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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Who could have predicted that after nearly 14 years of civil war and five years of stalemate, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria would collapse in just a week? With Assad’s departure, the pressing question now is what lies ahead for Syria’s immediate future. When opposition fighters led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the major city of Aleppo in late November with minimal resistance, commentators widely believed it marked the beginning of the Assad regime’s downfall. Many anticipated a bitter fight to the end. Assad was caught off guard, and his forces were clearly unprepared. He withdrew his remaining troops from Aleppo to regroup and gain time for reinforcements to arrive from Russia and Iran, and hope the opposition fighters would stop there. It wasn’t to be. Emboldened by their swift success in Aleppo, HTS fighters wasted no time and advanced on Hama, capturing it with ease. They quickly followed up by seizing Homs, the next major city to the south. Russia provided limited air support to Assad. But Iran, having depleted its forces in Hezbollah’s defence against Israel in Lebanon, was unable to offer significant assistance and withdrew its remaining personnel from Syria. Meanwhile, Assad’s frantic calls for support from Iraq did not go anywhere. Seeing the writing on the wall, the morale of Assad’s forces and leadership plummeted. Fearing retribution in the event of the regime’s collapse, defections began en masse, further accelerating Assad’s downfall. And on the last day, Assad fled the country, and his prime minister officially handed over power to HTS and its leadership. It marked the end of 54 years of Assad family rule in Syria. The Assad legacy The Assad family, including Bashar al-Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, will likely be remembered by the majority of Syrians as brutal dictators. The modern state of Syria was established in 1920 following the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the aftermath of the first world war. Syria became a League of Nations mandate under French control, only gaining independence in 1944. Following a tumultuous period, including a failed unification with Egypt, the Ba'ath Party seized control in 1963 through a coup that involved Hafez al-Assad. In 1966, Hafez al-Assad led another coup alongside other officers from the Alawite minority. This ultimately resulted in a civilian regime, with Hafez al-Assad becoming president in 1970. Hafez al-Assad established himself as an authoritarian dictator, concentrating power, the military and the economy in the hands of his relatives and the Alawite community. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority was largely marginalised and excluded from positions of power and influence. Hafez al-Assad is most infamously remembered for his brutal suppression of the opposition in 1982. The uprising, led by the Islamic Front, saw the opposition capture the city of Hama. In response, the Syrian army razed the city, leaving an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians dead or disappeared and decisively crushing the rebellion. Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, and, the least likely candidate, his younger son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed the presidency. Having been educated in the West to become a doctor, Bashar al-Assad projected a moderate and modern image, raising hopes he might usher in a new era of progress and democracy in Syria. However, Bashar al-Assad soon found himself navigating a turbulent regional landscape following the September 11 2001 terror attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. In 2004, after the United States imposed sanctions on Syria, Assad sought closer ties with Turkey. He and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became friends, removing visa requirements between their countries and making plans to establish economic zones to boost trade. Erdoğan and Assad then had a falling out during a series of events in 2011, a year that marked a turning point for Syria. The Arab Spring revolts swept into the country, presenting Assad with a critical choice: to pursue a democratic path or crush the opposition as his father had done in 1982. He chose the latter, missing a historic opportunity to peacefully transform Syria. The consequences were catastrophic. A devastating civil war broke out, resulting in more than 300,000 deaths (some estimates are higher), 5.4 million refugees, and 6.9 million people internally displaced. This will be Assad’s legacy. Syria’s immediate challenges Syria now has a new force in power: HTS and its leadership, spearheaded by the militant leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. They will face immediate challenges and four key priorities: 1) Consolidating power. The new leadership will now try to ensure there are no armed groups capable of contesting their rule, particularly remnants of the old Assad regime and smaller factions that were not part of the opposition forces. Critically, they will also need to discuss how power will be shared among the coalition of opposition groups. Al-Jolani is likely to become the founding president of the new Syria, but how the rest of the power will be distributed remains uncertain. It seems the opposition was not prepared to take over the country so quickly, and they may not have a power-sharing agreement. This will need to be negotiated and worked out quickly. The new government will likely recognise the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the territories it controls as an autonomous region within Syria. An independent Kurdish state, however, will be strongly opposed by Turkey, the main external backer of the opposition. Yet, history seems to be moving in favour of the Kurds. There is now the eventual possibility of an independent Kurdish state, potentially combining northern Iraq and northeastern Syria into a single entity. 2) International recognition. Syria is a very complex and diverse place. As such, the new government can only be sustained if it gains international recognition. The key players in this process are Turkey, the European Union, the United States and Israel (through the US). It is likely all of these entities will recognise the new government on the condition it forms a moderate administration, refrains from fighting the Kurdish YPG, and does not support Hezbollah or Hamas. Given their unexpected success in toppling Assad so quickly, the opposition is likely to accept these conditions in exchange for aid and recognition. 3) Forming a new government. The question on everyone’s mind is what kind of political order the opposition forces will now establish. HTS and many of the groups in its coalition are Sunni Muslims, with HTS having origins linked to al-Qaeda. However, HTS broke away from the terror organisation in 2016 and shifted its focus exclusively to Syria as an opposition movement. Nevertheless, we should not expect a democratic secular rule. The new government is also unlikely to resemble the ultra-conservative theocratic rule of the Taliban. In his recent interview with CNN, al-Jolani made two key points. He indicated he and other leaders in the group have evolved in their outlook and Islamic understanding with age, suggesting the extreme views from their youth have moderated over time. He also emphasised the opposition would be tolerant of the freedoms and rights of religious and ethnic minority groups. The specifics of how this will manifest remain unclear. The expectation is HTS will form a conservative government in which Islam plays a dominant role in shaping social policies and lawmaking. On the economic and foreign policy fronts, the country’s new leaders are likely to be pragmatic, open to alliances with the regional and global powers that have supported them. 4) Rebuilding the country and maintaining unity. This is needed to prevent another civil war from erupting — this time among the winners. A recent statement from HTS’s Political Affairs Department said the new Syria will focus on construction, progress and reconciliation. The new government aims to create positive conditions for displaced Syrians to return to their country, establish constructive relations with neighbouring countries and prioritise rebuilding the economy. Syria and the broader Middle East have entered a new phase in their modern history. Time will tell how things will unfold, but one thing is certain: it will never be the same.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah entered a 60-day ceasefire on Nov. 26, 2024, a move aimed at reducing tensions in the region more than a year into a multifront conflict.Under the terms of the deal, Israel would gradually withdraw its forces from Lebanon, and Hezbollah would fully withdraw north of the Litani River. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Army would “deploy and take control over their own territory,” U.S. President Joe Biden said, adding that the United States, France and other allies have pledged to support the deal.But what does the deal mean for the parties involved and future prospects for a more permanent cessation of hostilities? The Conversation U.S. turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert of Lebanon and border conflicts in the Middle East, to explain why they reached a ceasefire now and what it means going forward. Why is the ceasefire deal happening now? The timing of this ceasefire is the result of a convergence of interests among the government in Israel, Hezbollah itself and that of its chief sponsor, Iran – but all for different reasons. For the Israeli government, domestic issues are at play. First off, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are exhausted after more than a year of war. This is particularly true for Israeli reservists, a growing number of whom are not turning up for duty. The Israeli general public, too, is tired of conflict, and a majority favors a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also has internal issues in his government to contend with. He is facing pressure from the ruling coalition’s ultra-Orthodox partners to draw up laws exempting ultra-Orthodox Jews from the military draft. Reducing the need for active personnel by quieting the front with Lebanon will help in that regard. The secular and national-religious sectors of the society who do serve in the IDF and who are upset with the possibility of a formal draft-exemption law for ultra-Orthodox men may be more inclined to swallow this pill if the war with Hezbollah is over. From the Israeli army’s perspective, the war in Lebanon is coming to a point of diminishing returns. It has succeeded in weakening Hezbollah’s military standing but has been unable to wipe the militant group out entirely. This also factors into Hezbollah’s thinking. The group has been seriously debilitated in Lebanon; the war has eroded its military capabilities. Unlike its previous position – reiterated time and again over the past year by its now-dead leader, Hassan Nasrallah – that a ceasefire would only be possible if first it is reached between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran are now willing to delink the two fronts. This leaves Hamas in a far weaker position as they are now left without the support of Iran’s main proxy “axis of resistance” group. Drawing Hezbollah, and other aligned groups in the region, into direct confrontation with Israel had been Hamas’ hope when it launched its attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hezbollah and Lebanon’s other political factions also have strong domestic pressures to contend with. Lebanon has more than 1 million refugees as a result of the conflict – the vast majority of them Shia, the branch of Islam that Hezbollah is drawn from. The conditions in Lebanon have increased the risk of sectarian fighting between Shia and others factions in the country. For Hezbollah leaders, the time may seem right to cut their losses and prepare to regroup as a political and military body. Iran, too, is seeking to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon as soon as possible. The deal comes as Tehran is bracing for a U.S. administration that could have a more hawkish position on Iran and its proxies in the region, of which Hezbollah is the most significant. With a new Iranian president, and a new U.S. administration, a ceasefire between Iran’s main proxy and Israel may be a first step to Tehran building a constructive dialogue with a Trump White House. What is the role of the US in the ceasefire? What is interesting for me is that despite the very clear position of the U.S. in favoring Israel during the past year of conflict, it still functions as an effective mediator. It is thanks to the U.S. that there is a ceasefire – and it comes despite the fact that Washington is far from neutral in this conflict, being a chief ally of Israel and its main provider of weapons. But the Lebanese government and Hezbollah see a U.S. role, too. And this is not new. The United States was the mediator in the 2022 landmark agreement that, for the first time, set out the maritime boundaries between Israel and Lebanon. The ceasefire deal benefits both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations. For President Joe Biden, it would represent a diplomatic success after a year in which the U.S. has failed to mediate any breakthrough in the conflict in Gaza, and it is an opportunity for Biden to finish his presidency on a positive foreign policy note. From the perspective of Trump, the ceasefire in Lebanon will represent one less problem for him to face. What might be the consequences for Lebanon and Israel? Lebanon has the most at stake in this ceasefire holding. The country was already in a perilous economic situation before the war, and months of fighting has only worsened the structural, economic and political crises in the country. It is as dire as it can get. Further, the war has reignited sectarian tension in Lebanon – talk of a return to civil war in the country is not far-fetched. Lebanon-Israel border: A zone of continued conflict The lower reaches of the Litani River, outlined in blue, are the northern edge of a U.N.-proposed buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Golan Heights, which neighbors Syria, is also disputed territory in the region. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Palestinian territories that are governed by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority respectively, are also often areas of violent conflict.   But there is uncertainty over how the ceasefire will affect the various rival factions in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has been weakened and may well now look for a way to reassert its strength in Lebanon’s politics. The main question is how the other factions and parties respond to that. With a weak Hezbollah, other factions may challenge the militant organization in ways they haven’t before. Before being decimated by Israel, there were no rival groups in a position to challenge Hezbollah in Lebanon. But that has all changed: Hezbollah’s military power has been degraded and Nasrallah, the group’s leader, killed. And Nasrallah was not just the face and brains of Hezbollah, he was also the group’s most important link to Iran. There is concern among some Lebanon experts that the gap left by a weakened Hezbollah may see a struggle for power and further strife in the country. And I believe there should be no illusions that Hezbollah will try to reassert itself as a domestic force. Complicating matters is the fact that any realignment of political forces in Lebanon comes amid a political vacuum. There has been a caretaker government – and no president – for two years now since Hezbollah conditioned the appointment of a new president with the candidate being an ally of the group. Now, Lebanese politicians would need to agree on a new president who in turn would appoint a new prime minister and government. It remains to be seen how this will unfold with a weakened Hezbollah. For Israel, the ceasefire will provide an opportunity to reconstruct parts of the north that have been devastated by Hezbollah missiles and a possible return of the 60,000 Israelis who fled northern areas close to the Lebanon border. It will also allow the Israel Defense Forces to regroup, refresh and focus their resources in Gaza, rather than fighting on two fronts. Could the ceasefire lead to a permanent peace deal? I don’t see any permanent peace deal on the horizon, given the fact that the fundamental political goals of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran have not changed and that the Israel-Palestine conflict continues to fester. But I am hopeful that the ceasefire could lead to calm and stability between Israel and Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The details of the ceasefire agreement are not very different from U.N. Resolution 1701 that ended the last major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. That agreement brought relative calm to the region for 18 years, even if Hezbollah, supported by Iran, used these years to build up its military capability and prepare for a potential ground invasion of northern Israel. In my view, there is a possibility for greater stability this time around given the fact that the ceasefire agreement also stipulates that, if and when it becomes permanent, the deal would serve as a basis for negotiations over the demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon territorial boundary. This would not be an easy task, particularly in the area of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar. But with goodwill and good intentions, even difficult border disputes could be resolved.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractThis paper draws on rapidly emerging literature on the role of artificial intelligence in military conflicts and warfare as well as its implications for international security. It departs from an assumption that the emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence on military power.This project intends to ascertain the role of autonomous weapons in modern military conflicts. In doing so, it further adds to the recent debates, which take place among scholars, military leaders as well as policy makers around the world regarding the potential for AI to be the source of future instability and a great power rivalry.It is suggested that there is an urgent need to regulate the development, proliferation and usage of autonomous weapons and weapon systems driven by AI before it is too late – namely the AI achieves cognizant skills. 1.DefinitionsEncyclopedia Britannica proposes that artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience.1Interestingly enough AI defines itself as referring to the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, particularly computer systems. These processes include learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and language understanding. AI enables machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and natural language processing. AI technologies encompass machine learning, neural networks, deep learning, and other advanced algorithms that allow machines to mimic cognitive functions.2In the context of the military, artificial intelligence refers to the utilization of AI technologies and systems to enhance military capabilities, operations, and decision-making processes. Military applications of AI include autonomous weapons systems, drones, cyber defense mechanisms, predictive analytics for strategic planning, and battlefield surveillance. AI can be used to analyze large volumes of data quickly, identify patterns, and make real-time decisions to support military objectives. While AI offers significant advantages in terms of efficiency and precision, there are ethical considerations and concerns regarding the potential risks of autonomous AI systems in warfare.32. AI in the War in Ukraine and Israel vs. Hamas - UkraineThe ongoing war in Ukraine is arguably the first “full scale drone War”, which also employs loitering munitions, autonomous ships, undersea drones for mine hunting and uncrewed ground vehicles being deployed.AI is heavily used in systems that integrate target and object recognition and geospatial intelligence. Analysis of satellite images, geolocating and analysing open-source data such as social media photos in geopolitically sensitive locations. On top of that neural networks are used, for example, to combine ground-level photos, drone video footage and satellite imagery.AI-enhanced facial recognition software has also been used on a substantial scale. AI is playing an important role in electronic warfare and encryption as well as cyber warfare, especially in support of defensive capabilities. Finally, AI has also been employed to spread of misinformation - the use of deep fakes as part of information warfare. The emergence of this new technology has created new actors, private companies further fueling the so-called privatisation of security: Palantir Technologies, Planet Labs, BlackSky Technology and Maxar Technologies are some examples of such.The AI driven systems make a fundamental change in the field so much so that the combined use of aerial and sea drones in the October (2022) attack on Russia’s Black Sea flagship vessel, the Admiral Makarov, was perceived by some analysts as perhaps a new type of warfare.4What makes this conflict unique is the unprecedented willingness of foreign geospatial intelligence companies to assist Ukraine by using AI-enhanced systems to convert satellite imagery into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantages. U.S. companies play a leading role in this.These examples illustrate that the current conflict in Ukraine is a testing ground for AItechnology.- Israel vs. HamasIsraeli military says it’s using artificial intelligence to select many of these targets in real-time. The military claims that the AI system, named “the Gospel,” has helped it to rapidly identify enemy combatants and equipment, while reducing civilian casualties.5 Allegedly, multiple sources familiar with the IDF’s (Israel Defensive Forces) targeting processes confirmed the existence of the Gospel, saying it had been used to produce automated recommendations for attacking targets, such as the private homes of individuals suspected of being Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives. In recent years, the target division has helped the IDF build a database of what sources said was between 30,000 and 40,000 suspected militants. Systems such as the Gospel, they said, had played a critical role in building lists of individuals authorised to be assassinated.6 According to IDF’s own website the use of these tools does not change the obligatory principles and rules in the Intelligence Directorate's SOP and related instructions. They do not generate orders for attacks. They do not generate new intelligence that could not otherwise be accessed by an intelligence analyst. They do not constitute the sole basis for determining targets eligible to attack – regardless of how accurate they are. On the contrary, these tools improve the quality of the intelligence process outcome. They facilitate the accessibility of the analyst to relevant information, and help the analyst be more informed of the most up-to-date and relevant intelligence sources, making the analyses more precise. They reduce the risk of errors that may occur in intelligence analyses.7 3. AI and War As far as the role of AI driven technologies and software is concerned it is probably useful to think about them as the third revolution in warfare. The first one being mostly about gunpowder and the second one being about nuclear weapons.Additionally, one should also bear in mind that AI is closely related to the so-called cyber domain, which in the literature is often referred to as the fifth domain of warfare. (The first one being land, the second being sea, the third being air and the forth being space, as in cosmic space.)While AI and associated technologies hold potential for reducing harms of war if developed and applied responsibly, there exist significant risks of technological escalation, loss of human control and value alignment that demand proactive international cooperation and oversight to guide research and use of these systems. Nonetheless all major powers, including US and China are working nonstop to develop relevant AI driven military systems hoping to achieve potential advantages against each other. These technologies include: machine learning/deep learning applications with military uses like drone/vehicle autonomy, cyber/info warfare and predictive analytics of populations/scenarios.At the same time AI poses novel challenges and escalatory risks that differ from past arms races and call for new frameworks of governance and norms. Autonomous weapons threaten to undermine international humanitarian laws by removing human accountability from targeting - problems of biases, uncertain risks of loss of meaningful human control. Other related risks include preemptive/predictive AI for mass surveillance, social control and information warfare which is likely to erode principles of sovereignty, privacy and consent.It does not take the stretch of imagination to expect a certain level of ‘techno-tyranny’ in the future. Job losses to robotic systems are probably a given and as such risk further politico-economic instability. This consequently calls for just transitions and perhaps even a universal basic income.The Opaque ‘black box’ nature of neural networks hinders verification and accountability, fuelling distrust. Furthermore, there is a potential for accidental or unintentional escalation. Without safeguards and transparency, AI may ultimately serve military-industrial complexes and geopolitical ambitions rather than global security needs.The fast-emerging technology needs to be urgently regulated. International initiatives for AI governance (norms or regimes) will probably have to be introduced by the UN and its technical bodies. These will have to include outcome accountability’ through system design, impact assessments, red lines on certain applications and universal access to benefits.As warns Heidy Khlaaf, Engineering Director of AI Assurance at Trail of Bits, a technologysecurity firm warns “AI algorithms are notoriously flawed with high error rates observed across applications that require precision, accuracy, and safety,”8Reportedly, in a simulation of a military exercise carried out by US Military Force, an AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue. The robot worked out its controller was stopping it 'completing objectives on test.9In parallel, Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. “The highest-level commander is the sole core decision-making entity for the overall operation, with ultimate decision-making responsibilities and authority,”104. AI and International SecurityIn terms of national security-level applications of an AI, one can clearly identify numerous milieu:- MilitaryAI is transforming military operations by enabling autonomous systems, such as drones and robots, to perform tasks that were previously carried out by humans. These systems can be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, target identification, and even combat. AI-powered algorithms can analyze vast amounts of data to provide real-time intelligence, enhance situational awareness, and support decision-making processes on the battlefield- CybersecurityAI is crucial in combating cyber threats, as it can detect and respond to attacks more effectively than traditional security measures. Machine learning algorithms can analyze network traffic patterns, identify anomalies, and detect potential breaches. AI can also help develop predictive models to anticipate future cyber threats and vulnerabilities, allowing organizations to strengthen their defenses proactively.- Intelligence and SurveillanceAI enables intelligence agencies to process and analyze massive volumes of data, including social media feeds, satellite imagery, and communication intercepts. Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms can extract valuable insights from unstructured data sources, aiding in counterterrorism efforts, identifying potential threats, and monitoring geopolitical developments.- Decision Support SystemsAI can assist policymakers and military leaders in making informed decisions by providing predictive analysis and scenario modeling. Machine learning algorithms can analyze historical data, identify patterns, and generate forecasts regarding potential  conflicts, resource allocation, or geopolitical developments. This helps in strategic planning and resource optimization.- Autonomous Weapons SystemsThe development of autonomous weapons systems raises ethical concerns and challenges in international security. AI-powered weapons can operate without direct human control, leading to debates about accountability, proportionality, and adherence to international humanitarian law. International efforts are underway to establish regulations and norms governing the use of such systems.- Diplomacy and Conflict ResolutionAI can facilitate diplomatic negotiations and conflict resolution by providing data-driven insights and analysis. Natural Language Processing algorithms can assist in analyzing diplomatic texts, identifying common ground, and suggesting potential compromises. AI can also simulate scenarios and predict the outcomes of different negotiation strategies, aiding diplomats in finding mutually beneficial solutions.- Threat Detection and PreventionAI can enhance early warning systems for various threats, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics. Machine learning algorithms can analyze patterns in data to identify potential risks and predict emerging threats. This enables governments and international organizations to take proactive measures to prevent or mitigate these risks.5. ConclusionIn the world of microelectronics, experts often talk about Moore's law: the principle that the number of transistors on chips doubles every two years, resulting in exponentially more capable devices. The law helps explain the rapid rise of so many technological innovations, including smartphones and search engines.Within national security, AI progress has created another kind of Moore's law. Whichever military first masters organizing, incorporating, and institutionalizing the use of data and AI into its operations in the coming years will reap exponential advances, giving it remarkable advantages over its foes. The first adopter of AI at scale is likely to have a faster decision cycle and better information on which to base decisions. Its networks are likely to be more resilient when under attack, preserving its ability to maintain situational awareness, defend its forces, engage targets effectively, and protect the integrity of its command, control, and communications. It will also be able to control swarms of unmanned systems in the air, on the water, and under the sea to confuse and overwhelm an adversary.11References*This paper was presented at International Studies Association 65th Annual Convention. San Francisco, California April 3rd – 6th 20241 Copeland, B. (2024, March 15). Artificial intelligence. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence2 How do you define artificial intelligence? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/3 How do you define artificial intelligence in the context of the military? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/4 Fontes, R. and Kamminga, J. (2023, March 24). Ukraine A Living Lab for AI Warefare. National Defence. NDIA’s Bussiness Technology Magazine. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/3/24/ukraine-a-living-lab-for-ai-warfare5 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start6 ‘The Gospel’: how Israel uses AI to select bombing targets in Gaza. (2023, December 1). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/the-gospel-how-israel-uses-ai-to-select-bombing-targets 7 The IDF's Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. (2024, June 18). IDF Press Releases: Israel at War. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idf-s-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing/8 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start9 Bowman, V. (2023, June 2). AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue on simulation. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/02/us-air-force-ai-military-drone-goes-rogue-simulation/10 Chen, S. (2024, June 16). Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3266444/chinese-scientists-create-and-cage-worlds-first-ai-commander-pla-laboratory?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage 11 Flournoy, Michèle A. 2023. “AI Is Already at War.” Foreign Affairs 102 (6): 56–69. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=bth&AN=173135132&site=ehost-live.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Geopolitical tensions have intensified across the Middle East, amplifying the Iran-Israel standoff and reshaping regional power dynamics. Israel, deeply impacted by recent events, has adopted a more aggressive security stance, intensifying efforts to neutralise perceived threats from Iran’s regional network of proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shiite militias. Far from being minor, these dramatic developments reshape the strategic balance between Iran and Israel while considerably limiting Tehran’s options moving forward.  Strengths and Constraints of Iran’s Asymmetric Strategy  Hezbollah remains the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East, meticulously armed and funded for nearly 40 years to indirectly challenge Israel and the US. With around 150,000 missiles and 80,000 fighters, this Lebanese Shiite militia serves as one of Iran’s main spearheads against Israel, providing a strategic foothold in southern Lebanon, and exerting pressure on Israel’s northern border. However, the destruction of nearly half of Hezbollah’s military capabilities over the past year, as reported by Israeli sources, along with the loss of key military and political leaders, is severely altering the balance between Israel and Iran. While Hezbollah has historically been a strategic shield for Iran, it is now fully reliant on the actions—or inactions—of the Iranian leadership.  The dismantling of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities and the disruption of its decision-making apparatus come alongside the crippling of Hamas—another long-time ally of Tehran in its struggle against Israel. After nearly a year of conflict with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas is facing existential challenges, and its leaders, including figures like Yahya Sinwar, have had their ability to act severely weakened.   It would be premature to consider an end to Hamas and Hezbollah. Both groups remain key players in the conflict with Israel despite heavy airstrikes on their command-and-control centers. Despite recent setbacks, they continue receiving support from Iran and other allies, while their actions in Gaza and the Galilee persist. But, although these two organisations remain active, and their ability to recover shouldn’t be underestimated, their operational strength and impact on the balance of power with Israel have been significantly weakened. This, in turn, reduces the short-term influence of their Iranian sponsor in the Levant.   The limits of ballistic deterrence and the nuclear temptation  The neutralisation of Hezbollah and Hamas has significantly reduced the Islamic Republic of Iran’s room for maneuver, and its leaders are faced with choices that, as many analysts observe, all carry major disadvantages.  The ballistic confrontation between Iran and Israel has clearly highlighted the limitations of conventional military capabilities for Tehran. On 13-14 April, Iran launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for the destruction of an annex of its embassy in Damascus. On 1 October, Tehran launched a new salvo of missiles in what it called Operation True Promise Two, in response to the elimination of key Iranian-backed leaders like Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah.   In both cases, the Iranian attacks were aimed at conveying resolve to Israel, reestablishing deterrence, and reassuring the various components of the “Axis of Resistance,” increasingly concerned about Iran’s relative idleness. Each time, however, Israel’s air defence system, supported by its American ally, intercepted the vast majority of Iranian projectiles. During the April exchange of fire, the IDF responded by targeting an airbase in Isfahan tasked with safeguarding the Natanz nuclear facility, highlighting Iran’s vulnerabilities and limitations in its ballistic missile defences.  Given the limitations of its ballistic shield and the diminished potential of its proxy network, Iranian political and military leaders are increasingly aware that these resources are not enough for protecting the Islamic regime. Confronted with Israel’s strategy to contain Iran by dismantling its asymmetric warfare capabilities, they recognise a significant decline in terms of strategic depth. Acknowledging this mounting pressure, they are prompted to seek alternative solutions to compensate for these losses. Consequently, they are rationally driven to fortify the security of their Iranian stronghold by enhancing their nuclear deterrent capabilities.  Since 7 October 2023, the Islamic regime has significantly accelerated its nuclear activities, enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels. By the end of 2023, Iran was producing about nine kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent monthly, raising concerns due to its rapid potential for further enrichment. Despite earlier pauses in production, the rate has surged in response to heightened geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the US, and allies have criticised this acceleration. This summer, Kamal Kharrazi, a close aide to Iran’s Supreme Leader, raised international concerns by mentioning a potential “change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine.”  The Eastern Pivot and Its Drawbacks  However, with no indication that Iran will be able to acquire an effective nuclear umbrella in the short term, the mullahs and the Guardians are compelled to consider alternative solutions. On the diplomatic front, Iranian leaders are faced with two equally unsatisfactory options due to their negative implications for Iranian sovereignty. The first possibility would be to seek a reconciliation with the West. Tasked with embodying this scenario, President Massoud Pezechkian recently expressed Tehran’s desire to renew ties with liberal democracies and reopen negotiations over their nuclear dispute. However, significant mistrust and numerous obstacles still hinder the warming of relations, especially if a new Republican administration takes office in Washington.  The alternative path, already widely explored by Tehran, is to move forward with the so-called “Look East” doctrine. In fact, Tehran has continuously sought to strengthen its ties with Beijing and Moscow in recent years. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a comprehensive economic and security agreement, marking a significant step towards deeper cooperation. In September 2021, Iran began its accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional bloc led by Russia and China. Since February 2022, Iran has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has even provided logistical and military support to Moscow.   At the September 2022 SCO summit, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping welcomed the Islamic Republic, highlighting the regime’s growing ties within a bloc opposing Western influence. In January 2023, Iran became a full BRICS member, and, recently, Tehran and Moscow have enhanced their military collaboration, raising concerns about potential nuclear cooperation. Nonetheless, this pivot toward the Eastern bloc could threaten Iranian sovereignty by tying the regime’s future more closely to that of Russia and China, undermining Iranian nationalism and the aspiration to preserve independence.  The Islamic regime teetering on the brink of profound transformation  Faced with a drastic reduction in its international geopolitical room for maneuver, the Islamic Republic is also going through a serious economic crisis while facing a growing questioning of its internal political legitimacy. In all respects, the regime is at a crossroads; a decisive turning point that could go so far as to destabilise its political foundations.   In the past, showing extraordinary resilience, Tehran has always managed to get out of trouble by maintaining the course of its multifaceted policy conducted on all fronts and by all available means. Placed in a position of military and economic inferiority, the Iranian outsider has adopted an asymmetrical approach with considerable success by striving to avoid frontal combat and by striking blows where it was not expected. In this, the Iran of the mullahs and the guardians has managed, to borrow Henry Kissinger’s words, to “win by not losing.”  The capacity of Islamist leaders to navigate significant challenges and uphold their once unchallenged grip on the country now seems to be wavering. Increasing threats, coupled with a narrowing of strategic options, have placed the regime in a precarious position. The tactics and remedies that previously aided in maintaining the system’s stability no longer appear adequate to ensure the longevity of the political and ideological regime established in 1979.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s airstrikes of Oct. 26, 2024 – which hit around 20 military targets in Iran, Iraq and Syria – had been anticipated for weeks. Indeed, the operation followed a promise from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to retaliate for an earlier ballistic missile attack by Tehran in early October. The move also follows a pattern that has seen Iran and Israel take turns to up the ante in what was for a long time a “shadow war,” but which has has now developed into direct confrontation. These tit-for-tat attacks prompted widespread fears that the whole region was poised to enter a more escalatory phase. But, counterintuitive though it may seem, I believe that the latest Israeli strikes may actually have defused tensions. To understand why, it is worth analyzing the nature and scale of the Israeli operation, as well as the likely stance of decision-makers in Israel, Iran and the United States in the aftermath of the attack. A calibrated attack by Israel The October air assault by Iran was itself retaliation for a series of Israeli operations against Iran’s proxy group Hezbollah. These included the assassination of a high-ranking Hamas official in Tehran on the eve of the inauguration of Iran’s new president in July and the killing of Hezbollah’s leader in late September. Similarly, an earlier air assault on Israeli targets in April by Tehran was in response to Israeli provocations this spring – including a strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, on April 1 that killed two senior military officers. Many observers anticipated, or feared, an Israeli response to Iran’s October missile and drone attack to be heavy, and punishing – Israel certainly has the military capability to do so. But rather than target vital infrastructure in Iran or the country’s nuclear facilities, Israel instead opted for “precise and targeted” strikes on the Islamic Republic’s air defense and missile capabilities. The somewhat limited scope of the Israeli operations suggests that the strike was designed to send a strong message to Iran’s supreme leader and Iranian military commanders. In essence, Israel was signaling that it has the capability to strike at the heart of Iran, while holding back from a full-throttled attack that would have had further damaged Iran’s fragile economy. While it will take time for a full assessment of the effectiveness of Israel’s strikes to emerge, early indications suggest that they succeeded in revealing weaknesses in Iran’s overall security. These weaknesses that could be further exploited against other more important targets, such as oil and gas production facilities or even nuclear power sites, should Iran or its partners in the so-called “axis of resistance” choose to retaliate. A cautious response in Iran Despite the apparent success of Israel’s attacks against a wide range of targets, statements from Iranian leaders suggest the operational impact was limited. An Iranian Foreign Ministry statement condemned the attack, noting that Iran “had a right to self defense.” But at the same it added that Iran would “uphold its commitments for regional peace and stability.” Reading into those words, it suggests to me that Iran is not immediately seeking to retaliate and escalate tensions further. Of course, that could change. Further messages by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini or Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani may give a clearer indication whether Iran will seek to retaliate, and how. But with Iran well-aware of the impact that escalation – and the potential for more U.S.-led sanctions and heightened support for Israel – would have on its ailing economy, it may well calculate that a return to the pre-escalation status quo with Israel is in its interests. In Washington, a wary White House A return to the shadow war between Israel and Iran – as opposed to open warfare – would no doubt be welcomed in Washington. Since the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the Biden administration has been caught between competing obligations and concerns. This has included supporting longstanding ally Israel, while not alienating friendly Arab governments and trying to avoid conflict creep into all out war in the region. Meanwhile, in an election year, the Democratic ticket in particular is trying to balance its support for a largely pro-Israel Jewish voting block with a need not to offend potentially important Muslim votes in key states, nor a more pro-Palestinian youth vote. Escalation of conflict in the region does nothing to help the White House in these respects. Yet President Joe Biden’s decades-long relationship with Netanyahu has not led to outcomes that the administration has sought. Washington has not succeeded in pushing its ally toward a ceasefire in Gaza, nor a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon. And with the U.S. election looming on Nov. 5, elevated tensions in the Middle East on various fronts could impact how voters perceive Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump — especially in the battleground state of Michigan, where the Democratic ticket may lose votes among Arab and Muslim Americans angered over the Biden administration’s perceived pro-Israel stance. Threading the needle? Predicting what will happen next in the Middle East has escaped the most seasoned analysts. It may take days, weeks or even months to assess whether this latest airstrike by Israel will lead to a further escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel – or whether a more de-escalatory dynamic settles over the region. But there are good reasons to believe that decision-makers in Iran, Israel and the U.S. know that more escalation is in no one’s interests. And the latest salvo may have just done enough to satisfy Israel, while providing cover for Tehran to say that there is no need to return fire in kind.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Hamas will soon begin the process of deciding who will next head the militant Palestinian organization following the Oct. 16, 2024, killing of former leader Yahya Sinwar – but the task won’t be easy, or quick. What makes his replacement as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau a hard one is that since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack – for which, Sinwar was seen as the main architect – Israel has killed many of the senior political and military commanders that would be in line to replace him, or at least be tasked with determining the future direction of Hamas. Just two months before Sinwar’s death, his predecessor in the role, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran, purportedly in an Israeli operation. Meanwhile, Hamas’ military chief, Mohammed Deif, was killed in July and Saleh Arouri, a senior Hamas official and deputy of Haniyeh, was earlier killed in a Beirut drone strike. As an expert on Palestinian politics, I believe the death of Sinwar will leave a vacuum in Hamas that will likely last for many months, if not years. The question is whether the group eventually opts for a leader who continues Sinwar’s hard-line legacy or tries to moderate Hamas’ approach. Sinwar’s legacy Sinwar’s uncompromising stance has shaped not only Hamas but also the Palestinian cause. Born and raised in the Gazan refugee camp Khan Younis, Sinwar joined Hamas in the early days of the organization, which was established in 1987. He quickly rose through the ranks and was responsible for establishing Majd, a security agency within the military wing of Hamas responsible for apprehending and executing Palestinian collaborators with Israel. Sinwar confessed to Israeli interrogators to have killed and buried 12 suspected collaborators – earning him a life sentence in Israeli jail. He served 22 years before being released in a prisoner-swap deal in 2011, which also saw the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. A few years later, he made it to the top of Hamas, serving as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau in Gaza since 2017. After Haniyeh’s assassination in late July, 2024, Sinwar assumed overall leadership. Throughout, Sinwar has been a proponent of Hamas’ hard-line stance on Israel – an approach that won him respect within the organization. Less than a year after assuming power in Gaza, Sinwar endorsed the “Great March of Return and Breaking the Siege” protests of March 2018 along Israel-Gaza borders. The demonstrations – during which Israeli troops shot dead scores of Palestinian protesters – succeeded in galvanizing international support for the Palestinian cause. The protests may have also contributed to Israel’s decision in August of that year to allow Qatar to begin making monthly payments of millions of dollars to Hamas and Gaza in an attempt to defuse and de-escalate tensions. More concessions came as Israel tried to satisfy Sinwar and avoid the further escalation of unrest in Gaza, including allowing Gazan laborers to work in Israel for the first time since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005. But Sinwar had less success in getting Israel to agree to releasing the fellow Hamas members he had left behind in Israeli jails and had vowed to get out. He tried many times to strike a deal for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and two civilians, but Israel was not interested. That failure probably contributed to Hamas’ decision to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. How Hamas reacts to blows The killing of Sinwar has weakened Hamas, but Hamas as an idea and an ideology is harder to kill. Israel knows this. In March 2004, an Israeli missile struck and killed Hamas’ founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin; a month later, his successor Abdel Aziz Rantisi was also killed. But those deaths did not weaken Hamas. On the contrary, the organization grew more radical. A younger and more defiant leadership took over the organization, which fought Israel repeatedly from 2008 onward, culminating int the Oct. 7 attacks. Hamas’ reaction to that double blow may give an insight into the current decision-making process now. The killing of Yassin was an opportunity for Hamas to revise its military tactics against Israel – which then mainly consisted of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. But in the end, Hamas vowed to continue the violent struggle against Israel. Moderation or radicalization? Hamas is again at a crossroad. It is weakened, alienated from Arab moderate governments and increasingly unpopular among Gazans. But throughout the last year of conflict it has remained defiant. Footage of an injured Sinwar, fighting to the last and trying to down an Israeli drone with a stick, has only added to his legacy, making him a legend to many supporters. The new leadership will have to chose between continuing down the road of radicalization that Sinwar represented or opting for moderation. But Israel is not making that second option any easier. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s only offer to Hamas is total surrender – he has not left the group any face-saving exit. So it seems likely that Hamas will choose to continue the fight. As such, one of the most likely candidates for post-Sinwar leadership of Hamas is Khalil al-Hayya, a Palestinian politician who has served as the deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau since August 2024. Al-Hayya is known for his hawkish attitude toward the idea of Hamas’ reconciliation with rival Palestinian group Fatah, and his hawkish statements on Israel. After Sinwar’s death, he vowed to continue the fight against Israel, an indication that the spirit of Sinwar will continue to guide Palestinian resistance in the coming years. His main challenger for the role of leader is Khaled Mashaal, who served as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau from 1996 to 2017 and currently serves as its chairman in exile. Mashaal, who has a large network of regional and international allies, is considered a more moderate option. He was responsible for drafting Hamas’ 2017 manifesto – seen as a departure from the earlier, more radical and blatantly antisemitic 1988 charter. Collective leadership: Room for maneuver? But a decision on who will assume the role of leader is not expected immediately. Hamas appears more inclined toward collective leadership until scheduled elections in March 2025, if conditions permit. In the meantime, a five-member committee that was formed in August following the assassination of Haniyeh will take over decision-making. The committee is tasked with “governing the movement during the war and exceptional circumstances, as well as its future plans,” and the new committee is authorized to “make strategic decisions,” according to Hamas sources who spoke to Agence France-Presse reporters. Collective leadership of this sort would seemingly indicate that at present Hamas sees no single person as being able to fill the vacuum left by Sinwar. It would also give Hamas potentially more room to maneuver regarding negotiations with Israel and regional players, as some members of the committee are seen as acceptable faces to moderate Arab governments. Collective leadership also provides Hamas with a survival mechanism, making it harder for Israel to claim the type of success it has so far achieved in assassinating named Hamas “leaders.” No doubt, Israel has weakened Hamas with this strategy – notably with the killing of Sinwar. And while the assassination of leading Hamas figures does not constitute “total victory” over the group, as Israel wants, it does make the choice in choosing the next leader that much harder for Hamas.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With Iran’s firing of some 180 ballistic missiles at Israel overnight, the Middle East is again on the brink of what would be a costly, ruinous regional war. Israel and its ally, the United States, shot down most of the missiles. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately vowed to retaliate for the attack. He called it a “big mistake” that Iran will “pay for”. The strike marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s calculations following weeks of escalating Israeli attacks on the leaders of its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their forces in both Gaza and Lebanon. Iran has traditionally outsourced its fighting to Hezbollah and Hamas. It has been very much concerned about getting dragged into direct confrontation with Israel because of the ramifications for the ruling regime – namely the possible internal dissent and chaos that any war with Israel might generate. When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran in late July, Iran’s leaders said they would respond appropriately. They basically left it to Hezbollah to do that. And as Israel intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks, another Iranian proxy group, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, claimed to have retaliated by launching missiles and drones at Israeli cities and US destroyers in the Red Sea. Israel responded with airstrikes on Yemen. In this context, from the Iranian point of view, it looked like Iran was just sitting on the fence and not performing its leadership role in challenging Israel. So, to a large extent, Iran had to exert its role as the leader of the so-called “axis of resistance” and get into the fight. Fighting Israel is very much a pillar of state identity in Iran. The Iranian political establishment is set up on the principle of challenging the United States and freeing Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. Those things are ingrained in the Iranian state identity. So, if Iran doesn’t act on this principle, there’s a serious risk of undermining its own identity. A delicate balancing act Yet there are clearly serious risks to this type of direct attack by Iran. Domestically, the Iranian political regime is suffering from a serious crisis of legitimacy. There have been numerous popular uprisings in Iran in recent years. These include the massive “Women, Life, Freedom” movement that erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody for allegedly not properly wearing her hijab. There is also a major dissenting view in Iran that challenges the regime’s anti-US and anti-Israel state identity and its commitment to perpetual conflict with both countries. So, the authorities in Iran have been concerned that direct confrontation with Israel and the US would unleash these internal dissenting voices and seriously threaten the regime’s survival. It’s this existential threat that has stopped Iran from acting on its principles. In addition, Iran has a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp and has an agenda of improving Iran’s relations with the West. He has been talking about reviving the Iran nuclear deal with the international community, sending signals that Iran is prepared to talk with the Americans. But the problem is the regional dynamics have completely changed since that deal was negotiated with the Obama administration in 2015. Iran has been a pariah state in recent years – and even more so since the conflict between Israel and Hamas began a year ago. Since then, no Western country would deem it appropriate or politically expedient to engage in nuclear talks with Iran, with the aim of alleviating international sanctions on the regime. Not at a time when Iran is openly calling for the destruction of Israel, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks on Israel, and now engaging in confrontations with Israel itself. So the timing is awful for Pezeshkian’s agenda of repairing the damage to Iran’s global standing. Ultimately, though, it’s not the president who calls the shots in Iran – it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council who consider matters of war and peace and decide on the course of action. The supreme leader is also the head of state and appoints the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC generals have been advocating for more serious and resolute action against Israel ever since the war in Gaza started. And it looks like the supreme leader has finally listened to this advice. So, the regime has been maintaining a delicate balance of these factors:preserving Iran’s state identity and what it stands for in the region, and the need to manage internal dissent and ensure its survival. In normal circumstances, it was easy for Iran to maintain this balance. It could manage its internal opponents through brutal force or appeasement and advocate an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Now, the scales have tipped. From the Iranian perspective, Israel has been so brazen in its actions against its proxies, it just didn’t look right for Iran to continue sitting on the fence, not taking action. As such, it has become more important for Iran to emphasise its anti-American, anti-Israel state identity and perhaps deal with an acceptable level of risk coming from a rise in internal dissent. Where things go from here With its attack on Israel, Iran is also prepared for another risk – direct retaliation from Israel and all-out war breaking out. The conflict in the region is really going according to Netanyahu’s playbook. He has been advocating for hitting Iran and for the United States to target Iran. Now, Israel has the justification to retaliate against Iran and also drag the United States into the conflict. Unfortunately, Iran is also now prepared to see the entire Persian Gulf get embroiled in the conflict because any retaliation by Israel and perhaps the United States would make US assets in the Persian Gulf, such as navy ships and commercial vessels, vulnerable to attacks by Iran or its allies. And that could have major implications for trade and security in the region. This is the way things are heading. Iran would know that hitting Israel would invite Israeli retaliation and that this retaliation would likely happen with US backing. It seems Iran is prepared to bear the costs of this.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and Iran are at war. In truth, the two sides have been fighting for decades, but the conflict has played out largely under the cover of covert and clandestine operations. The recent actions of both sides in this once “shadow war” have changed the nature of the conflict. It is not clear that de-escalation is on the horizon. On Oct 1, 2024, Iran launched a massive, direct attack against Israel notionally in retribution for Israel’s dual assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. It was the second such barrage in six months. By many accounts, the previous Iranian attack against Israel on April 13 – which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones – caused very little damage to Israel. Perhaps because of this, and likely in part due to U.S. encouragement of restraint, Israel’s immediate military response then – an airstrike against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in the Isfahan province – was somewhat measured. Many onlookers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that both sides would prefer to de-escalate rather than engage in ongoing open warfare. But further Israeli military operations since then have prompted escalatory Iranian military responses, forcing the conflict back out of the shadows. With Hamas’ capabilities and leadership degraded in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s military leaders announced in June that they were “ready to face” Hezbollah – the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group whose persistent rocket attacks against northern Israel have caused tens of thousands to evacuate the area. Israel pivots north Israel’s pivot from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chairman, Haniyeh, during his stay in Tehran. The purported Israeli operation was seen as an affront to Iran’s sovereignty. It was also an embarrassment that highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran’s internal security apparatus. Even though Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei vowed a “harsh response” against Israel, by September Iran had taken no action. Tehran’s inaction caused many Middle East analysts to question if the Iranian response would ever materialize – and by extension, what that would mean for Khamenei’s commitment to his proxy forces. If indeed Iran’s leadership opted for restraint following the assassination of Hamas’ top political leader, the same could not be said for its reaction to Israel’s multiphase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September. Israel began with a clandestine operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s command and control through the means of sabotaged explosive communications devices. Israel then carried out airstrikes eliminating Hezbollah’s top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country’s leaders describe as a “limited [ground] operation” into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border. Tehran’s Oct 1. attack in response against Israel was, according to many Middle East experts and indeed Iranian military leaders, primarily a retaliation for the two high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran’s defense strategy, I argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel’s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence. Challenging Israel’s advance Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel embarks on ground operations into southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops must now deal with what is perhaps the world’s most capable guerrilla fighting force – one that performed quite successfully during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Nevertheless, Israel’s ability to achieve a tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah’s top leaders – even in the midst of an ongoing localized war, and even after Israel’s leaders announced their intention to engage Hezbollah – reveals a far superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah. And that presents a huge blow to what is seen in Iran as the Islamic Republic’s crown jewel within its “Axis of Resistance.” In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership, regroup and organize against Israel’s ground invasion. The brutal art of save face? It also serves to help Iran save face, especially in how it’s seen by other parts of its external proxy network. Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault. Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support has no doubt contributed to Hamas being successfully degraded as a threat by Israel, with many of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israel’s military leaders to claim the group has been effectively defeated. Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic. Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found. Now that Israel has shifted its attention to Lebanon and scored several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to stand back and watch for two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate within Iran’s borders. And second, Iran’s proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see if Tehran will continue supporting them – or will abandon them, as it seemingly has done with Hamas. Reclaiming deterrence Perhaps above all, in Tehran’s calculus over how to respond is Iran’s need to restore a deterrence. The two defining features of Iran’s interrelated external, or “forward defense,” and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones. These Iranian defense strategies seek to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional U.S. allies with punishment via proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks; and second, by offering scapegoat targets against which Iran’s enemies can express their rage. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran’s hostile policies. Israel’s degradation of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran’s ability to deter attacks against the homeland. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk. Who plays the next move? These interweaving imperatives likely prompted Iran’s leaders to launch a second massive, direct missile attack on Oct. 1 against Israel. How effective the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran’s aims is unknown. The Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90% of the ballistic missiles reached their intended targets, while Israel and the United States characterize the attack as having been “defeated and ineffective,” despite unverified cellphone videos showing several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel. What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack. IRGC leaders met this warning with a counterthreat of their own that if Israel responds to the Oct. 1 attack militarily, Iran will again respond with unspecified “crushing and destructive attacks.” Rhetorically, neither side is backing down; militarily this may be true, too. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will dictate how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah, which have been followed by an ongoing air campaign, signal a new phase in the conflict amid heightened regional tensions. The sophisticated remote pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah on 17–18 September were followed by an intensive Israeli air campaign against the militant group, which is ongoing. These events were hailed by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant as a new phase in the country’s conflict with Hezbollah and a shift of gravity in Israel’s conflict from south to north. These actions, driven by intelligence breakthroughs and rapid decision-making, mark a critical moment in the ongoing conflict in the region and could have far-reaching implications for regional stability and Israel's political landscape. Israel’s ‘Use it or Lose it’ Moment The sensational events of last week were, arguably, a suboptimal military outcome for Israel. Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility for either attack, though the capability and intelligence from allies point to its involvement. The pager and then the walkie-talkie attacks were originally designed to be the opening salvo in a coordinated and total attack against Hezbollah. This would undoubtedly have been devastating, rendering communications obsolete for Hezbollah while being prepared to simultaneously hit hard with drone and missile strikes, maybe even alongside a ground incursion. Despite this careful planning, US sources have reported that Israel’s leaders were forced to either act instantly or risk losing this asset. This was a ‘use it or lose it’ moment, and has ultimately led Israel to ramp up its pressure on the north to follow what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah fairly identified as a ‘declaration of war’.  After the activation of the pager attack was forced upon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel followed up with the movement of the 98th Division, a paratrooper division, from Gaza to the northern border on 18 September. In addition to this, Gallant visited aircraft bases on the northern border in the immediate aftermath of the pager attack. Israel then activated another of its assets in the walkie-talkie attack, another ‘use it or lose it moment’ as reeling Hezbollah security officials (as well as embedded Iranian officers) began to look for other infiltrations. Israel has since begun a brutal missile campaign against Hezbollah with strikes in Southern Lebanon as well as in Beirut, where Israel reported the successful assassination of Ibrahim Aqil, a senior Hezbollah commander. According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, these attacks killed almost 500 and wounded many more on 23 September alone. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to Israel’s demand to withdrawing its troops and missile silos to beyond the Litani River. After activating their pager asset, Israeli commanders were forced to activate their walkie-talkie asset before it was detected. The forced use of these two key assets led Netanyahu to believe that this was his best chance to push for a victory against Hezbollah with further missile strikes and assassinations. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to its demands What is clear is that throughout this last week Netanyahu has been led by events, and not the other way around. Despite this, he will be delighted that he is one step closer to reclaiming the ‘Mr Defence’ reputation that has seen him serve a record eight terms as prime minister. After the shock of 7 October and the hostages that Israel has not been able to bring home, this is a moment of victory for the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence services and Netanyahu himself in re-asserting the competence and superiority of Israeli capabilities.  Israel will ultimately hope that ramping up pressure on Hezbollah through its continuing assassination and missile campaign will force its troops back behind the Litani River (some 18 miles from the current border, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701). This would allow Israel to return 200,000 displaced refugees to cities and villages in the north and score a major political and legitimacy goal.  A Crushing Blow for Hezbollah For Hezbollah, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks represented the most significant failure for the organisation since the 2006 war. In three days, Israel’s intelligence services blatantly proved their ability to infiltrate and destroy Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures. This began with the remote detonation of several thousand pagers on Tuesday and was followed up by the remote detonation of thousands of walkie-talkies used by the terrorist group on Wednesday. For Hezbollah this is a serious blow that carries a number of serious implications for the group. Firstly, the successful outcome of the Israeli operation exposed  fundamental weaknesses in the group’s command-and-control mechanisms. Hezbollah already operates in an extremely difficult command-and-control environment due to extensive human intelligence and Pegasus spyware, where Israeli intelligence can compromise mobile phones simply by sending them a signal. This environment has forced Hezbollah to operate on a network of cells which rely on almost constant top-down delegation. The inevitable restructuring as well as the human capacity that Hezbollah has lost will hamper the group’s ability to effectively resist Israel’s attacks. Secondly, there has been an impact on Hezbollah’s legitimacy.  Israel’s attacks are a humiliation for the group, representing as they do a colossal security failure. Hezbollah’s inability to prevent the attacks and protect Lebanon (as it claims to do) makes its position extremely difficult. The severity of this legitimacy hit is demonstrated by Nasrallah being forced to admit that Hezbollah has suffered a major and unprecedented blow. Finally, Hezbollah’s position is made more difficult by its lack of credible options to respond. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion.  At the same time, however, Nasrallah has furious internal stakeholders demanding revenge. The only real pressure valve available to him in this extremely difficult position is being able to claim attacks by the Axis of Resistance as consequences for Israel’s actions. This axis is comprised of an aligned group in the region, led by Iran and including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and various militia groups, who claim to resist Israel and its allies. Wider Questions for the Axis of Resistance This is a major test for the Axis of Resistance. Iran has watched seemingly powerlessly as Hezbollah, its ally, has been pummelled again and again by Israel. The refugees streaming out of Southern Lebanon towards Beirut are another example of the pressure Israel is applying on Hezbollah. Iran is also yet to respond to Israel’s assassination of Ismayel Haniyeh in Tehran in July. Iranian leaders and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures will be increasingly frustrated that they have been unable to re-establish credible deterrence against Israel. This is a particularly sore point as it is fairly clear by now that their April missile and drone strikes against Israel were ineffective in achieving this. We can expect to see an evolving Iranian strategy that aims to place maximum diplomatic pressure on Israel through moves such as encouraging proxies to strike at Israel, as well as threatening regional stability and shipping lanes. We may also see Iran to make diplomatic overtures to the West to exert more diplomatic pressure. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion Something to be aware of is that there are multiple smaller militia groups and individual cells within Hezbollah that have the potential for escalation. Many of these smaller or splinter groups may feel that they must respond to Israel with an independent attack that pre-empts or goes beyond Hezbollah’s so far very measured response. This danger is illustrated by previous attacks on UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, such as the attack that resulted in the death of Private Sean Rooney in December 2022. If one of these smaller groups was to hit an Israeli population centre, either on purpose or by mistake, the tension could easily spill over into a larger-scale conflict. The US–Israel Relationship An interesting dynamic to note is that the pager attacks and subsequent missile campaign represent another case of Israel making aggressive decisions without first consulting the US. Prior examples of this include the decision to invade Rafah, rejecting any possibility of a future Palestinian state as part of negotiations, and missile campaigns on non-combat areas in Gaza. As the US is Israel’s main ally and security guarantor, this trend embodies the increasing risk appetite of the current Israeli government. This is likely due to an assessment of the strategic environment, particularly Iran’s reluctance to enter a full-scale conflict, but also represents a political calculation by Netanyahu. Once again, the only way for Netanyahu to safeguard his short-term survival is by taking decisions that ensure Israel remains in a state of conflict. Followers of Israeli politics will not need reminding that Netanyahu faces three criminal cases that will progress as soon as he loses the premiership. The escalation perhaps also reflects a weakness in the US’s security arrangements, as it has been unable to effectively dissuade and disincentivise its own allies from escalation. The US has made it very clear that its priority, especially approaching the presidential election, is for regional de-escalation. This is illustrated by the exhaustive diplomatic efforts made since 7 October to reach a settlement between Iran, Hezbollah and Israel in order to keep the border cool. When the new US administration takes office later this year, its first priority in terms of Middle East policy must be addressing the balance of power between Washington and the Israeli prime minister.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in early October 2023, many observers jumped to a grim conclusion that, from then onward, the Middle East was hurtling at an ever-increasing speed toward another major regional conflict. The military operation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip was to be followed by fierce hostilities in the West Bank, then by a large-scale border clash between Israel and Lebanon, and, finally, by an Israeli–Iranian war, which had been looming on the political horizon for years and was literally just a step away, with the likely involvement of several key regional and global actors, including the United States. Limits to escalation  But in the 11 months that have passed since the Hamas attack on Israel, no major war has broken out in the Middle East. Israel, as predicted, is stuck in Gaza for long. The death toll among Palestinian civilians has passed 40,000, with the number of wounded approaching 100,000, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons now in the seven figures. For the people of Gaza, everything happening there is not a targeted anti-terrorist operation, but an all-out war in every sense. While the neighboring West Bank also saw an escalation, it was much more limited—around 600 Palestinians and several dozen Israelis have died there over the past 11 months. This is still many times more than in previous years (28 people were killed there in 2020, 86 in 2021, and 146 in 2022), but it is clear now that the West Bank has not become a second Gaza today, nor is it likely to become one overnight. Along the line of confrontation between the IDF and Hezbollah forces on the Israeli–Lebanese border, nothing extraordinary has occurred so far either, except for a rocket strike at a soccer field in the town of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights on July 27, which killed 12 Druze teenagers. True, Hezbollah has fired an unprecedented number of missiles at Israel over the past 11 months, up to 6,000 according to some reports. Israel, in response, has launched massive retaliatory and even preemptive strikes on southern Lebanon. But the preliminary results of this duel were relatively minor: 21 civilian and 20 military deaths on the Israeli side, and around 375 fighters and civilians killed on Hezbollah’s side. Even the latest attack on Sunday, August 25, which was announced in advance and involved 340 rockets along with dozens of Hezbollah drones, seems to have caused no significant damage to Israel. In any case, nothing comparable to the IDF’s deep incursion into southern Lebanon in July 2006 (known as the Second Lebanon War) is happening now or is likely to happen soon. In recent months, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to escalate by conducting precision strikes on prominent figures of its adversaries. On April 1, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an Iranian embassy annex building in Damascus, killing 16 people, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, one of the top military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 30, senior Hezbollah operative Fuad Shukr was killed in a Beirut suburb, and on July 31, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran (Israel never claimed responsibility for his death). After each of these incidents, experts predicted a sharp increase in the risks of escalation. But the Iranian leadership’s response to these developments was surprisingly restrained (as was Tehran’s earlier response to the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani in early 2020 by the U.S. military in a Baghdad suburb). The leaders of most Arab states also showed restraint in their response to the events in Gaza. The highly emotional reaction of the Arab street did not translate into decisive actions comparable to the oil embargo imposed on Israel and its allies following the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Efforts to further promote the Abraham Accords between Israel and the conservative Arab monarchies continued, albeit fading from the public eye. The only consistent supporters of Palestine were the stubborn Yemeni Houthis, who have attacked foreign ships in the Red Sea. However, it was Egypt—not Israel—that suffered the most from these attacks, losing nearly half of its revenues from the Suez Canal. Reasons for restraint  Although the trigger of a major regional war was pulled almost a year ago, the bomb itself never exploded. This situation calls for an explanation, particularly to assess the risk that the bomb might eventually detonate in the foreseeable future, among other things. One explanation for the current situation around Palestine lies in the distinct nature of Hamas, which has an ambiguous reputation in the Arab world. Cairo does not hold it in high regard, and Egypt’s current military leadership, not without reason, draws parallels between Palestinian radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Russia) at home, which has been driven deep underground, but was, alongside Israel, among the founding fathers of Hamas. Damascus has not forgotten that at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the political opposition rather than President Bashar Assad. Opinions of Hamas are divided in the Gulf states—while the group can count on some patronage and even political support in Doha, Abu Dhabi is much more skeptical and doubtful of the former rulers of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, all regional actors are under pressure from the international community, which for various reasons does not want further escalation. The U.S. has no interest in a major regional war in the Middle East with an uncertain outcome, especially in the run-up to the presidential election in November. Thus, Washington is focused on maintaining the regional status quo. China has even less reason to welcome such a conflict, in the first place because it would immediately drive global hydrocarbon prices up and create many transportation and logistics issues for Beijing. Moscow could possibly count on some short-term gains from a major Middle East conflagration. The West would have to shift attention away from Ukraine for a while, while prices for Russian oil and gas would skyrocket. But the negative consequences of long-term destabilization in such an important region for Russia are so great that they undoubtedly outweigh any short-term gains. It is no coincidence that at his meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on August 13, President Vladimir Putin emphasized Moscow’s commitment to preventing further escalation and promoting a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It is also plausible that during the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Iran on August 5, Moscow urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to refrain from radical responses to Israel—not only to minimize possible civilian casualties but also to avoid provoking a direct conflict with the U.S. Postmodernity as inoculation against war  However, the core reasons lie not outside, but inside the region. It appears that key actors—from Egypt to Syria, and from Turkey to Iran—are unwilling to engage in a full-blown war. Middle Eastern leaders are reluctant to shoulder the numerous risks and costs associated with a major armed conflict in one way or another. True, the arms race in the Middle East region received a powerful new boost in October 2023 and is likely to accelerate later. Belligerent anti-Israeli rhetoric—not only in the Arab world but also in Iran and Turkey—will also persist. Isolated tragic incidents—both planned and accidental—will continue. Yet a major war is a different matter. This is not because all Middle Eastern leaders are exceptionally compassionate and peace-loving, but because almost none of them today can be fully confident in their own power and resilience. It is still possible to maintain a limited military presence near and far, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan does in Syria and Libya. But repeating the experience of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions wounded, is now a no-go: Middle Eastern societies have changed too much over the past 40 years, and the region has advanced too far down the path of postmodernity. It is hardly a coincidence that the strongest proponents of escalation are the Houthis, who are the least affected by the postmodern values and lifestyle in the Middle East. Perhaps even Tehran can no longer count on the unconditional loyalty of the new generation of Iranian citizens, who would have to pay with their own blood for the decisions of the political and military elite leading to a major regional war. In any case, the victory of the only “reformist” candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in the recent presidential election is a clear signal from society to the leadership of the Islamic Republic that people want peace, stability and economic development, rather than new military exploits or social and political upheavals that invariably accompany them. Even Israel—for all the outward determination of the current cabinet to see things through to the end—is no exception to this rule. The costs of the Gaza operation have already topped $60 billion, a staggering sum for a relatively small country, meaning inevitable budget deficits, tax hikes and cuts to social programs. Israel’s call-up of reservists has already drained the national economy, and its effects will be felt for a long time. Most importantly, as the Gaza offensive has once again shown, starting a war is easy, but ending it is very difficult. The prospect of a second Gaza in the West Bank or southern Lebanon is far from appealing, even for a politician as determined as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Armageddon is off the table? It is fair to assume that the current situation in the Middle East reflects the broader state of global politics. After February 24, 2022, many experts expressed a gloomy belief that “the world is entering a new era of big wars” and that the confrontation between Russia and the West would inevitably lead to a chain reaction of major armed conflicts all over the planet. They predicted an imminent U.S.–China military clash over Taiwan, an armed standoff between China and India in the Himalayas or between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, a rapid escalation on the Korean Peninsula and numerous new conflicts across Africa, among others. Fortunately, none of the above scenarios have so far come to pass. Many other ominous predictions have not come true either. ECOWAS member states opted out of a military intervention in Niger. The Libyan National Army’s threat of a border conflict with Algeria never materialized. Even Venezuela’s eccentric leader Nicolas Maduro seems to have changed his mind about going to war with neighboring Guyana over disputed territories. The number of conflicts in the world has not decreased, but the ongoing ones are predominantly low-intensity conflicts rather than conventional wars, after all. The international system, though shaken, has overall remained standing—for now. Of course, it is too early to sit back. The situation can explode at any moment and almost anywhere: there are more than enough flashpoints around the world, while the level of trust or even basic communication between the great powers has dropped to near zero. In today’s international environment, any negative scenarios are possible, down to the most apocalyptic ones. And this unsettling uncertainty is now very much felt in the Middle East as well. But for now, there is still hope that the unfolding transition to a new world order will be less destructive and less costly for humanity than many professional pessimists have imagined in recent years.