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Abstract This paper analyses the current challenges facing NATO and questions its future viability amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. It highlights the evolving U.S. stance, marked by a 2025 National Security Strategy that prioritises self-reliance for European allies and a reduced American military role in Europe, reflecting a broader "America First" approach. Russia's persistent opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine, fuels ongoing conflict and threatens regional stability. Germany's emerging leadership role in European security is explored, showcasing its increased defence commitments and strategic cultural shift from restraint to readiness. Turkey’s crucial geopolitical position and military capabilities underscore its significance within NATO despite recent tensions. The paper also discusses the Greenland dispute as a symbol of intra-Alliance tensions and as a challenge to collective defence principles under Article 5. Ultimately, the Ukraine war serves as a critical test for NATO, raising doubts about the Alliance’s coherence and effectiveness amid internal divisions and external threats. Key Words: NATO, Russia, US, Europe, Security Introduction Allegedly, Lord Ismay (Hastings Lionel Ismay), the first Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), famously claimed that NATO was set up for three major reasons: to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out (he meant the USSR) and to keep the Germans down.[1] Historians and international security experts generally agree that NATO has been a fundamental part of European security architecture, helping maintain peace on the European continent during the Cold War amid the great powers’ rivalry. Not only did the American presence on the European continent deter a possible Soviet invasion, but it also served as a pacifier regarding European military and political ambitions, especially German. As of today, "the Alliance" (as Nato is often referred to) seems to be edging towards the end of its coherence due to many internal and external reasons. This short paper will explore some of them, albeit the topic naturally requires a much longer and deeper approach. The Americans: still in? On December 9, 2025, Republican Congressman Thomas Massie of Kentucky introduced H.R. 6508, the NATO Act, which calls for the United States to withdraw from NATO. In his statement, following (consciously or not Lord Ismay) Massie states: “NATO is a Cold War relic. We should withdraw from NATO and use that money to defend our own country, not socialist countries. NATO was created to counter the Soviet Union, which collapsed over thirty years ago. Since then, U.S. participation has cost taxpayers trillions of dollars and continues to risk U.S. involvement in foreign wars. Our Constitution did not authorise permanent foreign entanglements, something our Founding Fathers explicitly warned us against. America should not be the world’s security blanket — especially when wealthy countries refuse to pay for their own defense.”[2] This is but a small ripple in a much bigger pool of water that hosts the U.S. concerns regarding their involvement in the European Security architecture. To cut a long story short, there seems to be a formidable force in U.S. politics advocating a "refocus" of US foreign policy doctrine and the consequent foreign policy and security strategies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the U.S. President has recently unveiled the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump administration indicates a shift away from the U.S. focus on Europe in foreign and security policy, emphasising greater self-reliance for European allies and prioritising other regions.[3] The NSS ranks global regions by priority, placing the Western Hemisphere first (elevated from fifth in the 2017 NSS), Asia second, and Europe third—a demotion from its previous second-place ranking. This reorientation aligns with an "America First" approach that emphasises burden-sharing, non-interventionism, and a narrower definition of U.S. national interests, thereby avoiding overextension in regions such as Europe. Key elements signalling a less focused approach to Europe include, among others, the encouragement of European self-defence. The strategy calls for Europe to assume primary responsibility for its own security as sovereign nations. It urges ending NATO's expansion and requires allies to meet a new 5% of GDP defence spending commitment (dubbed the "Hague Commitment"), far above the current 2% target, to ensure fair burden-sharing. Secondly, the NSS outlines a limited U.S. role in Europe. The U.S. involvement is framed as diplomatic support for stability (e.g. negotiating an end to the Ukraine war and fostering relations with Russia for reconstruction and strategic stability) rather than sustained military commitments. The document criticises Europe's economic decline, migration issues, and EU "transnationalism" that undermines sovereignty, but positions the U.S. as a helper only for aligned partners willing to open markets and combat hostile practices such as mercantilism. As far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, the NSS asserts U.S. preeminence through a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, focusing on migration control, supply chains, and denying adversarial influence through active military and economic measures (Central and South America and the Caribbean). This marks a departure from past NSS documents, which often centred on Europe due to NATO commitments and threats like Russia, toward a more transactional and restrained U.S. posture in the region.[4] With regards to that last point, the very latest National Defence Strategy of the U.S. confirms the direction away from Europe.[5] The strategy prioritises Europe taking primary responsibility for its own conventional defence, with critical but more limited support from the United States. This includes supporting Ukraine’s defence as primarily a European responsibility. Moreover, according to the document, Russia remains a persistent but manageable threat to NATO's eastern members. The Russians: already in? The ongoing war in Ukraine, which has lasted for 4 years now, has allowed the Russian army to make formidable advances in the field. Russian experts and military advisors are pushing for control of Odessa (I write about it here). It appears probable at this stage that the Russian Federation will want to control as much territory of Ukraine as possible and that the lack of effective diplomacy means that the outcome of the war will be settled on the battlefield rather than in the comfort of negotiation chambers. Regardless of the mainstream narratives constantly pushed by CNN or BBC, the Russians have not really changed their fundamental demand - that Ukraine should not be permitted to become a NATO member. Western societies and their political elites can, of course, feel moral outrage when confronted with such demands. The facts are, however, painfully simple. After the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany was agreed to and accepted by the then-Soviet Union, on the condition that NATO would not expand eastward. (I write about here). NATO did expand westward multiple times, however. From the Kremlin's perspective, Ukraine's possible membership in NATO is the last red line Russia cannot allow to be crossed. Put simply, Ukraine's geography makes it a strategic asset to NATO. Let us also remember that countries such as Turkey, Poland, all three Baltic states, and, recently, even Finland are already NATO members.[6] Importantly, Russian security and military experts see this as a fundamental threat to Moscow and its European environment. (Russia, after all, is also a European country). (The pivotal moment came at the April Bucharest Summit, where NATO leaders — despite opposition from France and Germany — declared that Ukraine (and Georgia) "will become members of NATO." This was not an immediate invitation but a promise of future membership once conditions were met, with the U.S. lobbying heavily for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Ukraine had formally requested a MAP in January 2008.)[7] Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/central-europe-map.htm According to the European Parliament, as early as back in 2014, Moscow identified several challenges as threats to its national security, with a particular focus on the West. First, it is the opposition to Russia's independent foreign policy. Russia perceives that its independent foreign and domestic policies are met with resistance from the United States and its allies, who seek to maintain their domination in world affairs and to "contain" Russia through political, economic, military, and informational pressure.[8] Second, Russia had always viewed the enlargement of NATO, the location of its military infrastructure close to Russian borders, NATO's "offensive capabilities," and the trend towards NATO acquiring global functions as direct challenges to its security Third, Russia was concerned about U.S. initiatives like the global antimissile system, Global Strike capabilities, and the militarisation of space, which it views as efforts to undermine its strategic deterrent. Fourth, Russia resented Western criticism of its policies in the post-Soviet countries, often described by Moscow as neo-imperialistic, and perceives NATO and the EU's enlargement and development of cooperative ties in the shared neighbourhood as expanding their spheres of influence at Russia's expense. Fifth, Moscow condemned efforts to provoke regime changes through means such as "colour revolutions," as it views these as attempts to destabilise its internal situation, supported at times by military force. This includes references to events in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004 and 2014 "Revolution of Dignity"), Kyrgyzstan (2005), and the Arab Spring (2010-2012). Sixth, the Kremlin perceived an increasing competition with the West, including rival systems of values and societal models, and it rejects the normative dimension of the EU's external action, which it sees as an attempt to impose its norms and values on Russia. Next, Russia faced economic sanctions, financial, trade, investment, and technological policies used by the West as instruments to address geopolitical problems and contain alternative centres of power, such as Russia. Finally, across its strategic documents, Russia consistently emphasised the West (including the EU) as its main challenger to its great-power ambitions and security. The latest National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation as approved by President Putin in July 2021 (still before the beginning of the War in Ukraine), NATO and Western European countries are perceived by Russia as sources of pressure and threats.[9] The Strategy states that attempts to exert pressure on Russia, its allies, and partners, including building up NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders and intensifying intelligence activities, contribute to increasing military dangers and threats to Russia. Moreover, there is mention of Western countries' desire to maintain hegemony, which is associated with the crisis of economic development models, rising disparities and social inequality, attempts to limit the role of states, and the exacerbation of political problems and inter-state contradictions. The document also notes that some states view Russia as a threat or even a military adversary, and that there are efforts to instigate disintegration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States to undermine Russia's ties with its traditional allies. Additionally, unfriendly actions by foreign countries, including Western states, are seen as attempts to exploit Russia's socio-economic problems to undermine internal unity and radicalise protest movements. Furthermore, information campaigns by foreign countries seek to form a hostile image of Russia, restrict the use of the Russian language, ban Russian media activities, and impose sanctions on Russian athletes. The document describes these as unjustified accusations and discrimination against Russian citizens and compatriots abroad. Overall, NATO and Western European countries are portrayed as pursuing policies aimed at containing Russia, undermining its sovereignty, and interfering in its internal affairs, which Russia views as threats to its national security and statehood. Now, as mentioned here, it seems that the outcome of the War in Ukraine is most likely to be decided on the battlefield and that the Russians will keep expanding their territory control, possibly even including Odessa, and that ultimately, they will want to keep as much Ukrainian territory under their direct or indirect control as possible. It is very unlikely at this stage that Ukraine will ever regain its territorial integrity (compared to pre-2014 status and Crimean operation). The Germans: up or what? In one of the recent publications (available here), I claimed that German leadership has, for some time now, promoted the idea of "special responsibility" for Europe and European security. To briefly recollect: "The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership’s vision regarding the European defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the EU's future at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four “revolutionary” ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the potential enlargement of the European Union to up to 35 states, a transition to majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy is urged. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the former German Chancellor asserts that Europeans are becoming more autonomous across all fields, assuming greater responsibility for their security, working more closely together, and standing even more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[10] Arguably, Germany's self-proclaimed special role stems from a re-evaluation of its strategic culture, moving from "restraint to readiness."[11] Post-reunification in 1990, Germany was reluctant to lead on security issues, preferring multilateralism through the EU and NATO while avoiding military assertiveness due to its Nazi past and a culture associating power with guilt rather than responsibility. However, events like the 2014 Crimea annexation and the 2022 Ukraine invasion forced a "profound transformation," with leaders arguing that Germany's previous "strategic ambiguity" is no longer viable in a world of revisionist threats.[12] Former Chancellor Scholz described this as a "mandate to act," not just a description of change, emphasising Germany's obligation to secure peace and foster EU solidarity. [13] Chancellor Merz has built on this, asserting that "everything else is subordinate to external security" and that Europe expects German leadership after years of underperformance.[14] German leaders generally justify this role through a combination of geopolitical, economic, and normative arguments, often tied to specific policy actions like defence spending hikes and institutional reforms. First, geopolitical necessity and threat response. Germany portrays itself as uniquely positioned to confront existential threats like Russian aggression, given its central location in Europe and proximity to conflict zones. Scholz argued that Germany must act as the "guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be," defending the international order against autocracies and serving as a bridge-builder in the EU. [15] Merz has emphasised the need to fill the void left by U.S. disinterest, stating that Germany faces a "dual shock" from Russian imperialism and American retrenchment, necessitating leadership to maintain transatlantic security. [16] This includes strengthening NATO's deterrence, with Germany committing to nuclear sharing and viewing alliance solidarity as part of its "reason of state."[17] Second, economic power and resource capacity. As Europe's largest economy, Germany justifies its role by leveraging its financial clout for defence investments, aiming to reach 3 - 3.5% of GDP by 2029 — surpassing NATO's 2% target and outpacing France and the UK.[18] Apparently, recently, Merz has relaxed the constitutional debt brake to fund €500 billion in infrastructure and defence, arguing this enables Germany to lead systemic renewal in European security without overburdening allies. [19] Leaders like Scholz and Merz frame this as a responsibility commensurate with Germany's potential, turning economic strength into security leadership rather than mere fiscal discipline.[20] Third, there is the question of perceived historical responsibility and the evolution of strategic culture. Drawing on Germany's past, its contemporary political leaders argue for a shift from "fence-sitting" to "pace-setting," redefining power as responsibility rather than aggression.[21] This includes overcoming "outdated beliefs" about post-Cold War peace and embracing a "geopolitical, security-driven master narrative." Scholz invoked Germany's duty to foster multilateral solutions and reject isolationism, while Merz highlights the need to reshape public perceptions of military force as a tool for stability. This narrative aligns with broader values such as defending democracy, human rights, and the rules-based order, positioning Germany as a defender of European unity.[22] What of Turkey? Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, joining primarily to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War, and it remains a pivotal ally due to its unique geopolitical position, military strength, and contributions to alliance objectives. As far as the country's location, Turkey straddles Europe and Asia, serving as NATO's southeastern anchor and controlling the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, which connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.[23] Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey regulates naval traffic through these waterways, effectively limiting Russian (and other non-Black Sea states') military movements — a role that's become even more critical amid Russia's actions in Ukraine and increased Black Sea presence.[24] This position also borders key regions like the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Iran), the Caucasus, and Europe, enabling NATO to project influence and address threats from multiple fronts, including countering Russian A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategies. In terms of military strength, Turkey boasts NATO's second-largest standing army, providing significant "military mass" for defending extended frontiers and sustaining operations where other allies might lack scale. [25] It hosts vital NATO assets, including the Incirlik Air Base (which stores around 50 U.S. nuclear weapons and supports Middle East operations), the Allied Land Command headquarters in İzmir, AWACS facilities at Konya, and a radar station in Kürecik for NATO's ballistic missile defence system. [26] These capabilities enhance the alliance's rapid response and deterrence in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Turkey has actively participated in numerous NATO operations, from sending 4,500 troops to the Korean War (which helped secure its NATO membership) to leading roles in Afghanistan (ISAF and Resolute Support), Iraq, the Balkans, and Mediterranean patrols like Operation Active Endeavour. More recently, it has supplied military aid to Ukraine, including Bayraktar TB2 drones that have proven effective against Russian forces, and co-led the Black Sea Grain Initiative to ensure global food security amid the ongoing war.[27] Turkey also collaborates on counterterrorism efforts against groups like ISIS and the PKK, and helps stabilise regions like the South Caucasus and Eastern Mediterranean. [28] Turkey's growing defence sector produces affordable, battle-tested equipment, such as drones and other systems, which offer NATO alternatives to more expensive Western options and enable rapid production for allies like Ukraine.[29] This industrial capacity strengthens the alliance's overall resilience and reduces dependency on single suppliers. Beyond military might, Turkey extends NATO's diplomatic reach through cultural, economic, and political ties in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia — areas where Western allies often face credibility gaps. It engages with challenging regimes to secure resources, energy deals, and counter Russian or Chinese influence, acting as a bridge for the alliance. However, recently Turkey's relations with NATO have faced strains — such as its purchase of Russian S-400 systems (leading to U.S. sanctions and F-35 exclusion), disputes with Greece over Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and delays in approving Finland and Sweden's memberships (resolved by 2024). It is fair to say that Turkey plays a strategically important role in European security, and its leadership effectively leverages this position against European partners. Given its geographic location and military potential, Ankara will largely influence NATO's future. Greenland Conundrum Perhaps the most intriguing in recent days is the U.S. President's claim regarding Greenland. As of January 27, 2026, tensions between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland have escalated due to renewed U.S. interest in expanding its strategic presence on the Arctic island. President Donald Trump has reportedly issued an ultimatum, pushing for greater control over parts of Greenland to bolster military bases and counter Russian influence in the region, including restrictions on drilling rights for Russia. This follows historical U.S. attempts, such as Trump's 2019 proposal to purchase Greenland outright, which was rebuffed by Denmark. Importantly, the U.S. already operates Pituffik Space Base in Greenland for early warning and missile defence, but the current demands aim to expand this amid Arctic geopolitical competition with Russia and China. Recent talks in Washington between U.S. and Danish officials have led to the formation of a working group aimed at a diplomatic resolution. However, interpretations differ: U.S. officials, including Ambassador Leavitt, frame it as facilitating a transfer or enhanced control, while Denmark emphasises disagreement and no sale. For example, a recent New York Times report indicates Denmark may grant the U.S. sovereignty over select land pockets for military bases, modelled after arrangements like those in Cyprus, to strengthen Arctic defences. [30] Greenland's Prime Minister has declared the island's sovereignty a "red line," rejecting any outright transfer.[31] Denmark has reportedly increased troop deployments to Greenland in response, insisting the territory is not for sale. To spice things up, Trump has questioned Denmark's legal claims, stirring further controversy.[32] This has arguably strained U.S. - EU relations, with Europe adopting a firmer stance against Trump's approach. As a NATO member and EU affiliate through Denmark, Greenland's status has prompted calls for allies to boost Arctic security.[33] Some European leaders worry this could force divestment from U.S. ties or heighten NATO divisions.[34] In an interesting twist, a number of European leaders issued strong rhetoric against Trump and his claims about Greenland. A Joint Statement from European Leaders declared in a collective rebuke: "Greenland belongs to its people. It is for Denmark and Greenland and them only to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland," […] "Security in the Arctic must therefore be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO allies including the United States, by upholding the principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. These are universal principles, and we will not stop defending them."[35] Herein lies the fundamental conundrum: the core of the security guaranteed by NATO (at least legally speaking) is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the so-called Casus Foederis.[36] The article 5 states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Originally conceived as a defensive military alliance, NATO was established to protect its member states from external threats, according to its founders. In the event that one member state turns against the others, the Alliance risks becoming ineffective, akin to the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, which served as a mechanism for exerting control over weaker states. Should such a scenario occur, the survival of NATO would be in jeopardy. Historical precedent suggests that oppressive institutions inevitably collapse over time. Conclusion It is imperative to acknowledge that NATO is currently engaged, albeit indirectly, in a conflict with Russia. This situation is significant as it serves as a test of NATO's capabilities. Presently, it appears that NATO is not prevailing. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert, as I have argued in my previous analysis (available here), that Russia is likely to achieve its primary objective: ensuring that Ukraine will not join NATO. Additionally, I expect Russia to retain its territorial acquisitions and, in some manner, exert influence over the political system that will emerge in Ukraine following the conflict. Several pertinent questions arise in this context. Will the eventual peace, following the conclusion of the conflict, be sustainable? Will it adequately consider the national interests of all parties involved? Will it offer a satisfactory compromise? Is there a probability of a resurgence of Cold War-like relations between Western European nations and Russia? In the event of a renewed Cold War scenario, will NATO continue to be perceived as an effective instrument? Furthermore, given the United States' strategic focus on the Far and Middle East, will it remain committed to participating in the European security framework through institutions such as NATO? References [1] NATO. (2026, January 15). A short history of NATO. NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/a-short-history-of-nato [2] Rep. Massie Introduces Bill to Remove the United States from NATO. (2025, December 9). Congressman Thomas Massie. https://massie.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395782 [3] United States of America. (2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America (November 2025). The White House. Washington. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf [4] Grieger, G. (2025, December). The 2025 US National Security Strategy. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://eprs.in.ep.europa.eu [5] Department of War. (2025). National Defense Strategy [Unclassified document]. U.S. Government. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF [6] See more at: https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-on-the-map [7] Pifer, S. (2024, August). Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO. American Diplomacy. https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2024/08/ukraines-long-path-toward-nato [8] Facon, I. (2017). Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine and their implications for the EU (Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/Lot6/11 EN). European Parliament. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/379ea707-e9dc-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en [9] President of the Russian Federation. (2021, July 2). National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Decree No. 400). Kremlin. [10] Sliwinski, K. (2025, June 16). Germany – the EU’s challenging leadership in challenging times. World and New World Journal. https://worldandnewworld.com/germany-eu-leadership/ [11] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? Germany Considers Conscription. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/from-restraint-to-readiness-germany-considers-conscription/ [12] Kandyuk, O. (2025, October 15). THE END OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY? GERMANY’S NEW ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. Ukraine Analytica. https://ukraine-analytica.org/the-end-of-strategic-ambiguity-germanys-new-role-in-european-security/ [13] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [14] Cliffe, J., & Puglierin, J. (2025, May 6). From fence-sitter to pace-setter: How Merz’s Germany can lead Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/from-fence-sitter-to-pace-setter-how-merzs-germany-can-lead-europe/ [15] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [16] Freytag von Loringhoven, A. (2025, December 16). Germany: Europe’s New Security Leader. Centre for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/germany-europes-new-security-leader/ [17] Dempsey, J. (2023, June 22). Judy Asks: Is Germany Getting Serious About Security and Defense? Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2023/06/judy-asks-is-germany-getting-serious-about-security-and-defense?lang=en [18] Koenig, N., & Schütte, L. (n.d.). Don’t Dodge Dilemmas Three Tests for German Leadership in European Defense. Munich Security Conference. Retrieved January 23, 2026, from https://securityconference.org/en/publications/analyses/dont-dodge-dilemmas-german-leadership-in-european-defense [19] Fuhrhop, P., & Kempin, R. (2025, December). New ambitions, old constraints: Germany’s role in shaping European defence. Berlin Perspectives, (08). Institut für Europäische Politik. https://www.iep-berlin.de [20] U.S. Department of State. (2024). Integrated Country Strategy: Germany (Approved May 25, 2022; Revised January 30, 2024). [Report]. https://placeholder-url-for-document.org [21] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? Germany Considers Conscription. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/from-restraint-to-readiness-germany-considers-conscription/ [22] Weiss, S. (2016, October 1). Germany’s Security Policy. From Territorial Defense to Defending the Liberal World Order? Newpolitik. https://www.bfna.org/politics-society/germanys-security-policy-1ozhaghk6w/ [23] The United States and Türkiye: A Key NATO Ally and Critical Regional Partner. (2023, February 19). U.S. EMBASSY TÜRKİYE. https://tr.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-turkiye-a-key-nato-ally-and-critical-regional-partner/ [24] Ellehuus, R. (2019, December 2). Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving. Centre for Strategic &International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving [25] Jones, D. (2025, February 20). Turkish army could play key role in Europe’s security. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/turkish-army-could-play-key-role-in-europe-s-security/7982514.html [26] Turkish Armed Forces. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved January 24, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Armed_Forces [27] Lucas, R. (2025, March 18). Turning Towards Turkey: Why NATO Needs to Lean into Its Relationship. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/turning-towards-turkey-why-nato-needs-to-lean-into.html [28] The United States and Türkiye: A Key NATO Ally and Critical Regional Partner. (2023, February 19). U.S. EMBASSY TÜRKİYE. https://tr.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-turkiye-a-key-nato-ally-and-critical-regional-partner/ [29] Lucas, R. (2025, March 18). Turning Towards Turkey: Why NATO Needs to Lean into Its Relationship. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/turning-towards-turkey-why-nato-needs-to-lean-into.html [30] Jakes, L., Tankersley, J., & Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2026, January 21). Trump Says He Has Framework for Greenland Deal as NATO Mulls Idea of U.S. Sovereignty Over Bases. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/us/politics/trump-greenland-threats-diplomacy-force.html?searchResultPosition=2 [31] Greenland and Denmark say sovereignty ‘red line’ after latest Trump remarks. (2026, January 22). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/22/trumps-greenland-pact-will-demand-allies-boost-arctic-security-nato-chief [32] Westfall, S. (2026, January 25). Trump tells one history of Greenland. Historians tell another. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/25/greenland-deal-trump-history-denmark-europe/ [33] Adler, K. (2026, January 20). Confronted over Greenland, Europe is ditching its softly-softly approach to Trump. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0lx7j1lrwro [34] Schoen, D. E. (2026, January 26). What Trump’s risking in the row over Greenland. The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5703677-trump-greenland-geopolitical-impact/ [35] Joint Statement on Greenland. (2026, January 6). ÉLYSÉE. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/01/06/joint-statement-on-greenland [36] See more at: https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1949/04/04/the-north-atlantic-treaty

I. Introduction In late December 2025, mass protests erupted across Iran, driven by public anger over the deepening economic crisis. Initially led by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran, the demonstrations quickly spread to universities and major cities such as Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad, becoming the largest unrest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Over time, the movement expanded beyond economic demands to include calls for freedom and, in some cases, the overthrow of the regime. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans such as “death to the dictator.” [1] In response, since late December 2025 Iranian state security forces have engaged in massacres of dissidents. The Iranian government has also cut off internet access and telephone services in an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing. The Iranian government has accused the US and Israel of fueling the protests, which analysts suggest may be a tactic to increase security forces’ willingness to kill protesters. A Sunday Times report, based on information from doctors in Iran, said more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the mass protests. The Interior Ministry in Iran verified 3,117 people had been killed in protests. [2] The Iranian protests, the largest in the Islamic Republic’s 46-year history, appear to have subsided for now in the face of a violent government crackdown. US President Donald Trump has threatened to “hit very hard” if the situation in Iran escalates, reigniting concerns about possible US intervention in the region. Even Trump called Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “sick man” in an interview with Politico on January 17th, 2026, and said, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” It appeared to be the first time Trump had called for the end of Khamenei’s rule in Iran. [3] Despite having repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the regime were to start killing protesters, Trump has held off on any immediate military action against the Islamic Republic. While the US reportedly sent the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the Middle East on January 15th, 2026, President Trump has not specified what he might do. However, on January 28th, 2026, Trump posted on social media: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran... It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” Saying that time is running out, Trump demanded that Iran immediately negotiate a nuclear deal. He also suggested his country’s next attack on Iran could be worse than last year’s. In response, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned the US that any attack on his country would result in a “regional war” as US President Donald Trump has amassed military assets in the Middle East. With this tension between Iran and the US running high, Iran and the US held a nuclear talk on Friday on February 6th, 2026, in Oman. However, the deal was not reached, although both sides agreed to resume the talks. If the US and Iran fail to strike a deal and then the US carries out military strikes on Iran, what will happen? Does US military strikes make a democratic transition in Iran possible? This paper deals with this issue. It first introduces theory on democratic transition and then examines whether US military strikes against Iran makes a democratic transition in Iran possible. II. Theory on democratic transition There is a considerable body of literature on theories of democratic transition. These broadly fall into the following categories: [4] a. Structuralist approaches which see the emergence of democracy as tied to factors such as economic development (Lipsett, 1959; O’Donnell 1979), political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), civil society and class conflict (Moore, 1966). b. Strategic choice approaches which focus on the calculations and decisions made by elites (Rustow, 1970; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Burton and Higley, 1987). c. Institutionalist approaches which stress the impact of institutions on policies and patterns of political actions (Leftwich, 2017). d. Political economic approaches which stress economic determinants of political change and democratization, in particular the impact of economic crises (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Guo, 1999). Empirical case studies (for example, Haggard and Kaufman, 1995) suggest that, rather than a single theory to explain democratic transitions, a combination of these theories is usually applicable. According to Idris (2016)’s study of the five case studies of South Africa (1986), Ghana (2000), the Philippines (1986), Indonesia (1999) and Ukraine (2004), enabling factors for the emergence of democracies are below: [5] - Unpopular incumbent: With the exception of Ghana, all the incumbent regimes were very unpopular, often characterized by human rights abuses, corruption, mismanagement and denial of democratic freedoms. A breakdown of the ‘authoritarian bargain’ in the Philippines and Indonesia, whereby growth and development were provided with limited democracy, fueled public opposition. - Economic development & situation: Economic development was a main factor in many democratic transitions, but the precise influence varied. Indonesia is the clearest example of democratic transition advanced by economic crisis (effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997); in the Ukraine, in contrast, growth had been strong overall, but inequality and corruption fueled public frustration. However, the modernization theory (Lipsett, 1959) that economic growth and development is a prior condition/enabling factor for democratization rarely applied. - United opposition and strong leadership figures: The ability of the opposition to unite around a common goal, especially behind strong leaders, was an important factor in democratic transitions. Cory Aquino in the Philippines, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine played this role. - Strong civil society: An organized civil society played a significant role in mass mobilization, monitoring government actions (e.g. election fraud) and countering government measures to suppress them. In Ukraine, for instance, many leaders of the 2004 Orange Revolution had taken part in anti-government protests in 2000-1; civil society groups in South Africa mounted a very effective civil disobedience campaign. - Mass mobilization: was a critical factor in successful democratic transitions, seen in South Africa, the Ukraine, the Philippines, and Indonesia. This came about because of information dissemination through television, radio, and the internet, as well as civil society groups. Mass protests created an irreversible momentum for change and led to defection or unwillingness to use force and violence against demonstrators on the part of the security forces. - International pressure/support: Military/Diplomatic/donor (e.g. IMF) pressure on an authoritarian regime could force it to make concessions where domestic factors alone would not. South Africa exemplifies this: without international sanctions and international condemnation of the apartheid regime, reform and democratization would not possible or likely have taken much longer. Ghana’s democratic transition arguably began mainly because of IMF pressure. External ‘democratic aid’, e.g. to raise public awareness of democratic values and build up the capacity of civil society groups, also made a difference. In Ukraine, a decade of such external support meant civil society groups were able to effectively monitor and document electoral fraud by the Kuchma government. III. The Case of Iran US military strikes on Iran is an international pressure/support that this paper explained as an enabling factor for the emergence of democracies. US military strikes on Iran are the most important element in facilitating a democratic transition in Iran. Thus, this paper first takes a look at current US military build-up to attack the Iranian regime and then explores whether US military strikes on Iran make a democratic transition in Iran possible. 1. US military build-up As US President Donald Trump considers a major strike on Iran, the US military has accelerated a weeks-long buildup of military hardware in the Middle East, open-source data shows. As Figure 1 shows, the arrival of the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, now in the northern Arabian Sea, represents the most dramatic shift in military positioning. The group includes the USS Abraham Lincoln along with three guided-missile destroyers and the carrier air wing which includes squadrons of F-35C Lightning II fighters, F/A-18E Super Hornet fighters, and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets. The US Navy also has three destroyers — the USS McFaul, USS Delbert D. Black, and USS Mitscher — in the region separate from the aircraft carrier strike group. Three littoral combat ships — USS Santa Barbara, USS Canberra, and USS Tulsa — based out of Bahrain could be called upon for minesweeping duties if Iran chooses to deploy such armaments. Figure 1: US military presence in the Middle East (source: Congressional Research Service, Airframes.io and FlightRadar24) In recent days, the US has deployed various air defense systems to the region as well, including additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, and Patriot missile systems that appeared at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar last week, Those systems would be key to combating retaliatory missile strikes of Iran by taking aim at either US military assets or US allies in the region. The guided-missile destroyers steaming with the Lincoln and elsewhere in the region offer significant strike potential. Each destroyer can carry dozens of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles with a range of 1,000 miles and wielding a 1,000-pound conventional warhead. In addition, US Navy carrier strike groups usually operate with an attack submarine that can also launch Tomahawks, but the presence of submarines is almost never disclosed. While the aircraft carrier provides a floating base for military operations, the US has a number of permanent locations in the region where a slew of other aircraft have also been heading. As Figure 2 shows, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, the US has at least 19 military bases - eight of which are considered to be permanent - across the Middle East. The US has a major military presence in Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman and the UAE. In Djibouti and Turkey, the US maintains large military bases that serve different regional commands, but contribute to activities in the Middle East. Currently, there are approximately 40,000 US troops in the Middle East, according to US defense officials. Around a quarter of them are in al-Udeid, Qatar, which hosts combat aircraft, tankers, aerial refueling and intelligence assets. Al-Udeid is the largest US military base in the region, hosting around 10,000 troops. The next biggest military base in terms of personnel is thought to be the naval base in Bahrain. Bahrain (hosting 9,000 American troops) is where the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is headquartered, with responsibility over the Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and some of the Indian Ocean. Kuwait hosts Camp Arifjan. That is the name of the tactical (or forward) headquarters of the US Army Central - a military formation that serves as the army component for Centcom. Ali al-Salem air base is also in Kuwait, along the Iraqi border. Another Kuwait base is Camp Buehring, which has been a staging post for units heading to Syria and Iraq. In total, around 13,500 US troops are stationed in Kuwait. Figure 2: US troops numbers in the Middle East (source: Middle East Eye) The UAE is home to 3,500 US troops, as well as Al-Dhafra Airbase, a site shared between the US and the Emiratis. It has been used during missions against the Islamic State group, as well as for reconnaissance missions in the region. The US military presence in Iraq includes the Ain al-Asad airbase in Anbar - a site that was targeted by Iranian missiles after the US assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the senior Iranian general. There’s also the Erbil airbase in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, which is used for training exercises. Approximately 2,700 US troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia, providing air and missile defense capabilities. The Prince Sultan Airbase, near Riyadh, is a major air force hub where its main assets include Patriot missile batteries. For its missions in the Levant, Muwaffaq Salti airbase in Jordan’s Azraq is the key hub. It hosts the US’s 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing. Further afield in Turkey, the major base run jointly with Turkish forces is the Incirlik Airbase in southern Adana. That base reportedly hosts US nuclear warheads. The size of US military bases, personnel, and equipment has fluctuated in recent years and months, reflecting shifting regional priorities. Early in President Trump’s second term, several warships departed the Middle East to support US international operations. However, naval and air power is now being bolstered in the region to attack Iran. On January 29th, 2026, an E-11A jet arrived at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This is one of the last critical assets that the US needs to coordinate complex operations. On the same day, a transport aircraft modified for combat search and rescue operations arrived in the area of Operation. A squadron of F-15E Strike Eagle fighters, capable of carrying a variety of guided bombs and air-to-surface missiles, also recently deployed to the region as part of a planned troop rotation. Surveillance flights by US drones and reconnaissance aircraft have continued in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Since last Monday, reconnaissance aircraft have been flying nonstop from US bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and even beyond the Middle East. Modified versions of the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, capable of detecting radioactive debris and interpreting electromagnetic signals, have also been deployed to the Middle East. On January 29th, 2026, at least eight aerial refueling tankers, used to provide aerial refueling for small military aircraft, crossed the Atlantic and landed at Morón Air Base in Spain. The six F-35 fighters were crossing the Atlantic and landed at Lages Air Base in Portugal. Amid high tensions over President Trump’s recent threats, US Central Command announced on January 27th, 2026 that it had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [6] 2. Will US strikes on Iran bring about a democratic transition in Iran? Iran and the US held a nuclear talk on Friday on February 6th, 2026, in Oman. However, no last-minute deal with Iran was reached, although both sides agreed to resume the talks. If the US and Iran fail to strike a deal and then the US carries out military strikes on Iran, what will happen? Will US military strikes make a democratic transition in Iran possible? According to Idris (2016)’s study of South Africa (1986), Ghana (2000), the Philippines (1986), Indonesia (1999) and Ukraine (2004), enabling factors for the emergence of democracies are: [7] • Unpopular incumbent • International pressure/support • Bad economic situation (economic crisis) • Mass mobilization • United opposition and strong leadership figures: • Strong civil society Table 1: presence or absence of six enabling factors for emergence of democracies in Iran   Among six preconditions for democratic transition, four conditions are present in Iran, while two are absent. The first condition (Unpopular incumbent) is present. Iranian regime or Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is very unpopular. He has faced recurring, intense public unrest (since 2017), indicating deep-seated unpopularity among significant segments of the population. Anti-government protests in Iran have continued since 2017, as seen below: • 2017–2018 Iranian protests • 2018–2019 Iranian general strikes and protests • 2019–2020 Iranian protests (economy, anti-government) • 2021–2022 Iranian protests (water shortages, economy) • 2022 Iranian food protests • 2022–23: Mahsa Amini protests • 2025 Iran water crisis protests (May–August) • 2025–2026 Iranian protests (anti-government, economy, human rights) Especially, according to Wikipedia, more than 3,000 anti-government protests took place in Iran each year in the 2020s. The second condition (International pressure/support) is present. US president Trump is ready to carry out military strikes on the Iranian regime to change Iran. The third condition (Bad economic situation) is present. The most serious economic problem of Iran is a skyrocketing inflation. As Figure 3 shows, inflation in Iran skyrocketed to over 48.6% in October 2025 and 42.2% in December 2025. This high inflation has been chronic in the 2020s, severely impacting household budgets. Figure 3: Inflation in Iran (source: Statistical Center of Iran) Moreover, as Figure 4 shows, food prices have significantly increased in the 2020s. For instance, the price of rice has surged by 2.11 times between 2012 and 2023, while bread costs have risen 3.4 times from 2011 to 2023. Potatoes have tripled in price over the same period, and chicken fillets have seen a 2.06-fold increase from 2010 to 2023. Figure 4: Food price index in Iran In addition, Iran faces a severe energy shortage, marked by rolling blackouts, gas cuts, and infrastructure strain, despite its massive oil and gas reserves. The Iranian energy crisis is a multifaceted problem that has been exacerbated by a combination of factors, including poor governance, foreign policy failures, and the dominance of industries under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As of November 2024, Iran faces its most severe energy crisis in decades, with frequent power outages and disruptions to natural gas supplies. The country’s energy infrastructure is outdated and in disrepair, with many refineries and power plants operating below capacity. Iran’s energy supply is unreliable, with frequent blackouts and shortages affecting daily life, industries, and essential services. The IRGC's control over key industries, including power generation and distribution, has hindered efficient management and strategic planning. The regime’s prioritization of political interests over efficient management and infrastructural development has exacerbated the crisis. A notable example is the extensive usage that the IRGC makes in electricity to mine cryptocurrency which leaves Iran in the dark.[8] Despite ongoing power shortages, Iran continues to export electricity, with a surge of nearly 92% in the first four months of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022. The crisis has put a stop to 50% of industry. In January and February 2025, constant power shutdowns were conducted with the schools as well as Iranian industries. Since February 2025, Iran has been suffering from daily blackouts, each lasting for 3-4 hours. The energy shortage does not equally affect all segments of the population. For example, in Teheran, rich northern neighborhoods experienced only 1% of outages while poorer southern districts endured 32%. [9] This energy crisis created deep public frustration and anger. With inflation running extremely high, a high unemployment rate hit Iran. The unemployment rate in Iran averaged 11.04 percent from 2001 until 2024, as Figure 5 shows. Fortunately, the unemployment rate in Iran decreased to 7.20 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 from 7.50 percent in the third quarter of 2024, but the unemployment rate in Iran is still high. Figure 5: Unemployment rate in Iran (source: Central Bank of Iran) In particular, the youth unemployment rate has been very high. As Figure 6 shows, the youth unemployment rate in Iran averaged 25.01% from 2011 until 2024. Youth unemployment rate in Iran was very high at 20.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024, although it has declined. More seriously, according to Majlis reports, 50% of males between 25–40 are unemployed and not looking for employment. [10] Figure 6: youth unemployment rate in Iran (source: Central Bank of Iran) Under the situations of high inflation and high unemployment, in March 2025, estimates ranged from 22% to 50% of Iranians living under the poverty line — a stark increase from 2022. [11] As a result, the number of people that cannot afford a healthy diet increased substantially. As Figure 7 shows, the number of people in mal nourishment increased to over 14 million in 2022. The ministry of social welfare in Iran announced in 2024 that 57% of Iranians are having some level of mal nourishment. Figure 7: Number of people in mal nourishment in Iran. These economic crises have triggered nationwide protests in Iran in 2025-26. The fourth condition (Mass mobilization) is present. Anti-government protests in Iran triggered by the economic crisis are under way in 2025-26, although they have recently subsided. According to a Sunday Times report, more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the mass protests of 2025-26. Moreover, according to Wikipedia, anti-government protests in Iran have continued since 2017, as shown before. Figure 8 shows the number of anti-government protests in Iran since 2016. Over 3,000 protests took place in Iran each year in the 2020s. Figure 8: the number of anti-government protests in Iran (source: Wikipedia) However, the fifth and sixth conditions (United opposition and strong leadership figures & Strong civil society) are absent in Iran. According to Maryam Alemzadeh, a professor at the University of Oxford, the Iranian regime has effectively suppressed any attempt for organized opposition in Iran over the past decades and arrested and silenced its leaders. There is no main opposition organization and leader in Iran such as the ANC and Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Even non-political NGOs, student groups, labor unions, and anything that could resemble a bottom-up order has been quashed. As a result, neither leadership nor grassroots organization can be expected, and protests are left contingent on ad hoc individual or collective decisions of the protesters. [12] 3. Analysis of a democratic transition in Iran As this paper explained above, among six preconditions for democratic transition, four conditions are present in Iran, while two are absent. Therefore, it is not clear whether Iran can make a democratic transition. The most important factor for democratic transition in Iran is US military intervention. The democratic transition in Iran mainly depends on to what extent the US militarily intervenes in Iran and what military options US uses. A. Scenario 1: US makes targeted, surgical strikes US secretary of state Marco Rubio assessed that the Iranian regime was probably weaker than it had ever been. US naval and air forces may conduct limited, precision strikes targeting military bases of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Basij unit - a paramilitary force under the control of the IRGC - ballistic missile launch and storage sites as well as Iran’s nuclear program. An already weakened Iranian regime might be toppled, eventually making a transition to a genuine democracy where Iran can rejoin the rest of the world. This is a highly optimistic scenario but is highly unlikely. Western military intervention in both Iraq and Libya did not bring a smooth transition to democracy. Although brutal dictatorships ended in both countries, it ushered in years of chaos and bloodshed. A senior Israeli official said that Israel does not believe US airstrikes alone can topple the Islamic Republic, if that is Washington’s goal. A protracted US air campaign is considered unlikely, military experts say, citing Trump’s reported desire for a limited and decisive attack. Jason Brodsky, a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project, said that President Trump has historically favored “quick, surgical, targeted, dramatic, and decisive military operations,” pointing to US airstrikes in Syria during his first term. But even a monthslong offensive would not guarantee the fall of the Iran regime. “A sustained US air campaign could severely degrade Iran‘s conventional military by ripping up command-and-control, and fixed infrastructure, but it is unlikely by itself to produce the collapse of Iranian security forces, which can disperse, hide, and shift to low-signature internal repression,” said Michael Horowitz, an independent defense expert in Israel. [13] “If you’re going to topple the Iran regime, you have to put boots on the ground,” he told Reuters, noting that even if the US killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran would “have a new leader that will replace him.” [14] Jason Brodsky also said any US military intervention could involve leadership decapitation alongside attacks on Iran’s military and security infrastructure. However, Brodsky cautioned that Iran’s political system is designed to survive even major leadership losses. [15] “The Islamic Republic is bigger than any one individual,” he said, noting that institutions and succession mechanisms exist to fill any vacuum — even if the removal of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could be temporarily destabilizing. Moreover, Iran’s leadership had been weakened by the massive protests but remained firmly in control despite the ongoing deep economic crisis that sparked the protests. Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence official now with the Atlantic Council, warned that US military strikes could actually strengthen hardliners. A US attack would more likely consolidate elite cohesion around the regime, marginalize protesters and reinforce Iran’s narrative of external siege,” he said. Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, said that without large-scale military defections, Iran’s protests remained “heroic but outgunned.” Only a combination of external pressure and an organized domestic opposition could shift Iran’s political trajectory, Vatanka said. However, opposition groups in Iran are ideologically diverse, including monarchists, republicans, secular nationalists, communists, socialists, ethnic separatists (e.g. Kurdish nationalists), supporters of Western liberal democracy, and Islamists (including Shia Muslims dissidents and Sunni Salafis and Kurdish Islamists). The opposition movement is currently fragmented and riddled with internal divisions over the future of a post-Islamic Republic Iran. [16] Moreover, US President Trump has notably avoided endorsing a successor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Iran’s exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi lacks sufficient support within the country to immediately be installed as a leader. [17] While some Western media have pointed out Reza Pahlavi – the son of the ousted Shah of Iran – who had called on protesters to take to the streets against Khamenei’s rule, as a possible alternative, many analysts don’t see in him the ingredients of a true leader. Many people see Pahlavi as a figure too close to Israel’s Zionist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Reza Pahlavi, even himself, is not looking forward to coming back to Iran,” says Fatemeh Karimkhan, an Iranian journalist. Karimkhan says that while there are some pro-monarchy supporters in Iran, they are not as many as projected. Karimkhan claims that “they are much less in number and in ability.” B. Scenario 2: Along with air strikes, the US send ground forces to Iran for a regime change Many experts say it is unlikely that the US would send ground troops to Iran. “President Trump is not a nation builder. He does not believe in long-term commitments or building democracy. He gave up on Afghanistan. So, he is not going to commit to boots on the ground in Iran. It is simply way too costly,” Akbarzadeh said. [18] Under Trump, the US moved decisively towards ending its long war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001. In 2020, during Trump’s first term, US officials and Taliban representatives signed the Doha agreement after months of negotiations in Qatar to end the war. The actual withdrawal of troops took place in 2021, during the presidency of Joe Biden. More importantly, the US can't invade Iran. [19] This is because there is no place from which to launch an invasion. To invade a country, you need one of two things: You need to be able to invade it by land or you need to be able to invade it by sea (an amphibious invasion). The US can do neither. [20] No land invasion is possible because the US controls no land that borders Iran. As Figure 9 shows, Iran’s neighbors are for the most part hostile to the US. Iran shares land borders with eight nations (that is, if you count the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karahakh). None of them agreed to be used for a land invasion of Iran. Moreover, the US lacks regional bases necessary to invade Iran, destroy its armed forces, and displace the revolutionary regime in Iran. Gulf allies such as Saudi Arabia do not want their soils and air spaces to be used for US attacks on Iran. Iraq has US troops stationed in the country, but Iraq has solid and good relations with the Iran regime at this point. There is basically no chance the Iraqis allow the US military to stage an invasion from there and neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are under direct US occupation any longer. [21] Figure 9: Iran’s neighboring countries are for the most part hostile to the US Alternatively, the US could undertake an amphibious forced entry into Iran. This would be the largest amphibious invasion attempt since D-Day of World War II and would result in heavy US casualties on the beaches of Iran. As tens of thousands of US servicemen are dying in a war with Iran, this military option will not be popular domestically in the US. Iran has tons of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as some of the largest stockpiles of artillery in the world. And Iran’s allies (China, Russia, and North Korea) can help arm the Iranian regime easily in the result of a full-scale US invasion. Simply put, it would be an incredibly difficult and costly military operation. Even if the US is willing to endure heavy casualties, then US troops would still need to traverse rugged and mountainous terrain in Iran in order to get to Tehran, conquer it, and remove the regime from power. This would be like fighting in the jungles of Vietnam only much worse. [22] More than 50,000 US servicemen died in roughly 8 years of fighting in Vietnam. In Iran, there would likely be tens of thousands of dead Americans a year. Is the US government and public willing to stomach losses like that? Such losses may be unheard of in the US since the Vietnam and Korean Wars, perhaps even World War II if it gets ugly enough as it has in the Russo-Ukrainian War where there have been hundreds of thousands of deaths in a little over 3 years. There would surely be a sizable level of resistance in the US if a war is launched against the Iranian regime, and the US government has to weigh these factors in when considering using military force for regime change operations. The Trump administration does not want to create the biggest anti-war movement in the country since the Vietnam War, which could also increase dissents regarding other issues like an immigration issue in the country. A war with Iran would radicalize a good amount of Americans. [23] Moreover, there are several geostrategic considerations to factor in as well with regional allies of the US. A war of any kind on Iran would not be supported by Saudi Arabia at this point and Iran can inflict severe damage onto US assets in the region which are stationed in places like Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, etc. These countries in the Gulf don’t want to be dragged into being a theater of the war, nor do they want their energy sectors attacked by Iran. In addition, there’s always the possibility that an American-Israeli war on Iran could metastasize into World War III. China gets roughly 40% of their oil from the Persian Gulf, which would surely be shut down for some time in the event of a US invasion of Iran. Will China sit idly by? Not likely. At the very minimum China would help arm Iran to defend itself, but there’s simply an inherent risk of global conflict given a third of world energy supplies come from this region. Middle East energy is existential to China right now as it stands. China has been expanding oil and gas imports from Russia, but these will take time to get China less reliant on Middle East resources. [24] Therefore, the deployment of US ground troops is highly unlikely, and a regime change and a transition to democracy in Iran are almost impossible. IV. Conclusion This paper raised a question “Does US military strikes on Iran make a democratic transition in Iran possible? To address this question, this paper first examined theories and preconditions for a democratic transition and then evaluated whether US military attacks on Iran makes a democratic transition in Iran possible. As explained above, US military interventions in Iran can’t bring about a democratic transition in Iran. References [1] Barin, Mohsen (31 December 2025). "Iran's economic crisis, political discontent threaten regime". DW News. [2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-president-warns-us-attack-on-supreme-leader-would-mean-full-scale-war/ [3] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/17/trump-to-politico-its-time-to-look-for-new-leadership-in-iran-00735528?_kx=LSFywwe4GSg_lcFWo5DyId8VKdphy2F0zhlZVneJnA97jKgVYFyty4cB80GJkTHR.U5D8ER&utm_id=01KF7GKF35MAAW8BRA143VFM9M&utm_medium=campaign&utm_source=Klaviyo [4] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [5] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [6] it had conducted several days of training exercises across the Middle East to demonstrate its “ability to deploy, distribute, and sustain combat power.” [7] https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HDQ1349.pdf [8] "Power Outages in Iran: The Rich Stay Lit, The Poor Go Dark". iranwire.com [9] "Power Outages in Iran: The Rich Stay Lit, The Poor Go Dark". iranwire.com [10] "تحلیل نشریه تایم از وضعیت ایران؛ آیا جمهوری اسلامی در آستانه فروپاشی است؟". euronews (in Persian). 18 December 2025. [11] Hafezi, Parisa. "Despite tough talk, economic woes may force Iran to bargain with Trump". Reuters. Retrieved 5 April 2025. [12] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/which-are-irans-main-opposition-groups [13] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [14] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3kenge1k9o [15] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/trump-iran-us-strikes-war-regime-change-nuclear-b2909957.html [16] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/which-are-irans-main-opposition-groups [17] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/who-makes-up-irans-fragmented-opposition-2025-06-18/ [18] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/14/what-are-trumps-military-options-for-an-attack-on-iran [19] https://medium.com/@markvmorgan/america-has-no-ability-to-attack-iran-4b5e51478542 [20] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/ [21] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/what-would-us-military-invasion-iran-look-209506 [22] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/ [23] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/ [24] https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/06/17/why-america-wont-launch-a-war-on-iran/

Donald Trump delivered an ultimatum to Iran at the first board of peace meeting in Washington on February 19. He told Tehran to reach a “meaningful” deal with the US within ten to 15 days, or “really bad things” will happen. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt had earlier said there are many arguments for taking military action in Iran. These comments came as reports indicated that the latest round of indirect talks between the two countries in Switzerland on February 17 had made at least some headway. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, emerged from the negotiations hailing what he saw as “good progress”. He added that the US and Iran had reached an understanding on “guiding principles”. The assessment of US representatives was less positive. Despite acknowledging that “in some ways” the talks went well, US vice-president J.D. Vance said Iran was refusing to acknowledge core US demands. The US wants Iran to dismantle its nuclear programme completely, reduce the number and range of its ballistic missiles and end its support for regional proxy groups. Following the talks, the US has continued to reinforce its military presence in the Middle East. Cargo planes, fighter jets, refuelling tankers and an aircraft carrier have been moved to the region, with a second aircraft carrier expected to arrive soon. According to the New York Times, the buildup of US forces in the Middle East is now sufficient for Trump to order military action at any moment. Iran appears to be gearing up for a confrontation. Its military held joint drills with Russia on February 19, days after the Strait of Hormuz was closed temporarily as Iran carried out live-fire exercises. And while emphasising that it “neither seeks tension nor war”, Iran has told the UN that if it were attacked it would consider “all bases, facilities and assets of the hostile force” in the region as “legitimate targets”. These developments come less than a week after hundreds of thousands of people, largely from the Iranian diaspora, demonstrated in cities worldwide. They did so in solidarity with protesters who took to the streets of Iran in January to demand regime change. In late December, protests that began over worsening economic conditions quickly spread nationwide in one of the most serious threats to Iran’s political establishment since the Woman, Life, Freedom protest movement of 2022. That protest wave began after the death of a 22-year-old women called Mahsa Amini in police custody. This time round, the Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown, creating a nationwide communications blackout in an effort to suppress the unrest. Human rights groups say thousands of people were killed, while many more were injured, detained or remain missing, in what was one of the most severe crackdowns in Iran’s modern history. According to local police, around 250,000 people rallied on February 14 in the German city of Munich alone, where world leaders had gathered for Europe’s biggest security conference. Many of those in attendance waved flags bearing the lion and sun emblem of Iran that was used before the Islamic revolution in 1979 ended the Pahlavi dynasty. Israeli and American flags were also visible at many of the rallies. This has widely been seen as a call for foreign intervention against Iran’s clerical leadership. Trump had raised the prospect of US military action during the unrest, urging the Iranian people to continue protesting and telling them that help was “on its way”. Such action now appears likely. Brink of war Iran’s fate is hanging in the balance. The deployment of US military assets to the Middle East suggests Trump may be preparing for imminent military action. However, despite making no secret of his desire to topple the Iranian regime, there is still a chance that Trump settles for a diplomatic agreement with the country’s leadership. Iranian opposition voices, including exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi, say such a deal would only prolong the survival of the Islamic Republic rather than address the demands of people in Iran for regime change. In an interview with American political commentator Glenn Beck on February 11, Pahlavi called the negotiations between the US and Iran “another slap in the face of the Iranian people”. But the prospects that any deal will be reached look slim. The US and Iran remain in fundamental disagreement over Tehran’s nuclear programme and have been unable to reach a deal since the Trump administration withdrew the US from a previous agreement in 2018 that had been negotiated by the Obama administration. Many people, including the US vice-president, are also sceptical that Iran’s authorities will budge on additional US demands around ballistic missiles and proxy groups like Hamas and Hezbollah – whether or not they are threatened with military action. Iran’s future is murky. But one thing is for certain: with war or without war, the Iranian people have started a revolution that has extended beyond their country’s borders.

Shortly after the opening salvo of U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026 – with missiles targeting cities across the country, some of which killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – President Donald Trump declared the objective was to destroy Iran’s military capabilities and give rise to a change in government. Framing the operation as a war of liberation, Trump called on Iranians to “take over your government.” In the first days alone, Israel dropped over 2,000 bombs on Iranian targets, equal to half the tonnage of the 12-day Israel-Iran conflict in June 2025. Heavy U.S. bombing, meanwhile, has targeted Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as well as ballistic missile and aerial defense sites. The destruction is real. But, as an international relations scholar, I know that destruction is not the same as political success. And the historical record of U.S. bombing campaigns aimed at regime change shows that the gap between the two – the point at which Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya campaigns all stalled – is where wars go to die. Destruction is not strategy Decades of scholarship dating back to World War I on using air power to force political change has established a consistent finding: Bombing can degrade military capacity and destroy infrastructure, but it does not produce governments more cooperative with the attacker. Political outcomes require political processes – negotiation, institution-building, legitimate transitions of power. Bombs cannot create any of these. Instead, what they reliably create is destruction, and destruction generates its own dynamics: rallying among the population, power vacuums, radicalization and cycles of retaliation. The American record confirms this. In 2003, the George W. Bush administration launched “Shock and Awe” in Iraq with the explicit aim of regime change. The military objective was achieved in weeks. The political objective was never achieved at all. The U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army created a vacuum filled not by democratic reformers but by sectarian militias and eventually ISIS. The regime that eventually emerged was not friendly to American interests. It was deeply influenced by Iran. In 2011, the Obama administration led a NATO air campaign in Libya that quickly expanded from civilian protection into regime change. Dictator Moammar Gadhafi was overthrown and killed. But there was no plan for political transition. Chaos and political instability have endured since. Asked what his “worst mistake” was as president, Barack Obama said, “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.” Libya remains a failed state today. The intervention also sent a powerful signal to countries pursuing nuclear weapons: Gaddhafi had dismantled his nuclear program in 2003. Eight years later, NATO destroyed his regime. Even Kosovo, often cited as the success story of coercive air power, undermines the case. Seventy-eight days of NATO bombing did not, by themselves, compel Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to withdraw. What changed was the credible threat of a ground invasion combined with Russia’s withdrawal of diplomatic support. The political outcome – contested statehood, ongoing ethnic tensions – is hardly the stable governance that air power advocates promise. The pattern is consistent: The United States repeatedly confuses its unmatched capacity to destroy from the air with the ability to dictate political outcomes. Why this war? The recent U.S. attacks on Iran raise a fundamental question: Why is the United States fighting this war at all? The administration has declared regime change as its objective, justifying the campaign on the grounds of Iran’s nuclear program and missile capabilities. But that nuclear program was being actively negotiated in Geneva days before the strikes. And Iran’s foreign minister told NBC the two sides were close to a deal. Then the bombs fell. Iran did not attack America. And it currently does not have the capability to threaten the American homeland. What Iran challenges is Israel’s regional military dominance, and I believe it is Israel’s objective of neutralizing a rival that is driving this operation. Israel targeted 30 senior Iranian leaders in the opening strikes. Israeli officials described it as a preemptive attack to “remove threats to the State of Israel.” I see the strategic logic for these killings as Israel’s, and Americans are absorbing the costs. U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have taken Iranian missile fire. American service members are in harm’s way – three have already been killed – not because Iran attacked them, but I believe because their president committed them to someone else’s war without a clear endgame. Each coercive step in this conflict – from the 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear deal, to the 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Iran’s most powerful military commander, to the June 2025 strikes – was framed as restoring leverage. Each produced the opposite, eliminating diplomatic off-ramps, accelerating the very threats it aimed to contain. The regime is not one man Decapitation strikes assume that removing a leader removes the obstacle to political change. But Iran’s political system is institutional — the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Revolutionary Guard have survived for four decades. The system has succession mechanisms, but they were designed for orderly transitions, not for active bombardment. The group most likely to fill the vacuum is the Revolutionary Guard, whose institutional interest lies in escalation, not accommodation. There is a deeper irony. The largest protests since 1979 swept Iran just weeks ago. A genuine domestic opposition was growing. The strikes have almost certainly destroyed that movement’s prospects. Decades of research on rally-around-the-flag effects – the tendency of populations to unite behind their government when attacked by a foreign power – confirms that external attacks fuse regime and nation, even when citizens despise their leaders. Iranians who were chanting “death to the dictator” are now watching foreign bombs fall on their cities during Ramadan, hearing reports of over 100 children killed in a strike on a girls school in Minab. Trump’s call for Iranians to “seize control of your destiny” echoes a familiar pattern. In 1953, the CIA overthrew Iran’s democratically elected prime minister in the name of freedom. That produced the Shah, the Shah’s brutal reign led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the revolution produced the Islamic Republic now being bombed. What comes next? And what guarantee is there that whatever emerges will be any friendlier to Israel or the United States? What does success look like? This is the question no one in Washington has answered. If the objective is regime change, who governs 92 million people after? If the objective is stability, why are American bases across the Middle East absorbing missile fire? There is no American theory of political endgame in Iran — only a theory of destruction. That theory has been tested in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya – and Iran itself over the preceding eight months. It has failed every time, not because of poor execution, but because the premise is flawed. Air power can raze a government’s infrastructure. It cannot build the political order that must replace it. Iran, with its sophisticated military, near-nuclear capability, proxy networks spanning the region and a regime now martyred by foreign attack, will likely not be the exception. U.S. law prohibits the assassination of foreign leaders, and instead Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader while American warplanes filled the skies overhead. Washington has called the result freedom at hand, but it has not answered the only question that matters: What comes next?