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Alexei Navalny was a giant figure in Russian politics. No other individual rivalled the threat he posed to the Putin regime. His death in an Arctic labour camp is a blow to all those who dreamed he might emerge as the leader of a future democratic Russia. What made Navalny so important was his decision to become an anti-corruption crusader in 2008. Using shareholder activism and his popular blog, he shone a spotlight on the corruption schemes that enabled officials to steal billions from state-run corporations. His breakthrough came in 2011, when he proposed the strategy of voting for any party but President Vladimir Putin’s “party of crooks and thieves” in the Duma (parliament) elections. Faced with a collapse of support, the regime resorted to widespread election fraud. The result was months of pro-democracy protests. Putin regained control through a mix of concessions and repression, but the crisis signalled Navalny’s emergence as the dominant figure in Russia’s democratic movement. Despite being convicted on trumped-up embezzlement charges, he was allowed to run in Moscow’s mayoral elections in 2013. In a clearly unfair contest, which included police harassment and hostile media coverage, he won 27% of the vote. Perseverance in the face of worsening attacks The authorities learned from this mistake. Never again would Navalny be allowed to compete in elections. What the Kremlin failed to stop was his creation of a national movement around the Foundation for the Struggle Against Corruption (FBK), which he had founded in 2011 with a team of brilliant young activists. During the ensuing decade, FBK transformed our understanding of the nature of Putin’s kleptocracy. Its open-source investigations shattered the reputations of numerous regime officials, security functionaries and regime propagandists. One of the most important was a 2017 exposé of the network of charities that funded the palaces and yachts of then-premier Dmitry Medvedev. Viewed 46 million times on YouTube, it triggered protests across Russia. No less significant was Navalny’s contribution to the methods of pro-democracy activism. To exploit the regime’s dependence on heavily manipulated elections, he developed a strategy called “intelligent voting”. The basic idea was to encourage people to vote for the candidates who had the best chance of defeating Putin’s United Russia party. The result was a series of setbacks for United Russia in 2019 regional elections. One measure of Navalny’s impact was the intensifying repression directed against him. As prosecutors tried to paralyse him with a series of implausible criminal cases, they also pursued his family. His younger brother Oleg served three and a half years in a labour camp on bogus charges. This judicial persecution was compounded by the violence of the regime’s proxies. Two months after exposing Medvedev’s corruption, Navalny was nearly blinded by a Kremlin-backed gang of vigilantes, who sprayed his face with a noxious blend of chemicals. More serious was the deployment of a death squad from Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), which had kept Navalny under surveillance since 2017. The use of the nerve agent Novichok to poison Navalny during a trip to the Siberian city of Tomsk in August 2020 was clearly intended to end his challenge to Putin’s rule. Instead it precipitated the “Navalny crisis”, a succession of events that shook the regime’s foundations. The story of Navalny’s survival – and confirmation that he had been poisoned with Novichok – focused international attention on the Putin regime’s criminality. Any lingering doubts about state involvement in his poisoning were dispelled by Navalny’s collaboration with Bellingcat, an investigative journalism organisation, to identify the suspects and deceive one of them into revealing how they poisoned him. The damage was magnified by Navalny’s decision to confront Putin’s personal corruption. In a powerful two-hour documentary film, A Palace for Putin, Navalny chronicled the obsessive greed that had transformed an obscure KGB officer into one of the world’s most notorious kleptocrats. With over 129 million views on YouTube alone, the film shattered the dictator’s carefully constructed image as the incarnation of traditional virtues. ‘We will fill up the jails and police vans’ It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of the “Navalny crisis” on Putin, a dictator terrified of the prospect of popular revolution. No longer was he courted by Western leaders. US President Joe Biden began his term in office in 2021 by endorsing an interviewer’s description of Putin as a “killer”. To contain the domestic fallout, Putin unleashed a crackdown that began with Navalny’s 2021 arrest on his return to Moscow from Germany, where had been recovering from the Novichok poisoning. On the international stage, Putin secured a summit with Biden by staging a massive deployment of military force on the Ukrainian border, a rehearsal for the following year’s invasion. The Kremlin’s trolling factories also tried to destroy Navalny’s reputation with a smear campaign. Within weeks of Navalny’s imprisonment, Amnesty International rescinded his status as a “prisoner of conscience” on the basis of allegations about hate speech. The evidence was some ugly statements made by Navalny as an inexperienced politician in the mid-2000s, when he was trying to build an anti-Putin alliance of democrats and nationalists. What his detractors ignored was Navalny’s own evolution into a critic of ethnonationalist prejudices. In a speech to a nationalist rally in 2011, he had challenged his listeners to empathise with people in the Muslim-majority republics of Russia’s northern Caucasus region. This divergence from the nationalist mainstream was accentuated by Putin’s conflict with Ukraine. After the invasion of Crimea in March 2014, Navalny denounced the “imperialist annexation” as a cynical effort to distract the masses from corruption. Eight years later, while languishing in prison, he condemned Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, exhorting his compatriots to take to the streets, saying: If, to prevent war, we need to fill up the jails and police vans, we will fill up the jails and police vans. Later that year, he argued a post-Putin Russia needed an end to the concentration of power in the Kremlin and the creation of a parliamentary republic as “the only way to stop the endless cycle of imperial authoritarianism”. Navalny’s tragedy is that he never had a chance to convert the moral authority he amassed during years as a dissident into political power. Like Charles de Gaulle in France and Nelson Mandela in South Africa, he might have become a redemptive leader, leading his people from war and tyranny to the promised land of a freer society. Instead, he has left his compatriots the example of a brave, principled and thoughtful man, who sacrificed his life for the cause of democracy and peace. That is his enduring legacy.

Each week we encounter mouthwatering policies implemented by the newly elected libertarian president of Argentina Javier Milei. He has the libertarian community in awe. His arrival to politics with an openly antisystem discourse shook not only the local scene in Argentina but also the rest of the world. But how? The respective libertarian parties in each country barely get enough votes to even appear on the main grid on election night! There are numerous reasons as to why this may be. We libertarians know ourselves well and no one with a minimum of self-criticism is surprised that our current situation in party politics is such. While political culture differs by country, our internal ideological discussions as libertarians are the same. While there’s no formula for liberty, one may find Milei’s Rothbardian pattern interesting. In a world sunk in destructionist trends, many voices of reason emerge. Are any of them following these same steps? Let’s now look at some factors that led Javier Milei to the presidency. Understanding of the Market Economics has been the main problem in Argentina for almost its entire history. Crisis after crisis has kept the country stagnant, and the application of different recipes, even with new parties in power, didn’t seem to produce any results. That is why the public interest has gradually turned to economists for answers. Javier Milei understood that need. He published successful books, articles, and even had his own comedic theatrical play on economic affairs. His repeated appearances on television since 2015 were because he knew how to have channels make money. Whenever he popped up at a talk show, there was a peak in ratings. Everybody wanted him! Despite his eccentric appearance, yelling, and proliferated insults, he exuded a magnetism that filled the viewer with curiosity. Although other valuable libertarian economists were gaining prominence, no one equaled him. Without understanding everything he said, the public still perceived he wasn’t talking nonsense—his speech and arguments were logical and made sense. For instance, on his explanation on the illegitimacy of taxes, he immortalized the phrase, “Are you in favor of stealing?” And he proceeded to explain how taxes were forcibly extracted, just like in a robbery. He’d even conclude by referring to Lysander Spooner’s analogy: “At least the robber has more honor than the politician; he shows his face and risks his life!” Education As Murray Rothbard says in the last chapter of For a New Liberty, A prime and necessary condition for libertarian victory . . . is education: the persuasion and conversion of large numbers of people to the cause. Libertarians must, therefore, engage in hard thinking and scholarship, put forth theoretical and systematic books, articles, and journals, and engage in conferences and seminars. On the other hand, a mere elaboration of the theory will get nowhere if no one has ever heard of the books and articles; hence the need for publicity, slogans, student activism, lectures, radio, and TV spots, etc. Milei’s simplicity in explaining the libertarian philosophy and economic principles from an Austrian perspective made people learn. Watching the night talk show with Milei’s presence wasn’t just another moment of mind-numbing TV garbage: it became an eye-opening experience. Moreover, he used to always carry a book with him. Whether it was one of his own or Economics in One Lesson or The Fatal Conceit. At times he’s been seen with Chaos Theory or Defending the Undefendable. In each of his appearances one could write down several authors or book titles, which he’d also often share in social media. The mention of names such as Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, or Friedrich Hayek on prime time was not in vain. Genuine Followers Young people composed his main harvest of followers. Accustomed to growing up seeing the same people in power, and a not-so-different opposition, they found in Milei’s speech a flame of hope which illuminated a possible future with features similar to wealthy countries. Followers began to mention Milei in conversations with their peers, behaving like someone newly converted to a religion and wanting everyone to know. Countless users began to create content on libertarianism, from quotes, infographics, and videos spreading the ideas, which soon became very popular. That is how the demonization of the ideas of liberty and capitalism was lifted. Social Media These mentioned followers became key, especially during the elections. Their exceptional communication and research skills served to unmask, expose, and humiliate politicians and supporters 24/7. The tireless work was impressive. It took the form of memes, slogans, or trending topics. X’s importance as a free-speech platform was extraordinary, unlike during Milei’s 2021 campaign for Congress where his main supporters were banned on Twitter and came back each time with a new account. The political class had fallen behind. It had no chance in the virtual world, which had been taken over years ago by libertarians while they neglected the people. Despite Milei’s opposition using public funds to plaster the streets with their faces and paying for highly invasive and disturbing ads against him on social media, his organic and decentralized activists communicated his message unceasingly, resisted endless attacks, and discredited operations. Paradigm Shift The then-current government, whose banners were “the people” and the working class, in practice dedicated itself to multiplying poverty. They themselves lived like kings in total dissonance with the needs of the common people. Their main followers are composed of themselves and people who benefit from the state’s parasitism machinery: union leaders, government employees, corporate media, “artists” and “intellectuals.” The working people, increasingly distanced from those who claim to represent them, resonated with Milei’s ideas. Why? Because they carry civilization and progress upon their shoulders. The political class was losing credibility, and with it the elections, for not seeing this change replicating all over the world. Today the political class at a global level is using different motives to drive the structure of systematic stealing. Race, immigration, climate change, digital currency—you name it. These ideas have been implanted by the elites through prominent figures and the media, financed by public funds. The more radical their attempts, the more they demonstrate their desperation. We have the opportunity for what seems to be a new beginning in the world with a subtle comeback of the ideas upon which civilization rests. If Mises called the twentieth century the century of socialism, may we be able to call the twenty-first century the century of libertarianism.

There can be no meaningful peace without full recognition of Palestinian sovereignty. Only new leadership and new vision, on both sides, will help. No issue of foreign policy that does not involve direct Australian military participation has caused as much division as the current Gaza War. There are several reasons for this. Since the creation of the state of Israel, Australia has been one of its staunchest supporters. Originally associated with Labor, because of Dr Herbert Evatt’s role in the United Nations and Bob Hawke’s infatuation with Israel, allegiances have shifted. After leaving office Hawke himself became more critical and former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Bob Carr are now among Israel’s most trenchant critics, while the Liberals have embraced the Netanyahu government, seemingly impervious to criticisms of the carnage in Gaza. In part this is due to very effective pro-Israeli lobby groups and a Jewish community, which is one of the most ardently Zionist in the world. Another part is due to a reflexive mirroring of the United States; when Scott Morrison spoke of moving the Australian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem he was both following President Donald Trump and hoping to win over Jewish voters in the Wentworth by-election. Beyond these factors is a largely unspoken sense of identity with Israel, which projects itself as standing up for western values of democracy within a region marked by turbulence and autocracy. Israeli propaganda has been very effective in highlighting Hamas and Hezbollah terrorism while passing over atrocities performed by their own troops. That sense is increasingly being questioned by younger Australians, who see more clearly than the political class the realities of Israel/Palestine. Israel is unique in that it is a state that defines itself in ethnic terms but effectively governs a population half of whom do not share the definition of being a real Israeli. Yes, Arab citizens in Israel are recognised, but their status is legally other than that of Jewish Israelis. In the occupied West Bank the massive growth of Jewish settlements—now estimated to include over 700,000 people—has created a system that many observers liken to apartheid. Most importantly, it has made the idea of a two-state solution, which is the rhetorical fallback for almost all our politicians, impossible. There are many arguments about why progress towards such a solution, which seemed momentarily possible after the Oslo Accords of 1994, stalled, and both sides share responsibility. But the reality is that Israel, as the dominant power, effectively blocked any moves that might have given meaningful sovereignty to the Palestinians. Indeed it seems the Netanyahu government has gone further. Not only has it encouraged continuing settlements in areas that were designated as part of a Palestinian state, it appears that it tolerated the existence of Hamas in Gaza as a means of weakening the Palestinian Authority and therefore their ability to seek statehood. However the current conflict ends, it will leave behind such deep scars that only a combination of new leadership and new vision on both sides can find peace. There are several scenarios that are being advocated, and there is increasing interest in a single state, with strong communal protection for Jews and Palestinians. [Various possibilities of how this might evolve are discussed in the new edition of After Zionism, edited by Antony Lowenstein and Ahmed Moor]. If both Israelis and Palestinians have equal claims to the land—“From the river to the sea” is a slogan that supporters of both find appropriate—there is a massive imbalance between them. Israel has military might and the support of the United States; the Palestinians have guarded support from Iran and no more than rhetoric from the Arab world. As Gaza is relentlessly bombed, flights from Dubai and Abu Dhabi bring businessmen and tourists into Tel Aviv. Crucial to any settlement will be a willingness by Israel’s western defenders to put sufficient pressure on whomever is in government after the current conflict to make major concessions. Not only is the current government deeply tarnished by its security failures, it includes ministers who deny any Palestinian aspirations for sovereignty and speak openly of what can only be described as ethnic cleansing. While the current leadership of the Palestinian Authority is geriatric, corrupt, and incompetent, no Palestinian movement can accept the permanent denial of sovereignty which is Netanyahu’s often stated position. The Albanese government has inched away from total support for Israel, presumably with one eye on domestic sensitivities, inflamed by the Murdoch press, which consistently conflates denunciation of Israel with anti-Semitism. As Penny Wong is consistently attacked by both the Liberals and the Greens the government may well feel they are managing Australia’s response effectively, and Wong’s visit to the Middle East was a nicely calculated diplomatic coup. But there are ways in which Australia might go further, in particular by making it clear that the position of the current Israeli government is unacceptable, both morally and politically. I suspect a stronger stance by Australia would be welcomed by the Biden Administration, which is constrained by the politics of election year, and the president’s own long emotional ties to Israel, from exercising real pressure on the Netanyahu government. If Australia is to sound credible when speaking of human rights abuses in countries such as Myanmar and China, it needs to be willing to address them when it is inconvenient. That a plausible case can be made at the International Court of Justice against Israel on charges of genocide underlines the scale of the carnage currently experienced in Gaza. While it is possible to “stand in solidarity” with Israel in reaction to the brutality of 7 October, it is no longer possible to be “in solidarity” with the Netanyahu government.

Abstract The rivalry between Iran and Israel has intensified over the past decades. Iran has continuously expanded its involvement across the region, which has led to a ‘balance of terror’ between the two countries. Various incidents of confrontation have occurred between the two countries in the Red Sea and East of Africa since 2010s. The Iranian regime, has been expanding its strategic depth into various regions, including Africa. Different Iranian administrations have adopted distinct policies in their term, that are influenced by various factors. The relations between Iran and East African countries have been transactional and facilitated by Iran’s effort to provide various forms of financial and military assistance in exchange for friendly diplomatic relations and ability to influence African leaders’ attitude towards the West and its allies, particularly Israel. This paper reviews the history of involvement of the two countries in these regions, and analyses how policies of confrontation in both countries have changed and developed over the different historical periods. The paper will have a particular focus on post-2005, because there is compelling evidence indicating a substantial expansion of Iran’s engagement in these regions. 1. Introduction The rivalry between Iran and Israel has intensified over the past decades. This has been inflamed by various regional events such as Iran’s involvement in Syria, its nuclear ambitions, and Israel’s unprecedented peace agreement with some of the Gulf Cooperation Countries, Sudan, and Morocco. Tehran and Israel have been persistently adopting strategies, to counter the influence of one another in various regions. Such strategies have created a ‘balance of terror’1 between the two countries, in which Iran is deterred by Israel’s military capability and Tel Aviv is anxious of Iran’s ‘strategic depth’ and its expansion2. The latter has been demonstrated in various regional crises, including the attacks on Israel in October 2023. Since 1979, the mainsprings of Iranian strategies have been to enhance the regime’s strategic depth while pursuing other objectives in support of what the senior political leaders in Iran refer to as ‘the geography of resistance’ 3. At the same time, Israeli policies have been framed around a fixation with maintaining security of the state of Israel. The country’s qualitative military edge is aimed at maintaining Israel’s security and military strength, against hostile neighbours, and other regional players including Iran and its proxies. This has led to many incidents of indirect confrontations that have occurred between the two countries in various regions, including in the Red Sea and East of Africa, since 2010s. This paper reviews the history of involvement of the two countries in these regions, and analyses how policies of confrontation in Tehran and Tel Aviv have changed and developed over the different historical periods. It will also explore how the Red Sea and East of Africa became a important zone for hostile strategies between the two countries. Since 1979, and despite Israel’s military and security supremacy over Iran that stems from its advanced air force, sophisticated anti-missile air defence system, and its powerful intelligence system, the country has increasingly become concerned with Iran’s strategies. The state of Israel had maintained a stable and peaceful relationship with Iran before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, after the Revolution the regime in Tehran has taken an extremely hostile position towards Israel, calling it a ‘cancerous tumour, that will be uprooted and destroyed’4. Given the outright hostility between the two countries since 1979, the focus of the analysis in this paper will be to evaluate post-Revolutionary formulation of Iran’s policies in the Red Sea and Eastern Africa regions that are directed at Israel. A brief overview of Iran’s pre-1979 policies in Africa is also provided as a valuable contextual component to enrich the analysis. The study reviewed various sources including academic literature and online news reports to collate data. Further, archival fieldwork was conducted at the National Archive of the United Kingdom (UK) to enrich the empirical evidence that is used in the analysis of the paper. During which the diplomatic catalogues of the archive, especially the Foreign Office (FO) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) catalogues, were thoroughly examined to obtain relevant evidence. These catalogues contain a vast repository of data detailing interactions between the British government and foreign nations from 1782 to the present era.5 The documents that were reviewed at the National Archive have been extremely beneficial to clarify the relations between Iran and African countries. 2. Iran’s Engagement in Africa, a Historic Review Iran’s engagement with the African continent is a history of ebbs and flows, revolving around both continuity and change. Commencing before the Islamic revolution (1979), it began under the reign of Mohammadreza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, and took the form of a pro-status quo set of foreign policies aiming at perforating the increasing Nasserist and communist-Soviet presence in the Sub-Saharan Africa.6 The Shah was particularly concerned about the growing influence of the Soviet Union and communist-backed regimes in the Horn of Africa and perceived the latter as a significant security threat to his rule. Additionally, a mixture of geopolitical and regional developments in the early 70s such as the cold war and great power competitions, the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and decline of Arab nationalism after the death of Jamal Abdul Nasser, made the Shah more confident in pursuing an independent and more balanced foreign policy. The Shah had ambitions to take the leading role as the security provider of the Indian Ocean in collaboration with its other littoral states. Against that backdrop, the Horn of Africa became strategically important for the Shah and, therefore, Iran pursued strategies that were aimed at growing the country’s influence in the region, particularly through closer ties with Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa.7 Additionally, Iran at the time sought to strengthen diplomatic alliance within the international forums such as the United Nations General Assembly, and its Security Council. This was mainly due to Iran’s contentious position with the Arab world over territorial disputes with Bahrain and with the United Arab Emirates over the three islands in the Persian Gulf.8 With the oil crisis largely looming in the early 70s and growing oil revenues, Iran was able to afford transactional relationships with African states, some of which were in dire need for financial aid, to gain diplomatic support. The historical rise of oil export income prompted the Shah’s ambitions to portray Iran as an altruistic nation willing to provide humanitarian and development assistance to poor African countries. During this period Iran had a balanced position in relation to the state of Israel, except on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran’s view on the Palestinian issue was aligned with the Arab worlds and as British diplomatic records indicates, Tehran’s position on this issue was built on ‘Third-Worldism’ and anti-colonial rhetoric with the aim of distancing from, but simultaneously pressuring, the United States.9 Despite that, the Israeli government was relatively close to the government of the Shah and supported Iran’s activities in Africa, including in the Horn. The Shah personally believed that a united front in the Horn. constituting of Iran, Israel, and Ethiopia, would be a stabilising force and will bring security to the Horn of Africa.10 The 1979 Islamic Revolution changed Iran’s foreign policy direction on many levels. One of the driving forces of Iran’s foreign policy since the Revolution had been the state’s ideology. Iran’s post-Revolutionary political leaders have viewed the African Muslim communities as fertile ground for ‘exporting the Islamic revolution’ and expanding the geopolitics of Shiism.11 In Zimbabwe, for instance, the activities of the Iranian embassy has raised concerns as the security forces have been anxious about promotion of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘indoctrination of young Zimbabweans’.12 Moreover, since the early years of the Revolution, the IRI have pursued diplomatic relations with African countries predominantly to counter economic and diplomatic influence of the West and its allies, including Israel. Through establishing transactional relationship with African states, in which the IRI provided African states with financial support, military assistance, and cooperation in development areas, Iran has been seeking to persuade African countries to limit ties with Israel. Moreover, from the early years after the Revolution, the IRI has been seeking to expand its diplomatic ties with Africa to gain international recognition and legitimacy. One of the early diplomatic initiatives of the IRI in the continent was the diplomatic tour of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1986, in his capacity as the president at the time.13 Through that initiative, launched by Khamenei’s tour to Southern African countries, the IRI sought to expand its relations with the region mostly to break the country’s post-Revolution diplomatic isolation. Entangled in a long war with Iraq, that started right after the Revolution, the IRI was increasingly detached from the international community. Africa was at the time the most accessible region for Iran to connect with. In exchange, Iran offered development assistance, that was mostly channelled through Construction Jihad,14 and oil supplies. In the aftermath of Iran-Iraq war and under the post-Cold War global dynamics, Iran’ former President, Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a foreign policy approach aimed at normalising the IRI internationally.15,16 He actively followed up with diplomatic initiatives that were launched in the previous decade to invigorate Iran’s Africa policy by fomenting the transactional relationships. The expansion of relations between the IRI and Sudan is a great example of such initiatives. The IRI became one of the strongest allies of the ruling Islamic regime in Sudan. Iran invested in a variety of infrastructure projects in Sudan, including a 10 million US dollar road construction, connecting the North of the country to the South. The project was finished during Rafsanjani’s successor, former President Mohammad Khatami, term in office and was reportedly built by the Construction Jihad.17 Further, Iran provided military support for Omar-Al-Bashir’s government. Rafsanjani reportedly provided 300 million US dollar credit to Sudanese government to finance Al-Bashir’s purchase of Chinese weaponry.18 Some of the diplomatic initiatives that were launched in Africa during Rafsanjani’s presidency were continued during Khatami’s presidency. While maintaining relationships with some of the friendly states of Africa, such as Sudan, was carried over by Khatami’s administration, some of the cooperation deals and financial promises that were made during Rafsanjani’s presidency were abandoned. Africa played a minimal role in his foreign policy agenda and priorities that were revolving around the notion of ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’ and rapprochement with the West.19 When Khatami’s successor, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to office, his government reignited the abandoned initiatives in Africa. His government launched a comprehensive initiative to develop new ties and strengthen the old links with African states. Ahmadinejad’s Africa policy was a crucial element of his government’s populist politics, providing an exemplary opportunity for his administration to showcase their support for the underprivileged nations in Africa. 3. Principalists’ Role in Iran’s Africa Policy Presidency of Ahmadinejad in 2005 was a turning point in the rise of the so-called ‘Principalists’ in the Iranian domestic politics. Principalists are considered to be the most conservative political camp in Iran. Due to their political ideology and loyalty for the Supreme Leader, they are known amongst the political factions in Iran, to be trusted allies of both Ayatollah Khamenei and the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran’s presidential election in 2005, was perceived as a turning point in Iran’s post-Revolutionary politics in favour of the Principalists, who promoted a foreign and domestic policy that were in line with the vision of the Supreme Leader. Though, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad clashed during his second term. Moreover, his presidency coincided with a historic rise of oil income in Iran that allowed pursuit of ambitious transactional relations with poorer nations, including those in East of Africa. Ahmadinejad promoted a foreign policy discourse that was framed around advancing ‘South-South’ relations, with strong emphasis on anti-imperial rhetoric of ‘Third-Worldism’20. During his terms, Iran launched an active diplomatic outreach campaign to various countries in Global South. At the same time, the IRI cut International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) access, for monitoring and surveillance of on its nuclear sites, after some clandestine nuclear activities were revealed.21 Considering the significance of Iran’s nuclear program for the security of the State of Israel, the latter caused, and continues to do so, immense level of anxiety amongst the Israeli political and security elite. These developments induced a shift in geopolitical vision of the IRI in that period and prompted foreign policy decisions that sought to create a new arena of confrontation between the two countries, in the Red Sea and East of Africa. As a result, Tehran pushed for strengthening relations with anti-West state and non-state actors to counter the international pressure that has been imposed on Iran in the form of international isolation and economic sanctions. The African continent, specifically the Eastern Africa, and the Red Sea region provided the IRI leaders an ideal environment to deter the international pressure and circumvent economic sanctions. Another noticeable achievement of the IRI’s policy in this region has been demonstrated in Iran’s success in gaining political presence to increase the regime’s international status. A great indicator of such success is African nations’ voting pattern in favour of Iran in the United Nations (U.N.). Figure 1 demonstrates that many African countries, including those in the Eastern Africa and the ones with military ties to Iran, have remained either neutral or in favour of Iran in their votes on consecutive the U.N. human rights resolutions. Figure 1. African states’ voting results in the U.N. General Assembly on resolutions related to the situation of human rights in Iran. Source: Data compiled from the United Nations Library22   So far, the paper provided a brief historical review of the Iranian initiatives in Africa. It has also highlighted the significant focus on Africa during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose populist politics played a major role in strengthening the transactional ties with the African nations. Although, the development that have so far been discussed in the paper are not directly linked with the rivalries between Iran and Israel in Eastern Africa and the Red Sea, they provide a valuable background on the development of Iran’s Africa policy that dates to pre-Revolution era. The next section will focus on post-2005, because the empirical data that has been analysed for this paper indicates a substantial expansion of the IRI’s engagement in the Red Sea and East of Africa. It will be later discussed that such developments, were perceived alarming by the state of Israel and prompted various push back. 4. Significance of Eastern Africa and the Red Sea in Iran–Israel’s Geopolitical Confrontations The presidency of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) was characterised by an aggressive expansion of Iran’s ties with Africa. Such expansion has alarmed Iran’s regional rivals, particularly Israel. In this period, Iran opened five new embassies and reopened three of its embassies across the African continent. Three of these embassies were in countries on the Red Sea (Djibouti, Somalia, and Egypt).23 High global oil price in this period, boosted the IRI’s surplus revenue and enabled Ahmadinejad’s government to sign, or implement already signed, generous economic and developmental agreements with Eastern African states.24 Although, there is an important distinction between signing and implementation of such agreements, the evidence suggests a substantial rise in Iran’s economic assistance in the continent. Through a wide range of projects such as: a comprehensive cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe, agricultural investments and building the National Parliament in Comoros, and development of oil refineries in Eritrea,25. Iran sought to maximise its presence, and deepen its influence across the region. Similar transactional relationships with the states in the region have been pursued since that period by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.26 The Arab uprising and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates to senior political offices in Egypt was another significant event that took place in this period. Egypt under Mohammad Morsi began to build cordial relations with the IRI. After a long rule by pro-US Mubarak, who were hostile to the Islamic regime in Iran, improvement of relation with Egypt was a major step for Iran to the detriment of its regional adversaries, especially Israel. In post-Mubarak Egypt, the country’s security apparatus in the Sinai almost entirely collapsed and, consequently, it enabled the arms smugglers to transfer weapons – including Iranian cargoes freely to Gaza.27 During Ahmadinejad’d presidency, the IRI envisioned to utilise its ties with Africa to shift the balance of power against regional and global powers like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. As Table 1 indicates, more than half of Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs)28 that the IRI has concluded, between 2006 and 2012, with the African states, had been signed with Eastern African states.29 The DCAs, included a wide range of collaborations including knowledge transfer, training, and modernising the military infrastructure, and naval cooperation. As such, they were instrumental in accelerating Iran’s military presence in the region. Simultaneously, hefty modernising and restructuring packages were introduced to boost the IRI’s naval strength. These developments have raised concern in Tel Aviv. The rest of this section will investigate some of Iran’s expansion initiatives that prompted Israeli response. As noted above, Sudan played a significant role in the IRI’s Africa strategy. Iran’s relations with Sudan have also become a key element of the evolving conflict between Iran and Israel. For many years, the IRI had been one of the primary suppliers of the country’s weaponry and military technology30 accounting for 13% of Sudan’s total arms import between 2001 to 2012.31 Given its proximity to Sinai region and Gaza, Sudan was selected by the IRGC-Quds operatives as a strategic route for transferring arms through the north of Sudan, into the Sinai and further delivered to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militias. The weapon cargoes were reportedly transferred by the Egyptian and Sudanese smugglers through the Nubian desert in the east of Sudan, along the Red Sea coastlines, sea routes, and tunnels in between the Egyptian border and the Gaza strip.32 In response, between 2009 and 2011, several Israeli airstrikes that targeted weapon shipments in Sudan were launched on what was believed to be Iranian arms destined to Gaza.33 Further, in 2012, Israel bombed Yarmouk factory in Sudan, that was believed to be a hub of Iranian weapon production, and a critical supplier for shipments that were towards the Mediterranean.34 Iran has also reportedly used Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti to sustain its weapons shipment up to the Mediterranean as well as Yemen.35 The IRI has utilised regional turmoil and lack of security to expand its influence and maintain (or create new) weapon smuggling routes.36 In doing so, it has engaged with government and non-government actors across the region, which in some cases acted against each other. For example, despite the overall positive nature of the IRI with the Somalian government, Iran delivered weapon to the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) fighters in Somalia, in support of their armed confrontation with the Somalian government, in exchange for small portions of uranium. It is worth noting that some of Iran’s strategies for engagement in this region have been carried out by Ahmadinejad’s successor as well. Under the Rouhani’s administration, the IRI cooperated with Horn of Africa states like Somalia against al-Shabab and other groups in the name of counterterrorism. The IRI’s involvement in East Africa and the Red Sea, was built of a combination of transactional relations to boost access and supporting destabilising actors. Ongoing regional chaos, weak regional governments, and lack of security in the region have created a hospitable environment for external players to pursue their political gains. Tehran has been seeking to strengthen its regional presence while maintaining safe weapon delivery routes to allies and proxies in the Mediterranean. In other words, while the expansion into the Red Sea and East Africa has been strategically planned by the IRI to establish a network of influence across this region, the end goal has been to penetrate the Mediterranean region and maintain the support of network of allies and proxies, who are integral to Iran–Israel confrontation. The data collected in this study supports this observation. Between 2006 and 2013, the bulk of Iran’s arm export had been destined to Syria, Lebanon (Hezbollah), and Sudan.37 At the same time, Israel played a pivotal role in South Sudan’s independence through providing military support for the South Sudanese Mayardit’s front in the war with Khartoum.38 It is worth noting that, except for the military assistance to South Sudan, Israel remained disengaged from the region throughout this period. The passive strategy of Israel in the region has been following the country’s overall defense doctrine, that is based on a consensus amongst the military and political elite over circumvention of overstretching the defense capacities. The diplomatic tour of the then Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, in 2009, in which he visited five African countries (nearly half of them were in Eastern Africa), marked one of Tel Aviv’s first political outreach to the continent.39 From the Israeli perspective, Lieberman’s African tour was largely motivated by gaining higher international recognition. Nevertheless, the Iranian pro-regime media interpreted it as a response to the first big diplomatic tour of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the African continent in 2008.40   In the post-2015 period, coincided with the war in Yemen and the events during in this period have been influenced by other regional powers’ effort for containing Iran in the region. Shortly after the beginning of the war in Yemen a diplomatic row between Saudi Arabia and Iran began that was prompted by the execution of a leading Saudi Shia cleric,43 and subsequent attack on Saudi embassy in Tehran. Apprehension about Iran’s destabilising strategies in the region, led to Saudi officials’ decision to embark on a regional initiative aimed at isolating Iran and containing its presence in this region. This was enhanced by the decline of the IRI’s interest under Rouhani’s Administration in maintaining the strategies pursued by the principalist president Ahmadinejad.44 Rouhani’s government prioritised a rapprochement with the West in pursuit of a nuclear deal that would bring the country out of its economic isolation and paid less attention to Africa. As a result, in 2016, all African countries in the Horn except Eritrea and Ethiopia but including Sudan (a long-time ally of the IRI), followed suit with Saudi Arabia and formally halted their diplomatic relationship with Iran. Government officials in Sudan explained their sudden and unexpected shift of policies against Iran to be ‘in response to to the barbaric attacks on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad … ‘.45 However, this sudden turnaround was motivated by the ‘the promise of financial reward’46 coming from Riyadh and the latter’s subsequent promises for investing billions of dollars in Sudan’s economy combined with Sudan’s detente with the US for sanctions relief and revoking the ICC arrest warrant against Bashir. In the case of Egypt, the country was already limiting ties with Tehran after the 2013 military coup that toppled Mohammad Morsi. Losing Sudanese, Djiboutians, and Egyptian bases, the IRI lost several major corridors and littoral states’ territorial lands through which it was previously able to sustain military supplies to allies and proxies in the Mediterranean, and project power vis-à-vis Israel. These setbacks on the part of Iran were coincided with Israel’s increasing diplomatic, military, and economic engagement in the region. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited four East African states for the first time. The visits marked the highest Israeli ranked diplomatic visit to the region in decades. Shortly after, Israel’s Agency for Development Cooperation (MASHAV) reportedly approved to establish offices in all four countries. The agency allocated US$13 million to advance economic relations and cooperation in the region.47 Saudi Arabia’s effort to push Iran out of the region has also continued after 2016. The Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin-Salman, organised the Red Sea Organisation as a regional platform to create a united Arab and Muslim front against Iran and concurrently to ‘institutionalize its expanding patronage network’.48 A combination of Israeli and the Saudi efforts, that were driven by mutual security concerns over Iran’s strategies across the region, had limited Iranian influence in the region. Having said, the internal dynamics and domestic political decisions of the African states in the region have also played a significant role. These countries have been historically influenced by the external actors,49 whilst neither the Gulf monarchies nor Iran have not fully delivered on their promises of economic aid and development assistance. As such, cutting ties with Iran in exchange for closer alliance with Saudi Arabia or Israel would be perceived as an organic trade off, and indeed a rational decision in countries where Iran had been playing a destabilising role domestically (e.g. supporting CIC in Somalia). Upon Iran’s multiple setbacks in the Horn of Africa, the country began pursuing its influence in Yemen as substitute strategic ally to counter the Saudi influence, and to compensate for its loss in the Red Sea region. In late 2014, the Houthis took control of the Yemeni port of Hodeida,50 a strategic location in the Red Sea. Shortly after, the Commander of Iranian Navy, Habibollah Sayyari, told the local state-owned media that the country’s presence in the Gulf of Adan and the North of Indian Ocean will be permanently maintained.51 Capturing the control of Hodeida was widely perceived in Iran as a victory and a major step towards increasing the country’s power in the region, despite the loss of ties with East African nations.52 The IRI also pursued other initiatives to challenge Israel in the region. One of Iran’s security policies towards Israel has been to pursue strategies that may result in pushing the opponent to overstretch its geographical and containment capabilities. Prompting Israel’s military campaign aimed at obstruction of arms smuggling routes across the Red Sea to block Iran’s efforts to arm allies and proxies in the Mediterranean region is a clear example of such strategies. These efforts have indeed influenced the security discourse in Israel and stimulated debate on whether the centre of activities of the Israeli naval forces should be moved from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea to deter Iran.53 In addition, various attempts have been plotted against Israel’s interest in the region. For example, in 2016 the Kenyan authorities reportedly arrested two individuals with suspected links with the Iranian government, that were collecting intelligence and preparing an attack against the Israeli embassy in Nairobi.54 Since 2019, the naval conflict between the two countries has exacerbated, particularly in the Red Sea.55 The IRGC’s presence in and beyond the Persian Gulf has caused concerns for all the regional players. Several Israeli ships have been attacked across the region, while the IRGC has been main suspect. In 2022, an Israeli tanker was attacked in the Gulf allegedly by Iranian drones and missiles.56 Since the beginning of the war in Syria, Israel has also reportedly conducted several attacks on the Iranian oil tankers that were destined to Syria,57 including a major Iranian-owned oil tanker, Sabiti, that was attacked near the cost of Jeddah. While neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia confirmed their involvement in the incident, it is speculated that it was a sabotage operation by the Israeli forces, to stop the Iranian tanker from reaching the Suez Canal.58 In 2021, one of the largest Iranian naval warships, Saviz, that was a crucial asset in IRI’s naval military operations in the Red Sea, was reportedly attacked by Israel.59 In the same year, another Iranian naval vessel, Khark, was attacked in the Strait of Hormoz. The naval tensions are a new form of confrontation between the two countries and are expected to escalate in external regions. Iran’s engagement in the Red Sea region and its littoral states has increased since 2011. This may have been, in part, triggered by Iran’s nuclear activities. In February 2010, the International Atomic Agency reported for the first time that ‘Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapon capability’60. Since then, Israel gradually recognised that the increasing Iranian influence in the region could pose a potential threat for its national security and economic interests. Although, Iran-Israel enmity dates to the very early days after the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s nuclear ambitions have played a significant role in escalation of the rivalry and its expansion to other regions such as the Red Sea and East of Africa. In Moreover, 2011 is considered as a significant point in the history of Iran’s activities in this region because in this year, Iran for the first time, sent a warship to this region that sailed through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to reach the Mediterranean. The presence of an Iranian warship was unsurprisingly alarming for the Israeli government. This has led to various events in the region, making this region a new zone for spill-over of the tension between the two countries. The move, unsurprisingly, caused strong reactions by the Israeli officials.61 Iran’s naval and political presence in this region has been perceived as a strong indicator for the country’s aspiration to expand its geopolitical influence. Israel and Saudi Arabia, along with the United States, have expressed their concern over Iran’s increasing interest in this region62. Saudi Arabia has accused the IRI of supporting the Houthi rebels in Yemen63, while Israel has claimed that Iran is using the Red Sea maritime and land routes to support its allies and proxies across the Mediterranean, in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. 64 After Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October, the risk of spill-over of Iran–Israel to this region has intensified. Most of Iran-backed proxies have openly expressed willingness for direct confrontation with Israel. In a televised statement, Houthi military spokesperson confirmed that the group had begun its missile and drone attacks on Israel and will continue to do so65. Such developments seem bound to make the prospects of Israel-Iran conflict (mostly through Iran’s proxies) in the region more likely. However, at the time of writing this article it is not possible to assess the extent or nature of this rapidly evolving conflict. Against this backdrop, strategies of containment and deterrence that limit Iran’s influence in the region have formed the core of Israel’s involvement in the politics and security structure of this region. Consequently, such strategies fostered another component to indirect military confrontation between the two countries. Threatening security of the State of Israel in the Red Sea, given that around 20 percent of Israel’s total trade depends on this naval route,66 has also been a strong motivation in Tehran. The port of Eilat, which connects Israel to the Gulf of Aqaba and further to the Red Sea, is one of the country’s major trade chokepoints, and of defense significance. There have been special deterrence measures, put in place by Israel, to maintain free navigation and avoid hostile powers from blocking the naval routes.67 5. Conclusion: What Lies Ahead? Iran–Israeli rivalry has evolved since the 1979 Revolution in Iran. The Iranian regime, has been pursuing ideology driven strategies of expanding its strategic depth into various regions, including Africa. Different Iranian administrations have adopted distinct policies in their term, that are influenced by various factors including ideological attachment with the most conservative senior political figures, government’s financial capabilities, and the overall international environment towards Iran. The relations between the IRI and some African countries have been transactional and facilitated by Iran’s effort to provide various forms of financial and military assistance in exchange for friendly diplomatic relations and ability to influence African leaders’ attitude towards the West and its allies, particularly Israel. This, combined with other factors such as Iran’s ambitious for the development of the country’s naval fleet, and its nuclear program have prompted anxious responses by Iran’s regional rivals, specifically in Tel Aviv. As a result, the Israeli government has begum to counter Iran’s effort to maintain its position in the continent. This has had spill-over effects particularly in the East of Africa and the Red Sea region. The region has become a crisis zone for strategic confrontations between Iran and Israel. This region is of high significance for Iran’s major adversary, for two reasons. First, it is of logistical significance for seaborn trade to Israel. Second, it is connected via the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, strategically important to Israel security. Against that backdrop, the region has become increasingly important to both Tel Aviv and Tehran. Given Iran’s strategic ambitions to expand its realm of influence, it is expected that the region will remain relevant to the Iranian calculus. The IRI has expanded its military capacities, particularly in terms of missile and drone technologies. It is therefore, likely to continue strategies to seek influence in this region, lure the local governments with its advanced warfare and financial resources, and continue to remain a significant player for the security structure of the region. Considering about 12% of global trade passes through the Red Sea, Iran’s strategies in this region will undoubtedly have wider global impact.   Disclosure Statement: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Correction Statement: This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article. Additional information: Funding - This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG, 463159331), and H2020 Marie Sklodowska‐Curie Actions, Grant/Award Number: 101025388. Sara Bazoobandi & Hamid Talebian (2024) The Evolvement of Iran–Israel’s Rivalry in the Red Sea and Eastern Africa, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2023.2299076 © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent. Notes 1 Marta Furlan, ‘Israeli-Iranian relations: past friendship, current hostility’, Israel Affairs 28(2), 2022, pp. 170–83, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2041304 2 Michael Sagal, ‘Iran’s strategic depth expands from Yemen and Africa to the Mediterranean coast’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, (8 July 2019), available at: https://jcpa.org/article/irans-strategic-depth-expands-from-yemen-and-africa-to-the-mediterranean-coast/ 3 Edward Wastnidge and Simon Mabon, ‘The resistance axis and regional order in the middle east: nomos, space, and normative alternatives’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, (2023), available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2179975 4 Amir Vahdat and Jon Gambrell, ‘Iran leader says Israel a ‘cancerous tumor’ to be destroyed’, Associated Press, (22 May 2020), available at: https://apnews.com/article/a033042303545d9ef783a95222d51b83 5 For more information, see, available at: https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/foreign-commonwealth-correspondence-and-records-from-1782/ 6 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, ‘Iran’s scramble for Sub-Saharan Africa’, Insight Turkey 21(1), 2019, pp. 133–50. 7 The National Archives of the UK (TNA), ‘FCO 31/1126’, 1972. 8 H.E. Chehabi, ‘South Africa and Iran in the apartheid era’, Journal of Southern African Studies 42(4), 2016, pp. 687–709. 9 The National Archives of the UK (TNA), ‘FCO 8/2731’, 1976. 10 Robert Steele, ‘Two kings of kings: Iran-Ethiopia relations under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Haile Selassie’, The International History Review 43(6), 2021, pp. 1375–92. 11 Soli Shahvar, ‘Iran’s global reach: the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy, involvement, and activity in Africa’, Digest of Middle East Studies 29(1), 2020, pp. 53–75. 12 The National Archives of the UK (TNA), ‘FCO 8/8969’, 1992. 13 UPI Archives, ‘President said Ali Khamenei of Iran, visiting Southern Africa’, (19 January 1986), available at: https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/01/19/President-Said-Ali-Khamenei-of-Iran-visiting-southern-Africa/8506506494800/ 14 Eric Lob, ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy and construction Jihad’s developmental activities in Sub-Saharan Africa’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 48(2), 2016, pp. 313–38. 15 Shireen Hunter, ‘Iran’s pragmatic regional policy’, Journal of International Affairs 56(2), 2003, pp. 133–47. 16 R.K. Ramazani, ‘Ideology and pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy’, Middle East Journal 58(4), 2004, pp. 549–59. 17 IRNA, ‘Journalists visit the ‘friendship road’ built by Iran in Sudan’, (31January 31, 2000), available at: https://www.irna.ir/news/6914870/بازدید-خبرنگاران-از-جاده-دوستی-که-توسط-ایران-در-سودان-احداث-شد 18 The National Archives of the UK (TNA), ‘FCO 8/8938’, 1992. 19 Edward Wastnidge, ‘Détente and dialogue: Iran and the OIC during the Khatami Era (1997–2005)’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 12(4), 2011, pp. 413–31. 20 Fariborz Arghavani Pirsalami, ‘Third Worldism and Ahmadinejad’s Foreign Policy’, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 4(2), 2013, pp. 81–109. 21 ‘Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, The Guardian, (24 November 2013), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-timeline 22 United Nations, ‘United Nations Digital Library, Voting Data 2005-2022’, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?cc=Voting+Data&ln=en&c=Voting+Data 23 Mira Demirdirek, Jens Heibach, and Hamid Talebian, ‘Explaining middle-power engagement in external regions: a comparison of Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish Sub-Saharan Africa policies dataset’, MPEX German Institute for Global and Area Studies. 24 For an overview, see: Eric Lob, ‘THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY AND CONSTRUCTION JIHAD’S DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 48(2), (2016), p.313-338. 25 Haifa Ahmed Al MAASHI, ‘From security governance to geopolitical rivalry: Iran-GCC confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean’, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11(4), 2017, pp. 46–63. 26 See, Alex De Waal, ‘Pax Africana or middle east security alliance in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea?’, World Peace Foundation, no. Occasional Paper 17, 2019, available at: https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100166/ 27 Eran Zohar, ‘The arming of non-state actors in the Gaza strip and Sinai Peninsula’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 69(4), 2015, pp. 438–61. 28 ‘DCAs establish broad legal umbrellas for the range of cooperative defense activities in which states might engage, from coordinating defense policies to conducting joint exercises to jointly producing weapons and technology’. See Brandon J. Kinne, ‘The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(4), 2020, p. 730. 29 Mira Demirdirek, Jens Heibach, and Hamid Talebian, ‘Explaining middle-power engagement in external regions: a comparison of Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish Sub-Saharan Africa policies dataset’, MPEX German Institute for Global and Area Studies . 30 Reuters, ‘Sudan has drones, is pursuing missiles − state media’, Reuters, (5 September 2007), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-29357320070905 31 Mira Demirdirek, Jens Heibach, and Hamid Talebian, ‘Explaining middle-power engagement in external regions: a comparison of Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish Sub-Saharan Africa policies dataset’, MPEX German Institute for Global and Area Studies; Jonah Leff and Emile LeBrun, Following the Thread: Arms and Ammunition Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan, May 2014. Small Arms Survey. 32 Eran Zohar, ‘The arming of non-state actors in the Gaza strip and Sinai Peninsula’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 69(4), 2015, pp. 438–61. 33 ‘Sudan: questions on an Airstrike’, Stratfor, (26 March 2009), available at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/article/sudan-questions-airstrike; ‘Dispatch: Missile Strike in Port Sudan’, Stratfor, (6 April 2011), available at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/article/dispatch-missile-strike-port-sudan 34 ‘Satellite pictures suggest Sudanese weapons factory hit by air strike’, The Guardian, (27 October 2012), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/27/sudan-weapons-factory-airstrike-israel 35 ‘Eastern Africa: a battleground for Israel and Iran’, Stratfor, (29 October 2012), available at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/eastern-africa-battleground-israel-and-iran 36 ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1676’, UN Security Council, (21 November 2006), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/46cbf2e00.html 37 ‘SIPRI arms transfers database (SIPRI)’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (13 March 2023), available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers 38 ‘Israeli penetration into East Africa objectives and risks’, (29 September 2016), available at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/09/israeli-penetration-east-africa-objectives-risks-160929102604246.html 39 Tania Krämer, ‘A history of Africa-Israel relations’, DW, (18 April + 2018), available at: https://www.dw.com/en/a-history-of-africa-israel-relations/a-43395892 40 Ali Maroufi Arani, ‘How Iran was able to eliminate Israeli cultural centers across the black continent’, Mehr News Agency, (28 January 2023), available at: https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5693917/ایران-چگونه-توانست-مراکز-فرهنگی-اسرائیل-در-قاره-سیاه-را-حذف-کند 41 Kinne, ‘The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)’. 42 Mira Demirdirek, Jens Heibach, and Hamid Talebian, ‘Explaining middle-power engagement in external regions: a comparison of Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish Sub-Saharan Africa policies dataset’, MPEX German Institute for Global and Area Studies. 43 Martin Chulov, ‘Saudi Arabia cuts diplomatic ties with Iran after execution of cleric’, The Guardian, (4 January 2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/03/saudi-arabia-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-iran-after-nimr-execution 44 See: Reza Bagheri and Eric Lob, ‘Rouhani’s Africa policy: disengagement, 2013–21’, Middle East Policy 29(1), 2022, pp. 154–73, available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12618 45 ‘Sudan cuts diplomatic ties with Iran’, Reuters, (4 January + 2016), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-iran-sudan-idUSKBN0UI17720160104 46 ‘Why has Sudan ditched Iran in favour of Saudi Arabia?’, The Guardian, (12 January 2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/sudan-siding-with-saudi-arabia-long-term-ally-iran 47 ‘Israeli penetration into East Africa objectives and risks’, (29 September, 2016), available at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/09/israeli-penetration-east-africa-objectives-risks-160929102604246.html 48 Zach Vertin, ‘Toward a Red Sea Forum: the gulf, the Horn of Africa, & architecture for a new regional order’, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, 2019, 18. 49 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, ‘Middle East conflicts and middle level power intervention in the Horn of Africa’, Middle East Journal 50(3), 1996, pp. 387–404. 50 ‘Houthi Rebels take over Yemen’s Hodeidah Port: residents’, Reuters, (15 October 2014), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-insurgency-idUSKCN0I40HB20141015 51 ‘Iran’s Presence in the North of Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden will be maintained’, FarsNews, (20 January 2015), available at: https://www.farsnews.ir/news/13931030000483/حضور-ایران-در-شمال-اقیانوس-هند-و-خلیج-عدن-مستمر-و-همیشگی-است 52 Mira Demirdirek, Jens Heibach, and Hamid Talebian, ‘Explaining middle-power engagement in external regions: a comparison of Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish Sub-Saharan Africa policies dataset’, MPEX German Institute for Global and Area Studies; Ali Maroufi Arani, ‘How Iran was able to eliminate Israeli cultural centers across the black continent’, Mehr News Agency, (28 January 2023), available at: https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5693917/ایران-چگونه-توانست-مراکز-فرهنگی-اسرائیل-در-قاره-سیاه-را-حذف-کند 53 Lazar Berman, ‘After Saviz strike, Israel may be in dire straits trying to battle Iran at sea’, Times of Israel, (11 April 2021), available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-saviz-strike-israel-may-be-in-dire-straits-trying-to-battle-iran-at-sea/ 54 Banafsheh Keynoush, ‘Iran’s Africa-Pivot Policy’, Middle East Policy 28(3–4), 2021, p. 236, available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12605 55 For an overview, see A. Lott, Iran-Israel ‘shadow war’ in waters around the Arabian Peninsula and incidents near the Bab El-Mandeb, in hybrid threats and the law of the sea use of force and discriminatory navigational restrictions in straits, Edited by A. Lott (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2022), p.117-141. 56 Eric Lob and Edward Riehle, ‘Assessing the threat of Iran’s drone carriers’, Middle East Institute, (7 March + 2023), available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/assessing-threat-irans-drone-carriers 57 Gordon Lubold, Benoit Faucon, and Felicia Schwartz, ‘Israeli strikes target Iranian oil bound for Syria’, The Wall Street Journal, (11 March 2021), available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-strikes-target-iranian-oil-bound-for-syria-11615492789 58 ‘Leakage from Targeted Iran tanker halted as it heads for Gulf -Iranian media’, Reuters, (12 October 2019), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-iran-tanker-idINL5N26X06D 59 Farnaz Fassihi, Eric Schmitt, and Ronen Bergman, ‘Israel-Iran Sea skirmishes escalate as mine damages Iranian military ship’, The New York Times, (6 April 2021), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/06/world/middleeast/israel-iran-ship-mine-attack.html 60 ‘Timeline: Iran’s nuclear program’, Reuters, (19 May 2010), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-nuclear-events-idUSTRE64I2O620100519 61 ‘Israel Anger at Iran Suez canal warship move’, BBC News, (16 February 2011), available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12488908 62 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, ‘Iran in the horn of Africa: outflanking U.S. allies’, Middle East Policy 19(2), 2012, p. 126. 63 Chase Winter, ‘Saudi coalition blames Iran for missile attack’, dw.com, (11 May 2017), available at: https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-led-coalition-blames-iran-for-houthi-missile-attack/a-41248951 ; Carole Landry, ‘Iran arming Yemen’s Houthi rebels since 2009: UN report’, Middle East Eye, (1 May 2015), available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-arming-yemens-houthi-rebels-2009-un-report 64 Isabel Kershner, ‘Israel says it seized ship in red sea with load of Iranian rockets headed to Gaza’, The New York Times, (5 March 2014), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/middleeast/israel-fires-on-militants-along-syrian-border.html 65 Maha El Dahan, ‘Yemen’s Houthis enter Mideast fray, hardening spillover fears’, Reuters, (1 November 2023), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-palestinians-houthis-idUSKBN31V1GR 66 Mira Demirdirek, Jens Heibach, and Hamid Talebian, ‘Explaining Middle-Power Engagement in External Regions: A Comparison of Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish Sub-Saharan Africa Policies Dataset’, MPEX German Institute for Global and Area Studies. 67 See N. Lucas, Israeli Policy in the Red Sea, in The Red Sea: Prospects for Stability, edited by A.M. Farid (New York: Routledge, 1983).

Introduction Despite the confusion in many writings between “geopolitics” and “geostrategy,” especially in Arabic writings, and despite their overlapping with political geography,[2] we will focus on the geostrategic dimension of the Arab region from a specific angle, which is international projects in the Middle East. We will limit research to Asian projects that may involve competition which might develop from competition to tension, dispute and conflict. After the beginning of the waning of Western influence and its “relatively” contemporary projects, such as the New Middle East, the Greater Middle East and the Arab NATO, two important Asian projects emerged: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced in 2013, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) announced in 2023. First: The Chinese Project Map of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative   Throughout 1949–1967, the Arab-Chinese relationship was captive to an ideological perspective (except for the period 1949–1955, when the picture of the Arab-Zionist conflict was unclear among the Chinese leadership). However, the transformation in this relation went through a transitional phase (1976–1978), then a gradual, quiet, pragmatic perspective prevailed leading to Saudi recognition of China in 1990, and Chinese recognition of Israel in 1992, thus opening the way for the growth of the Chinese-Middle Eastern relationship which was crowned by the BRI announced in 2013.[3] An academic study compares the motives and obstacles of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations, especially Arab relations, as follows:[4] 1. Chinese motives: Or the factors for growth in Arab-Chinese relations: a. The predominance of pragmatism in Chinese political discourse and behavior since 1978. b. The collapse of the Soviet Union has strengthened Chinese pragmatism since 1990. c. China’s increasing need for Arab oil, especially in conservative Arab countries, due to China’s achievement of record economic growth rates. d. The absence of pretexts for “democracy, human rights and bias toward certain religious sects over others, or ethnic tendencies (Kurdish, Berber or other)” in Chinese foreign policy. e. China does not link its aid or its overall relations with the Arab world to strategic political conditions, military presence or particular way of voting in international organizations. f. The increasing Arab tendency among Arab political elites, especially the new ones, to free themselves from the weight of some Western conditions for the relationship with them. g. The attractive force of the Chinese economic and technological development model has constituted an important factor in Arab awareness to the relationship with China. h. The rationality of Chinese decisions concerning the relationship with Arab countries, due to the increase in Chinese specialists in Arab affairs, the expansion of Arabic language teaching in Chinese universities, the spread of Confucius Institutes for teaching Chinese, and the increase in the number of Arab students in Chinese universities. i. The expansion of the base for Arab-Israeli normalization has lifted Chinese embarrassment regarding deepening its relations with Israel since 1992. j. The size of the Arab market on the one hand, and the large purchasing power of an important sector of this market’s consumers on the other hand, constitute an attractive force so that Chinese commodity orientation would be towards the region. 2. The obstacles to the development of Arab-Chinese relations: These include the following: a. The extent to which Chinese economic pragmatism and even mercantilism can curb the political, ideological and military influences of the Chinese Communist Party and some Chinese political elites in the long term. In China, there is a movement led by one of their most prominent thinkers, Wang Jisi, who calls on China to fill the void resulting from the US retreat in the Arab region by expanding its diplomatic and economic presence there. Another Chinese thinker, Qu Xing, head of the China Institute of International Studies, sees the necessity of pushing the US to immerse itself in the problems of the Middle East to deviate from restricting Chinese interests in the Pacific Basin.[5] This might be the background behind the tendency of Chinese project experts to expect that the next ten years will witness a shift in the strategy of the BRI, supplementing it with security and political doses.[6] b. A significant percentage of Chinese projects and development aid pledges have not been fulfilled or have not been completed according to the proposed plan, which reduces the credibility of the hoped-for Chinese projects. According to Chinese official reports, the level of direct foreign investments has declined, and there are projects that have been stopped, not to mention the Chinese focus on some sectors that are less important to the countries participating in the BRI, in addition to the burden of Chinese debt interest on the Belt and Road countries as Chinese interest ranges between 4.5 and 6%.[7] c. The corruption and instability in the region may greatly confuse Chinese plans to develop its relations with Arab sides. Given that the rate of political instability in the Arab region is the highest among other political regions, this makes the Chinese project vulnerable to radical transformations in the coming years, which pressures Chinese diplomacy to work on enhancing political stability variables. Taking into account that 23% of the BRI projects in 2022 were in the Middle East, an increase of about 6.5% compared to 2021, we realize why China will work to expand its circle of political mediations to ensure a safe environment for its initiative. This explains the mediation between Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran and the possibilities of increasing Chinese diplomatic role in settling the Palestine issue. d. The US determination to disrupt Chinese projects in the region, in light of the competition between them in different regions and issues, and especially in light of the heavy reliance of some Gulf countries on US armaments and protection from regional disturbances, not to mention the depth of US penetration of decision-making bodies in many Arab countries. e. The broad base of religious parties and intellectual movements and the possibility of them exploiting Chinese policies towards the Uyghur minority in the western Chinese provinces (about 12 million Muslims), may constitute a relative obstacle to the Chinese initiative. Second: The Indian Economic Corridor[8] Map of the Economic Corridor: India – Middle East – Europe   Arab-Indian relations extend back to the Sumerian period (3000 years BCE), where Persia formed a corridor for Arabs to India and China. With the advent of Islam, relations between the two sides increased, and even deepened during the colonial period and the emergence of the East India Company. Then there was the division of the Indian continent into Pakistan and India up to the contemporary period. These periods have witnessed cooperation at times and competition at others.[9] Three factors have formed the foundations of Arab-Indian relations in the contemporary period: 1. The role of the Indian National Congress (INC) and its non-aligned policies, which brought Indian politics closer to the Arab position, under the policies of the first Indian Prime Minister after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, regarding the Palestine issue. A stance strengthened under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966–1977 and 1980–1984). India was the first non-Arab and non-Muslim country to recognize the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), granting it full diplomatic representation. Although India recognized Israel in 1950, it was until 1992 that diplomatic representation between the two sides took place, the same year China and Israel exchanged diplomatic representation.[10] 2. The increasing Indian need for Arab oil with the increasing rates of Indian development. The continued economic and technological growth in India has led to an increased need for Arab oil, especially since it is the closest energy source to the Indian continent. Until 2023, Arab oil has been covering about 60% of Indian needs, while Arab-Indian trade amounts to $240 billion, most of which with the Gulf countries, including $84 billion with UAE and $53 billion with KSA.[11] 3. The expansion of commercial and demographic relations between India and both Israel and the Arab countries, especially in the Gulf region. Until 2022, Israel was the second source of Indian arms purchases after Russia. The roots of the Indian-Israeli military cooperation extend to the periods of Indian conflict with China (1962 and 1999) and with Pakistan (1965). Israel’s share in Indian arms purchases increased from 4.7% (2010–2015) to 13% (2015–2020). The takeover of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 represented a major shift in India’s weight in Israel’s military sales, as India has become the largest customer for Israeli arms, purchasing 42.1% of Israel’s military exports, followed by Azerbaijan (13.95%) then Vietnam (8.5%), all of which are Asian countries.[12] As for the Arab world, the volume of Arab-Indian trade amounted to $240 billion, as we mentioned above, in addition to the Indian demographic presence in the region, where according to Indian government figures, there are 8.751 million Indians in the Arabian Gulf, including more than 3 million in UAE and about 2.5 million in KSA.[13] This makes Indians the second largest population group in the Arab Gulf countries after the Saudis. All these factors formed the basis of putting forward the idea of the economic Indian-European corridor via the Middle East. Based on a memorandum of understanding between KSA, the European Union (EU), India, UAE, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and US, the participants in the G20 Summit in September 2023 committed to establish the IMEEC, to stimulate economic development, by enhancing connectivity and economic integration among Asia, the Arabian Gulf and Europe. The corridor will consist of two separate branches: the eastern corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf, and the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe. It will include a railway line that, when completed, will provide an efficient transit network linking existing ports to a network of railways to complement existing sea and land transport routes—allowing transit from and to India, UAE, KSA, Jordan, Israel and Europe. The participants intend to extend electricity and digital communication cables along railway routes, in addition to pipes to export clean hydrogen. This corridor will secure regional supply chains along the railway route in a way that facilitates trade flow and supports the increased focus on environmental, social and governmental impacts, all with the strategic goal of increasing efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing economic unity, generating job opportunities, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, thus leading to a transformative integration of Asia, Europe and the Middle East. In support of this initiative, participants commit to working collectively and expeditiously to arrange and implement all these new transit elements. The project will connect several ports along the way, including Haifa in Israel, Piraeus in Greece and three ports on the western coast of India: Mundra, Kandla and Jawaharlal Nehru. There are five ports in the Middle East that will be linked to Indian ports, namely Fujairah, Jabal Ali and Abu Dhabi in UAE, in addition to the ports of Dammam and Ras al-Khair in KSA. Third: India-China Competition Most of the political units in the Arab Levant were formed during the 20th century as a result of understandings, divisions and maneuvers between European countries (since the Arab Revolt until the defeat of the Ottoman State, Sykes-Picot, the Balfour Declaration, the establishment of Israel, etc.). Thus, it is not possible to separate the geographical map or the political conditions in this region from this European, English, French, Italian and German competition. Currently, there are two neighboring Asian countries that are rising and competing economically and technologically, namely India and China, and their rivalry has extended to the Arab region. Remarkably, the relationship between these two countries is dominated by intense competition and although China is India’s second trading partner, hostility and competition are the main characteristic of their relation, as evident in the following indicators:[14] a. The legacy of historical hostility between the two countries which included military clashes for more than six decades, and which have been repeated, albeit with less intensity, in 1962, 1967, 1987, 2018, and 2020 and lastly in December 2022. This conflict is mainly about border areas (about 3000 kilometers), especially in the Himalayas, and about demarcating the borders between the two countries. For while China denies the occurrence of demarcation and demands it, India considers the traditional borders to be the actual borders. Another competition is taking place between the two countries in the South China Sea, especially over oil exploration in this region, in addition they have been weaving alliances against the other. This is evident in the rapprochement between China and Pakistan (India’s traditional enemy) or the Iranian-Chinese rapprochement at the expense of some decline in the Indian-Iranian relationship, not to mention the growth of the Indian-US relationship in light of the deterioration of the US-Chinese relationship, and India’s support for the blockade policies on some Chinese economic sectors. b. with China’s presence in the region’s most important ports of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and although India has been able to relatively improve its relations with these countries. c. India’s participation in the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” which was established in May 2022 and brought together the US, Japan, India and Australia, and which China considered an “Asian NATO” because it calls for deepening military relations among the four countries, in addition to economic and diplomatic cooperation. d. The relationship between Israel and both India and China. In addition to Israel’s participation in the Chinese BRI and the Indian IMEEC, the so-called I2U2 group includes Israel, India, US and UAE, and its goal is to encourage cooperation among private sectors and businessmen in the four countries in water, energy, transportation, space, health, food security and technology, which China perceives as a kind of influence on its project, and it may also create Arab or Iranian problems with India. Fourth: The Theory of the Spread of International Conflicts Most studies of international relations indicate that international conflicts or wars do not remain limited to the direct parties to the conflict. Rather, tracking international conflicts and wars shows, in quantitative terms, that the vast majority of international conflicts have direct or indirect effects on neighboring and distant countries not involved in those conflicts. There is no doubt that the development of means of technical and commercial interconnection and the reduction of time and space, in light of accelerating globalization, have made preventing the repercussions of international conflicts a very complex matter. The influence and spread increase if the countries involved in the competition, conflict, or war are major countries or countries that are geographically adjacent or overlapping demographically. Since Chinese-Indian relations are more tense, and both countries are involved in trade, geo-economic and population relations, in addition to engaging in relations with rival countries in the region (Israel and Iran, Syria and Israel, Yemen and the Gulf states, Syria and Turkey), this affects the relations of the two countries with the Arab countries on the one hand, and it may, on the other hand, add new axes to the competing axes (normalization countries and resistance countries), some of which are closer to China and others closer to India. Moreover, since the major international powers (US, Russia and some European influence) are involved in the general situation of the Middle East, the above dynamics will increase the elements of instability in the region, even though it is already the least stable region in the world.[15] Fifth: The Future of the Region in Light of the Indian-Chinese Competition It is necessary to determine the future of the region in light of the competition between the two Asian poles by raising a number of rhetorical questions: 1. Is the Indian project an “obstruction” to the Chinese project in light of the economic competition between the two countries, and in light of the disputes I mentioned between them? This is said while noting that Indian policy under the BJP rule has become more inclined to US policies, contrary to the Indian policy under the INC rule. Noteworthy to say about 26 Indian parties have recently allied to confront the BJP in the elections scheduled to be held early 2024. The direct support of both US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the Indian project reinforces competitive concerns, especially since India is the largest customer of Israeli arms since 2014 after the BJP took control. Here, the Indian economic corridor may be a step to expand Saudi-Israeli normalization under the cover of the Indian project on the one hand, and US competition to disrupt the Chinese project on the other hand. 2. How will KSA reconcile its ties with India and with China if a severe conflict erupts between the two Asian giants? 3. Will the competition between the two projects make reaching strategic decisions in BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization more complicated? Could it paralyze them, given the stark differences among the major powers in this bloc? Was the recent inclusion of “Western-oriented” countries in the BRICS a mere coincidence? or part of a plan targeting China? 4. What are the possibilities of harm to the status of the Suez Canal if the region is crossed by railway from Eilat to Haifa or directly to Haifa while bypassing the canal? Preliminary Indian studies of the project indicate that it reduces the time needed for transporting goods from Haifa to Europe, although there are discrepancies among experts in estimating this period between 4 to 6 days or between 8 to 12 days. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen estimated that it would save 40% of the current time,[16] which threatens the third source of Egyptian income after remittances from workers abroad and tourism. In a study that was published in 2000 by the author, it pointed out to Israeli deliberations to make the Suez Canal less important in international transportation. It also pointed out to the encouragement of Asian projects in this field,[17] constituting a new erosion for Egypt’s economy, after the erosion inflicted by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which reinforces what we have suggested regarding Israeli plans to weaken Egypt in indirect ways.[18] 5. We mentioned earlier that about nine million Indian workers live in the Gulf countries (outnumbering the population of any country in the Gulf Cooperation Council except KSA), and the number of Chinese companies and employees in the Gulf countries is no less than 2.5 million people. Will this be a potential reason for the possibility of unrest between the two parties on Arab soil in case of intensification of competition and conflict between India and China? 6. Western support of the Indian project at the expense of the Chinese project: As we noted, the US, Israel, and EU have welcomed the Indian project. Indeed, media reports said that the Group of Seven (G7) countries pledged at their meeting in Tokyo in May 2023 to collectively mobilize $600 billion by 2027 to to counter the BRI, noting that the Chinese project has been supported by 150 countries and 30 international organizations, mobilizing nearly $1 trillion and creating over 3 thousand projects. The project is targeted for completion by 2049.[19] Will this polarization between the two projects be employed to manage their conflict on Arab soil? 7. Will the Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries (such as KSA and UAE), or those through which either or both projects (the Indian and the Chinese) pass, find themselves faced with the need to choose between the two giants, as Italy did when it announced that it would withdraw from the Chinese project? What about the positions of the nine million Indians if an Arab country takes a position opposed to the Indian position? 8. What are the possibilities and indicators of militarization of the two projects? India has conducted military exercises with some countries in the region, such as KSA, UAE, the Sultanate of Oman and Egypt in 2023,[20] and each time the scope of the exercises between the two sides expands. Since 2019, the Indian Navy has been conducting Operation Sankalp, under which its warships have been tasked with providing security for Indian-flagged vessels, specifically oil tankers, as they navigate the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman amid heightened tensions between Iran, US and others in the region. The Indian Navy has stationed a liaison officer at US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Bahrain, with the same personnel tasked with developing India’s cooperation with the Manama-based Combined Maritime Forces, a 38-nation maritime partnership that also includes Pakistan (India’s traditional adversary). These developments were cemented during the April 2020 2+2 ministerial dialogue between New Delhi and Washington. This clearly indicates two dimensions in Indian planning in the region: the strategic dimension and the economic dimension, which requires asking a central question: How will India reconcile its strategy toward Israel, Iran and KSA with all the differences among these important regional parties? China, for now, has managed to do this by leveraging its economic heft and regional states’ interest in using Beijing as a counterbalance to the US. “India will need to find other ways to strike a balance, specifically in its relations with Iran, which face the sanctions regime Washington has put in place.” Indeed, “New Delhi halted energy imports from Tehran both to comply with sanctions and in a show of intent to the US. This decision has come into question, especially after India picked up cheap Russian crude oil despite sanctions amid the war in Ukraine.”[21] 9. What if the two countries (China and India) begin to militarize their presence at a later stage, as we mentioned in the indicators and possibilities of militarization in the previous point? If the dispute and competition between them escalates, will India China establish bases in the Gulf states, Pakistan, or in the countries of the Horn of Africa from Djibouti to Sudan to protect their interests? This will increase the indicator of militarization in the Middle East. In addition to the Indian policies we mentioned in the course of militarization, China has carried out military activities to protect its citizens in a number of Arab countries or to rescue them during periods of instability, and it established some military bases or facilities for them, which was made clear in the White Paper released in 2019 by China’s State Council Information Office which stipulated the protection of Chinese interests, individuals and bodies abroad. This is not to mention arms sales to countries along the Road and Belt, where for example, 47% of Chinese arms sales during the 2017–2021 period were directed to Pakistan (India’s traditional enemy), while from 2012 to 2021, China’s military exports grew by 290% to KSA and by 77% to the UAE.[22] Conclusion The previous data indicate: 1. The importance of the Arab region to both China and India (as markets, energy sources and large labor absorption sites) makes the two Asian giants more eager to be present in the region. 2. The Chinese-Indian disputes are deep and may push the Arab region to forge political, economic or military connections, in order to manage the Chinese-Indian conflict there, especially in light of the lack of a unified Arab strategy. 3. The Gulf region may experience social unrest if Arab countries adopt policies inconsistent with the orientations of the two Asian countries, and it seems that this possibility is higher with India than with China. 4. If the interests of the two countries expand, the possibilities of militarization of the region are not excluded, which will impact the region’s policies and stability, especially if the Asian competition is accompanied by Western alliances with India, particularly by the US in the Middle East, all in order to confront the Chinese project. 5. Israel is trying to maintain its relations with the two Asian powers, and it appears to be reasonably successful in this aspect, which constitutes a challenge to some regional powers such as Iran, Syria and other Arab resistance wings. This requires the Arab side to support communication with the Indian opposition to the BJP, especially the INC, and to maintain “communication” with the less pragmatic trend in the Chinese Communist Party to benefit from its recommendations towards the region. 6. The strategic prospects of the Indian and Chinese projects indicate two conflicting possibilities: a. Transforming the conflict in the region from a zero-sum conflict into a non-zero-sum conflict by integrating Israel into the heart of Arab-Asian projects, which is what Israel as well as India and China seek. This will expand the circle of common interests among the parties to the projects at the expense of the contradictory interests at the heart of which is the Palestine issue. b. The failure of the first possibility means an increase in Asian competition between the Indian and Chinese projects, which may lead to the militarization of the region and an increase in regional polarization of the two projects. This will drag the region into new conflicts and higher levels of instability, especially since the Western side will remain present in these polarizations during the coming medium period, thus making the situation more complicated. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals. [2] The geopolitical concept is centered on the mutual influence between geographic variables and internal and external political behavior while the geostrategic concept is centered on planning based on identifying different geographical areas or regions that are more strategically important in their geographical location to achieve the state’s goals. For example, a country like Afghanistan cannot build a naval fleet since it is landlocked, but the first thing that Britain or Japan might think about is building a fleet. The geostrategic concept plans how to employ the strategic position of the geography to formulate the country’s foreign policy. For example, the strategic value of the location of Afghanistan cannot be compared to the location of Nepal from the perspective of the major and central countries competing on the international stage. The Egyptian writer Gamal Hamdan’s expression “the genius of place” can be considered a geostrategic expression, especially when he refers to the location or place, Egypt’s strategic character, and the heart of the world. See: Gamal Hamdan, Shakhsiyyat Masr: Dirasah fi ‘Abqariyyat al-Makan (Egypt’s Personality: A Study in the Genius of Place) (Dar al-Hilal, 1967), Chapter 25 entitled Egypt’s Strategic Personality and Chapter 26 entitled The Heart of the World. While Ali al-Wardi’s expression of the influence of the desert and the sea on Iraqi social behavior, including his political behavior, is an expression of the reflection of the natural geographical nature on political behavior, which represents geopolitics. See details in: Ali al-Wardi, Shakhsiyyat al-Fard al-‘Iraqi: Bahth fi Nafsiyyat al-Sha‘b al-‘Iraqi ‘ala Daw’ ‘Ilm al-Ijtima‘ al-Hadith (The Personality of the Iraqi Individual: An Investigation into the Psychology of the Iraqi People in Light of Modern Sociology), 2nd edition (London: Dar Laila Publications, 2001), pp. 48-55, and 75-78. See also Jan Wendt, “The Select Methods of Investigations in Geostrategy and Geopolitics,” Political Geography Studies in Central and Eastern Europe, Oradea, 2000, https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/5344/The_select_methods_of_investigations_in_geostrategy_and_geopolitics.pdf?sequence=1 [3] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Dirasat Mustaqbaliyyah fi al-‘Alaqat al-Duwaliyyah: Namadhij Tatbiqiyyah (Futures Studies in International Relations: Applied Models) (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2023), pp. 82-83. [4] Fazzur Rahman Saddiqui, China and The Arab World: Past and Present (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House Paper, 2022), pp. 84-92. [5] Walid Abd al-Hay, Does the Balancing Policy Restrict China’s Role in the Middle East? International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Foundation, Issue 207, January 2017, p. 26. (in Arabic) [6] Ruby Osman, Bye Bye BRI? Why 3 New Initiatives Will Shape the Next 10 Years of China’s Global Outreach, site of Time, 1/10/2023, https://time.com/6319264/china-belt-and-road-ten-years [7] Christoph Nedopil Wang, “Brief: China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2021,” site of Green Finance & Development Center, 2/2/2022, https://greenfdc.org/brief-china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2021; and NC Bipindra, China Completes 10 Years Of $1.4 Trillion BRI Project; Puts South Asia, Barring India & Bhutan, In A Bind, site of The EurAsian Times, 23/7/2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-completes-10-years-of-1-4-trillion-bri-project-puts [8] Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor, site of The White House, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Project-Gateway-Multilateral-MOU.pdf; and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, The Geopolitics of the New India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, site of ORF, 29/9/2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-geopolitics-of-the-new-india-middle-east-europe-corridor [9] For further details, see Hojjatollah Hezariyana and Ghaffar Pourbakhtiarb, A Historical Study of the Persian Gulf and Indo-Arab Trade Until the 5th Century AH, Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education, vol. 12, No. 11, 2021, pp. 6724-6725. [10] Sujata Ashwarya, “India’s policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue and Israel: the Indira Gandhi years,” Global Discourse journal, Bristol University Press, vol. 13, No. 23, 2022, pp. 2-5. [11] New Trade Initiative Offers India Major Gains in Middle East, site of VOA News, 27/9/2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/new-trade-initiative-offers-india-major-gains-in-middle-east/7287689.html [12] Azad Essa, India and Israel: The arms trade in charts and numbers, site of Middle East Eye, 31/5/2022, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-israel-arms-trade-numbers [13] Question No. 583 Indian Workers in Gulf Countries, site of Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9/12/2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/35979 [14] Derek Grossman, India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia, site of The Rand Blog, 21/8/2023, https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/08/india-is-pushing-back-against-china-in-south-asia.html; I2U2: India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, United States, site of U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/i2u2; Vijay Gokhale, Shivshankar Menon, and Tanvi Madan, A big-picture look at the India-China relationship, site of Brookings Institution, 20/9/2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-big-picture-look-at-the-india-china-relationship; What Kind of Group Is the 4-nation Quad?, site of Learning English, VOA news, 24/5/2022, https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/what-kind-of-group-is-the-4-nation-quad-/6587184.html; YP Rajesh, Krishn Kaushik and Martin Quin Pollard, Xi skipping G20 summit seen as new setback to India-China ties, site of Reuters, 5/9/2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/xi-skipping-g20-summit-seen-new-setback-india-china-ties-2023-09-05; and Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu, Rising tensions along the Indian-Chinese border, site of Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 8/8/2023, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-india-border-2 [15] Hasan Alhasan, The China-India Contest in the Middle East, site of The Diplomat, 21/7/2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-china-india-contest-in-the-middle-east [16] India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor to counter China?, site of Deutsche Welle (DW), 13/9/2023, https://www.dw.com/en/can-new-india-europe-middle-east-corridor-counter-china/a-66799232 [17] Walid Abd al-Hay, “The Future of the Strategic Position of the Arab World,” Journal of Strategic Issues, Arab Center for Strategic Studies, Issue 4, December 2000, pp. 146-147. (in Arabic) [18] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Future of Egyptian-Israeli Relations from the Israeli Perspective, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 5/6/2023, https://www.alzaytouna.net [19] India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor to counter China?, DW, 13/9/2023. [20] Indian Army to participate in largest ever joint military exercise in Middle East, says MoD, site of The Economic Times, 29/8/2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-army-to-participate-in-largest-ever-joint-military-exercise-in-middle-east-says-mod/articleshow/103176080.cms?from=mdr; and India, UAE conclude joint Arabian Gulf naval exercise, site of Arab News, 12/8/2023, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2354021/world [21] Kabir Taneja, How India views China’s diplomacy in the Middle East, site of Middle East Institute, 11/7/2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-india-views-chinas-diplomacy-middle-east [22] For details on China’s militarization activities, see Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun, PLA Navy’s 14 years of missions in blue waters safeguard intl trade routes, win more overseas recognition, site of Global Times, 1/8/2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1271933.shtml China increasing arms exports to Middle East and Eastern Europe, site of The Nation, 5/12/2022, https://www.nationthailand.com/world/china/40022762; Chinese Private Security Companies Along the BRI: An Emerging Threat?, site of Modern Diplomacy, 25/9/2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/25/chinese-private-security-companies-along-the-bri-an- emerging-threat; Chinese army prioritizes protecting China’s overseas interests, site of China Global Television Network (CGTN), 24/7/2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-07-24/Chinese-army-prioritizes-protecting-China-s-overseas-interests-IA9FouJ5ZK/index.html; and Andrea Ghiselli, Continuity and change in China’s strategy to protect overseas interests, site of The Frontier Post, 2021, https://thefrontierpost.com/continuity-and-change-in-chinas-strategy-to-protect-overseas-interests

In an ideal world, Taiwan's national elections would have nothing to do with China or the United States, let alone the relationship between these two countries. However, the victory of Lai Ching-te, hitherto the vice-chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, a candidate who enjoys no sympathy from Beijing, has implications for China-Taiwan and China-US relations. In any case, the DPP's victory has not guaranteed it an absolute majority - in a chamber composed of 113 seats, the vote for the DPP fell from 61 to 51 (because of the poor economic situation) - and it will be forced to negotiate a coalition government. Taiwan's national elections are a matter of world order mainly because one of Xi Jinping's policy priorities is the "historical inevitability" of "unification" between China and Taiwan. If Xi fulfills his ambition, changing the borders and territorial integrity of a country through military force, it would be a flagrant violation of the international liberal order. Given U.S. President Joe Biden's promise - that Washington would defend Taiwan if invaded by China - "reunification" would provoke a war between the two powers, between revisionist and authoritarian China and the United States, the country that has created, sustained and led the international order after World War II. While Western politicians and analysts argue that China, as a revisionist power, increasingly poses a threat to the stability of the region and the international liberal order, for Taiwan it is an existential issue. The successful consolidation of Taiwan's democracy in recent decades has intensified the growth of a distinct Taiwanese identity. As the political systems of China and Taiwan continue to diverge, there is little support on the island for "unification." Taiwan is increasingly anchored to the West and its population is broadly in favor of strengthening relations with liberal democracies, especially Japan, the United States and Europe. From the beginning of the campaign, all three candidates - DPP's Lai, Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), which increased its number of legislators from 38 to 52, and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), which has won 8 seats - expressed that the priority of their foreign and domestic policies would be to preserve Taiwan's de facto independence and peace with China. However, their strategies to achieve this are divergent. The strategy of Lai, the candidate who won the election, is to strengthen political, military and economic ties with the United States and its allies; while Hou and Ko intended to restart the dialogue with Beijing, which China interrupted after the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 (William Lai's predecessor, who served two presidential terms at the helm of the country). The new government, possibly a coalition between the DPP and KMT, will be rocked by debates over increased Defense spending. KMT politicians disagree with the DPP on the details of military strategy and what weapons to procure from the United States. In 2022, Washington and Taipei launched an ambitious trade initiative as well as security cooperation. Thus, Washington increased the number of troops deployed in Taiwan to train its military and expanded the training of Taiwanese soldiers in the United States. The new president faces economic problems that have undermined the popularity of the ruling DPP. But undoubtedly his biggest problem is relations with China. Strengthening Taiwan's defenses and minimizing Beijing's provocations-which are likely to increase in the form of military maneuvers and economic pressures-will remain the DPP's policy priorities in Taiwan. However, it does not seem clear that the DPP has a clear strategy for dealing with Xi Jinping's possible decisions. Xi is unlikely to conclude that he can tolerate Taiwan's trajectory. Lai's victory has deeply irritated the Chinese Communist Party. The election results can be read in the key of a referendum on Taiwan-China relations. Beijing has lost it to the United States. Peaceful "unification" is becoming less and less viable. Rather, there are signs that the Chinese Communist Party perceives that the trend in Taipei-Beijing relations is not moving in Beijing's favor. As a result, Xi may take the decision to act to achieve unification. Xi has stated that the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on to future generations and that achieving unification is the essence of the country's rejuvenation. "Historical inevitability" may turn into practical decision - use of military force - given China's unsatisfactory economic situation. Xi may try to make unification an important part of his political legacy. The outcome of the Taiwan election will not influence Xi Jinping's decisions. The results confirm a status quo in Taiwanese politics - the continuity of the DPP government - but it means increased pre-war tensions between Taiwan and China, as well as between China and the United States.

The Trump machine has once again dominated the media environment across the world. But don’t rule out America’s other electoral races in the US Congress, which will prove pivotal to US foreign relations. For observers of American politics, the onset of 2024 marked the commencement of the much-anticipated election year. Though political tensions in the US have not mellowed much in the last decade, the international community has ramped up its commentary on the predicted presidential rematch. Less covered in the media are the 438 house seats and 34 senate seats up for grabs in US Congress. Foreign audiences often confuse congressional powers with presidential powers. Though there are many, the most misperceived pertain to Congress’s ability to control the national budget and defence spending, declare war, and ratify treaties. With the potential for such a large shift in the electorate, the outcome of the Congressional elections is potentially a more significant issue than even another Trump presidency and will undoubtedly include important issues such as aiding Ukraine in its war against Russia, sustaining American commitments in the Indo-Pacific, and pushing back against China. Campaign strategists for both the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Republican National Committee (RNC) are acutely aware of the power that Congress can wield. For many of the individual campaigns – some 472 – strategists are required to lean on the spectacle of the presidential election and what is called the “coattail” effect. Popular presidential candidates or political party leaders attract votes for other candidates in his or her party and influence down ballot races. This becomes notably easier in a US election landscape where, in some states, voters can click a single “straight-ticket” button to vote at the top of the ballot. This instantly votes for every down ballot race (Presidential, Congressional, local, and otherwise), on the basis of political party. While it may seem as though Americans are more divided along party lines than ever, polls increasingly indicate that the political tumult that has encompassed high-level candidates over the last several election cycles has caused a rise in independent and indecisive voters. A survey conducted by Pew Research in September 2023 found that a record number of (28 percent) of Americans are expressing unfavourable views of both parties. This figure is similar (nearly 33 percent) for young voters who are undecided on who they will vote for in the 2024 elections. As the research on undecided voters continues to accumulate, a crucial question is how consequential the coattail effect will be for congressional elections. Senatorial elections unfold on a six-year cycle, introducing a staggered re-election pattern. This leads to certain election years showing a greater preference for one party in the Senate compared to others, as not all seats are up for re-election simultaneously, and contested seats are occasionally situated in states with strong partisan leanings. This election round, with 34 seats on the ballot, it is the Republican’s election to lose. While Democrats presently hold a slim 51-49 majority in the body, the electoral landscape suggests that Republicans are poised to retain all 11 of their currently held seats in staunchly red states. The Democrats face a more challenging landscape, with all 11 of their seats situated in contested states, along with 2 independents in states that remain uncertain. The Republicans are favoured to pick up at least two seats, with a majority of polls showing a 50-47 Republican control. The House race will be much more unpredictable. Congressional House members must campaign every two years, and with such numbers, the House races are not skewed by which seats are up for grabs or affected by the electoral college. For this reason, the House race is considered much more of a reflection of American political sentiment. It’s authorities cover the defence budget, the regulation of trade and tariffs, and the allocation foreign aid, among other important roles. On this basis, the House plays a pivotal role in shaping how the US government engages with its foreign allies. In a scenario where a polarising candidate such as Trump secures the presidency and the Senate, the balance of government can still be influenced by the outcomes of the popular vote for the House. If the majority of voters support a Democratic House, Democrats will have the ability to impede the Trump administration’s decisions on these critical issues for at least the next two years. The House races will serve as the definitive indicator of the success or demise of the coattail effect. Out of the 435 seats, 218 seats are required to control the House. The Democrats are expected to secure around 204 seats, with Republicans around 211. The remaining 20 highly contested seats, then, will determine who controls the lower house. With Republicans favoured to win the presidency and the Senate, this nail-biting unpredictability will be the difference between a smooth sailing Republican government and a bureaucratic deadlock until 2026. Of course, polls have been wrong in the past. For the time being, the Democrats (as well as the rest of America and the world) have much to be concerned about. Even if a party fails to gain the White House, the coattail effect will still be useful in mobilising party voters for lower-level races. Partly for this reason, spending on congressional and presidential races from external sources has reached US$318 million, marking a 600 percent surge compared to this same period in 2020. As a strategic financial approach, strategists will look to big and small donors who contribute to the presidential race to influence outcomes in down ballot elections. This fact that Congressional races will be influenced by elites and other powerful entities underscores the necessity for the general public to closely monitor and engage with these electoral contests. The substantial impact congressional races will have on American foreign affairs emphasizes the attention the international community must pay to broader electoral outcomes. Often overshadowed by the reality tv-esque drama of presidential elections, the powers vested in the US Congress are equally, if not more, consequential for global affairs. In 2017, and again in 2018, the Trump administration sought to defund the Department of State and would have succeeded if not for Congress. Similar scenarios are envisioned for Trump 2.0, particularly on the Ukraine question. Though comprehending the intricacies of down-ballot races and the coattail effect is a challenge, it stands as one of the most substantial stabilisers for foreign nations seeking to foster lasting relations with an unstable United States. By actively learning and being more conscious of the distinctive powers held by the president, in comparison to other bodies, the international community can facilitate more accurate and resilient policy responses.

A wave of violence, neoliberalism and drug trafficking Ecuador has been grappling with a profound crisis marked by heightened insecurity, exacerbated by the implementation of neoliberal policies and widespread impoverishment over the past few years. The looming threat of a quasi-permanent state of conflict, at least until the upcoming elections, coupled with a concerning trend towards creeping authoritarianism, while not yet institutionalized, casts a shadow over the current state of affairs. “By associating the presentation of meat to a dog with a bell sound for a certain number of times, eventually the bell sound alone will determine salivation in the dog.” - Pavlov's experiment There is much neuropolitics in the unraveling of the most recent events in Ecuador, with the worsening internal crisis and the draconian responses decided by President Daniel Noboa. There is the neuropolitics of terror, there is neuropolitics in the performance anxiety of a newly elected president who is confronted with a situation, already clear from the outset, that threatens to undermine his eventual future election. And there is much psychopolitics in a country that cannot shake off its visceral hatred of the years of the "Revolucion Ciudadana" on the one hand or its unconditional love for its father Rafael Correa on the other. And who inevitably falls back "like Pavlov's dog," into electoral choices that favor the country's economic elites in the belief that they are choosing the lesser evil. And there is a country exhausted by impoverishment, marginalization, viral weakening of the state apparatuses. And on the other side, again, overseas, there is a kind of Pavlovian reflex that a civil war, or a coup, is going on in Ecuador today. A hell on Earth, in short. A Pavlovian reflex that seems to hide a sort of latent "Orientalism" that still permeates the reading of events on this continent on the other side of the ocean. It will therefore be necessary to use the classic Occam's razor, to try to debunk the facts, news, and interpretations and get to the grain of things. The grain of things is so called. Ecuador has been experiencing for some years now an overt situation of increasing insecurity brought about by the penetration of as many as 22 drug trafficking gangs (Colombian, or affiliated with the Mexican cartels of Jalisco - Nueva Generación and Sinaloa, assisted by Albanian gangs present on the country's coast, which also suggests connections with the Calabrian "ndrangheta") mostly in the coastal regions. The homicide rate is among the highest in Latin America. Regions such as Esmeraldas - with an overwhelming majority of Afro population, which has always been marginalized and impoverished, or Guayas, in one way or another, are fertile or strategically relevant terrain for cocaine routes. The former due to the great availability of cheap "labor," "gatilleros" they call them, notably suburban boys left to their own devices, victims of a historical fate that marginalizes them, who for a fistful of dollars receive a gun and simply pull the trigger. Or they go to extort bribes, "vaccinations," from traders or families. The latter for the important port of Guayaquil, territory to be controlled to export drugs to the United States and Europe, often inside banana containers, as happened in a recent large seizure at the port of Gioia Tauro, Calabria, Italy. The penetration of narcos gangs into Ecuador undergoes a paradoxical acceleration with the peace process in Colombia when border areas "controlled" by the FARC are abandoned and left prey to new paramilitary formations or the coca-producing gangs. Ecuador thus finds itself between two producing regions such as Colombia and Peru, with porous borders, small and large ports from which to ship cargoes, a social fabric torn apart by years and years of neoliberal policies, an economy centered almost exclusively on an extractivist model that leaves large swaths of the population impoverished (and which is, after all, the "good" face of that of the narco-economies), a society ridden with enormous inequalities, first and foremost in urban areas, informal labor markets, and rampant corruption in state apparatuses. A dollarized economy that also makes money laundering easier, and further backed up by widespread illegal gold mining. What better combination for the narco-traffickers to make it the place for processing and shipping their goods? There is a strong correlation between the application of the IMF's neoliberal "shock doctrine," and its social, political and economic consequences, and the spread of organized crime. A correlation that calls for a indepth analysis of the root causes causes of what can be considered a "polycrisis" that runs through the small Andean country, certainly not used to situations such as that experienced in the past in Colombia or currently in Mexico. A polycrisis that is evident by analyzing in filigree the events of the last six months. Let us rewind the tape to August of last year. Riots have been igniting in prisons for some time. Gang clashes, often aided by the connivance of prison authorities (how else would one explain the presence of weapons and explosives used in the riots?) rage with unprecedented brutality. The prison problem stems from widespread pan-penalism in state apparatuses and an essentially punitive and deeply patriarchal view of retribution, and one that has disproportionately increased the type of crimes for which people go to jail (even for driving without a license). And by the construction in 2014 of three maximum security prisons in which narcos are locked up, creating the conditions for their transformation into command centers and theaters of internal wars among them. The presidential election campaign, convened prematurely following then-President Lasso's decision to dissolve parliament recurring to the mechanism of "muerte cruzada" and go to the polls to avoid impeachment proceedings for corruption, is actually dominated by the issue of security. Close to the opening of the polls, there comes the knockout blow that will determine the election outcome. First the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, a champion of the fight against corruption, killed in Quito at a campaign event, few weeks after Augustin Intriago, the mayor of Manta, another port city, a territory in the hands of gangs like others on the coast. In the days that followed, the hitherto minor figure of the coastal candidate, an expression of local and national oligarchies - the same ones that had supported Lasso at the time - emerged in the polls. A young man unknown to most, a sort of electora underdog, Daniel Noboa, son of "Alvarito" great tycoon of the banana industry, a permanent candidate for president, and grandson of Isabel a Guayaquil’s wealthiest real estate entrepreneur. In the runoff Noboa wins against the Revolucion Ciudadana candidate, Luisa Gonzales, and immediately makes of security his priority. He faces a very complex scenario. A Congress in which on paper it does not enjoy a majority (although it will later vote by a majority for the first economic measures and the state of internal armed conflict also by virtue of a pact with important sectors of the oppositions), the overwhelming majority of territories controlled by opposition parties (Revolucion Ciudadana and Pachakutik, the reference party of the powerful CONAIE, Confederation of Indigenous Organizations of Ecuador). In the background is the important victory in the national referendum against oil extraction in the Yasuni, which foreshadows the existence of a social and ecological movement far stronger than electoral numbers. In short, Noboa appears from the outset to be a kind of lame duck who will experience a situation, to return to the neuropolitics mentioned above, of a real post-electoral stress disorder, squeezed between the urgency of giving strong and impactful signals to counter organized crime and that of responding in the short time of his term (new elections are due for mid 2025), to the interests of the lobbies to which he refers. Tertium non datur, even if that tertium is represented by the overwhelming majority of the country, already affected by the pandemic. And it is precisely there, in that "tertium," "from below," Uruguayan sociologist Raul Zibechi would say, that decision makers should start to reconstruct a plausible hypothesis of a country capable of another future. It is that tertium to which the country's resources should be devoted, young people and adolescents left alone and in the grip of criminal gangs, with fathers and mothers migrating out of desperation, crossing the Isthmus of Darien on foot to try to get to the United States. So even before he takes office, Noboa finds himself making some pre-government reshuffles, launches a security plan, "Phoenix," then decides to get the inconvenient vice president, a great Vox sympathizer, out of the way by sending her to Israel with the assignment of "special envoy" for peace. And he gets to work. A few weeks go by and the "Metastasis" scandal explodes, proof of how far the narcos have managed to penetrate the judicial sector, squeezed between corruption and death threats. In the meantime, the president begins to set his economic agenda by presenting laws aimed mainly at flexibilizing the labor market, creating free-trade, tax-free zones that coincide with the large estates and plantations of the agribusiness tycoons, announcing the removal of fuel subsidies, the main detonant of last year's indigenous uprising, brutally suppressed by the Lasso government. A "ley economica" that would create great resistance in the country, and which responds, along with the others, to the need to secure support from the International Monetary Fund. In parallel, funds to local authorities are reduced, the security department under his direct command is even closed. A tax "amnesty" for the highest incomes is announced. Cases of corruption in the security apparatus follow one another. Noboa prepares a package of legislative proposals and amendments to the Constitution that would allow the police and army to have a free hand and enjoy total immunity, which in fact is already the case thanks to the decrees issued by Lasso, who several times resorted, in vain, to the state of emergency. Nothing new then. He then attempts the popular plebiscite card a few months before the new election deadline. To the first 11 referendum questions announced, it then adds others, even including issues that only partly have to do with the issue of security. These include the opening of casinos, or measures to ease foreign direct investments. Proposals that a leading constitutionalist and former member of the Constitutional Court, Ramiro Avila Santamaria, defined as unconstitutional or unfounded. The decision is now up to the Court. Then comes the sensational news of the escape from prison in Guayaquil of one of the leaders of the Choneros gang, alias "Fito," allegedly occurring as early as Christmas, and of another leader of the "Lobos" apparently implicated in the murder of Villavicencio. A severe blow to the government's credibility to which Noboa responds with yet another declaration of a state of emergency, resulting in a curfew from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m., a decision to have the army assist the police in public order operations, and the restriction of the right of assembly and the inviolability of the home. The narcos' response is immediate: new riots in prisons, attacks on some police stations, and the "raid" - the details of which have yet to be fully clarified - of a commando breaking into a live broadcast of a Guayaquil television station. A blow to the heart of his main electorate. Fact of the matter is that within a handful of hours of the blitz a new decree is issued in which the President - for the first time in the country's history - declares a state of internal armed conflict, that would be fought by the army, and recognizing the 22 gangs as "belligerent" parties. The crisis thus shifts from being a matter of public order to one of actual war, governed by international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva convention. Upon the announcement of the measure, the country goes into panic. Classes are suspended and will remain in online modality for several days, the evacuation of public buildings is ordered, and contingents of soldiers are dispatched to guard sensitive targets. The president locks himself up in the Carondelet Palace with senior state officials to decide what to do. After a few hours, military big brass in full uniform appear in front of the cameras, explaining the situation to the country and giving the line. A coup? There goes the first Pavlovian reflex. And yet no, Decree 111 declaring a state of "internal armed conflict" is overwhelmingly approved by Congress, even by the leftist opposition parties that had from the outset given declaration in favor of national unity. Indeed the main concern is that of not appearing as those who throw up their hands in the face of organized crime, a tasty opportunity for opposing parties in the upcoming 2025 presidential and parliamentary elections. A civil war? Not even, since we are not faced with organizations structured in paramilitary form, nor are we faced with an armed conflict on a national scale, but rather with public order operations "with boots on the ground" in well-defined territories. The declaration of war is in fact a media coup for effect to create the conditions for a "national unity" and "war", in which a clear distribution of tasks is emerging. On the one hand, the military, which from now on takes command of public order operations, with the police at their service (something that creates quite many frictions) and which can thus reaffirm their role and their credibility before the people. It must be said that the presence of the military in the streets is - at least in the capital Quito - very sporadic, the effect appears to be mostly symbolic. On the contrary the situation is pretty different in prisons where the military can now intervene freely to suppress riots and free that hundred hostages still in the hands of the rioters. Or when launching raids or searches in the "hot" outskirts of crime-ridden cities. However, even in the symbolic also lurks the risk of a pervasive "securitization" of public space, resulting in the inhibition of every possible form of dissent or social conflict. Noboa was quick to declare that even those who do not take action against gangs, (by extension one could also interpret those who oppose his policies) could be considered "the enemy." And then, in that public space now controlled by the military, there is a clear risk that the real victims of repression will end up being those marginal and marginalized classes, guilty only of being such, or of having dark skin. The precedent of "false positives" in Colombia comes to mind, where the military, in order to demonstrate the success of their operations, displayed to the public corpses of poor people in guerrilla uniforms. The military thus takes over – de facto - the public space determining by default the direction in which the country will go. In parallel, the private space is taken care of by the president with new decree-laws presented invoking the need to raise funds for internal warfare, from raising VAT to 15 percent, to the liberalization of the energy sector, the rejection of the result of the public consultation on Yasuni in order to continue drilling to generate funds to support the “war”, to policies aimed at attracting foreign capital. In the background are two agreements on cooperation in the military and security sector with the United States signed months ago by Lasso providing for the albeit temporary presence of the military on the national territory. They are in a hurry in Washington, with the specter of Trumpian “America First” isolationism looming. No surprise that the Ecuadorean Constitutional Court ruled that no approval by Congress is required. Then the free trade agreement with China, so far stalled by Congress, is due to go into effect soon. What about what exists and lives between public and private space? Movements? Civil society organizations? Theirs are the only expressions of criticism and dissent. CONAIE declares solidarity with the victims of the conflict, urges communities to organize indigenous guards to protect their territories (so far almost untouched by narco violence) and warns the government not to use the pretext of war to impose anti-popular measures. Its Amazonian organizations have recently taken to the streets to protest the construction of one of the two “Bukele-model” megaprisons in the Pastaza province. Environmental and indigenous movements are now denouncing Noboas’ decision against the ITT Yasuni’s decision. On the other hand, human rights organizations point the finger at the inappropriateness of the use of the military instrument, and the possible serious effects on human rights. The risks to the millions of Ecuadorians and Ecuadoreans working in informal economies or on temporary contracts are also stressed, as well as how the state of exception may increase cases of intra-family and gender-based violence. The rest is still a work in progress. The risk of a sort of permanent state of war that will characterize the country and the public debate at least until the next elections is just around the corner together with a creeping authoritarianism, certainly not at the institutional level, but surely in the state of affairs. Although the decrees of emergency and state of internal armed conflict have a duration of two months, it is highly unlikely that in that time the state will be able to declare victory. Since when you declare a war you must also be clear about when you are going to win it. Which at the moment is very vague and indefinite. Will it be when all Colombian or Venezuelan criminals are deported? Which is very difficult since the Constitution recognizes the human right to free mobility. Or when will they all be put in jail? Or when they will all be "shot down"? (numbers range from 30 to 50 thousand gang members), according to the term used by the mainstream press. This article was published originally in the Transnational Institute under the Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 licence

Less than two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Gaza War has re-ignited the Israel–Palestine conflict and disrupted regional politics. Developments in Syria and Yemen are in flux, Egypt finds a new role as mediator, and new spaces are opening up for international actors like China. We present a list of ten things to watch in the region as we move into 2024. Local conflicts: Authoritarian resilience will likely manifest itself in a series of sham elections. The Yemen War might linger on amid negotiations, while Israel has no plan on how to run Gaza after an end to hostilities. Regional developments: The Arab League has brought Syria back in from the cold. Israel’s normalisation of relations with Arab countries is on hold for the foreseeable future. Egypt is regaining some of its former regional lustre by acting as a mediator, whether in Gaza or in Sudan. International dynamics: Western democratic countries struggle to maintain influence compared to China and even Russia. A Trump victory in the US elections would change American foreign policy, make solving the Iranian nuclear file impossible, and could lead to adverse reactions from what is now a nuclear-threshold state. Israel would be given free rein in the Occupied Territories; the Gulf states would be forced to choose sides. Economic issues: The region remains an energy powerhouse difficult to ignore. OPEC+ arrangements will hold, and Gulf sovereign wealth funds might reconsider their asset allocation if G7 countries decided to seize – not just freeze – Russian foreign assets. Policy Implications Europe needs to confront China and Russia in the region, prepare for a possible Trump victory, and rein in the Israeli far right. Energy transitions may offer opportunities for regional collaboration. Sanctions against Russia and Iran need to be clearly communicated to other oil exporters unless they are spooked by financial weaponisation and refrain from investment in European capital markets. Who Will Run Gaza? Egypt administered the Gaza Strip between 1948 and 1967, but never thought about claiming it as its own territory. The Gaza Strip has remained a hot potato ever since. In contrast to the West Bank, where Israel expands illegal settlements and has annexation plans, it has no such ambition in Gaza. In 2005 Israeli forces even withdrew, only controlling external access points. Who will run Gaza after the arms fall silent? Israel does not seem to have a concrete plan, except for “destroying Hamas” – which has run the Gaza Strip for nearly two decades – and disconcerting mind games about ethnic cleansing by pushing large population segments out of Gaza. Whatever is meant by “destroying Hamas,” it is a task whose fulfilment is unlikely; one cannot militarily destroy an ideology with deep roots in an insurgent movement and the broader population. The Israeli government has also ruled out that the ailing and corrupt Palestinian Authority could ride back into Gaza with the help of Israeli bayonets, a plan that the US administration has peddled. (Leaving aside the question whether the PA would either want or could even do that given its extreme weakness; its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is 88 years old). Israel does not want to rule Gaza, but will have to if no other solution is found. It is still considered the occupying force by the UN and wants to have the freedom to intervene in the future to thwart any emerging security threat like the Hamas terror attack of 7 October. The UN or Arab countries such as Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to step in. They would only potentially assist in the administration of Gaza if Israel was ready to provide a credible political solution to the Palestinian question, but the populist Benjamin Netanyahu government with its right-wing extremists such as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir is unlikely to even contemplate such an idea. Running Gaza will be a daunting task. There is an escalating humanitarian crisis, and up to three-quarters of all houses are damaged or destroyed. Donors such as the Gulf countries and the EU will not be enthusiastic to provide reconstruction funds yet again if renewed hostilities and destruction are a distinct possibility. Will the War in Yemen End? In September 2023, direct negotiations in Riyadh between senior representatives of Iran-aligned Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) and high-ranking Saudi officials, including the Saudi minister of defence, raised hopes about a pending end to the protracted war in Yemen, which has caused one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises and an estimated 377,000 deaths since its onset in 2015. On the verge of Christmas, then, UN Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg announced that Ansar Allah and the Saudi-backed internationally recognised government had committed “to a set of measures to implement a nationwide ceasefire,” proclaiming that he “will now engage with the parties to establish a roadmap under UN auspices [towards lasting peace]” (OSESGY 2023). While these are significant developments that bear the potential to end the stalemate in one of the deadliest regional conflicts, one should exercise caution when assessing the prospects for peace in Yemen any time soon. Bent on terminating its direct involvement in the war, Riyadh failed to exact meaningful concessions from Ansar Allah. Instead, it demanded major ones from its Yemeni allies in the Presidential Council – who, given their dependence on Saudi Arabia, grudgingly acquiesced. With the Council representing a mixed bag of rival groups, however, upcoming negotiations will be challenging. Even if its members come to terms with Ansar Allah under Saudi pressure, the odds are high that intra-Yemeni fighting will be resumed thereafter – even if on a more modest scale. Another obstacle to peace is Ansar Allah’s growing involvement in the Gaza War. Since mid-October 2023, the group has been launching missiles towards southern Israel. In mid-November, it also began to attack shipping lanes in the Red Sea. These attacks not only threaten to derail the upcoming intra-Yemeni negotiations (Lackner 2023) but also, and crucially, boost the risk of Yemenis being drawn into another major conflict. Authoritarian Elections in the MENA: What For and Who Cares? Around the world, 76 countries will hold elections in 2024 – a number of them situated in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (The Economist 2023). Despite the prevalence of authoritarian tendencies and the failure of democratic transitions in many countries of the region, respective leaders seem to remain committed to practicing one key element of democratic systems at least: holding elections. Iranians will head to the ballot box in March 2024, for the country’s legislative elections. Concentration of political power within the hands of a small elite and the oppression of opponents have intensified over the past few decades in Iran. This has led to a widespread loss of confidence there in electoral processes, demonstrated in low voter turnouts in recent years. Meanwhile, Algeria is due to hold the country’s second presidential election since Abdelaziz Bouteflika stepped down in 2019 after 20 years in office. Hirak, the Algerian civil protest movement pivotal to the ousting of Bouteflika, has largely rejected the current president, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, as he is perceived to be a continuation of the previous political apparatus. As the opposition has called for boycotting previous elections in 2019 and 2021, we can expect low voter’s turnout in the upcoming elections again. In Tunisia, December 2023 marked the country’s first local elections under the new constitution, with a reported boycott rate of 90 per cent (El Atti 2023). Ennahda, the country’s main opposition group, has strongly questioned President Kais Saeid’s legitimacy since he suspended parliament in 2021 and called for boycotting the elections. Even in Libya there have been hopes that parliamentary and presidential elections, previously postponed for years on end, might be finally held in 2024.    While voter-turnout rates are expected to be low in Iran, Algeria, and Tunisia, underscoring their contested legitimacy, the opposite can be expected for Turkey. The local elections set for March will serve as a litmus test for the political fate of this polarised country. Following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s re-election in May 2023, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) aims to reclaim major metropolitan municipalities, currently held by the opposition. Istanbul’s mayoral election holds particular importance, both economically and symbolically, as the office of mayor marked the starting point of Erdoğan’s political career. If incumbent opposition mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu is re-elected, he may have a chance of winning the next presidential elections in 2028. Conversely, a victory for AKP candidate Murat Kurum could demoralise the fragmented opposition further and consolidate the authoritarian regime long-term (Turkey recap 2024). Why are the MENA’s authoritarian governments, despite their electoral engineering often determining the results ahead of time, so determined to hold elections? Authoritarian regimes across the region have adopted a narrative that seeks to justify various aspects of their conduct, such as violent crackdowns, oppression, and corruption. Democratic institutions like national elections are a useful element in legitimising such a narrative, portraying political leaders as democratically elected and their actions as in accordance with the will of the people. Elections are a useful tool to draw clear boundaries to political participation. Incumbent leaders tend to put processes in place that push opponent groups out of the race. Such processes may take place in the form of vetting or the criminalisation of opposing political views. This allows authoritarians to maintain the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite by limiting the participation of other interest groups. Elections are a means for consensus-building within the established system of rule. Military and paramilitary interest groups are integral players in elections held in the MENA region. Concentration of power in the hands of authoritarian ruling elites is achieved through collaboration between the military apparatus and civilian elements of the political elite. As such, elections are also a useful tool to help renew the consensus achieved between senior military and civilian leaders. Egypt: From Mediator to Regional Power Broker? In the past year, Egypt has played a major role in conflict mediation and provided humanitarian lifelines in Sudan, Libya, and Gaza. Acute risks to regional stability from these three wars fuel existing security threats through volatility, insurgencies, and arms trafficking the longer they go on. Managing these closely intertwined conflict environments puts Egypt on track to become a major power broker in the MENA region and the Sahel at a time when its battered economy weighs heavily on its foreign influence. Libya and Sudan were major junctions in trans-Saharan arms trafficking long before the ongoing civil war in Sudan started in April 2023. Militias operating near the Libyan border with Chad transport military equipment, personnel, and fuel throughout the region, while weapons smuggled from Yemen and Eritrea via the Red Sea supply insurgents operating on the Sinai Peninsula and in the Levant. Murky battlegrounds also facilitate Russia’s advances into Africa, as both Sudan and Libya buttress revenue streams for Moscow and the Wagner Group. The US and UK’s recent airstrikes on Houthi targets to secure Red Sea shipping lanes marks a new escalation in the Israel–Hamas war with far-reaching implications. Through 2023, Egypt engaged in multiple summits to broker humanitarian ceasefires via the UN, African Union, Arab League, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the US–Saudi-led Jeddah process in Sudan (Skinner 2023). It hosted several conferences in Cairo to facilitate a new roadmap between Libya’s rival administrations, and dialogue among Sudan’s highly fractured civil society. Though it initially suspended its mediation in the Israel–Hamas conflict after the latter’s second-in-command, Saleh al-Arouri, was assassinated in Lebanon, Egypt resumed its involvement only days later. While countries rally around assisting in ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas, or conflict management in Libya and Sudan, diplomatic rifts have strengthened in the Middle East. Egypt has so far benefitted from both trends in different ways. In the Israel–Hamas war, its indispensability opens the door for the expansion of political and economic collaboration – as, for example, through planned cash deposits from the Gulf, or US cooperation despite the recent straining of American–Egyptian relations. The fronts are more pronounced in Libya and Sudan, most notably with the UAE’s meddling in both countries through sponsoring and supplying militias with weapons, leaving Egypt as a more consistent mediator. For better or worse, Egypt’s proximity to three wars simultaneously is as much a security liability as it is a diplomatic opportunity to assert itself. Whether it can ascend from its role as mediator to a power broker, however, remains as open as these conflicts themselves do. Will Syria’s Regional Re-Integration Continue? During its annual summit on 19 May 2023, Syria under President Bashar al-Assad was re-admitted into the Arab League as a full, regular member. This was a major diplomatic and symbolic achievement for the dictatorial government in Damascus after being ousted for almost 12 years because of its massive, almost indiscriminate, repression of its own population in the incipient phase of the Syrian civil war in fall 2011 – a process that worsened in the years to follow, leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths and over 13 million displaced Syrians. The next regular Arab League summit, to be held in Bahrain in April or May 2024, will be a litmus test for whether Syrian regional re-integration will continue and what it might look like in concrete terms. So far, Arab countries’ normalisation of relations with Syria since the 2023 Arab League summit has been without any substance, essentially yielding zero benefit for the regional governments who were previously opposed to the Assad regime. There has been no economic investment from the Gulf countries, and trade with Jordan or Egypt has remained minimal. In the short-term, at least, there has been no “normalisation dividend” to speak of. In addition, the diplomatic normalisation with Assad has not led to any improvement in border security or to a decline in drug smuggling, especially of Captagon and hashish, into Jordan and towards the Gulf countries. Rather, 2023 was a record year for documented drug-smuggling activities as well as increased use thereof by Arab youth in Syria and its neighbouring countries. What is worse, the Assad government has instrumentalised the massive escalation of violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories since 7 October 2023 in two ways: Rhetorically, Assad and other Syrian officials have continuously denounced the Israeli aggression against Palestinian civilians while declaring that they have not been involved in any of the activities of the so-called resistance axis, thereby trying to improve their tarnished image in the region and beyond. Militarily, Assad’s armed forces have led a massive campaign against the Islamist opposition-controlled Idlib region, specifically targeting civilians. In the three months since October 2023, 200 people, mostly children and women, have been killed and over 120,000 internally displaced – happening out of sight and out of mind vis-à-vis Arab and international audiences alike (Haid 2024). Will Iran Go Nuclear after a Trump Victory? During his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump criticised the Barrack Obama administration’s conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July of the previous year. Once in office, in May 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the agreement. The current Joe Biden administration has since unsuccessfully tried to revive the deal; Iran, claiming it is no longer bound by the JCPOA’s provisions either, has since resumed its uranium enrichment. It is now within breakout capacity (Millington 2022). During the current presidential primaries, Trump, who will be Biden’s most likely opponent in the 2024 elections, has again called for a tougher stance on Iran. The higher (nuclear) stakes and Trump’s record of a “maximum pressure” policy towards Iran have raised fears of a potential military conflict should he win a second term in office in fall 2024. While such scenarios are not impossible, their likelihood is overstated in political commentaries. The US’s sanction and embargo policies against Iran have been a constant of the two countries’ relations since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. When a 2003 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency found that Iran was in violation of its safeguards agreement, the issue escalated further. Subsequent US administrations have initiated several new rounds of international sanctions against Teheran – with the stated goal of preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb and a potential arms race in the Middle East. This international pressure eventually brought a new moderate Iranian government to the negotiation table in 2013, resulting in the “nuclear deal” reached between the P5+1 and Iran in Vienna in 2015. However, neither the JCPOA nor its discontinuation have altered the fundamental parameters of the four decades and counting of US–Iranian antagonism. It only temporarily shifted the focus from military posturing towards diplomatic avenues. Even Obama, who championed a new approach “based on mutual interests and mutual respect,” continuously stressed that military options remained on the table. The Trump administration, on the other hand, shied away from limited strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, let alone an open military conflict with Tehran, despite its “maximum pressure” approach culminating in the targeted killing of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. With these fluctuating tactics, the chances of escalation remain real – whether triggered by an emboldened second Trump administration ordering a pre-emptive strike, an Israeli spoiler play, or Teheran’s conclusion that going nuclear while still under political cover from Russia is the best way to counter an unpredictable US president. In a more favourable scenario, there might be continuity on the American side despite rhetorical grandstanding. Iran could also decide that flaunting its nuclear-threshold status may give it as much leverage as actually crossing the threshold – with considerably less risk. Will the Abraham Accords Survive the Gaza War? The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020 between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and later Morocco and Sudan, led to diplomatic normalisation and envisaged cultivating deeper economic, cultural, and technological ties between the respective countries. After the peace agreements reached with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, four other Arab countries now entertain diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia was rumoured to be set to join their ranks before the Hamas attack on October 7 scuppered that. However, Israel’s ongoing hostilities in Gaza and the unprecedented humanitarian crisis there have sparked concerns about the durability of these accords and the broader trajectory of Israel’s normalisation process in the region. Arab governments that signed normalisation agreements with Israel are facing growing scrutiny and calls for accountability at home, exemplified by citizen-driven initiatives like protests, marches, and online activism. Up to 85 per cent of the population in Gaza have been displaced, and South Africa has launched procedures against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague over accusations of genocide. The vast majority of MENA populaces vocally support the Palestinian cause. Their governments are afraid that pro-Palestinian protests could turn against them in a re-iteration of the Arab Spring and threaten regime survival. This mounting pressure from below has led governments, such as those in Bahrain and Jordan, to recall their ambassadors from Israel, while US-brokered talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia have been suspended. The Abraham Accords came with considerable incentives: The US took Sudan off its list of terrorism-sponsoring states, removed sanctions on it, and also recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the entire Western Sahara territory. The UAE and Israel have a common interest in high-tech and defence investments, as well as in countering Iran’s regional posturing. The latter was also a major factor in the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. But the premise of the accords – namely, that sustainable normalisation could be achieved while ignoring the Palestinian question – has proven the populist right-wing Netanyahu government to be misguided. The enduring criticism of the US for its perceived lack of impartiality in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict could tarnish its role as a mediator, potentially affecting its ability to encourage other Arab nations to establish ties with Israel. By signing the Abraham Accords, elites’ political and economic interests took precedence over the concerns and aspirations of their broader publics. Popular discontent remains a powerful social force, compelling governments to re-assess and reconsider these commitments – as seen in the recall of ambassadors, and underscoring the limitations of elite agreements. China In, Europe Out? China–Middle East relations will continue to deepen on two fronts in 2024. Geoeconomically, China’s influence in the region has grown in recent years in various sectors due to its Belt and Road Initiative, while the EU’s – and US’s – regional presence has been in relative decline. According to Chinese customs data, the volume of trade between itself and the Middle East nearly doubled between 2017 and 2022, from USD 262.5 billion to USD 507.2 billion. By 2023, China was the leading import and/or export partner for most countries of the region. For example, it replaced the EU as the Gulf Cooperation Council’s top trading partner in 2020. Key sectors in China–MENA relations include traditional energy, renewable energy, infrastructure, technology and communications (including Huawei’s 5G), fintech, and manufacturing. Geopolitically, two points are worth noting. First, China will continue its policy of non-interventionism. The expensive regional military order is dominated and financed by the US. From the perspective of own national interests, there is no reason why China should change this equation. In 2024 the US will continue to spend more geopolitical resources regionally (thanks to the Gaza War), with China being the biggest economic beneficiary. Second, regarding the “geo” in geopolitics, the region is undergoing a slow pivot away from “the West” and self-identifying with other geographic imaginaries such as “Asia” and the “Global South.” In bilateral and multilateral exchange formats with each other or with Chinese, Indian, and other Global South partners, regional officials are increasingly dropping the term “Middle East” in favour of “West Asia.” They are slowly shedding the Western-centric concept of “the Middle East” (and “Near East”), reconceptualising the region’s geographic identity in a post–Western order world (Forough 2022). Another sign of this trend in recent years is countries of the region actively seeking membership in Asian-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS+. Moreover, the Western powers’ unapologetic support for how Israel has pursued its war in Gaza is going to speed up the regional distancing from the West. MENA countries have been supportive of South Africa’s case at the ICJ, while China has called for an immediate ceasefire and full Palestinian statehood within the framework of a two-state solution. Will OPEC+ Hold? The Saudi-led OPEC and Russia have not been natural allies historically. During the Arab Cold War from the 1950s to 1970s, they saw each other on opposing sides of the ideological divide, with the Soviet Union supporting revolutionary regimes in the Middle East that were hostile to the Gulf monarchies. The Saudi decision in 1985 to stop cutting production and open its oil spigots to regain market share led to collapsing prices. The fiscal impact of this decision on the USSR played no minor part in its eventual demise a few years later. All the more surprising was this odd couple joining forces in 2016. Russia became a member of OPEC+, which agreed to cut oil production. Before a glut caused prices to decline from 2014 onwards, Saudi Arabia had tried to instigate a price war against the newly emerging producers of unconventional tight oil in the US and lost. Yet, the new-found unity between the two oil heavyweights lasted only so long. In early 2020, Saudi Arabia and Russia engaged in a brief price war with each other, before agreeing on renewed OPEC+ production cuts in April of the same year. The US welcomed this step at the time. US producers were facing bankruptcy as the COVID-19 pandemic obliterated oil demand, pushing wholesale prices at the oil-trading hub in Cushing, Oklahoma, into negative territory at one point.    In October 2022, OPEC+ countries cut oil production by two million barrels per day – their first production cut since 2020. This time, the Western powers were outraged that the Gulf countries would collaborate with Russia in the middle of the latter’s war of aggression against Ukraine. However, the Gulf countries have their own national interests. They see opportunities in exploring new partnerships in an increasingly multipolar world. They need to safeguard their fiscal stability and fund development projects for the post-oil age. By the mid-2030s, global oil demand could level off – as, indeed, Saudi Aramco warned in its 2019 IPO prospectus. How will OPEC+ fare when OPEC meets next, in June 2024? All cartels are inherently unstable. Free riders try to benefit from higher prices without maintaining quota discipline and cutting production, like Iraq did during the Arab oil boycott of the 1970s. And then there are the newcomers, encouraged by artificially high prices. If the reduction in oil production in OPEC+ countries continues, the partially lost volumes may be compensated for by increased production in non-OPEC ones such as the US, Canada, Guyana, and Brazil. Traditional producers from the Middle East would lose market share like they did in the early 1980s. Energy transitions will likely impact on oil demand in the medium- to long term as well. If history is a guide, OPEC+ will then falter – albeit in June 2024 it might still be successful in keeping its cartel together for now. How Would Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds React If the West Seized Russian Assets? Western countries have taken the unprecedented step of freezing USD 300 billion in Russian assets in the wake of the latter’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Now the G7 wants to discuss at its next meeting in February 2024 going a step further, namely by seizing those assets and using them to pay for restoration work in Ukraine (Tamma and Politi 2023). This is ringing an alarm bell with sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the Gulf countries and China, given they hold significant assets in Western capital markets and jurisdictions. The investment authorities of Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Qatar belong to the largest SWFs worldwide. More recently, Saudi Arabia has developed its Public Investment Fund into and internationally active investor, rendering it completely different from the passive investor and sleepy holder of domestic assets that it was only a few years back (Roll 2019).    The very term “SWF” was only coined in 2005 at the time of the second oil boom. Gulf SWF assets have since swelled. During the financial crisis of 2007/8, they often acted as white knights for Western banks and companies facing financial turmoil. Heavy investment was thus made in companies such as Deutsche Bank, Barclays, and Volkswagen. The US, with the help of other Western countries, has increasingly weaponised the global financial infrastructure such as the SWIFT payment system (Farrell and Newman 2019). The Gulf countries have not been targeted by Western sanctions like Iran and Russia have, but they have faced such threats in the past. During the Arab oil boycott of the 1970s, the US even threatened to inflict a unilateral food embargo on the import-dependent Gulf countries (Woertz 2013). Against this backdrop, the threatened seizure of Russian assets will likely prompt them to diversify assets away from Western markets. They have already increased the share of emerging markets in their portfolios. The year 2023 also saw increased gold purchases by sovereign entities. So-called petrodollar recycling was a crucial aspect of international financial stability during the oil booms of the 1970s and early years of the new century, but this continuing to happen cannot be taken for granted in the future. This GIGA Focus deviates from the series’ typical format. It is the joint product of several GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies staff members. Eckart Woertz contributed the section on the administration of Gaza after the war, Jens Heibach authored the part on the Yemen War, Mira Demirdirek and Sara Bazoobandi wrote the one on regional elections. Hager Ali addressed Egypt’s growing importance as a mediator, André Bank looked at Syria’s regional re-integration. Nils Lukacs examined the possible implications of a Trump victory on US policy in the MENA. Deema Abu Alkheir authored the section on the future of Israel’s normalisation process with some countries of the region. Mohamadbagher Forough analysed the growing importance of China regionally as Europe struggles to maintain its influence there. The parts on OPEC+ and Gulf SWFs were written by Eckart Woertz and Olena Osypenkova, who also jointly edited this GIGA Focus.

Since at least a decade, migration has remained a hot-button issue in European politics, providing fodder for parties on the right of the ideological spectrum. With a steady increase in its migrant population from 8.5 percent in 2010 to over 10 percent in 2022, the situation is no different in France where the issue has long presided over French politics. Just after the European Union (EU) reached an agreement on Migration and Asylum in December, the French Parliament passed a law to reform its approach to immigration while combating illegal immigration. After the outright rejection of President Emmanuel Macron’s previous more lenient version of the immigration bill that was painstakingly drafted for 18 months, the version that eventually passed through Parliament was significantly toughened to appeal to the far-right. Even while granting temporary residence permits for work sectors plagued with labour shortages, the bill introduces tough controls. These include stricter conditions for immigrants to bring over family members, annual quotas for immigration, preferential access to state subsidies and welfare benefits to French citizens in a country traditionally known for its generous and inclusive welfare system, additional visa fees for foreign students, stripping crime-accused dual nationals off their French citizenship, diluting the right to automatic citizenship for those born in France, and installing an easier process to expel undocumented migrants. “The kiss of death” Unlike France’s controversial pension overhaul that was non-democratically imposed in March 2023 by bypassing Parliament and invoking special constitutional powers, the immigration bill was voted on in the lower house. The toughened legislation received 349 votes in favour and 186 against, where many in Macron’s own Renaissance Party and his centrist coalition either abstained or opposed the bill. On the other hand, all 88 members of the far-right voted in favour of the bill, lending their strong endorsement and backing. Many in the French media labelled this move as far-right Opposition leader Marine Le Pen’s “kiss of death” after the initial impression that her party the National Rally would either abstain or vote against the bill. Even though Macron managed to democratically pass legislation that was central to his second mandate, the optics of the compromise could not have been poorer. The results of a poll demonstrate that while 70 percent of the French population including 87 percent, of Macron’s own supporters support the new bill, 73 percent assumed that the bill was inspired by Le Pen’s ideas, leading to the outcome being touted as a massive “ideological victory” for Macron’s contenders on the far-right. Le Pen’s surprise coup and the strict measures that the bill contains also enraged Macron’s coalition members on the left, accusing him of caving into pressure from the far-right and risking the French Republic’s fundamental values. Moreover, the bill, through its incorporation of the beliefs of the far-right, has alienated supporters who voted for Macron as an alternative to the far-right, and are now accusing him of becoming their “stepping stone” rather than repelling their ideas. While France’s health minister Aurélien Rousseau resigned from his post, the Greens’ Yannick Jabot referred to the bill as the arrival of Trumpism in France. Furthermore, the process has exposed the governance difficulties associated with Macron’s weak mandate from the 2022 election, which led to a loss in parliamentary majority. The whole affair has prompted a government reshuffle and the resignation of French Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne with the hope of focusing on fresh priorities, ahead of EU elections scheduled for June where eurosceptic parties are leading the charge. Mainstreaming the far-right In their endeavour to assuage voter concerns amidst hardened public opinion on immigration, parties across the board have found themselves in a bind to tackle the issue of migration, which the far-right has successfully fed upon. Thus, the centre’s co-opting of the talking points of the far-right is a phenomenon being observed throughout European politics, whereby the mainstream is mainstreaming and legitimising the politics of the far-right. For Macron too, this is not the first time that he’s accommodated or imitated far-right rhetoric for political survival as evident in his increasingly hardline rhetoric on Islam in 2023. In September last year, Macron’s then-Education Minister Gabriel Attal, who has recently been appointed as France’s new Prime Minister, announced a ban on wearing the Muslim abaya in schools in the interests of secularism. The ball is now in the hands of France’s constitutional court to examine whether the law complies with the constitution or requires amendments. In addition, the caveat that while European countries, including France, crack down on immigration, they are simultaneously facing declining populations and need migrant labour, is inescapable. As France moves to the right on immigration, Macron may have managed to democratically pass a law on the most contentious issue in French politics. But his own image, as a defender of liberal democracy and a centrist alternative to the far-right, remains in tatters.