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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Since independence on June 25, 1975, Frelimo has made Mozambique its private preserve for 50 years. After having been the only authorized party in the country (from 1975 until the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992), it then systematically defrauded all elections, with the partial exception of the very first ones organized by the UN in 1994. But after the last general elections in October 2024, the fraud provoked a real popular revolt. The authorities reacted by unleashing a ruthless crackdown on the protesters, which continues to this day, without any notable reaction from the international community. On October 9, 2024, Mozambique held its seventh general elections (provincial, legislative and presidential) since the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992. Official results gave a clear victory to Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) candidates, including presidential candidate Daniel Chapo, elected with 70% of the vote (later reduced to 65%). According to international and independent national observers, these were the most fraudulent elections the country had ever seen. A large part of the population is convinced that, in reality, it was the opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane, officially credited with 20% of the vote (then 24%), who won the election. Admittedly, this is not the first time that Frelimo, in power without interruption since 1975, has maintained itself through fraud and, beyond that, through the complete fusion of party and state, as in the days of the single party (1975-1992), through the systematic practice of authoritarian clientelism (people live much better with a Frelimo card than without it or with another party's card!) and, finally, through the assassination of opponents. This time, however, there was a genuine revolt, rather than resignation, against the lack of respect for the people's dignity shown by electoral fraud. Fifty years of authoritarian paternalism In 1975, Mozambique gained independence and the Frelimo, officially of “Marxist-Leninist” orientation, which drew its legitimacy from its struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, came to power. This was followed by a long civil war (1977-1992) between Frelimo and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), which shaped the country's political life for a long time to come. Although the conflict had internal roots in the authoritarian, anti-peasant modernization policies of the government, the Renamo guerrilla movement was supported by the apartheid regime of neighboring South Africa. The violence was terrible, on both sides, but after the war, particularly in the cities (and especially in the South), even disgruntled people would never have voted for Renamo, seen in the hegemonic discourse as the party of “armed bandits”. However, particularly in the inner cities, the middle-class electorate began to vote for a third party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), which emerged from a split in Renamo and would very likely have won the 2013 municipal elections in the capital Maputo - were it not for a timely power cut when the ballots were being counted. The head of the list was Venâncio Mondlane, then a popular TV and radio commentator. In the 2014 legislative elections, against a backdrop of renewed internal warfare, Renamo doubled its number of votes (from 16 to 36.61%) and deputies (from 49 to 89 out of 250) compared to the 2009 ballot. But in 2018 (municipal elections) and 2019 (general elections, 21.48% of the vote and 60 deputies), this boom was shattered by the machinery of the state apparatus. The fraud took place well before the elections: the electoral census counted more voters than inhabitants in the pro-power Gaza province, but far fewer in some others. The systematic intimidation of voters (by collecting their voter card numbers) was highly effective. Non-Frelimo observers were rarely accredited, while Frelimo observers flocked to polling stations in their thousands, and so on. Even so, it was clear that this time Renamo had actually won the elections in Maputo and Matola, the other major southern city and historic Frelimo stronghold. But Renamo didn't really organize any protests, despite spontaneous youth marches, playing the legalism card and awaiting the results of its appeals to appeal institutions totally controlled by Frelimo. The Venâncio Mondlane phenomenon and the revolt of Mozambican society With the passing of the years and the passing of generations, we could see that, even in the cities of the South, disaffected voters no longer hesitated to vote for Renamo: memories of the civil war were no longer politically structuring. But Renamo was weakened by the death of its historic leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in 2018, and by the appointment as new president of a former guerrilla general, Ossufo Momade, who proved to lack initiative and leadership. Momade prevented Venâncio Mondlane from being Renamo's candidate in the presidential election of October 2024, but Mondlane ran as an independent, as a new type of candidate, a civilian, an educated man from the city, and also an evangelical (a religious current on the rise in the country). Massively, the Renamo and MDM electorates switched to this new candidate, all the more easily as their previous votes were not so much in favor of these two parties as, above all, against Frelimo. They changed tools. Venâncio Mondlane's campaign, though without a seasoned party to back him, was far better organized than Renamo's had been before. He set up a systematic parallel vote-counting system, with computer equipment, etc., in charge of collecting the thousands of minutes as soon as the counting was completed. This enabled him to claim that he had won the elections with 70% of the vote, whereas the official results gave him around 20%. What is certain is that the frauds were innumerable and that the popular conviction of a totally biased result was widespread. Venâncio Mondlane immediately called for “victory parades”, which were hardly tolerated by the authorities, who were claiming victory for their candidate, Daniel Chapo, an apparatchik who was virtually unknown before the election campaign.  The turning point came on October 19, 2024, when two leaders of Venâncio Mondlane's campaign, Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe, were murdered in the street and in their car, most probably by members of the Special Operations Group of the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR, militarized police), known locally as the “death squads”. This was a warning to Venâncio Mondlane, who had just called a general strike. From then on, the situation shifted from demonstrations against electoral fraud, such as often occur in various African countries, to a revolutionary process. The permanent mobilization of very poor people, young boys leading demonstrations, young girls organizing prayers in the streets, was observed all over the country, including the small bush towns, where they receive the news from time to time. The middle classes in the “cement districts” were not to be outdone: although they didn't take part in the demonstrations, they did “casserolades” (banging pots during protests) from their windows for hours on end. A very important feature was the complete absence of any ethnic dimension: of course, the civil war had never been inter-ethnic, but Frelimo tended to be the party of the south and the cities, and Renamo the party of the north and the bush. The fact that Venâncio Mondlane was from the South did not prevent demonstrations from taking place everywhere, including in the North, which had already been affected by jihadist guerrilla warfare. The authorities accused the demonstrators of looting stores, but the police were also seen looting... and real shots were fired multiple times. The official proclamation of the results and the announced failure of the last appeals, followed by the inauguration of the official president, Daniel Chapo, on January 15, 2025, did not weaken the mobilization. Venâncio Mondlane, who now considered himself to be the “people's president” and “elected president” rather than the “invested president”, began a tour of the country, gathering large crowds even in the regions most loyal to Frelimo. A new turning point in the revolutionary process began to emerge: people were no longer demonstrating against fraud, but rather against the high cost of living - Mondlane had issued a “decree” to lower the price of cement and other products, and people were mobilizing to enforce it. Communities revolted against the international companies that had set up in the country at the behest of the authorities, because compensation for lost land and homes, mentioned in “contracts” accepted under great pressure, was not respected; protests against the enormous pollution of the Moatize open-cast coal mines regained vigor; the destruction of sacred woods -cut down to avoid interfering with oil sands exploitation- was no longer forgiven. More or less, the entire Frelimo state was challenged, and the revolution underway went from being simply democratic to being social. And the price already paid is heavy: 353 proven deaths, including children or very young boys, or simple passers-by; no doubt at least 40 deaths among Venâncio Mondlane's local executives, like these two young men murdered in their car, at that time, outside any demonstration, in Massinga (Inhambane province), on the night of March 8, 2025, having fallen into an authentic ambush. Massinga had been a hotbed of opposition to the government in the south of the country for the previous few days. Thousands wounded (the number is put at 3,000, but this figure mainly concerns the wounded in the major cities), thousands arrested, many missing (including journalists)... Silence, we kill This revolutionary process took place without any involvement from the opposition parties, who agreed to send their elected deputies to sit in Parliament, while Mondlane called for a boycott. Another notable development was the remobilization of the Naparamas in the provinces of Nampula and Zambézia. The Naparamas are a historic phenomenon in Mozambique, magical peasant militias (vaccinated against bullets) armed with bows and arrows. At the end of the civil war, in exhausted societies, they acted mostly in favor of Frelimo against Renamo. But although they never completely disappeared, this time they have remobilized to serve the mobilized people, whom they seek to protect from the militarized police. Despite their “vaccinations”, they are harshly repressed by the heavily armed police. Faced with this outpouring, the authorities signed a reconciliation agreement with all the political currents... except Mondlane. On the very day the agreement was signed, March 5, 2025, a demonstration in Maputo attended by Mondlane was attacked with live ammunition by the UIR, killing four people and wounding others. At the same time, the official president has hardened his rhetoric. At his first public meeting after his investiture, in Pemba (north) on February 24, 2025, he proclaimed that “even if blood has to be shed to defend the homeland against demonstrations, we will shed blood. We will fight terrorism, fight the Naparamas and fight the demonstrations”, equating any form of challenge to power with jihadism, which has been rampant in the North since 2017. It's important to understand that, in the context of a state that has been totally fused with the party for fifty years, an authoritarian party ready to do anything to keep power, when a president publicly says “we will spill blood”, he then has no need to give the order to kill to the intermediate and local echelons of his forces of repression. They've heard the order. Power is ready for a bloodbath to defeat the social revolution in progress. Who will stop it? What is the international community saying, what are the foreign embassies in Maputo saying?

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In January 2002, the city of Goma, located in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, lay in ruins. The cause was not the Great African War,[1] which had been ravaging the country for several years. The war’s first rebellion had, in fact, started here in August 1998, when Banyamulenge-Tutsi fighters, led by a former ally of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila and backed by Rwanda (where Paul Kagame has ruled since the 1994 genocide), seized control of much of Congo’s resource-rich northeast. By early 2002, tensions were mounting between Rwanda and the Congolese Banyamulenge, while peace talks, facilitated by South Africa, were finally on the horizon. In January 2002, Goma—a city on Lake Kivu’s northern shore, at the foot of the Virunga Mountains—was still in rebel hands. But it also sat just 14 kilometers away from Nyiragongo, a volcano whose lava, low in silicates, moves fast—up to 100 km/h during an eruption. When Nyiragongo erupted, it took just hours for the lava to reach the city center, displacing over a million people and pushing the region toward yet another humanitarian disaster. The region teetered on the brink of it—yet again. Fast forward to January 2025, Goma once again made global headlines. This time, it was not because of a volcano, though the city’s situation did not look too different at first glance. On January 25–26, the M23 rebel group—born in 2012, partly from the remnants of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) that rebelled in 1998—launched a major offensive in North Kivu. Within days, they captured key locations in and around Goma, including Mount Goma, the airport and the TV station, though the city remained contested. The rebels also seized the nearby towns of Saké and Minova—both crucial for Goma’s supply lines—and started advancing into South Kivu, toward Bukavu, the provincial capital, and Nyabibwe, a key tin-mining site. Clashes led to a fire at Munzenze prison, allowing some 3,000 inmates to escape, adding to the chaos not only in the country’s northeast but also in the capital. On Tuesday, January 28, frustration over international inaction spilled onto the streets of Kinshasa, where mobs targeted embassies, including those of the U.S. and France. Any hope for de-escalation between the DRC and Rwanda now seems all but shattered: borders and embassies are shut, and most openly accuse Kigali of backing M23. Meanwhile, Rwanda remains under the firm grip of Paul Kagame, who was reelected in July 2024 for a fourth term with 99.15% of the vote—an election whose legitimacy, notably, did not raise many eyebrows in the West. Meanwhile, in Goma, early estimates suggest that one in five residents—out of a population of two million—has been forced to flee their homes, even before the conflict reached the current level of intensity. There is no electricity, and shortages of water, food and fuel are worsening, while UN humanitarian efforts appear to be scaling down rather than ramping up. Roots of the conflict The escalation in eastern DRC began long before alarming headlines started appearing in the media. But how far back do we go? Options are open and include: • 2022, when tensions steadily rose as M23 expanded its territorial control in eastern DRC;• 2021, when M23 resurfaced after its military defeat in 2013;• 2012, when M23 first emerged, reached its peak capturing Goma;• The Second Congo War (1998–2003), or even further back to the colonial era, when the ethnic dynamics that now fuel the conflict first took shape to complicate the current events. At this point, one might ask: who are the Banyamulenge and why are they closely linked to Rwanda? The answer lies in the history of the Lake Kivu region, home to multiple ethnic groups. Many of these groups can be classified under the broader linguistic umbrella of Kinyarwanda speakers—meaning they speak different variations of the same language and live not only in Kivu but also in Rwanda. Their core identity lies in ethnic categories such as Hutu, Tutsi or the lesser-known Twa. However, many other ethnic groups in eastern DRC do not see Kinyarwanda as autochthonous (indigenous), which fuels tensions and conflicts, both socially and politically. In response, Kinyarwanda-speaking communities have emphasized their Congolese, rather than Rwandan, identity by adopting local geographic names instead of ethnic labels. That is why we hear terms like Banyabwisha, Banyamasisi and Banyamulenge. Banyamulenge literally means “people from Mulenge,” a highland plateau in what is now South Kivu province. The issue of indigenous status is far from theoretical. On a practical level, perceptions of who is autochthonous and who is not dictate access to land, resources, and political rights and influence. And since power dynamics between ethnic groups in the region are constantly shifting—along with the broader political landscape in the country—so too are identity categories based on autochthony. For instance, the Hutu population in Goma often considers itself more “native” than the Tutsi. One reason for this is that Hutu and Tutsi were arriving in eastern DRC at different points in history: • The earliest waves of migration reached Kivu before the arrival of European colonizers (Germans and Belgians).• The second wave was engineered by colonial authorities, who sought loyal local administrators (such as the Banyamulenge) and a larger labor force for their plantation economy—since Kivu did not have enough workers.• Between 1959 and 1963, Rwanda was shaken by the “Wind of Destruction”—a revolution that overturned Belgian-backed Tutsi rule in Rwanda–Urundi and brought the Hutu to power in an independent republic. Thousands of Tutsis fled, settling in Kivu, where they became known as the “fifty-niners.”• Finally, after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when Hutu extremists turned their weapons against the Tutsi, the “defeated” Hutu (Banyarwanda) fled to eastern Congo, adding yet another layer of instability to the region. Over time, Congolese authorities treated different “waves of migrants from Rwanda” differently, adjusting their policies to fit the political expediency. They repeatedly changed citizenship laws, granting or stripping Kinyarwanda speakers of political rights. For example, a new law established 1885 as the official “cut-off date” for autochthony, effectively denying voting rights to most of the Banyamulenge—a decision that was enforced during the 1982 and 1987 elections. Unsurprisingly, this political and social exclusion created (and continues to create) fertile ground for mobilization and conflict under various pretexts. In the 1990s, for instance, many Congolese Tutsi, whose ambiguous citizenship status left them disconnected from Congo, joined Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took control of northern Rwanda and later ended the genocide by capturing Kigali. A few years later, the Banyamulenge threw their support behind Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), which helped Rwanda’s new government partially “resolve the issue” of Hutu refugees who had fled to Congo. After fleeing Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, many Hutu militants eventually rebranded themselves into the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The presence of both Hutu and Tutsi armed groups in eastern Congo effectively transplanted Rwanda’s ethnic conflict across the border. And both the Congolese and Rwandan governments found ways to manipulate this struggle to serve their own interests. This historical context is important to highlight the complex and often contradictory dynamics among the seemingly related ethnic groups living around Lake Kivu. The various ethnic communities in the area are fractured by competing interests, historical grievances and shifting alliances, with numerous armed factions operating on the ground. While Kinshasa and Kigali may view them as proxies, they fall short of full control over these groups, whose actions are often dictated by immediate gains and local rather than regional political interests. The Volcanic Republic On the other side of the border, in Rwanda, the notion of autochthony carries a different significance. Many Rwandans believe that a split of the Banyarwanda (“people from Rwanda” as opposed to Kinyarwanda, “people speaking Rwandese”) between two countries was a colonial construct, imposed by European powers, suggesting that borders in the region are quite artificial. A more extreme version of this narrative argues that Rwanda was historically much larger: “From a vast country that covered swathes of eastern Congo, southern Uganda and north-western Tanganyika, Rwanda became the tiny hill of Central Africa,” a perspective echoed by Rwanda’s formal President Pasteur Bizimungu in 1996. But this is more myth than reality as this claim oversimplifies history and ignores ethnic distinctions. More importantly, it fails to acknowledge that eastern Congo was never under a sustained Rwandan rule—neither before nor after colonization. Still, the idea of a “Greater Rwanda” breeds and fuels certain revanchist sentiments in some corners of Rwanda’s leadership. That is why many Congolese believe Rwanda is trying to carve out a “Volcanic Republic” (République des Volcans) in Kivu—a proxy state that would give it direct access to the region’s vast natural resources. Rebel leaders themselves reinforce these fears. For instance, Laurent Nkunda, leader of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)—a faction that split from the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) that rebelled in 1998 and maintains strong ties to Rwanda through Banyamulenge–Tutsi networks—argued: “If there had been no colonization, and thus the creation of totally new and artificial territorial entities in Africa, today’s Congo would never have existed for sure; but Bwisha would certainly be here as a transvolcanic province of ancient Rwanda.” Ultimately, this has for a long time contributed to both inter- and intra-ethnic tensions in the region, with shifting political, territorial or even personal allegiances of the groups. Who are the M23? To answer this question, we must once again trace the evolution of rebel groups in eastern DRC. During the First Congo War (1996–1997), Tutsi rebels, under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila[2] and with open support from Rwanda and Uganda, succeeded in toppling Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled since 1965 with support from the West. As the Cold War ended, Mobutu had outlived his usefulness by the 1990s, allowing Laurent-Désiré Kabila to take power. The problem was that many in Congo viewed Kabila as a Rwandan pawn. When he tried to shake off Kigali’s influence, the Second Congo War erupted (see above). Rwanda (and partly Uganda) responded by backing a new rebel group—the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)—which included Tutsi fighters. But when the war stalled, in part due to SADC’s military intervention led by South Africa, the RCD splintered. Its most powerful faction—RCD-Goma—held onto North and South Kivu, although Rwanda’s military remained the true power behind the scenes. In 2002, the Sun City Accords allowed Joseph, Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s son, to stay in power while granting RCD-Goma and the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), operating in northern Congo, formal status as legitimate political actors. As part of the deal, Rwandan and Ugandan troops withdrew from the DRC. By 2006, Joseph Kabila sought to consolidate his rule, but his 2007 election victory triggered clashes in Kinshasa with the MLC and a fresh Tutsi-led uprising in the east. This time, it was the Tutsi-dominated National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a faction that grew out of RCD-Goma. Neither Congolese troops nor UN peacekeepers could stop the CNDP’s advance. The rebels seized control of key mines and supply routes, though they ultimately failed to capture Goma—largely due to their lack of legitimacy and support locally. However, after a peace agreement reached between Kinshasa and the CNDP on March 23, 2009, the Congress formally transformed into a political party, while Joseph Kabila remained in power. In 2011, the CNDP suffered a crushing defeat in parliamentary elections, while Kabila retained the presidency, even as virtually all support for him in the east collapsed. Trying to preempt another rebellion, he decided to redeploy former CNDP fighters, who had by then been “integrated” into the Congolese army, away from the east. At the same time, he moved to arrest their leader, Bosco Ntaganda[3], who had been wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2006. This strategy backfired, triggering a new rebellion and the birth of M23, named after the peace deal of 2009, which they claimed Kinshasa had violated. M23 started out small (around 300 fighters in April 2012) compared to its predecessor, the CNDP, it quickly followed in its footsteps and even captured Goma in November 2012. However, this was a step too far for the international community, which quickly mobilized efforts to crush M23 militarily. By 2013, the group had suffered an irreversible defeat—or so it seemed at the time. Paradoxically, however, it was not military pressure alone that led to M23’s downfall. After years of continuous conflict, the rebel leaders—who had transitioned from the RCD to the CNDP and then to M23—had lost much of their political credibility. While they claimed to defend the interests of Congolese Tutsis and protect them from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—a Hutu militia hostile to Tutsis and Kigali—in reality, their real struggle was internal as they competed for power among themselves (M23 changed leadership just one month into the rebellion) and became ever more dependent on Rwanda’s direct military support, which further eroded their local legitimacy and claims to autochthony. Their rhetoric was highly populist, filled with calls for a nationwide revolution, but it failed to address the real concerns of Congolese Tutsis. Military control never translated into political support. By 2013, they were isolated and crushed. The remnants of M23 retreated over the border into Rwanda. With M23 collapsing, its factions splintered into local militias, losing any ideological pretence but continuing to operate along ethnic and materialist lines. The presence of a growing number of armed factions in eastern Congo as well as their constant fracturing is one of the reasons why the conflict has such a complex mosaic to it. Adding to the complexity are the Wazalendo (“patriots” in Swahili)—quasi-governmental militias, some of whom originated from the old Mai-Mai militias that once fought the CNDP. While they may oppose M23, they are far from a unified front. Instead, they operate independently, often pursuing economic interests not too dissimilar from those of M23 and expanding their political clout at the local level. Some of their leaders, too, have been hit with international sanctions. Rather than trying to rein the Wazalendo in, the government in Kinshasa has tolerated their presence, effectively militarizing governance in the country’s east—preferring to co-opt their influence rather than risk another line of conflict. When Goma fell in 2012, it forced the DRC government into something it is now desperate to avoid: direct negotiations with M23. The Kampala Dialogue dragged on for about a year, but it was hardly a real political process. By the time an agreement was reached—where M23 renounced rebellion and agreed to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate—the group had already been militarily defeated and was no longer a real negotiating force, nor was it a pollical actor. The retreat of M23’s remnants into Rwanda only reinforced Kinshasa’s stance: there was no point in talking to a fractured and disorganized rebel group with no clear political vision. If any real negotiations were needed, they had to be with Rwanda, not M23. The group’s main goal had always been controlling the resources and getting the rent—for its leaders, this was about profits, not politics. Even for ordinary M23 fighters, ideology often took a backseat to personal loyalty toward commanders they had known since the CNDP days or before. Volcanoes and minerals In May 2021, Nyiragongo erupted again. While this was just a coincidence, by November 2021, M23 had risen “from the ashes.” Crossing over from Rwanda, they returned to North Kivu, just as they had in 2012, and began their operations in Rutshuru—a town 30 kilometers from Rwanda, home to both Tutsis and Hutus (many of whom had settled there after the Rwandan genocide). Controlling Rutshuru is rather lucrative, as the region holds one of the world’s largest deposits of pyrochlore (a niobium oxide essential for electronics, aerospace, defense and other industries) as well as several gold mines. Without diving into the complex web of connections, it is worth noting that niobium/tantalum became Rwanda’s fifth-largest export in 2022—making it the ninth-largest exporter globally (accounting for 3.35% of global exports and surpassing the DRC’s less than 2%). Thanks to volcanic activity, the provinces on Lake Kivu are especially rich in highly sought-after minerals. North Kivu alone holds deposits of tantalum, cassiterite, cobalt, tungsten, gold, diamonds, tourmalines and pyrochlore. The problem, however, is that mining here is anything but transparent. Most extraction is artisanal, lacking proper environmental, safety or any oversight. The world’s growing demand for critical minerals is only making things worse in eastern DRC. The country relies on mining for 35–40% of its government revenue, and the mining sector is a key pillar of economic growth. However, agreements with Kinshasa do not always guarantee real access to resources. Even within a single province, competing power structures—provincial politicians, the Congolese military, local armed groups, and rebels proxy-linked to the neighbour country—can all contest control over mining sites. Rather than declining, illicit mineral exports—regardless of how they flow—have only increased in recent years, as global demand for these minerals surges and more competition kicks in. Eastern DRC has an estimated 2,500 mining sites—each one sustaining local armed groups and ensuring that the cycle of conflict remains unbroken. Since 2021, the EU and the U.S. have taken a much more proactive stance on critical minerals as new policies were introduced, partnerships with countries like the DRC and Rwanda have been strengthened, and steps have been taken to secure supply chains for critical raw materials while also developing a joint procurement platform. Around the same time, M23 made its comeback. While no direct causal link can be established, it can be suggested that close ties between the West and Rwanda have at the very least given Kigali the confidence to act without major international backlash. It is also probable that Rwanda indirectly controls eastern DRC’s resources through M23, since the group’s successes heavily depend on Rwandan military and logistical support. If these assumptions are correct, Western powers may well see Rwanda as a more reliable and predictable partner—one that could secure their resource interests in the region, something Kinshasa has failed to do for years due to its geographical and political detachment from the conflict zone. However, the situation is more complex than it seems. As M23 expands the territory under its control, it is not just gaining land—it is also increasing its ability to tax local populations. In late 2023, estimates suggested that M23 was collecting around $69,500 per month through various forms of taxation. This steady cash flow, combined with subsistence farming and local trade, actually sustains M23’s daily operations far more than mineral resources do. Extracting value from minerals is a slow, complex and difficult-to-control process, making it a less immediate source of funding for the rebels. So, while minerals are undeniably a catalyst for conflict and something that attracts both regional and global players, they are not the main factor keeping M23 alive. It would be a mistake to view it as the sole driving force behind instability. Even if access to resource extraction were cut off, M23 would still find ways to profit from controlling eastern DRC—which means the conflict in eastern DRC will persist regardless of changes in the resource trade. Why is the conflict exploding now? After its resurgence, M23 has been playing a long game, slowly building momentum for a decisive push. Until the right conditions were in place, they pushed forward assertively but carefully—avoiding an escalation that could bring the same level of international scrutiny as in 2012–2013, when it led to their defeat. In May 2022, M23 tested the waters near Goma but was repelled by the Congolese army and UN peacekeepers. A month later, in June, they triggered a “small-scale” humanitarian crisis at Uganda’s border by seizing the town of Bunagana, forcing thousands to flee—including Congolese soldiers. This move allowed them to control trade routes between Uganda and the DRC, giving them a stronger foothold. By February 2023, they had captured Mushaki and Rubaya, securing control over mines that produce nearly half of the DRC’s coltan output. And the more territory they controlled, the stronger their ranks grew. Meanwhile, there were several failed attempts at diplomacy. In April 2022, the Congolese government agreed to direct talks with several rebel groups in Nairobi, but nothing came of them. In July 2022, Angola attempted to broker a ceasefire, but violations by both sides rendered it ineffective. March 2023 saw new peace agreements, but these quickly collapsed, too. By December 2023, negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda had failed, further escalating tensions in Kivu. At the same time, public frustration with the perceived inaction of UN peacekeepers reached a boiling point. In August 2022, protests erupted in Goma and surrounding areas, targeting MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission deployed since 1999, by far the most costly in UN history. That same month, the East African Community (EAC) deployed a regional task force, but it was stationed in South Kivu rather than North Kivu, where the crisis was most acute. Their presence often led to M23 not being fully removed, but simply repositioning and sometimes coexisting with peacekeepers, as seen in Bunagana. Many locals viewed troops from Burundi and Kenya as little different from the “occupiers” from M23. In the end, the Congolese government demanded the withdrawal of the EAC contingent by December 2023. That same month, after repeated appeals from DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to withdraw MONUSCO from South Kivu and scale down its activities in other provinces. By the end of 2024, the mission was set to be fully dismantled. For M23, this was the perfect storm. The failures of international peacekeeping efforts, along with the stagnation and futility of negotiations—regardless of the mediators or external pressures on Rwanda and the DRC—ultimately played into M23’s hands. Though internal divisions persisted within the group, they understood that their window of opportunity was approaching. The arrival of SADC peacekeepers—who replaced the EAC forces—did little to change things. South Africa, the largest contributor, has been unwilling to fully commit. Public opinion largely views the casualties among South African troops as unjustifiable, while the country’s military is perceivably lacking the necessary preparedness for operations of such complexity, as is the case for eastern Congo. Throughout 2024, M23 laid all the groundwork to make their rapid advance on Goma possible in January 2025. In February 2024, they seized Shasha, a critical choke point controlling access to Goma’s supply routes. Around the same time, they came close to capturing Saké, which they fully took over in 2025—though sporadic shelling never ceased. By May 2024, half of Masisi Territory was under their control. Looking at the maps tracking M23’s territorial expansion compared to their 2012 peak when they first took Goma, it becomes painfully clear: their march toward Goma was never a question of ‘if’—only ‘when.’ Source: IPIS It appears that M23—and quite so Rwanda—have learned critical lessons from their 2013 defeat. Back then, as previously noted, the movement lacked both a political leader and a clear agenda, aside from an empty call for revolution across the DRC. Now, however, a major political figure has entered the scene: Corneille Nangaa has arrived in Goma, now under M23’s control. Formerly the head of the DRC’s National Electoral Commission, he was the one who validated Félix Tshisekedi’s contested victory in the 2018 elections. However, by 2023, tensions with Tshisekedi escalated, leading Nangaa to break ranks and align himself with M23. For the movement, he represents their first national-level political figure, unaffiliated with the Tutsi. Moreover, Nangaa has his own vision for the conflict: “In Congo, we have a non-state. Where all the armed groups have sprung up, it's because there’s no state. We want to recreate the state.” This suggests that the endgame for the current iteration of the conflict could be about securing political power in Kinshasa. This, in turn, echoes the dynamics of the First Congo War. Meanwhile, international mediators continue to flounder. Turkey has been dismissed, Angola’s peace talks have gone nowhere, South Africa has suffered reputational damage that led to tensions with Rwanda, and France’s shuttle diplomacy has achieved little. The EAC and SADC emergency summits continue, but this all with little coordination or tangible impact—each actor is seemingly pursuing their own interests, hoping for a chance of breakthrough. In stark contrast, M23 has moved with confidence and clarity, seeking solid control over eastern DRC and now willing to install an ally (at least) in Kinshasa.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The conflict in the African Great Lakes region, which had long remained in a low-intensity state, flared up again in the second half of January 2025. In the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter – DRC), rebel forces of the anti-government group M23, fighting against the Armed Forces of the DRC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC), launched an offensive and captured new territories. As of January 27, M23 entered the city of Goma, the largest city in the province [1]. Moreover, the DRC authorities claim that the city is also occupied by regular units of the Rwandan Armed Forces [2]. The rebel offensive has triggered panic and an outflow of local residents as well as refugees – Goma had been a refuge for several hundred thousand displaced persons. There are casualties not only among civilians but also among the UN peacekeeping contingent (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO) and peacekeepers from the Southern African Development Community – Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SAMIDRC. The escalation of the conflict has been condemned by leading world powers and the United Nations – the UN Security Council has demanded an immediate ceasefire [3].  Rwanda plays a distinct role in these events. The Congolese rebel group M23 consists of ethnic Tutsis living in the DRC and aims to “ensure the rights of the Tutsi ethnic minority in the DRC” [4]. It was formed in 2012 and, after several military operations against government forces, ceased hostilities. However, in October 2022, M23 resumed military operations in North Kivu. The DRC government almost immediately accused Rwanda of fully supporting M23 — accusations that Rwanda has categorically denied and continues to deny to this day [5]. However, the United States and several European countries, citing intelligence reports, have openly stated that M23 is being used by Rwanda as a proxy force to conduct military operations in the eastern DRC [6]. The current fighting in North Kivu is a direct consequence of the failed attempt by the government of the Republic of Angola to mediate the peace process. The President of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, ran in the 2018 elections partly on a promise to achieve peace in the east of the country. However, throughout his time in office, he has failed to make any significant progress in this direction. In 2024, Angolan President João Lourenço proposed direct negotiations between the leaders of Rwanda and the DRC [7], which led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the two countries at the end of June 2024. However, further progress toward peace encountered a major obstacle: Tshisekedi categorically refused to recognize M23 as a participant in the negotiation process, stating that they are terrorists with whom direct dialogue is impossible [8]. Nevertheless, after a series of meetings between the foreign ministers of Angola, the DRC, and Rwanda, an agreement was reached that M23 representatives would still take part in the negotiations [9]. However, the trilateral summit in Luanda, scheduled for December 15, 2024, was canceled just days before it was set to take place. Both sides blamed each other for the meeting’s collapse [10]. As it now appears, the failed summit may have served as a starting point for M23's January offensive in North Kivu. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, Angola’s Foreign Minister, Téte António, during a working breakfast with members of the UN Security Council, called on the Council to continue its strong support for the negotiation process, effectively acknowledging that Angola’s efforts on this track had failed [11]. At the same time, Rwanda’s Foreign Minister, Olivier Nduhungirehe, speaking at the UN Security Council on counterterrorism issues, sharply criticized the DRC government, stating that “despite the direct and clear threat of terrorism, the DRC is trying to divert attention from addressing real problems” and accusing the DRC of distorting the actual situation in the east of the country [12]. Just days after these statements, M23 launched its offensive. It is important to note that the rebels launched their offensive well-prepared. As early as October 2024, reports emerged that revenue from the sale of minerals was bringing M23 at least $300 000 per month, which the rebels used to arm and equip their combat units. For more than a year, M23 has controlled mines in the Rubaya area of North Kivu — these deposits contain 15% of the world’s coltan reserves, a strategically critical mineral essential for high-tech industries [13]. At the same time, FARDC units stationed in the province suffered from supply shortages and demonstrated low combat readiness [14]. As a result, M23 forces rapidly broke through, capturing key cities in the province. Currently, M23 (and, as it is believed, the Rwandan army) has taken control of the cities of Sake and Goma — securing all key crossroads and roads in this part of North Kivu. Sake provides M23 with a route south to the Numbi mining region, which is rich in tin, tantalum, niobium, and tungsten [15]. If this region also falls to the rebels, the revenue from mineral extraction and sales will reach enormous levels, transforming M23 from a purely military force into a political power. Additionally, Goma is a port on Lake Kivu, and with access to watercraft, the rebels could launch amphibious operations anywhere along the northern shores of the lake, further expanding their controlled territory. The most enigmatic factor at the moment remains the behavior of Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Since the start of M23's offensive on Goma, his administration has not issued a single official statement. The last time Kagame commented on the situation in North Kivu was during a press conference on January 9, where he expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would take a more thoughtful and balanced approach to the conflict, considering all influencing factors [16]. On January 26, 2025, Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a press statement expressing deep concern over the renewed escalation and reaffirming its commitment to a political resolution [17]. Apart from this, there have been no high-level statements from Kigali. However, political experts from various countries unanimously agree that all Rwandan state institutions, particularly the armed forces, are under Kagame’s total control [18]. They assert that any involvement of the Rwandan military in the DRC conflict — whether confirmed or merely suspected — would be impossible without his direct order. The most likely assumption is that Rwandan President Paul Kagame has begun implementing his long-term strategy: creating a buffer zone in eastern DRC with the help of M23. This would not only push the border further away (currently, the distance from Kigali to the DRC border is 150 km) but also significantly improve Rwanda’s economic position. The buffer zone’s territory would provide Rwanda with abundant water, agricultural, and mineral resources [19]. Moreover, such a buffer zone would give Kagame additional leverage in future negotiations, as the territories occupied by M23 would be directly linked to the political resolution of the conflict. A new territorial reality has already been established in eastern DRC. For Angolan President João Lourenço, this is a highly unfavorable outcome — his bid to become a regional peacemaker has failed [20]. One possible reason for Lourenço’s failure is the loss of U.S. interest in the DRC conflict at the end of 2024. As some analysts suggest, “Once Washington stopped applying pressure, Rwanda realized there was nothing to fear and withdrew from the negotiation process” [21]. Now, the task of translating this territorial reality into diplomatic and political terms has been taken up by Kenyan President William Ruto. On January 27, he issued an official statement announcing that a meeting between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame would take place in the near future. If this meeting occurs and results in any agreements, it will mark a diplomatic success for Ruto and strengthen his position on the regional stage [22]. Notes: [1] Rwandan-backed rebels enter Congo's Goma in major escalation // https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-enter-centre-congos-goma-after-claiming-capture-city-2025-01-27/[2] DR Congo says Rwanda army in Goma // https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-says-rwanda-army-in-goma/a-71422564[3] Rebel Conflict in Congo Escalates with Capture of Goma // https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2025/january/goma-capture-congo-M23/[4] Luanda summit postponed: Kinshasa’s maneuvers to frustrate peace process // https://www.thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Luanda--summit--postponed%3A--Kinshasa%E2%80%99s--maneuvers--to--frustrate--peace--process_1626[5] Rwanda denies backing armed group in DRC // https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-militia-violence-3828930[6] Rwandan army ‘ready to invade DRC’ and help rebels seize city // https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jan/25/rwandan-army-ready-to-invade-drc-and-help-rebels-seize-city[7] Presidente angolano propõe diálogo directo entre Rwanda e RDC // https://angop.ao/noticias/politica/joao-lourenco-propoe-dialogo-directo-entre-rwanda-e-rdc/[8] Avancée du M23: Discours de Félix Tshisekedi (Intégralité) // https://actualite.cd/2022/11/04/avancee-du-m23-discours-de-felix-tshisekedi-integralite[9] POSTPONEMENT OF LUANDA SUMMIT DUE TO UNRESOLVED CRITICAL ISSUES // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/postponement-of-luanda-summit-due-to-unresolved-critical-issues[10] Emergency ministerial meeting on the current escalation of the conflict in Eastern DRC // https://amaniafrica-et.org/emergency-ministerial-meeting-on-the-current-escalation-of-the-conflict-in-eastern-drc/[11] Angola Aims for UN Security Council Support On DRC Issue // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230042.html[12] Africa: Rwanda Proposes Five Steps to Reinforce Africa's Counter-Terrorism Effort // https://allafrica.com/stories/202501230067.html[13] M23 rebel roup generates approximately $300,000 a month from mining-UN // https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/01/m23-rebel-group-generates-approximately-300000-a-month-from-mining-un//[14] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[15] Petrology and Detail Geological Mapping of the Precambrian Basement Rocks of the Sn-Ta-Nb Numbi Deposit, Democratic Republic of the Congo // https://www.iieta.org/journals/eesrj/paper/10.18280/eesrj.090102[16] Africa’s anticipation of Trump’s foreign policy // https://en.igihe.com/politics-48/article/africa-s-anticipation-of-trump-s-foreign-policy[17] STATEMENT ON SITUATION IN EASTERN DRC // https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/statement-on-situation-in-eastern-drc[18] The Case Against Rwanda's President Paul Kagame // https://www.newsweek.com/case-against-rwandas-president-paul-kagame-63167[19] What does Rwanda want in the DRC? // https://www.egmontinstitute.be/what-does-rwanda-want-in-the-drc/[20] Thousands uprooted as Congo M23 rebels near Goma in major advance // https://www.yahoo.com/news/thousands-uprooted-congo-m23-rebels-105837754.html[21] Advancing M23 Fighters In DR Congo Aided By Rwanda Backing, Army Weakness // https://www.barrons.com/news/advancing-m23-fighters-in-dr-congo-aided-by-rwanda-backing-army-weakness-f021df51[22] Rwanda, Congo presidents to meet as rebels take Goma, Kenya's leader says // https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-congo-presidents-to-meet-as-rebels-take-goma-kenya-leader-says-/7952210.html

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Conflict hotspots and democratic instability are the major challenges facing a continent that now everyone in the world wants to partner with. In these, which will be the first articles of the year, we aim to reflect on 2025, a key year to consolidate Africa's growing importance in global geopolitics, a trend that has been evident in the last two years. A key point: we are just days away from the inauguration of an unleashed Donald Trump* in international relations. It will be crucial to observe how he handles his ties with Africa and how African countries react in a world marked by populism, far-right politics, and the decline of multilateral organizations. This weakens global consensus and reduces the prominence of Human Rights in increasingly polarized international debates, marked by disinformation and noise. Today, I will address the main challenges and threats facing the continent, from a more security-oriented perspective, including the main active and potential conflicts. Next week, I will take a more positive approach, focusing on the opportunities, even in this uncertain global scenario. Sudan: The worst humanitarian catastrophe in the least mediated war Sudan is facing the worst humanitarian catastrophe today, with over 150,000 deaths, millions of displaced people and refugees since the civil war began in April 2023. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has left 24 million people facing food insecurity and triggered a cholera outbreak, accounting for 10% of the global humanitarian needs despite representing less than 1% of the world's population. In 2025, the outlook remains bleak. The supply of weapons and fuel by Russia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates fuels the conflict, while the lack of political will between the SAF and RSF blocks any progress toward peace. Without a drastic change in international intervention, Sudan will remain trapped in a cycle of war, hunger, and global neglect. The conflict in Sudan is so complex that it is impossible to clearly define who the aggressors and the victims are, unlike in Ukraine or Palestine. In a world of simplification and misinformation, these complexities are overlooked, which explains why Sudan receives so little attention. Sahel In 2025, Sahel faces growing political instability and jihadist violence. Coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have led to the formation of the Sahel Alliance (AES), an anti-Western military bloc seeking to consolidate its authority. However, it must gain legitimacy both with citizens and international institutions while managing crises in governance, development, and security. In this context, the region's stability and regional influence will depend on its relationship with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (it is expected that in the coming days or weeks, the definitive rupture and exit** of the three countries from this West African economic bloc will be official), the African Union (which is also undergoing elections and renewal of its leaders) and foreign powers. Russia's growing presence, especially through the previously known Wagner Group (now Africa Corps), further complicates the dynamics in the Sahel. Moscow has filled the void left by France's withdrawal and the diminished influence of the EU, offering military support to the juntas in exchange for expanding its geopolitical influence (while also taking large amounts of gold to finance its invasion of Ukraine). However, the activities of Russian soldiers have been linked to human rights abuses, which could exacerbate social tensions and the delegitimization of military governments. It is a complicated moment, with a context of reinforcing the anti-Western narrative in the region (Senegal and Ivory Coast have already joined the call for the French to withdraw their troops from the military bases they still maintain in those countries) while consolidating the military juntas' dependence on external actors, rather than strengthening their state capabilities. The rise of jihadist organizations and the resulting violence remain the biggest security challenge for the region. Factors such as poverty, corruption, and state weakness perpetuate the influence of these groups, which have shown a remarkable ability to adapt and fund themselves through the exploitation of local resources and illicit activities. The withdrawal of international forces has left a security vacuum that not only facilitates the expansion of their territorial and social control but also increases their recruitment capacity, as they become the only option for some young people to find a way to support themselves. We thus have a prolonged Sahel crisis ahead, with all the implications it holds for the migration scenario along the so-called Atlantic Route, now primarily driven by young Malians fleeing the instability caused by jihadism and government breakdown. At the same time, we must remain attentive to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, whose control should be a concern for us. Other conflicts We must not forget that there are other points on the African continent that we must remain constantly alert to. Here, telegraphically, we highlight the main ones: Somalia The humanitarian crisis in Somalia remains one of the most complex in the world, exacerbated by internal conflicts, clan violence, and recurring climate disasters. In 2024, more than 4.5 million people in 20 districts were affected by insecurity and clashes, including over seventy clashes between clans since June, which caused the displacement of nearly 395,000 people. Additionally, military operations against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab and protection incidents related to displacement, which exceeded 11,000 between January and October 2024, are worsening the situation. Climate change has increased the country's vulnerability, with devastating events such as the 2020-2023 drought and the 2023 Deyr floods, which caused damages estimated at $176.1 million in 16 districts. The combination of conflicts and climate crises continues to undermine the country's recovery and development efforts. Democratic Republic of the Congo The DRC faces a critical stage in 2025, marked by the intensification of armed conflicts and severe food insecurity. Tensions in North Kivu, due to the advance of the M23/AFC group, and the increased military presence in provinces such as Maniema and Mai-Ndombe, threaten to cause massive displacement of people. Additionally, the concerning projections from United Nations agencies (FAO and WFP) on acute food insecurity foresee a significant deterioration for the most vulnerable populations in the country. Ethiopia Following the war between the central Ethiopian government and the northern Tigray region, Ethiopia has not yet closed the chapter on active conflicts, as it remains embroiled in a violent internal conflict, this time led by militia groups from the Amhara and Oromia regions. There are also concerns about the return of political hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  —-*Article was written before Trump’s inauguration, which was on January 20, 2025**Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso formally exited ECOWAS on January 29, 2025.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The countries of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States continue to strengthen their sovereignty and their alignment with Pan-African values and a multipolar world. This development has deeply unsettled Western regimes and their agents on the African continent. The growing integration of the member states of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States (Alliance-Confédération des Etats du Sahel, AES) – namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – has reached a new level. The regional Pan-African organisation now has its own logo and motto. The motto is particularly symbolic: One Territory, One People, One Destiny. Today, Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey are not only reviving the dreams of the forefathers of Pan-African values but are also bringing to life the aspirations of great African leaders and millions of African citizens. In doing so, they are giving additional momentum to these projects. Naturally, this does not sit well with the puppets and subcontractors of the Western planetary minority on the continent, nor with their masters. The AES Project: A Nightmare for the West When the Alliance of Sahel States was established – now formalised as a confederation of three nations within the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) – the interests of the Western planetary minority suffered a significant blow, not only in the Sahel but across the African continent. This shift was reflected in the neighbouring state of Chad’s decision to demand the withdrawal of the French military contingent. At the same time, public sentiment in several African nations has increasingly called for the removal of the remnants of Western neocolonialism from their lands. But the setbacks for French and Western interests did not end there. Senegal, whose authorities have yet to fully determine their strategic direction in foreign policy, also announced the conclusion of French military presence on its soil. Most ironically, even in Côte d’Ivoire – where one of the last openly pro-Western regimes in Africa remains in power – statements have been made suggesting that French troops will eventually leave the country. However, in Côte d’Ivoire, this move appears more like a tactical manoeuvre aimed at temporarily appeasing the widespread anti-French and anti-Western sentiment among a large segment of the population. Meanwhile, in the same Côte d’Ivoire, the military presence of the leader of the Western bloc – the Washington regime – continues to expand. Nevertheless, in all these processes, there is no doubt today that the AES countries, allies of Russia and the multipolar world, have played and will continue to play a key role. They enjoy the support of millions, not only among the citizens of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger but also across many other countries in the region and Africa as a whole. Notably, in addition to the military and economic alliance of the Alliance-Confederation of Sahel States, the union is becoming significantly stronger in the media and information space. Recently, the communication ministers of the three countries approved the creation of a joint union internet television platform, as well as a shared television channel and radio station. This is a highly strategic decision that will enable maximum outreach, covering urban populations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and neighbouring states, as well as the African diaspora living abroad. Crucially, it also aims to reach residents of remote rural regions, where radio often remains the most effective means of accessing information. The plan has been thoroughly thought out, leaving no detail overlooked. Importantly, the AES countries are also taking effective measures to counter Western propaganda. It is no coincidence that amidst these developments, anxiety is growing not only among Western powers – unable to dismantle the genuinely Pan-African AES alliance – but also within regional structures such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), where pro-Western interests remain strong. It is worth recalling that the AES member states announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS at the beginning of last year. However, ECOWAS has been reluctant to lose such significant members and is actively trying to persuade them to reconsider their decision. AES as a Reliable Ally of a Multipolar World Order Regional structures like ECOWAS, where Western influence still wields significant power, are acutely aware that African public opinion is largely not in their favour. The continued rise of AES could logically lead to a scenario where former ECOWAS members seek membership in AES. Consequently, this may eventually result in the dissolution of organisations like ECOWAS. In this context, those in Africa who still serve the neocolonial interests of the Western planetary minority understand their fate well. They recognise that there will be no place for them in the new African realities of a multipolar world. However, this does not mean that supporters of the multipolar world order can afford to become complacent. Quite the contrary. Given the radically revanchist sentiments of Western-NATO regimes, which are losing not only geopolitical influence in Africa but also their near-cost-free access to Africa’s strategic resources, and considering the growing unease among Western puppets and subcontractors on the continent who fear being left without a role, it is essential to remain fully prepared to counter any new attempts at Western destabilisation. Supporters of the multipolar world must continue their advance. Today, the position of Pan-African and multipolar world advocates in Africa is stronger than ever. This is partly due to the presence of patriotic leaders – in the case of AES, military officers guided by the hopes and expectations of their citizens. It is also bolstered by strategic support from Russia and China, leading forces of the multipolar world order. Moreover, the mass mobilisation of civil society and African youth plays a critical role – a force against which Soros-linked and other Western agents of chaos remain utterly powerless.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract Religious extremism and radicalization have dominated the discourse on the causes of terrorism. However, little is written of other drivers of terrorism, such as economic and social deprivations, which could prompt religious groups to resort to terrorism. Scholars have sufficiently analyzed the imports of radical ideological and religious views on the emergence of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. By contrast, the Seleka and anti-Balaka terrorists of the Central African Republic introduces a new perspective to the explanation of terrorism. This essay uses the analytical framework of abnormality and State fragility to discuss the rise of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The essay argues that the historical precedent of State failure and weak institutions provides a catalyst that propels the use of terrorism by religious groups, the state and organized groups to demand political and economic dividends as well as a tool for power contestations and regime change. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and building nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. They include the transformation of the subsistence farming culture to a masses-driven cash crop economy for exportation, which will manage state fragility and promote civil-military counter-terrorism culture at the grassroots. IMPACT STATEMENT Terrorism is one of the greatest threats to human security and the survival of the state in the 21st century. Since the 9/11 bombings, scholars and policymakers have committed significant resources to unpack the causes and course of terrorism. In this paper, we look away from the prevailing drivers of terrorism such as religious radicalisation and offer another lens through which policymakers and framers of counter-terrorism operations can view the use of terrorism by religious groups, individuals, and non-state actors within a state. The paper argued that where a state is unable to fulfil its social contract with the citizens, such a state permits its citizens to use terrorism as a tool to derive the benefit which the state failed to provide. The paper draws instances from the trajectories of the Balaka and Anti-Seleka terrorist groups operating in the Central Africa Republic. Introduction Terrorism has become a fundamental problem for individuals, groups and the state to manage in different parts of the globe. The growing nature of terrorism has made terrorists strong actors in national politics and international relations. The contemporary world records the increasing influence of terrorists. This has become true in the relations between Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran and other countries of the Middle East. Ironically, the multiplier effect is manifested in protest and politics across American universities and transportation of goods across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Studies on terrorism have linked the increasing use of terror by organized groups and States to ethnic, ideological, political, and religious factors (Schmid, Citation1998; Shultz, Citation1978). Essentially, the discourse on religiously motivated terrorism, although controversial and problematic, is prevalent particularly following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaida, and Boko- Haram (Jackson, Citation2012, p. 1). Elu and Price (Citation2014) linked terrorism in Africa to deprivation. Cilliers (Citation2001) argued that the root causes of terrorism and conflict in Africa include climate change, competition over resources, marginalization of the majority and global militarism. Nevertheless, critical terrorism studies have shown that more than the religiously and ideologically motivated use of terror by organized groups; the state also uses terrorism to drive its political objectives, especially against opposition groups (Lacqueur, Citation2001; Jackson et al., 2015). This study contributes to scholarship on how State failure and weak political institutions provide a catalyst that crystallizes the use of terrorism by religious and organized groups in demanding political dividends and power contestation. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. While Okereke et al. (Citation2016) study is in line with the position of this study, particular focus is on the unique nature of terrorism in CAR. It is this nature of state fragility that has weakened the ability of the state in CAR to provide other necessary societal conditions, resources, social amenities and developments that are needed to curb or eliminate terrorism. For instance, the inability of the state to provide and fund sustainable, functional education has created a society where people can easily be brainwashed to join terror sects. Again, the fragile nature of the CAR state has also undermined its ability to generate sustainable employment and a vibrant economy where a greater per cent of the citizenry could engage in small and medium-scale enterprises or engage in meaningful economic activities that would deny them the idleness that pushes them to terror activities. The place of ethnic, identity and ideological factors in driving terrorism cannot be neglected in CAR. This is because it is the fusion of state fragility and the advanced nature of ethnicity that drove the country into full-fledged terrorism as against mere ethnic crisis, thereby creating the absurdity that ethnic tension has become a driver of terrorism. The connection between economics, education and terrorism is deeply connected. In short, when the three factors are weak in a particular environment like CAR, and they become inflamed with religious fundamentalism, terrorism will be ignited in a very deadly form. The same factor played an active role in the mobilization of men and women who joined the Boko Haram terror sect in Nigeria (Ani kelechi et al., Citation2018). This is because the etymology of the word Boko Haram emanates from the traditional Hausa idea in the colonial era, which conceptualized and projected Western education (Boko) as a sin (Haram). Thus, the uneducated masses in North Eastern Nigeria did not desire further schooling to join a sect that was fighting for a hitherto historic ideology (Kukah, Citation2009). The position of Kukah (Citation2009) was also captured by Zenn et al. (Citation2013), who also linked local grievances to ideology (that was dominant in CAR) and internal politics of Nigeria in developing the study on terrorism. It should be noted that the concept of terrorism has evolved, and the precise meaning has remained contentious and exacerbated (Adibe, Citation2020; Ramsay, Citation2015). Puccetti (Citation2021) has argued that failing states create conditions for fostering terrorism. However, he has maintained that not all failing states experience the emergence of terrorism. Gaibulloev et al. (Citation2024) studied how terrorist groups survive in failed states. They maintain that in a state that is failing, terrorist groups easily survive. However, these studies did not particularly focus their analysis on the Central African Republic. The structural weakness and failure of the state have remained the major drivers of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The central objective of the study is to evaluate the place of state fragility and abnormality in the development of terrorism in the Central African Republic. The key research question is, to what extent is terrorism in the Central African Republic a function of state fragility and abnormality? The situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) represents a new dimension to the motivation for terrorism among organized groups. The CAR is one of Africa’s most economically viable states, but it repeatedly scores at the bottom of global development indices (World Bank, 2020: Boas, Citation2014). Economic and political development in the country remains, at best, a paradox because the poverty rate, inequality, and underdevelopment in the country, do not correlate with the country’s rich natural and human resources. With large-scale unemployment, poverty, terrorism, insurgency, maritime piracy, trafficking, increased insecurity, and delayed economic and political reform and integration, the CAR presents an example of an abnormal and fragile state in Africa. The absence of a standing state security apparatus means that the state does not have a monopoly on national force and security. As a result of weak political institutions, contestation to State power and regime change is a function of a ‘group’s ability to exert a higher degree of terror (Crescent, 2018, p. 8). It is this failed political, economic and security environment that triggers the proliferation of terrorism in the CAR. The study was developed using secondary data sourced from journals and books. The analysis of earlier scholars was sourced thematically and used to enrich the content of the study. This paper is significant because it breaks away from the simplistic explanation of terrorism in CAR as a mere religious and ideological phenomenon. It interrogates how an impoverished population can possess the capability for terrorism and contributes to the argument of state-sponsored terrorism. The paper argues that the insufficiencies of State institutions, a poor economy, and a security apparatus in disarray permit the use of terrorism by an impoverished population to demand political accountability and change. The argument of the paper is structured in two parts. The first part provides an overview of the CAR, clarifies and critiques the concepts of terrorism, state fragility, and abnormality, and the second part analyses the linkages between terrorism and state fragility and abnormality in CAR and concludes. Conceptual clarification terrorism versus state fragility and abnormality terrorism There is no precise definition of the concept of terrorism. The varying use of the concept by scholars, policymakers, and observers to create the desired political effect, the attempt to determine what fits and does not fit as terrorism, and efforts to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence make the concept difficult to define (Shimid, 1998, Weinberg et al., Citation2004). As a ‘contested ‘concept’, terrorism has been variously defined. Lacqueur (Citation1999) has argued that there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution in the character of terrorism. The new terrorist represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the familiar traditional terrorist groups (Hoffman, Citation1999). Terrorism covers the manipulation of fear to attain defined goals. Traditionally, terrorists target the killing of great political figures to ignite massive reactions like the killing of Archduke Ferdinand. However, during colonial rule in Africa, the imperial administrators were increasingly accusing Africans who challenged their exploitative rule as terrorists. This was the case with Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and the Zikist movement in Nigeria, among other nationalist movements that employed radical ideologies towards decolonization. However, the reality is that terrorism and terrorists change in form, scope and dynamics. They are more organised, strategic, and focused on unleashing harm and threats to individuals, groups, and states. While several scholars present terrorists as men and women who are irrational in their decisions, the reality is that terrorists are radicalized to rationally manipulate fear and violence to achieve certain goals that are set out by the protagonists of the terror onslaught (Ani & Uwizeyimana, Citation2021). The complexity in conceptualizing terrorism in CAR and many parts of Africa like Nigeria made Ramsay (Citation2015) to argue that terrorism should not be defined. Okereke et al. (Citation2016) identify state fragility, porous borders, armed conflicts and ungoverned spaces as facilitators of terrorism in Africa. Notwithstanding, Alex Schmid gave a popular definition of the concept. According to him, Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the primary targets (Schmid, 1988, p. 28). Furthermore, the above definition captured the orthodox perspective of terrorism as an act of State and non-state actors. Nonetheless, the definition follows the traditional explanation that terrorism is ideologically, religiously, and politically motivated. It undermined how weak political and economic institutions in a State could permit the use of terrorism to demand social and economic development and reforms by groups (Ani & Osisioma, Citation2014). Such uses of terrorism often have a clear target selection. In such situations, the persistent use of terrorism is aided by weak political and economic structures and intended to coerce the government to improve the economic and social life of the people (Ani & Chukwu, Citation2014; Anikelechi et al., Citation2018). In turn, the government uses terrorism in the absence of strong state security institutions for counterterrorism operations (Ani & Uzodike, Citation2015). Similarly, the absence of a strong political and state security institution permits the sponsorship of terrorism by external actors for their economic interests (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). Evidence of this type of terrorism is found in the Central African Republic, where religious groups form a coalition and use terrorism to demand economic and political dividends from the government. The next section of the essay will conceptualize State fragility and abnormality as a driver of terrorism in Central Africa. The weakness of the state, therefore, creates a sustainable environment for terrorism to strive. When the state is weak, and the machinery of the state cannot effectively deliver on its expected targets of providing the needs of the masses and guaranteeing the security of lives and properties, it naturally creates a lacuna that manifests in what is generally referred to as the ungoverned spaces. This is a collection of areas that are not under active state control, experience partial state control, or have a relatively weak presence of the rule of law (Bernard & Daful, Citation2021; Gov.UK, n.d.). It is this causal relationship between the nature of the state in the Central African Republic and the rise of terrorism that worsened the conditions for the security of lives and properties in the country. These ungoverned spaces are further occupied directly and indirectly by terror actors. Moreover, from these ungoverned space, they begin to launch their influence into other parts of the country and beyond. Downey (Citation2021) maintained that the United States’ war on terror did not deter ungoverned spaces in Africa. State fragility and abnormality As with terrorism, the concept of state fragility is complex and lacks a precise definition. Although a novel concept in development policy, the concept has been variously defined. The United Kingdom Department for International Development uses the term to describe the failure or lack of will and capacity by a State to perform its core functions and responsibilities to the citizens (DFID, 2005). According to the World Bank, fragile States are low-income countries scoring below 3.2 and below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. It applies to states that have higher tendencies to fail in their economic, security, and political obligations to their citizens (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 1). As a result, there is a prevailing atmosphere of poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, insecurity, weak institutional frameworks, lack of territorial control, and a high propensity to conflict and civil war (OECD, Citation2012, Citation2014). A state is described as fragile when there is an increase in poverty and economic decline, with State institutions incapable of handling civilian grievances arising from inequality in the distribution of wealth, representation, and access to public institutions (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 7). It should be noted that these main characteristics of state fragility are widespread in Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and CAR. These states share widespread poverty as a visible status of the economy among their citizens. Again, the nature of their insecurity is widespread within the sovereign state. Unfortunately, the managers of these states focus on advancing their exploitation of state resources, thereby creating opportunities for Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to advertise their quest for followership using social media and, in some cases, declaring dominance over some specified ungoverned spaces within the country (Mutambara et al., Citation2022). The difference among these sects is that Al Shabab survives on sea piracy in the Gulf of Guinea more than any other source of economy when compared to the terrorists in CAR (Anyika et al., Citation2022). Again, while Boko Haram and Al Shabab make use of social media to advertise and advance their network, economy, training and resources with international jihadi fighters and terrorist groups, terrorism in CAR is relatively domesticated (Anikelechi et al., Citation2018) In the Central African Republic, the income level of the masses remains low due to a weak national economy. There is a lack of bubbling production units and companies that could enhance mass production for commercial purposes and export earnings in general. The prevailing atmosphere of poverty and widespread unemployment and underemployment ensures that the society is prone to the negative influence of foreign terror sponsors as well as exposes the masses to the culture of exploitation by those who use their minimal resources to attract the frustrated poor and unemployed into the world of terrorism. The nature of the national geography also gives an advantage towards the expansion of insecurity and terror attacks within the country. Similarly, the concept of State abnormality is novel; the word is used in this paper to describe a State with full prospects and potential in terms of human and natural resources for development and economic growth but lacking in the human initiative and capacity to drive necessary developments and growth. In other words, the natural and economic resources in an abnormal State do not match the level of progress in all ramifications. An abnormal state is, therefore, a State riddled with developmental paradoxes. It is worth noting that all fragile and abnormal states are prone to and riddled with conflicts and threats of violence (Eugene, Citation2020). Moreover, scholars do not agree on the exact indices or parameters for measuring State fragility and abnormality. There is controversy over how the concept is operationalized and who sets the parameters for measuring fragility and abnormality (Ferreira, Citation2015, p. 2). However, Besley and Persson argue that in a fragile and abnormal State, there is the pathology of State ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and raising revenues or political violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict or even both pathologies are present at the same time (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Similarly, the World Bank uses the CPIA ratings based on Economic Management, Structural Policies, Social Inclusion and Equity Policies, and Public Sector Management and Institutions to measure fragile States. Moreover, the Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity observed three major features of fragile States – authority, service, and legitimacy failures (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Nonetheless, an overview of the working definitions of different organizations and agencies proposed above reveals three basic variables in measuring fragile and abnormal States. This paper has classified these three variables as legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps based on the core functions of the state. For this paper, the fragile state and abnormality of the state will be measured based on the existence of some legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps in the Central African Republic. Discussion on Terrorism in CAR: The State Fragility and Abnormality Linkages Geographically, the Central African Republic is located at the centre of the African continent. The country’s current borders were established by the French during the scramble and partition of Africa in the late 19th century. Because of its central location, the CAR shares boundaries with multiple countries within the Central African region of the African continent; these countries include Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan. The country covers an area of 622,984 sq. km with a population of about 4.7 million (BBC Africa, 2018). The country is made up of over 80 ethnic nationalities of varying sizes in both land areas of concentration and number and with distinct languages (Alusala, 2017, p. 11). Economically, the Central African Republic is endowed with natural resources, including uranium, oil, gold, diamonds, and timber, as well as a huge potential for hydroelectric power. However, these resources have not been properly harnessed, and the little activity that exists does not generate much income for the state as it is dominated by foreign powers that align with some privileged politicians to exploit them for their selfish interests (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 4). The country came under colonial domination in 1899 and attained political independence from France on 12 July 1960 (Alusala, 2017, p. 13). Statistics show that since 2013, the country has witnessed over 29 terrorist activities by both state and non-state actors resulting in over 1764 deaths and about 851 injured (World Data, Citation2020). The legitimacy gap is a key feature of fragile and abnormal States. Legitimacy gaps describe the institutional instability undermining public decision-making processes’ predictability, transparency, and accountability (Andersen & Engberg-Pedersen, Citation2008). Legitimacy gaps exist in a state where the electoral process that produces political leaders is compromised, tele-guided, or subverted, leading to the emergence of unpopular leaders who execute elitist policies. In such a system, the pervasive inconsistency in the process of regime change permits the use of force, violence, or threats in the acquisition and consolidation of State power. As a consequence, compliance with the state is achieved by force, violence, or threat of it (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, Citation2005, p. 9). The use of violence guarantees that the state maintains an advantage over other armed groups and legitimizes its grip on power (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). The use of terrorism by organized groups and the state in CAR is linked to the fact that there is no clear electoral approach to acquiring State power. At independence in 1960, the government of David Dacko institutionalized the one-party system to maintain its grip on power and whittle down opposition groups. This gave rise to pockets of political crises and protests, which were met with autocracy, kidnapping, and torture of protesters by State security agents (Le Vine, Citation1968, p. 12). Similarly, the second President, Jean-Bidal Bokasso, dissolved the parliament in 1976 and declared himself Emperor for the life of the CAR. His regime was characterized by torture, assassination, and oppression of political opponents, including the murder of over 100 demonstrating school children. Furthermore, when General Andre Kolingba seized power in 1981, he used State machinery to suppress and detain oppositions groups that supported a democratic system in the country. This use of force, violence, and intimidation by leaders to attain or sustain political power created the legitimacy gap that triggered terrorism by the Seleka and Anti-Balaka coalitions in the CAR. Consequently, legitimacy gaps in the country precipitated external/State sponsors of terrorism in CAR. For instance, the French government provided arms and support for the regime of Jean-Bidal Bokasso, who was willing to cut off economic and political relations with China and subsequently for the Anti-Balaka groups against the Selekas in 2013 following the overthrow of the Balaka-led government. Similarly, neighbouring countries like Chad and Sudan continue to support rebel leaders who agree to protect their economic interests (Congressional Research Group, Citation2024). For instance, in 2003, Chadian President Idriss Déby provided support for the Anti-Balaka leader Francoise Bozize, who overthrew Ange-Felix Pattasse. However, in 2013, Deby switched his support for the Seleka leader Michel Djotodia to replace Bozize. Consequently, in 2014, Derby used his militia to stand down the government of Djotodia and airlifted the entire CAR government to N’Djamena, where Catherine Samba-Panza was elected as the President of the transitional government (Lombard, Citation2014). The externalization of legitimacy in the CAR was effectively perfected during the colonial era. There was no unified system of political administration in CAR under the French colonial administration. The French leased the territory to private companies to run for their profit (Marima, Citation2014). In the absence of a unifying force for all peoples within the colony, colonial resistance was coordinated along ethnic lines, leading to the emergence of a multifarious coalition of ethnic groups who struck deals with concessionary companies to replace the French colonial officials (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). By leasing out different parts of the country to private companies to administer, the colonialists had given room for the privatization of state force, interference by foreign powers, and the proliferation of different armed groups with different ideologies of independence. The system has continued since independence and has created what Knoope and Buchanan-Clarke described as: A system whereby CAR politicians are often more concerned with the personal relationships they hold with these outside sources of power than with fulfilling their social contract with CAR citizens. This has resulted in a weak state that has little legitimacy to govern beyond the capital. (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Notwithstanding the introduction of a multi-party system in 1993, successive leaders of the country have failed to sustain the system as a legitimate means of political transition. Rather, it was characterized by meeting the personal ambition of the leaders, intent on staying in power, destroying the opposition, and ensuring their political interests (Siradag, Citation2016, p. 5). Consequently, a well-functioning state must possess the capacity to deliver certain public goods that improve the lives of its citizens as well as provide infrastructure that stimulates economic growth and development (Stewart & Brown, Citation2009). Fragile and abnormal states are remarkable for their lack of capacity to stimulate economic growth and development and a high dependence on foreign aid (Besley & Persson, Citation2011). Capacity gaps in the Central African Republic can be seen from the inability of the government to provide basic amenities for its citizens. Since the country gained independence in 1960, successive governments have failed to establish state institutions that provide social, economic, and political dividends to the people (Sıradag, 2017, p. 1, International Crisis Group, Citation2017). Over half of the country’s 4.6 million people depend on UN humanitarian aid, the highest recipient of UN aid destinations globally (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). The public sector in CAR since independence is characterized by deplorable working conditions, absence of educational opportunities for children, large-scale corruption, mismanagement of public finances, irregular payment of salaries, a lack of sanitation, absence of educational opportunities for children, and permanent insecurity (Boas Citation2014. This situation not only questions the capacity of successive CAR governments but also increases the disillusionment towards government officials. Amidst economic resources, the country ranks as one of the least developed and poorest in the world. Per capita, the national income is a meagre $774, and about 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (Trading Economics, Citation2018). A report by Conciliation Resources showed that the country’s debt tripled to 1.8 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2011. The study further revealed various anomalies in the execution of projects, ranging from corruption and embezzlement of project money to compromised accounting procedures and a lack of vigilance. The CAR is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2016, economic growth in the country slowed from 5 percent to 4.4 percent (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, only 10 of the 460 industries that operated in the country in the 1970s are functional. The only university in the country with a capacity of 1000 students has more than 20,000 students (Paul-Crescent et al. Citation2018, p. 8). These negative functional indicators suggest that the country is not just fragile but also abnormal because it lacks the initiative and capacity to harness its resources. Moreover, the use of terrorism by the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka groups is not aligned with religious identity but with the government’s inability to bridge the socio-economic inequalities in the country (Conflict Scan, Citation2017, p. 3). Successive governments in the country perpetrated inequality in the distribution of infrastructure between the Muslims who dominated the northern region and the Christians who dominated the southern region. Economic marginalization and neglect suffered in these regions provided a background for the use of terrorism by the northerners under the Seleka coalition to demand a fair share of the national resources and control of State power. For instance, the provinces of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto suffered marginalization and neglect as successive governments failed to establish schools, hospitals, roads, and general infrastructure. This led to the emergence of rebel groups who began to launch an attack on government facilities, taking hostages and seeking to take over power to protect their interests (International Crisis Reports, 2017). Furthermore, the replacement of the National Armed Forces with private security created security gaps in the CAR, which permitted the continued use of terrorism by both the State and organized groups (Global Security, Citation2020). When President Bozize came to power in 2003, he established a presidential guard made up of Chadian mercenaries to protect his government. Subsequently, successive governments have continued to maintain private securities at the expense of the national armed forces. The absence of a national security agency for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens means that the state is not the only legitimate monopoly of force. By maintaining private security, the state can carry out successful acts of terrorism against opposition groups. The anti-Balaka group was one of the groups mobilized by the Bozize government in 2003 to provide security for rural communities (CAR Briefing, Citation2014). However, following the rise of the Seleka coalition, he reactivated them in 2013 to protect his administration and help keep him in power till the general elections scheduled for 2016 (Kah, Citation2014, p. 9). Anti-balaka terrorism resulted in the ethnic cleansing of members of the Seleka coalition and created massive refugee crises and internal displacement (Amnesty International, Citation2014). This privatization of State security paved the way for foreign intervention and the upsurge of militia armed groups who perpetrate violence to secure State power, unleash vendetta as well as protect their members. The composition of these groups is constantly changing but is often made up of self-defence militia, highway robbers, and former members of the security and defence force. Between 2002 and 2017, 14 armed groups were identified (International Crises Group, 2017). Similarly, France, Chad, and Cameroon, among other foreign powers, have at one time or another, armed one group or another to protect their geo-strategic and economic interests in the CAR (Boas Citation2014),). In 2013, following serial bombings and killings which resulted in the death of over 2000 civilians, the Seleka, backed by Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, under Michel Djotodia usurped State power from the Christian-led government (International Crisis Group, Citation2017, p. 7). In a retaliatory move, the Anti Balaka began its reign of terror to counter the Seleka coalition. The Anti-balaka group did not start as a religious group but emerged out of the need to provide security to the population; they were motivated by their thirst for revenge (Kah, Citation2014, p. 36). The absence of government security forces in the peripheral and geostrategic areas of the country including Bocaranga, Ndassima, Yassine paved the way for rebel groups to control the rich mineral resources of the region while using revenue generated from the resources to finance their operations (African Union, Citation2018; Lombard, Citation2014). Added to failed security architecture is the question of State dispensation of justice and equity and asses to the State justice system. The State justice system has been subverted and hijacked by some members of the state who maneuver and manipulate the system to serve their selfish interests and intimidate opposition groups (Kah, Citation2014, p. 37, Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018). Basic institutions such as the Office of the Prosecutor, the tribunals, the gendarmerie, the Police, and the prison services are not operational in most parts of the country (Amnesty International, Citation2014). Conversely, it is imperative to appreciate the religious undertone of insurgency in the CAR. Since the escalation of the conflict in 2013, religion has been used as an instrument to radicalize members of both the Seleka and Anti-Balaka groups. The dynamics of terrorism have drawn the lines between Muslims and Christians in the country. Up till 2013, when the Seleka coalition (dominated by the Muslims) overthrew the government, the country was under a Christian leadership that paid little attention to the development of the Muslim-dominated Northern region of the country. Only two Muslims have been in parliament since the independence of the country (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). This painted a picture of political exclusion and economic marginalization by the Christians. These grievances were easily mobilized by the Seleka leader Djotodia during the coup of 2013. The rise of the Anti-Balaka groups and the consequent bombings of Muslim centers such as Mosques and schools have added to the narrative of religious terrorism (Union Africane, Citation2018). The presence of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko-Haram, the Islamic State, and Al-shabaab increases the risk of infiltration and violent Jihad by the Seleka groups (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, Citation2018, p. 19). Moreover, although the parties involved in the use of terrorism are drawn along religious lines, they do not claim to establish a state along religious line. Their use of terrorism is motivated by the weak political institutions and economic inequalities which are core features of fragile States (Besley & Persson Citation2011). In its manifesto, the Muslim Seleka coalition had three mandates: to topple the Bozize regime, take control of the state, and seize the natural resources (International Crisis Group, Citation2017). The anti-Balaka, on the other hand, is determined to maintain its grip on power by attacking Muslim civilians and bombing Muslim villages. These two main rebel groups have splintered into several movements over time. Some sources put the number of armed groups currently operating in the country at about twenty (Union Africane, Citation2018). The legitimacy crises in the country and the inability to set a blueprint for political transition and regime change have laid a culture of violence as the fastest way to gain State power, and CAR politicians have consistently used such armed groups to get to power or when in power, to fight bandits and other small criminal groups in remote parts of the country (Paul Crescent et al., 2018, p. 11). Conclusion The sovereign states within the African continent face different forms of nation-building challenges. This ranges from poverty to conflicts and other multiple forms of insecurity. Unfortunately, when the insecurity level within a country grows so that the state cannot fulfil its obligation of ensuring the protection of lives and properties, the state could be considered fragile. Unfortunately, the state does not become fragile in a day or year; rather, state fragility emerges from multiple weaknesses of the state, which strives when abnormal or dysfunctional behaviours are allowed to grow over time by the institutions of the state. Studies on terrorism have shown that economic and weak political institutions within a state make it possible for terror groups to emerge. These terror groups further degenerate the state of security within the polity. This study draws from existing literature to investigate the emergence of terrorism in the CAR. The study reveals that the state’s failure directly manifests in the state’s character and the state’s inability to perform its fundamental roles. The CAR state is very weak due to the inability of the state to transform or refine its mineral resources and use the products to produce good governance. The character of the state was weak in the provision of employment, basic education and eradication of mass poverty within the country, thereby allowing the masses to be dependent on religious and ethnic cleavages as an opium that determined their social relations. Consequently, this affiliation and addiction to religious inclinations soon divided the CAR state and found expression in religious fanaticism and fundamentalism. The paper argued that the use of terrorism by religious groups and the state in the CAR is a direct consequence of the failure to utilize State resources for the betterment of the people and not from the desire to establish a State based on religious ideologies. This is because the primary role of the state is to provide good governance, which is meant to transform the lives of the citizenry. The various religious armed groups are reacting to a long history of negligence, deprivation, isolation, and frustration arising from the government’s inability to mobilize State resources for equitable national development and self-actualization for the citizens. In this context of a broken social contract, the country fits itself into the fragile and abnormal State theory. Worthy of note in the use of terrorism in CAR is the sponsorships by foreign countries, which further buttresses the claim of State fragility. By and large, by situating the CAR within the purview of fragility and abnormality, this paper has opened up underlying historical and developmental issues that are critical in understanding and addressing terrorism in the country. Why terrorism in CAR has not attracted sufficient attention from international actors and their role in escalating terrorism in the CAR country merits further research and study. In conclusion, there is a need for leadership transformation in the CAR State. The leaders of the state must focus on the development of national resources to provide social amenities and meet the basic needs of the masses. They must build a circular state where national identity and patriotism are central to national transformation through intergroup cohesion and resource (human and material) development. It is then that the conditions of sustainable peacebuilding and societal transformations would be created in CAR. The study recommends multiple peacebuilding and nation-building processes that will aid the transformation of the state. 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Congress.gov. https://crsreports.congress.gov/search/#/?termsToSearch=central%20africa%20republic&orderBy=Relevance 19. Downey, M. (2021). Did the war on terror deter ungoverned spaces? Not in Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 151, 102648. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102648 20. Elu, J., & Price, G. (2014). The Causes and consequences of terrorism in Africa. In C. Monga & J. Yifulin (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Africa and economics: Vol. 1, Context and concepts (pp. 724–738). University Press. 21. Eugene Nweke. (2020). Nation-States and Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism Initiative: The Case of Fragile Abnormal States (Class Room Lecture Delivered at Nigerian Defense Academy on 12 February 2020). 22. Ferreira, I. R. (2015). Defining and measuring state fragility: A new proposal, The Annual Bank Conference on Africa, Berkeley. Retrieved from http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/109_-_ABCA_2015_Ines_Ferreira_Defining_and_measuring_state_fragility A_new_proposal_May1 5.pdf 23. Gaibulloev, K., Piazza, J. A., & Sandler, T. (2024). Do failed or Weak States favour resident terrorist groups survival? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 68(5), 823–848. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231183939 24. Global Security. (2020). Central African Republic Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war 25. Gov.UK. (n.d.). The link between ‘ungoverned spaces and terrorism: Myth or reality? https://assets.publishingservice.gov.uk 26. Hoffman, B. (1999). Inside terrorism. St. Andrews University Press. 27. International Crisis Group. (2017). Central African republic. Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic 28. Jackson, R. (2012). The study of terrorism 10 years after 9/11: Successes, issues, challenges. International Relations. 8(32), 1–16. 29. Jackson, R. (2015). Terrorism, taboo & discursive resistance: The agnostic potential of the terrorism novel. International Studies Review, 17(3), 396–413. https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12227 30. Kah, H. K. (2014). Anti-Balaka/Séléka, ‘‘‘Religionization’ and Separatism in the History of the Central African Republic. Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue, 9, 23–32. 31. Kah, H. K. (2014). History, external influence and political volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR). Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies, 3(1). 32. Knoope, P. & Buchanan-Clarke, S. (2018). Central African Republic: A conflict misunderstood; institute for justice and reconciliation. Occasional Paper. 33. Kukah, M. H. (2009). Boko Haram some reflections on causes and effect [Unpublished Article], 2009, pp. 1–2. 34. Le Vine, V. (1968). The coup in the Central African Republic. Africa Today, 15(2), 12–14. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4184887 35. Lacqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. Oxford University Press. 36. Lacqueur, W. (2001). The new terrorism: Fanatics and the arms of mass destruction. London: Phoenix. 37. Lombard, L. (2014). A Brief Political History of the Central African Republic. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology, Retrieved from https://culanth.org/fieldsights/539-a-brief-politicalhistory-of-the-central African Republic 38. Marima, T. (2014). Rebels, anti-rebels and refugees in the Central African republic. Think Thank Press. 39. Mutambara, E., Chidi, N. R., Gilbert Chukwu, A., Maxwell, O. E., Aja, N. I., Nwankwo, F. M., & Ani, K. J. (2022). Boko Haram and defence mechanisms of the Nigerian Army: A critical appraisal. African Renaissance, 19(2), 141–158. 40. OECD. (2012). Conflict and Fragility in https://www.oecd.org. OECD Publishing, Paris. 41. OECD. (2014). Terrorism and Violent Extremist Contents in https://www.oecd.org, OECD Publishing, Paris. 42. Okereke, C. N., Iheanacho, J., & Okafor, C. (2016). Terrorism in Africa: Trends and dynamics. African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 5(1), 1–25. 43. Paul-Crescent, M. B., Grâce, M. E. D., & Raymond, M. Z. J. (2018). Persistence of the crisis in the central African Republic: Understanding in order to Act. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Yaounde. 44. Persson, T. (2011). Weak states, strong states and development [Paper presentation]. Development Crises in a Post Crises World. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2011. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ERK5AQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA89&dq=persson+2011+state+capacity&ots=7cn-XHsB6g&sig=-1S5oIvDw7kjxrPKxvKuaOuIvqI 45. Puccetti, L. P. (2021). Failed States and Terrorism: Engaging the conventional Wisdom, E-International relations (pp. 1–5). https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/92285 46. Ramsay, G. (2015). Why terrorism can but should not be defined. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Achieving lasting peace requires parties to negotiate with adversaries – no matter how difficult this may be. Ever since conflict erupted in Sudan on 15 April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been engaged in an attritional war, with support from various armed allies and proxy actors. The war is complicated by power struggles and ideological differences at both domestic and international levels, and has ethnic undertones. Can multiparty negotiations resolve the conflict that has killed an estimated 16 000 people and displaced millions ? And how feasible would talks be, given the zero-sum stakes involved? The SAF and RSF have numerous armed and unarmed allies that can become significant forces in their own right. The two are also proxies for a network of international actors, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States (US), and Russia. These groups’ and Sudanese interests in continuing the conflict or resolving it aren’t always aligned. Amid this, the civilian group Taqaddum is positioning itself as an alternative and interlocutor between the RSF and SAF.   When the conflict started, multiple mediation channels were opened. The initial attempt was the May 2023 Saudi-US mediation process, which led to unsuccessful negotiations in Geneva in August 2024. The African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet, Egyptian initiative, and United Nations Envoy are also engaged in separate but supposedly coordinated processes. These efforts have been ineffective due to the SAF’s preconditions, the RSF’s battlefield successes, and a lack of mutual acknowledgement by all factions. Additionally, the mediation entities have recently been competing with one another or taking sides with the factions. All processes appear to lack the leverage required to facilitate dialogue between the parties. Although these factors contribute to prolonging conflict, they’re not the main barriers preventing the factions from resolving their disagreements. The numerous unsuccessful negotiations suggest that the parties have different preferences for mediation formats and strongly oppose each other. Power struggles and ideological differences at domestic and international levels complicate Sudan’s war Furthermore, the various mediators’ strategies follow a predictable incremental logic, starting with a humanitarian ceasefire and aiming for a power-sharing arrangement. All parties can anticipate the steps in this process and are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup. More importantly, Sudan’s various factions have different visions for the country’s future.   The RSF’s unwillingness to integrate into the national army, as stipulated by the political Framework Agreement, indicated their suspicion of National Congress Party (NCP) members who hold high-ranking positions in the SAF. This mistrust sparked the conflict. Since then, their ambitions have evolved, principally due to the SAF’s inept diplomacy, and now encompass acquiring political power and radically altering Sudan’s political landscape. The RSF’s vision for Sudan excludes NCP members and purported Islamists, whose fusion of state and religion is partially blamed for the country’s misrule. On the other hand, SAF members who are remnants of the NCP and Islamists perceive the RSF as their protégés, amateur soldiers, and even traitors who are undeserving of leadership roles. In contrast to the SAF’s lower ranks, the NCP holds deep resentment towards the RSF and believes military action is a fitting response to what they view as a betrayal. Similarly, the SAF is displeased with the RSF for failing to implement Jeddah agreement commitments. It also seems the SAF is more inclined to break apart than to share power with Taqaddum, who are believed to be internationally influential but insignificant in domestic politics. Despite professing impartiality, Taqaddum’s antipathy towards the Islamists and NCP has resulted in their association with the RSF, despite their denial of any formal ties. However, Taqaddum competes for influence with offshoots of the Forces of Freedom and Change, Democratic Bloc, and Resistance Committees, making it hard to assert leadership in a fragmented civilian landscape. These perspectives are shaped by ideological differences among the parties involved, making a swift resolution improbable. Parties are hesitant to engage in processes that could result in outcomes similar to the failed pre-conflict setup The NCP and Islamists present a singular challenge for Taqaddum and the RSF. The RSF, which includes ethnic groups linked to the NCP and Islamists, must engage in negotiations with an opponent whose fundamental beliefs challenge its very existence. In contrast, a secular government in post-conflict Sudan is an unnegotiable demand for many Darfur armed movements. This position is acceptable to Taqaddum and the RSF – but it is a red line for the Islamists and NCP. Negotiating with the RSF poses significant legal and ethical challenges for all parties, given its checkered history of human rights abuses dating back to the 2003 Darfur conflict and its continuing transgressions. Despite this, the RSF’s control over almost half of Sudan’s landmass makes its participation indispensable in any peace process. While the full extent of Taqaddum’s ambitions remains uncertain, one could speculate that their end goal is to gain political power. To achieve this, they must either ally with one of the armed factions, openly or secretly, or enhance their standing among civilian groups. Nonetheless, partnering with the SAF or RSF comes with political risks. Despite this, some consider the RSF a more dependable choice than the SAF, owing to its perceived history of reliability. The inflexibility of all parties is transforming Sudan into a hybrid of Libya and Somalia, with implications for the broader Horn of Africa. Taqaddum’s equivocation at July’s Cairo Conference of Political and Civil Forces and the AU preparatory Inter-Sudanese dialogue meeting weakened both processes. The RSF’s control over almost half of Sudan’s landmass makes its participation indispensable in any peace process By declining to join the January IGAD summit and the Geneva discussions in August, and pulling out of the less publicised but more practical Manama talks, the SAF enabled the RSF to present itself as more open to peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, this shouldn’t be interpreted as a genuine willingness on the RSF’s part to engage in negotiations. It’s also been hesitant to implement the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, even though doing so would remove the SAF’s primary reason for not participating in many processes. Despite opposing parties’ sharp differences, achieving peace requires engaging in negotiations with adversaries, regardless of how reprehensible they may be. This approach is consistent with the recommendations of IGAD, AU, and UN for an ‘all-inclusive’ process. If the parties insist on a ‘most-inclusive’ solution, they’ll exclude key factions, leading to inevitable post-conflict relapse and the real possibility of disintegrating Sudan. Sudan’s parties can learn from their own past experiences and those of countries like South Africa, Columbia and former Yugoslavia with multi-level and multimodal negotiations. These involved antagonistic actors and issues but led to outcomes that helped alleviate armed conflict. By addressing core issues first, they can realistically tackle the interests of secondary actors such as the UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, US and Russia, which are increasingly overshadowing internal Sudanese disagreement and dominating the conflict. The article was publilshed by ISS Today. Original article here (please add the link to ISS Today website https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-peace-possible-between-sudan-s-warring-parties)

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Photo credit: Flickr/Sailing Nomad - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Farea Al-Muslimi, Lisa Boström and Veera Tuomala In recent months, the Red Sea has drawn global attention, particularly due to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the deal between Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on access to the Gulf of Aden, which sparked a dispute with Somalia. The rising tensions and increasing military responses risk worsening conflicts in a highly volatile region. The renewed focus on the Red Sea, however, also provides an opportunity to redouble commitment to multilateralism and enhance the collective action needed to address threats facing the region. This blog post gives an overview of current issues in the region and possible ways to address them, building on the outcomes of a panel discussion at the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. Geopolitical competition in the Red Sea region The Red Sea has become a major flashpoint for global and regional contestation, with local, regional and global conflict dynamics deeply intertwined. Regional and global powers are constructing naval bases and military installations around the Red Sea to enhance their power projection, fuelling existing tensions and exacerbating ongoing conflicts. This has aggravated already dire humanitarian conditions, contributing to fragility across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. In Sudan, competition between Gulf states is widely considered a driving factor behind the civil war. In Somalia and Yemen, external influences have fuelled internal disputes and aggravated tensions, undermining state-building efforts and incurring particularly devastating consequences in Yemen. Climate change and a scramble for scarce natural resources and critical commodities, including water, agricultural land and food supplies, may reinforce this dynamic. Gulf states, in particular, have invested billions in agriculture and manufacturing in the Horn of Africa in recent years to secure food production and tap into the region’s burgeoning labour markets. Regional insecurity escalates Insecurity in the Red Sea region reached a critical point in early 2024 when the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in response to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, further threatening regional and international stability, upending trade and disrupting global markets. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out airstrikes against targets in Yemen, while the European Union took a more defensive approach with the launch of Operation ASPIDES to protect vessels. This escalation delayed peace negotiations in Yemen, weakening the fragile trust needed to agree on an extended ceasefire and a roadmap to peace. The Houthi attacks also further compounded humanitarian challenges, disrupting the flow of essential goods and humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region more widely, thus worsening shortages and human suffering. In Sudan around 26 million people, more than half the population, are suffering acute food insecurity. In Yemen, around 22 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, with about 17 million facing acute food insecurity. Instability on both coasts has also increased migration across the Red Sea. The number of migrants from the Horn of Africa arriving in Yemen has nearly tripled in recent years, with tens of thousands making the dangerous crossing annually in search of better economic opportunities. Additionally, the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia has exacerbated regional insecurity, with reports of coordination between the Houthis and the Al-Shabaab armed group in the Horn, increasing the risk of human trafficking and forced migration. Opportunities to strengthen multilateralism, cooperation and collective action The barriers to effective cooperation in the Red Sea region are significant but not insurmountable. Historical rivalries and political instability have eroded trust among countries in the region, and the diverse priorities and strategic interests of these countries complicate collaboration. Despite these challenges, the region holds immense potential for growth and development. The strategic location and resources of countries on both shores, if harnessed constructively and collectively, could spur economic prosperity and regional stability. However, the region can realize its potential and accelerate socio-economic development only through inclusive growth, innovation and addressing long-standing developmental challenges. In this regard, prioritizing economic and regional integration is critical to unlocking the region’s vast potential. Indeed, the geographical proximity between the Horn of Africa and Yemen across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has brought about initiatives such as the Bridge of the Horns, proposed in 2007 between Djibouti and Yemen, which represented a bold vision for a more integrated, peaceful and prosperous region. While the project did not materialize, it is symbolic of the potential for deep and mutually beneficial economic, cultural and political ties across the Red Sea. While there are currently no operational overarching mechanisms or forums for multilateral cooperation around the region, the establishment in 2020 of the Red Sea Council—formally the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—could fill this gap. Once operational, it could help to mitigate tensions and foster cooperation towards a shared vision for the region. Moving forward There are several areas where enhanced cooperation is achievable and could benefit the Red Sea region as a whole. For example, establishing joint coastal patrols and information-sharing mechanisms could significantly enhance maritime security and combat piracy, smuggling and terrorism along the vital maritime corridor. Developing regional trade agreements and infrastructure projects could boost economic growth and interdependence, reducing the likelihood of conflict. Collaborative efforts to address climate change, manage shared water resources and protect marine ecosystems could promote sustainability and reduce resource-related tensions. Coordinating humanitarian responses and development programmes could address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, food insecurity, and poor access to education and healthcare. Finally, establishing platforms for dialogue and mediation could help to resolve disputes peacefully, preventing the escalation of conflicts. By focusing on these areas, the countries of the Red Sea region could move towards a more cooperative, stable and prosperous future. Strengthening cooperation through robust multilateral frameworks is vital to addressing the factors that underpin regional insecurity as well as to promoting sustainable development. Regional solutions should be led by the region, rather than relying on external entities whose priorities and resources are currently focused elsewhere. Countries on both coasts of the Red Sea need to view each other as partners for common goals and stability, prioritizing cooperation to connect their needs and interests effectively. As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres notes in the New Agenda for Peace, rebuilding consensus around shared norms and developing new ways for states to act cooperatively is crucial to addressing collective challenges and meeting shared objectives. SIPRI is pleased to share a series of guest blog posts from partners of the 2024 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. This blog builds on a panel discussion at the Forum on the topic ‘Red Sea Security in a Time of Disorder’, which was organized by CMI–Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Wagner Group has maintained an active and controversial presence in Africa since 2017, where it has contributed to regional instability, countered Western influence, and exacerbated human rights abuses. Despite the death of its figurehead in 2023, the emergence of the Africa Corps indicates that Russia’s covert geopolitical strategies in the region will persist. The Wagner Group has gained significant attention since its involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a paramilitary organisation with deep ties to the Russian government, Wagner’s operations blur the lines between state and non-state actions. This ambiguity challenges traditional frameworks of accountability and international law, complicating efforts to address its activities on the global stage. Ukraine is not the group’s only violent contribution to the destabilization of peaceful nations. Wagner has maintained an active presence across Africa since 2017, where it has been accused of numerous human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and targeting civilians. The bulk of these activities have unfolded in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. The Wagner Group’s international impact is multifaceted, affecting strategic, economic, and humanitarian outcomes. Functioning as a tool for Russian geopolitical ambitions, the group has contributed to regional instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, countered Western influence by infiltrating anti-Western and anti-colonial movements and sentiments online, and raised significant concerns regarding human rights and international law. In many of its areas of operations, Wagner’s presence has served as a catalyst for conflict escalation, and regional instability. In CAR and Mali, for instance, the group’s presence has been linked to increased violence and human rights abuses and undermining international and regional efforts towards peace and stability. The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef,” on 23 August 2023, came two months after his march on Moscow, sparked by dissatisfaction with the Russian Ministry of Defence’s actions in Ukraine. It is likely that many of the governments and regimes in Africa that “benefitted” from Wagner’s services were deeply concerned about Prigozhin’s death. At the same time, many may have been relieved, hoping that his death might change the brutal and terror-driven campaign of violence that had plagued the Sahel region at the group’s hands. Additionally, Wagner has provided Russia with a platform to pursue state interests through covert operations. Until the invasion of Ukraine, this allowed Putin to maintain plausible deniability regarding association with Wagner and its controversial activities. In addition to military engagements, Prigozhin orchestrated extensive propaganda and disinformation campaigns across Africa. These operations bolstered Russia’s influence in countries that Wagner operated in, while obscuring the ability for international bodies and states to accurately assess and address the allegations of human rights abuses that came alongside Wagner’s deployments. In CAR, the Wagner Group was deployed in 2018 to provide protection for mines, support the government, and offer personal protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. However, Wagner’s role in CAR far exceeded resource and government protection. The group actively engaged in military operations alongside members of the armed forces, leading to numerous accusations of serious human rights violations, including summary executions and sexual and gender-based violence. Despite these allegations, the group continued to receive support from the CAR government. The media outlet, Corbeau News, reported that President Touadéra had authorised Wagner’s sexual violence. This was evidenced in one of Wagner’s most extreme acts in CAR, which occurred in April 2022 when members of the group entered a military hospital in Bangui and sexually assaulted women and new mothers in the maternity ward. One source within the military administration of CAR stated that it was the third time members from the group had entered the maternity ward and assaulted women. In 2021, reports surfaced that Wagner would deploy to Mali to combat a rebel insurgency. This announcement sparked outrage from France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, who warned Mali against partnering with the group. Similar to its operations in CAR, Wagner’s presence in Mali has been marked by violence and instability. In April 2022, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing the massacre of 300 civilians during a joint military operation involving Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group from 27 March to 31. A key feature of Wagner’s presence has been countering Western influence in strategic regions. The provision of military support to governments and groups engaged in activities against Western-supported entities has been notably destructive. This dynamic was evident in Mali, where in 2022, an extensive disinformation campaign on social media, linked to Wagner, exploited anti-France and anti-imperialist sentiments to undermine the French presence. The campaign, along with “multiple obstructions” from Mali’s military junta led to France announcing the withdrawal of its military forces from Operation Barkhane in Mali in February 2022. Following the announcement, Malians celebrated in the capital, Bamako, and held signs stating, “Thanks Wagner” and “France is a terrorist nation.” Wagner-linked actors then continued their disinformation efforts, attempting to shift blame onto France following the discovery of a mass grave near a military base that French forces had recently vacated. Satellite imagery released by France later revealed Wagner Group mercenaries arranging the bodies in the mass grave. The bodies were believed to have come from a joint-military operation between the Malian armed forces and the Wagner Group in the same area in the days prior. In Africa, Wagner’s operations have been closely linked to the control and exploitation of natural resources. In countries such as CAR and Sudan, Wagner has secured access to valuable resources such as gold and diamonds. Recently, investigative efforts by groups like All Eyes on Wagner have revealed that the group has circumvented sanctions by exporting timber from CAR through Cameroon, in addition to operating an extensive blood diamond trading network. The Wagner Group’s involvement in these countries highlights the group’s role in bolstering autocratic regimes in exchange for strategic and economic benefits. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023 had already fuelled significant speculation about the group’s future. Nonetheless, the group’s strategic plan to support autocratic governments, orchestrate foreign interference, and expand influence remains both politically and economically appealing to Moscow. The potential dissolution of the Wagner Group would pose a significant challenge and require the rebuilding of established relationships in countries where it has operated. The emergence of the Africa Corps, a new organisation seemingly poised to assume many of Wagner’s operations, emphasises the strategic and economic value these activities provide for Russia. With the announcement in January 2024 that 100 Russian soldiers from the Africa Corps would deploy to Burkina Faso, it is clear that the Wagner model is one that will continue.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In a complex moment of geopolitical relations, marked by issues such as armed conflicts or climate change, it is more necessary than ever to pay attention to what is happening in the Sahel and Africa. In a world as turbulent as the one we live in, geopolitics returns to the front pages of newspapers with what is happening in Gaza, the potential consequences of the elections in the United States or France, or, in the Spanish context, the recent visit of our king, Felipe VI, to the Baltic Republics, with particular support and recognition for the Spanish military units serving there, all within the framework of tensions with Russia on the European eastern border. Despite the frequent discussions about the implications these issues have on our lives and our tendency to look beyond our borders for answers, what remains unchanged and continues to surprise me is the lack of interest that the African continent still generates among the public and experts, along with a vast ignorance of the geopolitical importance that the continent is acquiring. For these reasons, today I would like to talk to you about three issues that, from a geopolitical perspective, do not receive the attention and reflection they deserve. First, I would like to remind you that jihadism remains a major threat in many areas of the African continent, especially in the Sahel. In fact, there is barely any discussion about how the security crisis in this part of the world is spreading to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea: Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. As they often do in Africa, jihadist groups are exploiting structural vulnerabilities, various frustrations, and resentments against states that do not always respond to their citizens' demands as they would like, to recruit young people who will swell their ranks. I recently read a republished article by Óscar Guijarro from the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE, in spanish) titled "The Expansion of Jihadism from the Sahel to the Coastal Countries of the Gulf of Guinea", which I found extremely interesting, especially for Spain. These coastal countries, which appear to have more stable political environments than those in the Sahel, are marked by significant inequalities and socioeconomic divisions in different areas (poor north versus richer south), as well as religious differences that jihadist groups exploit to gain influence. The strategic location of these countries and the presence of forest reserves that are used as resources and refuges facilitate the expansion of jihadism and organized crime, including arms and drug trafficking. While it is true that the European Union is providing support to confront the jihadist threat and that the affected countries are adopting military and cross-border security measures, I believe that at the very least, more attention needs to be paid to this part of the world. Being aware of the importance of jihadist movements' penetration in Africa and their impact on global geopolitics should be a priority. Thousands of people are dying and are being displaced in West Africa due to violence of all kinds, and it cannot be something we ignore. A friend of Casa África, a senior official at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, spoke in January before the United Nations Security Council on this matter. Ms. Théroux-Bénoni urged the international community not to ignore the Sahel and reminded that strategies to prevent terrorism must acknowledge the deep regional connections that allow extremist groups to recruit, fundraise, and manage their logistics across multiple countries. She asserted that the current situation in the region represents the worst possible scenario of violent extremism, coups d'état, and setbacks in regional integration, and called for international responses. From the ISS, they constantly remind us that the stability of West Africa is important to the global community for multiple reasons, some related to opportunities and socioeconomic development, and others related to terrorist threats, organized crime, and the illegal trafficking of all kinds of goods, from drugs and weapons to people. Regarding governance, Ms. Théroux-Bénoni stated that we must contribute to creating conditions that make coups d'état and political instability less likely. Another issue that I believe doesn't receive enough attention is what some analysts have already dubbed "new Russianism." Colonel and geopolitical analyst Ignacio Fuente Cobo, in articles published by the IEEE, uses this term to define Russia's neocolonial project to expand its influence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. While we focus on Ukraine and Europe's eastern flank, the truth is that we fail to fully grasp Russia's strategy of strengthening its presence in Africa. A quick glance at articles about the Sahel reveals that Russia is finding allies among the leaders of the region and a population that prefers Russian assistance over the help traditionally provided by France, for example, to solve their problems. Mr. Fuente Cobo discusses an alternative multipolar world order, whose reinforcement is evident, and Russia's interest in seizing natural resources and evading Western sanctions. The fact is that Russia has shown remarkable skill in exploiting the gaps in European cooperation in the Sahel and has managed to strengthen its position in some countries, particularly through the former Wagner group (now Africa Corps) and the military cooperation. The loss of European influence in the area should concern us and guide the design of our policy in the region, which I believe should always be based on mutual respect, attentive listening to our African partners and friends, and a mutually beneficial partnership that avoids paternalism and, especially, the geopolitical double standards that have discredited the West in the eyes of many countries, now more critical than ever of our decisions on the global stage. To conclude, I would like to highlight one of the many reasons why we depend on the African continent and should pay more attention to it: critical minerals, essential for the global energy and digital transition, a topic discussed by Mar Hidalgo García for the IEEE. In this area, Africa not only attracts Europe's attention. We face competition from other powers, such as the United States, Russia, India, Japan, and Australia. China, for instance, has established a strong presence in Africa, achieved through a long-term strategy that remains consistent regardless of the current leadership and involves more than just words. I believe it would be worthwhile to reconsider the focus on migration that seems to dominate the EU’s African strategy and to look beyond it by establishing strategic partnerships and developing infrastructure to negotiate access to African mineral resources, for example. Countless authors and analysts dedicate time to reflecting on the geopolitical implications of the changes occurring in our neighboring countries and to searching for formulas and strategies that can help us strengthen and improve our relations. What perhaps isn't emphasized enough, besides the need to look towards our southern neighbors and care about what happens to them, is that understanding and cooperating with them is the only way to progress and ensure that Europe remains relevant in the world. An equitable partnership based on mutual respect and a shared future is imperative. For the good of all. Article written by José Segura Clavell, Director General of Casa África, and published in Kiosco Insular, eldiario.es, and Canarias 7 on June 28 and 29, 2024.