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Diplomacy
Istanbul, Turkey - 10 October 2023: Turkish people wave Turkish and Palestinian flags during a march in support of Palestine and Gaza. Protest against Israel.

Political Insights (14): Determinants of the Turkish Policy on Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by Dr. Sa‘id al-Haj

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Operation al-Aqsa Flood occurred amid Türkiye’s normalization of relations with Israel and its intent to further develop economic cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, which initially influenced Türkiye’s position in the early days. However, as Israeli massacres unfolded, Ankara’s stance on the war on Gaza Strip (GS) evolved both in statements and actions, placing Türkiye in ongoing political conflict with Israel, and particularly with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First: Determinants of the Turkish Position The Turkish stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by several key factors, foremost among them: • It came as part of Türkiye’s broader efforts to de-escalate and normalize relations with several regional powers in recent years, aiming to resolve foreign policy crises and avoid regional conflicts that could threaten stability.• It came in the context of restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, reinstating ambassadors, and expressing a desire to cooperate primarily in the field of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was also a clear intention to separate the Palestine issue from the course of bilateral relations, aiming to keep Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians distinct from its relations with Türkiye, as stated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.• The traditional view that relations with Israel are one of the key factors in Türkiye’s ties with the US, remains significant. At this stage, Ankara seeks calmer and more positive relations with the US, especially as it awaits the conclusion of the F-16 fighter jet deal.• Türkiye’s advanced relations with both sides of the Palestinian spectrum are evident. On the official side, represented by the PA and President Mahmud ‘Abbas, Türkiye has been a key supporter of Palestinian diplomatic efforts, particularly at the UN. At the same time, Türkiye maintains close ties with the resistance, specifically Hamas.• Türkiye’s aspiration to play a leading role in the region and the Muslim world stems from its belief that achieving this requires taking a prominent stance on the Palestine issue, consistent with Türkiye’s moral and historical position on the matter.• Seeking to align with the popular stance on the Palestine issue, particularly regarding the war on GS, Türkiye has responded to the widespread and intense public anger. The public has demanded actions that correspond to the scale of the genocide and massacres occurring in GS.• The political consensus in Türkiye across various parties, almost without exception, has led to increased pressure on the presidency and the government from opposition parties to adopt stronger positions. This pressure is especially notable from Islamic and conservative parties, which are seen as rivals to the AKP within the conservative segment of society. Second: Aspects of Turkish Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The following aspects of Türkiye’s official stance toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be observed: • Ankara’s position in the first few days following Operation al-Aqsa Flood was characterized by restraint, taking a balanced approach by speaking of “targeting civilians,” calling on “all parties” to de-escalate, and urging the “release of hostages.”• With the onset of the ground war and the growing popular and partisan opposition within Türkiye against Israeli actions in GS, Ankara fully embraced the Palestinian narrative, condemning Israeli massacres as “genocide,” labeling Israel as a “terrorist state,” and declaring that it had “turned the page” on dealing with Netanyahu, now referring to him as a “war criminal.”• Türkiye rejects the classification of Hamas as a terrorist organization, affirming it as a resistance movement against occupation, viewing it as the first line of defense for Türkiye and the Muslim world. Türkiye has maintained ongoing communication and meetings with Hamas at various levels, including those involving President Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and the head of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) İbrahim Kalın.• Willingness to play a mediation role has been evident, as the Palestinian resistance released some foreigners in response to President Erdoğan’s mediation efforts.• Hosting dozens of wounded Palestinians in Türkiye’s hospitals for treatment and sending several aid convoys to Egypt to enter GS. Türkiye is the largest sender of aid, according to official data.• Proposing the deployment of Turkish troops in Palestinian territories as part of the concept of “guarantor states,” positioning Türkiye as one of the guarantor states for the Palestinian side—an idea that was rejected by Israel.• Participating in the joint ministerial committee established by the joint extraordinary summit between the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to monitor the situation and developments in GS.• As the massacres continued, Türkiye’s position has escalated through the imposition of gradual economic sanctions that could lead to a complete halt of all commercial dealings with Israel, despite reports suggesting alternative routes and third countries for delivering Turkish goods.• Türkiye’s announcement to join South Africa’s genocide case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).• Türkiye announced the dismantling of Israeli Mossad networks operating within its borders during the war months.• Verbal exchanges with Israeli officials, particularly Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz, who threatened Erdoğan with the fate of the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.• Türkiye has consistently criticized the US and European positions for being biased toward Israel, viewing them as partners in crime.• Hosting a speech by Palestinian President Mahmud ‘Abbas before the Türkiye Parliament was a response to Netanyahu’s speech in Congress.• Türkiye has declared solidarity with and support for Lebanon in the face of Israeli threats and warned that Netanyahu’s policies may lead to a regional war that will harm everyone in the region.• On the other hand, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi— AKP) and its ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP), rejected several proposals from opposition parties in parliament aimed at investigating the continued flow of Turkish goods to Israel, revoking the citizenship of Turkish nationals who are members in the Israeli army, and other related proposals. Third: Projections In light of the stalemate in field and political developments related to GS in particular and the Palestinian territories in general, it is expected that Türkiye’s official position will remain consistent. This means maintaining a state of political and media engagement with Israel, fully adopting the Palestinian narrative—including the resistance narrative—and condemning the ongoing genocidal war. It is expected that Türkiye’s efforts in the political and legal arenas to criminalize and hold Netanyahu and other Israeli officials involved in the genocide accountable will continue, especially following the killing of Turkish-American activist Ayşenur Ezgi Eygi in the West Bank, who was shot by Israeli soldiers. Ankara is unlikely to escalate further in the economic sphere, particularly regarding the ongoing transfer of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through its ports. In addition to the developments in the field and political situation related to GS and the resistance, there are two possible factors that may lead to a change or modification of Türkiye’s position in the future. The first is the upcoming US elections and the potential return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office. The second possibility is a regional war involving several parties significant to Türkiye, which could be affected directly or indirectly, primarily Iran, Syria, Greece and Cyprus. This scenario makes it unlikely that Türkiye will remain an observer, especially given its suspicions and concerns about US and Western military buildups in Greece and Cyprus.

Diplomacy
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy congratulated the Defenders of Ukraine on 1 October 2024 - 10

World Update: Ukraine faces prospect of defeat – but the west must ensure a just peace

by Jonathan Este

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском There’s a degree of irony that countries attending the 2024 Brics summit this week voted to adopt the Kazan declaration (named for the capital city of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan in Russia, where the summit is being held). The declaration’s first clause emphasises that “all states should act consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter in their entirety”. There’s also a certain amount of chutzpah on the part of conference chair, Vladimir Putin, whose ongoing invasion of Ukraine is so egregiously in breach of that charter.  Article one stresses that the primary purpose of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security”. Article two rules that: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”. If that’s not clear enough, it goes on to further insist that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”  Still, its a funny old world in which the UN secretary general, António Guterres, pitches up at a summit whose host is wanted on an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court on charges relating to the alleged illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. In a country whose troops are currently fighting in Ukraine in direct contravention of the UN’s charter.  To add a further layer of irony, October 24 is the 79th anniversary of the entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945.  Guterres called on Putin to agree a peace deal “in line with the UN Charter, international law and UN General Assembly resolutions”. The Russian leader is perhaps more likely to listen to a deal proposed by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. He said: “We must uphold the three key principles: no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames and strive for swift de-escalation of the situation.”  The UN chief’s idea of a just peace would call for Russia to give up its illegal occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Xi’s proposal appears to call for a deal based on the status quo – virtually the opposite, in other words.  This is pretty much all Ukraine can hope for, as far as the University of Portsmouth’s Frank Ledwidge is concerned. Ledwidge, who has written regularly for The Conversation since Putin launched his invasion in February 2022 and is well plugged into defence and intelligence networks in Nato as well as in Ukraine itself, believes that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia – at least as things stand.  Ledwidge says Ukraine’s western allies are partly to blame for the maximalist aims of the country’s president Volodymyr Zelensky. Western rhetoric has not properly been matched by sufficient weapons or the permission to use them as effectively as the situation warrants. Now is the time for realism, he writes:  A starting point could be accepting that Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk are lost … Then we need to start planning seriously for a post-war Ukraine that will need the west’s suppport more than ever.  One of the key factors that Ledwidge stresses is that just one of Russia’s allies, North Korea, has supplied twice as many artillery shells this year as the whole of Europe. Now North Korean troops are apparently also about to join their Russian comrades on the battlefield. This, writes Ra Mason – a Korea specialist at the University of East Anglia – will help ease the pressure on Putin to bring forward his mobilisation plans.    It’s a diplomatic coup for Putin, Mason believes – it’s a “clear show of opposition towards the Washington-led global order”, which “deals a further blow to the myth that the Russian Federation is isolated, as an international pariah, in a world led by western powers.”  But a military coup de grace against Ukraine? Probably not. The jury is out on how effective North Korea’s “poorly equipped, unmotivated and undernourished” troops will be against Ukraine’s highly motivated defenders. It will also be interesting to see where and how they are deployed. If sent to the frontlines in Kursk, they’ll be helping an ally in its struggle against an incursion by Ukrainian forces. If deployed inside Ukraine, they’ll join Russia in breach of international law. Mason concludes:  If sent into new theatres of war against state-of-the-art Nato-supplied weaponry, it could effectively mean waves of ill-prepared cannon fodder being thrown into the meat grinder of Donbas’ trenches.  Incidentally, the term “meat grinder” has been much bandied about of late. It follows reports from US intellegence recently that, while Russian forces have been making rapid advances and gaining a significant amount of ground in recent weeks, they are doing so at considerable cost in terms of dead and wounded. September was a particularly bloody month, with reports of Russian losses of more than 1,000 men a day, killed or wounded.  But Russian military strategists are well versed in such pyrrhic victories, writes historian Becky Alexis-Martin, who points to equally savage losses in Russia’s defence against Napoleon and in the first and second world wars. Stalin, in particular, was able to defeat the Nazi war machine by, inter alia, throwing millions of troops at their enemies (and incurring terrible casualties). But it’s not a strategy that guarantees success. And terrible psychological effects are beginning to manifest themselves in veterans returning from Ukraine with severe and often violent post-traumatic stress disorder.  The diplomatic front  As if things weren’t bad enough for Zelensky on the battlefield, the Ukrainian president was dealt a serious blow earlier this month when the US president, Joe Biden, was forced by extreme weather events, including a hurricane hitting the state of Florida, to cancel the planned meeting of the heads of government of up to 50 of Ukraine’s western allies in Germany. The “Ramstein Group”, so-called after the German air base at which they meet, was scheduled to meet in the second week of October to consider Zelensky’s “victory plan”. Stefan Wolff, an international security expert at the University of Birmingham writes that the Ukrainian president was hoping to get some degree of commitment for a path to Nato membership for Ukraine as well as permission to use western-supplied long-range missiles against targets deep inside Russia.  Neither of these seem likely to happen in the short term, says Wolff. Like Ledwidge, Wolff thinks Ukraine is doomed to defeat unless its allies double down on their aid – and fast. And like Ledwidge, Wolff sees little indication of that happening any time soon.  When it comes to continuing US support for Ukraine’s war effort, all eyes are now firmly fixed on November 5. The outcome of the presidential election will be seriously consequential for Ukraine’s future. Both candidates have made their positions clear and there is considerable difference between the two positions.  Donald Trump has said any number of times that had he not lost that “rigged and stolen” election to Biden in 2020, Putin would never have invaded Ukraine in the first place. Still, he says, if he wins this one, he’ll bring the war to a very rapid conclusion. But it remains to be seen, given Trump’s oft-stated admiration for Putin, whether the conclusion will be palatable to Kyiv – or to Nato in general.  Trump’s opponent, Kamala Harris, said the former president’s proposals are not “proposals for peace, they’re proposals for surrender”. As vice-president during the Biden administration, she flew to Europe not long after the invasion in February 2022 to help shore up support for Kyiv. Harris has also regularly restated her intention to continue to back Ukraine against Russia. In the only debate of the campaign she said that Ukraine was not Putin’s final stop and that he has “his eyes on the rest of Europe, starting with Poland”.  Poland, incidentally, is an interesting case in point. While it is Ukraine’s firmest ally and it leadership is four-square behind Kyiv, the people are curiously divided on the country’s support for Ukraine. You can read more about that here.  One imagines that Zelensky is as transfixed as anyone else on the 2024 US presidential election campaign as it heads into its final ten days. All we can tell you is that the polls are still very, very close. Well within most pollsters’ margin for error, in fact. A poll of polls, which combines polls from different agencies, published on the website FiveThirtyEight on October 22 shows that Harris leads Trump by 48.1% to 46.3% in the national popular vote. But the accepted popular wisdom is that the complex electoral college system used in the US may well favour Trump’s candidacy.  We’ll be providing daily updates on the US presidential race and full coverage of election day on November 5 and its aftermath.  Update: this article originally said that Vladimir Putin launched Russia invasion of Ukraine in February 2024. This has now been corrected to February 2022. Apologies for the error. 

Diplomacy
16th BRICS Summit family photograph (2024)

BRICS Summit 2024 — everything, everywhere, all at once?

by Priyal Singh

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ushering in a multipolar order requires a streamlined and coherent political agenda – not unfocused expansion.  The 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, concluded last week with the usual grand declaration of the group’s commitments, concerns and aspirations.  Many media headlines, particularly in Western countries, focused on how the summit and BRICS generally, symbolised Moscow’s ability to circumvent the fallout of sanctions by turning to the global south. In this way, BRICS is indirectly viewed as a threat to Western efforts to isolate Russia, weaken its power projection capabilities, and end its invasion of Ukraine.  Western governments and analysts often struggle to frame BRICS’s evolution beyond a binary, zero-sum narrative in which the group is a key geopolitical challenge to the Western-dominated international order. This interpretation places the forces of democracy and liberal political values in one camp and authoritarian governments in another, with certain developing countries caught in the middle, trying to play one side off the other for their own benefit.  There is some merit to these kinds of headlines. Russia and China are primarily major status-quo powers. Both have been permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members since its establishment. Moscow was the ‘other pole’ in the international order for most of the 20th century, a position Beijing is working towards. And the foreign policy goals of both place them in confrontation with the United States and its Western allies.  BRICS may be on a path towards unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  So, are these two countries in a position to champion the global south’s cause, and why haven’t more representative bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement played a more prominent role?  The preoccupation with Russia and China detracts from BRICS’s broader, underlying geopolitical project – the need for global south countries to reform and shape the international order’s future direction on their own terms.  These include greater representation and agency in global policy- and decision-making bodies and facilitating greater freedom to trade, invest and borrow money outside the Western-dominated financial system. They also include a more just and equitable global power balance that reflects modern realities.  In pursuing these aims, BRICS countries have made steady progress on developing a shared strategic agenda for increased cooperation across various policy domains.  The Kazan summit’s 32-page outcomes declaration covers almost everything from reforming the UNSC and Bretton Woods institutions to climate change, biodiversity and conservation. It also covers challenges from global crises, conflicts and terrorism and a suite of economic development, health, education, science and cultural exchange-related issues.  A group of democracies, autocracies and theocracies speaking with one voice on human rights and democracy is absurd.  The group’s ballooning cooperation agenda may indicate progress. But it could also signify the limits of its diverse members’ ability to agree on ‘hard’ political and security matters central to the core business of reforming the international order.  The expansion of BRICS’ substantive agenda and its membership dilutes its primary purpose and reinforces the binary, zero-sum Western narrative its members constantly try to shed.  Tangible, albeit gradual, progress on establishing intra-BRICS institutions and processes such as the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the cross-border payment system and its independent reinsurance capacity suggest that BRICS’ clout and credibility are growing.  These initiatives could enable members to pursue their international economic objectives without the constraints and transactional costs associated with traditional financial bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Ideally, this would improve their relative positions of global power and influence, and help deliver a more multipolar international order.  In contrast, deepening cooperation on big cat conservation, while important, doesn’t serve that purpose. Nor does facilitating youth exchanges on sports and healthy lifestyles or championing a BRICS alliance for folk dance. Including these kinds of initiatives in BRICS’ growing agenda detracts from its core objectives.  A streamlined agenda would divert attention from the contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring of BRICS’ members.  More worryingly, this suggests that BRICS’ diverse constellation of member states is pursuing the path of least resistance – expanding their cooperation in every direction, hoping something eventually sticks.  Instead of doubling down on hard strategic questions about a shared conception of multipolarity, and the steps necessary to reform global governance and security institutions, BRICS seems to be heading for greater expansion and formalisation. And with that come the risks, challenges and institutional dependencies that have led to the stagnation and ineffectiveness plaguing more established international organisations in recent years.  Perhaps the group’s core members recognise that they have very different ideas of what constitutes multipolarity. Russia (and China to an extent) envisage much more than global institutional reforms, focusing instead on reimagining international norms and core principles.  These differences are also reflected in BRICS’ expanding membership. It seems Russian and Chinese enthusiasm has been curbed by other founding members, who prefer a ‘partner country’ model for future growth. This contrasts with the full membership offers to Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2023. (Argentina’s new political administration declined, and the Saudis have remained non-committal.)    Most worrying, however, is BRICS’ preoccupation with promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no doubt that these terms are increasingly politicised and rife with double standards – among developing nations with mixed political systems and traditionally liberal, Western democracies. However, for BRICS to meaningfully champion normative values, its members must at least attempt to commit to common political governance systems in their own countries.  Having a group of partner nations composed of progressive constitutional democracies and closed repressive autocracies and theocracies attempting to speak with one voice on promoting human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms is absurd. It reeks of empty political rhetoric at best, and Orwellian double-speak at worst.  This again dilutes BRICS’ key messages, undermines its important core business, and detracts from the significant progress being made towards a common strategic agenda.  BRICS primary goal moving forward should be to trim the fat.  A streamlined annual working agenda would divert attention away from its individual member states' contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring. With a focus on addressing the international system’s failures, institutional reform and greater representation for global south countries in policy- and decision-making bodies could be prioritised.  This seems unlikely though, if this year’s summit is anything to go by. By following the path of least resistance, BRICS may be setting itself on a course towards increasing and unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  Only time will tell if certain members are willing to be more assertive and correct course before they are too far down a path impossible to pivot away from. 

Diplomacy
Donald Trump win in US president elections 2024. Washington DC, United Sates Of America - 2024 November 6

What Trump’s victory means for Ukraine, the Middle East, China and the rest of the world

by Stefan Wolff

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

Diplomacy
London, England, UK - May 13, 2023: Protestors participate in the National Demonstration for Palestine: NAKBA 75. Credit: Loredana Sangiuliano

How Israeli Occupation of Palestine is Aided by Double Standards

by Syed Munir Khasru

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском There must be a reconciliation between the human rights agenda and current humanitarian realities. In Gaza, the daily struggle is frightening, and there appears no end or peace plan in sight.  As the Gaza conflict enters its second year, the situation in the Middle East is taking an alarming turn. Having already escalated tensions by carrying out a series of high-profile assassinations, including Hassan Nasrallah, head of Hezbollah, and its top leadership, as well as Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in Tehran on 31 July during his visit for President Masaoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration, Israel has now launched a ground incursion into Lebanon, further intensifying its conflict with Iran. As of 30 September, 42,337 Palestinians have lost the lives. This is compared to just 1,540 Israelis. Put differently, that number is 27 Palestinian killed for each Israeli since 7 October 2023. Although Israelis claim that a portion of Palestinians killed are Hamas fighters. On 18 September 2024, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution (124 nations in favour, 14 against, and 43 abstentions) demanding Israel end its illegal occupation of Palestinian territories within 12 months. This resolution builds upon the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion outlining the illegality of Israel’s ongoing settlements in the Westbank, and called on all nations to refrain from acknowledging legitimacy of this protracted occupation. The UNGA’s call underscores the international community’s growing impatience with the ongoing conflict. Yet, as diplomatic pressures mount, the human cost of this prolonged strife remains devastatingly high. Glaring double standards and changing dynamics of global diplomacy  In the one year since the 7 October massacre, the conflict has taken a devastating toll on Palestinian civilians including nearly 16,765 children fatalities. Every hour, 15 people are killed, six of whom are children, while 35 are injured. This staggering figure contrasts sharply with the Ukraine War, which has seen far fewer civilian casualties with 1,551 children killed in more than two years. In addition to civilians, 210 aid workers have been killed, surpassing the annual toll of aid worker fatalities in any other past conflict in last 20 years, including the Ukraine-Russia conflict where 50 aid workers have died. More than 125 journalists have been killed in Gaza, compared to only 11 journalists who have died reporting the Ukraine war. This stark disparity underscores the disproportionality of rights violations in the Gaza conflict. While the US and its allies have been strongly critical of Russia, their criticism of Israel has been minimal in spite of the much larger scale of civilian casualties. While thousands of Palestinians continue to die in Gaza, and now with a ground war raging in Lebanon, the West has imposed limited sanctions against only a few Israeli settlers. For instance, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, while strongly condemning Russia for waging a “ruthless war,” remained mostly muted on Israel’s atrocities, leading EU staffers to criticize her “uncontrolled” support for Israel.  These double standards have led to protests from San Francisco to Sydney, speaking out against atrocities committed in the name of “self-defence.” The Gaza war has been changing the dynamics of international diplomacy as a growing number of countries have taken steps to recognize Palestine as a sovereign state. As of June 2024, 146 of 193 UN member states have made this step, including several European nations like Norway, Poland, Iceland, and Romania. Spanish and Irish governments are leading voices in Europe, pushing for a joint recognition of Palestine, signalling a strengthening of support for a Palestinian state in the diplomatic landscape surrounding the conflict What lies ahead The path towards a just resolution remains elusive, and the questions raised demand a re-examination of the moral and ethical foundations that underpin global order. The fate of thousands of Palestinians hangs in the balance and the conflict shows no signs of abating. The escalation of tensions with Hezbollah and Iran complicates the situation, threatening to engulf the entire region in a wider conflict. The international community must act now, and decisively, to prevent further loss of lives and work towards a lasting peace in the region. Correcting the gross injustice to innocent civilians in Palestine and addressing the Israel-Gaza conflict starts with recognising humanity in equal measures as well as rights of both Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and security side by side. It involves implementation of international law, upholding human rights, and a concerted effort to address root causes of the conflict, such as the displacement of Palestinians from their abode more than seven decades ago. While killing of any innocent civilians, including Israelis by Hamas, is not acceptable, what is also equally true is that when generations of Palestinians are born and grow up without a state and a sense of national identity, there is always a risk that frustration growing over decades can get out of control. The 18 September UNGA resolution demands that Israel return land in the West Bank and other “immovable property,” as well as all assets seized since the occupation began in 1967, and all cultural property and assets taken from Palestinians. It calls for Israel to allow all Palestinians displaced during the occupation to return to their place of origin and make reparation for the damage caused by its occupation. It urges UN member states to refrain from recognising Israel’s presence in East Jerusalem and the West Bank as lawful, preventing engagement in activities that support the occupation, ceasing imports of products from Israeli settlements, and implementing sanctions against entities involved in maintaining Israel’s unlawful presence. Unless some of the major players in the West, which includes countries like US, UK, Germany, and France, apply principles of rights and justice consistently, any effort will continue to remain infructuous. Advocating human rights and equality while turning a blind eye to atrocities does not work in the age of social media and digital platforms where the truth is more readily accessible and more difficult to suppress. The Gaza conflict is a wake-up call for the world, which has been for far too long oblivious to humanitarian crises. The fact that the state of Israel emerged from ruins of the untold sufferings caused to by the Nazis is a testament that justice prevailed. Today the Jewish peoples have a modern, prosperous, and democratic state in Israel. Hence, it is rather an irony that one of the educated and cultured populations of Middle East, the Palestinians, today are on the receiving end of human rights violation by a nation whose people went through one of the worst atrocities committed in the last century.

Diplomacy
Gaza at war city destroyed by idf attacks, aerial rare view Drone view over North Gaza in the war with Israel. Gaza-March,20,2024

Israel’s Punitive War on Palestinians in Gaza- Academic Article

by Camilla Boisen, New York University Abu Dhabi

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In this article, I consider how Israel’s justifications for war and rationalization of its conduct align with historical justifications for punitive war and unlicenced warfare. Approaches to forcible punishment in early modern writings in the Western Just War Theory tradition (JWT) relate both to defensive and offensive war. In the early modern period, the use of force for self-defence is a type of inter-state punishment justified by the aim of deterrence and the goal of preserving the state. Offensive war, by contrast, is deemed justified to deter aggressors, pre-emptively, or violators of the natural law, even warranting a rejection of a principle of discrimination between perpetrator and innocents.1 Most of the early modern jurists insisted that a right to inflict punishment was integral to claims of just war. For Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), wars were only justified to vindicate rights, which included wars to defend the common good,2 or interventions by a third party when crimes have been committed against another state. Before him, Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546) warned of the danger associated with resort to the principle of punishment because it allowed space for acts of revenge or vengeance masquerading under the pretext of humanitarian protection – a guise that remains a common feature of contemporary international politics.3 Since the Spanish conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century, settlers have justified their retaliatory actions against indigenous resistance as necessary for their own “self-preservation.” Furthermore, the “doctrine of double effect” provided moral justification, allowing them to consider the killing of innocents acceptable as an effect of achieving a moral objective such as preservation by means of self-defence.4 In exceptional circumstances where the levels of depravity were deemed abhorrent, the punishment of whole communities for violating the laws of nature was justified.5 The right to punish is no longer a regulative principle of international law. It was gradually replaced by principles of collective security, humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. With its focus on preventative war, modern international law has reduced just causes for war (threat or use of force) to essentially two: first, self-defence under United Nations (UN) Charter Chapter VII: Article 51, and second, when authorized by the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security (Article 39).6 Even though older theories by jurists in the law of nations have been superseded, international law and the JWT are not discordant doctrines. JWT provides the intellectual framework to international humanitarian law (IHL); minimally, for a war to be considered morally just, it must first and foremost be lawful.7 The Western JWT tradition provides two distinct judgments on war premised on the assumption that war can be justified in certain cases (jus ad bellum), while also establishing ethical limits on how war should be conducted (jus in bello).8 It is no wonder that the philosopher Immanuel Kant would describe its theorizers as “sorry comforters” in that they legitimized (and moralized) the intersection between the demands of morality and the pragmatism of foreign policy.  The permissive interpretation of IHL we are witnessing in Gaza since October 2023, as Jessica Whyte aptly describes, by a deliberate starvation policy to depopulate Gaza that also seeks to disavow any intent to do so, reveals Israel (and its allies) as Kant’s “unsorry comforters.”9 The use of starvation as an instrument of war, the imposition of military strategies akin to a scorched earth policy,10 and widespread violence against civilians suggest that Israel is using collective punishment against Palestinians in Gazan.11 This conduct has now led International Criminal Court (ICC) chief prosecutor Karim Khan to seek indictments against Israeli (and Hamas) leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Despite the excessive civilian death toll that has stemmed from Israel’s proclaimed self-defensive and genocide-preventive measures, Israeli authorities have remained steadfast in their military goal of irrevocably destroying Hamas’s military capacity rather than eradicating Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Since the 7 October 2023 attack on southern Israel by Hamas-led forces, Israel has claimed that its military operations in Gaza are justified in two interrelated ways. First, it is executing its right to self-defence in retaliation for the attack on Israeli citizens, including civilians, by a terrorist organization whose avowed aim is to destroy Israel.12 Secondly, in exercising its right to self-defence, it is engaging in “genocide-prevention” – by destroying the capacity of Hamas and Palestine to perpetrate a “second Holocaust.” At the Hague, Tal Becker, legal advisor to the Israeli Defense Forces, insisted “Israel is in a war of defence against Hamas, not against the Palestinianpeople.”13 In international law, deliberate targeting of citizens is not permissible or condoned. Collateral damage is.14 The extent of the death toll and destruction of civilian infrastructure – hospitals, schools, and mosques, in addition to residential neighbourhoods – suggests, however, that these distinctions have largely been ignored.15 Israel’s deployment of advanced Ai systems has allowed its forces to reshape the acceptance of the technology’s margin of error, including the risks of collateral damage and civilian casualties. This is just one of the ways Israel’s actions distort or pervert JWT criteria, prompting new moral (and legal) questions for advanced warfare, including where to draw the boundaries of existing ethical constraints.16 If we reference those boundaries to modern international law, Israel’s counteroffensive in Gaza is punitive because it violates the principle of proportionality. What further confines us to this limited international law framework is the current focus on whether Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. Since 7 October, the devastating civilian casualties caused by Israel, along with destructive rhetoric from Israeli leaders, quickly led to accusations of genocide and counter-accusations that Hamas committed genocide on7 October.17 The question is being considered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) thanks to a case brought by the Republic of South Africa. In large measure, the acrimonious global debate about genocide in Gaza is mired in legal technicalities due to the stringent requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNGC). Because the question admits only of a yes/no answer, other aspects of the conflict are missed: maybe we are witnessing an attack on civilians that amounts to “more than genocide”?18 Viewed historically, mass state violence against civilians is not an anomaly or exception in the international system as genocide implies: it is intrinsic to the very idea of statehood, and the kind of natural right of self-defence that Israel is invoking is central to the identity of many western states, whose formation is closely tied to imperial and colonial expansion.19 Early modern just war theorists often discussed wars in colonial contexts. Their theories accepted forms of punishment as well as unlicensed warfare in its normative schema, such as retribution, deterrence, restraint, and reform. They constitute a paradigm of punitive warfare.  Whether they realize it or not, commentators today are drawing on this paradigm in relation to Gaza. Edward Luttwak, for instance, arguably endorsed Samuel von Pufendorf’s (1632-1694) call for unrestricted warfare to achieve peace in his controversial 1999 article “Give War a Chance” (despite it being unclear if he has actually read the Saxonian jurist).20 Today he lauds Israel’s counteroffensive in Gaza as a military success, while bemoaning the severity of the constraints “that has been placed on Israel’s combat operations” as “a major impediment to its fight.”21 That any action taken against an enemy other is justified finds support among many Israelis, who have no faith in diplomacy and view Israeli security solely in terms of pre-emption, intimidation, and deterrence. They believe in always supporting the military against a relentless and cruel enemy.22 Israel’s war in Gaza is punitive in the sense meant by some of the early modern international jurists. Here I demonstrate how Israel is reviving archaic forms and justifications of state practice that are deeply rooted in the Western tradition of just war and the justification of punitive wars. By revisiting these ideas, my aim is not to furnish Israel with justifications for its war in Gaza from the archive of the law of nature and of nations, but rather to place it within the intellectual history of punitive war. This contextualization is anything but a consolation, for as I conclude, the genocide concept is an outgrowth of this history.  Historicizing the Right to Punitive War  The early modern just war theory discourse of punishment opens up at least two ways to think about Israel’s war as punitive. First, for security reasons, that is for reasons of self-preservation, which also include measures of preventative and non-proportional warfare (defensive punitive wars). Secondly, by constructing Palestinians as “barbarians” (see below), as the quintessential host is humani generis, enemy of humankind, thereby legitimating violence in the name of the state and the jus gentium, that affords them a right to punish “crimes against natural law” (offensive punitive wars). For the Europeans, this particular right opened a way to punishment without injury to the state, and thus cemented amoral pathway for colonial ventures and exploitation. Portraying Hamas as Nazis – the archetypical genocidaires – functions to criminalize Palestinians and allows the Israeli leadership to present them as a persistent genocidal threat.23 Defensive Punitive Wars  Punitive wars were a common feature in JWT during the medieval period. Pope Innocent IV (1195–1254), for instance, used his universal jurisdiction to include the spiritual care of the souls of infidels, which at this time meant principally Muslims, and retained a right to intervene with impunity in their domestic affairs.24 The medieval concept of punitive war emerged from the rejection of the Roman Law principle of self-defence in early Christian theology. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), for instance, contended that killing in self-defence could not align with God’s law because it stemmed from humans’ attachment to their earthly life. Augustine linked punishment with sin and heresy, advocating for persecution and punishment driven by the desire to do good and eradicate evil, thus framing the punishment of heretics as an act of charity. Gregory the Great (540–604) championed this idea, threatening divine retribution against rulers who did not support the clergy’s efforts to suppress and punish barbarians and heretics. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Church had expanded its authority to punish its enemies, ultimately merging just war theory with the concept of holy war.25 The gradual shift from a punitive to a defensive conception of war is expressed in the thought of sixteenth-century theologians, where the two paradigms coexist. Writing in the context of the Spanish conquest of the Americas, for the Salamanca theologian Vitoria every punitive war has a defensive character, and no defensive war is effective without a punitive element.26 Punishment was not grounded in vengeance, or vendetta; it had to fit the crime, which promoted a principle of proportionality.27 Although we have obligations based on our universal common rights, these do not justify waging war on the Indians, whether to punish them for violating natural law or to convert them to Christianity by force for their eternal salvation. The natural rights of the Indians are inviolable, and it would be unjust for the Spaniards to violate these rights with impunity.28 Yet, Vitoria contemplates the possibility of saving innocents by prohibiting and punishing offenders “from practicing any nefarious custom or rite.”29 Vitoria, nevertheless, imposes strict conditions on such humanitarian endeavours, insisting that they must bedriven by “right intention.” Punishing to save innocents from cannibalism is a noble intention, but using it as a pretext for war is unjustifiable. Slaughtering of innocents is not permissible, however, Vitoria does introduce exceptions to this rule in extenuating circumstances that relate to a prince’s necessity to obtain peace and security.30 Unlike Vitoria, the Italian jurist Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) recognized a state’s right to punish as an instrument of self-preservation.31 Sovereigns are justified in using preemptive force to deter threats, prioritizing state preservation even before these threats fully develop. The kind of state’s right to what Dirk Moses has termed “permanent security” is theorized with a remarkable clarity in Gentili’s writing.32 This also implies that general deterrence can be invoked as a justification for punishment that exceeds the balance between the wrongdoer and the enforcer. While Gentili maintains that war(and post-war punishment) should address a broadly defined injury, the concept of deterrence as a proactive measure can be applied even before any act directly impacts the state.33 Both Vitoria and Gentili acknowledged the reformative and retributive aspects of punishment, as well as punishing an offender to prevent future misconduct by the offender or by others,34 implicitly conflating punishment with deterrence. For Gentili, self-defence falls under the “category of expediency,” which is considered an autonomous source of justice and, as such, is less restrictive about the requirements of predicate injury. Grotius, as we will see, insisted on an even more permissive right to punitive war against those who offend against nature. This implies that a sovereign can justifiably wage war against another state for any violations without needing to prove harm or have that harm be “proportionate.” That is, the anticipation of injury, along with the harm already endured, provides a legitimate justification for war.35 Generally, cruelty in war is forbidden, but harsher warfare against uncivilized peoples is permitted, because “with respect to barbarians violence is more potent than kindness.”36 The reasoning that certain wartime circumstances, like self-defence or genocide, justify exceptions to norms of restraint for war and in war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) extends to the discussion of Israel’s war in and on Gaza. This JWT archetype has been invoked in the Gaza context by the prominent political theorist Michael Walzer.37 His views are significant because his book, Just and Unjust Wars (1977), revived the JWT in academic and public discourse, and he has applied the doctrine to Israel’s past attacks on Gaza, urging the principle of distinction while defending Israel’s right to retaliate against Hamas’s missiles.38 Because of academic reputation and occasional criticisms of Israeli military retaliation with statements (Israel today does not have cause “for revenge against the people ofGaza”39), he is regarded as a prestigious commentator with moral standing. He has now written about the conflict in Gaza since 7 October 2023. Walzer’s scrupulous regard for civilian protection would seem to distance him from the likes of Gentili. However, he allows for extensive civilian destruction in two circumstances.  First, his advocacy for “emergency ethics” (morally) justifying the targeting of civilians during war indicates a continuation of early modern arguments about punitive warfare. Walzer argues that military leaders may dispense with the ordinary moral constraints, including the prohibition against killing non-combatants, when the political community is existentially threatened, which he calls the “supreme emergency.”40 Supreme emergency requires that two conditions be met, namely, first, that the threat be imminent, and second, that it be a kind of radical threat to human lives and values that is beyond ordinary military defeat.41 Supreme emergency pertains to jus in bello because it considers revisions to the rules that guide conduct in war. The historical context for conceptualizing this doctrine is the Allied carpet bombing of German cities in World War II. Nazism represented an existential threat to British national existence, and the Allies were entitled to bomb German civilians until that immediate security threat passed.42  Second, Walzer goes further and argues in terms of permanent security, reflecting the colonial logic of thinkers like Gentili. He now argues even Hamas does not constitute an immediate threat (“supreme emergency”), massive Palestinian civilian casualties can still be justified in terms of Israel’s longer-term security.43 The justification of a military campaign with a shocking civilian casualty count through reasoning in terms of self-preservation is reminiscent of early modern thinkers:  Israel is fighting a war of existential importance, but there was no concrete threat of genocide against the Israeli civilian population. This war is existential in that if Israel does not succeed in securing its borders and deterring future attackers, many citizens would probably leave the country. But at this moment, it is not a supreme emergency. Therefore, the country is bound to the same standards that it adhered to in previous conflicts.44 As of this moment, and according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, Israel is illegally occupying Gaza, and only has the right to enforce immediate security, not permanent security. It can respond to immediate threats but not wage an endless campaign to achieve “absolute victory” to ensure that Gaza “never again” poses a threat. However, Walzer justifies, as Gentili had, an ongoing military campaign that produces a massive civilian casualty count in terms of anticipatory self-preservation (permanent security).45 By arguing for an existential threat exists that satisfies the principles of jus ad bellum, while simultaneously arguing the Israeli state must still satisfy the principles of jus in bello because there is no supreme emergency, Walzer has found a way to justify a war conducted in a manner that results in a massive civilian casualty count.  Walzer’s emphasis on self-preservation as a rationale for jus ad bellum is comparable then to Gentili’s “category of exception,” where the harm suffered does not need to be “proportionate,” also a condition for jus ad bellum, to justify and commit warfare.46 So while Walzer insists that Israel’s response is neither genocidal nor punitive, he clearly believes it to be proportionate: “if there were almost 10,000 Hamas fighters among the30,000 Palestinians killed, it’s not a bad ratio for such a war on urban terrain.”47 In order to maintain his view that the war is being conducted ethically, Walzer appears willing to give the Israeli state the benefit of the doubt. He denies, for example, reports that Israel is bombing Hamas targets after they enter their homes, thereby guaranteeing largescale civilian casualties, especially on women and children.48 Gentili’s JWT exposes Walzer’s appetite for offensive war against Hamas, because of the ambiguity between defensive and offensive war when justified for reasons of permanent security. However, permanent security concerns were not the only grounds for offensive war, including those of a punitive kind.  Offensive Punitive Wars  The issue of whether Europeans had the right to wage war as a means of punishing non-Europeans is a central topic in early modern just war theory discussions. Gentili was adamant that the Spaniards were justified in waging war against the Indians due to their practices of “abominable lewdness even with beasts” and cannibalism. This justification was based on the idea that the Indians, through such actions, had violated the natural and divine laws that form the bonds of union between all people,49 and “it is ordained by nature herself that all sinners should be punished.”50 The issues of European expansion, indigenous rights, moral questions of dignity, safety, self-preservation and humanitarian intervention were manifest in one of the most famous debates of the sixteenth century between the humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1494–1573), and the Dominican Bartholomé de Las Casas (1484–1566), at Valladolid in 1550. Here, the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V commanded that all wars of conquest be suspended until a panel of intellectuals convened in the imperial Spanish capital of Valladolid deliberated on the question by what right Spaniards subdue the Amerindians, and subject them topunishment.51  One of the many issues to be resolved was whether the Spanish were justified in punishing the American Indians for their violations of natural law. The contours of Sepúlveda’s argument can be simply stated: Native Americans were barbarians by both habits (e.g. by engaging in human sacrifice) and nature, tainted by their barbarous vices, and by right of nature, people in this state must obey the more civilized and prudent, or be punished for resisting the universal moral order. Designating this supposed natural defect in the capacity for rational thought to the American Indians cemented a strict God sanctioning order of classification. Resistance of this natural order of dominion gave their Spanish overlords grounds for waging just war against them. The American Indians, Sepúlveda insisted, had to be saved from themselves and subjected to their European masters in order to bring them into the fold of Christianity, and to save their souls. His stipulation for just war maintained first, that the American Indians killed innocents among themselves, hailing their salvation as a just enterprise and something to be encouraged. “If anyone doubts,” Sepúlveda contended, “no one who is a real Christian doubts that all men who wander outside the Christian religion die an eternal death.”52 To protect “innocent persons from such injurious acts” would give the Spanish “the right, already granted by God and nature, to wage war against these barbarians to submit them to Spanishrule.”53 And second, that these depraved acts of indecency were sanctioned and systematized by their own public customs and political institutions – a point, which caused Sepúlveda greater concern than individual acts of depravation.54 This institutionalization of evil required nothing less than a regime change and total victory through war and forcible subjection, a method that “is the most expeditious and best suited for accomplishing these ends and securing the salvation of souls.”55 The Spanish duties to humanity were irrefutable, as far as Sepúlveda was concerned, and they were morally obligated to civilize and Christianize the American Indians. It seemed obvious to Sepúlveda that the Indians lacked sufficient reason to be entrusted with their own affairs. The common bond of humanity, established by divinity and the natural law, considers all people as our neighbours, Sepúlveda asserted, “provided we can do so without harm to ourselves.”56 God has given human beings commandments concerning his or her neighbour, and we have a duty to obey such divine laws. If we do not, then we commit heresy.  Sepúlveda grounded this enlargement of just war theory beyond a principle of self-defence. Even if the Indians possessed natural rights (afforded to all humankind by the Natural Law) – to for instance self-defence, property and political autonomy, they had so blatantly misused them that they are now forfeited as a result of their ungodly practices.57 Wars were a necessary mean to combat their resistance in obeying the Natural Law. These crimes were a direct affront to God, and it was incumbent upon the Spanish to avenge, punish and restrain such crimes. Punitive wars such as these were salutary, but nothing to be celebrated.58 Sepúlveda was not concerned, as Las Casas had been, about the collateral damage of punitive wars, exactly because Natural Law permits collective punishment of those who violate its tenets. In fact, there is a slippage between what we might term collateral damage (unfortunate, but legitimate violence) and collective punishment (moral imperative to reform or deter) because the category of “innocent” is suspended. Sepúlveda is expounding the latter:  And the point he [Las Casas] makes about being obliged to refrain from waging a war aimed at punishing the few guilty parties if it cannot be accomplished without a much larger number of innocent people coming to grief is irrelevant. For in a city or community where human sacrifice was performed by public authority, all are guilty, since all approve of the practice.59, As evidenced further below, Israel’s claim that there are no “uninvolved civilians,” and that any casualties among “human shields” are morally the responsibility of Gazans, aligns with Sepúlveda’s reasoning. In a recent Israel Affairs article, the philosopher Per Bauhn adjudicates on the question of moral responsibility for non-combatants’ death in Gaza. He exonerates Israel and attributes all culpability to Hamas. By posing an “unjust danger to the state of Israel”, Bauhn says, “Hamas has created a situation in which Israel is morally justified in waging a war of self-defence that puts Palestinian non-combatants at risk of being accidentally killed.”60 This claim is not only deeply rooted in permanent security reasoning, it also presupposes that moral responsibility is a zero-sum concept. Yet, the Israeli leadership and the IDF are not exempt from moral scrutiny by the culpability attributed to Hamas for the conflict in Gaza, which the two morally distinct judgements of just war theory also implies.  What we have seen so far is that the idea of placing belligerents outside of the moral realm is a central framework for that of extreme emergency exceptions but also for offensive punitive wars. One of the fundamental presuppositions of theorizing about war is the belief that civilization consists in the gradual elimination of force from our relations with others. Thus, to uphold civilization means finding a way of regulating and humanizing armed conflict. However, there are those who do not fight under the auspice of a state; those who fall outside or are deemed to be outside of the civilized world. Laws of war do not apply to them to the same degree as actors within the society of civilized states, and these can be punished. Pirates, barbarians, and non-Europeans all fell within this exclusionary category among many classic international jurists.  Sonja Schilling describes how this narrative logic of deviance is closely associated with punitive war.61 Civilized humanity stands against a brutal, barbaric invader. The loser faces annihilation, and if civilization is defeated, humanity will revert to a dreadful state of constant warfare. The hostis humani generis idea assumes a consistent and unquestioned conflict between civilization and the Other, situated in a marginal area between the empire and a non-white wilderness. Evidenced below, Israeli officials frequently invoke the term wilderness, as an imposing “nature,” meaning it is a space where, due to its inherent characteristics, the state of nature exists.62 The act of claiming ownership achieves something important as it brings land into the legal or civilized domain for the first time.63 From the 1980s onwards, Palestinian violence against Israel was increasingly depicted not as a negotiable territorial dispute, but as a fundamental conflict between civilization and its inherent Other.64 As Schilling remarks “[t]he civil societies of both the United States and Israel are constructed as conceivable institutional enablers of civilization because these countries adhere to the universal and international principles of human rights.”65 Grotius prominently asserted the limitations of recognizing belligerency with whom we cannot hope to build moral relations, maintaining a strict distinction between lawful and unlawful enemies.66 For him “unlawful” enemies ultimately demarcated the boundary of international society, and the lingering problem remained whether they can be transformed into legal combatants recognized and protected by the law of nations. Grotius would – reluctantly – insist that promises and good faith should be kept even with pirates and brigands. Given that both Hamas, as an unlawful enemy (violent non-state actor), and Israel (recognized sovereign state) continue to be impervious to the ethical and legal standards of war, the importance of Grotius’s distinction seems less relevant. Wars against unlawful enemies cannot retain recognition that confers legal validation. Pirates are a particular kind of enemy. Pirates violate the commercial rights of humankind. In defending these commercial rights no declaration of war, for instance, is needed, since these violators have already declared war against all.67 In fact, Grotius writes that determining the “manner” of a war is best done on account of the enemy you are fighting: “they are Enemies, who publicly denounce War against us, or we against them; the rest are but Pirates, or Robbers.”68 Pirates and atheists are outside the moral community. War between “lawful” enemies implies that there is a thin aspect of respect that requires explanation when they are acting coercively against one another (one does not need to like one’s neighbour to have a binding social relationship). We can imagine that if a lawful enemy commits heinous crimes against humanity that warrant punitive action, it would need to be declared and follow the rules of the laws of war as a recognition of that relationship.  The right of punishment was fundamental for Grotius to determine how to enforce rights and duties to regulate relationships between states.69 The right to inflict punishment follows from the right to defend oneself, the right to recover property and the right to exact debt. Grotius specified four just causes of war, self-defence, recovery of property, obtaining what is owed, and the exacting of punishment.70 The first, afforded by natural law, arising “directly and immediately from the Care of our own Preservation.”71The latter was in effect punitive wars to address uncorrected wrongs – a state right he positioned as central to upholding international order and peace. States have permissive rights to punish human beings or peoples who grievously transgress or sin against natural law by engaging in acts of cannibalism, unnecessary killings, inhumanity toward parents, piracy, as well as religious impiety in public.72 Given that Grotius allows a permissive right to punish violations of the natural law, what exactly is the purpose of the punishment? There are a number of possibilities, of course. It could be retribution for committing a moral wrong, or a deterrent to prevent future violations, or indeed, it could be to reform the character of peoples, to force them to see the error of their ways. Grotius’s underlying assertion is that punishment has to have a deterrent effect; and this is where punishment may be considered a moral power. To deter someone from consorting with animals, for example, would be to prevent them from committing amortal sin, and to prevent an indelible stain on their soul.73 Punishment, then, is not exacted for retaliation or vengeance, but rather as precaution.  With his doctrine of a natural right to punish, Grotius recognized that there are some violations of the law of nature which affect us all, and for the sake of humankind should not go unpunished.74 Barbarians, who are more “beasts than men” are to all the world “a Foe,” and “such abominable Crimes do they allow of in their public Decrees, that if any City upon Earth should enjoin, or had enjoined, the like, it ought to have been, by the general Voice of Mankind, lain in ruin.”75 Gentili had pressed this permissibility even further. Not only were wars undertaken for the common interest of humankind and on behalf of others more honourable, upholding fundamental standards of justice for humanity, violators who commit the kind of crimes that legitimises such wars, must be defeated through a form of violence aimed at total destruction.76 The kinds of enemies that warrant this kind of punitive measures, as we have seen, are unjust or unlawful enemies. However, in “solemn wars,” those that are fought against a lawful enemy, Grotius generally cautions moderation in situations of war against women and children:“[W]e must not attempt any Thing which may prove the Destruction of Innocents,” Grotius says, “unless for some extraordinary Reasons, and for the Safety of many.”77 Retaliation, or collective punishment, against a whole people is forbidden, and to pretend that “Enemies are but one entire Body engaged against us” is absurd,78 because disproportionate punitive actions exceeded the need to maintain the peace.Recovering the Pufendorian Perspective on Licence for War  Unlike Grotius, Pufendorf denies that, in times of war, there are any moral jus in bello rules. The end of war is peace, and peace is most effectively achieved by unconstrained vengeance. There is a rich history to consider concerning the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello – and, as David Boucher shows, we can see how this relationship fluctuates. Since 9/11, the growing emphasis had been on jus ad bellum, and less emphasis on the principles of jus in bello.79 The disastrous consequences of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and now Israel, the balance seems to have swung the other way towards jus in bello. It is Israel’s conduct of the war that has come under severe scrutiny, not its right to go to war on the basis of a just cause (self-defence).80 For Pufendorf, such jus in bello scrutiny was unnecessary, as he allowed for unrestricted use of force in wars of self-defence.  Wars for Pufendorf could never really be properly punitive. Pufendorf is famous for denying the reality of independent international law, because ultimately law needs an author and an enforcer, and for Pufendorf it is God. International Law is for him the law of nature as applied to states.81 It is the law of nature that regulates the relations among states, and states are regulated by the moral constraints of the natural law. Pufendorf is much more preoccupied by the morality of war, and not its legality. As such, pace the arguments of Sepúlveda and Grotius, there could be no justifiable grounds for reforming the practices of the American Indians.82 Because the force of inflicting “punishment” in the international context does not emanate from a (temporal) authoritative superior, states cannot have the right to punish, but they may, of course, have just cause for war. If a belligerent puts itself outside the protection of the natural law, by for instance being an aggressor –and thereby violating the fundamental law of nature it has placed itself outside of its protection. This opens up a sort of licence for unrestricted war of self-defence. It is, in essence, defence against “unjust” violence. Pufendorf is very clear on the fact that “a state of hostility of itself grants one the license to do another injury without limit.”83  The very violation of the duty of peace against another provokes the licence of any force necessary to bring the war to an end and achieve peace; without this licence, Pufendorf argues, the end of war could never be feasible. Pufendorf conceptualizes states the same way as individuals in the state of nature. To protect one’s own security, Pufendorf prescribes any means necessary that “will best prevail against such a person, who, by the injury done to me, has made it impossible for me to do him an injury, however Imay treat him, until we have come to a new agreement to refrain from injuries in thefuture.”84 According to Pufendorf, the violation of the law of nature releases the victims from the obligation to observe it in relation to the violator. Excess in war is justifiable, and without this permission to go to extremes, the war will never have an end in sight. The aim of force is not to reform the offender by punishing them, but to protect our security, property, and rights. Pufendorf does, however, caution those states who engage in gratuitous violence against the enemy. On prudential grounds restraint should be exercised. One never knows when the table might turn, and the enemy becomes dominant and acts gratuitously towards you. As such, behaving in a manner that is considered inappropriate by other civilized nations can be counterproductive as one’s own reprehensible or cruel acts may be emulated and then used against them. Other reasons to observe the customs of warfare are that they can add to the prestige and honour of a ruler and ultimately it is in the interest of countries to be cooperative and not to cause unnecessary damage to states they may find themselves in alliance with again once the conflict is over, despite the fact that, in a state of war, they have a legal right to do as they please.85 Information: Here is a part called “Israel’s Justification for War against Gazans” – To read the full Article please visit the Original Source under: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2024.2406098?scroll=top&needAccess=true  Conclusion  Andrew Fitzmaurice has convincingly demonstrated how Raphael Lemkin developed the concept of genocide out of a critique of colonialism, thus inverting the Genocide Studies and Settler Colonial Studies preoccupation with the deployment of the genocide concept to explain 500 years of colonialism. This reframing allows Fitzmaurice to ask important questions about how colonialism has impacted the concept of genocide itself.133 “It is a moot point,” Fitzmaurice remarks “whether the word ‘genocide’ can be meaningfully used to describe the horrors of colonization in centuries that preceded the context in which Lemkin coined the term.”134 To comprehend the dispossession and destruction experienced by occupied peoples in the colonies, Lemkin aligns with the tradition of anti-imperial thought, wherein the framework of universal human rights and therefore also genocide emerged in response to issues concerning the status of colonized population. In these concluding remarks, I draw kinship with Fitzmaurice’s thought in positing the notion of genocide as a product of the history of the critique of colonialism that began with Las Casas, one of Lemkin’s heroes. However, I diverge from his emphasis on genocide as a concept emerging from the anti-imperial tradition, instead viewing genocide (as a practice), as an extension of what Benton calls “projects of peace making.” Colonial wars were invariably punitive wars, and genocide is a product of the punitive war theory tradition.  Israel’s arguments for the war in Gaza rely on an indiscriminate use between both defensive and offensive moral justifications for war. Previously, just war was seen as a punishment for an injustice committed by an adversary, with a jurisdictional enlargement of the right to punish that also included violations of natural law without being limited to direct injury. Now our focus on the right to self-defence, which categorizes wars as either “defensive” or “aggressive” to justify them, shows a noticeable absence of the normative application of the right to punish in modern international law.135 However, rather than absence between the older conception of punishment and modern international law and practice, Israel’s military actions in Gaza expose its continuity. The formal disappearance of the principle of the right to punish as an articulated objective of modern international law has not, therefore, meant the disappearance of punitive wars. Instead, punitive measures are often undertaken under a different guise as modern international law continues to implement measures addressing behaviour that violates its norms. Since7 October 2023, we have seen Israel reasserting this right in justification and conduct by measures of collective punitive actions, deterrence, and punishment of the unlawful genocidal enemy other. We have seen a justification for actions that place the responsibility for the immoral act of violating the laws of wars onto the victims, that is Palestinians, of that immoral act. The genocide concept has had a central role to play for this kind of political deceit, not least because of the way that “genocide prevention” that Israel purports its war to be is unavoidably punitive. The problem of caging in punitive action in the language of justification is that it places the argument into a sacrosanct place that causes hesitation in obligatory and legal frameworks meant to prevent it. Calling something justified does not make it so even when something bares the character but not the spirit of an idea. Just war theories have nuance and contingency not simply to be flexible to permissibility, but also the opposite, to redraw what is impermissible. In practice, however, the intent to punish and deter, which is integral to JWT tradition, is hard to distinguish from the intent to destroy, as the punishing and deterring we are witnessing in Gaza, often involves causing significant destruction to many people.  Acknowledgements I am grateful to A. Dirk Moses, David Boucher, Andrew Fitzmaurice, and Matthew C. Murray for making invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Also, to Katia Yesiyeva and Salaam Farhan for their research support. Lastly, to the Fall 23 Saving Strangers FYWS students, whose critical engagement with Walzer and Luttwak in the context of Gaza war prompted me to write this article. It goes without saying that any infelicities are mine alone.  Disclosure Statement  No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).  Notes on Contributor  Camilla Boisen is a senior lecturer in the Writing Program at New York University, Abu Dhabi. She is a historian of political thought, and has published widely on the intellectual history of empire and humanitarian intervention. She is also the co-author of Justice, Merit, and the Political Theory of Academic Knowledge Production (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024). Notes 1 The organising terms “defensive” and “offensive” punitive war is loosely derived from Alexis Blane and Benedict Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 241–65. For example, “[p]urely defensive uses of force are permissible to both individuals and states alike; each has the right to forceful self-defence when not the aggressor. However, once the immediate threat abates, only the state has the right to use force for a punitive end, to revenge a wrong that it suffers. […] The right to offensive uses of force belongs solely to the state and can be employed beyond its own borders in defence both of the interests of its citizens and of its own interests as a collectivity” (249).2 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck, trans. John Morrice et al. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), ii, xx, II, viii.3 Rajan Menon, The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).4 A. Dirk Moses, The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 2. For discussion on the doctrine of double effect, see Alison McIntyre, “Doing Away with Double Effect,” Ethics 111, no. 2 (2001): 219–55.5 Natural law was a (perceived) shared framework that yielded ever-revealing truths of natural design to create rules and establish the just and right conduct of individuals and governments. Its content and prescriptions changed, but it was always presented as a set of transfixed immutable laws sanctioned by God.6 Essentially, starting a war without UN Security Council approval is illegal, so states must demonstrate either that they acted in self-defence or had the host government’s consent. In recent decades some states have opted for another permissible justification, claiming that their use of force was implicitly authorized by the Security Council, as seen with some NATO members in Kosovo and the US, UK, and Australia in Iraq or that it was done for humanitarian purposes. See also Alex Bellamy, “The Responsibilities of Victory: ‘Jus Post Bellum’ and the Just War,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 601–25; Kevin Jon Heller, “The Illegality of ‘Genuine’ Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of International Law 32, no. 2 (2021): 613–47; Jennifer M. Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Philip Cunliffe, “The Doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a Practice of Political Exceptionalism,” European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 2 (2017): 466–86.7 Mary E. O’Connell, “The Just War Tradition and International Law against War: The Myth of Discordant Doctrines,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 35, no. 2 (2015): 33–51.8 In the classical just war theory, the principles of proportionality and necessity are applied twice: first, in the criteria for deciding to go to war (jus ad bellum), and second, in the rules for how war is conducted (jus in bello). This means the theory demands that both the war as a whole and each specific action within it must be proportionate and necessary. See Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality and Necessity in Jus in Bello,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War, ed. Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 418–39.9 Jessica Whyte, “A ‘Tragic Humanitarian Crisis’: Israel’s Weaponization of Starvation and the Question of Intent,” Journal of Genocide Research (17 April 2024), https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2339637. On the “foundational myth” of the Geneva Conventions see Boyd van Dijk’s excellent work, Preparing for War: The Making of the Geneva Conventions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).10 Eiland quoted in ibid., 14.11 Collective punishment refers to any non-individual punitive measure or sanction imposed on all members of a group for actions they did not commit. Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention declares a war crime: “Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”12 Commentators have consistently challenged the legality of Israel’s excessive use of force in Gaza. See, for example, Ralph Wilde, “Israel’s War in Gaza is Not a Valid Act of Self-defence in International Law,” Opinio Juris, (9 November 2023), http://opiniojuris.org/2023/11/09/israels-war-in-gaza-is-not-a-valid-act-of-self-defence-in-international-law/. The second ruling of 24 May 2024 by the ICJ that Israel should with immediate effect cease the military offensive in Rafah points now to the danger of excessive force amounting to genocide, and therefore military action should cease. One judge, however, underlined that the court could not ban Israel from taking legitimate action in self-defence.13 “War against Hamas in Gaza is act of self-defence, Israel tells world court,” UN News, 12 January 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145452.14 The principle of collateral damage forms part of the necessary criteria that has to be met to establish wars legitimacy. According to IHL, civilians cannot be directly targeted, but they may be lawfully killed as collateral damage. Although numbers are classified, militaries used a specific value of the collateral damage estimation (CDE), which gauges the accepted number of civilian casualties for any military action. From an ethical standpoint of how much collateral can be accepted in order to obtain the purpose of a war or military humanitarian intervention is the question. Charles P. IV Trumbull, “Proportionality, Double Effects, and the Innocent Bystander Problem in War,” Stanford Journal of International Law 59, no. 1 (2023): 35–74. Regardless, the principle of collateral damage continues to be morally troubling. See also F. M. Kamm, “Terror and Collateral Damage: Are They Permissible?,” Journal of Ethics 9, nos. 3–4 (2005): 381–401.15 Israeli President Isaac Herzog remarked on 13 October that the entire people of Gaza are responsible for the 7 October attacks as part of a wider phenomenon of modern war where the targeting of civilians is increasingly prevalent. Elyse Semerdjian, “Gazification and Genocide by Attrition in Artsakh/Nagorno Karabakh and the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” Journal of Genocide Research (17 July 2024): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2377871.16 Bethan McKernan and Harry Davies, “‘The Machine Did it Coldly’: Israel used AI to Identify 37,000 Hamas Targets,” The Guardian, 4 April 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes.17 Raz Segal, for example, is vocal in labelling Israel’s war in Gaza a genocide. See Raz Segal, “A Textbook Case of Genocide,” Jewish Currents Magazine, 13 October 2023, https://jewishcurrents.org/a-textbook-case-of-genocide.18 A. Dirk Moses, “More than Genocide,” Boston Review, 14 November 2023. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/more-than-genocide/.19 See Moses, The Problems of Genocide.20 Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs, no. 78 (1999): 36–44.21 Edward N. Luttwak, “Why Israel is Winning in Gaza,” Tablet, 9 February 2024, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/israel-winning-gaza.22 Comments by American-Israeli analyst and cited in Steven Erlanger, “Netanyahu, Defiant, Appears to Have Gone Rogue, Risking a Regional War,” New York Times, 2 August 2024.23 Zoé Samudzi, “‘We are Fighting Nazis’: Genocidal Fashionings of Gaza(ns) After 7 October,” Journal of Genocide Research (18 January 2024): https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2305524.24 F. E. Peters, The Monotheists: Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Conflict and Competition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 146; James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), chaps. 1–2. I have laid out aspects of the early modern theories of punishment in JWT before. See Camilla Boisen and David Boucher, “The medieval and early modern legacy of rights: The rights to punish and to property,” in Medieval Foundations of International Law, ed. William Bain (New York: Routledge, 2017), 148–65.25 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 24–25.26 Pärtel Piirimäe, “Alberico Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War and its Impact on Seventeenth-Century Normative Views” in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 187–209, 189–93.27 See Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68; Blane and Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” 248.28 Francisco Vitoria, Political Writings, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 219.29 Vitoria, Political Writings, 288. Emphasis in original. The connection between the right of property and Vitoria’s argument concerning saving the innocent is explored in William Bain, “Saving the Innocent, Then and Now: Vitoria, Dominion, and World Order,” History of Political Thought 34 (2013): 588–613.30 A. Dirk Moses, “Empire, Resistance, and Security: International Law and the Transformative Occupation of Palestine,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development 8, no. 2 (2017): 384. See also Vitoria, Political Writings, 324.31 Blane and Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” 250.32 Moses, The Problems of Genocide.33 Ibid., 251; Alberico Gentili, Three Books on the Law of War, trans. John C. Rolfe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), i, chapter xiv, 62.34 It is worthwhile to consider the underlying metaphysical differences between Vitoria and his protestant successors. As a Thomist, Vitoria was deeply invested in the idea of human sociability, rooted in mutual affection within society, including between different peoples. Consequently, wars of retribution and reprisal conflicted with these core beliefs. In contrast, Grotius, along with other seventeenth-century natural law theorists, adhered to what Kant described as a theory of "unsociable sociability," which underpinned the social contract – a concept unnecessary for Vitoria, who, following Aristotle, believed societies naturally predate the individual. Contrarily, for someone like Grotius, the notion of unsociable sociability was based on the assumption that self-preservation is humanity's primary goal, and this was considered the first law of nature. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that these seventeenth-century natural law writers would allow for a more aggressive pursuit of self-interest than Vitoria, for instance, had endorsed. I thank Andrew Fitzmaurice for bringing this important difference to my attention.35 Blane and Kingsbury, “Punishment and the ius post bellum,” 251–2. See also fn.8 above.36 Gentili, On the Law of War, iii, chap ii, 293.37 Recently also by Per Bauhn, “Just War, Human Shields, and the 2023–24 Gaza War,” Israel Affairs (21 August 2024): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537121.2024.2394289?src = .38 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Boston: Basic Books, 2015); Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, “Israel: Civilians & Combatants,” New York Review of Books, 14 May 2009; Michael Walzer, “Israel Must Defeat Hamas, But Also Must Do More to Limit Civilian Deaths,” New Republic, 30 July 2014.39 Michael Walzer, “Justice Demands the Defeat of Hamas, Not Revenge against the Palestinians,” K. Jews, Europe, XXIst Century, 19 October 2023, https://k-larevue.com/en/michael-walzer-justice-demands-the-defeat-of-hamas-not-revenge-against-the-palestinians/.40 Walzer’s doctrine of supreme emergency has met with understandable criticism over the years. Especially Walzer’s moral exercise of it. See for example Alex J. Bellamy, “Supreme Emergencies and the Protection of Non-Combatants in War,” International Affairs 80, no. 5 (2004): 829–50; Robin May Schott, “Just War Theory and the Problem of Evil,” Hypatia 23, no. 2 (2008): 122–40.41 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 251–5.42 Ibid., 253.43 Michael Walzer, “Gaza and the Asymmetry Trap,” Quillette, 1 December 2023, https://quillette.com/2023/12/01/gaza-and-the-asymmetry-trap/.44 Michael Walzer, “What is a Just War,” Zeit Magazine, 17 April 2024, https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/leben/2024-04/michael-walzer-just-war-israel-gaza-english.45 International Criminal Court, “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,” 9 July 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf.46 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 305.47 Walzer, “What is a Just War.”48 Yuval Abrhaham, “‘A Mass Assassination Factory’: Inside Israel’s Calculated Bombing of Gaza,” 972 Magazine, 30 November 2023, https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza/; Yuval Abhraham, “‘Lavender’: The AI Machine Directing Israel’s Bombing Spree in Gaza,” 972 Magazine, 3 April 2024, https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/49 Gentili, On the Law of War, i, chap. xxv, 122–123.50 Ibid., iii, chap. xi, 330.51 Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490–1700 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 69.52 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, “The Defence of the Book, On the Just Reasons for War (Apologia pro libro de iustiis belli causis)” in Sepúlveda on the Spanish Invasion of the Americas: Defending Empire, Debating Las Casas, ed. and trans. Luke Glanville, David Lupher, and Maya Feile Tomes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 191–224, 207.53 Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indian (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 86.54 Sepúlveda, “The Defence,” 204–7.55 Ibid., 213.56 Ibid., 210.57 David Boucher, The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights and Human Rights in Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 172; Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1959), 35–42.58 Sepúlveda, “Contained Herein is a Debate or Disputation (Aquí se contiene una disputa o controversia),” Sepúlveda on the Spanish Invasion of the Americas, 225–350, 281.59 Ibid., 283.60 Bauhn, “Just War, Human Shields, and the 23–24 Gaza War,” 3.61 Sonja Schilling, Enemies of All Humankind: Fictions of Legitimate Violence (Hannover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2016), 91.62 Ibid.63 Ibid., 100.64 Ibid., 208.65 Ibid., 200.66 I have laid out some of these ideas before in “Hugo Grotius, Declaration of War, and the International Moral Order,” Grotiana 41 (2020): 282–303. It must be said that Grotius is somewhat ambivalent about punishment of violent non-state actors. He advocates for the eradication of pirates and other actors against humanity, but he is, of course, also famous for his tract defending Jacob van Heemskerck, commander of a fleet of eight vessels belonging to the United Amsterdam Company (and Grotius’ cousin), whose actions in attacking the Portuguese in 1603 were performed without authorization from the Dutch state. Grotius would go on to argue that the seizure of the Portuguese ship Santa Catarina and its cargo were good prize in a just war. See also Randall Lesaffer, “Grotius on Reprisals,” Grotiana 41 (2020): 330–48.67 Hans W. Blom and Mark Somos, “Public-Private Concord through Divided Sovereignty: Reframing Societas for International Law,” Journal of the History of International Law 22 (2020): 565–88.68 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, iii.ii.i, 1246.69 Piirimäe, “Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War,” 202.70 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ii, xx.71 Ibid., ii, i, 397.72 Ibid., ii, xx, 1021–24;1027–31;1051–52.73 Ibid.74 Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature, 215. See also Camilla Boisen, “The Law of Nations and The Common Law of Europe: the Case of Edmund Burke,” in International Law in the Long Nineteenth Century 1776—1914 – From the Public Law of Europe to Global International Law?, ed. Randall Lesaffer and Inge Van Hulle (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 20–44. The idea that wars waged for the purpose of self-preservation, including pre-emptive ones and wars undertaken by third parties against those who disrupted the sociability of the international order was commonplace among early modern thinkers. Specifically, Grotius believed this principle was why the society of nations functioned as a society rather than existing in a state of nature, as Hobbes suggested. Grotius contended that what elevated the law of nations to the status of a legal order, rather than a mere convention, was the readiness of its members to sanction those who posed a threat to others.75 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ii, xx, 1024.76 Claire Vergerio, War, States, and International Order: Alberico Gentili and the Foundational Myth of the Laws of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 116.77 Ibid., iii, xi, viii, 1439.78 Ibid., xvi, 1452–53.79 David Boucher, “The Just War Tradition and its Modern Legacy: Jus ad bellum and jus in bello,” European Journal of Political Theory 11, no. 2 (2011): 92–111.80 That being said, the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 has many implications for Israel’s claims of a right to self-defense (jus ad bellum). The occupation is per se illegal, and not simply the way it is conducted (jus in bello). Israel cannot claim self-defense when it is committing an ongoing act of aggression through the illegal occupation; moreover, Palestinians have, under international law, a right to resist alien occupation, colonial domination, and racist regimes. See: UNGA resolution 3314 (1974), UNGA resolution 37/43 (1982), and Article 1(4) of API to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. I am grateful to Jinan Bastaki for pointing this out.81 Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Eight Books (1672), trans. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), i.ii.6; ii, iii, 23.82 Ibid., viii, iii, 4–7.83 Ibid., viii, vii, 2.84 Ibid., vi, 7.85 Francesca Iurlaro, The Invention of Custom Natural Law and the Law of Nations, ca. 1550–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 142. It is important not to downplay the significance of natural law by over-focusing on interest and self-preservation as states’ main motivation for agreeing to follow customs. In opposition to Iurlaro, Peter Schröder rightly points to the error in giving too much consideration to interest as a basis for Pufendorf ’s international political thought. Pufendorf thinks that states’ behaviour can be regulated by natural law, the primary concept of which is socialitas. See Peter Schröder, “Sovereignty and Interstate Relations,” in Pufendorf's International Political and Legal Thought, ed. Peter Schröder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 155–74. In same volume, see also Boisen, “Pufendorf ’s Enduring Legacy for International Law,” 251–69.133 Andrew Fitzmaurice, “Anticolonialism in Western Political Thought: The Colonial Origins of the Concept of Genocide,” in Moses, Empire, Colony, Genocide, 55–80.134 Ibid., 74.135 Piirimäe, “Alberico Gentili’s Doctrine of Defensive War,” 189. The modern focus on self-defence, and its implications, is explored in detail in James Turner Johnson, “Then and Now: The Medieval Conception of Just War Versus Recent Portrayals of the Just War Idea,” in Medieval Foundations of International Relations, 117–31.

Diplomacy
NATO symbol on the background of the American flag. Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The future of NATO after the US elections

by Evelyn Gaiser, Konrad Adenauer Foundation , Max Willem Fricke, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском More European responsibility for a sustainable transatlantic relationship ' US geopolitical priorities will continue to shift to the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. ' Regardless of the outcome of the US elections, it can be assumed that US defense resources will be withdrawn from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. ' Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, espionage, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. Militarily, Russia is threatening the European NATO partners. Europe must function as a credible deterrent against this threat. ' In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. ' The US is still the backbone of NATO's defense capabilities in areas such as reconnaissance and deterrence. European countries must contribute significantly more to their defense capability to complement US support and take over parts of it in the medium term. ' By collaborating with partners in the Indo-Pacific, Germany and other European NATO members promote interoperability and competence and signal to the US a willingness to contribute to security beyond the defense of the European Alliance area. ' Whoever rules from the White House after January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and engagement in NATO is scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. Introduction The US election campaign is being followed with great interest by security experts and transatlanticists in Europe. This is because the outcome of the election on November 5 will have a major impact on the future of NATO - and thus the most successful defense alliance of all time. This Monitor analyzes what an election victory by Donald Trump on the one hand and an election victory by Kamala Harris on the other could mean for the transatlantic alliance and how the European NATO partners must position themselves to keep transatlantic relations on a sustainable footing. The geopolitical priorities of the USA will continue to shift towards the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years, despite the warlike events in Europe. For decision-makers in Germany and other European NATO states, this means that there is an urgent need to consistently develop their defense policy and take responsibility for security policy. This is the only way to ensure peace and freedom in the European NATO states in the future. A decisive strengthening of European defense capabilities should be the key to shaping a sustainable and future-proof transatlantic partnership. Concerns about a second term for Donald Trump: Trumpproofing NATO There is concern in many European capitals that a second term in office for Donald Trump could have a decisive impact on the stability of transatlantic relations and NATO.1 The buzzword “Trumpproofing NATO” is therefore being used on both sides of the Atlantic to prepare for a possible second Trump administration. There are plenty of reasons for this. Trump has openly threatened to reduce the US troop presence in Europe, restrict intelligence sharing with NATO allies, cut a deal with Russia over Ukraine's head and revoke NATO's Article 5 security guarantee for those who do not contribute sufficiently.2 Take him seriously, not literally!  Trump's unpredictability is part of his political strategy. And so, Europe should prepare for various scenarios. The recommendation made by Republican MPs to their transatlantic partners at the recent NATO summit in Washington appears to be quite groundbreaking: Trump is not to be taken literally, but he should certainly be taken seriously.3 European decision-makers should also look at existing security policy ideas from Trump's environment, as he could - without a security policy strategy of his own - use these as a guide. “Dormant-NATO” - possible withdrawal of large parts of US troops  The concepts of conservative security policy pioneers such as Elbridge Colby4, Sumantra Maitra5 and Dan Caldwell6 are well-known. Colby was the architect of the national security strategy under Trump in 2018 and is considered a candidate for a top security policy post in a possible Trump II administration.7 Caldwell is Vice President and Maitra is a Senior Fellow at the influential Trump-affiliated think tank “Center for Renewing America”. The aforementioned experts advocate an increase in defense spending by European NATO members far above the 2014 target of two percent of gross domestic product.8 Furthermore, they call not only for increased burden-sharing, but also for burden-shifting within NATO.9 So far, Western Europe has acted as a free rider and exploited the US involvement in NATO (“freeriding”) - an insight that has long been shared by Republicans and Democrats, albeit in different tones.10 However, the Republicans go further: in view of rising debts, problems with recruiting soldiers and a defense industry that cannot keep up with the challenge posed by Russia and China, the US can no longer avoid a realignment of NATO.11 Maitra's “Dormant NATO” concept suggests that the USA should only be active in Europe with a limited naval and air force presence in future and would only operate in acute threat situations and in extreme emergencies with nuclear deterrence.12 The majority of the infantry, armored forces, logistics and artillery previously provided by the USA should therefore be provided by the Europeans.13 According to Maitra, the costly US leadership role in NATO is no longer in the interests of the United States, as Russia no longer poses an immediate threat to the US.14 Europe is therefore called upon to take over the conventional defense of its own continent, which is also justified by the fact that the US must focus its security policy resources on the Indo-Pacific and the protection of Taiwan. About Ukraine, Trump is considering a deal with Russia if he wins the election. The content of such a deal could be the end of NATO's eastward expansion and the rejection of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Trump could also negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Moscow's Ukrainian territorial claims - over the heads of Ukraine.15 JD Vance - Isolationist approaches of a vice-presidential candidate Donald Trump's vice-presidential candidate JD Vance also criticizes NATO and calls for US resources to be prioritized in Asia, particularly to deter a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, his position on Ukraine stands out in particular: he is completely opposed to US military aid for Ukraine.16 Vance believes that Ukraine cannot win the war against Russia in purely numerical terms and is in favor of negotiations with Russia.17 Another accent of the vice presidential candidate is his clear criticism of the rules-based world order. With him as Vice President, a break with the traditional foreign policy of the United States could become more likely.18 However, Vance has also shown himself to be very changeable in terms of his opinions and convictions, which is why he - like Trump - is difficult to assess overall. Despite the ambiguities and versatility that Trump and his foreign and security policy makers stand for, they are united by a tendency towards isolationism and criticism of NATO. Although a withdrawal from NATO is unlikely, Trump could drastically reduce the US role in the European security architecture. A Trump II scenario could pose further dangers for Ukraine in particular. Continuity under Kamala Harris? While the transatlantic agenda of a Democratic presidential candidate Biden was considered predictable, the nomination of Kamala Harris has brought a new dynamic to the debate about the future of transatlantic relations in case of a Democratic victory. Against this backdrop, it makes sense to look at the defense policy approaches that a Kamala Harris presidency could entail. Would Kamala Harris mean continuity in transatlantic relations? Would Harris be a transatlanticist? Kamala Harris gained important insights into foreign and security policy not only as Vice President, where she was present in the Oval Office or Situation Room for all important foreign policy decisions,19 but also as a Senator on the Home-land Security and Intelligence Committees. This applies to the investigation into Russian influence on the 2016 US elections in the Intelligence Committee, which is also likely to have shaped her view of Vladimir Putin.20 Kamala Harris is regarded as an advocate of transatlantic cooperation. As Vice President, Harris took part in Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland in the summer, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky six times and attended the Munich Security Conference three times. There she reaffirmed the USA's unwavering commitment to NATO and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.21,22 Her previous statements during the election campaign - particularly at the Democratic Party conference - also indicate that her foreign policy approach will continue to be in line with Joe Biden's NATO policy. Harris emphasized the importance of alliances, her commitment to NATO and her support for Ukraine against the Russian occupation. In the TV duel against Donald Trump, she described NATO as “the greatest military alliance the world has ever known ”23 and announced that she would continue to support Ukraine if she won the election. However, she left open whether she would supply Ukraine with added weapons or authorize the use of American weapons against targets on Russian soil.24 Her current security advisor, Phil Gordon, a proven expert and friend of Europe, is also being touted as a candidate for a high-ranking position in a possible Harris administration.25 There are therefore initial indications that the transatlantic alliance would continue to play an important role in foreign and security policy under Kamala Harris. Tim Walz: Foreign policy profile Harris' candidate for Vice President, Tim Walz, does not yet have a clear foreign policy profile. However, as a long-standing and high-ranking representative of the National Guard, he has ability in military matters. In the past, he has spoken out against military operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.26 He also joined Republican politicians in 2016 who spoke out against cuts to the military, as it needs to be well funded in order to meet the challenges in the world.27 The China expert spoke out against Trump's trade arms race with China, but also denounced human rights violations. Walz clearly condemned the Russian war of aggression, signed a law as governor of Minnesota that ended the state's investments in Russia28 and expressed his support for Ukraine29. However, many of his foreign policy positions are unlikely to be completed and will depend on which advisors he chooses to surround himself with. Generational change in the White House Despite Kamala Harris' fundamental support for NATO, her inauguration would mark a generational change in the White House. While President Joe Biden, who was born three years before the end of the Second World War, was significantly socialized politically by the Cold War, Harris began her political career a good twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and does not share the same historical ties to Europe. At the same time, Harris must respond to changing domestic and geopolitical realities. The United States is still the global superpower with a claim to military leadership. However, NATO has recently lost support in public opinion in the USA and the willingness to fund European defense is dwindling.30 Support for Ukraine is also viewed increasingly critically.31 There is also a consensus in broad circles of the Democratic Party that Europe must take more responsibility for its own defense. The economic policy agenda now announced by Harris in the election campaign would be enormously costly.32 This makes a significant increase in defense spending unlikely. The public, politicians and experts33 now perceive China as by far the greatest threat to the security and prosperity of the United States, and Harris is also concerned about China's quest for global political power. Harris has already announced at the party congress that she will ensure that America wins the competition for the 21st century against China.34 In view of increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the transfer of additional military resources, particularly air force and navy, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region will be unavoidable in the medium term. About NATO, the difference between a Harris and a Trump-led administration is likely to lie in the scope and speed of the withdrawal of US defense resources from Europe. While a withdrawal under Trump could be implemented quickly, an election victory for Harris is more likely to mean a gradual withdrawal and would give the Europeans time to position themselves better in terms of defense policy.35 NATO is still the most important instrument for European defense cooperation. Against the backdrop of the volatile security environment and the shift in priorities in the USA, Europeans must take on more responsibility for the defense of their own continent. This is the only way to ensure that NATO is still a successful defense alliance in the future. However, this debate should not be about Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, but about improving military capabilities to deter and defend against attacks on alliance territory. In view of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and possible further Russian expansionist ambitions, it is in Europe's own interest to be prepared for a possible partial withdrawal of US troops. This can only take place in close coordination with the USA and within NATO structures. Europe's security still depends on the USA. Because even if the European pillar of NATO is placed on a more stable footing, European security can only be guaranteed with American support for the near future. The USA is indispensable in NATO. The partners lean on its capabilities and are guided by developments. The US defense budget accounts for around two thirds of defense spending within NATO. There are currently around 85,000 soldiers stationed in Europe.36 This means that US defense spending is almost ten times higher than that of Germany, which has the second highest defense budget in NATO. A substantial proportion of US defense spending currently goes towards protecting European NATO members.37 At the same time, nine NATO countries, including Canada, Spain, and Italy, still spend less than two percent of their GDP on defense. Most of the so-called "strategic enablers", such as reconnaissance, aerial refueling and satellite communications, are currently provided by the USA, whose forces, in contrast to most European armies, are quickly deployable, combat-ready and equipped with sufficient stocks of ammunition.38 Despite all the debates that are taking place in this regard, the nuclear umbrella is likely to remain Europe's life insurance in the future. "New" threat situation requires a rethink. Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference39 in 2007 was followed by action: Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, its illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of the protracted conflict in the Donbass in 2014, its withdrawal from the arms control and security architecture and finally its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.40 The assumption is that, in the event of military success in Ukraine, Putin will declare further territorial claims and take military action. Security experts warn that Russia could press ahead with its imperial expansionism in just a few years and be capable of waging war against a NATO country.41 Russia is already waging a hybrid war against NATO members in the form of sabotage, cyber-attacks and disinformation.42 However, Russia is not the only threat to European security. From the Sahel to the Middle East, there are numerous complex challenges: Terrorism, ongoing conflicts and fueled instability on the southern flank have a negative impact on Europe. The resulting migration movements also have destabilizing effects. Military exercises with Chinese participation in Belarus and cyber-attacks on European NATO partners are also signs of China's growing claim to power in Europe. The ever-closer cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a challenge for NATO. Decisive strengthening of the European security architecture for a sustainable transatlantic relationship For NATO to support a sustainable foundation, the European and German security architecture must be better secured and coordinated in the future. In the long term, defense spending in Europe should be increased beyond the envisaged two percent of gross domestic product and permanently integrated into national budgets. Resilience means creating resilience, deterrence, and defense capability. In the case of Germany, the threat situation and the resulting security policy requirements do not yet appear to be sufficiently anchored in political awareness. A consistent rethink is needed here. More efficient organization of defence structures and military procurement is needed. At present, the Bundeswehr is only partially capable of defending the country and the alliance, also in view of the gaps that have arisen due to the transfer of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. A study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy found that at the current rate of procurement, Germany would need up to almost 100 years to reach the military stocks of 20 years ago.43 Although the turnaround in Germany has been proclaimed, it has not been sufficiently driven forward politically and has not been set up sustainably in terms of financial policy - beyond the special fund. A consistent implementation of the turnaround for a defensible Germany would inevitably require painful savings elsewhere. This must be considered in the domestic political discourse to prepare the public for future necessities. This also includes the debate on compulsory military service and the creation of a new security culture in society. This will only be possible if the threat situation and, conversely, the need for a turnaround are communicated in all their urgency and consistency. In the German arms industry, ability building and close cooperation and coordination with European partners are of crucial importance.44 Promises made to NATO partners must be backed up financially, in terms of personnel, structure and material. While Russia has switched to a war economy, Europe is finding it difficult to significantly increase production. This also requires a stabilization of defence spending. To build up sustainable abilities, the industry needs planning security. And the budget, which provides for hardly any growth in defense spending, does not offer this.45 It is precisely this planning security that would enable the defense industry to create new jobs in the long term and thus take on employees who currently have less of a future in the weakening automotive industry, for example. The (not yet officially published) draft for the new National Security and Defense Industry Strategy, which aims, among other things, to ease access to loans and capital market-based financing for the security and defense industry (SVI), sends a positive signal. The draft states that the “SVI activities are fundamentally compatible with ESG criteria” (Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance) from the perspective of the federal government.46 Strengthening joint commitment in the Indo-Pacific It is not only the USA that has recognized the danger of China's desired supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. European NATO members also see increasing challenges in Asia and have an interest in supporting a rules-based order and free sea and trade routes in the Indo-Pacific, which is of crucial importance not least for an export nation like Germany. European NATO states, including Germany, are becoming increasingly involved in the Indo-Pacific region.47 At the anniversary summit in Washington in July, NATO toughened its tone towards China and clearly stated the danger posed by the ever closer cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.48 At the same time, cooperation with the so-called Asia-Pacific 4, the NATO partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, is becoming closer. This cooperation must be further strengthened, for which the partner countries Australia49 and Japan50 or the multinational maneuver RIMPAC51 are particularly suitable. By cooperating with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and participating in multinational exercises and freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs), Germany and other European NATO members not only defend their interests and promote interoperability and competence, but also signal to their partner, the USA, their willingness to get involved beyond the defense of the European alliance territory and make a contribution to transatlantic security.52 NATO is not a one-way street: clearly communicating added value for the USA. Without the leadership of the United States, NATO will not be able to continue its success story. For this reason, it is crucial to convince the American side and to highlight the strategic interest of the US in preserving this treaty-based peace order and stability in Europe.53 In doing so, the European NATO partners should not only effectively communicate their defense policy progress, but also increasingly provide up-to-date data and figures on the benefits of NATO engagement for the US. The evidence shows that US security engagement has significant positive effects on US trade. According to calculations, trade losses that could result from a US withdrawal from international security commitments in the medium and long term would exceed the potential savings in defense resources.54 European partner states are also making significant purchases of military equipment in the US, as illustrated by the example of the F35 fighter aircraft, for which numerous European states have concluded purchase agreements.55 Since the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, European demand for US military equipment has risen sharply and in 2023 the US Department of Defense recorded record sales of military equipment and hardware, particularly to European partners and allies.56 NATO's deterrent effect has been instrumental in preventing armed conflict in member countries since its start. The stability that the alliance guarantees therefore also relieves the strain on American resources. Whoever takes office in the White House on January 20, 2025, must consider the signal the US will send to China if support for Ukraine and involvement in NATO are scaled back. If Russia's war of aggression is successful, China will take note and draw its own conclusions. A vacuum in Europe would not only be used by Russia, but also by China to expand its presence and influence on the continent. A US withdrawal from NATO in favor of a stronger focus on its strategic rival China could therefore ultimately play right into the latter's hands. References 1 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 2 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/07/11/trump-nato-republicans-con-gress/ (last request 15.08.2024) 4 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/31/elbridge-colby-trump-foreign-policy-military-china/ (last request 16.08.2024) 5 https://americarenewing.com/team/sumantra-maitra/ (last request 20.08.2024) 6 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/foreign-policy-republican-american-power (last request 02.09.2024) 7 https://www.politico.eu/article/former-president-donald-trump-ally-europe-joe-biden-us-elec-tions-pentagon/ (last request 16.08.2024) 8 https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-ally-warns-eastern-europe-to-rapidly-increase-defense-budgets/ (last request 21.08.2024) 9 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 29.08.2024) 10 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 11 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 15.08.2024) 12 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 13 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 14 https://americarenewing.com/policy-brief-pivoting-the-us-away-from-europe-to-a-dormant-nato/ (last request 15.08.2024) 15 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 02.09.2024) 16 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/j-d-vance-trump-foreign-policy-china-ukraine-vice-presi-dent-pick/ (last request 15.08.2024) 17 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 18 https://www.cfr.org/blog/meet-jd-vance-republican-vice-presidential-candidate (last request 29.08.2024) 19 https://english.elpais.com/usa/elections/2024-09-02/kamala-harriss-foreign-policy-continuity-in-substance-a-new-style-in-form-and-the-hot-potato-of-gaza.html# (last request 02.09.2024) 20 Vgl. https://www.npr.org/2024/07/24/nx-s1-5049698/a-perspective-on-kamala-harris-poten-tial-foreign-policy-priorities (last request 08.08.2024)21 Vgl. https://de.usembassy.gov/de/rede-von-us-vizepraesidentin-kamala-harris-auf-der-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-2023/ (last request 08.08.2024) 22 Der Artikel 5 zum Bündnisfall der NATO sieht vor, dass im Falle eines bewaffneten Angriffs gegen ein Mitgliedsland, die anderen Mitgliedsstaaten dem angegriffenen Land Beistand leisten. Vgl. Nordatlantikvertrag: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selec-tedLocale=de (last request 08.08.2024) 23 https://www.youtube.com/live/SGRydccYp0c?si=L4RBnZ0pBsF_JGmm (last request 12.09.2024) 24 https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4874527-the-debate-failed-on-foreign-policy/ (last request 12.09.2024) 25 Vgl. https://www.politico.eu/article/philip-gordon-us-politics-kamala-harris-us-elections-eu-rope-joe-biden-emmanuel-macron/ (last request 08.08.2024) 26 https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/07/harris-walz-us-election-progressive-foreign-policy-war-israel-gaza-ukraine/ (last request 09.08.2024) 27 https://fpc.org.uk/us-presidential-election-what-would-a-harris-walz-foreign-policy-look-like/ (last request 02.09.2024) 28 https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/gov-walz-signs-bill-ending-state-investments-in-russia/ (last request 02.09.2024) 29 https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/tim-walz-vp-harris-veterans-00172782 (letzter Ab-ruf 14.08.2024) 30 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/08/americans-opinions-of-nato/ (last request 12.09.2024) 31 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67649497 (last request 09.08.2024) 32 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/08/16/kamala-harris-2024-policy-child-tax-credit/ (last request 19.08.2024) 33 https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5038077/pacing-challenge (last request 30.08.2024) 34 https://www.ft.com/content/5d50d474-dc4d-4504-8002-7a81874153a8 (last request 03.09.2024) 35 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/natos-missing-pillar (last request 21.08.2024) 36 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 (last request 09.08.2024) 37 https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517 (last request 03.09.2024) 38 https://ip-quarterly.com/en/nato-thrive-europe-needs-wake (last request 30.08.2024) 39 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (last request 04.09.2024) 40 https://ecfr.eu/publication/defending-europe-with-less-america/?amp (last request 03.09.2024)41 https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wir-mussen-raketenabwehr-aufbauen-bundeswehr-sieht-russland-in-funf-bis-acht-jahren-zu-krieg-gegen-nato-fahig-11406908.html (last request 15.08.2024) 42 https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-trump-proofing-natos-real-adversaries (last request 15.08.2024) 43 https://www.ifw-kiel.de/de/publikationen/aktuelles/kriegstuechtig-in-jahrzehnten-deutsch-land-ruestet-viel-zu-langsam-gegen-russische-bedrohung-auf/ (last request 18.09.2024) 44 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/tun-wir-genug (last request 15.08.2024) 45 https://www.dbwv.de/aktuelle-themen/verband-aktuell/beitrag/wuestner-sich-die-augen-zu-halten-reicht-nicht (last request 15.08.2024) 46 https://table.media/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/12162241/Entwurf_Strategie-Staerkung-SVI.pdf (last request 12.09.2024) 47 https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/german-air-force/pacific-skies-24- (last request 05.09.2024) 48 Vgl. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nato-jubil%C3%A4umsgipfel-2024-mehr-verantwortung-zemle/ (last request 08.08.2024) 49 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/fernbeziehung (last request 04.09.2024) 50 https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/die-zusammenar-beit-zwischen-japan-und-der-nato (last request 04.09.2024) 51 https://www.cpf.navy.mil/RIMPAC/ (last request 05.09.2024) 52 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/memo-to/nato-leaders-indo-pacific/ (last request 05.09.2024) 53 https://youtu.be/2_djNsTnJcI (last request 14.08.2024) 54 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR518.html (last request 04.09.2024) 55 https://euro-sd.com/2024/07/articles/39541/f-35-in-europe-a-takeover/ (last request 04.09.2024) 56 https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3736017/dod-has-seen-huge-in-crease-in-military-sales-since-ukraine-invasion/ (last request 04.09.2024)

Diplomacy
Caracas/Venezuela. 11/22/18: The president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, participates in an event at the Government Palace in Caracas.

What Explains Support for Populism in Latin America?

by Dinorah Azpuru, Wichita State University

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In the 21st century, populism has resurfaced in Latin America, but it has also emerged as a political force in other developing countries, as well as in Eastern European countries and several advanced industrial democracies. The support for populism in Latin America offers a lens through which to understand this phenomenon globally. In countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, citizens voted for populist presidents multiple times between 1998 and 2019, also expressing their support through moderately high approval ratings. Over time, however, some of these leaders transitioned from populism to authoritarianism, as seen in Venezuela and Nicaragua around 2018. This shift marks a critical point in understanding how populism can evolve into more repressive forms of governance. The most recent wave of Latin American populism began with Hugo Chávez’s election in Venezuela in 1998, followed by Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. These leaders, despite their populist appeal, took an authoritarian drift, accumulating power, limiting political opposition, and undermining checks and balances. They co-opted state institutions and placed constraints on independent media, distorting the democratic process. It is crucial to distinguish between the social-democratic left, seen in countries like Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile in the early 2000s, and the populist left in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua during the same period. A new wave of populism emerged in Mexico and Brazil in 2018, and El Salvador in 2019, with leaders like Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) in Mexico and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. While these leaders still enjoy high levels of support, they have also resorted to undemocratic tactics to bolster their executive power. Support for populist leaders in Latin America is not monolithic. It can be linked to various factors, including ideology, policy preferences, and perceptions of presidential performance. Populist supporters can be categorized into two distinct groups: “convenience followers” and “hardcore supporters.” Convenience followers are willing to support populist leaders temporarily, based on perceived performance, while hardcore supporters remain loyal despite undemocratic actions. In examining the dimensions of support for populism, it becomes clear that demographic variables, while relevant, are not as significant as other factors. For example, in many countries, women and more educated citizens tend to be less supportive of populist leaders. Ethnic identity also plays a role, particularly in countries like Bolivia. However, these factors alone do not fully explain the appeal of populist leaders. Ideology and policy preferences are crucial in understanding the support for populism. Those who identify with the political left were more likely to support leftist populist presidents in countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, while those on the right were more inclined to support right-wing populists like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. This alignment suggests that populist leaders can effectively mobilize support by appealing to the ideological preferences of their base. The perceived performance of populist leaders also plays a significant role in their support. Populist leaders who can create the perception of a thriving economy, reduced corruption, and improved security are more likely to maintain high levels of support. This is true even when the reality may not match these perceptions, as populist leaders are often skilled at shaping public opinion to their advantage, especially when they attack critical media. Another important aspect of populist support is the relationship between citizens’ attitudes toward democracy and their support for populism. Paradoxically, populist supporters often express satisfaction with democracy while simultaneously endorsing authoritarian practices, such as unchecked presidential power and the suppression of opposition. This contradiction highlights the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of populist support. The distinction between convenience followers and hardcore supporters further illustrates the diversity of populist support. Convenience followers are pragmatic, supporting populist leaders as long as they perceive them to be effective. Hardcore supporters, on the other hand, are more ideologically committed and willing to overlook or even endorse undemocratic actions by their leaders. Both groups contribute to the persistence of populism, but hardcore supporters pose a greater risk to democratic institutions by legitimising authoritarian behaviour. In conclusion, the resurgence of populism in Latin America and beyond is a multifaceted phenomenon driven by a combination of demographic, ideological, and performance-related factors. While populist leaders may initially rise to power by tapping into legitimate grievances and desires for change, their tendency to undermine democratic norms and institutions poses a significant threat to the stability and health of democracies worldwide. Understanding the dynamics of populist support is crucial for those who seek to defend and strengthen democratic governance in the face of rising populist movements. These insights are taken from the author’s recent book: Explaining Support for Populism in Contemporary Latin America (Routledge 2024).

Diplomacy
Russia, China and USA political confrontation concept.

USA, China, Russia: Multiplying Deterrence

by Ivan Timofeev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Minimising the number of one’s enemies while multiplying one’s number of friends is a basic principle of diplomacy that has existed for centuries. The simplicity of the principle itself is more than compensated by the complexity of its practical implementation. In international relations, the price of friendship may be too high, limiting freedom of manoeuvre, while open hostility brings existing contradictions to the limit, radically resolving them in favour of one side or another. Advising a diplomat to expand alliances and limit confrontations is like advising a stock market player to buy shares when they are cheap and sell when they are expensive. It is obvious that minimising the number of rivals allows you to save resources, concentrate them on the tasks of internal development, and not be torn on several fronts. However, it is also obvious that competition may be preferable to concessions to the demands of the opposite side, especially when it comes to issues of principle. The situation is further complicated by the fact that countries can compete in some areas while remaining partners in others. Then adjusting the balance of cooperation and competition becomes even more difficult. The transition of international relations to extreme forms of rivalry is quite possible; history is full of such episodes. In such situations, the key task becomes not so much preserving the remnants of friendship as a preparation for the upcoming war, which the parties may consider inevitable, waging war by proxies, and entering into confrontation at a convenient moment. The bottom line is that the one who finds the optimal balance of allies and rivals will be able to conserve resources, and if confrontation is inevitable, will be able to withstand it, emerge victorious, and make use of the results of victory. The current state of international relations demonstrates a steady tendency towards the multiplication of deterrence tasks among the three key global centres of military power—the United States, China and Russia. Each of them has an increasing number of opponents. Moreover, the increase in their number, as well as the degree of confrontation, has its roots in the relatively favourable situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington, Beijing, and Moscow enjoyed much more favourable external conditions: the number of rivals was negligible, while the density of partnerships was unprecedented. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the United States had virtually no rivals among the major powers. Relations with Russia were defined by a network of arms control treaties. It was difficult to call them cloudless, but even a semblance of confrontation from the Cold War era was very difficult to imagine. The key security problem for the United States was radical Islamism in its terrorist guise; Russia actively helped the United States in its fight against international terrorism, and China simply did not interfere. North Korea and Iran formed an “axis of evil” whose nuclear ambitions Washington tried to restrain with sanctions. Moscow and Beijing, if they did not help the Americans, then at least tried to find the optimal formula for solving nuclear problems via the UN Security Council. Some twenty years later, the situation for the United States has changed quite radically. China is perceived as a powerful and long-term rival in all senses. We are talking about a military-political, economic, and even ideological rivalry. It is difficult to compare China with the USSR during the Cold War. But in all three of these dimensions, it represents an alternative to American politics. Although the United States would like to keep the rivalry with China under control, especially given the close ties between the two economies, the task of containing China will become a priority for decades to come. Russia has turned from a weakened and extremely cautious partner into a tough and uncompromising adversary, as its interests in the post-Soviet space are being infringed upon, and its economy and military-industrial complex are being restored. Enmity with it requires a manifold increase in investments in support of Ukraine, an increased presence in Europe, and the modernisation of nuclear potential, taking into account the advance appearance of new missile systems in Moscow. The arms control regime has been torn to shreds. Washington is trying to control the escalation but could find itself at war with Russia, with the unlikely but growing risk of a nuclear exchange. The DPRK has both nuclear weapons and missiles capable of launching them. It would now be more difficult to crush North Korea.  US enmity towards Russia and its rivalry with China has provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to emerge from isolation. The same goes for Iran. The aggravation of US relations with Russia and China plays into Tehran’s hands in overcoming isolation and the blockade. The “axis of evil” that the United States so actively fought against has only strengthened, and in interaction with Russia and partly China, it will continue to strengthen. Russia and China themselves are also getting closer. A military alliance is a long way off. Moscow and Beijing are not striving for it. But their interaction is now closer, and the United States will no longer be able to use Russia to balance China. Chinese diplomacy has been building an extremely cautious foreign policy since the late 1970s. Beijing has most consistently adhered to the principle of minimizing adversaries and maximizing friends. In many ways, China has achieved its goal, having managed to create favourable foreign policy conditions for enormous economic growth, increasing the well-being of citizens and modernising the army. The problem is that such PRC growth, even taking into account the lack of expressed ambitions, has caused growing concern in the United States. As a result, Beijing was faced with the fact that Washington decided to act proactively, containing China while the possibilities for such containment remained in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Perhaps the PRC leadership would prefer to continue to enjoy the benefits of global peace and live amid conditions of minimal competition. But the results of successful modernisation are now becoming an issue that the United States considers a security challenge. This means China will have to live in response to the American policy of containment, which includes the building of anti-Chinese alliances. Here, American diplomacy will try to place its bets, including in India. However, India is too large and powerful a country to play a passive role. China, in turn, is building a special relationship with the United States' European NATO allies. Here Beijing could take into account the Russian experience of “special” relations with the European Union. Finally, Russia at the turn of the century had practically no serious rivals. The country was seriously weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union and controversial reforms. Political relations with the West have gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, but still haven’t reached a critical level, having been compensated with a high level of economic cooperation. In Asia, relations with US allies Japan and South Korea were also especially cordial without the burdens that remained in matters of European security. Today, almost the entire collective West is fighting against a strengthened Russia in Ukraine, supplying Kiev with weapons and ammunition, and providing Ukraine with finances, intelligence, military specialists, etc. Economic relations have been undermined for a long time by sanctions. Tokyo and especially Seoul have taken a more cautious position, but are still forced to follow the American line. The bottom line is that all three powers, for various reasons, have found themselves in a situation where the tasks of containment, expanding confrontation, and the need to resolve security issues involve using force or the threat of its use. Past economic ties have not held back political contradictions. Apparently, we are only at the beginning of an exacerbation. After all, the real fight between the two key rivals—the USA and China—is yet to come. One can argue for a long time about what is the root cause of the increase in deterrence—mistakes of diplomats or objective factors giving rise to rivalry. The result is what’s important. The three largest military-political centres simultaneously faced deteriorating foreign policy conditions, whereas twenty years ago all three were in a much more peaceful environment. The fate of the future world order still depends on the ability of the ‘troika’ to control rivalry and on the results of such rivalry. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club. Original published in Russian. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ssha-kitay-rossiya-umnozhenie-sderzhivaniya/

Diplomacy
The tenth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting

Who speaks for the Pacific?

by Kerryn Baker , Theresa Meki

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Pacific Islands Forum came to an end, the underlying questions remain: who has a voice and legitimacy to influence the region, and who doesn’t  The Pacific Islands – a grouping largely made up of small island developing states – is in the middle of an increasingly contested strategic space, making regional politics an important, and closely observed, site. At the end of August, Pacific Islands Forum heads of government met in Tonga for the organisation’s annual leaders’ meeting. Along with the Pacific heads of government, other dignitaries were also present, including United Nations Secretary General António Guterres. This is the apex event on the regional calendar, and it came with a crowded agenda, including issues like climate change, transnational crime and health security. But one of the pressing issues facing the Forum is an existential one, as membership debates and geopolitical tussles highlight: the question of who and what the Forum represents. In recent years, divisions within the region have become apparent, including the perceived marginalisation of North Pacific countries in what was initially called the South Pacific Forum. These tensions culminated in the decision by five Micronesian states to leave the Forum in 2021, although this was later reversed. Yet, the final Forum communiqué demonstrates that Pacific leaders are on the same page on many issues, covering agreed outcomes relating to health, education, fisheries and other key issues. Climate change was highlighted as ‘a matter of priority to the Pacific region’ and as an intersecting and broad-ranging issue affecting Pacific states. A new Pacific Policing Initiative – a proposal to create a multinational Pacific police force and invest in subregional policing hubs – was endorsed, although in a nod to some debate surrounding its implementation, leaders emphasised the need for further consultation. Emerging geopolitical frictions  A controversy over the final version of the communiqué, however, highlights enduring divisions in the Forum. In the communiqué initially published online on Friday afternoon, paragraph 66 read that ‘Leaders reaffirmed the 1992 Leaders decision on relations with Taiwan/Republic of China.’ This refers to Taiwan’s established status as a ‘development partner’ of the Forum. After public statements from China’s special envoy for the Pacific Qian Bo criticising this language, the communiqué was taken offline and revised, with the paragraph referencing Taiwan removed. Forum officials blamed the confusion on an administrative error. Three of the 18 full members of the Forum recognise Taiwan: Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu. While the Pacific was once a key focus of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy, its influence has waned in the region in recent years with moves from Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Nauru to shift recognition to Beijing, prompted by a diplomatic offensive by the People’s Republic of China. In an increasingly contested geopolitical context, Taiwan’s status in regards to the Forum is likely to remain a difficult topic for member countries. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not UN member states. In light of rising strategic competition, issues of membership of the Forum also raise existential questions for its future. In 2016, the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full Forum members. But their political status does pose interesting questions for the Forum, especially considering the recent riots and ongoing tensions in New Caledonia. In the Forum communiqué, leaders reaffirmed a decision to send a mission to New Caledonia, a move that has been fraught; prior to the meeting, the French Ambassador to the Pacific had asserted that ‘New Caledonia is French territory and it is the [French] State which decides on who enters’. The communiqué also endorsed the applications for associate member status for Guam and American Samoa, two US territories with clear ambitions to accede to full membership status in the future as New Caledonia and French Polynesia have. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not United Nations member states and also do not issue their own passports. Yet, the 2016 decision represented a substantive shift in the principles of Forum membership, one likely to bolster the claims to full membership of other territories. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Forum is becoming more representative in encompassing more Pacific polities and acknowledging the remarkable diversity in political status that exists in the region. On the other, an expanding membership raises questions of the influence of metropolitan powers like France and the US in the Forum. This is an already fraught conversation given the perceived outsized influence of founding member states Australia and New Zealand. Pacific leaders have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. France and the US, along with Australia and New Zealand, all have colonial histories – and, for many, an enduring colonial presence – in the region. Given this context, their present and prospective roles in the Forum have been critiqued as preventing the institution from being a truly Pacific space. Pacific leaders like former Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. Behind all of these decisions and controversies are fundamental questions: who has a voice in the Forum and who does not; who has the legitimacy to exert influence in the region and who does not. Resolving these issues in a way that strengthens the Forum’s own legitimacy as the primary regional institution is a pressing and existential matter. In the midst of this, what was not on the Forum agenda is also worth considering. Even in the presence of two elected women heads of government – President Hilda Heine of Marshall Islands and Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa of Samoa – and even following last year’s endorsement of a Revitalised Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration, gender equality is absent from the 2024 communiqué.