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As international order evolves in the 21st century, strategic competition is increasingly shaped by technological frontiers and emerging domains of power. Unlike the unipolar moment following the Cold War, the contemporary landscape is defined by multipolarity, where major powers vie for influence across space, cyberspace, and biotechnology. Outer space has emerged not only as a frontier for exploration but also as a potential arena for resource acquisition and military projection, raising novel challenges for international law, security policy and cooperative governance. Examining interstellar phenomena in this context underscores the importance of preparedness, coordination, and risk management, even without assuming the presence of extraterrestrial intelligence, yet acknowledging the unprecedented nature of events that are pushing the boundaries of human observation. Humanity is gradually entering an era in which technological progress is reshaping our conception of cosmic exploration. As advancements in rocket propulsion, materials science, and observational astronomy accelerate, the prospect of humanity departing Earth towards other worlds becomes less a distant dream and more an inevitable chapter in our long-term evolution. The future of our species increasingly appears to be tied to the potential terraforming of new planets and celestial bodies, alongside the development of aerospace technologies capable of carrying us deeper into the cosmos. Within this transformative horizon, the Fermi paradox or the Dark Forest theory gains renewed relevance, challenging humanity to consider the existential filters that civilizations must surpass to survive, expand and potentially encounter other life forms. Yet, while such milestone may unfold centuries from now, the foundations of that future are being laid in the present. In the 21st century, specifically by the year 2026, humanity will become more capable of observing its immediate cosmic neighborhood. Modern telescopes and space-based observatories allow us to detect objects that for centuries have likely passed through our solar system unnoticed. Only within the brief span of our scientific maturation have we acquired the tools to identify interstellar objects, bodies originating beyond the solar system whose physical properties and trajectories challenge our existing frameworks. These objects, often catalogued as cometary in nature, possess characteristics that warrant careful study. Their unusual shapes, compositions, and velocities offer insights into environments beyond our interstellar cradle and, in some cases, raise questions about their natural origin or even the possibility of artificial extraterrestrial technology. As our detection capabilities improve, the arrival of each interstellar visitor represents not only a scientific opportunity but also a critical data point for understanding planetary security and defense. Consequently, their study urges nations to evolve towards a more serious and coordinated international framework capable of addressing the strategic, scientific, and existential implications of interstellar encounters. The emergence and Relevance of Interstellar Objects The scientific understanding of interstellar objects (ISOs) has evolved rapidly in recent years, propelled by technological advances and the unexpected discovery of bodies crossing the solar system on hyperbolic trajectories. Before 2017, the existence of such objects was largely theoretical, supported by models of planetary formation and stellar dynamics that predicted the ejection of debris during the early stages of planetary system evolution. These models implied that the Milky Way should contain vast populations of wandering fragments- comets, asteroids, and potentially more complex bodies such as extraterrestrial debris moving freely through interstellar space. Yet observational confirmation remained unattainable due to instrumental limitations. This changed with the detection of the first confirmed interstellar object, 1/Oumuamua, whose physical properties departed radically from known solar system bodies. Its non-gravitational acceleration, lack of a visible coma, and elongated shape challenged established models of cometary activity and asteroidal composition (Meech et al, 2017). The subsequent discovery of 2I/Borisov, a more conventionally cometary object, confirmed that the solar system is indeed exposed to material originating from other stellar environments (Jewitt & Luu, 2019). The contrast between both objects highlighted a key insight: ISOs are highly diverse, and their properties may reveal mechanisms and materials absent from our own planetary system. Advances in wide-field surveys, high-resolution instrumentation, and automated sky- monitoring systems have significantly expanded humanity´s capacity to detect and track ISOs. The increasing sensitivity of these tools marks a transition toward a new observational era in which interstellar detections may become more frequent. As a result, we are now able to observe the behavior of bodies entirely foreign to the solar system-objects whose trajectories, compositions, and signatures often defy established expectations and expose gaps in existing theoretical frameworks. This expanding observational capability not only advances scientific knowledge but also underscores the urgency of early warning detection. Because ISOs are typically identified within narrow observational windows, delayed characterization can lead to the loss of critical scientific and strategic information. Consequently, the growing presence of ISOs calls for enhanced global coordination, standardized protocols, and a more serious international approach to monitoring and interpreting near-Earth interstellar encounters. The Impact and Arrival of 3I/ATLAS The discovery of 3I/ATLAS, the third confirmed interstellar object entering our solar system, marks a significant milestone in modern astronomy. Unlike 1/Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov, whose observational windows were limited and partially constrained, 3I/ATLAS has provided a comparatively longer period for systematic study. Its hyperbolic trajectory, unusual photometric behavior, and non-standard luminosity variations have made it an object of exceptional scientific interest. While early observations suggest that while 3I/ATLAS shares key characteristics with known cometary bodies, its behavior reinforces broader findings that interstellar objects often display physical and dynamical properties that do not fit neatly within exiting taxonomies of solar system objects (Jewitt, 2023). The media response to 3I/ATLAS has been unprecedented. As with Oumuamua, the object rapidly became the subject of public fascination, sensational claims, and speculative narratives. News outlets, online forums, and social media ecosystems proliferated interpretations ranging from exotic physics to extraterrestrial probes. While much of this discourse lacks grounding in empirical evidence, its widespread circulation reflects a broader sociological trend: interstellar phenomena increasingly operate not only as a scientific event but also as catalysts for public, imagination, cultural anxiety, and geopolitical attention. As Kaku (2020) notes, humanity approaches a technological threshold where cosmic discovery intersects directly with public consciousness, provoking both curiosity and apprehension. From a scientific standpoint, researchers such as Loeb (2021) have emphasized that anomalous behavior in interstellar visitors should not be dismissed lightly. Although 3I/ATLAS currently appears consistent with a natural origin, its unique features-and the difficulty in categorizing ISOs-underscore the need for serious, methodical investigation. Loeb argues that humanity must abandon its complacency regarding the unknown nature of interstellar technologies or civilizations and instead adopt a posture of preparedness, open inquiry, and systematic risk assessment. In his view, phenomena like 3I/ATLAS are reminders that humanity is not isolated, and that contact-whether intentional or incidental—with non-human intelligence represents a real possibility with profound implications. The arrival of 3I/ATLAS has also highlighted the potential consequences of extraterrestrial technological encounters. Even in the absence of direct evidence of artificial origin, the mere ambiguity of such objects can trigger global destabilization through speculation, misinformation, or geopolitical competition. Historical examples such as the economic collapses of 1929 and 2008, the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the global tensions surrounding major wars demonstrate how uncertainty-especially when amplified by media-can generate widespread instability. In this context, an interstellar object exhibiting unexplained characteristics could easily become a flashpoint for international tension, economic turbulence, or strategic miscalculation. Thus, beyond its scientific significance, 3I/ATLAS has brought renewed attention to the vulnerabilities and responsibilities of a species becoming increasingly aware of its cosmic environment. The object serves as a practical reminder that humanity must develop not only more advanced observational systems but also coordinated international frameworks for managing unexpected astronomical events. As we confront the possibility of encountering technologies or life beyond Earth, the world must adopt a more mature, structured approach to detection, interpretation, and global communication. This moment sets the stage for next critical dimension of the discussion, the implications of interstellar objects for planetary security and defense, and the urgent need to assess humanity’s readiness for cosmic contingencies. Toward a Multiplanetary Security Architecture Planetary security has grown increasingly complex as scientific capabilities expand toward detecting and characterizing interstellar objects whose origins and physical attributes lie beyond conventional astrophysical categories. Within the United Nations framework, existing mechanisms-such as COPUOS, the International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN), and the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG) provide the foundational structure for global coordination on natural impact hazards (UN COPUOS, 2014). However, these institutions were established under assumptions limited to solar system derived natural threats, leaving them poorly equipped to address unknown interstellar phenomena. The Outer Space Treaty and subsequent conventions introduced broad principles on cooperation and peaceful use, but no anticipated scenarios involving technologically anomalous interstellar objects or potential artificial extraterrestrial artifacts, resulting in a significant global governance vacuum. These mechanisms are designed primarily for probabilistic, natural impact scenarios, not for interstellar objects exhibiting anomalous trajectories, non-gravitational accelerations or uncertain technological signatures. Recognizing this gap, recent scientific proposals-most notably those advanced by Loeb (2023)-have called for the development of a dedicated international coordination mechanism under the United Nations system for the study and assessment of interstellar objects. Rather than proposing a fixed institutional blueprint, these contributions emphasize the need for a structured platform capable of integrating scientific analysis, risk assessment, and transparent diplomatic communication in cases involving anomalous interstellar phenomena. Such proposals should be understood not as a definitive institutional prescription, but as forward as a definitive institutional prescription, but as forward-looking reference points for the type of governance architecture of international community must begin to contemplate. As humanity´s observational reach extends beyond the boundaries of the solar system; this governance gap becomes increasingly consequential. Interstellar objects introduce forms of uncertainty that existing planetary defense regimes-designed around predictable, solar system-derived threats were never Intended to manage, underscoring the need for flexible and adaptive legal frameworks capable of integrating scientific uncertainty into decision making processes. Within this emerging landscape, conceptual assessment tools have gained relevance as mechanisms to structure uncertainty rather than eliminate it. One illustrative example is the Interstellar Threat Assessment Scale (ITAS) proposed by Loeb (2024), which offers a simplified framework for evaluating interstellar detections based on observable characteristics rather than speculative intent. As its lower levels, the scale categorizes objects that behave consistently with natural interstellar debris, such as comet-like bodies exhibiting predictable physical and dynamic properties. Higher levels correspond to increasing degrees of anomaly-such as unexplained non-gravitational acceleration, unconventional trajectories, or geometries inconsistent with known natural formation processes. While the scale is not explicitly designed to identify extraterrestrial technology, it intentionally encompasses characteristics that fall outside established natural baselines. This design allows it to function across multiple scenarios, from rare or poorly understood natural phenomena to detections that may warrant closer scrutiny due to their atypical behavior. In this sense, the framework remains agnostic regarding origin, yet adaptable enough to support both conventional astrophysical analysis and precautionary assessments under conditions of elevated uncertainty. Importantly, it does not assert hostile intent or artificial origin, rather it operates as a risk-management tool that helps differentiate levels of scientific uncertainty and potential planetary relevance. Approached in this manner, such frameworks contribute to the evolution of international space governance by providing a shared analytical language for policymakers, scientific institutions, security agencies and statecraft-oriented decision-makers. By standardizing how uncertainty is assessed and communicated, they reduce fragmented national interpretations, limit reactive or militarized responses, and promote cooperative, evidence-based decisions. Decision-making under conditions of incomplete information. This process reflects a broader need for international space law to evolve dynamically. However, the governance of interstellar risk cannot rely solely on conceptual models or isolated scientific initiatives. It requires a genuinely planetary response that integrates the full spectrum of contemporary technological, institutional, and political capacities. International legislation governing outer space must be adaptive and evolutionary, capable of responding to emerging scientific realities. Artificial intelligence, real-time global surveillance networks, and autonomous detection algorithms must be incorporated into a unified planetary architecture capable of identifying and characterizing interstellar objects far earlier than current capabilities allow. Equally important is the sustained collaboration among major space agencies-including NASA, ESA, CNSA, ISRO, Roscosmos, and JAXA- alongside private actors such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and emerging aerospace enterprises, whose technological capabilities and rapid innovation cycles are increasingly central to space governance. Equally critical is great-power cooperation. From a realist perspective, the international system remains defined by competition, power asymmetries, and strategic mistrust. Yet planetary defense represents a rare domain in which shared existential vulnerability can partially override zero-sum logic. The detection of an anomalous interstellar object must never become a catalyst for geopolitical rivalry or strategic miscalculation, but rather an opportunity for transparent scientific collaborations and coordinated global response. In an international order strained by power competition, planetary security stands as one of the few areas where shared survival interests necessitate shared responsibility. Ultimately, interstellar objects compel humanity to transcend political fragmentation and adopt a forward- look global strategy. Building a resilient planetary security architecture requires the integration of scientific expertise, adaptive international governance, technological innovation, and coordinated commitment of state and private actor alike. Whether future interstellar encounters prove benign or reveal unprecedented anomalies, preparedness is not speculation, it is an essential step in the evolution of humanity´s role within the cosmos. References - Jewitt, D., & Seligman, D. Z. (2023). The interstellar interlopers. Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics, 61, 197–236. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-astro-071221-054221 - Jewitt, D., & Luu, J. (2019). Initial characterization of interstellar comet 2I/2019 Q4 (Borisov). The Astrophysical Journal Letters, 886(2), L29. https://doi.org/10.3847/2041-8213/ab530b - Kaku, M. (2018). The Future of Humanity: Terra­forming Mars, Interstellar Travel, Immortality, and Our Destiny Beyond Earth. Doubleday. https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/555722/the-future-of-humanity-by-michio-kaku/ - Loeb, A. (2021). Extraterrestrial: The first sign of intelligent life beyond Earth. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. https://openlibrary.org/books/OL31850155M/Extraterrestrial?utm_source=chatgpt.com - Loeb, A. (2024). The interstellar threat assessment scale. Medium. https://avi-loeb.medium.com/ - Meech, K. J., et al. (2017). A brief visit from a red and extremely elongated interstellar asteroid. Nature, 552, 378–381. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature25020 - United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS). (2014). Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its fifty-first session. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/stsc/2014/index.html

A historic turning point in Sahelian sovereignty, as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger bolstered their regional security through a unified military force and in the same week held its second AES summit. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has taken a decisive step toward regional self-defense after officially launching a joint military force aimed at combating Islamist insurgency and terrorism across the Sahel. The force was inaugurated on December 20, 2025, during a ceremony held at an air base in Bamako, Mali’s capital. The ceremony was presided over by Mali’s Transitional President, Head of State, Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, and outgoing President of the AES, Army General Assimi Goïta. The event was the formal handover of the Unified Force of the AES banner, marking the operationalization of a long-declared commitment by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to jointly secure their territories’ sovereignty. The newly established force, known as the FU AES, brings together approximately 5,000 troops drawn from the three member states. It is designed to integrate air power, intelligence sharing, and coordinated ground operations to confront armed groups that have destabilized large parts of the Sahel for over a decade. Addressing the gathering, Malian General Aliou Boï Diarra delivered a deeply symbolic and emotional speech, underscoring the historical and moral significance of the banner. He described the banner as far more than a ceremonial object. “The standard that you are presenting to the unified AES force represents a memory, a will, an irreversible commitment. It profoundly affirms a certainty now deeply engraved in the hearts of our beloved peoples. This is indeed a truly historic and momentous act,” General Diarra said. Diarra declared that the banner embodied sacrifice and struggle rather than decoration: “This sacred standard is not merely a decorative symbol. It is the profound and enduring result of precious blood bravely shed, immense courage valiantly embraced, and fundamental truth profoundly rediscovered.” Paying tribute to the fallen, he added: “To our cherished martyrs, to all innocent civilians, and to the brave soldiers who have fallen in battle, I humbly pay a solemn and heartfelt tribute beneath the eternal snow. They did not die in vain.” Mali’s leader, General Goïta, in his own address, described the launch as a historic turning point for the Sahel. He began by saluting the defense leadership and troops of the region. “On this significant occasion, I would like to extend my sincere congratulations and profoundly salute the exceptional courage, unwavering professionalism, steadfast commitment, and resolute determination of the ministers of defense, the chiefs of general staff, and especially all the brave defense and security forces of the AES area for the remarkable achievements they have made in their relentless fight against armed terrorist groups,” he said. The AES president recalled that since the Niamey Mutual Initiative (NMI) declaration of July 6, 2024, joint military operations have already been underway, noting that they resulted in the neutralization of several terrorist leaders and the destruction of multiple insurgent sanctuaries. According to Goïta, “All these positive results were achieved thanks to meticulous planning, timely and effective intelligence sharing, and above all the comprehensive pooling of our collective efforts and resources.” He further announced key institutional steps consolidating the unified force, including the appointment of a new commander, the establishment of a central command post in the strategic city of Niamey, and the assignment of specialized battalions fully dedicated to AES operations. He stressed that the task ahead would require adaptability to the evolving tactics of armed groups. “It is now critically important for the new commander not only to anticipate the increasingly complex operating methods of terrorist groups, but above all to resolutely continue this crucial fight to secure the entire Sahel region and ensure lasting peace and stability.” General Goïta added that the conflict confronting the Sahel is multidimensional, “This war is not only military. It is also political, economic, and informational.” He identified what he described as three major threats facing Sahelian states: armed terrorist violence, economic terrorism, and media terrorism. In response, he noted that the confederation has adopted a comprehensive strategy that goes beyond battlefield operations. “We have taken measures to counter these threats not only by establishing this unified force, but also by creating AES Television, AES Radio, and AES print media,” he said, framing these platforms as tools to counter disinformation and psychological warfare. The military launch follows a series of symbolic and political moves that underline the bloc’s growing autonomy. Earlier in the year, the AES unveiled a new flag, representing the confederation’s shared identity and its intention to redefine political, economic, and security cooperation outside the shadow of French imperialism and Western neoliberal frameworks. Leaders of the bloc have repeatedly criticized past military partnerships with France and other Western powers, arguing that foreign interventions failed to bring peace while undermining national sovereignty. The AES summit Mali hosted a summit of the Alliance of Sahel States in the same week, which concluded on Tuesday, December 23. During the summit, Burkina Faso’s leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, was appointed as the new head of the Alliance of Sahel States. Following the meeting, the Alliance announced that the summit would be followed by a large-scale military operation. Earlier this year, the three countries also introduced a joint AES passport, a major step toward deeper integration. This move came after Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an organization they now openly describe as hostile. The launch of the unified force also takes place amid rising regional tensions. Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, both influential ECOWAS members, have been criticized by AES leaders and their supporters for what they see as counter revolutionary postures. In official and popular discourse within the Sahel, these countries are increasingly portrayed as attempting to contain or reverse the radical political shifts unfolding in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey. What is clear is that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are charting a new path, one that is redefining power, alliances, and resistance in the heart of West Africa.

In Madagascar, a youth-led revolt has toppled a president and ushered in a military-led transition. Whether this moment becomes a democratic turning point — or yet another loop in Madagascar’s long cycle of crises — still hangs in the balance. Since September, Madagascar has been in the throes of a fast-moving political crisis that toppled President Andry Rajoelina and brought a military-led transitional regime to power. What began as small demonstrations by Generation Z activists in the capital Antananarivo — protesting severe water and electricity shortages — quickly grew into a nationwide movement amplified by influencers and opposition voices. Protests spread to other cities such as Toamasina, Antsiranana, and Toliara, and violent clashes with security forces left several injured and at least 22 people dead, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights—figures the government denies. Within days, frustrations over the daily hardships of life and a lack of freedom of expression escalated into an open demand for President Rajoelina to resign. A decisive military defection The turning point came on October 11, when the ‘Corps d’administration des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques’ (CAPSAT) unit of the armed forces unexpectedly joined protesters at Antananarivo’s symbolic ‘Place du 13 Mai’ — a square historically tied to several protests that ultimately led to the downfall of multiple governments since 1972. The move evoked memories of the 2009 crisis, when the military also sided with opposition-led protests. One day later, President Rajoelina abruptly left the country. While the presidency insisted he was on an overseas mission, foreign media reported he had been evacuated from Sainte Marie island aboard a French military aircraft. Speaking via social media from an undisclosed “secure location,” Rajoelina claimed he had received death threats. Constitutional showdown October 14 marked a chaotic escalation. The National Assembly announced it would convene to remove Rajoelina from office. In response, the presidency issued a decree dissolving the Assembly. Lawmakers — across opposition, independents, and even the ruling party — ignored the decree and voted to remove him anyway. Hours later, CAPSAT forces led by Colonel Michaël Randrianirina declared they were “taking responsibility” for the country. Rajoelina’s allies called it a coup; the military insisted it was a necessary intervention. The High Constitutional Court quickly validated the takeover, declaring the presidency vacant due to Rajoelina’s “passive abandonment of power.” With the Senate presidency itself in disarray, the court chose an unprecedented path: endorsing a military-led transition and effectively “inviting” Randrianirina to power, thereby giving his takeover a semblance of legality. The “refoundation” begins On October 17, Colonel Randrianirina was sworn in as President of the “Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar,” launching a two-year transitional period. Among other reform measures outlined in a six-step plan, the new leadership pledged to conduct a national consultation, organize a constitutional referendum, and hold presidential elections. The concept of “refoundation” has become a rallying cry for breaking with decades of corruption, patronage, and institutional fragility. Gen Z activists have demanded entirely new leaders across all institutions. But controversy erupted quickly. The appointment of Prime Minister Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo — criticized for alleged ties to figures close to the former regime — raised doubts about how deep the renewal will truly go. By October 28, a new cabinet of 29 non-military members had been installed. Justice or political score-settling? A wave of arrests and searches targeting figures close to the former ruling circle has fueled growing unease. While the new authorities portray the moves as a fight against impunity, critics see echoes of past governments that weaponized the justice system against opponents. Once again, the line between accountability and political revenge is blurred. This latest turmoil marks Madagascar’s sixth major political crisis since independence —following those of 1972, 1991, 2002, 2009, and 2018. Unlike its predecessors, however, the 2025 revolt was driven not by political elites but by young citizens demanding dignity, opportunity, and responsive governance — a development that has been driven by anger over the steady erosion of public services and civil rights. The stakes are enormous in a country already struggling with severe social and economic fragility. As evidenced by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Madagascar has witnessed a stark decline in the political and social realm over the past 20 years, with indicators such as freedom of expression (reducing from 8 to 3) and commitment to democratic institutions (falling from 9 to 3) dropping drastically. Similarly, economic indicators such as market organization and liberalization of trade have stagnated at relatively low levels. An uncertain international embrace With regard to the current political situation, the international community appears divided. Although foreign diplomats attended Randrianirina’s swearing-in, the African Union suspended Madagascar while simultaneously dispatching envoys to mediate. This ambiguity threatens the new regime’s access to international financing — making international recognition a top priority. Diplomatically, the transition government has signaled openness to all partners but has notably leaned toward Russia: The Russian ambassador was the first foreign official to meet Randrianirina after his inauguration, and the new National Assembly president, Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko, travelled to Moscow soon after. A crossroads: renewal or repetition? All eyes now turn to the national consultation, expected to be convened by Madagascar’s influential Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches. The process is meant to chart the transition’s long-term political future, including the drafting of a new constitution. Yet scepticism is warranted. Recent events — echoing findings from a recent Afrobarometer survey — show that while most Malagasy citizens support democracy and reject military rule, many are willing to tolerate military involvement when civilian leaders abuse their power. It’s a stance that, paradoxically, weakens democracy itself. Still, forward-looking debates are already emerging: Should Madagascar remain a unitary state or move toward federalism? Should decentralization finally be strengthened? And when will a constitutional referendum be held before the return to elected leadership? The answers will determine whether Madagascar can finally escape its cycle of instability — or whether this moment, like so many before, will slip into the familiar pattern of hope, upheaval, and disappointment.

The recently released Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has upended what had been the decades-long consensus about American foreign policy. Most notable in it is the Trump Administration’s prioritization of the Western Hemisphere as an American security concern, its deemphasis on defending America’s traditional European allies, its identification of China as far more of a threat than Russia, and its determination not to be drawn into conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. But while the 2025 Trump Administration National Security Strategy breaks with much of previous American foreign policy, the logic behind it is not something completely new. Even though the document makes no mention of him, the policy outlined in the NSS comports with what John Mearsheimer described in his influential book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, which was first published in 2001 and updated in 2014. In his book Mearsheimer declared that no nation has ever achieved global hegemony. According to Mearsheimer, America is the only country that has achieved predominant influence in its own region (the Western Hemisphere) and has also been able to prevent any other great power from dominating any other region. Mearsheimer wrote, “States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers” (2014 edition, p. 41). Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy has, whether knowingly or not, adopted these aims as well. It discusses the various regions of the world in the order of their priority for the Trump Administration: the Western Hemisphere first, followed by Asia (or Indo-Pacific), Europe, the Middle East, and lastly Africa. With regard to the Western Hemisphere, the NSS unambiguously calls for the restoration of “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” and states, “We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” This is very much in keeping with what Mearsheimer described as America being a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. As for the other four regions of the world, though, the Trump Administration seeks either to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant — or it doesn’t see this as a possibility that needs to be worried about. According to the NSS, the Middle East was a priority in the past because it was the world’s most important energy supplier and was a prime theater of superpower conflict. Now, however, there are other energy suppliers (including the U.S.) and superpower competition has been replaced by “great power jockeying” in which the U.S. retains “the most enviable position.” In other words: the Trump Administration does not see any other great power as able to become predominant in this region which is now less strategically important than it used to be anyway. Similarly, the NSS does not see any other great power as even seeking to become predominant in Africa. The NSS thus sees America’s main interests there as mainly commercial. By contrast, China is seen as a threat in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS, though, discusses Chinese threats in the economic and technological spheres before turning to the military one. A continued U.S. military presence in the region is seen as important for preventing Chinese predominance. But Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia are all enjoined by the NSS to increase their defense spending in order to counter this threat. The NSS also identifies “the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea” as a common threat that not only requires investment in U.S. military capabilities, “but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond.” Unlike the Middle East and Africa, then, the NSS does identify a rival great power as striving for predominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Countering it, though, is not seen as just being America’s responsibility, but also that of other powerful states in the region. The strangest section in the 2025 NSS is the one on Europe. While acknowledging that “many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat,” the NSS envisions America’s role as “managing European relations with Russia” both to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability” and “to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.” This is very different from the decades-long U.S. policy of seeing America’s role as defending democratic Europe against an expansionist Soviet Union in the past and Putin’s Russia more recently. Indeed, the NSS’s claim that the European Union undermines “political liberty and sovereignty” and its welcoming “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” (in other words, anti-EU right wing nationalist ones) suggests that it is not Russia which the Trump Administration sees as a rival, but the European Union. The 2025 NSS does call for a “strong Europe…to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” The NSS, though, seems to envision the European Union as either greater than or equal to Russia in threatening to dominate European nations. In his book, Mearsheimer did not envision the European Union as a potential great power rival to the U.S. Indeed, there isn’t even an entry for it in the book’s index. The way that the NSS envisions the world, though, comports with how Mearsheimer described America’s great power position: predominant in the Western Hemisphere and able to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant in any other region of the world. Mearsheimer, though, is a scholar who described the position in the world that he saw the U.S. as having achieved and which would seek to maintain. The 2025 NSS, by contrast, is a policy document laying out how the Trump Administration believes it can best maintain this position. And there is reason to doubt that it has done so realistically. Keeping non-Hemispheric great powers out of the Western Hemisphere will not be easy when there are governments there that want to cooperate with them. Further, devoting American resources to being predominant in Latin America when this will be resented and resisted could not only take away from America’s ability to prevent rival great powers from becoming predominant in other regions, but could counterproductively lead Latin American nations than have already done so to increase their cooperation with external great powers which the Trump Administration wants to avoid. Further, the Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce the influence of the European Union runs two risks: the first is that such an effort will succeed, but that the rise of anti-EU nationalist governments throughout the old continent results in a Europe less able to resist Russian manipulation and incursion. The second is that Trump Administration efforts to weaken the European Union backfire and result not only in a Europe united against American interference but unnecessarily emerging as a rival to the U.S. It would be ironic indeed if pursuing the NSS’s plan for upholding what Mearsheimer described as America’s ability to predominate over the Western Hemisphere combined with an ability to prevent any rival from predominating over any other region ended up undermining America’s ability to do either.

When we hear the word Pyramids, the first country to come to our mind is mostly Egypt and its marvelous Pyramids of Giza. But there is one country down south known as Sudan which has significantly more pyramids when compared to Egypt, albeit smaller in size compared to Egyptian pyramids. This country is marred with power struggles, civil war and genocide because of multiple reasons including geographic, social, historical and economic reasons. Since April 2023, the country has been going through its brutal third civil war. Origin of Modern Sudan The history of modern Sudan can be traced back to the beginning of the 19th century. In the year 1820, the Governor of Ottoman-Egypt Muhammad Ali-Pasha sent his army to conquer Sudan and from 1821–1885 it was ruled by the Ottoman-Egyptian rulers. In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad launched a revolt against the Egyptians and established the Mahdist State, which ruled Sudan between 1885–1899. Later, when the British conquered Egypt during the Scramble for Africa, they also conquered Sudan and both countries came under British jurisdiction. Sudan got independence from the British in 1956 after several anti-colonial movements. North–South Civil War Sudan has till now fought two civil wars and is currently fighting its third civil war. The seeds of the first and second civil wars can be traced back to British colonial rule of Sudan. When the British took control over Sudan, they found that the northern and southern regions of Sudan were culturally diverse. Their so-called aim was to preserve the southern culture from the north, and they developed certain policies collectively referred to as the British Southern Policy. Under these policies, the southern provinces (Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal) were closed off to northerners, except for those on government business. Greek, Syrian and Jewish traders were encouraged to open businesses in the south. The Arabic language, lifestyle and even names were discouraged. Christian missionaries were encouraged while at the same time Muslim proselytizing was banned. Source: New York Times The result of these policies wasn’t good; the southerners lagged behind northerners in every aspect from education to economic development. Northerners tended to view southerners as backward and uncivilized. In 1946, the British reversed their policy and began to reintegrate the south with the north. By this time, anti-colonial movements had taken a strong hold in the north and were asking for British withdrawal. Negotiations for the transition to independence largely bypassed the south. Mistrust in the northern government increased when, in 1954, the newly elected transitional government, dominated by the north, began the process of “Sudanization” of government institutions. A total of 800 posts were vacated by the British but only six went to southerners. Although the root cause was that the southerners to some extent lacked the required qualifications to fill these posts — and it was because of the British Southern Policy — the southerners viewed this as domination and discrimination by the north. Tensions were already high, but they escalated in 1955, just prior to Sudan's declaration of independence. Southern soldiers in the Sudanese army stationed in Torit mutinied against their northern commanders. The immediate cause was the transfer of these southern units to the north, which was seen as a move towards further domination and suppression by the northern government. Although the Torit mutiny was quickly suppressed, it sparked widespread unrest across the south. All hell broke loose in 1958 when the elected government of Sudan was overthrown by Brigadier General Ibrahim Abboud. It was under his regime that the tense situation in the south blew into an outright civil war. It was an assumption in the north that the North–South problem could be solved by assimilating the southerners, who were predominantly non-Arab Christians and animists, with Arab-Islamic influence in the north. Abboud, being a dictator, took it to the extreme: he banned Sunday holidays in the south, prohibited religious gathering outside churches, expelled missionaries from the south, and eventually the situation became dire. He was overthrown in 1964 and civilian rule returned to Sudan, but it didn’t last long, and in 1969 there was a coup by Gaafar Muhammad al-Nimeiri and he became the new dictator. By the time the armed conflict ended in stalemate in 1972, anywhere from 500,000 to 1 million people had been killed. The Addis Ababa Agreement brought an end to the conflict; this treaty established the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region, which gave southerners some degree of autonomy. The Addis Ababa Agreement couldn't bring lasting peace and within a decade of signing the agreement a second civil war broke out and oil played a crucial role in it. Oil was discovered in Sudan in 1959, but the north had negligible amounts of oil; most oil fields were in the south. Al-Nimeiri wanted to take control of those fields. In order to achieve this objective, he used certain tactics. In January 1982, Nimeiri announced that a referendum would be held in the south on the decentralization issue, but only in Equatoria Province. Some southern politicians immediately viewed this plan as an effort to divide the south and claimed that the plan was contrary to the 1972 autonomy agreement. These politicians were arrested on charges of forming an illegal political organization. In response to this, the separatist group Anya-nya II started attacking police stations and army barracks. There was also the Bor Mutiny in which the southern soldiers refused to leave and move to the northern garrison as part of the government’s rotating policy. These southerners threatened to fire against the newly arrived northern soldiers. On September 8, 1983, sharia, or Islamic law, went into effect in Sudan. The penal code was amended to conform to the precepts of the Qur՚ān. Some offenses, such as theft, were punished by amputation, while alcohol and gambling were prohibited. The south, with its varied religious traditions, strongly opposed the Islamization of Sudan. However, with two-thirds of Sudan’s land and population in Arab-Muslim possession, the north controlled the country. In 1984, Nimeiri proclaimed a state of emergency because of increasing rebel attacks from different rebel groups as these attacks were threatening his regime. His policies had negative impacts on Sudan, and, in 1985, he was ousted from power by General Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab in a bloodless coup. Later on, General Abdel Rahman relinquished his power and gave it to the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. In May 1986, the new Khartoum government led by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) led by Col. John Garang met for negotiations to end the conflicts. In February 1989, a peace plan was approved by the al-Mahdi government, but later in that year Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir came to power by overthrowing Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Al-Bashir’s regime dissolved the parliament and banned political parties. The SPLA, initially seeking a unified “New Sudan” with secular governance, later shifted toward secession mostly because of al-Bashir’s policy. The second war lasted until 2005, marking it infamously as the longest civil war in modern history. A 2005 peace agreement ended the conflict and the 2011 referendum ultimately led to South Sudan's independence. It is estimated that 1 to 2.5 million lives were lost during Sudan’s second civil war. While both the Civil wars were fought on the North-South Muslim-Christian divide, there were also numerous ethnic groups who were caught during these wars. In South Sudan, communities such as Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Bari held their own grievances rooted in exclusion, land and resources. In the North, groups like Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa in the Darfur region; the Nuba people in South Kordofan and the Beja in the East have their own patterns of neglect. Even though religion played an important role, but we can't rule out the importance of ethnicity in these brutal conflicts. Source: BBC & Instagram/Geopolitical Futures The Darfur Genocide — A Dark Chapter in Sudan's History Darfur is a province in the western part of Sudan. During the second civil war, Darfuri rebels launched attacks on Sudanese government military targets. The Sudanese government assumed that Black African people- Fur, Maselit and Zaghawa in Darfur had supported these rebels and they reacted by arming militias — the Janjaweed — to attack those same innocent people. The Janjaweed militias were brutal; they used “scorched earth” tactics to target those Black people. The results were catastrophic: thousands of people were murdered, and millions were forced to flee their homes. When refugees from Darfur were interviewed, they said that after government air raids on villages, the Janjaweed used to attack their village, slaughter men, rape women and steal whatever they found. In July 2004, the US Congress declared atrocities in Darfur to be genocide and in July 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued indictments against then President al-Bashir. In 2014, these same Janjaweed militias were incorporated into the paramilitary forces known as the Rapid Support Forces. It is estimated approximately 200,000 people were killed and more than 2 million displaced during the Darfur Genocide. Third Civil War Omar al-Bashir ruled as dictator of Sudan up until 2019, when he was overthrown by a coup jointly organized by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). RSF is the most powerful paramilitary group formed during Bashir's regime. The roots of RSF can be traced back to the Janjaweed militia which committed the heinous Darfur genocide. With support from Bashir, RSF was organized and it was employed as border security guard, mercenaries to fight wars in Yemen, to suppress any civil protest or rebellion rising against him, and most importantly it acted as a counterweight to SAF. Bashir was a dictator and a military officer; he knew that his regime was also threatened by a military coup. In 2019, there were civilian protests against the dictatorial regime of al-Bashir. Contrary to al-Bashir’s belief, RSF didn't protect him and with SAF organized a coup and overthrew his government. They established a transitional government and a new constitution. SAF’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the transitional government while RSF’s General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti”, was appointed as Deputy. Abdalla Hamdok, an economist and development expert, was chosen as Prime Minister. Hamdok tried to fix Sudan's problems, but al-Burhan and Hemedti orchestrated a coup against him in October 2021. But there were protests, the IMF and World Bank paused funding, so Hamdok was reinstated back in power in November 2021. But it was short-lived; he resigned again in February 2022 because the terms of reinstating were predatory for civilian leaders. With his resignation, Burhan and Hemedti, two strongman leaders, were left to transit Sudan into a democratic nation. Negotiations culminated in a December 2022 deal; it laid the groundwork for a two-year transition to civilian leadership and national elections. There were protests because of the timeline and it was brutally cracked down as you expect from a strongman. A major sticking point emerged: there was a proposition in the deal that RSF would be incorporated into SAF. The suspicions were that both generals wanted to hang on to their positions of power, unwilling to lose wealth and influence. As months passed, the power struggle between both of them increased and it stalled the country's transition efforts. On April 15, 2023, everything went loose as a series of explosions shook Khartoum, along with heavy gunfire. SAF and RSF leadership accused each other of firing first. The involvement of foreign powers in this conflict has worsened the situation. It is believed that RSF has strong backing of UAE and Libyan strongman General Khalifa Haftar, while SAF has strong backing of Egypt and to some extent Iran. RSF controls almost the western half of Sudan including the Darfur region and controls the gold mines of the region. This gold is allegedly smuggled into the UAE and sold throughout the world. SAF controls most of the north and east part of Sudan including Sudan's capital Khartoum. Several NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, have documented evidence of numerous mass atrocities committed throughout the conflict prompting accusations of ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Humanitarian access remains a crucial concern for many international actors, including the United States, which called on the UN Security Council to authorize aid deliveries through Chad. The situation has been grim since war broke out. As of November 2025, nearly twelve million people have been forcibly displaced, according to the UN refugee agency. More than 7.2 million of them are internally displaced within Sudan, while over 4.2 million are refugees, asylum seekers or “returnees” who have fled or returned to neighboring countries. The number of people killed in the conflict is unknown due to restricted media access, but researchers’ estimates vary between 20,000 and 150,000 fatalities. In early November 2025, the RSF announced it had agreed to a humanitarian truce proposed by the US, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, the army said it would be wary of agreeing to a truce, accusing the RSF of not respecting ceasefires. UN health chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has also lamented that there is less global interest in the conflict in Sudan, and other recent conflicts in Africa, compared to crises elsewhere in the world. As of late November 2025, both parties are still waging war and millions of innocent Sudanese are suffering.  Conclusion Sudan as a nation-state was a colonial product; its leaders couldn't build stable institutions; they weren't able to properly define the idea of Sudanese nationalism. All of these led to power struggles, political instability, civil war and the fracturing of the nation into two parts. They could learn from countries of Asia; they were once colonies of European powers. Many of them were able to address the same problems which Sudanese politicians couldn’t. Those countries defined the idea of nationalism, built strong institutions and in turn it brought political stability and economic prosperity. Lasting peace can only happen in Sudan once stable institutions are formed; until then, Sudan will be stuck in this vicious cycle. Sources BBC News. Sudan conflict explainer. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o BlackPast.org. First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972). https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/first-sudanese-civil-war-1955-1972/ BlackPast.org. Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/second-sudanese-civil-war-1983-2005/ Council on Foreign Relations. Power struggle in Sudan: Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan Council on Foreign Relations. To what extent is Sudan’s humanitarian crisis escalating? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-extent-sudans-humanitarian-crisis EBSCO Research Starters. First Sudanese Civil War erupts. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/first-sudanese-civil-war-erupts EBSCO Research Starters. Sudanese Civil War resumes. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/sudanese-civil-war-resumes Holocaust Memorial Day Trust. Darfur genocide. https://hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/darfur/genocide/ World History Edu. Major facts about the Second Sudanese Civil War. https://worldhistoryedu.com/history-major-facts-about-the-second-sudanese-civil-war-1983-2005/ World History Edu. History of the First Sudanese War: How and when did it erupt? https://worldhistoryedu.com/history-of-first-sudanese-war-how-and-when-did-it-erupt/

Drug trafficking is the illegal trade, in large quantities, of drugs or narcotics (RAE, 2025). However, while this definition is accurate, it is insufficient to describe the complexity of a global phenomenon that transcends borders and involves the production, purchase, and distribution of illicit substances. Drug trafficking has developed hand in hand with global trade and interconnection (Saldaña, 2024). In other words, the evolution of drug trafficking is closely linked to globalization, which has strengthened the logistical, technological, and financial networks that enable its expansion. Therefore, more than isolated crime, drug trafficking must be understood as a transnational system of power that feeds on globalization itself. Drug Trafficking as a Transnational System of Power Drug trafficking is described by some authors as a profoundly complex transnational phenomenon resulting from globalization (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). This phenomenon involves and connects global networks of production, logistics, financing, and consumption, all made possible by economic interdependence, information technologies, and established global logistical routes. These authors analyze drug trafficking from a multidimensional perspective, identifying seven interrelated spheres that sustain this activity: the economic (money laundering and investment diversification), institutional (corruption and institutional capture), organizational (organized criminal networks and advanced logistics), social (presence in territories with state vacuums and community legitimization), technological (use of cryptomarkets, encryption, and innovation), geopolitical (route adaptability and resilience against state policies), and cultural (narratives and subcultures that normalize illicit practices) (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). These dimensions form a web of relationships in which criminal groups not only control the flow of drugs but also influence economic and political structures. As Interpol (n.d.) warns, this global network undermines and erodes the political and economic stability of the countries involved, while also fostering corruption and generating irreversible social and health effects. Furthermore, drug trafficking is intertwined with other crimes — such as money laundering, corruption, human trafficking, and arms smuggling — thus forming a globalized criminal ecosystem, a global issue and a national security concern for nations worldwide. Origins and historical context There are records of the use of entheogenic drugs for ritual or medicinal purposes in Mesoamerican cultures — such as the Olmecs, Zapotecs, Mayas, and Aztecs (Carod Artal, 2011) — as well as in Peru (Bussmann & Douglas, 2006), the Amazon region, and even today among the Wixárika culture in Mexico (Haro Luna, 2023). Likewise, there was widespread and diverse drug use among the ancient Greeks and Romans, including substances such as mandrake, henbane, belladonna, cannabis, and opium, among others (Pérez González, 2024). However, modern drug trafficking can trace its origins to the First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Chinese Empire (Qing Dynasty) and the British Empire, marking the first international conflict directly linked to the drug trade. During the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, several drugs —such as heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamines — made their debut in the pharmaceutical field, being used in medicines and therapeutic remedies (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). This period is considered the pharmaceutical revolution, characterized by the emergence of researchers, research centers, and major discoveries in the field. During that time, the term “drug” began to be associated with “addiction.” The pharmaceutical revolution had its epicenter in Germany; however, it was the British and Americans who promoted its expansion (Luna-Fabritius, 2015) and contributed to the normalization of psychoactive substance consumption. Military promotion, use and dependence Armed conflicts — from the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) to the First World War (1914–1918) — played a key role in spreading and promoting the military use of psychoactive substances. For instance, stimulants such as alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines, and methamphetamines were used to combat sleep, reduce fatigue, boost energy, and strengthen courage, while depressants like opium, morphine, and marijuana were used to relieve combat stress and mitigate war trauma (Marco, 2019). The dependence that developed led to a process of expansion among the civilian population, which entered a period of mass experimentation that often resulted in substance abuse and chemical dependency (Courtwright, 2001). In response, the first restrictive laws emerged, particularly in the United States (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). However, the high demand for certain substances, such as opium, gave rise to the search for markets capable of meeting that demand. Thus, Mexico — influenced by Chinese immigration that introduced the habit of smoking opium in the country — became, by the 1940s, the epicenter of poppy cultivation and opium processing in the region known as the Golden Triangle (Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua). It became the main supplier for drug markets in the United States and other parts of the continent, at times providing up to 90% of the demand during periods of shortage (Sosa, 2025). Even during World War II (1939–1945) — when the traditional supply of heroin and morphine to Europe was disrupted — Mexico strengthened its role in the illicit trade by providing smoking opium and processed morphine or heroin. These developments, alongside the implementation of opiate regulations in Mexico, helped consolidate and structure Mexican drug trafficking, which has persisted for more than sixty years (Sosa, 2025). Social expansion and regulatory restrictions The end of World War II brought stricter restrictions and regulations, but that did not prevent socio-cultural movements such as the hippie movement (in the 1960s) from adopting the use of marijuana, hashish, LSD, and hallucinogenic mushrooms (Kiss, 2025) without facing severe repercussions. That same hippie movement — which promoted pacifism and opposed the Vietnam War (1955–1975) — in one way or another encouraged drug use among young people. Moreover, the demand for substances by returning veterans led to the internationalization of drug markets, fostering, for example, the heroin trade from Southeast Asia (Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) (Saldaña, 2024). The Nixon administration and the US “War on Drugs” The dependency became so severe that it was considered a public health emergency in the United States. On June 18, 1971, Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” at an international level, labeling drug trafficking as “public enemy number one” (Plant & Singer, 2022). Nixon’s strategy combined international intervention with increased spending on treatment and stricter measures against drug trafficking and consumption (Encyclopedia.com, n.d.), along with the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973. Although the War on Drugs was officially declared in 1971, it had a precedent in 1969 with the failed Operation Intercept, whose goal was to combat marijuana trafficking across the U.S.–Mexico border (M. Brecher, 1972). As part of his international strategy, Nixon launched several operations such as Operation Condor with Mexico (1975 and 1978), Operation Stopgap in Florida (1977), and Operation Fulminante, carried out by Colombian President Julio César Turbay in 1979. Most of these efforts were aimed at combating marijuana trafficking. The results were mixed, but the consequences were significant, as drug traffickers resisted and adapted — giving rise to a more active and violent generation and marking the consolidation of modern drug trafficking. The Consolidation of Modern Drug Trafficking: Colombia and Reagan Era. During the 1980s and 1990s, drug trafficking evolved into a highly organized industry. Figures such as Félix Gallardo [1], Amado Carrillo Fuentes [2], Pablo Escobar [3], Carlos Lehder [4], Griselda Blanco [5], Rafael Caro Quintero [6], and later Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera [7], among others (Wikipedia, 2025), symbolized the growing power of the cartels in Colombia and Mexico. During this period, criminal organizations consolidated their operations, and the profits from drug trafficking fueled violence and corruption. Moreover, the struggle for power — not only in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, or the United States but also in other regions of Latin America — and the competition for markets led to greater sophistication, as well as the construction of infrastructure and distribution networks. Pablo Escobar’s famous phrase, “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”), reflects the immense power and influence that drug traffickers wield, even over governments and authorities. Colombia, through the Cali and Medellín cartels, dominated the production and export of cocaine via a triangulation network that connected through Mexico or the Caribbean, with the final destination being the United States, where the Reagan administration (1981–1989) intensified the War on Drugs, focusing on criminal repression rather than public health. The Reagan’s War on Drugs was characterized for setting aggressive policies and legislative changes in the 1980s which increased the law enforcement and the punishment, as a consequence the prison penalties for drug crimes skyrocketed from 50,000 in 1980 to more than 400,000 by 1997 (HISTORY.com Editors 2017) Mexican cartels consolidation and Mexico’s transition to a consumer nation Around the same time, on the international arena, following the fragmentation of the Guadalajara Cartel in the 1980s, the emergence of new Mexican cartels — the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Tijuana Cartel, and Juárez Cartel — combined with the downfall of Colombia’s Cali and Medellín cartels in the mid-1990s, catapulted Mexican cartels into prominence. They seized control of trafficking routes and diversified their operations, thus consolidating their role in the global drug market. Later, the September 11, 2001, attacks altered U.S. security policy, affecting border transit, increasing security measures, and tightening inspections along the southern border with Mexico (Rudolph, 2023) — one of the main drug distribution routes into the United States. Although some studies suggest that U.S. security policies at land ports of entry had only marginal pre- and post-9/11 effects (Ramírez Partida, 2014), in reality, these measures significantly impacted Mexico more than the US. Mexico transitioned from being primarily a producer, distributor, and transit country for drugs to also becoming a consumer nation. In 2002, more than 260,000 people were reported to use cocaine, whereas today the number exceeds 1.7 million addicts, according to data from the federal Secretariat of Public Security (Alzaga, 2010). Likewise, the ENCODAT 2016–2017 survey shows that the percentage of Mexican adolescents who had consumed some type of drug increased from 1.6% in 2001 to 6.4% in 2016 (REDIM, 2025). By disrupting one of the main drug distribution routes to the United States, the situation led to drugs being redistributed and sold within Mexican territory. This, combined with the country’s social and economic conditions, facilitated the recruitment of young people by organized crime groups (Becerra-Acosta, 2010) for the domestic distribution of drugs. Mexico and the Contemporary War on Drug Trafficking The escalation of violence caused by the power struggle among Mexican cartels became so critical that President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) declared an open war against organized crime on December 10, 2006 (Herrera Beltrán, 2006). His strategy involved deploying the armed forces throughout Mexican territory, as well as obtaining financial aid, training, and intelligence through the Mérida Initiative from the United States to support the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America (Embassy of the United States in Mexico, 2011). His successor, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), shifted the focus toward prevention and civil protection, although he continued the militarization process and the transformation of police institutions (BBC News, 2012). The strategies of Calderón and Peña Nieto — often grouped together — while questioned and criticized (Morales Oyarvide, 2011), achieved significant arrests, including figures such as “La Barbie,” “La Tuta,” “El Menchito,” “El Chapo,” “El Marro,” and “El Ratón.” They also eliminated key figures like Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, and Nazario Moreno González. Later, during the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), the strategy shifted once again toward a stance of “hugs, not bullets,” showing clear signs of passivity that allowed cartel expansion (Fernández-Montesino, 2025). His successor, Claudia Sheinbaum (2024–2030), on the other hand, has navigated both internal and external pressures (particularly from the United States), seeking to balance intelligence, coordination, and attention to structural causes (Pardo, 2024), although continued militarization suggests a hybrid strategy remains in place. Fentanyl and synthetic drugs: The future of drug trafficking The president of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Jallal Toufiq, said that “the illicit drug industry represents a major global public health threat with potentially disastrous consequences for humankind.” In addition, the 2024 INCB Annual Report found that illicit synthetic drugs are spreading and consumption is increasing, moreover, these could overtake some plant-based drugs in the future. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025) The press release before mentioned also points out that Africa, Middle East, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific drug markets are increasing, while production in Central America, Peru, Colombia and the Caribbean keeps on developing. On the other hand, the opioid crisis (fentanyl) remains a serious problem for North America and the cocaine keeps affecting Europe with a spillover Africa. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025). The fentanyl crisis in North America is well documented. Data show an increase of 540% in overdose deaths between 2013 and 2016 (Katz 2017), with 20,100 deaths in the USA, while by 2023, the number increase to 72,776 deaths (USA Facts 2025). On the other hand, Canada has reported 53,821 deaths between January 2016 and March 2025 (Government of Canada 2025), while Mexico reported only 114 deaths from 2013 to 2023 (Observatorio Mexicano de Salud Mental y Adicciones 2024). These figures reveal not only the unequal regional impact of the synthetic opioid crisis but also the ongoing adaptation of organized crime networks that sustain and expand these markets. Evolution and Diversification of Organized Crime The phenomenon of adaptation, evolution, and diversification of new illicit markets is not an isolated issue. Experts such as Farah & Zeballos (2025) describe this in their framework Waves of Transnational Crime (COT). The first wave is represented by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, pioneers in moving tons of cocaine to the U.S. market through Caribbean routes. The second wave is represented by the Cali Cartel, which perfected the model and expanded trafficking routes through Central America and Mexico — still focusing on one product (cocaine) for one main market (the United States). The third wave is characterized by the criminalization of criminal structures, the use of armed groups (such as the FARC in Colombia), and the use of illicit production and trafficking as instruments of state policy, with clear effects on public policy functioning. At this stage, there is product diversification, with the main market remaining the U.S., but expansion reaching Europe (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Finally, the fourth wave — the current stage — is defined by total diversification, a shift toward synthetic drugs, and global expansion, involving extra-regional groups (Italian, Turkish, Albanian, and Japanese mafias), where many operations function “under government protection.” This fourth wave offers clear examples of collusion between criminal and political spheres, which is not new. However, the arrest of Genaro García Luna (Secretary of Public Security under Calderón), the links between high-profile Mexican politicians and money laundering or fuel trafficking (Unidad de Investigación Aplicada de MCCI, 2025), and even Trump’s statements claiming that “Mexico is largely governed by cartels” (DW, 2025) reveal a reality in which drug trafficking and criminal organizations are no longer merely producers and distributors of illicit substances. Today, they possess the power and capacity to establish parallel governance systems, exercise territorial control, infiltrate institutions and local economies, and even replace core state functions (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Future Perspectives and Challenges Currently, drug trafficking and organized crime represent structural threats. It is well known and widely studied what drug trafficking means for public security and health, but it has now also become a threat to politics, democracy, and the rule of law. With divided opinions, many analysts argue that the war on drugs has failed — in addition to being costly and, in many cases, counterproductive (Thomson, 2016). Punitive strategies have generated more violence without truly addressing the social causes behind the phenomenon (Morales Oyarvide, 2011). In this context, a paradigm shift is necessary: drug trafficking should not be approached solely as a security issue, but also as a public health and social development problem. Drug use has been a historical constant, and its total eradication is unrealistic. The key lies in harm-reduction policies, international cooperation, and inclusive economic development. Moreover, organized crime demonstrates adaptive resilience, making its eradication difficult — especially given that its operational capacities are so diversified, it maintains alliances with groups worldwide, and globalization and new technologies continually help it reinvent itself. Furthermore, even political and economic tensions among the United States, Mexico, Canada, and China are now intertwined with the trade of synthetic drugs — particularly fentanyl —, revealing the geopolitical magnitude of the problem (Pierson, 2024). Conclusion In summary, drug trafficking has ceased to be a marginal activity and has become a transnational structure capable of influencing politics, the economy, and society. Its persistence can be explained not only by the profitability of the business but also by social inequality, institutional corruption, and sustained global demand. History demonstrates that repression has not eradicated the problem but rather transformed it. Today, it is essential to rethink drug policies from a comprehensive approach that integrates security, public health, education, and international cooperation. Only through a multidimensional strategy will it be possible to contain a phenomenon that — more than an illicit economy — constitutes a global form of parallel governance that challenges the very foundations of the modern state. Notes[1] Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, also known as “El Jefe de Jefes” (“The Boss of Bosses”), “El Padrino” (“The Godfather”), or “The Drug Czar”, was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [2] Amado Carrillo Fuentes, known as “El Señor de los Cielos” (“The Lord of the Skies”), was the former leader of the Juárez Cartel. [3] Pablo Escobar was the founder and former leader of the Medellín Cartel. [4] Carlos Lehder was the co-founder of the Medellín Cartel. [5] Griselda Blanco, known as “The Black Widow,” “The Cocaine Queen,” or “La Patrona” (“The Boss”), was a founder of the Medellín Cartel. [6] Rafael Caro Quintero, known as “El Narco de Narcos” (“The Drug Lord of Drug Lords”), was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [7] Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as “El Chapo,” was the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. ReferencesAlzaga, Ignacio. 2010. Creció mercado de droga por blindaje en frontera. 23 de Enero. https://web.archive.org/web/20100328122522/http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8707705.BBC News. 2012. México: el plan de Peña Nieto contra el narcotráfico. 18 de Diciembre. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2012/12/121218_mexico_pena_nieto_estrategia_seguridad_narcotrafico_jg.Becerra-Acosta, Juan P. 2010. Los ninis jodidos y el narco tentador…. 16 de Agosto. https://web.archive.org/web/20100819043827/http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8816494.Bussmann, Rainer W., y Sharon Douglas. 2006. «Traditional medicinal plant use in Northern Peru: tracking two thousand years of healing culture.» Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine 47. doi:https://doi.org/10.1186/1746-4269-2-47.Carod Artal, Francisco Javier. 2011. «Alucinógenos en las culturas precolombinas mesoamericanas.» Neurología 30 (1): 42-49. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nrl.2011.07.003.Courtwright, David. 2001. «Forces of Habit. Drugs and the Making of the Modern World.» Editado por Cambridge. (Harvard University Press).DW. 2025. Trump dice que México está "gobernado por los carteles". 19 de Febrero. https://www.dw.com/es/trump-dice-que-m%C3%A9xico-est%C3%A1-gobernado-por-los-carteles/a-71666187.Embajada de los Estados Unidos en México. 2011. Iniciativa Mérida. 22 de Junio. http://spanish.mexico.usembassy.gov/es/temas-bilaterales/mexico-y-eu-de-un-vistazo/iniciativa-merida.html.Encyclopedia.com. s.f. President Nixon Declares "War" on Drugs. https://www.encyclopedia.com/science/medical-magazines/president-nixon-declares-war-drugs?utm_source=chatgpt.com.Farah, Douglas, y Pablo Zeballos. 2025. ¿Por qué el crimen organizado es cada vez más grave en América Latina? 19 de Septiembre. https://latinoamerica21.com/es/por-que-el-crimen-organizado-es-cada-vez-mas-grave-en-america-latina/.Fernández-Montesino, Federico Aznar. 2025. México y la guerra contra el narcotráfico. 20 de Mayo. https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2564257/Mexico_2025_dieeea36.pdf/1d38d679-f529-7d1e-130c-71a71cf0447c?t=1747593702946.Government of Canada. 2025. Opioid- and Stimulant-related Harms in Canada. 23 de September. Último acceso: 5 de November de 2025. https://health-infobase.canada.ca/substance-related-harms/opioids-stimulants/.Haro Luna, Mara Ximena. 2023. Los hongos en la cultura wixárika. https://arqueologiamexicana.mx/mexico-antiguo/los-hongos-en-la-cultura-wixarika.Herrera Beltrán, Claudia. 2006. El gobierno se declara en guerra contra el hampa; inicia acciones en Michoacán. 12 de Diciembre. https://www.jornada.com.mx/2006/12/12/index.php?section=politica&article=014n1pol.HISTORY.com Editors. 2017. Just Say No. 31 de May. Último acceso: 5 de November de 2025. https://www.history.com/articles/just-say-no.International Narcotics Control Board. 2025. Press release: The deadly proliferation of synthetic drugs is a major threat to public health and is reshaping illicit drug markets, says the International Narcotics Control Board. 4 de March. Último acceso: 5 de November de 2025. https://www.incb.org/incb/en/news/press-releases/2025/the-deadly-proliferation-of-synthetic-drugs-is-a-major-threat-to-public-health-and-is-reshaping-illicit-drugs-markets--says-the-international-narcotics-control-board.html#:~:text=In%20its%202024%20Annu.Interpol. s.f. Tráfico de drogas. https://www.interpol.int/es/Delitos/Trafico-de-drogas.Katz, Josh. 2017. The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in Three Years. 2 de September. Último acceso: 5 de November de 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/02/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur.Kiss, Teresa. 2025. Movimiento hippie. 18 de Octubre. https://concepto.de/movimiento-hippie/.López-Muñoz, Francisco, y Cecilio Álamo González. 2020. Cómo la heroína, la cocaína y otras drogas comenzaron siendo medicamentos saludables. 25 de June. https://theconversation.com/como-la-heroina-la-cocaina-y-otras-drogas-comenzaron-siendo-medicamentos-saludables-140222.Luna Galván, Mauricio, Hai Thanh Luong, y Elisa Astolfi. 2021. «El narcotráfico como crimen organizado: comprendiendo el fenómeno desde la perspectiva trasnacional y multidimensional.» Revista De Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad 199-214. doi:https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.5412.Luna-Fabritius, Adriana. 2015. «Modernidad y drogas desde una perspectiva histórica.» Revista mexicana de ciencias políticas y sociales 60 (225). https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0185-19182015000300021.M. Brecher, Edward. 1972. Chapter 59. The 1969 marijuana shortage and "Operation Intercept". https://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/library/studies/cu/CU59.html.Marco, Jorge. 2019. Cocaína, opio y morfina: cómo se usaron las drogas en las grandes guerras del siglo XX. 7 de Diciembre. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-50687669.Morales Oyarvide, César. 2011. El fracaso de una estrategia: una crítica a la guerra contra el narcotráfico en México, sus justificaciones y efectos. Enero-Febrero. https://nuso.org/articulo/el-fracaso-de-una-estrategia-una-critica-a-la-guerra-contra-el-narcotrafico-en-mexico-sus-justificaciones-y-efectos/.Observatorio Mexicano de Salud Mental y Adicciones. 2024. Informe de la demanda y oferta de fentanilo en México: generalidades y situación actual. Abril. Último acceso: 2025 de November de 2025. https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/910633/Informe_Fentanilo_abril_2024.pdf.Pardo, Daniel. 2024. Cómo es el plan de seguridad que Claudia Sheinbaum anunció en plena crisis de violencia en México. 8 de Octubre. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c1wn59xe91wo.Peréz González, Jordi. 2024. Del opio al cannabis. Drogas en Grecia y Roma, una peligrosa adicción de plebeyos y emperadores. 19 de Enero. https://historia.nationalgeographic.com.es/a/drogas-grecia-roma-peligrosa-adiccion-plebeyos-emperadores_14533.Pierson, David. 2024. El fentanilo tiene otro auge, ahora como arma diplomática de Donald Trump contra China. 26 de Noviembre. https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/11/26/espanol/mundo/fentanilo-china-trump.html.Plant, Michael, y Peter Singer. 2022. Why drugs should be not only decriminalised, but fully legalised. August. https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2022/08/drugs-should-be-decriminalised-legalised.Ramírez Partida, Héctor R. 2014. «Post-9/11 U.S. Homeland Security Policy Changes and Challenges: A Policy Impact Assessment of the Mexican Front.» Norteamérica 9 (1). https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-35502014000100002.Real Academia Española. 2025. narcotráfico. https://www.rae.es/diccionario-estudiante/narcotr%C3%A1fico.REDIM. 2025. 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Los expertos opinan: la guerra contra las drogas ha sido un fracaso. ¿Es hora de legalizarlas? 7 de Diciembre. https://es.weforum.org/stories/2016/12/los-expertos-opinan-la-guerra-contra-las-drogas-ha-sido-un-fracaso-es-hora-de-la-legalizacion/.Unidad de Investigación Aplicada de MCCI. 2025. Huachicol Fiscal. https://contralacorrupcion.mx/anuario-de-la-corrupcion-2025-gobierno-de-sheinbaum/huachicol-fiscal-corrupcion-mexico/.USA Facts. 2025. Are fentanyl overdose deaths rising in the US? 25 de October. Último acceso: 5 de November de 2025. https://usafacts.org/articles/are-fentanyl-overdose-deaths-rising-in-the-us/.Wikipedia. 2025.

Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2023, sparked by a power struggle between the two parties. The war has displaced more than 14 million people. Over half the population of about 50 million is facing acute levels of hunger. Several mediation initiatives have been launched since the start of the war, with limited success. The African Union has also been unable to get the main warring parties to agree to a permanent ceasefire. The four countries leading the main peace mediation effort (known as the Quad) are the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They issued a joint statement in September 2025, calling for a ceasefire in Sudan and offering a roadmap to end the internal conflict. I’ve been researching Sudan for over a decade, and in my view, these countries’ capacity to deliver a final political settlement for Sudan is severely constrained. The prospects for peace rest on the resolution of three factors: • the sharp differences between the Sudanese army and the Quad over who should participate in post-war politics• a widening rift between the main protagonists in the war on the terms of ending it• internal divisions within the Quad – particularly between Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia – over how to balance support for the army, curb Islamist influence and manage competing regional interests. The Quad’s plan called for an immediate ceasefire, a three-month humanitarian truce and an inclusive political process to resolve disputes within nine months. The statement was initially welcomed by the Rapid Support Forces and Sudan’s army leaders. However, follow-up meetings between the Quad and representatives of the warring parties have failed to translate any of these proposals into action. Meanwhile, the paramilitary troops and their allies captured the city of El-Fasher in North Darfur after a bloody 500-day siege. This was the army’s last major stronghold in Darfur. Darfur encompasses nearly 20% of Sudan’s territory. It borders Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. The capture has fuelled concerns of a de facto partition of the country in the western region. Against this backdrop, the Quad’s latest initiative seems unlikely to achieve more than a fragile ceasefire. The obstacles Efforts to broker peace in Sudan are hindered by three key challenges. 1. Diverging agendas between the Quad and the Sudanese army Despite broad similarities between the Quad’s roadmap and a proposal the army submitted in March 2025 to the United Nations, key differences remain. The core disagreement lies in the design of the political process to follow the ceasefire. The Quad insists that Islamist factions should be excluded from consultations over fears that these factions have close ties to terrorist groups and Iran. The army’s proposal, by contrast, opposes the exclusion of any party. The military leadership has alliances with elements of the former Islamic Movement. Its fighters still help stabilise the army’s frontlines. 2. A widening gap between the army and Rapid Support Forces on the terms of ending the war The army’s roadmap implicitly allows the paramilitary troops to remain in parts of Darfur for up to nine months, provided that local authorities consent. However, it also requires the withdrawal of the group from El-Fasher and North Kordofan. The Rapid Support Forces’ behaviour on the ground reveals a very different mindset. Rather than preparing to withdraw, the group has expanded militarily in North Kordofan and intensified its drone attacks on Khartoum and other regions. At its core, the dispute reflects conflicting end goals. The paramilitary group seeks to enter negotiations as an equal to the army. It wants a comprehensive restructuring of the armed forces. The army insists that it should be the only unit that supervises any reform of Sudan’s military institutions – the very issue that triggered the outbreak of war in 2023. 3. Internal divisions within the Quad The Quad’s own cohesion has been undermined by internal rifts that have derailed several meetings. The most visible divide lies between Egypt and the UAE. Cairo leans towards the army, seeing it as the guarantor of Sudan’s state institutions against collapse. Abu Dhabi prioritises dismantling the influence of Islamist leaders as the main precondition for peace. Saudi Arabia is wary of Emirati involvement, especially since the Sudanese army has repeatedly rejected UAE mediation and the Rapid Support Forces has attacked Egyptian policy towards Sudan. Washington has tried to manage these tensions by limiting direct mediation roles for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE while keeping them within the broader negotiation framework. These nations have significant leverage over the warring factions. How Sudan got here Sudan’s fragile transition began after the ousting of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019. An uneasy power-sharing arrangement between the army and civilian leaders collapsed in 2021 when army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, jointly seized control in a coup. Their alliance fractured two years later and sparked the 2023 civil war. Despite international pressure, neither side has given in or gained a decisive advantage since. The conflict has been devastating for Sudan’s population of 50 million. Death toll reports since the start of the war have varied between 20,000 and 150,000 people. The country is facing the world’s worst displacement crisis, and health and education systems have collapsed. Further, more than 12 million girls and women, and an increasing number of men, are at risk of sexual violence. Is breakthrough still possible? Despite existing divisions, shifting dynamics on the ground could still produce a limited breakthrough. The worst scenario for the military would be the paramilitary group’s renewed advance into territories it had been pushed out of. That prospect might push army leaders to accept a preliminary ceasefire. This would allow the army to regroup and consolidate existing positions without conceding ground politically. For the Rapid Support Forces, the calculation is different. After spending more than 18 months battling to capture El-Fasher, the group recognises that advancing further towards the capital would come at a high human and political cost. A temporary truce, therefore, could allow it to entrench its governance structures in Darfur and strengthen its military presence there. In this sense, a short-term ceasefire remains the most practical outcome for both sides. Washington’s eagerness to secure conflict-ending deals is likely to push the Quad towards this scenario. But a final political settlement in Sudan remains distant. For now, the most any diplomatic initiative can achieve is to pause the fighting, not to end the war, as it remains difficult to bridge the political gaps between Sudanese powers. 

Abstract: The Sahel is the most attractive strip of Africa for terrorist groups to establish themselves in. As a result of the fragility of the area and the limited resources to deal with armed gangs, more and more terrorist groups are emerging and coexisting in the area. This paper aims to briefly analyse the multiplicity of terrorist groups and the relationship between them, focusing essentially on one question: is the rise of Salafi attacks that make the Sahel the global epicentre of terrorism caused by all terrorist groups acting together to achieve their aims, or is each acting independently? Keywords:Sahel - Terrorism - Jihadism - Terrorist groups - Cooperation - Competition. The Sahel: Africa’s Perfect Stage for Terrorists?  The Sahel is defined as the large strip that runs from west to east across Africa, between the Sahara Desert and the tropical zone of Sub-Saharan Africa1; in fact, Sahel derives from an Arabic word meaning ‘shore’, thus forming the southern shore of the great Sahara Desert. Although this area covers a dozen countries, due to the existence of a greater number of similarities between certain states in the area, reference is usually made to five specific countries when talking about the Sahel, specifically those that formed the G5 Sahel group between February 2014 and November 2023, with the aim of trying to find a joint and concerted solution to the instability in the area.  Indeed, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania share similarities given their historical and political past, to a greater extent than the rest of the Sahelian countries, and all of them are subject to strong instability. Within this general instability, it should be noted that in the case of the first three countries mentioned above, they share the so-called ‘triple border’, an area where 80% of the attacks recorded in the Sahel are concentrated2.  The countries have the common legacy of the mostly French colonisation process, sometimes, and more in the framework of current narratives, it is held responsible for having generated great instability in their political institutions and in the economy of the states3. And, faced with the challenge of having to develop democratic and stable political regimes, the reality is that these have mostly failed, especially in the countries that make up this triple frontier, which have been subject to multiple coups between 2020 and 2023, generating a powerful feeling of instability, especially towards the most vulnerable population4 who always suffer the consequences of political and social instability.  In addition, they are very poor countries; in the Human Development Index these countries are among the 10 poorest of those evaluated worldwide5, and to which must be added the negative effects of climate change, which has a direct impact on food insecurity, health problems and the quality of life of civilians6, and have a life expectancy of around 53 and 65 years.7 As these are countries with limited security along with an overflowing population growth, with the population doubling every twenty years, since 65% are under 25 years old sytems and bodies8 - since they are fed by the taxes collected - they are not very effective and security can only be provided in some parts of these countries, which leads to a growing feeling of distrust and frustration on the part of the population towards them and towards the government, so that the ‘social contract’, the obligation to respect the rules and laws of a state in exchange for receiving a series of services - the basic and primordial one being security - is not fulfilled in large parts of the Sahel. Faced with this situation, jihadist groups sometimes present themselves as an alternative capable of offering certain services to cover these needs neglected by governments9. In such complex and hopeless conditions, where the feeling of abandonment and the instinct for survival grow, being part of a terrorist group - or an organised crime group - is often seen by many young people as almost the only work alternative, often the only viable choice.10 .. or emigration. While the term ‘jihad’ generates debate and there is no clear consensus on its meaning and personal implication, in the literal sense it means “struggle” and for radicals it is used as ‘holy war’, which justifies terrorist attacks11, largely obviating the meaning of ‘inner struggle’ that any believer must sustain in the face of life's temptations in order to be a good believer. But, in the common wisdom, jihad comes to be understood as holy war. And with the intention of imposing a comprehensive vision of Islam, jihadists try to recruit and indoctrinate young Africans, offering them a sense of protection from other armed groups - in short, a sense of security - as well as a sense of identity and hope12, filling the vacuum that would otherwise be filled by a developed nation-state. Thus, jihadism is growing rampantly in the Sahel, where conditions are favourable for its development. Thus, in 2024, most of the global deaths related to terrorism occurred in the Sahel, an area where this figure has increased tenfold since 2015.13 Complexity of terrorist groups in the Sahel. In this scenario, which is very favourable to the emergence and growth of terrorist groups, there are multiple groups that continue to multiply their attacks qualitatively and quantitatively throughout the region, although it is feasible to point to the existence of ‘two large conglomerates of terrorist groups of jihadist aetiology’14. The two groups that dominate the geopolitical landscape in the Sahel are, on the one hand, ‘Jama'at Nusrat al islam wa ak Muslimeen’ (JNIM), an Al Qaeda affiliate - the Arabic transliteration of its initials would correspond to ‘Support Group for Islam and Muslims’ - and, on the other hand, the ‘Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’ (EIGS or ISIS), which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS)15. To these two branches belong various groups such as Ansar Eddine, which acts under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda, as well as Macina or Al-Mourabitoun. In fact, JNIM is composed of an alliance between four terrorist groups that follow Al-Qaeda's line. Among them, three of those mentioned above are part of these Sahara Brigades that are grouped under the name of JNIM16, and represented by the slogan: ‘One banner, one group, one emir’, which makes clear the idea of unity among them. And under the aegis of ISIS or EIGS (Islamic State), the largest active terrorist group is Boko Haram, although other active groups, such as Junud al-Khilafa, also follow the same line. What we understand by the oath of allegiance or loyalty comes from the practice of bay'ah and is one of the traditional procedures required to formalise terrorists' alliances with the respective organisations.17. This act of adherence to a group would be beneficial for both the one that lends allegiance and the one that receives it, being a way of projecting itself globally and going further in its expansion in the search for the constitution of a caliphate, while at the same time giving more power and a new status to the group that pledges allegiance. This procedure, which has been playing an increasingly significant role for the two Jihadist branches mentioned above, changed the terrorist landscape, given that until then they were only sympathetic to al-Qaeda, but several groups began to opt to join the Islamic State, a fact that reinforces the concept of the two dominant branches of global Jihadism. Al Qaeda was the first reference group to establish the Islamist terrorist phenomenon in the Sahel. In 2007, the first terrorist organisation in the geographical area of the Sahel was renamed Al Qaeda because of the power that this global denomination reflected18. Later, the Islamic State created the ‘Agency of Distinct Provinces’ in 2014, which allowed the group to plan an African strategy19. And this shift towards the Sahel coincides with the year of the fall of Mosul in Iraq, a city in which the Islamic State had proclaimed its caliphate three years earlier and which in 2014 had been liberated by an international coalition from Jihadist hegemony, drastically reducing the presence of members of the terrorist group. And the growth of these groups in this strip of Africa, in the Sahel, highlights both the vulnerabilities that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are trying to exploit to achieve their objectives and the fact that the loss of control of a territory does not mean the end of the Jihadist struggle.20, in search of alternative spaces.  Coexistence of Terrorist Groups in the Sahel: Allies for a Common Cause?  Thus, several terrorist groups coexist in the Sahel, all sharing the same Salafist ideology and the common goal of returning to the original Islamic community by establishing a caliphate21. One example is the 2018 campaign to isolate Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, which was coordinated by both major groups to gain control of that territory—demonstrating that, under certain circumstances, the two major groups can cooperate to achieve jihadist objectives22.  Analyzing the actions and attacks carried out by each group shows that each faction has more or less presence in specific areas, and in several of them, different Salafi groups coexist. In fact, in the so-called “tri-border area”—the region most affected by these attacks—the two main jihadist branches operate side by side23. However, according to findings by the International Observatory for the Study of Terrorism in February 2025, JNIM (an Al-Qaeda affiliate) was the sole perpetrator of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and the main actor behind those in Mali. In contrast, in Niger, it is the Islamic State that has caused the highest number of casualties24. And although JNIM has been active in the Sahel longer than ISGS, which is reflected in the wide area they operate in, ISGS is responsible for more victims due to the intensity of its attacks. Because these groups often overlap in the same localities and carry out separate and uncoordinated operations, it is clear that they mostly act independently, leaving behind evidence of distinct attacks. Even though it may seem logical to assume they would act jointly toward their shared goal, this is not usually the case.  The motivation for terrorist groups to form alliances can depend on international political-military pressure and the policies of local regimes.25 Additionally, personal relationships between leaders and members of these terrorist groups can significantly influence the connections between factions. These relationships, often complex, can be explained by the fact that many of the terrorist groups currently active in the Sahel were born out of internal tensions within larger factions, including differing views on how jihad should be carried out.26 Such tensions sometimes result in splinter groups—some maintaining ties, while others become rivals. One example is the close relationship between Amadou Koufa, founder of Macina (now part of JNIM), and Iyad ag Ghali, leader of Ansar Dine and head of JNIM. Similarly, in August 2018, the UN Group of Experts identified Abdallah Ag Albakaye, a Tuareg emir of JNIM, as coordinating actions between JNIM and ISGS in the Gao region of Mali.27  These coordinated actions were possible for a time when both Salafi groups carried out attacks together without competing or issuing dual claims of responsibility. These attacks were officially announced by only one of the groups, although later reports revealed that fighters from both branches were involved—for instance, the May 2019 ambush in Niger in which around 30 Nigerien soldiers were killed. Regarding this attack, a JNIM commander confirmed that the fighters were split between the two groups28.  Such fluid personal relationships gave rise to the so-called “Sahelian exception,” which referred to the unusually cordial relations between rival leaders and the absence of conflict between the two factions. But this is not always the case.  Competition for jihadist dominance in the Sahel?  While Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have come to show connections in certain attacks, the style and tone of each group differs. The controversies and disputes that can be observed between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are essentially two-fold: religious and political.  A phenomenon that was already occurring in previous years in parts of the Middle East, but is becoming increasingly common in the Sahel, is precisely this fragmentation and splintering of terrorist groups, which leads to clashes and disputes. In February 2018, JNIM claimed responsibility for an explosive attack in Mali, which EIGS claimed a year later; identical claims of attacks in the same territories are coming to light between 2019 and 202029. But what is significant is what happened in Mali in 2020, when a clash between terrorist groups took place due to the crossing of Al Qaeda-dominated territory by terrorists under the aegis of the Islamic State, a clash that was made official in a letter from the ‘number two’ of the EIGS affiliate to the JNIM30.  Despite this, and despite this and other clashes, it was not until May 2020 that both JNIM and EIGS openly acknowledged the armed disputes between them, and did so in an ‘official’ manner, in the weekly Al Naba newsletter31, a publication of the ISIS jihadist gang, which specifically mentions clashes in the area of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali known as the triple frontier.  Later in 2022, the EIGS celebrated the addition of 11 new Al Qaeda members, news announced by the EIGS in a tone of supremacy and describing Al Qaeda fighters as sinners and infidels to God.32. And, on the part of the other groups, similar patterns are followed.  Therefore, it is feasible to point out that, on the one hand, tensions are generated due to clashes in the same territory and the desire to dominate it, and that despite having the same objective of imposing the caliphate, the motivation to control each region by a particular group is important, so much so as to fight against ‘apparent partners’, which reflects a clash over territorial ambitions.  On the other hand, there is also a certain religious and ideological fragmentation, a certain vision of Islam, which is what each group tries to impose, and this is of utmost importance, given that all this is framed in a ‘holy war’, so that the religious approach is a very important dimension in explaining these clashes. Both jihadist branches are based on the theory of takfirism, a doctrine that the Islamic State accuses al-Qaeda of not applying properly and vice versa33. As a result, both terrorist groups have blamed each other for deviating from the path of jihad; indeed, earlier this year the ISIS released a propaganda video mentioning JNIM as ‘impure’ for not applying Shariah34.  For this reason, and despite this common goal of creating an Islamic caliphate, since 2020 attacks between the two groups have not ceased and they have actively worked to increase the degree of territorial control exercised by each group, as a way of gaining supremacy in the region. Thus, in April 2020, JNIM had to withdraw from part of northern Burkina Faso due to pressure from the EIGS35, which is also gradually, and to a greater extent, taking root in the southern part of Niger, forcing JNIM to leave the area36.  Since then, there has been constant fighting between the groups in several regions of the Sahel, with the aim of consolidating and imposing themselves as the dominant reference point for jihad37… and those who suffer the results of this fighting end up being the civilians in these areas where government action is almost non-existent. Conclusion  The Sahel has become the epicentre of Islamic terrorism in which multiple terrorist groups from the two main branches coexist, as both JNIM and EIGS have been able to see the potential that this vast geographical area offers them due to the weakness of the region's states, especially in terms of security, to oppose these terrorist groups. And it is this vacuum that terrorist groups - and also organised crime groups - are trying to fill, presenting themselves as almost the only alternative life - apart from emigration - for many young people, which is why these groups are growing in power and degree of territorial control. While the common goal of all jihadist groups is to establish a caliphate, and despite the existence of a period of peaceful coexistence between the two main branches of jihadist terrorism, differences over both religious issues and simple power struggles are yet another source of conflict in this tortured part of Africa and the world. And, in addition to the chaos and suffering generated in the region, being the epicentre of global jihadism in a global world does not only have a regional impact. It has, and increasingly so, a global impact. References 1 MONTER, Jara “El mapa político del Sahel”, El Orden Mundial, 7 de febrero de 2025. https://elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/mapa-politico-sahel/  2 DEPARTAMENTO DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, “Terrorismo en el Sahel Occidental”, 16 de julio de 2021. https://www.dsn.gob.es/en/node/15446  3 ALLIANCE SAHEL, “Décryptage des causes et déterminants de la crise au Sahel: quels enjeux pour les partenaires au développement”, 12 de diciembre de 2023. https://www.alliance-sahel.org/seminaire-decryptage-causes-determinants-crise-sahel/#:~:text=La%20région%20du%20Sahel%20fait,augmentent%20la%20vulnérabilité%20des%20populations  4 FONDS MONÉTAIRE INTERNATIONAL, “La compléxité des défis au Sahel”, septiembre de 2024. https://www.imf.org/fr/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/09/the-sahels-intertwined-challenges-yabi   5 Datos de country economy (Human Development Index), 2024. https://countryeconomy.com/hdi/niger  6SÁNCHEZ HERRÁEZ Pedro, “Sahel: ¡tormenta perfecta de amplitud e intensidad creciente!!, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2021. https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2077188/Capítulo+8+Sahel+tormenta+perfecta+de+amplitud+e+intensidad+creciente.pdf/d4bc511b-75ef-6c12-aaeb-f9b51e72a765?t=1731579352666  7 SOLER David, “La esperanza de vida en África”, África Mundi, 26 de marzo de 2022. https://www.africamundi.es/p/la-esperanza-de-vida-en-africa  8 IFAD, “Afrontar los retos del desarrollo sostenible en el Sahel”. https://www.ifad.org/es/africa-occidental-y-central/sahel  9 BALLESTEROS MARTÍN Miguel Ángel, “Análisis geopolítico del Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, octubre de 2015. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5270491  10 SÁNCHES HERRÁEZ Pedro, “El Sahel: ¿también epicentro de la reconfiguración global?, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 18 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/el_sahel_tambien_epicentro_de_la_reconfiguracion_global  11 SANJUÁN MARTÍNEZ Casimiro, “El terrorismo yihadista. El yihadismo en el Sahel amenaza a Europa”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de noviembre de 2020. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2020/DIEEEO140_2020CASSAN_yihadSahel.pdf   12 DEPARTAMENTO DE SEGURIDAD NACIONAL, “El terrorismo en el Sahel”, 12 de mayo de 2021. https://www.dsn.gob.es/en/node/14943  13 OBSERVATORIO INTERNACIONAL DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE TERRORISMO, “Anuario del terrorismo yihadista 2024”. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/ES-ANUARIO-OIET-2024.pdf  14 MARTÍN SERRANO Lucas, “Daesh vs Al Qaeda. La lucha por la supremacía a las puertas de Europa”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 11 de julio de 2016. D https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5998290  15 FUENTE COBO Ignacio, “Radiografía de la amenaza yihadista en el Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel   16 ECSAHARAUI, “Estos son los grupos terroristas que operan en el Sahel”, 22 de septiembre de 2024. https://ecsaharaui.com/09/2024/estos-son-los-grupos-terroristas-que-operan-en-el-sahel/  17 IGUALADA Carlos y YAGÚE Javier, “El uso de la bay’ah por los principales grupos salafí-yihadistas”, OIET, 13 de octubre de 2021. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/actividades/el-uso-de-la-bayah-por-los-principales-grupos-salafi-yihadistas/  18 HERRERO Rubén y MACHÍN Nieva, “El eje Magreb-Sahel: La amenaza del terrorismo”, Revista UNISCI, octubre de 2015. https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-74789/UNISCIDP39-8RUBEN-NIEVA.pdf  19 ORIENTXXI, “Estado Islámico, diez años de expansión en el continente africano”, 24 de marzo de 2023. https://orientxxi.info/magazine/estado-islamico-diez-anos-de-expansion-en-el-continente-africano,6325   20 BBC NEWS MUNDO, “Caída de Mosul: cómo Estado Islámico se está transformando ante la pérdida de su territorio”, 10 de julio de 2017. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-40407044  21 THOMAS Dominique, “État islamique vs Al-Qaïda: autopsie d’une lutte fratricide”, Politique Étrangère, 2016. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2016-1?lang=fr&tab=sommaire  22 PÉREZ Carlota, “Al Qaeda y Daesh: rivales en Oriente Medio y aliados en el Sahel”, ATALAYAR, 29 de junio de 2018. https://www.atalayar.com/articulo/politica/al-qaeda-y-daesh-rivales-en-oriente-medio-y-aliados-en-el-sahel/20200224202755144652.html  23 BEAUDOUX Clara, “Qui sont les groupes islamistes qui opèrent en Afrique de l’Ouest?”, Fance Info, 20 de febrero de 2013. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/qui-sont-les-groupes-islamistes-qui-operent-en-afrique-de-l-ouest_1645959.html  24 AGUILERA Ana, “Actividad yihadista en el norte de África y el Sahel”, OIET, 26 de marzo de 2025. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/yihadismo-en-el-magreb-y-el-sahel-2025/actividad-yihadista-en-el-norte-de-africa-y-el-sahel-febrero-2025/   25 FUMAGALLI Giuseppe, “Terrorismo in Africa; le complicità dei regimi autoritari”, Instituto per gli studi di política internazionale, 5 de abril de 2016. https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/terrorismo-africa-le-complicita-dei-regimi-autoritari-14927  26 DE LEÓN COBO Beatriz, “La estrategia glocal de los grupos yihadistas del Sahel”, OIET, 15 de enero de 2021. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/actividades/la-estrategia-glocal-de-los-grupos-yihadistas-del-sahel/#_ftn5  27 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, “Letter dated 8 august from the Panel of Experts etablished pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali adressed to the President of the Security Council”, 8 de agosto de 2018, p.20.https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_581.pdf  28 ALJAZEERA, “ISIL claims attack on Niger soldiers as death toll rises to 28”, 16 de mayo de 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/16/isil-claims-attack-on-niger-soldiers-as-death-toll-rises-to-28   29 POST X, Menastream, “#Burkina faso: #JNIM claimed Thursday’s atttack against the police station in Manila…”, 27 de enero de 2019. https://x.com/MENASTREAM/status/1089648251291254784  30 EL IMPARCIAL, “Al Qaeda y Daesh se enfrenan en un conflicto armado inédito en el Sahel”, miércoles 9 de abril de 2025. https://www.elimparcial.es/noticia/212597/mundo/al-qaeda-y-daesh-se-enfrenan-en-un-conflicto-armado-indito-en-el-sahel.html  31 NSAIVIA Héni y WEISS Caleb, “The end of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the Global Conlict between the Islamic State and al-Qaìda finally came to West Africa”, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Julio de 2020. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-end-of-the-sahelian-anomaly-how-the-global-conflict-between-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida-finally-came-to-west-africa/  32 OBSERVATORIO DE AL AZHAR, “Daesh celebra la incorporación de 11 miembros de Al Qaeda… una muestra más de las diferencias entre ambas organizaciones terroristas”, miércoles 3 de agosto de 2022. https://www.azhar.eg/observer-es/details/ArtMID/1201/ArticleID/63847/Daesh-celebra-la-incorporaci243n-de-11-miembros-de-Al-Qaeda…-una-muestra-m225s-de-las-diferencias-entre-ambas-organizaciones-terroristas  33 THOMAS Dominique, “État islamique vs Al-Qaïda: autopsie d’une lutte fratricide”, Politique Étrangère, 2016. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2016-1-page-95?lang=fr  34 AGUILERA Ana, “Actividad yihadista en el norte de África y el Sahel, febrero 2025”, OIET, 26 de marzo de 2025. https://observatorioterrorismo.com/yihadismo-en-el-magreb-y-el-sahel-2025/actividad-yihadista-en-el-norte-de-africa-y-el-sahel-febrero-2025/  35 SUMMERS Marta, “Enfrentamientos entre JNIM y EIGS. Cambios en el equilibrio terrorista del Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 6 de julio de 2020. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2020/DIEEEO98_2020MARSUM_Sahel.pdf  36 MARSTON Barry, “Analysis: High jihadist activity in Africa’s Sahel continues”, BBC, 9 de noviembre de 2023. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c204qwhm   37 FUENTE COBO Ignacio, “Radiografía de la amenaza yihadista en el Sahel”, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 5 de marzo de 2025. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel  

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Spread of Instability from the Sahel Directly Threatens West African Countries, Especially the Gulf of Guinea States (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo) — recently, there have been more attacks by jihadist fighters in these areas. If these attacks become more successful, it could seriously hurt the global economy, especially the economy of the European Union. Events in spring 2025 show that the jihadist movement is growing in this region, which causes big problems for safety and the economy.Gulf of Guinea Countries Under Attack by Jihadists Before, jihadists attacked only the northern parts of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo — near the borders with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. But on April 24, 2025, they destroyed and captured an army vehicle in the center of Benin, far from the northern border. This showed they can now strike deep inside the country, not just near the border where most of the army is based. It seems this was done to force the army to move some soldiers away from the north, making it weaker there. This could mean that fighting is spreading into areas that used to be safe. A video of the attack was shared by a group linked to the Wagner Group that works in Africa. An even more worrying event happened on May 12. Jihadists attacked a gold mine in Mali, near the town of Narena on the border with Guinea. During the attack, they kidnapped Chinese workers. It’s important to note that the distance between this place and the attack in Benin is about 1,700 kilometers. This shows how far the violence is spreading across Africa. The situation is especially bad in Benin. Its army has been hit very hard in recent years. On April 17, 2025, jihadists destroyed two army posts in the north. The army said 54 soldiers were killed (the attackers said it was 70). Earlier, on January 8, 2025, radical Islamists killed 28 soldiers. In total, over 300 Beninese soldiers have been killed by jihadists between 2019 and 2025. The current year — 2025 — is already the worst so far, with 157 soldiers killed by May. A similar situation is happening in countries next to Benin. For example, in Togo, between 2022 and 2024, at least 37 soldiers and civilians were killed during major group attacks (with 29 of them in 2024 alone). Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) is also suffering from jihadist attacks. Back in 2016, at least 15 people were killed in one attack, including three elite special forces soldiers. Later, during a series of attacks by radical Islamists in 2021–2022, at least 15 more Ivorian soldiers were killed. And this does not include small attacks carried out by these groups. Reasons for Escalation West African countries became a new target for jihadist attacks for several reasons. Of course, the situation in neighboring Nigeria, where the jihadist group Boko Haram operates (recognized as terrorist and banned in Russia), plays a destabilizing role. Part of this group joined the Islamic State (also banned in Russia). Its appearance helped create instability in the southern Sahel, and a similar process happened in the north after Muammar Gaddafi was removed from power in Libya in 2011. Radical Islamists who took over big parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger want to spread their control even more. These are jihadist “katibas” (Arabic for “unit”), acting under the name of JNIM (an Al-Qaeda branch in the Sahel, banned in Russia) and IS Sahel (Islamic State in the Sahel, banned in Russia). They want to build on their success in fighting French influence in Africa, get rid of it in other countries too — like Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire — and bring in Islamic rule and sharia law to new areas. This is their “mission,” as they see it. It seems that they will try to do this in the medium term. For now, their main goal appears to be bringing down the weak governments in Sahel countries. Even though the situation in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is still very bad, and the governments there mostly control only big cities, the jihadists have not yet succeeded in removing these military regimes. One of the reasons for this is the presence of Russian forces in the region, both state-run (“African Corps”) and semi-private (“Wagner Group”). Without removing these governments, it is too risky for jihadists to start big operations to take over other countries. But it is possible that, after facing Russian military experts — who have made the armies of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger stronger — the jihadists are now trying to focus on West African countries where they are not yet present. It may also be that the goal of jihadist attacks in West Africa is to put pressure on their enemies in the Sahel from the northern areas of the coastal countries in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, by setting up in northern Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, the jihadists can create safe zones for operations in southern Burkina Faso and Niger, and also threaten the capital of Niger, Niamey. They also place supply camps and families in local forests so that government forces in the Sahel don’t capture them. And finally, they use Gulf of Guinea countries as transit zones to get the things they need. For instance, they smuggle fuel from Nigeria for their vehicles — cars and motorbikes (their “mechanized cavalry”). They pay for this with illegally mined gold and livestock from the Sahel and West Africa. Ghana plays a special role in these operations. It is the only country in the Gulf of Guinea that borders the Sahel but has not yet experienced bloody jihadist attacks. Its geographic location is very important for the logistics of radical Islamists, and the local terrain helps their activities. For example, in northern Benin and Togo there are nature reserves and national parks stretching for hundreds of kilometers — W and Pendjari Parks in Benin, Comoe Park in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Oti-Keran Mandouri complex in Togo. These are rough, hard-to-reach areas with thick forests and poor road networks. Because of this it’s hard for the slow and heavy security forces of local governments to act in these places. But for small, lightly armed jihadist groups, it is much easier to move around and complete their missions. Security Forces Are Not Ready to Fight Jihadists Among the reasons why West African countries cannot succeed in the fight against radical Islamists is the "physical" weakness (as in the case of Togo and Benin) of their state security forces, and their general unpreparedness for conducting quick anti-guerrilla operations. For example, even after being enlarged due to the current crisis, their armies do not exceed 12,300 troops each, including naval forces (which have not really been involved in this fight). This is clearly not enough to effectively control their northern borders with Burkina Faso and Niger, which together stretch more than 700 km. The technical equipment of the armies of Benin and Togo is also poor because of a lack of transport, aircraft (especially drones), and modern gear in general (for example, some armored vehicles are still from the 1950s). The army of Côte d’Ivoire is much stronger. By the end of 2024, it had 22,000 soldiers, including the navy, and more than 5,000 irregular fighters. But even this is not enough to effectively guard its difficult border with Mali and Burkina Faso, which is 1,183 km long and has rough terrain. In such conditions, it is hard to expect a turning point in the fighting. Lack of Loyalty from the Local Population The establishment of jihadist control over the northern areas of Gulf of Guinea countries is also prevented by the low loyalty of the local population. Understanding that without at least some level of support (even if forced and limited) from locals, jihadists from the Sahel would not be able to act so effectively, the security forces of the region often carry out repressions against local people. This clearly does not increase their loyalty to the authorities and creates new problems for the future. These people can seriously harm the military, even if acting passively — for example, by helping jihadists as guides, scouts, or informants. This especially concerns the nomadic herders from the Fulani (or Fula) ethnic group, who are known to form the main part of jihadist groups in the Sahel countries. Many Fulani people also live in West and Central Africa. The high involvement of the Fulani and some other groups in jihadism often comes from their dissatisfaction with their situation. They often feel left out when it comes to getting resources, positions in government, and so on. When they express their dissatisfaction, it is often ignored at best, or met with repression at worst. The dissatisfaction of people in other West African countries with their own governments and the general situation comes from many factors. One of them is the strong and sometimes very fast population growth since the countries gained independence. At the same time, the amount of resources per person, like water and fertile land, has gone down. This has naturally led to more conflicts. Just like in the Sahel, conflicts over water and land between herders, farmers, hunters, and fishermen have gotten worse in West Africa. In the Gulf of Guinea countries, this happened at the same time as the government’s efforts to protect unique nature parks, which were declared reserves, but later became jihadist strongholds. As a result, farming and herding in these areas was greatly limited, and often completely banned, which hit the local economy hard. At the same time, people believe that the governments invested very little in the development of remote northern regions, especially in infrastructure. However, the presence of almost untouched parts of nature, far from cities, did lead to some tourism development (before the jihadists arrived). Because of this, some people who could not succeed as farmers or herders found jobs in tourism. The rebels used local dissatisfaction to their advantage. When they arrived, they removed the government bans on local economic activities (except cutting down the forests that hide their fighters), including hunting rare protected animals. Many local people saw this as a good thing. Prospects for the Fight Faced directly with the threat of Sahelization, the governments of the region are trying to urgently stabilize the situation. For example, the Beninese army (and other security forces) was increased by one and a half times — if at the beginning of the jihadist attacks it had 8,000 soldiers, now it has 12,300. The governments of the Gulf of Guinea countries also turned for help to their former security partners — France and the United States, who started sending modern weapons. But new weapons alone cannot change the situation — not even the use of drones, which are supposed to help better observe the terrain and find jihadist bases. The forests in the conflict zones are so thick that even modern UAVs sometimes cannot spot the enemy, even with poor camouflage. The authorities of Benin and Côte d’Ivoire have started developing border areas and creating jobs for young people, to make it harder for jihadists to recruit them. The Beninese government is also considering helping herders switch from a nomadic way of life to more efficient and less environmentally damaging farming. This idea might work in the long term, but it will need huge resources and could anger herders, who find it very hard to change their traditional lifestyle. Togo, which is poorer, cannot keep up with Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. Its government is mainly just running information campaigns and talking about the dangers of jihadism. So, the measures to stop jihadist expansion in these countries are not well coordinated. There is also a lack of cooperation in the fight itself. For example, Islamist radicals have escaped many times into neighboring Sahel countries, and this happened because there was no agreement that would let the security forces of one country pursue enemies into another. It is important to note that back in 2017, seeing the growing threat from jihadists, the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea countries signed the “Accra Initiative”, which became an anti-jihadist alliance. But soon after that, coups hit the region, removing pro-French governments in the Sahel countries, while in the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea (except for Guinea itself), pro-Paris governments stayed in power. This damaged relations between the Sahel countries and the West African countries that remained loyal to France. Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, still somewhat supported by France, joined the blockade of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and even considered military intervention. The military governments of the Sahel, in turn, began to actively cooperate with Russia. Since then, there has been no coordination between the former allies in the fight against jihadism. And until this conflict is resolved, it is hard to expect any effective cross-border fight against jihadists. Therefore, even in the short term, the situation in the region will likely get worse — because the Sahel’s population keeps growing rapidly, and as they move south into West African countries, competition for limited resources will keep increasing. How the Escalating Struggle Shapes the Global Landscape and Russia’s RoleDespite the destabilizing effect of “Sahelization” and the spread of jihadism into the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, there are some opportunities for Russia. For example, it is possible that the people of West African countries, just like those in the Sahel, will lose trust in France — especially if Paris fails to stop the jihadist advance. As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility of anti-French coups in Gulf of Guinea countries. Russia could use this to further weaken the West, and France in particular, during the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Other countries will also try to fill the growing political vacuum in the region. The United States is already doing this, by giving military and technical help to these countries and clearly trying to push out French influence. In the worst-case scenario (if the governments of the coastal West African countries collapse), jihadists could reach the major shipping routes of the Gulf of Guinea. Since important global trade routes pass through this area, this would be a direct threat to international trade, especially for the European Union. However, for now, this seems possible only if the entire state system built in Africa after the end of colonial rule completely falls apart. A much more serious danger may come from jihadists reaching the border with Guinea, or pushing further south into coastal West African countries. In the first case, the threat affects the world economy, because Guinea supplies 20% of the world’s bauxite — the raw material used to make aluminum. Guinea also has rich deposits of iron ore and other minerals. It's important to note that not only the West, but also China depends on these supplies. Russian companies also work in Guinea. That’s why many outside powers (like the USA, Turkey, UAE, Qatar, and others) may be tempted to use Sahel rebel groups to try to change who controls the market in Guinea. Many people in Guinea are unhappy with how the wealth is shared, and most of the population lives below the poverty line. A large part of the population (about one-third of the 14 million people) are again the Fulani, the same active group that often forms the base of rebel movements. Some of them might join the fighters if there is an invasion of Guinea from Mali. As for the attempt to move jihadist activity into central Benin, this is very bad news for the European Union, which hopes to get cheap pipeline gas if the planned “Atlantic” gas pipeline from Nigeria to Morocco is built. So, if jihadists become more active in coastal Gulf countries, it could scare away investors from this expensive project. At the same time, Russia might use the situation to its own advantage.

Another war appears imminent in Tigray; this time the conflict threatens to engulf the region. Eritrea appears ready to join the fighting . Despite the heavy toll of the 2020–2022 war, both the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government have resumed belligerent rhetoric. If fighting resumes, the underlying causes are the TPLF’s pursuit of secession, Abiy Ahmed’s authoritarian rule, and his territorial ambitions. The TPLF has pursued independence since its formation in 1975  by advocating the right to self-determination; it has promoted a narrative rooted in historical exceptionalism and the right to self-determination. That vision matured into a program of statehood during the years the TPLF controlled the Ethiopian government. Between 1991 and 2018, it used state power to lay the political, economic, and military groundwork for secession. Ethnic federalism, introduced under the rhetoric of self-rule, eroded national cohesion. A constitutional clause granted regional states the right to secede unilaterally. Ethiopian nationalism was deliberately undermined; ethnic nationalism was systematically promoted. Ethnic regions were later militarized through the creation of special forces that operated beyond constitutional limits, ostensibly for regional security. Tigray assembled the most powerful of these units—well-armed, well-trained, and well-structured, designed as a paramilitary force prepared to enforce constitutional claims to territory ). These units appear intended to serve as the armies of the independent states they envisioned. In parallel to this build-up, heavy military equipment vital to national defense was transferred to Tigray under the pretext of countering threats from Eritrea. The TPLF later used its special forces and this hardware to wage war against the Ethiopian state. Unrestrained by legal, political, or institutional checks, the TPLF exercised full control over the Ethiopian state. It used that power to extract the country’s natural resources, seize physical assets, and divert financial capital. Under the guise of implementing market reforms recommended by the IMF and World Bank, it transferred state-owned enterprises to firms under its command. The TPLF used the state’s economic apparatus and its control over the private sector to advance its long-term goal of Tigrayan independence. As the TPLF moved toward secession, Ethiopia stood primed for fragmentation, by its constitution, by its leaders, and by its institutions. When a popular revolt removed the TPLF-led government in 2018, the leadership retreated to Mekelle and intensified its campaign for independence. The TPLF escalated its confrontation with the federal government through a series of provocative actions: holding regional elections in September 2020 in defiance of federal authority, expelling federal military officers from Tigray, obstructing troop movements and logistics, and organizing large-scale military parades to project force. Each move appears calculated to provoke a military confrontation with the central government. Convinced that the moment had arrived, the TPLF launched a coordinated assault on the Northern Command on November 4, 2020, as a decisive step toward secession. After two years of devastating war, it failed to achieve its long-term objective. On November 2, 2022, it accepted a cessation of hostilities under the terms of the Pretoria Agreement. Support for secession has increased, fueled by the federal government’s conduct during the war, particularly its decision to invite the Eritrean army into Tigray (Reuters). The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, once a bastion of unity, has splintered. Tigrayan clergy formed a separate synod and severed all ties with the central hierarchy. In the diaspora, former advocates of unity champion independence. Among educated Tigrayans, disillusionment runs deep. Many interpreted the nationwide support for the federal war effort, mostly due to the TPLF’s authoritarianism, as a broader denunciation of Tigrayan identity. For this group, the war was not a political confrontation, but a genocidal campaign. That belief has hardened into a dominant narrative: that civilian deaths were not accidental byproducts of conflict, but deliberate acts of extermination. A rival project of state-building has emerged at the federal level, based on irredentism rather than ethnic autonomy. Abiy Ahmed, an authoritarian ruler backed by a narrow Oromo elite, has declared his intention to govern a unitary state stretching from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. He has repeatedly insisted that Ethiopia must secure a seaport, peacefully or by military force. Despite having no coastline, his government established a navy with France’s assistance; he signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to build a naval base—later cancelled—and has advanced a plan for an economic union encompassing Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia.Federal authorities have also provided weapons to factional leaders in Puntland and Jubaland to undermine the Somali government). While economic integration offers benefits, Abiy’s strategy to annex or dominate neighbouring states risks regional instability, diplomatic estrangement, and military confrontation. A government committed to external expansion is unlikely to tolerate internal disintegration. Tigrayan secessionism and Abiy’s expansionism stand as twin causes of the impending war. The immediate triggers of renewed war have already surfaced. Abiy Ahmed can invoke a legal casus belli against Eritrea, which continues to occupy Ethiopian territory despite repeated demands from Western governments and multilateral organizations). Eritrea, in turn, could claim self-defence. The TPLF could justify a war by claiming that the federal government has failed to fully implement the Pretoria Agreement. Both sides blame each other for the collapse of the agreement and have resumed hostile rhetoric and provocative actions. The TPLF, ignoring the Pretoria Agreement, has declared that it does not require federal permission to engage with Eritrea). Its leaders have publicly affirmed sovereignty, consistent with the constitutional framework. An Eritrean official has offered explicit support for Tigrayan independence; this has introduced an unpredictable external variable into an already volatile situation). On the federal side, the government has revoked the TPLF’s legal status as a political party, eliminating what remained of the formal political channel). At the same time, Abiy launched a European tour on May 22, likely to secure diplomatic backing for a new campaign). The symmetry with the prelude to the first war is striking: escalating rhetoric, foreign lobbying, and mutual delegitimization. What unfolds is not a fresh crisis but the second act of a war poorly resolved. The TPLF has fractured under the weight of the war it helped to unleash. An internal power struggle—driven by disputes over military conduct, political legitimacy, and personal ambition—split the organization in August 2024 into two factions: one led by Debretsion Gebremichael, the chair; the other by Getachew Reda, the vice chair. Each accuses the other of betraying the people of Tigray). The TPLF fighters are also divided. A large faction supports the Debretsion group, while Getachew’s faction has secured the backing of armed groups in southern Tigray, reportedly trained by the Ethiopian government in the Afar region). These forces have pledged to defend the administrative structure he established. The likelihood of intra-Tigrayan armed conflict is high. Tensions have escalated further as Getachew has leveled serious criminal accusations against the TPLF’s military command. In interviews aired on government television on May 13 and 14, he alleged that senior generals committed war crimes, operated illegal gold mines, embezzled state funds, trafficked humans, smuggled arms, and stripped steel from public infrastructure for sale—even as the war was taking place ). The accused commanders have denied all charges and denounced him as a traitor aligned with the federal government. He further reported that the number of registered TPLF fighters DDR had been inflated and that commanders had embezzled funds intended for their salaries. He accused the same officers of plotting to assassinate him. These are not casual allegations—they come from a man who served as deputy chair of the party, member of the executive, member of its wartime command, spokesperson during the conflict, head of the Pretoria delegation, and former regional president. According to Getachew, the TPLF’s military leadership has a vested interest in restarting the war to avoid accountability. He argues that peace would expose their crimes, while renewed conflict offers protection. As evidence, he cites the leak of secret peace talks in Djibouti between the TPLF and the federal government by one of the implicated generals. The federal government, upon learning of the leak, ended the negotiations. In another case, he claims that when the federal government attempted resettlement of Tigrayans in contested areas, the TPLF commanders demanded that fighters accompany the returnees; the government refused. Getachew alleges the generals are using displaced civilians as “hostages” to obstruct reconciliation. He claims to hold documentary evidence supporting these accusations. While he describes the TPLF as a “criminal enterprise,” he occasionally softens the charge, placing blame on a few bad actors. This contradiction raises a crucial question: if an organization protects offenders and functions as a criminal network, can it still claim political legitimacy? The conflict between the TPLF and the federal government has persisted, but alliances have shifted dramatically. During the first Tigray war, a coalition of federal troops, Eritrean forces, Amhara special forces, and the Fano militia fought the TPLF. That coalition has disintegrated. In April 2023, the federal government disbanded the Amhara special forces while retaining similar units in other regions). It then launched a military campaign to disarm the Fano, provoking armed resistance across the Amhara region. The government has struggled to suppress the rebellion and has lost control of large areas. It accuses the TPLF of aiding the Fano. At the same time, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have unraveled. Abiy Ahmed’s declaration that Ethiopia would obtain a seaport—by negotiation or by force—has pushed the two states into hostility). In a startling reversal, the TPLF has begun to align with Eritrea, its former enemy. Reports suggest the Debretsion faction has initiated cooperation with Eritrean officials, despite Eritrea’s continued occupation of territories claimed by Tigray). Getachew alleges that senior TPLF commanders have coordinated military planning with Eritrean authorities. Gebru Asrat, the former Tigray regional president, has made similar claims). Eritrea appears prepared to re-enter the war, this time as a TPLF ally. One Eritrean official has gone further and has expressed support for Tigrayan independence, as stated earlier. But given their history of mutual hostility, unresolved border disputes, and clashing ambitions, the alliance remains fragile. It may serve tactical needs, but it is unlikely to survive strategic realities. Strategic miscalculation is a crucial risk in this war, as it was in the previous one. During the first Tigray war, both the federal government and the TPLF overestimated their military capacity and underestimated their opponent’s. The war yielded no victory. Instead, both sides accepted a cessation of hostilities after enduring political crisis, economic hardship, and human catastrophe. The result crippled both actors. Despite renewed threats, confrontational posturing, and aggressive rhetoric, neither side appears ready for war. In Tigray, the public is exhausted. People demand peace, basic services, the return of the displaced, and the restoration of infrastructure. The struggle for basic needs outweighs the desire to engage in another war. While support for independence remains high, many Tigrayans question whether the embattled TPLF can govern a region, let alone a future state. Among Tigrayans, the yearning for peace far exceeds the willingness to fight another war. The Eritrean government, although it commands a disciplined army, lacks the diplomatic support and military capabilities to confront a stronger adversary. Its economic base is fragile; its population is small, overburdened by years of forced conscription, and exhausted by endless mobilization. Eritrea’s international isolation—worsened by sanctions, strained relations with neighbors, and a dismal human rights record—undermines its capacity to secure foreign military or financial assistance. These constraints—weak economy, fragile population base, diplomatic isolation, and limited military resources—reduce Eritrea’s capacity to sustain a protracted war The Ethiopian state faces even greater problems. Armed insurgencies continue in Amhara and Oromia, the country’s two most populous regions. Federal forces have failed to suppress either movement and have lost control over extensive territory. Across the country, support for the government has collapsed. A nationwide strike by healthcare workers—triggered by surging inflation—signals broader unrest). Legitimacy has eroded; institutions have decayed; crises have multiplied. The military—commanded by officers appointed for ethnic loyalty rather than professional competence, crippled by systemic corruption, and plagued by operational incapacity—is unfit for war. These deficiencies became evident when the army suffered a series of humiliating defeats in the last war against the TPLF. External actors can influence both the likelihood and the outcome of a renewed conflict. In the previous war, the United States played a moderating role, driven by its own strategic interests in Ethiopia, the Horn, and the Red Sea. The Biden administration helped contain escalation by the Ethiopian government and dissuaded the TPLF from pursuing independence. It appointed Special Envoy Mike Hammer, whose diplomacy helped secure the Pretoria Agreement). Under President Trump, U.S. policy shifted toward disengagement. That shift may have persuaded the Ethiopian government that war carries no consequences and emboldened the TPLF to pursue secession. Regional powers also have the capacity to influence whether the war erupts and how it unfolds. Egypt, a traditional adversary of Ethiopia and locked in dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, has aligned with Eritrea and had supported the TPLF in the past. Saudi Arabia continues to back the Eritrean regime). The United Arab Emirates has supplied Ethiopia with drones and weapons). Turkey has armed Ethiopia with drones as well, but backs Somalia over Abiy’s memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the breakaway state of Somalia, later cancelled ). Whether another war erupts will depend in part on how these regional powers calculate their interests and the extent to which they are willing to intervene to secure them. Under present conditions, neither side appears capable of waging war. The TPLF—isolated abroad, fractured within, stripped of territory, crippled by corruption, and bereft of popular support—lacks the means to mount a new campaign. The federal government, weakened by internal fragmentation, collapsing legitimacy, and mounting public dissent, cannot sustain another conflict. Rhetoric has escalated, but capacity has not. The Eritrean government commands a well-trained army but lacks the diplomatic support, economic strength, and military capacity to fight a stronger adversary. Its international isolation, small population, and limited resources leave it vulnerable. Eritreans may defend sovereignty but show little enthusiasm for another costly war. Eritrea’s shifting loyalties, Abiy Ahmed’s expansionist ambitions, the Tigrayan elite’s secessionist agenda, the TPLF’s record of miscalculation, and foreign interference have created a volatile situation. Any of these variables could reignite the conflict, dismantle either state, and destabilize the entire region. Even in the absence of strategic advantage, wars can erupt because of misjudgments, personal ambition, or elite rivalries. Peace in the Horn is no local concern; it is a global imperative essential to regional order, international security, and the prevention of another humanitarian catastrophe.