the depth of distress of a new generation who felt disrespected and excluded from determining the future of their homeland. How France responds will be decisive for its sustainable future in New Caledonia. New Caledonia’s population is about 270,000. In the census of 2019, indigenous Kanaks were 41 percent, Europeans 29 percent and other Pacific islanders and ‘others’ composed the remaining 30 percent. Another census is due this year. Kanaks may now exceed 45 percent, since there have been net departures of about 2000 people a year since 2015, almost all presumably non-indigenous. Moreover, some people in the ‘others’ category, which includes the sub-categories of ‘mixed’ and ‘Caldeonian’, would also be Kanaks. And the Kanak share of the population will rise, especially since recent developments may contribute to an increase in non-Kanak departures. While New Caledonia’s neighbours have quietly supported the peace agreements, they remain concerned about the interests of the islanders in the non-self-governing French territory. Some of them took New Caledonia to the United Nations Decolonisation Committee in 1986, ensuring annual UN scrutiny of the territory and France’s dealings with it since then. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has regularly sent missions monitoring implementation of the Noumea Accord and observed each referendum, expressing serious reservations on the third. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and New Caledonia’s FLNKS independence coalition) was formed in the mid-1980s specifically to support Kanak independence claims. With the eruption of violence, their silence has broken. Making Australia’s highest-level statement in decades, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said Australia was closely monitoring the situation and encouraged all parties to work together constructively to shape the institutional future of New Caledonia. PIF Secretary-General Henry Puna said he was not surprised by the riots, noting it was unfortunate that the third referendum had been allowed to go ahead amid the pandemic. PIF chair and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown said New Caledonia and French Polynesia had been included in the forum ‘in recognition of their calls for greater autonomy coming from their people’, and supported providing help to prevent conflict. Vanuatu Prime Minister and Melanesian Spearhead Group Chair Charlot Salwai publicly opposed France’s constitutional change and urged a return to the spirit of the peace agreements and the sending of a dialogue mission led by a mutually respected person. France has done much to regain the acceptance and trust of the region in recent decades. Responding to island governments’ visceral opposition to its policies in the 1980s, France abandoned nuclear testing in the region and gave greater autonomy to its Pacific territories. It did so by respecting local governments and people. Macron has articulated an Indo-Pacific vision for France that’s firmly based on its sovereignty in the Pacific. But, to maintain France’s claims as an Indo-Pacific power, he must listen to the large and growing indigenous minority in its pre-eminent Pacific territory, New Caledonia. And he must listen to the appeals of Pacific island governments, so they and France can move forward together with humility and respect.