Defense & Security
Pakistan bogged by growing ferocity of Balochistan insurgency

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Defense & Security
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First Published in: Mar.12,2025
Apr.07, 2025
Escalating Baloch insurgency challenges Pakistan’s authority, as militant coordination grows and state repression deepens regional instability
The insurgency in Balochistan is becoming ominous and has been palpable for a couple of years. But the gravity of the situation in Pakistan's biggest province failed to register in the Byzantine corridors of power in Islamabad. In Pakistan's capital city, the only thing that mattered was controlling and manipulating the state’s institutions to ensure the survival of the hybrid regime controlled by the military junta of General Syed Asim Munir and fronted by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The fires in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) received cursory coverage in the media. The public discourse has predominantly revolved around Imran Khan and his trials and tribulations in prison, and the regime’s machinations in countering his narrative, and his popularity. Balochistan was too distant from Islamabad and even Lahore for anyone to bother about what was happening in the restive province.
Latelast month, after Maulana Fazal-ur Rehman’s speech in the National Assembly where he said that “five to seven districts in Balochistan were in a position to announce independence” and the “United Nations (UN) would recognise them the next day,” Pakistani people and beyond started taking notice of the sharply deteriorating security situation in the province. Although Maulana may have gone a bit overboard over the UN recognising a declaration of independence in Balochistan, he has his ears and eyes on the ground in the province and has a very good understanding of how bad things are. Following the Maulana, the Leader of Opposition (LoP) in the National Assembly, Omar Ayub, said that the Pakistani state had virtually ceased to exist in more than half a dozen districts of Balochistan. According to Ayub, the Pakistani flag was not flying in these districts.
Nonetheless, it was not only political leaders opposed to the hybrid regime who were flagging the alarming situation in Balochistan. One of the closest advisors of PM Sharif, Rana Sanaullah, warned that armed groups could descend from the mountains and seize control of Balochistan. After initially trying to deny that things were spiraling out of control in the province, the Chief Minister, Sarfraz Bugti, finally admitted the situation was alarming. However, the insurgents could not hold any area for longer than a few hours. That the insurgents could strike at will and seize control of major highways and small towns for even a few hours was hardly something that any responsible administrator could be sanguine about. If anything, the rising frequency of high-profile, high-impact strikes by the Baloch insurgents has completely undermined the authority of the state. Worse, it has fuelled so much uncertainty that it has put paid to ambitious plans to attract foreign investment in infrastructure and mining projects.
It was against this backdrop that the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella group of four militant insurgent groups namely Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Republic Guard (BRG) and Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) announced the formation of a Baloch National Army with a unified command structure and a shift of focus from "Scattered operations to an organised, coordinated and decisive force”. BRAS declared its intent to intensify the war against both Pakistan and its main patron, China and bring greater lethality in its guerilla operations. To hit Pakistan and China where it hurts, the BRAS decided to ‘intensify the blockade on all important highways of Balochistan to disrupt the logistical, economic, and military interests of the occupying state.’
Within days of the BRAS announcement of ramping up its operations, the guerillas hit the strategic Coastal Highway and set six gas tankers and police vehicles on fire. There was also a sudden uptick in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks on Pakistani security forces and Baloch collaborators. The sheer expanse of geography where these attacks took place was particularly notable–a suicide attack in Kalat city, an IED blast in Quetta, another IED in Khuzdar against a pro-regime tribal leader, targeted killings of two clerics in Zehri, the same town that was stormed and occupied for a few hours by nearly a 100 insurgents in January last. According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in just the first nine weeks of 2025, there have already been 70 incidents, in which around 135 Pakistani security forces personnel have been killed as against 66 insurgents/extremists–a ratio of 2:1 which reflects the enormity of the problem.
Some of these insurgent attacks caused serious damage in men and material to the Pakistani security forces. In early February last, insurgents ambushed a van carrying troops, killing 17 Pakistani soldiers in the Kalat district. Two weeks later, in attacks on a Pakistan army checkpoint and a convoy in the Mand area, another 17 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The insurgents also attacked a bus carrying mine workers in Harnai, killing 11. Although the Pakistani media presented this as an extortion racket run by the insurgents, the fact that it was an attack on an economic target–the insurgents call it exploitation of Balochistan’s resources by Punjab–made it a legitimate target in their view. Similarly, the targeting of Punjabi businessmen and settlers the Baloch call them spies and collaborators–is also a part of the strategy of the Baloch fighters against the Pakistani state.
Perhaps the most devastating attack was carried out in August 2024 when the Baloch insurgents launched Operation Herof, in which they carried out coordinated attacks across the length and breadth of the province. In 2024 alone, over 900 attacks were carried out by the insurgent groups, the bulk of them by BLA, BLF and under the label of BRAS. Except for the Pashtun-dominated districts of Northern Balochistan, the Baloch insurgents have been active in every district of Balochistan. This is a qualitative change from past insurgencies when the fighting was restricted to a few districts and tribes. Now, it is pan-Balochistan and cutting across tribal, linguistic, and gender divide.
While the Baloch insurgents have upped their game, not just in terms of the ferocity, intensity, and organisational capability, the Pakistani state—which is a euphemism for the Pakistan Army—has not been able to evolve to respond effectively. Its playbook is the same decades-old one: increase brutality, offer blandishments to tribal chieftains, bribe influential politicians, browbeat the people, stifle all dissent, keep a very tight leash over the media, install puppets and Quislings to run the province under the garb of democracy. But it is proving counterproductive, and the more the Pakistan Army doubles down on its repressive rule, the more it alienates the Baloch people and swells the ranks of the insurgent groups with recruits, including women and young people from educated middle-class.
Finding itself losing the narrative war, the Pakistan Army has responded predictably. It has started raiding universities and abducting Baloch students, keeping them in illegal custody and, in some cases, killing them and dumping their bodies on the roadsides or in the wilds. In just the first few weeks of this calendar year, over 250 students have forcibly disappeared. This enforced disappearances issue has only fuelled disgust and alienation against the Pakistani state, arguably becoming one of the central pillars around which Baloch public opinion has been mobilised. Apart from the brutal repression that has been unleashed, the Pakistan Army is trying to play catch up in the narrative game by using tactics which are now anachronistic.
For instance, authorities often parade a ‘surrendered militant’ who recites a predictable narrative – accusing commanders of greed, claiming India funds them, and asserting they work against Baloch interests. The Pakistani media then plays up these stories to amplify them. But no one except perhaps people in Punjab are buying what the Pakistan Army’s disinformation wing is selling. Similarly, exaggerated and often utterly fictitious claims of the Pakistan Army’s operations either to repel an attack or to raid insurgent hideouts are not impressing anyone. In most cases, the Pakistan Army conjures up an imaginary number of insurgents killed just to show that it is fighting back, and hard.
The BRAS declaration to restructure its organisation and intensify its operations makes it clear– the insurgents believe the struggle in Balochistan has entered a decisive phase. The political narrative is dominated by young leaders of the Baloch Yakjheti Council, such as the indomitable Mahrang Baloch, Sami Deen Baloch and other members spearheading massive protests across the province. Members of the legislative assembly and the ‘elected’ government in the province have become political pigmies who are in power only because they have been foisted on the people of Balochistan by the Pakistan Army. The political and democratic processes in Balochistan have become redundant because they have been completely compromised and rigged by the Pakistan Army, all of which feeds into the narrative of pro-independence voices.
Militarily, the Baloch insurgents have demonstrated their reach, capability and ability to coordinate complex attacks. While there is some skepticism about how much the Baloch can achieve because they constitute less than 5 percent of Pakistan's 250 million population, the insurgents believe that they have the critical mass required to win against the Pakistani state. What they lack in sheer numbers, they make up because of the raging Taliban insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, which is bogging down and bleeding the Pakistan Army. Add to this the sharp deterioration in relations between the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban appear to be giving space to the Baloch as it gives them a certain leverage over Pakistan, which they suspect of flirting with Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) to undermine the Islamic Emirate. The situation in Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran is also proving conducive for the Baloch insurgents in Pakistan.
Faced with the audacity and ferocity of attacks being carried out by the Baloch freedom fighters, and given that Pakistan’s antediluvian approach to tackling the restiveness in the province is not working, there are limited options available to the Pakistan Army. It can continue doing what it has been over the last 25 years since this fifth insurgency has been raging in Balochistan, perhaps intensify what it has been doing. But the result is unlikely to be any different. The Pakistan Army could also decide to carry out a scorched earth steamroller operation in Balochistan. Managing the operation’s political, military and diplomatic consequences could prove disastrous. A third option is to try reconciliation. This is, however, a long and difficult path to take and beyond the intellectual ability of Pakistan's Punjabi military elite because it militates against the colonial control fetish of Pakistan's ruling class. But regardless of what policy Pakistan adopts, the situation in Balochistan will continue to be fraught for the foreseeable future. And while intimations of Balochistan shaking off the ‘shackles of slavery’ (to use the evocative phrase of Imran Khan) might be highly premature and overly optimistic, Balochistan will remain the bone stuck in Pakistan's throat—one it cannot expel, yet one it struggles to swallow.
First published in :
Sushant Sareen is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.
His published works include:
Balochistan: Forgotten War, Forsaken People (Monograph, 2017)
Corridor Calculus: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor & China’s comprador model of investment in Pakistan (Monograph, 2016)
Zarb-e-Azab: An evaluation of Pakistan Army’s anti-Taliban operations in North Waziristan (Monograph, 2015)
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